Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158182

June 12, 2008

SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14
May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of
petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section 68, 3 Presidential Decree No. 705
(PD 705),4 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003 denied
admission of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 5
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court)
with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and
remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod
Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership. 6
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that
petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio
Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,7 Royo summoned petitioner to
a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree,
petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar
Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in
October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written
authorization signed by Calix's wife.8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.
When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier
claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calix's permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to
convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra
trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to
the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber.
Hernandez took custody of the lumber, 9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued
an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod
Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter. 10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial
Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the
preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he
cut the narra tree with Calix's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor 11 found probable cause to
indict petitioner and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No.
2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo, and
Hernandez who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the treecutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he
had no part in the tree-cutting.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged,
sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal and ordered theseized lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor. 12 The trial
court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions
that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and
petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation
of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also
contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based
on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of
PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but
ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. 13 The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of
cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals
also found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest
officer considering that the case underwent preliminary investigation by the proper officer who
filed the Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling,
sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion
temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "the penalty to be
imposed on [petitioner] should be (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial court imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003,
did not admit his motion for having been filed late. 15
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE
CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST
PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND
CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS
COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT
THE STANDING AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS MANDATED
BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE
CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING
OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE
THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME. 16
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that (1) the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest
officer, filed the complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section
68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:17
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even
though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest

officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The
Trial
Criminal Case No. 2207

Court

Acquired

Jurisdiction

Over

We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be
initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals, 18 non-compliance of which ousts the trial
court of jurisdiction from trying such cases. 19However, these cases concern only defamation and
other crimes against chastity20 and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint
before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD
705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses
defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or
employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials,shall immediately be
investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the
report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the
investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80
refers to "reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the
area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or
any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their
presence."22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property
but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus,
Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima
facie evidence to support the complaint or report." 23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded,
either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For
its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls
within its exclusive original jurisdiction. 24
Petitioner
is
Liable
Property Without Permit

for

Cutting

Timber

in

Private

Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts 25 penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, ortimber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in

addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing
of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting,
gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority;26 and (3) the possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed timber
or other forest products from a private land 28 without x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his
liablity, if ever, should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]
timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner
did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a
lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x
xtimber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit. 29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a DENR
permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently
represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so
only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in
question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind
him.30 Petitioner does not explain why Royo and Hernandez, public officials who testified under
oath in their official capacities, would lie on the stand to implicate petitioner in a serious
criminal offense, not to mention that the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of
regularity. Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's authorization to Royo and
Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use of
Calix's authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in the Mayod
Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes
"timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only "forest
product" (which circuitously includes "timber.") 31 Does the narra tree in question constitute
"timber" under Section 68? The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section
68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In other jurisdictions,
timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions 33 or certain "stand age" or
"rotation age."34 In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 35 this Court was faced with a
similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether
possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that
"lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or
timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While
the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3,
the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
"Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the
1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words

and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. And in so far as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended,
makes no distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we. 36 x x x
x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its
common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or
joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling,
beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber. 38
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into
"several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x
consisting of 111 board feet x x x." These measurements were indicated in the apprehension
receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in
evidence.39 Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled log left in the Mayod
Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end measured
65 centimeters and the length was 2.8 meters." 40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled
and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls
under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article
310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not
exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such
value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.

.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,
when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall
have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning
a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring 111
board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod Property is
included, the amount increases toP20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on
Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are
his "estimates" based on "prevailing local price." 41
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty
imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more
than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. 42 In the absence of independent and
reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under
Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the
case.43 In People v. Dator44 where, as here, the accused was charged with violation of Section 68
of PD 705, as amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the prosecution's evidence for
the lumber's value consisted of an estimate made by the apprehending authorities whose
apparent lack of corroboration was compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the
estimate was not presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the minimum
penalty under Article 309(6)45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining
here, the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May
2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is
sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years,
four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Associate Justices

Cancio C. Garcia (a retired member of this Court) and Marina L. Buzon, concurring.
3

Re-numbered as Section 77 under Section 7, Republic Act No. 7161.

The Revised Forestry Code.

Filed by petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Marcelino P. Arias.

The Information alleged (CA rollo, p. 10):

That on or about the 23rd day of December 1998, in barangay Ipil,
municipality of Magdiwang, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously cut, gather, collect, remove
and/or caused to be cut, gathered and removed one (1) narra tree [from] the
private land owned by OSCAR M. TANSIONGCO and converted the same into
several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3)
pcs. 2x18x7 narra sawn lumber were confiscated by the elements of the
DENR personnel consisting of 111 board feet, valued in the sum
of P3,330.00, Philippine currency, including the remaining felled narra tree

showing the total amount of P20,930.40 due to the government, without

having first secured and obtained the necessary permit or license and/or
legal supporting documents from the proper authorities.
7

Other parts of the records place this date on 26 December 1998.

Imelda Muros.

Valued at P3,330.00. If a larger part of the narra tree, left at the Mayod Property,
is included in the valuation, the total amount is P20,930.40. The Information filed
against petitioner alleged the higher amount.
10

The records do not contain the results of the investigation.

11

Senior State Prosecutor-OIC PPO Francisco F. Benedicto, Jr.

12

The dispositive portion of the ruling provides (rollo, p. 31):

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused SESINANDO MERIDA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the aforementioned
Information, dated January 28, 2000, and hereby sentences him to an
indeterminate sentence of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, and to pay the costs.

13

The dispositive portion of the ruling provides (id. at 51):

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 24 November 2000 trial court
decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendant-appellant is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. The
forest products derived from the narra tree, including the 6 pieces of lumber,
are confiscated in favor of the government.

14

Id. at 51.

15

The Court of Appeals entered judgment on 27 August 2002.

16

Rollo, p. 14.

17

The OSG does not claim that this Court is precluded from reviewing the Court of
Appeals' rulings for having attained finality. At any rate, the Court resolved to give
due course to the petition in the interest of justice taking into account the nature of
the case and the issues raised for resolution.
18

Section 5, Rule 110.

19

See People v. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372 (1934); People v. Trinidad, 58 Phil. 163 (1933).

20

Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction, and Acts of Lasciviousness.

21

G.R. No. 46772, 13 February 1992, 206 SCRA 187.

22

Id. at 194.

23

It cannot be said, however, that Hernandez failed to act on Tansiongco's report as

Hernandez conducted field investigation, oversaw the confiscation of the lumber,
and took part in the subsequent DENR investigation.
24

Under Section 20 in relation to Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as

amended by Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts are vested with exclusive
original jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six
years. Here, the offense for which petitioner was charged is punishable byreclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods (that is, 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 20 years) and thus falls under the RTC Romblon's exclusive original

jurisdiction.
25

The other acts penalized under PD 705, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1559 and re-numbered by RA 7161, are: cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber
or other products without license (Section 77); unlawful occupation or destruction
of forest lands (Section 78); pasturing livestock (Section 79); illegal occupation of
national parks system and recreation areas and vandalism therein (Section 80);
destruction of wildlife resources (Section 81); survey by unauthorized person
(Section 82); misclassification and survey by government official or employee
(Section 83); tax declaration on real property (Section 84); coercion and influence
(Section 85); unlawful possession of implements and devices used by forest officers
(Section 86); payment, collection and remittance of forest charges (Section 87);
and sale of wood products (Section 88).
26

Thus, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that Section 68 of PD 705 does not
penalize the cutting of timber in private land.
27

In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257
SCRA 430), the acts falling under the first and second groups were lumped
together. The elements for the criminal acts under the first and second groups are:
(1) that the accused cut, gathered, collected, or removed timber of other forest
products; (2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected, or
removed belong to the government or to any private individual; and (3) that the
cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing was without authority under a license
agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state (People v. CFI of Quezon,
G.R. No. 46772, 13 February 1992, 206 SCRA 187).
28

It cannot be determined from the records if the Mayod Property is registered.

29

Under DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21, dated 28 February 2000, private
land owners are required to obtain a Special Private Land Timber Permit (SPLTP)
from the DENR to cut, gather and utilize premium hardwood species, whether
planted or naturally-grown.
30

Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: "The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him."
31

Section 3(q), PD 705 provides: "Forest product means timber, pulpwood,

firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or
other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water,
fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest lands."
(Emphasis supplied)
32

Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257
SCRA 430.
33

In the Pacific and Northwestern Region (Region 6) of the United States Forest
Service, timber utilization limits are set as follows: length - 8 feet; diameter
(breast-height) - 9 inches; and top diameter - 4 inches (see A Review of the Forest
Practices Code of British Columbia and Fourteen other Jurisdictions Background
Report - 1995 at http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/legsregs/westland/report/2-3.htm
[British Columbia Report]).
34

In the Baden-Wurttemberg State of the Federal Republic of Germany, the "stand

ages" are: 50 years for coniferous stands and 70 years for deciduous stands
(Section 16 of the Forest Law). In Sweden, the following are the minimum rotation
age: conifer stands - 45 years to 100 years (depending on the quality of the site);
hardwood stands - 35 years; and oak and beech trees - 100 years (see British
Columbia Report).
35

Supra.

36

Supra at 448.

37

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1996 ed.).

38

Wood pulps from timber can also be used for paper production.

39

Exh. "E."

40

RTC Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 25.

41

CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 42.

42

Lucas v. Court of Appeals, 438 Phil. 530 (2002). See also People v. Elizaga, 86
Phil. 364 (1950).
43

People v. Dator, 398 Phil. 109 (2000). The Court deems it improper to take
judicial notice of the selling price of narra at the time of the commission of the
offense in this case. Such evidence would both be unreliable and inconclusive
considering the lack of independent and competent source of such information.
44

Supra.

45

Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.

46

The Court also took into account the following circumstances: (1) the accused, a
janitor, cut the pieces of soft lumber from his mother's landholding for use in
renovating his house and (2) the accused had no prior record for violation of PD
705. Here, petitioner also appears to have no record for violation of PD 705.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995

AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Regional Director, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Region VIII, Tacloban City, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Hinunangan Silago,
Southern Leyte,respondent.
RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:
At around 10:00 o'clock of November 14, 1992, police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan,
Southern Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally
cut lumber. The truck and logs were impounded. A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the
alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent Judge
Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the
release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge alleging that his order releasing
the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest products violated Presidential Decree 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A 1 and Administrative Order No. 59,
Series of 1990. 2 Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority to order the release
of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been
turned over to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern

Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office.
In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation,
he found that Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand and
gravel and the delivery of hollow blocks. On his way home after delivering hollow blocks in
Barangay Sto. Nio II, he met his friend Cabig who requested him to load sliced lumber and
deliver the same at Brgy. Lungsod-daan, Hinundayan to be used for the construction of a
barangay high school building. They were apprehended when the truck had a flat tire. After
changing the tire, both the lumber and the truck were ordered deposited at the police station of
Hinunangan.
Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in the crime of illegal logging
and, being a mere accessory, he might be utilized by the Acting Chief of Police as prosecution
witness against Cabig. More importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only Cabig,
respondent Judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the release of the truck owned
by Golpe.
The Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that a formal
investigation be conducted. An excerpt from its Memorandum states:
We find the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. While he is authorized to
conduct preliminary investigation in all cases of violations of P.D. 705, as amended,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, Sec. 68-A thereof
provides that it is the Department Head or his duly authorized representative who
may order the confiscation and disposition of the forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
There may be some facts that are not extant in the records which can only come out
during a formal investigation to better establish clear culpability or exoneration over
the respondent.
In view thereof, and to give respondent an opportunity to clear himself, it is
respectfully recommended that this matter be referred to Acting Executive Judge
Leandro T. Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for investigation,
report and recommendation within sixty days from receipt of the records. 3
In the Resolution of November 8, 1993, the Court resolved to refer the case to Acting Executive
Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for investigation, report
and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records. 4
During the first two hearing dates, complainant was unable to attend but sent his
representatives, DENR lawyer Constantino Esber and legal assistant Romeo Gulong. Respondent
Judge appeared with his counsel. However, on the third hearing date, respondent Judge failed to
appear as he suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Thereafter, DENR counsel Esber manifested
that their office has filed a motion for reinvestigation and for the turnover of the jeep to the PNP
and subsequently, to the DENR. He also manifested that the complainant is submitting the
administrative matter for resolution and recommendation without adducing evidence against
respondent. Respondent's counsel did not object to complainant's manifestation. The counsel of
both complainant and respondent jointly agreed to submit the case for appropriate action.
The Investigating Judge's confidential report, in part, states:
In view of this development in the course of an intended investigation this
investigator could not elicit additional facts than are found in the records, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory. Respondent was given an opportunity to explain the
unfavorable circumstances against him but he was overtaken by a serious illness.

So much was expected from the complainant to supply the facts not extant in the
records, but he lost interest in substantiating his April 1993 report to the Supreme
Court. In fact, he was submitting this administrative matter for resolution without
adducing evidence against respondent.
Except for the 21 January 1994 motion for reinvestigation of DENR counsel Esber
which sought for the inclusion of jeep owner and driver Dionisio Golpe in the
criminal information, there is nothing new that can be added to the facts found by
the Honorable Deputy Court Administrator as reflected in his Memorandum for the
Honorable Chief Justice dated 12 October 1993.
There being no actual investigation conducted, no additional facts could be reported
and consequently, there is no basis for a recommendation on the basis of facts.
This investigator can only recommend appropriate action by the Supreme Court on
the basis of the facts already extant in the records with a prayer for consideration of
respondent plight especially so since on account of this investigation his health has
deteriorated and may affect his efficiency output as a judge. Perhaps, allowing him
to bow out of the service with honor and corresponding benefits. 5
During the pendency of this case, respondent Judge filed for disability retirement. His application
was approved but his pension was not released pending the outcome of this case.
We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe
legally justifiable, hence, he is not subject to any disciplinary sanction.
According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this cannot be done if such proceeds
and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for offense." In this case,
the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited
in the event accused therein be convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was
not indicted. Hence, there was no justification for respondent Judge not to release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A and Adm.
Order No. 59, the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representative has the power to
confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws.
However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in relation to the
administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.
We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the preliminary
investigation and satisfied himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck, he
violated Pres. Decree No. 705 and Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not render
nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation proceedings under
Adm. Order No. 59 6 is different from the confiscation under the Revised Penal Code, which is an
additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the order of release, the truck can
be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the truck
owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before the lower court
or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he
confiscation of the conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any criminal
action which shall be filed against the owner thereof or any person who used the conveyance in
the commission of the offense."
Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances, respondent Judge should have turned
over the truck to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Juan,
Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition. No doubt, this would have simplified matters and
prevented the present situation from occurring wherein one government official files a complaint
against another. Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR

field offices, deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs
and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices and
turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. A period of
about two weeks lapsed from the time the seizure was made before a complaint was filed. During
this period, the apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the logs and the truck to
the nearest DENR field office for proper action and disposition since the duty to turn over the
truck to the nearest DENR field office rests on the officials apprehending the illegal logs. There
being no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not
be visited with disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field office in
San Juan, Southern Leyte.
The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the National Police, the DENR, the prosecutors, and the
members of the bench to coordinate with each other for a successful campaign against illegal
logging. It behooves all the concerned agencies to seriously strive for the attainment of the
constitutionally-declared policy to "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature" 7 in order to preserve our
natural resources for the benefit of the generations still to come.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Presidential Decree No. 705 REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 389,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Sec . 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or
other forest laws ruled and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
2 SUBJECT: GUIDELINES IN THE CONFISCATION, FORFEITURE AND DISPOSITION OF
CONVEYANCES USED IN THE COMMISSION OF OFFENSES PENALIZED UNDER

SECTION 68, P.D. 705, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 277, SERIES OF 1987
AND OTHER FORESTRY LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. All conveyance used in
the transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not
covered with transport documents found spurious or irregular in accordance with
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed
of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. Disposition of Conveyance. All conveyances found to have been used in the
transport of any forest product from illegal sources and/or covered by spurious
documents shall be declared forfeited in favor of the government in accordance
with Sec. 68-A of PD 705, as amended. Forfeited conveyances may be used, at the
discretion of the DENR, in the forest protection and development activities,
otherwise, the same shall be disposed of through public auction by the Secretary or
the Regional Office, as the case may be, in accordance with existing policies and
procedures for the disposition of government property.
6 Sec. 7. Notice to Owner. For the purpose only of complying with due process, the
Secretary, RED/PENRO/CENRO or their duly authorized representatives shall give the
owner or his representative a written notice of the seizure and shall give him an
opportunity to be heard in reference to the ground or reason for the seizure by
requiring said owner or representative to submit sworn statements or affidavits
within three (3) days from receipt of such written notice or they may elect to have a
formal hearing conducted, but they must signify their intention in writing within the
same period. For the purpose of such notice and all proceedings connected with
confiscation, "representative" shall be deemed to include not only representative-infact of the owner but also any person having possession of the conveyance at the
time of confiscation or seizure.
Sec. 8. Report/Recommendation. Upon receipt of the aforesaid sworn
statement/affidavit of the owner or representative or if none is received despite due
notice, the PENRO/CENRO or any authorized representative of the DENR for the
matter shall determine if the seized conveyance was used in the commission of the
offense as contemplated in section 2 hereof, and shall render a report thereon
within one week accompanied by the evidence he has gathered including his
recommendations to the Secretary or the Regional Executive Director, as the case
may be.
Sec. 9. Disposition of Conveyance. All conveyances found to have been used in the
transport of any forest product from illegal sources and/or covered by spurious
documents shall be declared forfeited in favor of the government in accordance
with Sec. 68-A of PD 705, as amended. Forfeited conveyances may be used at the
discretion of the DENR, in the forest protection and development activities,
otherwise, the same shall be disposed of through public auction by the Secretary or
the Regional Office, as the case may be, in accordance with existing policies and
procedures for the disposition of government property.
7 Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 16.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND
LUIS FLORES,respondents.
Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Quezon in Criminal Case No. 1591, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo,
Arrozal, Luis Flares and twenty other John Does," dismissing the information filed therein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and
punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which read:
That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang
Lalim, Municipality of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal
and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does whose identities are still
unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging
Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the
name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title
No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away
therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a
license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species,
consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including
government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid amount.
Contrary to Law.
Lucena City, 7 January 1977. (p.17, Rollo).
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2)
grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked (pp. 3242, Rollo), The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9, 1977 (p.42, Rollo).
On October 15, 1977, this petition was filed directly with this Court, raising the following
questions of law: (1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and (2) whether or not
the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents
and the opinion of the trial court, the information substantially alleged all the elements of the

crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that
the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the
consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally
cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without
any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of
different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or
permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information
that the asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of
the state.
We agree with the petitioner.
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without
license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public lands,
or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information
hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the
essential elements of the offense defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958];
People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 57).
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered,
collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products
cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and
3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license
agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the information was defective because:
. . ., it is noted that the Information alleges that the cutting, gathering and carrying
away of the logs were done without the consent of the owner of the land. While the
prosecution admits that timber is a forest product that belongs to the state, the
information, however, fails to allege that the taking was without the consent of the
latter, for which reason the Information is patently defective. (p. 39, Rollo)
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It
should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but
from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario
Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not
make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines
including those produced in private woodlands. The case of Santiago v. Basilan Company, G.R.
No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 349, clarified the matter on ownership of timber in
private lands. This Court held therein:
The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should not be held liable to the
plaintiff because the timber which it cut and gathered on the land in question
belongs to the government and not to the plaintiff, the latter having failed to
comply with a requirement of the law with respect to his property.
The provision of law referred to by appellant is a section of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, which reads;
"Sec. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. Every private
owner of land containing timber, firewood and other minor forest

products shall register his title to the same with the Director
Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the boundaries
their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector
Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time
time as occasion may require.

of
of
of
to

Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in

which any such land lies shall render assistance in the examination of
the title thereof with a view to its registration in the Bureau of
Forestry."
In the above provision of law, there is no statement to the effect that noncompliance with the requirement would divest the owner of the land of his rights
thereof and that said rights of ownership would be transferred to the government.
Of course, the land which had been registered and titled in the name of the plaintiff
under that Land Registration Act could no longer be the object of a forester license
issued by the Director of Forestry because ownership of said land includes also
ownership of everything found on its surface (Art. 437, New Civil Code).
Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in section 1829 of the
Administrative Code is to exempt the title owner of the land from the payment of
forestry charges as provided for under Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, to wit:
"Charges collective on forest products cut, gathered and removed from
unregistered private lands. The charges above prescribed shall be
collected on all forest products cut, gathered and removed from any
private land the title to which is not registered with the Director of
Forestry as required by the Forest Law; Provided, however, That in the
absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather and
remove timber and other forest products from such land shall secure a
license from the Director of Forestry Law and Regulations. The cutting,
gathering and removing of timber and the other forest products from
said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful
cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests
and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases in this
chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, while it is admitted that the plaintiff has failed to register the
timber in his land as a private woodland in accordance with the oft-repeated
provision of the Revised Administrative Code, he still retained his rights of
ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code) the
very rights violated by the defendant Basilan Lumber Company.
While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove
forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited
case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle
in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705.
Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material;
it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the
government.
Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides:

Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the
Bureau shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also
seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the
offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting forest officer or
employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and
seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to,
and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to
conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.
If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the authorities designated
by law to conduct preliminary investigations, the delivery to, and filing of the
complaint with, the latter shall be done within a reasonable time sufficient for
ordinary travel from the place of arrest to the place of delivery. The seized products,
materials and equipment shall be immediately disposed of in accordance with
forestry administrative orders promulgated by the Department Head.
The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the Philippine
Constabulary, police agency, barangay or barrio official, or any qualified person to
protect the forest and exercise the power or authority provided for in the preceding
paragraph.
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in
this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or
any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the
forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who
shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is a prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the
investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate
official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases
and file an information in Court.
The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may commence
a prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes
a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who
has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The
second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the
presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a
report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the
offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a
preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations in court.
The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section
80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and
neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in
a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.
The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as
prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that:
. . ., the authority given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints
regarding the commission of offenses defined in P.D. No. 705 by the said last and
penultimate paragraphs of Section 80 may be considered as covering only such
reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the
area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development, or
any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed

in their presence. Such interpretation becomes cogent when we consider that the
whole of Section 80 deals precisely with the authority of forest officers or employees
to make arrests and institute criminal actions involving offenses defined in the
Decree. (p. 26, Rollo).
Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687
of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter
of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or
made against persons charged with the commission of the crime.
Sec. 1687. Authority of fiscal to conduct investigation in criminal matter. A
provincial fiscal shall have authority, if he deems it wise, to conduct an investigation
into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor. To this end, he may summon reputed
witnesses and require them to appear and testify upon oath before him. . . .
With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2 prosecutions in
Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting
a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general
authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations.
In both cases under said Sec. 80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for
offenses committed in his presence); or 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or
complaints of violations of the decree (for violations not committed in his presence) he is still
required to file the proper complaint with the appropriate official designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive
authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the
decree rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special authority
to arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such
authority by those upon whom it is vested by general law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the
information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases No. 1591 is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Concubinage, adultery, seduction, abduction, rape, acts of lasciviousness and
defamation imputing any of the aforesaid offenses where the rule provides that
these crimes shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party.
2 In People v. Inting, G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 788, We hold that the
Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases
involving election offenses and to prosecute such offenses. However, if the Comelec
fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may
file the complaint with the office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for
preliminary investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44649 April 15, 1988
DAYLINDA A. LAGUA, MANUEL P. LAGUA, HONORATO ACHANZAR and RESTITUTO
DONGA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Davao City, Branch I, CONSTANCIO MAGLANA and the EASTCOAST
DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES,respondents.
Wilfred D. Asis for petitioner.
Carlos A. Carbonilla for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was instituted by the
petitioners against the private respondents for closing a logging road without authority.
In their complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:
In Paragraph 5(a):
a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued
a memorandum to the Chief Security Guard of Defendant Eastcoast directing the
latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for
the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time) on the
national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In compliance with
this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the use
by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage
thereof while the vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed
and were allowed passess on the same road. It resulted that the loading of logs on
the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. A xeroxed copy of this Nombrado
memorandum, the original of which is however in the possession of defendants, is
hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.
In Paragraph 5(b):

b) Upon representations made to Indalecio L. Aspiras, Acting Station Officer-inCharge, BFD Lambajon Forest Station, and in response to plaintiff Laguas'
complaint, a letter dated 2 January 1976 was addressed by Aspiras to the Resident
Manager of Defendant Eastcoast with instructions to open and allow Plaintiff Laguas'
trucks and machineries to pass that road closed to them (but not to others) by
Defendant Eastcoast. A xeroxed copy of this letter is hereto attached as Annex "D"
and made a part hereof. Accordingly, Sagrado Constantino, Resident Manager of
Defendant Eastcoast, issued an order to their Chief Security Guard for the latter to
comply with the Aspiras letter. These events, however, took the whole day of 2
January 1976 so that notwithstanding the lifting of the road closure no hauling of
logs could be made by Plaintiff Laguas on that day.
In Paragraph 5(c):
c) When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs
towards the Japanese Vessel on 3 January 1976, again that same road, only the day
before ordered by the BFD to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was
closed to them by Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order
of Defendant Maglana. Even the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by
Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to existing laws, rules and
regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine Coastguard. A xeroxed copy
of the Maglana message, the original of which is in the possession of the
defendants, is hereto attached as Annex "E" and made an integral part hereof.
And in paragraph 5(d):
d) Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in
defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the
order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao
Oriental, from Baganga where the shipment and the road closure were made, to
seek the assistance of the PC thereat. Thus on 5 January 1976, Provincial
Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC Detachment Commander
at Baganga to lift the illegal checkpoint made by defendants. A xeroxed copy of this
directive is hereto attached as Annex "F" and made a part hereof. (Rollo, pp. 57-58)
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction,
and (2) lack of cause of action.
The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of
the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber
licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this
question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda
Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs
in the Bureau of Forestry.
On August 3, 1976, the trial court issued the questioned order dismissing the petitioners'
complaint on the basis of the abovementioned grounds. It ruled:
The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest
Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to
determine whether their use is in violation of laws. Since the damages claimed to
have been sustained by the plaintiffs arose from the alleged illegal closure of a
logging road in the language of the defendants on page 3 of their motion to
dismiss. The simple fact is there was an illegal closure of the national highway
affecting the private rights of the plaintiffs who sustained damages and losses as a
consequence thereof the question whether or not the road was illegally closed
must first be determined by the Bureau of Forest Development. If the said Bureau
finds that the road was legally closed, an action for damages may be filed in Court.

Otherwise, no civil action would prosper, for there would be no tortious act. (Rollo,
pp. 58-69).
xxx xxx xxx
After the logging road was closed for the first time, more so after the second time,
by the defendant Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., the plaintiffs should
have asked the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the legality or illegality
of the closure since they wanted to file, as they did file, an action for damages
based on the alleged illegal closure. The fact that the letter of January 2, 1976,
directed defendant Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc. to open the road does
not necessarily mean that the Bureau of Forest Development had found that the
closure was illegal. There must be a positive finding that the closure was illegal. ...
(Rollo, p. 60)
xxx xxx xxx
As an attorney-in-fact, Daylinda A. Lagua is not entitled to, and cannot cannot claim,
damages in her personal capacity. For she could not have sustained damages as a
result of the alleged illegal closure of the road in her personal capacity while acting
in her representative capacity. So if she and her husband sustained damages, it
must have been because their legal rights were violated by a tortious act committed
by the defendants other than the alleged illegal closure of the road. But as stated
elsewhere in this order, even the plaintiffs admit that the damages they claimed to
have sustained arose from the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Assuming,
however, that another tortious act violated the legal rights of the Laguas, still they
could not joint Achanzar and Donga in this complaint for there would be misjoinder
of parties. (Rollo, pp. 61-62)
Hence, this petition for mandamus which we will treat as a petition for certiorari in the interest of
justice.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have
jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding that
the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is
illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.
We agree.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the
Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal
or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be
maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based
on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a
matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the
private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is
beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful
closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such
closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development. As we have held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of appeals (145 SCRA 100,
110):
The issue in this court was whether or not the private respondents can recover
damages as a result of the of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely
legal question and nothing of an a administrative nature is to or can be done
(Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230; Tapales v. University of the Philippines, 7
SCRA 533; Limoico v. Board of Administrators. (PJA) 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan v.
Ramonte, 129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages
provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil courts.

The private respondents, in their memorandum filed with the respondent court, alleged that the
logs of petitioner Achanzar were cut down and removed outside of the area granted to the latter
under his Private Timber License No. 2 and therefore inside the concession area of respondent
company's Timber License Agreement. This, apparently, was the reason why the respondent
company denied to the petitioners the use of the logging road. If we hold the respondents to
their contention that the Bureau of Forest Development has the power and authority not only to
regulate the use or blockade of logging roads but also to exclusively determine the legality of a
closure of such roads, why then did they take it upon themselves to initially close the disputed
logging road before taking up the matter with the Bureau and why did they close it again
notwithstanding the Bureau's order to open it after the petitioners had duly informed the said
Bureau of the closure? To use the Bureau's authority which the respondents ignored to now
defeat the court's jurisdiction would be totally unacceptable. We, therefore, find that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's
ruling that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in
their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages. They are not the real
parties in interest. However, the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed
because the real parties in interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court
should have ordered only the dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section
11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned order of
the respondent court is SET ASIDE and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for
trial on the merits
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165448
July 27, 2009
ERNESTO AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision2 and 24 September
2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the
Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were
to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a
forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of
Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the
cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an
appropriate place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the
same is required to plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which
shall be properly maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of
the planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and
regulations shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of
penalties in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as soon as
the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first. 4
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo
Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were
being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they
found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the
cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing
(Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab),
who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out
of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58
cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The
market value of the trees cut without permit wasP182,447.20, and the forest charges
were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 5 (PD 705) was filed
against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or
permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total
volume and market price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00
bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at
Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No.
05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law. 6lawphil
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy
of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who
claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were

stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he was
cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was
in possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber
while two were stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely
followed petitioners instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit
was issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and
Masing cutting down the trees in petitioners presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He
allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the
permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity
map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the
overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by
three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 26 May 1994 Decision,7 the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL
CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the amounts of P182,477.20
and P11,833.25, representing the market value of and forest charges on the Benguet pine trees
cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are
acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their
provisional liberty in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated
February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper
receipt therefor.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to
be cut. The trial court further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the
permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto
Santiago and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto
Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had
the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms
of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers
Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of Appeals
rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of
Santiago because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of
Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees
without permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of
Appeals found that the prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following orders as to which
trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises
questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.10 For questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. 11The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 12
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without
License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations. 13
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to
supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or
removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in
possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs.
Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his coaccused were acquitted of the charges against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting
trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could
have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only
make petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section
68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not
an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or
collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24
September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto
Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO
S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rollo, pp. 16-31. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices
Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Hilarion L. Aquino, concurring.
3
Id. at 33-35. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Jose L.
Sabio, Jr. and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring.
4
Records, p. 190.
5
Revised Forestry Code.
6
Rollo, p. 20.
7
CA rollo, pp. 11-18. Penned by Judge Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
8
Id. at 17-18.
9
Rollo, pp. 30-31.
10
Republic v. Heirs of Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, 23 December 2008.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Revaldo v. People, G.R. No. 170589, 16 April 2009.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief,
Special Actions and Investigations Division, DENR, respondents.
G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and RI CHUY PO, respondents.
G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA,
JR., respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the
Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with
the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street,
Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such
was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were,
during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID)
of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted
sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. 1 The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner. 2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R.
Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team
seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings,
and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber
and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. 3

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela
and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of
their source and origin. 4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by
the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further
orders. 5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of
fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles
because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the
Province of Quirino Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents being required
from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure. 6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary
Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and
possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck
with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR
compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of
the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc.
and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and
almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as the lumber
loaded therein for transport lumber using "recycled" documents. 7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's
lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing
within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter
that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them.
None, however, was submitted. 8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which
took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the government to
be disposed of in accordance with law" the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and
almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard. 9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of the said court. The petitioner
questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued
by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of
apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00;
and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and
of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of
Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the
business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The
team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had
already been suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was
open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon
investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to
the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The
members of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned
out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was
then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of
lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and
equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a
constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes
stockpiled
in
the
premises
by
issuing
a
receipt
10
therefor.
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition forcertiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the
petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating
prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution 11whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information
be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of
almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series
of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and
slabs covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as
Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging." 13
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch
172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 58 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL
CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within
the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal
documents
as
required
under
existing
forest
laws
and
regulations. 14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:

15

WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:

in the FIRST CIVIL CASE,

1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S.

Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government
the approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end almaciga Lumber, shorts
and sticks, found inside and seized from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune
Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990
(Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are
required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan,
supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action
before the proper court regarding the Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes
and dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were
seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be
rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and
2 of this judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa and almaciga lumber,
shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be
returned to said petitioner is withheld in this case until after the proper court has
taken cognizance and determined how those Lumber, shorts and sticks should be
disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April
1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document
showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that
search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the
settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search
of a moving vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation
of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued
by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question. 17And, although
the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts,
their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore
contrabands
observed
during
the
conduct
of
the
search. 18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the
confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the
articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should
have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the
same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber dealer's
permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to
Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an
offense, for possession oflumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No.

705, as amended, and even grantingarguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said
section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an
illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises
a prejudicial question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized
therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the
definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68
would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has
resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21 respondent Judge Teresita DizonCapulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of
lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, 23 the People
filed a petition forcertiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in
dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that the truck
was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession oflumber,
and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is unlawful
under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product
involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the
legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that
when appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition
and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the
period of extension granted to it. 25
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 3 March 1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not
exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the
petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure
was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a
warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal
as CA-G.R. SP No.33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CAG.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in
dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz.,
"timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various
building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the definition
of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in
Section 68 under the term forest product.

The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest
product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as
amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the
Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police
shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in
his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing
the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the
process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or
other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the
resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No.123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No. 106424 with which the other two
were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground
that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion
reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is
neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized
under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed
on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that
"the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information,
that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information,
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
E.O. No. 277, which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.

Punished
then
in
this
section
are
(1) the cutting,
gathering, collection,
or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without
any authority; and (b) possession of timber forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this
omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in
the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not
solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of
the private respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber."
They cannot refer to the "lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
"approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction "and," and not with the preposition
"of." They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section
3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. -xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum,
wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest plant, the
associated water, fish game, scenic, historical, recreational and
geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and
the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information.
Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above
fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an
offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court
go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information
exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at
the conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only
the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining
whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the
contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the
annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber.
Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four
(4) truckloads ofnarra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible
amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are
classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31 of the investigating prosecutor,
which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber;
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information
be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and
lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a
crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond,
blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter
alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." 32 Simply put, lumber is
a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi
lex non distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was
coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different
sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport
documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE,
the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted
without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate 34 that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a
judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3)

search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs
searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4
April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the
search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any
time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the
same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under
a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following
day, provided it is still within the ten-day period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber
without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly
merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpally fail to shaw prima
facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged
decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must,
forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to
comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial
court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's
license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension
was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the
petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly,
Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize the Lumber
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or
other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail view
of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally
irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of
the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up
blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended.
They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the
decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take
firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only
ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable
of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by
prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and
protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and
ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the
challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge

Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro

Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy
Po"; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING
the respondent Judge or her successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful
dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure
of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No.
25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the
SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., dissenting:

The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment
of the 16th August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private respondent Ri
Chuy Po to quash the information that has charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code, as amended
by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the 18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private
respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of
violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order
No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent
thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in
Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that
the facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the alternative, to

suspend the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question, private respondent having
formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question in a civil case before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the motion of
private respondent to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of "timber or
other forest products" (without supporting legal documents), the mere possession of "lumber"
had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705. Petitioner moved for
a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come within the purview of "timber"
defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986. The motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution
before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products,"
on the one hand, from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other, and that the
possession of lumber of any specie, size or dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong,
almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal offense; (2) that DENR
Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition
of almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not considered illegal; (3) that while
under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra and
other premium hardwood species (supa included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make
possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa included) punishable by mere
inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by
DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on
lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater Manila area to another province or city
or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the
origin and destination points are both within the greater Manila area or within the same province
or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not removed from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the
compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No.
277, the possession of which without requisite legal documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989, that defines "lumber"
to be a -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying
and passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or
unedged lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987,
dated 28 December 1987, to be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at
1.5 meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered
as timber regardless of size;
which may either be -a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar
mechanical hard tools in the forest and which from the size of the
piece and the character of the wood is obviously unfit for use in that
form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987,
dated December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared
timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into pieces, even if only to
facilitate transporting or hauling, as well as all sawn products, all
timber hewn or otherwise worked to approximate its finished form,
such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas,

troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec.
2.26, DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986, dated
November 11, 1986) -(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the purpose of
the law, i.e., to stop or minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of
forest resources; (3) that the claim of private respondent that a CLO is required only upon
the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is merely stored in a
compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to show
any CLO or other legal document required by administrative issuances raises the
presumption that the lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources; and, (5)
that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality of the
seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two
consolidated cases (G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term "timber or
other forest products" the possession of which without the required legal documents would be a
criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers "lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the
possession without required legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned refer to
"timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however,
would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance -(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman
Belleng, 3subscribed and sworn to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon
which basis the latter recommended the filing of the information, read, as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail
from our agency continued to monitor the activities inside the
compound and in fact apprehended and later on brought to the DENR
compound a six-wheeler truck loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering
the shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal
complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber for
violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by Executive Order 277,
having in its possession prohibited wood and wood products without
the required documents." 4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano,
approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that -" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor
the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended a sixwheeler truck coming from the compound of Mustang loaded with
almaciga and lauan lumber without the necessary legal documents
covering the shipment." 5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran,
suspending the Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang
Lumber, Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the latter's possession of
almaciga lumber without the required documents. 6

(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran,
authorized the confiscation of approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and dimensions owned by
Mustang Lumber, Inc. 7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR,
before the Department of Justice, Manila, against private respondent was
for possession of lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal documents, 8 in
violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash,
sought to argue that the possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in
the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., 9 was covered by the penal provisions of
P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,
Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on the
thesis that "lumber" should be held to be among the items that are banned under Section 68 of
PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a motion
to quash following the standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone be
considered and should not be challenged, there should, however, be no serious objections to
taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out in the
information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the case of People
vs. Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain -. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the
motion the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the
fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the complaint.
Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are
not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be
inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no
reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable
facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that such official's
role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that the
guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from
considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy
administration of justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products
Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as

well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit,
and it is confined to "timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree defines "forest
product" to mean -(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering
plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic
resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has
undergone processing. In defining a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it
to refer to -. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood,
wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products
(emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while
lumber has been categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood
products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987, which
defines "timber" to be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at
1.5 meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered
as timber regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989,
stating that "lumber" includes -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing
lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the
term "forest products" shall include "lumber -cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by the
government agency called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be good,
however, to the extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous with the governing
statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it would be legal
absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those which are penal in
nature,
of
extending
the
scope
of
the
law
or
its
plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition
in G.R. No. 104988 and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I must hasten to
add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No.
36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever remains of the country's forest
reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed and checked, the
continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as

well as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on end the expected order of the day. I,
therefore, join ail those who call for the passage of remedial legislation before the problem truly
becomes irreversible.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment
of the 16th August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private respondent Ri
Chuy Po to quash the information that has charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code, as amended
by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the 18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private
respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of
violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order
No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent
thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in
Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that
the facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the alternative, to
suspend the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question, private respondent having
formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question in a civil case before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the motion of
private respondent to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of "timber or
other forest products" (without supporting legal documents), the mere possession of "lumber"
had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705. Petitioner moved for
a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come within the purview of "timber"
defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986. The motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution
before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products,"
on the one hand, from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other, and that the
possession of lumber of any specie, size or dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong,
almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal offense; (2) that DENR
Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition
of almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not considered illegal; (3) that while
under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra and
other premium hardwood species (supa included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make

possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa included) punishable by mere
inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by
DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on
lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater Manila area to another province or city
or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the
origin and destination points are both within the greater Manila area or within the same province
or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not removed from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the
compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No.
277, the possession of which without requisite legal documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989, that defines "lumber"
to be a -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying
and passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or
unedged lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987,
dated 28 December 1987, to be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at
1.5 meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered
as timber regardless of size;
which may either be -a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar
mechanical hard tools in the forest and which from the size of the
piece and the character of the wood is obviously unfit for use in that
form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987,
dated December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared
timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into pieces, even if only to
facilitate transporting or hauling, as well as all sawn products, all
timber hewn or otherwise worked to approximate its finished form,
such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas,
troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec.
2.26, DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986, dated
November 11, 1986) -(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the purpose of
the law, i.e., to stop or minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of
forest resources; (3) that the claim of private respondent that a CLO is required only upon
the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is merely stored in a
compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to show
any CLO or other legal document required by administrative issuances raises the
presumption that the lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources; and, (5)
that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality of the
seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two
consolidated cases (G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term "timber or
other forest products" the possession of which without the required legal documents would be a
criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers "lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the
possession without required legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and

approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned refer to
"timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however,
would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance -(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman
Belleng, 3subscribed and sworn to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon
which basis the latter recommended the filing of the information, read, as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail
from our agency continued to monitor the activities inside the
compound and in fact apprehended and later on brought to the DENR
compound a six-wheeler truck loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering
the shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal
complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber for
violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by Executive Order 277,
having in its possession prohibited wood and wood products without
the required documents." 4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano,
approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that -" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor
the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended a sixwheeler truck coming from the compound of Mustang loaded with
almaciga and lauan lumber without the necessary legal documents
covering the shipment." 5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran,
suspending the Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang
Lumber, Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the latter's possession of
almaciga lumber without the required documents. 6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran,
authorized the confiscation of approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and dimensions owned by
Mustang Lumber, Inc. 7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR,
before the Department of Justice, Manila, against private respondent was
for possession of lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal documents, 8 in
violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash,
sought to argue that the possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in
the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., 9 was covered by the penal provisions of
P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,
Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on the
thesis that "lumber" should be held to be among the items that are banned under Section 68 of
PD 705.

While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a motion
to quash following the standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone be
considered and should not be challenged, there should, however, be no serious objections to
taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out in the
information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the case of People
vs. Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain -. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the
motion the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the
fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the complaint.
Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are
not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be
inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no
reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable
facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that such official's
role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that the
guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from
considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy
administration of justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products
Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit,
and it is confined to "timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree defines "forest
product" to mean -(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering
plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic
resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has
undergone processing. In defining a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it
to refer to -. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood,
wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products
(emphasis supplied).

In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while
lumber has been categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood
products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987, which
defines "timber" to be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at
1.5 meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered
as timber regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989,
stating that "lumber" includes -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing
lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the
term "forest products" shall include "lumber -cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by the
government agency called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be good,
however, to the extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous with the governing
statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it would be legal
absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those which are penal in
nature,
of
extending
the
scope
of
the
law
or
its
plain
16
mandate.
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition
in G.R. No. 104988 and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I must hasten to
add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No.
36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever remains of the country's forest
reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed and checked, the
continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as
well as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on end the expected order of the day. I,
therefore, join ail those who call for the passage of remedial legislation before the problem truly
becomes irreversible.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 115507 May 19, 1998

ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED MORENO, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In denying this petition, the Court reiterates that the gathering, collection and/or possession,
without license, of lumber, which is considered timber or forest product, are prohibited and
penalized under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.
The Case
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set
aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR No. CR-12815 promulgated on July 30,
1993, and its Resolution 3promugated on April 28, 1994. The assailed Decision affirmed the
judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, 5 which, in the complaint against
petitioners for violation of Section 68, PD 705 (Forestry Reform Code) as amended, disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds:
a) the accused ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED MORENO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of lumber under the Information,
dated March 16, 1990, under Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, and sentences each of them to an indeterminate sentence of SIX (6)
MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs, and
b) the accused ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and CRISPIN CABUDOL GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of lumber under the
Information, dated March 16, 1990, under Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, and sentences each of them to an indeterminate sentence
of SIX (6) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs.
The two (2) terms of imprisonment of each of the accused shall be served
successively under Article 70, RPC.

The preventive imprisonment which any of the accused may have suffered is
credited in his favor to its full extent.
The Court further orders the confiscation of the lumber described in the aforesaid
Informations in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island,
Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded
with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee
of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay
Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No.
DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an
employee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were
owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents showing legal possession of
the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were
confiscated.
On March 16, 1990, Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and time keeper of A
& E Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with
violation of Section 68, 6PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277, in an Information 7 which reads:
That on or about the 26th day of October, 1989, at around 6:30 o'clock in the
Poblacion, municipality of Cajidiocan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain and without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and under their
custody and control 13 pieces narra lumber about 171 board feet and 41 pieces
tanguile lumber about 834 board feet valued at P8,724.00, Philippine currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount.
In another Information, 8 Tan and Ramilo, together with Crispin Cabudol, were also charged for
the same violation in connection with the October 30, 1989 incident.
On April 26, 1990, all the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on the basis of the
aforementioned Informations; each pleaded not guilty. 9 The cases were thence jointly tried,
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. 10
During the trial, the defense did not contest the above factual circumstances except to deny that
the forest guards demanded, on either of the two occasions, papers or documents showing legal
possession of the lumber. Additionally, Prisco Marin, who claimed to have been the officer-incharge (OIC) of the Bureau of Forest Development of Sibuyan, testified that the seized pieces of
lumber were bought by Tan's Cajidiocan Trading, one of the licensed lumber dealers in the island,
from Matzhou Development Corporation ("Matzhou") which thus delivered to the former Auxiliary
Invoice No. 763850 11 dated March 19, 1987 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue office in
Romblon. According to Marin, the director of forestry had granted Matzhou a Tree Recovery
Permit covering the entire island of Sibuyan. He added that he had inspected the lumber in
question in the compound of A & E Construction or Cajidiocan Trading, where he was shown the
auxiliary invoice covering the subject. 12
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court brushed aside the version of the defense and ruled that the confiscated pieces of
lumber which were admittedly owned by Accused Tan were not legitimate deliveries but aborted
nocturnal hauling. It convicted all the accused as charged, for their failure to comply with the

Forestry Reform Code, which requires the following legal documents: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2)
a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber dealer permit.
Ruling of Respondent Court of Appeals
On appeal, the accused assigned to the trial court these ten errors: (1) holding them liable under
Section 68 of EO 277; (2) ruling that their possession of the lumber were unauthorized or illegal;
(3) retroactively applying E.O. 277; (4) ruling that the accused did not have the necessary
documents to make their possession legal; (5) convicting them despite the absence of
the corpus delicti; (6) admitting in evidence the alleged seizure receipts or, assuming their
admissibility, considering them as evidence of corpus delicti; (7) finding that the deliveries were
aborted nocturnal hauling; (8) convicting Alejandro Tan on the ground of conspiracy; (9) ruling
that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (10) sustaining the
constitutionality of EO 277. 13
As regards the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals held petitioners' "artful distinction
between timber andlumber" "to be fallacious and utterly unmeritorious." It thereby upheld the
solicitor general's manifestation that "forest products" include "wood" which is defined by
Webster's Dictionary as "the hard fibrous substance beneath the back of trees and shrubs."
Respondent Court succinctly ruled that to construe "sawn lumber" as not covered by "sawn
timber" would defeat the evident intent and purpose of the law, for "what would prevent an
illegal logger [from bringing] with him a portable saw and having the timber illegally
cut/gathered [and] sawn right on the spot, thus gaining immunity for himself[?]" 14
As to the next three assigned errors which relied heavily on Prisco Marin's testimony, Respondent
Court dismissed the said witness' account as "anything but credible." It added that Marin's
testimony largely focused on a certification he made stating that, five years ago, he inspected
the same confiscated lumber which were to be used for the repair of school building by A & E
Construction in Sibuyan. But during the cross-examination, he admitted that he made the
inspection in December 1989. The appellate tribunal noted that, by then, he had already been
relieved of his position as OIC of the Bureau of Forest Development in Romblon; hence, he had no
business inspecting the lumberyard of Petitioner Tan. In fact, he admitted that in December
1989, it was Romulae Gadaoni who was already the highest forest officer in the island. 15
As to the fifth and sixth alleged errors, Respondent Court ruled that corpus delicti does not refer
literally to the object of the crime in this case, the forest products possessed without the
required legal documents. The fact that the crimes charged were perpetrated by the petitioners
was credibly and amply proven by the detailed testomonies of the prosecution witnesses,
including the admission of Defense Witness Ismael Ramilo. The seizure receipts merely served to
corroborate their testimonies. 16
The seventh and ninth assigned errors were deemed answered in the foregoing discussions. As to
the eighth, no other than the admission of his caretaker or katiwala, Co-Accused Ramilo, proved
that Tan was involved in the conspiracy. Ramilo testified that the deliveries of lumber on the
subject dates (October 26 and 30, 1989) were made pursuant to the instruction of Tan; and that
the latter owned said lumber, the trucks and the construction firm. The two accused truck drivers
who were caught in flagrante delicto were mere employees of Tan. 17
The last assigned error was set aside by Respondent Court as unnecessary. Absolutely of no
concern to the petitioners, who were caught in possession of lumber without the required legal
documents, was the alleged unconstitutionality of the inclusion of "firewood, bark, honey,
beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the associated water' or fish" in EO 277. There being other
grounds to resolve the case, the constitutionality of said phrase was not passed upon. 18
In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners raised these additional grounds: (1) the Forestry
Reform Code and the laws and regulations of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) distinguish between timber and lumber and between lumber and other forest
products; (2) the Informations alleged and the facts proved that lumber is not covered by the
provision supposedly violated; (3) judicial interpretation or construction may not be resorted to in

order to fill a gap or clear an ambiguity in penal statutes and, assuming the propriety thereof,
construction should be in favor of the accused; (4) lack of documents for possession of lumber is
not punishable under the law; and (5) the perceived weakness in the testimony of Defense
Witness Prisco Marin should not strengthen the case for the prosecution. In its April 28, 1994
Resolution, Respondent Court found "no cogent reason for the reversal or modification" of its
Decision. Hence, this petition. 19
The Issues
Petitioners now ask this Court to likewise pass upon their foregoing submissions. Many of the
errors raised, however, involve factual questions, the review of which is not within the ambit of
this Court's functions, particularly in this case where the findings of the trial court were affirmed
by the appellate court and where petitioners failed to show any misappreciation of the evidence
presented. 20 We shall therefore limit our review only to questions of law.
Accordingly, we shall rule on the following legal issues: (1) the constitutionality of Section 68 of
EO 277, (2) the treatment by the lower court of lumber as timber and/or forest product within the
contemplation of PD 705, as amended, and (3) the alleged retroactive application of EO 277.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Constitutionality of Sec. 68, E.O. 277
The impugned legal provision reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products
Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceeding on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
Petitioners aver that the above provision is violative of substantive due process, because it
requires the possession of certain legal documents to justify "mere possession" of forest products
which, under Section 3(q) of PD 705, includes, among others, "firewood, bark, honey, beeswax,
and even grass, shrub, flowering plant, 'the associated water' or fish" and penalizes failure to
present such required documents.
One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is
the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination. 21 As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were
not "charged with the [unlawful] possession of firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass,
shrub, 'the associated water' or fish"; thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO
277 "is absolutely of no concern" to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which
they are entitled to a judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any

convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the
nullification of said provision. 22 A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who
attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity. 23
Main Issue: Under PD 705 and EO 277,
Is Lumber Considered Timber or Forest Product?
Petitioners contend that possession of manufactured lumber is not punishable under the Forestry
Reform Code, as amended. As explicitly provided in Section 68 of both PD 705 and EO 277 (the
law that amended the former), only the cutting, gathering, collecting and/or possession, without
license, of timber and other forest products are prohibited. As expressly defined under Section
3(q) of PD 705, lumber is not timber or a forest product. It is only in Section 79 of the same law
where the sale of lumber, without compliance with established grading rules and standards, is
prohibited. Petitioners submit that the forest laws and regulations sufficiently differentiate
between timber and lumber; therefore, court should not construe lumber as timber.
The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 24 in which this Court
expressly ruled that "lumber is included in the term timber." 25 We quote at length the Court's
discussion:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber of lumber. While
the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3,
the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
"Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the
1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents
is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither do we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemus. 26
Mustang was recently reiterated in Lalican vs. Vergara, 27 where we also said that "'[t]o exclude
possession of 'lumber' from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law
itself. . . . After all, the phrase 'forest product' is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to
reiterate, is manufactured timber" Indeed, to mention lumber in the aforesaid section would
simply result in tautology.
In addition, under American jurisprudence, lumber has been legally accepted as a term referring
to the manufactured product of logs 28 or to timber sawed or split into marketable form,
especially for use in buildings. 29
Consistent with Mustang, we find no error in the holding of both lower courts. Clearly, petitioners
are liable for violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.
Corollary Issue:

No Retroactive Application of EO 277

Petitioners insist that EO 277 is not applicable to them, because the seized lumber had been
lawfully possessed by Cajidiocan Trading since March 1987, while the amendatory law was issued
only on July 25, 1987, and took effect fifteen days after publication. This strained reasoning
deserves scant consideration. First, at no time during the apprehensions did petitioners claim
that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan Trading. In fact, Petitioner Ramilo and the drivers openly
claimed that the lumber and the trucks belonged to A & E Construction which was, in turn,
owned by Petitioner Tan. It was only during the course of the trial, through the testimony of
Prisco Marin (characterized by the appellate court as "anything but credible"), that the alleged
ownership thereof by Cajidiocan Trading was brought out. Second, the supposed sale of the
subject lumber by Matzhou to Cajidiocan Trading, as evidenced by the auxiliary invoice, occurred
in March 1987, or more than two and a half years prior to the apprehension and seizure that
gave rise to this case. It is highly doubtful if the lumber bought at the earlier date was the very
same lumber confiscated in October 1989. No evidence was presented to overcome this veritable
doubt. Third and most important, assuming that indeed they were the very same lumber, forest
laws and regulations also require the following documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2)
sales invoice, (3) delivery receipt, (4) tally sheet, and (5) certificate of transport
agreement. 30 None of these documents were proffered in court or elsewhere. Petitioners'
unlawful possession of the subject lumber occurred in October 1989. EO 277, which specifically
included "possession" of timber and other forest products within the contemplation of PD 705,
had already been issued and in effect more than two years previous thereto. Nothing will prevent
the indictment of petitioners for violation of EO 277 at the time they were caught by the forest
guards in flagrante delicto. The prohibited act is a malum prohibitum, and absence of malice or
criminal intent will not save the day for them. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The questioned Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., I reiterate my separate opinion in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA