DAMS AND FLOOD CONTROL

Carlos E. M. Tucci
Institute of Hydraulic Research
University Federal of Rio Grande do Sul
Porto Alegre RS Brazil Tucci@if.ufrgs.br
Abstract: Floods are a natural process in which the river spills over its banks. Hazards
occur when the population occupy these areas during a sequence of small floods. In
South America flood impacts have occurred mainly due to the lack of flood plain
management. Flood hazards in some communities on the banks of major rivers have
had major social and economic impacts which can be seen many years after the event.
There is an explicit conflict between dams for energy production and their use to for
flood control. In the Brazilian electricity sector, these dams have been operated since
the end of the 1970s, with a waiting volume that aims not only at improving their
safety but also at reducing the impact of floods.
In this article, the potential impacts of dams are stressed, with operational features for
flood control and the description of a conflict generated between a hydropower dam
and the community of two cities.
FLOODS
Floods may occur due to the natural conditions or those generated by land use,
such as urbanization or hydraulic structures. In this article we will discuss the natural
floods and those related to dams for flood control or other Water Resources uses.
The main flood in the regions occur on the banks of the major rivers of South
America such as the Prata/Paran, Amazon, So Francisco and Tocantins.
In Figure 1 the basin of the Prata river can be seen with the main reaches where
flooding occurs and there are dams (hydropower dams). In the Paraguay river basin
and in the lower reach of the Paran river, floods are the result of prolonged rainy
periods which affect large areas and produce flood levels for several months. In the
reach involving Argentina, the areas are flat and usually flooded for several months. In
the upper part of the Paran river and in the Uruguay river floods are of short duration
lasting only a few days.
Flooding is a natural process in which the river floods its first bottom depending
on the intensity and duration of floods and initial humidity conditions. When changes
occur in the river, such as dam construction, flooding levels may change as a result of
operational conditions in the dam.
The main impacts on the population occur due to lack of: (i) knowledge
regarding the occurrence of flood levels, and (ii) planning for space occupancy
according to the risks of flood events.
Levels can be forecasted for the short term (real time forecasting) or for the long
term that is the statistical forecast or risk of occurrence of a given flood. The first type
allows flood warning a few hours or even days in advance, reducing the resulting
damages. The second type allows planning the occupancy of spaces at risk, or building
protection works.

Control measures are non-structural and structural. The non-structural control

measures involve the population living near the river by means of warnings and the
zoning of areas where floods could occur and the structural measures involve the
modification of the river by constructing protection works such as dykes, dams, canals
and others. The costs of the former type are generally much lower than those of the
structural measures.
No systematic flood control management program is observed in the region, only
single actions to build protection works, while very few non-structural measures are
taken. In some river reaches flood alerts are given by simple information regarding
levels or short-term forecasts, as in the lower reach of the Paran river, the Pantanal
reach of the Paraguay river and in Iguau river. In the city of So Paulo there is a
warning forecast system based on meteorological radar.

The common scenario of impact is due to the fact that the population occupies
the flood plain during a sequence of years with low maximum annual levels, since the
flat areas are favourable to settlement. When years with higher floods return, damages
are significant and the population demands that governments take action to build
control structures such as dams and others.
Below are examples of this scenario:

In figure 2 the floods levels of Iguau river at Unio da Vitria can be

observed. For a long time, floods remained below the 5-year return period.
The floods after 1982 produced significant damages to the community (table
1).
Table 1 Flood losses at Unio da Vitria and Porto Unio(JICA, 1995)
Year
Losses
US$ millions
1982
10.365
1983
78.121
1992
54.582
1993
25.933

Figure 2 Maximum flood levels in Iguau river at Unio da Vitria (a basin of

approximately 25,000 km2), Tucci and Villanueva, 1997)

For the Itaja river there are records which began in 1852, with all the levels
above the low-flow bed of the river. In figure 3 the variability of these levels
can be observed, and also that between 1911 and 1983 no levels were higher
than 13.04 m (15-year risk, approximately), whereas before and after this
period there were several levels of up to 17.19m. Both in this case and in the
previous one, the continuous series of records that began in 1930 presented a
sample bias for risk assessment. In this case the losses were also significant; in
1983 (approximately 30-year risk) they represented 8% of the GDP of the State
of Santa Catarina at the time.
One of the largest wetlands of the world, called Pantanal, is located in the
Upper Paraguay river. In this region the environment and the population
have always lived together in peace. In figure 4 the maximum flood levels can

be observed at Ladrio since the beginning of the century. Table 2 shows the
values of the maximum mean level of flooding and of flooded reas of the
Pantanal, at three different periods. The great difference between the 1960s
and the other periods can be observed. During this period the flood valleys
were occupied. This population was dislodged during the following decades
and, due to the changes in the bed caused by the variability of the Pantanal
flows, they had to abandon their properties and are living in poverty on the
outskirts of towns and cities in the region.

flood level, m

18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4

flood levels

2
0
1850

lower flood level

1900

1950

2000

year
Figure 3 Flood Levels in Blumenau, S. Catarina, Brazil
Table 2 Estimated values for levels and flooded reas in the Pantanal (approximate
values)
Period
Mean Maximum Level
Mean flooded area in the
m
Pantanal *
1000. Km2
1900-1959
4,16
35
1960 1972
2,21
15
1973-1992
5,49
50
* approximate values obtained from Hamilton ( 199x )

Annuall Flood levels, m

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000

Years

Figure 4 Annual flood water levels at Ladario in the Paraguay River and the mean of
the periods: (i) 1900-1961;(ii)1961-1973; n(iii)1973-1991
DAM CHARACTERISTICS
Dams in South Amrica were usually designed for one of the following purposes:
power production, water supply, irrigation and navigation. Very few enterprises aim
exclusively at flood control in the region.
The Itaja-Au river basin in Santa Catarina, in Brazil, is an example of mediumsized basin ( approximately 12,000 km2) with three dams built solely in order to
control floods.
Medium-sized and large dam construction in South Amrica has always been
associated with hydroelectric power generation. Hydropower developments usually
have a significant volume and are located downstream from large basins (>2,000 km2).
Since the energy of a development depends on the discharge and head, the larger
the streamflow regulated by the reservoir and the head generated by the dam, the
more power will be generated. Thus, the volume and basin should possess
characteristics that will render the enterprise economically feasible.
The small dams have generally been built for irrigation or water supply, but they
are for small volumes and in basins with an area of less than 1,000 km2. These dams
will not interfere very effectively in flood control. Navigation dams only maintain the
water levels and also have an insignificant volume for flood control.
Thus, this article will analyze flood characteristics, flood control by means of
dams, hydropower development characteristics, their potential impacts, the multiple
use of a dam for flood control and power production and several examples.
DAMS AND FLOODS
Conditions of dams as to floods
The dams designed should take into account the impacts they may produce
downstream and upstream from the development.
Downstream: Generally, downstream from a dam are areas subject to flooding. When
the dam is built, the tendency is for the reservoir to dampen the floods, in these

riparian areas, if no operational problems occur in the dam. However, if the

downstream area is not occupied, people will move in because of the proximity to the
development, and it then becomes subject to floods. If the development does not
dampen the floods, the tendency is that they be required by society to reduce the
downstream impacts. Thus, the downstream constraint becomes the maximum
streamflow Q1, from which point onwards the river floods its banks. During the
flooding periods there will be events in which the dam will not be able to dampen the
streamflow and floods will occur
The public perception of this situation is generally to blame the dam for what has
happened. Therefore it is necessary for the development to have an effective
operational system and reliable observation of the hydrological data needed to show
the operational conditions and justify their actions
Upstream:
upstream:
(i)
(ii)

The construction of a reservoir could produce the following impacts

Depending on the inflow, the operational rule and runoff capacity, the
backwater curve could flood or provoke damming upstream;
the conditions of the previous items could change over time due to
sedimentation in the reservoir, which initially occurs in the reach lying farthest
upstream. For this reason, the previously designed flood levels may rise,
reaching areas outside the boundaries of expropriated properties.

Dam failure: the possibility of dam failure should be considered with the area that
may be affected and runoff velocity as a base for a civil defense plan downstream from
the development. Considering the occurrences, the main causes are presented in table
3. In the same table the proportion can be seen according to type of dam, in which the
earth dams are outstanding because there are more dams of this type (Serafim, 1981).
The risk of dam failure is generally on the order of 10-4 (based on the probability of
spillway sizing). Thus, during its service life of 100, a dam would have a 1% chance of
failing. During the last few decades, with increased hydrological information,
improvement of building methods, forecasting and flood warning, this risk is expected
to diminish (Serafim 1981). Marengo(1996) shows that depending on the period when
it was constructed and on age the risk of failure diminishes, converging to values of
10-5.
According to Lave et al. (1990) and Serafim (1981) the use of a warning system
with an advance alert of at least two hours may reduce the number of deaths to zero
.Pat-Cornell and Tagaras (1986) mention that a monitoring system could reduce the
chances of dam failure by 12%, the number of deaths by 44% and the losses by 12%.
Brown and Graham (1988) identified two types of floods: (i) time longer than
evacuation, estimated as 90 minutes; (ii) time less than 90 minutes. In the former case,
the loss of lives is estimated as 0.04% of the population threatened and in the latter
13%. It should be considered that the highest risks occur at the flood passage crosssection, where velocities are higher.
Few countries have a legal system that obliges developments to include
prevention for this type of event. In Argentina this process began with the privatisation
of the electricity system. In Brazil, as yet, there are no regulations to prevent the
impacts resulting from this situation. In France a 1968 decree requires an emergency
plan for all dams over 20 meters high, or reservoirs with a capacity of more than 15
hm3 (Benoist, 1989). In the United States there are dams under federal legislation and
others under state legislation. Only dams managed by federal agencies or private dams

that participate in hydropower projects are under federal law. During the nineties, the
federal government developed a dam safety standard to unify the laws of the different
states.
Table 3 Dam Break characteristics
Causes
Events
%
Underdesigned spillway
35
Foundations, infiltration, landslide and earthquake
25
Others: construction and design problems; quality of the 40
material, war sabotage, etc
Type of dam
Earth
63
Concrete arch
1
Concrete gravity
6
Rockfill
4
Others
26
Flood control dams
Traditional flood control developments are designed with constraints only
downstream from the development. In this case the project is based on the Ql limit of
outflow discharge at the outlet from the dam and on the useful volume Vu necessary to
dampen the flood. The project should have overflow outlets that will allow the
discharge downstream of all the inflow up to streamflow Q1, using the useful volume
above this limit.
The operation of this system may become even more efficient if there is a
warning system that enables decisions regarding the use of the useful volume
throughout the flood.
As mentioned above, dams are rarely built for flood control. When they exist
they are built on medium-sized basins where the dam volume may minimize flood
impacts.
An example of a system of dams built for flood control is that of the Itaja-Au
river basin in Santa Catarina, Brazil (figure 5). The West dam, located on Itaja-Oeste
river, upstream from the town of Tai (finished in 1973), the South dam on Itaja do Sul
(finished in 1975) upstream from the town of Ituporanga, Ibirama dam on river
Herclio (finished at the end of the eighties). The latter did not exist during the 1983
and 1984 floods. The design of these dams uses bottom spillways with a capacity that
tends to retain a large volume in the reservoirs, requiring a very long time to empty.
The contribution of the first two dams to flood control in 1983 was insignificant due to
the large volume of rainfall that occurred during 7 days. In the case of the 1984
flood,which lasted only 2 days, the contribution was greater. Examining the maximum
discharge series before and after the dams were built, an unexpected result was
observed, the increased mean and standard deviation of the dams to one of the
downstream sections of one of the dams. However, the result of this increase was due
to increased rainfall in the basin, precisely between the two periods. In table 4 are
presented some statistics of this comparison. The West dam that did not show an
increase proved effective at containing the floods, whereas the South dam apparently
does not have the design volumes appropriate to provide a significant reduction in
floods.

West
Dam

Herclio

Rio do Sul
Itaja

South
Dam

Blumenau

Figure 5 Itaja River basin and Flood Control Dams

Table 4 Statistics before and after dam construction in the Itaja Basin
Statistics
West Dam South Dam Annual Rainfall
Rainfall(1)
3
3
m /s
m /s
mm
mm
Mean
Before the Dam
292,2
488,5
1309
224,1
After the Dam
274,5
513,3
1658
291,7
Standard deviation
Before the Dam
73,2
267,1
After the Dam
56,2
356,6
Period
Before
1934-1972 1935-1974 1942-1972
1942-1972
After
1973-1983 1975-1984 1973-1984
1973-1984
(1) Rainfall of the month in which the annual maximum flood occurs
Multiple Use: flood control and power production
Considering that most of the reservoirs built in the region are for hydropower
production, it is initially found that there is a potential conflict, since the hydropower
developments aim to keep the water level as high as possible during the rainy period
(greater hydropower generation), with a consequently smaller damping volume.
Under these circumstances, the development may worsen flooding conditions, both
upstream and downstream from the development.
Most hydropower developments were not designed to contain floods. Since
building reservoirs tends to regulate downstream discharge, the low risk floods no
longer occur due to damping caused by the reservoir. Thus, a larger amount of risk
areas is occupied, because of the structures and the development of flat reas. When
the higher risk floods occurred, that the reservoirs were not prepared to dampen, large
floods occurred, with conflicts between the population and the developments.
During the 1970s, several relevant facts occurred in the Brazilian electricity
sectors which produced a change of attitude as regards hydropower dam operation.
First two dams broke on Pardo river in the state of So Paulo. The rupture of the first

due to operational and design failure led to the break in the second one due to the
rupture wave. The second fact were the floods in So Francisco river, in 1979, which
produced impacts downstream and strong public pressure. For this reason, criteria
were established for these systems, so that, besides producing power, they could
contain part of the floods by creating a waiting volume.
Figure 6 shows the stages and the definition of the waiting volume of a reservoir.
This volume is kept free to receive the flood volumes and reduce streamflow
downstream, trying to satisfy the upstream and downstream constraints.
There are several methodologies to estimate this volume, based on the statistics
of the historical series of dam flows. The methods used in the Brazilian electricity
sector have been the Volume x Duration Curve Method (adaptations of the
methodology presented by Beard, 1963), or the method of critical pathways (Kelman et
al. 1983). The former uses the historical series observed and the latter, the series of
streamflows generated by a stochastic model. Both methods determine, statistically, the
waiting volume that should be maintained by the reservoir during each day of the
rainy period for a given risk of analysis.
Maximum
design level

Dam height

Normal maximum
operation level
Waiting volume

Maximum operation
Level for flood
control
Net volume

Minimum operation
level

Dam bottom

Figure 6 Operation levels in a Hydropower

These procedures do not take into account the information existing in the basin
during the flood period. For basins where seasonality is not clearly defined, the model
may underestimate or overestimate the waiting volume with significant losses. On the
one hand losses due to flooding and, on the other, due to loss of power generated.
The use of information that exists in the basin involves the real-time forecasting
of inflows to the reservoirs. For a safe forecasting system the waiting volume could be
reduced if the inflow can be predicted in advance, and therefore, the volume could be
increased according to need, taking downstream constraints into account.
Silveira (1996) showed the usefulness of this approach to predict inflows to
Sobradinho on So Francisco river, based on a simple flow forecasting model from
upstream flows. Moro (1998) showed the use of a group of models to predict the
inflows to the Foz do Areia reservoir and, based on this forecast, to optimize system
operation (example presented in the last item).

CASE STUDY: Unio da Vitria x Foz de Areia

The conflict
In recent years (1983 and 1992), Unio da Vitoria and Porto Unio in Brazil suffered
severe floods, after a long period (50 years) of normal to low floods. The economic
losses to some industries, businesses and homes created a depression and
psychological impact on most of the population. The population believed that the main
cause of the floods was the impact of Foz do Areia Dam, a Hydropower Plant located
downstream from the city. It created a major conflict lasting more than ten years
between the population and the State Power Company.
Cities and flood conditions
The cities of Unio da Vitria and Porto Unio (figure 7) are located on the banks
of the Iguau River, State of Parana, Brazil, where, for about 50 years (1930 to 1982, see
figure 2), only low or medium floods occurred. During the early 80s the Foz do Areia
Dam was built, about 100 km downstream.
The backwater curve for the dam design flood may reach the cities, depending on
its operation water level. While designing the dam, two alternatives were studied to
cope with this influence, protection levees or operational rules to prevent the rise of
flood levels in the cities. The first operational level chosen was 744 m. Studies carried
out by Parana State Power Company (owner and operator of the dam) in 1982 and
1985, showed that 744 m was a high level, and recommended 742 m at first, and later
741.5 m. In 1983 an extreme flood occurred, which caused severe economic losses. The
flood level was the highest in 107 years (estimated return period of 170 years, and a
duration of 62 days), and the estimated losses were U$S 78,1 millions.
At that time the population blamed the Power Co. for the Dam operation and
high flood levels. The flood recurrence was estimated as being about 1000 years, using
continuous records (1930-1983). This calculation, however, did not take historical
marks (figure 2) into account, and this led to an overestimate of the return period.
When historical marks (found after some research done by local personal) were
included in the statistical analysis, the return period decreased to 170 years. In 1992
there was another flood, smaller than the last, but of similar magnitude and impact
(return period of 30 years, duration of 65 days and U$S 54,6 millions in losses). As the
people had been told that the risk was very small, and, in less than ten years, the cities
were flooded again, their reaction was very strong, and distrust towards previous
studies and official statements was widespread.

Figure 7 Iguau River at Foz de Areia and Unio da Vitria

A NGO (Non Governmental Organization) called CORPRERI (Regional
Permanent Commission for Flood Prevention of Iguau River) was created by the
population to deal with the flood problem. This organization has been the
representative of the cities in the discussion with the Parana State Eletric Power
Company (COPEL). Tucci and Vilanueva (1997 ) presented the alternative study
described here.
Simulation of Iguau River with Dam operation
In order to answer most of the questions asked by the population, a
hydrodynamic model was applied (Tucci, 1978), taking into account the characteristics
of the flood valley and main channel in the reach between the cities and the dam.
Usually the flood plain is represented only by a storage function assuming an infinite
roughness. Since depths in the flood plains can reach more than 5 m, there are flow
dynamic effects in this part of the river system. The model used to describe the
dynamic effects was the Lateral Distribution Method described by Wark et al (1991)
and Villanueva, (1997) to compute the conveyance and velocity distribution coefficient
for each section.
The boundary conditions used for the simulations (fitting and scenarios analysis)
were the discharges in the cities (upstream boundary) and the level at the dam
(downstream).
Model fitting was performed comparing simulated and recorded levels at Unio
da Vitria (section M8, figure 7) and discharge and level at Porto Vitria (figure 6) for
the 1983 and 1992 events. The discharges in those floods varied between 240 m3s-1 to
5,000 m3.s-1 (figure 8).

Figure 8 Simulation of the floods at Unio da Vitria

Flood impacts
The first question to be answer was the influence of the dam operation in the cities
floods and the causes of the high levels. Some other questions were raised by the
population related to other solutions for flood alleviation such as improvement of
channel conveyance and bridges impacts.
Using the two major floods, 1983 and 1992, two different downstream boundary
conditions were used in the model: (i) the actual operational levels at the time of the
flood; (ii) safe operational level at the dam, established at 741.50 m by previous studies.
The results showed that the operational procedure in 1983 increased the flood
levels at the cities by 14 cm during the first part of the flood but did not show any
influence during the flood peak. During the 1992 flood the operational levels at the
Dam did not influence the flood levels at the cities.
Flood Control Measures
Non-structural measures: The non-structural measures developed were: (i) Flood
zoning and (ii) flood forecasting.
Flood zoning: In order to define the flood levels for the land use map, levels were
calculated for each of the available cross sections, for several return periods, using the
mathematical model. A 1:2,000 map was used. Flood level lines were established for 5,
10, 50 and 100 year return periods (considering historical marks). Figure 9 shows a
view of the flood map.
Three zones were established for the flood control areas: (i) Preservation area:
below 744.50, reserved for environmental protection and parks. This area was
purchased by the Power Company that owned the dam. A park was constructed in the

urban part of the land after an agreement between the communities and the Company;
(ii) Water resources protection area: between the former area and the 10-year levels.
Remove public building such as school and hospital from this area; progressive taxes
to be imposed for any use but the recommended ones: parks, sport fields, agriculture,
and others. A tax deduction was recommended for these uses; (iii) Low density area: less
restrictive than the former, but needing special care and protection against flood
damage in the buildings.

Figure 9 Unio da Vitria Flood Map

Flood forecasting: The flood zoning must also have a real time flood forecasting
system, working together with the Civil Defense Authority. The proposed actions
were the following: (i) definition of an alert system: mathematical model, forecasting
range and alert steps; (ii) County Civil Defense Authority must be created, so as to be
prepared to act, with well pre-established plans, during the floods; (iii) emergency
plans must be prepared for the different parts of the city.
Three forecasting conditions have been recommended: (i) watch condition: from
that level on, the behavior of the river must be accompanied carefully. Real time

forecasting begins at this condition; (ii) alert condition: when the 744.0 m level is to be
reached within 12 hours; (iii) emergency condition: when the 745.5 m level is to be
reached within 12 hours;
Mine (1998) developed a model to forecast the flow and operate the dam taking
into account the upstream and downstream restriction. The flow forecasting for Unio
da Vitria (25.000 km2) was done by an empirical model, the flow from the basin
between Unio da Vitria and Foz do Areia (5.000 km2) was simulated by the rainfall
runoff model IPH II (Tucci et. al. 1981) and the flow in the river reach was simulated by
the hydrodynamic model used in the other simulations. In the real time flood
forecasting there were the following options: (i) zero rainfall for the lead time; (ii)
rainfall forecasted by empirical model; (iii) known rainfall.
This flood forecasting model was integrated to a operation model based on the
upstream and downstream flood restrictions. The forecasts were done with a lead time
of 24 hours and updated every 4 hours. The Dam level has to be below 742,0 m due to
upstream restrictions. In figure 10 are shown the results for the 1983 flood. It can be
seen that the actual operation used during this event was above the limit for a few
hours due to the amount of water from the tributaries and operation brought the level
down very fast. Using the operational system with well-known rainfall, the operation
is more efficient because it stays below the restriction and increases the dam level after
the risk, improving energy production.

Figure 10 Levels at Foz do Areia actual operation and with flood forecasting and
operation management model (Mine, 1998)
Structural measures: The structural measures studied were: (i) changing river
characteristics and; (ii) levee protection along the city.
Some of the potential alternatives to decrease the flood levels were to modify the

characteristics of the river at some critical reaches downstream from Unio da Vitria.
These river modifications are: straightening and enlarging some bends, duplication of
the channel and by-pass of the curve immediately downstream from the cities, and
even deepening the channel stretch between the Porto Vitoria rapids and the cities
(about 50 km long).
As a general conclusion of the analysis, it can be said that, even though the
critical points contribute to increasing the levels, none of them is alone responsible for
the high levels. Not even their joint effect increases the floods critically. The main
problem is the lack of river flow conveyance for the floods in the sections along the
cities and some contractions. Other factors such, as river bends and contractions far
downstream have little influence.
In fact, discharges for both floods considered (1983 and 1992) were very high,
and the 1983 flood was the historical maximum. The historical records, however, show
that flood levels of a similar magnitude had already occurred. In a previous study,
JICA (1995) considered the levee alternative as a control measure and recommended a
feasibility study for this solution.
Most of the structural solutions studied, relating to the river conveyance, were
not feasible due to the high intervention cost. A feasibility study was recommended for
this system and concluded that this was the acceptable combination of protection and
cost. The levee system would be constructed protecting the areas above a 10-year
return period.
This engineering system will change the cities characteristics and protecting it
from low risk floods. The analysis done in this study led to some questions that the
population had to answer before it decided in favor of this system:
a system of that kind must be under the jurisdiction of the city authorities. This
implies a cost that needs to be supported by taxes. The investment maintenance
costs are high which may create a major impact on the city economy.
the protection will benefit mainly the areas between the 10-year flood level and
the 1983 flood level. Will the whole population be willing to pay for the benefit to
only part of them?;
the impact of the levees on the flow conditions upstream and downstream of
them must be carefully studied;
not only the technical and economical aspects of the levees must be considered,
landscape and urban environment issues also need to be included. Questions
such as this have to be answered: Would you like to live with a 6 m wall, all
along the city, which will protect levels above 10 year flood or create a new urban
development toward more safe areas and use zoning measures?
Until now the decision has been to use non-structural measures in order to cope
with flood conditions. But for political reasons there are pressures to show some
structural measure that in this case represents high costs.
The analysis of the problem leads to some interesting conclusions regarding its
origin and development. A long period without severe floods induced a false feeling
of security in people, who began settling in the flood valley. Also as a result of this
false security, no flood protection measures or planning were adopted. When the 1983
flood showed that there was an actual risk, it was disregarded, based on seemingly
dependable (50 years data) statistical analysis. This analysis, however, did not take into
account existing and very valuable information (the historical flood marks). When

another severe flood came along in 1992, the population was upset, and distrusted the
technical studies. This problem was aggravated because of communications problems
with the responsible institutions. It must be stated that, except for the statistical
analysis, the existing technical reports were basically right in their diagnosis and
conclusions.
The lack of flood protection planning and preventive measures has caused losses
evaluated at about U$S 150 millions, and the solution will have a similar cost, not to
mention the indirect impacts in both cases.
Several decades without severe floods are not an unusual situation, it is logical
that floods with high return periods seldom occur. The consequences of long lags
between this kind of floods are also common: occupation of the river valley and
disregard for protection measures.
CONCLUSIONS
A long period without severe floods induced a feeling of false security in
people, who began settling in the flood valley. Also as a result of this false security, no
flood protection measures or planning used to be adopted.
The lack of flood protection planning and preventive measures has caused losses
evaluated as able to destroy the economy of the communities. Several decades without
severe floods are not an unusual situation, it is logical that floods with high return
periods seldom occur. The consequences of long lags between this kind of floods are
also common: occupation of the river valley and disregard for protection measures.
Flood control should not be performed with single solutions, but by means of a
preventive program for the occupancy of higher risk spaces, the development of
efficient flood warning systems with advance alerts that will allow the minimization of
the space and effective performance by Civil Defense. The non-structural measures are
usually most difficult to implement due to their constraint characteristics and the
population is always expecting that some structure will provide Salvation!
Dam planning and operation involves responsibility for the effects which may be
produced upstream and downstream of the valley. The simple expropriation of the
estimated flooding areas and traditional operation of power production levels do not
exempt dam owners of responsibility. A preventive system for flood warning will be
necessary, an organized prevention system to prevent the impact of dam breaks and to
perform independent monitoring of levels upstream and downstream from the
development in order to control operations and their social impacts.
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