FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6738, August 12, 2015

GABRIELA CORONEL, Petitioner, v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order and
public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system is guilty of gross misconduct, and should be
suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred.
Antecedents
On May 17, 2005, the complainant initiated this disbarment case against Atty. Nelson A. Cunanan, alleging that he
had advised and convinced her to engage him for the transfer of Original Certificate of Title No. 9616 and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-72074, which were both registered in the name of their deceased grandparents, to her
name and to the names of her co-heirs by direct registration with the Office of the Register of Deeds in violation of
the proper legal procedure; that following the engagement, he had received from her the amount of P70,000.00 for
the payment of the transfer and other fees, and had misappropriated the same; and that he had not returned the
money and the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72074. 1cralawrednad
The Court ordered the respondent to comment on the complaint on July 11, 2005, 2 but he complied only on March
7, 2006.3 In turn, the complainant submitted her reply on March 20, 2006. 4cralawrednad
Proceedings before the IBP
On July 31, 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.5cralawrednad
On February 21, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the mandatory conference on April 11, 2007, and
notified the parties thereof.6 At the hearing, the parties defined the issues upon which they would submit their
position papers. The complainant stated the issue to be whether or not the actions of the respondent constituted
malpractice, deceit or gross misconduct. The respondent defined the issue to be whether or not he had acted in a
deceitful manner or committed any misconduct by entering into the contract of legal services with the complainant
based on terms mutually agreed upon between them. Only the complainant submitted her verified position
paper.7cralawrednad
On February 20, 2008, the complainant requested the early resolution of her complaint. 8 On September 1, 2009,
however, she submitted an affidavit of desistance,9 whereby she stated that she had meanwhile made amends with
the respondent, and that the disbarment complaint had been due to a misunderstanding between them. A few days
later, the parties also submitted their Joint Motion To Dismiss dated September 15, 2009,10 which the Court referred
to the IBP on November 18, 2009.11cralawrednad
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued its resolution adopting and approving, with modification, the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding the respondent guilty of malpractice and
negligence; recommending his suspension from the practice of law for six months; and requiring his return of the
P70,000.00 to the complainant.12cralawrednad
On August 8, 2011, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 citing the affidavit of desistance executed
by the complainant and their Joint Motion to Dismiss. The IBP Board of Governors denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on December 15, 2012.14cralawrednad
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
The report of the Investigating Commissioner recited the following summary of the factual antecedents, to
wit:cralawlawlibrary
Complainant recounts that sometime in October 2003, she engaged the services Respondent to transfer to her
name and her co-heirs the parcels of land covered under TCT No. T-72074 and OCT. No. 9616, which certificates
of title are both registered under the name of Complainant's deceased grandparents. Respondent advised
Complainant that for the registration of TCT. No. T-72074, the transfer may be effected by two means namely: first,
by way of "ordinary procedure"; and second, by way of "direct registration". Ordinary procedure involves transfer by
way of execution of Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, publication, payment of capital gains tax, etc., and registration
with the Register of Deeds. Transfer by this means will cost Complainant an estimate of Php56,000.00 with the
amount of Php50,000.00 more or less to be spent for the payment of taxes. Transfer by this means may take a
period of at least five (5) months. Direct registration, on the other hand, involves preparing documents upon advise
of the Register of Deeds and will involve an estimated cost to be negotiated with the officials or employees of the

Register of Deeds to a flat amount of Php50,000.00. Transfer by this means will take only one (1) month or less. As
for the transfer of OCT No. 9616, Respondent advised Complainant of the filing of a petition for issuance of
Owner's Duplicate Copy and thereafter, to proceed with the transfer in the same manner as that outlined in the
transfer of TCT. No. T-72074.
It appears that Complainant and Respondent agreed on the direct registration approach because sometime
thereafter, Respondent billed Complainant with the following fees: Php50,000.00 as package deal for the direct
transfer of title for TCT. No. T-72074; another Php50,000 as package deal for the transfer of title for OCT No. 9616;
Php5,000 for litigation expenses for issuance of duplicate copy of OCT 9616 and another Phpl5,000 as professional
fees, to which Complainant agreed.
On October 28, 2003, Complainant paid Respondent Php70,000.00 pesos [sic].
According to Complainant, she thereafter tried to contact Respondent but the latter cannot be contacted. Thus, she
was constrained to write Respondent a letter dated March 5, 2004 asking the latter to contact her.
Subsequently, Respondent sent to Complainant an Extra-judicial Settlement Agreement. Complainant had it signed
and sent back to Respondent. Thereafter, Respondent asked Complainant for the owner's duplicate copy of TCT.
No. T-72074, which complainant, likewise, sent to Respondent.
Afterwards, Complainant heard nothing from Respondent. When her request for a call from Respondent was not
heeded, Complainant wrote Respondent demanding that the amount of Php70,000 which she paid to Respondent
be returned to her as well as the owner's duplicate copy of TCT. No. 72074. When Respondent refused,
Complainant filed the instant disbarment case charging the former with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct.
In his Comment, Respondent admitted most of the allegations of Complainant. However, he denied that there was
deceit on his part insisting that he clearly outlined to Complainant the available procedures for the transfer of title
and afforded Complainant the opportunity to think about the options. He claimed that there was nothing illicit in
suggesting the direct registration scheme as the same was advised to him by the officials and employees of the
Register of Deeds upon his inquiry thereto. Respondent further argued that he was in constant communication with
Complainant and that he processed the transaction for the transfer of registration but that the transfer could not be
effected because the documents were inadequate and due, also, to the fact that several officials and employees of
the Register of Deeds with whom he was transacting were transferred to other offices due to a revamp in the said
office. Respondent added that he continued with the processing of the transfer and that he submitted the matter
anew for the approval of the new officials of the Register of Deeds. However, the new officers have not yet
approved the same.15
Ruling of the Court
We AFFIRM the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.16 He shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; 17 or counsel or abet activities
aimed at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence in the legal system. 18 He should advise his client to
uphold the law, not to violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not recommend to his client any recourse or
remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and public morals.
Although the respondent outlined to the complainant the "ordinary procedure" of an extrajudicial settlement of
estate as a means of transferring title, he also proposed the option of "direct registration" despite being fully aware
that such option was actually a shortcut intended to circumvent the law, and thus patently contrary to law. The
transfer under the latter option would bypass the immediate heirs of their grandparents (i.e., the complainant's
parent and her co-heirs parents), and consequently deprive the Government of the corresponding estate taxes and
transfer fees aside from requiring the falsification of the transfer documents. He assured that he could enable the
direct transfer with the help of his contacts in the Office of the Register of Deeds and other relevant agencies of the
Government, which meant that he would be bribing some officials and employees of those offices. The proposal of
"direct registration" was unquestionably unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at once.
The respondent argues that his proposal did not deceive the complainant because he had informed her on all the
"steps" to be taken on her behalf. His argument misses the point, which is that he made the proposal despite its
patent illegality in order to take advantage of the complainant's limited legal knowledge of the regular procedures
for the transfer of title under circumstances of intestacy. In other words, he made her agree to the "direct
registration" through deceitful misrepresentation. He then ignored the written demands from her, which forced her in
the end to finally charge him with disbarment. He thereby abused his being a lawyer to the hilt in order to cause not
only his client but also the public in general to doubt the sincerity of the members of the Law Profession, and
consequently diminish the public's trust and confidence in lawyers in general.
Lastly, the respondent pleads for the Court to consider in his favor the fact that the complainant subsequently
executed the affidavit of desistance, and later on the Joint Motion To Dismiss.
His plea is unworthy of consideration.
An administrative case proceeds independently from the interest, or lack thereof, of the complainant, who only sets

the case in motion through the filing of the complaint. Upon her doing so, she becomes a witness to testify against
the respondent lawyer. The disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer do not involve private interests, but only
how the lawyer conducts himself in his public and private lives. Accordingly, neither the affidavit of desistance nor
the Joint Motion To Dismiss should bear any weight, or be relevant in determining whether or not the respondent
was fit to remain as a member of the Law Profession. The desistance by the complainant was a matter that was the
concern only of the parties, and was non-binding on the Court. What will be decisive in this administrative
proceeding are the facts borne out by the evidence competently adduced herein. 19cralawrednad
The complainant testified that the respondent had proposed to her two methods to transfer title, and one was
patently contrary to law. She presented documentary proof to her testimony against him. She established that he
had not communicated with her after receiving the money and the documents. The affidavit of desistance and
the Joint Motion To Dismiss only came about after the complainant had completed her testimony, a true indication
that their submission was done in hindsight and insincerely. His remorse, if it was that, came too late.
In Bengco v. Bernardo,20 the respondent lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of law because he
had represented that he could expedite the titling of the clients' property with the help of his contacts in various
government offices, including the Department of Natural Resources, the Community Environment Office, and
Register of Deeds. After convincing his clients through such representations, and taken their money for that
purpose, he did not bother to even update them on the progress of the undertaking. In that regard, he was also
convicted of estafa.
In Espinosa v. Omaa,21 the respondent lawyer was also suspended for one year from the practice of law for
advising her clients that they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage by executing the Kasunduan
ng Paghihiwalay (Agreement to Separate) that she had drafted. Her advice was blatantly contrary to law and public
policy.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Resolution dated May, 14, 2011 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors, WITH MODIFICATION as to the recommended penalty by suspending
respondent Atty. Nelson A. Cunanan from the practice of law for one year effective immediately upon his receipt of
this decision.
The Court ORDERS respondent Atty. Cunanan to RETURN to the complainant the amount of P70,000.00 within 10
days from receipt of this decision, and to report on his compliance within five days thereafter.
Let copies of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent Atty. Cunanan in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 4191

June 10, 2013

ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Pea, former head of the Records Department of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint 1 against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno.
Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in
Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N61244,2Register of Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She personally knew
respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she filed
against her husband in 1974, and the aforementioned property was her share in their property settlement.
Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's trusted
employee who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was always there whenever she visited
respondent in connection with her cases.

Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she (complainant) apply for a
loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to interested buyers, and that her property be
offered as collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she would work out the speedy processing and release
of the loan. Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent her the
sum of P27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was released by the GSIS,
complainant entrusted it to respondent who would handle the preparation of documents for the loan and follow-up
the same, and complainant gave respondent the authority for this purpose. From time to time, complainant inquired
about the application for the loan, but respondent always assured her that she was still preparing the documents
required by the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not bother to check on her property, relying on
respondent's words that she would handle speedily the preparation of her application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her apartment was already
demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on her property, which she later learned was
already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant
immediately confronted respondent about what she discovered, but respondent just brushed her aside and ignored
her. After verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd., and respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged. 3Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd., through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April
13, 1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and that
she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before respondent to acknowledge the sale. She
alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted
employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign
any deed selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law office, and that
Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent denied that she suggested
that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses. She said that it was the complainant,
on the contrary, who requested her (respondent) to look for somebody who could help her raise the money she
needed to complete the amortization of her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS and was about to be
foreclosed. Respondent stated that she was the one who introduced complainant to the Spouses Kraus when they
were both in her office. In the course of their conversation, complainant offered the property, subject matter of this
case, to the Spouses Kraus. The Spouses Kraus were interested, and got the telephone number of complainant.
Thereafter, complainant told respondent that she accompanied the Spouses Kraus to the site of her property and
the Office of the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell her
that they had reached an agreement with complainant, and they requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale
in favor of their company, Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to
respondent's office where complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven Thousand Pesos
(P67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took hold of the Deed of Sale, as the
understanding was that the complainant would, in the meantime, work for the release of the mortgage, and,
thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title, together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses Kraus who would
then pay complainant the balance of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told respondent that she would inform
respondent when the transaction was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book.
Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of what transpired between complainant and the
Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she was never entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her
property in Marikina (TCT No. N-61244). Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property
in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years to verify
what happened to her property only meant that she had actually sold the same, and that she concocted her story
when she saw the prospect of her property had she held on to it. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and affirming the veracity of her
complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be scheduled by the Commission on Bar
Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its initial hearing, and hearings were conducted from March
21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the reception of
respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their postponement.

On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, 8 which was opposed by complainant. The Investigating
Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the complaint, and directed respondent to
present her evidence on October 24, 2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of complainant and the issuance
of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the Register of Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002.
During the hearing held on July 29, 2003, respondent's counsel presented a certification 10 from Records Officer Ma.
Corazon Gaspar of the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale
executed by Anita C. Pea in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a parcel of land in Marikina, could
not be located from the general file of the registry and that the same may be considered lost. Hearings continued
until 2005. On February 17, 2005, respondent was directed by the Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her
evidence and to submit her memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP on the ground that
the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36, which estafa case was anchored
on the same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed in a Decision 11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal
Case No. 94-138567. The RTC held that the case for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina
C. Paterno, respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
considering the absence of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that would show that Anita Pea's
signature therein was forged and the transfer of the land was made through fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and preponderant
evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant
Anita C. Pea; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the
subject property in his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted his Report and
Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by complainant by executing a
bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's certificate of title, and that respondent also
notarized the spurious deed of sale. Commissioner Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that
respondent actively conspired with any party or actively participated in the forgery of the signature of complainant.
Nevertheless, Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that her signature
on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search in the National
Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Commissioner Sordan stated that the
interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her witness, Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title was delivered to respondent. 12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to
respondent's denial that complainant handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November 1986
at the GSIS, as Maura Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as Records Processor at the GSIS, testified
that she saw complainant give the said title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave respondent her owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral in constructing a townhouse,
and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven years. 13 Despite repeated demands by
complainant, respondent refused to return it.14 Yet, respondent assured complainant that she was still the
owner.15 Later, complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her property in January 1994, eight
years after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years,
complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor visited her property, if it is untrue
that she sold the said property. Complainant explained that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank required
the submission of her title in order to process her loan application. 16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of the
property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for P200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that
complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her presence inside her office. 19 However, respondent would neither directly
confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct examination, 20 but on cross-examination, she
stated that she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale. 21Estrella Kraus'
affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.

Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing by complainant of
the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of the said Deed. However, Commissioner
Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed that his participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute
Sale was mere recording, but he later affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. 23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's testimony that she saw
complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's deception. Respondent's notarization of the
disputed deed of sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan
declared that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the
alleged party, Anita Pea, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person did
not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the
necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable for violation of her
oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), 24 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon
125 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her name strickenoff the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the notarial commission of respondent, if still
existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464, adopting and approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial
commission if still existing is Revoked with Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment as a Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law
applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections 128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases,
or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and
independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is
merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial
wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of
acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
or that no crime was committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court
and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 33 The burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony that she gave
respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent would apply for a bank loan in
complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in complainant's office at
the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw complainant give her title to

respondent.35Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the
Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 150322 37 in
complainant's title, TCT No. N-61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of
the complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her allegation that her
signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by facilitating the sale of the property to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's approval. However, complainant proved that respondent did
not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of
November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall keep a notarial register, 38 and he
shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, among others, and,
when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise
enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof. 39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy of the entries to the
proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month next following or the failure of
the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of court. 40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification, 41 dated February 22, 1994, stating that
respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year 1986, and that respondent has
not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the
Deed of Sale was executed and notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed
of Sale could not also be found in the National Archives per the certification 42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita
R. Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public to submit her
notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on
the same month is cause for revocation of her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law. 43 Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for any deceit or
dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the certificate of title
(TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale,
which complainant denied having executed or signed, the important evidence of the alleged forgery of
complainant's signature on the Deed of Sale and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy
of the Deed of Sale could not be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be located in
the general files of the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be considered
lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her Notarial Report for the
month of November 1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, which was executed on November 11, 1986. Hence,
Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the
said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from getting hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting
verification from an expert to prove that her alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged. The failure of
respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of November
1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching implications
and grave consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed
the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her testimony, it was observed
by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of records that respondent would neither directly
confirm nor deny that she notarized the said Deed of Sale.
For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As a member of the bar,
respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
following Canons:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law, pursuant to Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the
notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply with the
requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this Court to the
practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012.
Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance
and received the following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano),
MCLE's Executive Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS
ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following compliance
periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)
b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
c.

Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)

This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE requirement on (sic)
January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009 meeting. 1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE

Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report
and Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation3dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE
Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE
Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise
in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14
January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption
nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to furnish respondent
with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required respondent to file his comment within ten
days from notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the
5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be
granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE
Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged
to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent
alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the
province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50
years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of
the Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd
to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the results of the
1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI
revolution;
xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the national
canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then GENERAL FIDEL
RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like ABENINA and
COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS,
including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the 2010 national
elections, still undecided up to this day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and legality of
the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief
Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament
in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate in
the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the Supreme Court when
Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts all over the
country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE;
x x x x6
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables
and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5)

Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for
an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying
with the MCLE requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent applied for
exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing
Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of his application
in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be
exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the
applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law."
The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their pleadings filed with
the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No.
1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for
Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking
out of the pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also reported that under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt
of notification to explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also provides
that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be
listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August
2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be
filed against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption number
for the immediately preceding compliance period and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that
respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the
pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-compliance
with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the
MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout
their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April
2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012
which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from
15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance periods. The
records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the
MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods.
Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the
requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to
convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent,
through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant,
Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's
MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the
MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was

10

sent to respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.

Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His
application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had
ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated
7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his
secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.11He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the requirements for the
First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent
to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60
days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court,
respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could
comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE
Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with
the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-Compliance Notice
stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the
deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall be written in capital letters as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL
BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit units
earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in
excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his
deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter
No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He
purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to
send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his application for
exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on
28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14
February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14
January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office
only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's
compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process"
in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption.
However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year
to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is
still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE
Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before
the MCLE Office.

11

Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office
warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that
the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent
member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline
erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the
IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In addition, his
listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice
law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of
Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend
him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the
First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required noncompliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require its immediate
attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested
parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter had
already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE
requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid
the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for their appropriate actions.
EDUARDO A. ABELLA vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR. (June 18, 2013)
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2013 Labels: Disbarment, Lawyers, Legal Ethics
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals involving a Labor Case. Complainant
then filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch which the respondent
was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainants motion remained unacted, prompting him to
file a Second Motion for Execution. However, still, there was no action until the complainant agreed to give
respondent a portion of the monetary award thereof after the latter asked from the former how much would be his
share. Thereafter, respondent issued a writ of execution but the employer of the complainant moved to quash the
said writ. Eventually, issued a new writ of execution wherein complainants monetary awards were reduced to the
effect that it modifies the DECISION of the CA. Complainant now filed the instant disbarment complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for
(a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to
give benefit and advantage to PT&T, complainants employer.

ISSUE:

12

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and
Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
HELD:
YES. The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyers
responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or
proceeding or delaying any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly
directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using ones public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. It is well to note
that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The infractions of the respondent constitute gross misconduct. Jurisprudence illumines that immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of
the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. On the other hand, gross
misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment."
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.However, the Court takes judicial notice
of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo
G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing,
the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 in order to penalize respondents
transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.

A.C. No. 9401

October 22, 2013

JOCELYN DE LEON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TYRONE PEDREA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment against a female client is guilty of reprehensible conduct
that is unbecoming of a member of the Bar and may be condignly punished with suspension from the practice of
law.
Antecedents

13

Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedrea, a Public Attorney. She averred in her complaint-affidavit that Atty.
Pedrea had sexually harassed her as follows:
1. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, I went to the Public Attorneys Office in Paraaque
City, in order to inquire from ATTY. TYRONE PEDREA about the status of my case for support for my two
minor children against my husband, which case is being handled by Atty. Pedrea;
2. At that time, said Atty. Pedrea was at a court hearing, so I waited at his office until he arrived at about
11:45 a.m. Atty. Pedrea told me to go ahead to Tita Babes Restaurant so we could take our lunch together
and to talk about my said case;
3. While we were eating at the said restaurant, he asked me many personal matters rather than to discuss
my said case. But still, I answered him with respect, for he was my lawyer;
4. After we took our lunch, he told me to just go back on February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. because according
to him, my said case was quite difficult, that he needed more time to study;
5. Since Atty. Pedrea was also already going home then, he told me then to ride with him and he would
just drop me by the jeepney station;
6. Although I refused to ride with him, he persistently convinced me to get in the car, and so I acceded to
his request so as not to offend him;
7. Right after we left the parking lot and not yet too far from the City Hall, Atty. Pedrea immediately held
my left hand with his right hand, insisted me to get closer with him and laid me on his shoulder;
8. I immediately responded by saying "AYOKO HO!" But he persisted in trying to get hold of my hand and
he also tried very hard to inserting (sic) his finger into my firmly closed hand. Thus, I became very afraid
and at the same time offended for his lack of respect for me at that moment; 9. Despite my resistance, he
continued rubbing my left leg. I was then attempting to remove his hand on my leg, but he grabbed my
hand and forced it to put (sic) on his penis;
10. Because I was already really afraid at that moment, I continued to wrestle and struggle, and as I saw
that we were already approaching the 7-Eleven Store, the place where I was supposed to get off, Atty.
Pedrea made another move of pressing his finger against my private part;
11. I thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the cars door and told him categorically that I was getting off the
car. But because the traffic light was on green, he accelerated a bit more instead, but sensing my
insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed me to get off. He then reminded me to see him on
February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. for the continuation of hearing of my case;
12. That on February 1, 2006, I had to come for my case, but this time, I brought with me my five-year-old
child to avoid another incident. I was not able to see Atty. Pedrea then, so I just signed some documents; 1
In his answer, Atty. Pedrea averred that De Leons allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a
complaint would open the gates to those who had evil desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that the
complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already
charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the Paraaque City Prosecutors Office; and that he had also filed a
complaint for theft against De Leon.2
Attached to Atty. Pedreas answer were his counter-affidavit in the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness and his
complaint-affidavit for theft. In his counter affidavit, Atty. Pedrea admitted giving a ride to De Leon, but he
vehemently denied making sexual advances on her, insisting that she had sat very close to him during the ride that
even made it hard for him to shift gears, and that the ride had lasted for only two to three minutes. 3 He claimed that
De Leon was allowing herself to be used by his detractors in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) after he had
opposed the practice of certain PAO staff members of charging indigent clients for every document that they
prepared. In his complaint affidavit for theft, he stated that he had another passenger in his car at the time he gave
a ride to De Leon, who did not notice the presence of the other passenger because the ride lasted for only two to
three minutes; and that the other passenger was Emma Crespo, who executed her own affidavit attesting that she
had witnessed De Leons act of taking his (Pedrea) cellphone from the handbrake box of the car. 4
Only De Leon appeared during the hearing.5 Hence, Atty. Pedrea was deemed to have waived his right to
participate in the proceedings.6
Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedrea and the striking off
of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.7 Holding that a disbarment case was sui generis and could proceed
independently of the criminal case that was based on the same facts; and that the proceedings herein need not wait

14

until the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness brought against Atty. Pedrea was finally resolved, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Pedrea had made sexual advances on De Leon in violation of Rule
1.018 and Rule 7.039 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 dated September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty.
Pedrea suspension from the practice of law for three months. 10
Atty. Pedrea filed a motion for reconsideration with the IBP,11 which adopted and approved Resolution No. XX2012-43 dated January 15, 2012, denying the motion and affirming with modification its Resolution No. XVIII-200783 by increasing the period of suspension to six months. 12
On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to the Court Resolution No. XX-2012-43 and the
records of the case for final approval.13
In the Resolution dated April 24, 2012, the Court noted the IBP Board of Governors notice of Resolution No. XX2012-43.14
Ruling
The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner stated thusly:
There is no doubt that Complainant was able to prove her case against the Respondent. During the clarificatory
hearing, she was straightforward and spontaneous in answering the questions propounded on her. Her account of
the incident that happened on 30 January 2006 was consistent with the matters she stated in her Complaint and
Verified Position Paper.
On the other hand, Respondents defenses are not credible enough to rebut the claims of Complainant. His
defenses are replete with
Decision 5 A.C. No. 9401 inconsistencies and his actuations in the entire proceedings show lack of integrity in his
dealings with both the Complainant and this Commission.
xxxx
We find no merit at all in the defenses put forth by Respondent. The Theft case filed by Respondent is a mere
afterthought on his part. We note that such criminal complaint hinged on a claim that there was another person
during that incident who allegedly saw Complainant stealing Respondents mobile phone. Yet, in Respondents
Position Paper and in his Counter-Affidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which was executed after the
institution of the criminal complaint for Theft, Respondent never mentioned anything about a third person being
present during the incident. If the presence of this third person was crucial to prove his case against herein
Complainant, there is no reason why this allegation would be omitted in his Position Paper and Counter-Affidavit to
at least support his defense.
Furthermore, Respondents contention that Complainant is being used by his detractors is self-serving. His memo
regarding the amount of RATA he receives is a relatively harmless query to a higher authority, which could not
possibly motivate his colleagues to prod other people to file cases against Respondent. 15
We adopt the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of
Governors, for being substantiated by the evidence on record.
The records show that Atty. Pedrea rubbed the complainants right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into
her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against
her private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and
undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer.
In this regard, it bears stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.16
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly duty- bound
to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant
behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, be it in the lawyers public or private activities, is sufficient to warrant the lawyers suspension or
disbarment.17 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his oath as a lawyer. Towards that end, we have not been
remiss in reminding members of the Bar to live up to the standards and norms of the Legal Profession by upholding
the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

15

Atty. Pedreas misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free
legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath
as a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her
vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance.
Yet, even as we agree with the findings of the IBP, we consider the recommended penalty of suspension for six
months not commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed.
Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is within the Courts discretion.1wphi1 The
exercise of the discretion should neither be arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or prejudice
towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity
and independence of the Bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the Court, to his
client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the general public. 18
In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed on Atty. Pedrea, therefore, we take into consideration judicial
precedents on gross immoral conduct bearing on sexual matters. Although most of the judicial precedents dealt
with lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs, or cohabited with women other than their wives, 19 they are
nonetheless helpful in gauging the degree of immorality committed by the respondent.
In Advincula v. Macabata,20 the Court held that the errant lawyers acts of turning his clients head towards him and
then kissing her on the lips were distasteful, but still ruled that such acts, albeit offensive and undesirable, were not
grossly immoral. Hence, the respondent lawyer was merely reprimanded but reminded to be more prudent and
cautious in his dealings with clients.
In Barrientos v. Daarol,21 the respondent lawyer was disbarred, but the severest penalty was imposed not only
because of his engaging in illicit sexual relations, but also because of his deceit. He had been already married and
was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage to a 20-year-old girl. He succeeded in his seduction of her, and
made her pregnant. He not only suggested that she abort the pregnancy, but he also breached his promise to marry
her, and, in the end, even deserted her and their child.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,22 the Court adjudged the respondent lawyer, a married man with children, highly immoral
for having taken advantage of his position as the chairman of the College of Medicine of his school in enticing the
complainant, then a student in the college, to have carnal knowledge with him under the threat that she would flunk
in all her subjects should she refuse. The respondent was disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
Without diminishing the gravity of the complainants sad experience, however, we consider the acts committed by
Atty. Pedrea to be not of the same degree as the acts punished under the cited judicial precedents. Neither did his
acts approximate the act committed by the respondent lawyer in Calub v. Suller,23 whereby we disbarred the
respondent lawyer for raping his neighbors wife notwithstanding that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt in his criminal prosecution for the crime. We further note that, unlike in Barrientos where there was deceit and
in Delos Reyes where there were threats and taking advantage of the respondent lawyers position, Atty. Pedrea
did not employ any scheme to satiate his lust, but, instead, he desisted upon the first signs of the complainants firm
refusal to give in to his advances.
In view of these considerations, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years is fitting and just.
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS ATTY. TYRONE PEDREA from the practice of law for two years effective
upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Adm. Case No. 7332

June 18, 2013

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant,

vs.
RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

16

Far the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Eduardo A. Abella (complainant)
against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and
Rule 6.Q2, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
The Facts
On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII-01-0128-99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto
F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May 13, 1999,2 ordered PT&T to pay complainant P113,100.00 as separation
pay and P73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LAs Decision to the NLRC. In a Decision
dated September 12, 2001,3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreons ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate
complainant to his former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay, including moral damages and attorneys fees. On reconsideration, it modified the amounts of the aforesaid
monetary awards but still maintained that complainant was illegally dismissed. 4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision),5 the CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling with modification,
ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial
reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service were not taken into account in the computation of his
separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded the case to the LA for the same
purpose.6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final and executory.7
Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB on
October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had already been assigned to the new LA, herein respondent. After the
lapse of five (5) months, complainants motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for
Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there was no action on complainants motion. Thus,
on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to respondents office to personally follow-up the matter. In the
process, complainant and respondent exchanged notes on how much the formers monetary awards should be;
however, their computations differed. To complainants surprise, respondent told him that the matter could be
"easily fixed" and thereafter, asked "how much is mine?" Despite his shock, complainant offered the amount
of P20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it P30,000.00." By force of circumstance, complainant acceded on
the condition that respondent would have to wait until he had already collected from PT&T. Before complainant
could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the latter P1,500.00.8
On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution, 9 directing the sheriff to proceed to the premises of
PT&T and collect the amount of P1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to quash 10the
said writ which was, however, denied through an Order dated November 22, 2005. 11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a
Supplemental Motion to Quash dated December 2, 2005, 12 the contents of which were virtually identical to the one
respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of the said supplemental motion on December 9, 2005, respondent
rendered an Order13 in open court, recalling the first writ of execution he issued on November 7, 2005. He
confirmed the December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated December 14, 2005 14 and eventually, issued a
new writ of execution15 wherein complainants monetary awards were reduced from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00,
inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the NLRC. In a Resolution
dated March 14, 2006,16 the NLRC annulled respondents December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent had no
authority to modify the CA Decision which was already final and executory.17
Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman, 18 complainant filed the instant
disbarment complaint19 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable
resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T.
In his Comment,20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations, maintaining that he merely implemented
the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of backwages. He also claimed that he never demanded a
single centavo from complainant as it was in fact the latter who offered him the amount of P50,000.00.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008, 21 Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco
(Commissioner Limpingco) found that respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical,
reasonable and grammatical context in order to favor PT&T.22 He further observed that the confluence of events in
this case shows that respondent deliberately left complainants efforts to execute the CA Decision unacted upon
until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof. Notwithstanding their agreement,
immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as far as turning the proceedings into some bidding war which
eventually resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to be guilty of gross
immorality and therefore, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that he be disbarred. 23

17

On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP Resolution), 24adopting
and approving Commissioner Limpingcos recommendation, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and for Respondents violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G.
Barrios, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED.25
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and
1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco as adopted by the IBP Board
of Governors.
The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
mans cause.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE
OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
xxxx
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyers responsibility to
society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying
any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in
government service, enjoining them from using ones public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance
private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. 26 It is well to note that a lawyer who
holds a government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.27
In this light, a lawyers compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules should be taken into
consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." 28 This proceeds from the lawyers
duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bars integrity.29 Consequently, any errant
behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. 30
In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to recompute the monetary awards due to the
complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision which had already been final and executory. When
complainant moved for execution twice at that respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It was only
when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4, 2005 that the latter speedily issued a writ of
execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the Court observes that the
sudden dispatch in respondents action soon after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his
denial, i.e., that he did not extort money from the complainant.

18

The incredulity of respondents claims is further bolstered by his complete turnaround on the quashal of the
November 7, 2005 writ of execution.
To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&Ts initial motion to quash through an Order dated
November 22, 2005 but later reversed such order in open court on the basis of PT&Ts supplemental motion to
quash which was a mere rehash of the first motion that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled his
earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing complainants monetary awards from P1,470,082.60
to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA Decision which did not provide
for the payment of backwages. A plain and cursory reading, however, of the said decision belies the truthfulness of
the foregoing assertion. On point, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, ordering
petitioner PT&T to pay private respondent Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in
lieu of reinstatement.31
Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRCs rulings dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002
which both explicitly awarded backwages and other unpaid monetary benefits to complainant. 32 The only
modification was with respect to the order of reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRCs rulings which was
changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the strained relations between the parties as well as the
supervening removal of complainants previous position.33 In other words, the portion of the NLRCs rulings which
awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted and the modification pertained only to the CAs award
of separation pay in lieu of the NLRCs previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as it is, can be
easily deduced from the records.
Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding that
the CAs award of separation pay denied complainants entitlement to any backwages and other consequential
benefits altogether. In his Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution, 34 respondent stated:
From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in directing PT&T to pay
complainant his separation pay ONLY in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly, the Court did not direct the PT&T to pay him
his backwages, and other consequential benefits that were directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be
reinstated to his previous position on the ground of strained relationship and his previous position had already
gone, and no equivalent position that the PT&T could offer. x x x.
Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. 35 There is
nothing in the records that could confound the finding that complainant was illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the
NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that
respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in view of the standing
pronouncement of illegal dismissal.1wphi1 In this regard, respondents defense deserves scant consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and upholds Commissioner
Limpingcos and the IBP Board of Governors pronouncement of respondents gross immorality. Likewise, the Court
observes that his infractions constitute gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.36 It treads the line of
grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense
of decency.37 On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." 38
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral
conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred:
SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as respondents violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment
should come as a matter of course.1wphi1 However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already

19

been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 39 which
therefore precludes the Court fromduplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it
proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.0040 in order to penalize respondents transgressions as
discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.
As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a privilege 41 accorded only to
those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which the
profession brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is
quintessential that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect moral uprightness in
their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar holds no place for
the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and gross
misconduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P40,000.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5377

June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer suspended
from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring
the authority to practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the practice of law. 1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents
allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 5 and 2466 of the Notarial
Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions,
and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, 7 praying that respondents be disbarred, not
merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution 8 dated September 6, 2006, this court denied
complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office
for Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court. 9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the
Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's
suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc
issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the.
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En
Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional
Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended." 11
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include
his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to
prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights." 12

20

This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not render advisory
opinions.13
On May 8, 2009, this court received a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter 14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan
alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's
suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a notary
public."15According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration. 16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a
member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of
law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director]
[during the effectivity of the order of suspension]." 17 The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant
Lingan, should have ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant
Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on the matter." 18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and recommendation. 19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the period of
suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to
file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel and state that they desisted from
practicing law during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as Regional
Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly]
disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on
Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final
and executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court require him to submit
a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from performing his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on Human Rights be
required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to perform his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation, 24 arguing that his suspension from the practice of law did not
include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his suspension from the
practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due process
and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included is deemed excluded." 25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective motions to lift
order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further ordered Atty. Baliga and
the Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued
performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law. The resolution
dated September 23, 2009 provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective motions to lift
relative to their suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public and SUBMIT
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge of the Court where they may
appear as counsel, stating that respondents have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law
during the entire period of their suspension and disqualification, unless already complied with in the
meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on Human Rights [CHR]
stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped from the performance of his functions for
the period stated in the order of suspension and disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;

21

(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of complainant against
them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ... 27 (Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to lift order of
suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing
his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he "perform[ed],
generally, managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These managerial functions allegedly
included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional office and its personnel"; 31 "monitoring progress
of investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human Rights] Investigation Unit"; 32 "monitoring the
implementation of all other services and assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different
units at the regional level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement of
funds and expenditure of the [Regional Office]." 34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which
takes care of the legal services matters of the [Commission]." 35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he
"faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of law]." 36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the penalty
imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed
upon him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the
practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an
entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body." 40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and would "abide
by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. " 41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment,
complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification
from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he was suspended from office and desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and only
performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the
order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager," 43 which under the
landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position
of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing." 45 Moreover, as admitted by
Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional Director,
complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have followed the initial
resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this
court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on Human Right's resolution suspending him from
office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and philosophizing," 46 complainant Lingan
argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney." 47Compfainant
Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib. 48 He was allowed to resume his
practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for issuance of a notarial
commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and recommendation
Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of Atty. Baliga and the Commission
on Human Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga
"should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director] which
[required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform his
functions as Regional Director which required the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that
the Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also
recommended holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the
Commission on Human Right's filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift
one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's claim that he
did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty.
Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as Regional Director. The

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Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of [Regional Director] is managerial and does not
[require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court]
arrives on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from the
practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" 58 or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v.
Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered
by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent" 61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with power to
investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]" 62 It is divided into regional
offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations in its territorial
jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses,
and the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;" 65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices; 66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of the
legal officer or investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate courses of
action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute
resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or
subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office; 69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually
performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the
bar.72Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer. 73 Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice
of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to
practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding.
The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006, 76 he has been
without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his position as Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution
dated January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his post, for
want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is without prejudice to the
investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all Regional Human Rights
Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines resolved to put
into effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy P.

23

Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in

Tuguegarao City for the period for which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect. 77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights did not
violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the Commission on
Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be
heard when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was also
immaterial.1wphi1 He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his
authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted practice of law.
Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a
ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six
months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite lack.of authority to
practice law.1wphi1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering
its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission admonished
Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The
resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the
Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the Commission on
Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is
totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of
his oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority to
secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act as a notary public in accordance with the
rules and regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth by the Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15
June 2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the conduct
of an officer reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for having
contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a
privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in equal footing with the constitutional mandate of
the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude
from whatever privilege the Commission grants of every official and employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him pursuant to the
Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty. Baliga from the office may
be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being served. This Commission is prevailed upon
that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring
public officer.

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WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the
penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the
service.80 (Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty.
Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its
officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions." 83 To enjoy the
privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest
degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession." 84
WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga
shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service
on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the
Commission on Human Rights.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7314, August 25, 2015
MARY ANN T. FLORES, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Resolution1 dated 21 March 2014 in Administrative Case No. 7314, Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio LL.
Mayor, Jr., the Board of Governors (Board) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation2 of the Investigating Commissioner3 finding respondent guilty of violation of his sworn
duty not to delay any man's cause for money or malice and disbarring him from the practice of law.
Facts
This administrative case stemmed from the Complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) by Jose Roberto Flores (Flores), the husband of herein complainant, against JMJB
International Services, Inc. The case, docketed as NLRC Case No. 99-06-0972, was raffled to respondent, who is a
Labor Arbiter.4redarclaw
In a Decision5 dated 23 July 2001, respondent dismissed the case on a finding that Flores had voluntarily resigned
from employment.6redarclaw
Flores elevated the case to the NLRC, but the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The case
was then brought to the Court of Appeals (CA). 7redarclaw
The CA, in its Decision8 dated 21 October 2002, ruled that the appeal to the NLRC had been timely filed. 9 The
appellate court set aside the NLRC Resolution for being null and void and granted monetary awards to Flores. 10 On
19 February 2003, the CA Decision became final and executory.11redarclaw
On 24 July 2003, Flores filed before respondent a Motion for Execution of the CA Decision. 12redarclaw
On 15 November 2003, complainant claimed that the counsel of her husband received from the CA a Notice of
Transmittal of Records of Case dated 19 August 2003 addressed to the Clerk of Court of the NLRC.
As respondent was not acting on the Motion for Execution, the counsel of Flores filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation on 20 September 2004 praying that the motion be resolved with dispatch.
Upon inquiry with respondent's labor arbitration associate, the counsel learned that the records of the case were
still being requested from the Records Section of the NLRC. 13 Apparently, as shown in the Certification14 dated 13
October 2004 issued by a Records Officer of the NLRC, the case records had been sent for archiving sometime in
2003 and were difficult to retrieve.

25

On 16 November 2005, respondent finally issued a Writ of Execution against JMJB International Services, Inc. By
that time, the corporation had not yet been dissolved, but had already amended its name to F.O. Maidin
International Services, Inc.15 This amendment prompted the counsel of Flores to file a Motion to Amend Writ of
Execution. Respondent, however, refused to act on the motion, reasoning that F.O. Maidin International Services,
Inc. was not a party to the case.16redarclaw
Accordingly, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent, citing that the latter's act of archiving the
records of the labor case and refusal to amend the Writ of Execution constituted a violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards. 17redarclaw
In a Resolution18 dated 11 April 2007, this Court referred the administrative case to the IBP for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
The IBP's Investigating Commissioner, in a Report and Recommendation 19 dated 21 July 2008, found respondent
guilty and recommended his disbarment. The gist of the report reads: 20redarclaw
We find as unacceptable the respondent's gross delay in performing what is supposedly a purely ministerial act on
his part, his unexplained and unsanctioned resort to "archiving" which led to the disappearance of the case records,
and his gross ignorance of the law in refusing to issue a writ of execution against what the SEC has essentially
certified to be a company hiding under a new name. We believe that the respondent's actions were not a product of
ignorance, indolence, or negligence, but rather, were clearly borne out of a willful, deliberate, and wholly malicious
intent to misuse his position by favoring one of the parties in NLRC Case No. 99-06-0972, thus causing no small
degree of serious injury to the complainant therein and to the integrity of the legal process as a whole.
In a Resolution21 dated 14 August 2008, the IBP Board adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
with modification, lowering the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for three years.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,22 but it was denied in the IBP Board Resolution23dated 21 March
2014. The Board affirmed its previous Resolution with modification, reverting the penalty to disbarment. 24redarclaw
Neither party has filed a motion for reconsideration or petition for review thereafter.25redarclaw
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
other ethical standards.
DISCUSSION
We adopt the IBP Board Resolution.
There is a clear neglect of duty and ignorance of the law on the part of respondent on account of his failure to
immediately act on the Motion for Execution, as well as his refusal to amend the Writ of Execution despite having
been informed of the amendment of the name - but not the dissolution of the corporation against which the writ
was issued.
The justification offered by respondent to explain his delay in acting o|n the motion cannot be countenanced, as it
was through his fault that the records of the case were lost. That he archived the case records at the NLRC
Records Section, not on the basis of official or sanctioned guidelines but only because it was the common practice
in his office, reflects his lack of due diligence and care in the custody of official documents.
While delay in the processing of documents normally occurs, it was inexcusable and out of the ordinary for
respondent to allow a period of more than two years to lapse before acting on the motion. This omission amounts to
gross misconduct as the unnecessary delay has caused prejudice to complainant. As defined, gross misconduct is
any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of
justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. 26redarclaw
Respondent also erroneously interprets jurisprudence when he insists that the writ could not have been issued
against F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc., because it was not a party to the case. His argument contravenes
the pronouncement of the Court in Republic Planters Bank v. Court of Appeals,27 in which it said that "a change in
the corporate name does not make a new corporation, and whether effected by special act or under general law,
has no effect on the identity of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities."
As a Labor Arbiter, respondent is a public officer28 who must at all times be accountable to the people, whom he
must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.29 The unjustified delay in his actions and his
failure to act according to law constituted a breach of his accountability not only to complainant, but also to the
public in general.
Further, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to delay no man for money or malice, 30 and abandoned his
professional responsibility to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient

26

administration of justice.31redarclaw
Without a doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalties, including suspension and disbarment. 32 These penalties are imposed with great caution,
because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are beyond
repair.33 Disbarment, in particular, may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. 34redarclaw
The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a
repeat offender.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting,35 the respondent lawyer was disbarred after the Court: found out that he had notarized a
forged deed of quitclaim. The penalty of disbarment was imposed after considering that he was previously
suspended from the practice of law for six months on the ground that he had purchased his client's property while it
was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding. 36redarclaw
In Flores v. Chua,37 the respondent lawyer was disbarred after he was found guilty of notarizing a forged deed of
sale. The penalty of disbarment was imposed because in a previous administrative case, respondent was found
guilty of violating Rule 1.01 [16] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He was also sternly warned that a
repetition of a similar act or violation in the future would be dealt with more severely.38redarclaw
Herein respondent was already suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months in another
case, Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,39 in which he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. For that offense, he was warned that the commission of the
same or a similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. In light of
respondent's previous suspension from the practice of law in an earlier administrative case as above-mentioned,
the recommendation of the IBP Board to disbar respondent is only proper.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR. guilty of grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal files of respondent; all the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,
Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., and Bersamin, JJ., no part.
Brion, and Reyes, JJ., on leave.
Villarama, Jr., J., on official leave.

27