Ejusdem generis

Mutuc vs. Comelec

This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need
for urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on
the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting
the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory
authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the
light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the
principle that the construction placed on the statute by
respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious
doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the
right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was
worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent
Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and
prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of
political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately
executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the
question before us was one of power. Respondent
Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a
prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority
was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above
makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda
gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans,
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the
words "and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last
three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the
matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval
under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the
general words following any enumeration being applicable
only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in
the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to
as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of
respondent Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a
cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be
interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than
repugnant
to,
any
constitutional
command
or
prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions
were given a "construction which should be more in harmony
with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of
removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity
from legislative enactments has always commended itself.
The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words
to avert any collision between what a statute provides and
what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an
interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion
reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but
also grave doubts upon that score. 9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then,
has in its favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view

advanced by him that if the above provision of the

Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view
that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the
challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet.
For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an
abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our
constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more
for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission
did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil
against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could
respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that
petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be
free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile
loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to
be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but
not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other
mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain
respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be
distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be
validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution
in express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the
fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of
any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or
the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of
government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with
priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in
the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in
the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have
no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever
limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment
of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its
authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The
Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the
facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to
maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law.
Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of
the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that
the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental
measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent
Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief
Justice
thus:
"Lastly,
as
the
branch
of
the executive department although independent of the
President to which the Constitution has given the
'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of
decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding
of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that
respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in
conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law
than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally
construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that
only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to

insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately

fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending
approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent
Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was
obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.
Liwanag vs. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association
III Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision forms
part of its open space
The term "open space" is defined in P.D. 1216 as "an area
reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses,
schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers,
barangay centers and other similar facilities and amenities.33
The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for
water facilities. Therefore, we resort to statutory construction
to determine whether these areas fall under "other similar
facilities and amenities."
The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis
states that where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same
class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include
or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the
same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.34
Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D.
1216, we find that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for
the common welfare of the community. Thus, the phrase
"other similar facilities and amenities" should be interpreted
in like manner.
Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for the
benefit of the community. Water is a basic need in human
settlements,35 without which the community would not
survive. We therefore rule that, based on the principle of
ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the intention of
the law to create and maintain a healthy environment in
human settlements,36 the location of the water facility in the
Subdivision must form part of the area reserved for open
space.
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos
Pilar vs. Comelec
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to
file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he
was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of
candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is
. . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost" (Rollo,
p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has
the obligation to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non

distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be

made in the application of a law where none is indicated.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate"
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued
his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in
implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a
general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies
that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may
be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this
meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the
general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988];
Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608
[1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is
clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the
electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass
legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of
candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.
Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the
purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg.
881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and
regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P.
Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13; Resolution
No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt
and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United
States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of
candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements
of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be
spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the
solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d,
Elections 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity
with respect to matters contained in the statements and to
prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys
devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions
(26 Am Jur 2d, Elections 289). These statutes also enable
voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of
candidates by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of
corrupt practices for annulment of elections.
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are
mandatory as to the requirement of filing. It is not improbable
that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted
contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short

span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the

law is not all too remote.
Guerrero vs. Comelec
This contention lacks cogency and is far from persuasive.
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be
circumscribed lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot be
read as qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non
distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish.15 There should be no
distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.
For firstly, the drafters of the fundamental law, in making no
qualification in the use of a general word or expression, must
have intended no distinction at all. Secondly, the courts could
only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances
showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or
qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give
effect to the lawgivers intent.16
Use of technical terms
Manila Herald Publishing vs. Ramos
Section 1 Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an
action may be dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a
motion to this end be filed. In the light of this express
requirement we do not believe that the court had power to
dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly presented.
The fact that the parties filed memoranda upon the court's
indication or order in which they discussed the proposition
that the action was unnecessary and was improperly brought
outside and independently of the case for libel did not supply
deficiency. Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides for the
cases in which an action may be dismissed, and the inclusion
of those therein provided excludes any other, under the
familiar maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The only
instance in which, according to said Rules, the court may
dismiss upon the court's own motion an action is, when the
"plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply
with the Rules or any order of the court."
The Rules of Court are devised as a matter of necessity,
intended to be observed with diligence by the courts as well as
by the parties for the orderly conduct of litigation and judicial
business. In general, it is compliance with these rules which
gives the court jurisdiction to act.

vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action."

What is "proper action"? Section 1 of Rule 2 defines action as
"an ordinary suit in court of justice, by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong," while section
2, entitled "Commencement of Action," says that "civil action
may be commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
"Action" has acquired a well-define, technical meaning, and it
is in this restricted sense that the word "action" is used in the
above rule. In employing the word "commencement" the rule
clearly indicates an action which originates an entire
proceeding and puts in motion the instruments of the court
calling for summons, answer, etc, and not any intermediary
step taken in the course of the proceeding whether by the
parties themselves or by a stranger. It would be strange indeed
if the framers of the Rules of Court or the Legislature should
have employed the term "proper action" instead of
"intervention" or equivalent expression if the intention had
been just that. It was all the easier, simplier and the more
natural to say intervention if that had been the purpose, since
the asserted right of the third-party claimant necessarily grows
out of the pending suit, the suit in which the order of
attachment was issued.
The most liberal view that can be taken in favor of the
respondents' position is that intervention as a means of
protecting the third-party claimants' right is not exclusive but
cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring a new,
independent suit. It is significant that there are courts which
go so far as to take the view that even where the statute
expressly grants the right of intervention is such cases as this,
the statute does not extend to owners of property attached, for,
under this view, "it is considered that the ownership is not one
of the essential questions to be determined in the litigation
between plaintiff and defendant;" that "whether the property
belongs to defendant or claimant, if determined, is considered
as shedding no light upon the question in controversy, namely,
that defendant is indebted to plaintiff."
Noscitur a sociis
Caltex Phils. vs. Palomar

The foregoing conclusions should suffice to dispose of this

proceeding for certiorari, but the parties have discussed the
second question and we propose to rule upon it if only to put
out of the way a probable cause for future controversy and
consequent delay in the disposal of the main cause.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in
question is used in association with the word "lottery". With
the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the wellknown principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis
which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although
only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with
the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery
is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must
the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there
is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to
eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.

Section 14 of rule 59, which treats of the steps to betaken

when property attached is claimed by the other person than
that defendant or his agent, contains the proviso that "Nothing
herein contained shall prevent such third person from

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to

be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof
being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail
fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of

We are the opinion that the court acted with grave abuse of
discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing the
case without any formal motion to dismiss.

the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters

which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable.
As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes,
justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their
tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public
morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208).
Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be
hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows
ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the
contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly
be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not
constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade
the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly,
from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67
P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed.,
p. 695, emphasis supplied). We find no obstacle in saying the
same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded
to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only
if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the
appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes
thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules
submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions
of the Postal Law.
Magtaas vs. Pryce Properties Corp.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local
Government Code, local government units are authorized to
prevent
or
suppress,
among
others,
"gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than
accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such
games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of
the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule
of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in
relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it
is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of
chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal
gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance,
must be prevented or suppressed.
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius

December 31, 1980. Rep. Act 6236, the very law on which
respondents Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral
proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents'
contention. It will be noted that while Rep. Act 2061 fixed the
time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond
December 31, 1968, no similar provision is found in Rep. Act
6236 expressly 'extending the time limit for the reopening of
cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land.
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as
provided for by the Rep. Act 6236 makes no reference to
reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, Rep. Act 2061,
expressly did. Under the legal maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express
Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one
thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others
not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable
legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the
natural workings of the human mind. 4 If Rep. Act 6236 had
intended that the extension it provided for applies also to
reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the
same way that it provided the extension of time to file
applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the
reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which
were declared public land in Rep. Act 6236 is made clearer by
reference to Rep. Act 2061 which includes the reopening of
cadastral cases, but not so included in Rep. Act 6236.
We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for by Rep.
Act 6236 which is the sole basis for filing the respondents
Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings applies
only to the filing of applications for free patent and for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not
to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a
proceeding entirely different from "filing an application for a
free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles."
Parenthetically, in setting aside the decision dated September
28, 1940, the respondent Judge has concluded that Rep. Act
6236 is applicable also to reopening of cadastral proceedings,
thereby, altering Rep. Act 6236. That cannot be done by the
judiciary. That is a function that properly pertains to the
legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs. Court
of Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and again that where
the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for
the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt
as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions
have consistently been to that effect. 6 Likewise, it is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of
the statute are clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is
called for, and the law is applied as written, 7 for application is
the first duty of courts, and interpretation, only were literal
application is impossible or inadequate. 8

People vs Estenzo
Malinias vs. Comelec
Respondent Aotes filed on February 23, 1972 a petition to
reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Rep. Act 931
as amended by Rep. Act 6236. Respondents Aotes claim that
since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and
applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and
imperfect titles have been extended up to December 31, 1980,
the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until

Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked

that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election
offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of
B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is
unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the
canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses

criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg.

881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is
not punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of
B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for an election offense
under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than
one year but not more than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC
to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a noncriminal act.
"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated
in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle
that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its
variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are
based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. They are predicated upon one's own voluntary
act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned."23
Doctrine of Necessary Implication
Pepsi Cola Products Phil., Inc vs. Secretary of Labor
As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees
can join the labor union of the rank and file, what was held in
the case of National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)
Republic
Planters
Bank
Supervisors
Chapter
vs. Hon. R. D. Torres, et. al., G.R. No. 93468, December 29,
1994, applies to this case. Citing Bulletin Publishing
Corporation vs. Sanchez, 144 SCRA 628, 635, Golden Farms
vs. NLRC, 175 SCRA 471, and Pier 8 Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Nieves Roldan-Confessor
et al., G.R. No. 110854, February 14, 1995, the Court ruled:
. . . A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence
on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and
protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245 of the
Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to
join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine
of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly
disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed, as
elucidated in several case; the latest of which is Chua v. Civil
Service Commission where we said:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
involved in its application. There is always an omission that

may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the

time of the enactment, to be an all embracing legislation
maybe inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the
future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill
in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication . . ., Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis . . .
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took
into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification of
managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing
Corporation v. Sanchez, thus ". . . if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in
view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership." Stated
differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to
act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interest are
well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection
if these employees themselves are union members. Collective
bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the
same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position
of confidential employees as included in the disqualification
found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential
employees were written in the provision. If confidential
employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages
for themselves, then they could be governed by their own
motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover,
unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of
collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to
persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest
of" the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of
collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest
which they are duty bound to protect. Along the same line of
reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. vs.FerrerCalleja reiterated in Philips Industrial Development, Inc.,
NLRC, that "confidential employees such as accounting
personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access
to confidential information, may become the source of undue
advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either
party to a collective bargaining agreement.
Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est
Municipality of Nueva Era vs Municipality of Marcos
At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of
the creation of a local government unit is not required.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units

directly affected.40

creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on

June 21, 1969.47 (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).

The purpose of the above constitutional provision was

acknowledged by the Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno
in Miranda v. Aguirre,41 where it was held that:

Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos

but merely interpreting the law that created it. Its creation was
already a fait accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to
further require a plebiscite.

The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous

Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our
people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986
EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the
undesirable practice in the past whereby local government
units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis
of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people.
Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit
directly affected was required to serve as a checking
mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating,
dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of
local government units. It is one instance where the people in
their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru
people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in
accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more
autonomy to local government units.42
Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and
statutory43 plebiscite requirement for the creation of a local
government unit is applicable to this case. It posits that the
claim of Marcos to its territory should be denied due to lack
of the required plebiscite.
We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over
parts of its territory is not tenable. However, the reason is not
the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973
constitutions and the Local Government Code of 1991 but
other reasons as will be discussed below.
At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required
by law to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was
validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of
fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was
derived.
Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not
backward.44 It is the basic norm that provisions of the
fundamental law should be given prospective application
only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is
so provided.45
In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on
Elections46 involving the City of Mandaue, the Court has this
to say:
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as
unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the residents
of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city,
municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by
the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that
came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is
prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the

As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:

Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the
Constitution should be given only a prospective application
unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule
otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly
disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence of an
unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the
Constitution.48
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation
of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which
Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. To
wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda,
Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of
Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from
the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate
municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with
the following boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as
Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore,
excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing
not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which
it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by
implication be excluded from its operation and effect. 49 This
rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon
the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.50
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era
to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by
clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or
construction be extended to other matters.51 The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not
to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.52
Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not
mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the
territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to
have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in
the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which
states that a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.53
Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature
is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved
the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note

mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of

Marcos.
Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts
may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity
and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.54
Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the
law creating Marcos, the latter still contends that said law
included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of
its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary
going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary
consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by
the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios
Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which
is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of
Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the
boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the
Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a portion of Nueva Era
formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era
is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to
reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will
necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva Era.
Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle
portion of Nueva Era but also to its northern portion which, as
a consequence, was isolated from the major part of Nueva
Era.
We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.
Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory
of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of
Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras
as a compact and contiguous territory.
Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of
Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be
interpreted in light of the legislative intent.
The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude
absurdity in its application.55 We thus uphold the legislative
intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.
Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that
can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of
the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole
statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be
considered.56 Every section, provision or clause of the statute
must be expounded by reference to each other in order to
arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole
text of the law, and every part of the act is to be taken into
view.57
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable
interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for

which they were passed. This Court has in many cases

involving the construction of statutes always cautioned
against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose
of the legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of
judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a
deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore
"a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results."58
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus, in
construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
People vs. Manantan
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was
enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and
Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor
of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the
Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural
police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall
aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any
election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the
legislative development or history of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word
"justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as
averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that
in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace"
were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180),
the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not
carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words,
whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of
the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would
follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology
would seem to justify the conclusion that when the legislature
omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180,
it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation.
Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had
destroyed congressional records which might have offered
some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357
which legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the
first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional
clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless,

the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep.

Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.

been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of

terms.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among

the officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that
said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the
phrase "of any province." The last mentioned phrase,
defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace
since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a
municipality.

Reddendo singular singulis

Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is

true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily removes
justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that
they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same
thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of
the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can
there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of
the Court of Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The
more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is
that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are
generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is
likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said
rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is
applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace
must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately
exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.

People vs. Tamani

Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be
taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice
of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a
motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion shall have been served upon the
defendant or his attorney.
The word "must" in section 6 is synonymous with
"ought". It connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. The
clear terms of section 6 leave no room for doubt that the
appeal should be effected within fifteen days from the
promulgation of the judgment.
The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so
understood that import of section 6 (which is confirmed
by the practice in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that
his motion for reconsideration was filed on March 1st,
which was the fifteenth or last day of the reglementary
period.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim

"casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature
did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan
political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another
term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be

counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the
decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by
registered mail, is not well-taken. The word
"promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as
referring to "judgment" (see section 6 of Rule 120), while
the word "notice" should be construed as referring to
"order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule
of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each;
referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate
object", or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the
words should be taken distributively" (76 C. J. S. 175).

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to

this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that
the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular
application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is
pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against
the government since proceedings under it are criminal in
nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes
should be strictly interpreted against the state.

Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for

reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th
on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within
which to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. That
construction is an application by analogy or in a
suppletory character of the rule governing appeals in civil
cases which is embodied in section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court.

Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict

interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit
of fair play and due process demand such strict construction
in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if
a certain line is passed, in language that the common world
will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283
U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).

Relative and qualifying terms

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed

from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather
from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the
present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has

Mapa vs. Arroyo

We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application
of the so-called doctrine of last antecedent in the
interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21.
He would thereby have the enumeration of "facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of
development" interpreted to mean that the demonstrative
phrase "which are offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of
development" and not to "facilities, improvements and

infrastructures." While this subserves his purpose, such

bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set
apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous.
The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens
fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. 9 Relative words refer to
the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context.
In the present case, the employment of the word "and"
between "facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other
forms of development," far from supporting petitioner's
theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal
hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is
a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.
Thus, if ever there is any valid ground to suspend the monthly
installments due from petitioner, it would only be based on
non-performance of the obligations provided in Clause 20 of
the contract, particularly the alleged non-construction of the
cul-de-sac. But, even this is unavailing and is obviously being
used only to justify petitioner's default. The on-site inspection
of the subdivision conducted by the OAALA and its
subsequent report reveal that Labrador substantially complied
with its obligation.
Use of punctuation marks
U.S. vs Hart
It is insisted by the Attorney-General that as visible means of
support would not be a bar to a conviction under any one of
the last four clauses of this act, it was not the intention of the
Legislature to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no
visible means of support. Relying upon the second clause to
sustain the guilt of the defendants, the Attorney-General then
proceeds to argue that "visible means of support" as used in
that clause does not apply to "every person found loitering
about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses," but is
confined entirely to "or tramping or straying through the
country." It is insisted that had it been intended for "without
visible means of support" to qualify the first part of the clause,
either the comma after gambling houses would have been
ommitted, or else a comma after country would have been
inserted.
When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it
is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true
legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute
which will give it effect. The construction finally adopted
should be based upon something more substantial than the
mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation
of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in
apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an
additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an argument
based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts
will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to
give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and
inserting others where necessary.
The Attorney-General has based his argument upon the
proposition that neither visible means of support nor a lawful
calling is a sufficient defense under the last four paragraphs of
the section; hence, not being universally a defense to a charge

of vagrancy, they should not be allowed except where the

Legislature has so provided. He then proceeds to show, by a
"mere grammatical criticism" of the second paragraph, that
the Legislature did not intend to allow visible means of
support or a lawful calling to block a prosecution for vagrancy
founded on the charge that the defendant was found loitering
around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses.
A most important step in reasoning, necessary to make it
sound, is to ascertain the consequences flowing from such a
construction of the law. What is loitering? The dictionaries
say it is idling or wasting one's time. The time spent in
saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything
but that. So that under the proposed construction, practically
all who frequent such places commit a crime in so doing, for
which they are liable to punishment under the Vagrancy Law.
We cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature
to penalize what, in the case of saloons and dram shops, is
under the law's protection. If it be urged that what is true of
saloons and dram shops is not true of gambling houses in this
respect, we encounter the wording of the law, which makes no
distinction whatever between loitering around saloons and
dram shops, and loitering around gambling houses.
The offense of vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the
Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and
harmful parasites of society. While the statutes of the various
States of the American Union differ greatly as to
the classification of such persons, their scope is substantially
the same. Of those statutes we have had an opportunity to
examine, but two or three contain a provision similar to the
second paragraph of Act No. 519. (Mo. Ann. Stat., sec. 2228;
N. D. Rev. Codes, sec. 8952; N. M. Comp. Laws 1897, sec.
1314.) That the absence of visible means of support or a
lawful calling is necessary under these statutes to a conviction
for loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling
houses is not even negatived by the punctuation employed. In
the State of Tennessee, however, we find an exact counterpart
for paragraph 2 of section 1 of our own Act (Code of Tenn.,
sec. 3023), with the same punctuation:lawph!1.net
. . . or of any person to be found loitering about saloons or
dram shops, gambling houses, or houses of ill fame, or
tramping or strolling through the country without any visible
means of support.
A further thought suggest itself in connection with the
punctuation of the paragraph in question. The section, as
stated above, is divided into seven clauses, separated by
semicolons. To say that two classes of vagrants are defined in
paragraph 2, as to one of which visible means of support or a
lawful calling is not a good defense, and as to the other of
which such a defense is sufficient, would imply a lack of
logical classification on the part of the legislature of the
various classes of vagrants. This we are not inclined to do.
In the case at bar, all three of the defendants were earning a
living by legitimate methods in a degree of comfort higher
that the average. Their sole offense was gambling, which the
legislature deemed advisable to make the subject of a penal
law. The games in which they participated were apparently
played openly, in a licensed public saloon, where the officers
of the law could have entered as easily as did the patrons. It is

believed that Act No. 1775 is adequate, if enforced, to supress

the gambling proclivities of any person making a good living
at a lawful trade or business.
Words and Phrases:
Proviso
CIR vs. Filipinas Campania de Seguros
As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. (Art. 4, Civil Code of the Philippines; Manila
Trading and Supply Co. vs. Santos, et al., 66 Phil., 237; La
Provisora Filipina vs. Ledda, 66 Ph 573.) Otherwise stated, a
state shou!d be consider as prospective in its operation
whether it enacts, amen or repeals a tax, unless the language
of the statute clearly demands or expresses that it shall have a
retroactive effect (61 C. J. 1602, cited in Loremo vs. Posadas,
64 Phi 353.) The rule applies with greater force to the case
bar, considering that Republic Act No. 1612, which imposes
the new and higher rates of real estate dealer's annual fixed
tax, expressly provides in Section 21 thereof the said Act
"shall take effect upon its approval" on August 24, 1956.
The instant case involves the fixed annual real estat dealer's
tax for 1956. There is no dispute that before the enactment of
Republic Act No. 1612 on August 2 1956, the uniform fixed
annual real estate dealer's was P150.00 for all owners of rental
properties receiving an aggregate amount of P3,000.00 or
more a year in the form of rentals 2 and that. "the yearly fixed
taxes are due on the first of January of each year" unless
tendered in semi-annual or quarterly installments. 3 Since the
petitioner indisputably paid in full on January 4, 1956, the
total annual tax then prescribed for the year 1956, require it to
pay an additional sum of P350.00 to complete the P500.00
provided in Republic Act No. 1612 which became effective by
its very terms only on August 24 1956, would, in the language
of the Court of Tax Appeals result in the imposition upon
respondent of a tax burden to which it was not liable before
the enactment of said amendatory act, thus rendering its
operation retroactive rather than prospective, which cannot be
done, as it would contravene the aforecited Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 1612 as well as the established rule
regarding prospectivity of operation of statutes.
The view that Congress did intend to impose said increased
rates of real estate dealer's annual tax prospectively and not
retroactively, finds some affirmation in Republic Act No.
1856, approved on June 22, 1957, which fixed the effective
date of said new rates under Republic Act No. 1612 by
inserting the following proviso in Section 182 of the National
Internal Revenue Code:
Provided, further, That any amount collected in excess of the
rates in effect prior to January one, nineteen hundred and
fifty-seven, shall be refunded or credited to the taxpayer
concerned subject to the provisions of section three hundred
and nine of this Code. (Sec. 182 (b) (2) (1).)
Petitioner, however, contends that the above-quoted provision
refers only to fixed taxes on occupation and does not cover
fixed taxes on business, such as the real estate dealer's fixed
tax herein involved. This is technically correct, but we note
from the deliberations in the Senate, where the proviso in

question was introduced as an amendment, that said House

Bill No. 5919 which became Republic Act No. 1856 was
considered, amended, and enacted into law, in order precisely
that the "iniquitous effects" which were then being felt by
taxpayers. in general, on account of the approval of Republic
Act No. 1612, Which was being given retroactive effect by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue by collecting these taxes
retroactively from January 1, 1956, be eliminated and
complaints against such action be finally settled. (See Senate
Congressional Record, May 4, 1957, pp. 10321033.)
It is also to be observed that said House Bill No. 5819 as
originally presented, was expressly intended to amend certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code dealing on
fixed taxes on business. The provisions in respect of fixed
tax on occupation were merely subsequently added. This
would seem to indicate that the proviso in question was
intended to cover not only fixed taxes on occupation, but also
fixed taxes on business. (Senate Congressional Record, March
7, 1957, p. 444.)The fact that said proviso was placed only at
the end of paragraph "(B) On occupation" is not, therefore,
view of the circumstances, decisive and unmistakable
indication that Congress limited the proviso to occupation
taxes.
Even though the primary purpose of the proviso is to limit
restrain the general language of a statute, the legislature,
unfotunately, does not always use it with technical
correctness; consequently, where its use creates an ambiguity,
it is the duty of the court to ascertain the legislative intention,
through resort to usual rules of construction applicable to
statutes, generally an give it effect even though the statute is
thereby enlarged, or the proviso made to assume the force of
an independent enactment and although a proviso as such has
no existence apart from provision which it is designed to limit
or to qualify. (Statutory Construction by E. T. Crawford, pp.
604-605.)
. . . When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construe
with reference to its intended scope and purpose.
Mercado et. al. vs. NLRC
The contention of petitioners that the second paragraph of
Article 280 of the Labor Code should have been applied in
their case presents an opportunity to clarify the aforementioned provision of law.
Article 280 of the Labor Code reads in full:
Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the
parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where
the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to
be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not

covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such actually exists.
The first paragraph answers the question of who are
employees. It states that, regardless of any written or oral
agreement to the contrary, an employee is deemed regular
where he is engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except for project
employees.
A project employee has been defined to be one whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or
where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season 26 as in the present case.
The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as "casual"
employees, all other employees who do not fan under the
definition of the preceding paragraph. The proviso, in said
second paragraph, deems as regular employees those "casual"
employees who have rendered at least one year of service
regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or
broken.
Petitioners, in effect, contend that the proviso in the second
paragraph of Art. 280 is applicable to their case and that the
Labor Arbiter should have considered them regular by virtue
of said proviso. The contention is without merit.
The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or
modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or
limit the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows. 27 Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of
the provision to which it is attached, and not to the statute
itself or to other sections thereof. 28 The only exception to this
rule is where the clear legislative intent is to restrain or
qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it (the
proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the
statute itself as a whole. 29
Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and
Employment discloses that the concept of regular and casual
employees was designed to put an end to casual employment
in regular jobs, which has been abused by many employers to
prevent called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular
employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions. The
same instructions show that the proviso in the second
paragraph of Art. 280 was not designed to stifle small-scale
businesses nor to oppress agricultural land owners to further
the interests of laborers, whether agricultural or industrial.
What it seeks to eliminate are abuses of employers against
their employees and not, as petitioners would have us believe,
to prevent small-scale businesses from engaging in legitimate
methods to realize profit. Hence, the proviso is applicable
only to the employees who are deemed "casuals" but not to

the "project" employees nor the regular employees treated in

paragraph one of Art. 280.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to
use the correct term, seasonal employees, their employment
legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. The
termination of their employment cannot and should not
constitute an illegal dismissal. 30
Including
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. LLDA
The word include means "to take in or comprise as a part of a
whole."53
Thus, this Court has previously held that it necessarily
conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the
enumeration.54 The principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate
that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or
where the enumeration is by way of example only.55 The
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply
when words are mentioned by way of example. 56 Said legal
maxim should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest.57
In another case, the Court said:
[T]he word "involving," when understood in the sense of
"including," as in including technical or financial assistance,
necessarily implies that there are activities other than those
that are being included. In other words, if an agreement
includes technical or financial assistance, there is [] apart
from such assistance something else already in[,] and
covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.58
As the regulation stands, therefore, all cottage industries
including, but not limited to, those enumerated therein are
exempted from securing prior clearance from the LLDA.
Hence, the CA erred in ruling that only the three activities
enumerated therein are exempted.
Next, the Court must determine if petitioner is in fact a
cottage industry entitled to claim the exemption under LLDA
Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997.
That jewelry-making is one of the activities considered as a
cottage industry is undeniable. The laws bear this out.
However, based on these same laws, the nature of the activity
is only one of several factors to be considered in determining
whether the same is a cottage industry.
In view of the emphasis in law after law on the capitalization
or asset requirements, it is crystal clear that the same is a
defining element in determining if an enterprise is a cottage
industry.
Petitioner argues that its assets amount to only P312,500.00,
representing its paid-up capital at the time of its SEC
registration. The law then in force was R.A. No. 6977, which,
to recapitulate, states:
SEC. 3. Small and Medium Enterprises as Beneficiaries.
"Small and medium enterprise" shall be defined as any

business activity or enterprise engaged in industry,

agribusiness and/or services, whether single proprietorship,
cooperative, partnership or corporation whose total assets,
inclusive of those arising from loans but exclusive of the land
on which the particular business entitys office, plant, and
equipment are situated, must have value falling under the
following categories:

Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory,

or, as it has been aptly stated, there is but one way to obey the
command "thou shalt not", and that is to completely refrain
from doing the forbidden act. And this is so, even though the
statute provides no penalty for disobedience.

In a generic sense, all enterprises with total assets of Five

million pesos (P5,000,000) and below shall be called small
enterprises.

Bersabal vs. Salvador

Accordingly, it should be considered as a cottage industry,

petitioner insists.
However, petitioners contention that its total assets amounts
only to P312,500.00 is misleading.
The P312,500.00 represents the total amount of the capital
stock already subscribed and paid up by the companys
stockholders. It does not, however, represent the totality of its
assets, even at the time of its registration. By the expert
opinion of petitioners own consultant, independent CPA
Maximiano P. Sorongon, Jr., it does not mean that the paid-up
capital is the only source of funds of the corporation for it to
support its recurring operational requirements, as well as its
increased financial requirements later on, as and when the
business grows and expands.59
In other words, its paid-up capital is not the only asset of the
company. Under R.A. No. 6977, the term total assets was
understood to mean "inclusive of those arising from loans but
exclusive of the land on which the particular business entitys
office, plant, and equipment are situated."
Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal,
tangible and intangible, including, inter alia, for certain
purposes, patents and causes of action which belong to any
person, including a corporation and the estate of a
decedent.1avvphi1 It is the entire property of a person,
association, corporation, or estate that is applicable or subject
to the payment of his, her, or its debts.
Negative vs. Affirmative Words
In re McGee vs. Republic
One additional reason for holding that article 338 of the new
Civil Code should be subordinated and made subject to the
provisions of article 335 so as to limit the permission to adopt
granted in article 338, to parents who have no children of their
own, is that the terms of article 335 are phrased in a negative
manner the following cannotbe adopted, while the
phraseology of article 338 is only affirmative the
following may be adopted. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.
. . . negative (prohibitory and exclusive words or terms are
indicative of the legislative intent that the statute is to be
mandatory, . . . (Crawford, Statutory Construction, sec. 263, p.
523.)
Ordinarily ... the word "may" is directory, . . . (Crawford, op.
cit., sec. 262, p. 519.)

Mandatory vs. Permissive

The sole inquiry in the case at bar can be stated thus: Whether,
in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No.
6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on nine the
memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would
empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on
the ground of failure to Prosecute; or, whether it is mandatory
upon said Court to proceed to decide the appealed case on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, the failure
of the appellant to submit a memorandum on time
notwithstanding.
The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296,
otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on
the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city
or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may
submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested ... . (Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for
doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the
submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the
parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter
may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And
as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the
Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the
submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not
to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left
with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to
dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to
submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court's
mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available
evidence and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is
permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the
word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which
may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24,
1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the
Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case
either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to
it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief
with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
It is first contended by the appellant that the above provision
is mandatory, not only because it employs the word "shall",
which in its ordinary signification is mandatory, not

permissive, but also because the provision is applicable to

institutions of credit under the control of the Government, and
because otherwise the phrases "subject to availability of
loanable funds" and "any provisions of this charter, . . . and
regulations to the contrary notwithstanding" would be
superfluous.
It is true that its ordinary signification the word "shall" is
imperative.
In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary
signification, the term "shall" is a word of command, and one
which has always or which must be given compulsory
meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a preemptory
meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It has
the invariable significance of operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in
favor of this meaning or when addressed to public officials, or
where a public interest is involved, or where the public or
persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced,
unless a contrary intent appears. People vs. O'Rourke, 13 P.
2d. 989, 992, 124 Cal. App. 752. (39 Words and Phrases,
Permanent Ed., p. 90.)
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used is
an imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different
interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the
character of the legislation or in the context which will justify
a different meaning. Haythorn vs. Van Keuren & Son, 74 A.
502, 504, 79 N. J. L. 101; Board of Finance of School City of
Aurora vs. People's Nat. Bank of Lawrenceburg, 89 N. E. 904,
905 44 Ind. App. 578. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed.,
p. 93.)
However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as
"many", when so required by the context or by the intention
of the statute.
In the ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative, and not
permissive, though it may have the latter meaning when
required by the context. Town of Milton vs. Cook, 138 N.E.
589, 590, 244 Mass. 93. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent
Ed., p. 89.)
"Must" or "shall" in a statute is not always imperative, but
may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. In re O'Hara,
82 N.Y.S. 293, 296, 40 Misc. 355, citing In re Thurber's
Estate, 162 N.Y. 244, 252, 56 N.E. 638, 639. (Ibid. p. 92.)
The word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative, but in
some context it is given a permissive meaning, the intended
meaning being determined by what is intended by the statute.
National Transit Corporation Co. vs. Boardman, 197 A. 239,
241, 328, Pa. 450.
The word "shall" is to be construed as merely permissive,
where no public benefit or private right requires it to be given
an imperative meaning Sheldon vs. Sheldon, 134 A. 904, 905,
100 N.J. Ex. 24.
Presumption is that word "shall" in ordinance, is mandatory;
but, where it is necessary to give effect to legislative intent,
the word will be construed as "may." City of Colorado
Springs vs. Street, 254 p. 440, 441, 81 Colo. 181.

The word "shall" does not necessarily indicate a mandatory

behest. Grimsrud vs. Johnson, 202 N. W. 72, 73, 162 Minn.
98.
Words like "may," "must," "shall" etc., are constantly used in
statutes without intending that they shall be taken literally,
and in their construction the object evidently designed to be
reached limits and controls the literal import of the terms and
phrases employed. Fields vs. United States, 27 App. D. C.
433, 440. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., 89, 92).
In this jurisdiction the tendency has been to interpret the word
"shall" as the context or a reasonable construction of the
statute in which it is used demands or requires. Thus the
provision of section 11 of Rule 4 of the Rules requiring a
municipal judge or a justice of the peace to render judgment
of the conclusion of the trial has been held in the directory.
(Alejandro vs. Judge of First Instance1 40 Off. Gaz., 9th
Supp., 261). In like manner section 178 of the Election Law,
in so far a it requires that appeals shall be decided in three
months, has been to the directory for the Court of Appeals.
(Querubin vs. The Court of Appeals,2 46 Off. Gaz., 155).
In the provision subject controversy, it is to be noted that the
verb-phrase "shall accept or discount" has two modifiers,
namely, "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "at not
more that two per centum per annum for ten years." As to the
second modifier, the interest to be charged, there seems to be
no question that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not
only does the law use "at not more" but the legislative purpose
and intent, to conserve the value of the backpay certificate for
the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have
been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for
discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall
be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary
interpretation. The phrase "subject" means "being under the
contingency of" (Webster's Int. Dict.) a condition. If the
acceptance or discount of the certificates to be "subject" to the
condition of the availability of a loanable funds, it is evident
that the Legislature intended that the acceptance shall be
allowed on the condition that there are "available loanable
funds." In other words, acceptance or discount is to be
permitted only if there are loanable funds.
Adasa vs. Abalos
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
interpretation of the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70
violated three basic rules in statutory construction. First, the
rule that the provision that appears last in the order of position
in the rule or regulation must prevail. Second, the rule that the
contemporaneous construction of a statute or regulation by the
officers who enforce it should be given weight. Third,
petitioner lifted a portion from Agpalos Statutory
Construction8 where the word "shall" had been construed as a
permissive, and not a mandatory language.
The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case,
an administrative rule9 of procedure, is that when a statute or
rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be
resorted to.10 Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly
and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an

appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no

resort to interpretation is necessary.
Petitioners reliance to the statutory principle that "the last in
order of position in the rule or regulation must prevail" is not
applicable. In addition to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 70 needs no construction, the cited principle
cannot apply because, as correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, there is no irreconcilable conflict between Section 7
and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Section 7 of the
circular provides:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. The Secretary of
Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same
to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay,
or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. If an information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be
given due course if the accused had already been arraigned.
Any arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall not
bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of
review. (Italics supplied.)
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states:
SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. The Secretary may
reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may,
motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review
on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in
Section 3 hereof;
(b) That the procedure or any of the requirements herein
provided has not been complied with;
(c) That there is no showing of any reversible error;
(d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature,
except when it suspends the proceedings based on the alleged
existence of a prejudicial question;
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the
appeal was taken;
(f) That the offense has already prescribed; and
(g) That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a
dismissal. (Emphases supplied.)
It is noteworthy that the principle cited by petitioner reveals
that, to find application, the same presupposes that "one part
of the statute cannot be reconciled or harmonized with another
part without nullifying one in favor of the other." In the
instant case, however, Section 7 is neither contradictory nor
irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen above, Section
7 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take,
while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with
regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an
appeal.
As aptly observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically
applies to a situation on what the DOJ must do when
confronted with an appeal or a petition for review that is
either clearly without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or

filed after an accused has already been arraigned, i.e., he may

dismiss it outright if it is patently without merit or manifestly
intended to delay, or, if it was filed after the acccused has
already been arraigned, the Secretary shall not give it due
course.
Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal.
Under said section, the DOJ may take any of four actions
when disposing an appeal, namely:
1. reverse the appealed resolution;
2. modify the appealed resolution;
3. affirm the appealed resolution;
4. dismiss the appeal altogether, depending on
the circumstances and incidents attendant
thereto.
As to the dismissal of a petition for review or an appeal, the
grounds are provided for in Section 12 and, consequently, the
DOJ must evaluate the pertinent circumstances and the facts
of the case in order to determine which ground or grounds
shall apply.
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ
must not give the appeal or petition for review due course and
must dismiss the same. This is bolstered by the fact that
arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or
petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its
dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ, noting that
the arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal
or petition for review is a ground for dismissal under Section
12, must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated
therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give due course to,
and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
Likewise, petitioners reliance on the principle of
contemporary construction, i.e., the DOJ is not precluded
from entertaining appeals where the accused had already been
arraigned, because it exercises discretionary power, and
because it promulgated itself the circular in question, is
unpersuasive. As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous
interpretation or construction by the officers charged with the
enforcement of the rules and regulations it promulgated is
entitled to great weight by the court in the latters construction
of such rules and regulations. That does not, however, make
such a construction necessarily controlling or binding. For
equally settled is the rule that courts may disregard
contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or
rule construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction
is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary
exists, and where the court has previously given the statute a
different interpretation.
If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or
administrative officer called upon to implement it has
erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be corrected
when the true construction is ascertained. If a
contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the
same must be declared null and void. Such principle should be
as it is applied in the case at bar.11
Petitioners posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory
import of the word "shall" is misplaced. It is petitioners view

that the language of Section 12 is permissive and therefore the

mandate in Section 7 has been transformed into a matter
within the discretion of the DOJ. To support this stance,
petitioner cites a portion of Agpalos Statutory Construction
which reads:
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act
304 which states that "banks or other financial institutions
owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to
availability of funds xxx, accept at a discount at not more than
two per centum for ten years such (backpay) certificate"
implies not a mandatory, but a discretionary, meaning because
of the phrase "subject to availability of funds." Similarly, the
word "shall" in the provision to the effect that a corporation
violating the corporation law "shall, upon such violation being
proved, be dissolved by quo warranto proceedings" has been
construed as "may."12
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes
apparent that the same is not applicable to the provision in
question. In the cited passage, the word "shall" departed from
its mandatory import connotation because it was connected to
certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the availability of
funds" and "upon such violation being proved." No such
proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section 7 of the
subject circular. Hence, the word "shall" retains its mandatory
import.
And, or and/or
People vs Martin
The rule is too well-settled to require any citation of
authorities that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence of one thing from each of the
other things enumerated unless the context requires a different
interpretation. While in the interpretation of statutes, 'or' may
read 'and' and vice versa, it is so only when the context so
requires. 2
A reading of section 46 above-quoted does not justify giving
the word "or" a non-disjunctive meaning.
Bringing into and landing in the Philippines of the 39 aliens
were completed when they were placed ashore in the barrio of
Damortis on September 22, 1966. The act of the six accused
in criminal case 6258-M before the CFI of Bulacan of
transporting the aliens constitutes the offenses of "concealing"
and "harboring," as the terms are used in section 46 of our
Immigration Laws. The court a quo in point of fact accepted
this interpretation when it observed that "it could happen that
different individuals, acting separately from, and
independently of each other could violate and be criminally
liable for violation of the immigration Act, if each individual
independently commits any of the means specified under said
section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by
Republic Act 827. For example, an individual act
independently, with the use of a motor boat, brings into the
country and lands several Chinese aliens and after doing so he
goes away. There is no question that said individual violated
said section 46 of the Immigration Act, for bringing into and
landing in the Philippines some alien. Now, after the said
landing of the said aliens another individual also acting
independently, without connection whatsoever with the one

who brought and landed the said aliens, and knowing that the
Chinese aliens have no right to enter the country or
unlawfully conceals or harbors the said aliens. There is no
doubt that this is also liable and punishable for another
separate violation of said section 46 of Commonwealth Act
613."
Lincomcen vs. Foundation Specialist, Inc.
2. For Convenience of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED
If any time before completion of work under the Contract it
shall be found by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED that
reasons beyond the control of the parties render it impossible
or against the interest of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED to
complete the work, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED at
any time, by written notice to the Contractor, may discontinue
the work and terminate the Contract in whole or in part. Upon
issuance of such notice of termination, the Contractor shall
discontinue the work in such manner, sequence and at such
time as the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer may
direct, continuing and doing after said notice only such work
and only until such time or times as the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct. x x x 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
Unfortunately for LICOMCEN, this provision does not
support but enervates its theory of indefinite suspension. The
cited provision may be invoked only in cases of termination
of contract, as clearly inferred from the phrase "discontinue
the work and terminate the contract." And in statutory
construction implies conjunction, joinder or union.42 Thus, by
invoking GC-41, LICOMCEN, in effect, admitted that the
contract had already been terminated.
The termination of the contract was made obvious and
unmistakable when LICOMCENs new project consultant
rebidded the contract for the bored piling works for the
CITIMALL.43 The claim that the rebidding was conducted for
purposes of getting cost estimates for a possible new
design44 taxes our credulity. It impresses us as nothing more
than a lame attempt of LICOMCEN to avoid liability under
the contract. As the CIAC had taken pains to demonstrate:
Suspension of work is ordinarily understood to mean a
temporary work stoppage or a cessation of work for the time
being. It may be assumed that, at least initially, LCC had a
valid reason to suspend the Works on December 16, 1997
pursuant to GC-38 above-quoted. The evidence show,
however, that it has not ordered a resumption of work up to
the present despite the lapse of more than four years, and
despite the dismissal of the case filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman which it gave as reason for the suspension in the
first place. As such, LCCs suspension of the Works had
already lost its essential characteristic of being merely
temporary or only for the time being. To still consider it a
"suspension" at this point is to do violence to reason and
logic.
Perhaps because of this LCC came up with the assertion that
what we have is an "indefinite suspension." There is no such
term in the Construction Agreement or the Contract
Documents. In fact, it is unknown in the construction industry.
Construction work may either be suspended or terminated, but

never indefinitely suspended. Since it is not sanctioned by

practice and not mentioned in the herein Construction
Agreement and the Contract Documents, "indefinite
suspension" is irregular and invalid. Due to the apparent
incongruity of an "indefinite suspension," LCC changed the
term to "continued suspension" in its Memorandum.
Unfortunately for it, the factual situation remains unchanged.
The Works stay suspended for an indefinite period of time.45
Accordingly, the CA did not err in affirming the CIAC ruling
that the contract had already been terminated.
Neither can LICOMCEN find refuge in the principle of laches
to steer clear of liability. It is not just the lapse of time or
delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either
abandoned or declined to assert it. 46
Indeed, FSI filed its petition for arbitration only on October 8,
2002, or after the lapse of more than four years since the
project was "indefinitely suspended." But we agree with the
CIAC and the CA that such delay can hardly be considered
unreasonable to give rise to the conclusion that FSI already
abandoned its claim. On the contrary, the delay was due to the
fact that FSI exerted efforts to have the claim settled extrajudicially which LICOMCEN rebuffed. Besides, except for
LICOMCENs allegation that the filing of the suit is already
barred by laches, no proof was offered to show that the filing
of the suit was iniquitous or unfair to LICOMCEN. We
reiterate that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are
adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned
by law and is not to be considered delay that would bar
relief.47 In the instant case, FSI filed its claim well within the
ten-year prescriptive period provided for in Article 1144 of
the Civil Code.48 Therefore, laches cannot be invoked to bar
FSI from instituting this suit.
Rumarate vs. Hernandez
The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be
awarded? To petitioners who possessed and cultivated the lot
since 1929 up to the present, but do not have a certificate of
title over the property, or to respondents who have a
certificate of title but are not in possession of the controverted
lot?
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the parties so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever
free from any danger of hostile claim.26 Under Article 47627 of
the Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast
on the complainants title to real property or any interest
therein. Article 477 of the same Code states that the plaintiff
must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the suit.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or

complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in

the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.28
In Evangelista v. Santiago,29 it was held that title to real
property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the
evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest,
by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert
a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.
In the instant case, we find that Teodulos open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of Lot No.
379, in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years vested
him and his heirs title over the said lot. The law applicable at
the time Teodulo completed his 30-year possession (from
1929 to 1959) of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner was
Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land
Act, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, effective
June 22, 195730 which provides:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act (now Property Registration Decree), to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been, in continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
right to a government grant, without necessity of a certificate
of title being issued, and the land ceases to be part of the
public domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth
be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. 31
In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence
to the testimony of Teodulo and his witnesses that his
(Teodulos) possession of the land since 1929 was open,
continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an
owner. It is a settled rule in civil cases as well as in criminal
cases that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings

of the trial courts are given great weight and highest degree of
respect by the appellate court considering that the latter is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.32
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that
Teodulo possessed and occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept
of an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted
land, built his home, and raised his 11 children thereon. In
1957, he filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379 but
failed to pursue the same.33After his demise, all his 11
children, the youngest being 28 years old, 34 continued to till
the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never challenged
Teodulos possession of Lot No. 379 nor demanded or
received the produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago never
exercised any act of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in
1960, he confirmed that he is no longer interested in asserting
any right over the land by executing in favor of Teodulo a
quitclaim.
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated
the land as owner thereof since 1929. While the oral donation
in 1929 as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo are void for non-compliance with the formalities of
donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his familys
long years of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the
nature of their possession thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete,35 the Court sustained the registration of
a parcel of land in the name of the successors-in-interest of
the donee notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation
inasmuch as said donee possessed the property in the concept
of an owner. Thus
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid
because it involves an immovable property and the donation
was not made in a public document as required by Article 633
of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the
same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not
follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive
prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken
possession of the property adversely and in the concept of
owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulos open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of Lot
No. 379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the concept of
an owner, earned him title over the lot in accordance with Sec.
48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379
became the private property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had
no more right to sell the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently, the latter and herein
respondents did not acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and
the titles issued in their name are void.
Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago
acquired title over Lot No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925
Decision of the CFI of Tayabas which merely recognized his
rights over said lot, but from his more than 30 years of
possession since 1925 up to 1964 when he sold same lot to
their (respondents) predecessors-in-interest, the spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said

claim, said spouses filed an action for, and successfully

obtained, confirmation of imperfect title over Lot No. 379,
pursuant to Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
However, the records do not support the argument of
respondents that Santiagos alleged possession and cultivation
of Lot No. 379 is in the nature contemplated by the Public
Land Act which requires more than constructive possession
and casual cultivation. As explained by the Court in Director
of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court:36
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and
occupation." Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the wordoccupation, it seeks to delimit
the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together
with
the
words open,
continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b)
of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be
mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice
Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
"x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid
down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175,
180). (See also Rosales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302,
304). But it should be observed that the application of the
doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to
certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe
that among these qualifications is one particularly relating to
the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the claimant. While,
therefore, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession,
possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is
not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a
sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like
claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory.
Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may
be constructive, is not a mere fiction x x x."
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court
noted:
"x x x The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for
taxation purposes and visiting it every once in a while, as was
done by him, does not constitute acts of possession."
In the instant case, Santiagos short-lived possession and
cultivation of Lot No. 379 could not vest him title. While he
tilled the land in 1925, he ceased to possess and cultivate the
same since 1928. He abandoned the property and allowed
Teodulo to exercise all acts of ownership. His brief possession
of Lot No. 379 could not thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus
juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet. No one can transfer
a greater right to another than he himself has. Hence, spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta and herein respondents
did not acquire any right over the questioned lot and the title

issued in their names are void, because of the legal truism that
the spring cannot rise higher than the source.37
Repeals
Villegas vs. Subido
2. Much less is reversal of the lower court decision justified
on the plea that the aforesaid provision in the Decentralization
Act had the effect of repealing what is specifically ordained in
the city charter. It has been the constant holding of this Court
that repeals by duplication are not favored and will not be so
declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended.
Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a
1908 decision. 13 It is necessary then before such a repeal is
deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory
provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter
be inconsistent with the former. 14 There must be a showing of
repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language
used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.
What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative
purpose to repeal. 15
More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as
to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing
a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose
to do so is manifest. This is so even if the provisions of the
latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set
forth in the special act. This principle has likewise been
consistently applied in decisions of this Court from Manila
Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 16decided as far back as 1919. A
citation from an opinion of Justice Tuason is illuminating.
Thus: "From another angle the presumption against repeal is
stronger. A special law is not regarded as having been
amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to
repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non
derogant. And this is true although the terms of the general act
are broad enough to include the matter in the special
statute. ... At any rate, in the event harmony between
provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is
impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute,
considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon
the part of the legislature. ... A general law is one which
embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
subject or place naturally belonging to such class while a
special act is one which relates to particular persons or things
of a class.
Tac-an vs. CA
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the Acopiado
brothers fully understood the tenor of the Deed of Quitclaim
which they executed. But the Court of Appeals also found as a
fact that the Acopiado brothers are Non-Christians, more
specifically Subanons, and that each is married to a Subanon.
And because they are Non-Christians, the Court of Appeals
applied Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu which reads as follows:

Sec. 145. Contracts with Non-Christians requisites. -- Save

and except contracts of sale or barter of personal property and
contracts of personal service comprehended in chapter
seventeen hereof no contract or agreement shall be made in
the Department by any person with any Moro or other nonChristian tribe or portion thereof the Department or with any
individual Moro or other non-Christian inhabitants of the
same for the payment or delivery of money or other things of
value in present or in prospective, or in the manner affecting
or relating to any real property, unless such contract or
agreement be executed and approved as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) It shall be executed before a judge of a court of record,
justice or auxilliary justice of the peace, or notary public, and
shall bear the approval of the provincial governor wherein the
same was executed or his representative duly authorized in
writing for such purpose, indorsed upon it.
It should be stated that under Section 146 of the same Code,
contracts or agreements made in violation of Sec. 145 shall be
"null and void."
It should be recalled that on July 2, 1964, Tac-An secured the
approval of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte
to the Deed of Quitclaim and that should have satisfied the
requirement of Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code for
Mindanao and Sulu. But it appears that on April 12, 1965,
while Tac-An's suit was pending in the trial court, the
Governor of Zamboanga del Norte revoked his approval for
the reasons stated therein.
The petitioner now asserts that the revocation of the approval
which had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal
effect and cannot affect his right to the land which had already
vested. But as Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, with Justices
Mateo Canonoy and Ameurfina M. Herrera concurring, said:
The approval by Provincial Governor Felipe Azcuna
appearing on the face of the Deed of Quitclaim (Exh. "E ")
made on July 2, 1964 may no longer be relied upon by the
plaintiff in view of the revocation thereof by the same official
on April 12, 1965 (Exh. 4). The revocation was based on the
ground that the signature of Governor Azcuna was obtained
thru a false representation to the effect that the alleged
transaction was legal and voluntary when in truth and in fact,
as found out later, the said parcel of land was the subject
matter of a court litigation; and, moreover, the non-Christian
vendors were not brought before him for interrogation,
confirmation or ratification of the alleged deed of quitclaim.
The fact that the revocation was made after the filing of
instant action on October 10, 1964 does not vitiate the
aforesaid action of the Provincial Governor. Significantly, no
attempt was made to disprove the truth of the reasons stated in
the certificate of revocation (Exh. 4). (Rollo, p. 37.)
The petitioner also argues that the Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu was repealed on June 19, 1965 by
Republic Act No, 4252, hence the approval of the Provincial
Governor became unnecessary. Suffice it to say that at times
material to the case, i.e. when the Deed of Quitclaim was
executed, when the approval by the Provincial Governor was
given and when the approval was revoked, Sections 145 and

146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in

full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature
the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. It
should also be stated that the land in question must be

presumed to be conjugal in nature and since the spouses of the

Acopiado brothers did not consent to its transfer to the
petitioner, the transaction was at least voidable.