Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No elective public officer may charge his political party affiliation during
his terms of office, and no candidate for any elective public organization
may change his political party affiliation within six months immediately
preceding or following an election (Section 10, Art. XII [C]).
Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 180700, 04 March 2008
Finally, to make the constitutional prohibition, applicable to the period beyond the
frame up, term to which public officials were elected in the 1971 local elections
under their respective political parties would work manifest injustice and unduly
impinge on the freedom of association guaranteed to all individuals, incumbent
public officials who ran during the last election (1971 elections) prior to the 1973
Constitution which embodies the said novel provision, would be undoubtedly
unjustifiably prejudiced if the party under the banner of which they ran and won,
would no longer participate in the succeeding elections after the effectivity of the
new Constitution, such as the Liberal Party in the case at bar which boycotted all
elections during and after the lifting of martial law. In the present case, it appears
that most of the prominent LP leaders who participated in the elections held after
the effectivity of new Constitution, campaigned and ran under new opposition
groups such as the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN), National Union for Liberation (NUI),
Mindanao Alliance (MA), Pusyon Bisaya, Bicol Saro and other new political
aggrupations. This we believe was not the manifest intention of the framers.\
Hence, the more logical interpretation is that which gives effect to Section 10 of
Article XII (C) of the 1973 Constitution and does not violate the individuals basic
right to association.
Genaro Reyes Construction v. CA
G.R. No. 108718 July 14, 1994
The discretion, therefore, of the DPWH to terminate or rescind contract comes into
play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of
15% or more. In the instant case, the negative slippage of petitioners at the time
they were served the notice of termination was only 9. 86%. Hence, respondents
violated the law and committed an illegal act and abused their discretion when
they terminated petitioners contract based in negative slippage of only 9.86%.
Such wrongful and illegal act is in derogation of petitioners right not to be
deprived of property without due process of law. Petitioners contract with the
DPWH covering the project in question is a proprietary right within the meaning of
the Constitution and can only be rescinded strictly in accordance with the
governing law, Presidential Decree No. 1870, as implemented by DPWH Circular
No. 102.
RULES OF COURT
Section 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. (2a)
Vette Industrial Sales v. Cheng
G.R. No. 170232, 05 December 2006
A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due
process intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a
motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is
permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
Circumstances in the case at bar show that private respondent was not denied
procedural due process and that the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been
served. On the day of the hearing, Atty. Desierto did not object to the said Motion
for lack of notice to him; in fact, he was furnished in open court with a copy of the
motion and was granted by the trial court thirty days to file his opposition to it.
These circumstances clearly justify a departure from the literal application of the
notice of hearing rule. In other cases, after the trial court learns that a motion lacks
such notice, the prompt resetting of the hearing with due notice to all the parties is
held to have cured the defect.
Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due
process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application that renders
any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to
promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of any action and proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, we believe
that Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that the Motion for
Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper.
PNB v. Deang Marketing
G.R. No. 17793, 08 December 2008
It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended.
(12) The courts discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon
such motions timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to
entertain or grant it, [13] Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of
the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend.
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The bare
invocation of the interest of substantial justice is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel this court to suspend procedural rules.
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction
of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities.
This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained
at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in
the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement
of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsically in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other,
or as often suggested that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedures must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain
his failure to abide by the rules.
Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner
G.R. No. L-25602 February 18, 1970
It is true that in construction of tax statutes, tax exemptions (and deductions are of
this nature) are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer.
However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is
clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the courts seeking the
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction. In this case, we find the provision of Section 186-A
Whenever a tax free product is utilized, etc.all encompassing to
comprehend tax-free raw materials, even if imported. Where the law
provided no qualification for the granting of the privilege, the court is not
at liberty to supply any.
Serfino v. CA
G.R. No. L-40858, 15 September 1987
The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed
procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of
property rights should be follower punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes
governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but
also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public
officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land
owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement
of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale.
People v. Castaeda
G.R. No. L-46881, September 15, 1988
Accused Valencia argued that the People were estopped from questioning his
entitlement to the benefits of the tax amnesty, considering that agents of the BIR
had already accepted his application for tax amnesty and his payment of the
required fifteen percent (15%) special tax.
This contention does not persuade. At the time he paid the special fifteen percent
(15%) tax under P.D. No. 370, accused Francisco Valencia had in fact already
been subjected by the BIR to extensive investigation such that the criminal
charges against him could not be condoned under the provisions of the amnesty
statute. Further, acceptance by the BIR agents of accused Valencias application
for tax amnesty and payment of the fifteen percent (15%) special tax was no more
than a ministerial duty on the part of such agents. Accused Valencia does not
pretend that the BIR had actually ruled that he was entitled to the benefits of the
tax amnesty statute. In any case, even assuming, though only arguendo, that the
BIR had so ruled, there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and
enforcement of law by public officers do not block, subsequent correct application
of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on
the part of its agent, which finds application in the case at bar.
Still further, a tax amnesty, much like to a tax exemption, is never favored not
presumed in law and it granted by statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of a
tax exemption must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing authority. Valencias payment of the special fifteen percent (15%) tax
must be regarded as legally ineffective.
CIR v. BF Goodrich Phil. and CA
G.R. No. 104171, February 24, 1999
Loong v. Comelec
G.R. No. 133676, 14 April 1999
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where
the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing.
We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from
levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives
the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to have COMELEC
all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only
reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes in the six (6)
municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is
that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly
determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal
interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when
machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an
election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to
be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot
count the result of an election.
Our decisions have been in cadence with the movement towards empowering the
COMELEC in order that it can more effectively perform its duty of safeguarding
the sanctity of our elections. In Cauton vs. COMELEC, we laid down this liberal
approach, viz:
The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections
and to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters.
The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular
government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do
everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the
elections.
Home Insurance v, Eastern Shipping Lines
G.R. No. L-34382, July 20, 1983
To repeat, the objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an
unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade
relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries.
Alpha Insurance v. Castos
G.R. No. 198174, 02 September 2003
In denying respondents claim, petitioner takes exception by arguing that the word
"damage," under paragraph 4 of "Exceptions to Section III," means loss due to
Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the
retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
We do not agree.
True, it is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that the terms of a contract
are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the
parties thereto have used. In the case of property insurance policies, the evident
intention of the contracting parties, i.e., the insurer and the assured, determine the
import of the various terms and provisions embodied in the policy. However, when
the terms of the insurance policy are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain, such that
the parties themselves disagree about the meaning of particular provisions, the
policy will be construed by the courts liberally in favor of the assured and strictly
against the insurer.
Retirement laws should be liberally construed and applied in favor of the persons
intended to be benefitted thereby, for, as we again held in the Ortiz case:
". . . . To a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred
compensation for services performed and his right thereto commences to vest
upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation
in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly,
retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public employment. They serve
a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce able
persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and
efficient service while so employed."
Tantuico v. Domingo
Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the government that may be
discovered from the audit concerning his fiscal responsibility as former COA
Chairman, respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under
the retirement laws.
In Romana Cruz v. Hon. Francisco Tantuico, 166 SCRA 670 (1988), the National
Treasurer withheld the retirement benefits of an employee because of his finding
that she negligently allowed the anomalous encashment of falsified treasury
warrants.
In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the respondents, we found that
the employee had been cleared by the National Treasurer from all money and
property responsibility, and held that the retirement pay accruing to a public officer
may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.
In Tantuico, we cited Justice Laurel's essay on the rationale for the benign ruling in
favor of the retired employees, thus:
. . . Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the
Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide
the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless
otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the
pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved
was had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial
process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view
of the prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by
administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and
enable the respondent to do indirectly what they cannot do directly under Section
3 of the Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved on
February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies
Section 624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that
year. Considering Section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general
authority granted in Section 624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between
the two provisions is avoided (Hunt v. Hernandez, 64 Phil. 753 [1937]).
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor
General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the
benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment,
levy or execution.
Estolas v. Mabalot
Agrarian laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of the grantee, in order to give
full force and effect to their clear intent, which is to achieve a dignified existence
for the small farmers and to make them more independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.
Republic v. Ong
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued
with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden
of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law.
Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his familys basic needs,
but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable
margin of income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income
over his familys expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide him and his
family with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability
to work.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the
qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law.
Velasco v. Republic
We agree to the foregoing finding. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that
petitioner was employed at the Wilson Drug Store only on February, 1957 with a
salary of P150.00 a month, or barely a month before he filed the instant petition,
and that said store is partly owned by his mother who has one-fifth capital
investment therein. This leads one to believe that petitioner's employment, even if
true, is but a convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family in order to
show a token compliance with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipino
citizen one must a lucrative income or occupation.
CONFLICTING STATUTES
Apex Mining v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
G.R. No. 152613, 30 November 2009
In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM contends that Proclamation No.
297, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and declaring the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area a mineral reservation, is invalid on the ground that it lacks the
concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution;
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act
No. 7586, and Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.
It is well-settled that when questions of constitutionality are raised, the court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present:
(1) an actual and appropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is readily
clear that the third requisite is absent. The general rule is that the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised
in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not raised in the
trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
It was only after the assailed Decision was promulgated -- i.e., in SEMs Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Decision filed on 13 July 2006 and its Motion
for Referral of the Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments filed on 22
August 2006 -- that it assailed the validity of said proclamation. Certainly, posing
the question on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 for the first time in its
Motion for Reconsideration is, indeed, too late.
It is a rudimentary principle in legal hermeneutics that where there are two acts or
provisions, one of which is special and particular and certainly involves the matter
in question, the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the matter
and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special act must as
intended be taken as constituting an exception to the general act or provision,
especially when such general and special acts or provisions are
contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a
conflict.
Hence, it has become an established rule of statutory construction that where one
statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the
same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible;
but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was
passed prior to the general statute. Or where two statutes are of contrary tenor or
of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the
one specially designed therefor should prevail over the other.
It must be observed that Republic Act No. 3092, An Act to Amend Certain
Sections of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, and the Administrative
Code of 1987, are general laws. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3092 and Section
14 of the Administrative Code of 1987 require the concurrence of Congress before
any portion of a forest reserve can be validly excluded therefrom. These
provisions are broad since they deal with all kinds of exclusion or reclassification
relative to forest reserves, i.e., forest reserve areas can be transformed into all
kinds of public purposes, not only the establishment of a mineral reservation.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 is a special provision, as it specifically treats of
the establishment of mineral reservations only. Said provision grants the
President the power to proclaim a mineral land as a mineral reservation,
regardless of whether such land is also an existing forest reservation.
Sec. 5(a) of Republic Act No. 7586 provides:
Sec. 5. Establishment and Extent of the System. The establishment and
operationalization of the System shall involve the following:
(a)
All areas or islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated or set aside,
pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive
order as national park, game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness
area, strict nature reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural
and historical landmark, protected and managed landscape/seascape as well as
identified virgin forests before the effectivity of this Act are hereby designated as
initial components of the System. The initial components of the System shall be
governed by existing laws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this Act.
Furthermore, the settled rule of statutory construction is that if two or more laws of
different dates and of contrary tenors are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of
legislative will.
City of Manila v. Teotico
G.R. No. L-23052, 29 January 1968
The issue is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 reads:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer,
to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.
the same Code, which speaks of real actions, indicates that it is an exception to
the rule in the previous article.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of
Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid
down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has
held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games
of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners
are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games
of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated
with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring
to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D.
1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this
misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an
ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the
change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also
enacted by the national lawmaking authority.
In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely
"modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over
the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D.
1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change
or repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the
decree has only been "modified protanto," they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the
Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co.
v. Apostol, this Court explained:
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is readily
clear that the third requisite is absent. The general rule is that the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised
in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not raised in the
trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the
assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect;
but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has
become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a
former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two
statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each
other the relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869.
It was only after the assailed Decision was promulgated -- i.e., in SEMs Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Decision filed on 13 July 2006 and its Motion
for Referral of the Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments filed on 22
August 2006 -- that it assailed the validity of said proclamation. Certainly, posing
the question on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 for the first time in its
Motion for Reconsideration is, indeed, too late.
The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of
Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the
deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to
Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of
Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be
subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
Nitafan v. Commissioner
In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM contends that Proclamation No.
297, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and declaring the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area a mineral reservation, is invalid on the ground that it lacks the
concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution;
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act
No. 7586, and Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of
the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987. Although the intent
may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a
proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has
authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the
salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all
other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then
discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that
declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the
income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices
and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law
applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by
Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President
and his official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz
after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and
debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions,
originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the
Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be
stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise
more powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain
parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the
Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office
or employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective
public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during
his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of
Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act
as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall
not have been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such absurd consequence can be
avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e.,
Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e.,
Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner
must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article
VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory.
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail 42 as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how
it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.
Co v. HRET
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1. the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women.
There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue
of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or
after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228;
Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born
Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it
to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot
be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Further, even if foreigners who own more than forty percent of the voting shares
elect an all-Filipino board of directors, this situation does not guarantee Filipino
control and does not in any way cure the violation of the Constitution. The
independence of the Filipino board members so elected by such foreign
shareholders is highly doubtful.
As the OSG pointed out, quoting Justice George Sutherlands words in
Humphreys Executor v. US,44 x x x it is quite evident that one who holds his
office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain
an attitude of independence against the latters will. Allowing foreign shareholders
to elect a controlling majority of the board, even if all the directors are Filipinos,
grossly circumvents the letter and intent of the Constitution and defeats the very
purpose of our nationalization laws.
Ordillo v. COMELEC
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote
that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region"
used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the
fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D.
No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it
must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins
other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be
applied in this case.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage
fee is the volume of waste currently generated by each person in Quezon City,
which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the increasing trend of
waste generation for the past three years.
Respondents did not elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect
thepecific types of wastes generated whether residential, market,
commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural, agroindustrial, institutional, etc.
It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such amount pertains to
the totality of wastes, without any
distinction, generated by Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the
authority of a municipality or city to impose fees extends only to those related to
the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day
refers only to non-recyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain the
validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable
and based as far as practicable on the taxpayers ability to pay, and not unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor
area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing
project or apartment.
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction
between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most
likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does
not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable.
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident
of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay
twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of
Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of
whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Belgica v. The Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr.
G.R. No. 20856, 19 November 2013
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all
other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or
executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience
and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in
the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of
nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if
there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In
the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored."268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Araullo v. Aquino
G.R. No. 209287, 03 February 2015
As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it
the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will
result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling,
the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the
country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification of
the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic
services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of
nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and
practices under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded
projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot sustain
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442.