Holy See vs Rosario

G.R. No. 101949

238 SCRA 524
December 1, 1994
Petitioner: The Holy See
Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.
FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was
contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the
Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican
City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose
responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy
See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be
returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.
The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr.
Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that

petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2
Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus
shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.
It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be
granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private
immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is
entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.
Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was
acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner
to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent
disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or
gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.

People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an
investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion edited by herein respondent Gregorio
Perfecto published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code provision that punishes
those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the
King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court
determined Article 256 of the SPC to be political in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. Hence, Article
256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

G.R. No. L-18463

October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or
insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given
by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the
Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day
following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate,
yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not have to display
great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery?
How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured
their election through fraud and robbery.

The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which
should be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to
indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio
Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in
which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and
again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or
not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the
King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense
to insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine
Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other
representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said
provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a
majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:
In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them, because they are generally the
result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a legislative body are not
punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under
which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting
language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in
the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a
majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable
under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or
favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him
to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned
counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the beginning of this decision.

It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not
published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of
the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the
instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed a
prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the
return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case
has never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is
certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in
the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case,
urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer
to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law,
Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and
the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be
acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that
article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of
government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine
Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or
pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish
the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of
laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code,
cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the
early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject
of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it
was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel
Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)

The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation
of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F.
Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as
such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the
author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention
and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing,
shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the
old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous
laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the
effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a
pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. Appellant's main proposition in the
lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the
change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was indirectly
favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or
independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against
the Cortes and its members and against the council of ministers, crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes
of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias,
and threats against their agents and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt
committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an article condemning
challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that
the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of
any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in the
Monarchy of Spain.

It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion,
sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or,
more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
characteristics and institutions of the American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island
and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court
stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all
laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of
political jurisdiction and legislative power and the latter is involved in the former to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion
or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to
that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States
any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or
otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3
Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal
laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they
were compatible with the new order of things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of
the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it
has been taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court in
Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal
provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of
our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish
codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273;
U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine
liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he government
which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest
extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind,
and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our
governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied
the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great

principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty
and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most enligthened thought
of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The
President and Congress framed the government on the model with which American are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public
interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their
customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the
King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old,
although merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the individual
citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated
breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man. We have no rank or station,
except that of respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein,
if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every man may lawfully
do what he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo.,
205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which
words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown,
without proof of any special damage. The Crown of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus,
Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known.
In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States,
but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a
high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous
charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d
ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this
article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the
United States. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to
the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of
the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands.
1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the
entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in
monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and
obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience
where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official
halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant
and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:
I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused, for the sole reason that the facts alleged in the information do not
constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force with respect to calumny, injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority in
the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, outside of his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed
against an authority by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said information.
ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either under article 256 of the Penal Code or under the Libel Law.
I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown," whom we do not have in our Government, and to
calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing, committed against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the
Libel Law.
Johnson, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982

(En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte
became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated
October
23,
1963.
Among
the
parties
thereto
was
complainant
Bernardita
R.
Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was
adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria
Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Manufacturing
and
Fishing
Industries
Inc.
wherein
Judge
Asuncion
was
the
president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with

"acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the
New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and
Canon
25
of
the
Canons
of
Judicial
Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended
on
her
decision
dated
March
27,
1971
that
Judge
Asuncion
be
exonerated.
Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E
which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency
as
a
judge
of
the
CFI
of
Leyte
constitute
an
"act
unbecoming
of
a
judge"?
Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be
more
discreet
in
his
private
and
business
activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in
Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in
question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the
plaintiffs
Reyes
after
the
finality
of
the
decision
in
Civil
Case
No.
3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of
Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision
of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent
Judge
Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent
participated
had
obviously
no
relation
or
connection
with
his
judicial
office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its
incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77
Bernardita Macariola vs. Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI Leyte
A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS:
In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining
the legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties.
The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the
project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion in 1965.

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge on the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which
was involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their

profession".

Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition
were insignificant portions of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

HELD:
No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property in 1965 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy
the property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted
as a dummy of Asuncion.

Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got were insignificant portions of the land.

The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal transactions.
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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409

January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that
a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently,
the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation
of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity
and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary
allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he
receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster
Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we
have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the
supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may
be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out
of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of
the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary
implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists
during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as
suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4
Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,
supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the
occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy
territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of
the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without
putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of
the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the
inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to
the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as
above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or
sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the
same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he
adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more
than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one
hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he

receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign,
and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy
military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political
laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim
cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or
not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war,
correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of
firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate
government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader
for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation
of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the
legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his
pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the
occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the
usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States
Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the
territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in
force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not
demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed
by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist
and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and
would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of
the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not
aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of

their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in
the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words,
to commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally
intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime
against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article
II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall
remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the
Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United
States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as
having now the status as a government of other independent nations in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record,
Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United
States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of
the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people
retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the
Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed
against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an
offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this
constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set
forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a
separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when
peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It
remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with
national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to the enemy,
or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical
with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason,
under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended.
Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he
receives.
"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.
"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is." United
States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render
service and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government
and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.
By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for
the protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an
absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or
subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence.
Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.

"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject.
Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such
as is due from all men born within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural
allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an implied contract with
the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire
by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being
acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent
to the King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to
foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they
receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns.,
188, 911. (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)
Allegiance. Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political
duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government; the obligation of fidelity and
obedience which the individual owes to the government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to
the right of protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.
Classification. Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance that which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance that arising through
some circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that arising from residence simply within the country, for
however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be
tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)
Allegiance. the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the
protection he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).
"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it.
The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The machinery through which it
operates is its government. The persons who operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state utters or enforces are its law,
and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1
American Journal of International Law, p. 915.).
The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:
Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty protection on the part of the society. These
are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)

Allegiance. The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to
the sovereign, correlative with the protection received.
It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty,
i. e., absolute and qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or
sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local allegiance continuing during such
residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle
that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical
publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible that
they had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of
sovereignty have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the famous
words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and in opposition to the
people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than
in the pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people.
To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended
during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our government stopped to function in the country. But the
idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could
not have been suspended during the enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible
middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended
personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.
There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes
the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of
suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms
during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda.
de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of changing the name

of our Government and the withdrawal by the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty
of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United
States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people,
accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President
Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part outstanding and
brilliant, it may be added in the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future democratic federal constitution of
the world government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired by all who want to be
spared the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power
granted by the Election Code to the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public
calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power,
authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the
Commonwealth which, by his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the Japanese occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of
Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason
or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service."
Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor
nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did
not entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state,
the same should be suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from the
indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.
Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy
occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an
indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the social
compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of
course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaning the
loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue, irrespective of
the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal protection.

After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by
Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil.,
113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept petitioner's
theory.
If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one
constituted by the Filipino people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones that could claim obedience from our
citizens.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it
is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring
absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity,
understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them.
The enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility
of political, social and ethical ideologies between our people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside from the
initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the
Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.
Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a
reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To
love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of international law, could not have established in our country any government
that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance even
a temporary one from a decent people.
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague
Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on
imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium of the
invaders.
Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682
took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2,
1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive departments have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese occupation, all
laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should be enforced.

That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, ever dared to expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the
laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement
of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort
to help quash the pending treason cases at any cost.
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile
by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart.
Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally accepted
principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative
but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in nature than the
Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the offspring
devours its parent.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it
would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and
other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all
our laws shall continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in force laws and appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it
necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided that
the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may
not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available the
necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are
now under indictment for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to
revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations
with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of law that they are free
from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of test.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the
occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to
their legitimate government and to the United States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty here; but
my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles
which came to be known as International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian
life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential excesses of
which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not
on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the
reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared
to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well defined
battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only in the
countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly subscribe
to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the
prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President Truman of June 7, 1945:
International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international
law are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a change circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from
time to time in adopting settled principles to new situations.
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After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time
the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of
legitimate warfare was no longer available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive warmaking is illegal and criminal.
The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which
Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound
themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.

Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L.
Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, "war between nations was renounced by the signatories of
the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no
longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete
many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.
This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind
that unjustifiable war is a crime.
Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the
representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an International crime. . . .
The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared
that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously
adopted a resolution stating that "war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."
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We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it
are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of peace. ("U.S.A. An American Review," published by the United
States Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war,"
he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust war the war of
defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report.
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of
the 20th century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report,
the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the view-point that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind
that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression
constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an
international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of
aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack against the Philippines and its consequent
invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.

Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and
accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military
occupation in the course of really justifiable war.
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the
last month of 1941 of the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to
seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules and
principles of international law governing the matter. With the modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its
implications, among them the outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed
and renounced. This is only one way of saving that the rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were automatically
abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact.
If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which
occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or posses any legitimate power or right
growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the Pacific war,
could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense and only this sense should we speak here with respect to this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar
breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either to the person of the owner or to his property.
To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same as in
case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable
contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their
occupation invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes trials.
Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government has a representative in the international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in
Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a
crime. Not only this, but this country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of national policy (Constitution, Article II,
section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during
that war the rules and principles of international law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court
recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese
"war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such
circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and government?
(b) But even in the hypothesis and not more than a mere hypothesis that when Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was
engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a notion by its citizens is one of those
high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with.

. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that
irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of some highly important
privileges. These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection
with or residence in the occupied territory.
The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law,
2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.)
. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no
temporary allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)
The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to
their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him.
In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance
to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may compel them to take an oath sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' . . . willingly to submit to his 'legitimate
commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel
the inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of obedience to his laws; and
since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them, does not
constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the one's country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be bound
to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved
from the loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring. The outward manifestation of one
or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings,
and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of the spirit of the
people should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and
say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence was disabled from affording them protection, they were
released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal
responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their crime.
II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the
self-same people before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the
Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said Constitution
stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of

the Philippines." Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical government thereafter
only the name of that government was to be changed.
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being
entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of
treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued, along with
the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of
the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution" of course, meaning the
Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty resided and resides
in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been
any change in its respect.
If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if,
following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the
"Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after independence
became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence
that they became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of
age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically independent be extinguished after they
acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the same only his status has changed.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the
international law adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that
"laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect
the welfare and safety of his command, such action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the
United States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior to the
independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of
any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely
different factual bases.

Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of
the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the
Military Administration under martial law over the district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February 20, 1942, providing
that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further
orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3
reminding that "all laws and regulations of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the application of "laws and regulations which
are not proper act under the present situation of the Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes."
The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less
at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over progressive needs of
civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."
These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and
by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to himself as clothed with freedom to
endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure
exerted upon enemy officials who are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945,
p. 1879.)
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict
with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the
security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 297), and
to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country" (Hague
Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government of the occupant and are
bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the
territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be
promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting
Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II. Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)
He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers.
To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the
following passage:
To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and
other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and
impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and
institutions on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance,
if only temporary, to Japan.

The only sensible purpose of the treason law which is of political complexion and taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the
belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), must be the preservation
of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is merely the
exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military
occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing or displaced government
cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step
of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd
proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of
the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete
with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the
legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to
comply with what the occupant has ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from the prosecution by the
occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)
As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state
of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant, against which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants
cannot obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted and punished for an
act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.
In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed
in the following passage (page 298):
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the accused under
that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution
be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a constitution should operate
prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh
edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.
In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the Japanese military occupation against the United States or the
Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the time of
the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because, under
article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution,
more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension
was good only as to the military occupant?

The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas.,
773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States the court of highest human authority on that subject and as the decision was against the
United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and while no
department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind
of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the
war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of Maine, and
held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without
paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place by treaty restored to the United States, and after that was done Government of the United States
sought to recover from the persons so introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would have
been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the
United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of the United States (the power of that government there having since
been restored) was bound so to decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that
great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine during its
occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties
cannot be sustained. . . . The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully
enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary
allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could
be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by
the inhabitants were subjects to such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into the Unites States.' The
court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been
imported there previous to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or
municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of
the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerents
occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the
United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the
law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the purpose of the application
of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct
sense done within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and
that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can
have any important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself or
its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully
enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect
violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are
to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the
doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the
military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare,

1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory of another State does not
operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the time
being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the
Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary
allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the territory wherein he resides
in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his
own government; he is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of political nature of his own government; and the
protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can expect from a belligerent
army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits
of such other States, should insist that States should provide system of law and of courts, and in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice
to alien residents. This does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it
grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law
impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)
When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a
crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion over
the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be "delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their
own government, without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying
with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of taking part military
operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes
if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law should be corrected by such world agency as the
United Nations organizations.
It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the
ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there
would not be any Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas
after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting forces, they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering that the latter's
military strength at the time and the long period during which they were left military unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic
bomb as a possible means of destruction.

If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen
enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst
of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent to
the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent
occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control
over them. At heart they remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to interfere
with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted
by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or
customary prohibitions, proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised
Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a little more than three years. Said
occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by
Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations
accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945],
Vol. III, p. 1879.)
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism
of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the
Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died during the last war,
and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people as
a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and
American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but they met and will
unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the perils of military
operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military
authorities of the returning sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law,
and under this group even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to person or property; the
buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the
death of, or injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war against the United
States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies.
The recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal
sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors.
It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the
Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the Philippines, when their mere physical presence implied force and pressure and not after the American forces
of liberation had restored the Philippine Government that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to release the Filipinos
temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were those
who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody
who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave aid and
comfort to the enemy.

Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and
force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who
was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, did
not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the
President of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and
benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The United
States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all the laws of a political nature and even
require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of
American Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the
control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from which it
is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the
authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people
should be in a better position to know what will save them during the military occupation than any exile government.
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics
who "see no reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he,
but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts that are
merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing
criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than
that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from the editorial
appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the Japanese military occupation, they were at most borrowing the famous
and significant words of President Roxas errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of
suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to
their country.
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to
prosecute treason committed against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the United
States. This court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion and sedition
are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides
that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior
to the independence of the Philippines, was subervient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition to its many provisions

essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn.
The framers of the Constitution had to make said declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the
Preamble should not have announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their posterity the "blessings of independence."
No one, we suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent country under the Commonwealth Government.
The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained
unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.
The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. It has already been seen that the exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various
organs which, collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can be easily appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a
State should be formulated and executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the control of other States. There is, however,
nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental agencies of another
State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental agencies of other States,
those governmental agencies thus becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these
agencies do not cease to be Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they were originally created.
By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal
competence again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to colonies almost
complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and
improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and
the continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only
administrative autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite State,
the cooperating States may yield to the central Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or,
on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an
amplitude of powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any
considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local self-government be granted to particular districts. (Willoughby,
The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75.).
The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty
although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such
autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the
sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested.
It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by
the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even when selecting
members for the national legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents of
the National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)

This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested.
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is
the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States
and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an
independent State not receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or against its instrumentality, the
Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the
Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the Republic.
Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippines Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until
amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried,
and determined under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains,
however, that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United
States or the government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the Constitution of the
present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have
been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and
application of an ex post facto law.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38),
that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same
court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S., 308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over the
Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the
mother country, the United States.
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having
now the status as a government of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as
having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no
less also than the President of the United States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine
Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President Osmea who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth
Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines.

The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed
against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained,
treason against either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

Footnotes
PARAS, J., dissenting:
1

English case of De Jager vs. Attorney General of Naval; Belgian case of Auditeur Militaires vs. Van Dieren; cases of Petain, Laval and Quisling.