I.

Canon
1-6,
Responsibility

Code

of

Professional

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(Promulgated June 21, 1988)
CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's
cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end
or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES
AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER
COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons,
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a
case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL
SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED
AND
OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION
OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading
or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the
name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the
firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall
withdrawal from the firm and his name shall be dropped from
the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law
currently.
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business.
CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING
OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL

DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL
AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND
ASSIST
IN
DISSEMINATING
THE
LAW
AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS
IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF
THEIR TASKS.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable
of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

II.
III.

Notarial Law (to be searched)

Cases
Leslie Ui vs. Atty. Iris Bonifacio
ADM. CASE No. 3319
June 8, 2000
LESLIE UI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against

Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral
relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie
Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L.
Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1and as a
result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely,
Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui.
Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he
begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been
living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang
Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of
the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the
respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office
in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the
legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her
that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that
everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant
believed the representations of respondent and thought things
would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent continued,
and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her
husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met
again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded
with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with

Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and

complainant even came to know later on that respondent had
been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319,
was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that
she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all
along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that
Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China,
from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that
during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his
intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii,
USA in 19853. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not
live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children
in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos
Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the
fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu,
Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the
Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties.
During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she
was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the
lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery
of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in
March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a
few days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was
connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the
wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know
if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui
is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after
June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil
status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred
that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he
resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house
which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that
the said house was built exclusively from her parents'
funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral
damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the
present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case
against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among
others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was
married to complainant and had children with her even at the
start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason
respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2)
children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated
Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and
respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but
the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged. The
resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents
allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987.
The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui

was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988

and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the
"relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent
Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly,
continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early
(sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left
the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho
(sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had
been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this
same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the
"fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband
and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof
of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create
probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone
of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion
respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the
complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents
in support of their respective positions on the matter support
and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was
dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove
her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in
Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged
respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for
submitting a supporting document which was altered and
intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed
before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others,
that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and
attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her
averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11duly certified
by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the
Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by
the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not
October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer.
According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation
was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP
that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act
constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission;
and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in
her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document
are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which
make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in
Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the
original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was
in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such

copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the

copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995
and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted
herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with
the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the
legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner.

improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as

of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that
Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred
that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission
for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent
stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient
proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that
contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing
that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of
Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew
Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it

was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married,
and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cutoff all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no
reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of
Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much
time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on

Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation,
finding that:

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent

alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly
attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she
known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that
there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that
her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987,
because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
married before complainant confronted respondent and
informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June
1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who
testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for
changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to
1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the
testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he

represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not
hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer
single men.

Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of

the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent
with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a
light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same
car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture
of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of
the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in
an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according
to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a
private security agency and who was not presented during the
hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of
the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427
dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent
for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department
of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of
any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with
Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the
relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct
cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can
it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui
whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery
of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by
complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty.
Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed
immorality by having intimate relations with a married man
which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant
testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late
1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was

courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be
single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to
believe in the light of contemporary human experience.

The records will show that when respondent became aware

the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United
States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him.
When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she
lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and
respondent only talked to each other because of the children
whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to
find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered
as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic)
anything else and should deserve compassion rather than
condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her
chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream
cherished by every single girl.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13,
1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A",
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the
complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her
Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not
have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession
simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that
can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a
lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The
requisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good
moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has
been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the
bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is
also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs.
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio
that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be
single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married
and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2)
children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos
Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the
actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal
society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility
and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater
caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps
respondent would not have found herself in such a
compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been
more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least
aroused respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in
her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew
that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China,
yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to
find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried.
Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with
respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply

incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that

Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion
that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal
affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with
Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was
a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms
of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is,
it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil
status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves
that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare
assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified
Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer,
we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that
she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate
which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would
verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to
fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar,
can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is
contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information
contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when
she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with
an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent
on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality.1avvphi1 The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon
to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and
acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is
hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching
to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an
altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING
that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Emma T. Dantes vs. Atty. Crispin G. Dantes.
A.C. No. 6486
September 22, 2004
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one
requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the
practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate
that he or she has "good moral character," and once he
becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance
with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character
is not only a condition precedent1 to the practice of law, but an
unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence,
when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he
may be suspended or disbarred.2
In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes,
sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes
on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of
professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer.
Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two
women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with
them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed
to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus
forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their
childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of
respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his
moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued
an Order4 requiring respondent to submit his answer to
the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001.
Though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and
the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have
mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after
complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence
and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed
that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she
insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and
their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone
in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the
best school he could afford and provided for their needs. He
even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and
Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even
after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order
to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly
salary to her.

mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because

respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986
to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and
respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that
she was just compelled to work abroad to support their
children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned
that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent,
then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her
anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of
the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian
Dave,12 all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent
and his paramour13 to prove the fact that respondent sired
three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two
different women. Letters of complainants legitimate children
likewise support the allegation that respondent is a
womanizer.14
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to
have waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he
failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due
notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the
Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude
the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings15 on
August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted
a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism.
Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the
complainant
had
already
presented
her
evidence.16 Respondent was given a final chance to present
his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited
pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on
August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations
in his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of
the resolution of the complaint for support with
alimony pendente
lite18 filed
against
him
by
the
complainantbefore the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City,19 the instant administrative case should be dismissed for
lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of
the Bar Confidant its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004230 involving
CBD
Case
No.
01-851.21 The
IBP
recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law.

Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings

on the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both
oral and documentary,6 to support the allegations in
her Affidavit-Complaint.

Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation

well-taken.

From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was

established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and
respondent were married7 and lived with the latters mother in
Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law
student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy
and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the
respondents mother.

"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct."

Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo,

Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20,
1980,8October 14, 19819 and August 11, 1983,10 respectively.
Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by
frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital
affairs.11 Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and

dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so

willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary action, the
lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the
court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If
the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and
attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not
only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their
lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of
good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral
character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect
the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to
protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect
errant lawyers from themselves.26
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive
and honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.28
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit
relationships with two different women during the subsistence
of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral
conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions.
Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the
documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents
commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently,
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession. He has made
a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.29
In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for
abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman
who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs.
Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming
carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral
delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by
behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court

and as a member of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such

as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the
present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the
Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes
is
hereby DISBARRED and
his
name
is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of
the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Pedro G. Tolentino, et al. vs. Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza
ADM. CASE NO. 5151
October 19, 2004
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M.
LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA,
SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M.
Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr.,
and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for
Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that
respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned
his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour,
Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G.
Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been
cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy.
Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered
two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent
and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of
their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986,
making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while in
respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC
during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is
Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of candidacy for
the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated;
such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in
his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of
public documents; and respondents acts betray his lack of
good moral character and constitute grounds for his removal
as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that
complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge
on him for his filing of criminal charges against them;
complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates
of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such
documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not
participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil
registry of subject birth certificates; respondent never declared
that he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is
separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and
complainants have used this issue against him during elections
and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected
him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the publics
sense of morality.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M.
Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their direct testimony and
were subjected to cross-examination by respondents counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows:
He knows respondent for they both reside in Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a
former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been
cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente,
representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from
their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara
Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he (witness
Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing
him that respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San
Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent
abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente.
Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued
by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between
respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received
information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is
also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by
a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent
stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC
in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia. In
respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC
in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondent
has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela
Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where
respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the
Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as
husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna
Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He
was the former mayor of Naujan and he and respondent
belong to warring political parties. It was not respondent who
told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the
present case. Although he received the letter of a concerned
citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far
back as 1995, he did not immediately file a case for disbarment
against respondent. It was only after respondent filed a
criminal case for falsification against him that he decided to file
an administrative case against respondent.1
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there
were people who were against the open relationship between
respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent had been
publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that
they are both still legally married to other persons, and so
someone unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of
the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra
Khrisna Normina.2
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as
his direct testimony, is practically identical to that of witness
Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he
was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the
birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,
as somebody just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He
was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a
concerned citizen regarding respondents immorality was sent
to Melgar, but he did not take any action against respondent at
that time.3
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence
consisting of photocopies which were admitted by respondents

counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified

true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez
informing Nelson Melgar of respondents immoral acts,4 the
Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael,
Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriage between
respondent and one Felicitas Valderia,5the Birth Certificate of
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza,6 the Birth
Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza,7 the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated
March 9, 1995,8 the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent
dated March 25, 1998,9 Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998,
attesting to the marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela
Fuente and Ramon Marcos,10 and the editorial page of
the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),11 wherein it was
stated that respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn
dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any
evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on
his arguments that the testimonies of complainants witnesses
are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their
documentary evidence have no probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as
it
is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the
Report
and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondents violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law
until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer
cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has
abandoned such immoral course of conduct.
Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the above-quoted
Resolution was based, read as follows:
FINDINGS:
The evidence of complainants to support their charge of
immorality consists in a) the testimonies of Nelson Melgar and
Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under oath
and affirmed before the Commission and b) their documentary
evidence consisting of their Exhibits "A" to "H".
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not
formally present or offer any evidence. Respondent opted not
to present his evidence anymore because according to him
"there is none to rebut vis--vis the evidence presented by the
private complainants." Respondent instead submitted a
memorandum through counsel to argue his position. As can be
seen from the comment and memorandum submitted,
respondents counsel argues that the complaint is politically
motivated since complainants are political rivals of respondent
and that the birth certificates Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which were
offered to show that respondent sired the children namely
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his cohabitation
with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were
allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or
self-serving according to respondent.
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on
the other hand, categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits
"A" and "B"] particularly in paragraph 2 that "Respondent has
been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente,

representing themselves to be husband and wife." In

paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also categorically
state that "respondent has even represented to all and sundry
that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife." These categorical
statements made under oath by complainants are not hearsay
and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them.
Exhibit "E," the Certificate of Candidacy executed by
respondent shows that respondent is married to one, Felicitas
V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit "H", a marriage certificate,
Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos.
Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have been presented
by complainants.
With respect to Exhibits "D" and "D-1", we believe that they are
competent and relevant evidence and admissible in this
proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars admission of
illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to
evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures.
The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal search or
seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of Administrative Order
No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty
of imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the
document so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in
proceedings like the present case. Exhibits "D" and "D-1"
which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore
competent evidence to show paternity of said children by
respondent in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo,
and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that
indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain
Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said
cohabitation respondent sired two children. These facts we
repeat have not been denied by respondent under oath since
he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations
and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the
documents presented. Complainants have presented evidence
sufficient enough to convince us that indeed respondent has
been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his wife. The
evidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is
not of good moral character. That respondent chose not to
deny under oath the grave and serious allegations made
against him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not
helped his position before the Commission. As between the
documents and positive statements of complainants, made
under oath and the arguments and comments of respondent
submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under
oath by respondent himself, we are inclined and so give weight
to the evidence of complainants. The direct and forthright
testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo
Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de
la Fuente is not hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted
that respondent Mendoza did not tell them that a certain
Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would
respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did
state clearly in their affidavits under oath that respondent was
cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not respondents
wife. Again their categorical statements taken together with the
other documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that
respondent is not of good moral character.
Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that
possession of good moral character is a continuing condition
for membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for
remaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil.
586
(1956); Cordova
vs.
Cordova179
SCRA
680
(1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for

instance, which makes "mockery of the inviolable social

institution of marriage" [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1
(1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a
mockery of the fundamental institution of marriage.
Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit "F" that he is
separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any
further explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot
in his moral character which good moral character we repeat is
a continuing condition for a member to remain in good
standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has
violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement
made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts
should not be used by private persons particularly disgruntled
opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through
unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant
case the charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or
unjust based on the evidence presented. The evidence
presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that
good moral character necessary as a condition for him to
remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore
not entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law.
We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully
supported by the pleadings and evidence on record, and,
hence, approve and adopt the same.
The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum
of evidence required in administrative proceedings which is
only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conviction.12
Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been publicly
introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is corroborated by
the contents of an article in the Naujanews, introducing
respondent as one of Naujans public servants, and stating
therein that respondent has been blessed with two beautiful
children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.13 It should be
noted that said publication is under the control of respondent,
he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be
reasonably concluded that if he contested the truth of the
contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not
wish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he
could have easily ordered that the damning portions of said
article to be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the credibility of
witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact that they
are motivated by revenge for respondents filing of criminal
cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar
and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies
cannot be discounted as they are fully supported and
corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for
themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990,
respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela
Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of
an entry of a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas
Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public
documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein, as provided for under Article 41014 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra

Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988

and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and
Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having
been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept strictly
confidential and no information relating thereto shall be issued
except on the request of any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by
him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely
necessary in administrative, judicial or other official
proceedings to determine the identity of the childs parents or
other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of at least two months or a fine in an amount
not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of
the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." There
could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are
relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether
the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993
only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule
on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state
that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would
render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other
hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal
searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that
said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant
only to protect a person from interference by the government
or the state.15 In People vs. Hipol,16 we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of
Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the
individual against any aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its
agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search"
made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurers
office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private
individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence
against respondent, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993
and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the
exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question,
said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should
be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this
administrative case against respondent.

Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna

Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina
dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents Certificate of
Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself
declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never
denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public
documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by
Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally
married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
In Bar Matter No. 1154,17 good moral character was defined
thus:
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character
is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is
not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to
escape the penalty of criminal law.
In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,18 we reiterated the definition of
immoral conduct, to wit:
. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards
and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his
wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required
of every lawyer.19
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact
that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a
woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by her,
shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should
keep in mind that the requirement of good moral character is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine
Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain ones good
standing in the legal profession.20 In Aldovino vs. Pujalte,
Jr.,21 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and
good moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not
only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits
satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of
conduct.

Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on

respondent at his last known address and entered in his record
as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court
Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for
their information and guidance as well as for circularization to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Maria Elena Moreno vs. Atty. Ernesto Araneta.
A.C. No. 1109
April 27, 2005
MARIA ELENA MORENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of debts.
The complaint,1 dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this
Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two causes of action. The
first cause of action involved Treasury Warrant No. B02997354 issued by the Land Registration Commission in
favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as
president of the said corporation, to Moreno, in consideration
of the amount of P2,177. The complaint alleged that almost a
year later, the warrant was dishonored.
The second cause of action involved Aranetas nonpayment of
debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno alleged that
sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her,
purportedly to show to his associates, with the assurance that
he would return the said amount within the shortest possible
time. Again in May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the
same purpose and with the same assurance. Thereafter, since
he failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought
repayment in the aggregate amount of P11,000. Araneta
issued two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first dated
30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972
for P5,000. However, when Moreno tried to encash the
checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked
"Account Closed." She referred the matter to a lawyer, who
sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta, however, ignored the
same.
In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who
sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To accommodate her, he
allegedly endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question,
worth P2,177, which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of his
attorneys fees, and gave her an additional P323 in cash.
Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He
admitted that he issued the two undated checks in her favor,
but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He
avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her
request, only so she could show the bank where she was
working that she "had money coming to her." Araneta further
claims that he warned her that the checks belonged to the
unused portion of a closed account and could not be
encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant to
issue a check in the amount of P11,000 to offset the two
"borrowed" checks. The respondent offered this check in
evidence.
Moreno, however, contended2 that this check for P11,000
"belonged" to the Philippine Leasing Corporation, which she
managed when her father passed away. She claimed she
signed the check in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell
seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who was then helping
her in the management of the corporation. She concluded that

Araneta falsely filled up the check "in a desperate bid to turn

the tables on her."3
On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.4
The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine
oclock in the morning, when the complainant and her counsel
appeared. Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon
motion, however, of Moreno, and to give the respondent a
chance to defend himself, the hearing was reset to 23 and 24
January 1973, both at nine oclock in the morning. Service of
the notice for the new dates of hearing were effected to the
respondent through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January
1973.5 On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more did not
appear, so the case was called again the following day, 24
January 1973.
In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was
conducted on 24 January 1973 with the complainant, Moreno,
taking the stand.6 On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for
the scheduled hearing, only to ask for a postponement to
prepare his defense.7 No further hearings appear to have been
conducted thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been
scheduled on 28 May 1973, however, on said date, Araneta
filed a joint motion for postponement with the conform of
Morenos lawyer, as he, Araneta, was "earnestly pursuing a
possible clarification of complainants basic grievance."
Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On
14 September 1988, records of the case were forwarded to the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court. Two days later, the Commission
notified8 both parties of a hearing to be held on 2 November
1988, on which date neither of the parties nor the
complainants counsel appeared despite due notice. It
appears that notice could not be served on Araneta, as he no
longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts
were unknown. An inquiry9 made at his IBP chapter yielded
negative results. The Commission reset the hearing to 18
November 1988 at two oclock in the afternoon.10 Again on
this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of
the evidence so far adduced, the case was submitted for
resolution on such date.11
On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion
Buencamino submitted her Report,12 which reads in part:
The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in
evidence. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile considering. The
"stop payment" of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an
act of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent. There was a
subpoena issued for the appearance of Lilia Echaus, alleged
President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged
Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain about why the "stop
payment" of the treasury warrant was done but neither witness
appeared (as evidenced by the records) before the Office of
the Solicitor General to testify. At the dorsal portion of Exh.
"B," the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a signature
which complainant claims to be that of the respondent beneath
which is the word "President" and above the signature are the
words Lira, Inc. but an ocular examination of said signature in
relation to the signature on the checks Exhibits "G" and "H" do
not show definitely that they were the signatures of one and
the same person, so there is no basis to form the conclusion
that the respondent did sign the treasury warrant as president
of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that
[the] same treasury warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta,
which she deposited [in] her account. There is no evidence to
prove that she saw him sign it.
There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing
the respondent about the "stop payment" or even any written

demand by the complainant to the respondent that the

payment of the treasury warrant having been "stopped" he
should reimburse her with what he received as consideration
for this check.
Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for
the first cause of action.
On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the
two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 to
the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money
was coming her way, when in fact he is presumed to have
been aware when he issued said checks that his account with
the bank against which [these] checks were drawn was already
closed, as was discovered from the fact that the checks were
dishonored for said reason.
Even disregarding the complainants evidence and considering
the answer of the respondent, the act of the respondent in
issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for
P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to show to
her creditors that money was coming her way, when there was
none and the respondent knew such fact was an act of
connivance of the respondent with the complainant to make
use of these useless commercial documents to deceive the
public. However beneficial it may have been to the
complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer is
abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and
decency required of a member of the Bar.
The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of
which was, as in this case, committed by the respondent,
belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon
his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue
is a necessity which the respondent lacks.
The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as
a lesson the respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for three (3) months arising from his irresponsible conduct as a
member of the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the
decision of suspension.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted13 the above report, but
increased its recommended period of suspension from three
months to six months.
Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar
Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted14 the records of
this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b)
of the Rules of Court.15 On 8 July 2003, the Office of the Bar
Confidant filed a Report16 regarding various aspects of the
case.
The Report further made mention of a
Resolution17 from this Court indefinitely suspending the
respondent for having been convicted by final judgment
of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. The
Resolution, which was attached to the report, states:
L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.)
Considering that the motion of petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta for
reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977 which
denied the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18553-R which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the
said petitioner of the crime of estafa thru falsification of
commercial document, was denied in the resolution dated
October 17, 1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack
of merit, which denial is final, the Court Resolved: (a) to
SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta from the practice of
law and (b) to require the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE
within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.
Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant
revealed that the above case had been archived on 20
November 1992.

It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein

respondents last filed pleading dated 28 May 1973, when he
sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case
to settle matters amicably between himself and Moreno, and
the present, Araneta had been found guilty and convicted by
final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and
indefinitely suspended.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner
Buencamino. However, we disagree with the penalty sought to
be imposed.
Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta
failed to pay his debts is irrelevant, because by his own
admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of
Moreno knowing fully well that the same were drawn against a
closed account. And though Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not
yet been passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this act
"abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and
decency required of a member of the Bar," which "belittles the
confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity
and morality."
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of
worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,18 as the effect
"transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community
at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the
circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer
who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals."19
Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check
knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a
manifestation of moral turpitude.20
In Co v. Bernardino21 and Lao v. Medel,22 we held that for
issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one
years suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of
six months upon partial payment of the obligation.23
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the
intervening time, apparently been found guilty by final
judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document,
a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been
indefinitely suspended.
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."24 It involves "an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."25
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly
fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral
turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty.
In fact, we have long held26 that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving
moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,27 "[t]he review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The
judgment not only has become final but has been executed.
No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent

unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the

bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has
proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice."28
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby
dISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Atty. Leo J. Palma.
Adm. Case No. 2474
September 15, 2004
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
"The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral
fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules
of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but
require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character.
These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else
incur the risk of suspension or removal."1
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging
as grounds "deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office,
violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct."
The facts are undisputed:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s.
Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala &
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer
assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business
concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his
personal counsel.
Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants
family became intimate. He traveled and dined with them
abroad.2 He frequented their house and even tutored
complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco
(Lisa), then a student of Assumptionlavvphil.net
Convent.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants
family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the
next
day that respondent informed complainant and assured him
that "everything is legal." Complainant was shocked, knowing
fully well that respondent is a married man and has three
children. Upon investigation, complainant found that
respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions.
Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to
convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter
with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the
supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
(complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia,
with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented
himself as "bachelor" before the Hong Kong authorities to
facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c) respondent was

married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children,

namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First
Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition3 for declaration
of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa,
docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the Decision4 dated
November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void
ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant
complaint5 for disbarment, imputing to respondent the
following acts:
"a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by complainant and his family and taking undue
advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa,
respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity in
intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity between
Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an overwhelming
moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her
scruples and apprehensions about respondents courtship and
advances, considering that he is a married man with three (3)
children;
b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and
determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad
under false pretenses that he was traveling on official business
for complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria
Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations
that there was no legal impediment whatsoever to his
marrying;
c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his
misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or
prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent
succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him.
Without complying with the requirements of Philippine law that
he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the "advice" of Maria
Luisas parents should first be obtained she being only twentytwo (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting
marriage with her in Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely
representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is
a bachelor. x x x."
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground of lack of
cause of action. He contended that the complaint fails to allege
acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or
violation of his lawyers oath. There is no allegation that he
acted with "wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of
the law" in serving complainants interest. Anent the charge of
grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married
complainants daughter with "utmost sincerity and good faith"
and that "it is contrary to the natural course of things for an
immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves."
In the Resolution7 dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,
report and recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor
General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili conducted the investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this
Court issued in G.R. No. 645388 a Resolution9 (a)setting aside
the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No.
Pq0401-P declaring the marriage between respondent and
Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to the
CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this date, the
records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent
Motion to Suspend Proceedings10 on the ground that the final
outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial
question to the disbarment proceeding. It was denied.

Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent

Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order.11 In the Resolution
dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from
continuing the investigation of the disbarment proceedings.12
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October 19,
1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following
order:
"Considering the length of time that this case has remained
pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this
Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice,
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting
this case or supervening events have transpired which render
this case moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be
deemed closed and terminated."13
In his Manifestation,14 complainant manifested and confirmed
his continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for
disbarment against respondent.
On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements
of hearing on the ground that he needed more time to locate
vital documents in support of his defense. The scheduled
hearing of December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on
January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to appear
or present deposition, the case will be deemed submitted for
resolution.15 Respondent again failed to appear on January
24, 2002; hence, the case was considered submitted for
resolution.16
On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of
his oath as a lawyer. She recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years. Thus:
"The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
respondent committed the following acts which warrant his
disbarment:
a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by complainant;
b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or
prohibition to his contracting a second marriage;
c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of
his oath as a lawyer.
Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong
representing himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that
the marriage certificate stated a condition no different from
term "spinster" with respect to Luisa.
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in
the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was
entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent
betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was
treated as part of the family and was allowed to tutor Maria
Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as
a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years.
SO ORDERED."

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above

Report and Recommendation, but it reduced respondents
penalty to only one (1) year suspension.
Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and
Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does
not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private
life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so
as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.17 Thus, not only his professional activities but even
his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably
upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the
courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of
the proper authorities.18
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best
of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he
acted with "wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of
the law."
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a
good lawyer,19 however, professional competency alone does
not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa
while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth
Hermosisima. The Certification20 from the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on December 19,
1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other
hand, the Certificate of Marriage21 from the Deputy Registrar
of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondents subsequent
marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at
the time of respondents second marriage was confirmed on
the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeths
classmate and family friend.22
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral
conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack
of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.23
This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus,
we have somehow come up with a common definition of what
constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community."24Measured against this definition, respondents
act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife
and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself
as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:
1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,25 respondent entered into
multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to
sever them. There, we ruled that "[S]uch pattern of misconduct
by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of
our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the
strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be
no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."

(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,26 respondent contracted marriage with

another married woman and left complainant with whom he
has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts
constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession," warranting respondents disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,27 respondent married complainant
while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and
subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting
the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required
by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being
admitted to the bar.
(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,28 respondent lured an innocent
woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his
lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of
morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of
members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the
practice of law.
(5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,29 respondent abandoned his wife,
who supported him and spent for his law education, and
thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he
"failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar." For this, respondent was
disbarred.
(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,30 respondent abandoned his
lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his former
paramour. Here, we ruled that "abandoning ones wife and
resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married
woman," constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting
disbarment.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of
trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondents closeness
to the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust
in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa.
When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal
affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted his
daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked
when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of
complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from
complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter in
Hongkong. He did this without complainants knowledge.
Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant
that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had crossed the
limits of propriety and decency.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved
Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged with
immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen
regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the
man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity.31 How could respondent perform
these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to
Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he
could have done was to walk away.
Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa
was just a 22-year old college student of Assumption Convent
and was under psychological treatment for emotional
immaturity.32 Naturally, she was an easy prey.
Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his
marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with
finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present
disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent
judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the
instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re
Almacen,33 a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither
purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by

the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of
a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an
administrative case against him,34 or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course,35 then the judgment of annulment of respondents
marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing
actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear
preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.36
The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they "shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
This is founded on the lawyers primordial duty to society as
spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
"CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes."
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of
Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first
in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody
else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most
obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:37
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws,
to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of
society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic."
Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the
Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take
before he is allowed to practice.
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year
suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to
the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports
the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer,
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts throughout the country with
copies of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Michael P. Barrios vs. Atty. Francisco P. Martinez
A.C. No. 4585
November 12, 2004
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition1 for disbarment filed against Atty.
Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final judgment
in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral turpitude
by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban
City.2
The dispositive portion of the same states:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco

Martinez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic)
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the
Information. He is imposed a penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and fine double the amount of the check which is
EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus payment of the
tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and
costs against the accused.3

Martinez's wife. When plaintiff asked for his money, he was

only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed
the remaining P60,000 as his attorney's fees. Holding that it
was "absurd and totally ridiculous that for a simple legal
service he would collect 2/3 of the money claim," the trial
court ordered Atty. Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the
amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.

Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March

1996 and the Entry of Judgment from this Court dated 20
March 1996.

Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's

dilatory tactics during the trial, citing fourteen (14) specific
instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above judgment
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his
brief, despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day
extensions to do so.13

On 03 July 1996, we required4 respondent to comment on said

petition within ten (10) days from notice. On 17 February 1997,
we issued a second resolution5 requiring him to show cause
why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure
to comply with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said
Comment. On 07 July 1997, we imposed a fine of P1,000 for
respondent's failure to file said Comment and required him to
comply with our previous resolution within ten days.6 On 27
April 1998, we fined respondent an additional P2,000 and
required him to comply with the resolution requiring his
comment within ten days under pain of imprisonment and
arrest for a period of five (5) days or until his
compliance.7 Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three
years later, we declared respondent Martinez guilty of
Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with
the aforesaid resolutions.8
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation
reported9 that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on 26
March 1999, but was subsequently released after having
shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February
1997 and 27 April 1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and
submitting his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment10 dated 16 March 1999, respondent
stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February
1997 as he was at that time undergoing medical treatment at
Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in
June 1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case
which was decided in respondent's favor (as plaintiff in the said
case). Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the
execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family
of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the
present administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert
Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City
submitted a letter11 to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging
that respondent Martinez also stood charged in
another estafa case before the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case involving the
victims of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the
Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a
decision against him, his appeal thereto having been
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of
Basey, Samar,12 it appears that herein respondent Atty.
Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of the Doa
Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said
civil case was issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines
representing compensation for the deaths of his wife and two
daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check,
which was then deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty.

On 16 June 1999, we referred14 the present case to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
The report15 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D.
Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but
none of the parties appeared before the Commission, until
finally it was considered submitted for resolution last 27 June
2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died
sometime in June 1997 and that dismissal is warranted
because "the case filed by him does not survive due to his
demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death."
We disagree with respondent's contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court, the Honorable Supreme Court or the IBP may motu
proprio initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of
lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is
called by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has
been perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary
sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to disregard or
ignore orders of the Honorable Supreme Court for which he
was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects an utter lack
of good moral character.
Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
(estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his
unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore
justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re:
Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re:
Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA
1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be
disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution16 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation,17 in the instant case
alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner is tantamount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law, although admittedly the practice of
law is a privilege;

2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in

court and allowed to adduce evidence, the result/outcome
would be entirely different from that arrived at by the
Investigating Commissioner; and
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the
judiciary in various capacities (from acting city judge to
Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter President) for almost
17 years prior to resuming his law practice.
On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a
comment within ten days. On 16 February 2004, we received a
Manifestation and Motion19 from complainant's daughter,
Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been
furnished with a copy of respondent's Motion, notwithstanding
the fact that respondent ostensibly lives next door to
complainant's family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004,
respondent has until now failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a
copy of said Motion to herein complainant. The records also
show that respondent was given several opportunities to
present evidence by this Court20 as well as by the
IBP.21 Indeed, he only has himself to blame, for he has failed
to present his case despite several occasions to do so. It is
now too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to
receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same
patience that it did when it waited for his comment on the
original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the
records of the instant case, we find the evidence on record
sufficient to support the IBP's findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and
convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for
issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The issue
with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said
crime is one involving moral turpitude. 22
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."23 It involves "an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."24
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the
erring lawyer was indefinitely suspended for having been
convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held
that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude and stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise
of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense26 (emphasis supplied)

Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber

v. Commission on Elections27 and disqualified a congressional
candidate for having been sentenced by final judgment for
three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec.
12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced
to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of
a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein
petitioner's averment that he was not a lawyer, we
nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the
effect that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and
"certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person." [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a worthless
check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez,
through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers
"can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest." Thus, paraphrasing Black's
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately
reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society
in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.28 (emphasis
supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,29 we
stated that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her.
It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character
as to render her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v.
Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The issuance of a
series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude
of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act
to the public interest and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405
SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyer's low regard for her
commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem. [Sanchez v.
Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without
sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful
dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is
that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the
court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him
for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity,
where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's
professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him
morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which
his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be
justified in suspending or removing him from the office of
attorney."30

The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is

tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of
law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the
practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for
disbarment is "to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall
be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence."31 "A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is
a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministrations of persons unfit to practice them."32 "Verily,
lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their
conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar
or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue
as officers of the Court."33
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea
that if "given another chance to have his day in court and to
adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely
different from that arrived at." We note with displeasure the
inordinate length of time respondent took in responding to our
requirement to submit his Comment on the original petition to
disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the
lawful orders of this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is in itself a cause sufficient for suspension
or disbarment. Thus, from the time we issued our first
Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit his
Comment, until 16 March 1999, when he submitted said
Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years
had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it
took respondent to comply, his Comment consists of all of two
pages, a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to furnish
complainant.34 And while he claims to have been confined
while undergoing medical treatment at the time our Resolution
of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely reserved the
submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he
able to offer any explanation for his failure to submit his
Comment from the time we issued our first Resolution of 03
July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said Comment alleged,
merely, that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away
sometime in June 1997, and imputed upon the latter
unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against
him, which argument has already been resolved squarely in
the abovementioned IBP report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to
appear before the Commission as the main reason for the long
delay, until the same was finally submitted for Resolution on 27
June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven
years to "have his day in court and adduce evidence" in his
behalf, which inaction also unduly delayed the court's prompt
disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we reminded attorneys that
"there must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides that
the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes
that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action.36 It is noteworthy that in the

past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for willful
disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant's briefs, as
a penalty for disobedience thereof. 37
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's
old age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in various
capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a higher
standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence,38 and his conduct
should be above reproach.39 The fact that respondent has
chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now
free to conduct himself in less honorable or indeed in a less
than honorable manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege,40 demanding a high degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.41 Sadly, herein
respondent falls short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this
case. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the
imposition of one year's suspension for non-payment of debt
and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six
months upon partial payment of the obligation.42 However, in
these cases, for various reasons, none of the issuances
resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for
either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that
the issuance of
worthless
checks
constitutes
gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has
been found guilty and stands convicted by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda, which is
similar to this case in that both respondents were convicted for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime,
we affirmed the order of suspension from the practice of law
imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided
after Tuanda, we have held disbarment to be the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo,43 we disbarred a lawyer convicted of estafa without
discussing the circumstances behind his conviction. We held
that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral
turpitude. The review of respondent's conviction no longer
rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has
been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold
the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.44
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,45 a lawyer was
convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals. "And since bribery is
admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736;
5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the
plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment
as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127."46
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,47 the
erring lawyer acknowledged the execution of a document
purporting to be a last will and testament, which later turned

out to be a forgery. He was found guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of falsification of public document, which the
Court held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act
being contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, and was
subsequently disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q.
Gutierrez,48 Atty. Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After
serving a portion of the sentence, he was granted a conditional
pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was not
absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term, the court
nevertheless disbarred him.
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was convicted
of the crime of estafa for misappropriating the amount of
P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We held thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the
case, there can be no question that the term "moral turpitude"
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no
doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is
unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals (In re
Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt
cannot now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable.
(emphasis supplied)50
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,51 the conditional pardon
extended to the erring lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed
to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment imposed by this
court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,52 a lawyer was
charged and found guilty of the crime of falsification of public
document for having prepared and notarized a deed of sale of
a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an
impostor and that the vendor had been dead for almost eight
years. We ruled that disbarment follows as a consequence of a
lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public
document involves moral turpitude, we ordered respondent's
name stricken off the roll of attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,53 we
upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through
falsification of public documents, because she was "totally unfit
to be a member of the legal profession."54
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,55 a
lawyer was disbarred for having been convicted of estafa by
final judgment for misappropriating the funds of his client.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate
penalty. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant;
and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office
and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic."56
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is
hereby dISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

In re: Luis B. Tagorda

March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for
the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a
member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous
to the last general elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS
Attorney
Notary
CANDIDATE
Province of Isabela

B.

FOR

TAGORDA

THIRD

Public
MEMBER

(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of

sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral
office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make
your application and final requisites for your homestead; and
can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you
collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any
complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town,
Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to
help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter
addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality
written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the
approaching date for our induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my
induction into office I should be very glad to hear your
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province
in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my
house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of
suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I
will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the
session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the
following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a
lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of
the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a
lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home
on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me
there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any
work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales
and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even
on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason
that some people are in the belief that my residence as
member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be
disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary
public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am
free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have
my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to
your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings
so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve
with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the
people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services
of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land
titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would
charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Attorney
Notary Public.

LUIS

TAGORDA

through others for to do so would be unprofessional.

(State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs.Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the

applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of
members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine
Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No.
2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly

practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of
the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of

Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association
in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons
27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must
be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of
personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience,
is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars
or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview
not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is
equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection
through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or
trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or
wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct,
the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the
traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH
AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer
advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of
blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable
at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or
other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out
those with claims for personal injuries or those having any
other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to
employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward
directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing
of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court
or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly
advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the
ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to
the public and to the profession devolves upon every member
of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that
the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and
quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law,
and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same
evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at
the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as
constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not
difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business.
The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for

disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the
admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having
solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon
the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of
Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the AttorneyGeneral in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the
respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action
should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward
cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's
is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would
amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as
mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent
there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the
impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at
the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake
in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit
the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly
understood that this result is reached in view of the
considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively
lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be
taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this
kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of
the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is
hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for
the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Mauricio C. Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET
P560.00
for
Info
on
ANNULMENT. VISA.

a
valid
DIVORCE.

MARRIAGE?
marriage.
ABSENCE.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC,

INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr.
US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 5222041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended
by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his
petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that
it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of
the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of
the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on
the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said
bar associations readily responded and extended their
valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes
note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and,
in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of
this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support

services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would

readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government
agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign
visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to
make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to
state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic"
and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision
of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal
services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can
be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services
for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term
"Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it
offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically
removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely
offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law
practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support
services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the
minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the

advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code,
there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious
that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid
the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves
to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can
be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain
defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the
words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address
those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which
is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the above impressions one may
gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms
what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts
does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support
services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves
are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are

contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,

thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined
from causing the publication of the advertisements in question,
or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal
research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal
profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members
of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be
no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar
can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as
computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern
technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing
better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal)
in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only
for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed
to perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's
services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which
tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages
which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is
not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular
lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law
or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as
a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined
by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective

means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a

corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal
profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of
law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts
of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The
Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty.
Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its
pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve
of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients
as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal
and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have
been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses
its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it
are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal
right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under
the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the
issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical,
but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress
and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading
and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law.
It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to
answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the
Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised

services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show

that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services
on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding
foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages,
absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of
the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related
thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited
Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are
embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this
paramount consideration should be given
the general public from the danger of
unqualified persons or entities who may
practice of law.

Honorable Court,
to the protection of
being exploited by
be engaged in the

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous

four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts
or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction
as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that
at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by
those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise
of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be
protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those
who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer
such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the impression that information
regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or
can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main

purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned

"Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements
to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for
under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold
letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only
illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that
one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do
so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise
their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify
the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the
petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended
so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot
nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce,
where in this country there is none, except under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against
good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to
the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be
done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court
held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this
character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law,
such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered
by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same
vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice
of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily
make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can
render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or
inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are acting

for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor

dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory
and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire
tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations
Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land
to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect
to the building code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be considered to be
trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of
the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it
has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter,
and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class
of men who customarily perform a certain function have no
right to do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees,
to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the
fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides
the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of
his work, he performed services which are customarily
reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of
the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns

on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by

brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute
and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it
may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach
a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented
by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or
to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the
agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations
Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a
licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in
a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to
members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the
Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession
or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make
clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render
wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on
routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage
license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is
as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on
the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case,
then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to
that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by
himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely

giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the
law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles
or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular
reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is,
the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should
be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is
the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact
or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At
most the book assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and
sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the
kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating
to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however,
the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies
and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents
(The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting
the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are
"strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted,
however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or
counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment,
par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can
give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there
is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and
other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family
Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to
the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice

of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that
the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning
and scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind
of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation
of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them
of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in
order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of
law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself
as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers
with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes
the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the
case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on
court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or

defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise

stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities
in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained.
Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction

of information and communication, such as computerized legal

research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from government or nongovernment agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws
of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other
matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for
the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization
of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify
an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or
her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose
and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The
Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria
Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the
client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the CunetaConcepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can
take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to
clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they
come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors
do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering
you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the
symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once

the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of

our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require
surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a
simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of
by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait
basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or
diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are
dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and
named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of
pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in
taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed
by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich
relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out
its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of
the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it
has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.
WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being
offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such
in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction
wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law
is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have
been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of
court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education
and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing

profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,

counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities
of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding
from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found,
not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's
position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as
an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in
this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption
as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As
admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education,
while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education
Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of
paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service.
As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in
behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law,
rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that,
in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person
who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by
the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled
person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue
to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal
rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he
pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also
warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like selflaudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's

advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation
of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the
that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are
involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute
improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services
or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The
most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a
way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions
to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the
extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of
two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law
lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only
a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or
quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists;
the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published

principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may

not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data
in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name,
the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly
or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in
any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for
such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the
case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American
Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of
the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials,
it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy
from
Professional
from
Honest
from
Dignified from 45% to 14%

71%
71%
65%

to
to
to

14%
14%
14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of

our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only
serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently
been under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the
face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is
beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the
lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the

unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio

P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality
or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It
is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice
of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some
so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General
who
can
institute
the
corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate
charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off
from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General
for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr. vs. Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
A.C. No. 5299
August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053
August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL
G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement
that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper,
Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public
Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the
published telephone number and pretended to be an interested
party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her
husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four

to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of

property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her
husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable
at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a
decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and
the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The
Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and
solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him,
but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views
about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the
interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition
on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered
by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order
as long as it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.5 On June 29,
2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year
with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this
Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution
No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo,
Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents." This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution
dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were
required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading
or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution
on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent,
on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June
20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and
XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish
the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition
rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after
claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal
services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free
Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of
Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage
Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines
not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective
clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six
months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made
in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to
the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs

stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and

residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data,
are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyers name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public
or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists;
the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data
in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.

No. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal,

earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the
pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages
with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public
Works, the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein, B.
R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 757-R. 1
On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding
petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other
defendants. 2
Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and
Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as
C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R. 3
During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee
therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave of the
respondent Court, he was substituted by his heirs Enrique
N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and
Renne Marie N. Ryes who are now the private respondents
in this present petition.
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of
record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days
from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within
which to comply.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also

permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name,
the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July

1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said
counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the
reglementary period. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received
by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. 5

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO

T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show

cause why the appeal should not be dismissed (for failure to
file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which
expired on April 5, 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in
the resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of which was received by
said counsel on July 17, 1974; . . . 6

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as

attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.
G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992
B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES,
NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, in his capacity as Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal, and ANTONIO MARINAS, in his capacity as
Deputy Sheriff, respondents.
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution dated 10
November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.

As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution,

respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued another
Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal:

On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS

LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the
resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the
death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of
BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm
are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin
Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having established
her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the
lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is
believed to have also attended to the preparation of the
Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and
inadvertence, had also left the firm.
In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied
the motion for reconsideration, stating that:
Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendantappellant, praying, on the grounds therein stated, that the
resolution of September 9, 1974, dismissing the appeal, be set
aside, and that appellant be granted a reasonable period of
time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months
had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and

more than two and one-half (2-) months since counsel

received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief;
Motion Denied. 8
No action having been taken by petitioner from the above
Resolution within the period to file a petition for review, the
same became final and executory, and the records of the case
were remanded to the court of origin for execution.
The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October
1975. 9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial Sheriff and
Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with
Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a
Notice of Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November
1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the auction sale
thereof. 10

Comment until after the amendment is presented and

admitted. 16
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it
attached the said Amended Petition. 17 The amendment
consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. Reyes with his heirs.
This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the
respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from
notice thereof, which they complied with on 5 April
1976. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April
1976. 20
In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition
for lack of merit: 21

On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a

Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975, and
containing the following allegations:

L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,

et. al.). Considering the allegations, issues and arguments
adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents' comment
thereon, as well as petitioner's reply to said comment, the
Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.

1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has the inherent
power to modify and set aside its processes, in the interest of
justice, especially so in this case when the case was dismissed
on account of the untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas,
counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).

However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its

reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the
right to appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be
given due course.

2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief
owing to the untimely death of the late Atty. Crispin D. Baizas
would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court,
and is, therefore, a clear and unmistakable denial of due
process on the part of BRSEI.
3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights
of the parties, since all that BRSEI is asking for, is a day in
court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair, unjust
and unlawful decision, set aside and reversed.
The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution
of 10 November 1975: 12
. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm
of Baizas, Alberto & Associates, and while Atty. Baizas died on
January 16, 1974, his law firm was not dissolved since it
received the notice to file brief on February 19, 1974, and the
copy of the Resolution of July 9, 1974, requiring appellant to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed was
received by the law firm on July 17, 1974 and no cause was
shown; . . .
Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original
petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio B.
Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and
Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise
prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining
Order. 14
On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on
the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on
the ground that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead
and his lawful heirs had already been ordered substituted for
him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent
Court of Appeals.
In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered
petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from
receipt of notice, and suspended the filing of respondents'

Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to

said Motion for Reconsideration.
On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to
reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both
parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda
within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November
1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November
1976. 26 On 29 November 1976, this Court deemed the
present case submitted for decision. 27
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously
dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on
respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals
and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of
Clemente Celestino vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 28Indeed, in
said case, this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for
failure by the appellants therein to file their brief, and after
entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court
and cancelled the entry of judgment, requiring the lower
court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit
appellant's brief. Said case, however, had a peculiar or singular
factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant
the relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such
action. As this Court, through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino,
said:
We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual
situation in this case and to forestall a miscarriage of justice
the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal
should be upheld.
That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the
mistaken belief that they had abandoned it because they
allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for
paying the cost of printing their brief.

But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud

might have been practised on appellants Pagtakhans since
their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. In
(sic) sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations
of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into
dismissing the appeal.
Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with
copies of his motions for extension of time to file brief so that
they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been
apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing
their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly
to the Court. Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court
that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the
Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still
desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a
mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs.
Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728). Since
counsel did none of those things, his representation that the
appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal
is difficult to believe.
If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may
exercise its discretion in reinstating an appeal, having in mind
the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of
substantial justice (Alquiza vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February 10,
1968, 22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs.
Raymundo, 62 Phil. 275; Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).
But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by
reason of the remand of the record to the lower court, it,
nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or
the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a
decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud
practised upon it. Such a right is not affected by the statutory
provision that after the record has been remanded, the
appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5
Am Jur. 2nd 433 citing Lovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So.
176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac.
279).
In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple
negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which is neither
excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on
its plea.
As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., 29 and reiterated
in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 30 We
said:
Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal
that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the
power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or
discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and
sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or discretion
vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the
filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would call
for, prompt and justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot
and must not be upheld.
To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies
mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas and the supposed
confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES. It says: 31
Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged
the services of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas to handle its defense in
Civil Case No. 757-R; however, it appears that Atty. Baizas
entered petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law
firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D. Baizas &
Associates." Hence, the Answer to the complaint, Answer to
Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party Complaint filed for

petitioner in said case, evince that the law firm "Crispin D.

Baizas & Associates" represents petitioner in the action.
After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court,
petitioner's counsel appears to have changed its firm name to
"Baizas, Alberto & Associates." The appeal was thus pursued
for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates."
On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of
a brief heart attack. In consequence (sic) of his death, the law
firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was in a terribly confused
state of affairs. In effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty.
Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates
left the dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting
up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of deceased Crispin D.
Baizas, took over the management of why may have been left
of his father's office, it appearing that some, if not many, cases
of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left
the firm upon its dissolution.
But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of
the dissolved law firm filed the required appellant's brief for
herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent
Court of Appeals. No notice was served upon petitioner by any
of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its
appellant's brief was due for filing or that the law office had
been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved and
that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to
handle the appealed case of petitioner. . . .
The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas, Alberto &
Associates" was dissolved and that none of the associates
took over petitioner's case, and no notice of such state of
affairs was given to petitioner who could have engaged the
services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before
respondent Court, constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE
CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On
the other hand, the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas,
Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for relief
since, in such event, the said firm had ABANDONED
petitioner's cause, which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless
inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day
in court. In the abovementioned Yuseco case, this Honorable
Court had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will
always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by
perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence
of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their day
(sic) in court.
We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel
was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and
not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter
did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said
firm and petitioner.
In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal
filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on
behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to
comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court;
the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of
Atty. Crispin Baizas. This Court held therein that:
The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the
part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal,
supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with
the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals.
Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually
collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did not
file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of
petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. As
revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file

Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days

granted to it. Said law firm also received a copy of the
respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure
to file the Brief within the reglementary period. Petitioner chose
not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to
issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the
appeal, a copy of which the former also received. Then, on 28
September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for
reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court
denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was
heard from petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November
1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a
writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the
records for the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death
of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to
file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty.
Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel
remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in
the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because
it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before
both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an
associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the
office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since
others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the
notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the
case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as
counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that
the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.
In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:
The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be
considered excusable, nor (sic) is it unavoidable. Time and
again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of
distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working
therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for
them, so that they will always be informed of the status of their
cases. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence
of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers,
is binding upon the latter.
Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS
LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion
for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any
further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied
said motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said
counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. The
latter has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance.
The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the
client. 33
Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it
failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. As
pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner
corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin
Baizas; hence, the death of the latter must have been known to
the former. 34 This fact should have made petitioner more
vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act
with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not
accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit
either approval or sympathy. 35
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to
show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the
reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of
Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted.

Costs against petitioner.

IT SO ORDERED.
Consolidated Farms, Inc. vs. Atty. Crisanto E. Alpon, Jr.
A.C. No. 5525
March 04, 2005
CONSOLIDATED FARMS, INC., acting thru its President
ANTONIO C. OPPEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CRISANTO E. ALPON, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Consolidated Farms, Inc., thru its President
Antonio C. Oppen, against respondent Atty. Crisanto E. Alpon,
Jr. for gross negligence, incompetence, dereliction of duty and
violation of his oath as counsel to protect the interest of his
client.
Record reveals that complainant hired the services of
respondent as counsel in its case before the Social Security
Commission, docketed as SSC Case No. 3-13961-93, entitled
"Agapita Padohinog vs. Margarita C. Vda. De Oppen et al. and
the Social Security System".
Complainant alleged that respondent, as its counsel in said
case, did not submit the position paper despite being required
by the Social Security Commission, and that he likewise failed
to attend the scheduled hearings of the case despite due
notice. On account thereof, complainant was considered to
have waived the right to present evidence and to cross
examine those of the other party. As a consequence, the Social
Security Commission, in its resolution dated February 7, 1996,
held complainant liable in SSC Case No. 3-13961-93 and
ordered it to remit to the Social Security System the amount
of P27,117.09, representing the other party's claim for
retirement benefits.
Complainant thus pray that respondent be disbarred;
dismissed from the service as municipal judge of Castellana,
Negros Occidental; and required to reimburse the amount
of P27,117.09 it paid to the Social Security System.
In his COMMENT, respondent denied that he is the presiding
judge of the Municipal Trial Court of La Castellana, Negros
Occidental. He manifested willingness to reimburse
complainant the amount of the judgment decreed in the
February 7, 1996 resolution in SSC Case No. 3-1361-93.
Respondent explains that he stopped reporting to
the Octaviano, Pelayo and Associates Law Office where he
was previously connected as he was hounded by marital
problems, adding that the notices issued by the Social Security
Commission were not sent to him by the said law office. He
asserts that he is not habitually negligent of his cases, albeit
admitting that SSC Case No. 3-13961-93 was an oversight on
his part. He also stresses that he did not represent any client
before the courts except close friends and relatives on a probono basis during the period 1995 to 1999. According to him,
he limited his practice to being a consultant to local
government leaders in the field of administration and
development planning.
Upon verification with the Office of the Court Administrator, it
was confirmed that respondent is not a municipal judge of
Castellana, Negros Occidental, hence not a member of the
Judiciary.
In a resolution dated March 10, 2003, the Court referred the
case to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In time, the Commission designated Atty.
Milagros V. San Juan as Investigating Commissioner.

On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed

Resolution No. XVI-2003-229, adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as
it
is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the
Report
and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled
case,
herein
made
part
of
this
Resolution/Decision as annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent
violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,
Atty.
Crisanto
E.
Alpon,
Jr.
is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months with a stern Warning that a similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the aforestated recommendation.
Records show that respondent admitted under oath the acts
imputed against him and even offered to make amends by
reimbursing the amount of P27,117.09 to the complainant.
In People vs. Sevillano,1 we ruled:
"Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable."
As complainant's counsel in SSC Case No. 3-13961-93,
respondent is duty bound to monitor the progress of the case
he is handling. He should have put himself on guard on all the
processes issued by the hearing body relative thereto and
should have, thus, anticipated a resolution thereof. So it is that
in Re: Vicente Y. Bayani,2 we have made it clear that "[A]
lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and
capability in that representation".
Respondent, through gross negligence and incompetence,
failed to perform what is required of him. As it were, he fell
short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a
member of the bar. His offer to pay the amount of P27,117.09
would not exonerate him from liability.
This Court has always reminded the members of the legal
profession that every case they handle deserves full and
undivided attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether they accept it for a
fee or for free, and to constantly keep in mind that not only the
property but also the life of their clients may be at stake.
Verily, in Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals,3 as reiterated
in Rosita Tan vs. Atty. Jose L. Lapak,4 we ruled:
"An Attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best
of his ability and with utmost diligence."
Respondent placed much emphasis on the fact that during the
time complainant engaged his services as counsel in the case
in question, he was still connected with the Octaviano, Pelayo
and Associates Law Office, thereby suggesting that the blame
should lay at the doorstep of said law firm for not sending him
all the notices relative to the subject SSC case.
Evidently, respondent would want us to view his situation in the
light of our ruling in Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampoand Africa vs.
Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.,5 where this Court
ruled that when a client employs the services of a law firm, he
does not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to
personally handle the case, as well as that in Five Star Bus
Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,6 where we declared that if

a party is represented by a law firm, it means that any of the

firm's members could lawfully act as his counsel during trial.
Regrettably, respondent's attempt to "pass the buck", so to
speak, falls flat on its face considering that the evidence on
record point to his own gross negligence.
For one, in his Entry of Appearance and Motion to Reset
Case for
Hearing,
bearing
date
November
19,
1993,7respondent
affixed
his
signature
under
the
representation of the Antonio de Luzuriaga and Crisanto E.
Alpon, Jr. Law Office as counsel for complainant. This clearly
shows that respondent was personally hired as counsel to the
subject SSC case even before he became an associate of
the Octaviano, Pelayo and Associates Law Office. Clearly,
complainant did not hire the services of the latter law firm to
represent it in that case.
For another, the following processes were issued in the said
SSC case during the period 1994 when respondent was still
very much connected with the Octaviano, Pelayo and
Associates Law Office: Order dated March 27, 1994, requiring
the submission of the parties' respective position papers and
resetting the case for hearing8 Order dated August 15, 1994,
granting last chance to respondent's client to submit verified
position paper and resetting the case for clarificatory
questions10 Respondent, therefore, could not use the excuse
that he was not notified of the processes issued by the hearing
officer. At the very least, respondent should have inquired from
the same hearing officer the status of his client's case.
Unfortunately, through manifest gross negligence, respondent
failed to attend to the case.
On the issue of reimbursement of the amount of P27,119.09
which complainant was ordered to pay the Social Security
System in the same case, it appears that on May 26, 2003,
complainant filed a Compliance, therein stating that
respondent's proposal for settlement of the instant
administrative case has been accepted by it and that it was just
waiting for the payment to be made by respondent. On
September 3, 2003, respondent filed a Manifestation of
Settlement of Case, whereunder he stated that complainant
has accepted his proposal for reimbursement and had in fact
paid complainant the amount of P27,117.00.
Not being a municipal judge of Castellana, Negros Occidental
per verification from the records of the Office of the Court
Administrator, complainant's additional prayer for respondent's
dismissal from the Judiciary is not possible.
All told, we rule and so hold that on account of his failure to file
the required Position Paper for his client, as well as attend the
scheduled hearings in SSC Case No. 3-13961-93, respondent
indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, stating that "[A] lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable".
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly,
ATTY. CRISANTO E. ALPON, JR. is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. vs. Atty. Felina Dasig
A.C. No. 4984
April 1, 2003
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA,
ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA
DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA
CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO,complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty.
Felina S. Dasig,1 an official of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of
respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used
her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of
the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking
officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed
with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that
respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED,
committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section
27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a
teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in
Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later
reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the
effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B.
Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the
effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G.
Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even
suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full
knowledge of the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and
during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-inCharge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of
P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested
to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent
Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name.3
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath
as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless,
and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.4
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing
subparagraph b (22), Section 365 of Presidential Decree No.
807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire
Supply" and "Novas Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by
the dishonored checks she issued,6 the complaint sheet, and
the subpoena issued to respondent.7
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the
commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she
encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun
and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As

a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against

the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No.
86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 36.8
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent
to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report,
which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than
eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive
of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of
securing an appointment for herself.9
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent
to file a Comment on the charges.10 A copy of said resolution
was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12,
Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be
returned to this Court with the notation "Unclaimed."11
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of
February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to respondent
at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the
Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the said
mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for
by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on
August 27, 1999.12
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to
refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer to the
Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default
and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said
order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her
anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the
directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had
waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the
Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of
the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded
that respondent in violation of her oath as a government official
and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands
or attempted to extort money from certain people who had
pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for
her promise to act favorably on said applications/requests.
Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to
secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period
allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar
action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of
respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and
considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in

order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity

and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education,
Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) years.13
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorneyat-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED,
may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance,
considering that her position, at the time of filing of the
complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist,
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards, CHED."
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.14 However, if said misconduct as a government official
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.15
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various
occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED,
attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela
Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office. The evidence
remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We
find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is
of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member
of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was
patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties
of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the
duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further
stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.16 Respondents demands for sums of money to
facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests
before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath
she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run
contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed
his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant
to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear
from Canon 617 of said Code. Lawyers in government are
public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct
is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office are violative
of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or
participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the
Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests
includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in
office falls short of the integrity and good moral character
required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high

public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only

to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she
must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of
the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of
dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the
penalty of three years suspension from membership in the Bar
as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall
be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable
for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the
Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant
to be spread on the records of the respondent, as well as to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Lolita Artezuela vs. Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo
A.C. No. 4354
April 22, 2002
LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional
ethics, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000
recommended the suspension from the practice of law of
respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six (6)
months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will
be dealt with more severely. Respondent allegedly represented
conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.1
By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,2 respondent now
comes before this Court to challenge the basis of the IBP's
resolution, and prays for its reversal.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or
about 3:00 in the early morning of December 24, 1992, Allan
Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H.
Abellana St., Mandaue City. At the time of the accident,
Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by a Japanese
national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the
name of his brother-in-law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car
rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita
Artezuela.3
The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the
cessation of the operation of her small business, resulting to
her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives
and due to financial constraints, stopped sending her two
children to college.4
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a
damage suit against Echavia, Villapez and one Bernardo
Sia.5 Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was

assigned to Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An

Amended Complaint was thereafter filed, impleading Echavia,
Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a partydefendant.6 For his services, complainant paid the respondent
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's
fees and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as filing
fee.7 However, the case was dismissed on March 22, 1994,
allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her
husband.8
Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant
filed a civil case for damages against the respondent. It was
docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City. The case was dismissed on June 12,
2001.9
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a
verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She
alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a
lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal and
enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No. 13666 was
scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993,
respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties
were present. Notwithstanding complainant's persistent and
repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the
case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining
complainant's consent.10
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in
activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel,
respondent prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended
Complaint. The said document was even printed in
respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was
respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading
the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her
consent.11
Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred
that he conscientiously did his part as the complainant's lawyer
in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the
complainant was uncooperative and refused to confer with him.
He also gave several notices to the complainant and made
known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to
withdraw as counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the
lower court, after holding a conference, decided to grant
respondent's manifestation and advised the complainant to
secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however,
refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case.12
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the
Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on August 20, 1993 so that he
could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but
denied having prepared the document and having acted as
counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested
him to prepare Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia,
however, went back to his office and asked respondent's
secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated that the
complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations
against him to compel him to pay the amount
of P500,000.00.13
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The IBP-Visayas Regional Committee on Bar
Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the
disbarment complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a
Report finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Ethics. He recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period

of one (1) year.14 Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the

other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines upheld the findings of the Committee with
modification only as to the penalty.
Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent
contends that the Investigating Committee did not conduct trial;
hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses
against him. He argues that the Investigating Committee's
finding that he represented Echavia is contrary to court records
and the complainant's own testimony in CEB-18552. He also
casts doubt on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to
render just and fair recommendations considering that the
Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are counseladversaries in another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally,
he questions the imposition of a six-month suspension, which
he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is
his only source of income.15
After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable
laws and jurisprudence on the matter, this Court is inclined to
uphold the IBP's resolution.1wphi1.nt
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing
does not connote full adversarial proceedings, as "actual
adversarial proceedings become necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching
questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies."16 Due
process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of
their arguments.17
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly
sought the postponement of the hearings, prompting the
Investigating Commissioner to receive complainant's
evidence ex parte and to set the case for resolution after the
parties have submitted their respective memorandum. Hence:
"The records show that this is already the third postponement
filed by respondent namely December 12, 1996 (sic), January
3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.
The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing
and can no longer tolerate any further postponement. Notify
respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996
at 2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and
likewise her witness, Allan Echavia, also affirmed the contents
of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the
same and understood the contents thereof."18
It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to
have waived his right to cross-examine the complainant and
her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new
trial after he has squandered his opportunity to exercise his
right.
Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating
Committee was contrary to the records and the complainant's
own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that
Atty. Aviola was Echavia's counsel-of-record in Civil Case No.
13666 as evidenced by the certification from the clerk of
court,19 and as admitted by the complainant in CEB18552, viz:
"ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q:
Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in
this case was the counsel of Allan Echavia as early as August
20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact
when you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean

he is the counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil Case

before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you mean?
A:
What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of
Allan Echavia in the case before Judge Dacudao but I heard
Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty.
Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be the one to
coordinate with Allan's case.
Q:
So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the
counsel of record of Allan Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated by
you now?
A:
Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it
was Atty. Alviola who was the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia."20
Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the
respondent also acted as the counsel-of-record of Echavia.
Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the
preparation of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-ofrecord of one party need not also be counsel-of-record of the
adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the
counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance
the adverse party's conflicting interests of record--- although
these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory
proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party
had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party,
claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his
original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of
the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of
deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose
to the client the circumstances of his relations to the parties
and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the
clients, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose." (emphasis supplied)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of
the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship,
sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent
duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. Indeed, good
faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer does
not make this rule inoperative.21 The lawyer is an officer of the
court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising
rules of professional ethics. Thus:
"The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of
public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice."22
The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided
attention and zeal for his client's cause is likewise demanded in

the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently

disadvantageous to his client's cause, representation by the
lawyer of conflicting interests requires disclosure of all facts
and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:
"CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
xxx
Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."
While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we
find no reason to reverse the same. In disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of
evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the
evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice
of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of
disciplinary sanction is justified.23
A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint
shows that it indeed conflicts with the complainant's claims. It
reads:
"1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint
is admitted in so far as it pertains to the personal circumstance
and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of the
allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in
Paragraph Two (2) , THREE (3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6),
ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the
Complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of such allegations."24
By way of prayer, Echavia states:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing,
judgment be rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint."25
Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document
quoted above, the Investigating Committee found the
testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as
opposed to respondent's bare denial. As pointed out by
Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced
himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the latter's
office, asked him to return and sign a document which he later
identified as the Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense
weak. Respondent did not bother to present his secretary as
witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations.
Instead, he offered a convenient excuse--- that he cannot
anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him
to prepare Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint, after
reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor
of the complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed
that it was the complainant who prepared the document and
asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to
the complainant.
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is
practically off the hook. We cannot find any reason why
Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once
again, with the law. He does not stand to profit at all by
accusing the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of
legal education, we can not see how she could have prepared

Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a

legal maneuver as complicated as the present case.
Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating
Commissioner Ingles to render an impartial decision, having
been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not
convince us to grant new trial. This is the first time that
respondent questions the membership of Commissioner Ingles
in the Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in
good faith that Commissioner Ingles would be biased and
prejudiced, he should have asked for the latter's inhibition at
the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of
irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation
that would lead us to set it aside.
Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not
a property right but a mere privilege, and as such, must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer's public responsibilities.26 The suspension of
the respondent's privilege to practice law may result to financial
woes. But as the guardian of the legal profession, we are
constrained to balance this concern with the injury he caused
to the very same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty
and fairness.1wphi1.nt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the
respondent guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with a
stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and
Ligaya P. Salayon
Adm. Case No. 4680
August 29, 2000
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio
M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct,
serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in
connection with the discharge of their duties as members of
the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said
Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig
City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by
law.1 Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the
Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646,
27(b),2 respondents tampered with the votes received by him,
with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes
(SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263
precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce
Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo
Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with
votes which were above the number of votes they actually
received while, on the other hand, petitioner's votes were
reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enrile's votes were in excess of
the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3)
the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs.
Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC
despite respondents' knowledge that some of the entries
therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of
public trust and of their lawyers' oath.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They

alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12
canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to
assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed
out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake,
oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that
respondents should be held responsible for the illegal padding
of the votes considering the nature and extent of the
irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election
returns was done under their control and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to
which this matter had been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B,
13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.3Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion
was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges
against respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 961132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution
dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed
complainant's charges for insufficiency of evidence. However,
on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,4 this Court set
aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate
criminal
charges
against
respondents.
Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are
guilty of misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present
petition on the ground that it was filed late. He contends that a
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule
139-B, 12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such motion before
the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the
period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming
such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to
indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution
of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it
cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed within the
15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion
for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under Rule
139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,6 in
which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(C) makes no mention of a motion for
reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that
such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15
days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion
should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the
agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any
error it may have committed through a misapprehension of
facts or misappreciation of the evidenced.7
On the question whether petitioner's present petition was filed
within the 15-day period provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c),
although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999,
respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of
the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his
motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the
petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution
personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this
Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP
resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the
copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18,
1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition was

filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In

any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party,
to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15day period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in
question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of the
same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
delay would only be two days.8 The delay may be overlooked,
considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are
undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for
determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be
allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the Court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.9 For this reason,
laws dealing with double jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with
procedure like verification of pleadings12 and prejudicial
questions13 have no application to disbarment proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals
is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity where the
appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due
course to appeals even though filed six,14 four,15and
three16 days late. In this case, the petition is clearly
meritorious.

Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of

mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of
the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs23 but a systematic
scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in
the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted
by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101
precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number
of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18
SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were-tabulated twice. In
addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of
votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in
question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those
indicated in the SoVs.24
Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double
recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in
the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were
apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation
involves substantial number of votes, respondents
nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts
constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorente's contention that he merely certified the
genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not their
correctness is belied by the certification which reads:

Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioner's

complaint on the basis of the following: (1) respondents had no
involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because
when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them,
such had already been accomplished and only needed their
respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the
presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties,
the media, and the general public so that respondents would
not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the
acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and
not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal
intent on the part of respondents.17

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes

by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of
___________ Province of ________ this _______ day of May,
1995. (Emphasis added)

The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary

proceedings against members of the bar, only clear
preponderance of evidence is required to establish
liability.18 As long as the evidence presented by complainant
or that taken judicial notice of by the Court1 9 is more
convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto,20 the imposition of disciplinary sanction is
justified..

Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be

disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official.25 However, if
the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows
moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be
disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.26

In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive

irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City election
returns. The only explanation they could offer for such
irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake,
human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the
canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question,

respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code
which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By express provision
of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their
oath of office as lawyers to "do no falsehood."

This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission

on Elections.21 In rejecting this allegation and ordering
respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),
this Court said:

Nowhere is the-need for lawyers to observe honesty both in

their private and in their public dealings better expressed
in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said:

There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an

honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance
of official duty. The sheer magnitude of she error, not only in
the total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned
candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not
tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the
total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile
which exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted
in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders
the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as
incredible and simply unacceptable.22

Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public
and observed by numerous individuals preclude the
commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact
is that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus
had the opportunity to compare them and detect the
discrepancies therein.

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers to

behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor
it is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and
large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act
honestly, should not become a common reality . . .28
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service,
respondents were under greater obligation to observe this
basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public
trust.

Third. Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein

reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on lawyers in
government in particular. Such conduct in the performance of
their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of
the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have
merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is
their first administrative transgression and, in the case of
Salayon, after a long public service.29 Under the
circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00
for each of the respondents should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M.
Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and
imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00
with a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Dan Joel V. Lim vs. Edilberto Barcelona
A.C. No. 5438
March 10, 2004
DAN JOEL V. LIM* and RICHARD C. TAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO BARCELONA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On May 9, 2001, Dan Joel V. Lim and Richard C. Tan,1 both
businessmen, filed a complaint for alleged robbery or extortion
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act against Atty. Edilberto Barcelona, a lawyer formerly
employed with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The complaint was simultaneously filed with this Court
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.2
Complainant Lim alleged that on the first week of August 2000,
respondent phoned him and introduced himself as a lawyer
and chief of the Public Assistance Center, NLRC. Respondent
informed him that his employees filed a labor complaint against
him in his office and it was necessary for him to see and talk
with respondent. From then on respondent would often call
him. Respondent visited him in his office and told him to settle
the case or else his business, Top Gun Billiards, would be shut
down. Lim recalled that on August 14, 2000, at around 7:30
p.m., respondent again visited his establishment and told him
to settle the case for P20,000.00.
In support of his allegations, Lim submitted a written complaint
of Arnel E. Ditan and Pilipino Ubante; an endorsement letter
dated August 2, 2000 of Atty. Jonathan F. Baligod of the
Presidential Action Center; handwritten calling cards of the
respondent; and an affidavit of desistance executed by Ditan
and Ubante.
In their joint affidavit, Ditan and Ubante confirmed the filing of
their complaint against their employer, Lim, and that after some
dialogue, the aforenamed employees executed an affidavit
dated August 8, 2000 withdrawing their complaint. According to
Ditan and Ubante, they met the respondent in Top Gun
Billiards where the latter often played billiards. One day,
respondent gave them a letter and asked them to sign it. Since
they were busy at that time, they signed it without reading and
understanding its contents. Their employer, Lim, asked what it
was about and they told him that they were just made to sign a
document without their understanding it. They added, they did
not have any complaint against their employer. Despite such
withdrawal, respondent still called Lim threatening the latter
that he would pursue the case, have his establishment closed
and he would be jailed if he did not come up with P20,000.00
as settlement. In the evening of August 14, 2000, respondent
reiterated his demand for P20,000.00, again with the threat of
closure of the billiard center and putting Lim in jail.

Complainant Lim said that after his meeting with respondent,

he agreed to give the amount but did not fix any date when
payment would be made, whereupon, respondent gave notice
that he would drop in at around 7:00 in the evening, on August
16, 2000, to pick up the money.
Aurora Cruz y Libunao, owner of the carinderia adjacent to Top
Gun Billiards, stated in her sworn statement as well as court
testimony that she met respondent when he ate in her
carinderia. She recalled that the respondent told her that he
would shut down the billiard business if the owner would not
talk to him. She also recounted that on August 14, 2000, at
around 8:30 p.m., she saw on the second floor of the pool
house, the respondent and Lim talking. After a while, the
respondent came down and passed by her carinderia. The
respondent then informed her that he and Lim talked about the
P20,000.00 which respondent would give to his alleged boss in
Malacaang. During the hearing, she also recalled seeing Lim
hand money to respondent who in turn put the cash in his
attach case and immediately thereafter, she saw three men
arrest respondent.3
Notably, almost nine months before the filing of his complaint,
or on August 14, 2000, complainant Lim personally submitted a
letter to the NBI requesting the NBI to investigate respondent
Atty. Edilberto Barcelona.4 According to the NBI report, after
due investigation, it decided to conduct an entrapment
operation. On August 15, 2000, Special Investigator Marvin de
Jemil, sent nine five hundred peso bills and five one hundred
peso bills for fluorescent powder dusting to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Division. Further, the NBI reported that thru the NBI
Identification and Records Division, it found no record of such
person named Edilberto Barcelona.
The NBI report also stated that on August 16, 2000, Lim
informed the NBI operatives that at around 7:00 p.m.
respondent would drop by his pool house to collect the money.
At around 6:30 p.m., the operatives went to the pool house and
strategically positioned themselves and posed as pool players.
At about 7:20 p.m., respondent arrived, sat on a plastic chair
and talked to complainant Lim. At around 7:30 p.m., Lim
handed the marked money to the respondent who, in turn,
received it. While respondent was counting the money and
about to place it inside his bag, he was immediately arrested.
The respondent initially resisted and tried to create scandal but
was later pacified.
The NBI averred that the respondent was informed of his
constitutional rights and was brought to the NBI office where
he was booked and fingerprinted. In his fingerprint chart, the
respondent indicated that he was a government lawyer and
assigned at the office of the Chief, Public Assistance Center,
NLRC, Banawe, Quezon City. He showed his identification
card. Later he was brought to the Forensic Chemistry Division
for ultraviolet examination. The certification issued by Forensic
Chemist Loren G. Janobas stated that there were "yellow
fluorescent specks and smudges" on the back and palm of the
left and right hand of the respondent. On August 17, 2000, the
NBI turned over respondent to the City Prosecutor of Manila
who eventually indicted him for robbery/extortion.5
Complainant Richard Tan, owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, a
co-signee in the herein complaint, executed a sworn statement
dated August 16, 2000. In it he alleged that he went to the
Criminal Intelligence Division, Intelligence Service of the NBI to
complain about respondent Barcelona. He said that sometime
during the last week of July, respondent called him, introduced
himself and informed him that one of his employees filed an
illegal dismissal case against him. He remembered that before
respondent's call, he had suspended an employee, Bryan
Tellen, for leaving his workplace without permission. Tellen
received several warning letters from him regarding his
misdemeanors. Tan remembered that Tellen once hinted that

he knew someone in the Department of Labor, who turned out

to be herein respondent, Atty. Barcelona. Before Tan sent his
accountant, Ditas Guitierrez, to respondent's office to represent
him, he told her to bring a copy of Tellen's suspension letter
and to inform respondent that Tellen had not been dismissed.
When Guitierrez returned, she told him that respondent wanted
him to pay his employee. She added that respondent did not
give her any copy of a formal complaint on the alleged illegal
dismissal. After two days, according to Tan, respondent went to
his office, showed him an identification card and gave him a
handwritten calling card. Respondent told him to pay his
employee P20,000.00 to P30,000.00, otherwise respondent
would go on with the filing of the illegal dismissal case. When
he said he did not have that kind of money, respondent
lowered the amount to P15,000.00. Complainant Tan added
that when he gave respondent the money, the latter promised
to take care of the illegal dismissal complaint. On July 29,
2000, according to Tan, respondent came to see him again.
Respondent appeared drunk and told Tan to go to the
respondent's office because a problem regarding the case
arose. Tan stated that before respondent left, respondent
invited his employees to a game of billiards. Tan said he did
not consent to the employees playing because they had work.
On July 31, 2000, respondent went to him a third time and
asked for an additional P10,000.00 allegedly for his employee,
Tellen, since the P15,000.00 Tan gave earlier was for
respondent only. After a few more visits by respondent, Tan
finally told the respondent to show him the formal complaint
and he would just get himself a lawyer.6
The Joint Affidavit of Arrest, signed on August 17, 2000 by
Agent Don R. Hernandez, SI Felix O. Senora and SI Marvin de
Jemil, cited complainant Tan's allegations.7
Respondent Atty. Barcelona filed his Comment8 on December
10, 2001, praying for the dismissal of the complaint against
him. Respondent, in his defense, alleges that he normally
played billiards at the Top Gun Billiard Center where he would
drop by from his office before going to his residence; that when
certain employees of the billiard center learned that he was a
lawyer and Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC,
they confided in him their grievance against their employer,
Lim, for alleged violation of labor laws, there respondent gave
them assistance; that with the proper complaint and required
documentation accomplished, respondent's office scheduled
the case for a dialogue-conference between the complaining
workers and their employer; that on instigation and coercion of
complainant Lim, respondent became a victim of theft, billiard
hustling, swindling and syndicated gambling on August 9,
2000; that on or about August 9, 2000, respondent filed a
complaint for theft of cellphone and pack of cigarettes, billiard
hustling, syndicated gambling, and swindling against Lim and
his three workers, eventually docketed as I.S. No. 38251 to
53.9
Respondent's Comment narrated his version on how the
money allegedly was given to him. According to the
respondent, on August 16, 2000, at about 3 p.m., he received a
phone call from complainant Lim informing him that Ian
Gonvan,10 one of the accused in I.S. No. 38251, admitted
taking his cellphone and was willing and ready to return it at
around 7 p.m., at the Top Gun Billiard Center. It was the
birthday of his daughter that was why he took the day off from
office. At about 7:30 p.m., he arrived at the billiard hall and
there found Lim with one of his complaining workers, fixing the
lamp of one of the billiard tables. He did not see Gonvan within
the premises so he sat and watched the billiard games going
on while he waited. After about 15 minutes Lim sat beside him
and told him that Gonvan could no longer return the cellphone
and instead Gonvan entrusted Lim with the equivalent value in
cash. According to respondent, Lim persistently whispered to
him to accept and count the wad of paper money Lim pulled
out. According to respondent, he consistently refused to touch

the money and he insisted, "Gusto ko munang makaharap ang

sinasabi mong si Gumban,"11 continuously refusing to accept,
much less count, the offered wad of money. Respondent added
that when Lim realized that he could not be prevailed upon to
accept it, he placed and inserted the wad of money in the open
side pocket of respondent's shoulder bag that respondent
normally carried, again pleading to respondent that he should
count the money. Respondent added that Lim's behavior was
rude and intimidating so much so that respondent protested
such rudeness. But respondent said while he was trying to
retrieve the wad of money to throw it back to Lim, about five or
seven burly men accosted respondent and handcuffed him
over his vehement protestations.12
On Tan's complaint, respondent declared that he never
demanded nor received money from Tan, and Tan's
accusations are but a product of the former's fertile imagination
as leverage because he actively assisted a complaining worker
of Tan.13 Respondent added that a formal labor complaint has
been filed against Tan.14
Eventually, we referred the complaint against Atty. Barcelona to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. Its report with recommendation is
now before us. We shall now proceed to the merits of the
complaint.
Respondent's version seeks to discredit the NBI report to the
effect that respondent accepted the marked money which Lim
handed to him. His version, however, fails to explain why he
was found positive for yellow fluorescent specks and smudges
in his dorsal and palmar aspects of the left and right hands by
the Forensic Department of the NBI.
Respondent claims that he continuously refused to accept,
much less count, the offered wad of money. Because of such
refusal, according to respondent, Lim inserted the wad of
money in respondent's shoulder bag's open pocket while
complainant Lim was still pleading to count the wad of money.
Respondent alleges that the alleged bribery or extortion is a
mere concoction of complainant and as leverage for the cases
against Lim and Tan.
Based on the NBI report, this case appears to be an
entrapment operation. Notably, Atty. Don Hernandez and his
team of arresting officers confirm the entrapment operation
against respondent on the basis of complainant Lim's call for
NBI assistance.
While respondent alleges that complainant Lim merely
concocted a charge of extortion against him in retaliation to a
complaint for theft which he had filed, it may be noted that the
complaint for theft was not directed against Lim but only
against his workers who were accused by respondent. Hence,
there appears to be no strong reason for Lim to resort to a
counter-charge for extortion against respondent.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP concluded that it
is highly improbable that the NBI could be misled by
complainant Lim into conducting an entrapment operation
against respondent, if there was no merit to his complaint
against respondent. From a reading of the NBI Report as well
as the documents attached to said report, it is evident that the
NBI considered the merits of Lim's complaint of extortion
against respondent. Finding it worth pursuing, the NBI
conducted an entrapment operation against respondent. On
the basis of the entrapment operation conducted by the NBI,
respondent was caught in the act, so to speak, of attempted
extortion. Respondent was brought to the City Prosecutor of
Manila for inquest and the appropriate complaint for
Robbery/Extortion was filed against respondent.15

Based on its own evaluation and the NBI Report, the

Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two years.16
In the final resolution dated September 27, 2003, the Board of
Governors of the IBP imposed the penalty of disbarment for
the reason that respondent in fact attempted to extort money
as Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC to
threaten/coerce Lim and that no less than the NBI caught him
in the act of receiving and counting the money extorted from
Lim.17
The grounds for disbarment or suspension of an attorney are:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.18
The NBI found that respondent's hands had yellow fluorescent
specks and smudges with which the money used for the
entrapment of the respondent had been powdered. We find no
reason to doubt the NBI report. Also, we see no basis to
overturn the presumption that the NBI had done its duty
regularly.
Respondent would make us believe that the specks and
smudges of yellow fluorescent were in his hands because Lim
offered him what was allegedly the payment for the stolen
cellphone by a certain Gonvan. Regrettably, there is no
corroboration from Gonvan nor anyone else on this matter.
Thus, respondent's story appears to us entirely self-serving.
We had held previously that if a lawyer's misconduct in the
discharge of his official duties as government official is of such
a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a member of the
Bar on such ground.19 More significantly, lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks have
more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of
moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer
who holds a responsible public office. 20 Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. Extortion by a
government lawyer, an outright violation of the law, calls for the
corresponding grave sanctions. With the aforesaid rule a high
standard of integrity is demanded of a government lawyer as
compared to a private practitioner because the delinquency of
a government lawyer erodes the people's trust and confidence
in the government.
Needless to say, lawyers owe it to the court and to society not
to stir up litigations. Employees of the billiards hall, Ditan and
Ubante, swore that respondent public officer encouraged
complainant Lim's workers to file a case against the latter. Rule
1.03 of the same Code states that a lawyer shall not, for any
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.
Noteworthy, as an Attorney IV and Chief of the Public
Assistance Center of the NLRC, respondent failed to observe
prudence by hanging out and playing in the billiard hall. By so
doing, he exposed himself unnecessarily to certain elements
and situations which could compromise his official position and
his status as a lawyer.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a
noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon
those who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially
in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with

honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must

faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions
which
includes
suspension
and
disbarment.21 More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege
of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.22
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against
lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual
lawyers, but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers and to remove from the legal profession persons
whose utter disregard of the lawyer's oath has proven them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar.23 These pronouncements gain practical
significance in this case, considering that respondent is a
senior lawyer of the NLRC. It bears stressing also that
government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the
public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers
should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as
their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public eye.24
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent
miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.
In Montano v. IBP,25 this Court said that only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer may disbarment be imposed as a penalty. In the
instant case, the Court is convinced that the evidence against
respondent is clear and convincing. He is administratively
liable for corrupt activity, deceit, and gross misconduct. As
correctly held by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, he should not only be suspended from the
practice of law but disbarred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona is found
administratively guilty of corrupt activity, deceit, and gross
misconduct and is hereby ordered DISBARRED. Let his name
be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately,
and this resolution spread in his record in this Court and
circulated to all courts in the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Jose B. Tiongco, et al. vs. Severiano C. Aguilar, et al.
G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995
THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M.
TIONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35,
Iloilo City, and the Spouses WILFREDO and LORENA
AGUIRRE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, J.:
In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required
ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the petitioners, to
show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively
for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility considering:
. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court
did not read the petition as borne out by the following
statement:

". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had

read the petition and the annexes attached thereto and hold
that the same has "failed to sufficiently show that the
respondent Court had committed a grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the questioned judgment". . .
which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and
considering further his use of intemperate language in the
petition, as exemplified by his characterization of the decision
of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted in order to
fool the winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs'
favor"; one "you could have sworn it was the Devil who
dictated it"; or one with "perfidious character," although the
petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing
party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his
charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused with
that confusion which is the natural product of having been
born, nurtured and brought up amongst the crowded
surroundings of the non-propertied class; In fact, His Honor,
Respondent Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had not
owned any real property until March 5, 1974 when his Honor
was already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge; in one
scale of the balance, a 311 square meter lot, 6 houses from the
Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall of
Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brand-new car,
impeccable attire, and dignified "mien"; and his charge that the
respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their counsel
in a scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession
and fruits of their property for the duration of appeal"; and with
respect to the Order of 30 May 1994, by describing the
respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or "blasphemer."
In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges
that:
If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious"
and "blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief,
perfidious and blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic] First Division,
however, forget, that the undersigned alsp [sic] called him a
"robber" (Petition, pp. 13 bottom; 14 bottom), a "rotten
manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26) and "abetter" of graft and
shady deals (Petition, p. 12 bottom, p. 13 top); On the other
hand, if the undersigned called anybody "cross-eyed," it must
be because he is indeed cross-eyed particularly when he
sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed, it
must be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and
therefore stands in dire need of amendment which punishes
lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and corrupt judges
before this Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore,
respectfully submitted, that for all his pains, the undersigned
does not deserve or is entitled to the honors of being dealt with
administratively or otherwise.
and prays:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully prays of this Honorable Supreme Court, that it
forebear from turning the undersigned into a martyr to his
principles.
Yet, he added the following:
WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES
AND UNDYING LOVE (Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).
It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show
cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for
violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in view of his unfounded and malicious
insinuation that this Court did not at all read the petition in this
case before it concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently
show that the respondent court had committed a grave abuse
of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his
descriptions of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief."

perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for

his use of the rest of the intemperate words enumerated in the
resolution. Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at the
incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate
words or phrases, he volunteered to point out that in addition to
those so enumerated, he also called the respondent judge a
"robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption,
and "cross-eyed."
Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely
unacceptable for the following reasons: first, he impliedly
admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not
read the petition' second, except as to the words "liar," "thief,"
"perfidious'" and "blasphemer," he failed to address squarely
the other intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the
resolution of 26 September 1994, which failure amounts to an
admission of their intemperateness; third, he did not indicate
the circumstances upon which his defense of truth lies; and,
fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance of the harsh
words and phrase to his petition.
We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously
insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition in this
case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to
and contempt for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit
the Members of the First Division of the Court and put them to
public contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the
violation of their solemn duty to render justice, thereby creating
or promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have
the effect of "encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is
the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation on
which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those
who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief" (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).
In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous
words and phrases against the respondent judge which are
obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and
whose glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by the respondent
judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their
case for recovery of possession and damages, and by the
dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his
disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby
diminishing public confidence in the latter and eventually, in the
judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of justice.
Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a
serious violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads as follows:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath
"to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the
courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty under the first
canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444
[1967]), this Court said:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become
commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse
for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138

of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such

duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of
legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer
to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same
canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and
clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to
conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts."
Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts
"can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold."
[Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration
at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune.
Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to
harden into a belief that he may attack court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance
to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed
by error, fettered by fallibility.
Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this
Court, in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel(31
SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), stated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself,
an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."
[People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty
is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to which
he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration in
the administration of justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602].
faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people." [Malcolm legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160].
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
[People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See also In re: Rafael
C. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]).
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an
officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his
right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the
court to avail of such right. Thus, In Re: Almacen(31 SCRA
562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judge, which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec.
657, 665).
"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best
opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of out judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, or no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench." (State Board of
Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216).
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of
courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to
speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is
concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but

as to his demerits there must be profound silence. (State vs.

Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196)).
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court
warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
hence, in the assertion of their client's rights, lawyers even
those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up
their tempers.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by
the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right
carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it
was held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional
guarantee of free spe ech. No one seeks to deny him that right,
least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is
that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression
needs an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with
the requirements of equally important public interests. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration justice.
There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity
of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary
language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or
tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in
the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the
administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael
Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive
language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]); or of
disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge
(Baja vs. Macando, 158 SCRA 391 [1988], citing the resolution
of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers
Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs.
Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and
propriety in making the false and malicious insinuation against
this Court, particularly the Members of the First Division, and
the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is,
indeed, all too obvious. Such could only come from anger, if
not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate
could only come from one who "seems to be of that frame of
mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and
justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and

as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with

his views" (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]).
When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or
arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate
words in his petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the
resolution of 26 September 1994, and with seething sarcasm
as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . .
[him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his
Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND
UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution Preamble, 66th word),
"nothing more can extenuate his liability for gross violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility and his
other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.
WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is
hereby ordered to pay a Fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more money.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the record of Atty.
Jose B. Tiongco in this Court.

Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO
B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros
Occidental, respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto
Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding
Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros
Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to
non-compliance with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of
the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the
legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or
duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders
of the respondent judge denying the motion for
reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26,
1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as
counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the
resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of
P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a
duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also the
IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership
dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the
duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for
reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the
Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint
dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President
of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through
his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the
five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments
or resolution." 5The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano
"for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.
Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant
Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate language
of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the
President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no
jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the
Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was

required to show cause why he should not be punished for

contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by
registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or
Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint
"was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith
the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices
concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further
disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing
the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they
are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as
Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give
such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they
(Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure
(sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will
not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common
tao." 11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a
"constructive criticism," the Court finds the various statements
made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the
Office of the President of the Philippines and in his
"Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as
follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to
that most Honorable Supreme Court, the complainant was
legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to our
Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all
the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your
administration without bloodshed but by honest and just
investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such
procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a
rebel with the undersigned with a cause for being maliciously
deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our
Justices designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court
of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at
all for being Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned
therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing ignorance of
the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason
observed by the undersigned and believed by him in good
faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose
common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and
to rob from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and
Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to
their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's
honest, firm and determined Decision to bring back the real
Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and
progress of your people and the only country which God has
given us. PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple
meaning of Justice, yet they refused to grant to the poor and
innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren in
rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14
IX
. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the
fault of the Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court, the
dismissal of the petition was based more of money
reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath
of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts
of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By

reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right
of the poor and innocent-accused (complainant) to be heard
against the rich and high-ranking person in our Judiciary to be
heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the
respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an
ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate,
extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby
grossly violate their Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give
all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any man,
regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with
it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the
requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents
denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the
name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict
or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic)
of genuine justice was too far and beyond the reach of the
Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by records of
both cases mentioned above. 16
xxx xxx xxx
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon
commonly abused by Judges and Justices, against practicing
lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no
Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records
were cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. That this
weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a
righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person
with close relation. 17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in
dismissing his petition did so "to save their brethren in rank and
office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the
dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his
insinuation that the Court maintains a double standard in
dispensing justice one set for the rich and another for the
poor went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism."
They are not relevant to the cause of his client. On the
contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a
neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought
before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in
resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not
to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the
Court for the counsel's failure to fully comply with the
requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on
expeditious disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on
November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989, after due
publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of
his client a motion for reconsideration and remitted the
necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate
original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and
indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his
dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the
Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the
other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court
judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did
not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated
in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with
finality his motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling
reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration
sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is
provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above
requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of
dismissal unless it be shown that such non-compliance was
due to compelling reasons."

It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices
Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the
Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however,
seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in
the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client.
Unfortunately, the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to
pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer
of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the
honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of
his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to
that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his
client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he
can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo." 22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from
criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that
the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct
whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then
again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on
the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this
regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menancing language or behavior before the
courts.
RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives
not supported by the record or have materiality to the case.
xxx xxx xxx
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices
of the Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of
our government system the separation of powers between
the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has
been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this occasion
to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is
supreme the third great department of government
entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other
department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare
them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to the foregoing,
not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive
may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a
constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the
erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned
as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his
clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. The arrogance
displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no
jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the
Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is
used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing
lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not
honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's
complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the

Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an

impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to
law.

Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed

by respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No.
7512936;

WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of

CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a
member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the
finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the
municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails
to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as
soon as this Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a
repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more
severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty.
Castellano's record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges of
the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for
their information and guidance.

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant

who was his client;

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19,
1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's
oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against
him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of
particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his
complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution
dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion
and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On
July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint
for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the
following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely,
Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado
[hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses,
including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%)
of the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants
and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the
Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation in
Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter
into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the
development into a residential subdivision of the land involved
in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929,
claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as
attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well
that the said property was already sold at a public auction on
June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and
registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
falsified documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum
to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971"
and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints

without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his
pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not
intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29,
amended answer on November 18, 1976,
accusations against him. Complainant filed
respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and
1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.

1976 and an
denying the
a reply to
on March 24,

In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the

case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by
the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a
witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent
appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits
"1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective
memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in the
resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation
of his constitutional right to due process and speedy
disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor
General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8,
1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case
was due to the numerous requests for postponement of
scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for
extension of time to file their respective memoranda."
[Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365].
Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on
October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the
Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report
with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be
suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that
respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients
during the pendency of the case where the properties were
involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property
subject of their land development agreement had already been
sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said
agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a
document where two signatories who had not signed the
original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as
having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of
the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he
intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on

November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to

refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to
bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue
raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention that the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
was limited to the determination of whether or not there is
sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule
139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative
complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should
be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides
that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall
supersede the present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR
SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this
Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first
place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of
complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of
complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under
Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may
conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the
IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General
or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the
investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme
Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the
report and recommendation submitted by the investigating
official and the evidence presented by the parties during the
investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at
the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the
investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General
had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B
provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which
has not been substantially completed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case
the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even
before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself
admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General
terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date
when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to
Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].

witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11)

documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to
cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness
against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or
not respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged by
complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report
and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the Court finds
that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant
the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document
entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the
Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to
respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados
covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm.,
and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in
consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the
document was executed, respondent knew that the
abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case
[Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint,
p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring
one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent
violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring
his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which
he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New
Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer
of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of
professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70
Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of
Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not
purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new
Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes
that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void
under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a
ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the

Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough and
comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to
the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in
duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor
General but also to further delay in the disposition of the
present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13)
years.

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the

new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule
138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every
lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of
the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this
oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme
Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these
underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer
is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not
countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated
Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to
his client and to society.

Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to

present does not warrant the referral of the case to the IBP.
Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General respondent was given ample opportunity to present
evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely
his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due
process. The record shows that respondent appeared as

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned

in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing
the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from
acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation
because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and
rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that

the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to

emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship.
Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding
the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new
Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of
the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well
as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a
lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach
of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be
brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties
was not really implemented, because the land development
agreement on which the transfer depended was later
rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer
of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the
Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of
the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the
Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY.
RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a
resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered
to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do
transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights
and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all
the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint,
Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the
transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute and
unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land
development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure
to disclose to complainant, at the time the land development
agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No.
T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land
development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977
while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client,
claiming that his appearance for the complainant in an antigraft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro
was upon the request of complainant and was understood to
be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant
was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the
fact that the land involved in their land development agreement
had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent
argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so that
there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that
the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. T1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the
complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the
negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing,
respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics
of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and
condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was
not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent
from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact
pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation.
Since he was a party to the land development agreement,
respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of
the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a
proper assessment of the viability of the project they were

jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should

observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and
failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him
[Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81
SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the
court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of an
addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor
General found that in the document filed by respondent with
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to
the addendum to the land development agreement namely,
Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado,
Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to
appear as having signed the original document on December
9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their
names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and
complainant who signed the original and duplicate original
(Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor
Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that
Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh.
2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking
them to sign the said xerox copyattached to the letter and to
send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's
Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent
acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely
agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the
alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973
[Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when
respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum
on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled
the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed
by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct
constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to
act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer
should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics;
Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General
found that no impropriety was committed by respondent in
entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados
[Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The
Court, however, finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee,
provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all
expenses, for the suit, including court fees. is contrary to
Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides
that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or
bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good
faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be
subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent
and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by
him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay
expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is
champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324
(1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially
where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to
have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion
Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution
of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between
the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.

The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot

be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in
Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the
Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case
No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees
with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The
evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance
of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and
consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the
Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their
consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo,
p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against
representation of conflicting interests is where the clients
knowingly consent to the dual representation after full
disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several
complaints against him before the Court of First Instance and
the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of
harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's
investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still
pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury
(I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively
[Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403].
The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the
complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to
harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering
that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made
no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by
respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of
the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending
resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor
General, and accordingly holds that there is no basis for
holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the
aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be
discussed separately since the above discussion on the other
grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four
counts the respondent violated the law and the rules governing
the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to
assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of
law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards
expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm.
Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The
Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the
nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts
and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A.
Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the
country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Concordia B. Garcia vs. Crisanto L. Francisco

A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL;
VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR
MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE
OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO
THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY
WITHOUT MERIT. The cause of the respondent's client is
obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact
when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above,
continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he
should have expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of
recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that
had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation
of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as
appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath
not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched
the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the
Court . . . For this serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not
only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning
to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from
the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992,
Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L.
Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband
Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena
Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a
period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated
verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the
expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to
extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of preemption over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's
counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits
before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her
property and that all these proceedings were decided against
Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract
and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the
proscription against forum-shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense
of his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by
law.
The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as
follows:
1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a
complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific
performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause
of action, laches and prescription. The case was dismissed by
Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.

2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a

complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case
No. 1455. Through Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as
special and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no.
Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On
September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a
resolution rejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues
before the two courts were separate and different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista,
Garcia and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case
No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should
have known that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure
prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court.
Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer
for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case
Q-89-3833 was clearly a special civil action and not an appeal.
On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order
enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the
unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant,
however, the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-893833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.

7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the

Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of
Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This
Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992, and
reconsideration on April 8, 1992.
8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon,
Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City to set aside and declare the writs of execution in
Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992,
and Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration.
According to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this
motion was pending.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit.
The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully
resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously
seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have
expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of
the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused
much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who
was obliged to defend herself against his every move.

4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for

certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon,
Garcia and the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No.
20476, the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of
Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31,
1989, the petition was denied.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the

purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed,
he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only
such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and
such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for
money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an
honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust
reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.

5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no.

1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee
did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco
again, he filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other
lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil
Case No. 1455 and damages with prayer for issuance of
preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil case No. 905852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.

Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March

2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of
the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and
to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant
and the misuse of judicial processes. For this serious
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
deserves to be sanctioned, not only as punishment for his
misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be
influenced by his example.

In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case

No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case.
Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil
action and not an appeal.

Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from

the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.

On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to

Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990, Judge
Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from
enforcing the decision in that case. Garcia attacked this order
in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The
petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19,
1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful detainer
case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.
6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution
in the unlawful detainer case. On September 27, 1991, Lee,
through Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and
to defer the hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was
nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the

respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RlCARDO RIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ray Anthony F. Fajarito for accused-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:p
Convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLVI * of Makati, Metro Manila,
in Criminal Case No. 12042, accused-appellant Ricardo Rio
interposed his appeal and as a consequence, the clerk of court
of said regional trial court branch forwarded the records of the

case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however,

forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme Court in
view of the penalty imposed upon the accused.
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in
two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989, addressed to Division
Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court
Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the
appeal due to his poverty. 1
The Court resolved in a resolution dated 22 June 1990 to
require the Solicitor General to comment on the appellant's
manifestation to withdraw the appeal.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action
recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the
accused-appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court,
whether he desired the appointment of a counsel de oficio on
appeal, in view of the reasons stated by him for the withdrawal
of his appeal, and inasmuch as poverty should not preclude
anyone from pursuing a cause. It was also recommended that
the clerk of court of the trial court be required by the Court to
submit the response of the accused-appellant along with a
certificate of compliance with the duty imposed on him 2 by
Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on
appeal. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial court upon
the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case, to
ascertain from the appellant, if he is confined in prison,
whether he desires the Intermediate Appellate Court or the
Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to defend him de
oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a form to be
prepared by the clerk of the appellate court, a certificate of
compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant
to his inquiry.
The branch clerk of the trial court, in a letter addressed to the
Assistant Clerk of Court of the Second Division, this Court, in
compliance with the resolution of this Court, dated 16 April
1990, adopting the suggestions of the Solicitor General, which
required him to comply with his duty mandated in Section 13,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, submitted the reply of the
accused-appellant informing the Court that he was no longer
interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn
his appeal. 3
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the
Court in a resolution dated 1 October 1990, denied the
appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a
counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant for, as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, all the letters of the
accused-appellant reveal that the only reason offered by him
for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the
services of a counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a
reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice
in any forum. 4
It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this
Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his appeal
pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and
the constitutional mandate provided in Section 11 of Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
This constitutional provision imposes a duty on the judicial
branch of the government which can cannot be taken lightly.
"The Constitution", as aptly stated in one case, "is a law for
rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers
with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times
and under all circumstances." 5

Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic

privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are the right
to the assistance of counsel and the right to a preliminary
examination. President Mckinley made the first a part of the
Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission by imposing
the inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
'shall enjoy the right ... to have assistance of counsel for the
defense' ". 6 Today said right is enshrined in the 1987
Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the
privilege most important to the person accused of crime." 7
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask
him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own." 8
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the
conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even
during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a
counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an
intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where
the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the
court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal.
Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty,
as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for
despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the
accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all,
"those who have less in life must have more in law." 9 Justice
should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for
everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be
balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to
favor one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of
trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty imposed on
them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so
that courts will be above reproach and that never (if possible)
will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not
committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de
oficio for the accused-appellant and for said counsel and the
Solicitor General to file their respective briefs, upon submission
of which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the
accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a
verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, duly
subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro of
the province of Rizal, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in the
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. 10

On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-appellant,

assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the Makati CLAO office, as
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. 11 The evidence for the prosecution adduced at the
trial established the following facts:

April 1984 that Maria Zena was able to bring Wilma to the
police to report the matter and to file the complaint. After the
report to the police, they were referred to the P.C. Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame where Wilma underwent physical
examination. 17

During the months of February and March 1984, complainant

Wilma Phua, then only 13 years of age, was living with her
mother and three (3) sisters in a house in Barangay Bayanan,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. At a distance of
about three (3) meters from this house is another house with a
toilet and bath also owned by complainant's mother but which
was uninhabited at that time. The accused, complainant's
uncle, being the younger brother of complainant's mother, was
staying in their house, free of board and lodging, although he
helped in the household chores. The children used the
bathroom in the uninhabited house because the amenities in
the inhabited house were used only by the adults. 12

Dr. Dario Gajardo, the physician who conducted the internal

examination of Wilma, submitted a report of his examination
dated 6 May 1984. The medical report showed, among others,
the following findings:

At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 24 March 1984,

classes having closed for vacation and while Maria Zena Phua
Rio was in the house occupied by her family, her daughter
Wilma (complainant) asked her for the key to the comfort room
of the uninhabited house because she had to answer a call of
nature. After having delivered the key to Wilma, the latter
proceeded to the other house, entered the comfort room, and
seeing that nobody was around and that her uncle was
washing dishes in their house, proceeded to answer nature's
call without taking the precaution of locking the comfort room
from inside. 13
After relieving herself but before she could raise her panty, the
accused entered the bathroom with his body already exposed,
held Wilma's hands, and ordered her in a loud voice to lie
down and when she resisted, the accused got mad and
ordered her to lie down. After she lay down on her back, the
accused put himself on top of her and tried to insert his private
organ into her private part. Wilma kept pushing the accused
away and calling for her mother; however, since the accused
was heavier than she, the accused succeeded in overpowering
her, inserting his penis into her vagina and having sexual
intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, the accused
released Wilma and allowed her to leave the bathroom. 14
Outside the bathroom door, complainant met her mother Maria
Zena who, meanwhile, had proceeded to the said other house
after sensing that an inordinate length of time had passed and
her daughter, complainant herein, had not returned from the
bathroom. Maria Zena, upon noticing that Wilma was
speechless, trembling and looking fearful, suspected
something remiss so she tried to open the door of the
bathroom. Unable to open it the first time because it was
locked from inside, Maria Zena waited a few minutes before
pushing the door again. This time she was successful in finding
her brother, the herein accused-appellant in the process of
raising his pants. Maria Zena was ignored by her brother when
she asked him the reason for his presence inside the
bathroom. 15
Still suspecting that the accused has done something to her
daughter, Maria Zena continued her inquisition of her brother
for several days but to no avail. Finally, on 9 April 1984, the
accused was asked to leave the house and move out by his
sister Maria Zena. 16
Only after the departure of the accused did Wilma report to her
mother the fact that she had been raped by the accused four
(4) times between the months of February and March of that
year (1984). After receiving such information, Maria Zena
wanted her daughter to immediately undergo physical
examination; however, Wilma, apparently traumatized by her
experience, was too weak to go with her for such examination
and frequently suffered from fainting spells. It was only on 30

There is a scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full,

convex and gaping which pale brown, slightly hypertrophied
labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is
disclosed an elastic, fleshly-type hymen with deep lacerations
at 3, 8 and 9 o'clock. ... 18
The medical report also showed that "there was (sic) no
external signs of recent application of any form of
trauma." 19 All these findings led him to conclude that Wilma is
"in a non-virgin state physicially." 20 Later, on the witness
stand, Dr. Gajardo would further testify that Wilma, on inquiry,
revealed that the first rape happened in the month of February
1984, but that he could not tell the approximate period or age
of the lacerations. 21
Armed with this medical report, Maria Zena and Wilma went
back to the police where a sworn statement of Wilma was
taken and the complaint for rape against the accused was filed
before Third Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro on 12 May
1984. 22
The evidence for the defense consisted of the testimony of the
accused himself and his brother, Amado Rio. The accused's
defense was anchored on alibi and he substantially testified as
follows: that contrary to the statements made by the witnesses
for the prosecution, he was not asked to leave their house in
April 1984, the truth being that he left in the month of January
1984 or about a month before the alleged first rape on Wilma
was committed because, contrary to an alleged employment
agreement between brother and sister, his sister, Maria Zena,
had not paid him any salary as helper in their house; that from
the month of January 1984, up to 24 March 1984 when the
rape charged in the complaint was allegedly committed, he
was in their hometown in Kambalo, Cahidiocan, province of
Romblon; that at the time of his arrest, he was informed of the
criminal charge of rape on his niece filed against him in court;
that from January 1984 up to the time of his arrest on 6 May
1984, he had stayed in the house of his uncle, Francisco Rio,
and had never left the place during the whole period.
The accused vehemently denied the rape and conjectured that
his sister could have fabricated the charge because he left her
house due to her non-payment of his salary as helper. The
brother of the accused in the person of Amado Rio
corroborated the defense of alibi of the accused. 23
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Nemesia B. Merca, the
Election Registrar of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, who
brought with her a Voter's Affidavit which was executed on 31
March 1984 by one Ricardo Rio and was subscribed and
sworn to on 31 March 1984 before Tessie Balbas, Chairman of
Voting Center No. 37-A of Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
On cross-examination, Registrar Merca admitted that she does
not know the accused personally but that the xerox copy of the
Voter's Affidavit that she brought to court was copied from a
book containing about 60 voter's affidavits of said precinct. 24
After comparing the signature appealing in the Voter's Affidavit
with the penmanship appearing on a letter 25 dated 12
December 1985 written by the accused to his brother, Amado
Rio and on the envelope of said letter, 26 the trial court ruled
that the writing characteristics on the presented documents are
the same, especially the rounded dot over the letter "i"

appearing in the afore-mentioned mentioned documents. It

was, therefore, satisfied that the Voter's Affidavit was indeed
prepared by the accused in Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, on 31 March 1984, before Tessie Balbas and that this
piece of evidence completely belies the defense of the
accused as corroborated by his brother, Amado, that he was in
Romblon continuously from the month of January 1984 up to
the time that he was arrested on 6 May 1984. 27
Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the above-named accused guilty of the
crime charged in the information beyond reasonable doubt the
Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify
Wilma Phua in the sum of P15,000.00, Philippine currency, and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded
on alibi. The accused claimed that at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. This
claim was corroborated by the accused's brother, Amado Rio.
However, this claim was, as aforestated, rebutted by the
prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit executed by
the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31 March 1984
when appellant claimed he was in Romblon.
Upon careful examination of the voter's affidavit, the Court is
convinced, as the trial court, that the affidavit was indeed
executed by the accused himself and the date appearing
therein must be presumed correct and genuine.
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication
especially between parents and children, husband and wife,
and other relatives and even among those not related to each
other. For such defense to prosper, the accused must prove
that it was not possible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. 28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi except
the testimony of a relative, in this case the accused's brother
Amado, it deserves but scant consideration. 29 Moreover, the
Court notes the fact that while the accused-appellant had
another brother and sister living in Manila besides the
complainant's mother, those two never came to his aid. Were
the accused the innocent man he claims to be, these siblings
would have readily helped in his defense. The testimony of his
other brother Amado alone cannot raise the necessary doubt to
acquit him as against the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female,
especially a twelve-year old child, would undergo the expense,
trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, not to mention
suffer the scandal, embarrassment and humiliation such action
inevitably invites, as wen as allow an examination of her
private parts if her motive were not to bring to justice the
person who had abused her. A victim of rape will not come out
in the open if her motive were not to obtain justice. 30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of twelve
will abuse her child and make her undergo the trauma of a
public trial only to punish someone, let alone a brother, for
leaving her without the services of an unpaid helper were it not
with the aim to seek justice for her child. Nobody in his right
mind could possibly wish to stamp his child falsely with the
stigma that follows a rape.
On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of
the defense. The new theory presented by counsel de oficio is

that Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant had

sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. It was stressed
by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984
and that, allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had abused
complainant. This allegation as well as the fact that
complainant failed to lock the door to the bathroom could only
have been due to the fact that there was consent. The charge
was filed, according to defense counsel de oficio, only because
the complainant's mother caught them. 31
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been
consent from the complainant, fails to generate doubt as to the
accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous situation indeed
to believe that one, so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways
of the world, would permit the occurrence of an incestuous
relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very own mother.
The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense
from one of total denial of the incident in question, by way of
alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the alleged consent of
the complainant. This new version could only be attributed by
the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different from the
counsel in the trial court. Although the Solicitor General has
suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an
afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get himself
acquitted, 32 the Court deems it more likely that this shift was
caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the appellant's
brief without examining the entire records of the case. If the
appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal, had read the
records and transcripts of the case thoroughly, he would not
have changed the theory of the defense for such a shift can
never speak well of the credibility of the defense. Moreover, the
rule in civil procedure, which applies equally in criminal cases,
is that a party may not shift his theory on appeal. If the counsel
de oficio had been more conscientious, he would have known
that the sudden shift would be violative of aforementioned
procedural rule and detrimental to the cause of the accusedappellant (his client).
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more
conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients' causes,
whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest
requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or defense of his client's cause." 33 Lawyers are
an indispensable part of the whole system of administering
justice in this jurisdiction. 34 And a lawyer who performs that
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of
his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. 35
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, 36 he is
expected to take such reasonable precaution in the discharge
of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance as will
not make him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a transgressor
of its precepts. 37
The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the
circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither
diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility
owed to his client. 38 The ethics of the profession require that
counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty
irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. 39 Any
attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation
distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar. 40
Returning to the case at bar, even if we consider the sudden
shift of defense theory as warranted (which we do not), the
Court is just as convinced, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime as charged. His
conviction must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the

accused-appellant Ricardo Rio guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape and sentencing him to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties of the law,
is hereby AFFIRMED. The Court, however, increases the
amount of indemnity to be paid by the accused-appellant to
Wilma Phua to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in line with
prevailing jurisprudence on this matter. Costs against accusedappellant.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2285 August 12, 1991
MARIA TIANIA complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO, respondent.
A.C. No. 2302 August 12, 1991
FELICIDAD LLANOS ANGEL and ALFONSO
ANGEL, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
These disbarment proceedings against Attorney Amado
Ocampo were filed by Maria Tiania, docketed as Administrative
Case No. 2285, and by Spouses Felicidad Angel and Alfonso
Angel (hereinafter referred to as the Angel Spouses), docketed
as Administrative Case No. 2302.
Both cases were consolidated upon the instance of Atty.
Amado Ocampo who, in his answer, denied the imputations.
The complaints in Adm. Case No. 2285 and Adm. Case No.
2302 were filed on July 14, 1981 and August 10, 1981,
respectively.
On January 27, 1982, after Atty. Ocampo filed his comment,
the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report, and recommendation as provided, then,
by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1
It was only on April 25, 1990, more than eight years later, that
the Office of the Solicitor General returned the entire records of
Adm. Cases Nos. 2285 and 2302 with the accompanying
complaint for disbarment.
Hence, the administrative complaint for disbarment in both
cases was filed.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2285
Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that respondent
Amado Ocampo who has been her "retaining (sic) counsel" in
all her legal problems and court cases as early as 1966, has
always had her unqualified faith and confidence.
In 1972, one Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for
ejectment 2 from a parcel of land described as "Lot 4131, TS308." Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock. Tiania
confronted Ocampo about this but the latter reassured Tiania
that he will take care of everything and that there was no need
for Tiania to hire a new lawyer since he is still Tiania's lawyer.
Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment case,
which Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a
Compromise Agreement 3 which the latter signed without
reading.

Two years from the submission of the Compromise Agreement,

Tiania was shocked when she received an order to vacate 4 the
property in question. To hold off her ejectment for another two
years, Ocampo advised Tiania to pay him a certain amount for
the sheriff. 5
Ocampo denied the charges in detail. Although he handled
some legal problems and executed some notarial deeds for
Tiania from 1966-1971, Tiania had also engaged the services
of various counsel to represent her in several criminal and civil
cases, involving violations of municipal ordinances and estafa.
Thus, he could not be the complainant's "retaining counsel" in
all her legal problems and court cases.
Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs.
Blaylock, and not as counsel of Tiania, in Civil Case No. 11040. He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil
case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could not have
discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer,
and more so the preparation of the answer in the said case. He
admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania
showed to him a document which supported her claim, over
the property in question. Ocampo, after going over the
document, expressed his doubts about it authenticity. This
convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay
the acquisition cost to Blaylock over a period of six (6)
months. 6
But Tiania never fulfilled any of her obligations. She moreover
made the situation worse by selling the contested property to a
third party even after an alias writ of execution had ordered the
transfer of the possession of the disputed property to
Blaylock. 7
Significantly, the petition was filed five years after Tiania
allegedly suffered "terrible shock" upon receiving the Notice to
Vacate.
Citing Arboleda v. Gatchalian, 8 Ocampo said that the overdue
filing of a complaint against a lawyer should already create a
suspicion about the motives of the complainant or the merit of
the complaint.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2302
The Angel spouses, complainants in A.C. No. 2302, allege that
sometime in 1972, they sold their house in favor of Blaylock
(the same Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock in A.C. No. 2285) for the
amount of seventy thousand pesos, (P70,000.00). Ocampo
(the same respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo), acted as their
counsel and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House
and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.
With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought
another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed of
Sale which was signed by the vendor, a certain Laura Dalanan,
and the Angel spouses, as the vendees. In addition, Ocampo
allegedly made the Angel spouses sign two (2) more
documents which, accordingly, were made parts of the sale
transaction.
Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate
Mortgage of the same property purchased from Laura Dalanan
and a Promissory Note, 9 both in favor of Blaylock.
The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said
documents until they received a complaint naming them as
defendants in a collection suit 10 filed by Ocampo on behalf of
the plaintiff, Commercial Corporation of Olongapo, a firm
headed by Blaylock.

The Angel spouses added that Ocampo reassured them that

there was no need for them to engage the services of a new
lawyer since he will take care of everything. Ocampo even
appeared as counsel for the Angel spouses in a civil
case 11 they filed sometime in 1976. However, in 1978, a Notice
to Vacate, 12 on the basis of the two (2) documents they signed
in 1972, was served on them.
These acts, the complainants charge, violate the ethics of the
legal profession. They lost their property as a result of the
respondent's fraudulent manipulation, taking advantage of his
expertise in law against his own unsuspecting and trusting
clients.
As in the first case, Ocampo presented an elaborate
explanation.
Ocampo alleged that it was his client, Mrs. Concepcion
Blaylock, who introduced to him the Angel spouses in 1972.
Blaylock wanted Ocampo to check the background of the
Angel spouses in connection with the loan they were seeking
from Blaylock.
In his interview with Mrs. Angel, Ocampo learned that the
amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to be loaned to
the Angel spouses from Blaylock would be used to repurchase
the property at 39 Fendler Street, Olongapo City, which the
Angel spouses had originally owned. In turn, the Angel
spouses should sell the same to Blaylock.
Ocampo himself facilitated the transfer by delivering to the
complainants the P20,000.00 for the repurchase of the Fendler
property.
This
in
turn
was
sold
to
Blaylock. 13
Since the sale of the Fendler property would render the Angel
spouses homeless, they suggested to Blaylock that they would
need an additional loan of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
to purchase from Laura Dalanan another property located at
#66 Kessing Street, Olongapo City, which was mortgaged in
favor of a certain Salud Jimenez.
To expedite the transfer of the Kessing property from Dalanan
to the Angel spouses, Ocampo himself delivered to Salud
Jimenez twenty two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos from
Blaylock in payment of the mortgage debt of Dalanan. The
balance of eighteen thousand (P18,000.00) pesos was then
delivered to Mrs. Angel upon the execution of the final
documents between the Angel spouses and Dalanan. 14
Ocampo explained that simultaneously he executed a Real
Estate Mortgage over the Kessing property and a Promissory
Note for the Angel spouses in favor of Blaylock for the amount
of seventy-four thousand seventy five (P74,075.00) pesos.
Although only forty thousand (P40,000.00) was received by
Mrs. Angel and Dalanan, the difference between seventy-four
thousand seventy five pesos and forty thousand pesos
represented the interests in advance over a period of five years
in which the loan would be paid.

Ocampo admits appearing for the Angel spouses in Civil Case

No. 1458, filed July 26, 1976, but only because he had his
client Blaylock's interest foremost in his mind.
Blaylock, through Ocampo, had sued one Benedicto
Hermogeno a lessee of Blaylock's property, in an ejectment
case. But before the institution of the ejectment case,
Hermogeno leased out the same premises to Mrs. Angel on
June 14, 1976. Four days later, Hermogeno without the
knowledge and consent of Mrs. Angel, regained possession of
the leased premises. Thus, Ocampo, in filing a complaint
against Hermogeno on behalf of Blaylock, was also doing so
for Mrs. Angel.
These explanations notwithstanding, the Solicitor General
charged the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo with malpractice
and gross misconduct punishable under Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and violation of his
oath of office as an attorney for the following acts:
a) Administrative Case No. 2285
At the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 11 04-0, the
respondent appeared as counsel for the
plaintiff and while appearing for the same,
gave advice and warnings to the defendant
which paved the way for an amicable
settlement and which may have prejudiced
the defendant's rights.
b) Administrative Case No. 2302
(1) Respondent while acting as counsel for
Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock and her
Commercial Credit Corporation; also acted
as counsel of the complainant Mrs. Angel
when he prepared the Deed of Sale of a
Residential House and Waiver of Rights
Over a Lot for Mrs. Angel in favor of Zenaida
Blaylock, daughter of Concepcion Blaylock.
(2) Respondent, while acting as counsel for
Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock and her
Commercial Credit Corporation, also acted
as counsel of Mrs. Angel when he proceeded
to Cavite and paid Salud Jimenez the sum of
twenty two thousand pesos (P22,000.00) for
Dalanan's Kessing Property.
(3) Respondent was representing conflicting
interests when he simultaneously prepared
the Deed of Sale of the Kessing property in
favor of Mrs. Angel and the Real Estate
Mortgage for the same property to be signed
by Mrs. Angel in favor of Mrs. Blaylock and
her Commercial Credit Corporation.
(4) Respondent used Mrs. Angel by
pretending to protect her interest as his client
in Civil Case No. 2020-0, when admittedly he
was only "forced to help and assist Mrs.
Angel in said case to protect the property of
Mrs. Blaylock."

When the monthly amortizations became due, the Angel

spouses never paid any of it despite repeated demands from
Blaylock. Blaylock assigned the promissory note to the
Commercial Credit Corporation which later on filed a civil case
against the Angel spouses.

Was the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests?

The Angel spouses never filed an answer and were declared in

default. Upon execution, the Kessing property was levied on
and sold at public auction followed by a Notice to Vacate.

The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule

15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting

interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
We prohibit the representation of conflicting interests not only
because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the
duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is
abused, the entire profession suffers. 15
The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a
lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof. 16 Considering this criterion and applying it to the
present administrative cases, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the Solicitor General upholding the
complaints
against
the
respondent.
Indeed,
the
aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing
Blaylock, and at the same time advising Tiania, the opposing
party, as in the first administrative case, and once again
representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the legal
documents of another opposing party as in the second case,
whether the said actions were related or totally unrelated,
constitute serious misconduct. They are improper to the
respondent's office as attorney.
However, taking into consideration the advanced age of the
respondent, who would have reached seventy three (73) years,
as of this date, the Court, while uncompromisingly firm in its
stand against erring lawyers, nonetheless appreciates the
advance years of the respondent in his favor.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo
guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, we hereby SUSPEND him
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the
respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Evangeline Leda vs. Trebonian Tabang
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992
EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue
respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in
two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar
Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for
Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and
Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The
marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan,
was
performed
under
Article
76
of
the
Civil
Code 1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until

after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in l977),
and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to
ensure
a
stable
future
for
them.Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January
1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter
applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he
was "single." He then passed the examinations
but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting
Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted
fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was
unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral
character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's
law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition,
par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's
required him to answer the Complaint.

Oath-taking

and

Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which

was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries
Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted
that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October
1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared
public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until
after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep
stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he
was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that
to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single
since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made
and declared public." He further averred that he and
Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the
"Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint
be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June
1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance,
which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a
misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was
refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court
dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take
his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this
Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's
disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal
knowledge to contract an invalid marriage
with me assuming that our marriage is not
valid, and making a mockery of our marriage
institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as
single when in truth he is already married in
his application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character
contrary to the certification he submitted to
the Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason
that he deceived me into signing of the
affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity to
his explanation and later on the comment to

his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in

fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended
me to resume our marriage and introduced
me to his family, friends and relatives as his
wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me
to withdraw my complaint against him with
the Supreme Court.

Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly

provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making
a false statement or suppression of a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." That
false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified
him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably
exhibits lack of good moral character.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex

"F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to
Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had
already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he
was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force
myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered
her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for
failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years
before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect
by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they
were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised
Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her
family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal
as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can
do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any
court." According to Complainant, although the letter was
unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand
corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in

declaring his status as "single" not only because of his pact
with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also
because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the
beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of
merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to
Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites
and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under
Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's
official duty in connection therewith has been regularly
performed.

Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter

contending that it is Complainant who has been indulging in
fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he
and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take
the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from
the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of
the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before
the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the
same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant
because they had never lived together as husband and
wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he
honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the
Solicitor
General
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General
submitted his Report, with the recommendation that
Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since
Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate
her charges but that he be reprimanded for making
inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings
he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's
Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In
an
undated
Report, the
latter
recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until
the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence
from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good moral
character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the
1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross
misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for
which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7,

Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting

positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter
No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had
submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he
admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet,
during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied
under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p.
21) contending instead that it is only the second page where
his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the
averments on the first page which were merely of
Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his
Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes
reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been
"legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however,
he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its
being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the
marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of
marriage was not to be made public so as to allow him to finish
his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he
contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it
was "not in order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned
letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very
tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his
Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is,
for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows
that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and
admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78
to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he
would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and
had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to
honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before
this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious
tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose.In so
doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001
thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor

consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or

allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled
to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola,
Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA
10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in
the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but
also as an officer of the Court.

entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the

power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good

moral character is not only a condition precedent toadmission
to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law(People v. Tuanda,
Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA
692). As so aptly put by Mr. JusticeGeorge A. Malcolm: "As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in
such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record

as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the
same to all Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang

grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.