Professional Documents
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REVIEWS
I
Although perhaps not well known to the Anglo-Saxon scholarly community, Henry
has a solid philosophical reputation in France stemming from two earlier works,
L'Essence de la manifestation (I963) and Philosophie et phgnomdnologie du co~'ps
(I965). He is further a novelist of some distinction and recent winner of a literary
award. His literary penchant is apparent in his masterly style, unusual even for a
French writer. The following passage, which should be quoted in the original French,
is not untypical :
Si Le Capital est le m6morial et le martyrologe des individus de son temps, c'est que
cdui-ci est le temps propMtique oh le savoir salt n'etre que l'id4ologie de la praxis,
off les documents eux-mSmes vont dire ee qu'est la r&lit6. (=-444)
Henry develops his present discussion in the form of a lecture de texte. As commonly
understood, this technique implies an attempt to work o u t an immanen't textual
interpretation in the form of a close reading, which mainly relies for its dev:ei~pment
on internal indications in a text or series of texts. So understood, one cou!d fairly
expect a rather monochromatic and even rather microscopic study which weighs and
sifts possible readings. But although to some extent this is the case, Henry's analysis
has other dimensions which require our notice. In particular, he feels called upon,
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while interpreting Marx's position, to attack Marxism in general, and particularly the
Althusserian structuralist approach, which represents a rival lecture de texte. As a
result, what might otherwise have been a dreary reading of Marx's writings is
transformed into an exciting study which combines the interpretation of Marx's
position with a simultaneous attack on other specific interpretations and the interpretative tradition itself.
The book is divided into twelve chapters, an introduction and a conclusion,
comprising two volumes of approximately equal length and 965 pages of closely
argued text. The initial volume, which includes the introduction and first five
chapters, deals more or less chronologically with selected writings through the
German Ideology, with some excursions into later material. Henry here develops an
interpretation of Marx's theory as philosophy in terms of the central concept of
praxis. The second volume, which contains the remaining chapters and the conclusion,
is devoted mainly to Marxian political economy from a philosophical perspective.
Relying on the discussion in the first volume, Henry argues at length that philosophy
and political economy are continuous in Marx's position.
II
After this general presentation, we can now turn to the work as a whole. The
introduction, which is entitled "Theory of the Texts," provides the occasion for
Henry to state some of his basic ideas. Although they are not developed systematically, one can nevertheless isolate three main themes, which shape the discussion
throughout the book. To begin with, Marxism is merely the ensemble of misunderstandings concerning Marx's position. Second, Marx's theory is primarily a
philosophy. Finally, Marx's fundamental insight concerns the concept of praxis.
The novelty of this approach is easily demonstrated. Although the importance
of praxis in Marx's position has often been noted, most commentators reject the
label of philosophy as not descriptive of Marx's theory. Indeed, ever since Engels
first asserted in Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy
that Marx's view is incompatible with philosophy, this has been an important dogma,
indeed almost an article of faith for Maxism. Thus with respect to the more frequent
lines of Marx interpretation, Henry's emphasis on praxis as the central concept
of Marx's philosophy agrees with the importance usually accorded to this concept,
but disagrees as to the nature of the theory to which it belongs.
Turning now to the text, the basic point which Henry wishes to make in the
first volume can be summed up in the following citation:
.Marx's entire philosophical effort was to substitute the conception of the real
individual as producer and consumer, for the traditional ideological conception of
the individual defined by his consciousness, namely the manner in which he represents t h i n g s . . . (2.23)
.
Henry attempts to bring this point out through largely immanent interpretation of
the early writings.
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The essential points can be summarized in rapid order. Skipping over earlier
texts, notably the Doktordisse~'tation which Lukaes and Hartmann for instance find
so significant for Marx's later evolution, Henry begins his analysis with the Critique
of Hegel's Doctrine of the State. Henry sees the early emphasis on reality, against
which Marx tests Hegel's view of the state, as the initial emergence of a dominant
theme which later leads Marx on to develop his own philosophy. Pointing to the
irreducibility of individuality to an ideal essence, Marx rejects Hegel's proposed
reconciliation of the universal and the particular. But the critical point transcends
the immediate context in which it is formulated. For in his rejection of the suggested
Hegelian mediation, Marx undermines the speculative Hegelian synthesis or, as
Henry terms it, Hegel's ideal universalist ontology.
Although sceptical of the proposed solution, Marx remains concerned by the
I-Iegelian problem of the unity of civil society and the state. In the Paris A4anuscripts, which Henry discusses next under the heading of "Marx's Youthful Humanism," Marx tackles this problem with the aid of the Feuerbachian conception of
species-being (Gattungswesen). Both in Feuerbach and Marx, in Henry's opinion,
this concept refers to the generic man and not the individual. Further presupposing
the Feuerbachian critique of religion, Marx advances the idea of proletarian revolution as a means for achieving the desired reconciliation. But since the Feuerbachian
conception of species-being, which Marx presupposes at this point, is merely a
camouflaged version of Hegelian spirit, Marx's youthful humanism is seen to be
hidden Hegelianism. By the same token, his humanism or naturalism is nothing
other than idealism.
In the "Reduction of Totalities," Henry turns to the German Ideology in order
to examine the question of history. Arguing that the Hegelian conception is the unhappy result of the "invasion" of German metaphysics into the spheres of history
and society, he proposes that its doctrine of the self-sufficiency of history is partially
attributable to an erroneous conception of man as a generic being. In Marx's rejection
of the Hegelian dialectical model of history, several conclusions follow for his own
position. To begin with, Marx must renounce the idea that history automatically
produces truth. At the same time, he must abandon the concept of species-being
which subtends the Hegelian philosophy in favor of a concept of the human
individual which will henceforth constitute a parameter of his thought. And it
further follows that, by virtue of his rejection of the dialectical view of history,
Marx's own position cannot be described as dialectical materialism. Indeed, the latter
has nothing at all to do with Marx's own view, or so Henry believes, but is merely
a theory invented by his epigones to substitute for a position they could not understand.
In the "Determination of Reality," Henry studies the Theses on Feuerbach from
an epistemological perspective. In Feuerbach's position, reality or practice is lacking
any necessary relation to action. "Feuerbach's error is precisely not to have understood that the object of intuition, which this intuition presents us as the world
and as multiple sensory appearances of the world, is nothing other than praxis, in
reality the multiple activities of individuals." (r.362-3) In taking action or praxis
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seriously, Marx breaks with Feuerbach. On Marx's rival theory, "empirical activity
is nothing other than the sensory activity or praxis as present for theory, and this
is the mode in which praxis is accessible that is no longer constituted by praxis
itself." (I.35I)
In the last chapter of the first volume, Henry returns to the German Ideology,
making use of the epistemological ideas just developed, in order to prepare for a
transition to Marxian political economy. In his terminology, ideology reflects "an
ontological inequality between reality and its representation." (1.377) But the
opposition in question is merely another name for that between theory and practice.
Now reality, which is practice, underlies and justifies its representation. The problem
Marx hence faces is to work out a theory of praxis, which in his vocabulary is
merely another name for science. Summing up the results of Marx's critique of
contemporary thought and the direction in which his thinking will need to move,
Henry writes :
Marx's abandonment of science is, as has been shown, the abandonment of the
Hegelian philosophy, of the autonomous thematic development (thdmatisation) of the
conscious ideality (idgalitd conscientielle), in favor of reality identified with praxis. It
is the emergence of the latter which motivates the orientation of the problematic
towards economics, which is nothing other than the thematic development of praxis.
But the thematic development of praxis is, for Marx, the same as science. (1.432-3)
In the second volume, which is mainly devoted to Marxian political economy,
Henry argues at length that Marx's view of the active individual is presupposed in
the later phase of his thought. Henry thus is at pains to demonstrate a continuity
between earlier and later sides of Marx's thinking which has often been denied
in the recent literature, especially in France. Since this part of the essay consists
mainly of an application of the interpretation already stated, the summary can move
more quickly.
Henry begins with a discussion of the "Final Presuppositions" of Marxian political economy in an argument which i s unclear and hence difficult to restate. The
three presuppositions are the Marxian concept of the individual discussed above;
individual life, which is to be understood in contradistinction to the prevailing
romantic notions, such as the Hegelian world soul; and life itself, not as fortuitous,
but as determined. It is Henry's contention that the problem of political economy
emerges from the relation and paradoxical negation of these three fundamental parameters of reality, and in the immediate sense as alienation.
Taking up this theme ,in "Economy as Alienated Life," Henry maintains that
free market economy results in alienation, since through a form of teleological inversion individual life is subordinated to the needs of the market place. Alienation
is here understood in a non-Hegelian sense already familiar from the Paris Manuscripts. Against those who contend that this concept is absent from Marx's later
writings, Henry argues vigorously that, on the contrary, it is fundamental to Capital
since, for Marx, "alienation is exchange itself." (2.i29) And from this perspective,
it follows that "the central theme of Capital" is merely the "elucidation of real
alienation, as the alienation of work." (2.x34)
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Although rather lengthy, the length of the summary does not seem out of proportion
to the size and importance of Henry's essay. An enormous amount of detail, far
more than it has been possible to include and often of real interest, has perforce
been omitted. I have further, for the most part, refrained from critical commentary.
Given the complexity of the discussion and its chronological character, it seemed
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preferable to let the main ideas emerge unhindered as much as possible by evaluative
statements. Turning now to an assessment of the book, I shall discuss it on several
levels, concerning its success as an immanent interpretation, the appropriateness
of its technique for the kind of study in question, and the light it casts on the
problem of Marx interpretation.
To evaluate Henry's interpretation of Marx, the main lines of the argument must
be reconstructed, albeit in simplified style, in systematic form. Beginning from the
assumption that Marxism cannot achieve a correct interpretation of Marx's position,
since it arose in ignorance of certain of Marx's texts, Henry maintains that Marx is
primarily interested in testing philosophical theory in terms of experience and in
formulating an adequate philosophy of experience. Since man is basically an active
being, a philosophy of experience needs to start from man's quasi-sensuous activity
or praxis as an initial category. Marxian praxis hence functions both as a standard
in terms of which philosophers such as Hegel and Feue,'bach are to be criticized and
as the basis for Marx's own theory of political economy. Hence Marx's position can
be described as a philosophy of praxis or, in Henry's language, a metaphysics of the
individual.
Taken as a whole, this argument has much to recommend it. In the first place,
it is a major attempt, and surprisingly successful at that, to view a number of Marx's
writings as constituting an organic whole. For various reasons, there has recently
been an unfortunate tendency to maintain that at different periods in his career
Marx was concerned with entirely disparate problems, so that it is perfectly permissible to isolate writings from different stages of his development as separable and
separate. Against this approach, Henry emphasizes, correctly in my opinion, that
there are a small number of basic concerns which continue to animate Marx's
position throughout and which lead him to develop it on several different planes,
including philosophy and political economy.
In the course of his discussion, Henry further takes the opportunity to attack,
if not entirely to dispel, a number of myths which inhabit the secondary literature.
Ours is an age which is unfortunately characterized by the proliferation of secondary
literature that, to an alarming extent, is of rather secondary quality. All too often
its authors attend more to one another than to the primary texts. This is especially
the case as regards Marx. In his concern to clear away some of the more mythological
concepts in the secondary literature, such as dialectical materialism, which do so
much to confuse the interpretation of Marx's theory, Henry has rendered a valuable
service.
.Henry has further contributed to an understanding of the central role of human
individuality in Marx's thought. This is an aspect of his position which has generated
much confusion in recent years. The most diverse and contradictory claims have been
made, including that Marx's view of the individual is central to his position (Fromm
et al.), that his view of individuality is largely absent (Sartre), that the concept of
the human individual relates only to Marx's early writings (Althusser), and that
Marx's interest is not in the individual but in the class (S6ve). Although the
situation is confused as a result of the proliferation of conflicting interpretations, the
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IV
But although I am in general agreement with and favorable to the textual discussions as
a whole, I think it rarely goes far enough to make its point and thus does not demonstrate its interpretation as correct. Despite the length of the study and its detailed
nature, it would appear that at crucial phases of the argument the author is unaware
of the complex issues to be resolved. As a result although the discussion is interesting,
it is often too elementary and occasionally in error, as several examples will show.
In the present context, the claim that Marx's position is a metaphysics of the individual means that it is a philosophy of praxis. With this in mind, I shall organize
my comments around the themes of philosophy and praxis, as well as related issues.
The treatment of Marx's view as metaphysics and philosophy could stand some
further development, To begin with, something needs to be said concerning the
relation of metaphysics and philosophy, since this is a disputed topic. It is not at
all clear that the former constitutes an acceptable enterprise. Ever since Hume and
Kant, the claim that a position is metaphysics has often been a signal that it engaged
in an impossible task. Now this is clearly not Henry's feeling about Marx's position,
but he needs to defend it against the kind of a priori objection which has so often
been raised against metaphysics in the past.
In making the claim that Marx's position is philosophy, Henry is under an
obligation to indicate what he takes philosophy to be. Now this is, at least for the
English-speaking reader, no easy task. What precisely, to take a single example, is
the common feature of Plato's dialogues and modal logic ? Henry's approach is to
indicate that a theory is philosophy if its principles are formulated textually. "We
call those texts philosophical which contain and define the ultimate (derni&'e)
theory." ( i . i i ) But this definition is too broad, since it is difficult to specify any
theory whatsoever which is excluded by it. As a result, the assertion that Mazx's
position is philosophy is deprived of any real meaning.
When Henry attempts to specify the kind of philosophy exhibited by the Marxian
position, he runs the risk of serious error. According t O Henry, Marx is constantly
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claim that Marx was in fact a philosopher of praxis, and the distinction ought to be
observed.
I am further troubled by some details in the discussion of praxis. In my opinion
Henry commits an important error when he maintains that the social character of
work is not a given (donn$)~ but is rather the result of capitalist alienation. (See
2.469) To the contrary, Marx maintains throughout his writings that work is inherently social since the individual can meet his reproductive needs only in association with others. Now it is of course correct that Marx holds that man will only
become a full human being or fully individual in communism. But the belief that at
some later date a different form of social relation will arise is not to be confused
with the view that work is not social prior to this future time.
Both the claim that the concept of individuality emerges only in the German
Ideology and the attempt to divorce generic and individual conceptions of human
being are puzzling. To my mind, Henry overstates both the extent to which Marx
initially accepts the concept of species-being as initially formulated by Feuerbach as
well as the later evolution in his position. As early as the Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right, in which Marx objects that specific individuality is not realized
in the Hegelian state, his criticism presupposes the idea of individuality. And conversely Marx's later definition, in the German Ideology, of man in general as a being
which differs from other beings in the production of its means of subsistence, still
presupposes a generic concept.
As it stands, Henry's demonstration of the continuity in Marx's thought is incomplete. The themes he emphasizes, namely the individual, immanent life, and
determinate life, are vaguely defined and their relation to political economy is unclear. Henry couid have sharpened his argument in a number of ways, such as through
an elucidation of the categorial structure of Marxian political economy which can be
shown to presuppose categories from the earlier writings. Now Henry makes a start
in this direction through his account of human subjectivity as the necessary ingredient
in surplus value and value in general. But, despite much discussion, he never, to my
mind, furnishes a convincing account of the relation between Marx's view of man
and political economy which would justify the approach he takes.
V
Up to this point I have been suggesting that although Henry's discussion is interesting, it does not suffice to demonstrate his interpretation. I would now like to
relate this criticism to Henry's method. Although the attempt to make the text, in
quasi-phenomenological fashion, yield its secrets through close discussion is a widespread technique, especially in French circles, it is, in my opinion, not entirely
suitable for the present task.
Of course, careful study is always in order, especially in an age dominated by the
proliferation of secondary literature. The authors of such studies all too often are
more interested in other secondary studies than they are in primary commentators,
who on numerous occasions have interpreted his position in an arbitrary or capricious
14
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fashion in order to confirm preconceived attitudes. As a reaction to this tendency,
Henry's careful textual exegesis has real value. But there is also much of value in
the Marxian secondary literature. The difficulty with any approach that directs its
atterttiotl primarily towards immanent textual interpretation is to avoid the tendency
to neglect the avaiable primary and secondary literature which bears on the topic.
An indication of the manner in which Henry neglects the relevant literature is
provided by a partial list of writers to whom he refers. The analysis of Marx's
relations to Hegel and the young Hegelians is unusually detailed. Above all, Henry
is deepIy familiar with Feuerbach and, to a lesser extent, Bauer and Stirner as well.
In the course of his essay, Henry further alludes to writers as diverse as Ryazonov,
Engels, Lenin, Cottier, Negri, Hyppolite, Planty-Bonjour, Luporini, Althusser, RanciSre, Maine de Biran and Husserl. But in my opinion this list is somewhat peculiar.
Although an author certainly has an absolute right to constitute his own frame of
reference, there seems little need to offer repeated allusions to Maine de Biran in
the course of a book on Marx, unless one is also the author of a study of Maine
de Biran. Similarly, I am at a loss to understand the strong Husserlian influence
in Henry's discussion. Koj~ve, of course, published an important study of Hegel from
a partially Husserlian perspective, and for some time an attempt has been underway
to link Marx and the Husserlian concept of the life world, for instance in the work
of Lefebvre and Varda. Henry refers neither to Koj~ve nor to the Husserlian approach
to Marx. Yet, his reading of the text is couched often in strangely Husserlian
terminology, seemingly of questionable relevance for Marx's position, as when he
writes that Marx "consciously understands" the presuppositions of his thought "according to the principal apodicticity of their immediate phenomenological meani n g . . . " (x.474)
But the problem with Henry's lecture de texte is less those who are mentioned
than those who are not. As already indicated, Henry contends that Marx's theory
is a philosophy which reverses the entire tradition. In order to demonstrate this
or related points, it is essential to undertake comparative analysis of Marx's ideas
and those to be found in the philosophic tradition. But with the exception of some
references to Hegel, and to a much lesser degree to Husserl as well, Henry makes
little effort to situate Marx's position in relation to the history of philosophy. In
consquence, the claim that Marx is in some sense a philosopher is deprived of its
possible force since his position, although it now takes on the name "philosophy,"
still remains isolated from other theories that bear that name. In the same way,
the claim for the centrality of praxis is un-accompanied by a single reference to
other philosophers interested in this concept, such as Aristotle.
A related deficiency exists with respect to the secondary literature. Although not explicitly formulated, with the exception of some references to Ryazonov, Henry's
practice seems to be to take Althusserian structuralism, including its Italian origins
and French acolytes, as representative of Marxism in general. Now in the first place,
Henry is somewhat overselective. If he is going to mention Ranci~re, which he does
on numerous occasions, he should allude to others among Althusser's epigones,
especially Badiou, since both disciples have an equal claim to fame. By the same
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token, Althusser was influenced not only by Luporini, but by Labriola as well.
But from a larger perspective, it is a distortion to equate Marxism with Althusserian
structuralism. There is an enormous amount that has and is being written on Marx
which has little or nothing to do with French strueturalism. A study of this dimension, or even a much more modest attempt, is simply incomplete if it does not take
notice of what has already been done.
Henry's seeming unawareness of the debate in the literature weakens his ability
to sustain his interpretation. Santayana has commented that those who are unaware
of history are compelled to repeat it, and this remark certainly applies to the present
discussion. Many of the points Henry wishes to bring out have often been treated
at great length in the secondary literature. What, for instance, is the purpose in
spending some 53 pages to explain Marx's procedure in setting constant capital equal
to zero in order to calculate surplus value, since the method itsdf is not controversial ? A brief discussion, or an allusion to a standard commentary, such as
Mandel's, would surely suffice. The important point is whether Marx's theory of
surplus value can be defended, yet Henry unfortunately skips over this issue entirely,
although Becker, for instance, has recently devoted a book merely to this topic.
Similarly, in his claim that Marx is a philosopher, Henry has to counter the opposite
view, which has great support in the literature. Henry's failure either to deal with
the points cited by writers such as Engels and Luk~cs, Althusser and Hartmann, or
to offer an alternative explanation for the Marxian texts they cite to back up their
interpretations, considerably weakens his own analysis. Even if one agrees with the
view that Marx's antipathy to philosophy is largely confined to the Hegelian variety,
one must concede that Henry has not shown this to be a correct interpretation.
VI
Attention has so far been mainly directed to the details of Henry's immanent interpretation as well as the technique employed. Although this side of the work is welldeveloped, there is another and less well-worked-out aspect which deserves our
attention. I refer to the comments in the introduction, concerning the "Theory of
the Texts." The significance of Henry's brief attempt to raise the question of Marx
interpretation can perhaps be shown through contrast with Klaus Hartmann's Die
Marx'scbe Theorie (Berlin: De Gruyter, I97o), the only study of which I am
aware that is on the same approximate scale as the present work.
Henry's and Hartmann's studies are comparable in two respects, concerning
the philosophic status of Marx's position and the justification of Marxian political
economy. Hartmann's book, however, lacks the reflection on the problems of Marx
interpretation which allows Henry, properly in my opinion, to distance himself from
some of the dogmatic preconceptions current in the secondary literature. Thus,
when Hartmann maintains that Marx's view is not philosophy since Marx desires to
transcend the tradition he is following a long interpretative tradition (op. cit. 70I4o). As a result, although he contributes to our understanding of the details of
Marx's position, Hartmann is unable to present a convincing overall characterization
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of the theory. In this context, one advantage of Henry's inquiry is that by virtue
of his suspension of crucial dogmas dominant in the literature he is able to understand that Marx's revolt against Hegel does not take him beyond philosophy. In
the same way, for the sake of consistency Hartmann is obliged to contend that
Marxian political economy is self-justifying (op. cit. i53-I54). This puts him in
the peculiar situation of needing to deny Marx's reliance on a concept of man in the
later writings at the same time as he affirms the importance of subjectivity for
the theory of surplus value. Here again, Henry's bracketing of the more usual
approach allows him to understand that Marx's later political economy follows from
and is justified by his earlier speculations on man.
The suggestion that Henry's study as a whole owes a considerable measure of
its success to his initial reflections on the conditions of Marx interpretation is
somewhat surprising, since this side of the discussion is but scarcely sketched. Yet
it is nevertheless of importance, since the question of how to proceed is so rarely
broached. One may even be permitted to speculate that the most significant aspect
of the present study is that for perhaps the first time the problem of Marx interpretation has been clearly posed in the course of a major study of the texts. This in
itself, if Henry's book were attentively read, should make it easier to depart from
some of the sterile litanies of the past.
VII
Although in most instances a prior study of the conditions of interpretation
would be clearly superfluous, such is not the case for Marx. Anyone who has ever
delved into the Marx literature or thought about Marx's position will be aware
that the latter presents problems which, although not unique, are unusual enough
to justify special consideration. It is hence unfortunate that Henry did not see fit
to develop his comments on this topic at greater length. At least the following interrelated difficulties can be mentioned.
As Henry correctly notes, there is the historical accident that important texts,
such as the Paris Manuscripts and the Grundrisse were initially published only after
the development of Marxism. As a result, one often finds the tendency to account
for the existence of newly-discovered texts in terms of already extant interpretations.
This reversal of the more usual procedure is responsible for some of the more
bizarre interpretations.
Marx's writings also present special problems. Although he possessed a doctorate
in philosophy, Marx quickly abandoned hopes of a philosophical career. Perhaps for
this reason, his writings are often seemingly lacking in precision. Again, he was a
slow writer, who preferred to rewrite and develop his views as opposed to putting
them into final form. In consequence, many of the writings have a fragmentary
character. Further, he was a cautious thinker, far more so than is commonly realized.
His texts often yield alternative analyses of various ideas. For these reasons, it has
frequently been the practice to turn to Engels, who almost unfailingly has a simple,
but often simplistic statement to offer. But although Engels' comments have been
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given a perhaps undue weight in the literature, they are frequently demonstrably at
variance with Ma*x's writings.
The political bias which infects so much of the Marx discussion is also problematic. It may well be, as has so often been suggested, that perfect interpretative
neutrality is an objective impossibility, and it is not my purpose to suggest that a
complete absence of bias reigns elsewhere in the secondary literature. But there are
powerful forces at work which prejudice the purity of any approach to Marx, not
the least of which is the vested political interest of both proponents and opponents
of the theory in terms of one or another interpretation.
A political bias is further evident in the unusual way in which Marx's writings
have been edited. After Stalin caused the editor of the earlier, incomplete MEGA
edition to disappear, a fuller, although still incomplete edition was undertaken in
East Germany. But although the distinction between Marx and Engels was somewhat
blurred by the publication of the Marx.Evgels Werke, the major idiosyncrasy of this
edition is the unaccountable omission of both the Paris Manuscripts and the Grundrisse. The former was added in a supplemental volume, but the latter is still missing
from this 44-volume edition, despite the fact that it is available separately from the
same publisher. Stranger yet, it is common knowledge that the text of the Grundrisse was altered to cause it to reflect a particular interpretation in the French translation.
Then there is a peculiar obstacle to a philosophic approach to Marx, which should
be faced. The Marxian doctrine concerning ideology, an important tenet of his
position, is often applied to the interpretation of his theory. Not only is Marx's
position not philosophy, but philosophy in general is held to be ideology. It is thus
necessary to provide a justification for the decision to approach Marx from a
philosophical angle prior to textual interpretation. With the possible exception of
Kierkegaard, I can think of no other thinker regularly studied by philosophers for
his philosophical import for whom this kind of prior justification is necessary.
And finally one should mention the dimensions of the secondary literature. Quite
obviously there is a plethora of writing on Marx. Although it is difficult to be
certain, it would seem that no author with philosophical pretensions has been so
frequently studied in such a variety of languages and traditions. The sheer volume
of the discussion is an obstade to anyone who desires to deal with Marx's ideas in
terms of what has been written about them. Thus one is confronted by the unenviable situation of needing to master enormous chunks of secondary literature, of
which much, but by no means all, is largely worthless. But then students of Plato
and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, face a similar dilemma.
VIII
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current state of the Marx discussion. Good as it is, and except as noted Henry's
immanent interpretation is interesting and judicious, his most significant contribution
may well be that he raises the problems of the conditions of Marx interpretation.
But this is precisely what seems to be needed at this point in time. Indeed, I would
like to suggest that what we most require at this juncture is not still another
account of the whole of Marx's corpus, but an earnest attempt to understand the
conditions of an unbiased assessment of his writings and their contribution to an
understanding of our world.
Torn Rockmore
Yale University
Robert R. Magliola, Phenomenology and Literature; An Introduction (West Lafayette,
Indiana : Purdue University Press x977) Pp. 2o8.
The present work undertakes a Herculean endeavor of both introducing one to the
range and scope of phenomenological literary theory and criticism and providing a
particularly valuable commentary on Roman Ingarden's The Literary Work of Art
and Mikel Dufrenne's The Phenomenology o[ Aesthetic Experience, The former task
carefully and succinctly outlines the multifarious labors of the Genevan, Parisian,
and Heideggerian representatives of criticism within the general arena of phenomenological literature. The latter task focuses on a topology of meaning, examining and
evaluating the roles of validity and interpretation, culminating in an important contribution to the relationship of phenomenology and literature. Throughout this work,
crucial questions are raised and pursued with a masterful rigor that addresses the
intersection at its foundations: What is Meaning ? W h a t is the valid sense
depicted when a text presents several ? What does one do with multiple meanings,
ambiguity, and contradictory senses ?
Part One returns us to some familiar battles and parlays in phenomenological
epistemology. The central Husserlian turn to a real intercourse with the world is
accepted by all critics. But the ensuing division of Husserl into neo-realist a n d
transcendental idealist stages induces a fracas from which the various splinter
factions arise. The pivot crucially determines Magliola's own direction. Though he
acknowledges (p. 4) the brilliant application of Husserl's notion of transcendental
subjectivity to literature and all the arts by Maurice Natanson, the contribution
lingers mysteriously and regrettably unexamined, perhaps because Magliola rejects
later Husserlian thought as a recondite idealism and retreat to neo-Kantianism.
Instead, Magliola considers phenomenological "any literary theory or practice
which is broadly in the neo-realist Husserlian tradition (and even Heidegger fits
here), as long as the theory or practice adheres to the following provisions. First,
it must incorporate somehow an epistemology of mutual implication, and second,
it must see the essence of Being anc~/or beings concretely, and in experience (p. 63)."
At issue is the fundamental root sense of how we have intercourse with the world.
For Husserl, seeing meaning in experience, rather than imposing meaning as traditional metaphysics had done, is the proper course of phenomenological evidence.
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A survey of the Geneva School and its accomplies from the proto-phenomenologists,
Marcel Raymond and Albert Beguin, to the transitional work of Georges Poulet and
the second generation critics Jean-Pierre Richard, Jean Rousset, Jean Starobinski, and
J. Hillis Miller, provides a programmatic description of its ontology and critical
methodology. The reader will be delighted with Magliola's sympathy for, yet critical
distance from, his subjet's emplacement within the historical matrices outlined.
Poulet, an important fulcrum in the movement, is treated as a phenomenologist
though he insists upon a Cartesian heritage ! Magliola avers "Thus we find ourselves confronted with a not uncommon state of affairs i n the history of literary
criticism: there is a considerable divergence between how the critic sees himself
and how other critics see him (p. 2 i ) , " For Poulet, an author's epistemology "reveals
itself to itself by transcending all that is reflected in it." For Magliola, it may be
the case that Ponlet's Cartesia.nism tears images away from their customary values
and revalues them in terms of subjective consciousness. But it ought to be the
phenomenological task to suspend these images of their taken-for-granted values and
reveal them as such for their intersubjective constitution.
Despite differences, the Geneva School agrees on the basic ontological given of
human consciousness as a "massive self-world relation, a Lebenswelt or network
of personal experiences." A fictive universe, then, is created by an author who selects
and transforms elements of the Lebenswett througla imagination and language; a
process that expressively bears the author's imprint for critics to follow, whether it
be through Dufrenne's "textual exhibition" or Ingarden's duplication of the "sensebestowing" authorical acts. Following this trace does not involve psychologism, the
b&e noire of phenomenology. From this intersubjectively constituted world what is
exhibited and bestowed are experiential patterns, "fundamental self-world relationships
which underlie their actualizations, real or imaginary," that are the means whereby
something of the authors consciousness is present in the work (Cf. pp. 30, 3 I, 53-56).
These patterns (much like Alfred Schutz's recipes which gear us into the world of
everyday life) provide unity for both individual and author, and their exposure and
evaluation becomes the critic's ultimate task. Two questions emerge for the Genevan
here : W h a t descriptive typology will render these patterns explicit ? And bow are
the author's experiential patterns embodied in the literary work ? The former question investigates the modes and contents of consciousness which together present
the context of experience, while the latter raises questions concerning the status of
non-conceptual knowing and its embodiment in language. Magliola carefully reminds
us here that these categories are artificial, and not thematic; they chart the field of
consciousness rather than account for it. That is, the Geneva critic describes consciousness in terms of intentionality, and charts fields of consciousness through the
"provisional" schemata of modes and contents of consciousness. But the Genevan%
eplstemological grasp of intentionality hinges on the employment of the phenomenological reductions which place in abeyance questions of existence in order to see
the essential structure of things, and Magliola denies the epistemological neutrality
of intentionality, claiming that "Husserl's behavior rests on the principle that there
is a "what" which is open to description. In fact all epistemology rises out of a
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and meaning. One is guided through the labyrinth of interpretations in the first Part
by the question of the author-critic-text relation, and in the second Part by the intersection of sense and meaning. The text is examined for its claim to singular or
multiple meanings, which sense or senses can be valid, and whether in fact an
author's sense can be shared, duplicated, or developed. The problem of validity is
first approached through a comparison of the non-phenomenologist E.D. Hirsch and
Husserl on intentionality. Surprisingly, though Magliola had earlier rejected Husserl's
idealism, he now finds the doctrine of intentionality formulated in Ideas useful to
the critic's understanding of validity, and a prolegomenon for Heidegger's theory of
meaning. But the study of meaning in the literary work and the possibility of its
duplication or actualization is the beacon of lngarden's The Litera~7 Work of Art,
and is accorded Magliola's most penetrating analysis. Focusing on the onto-epistemological problems of Ingarden's work, Magliola discusses the relevant issues of
the fourfold and valenced strata of the literary work's structure. The lowest stratum,
word sounds and higher phonetic formulations that transcend mere phonic material
by expressing "living" forms which give an object "intuitive fullness", forms the
bedrock for literary expression. Compounded of this stratum, the all important second
level "meaning units" serve as building blocks for Ingarden's theory. Basically,
"everything bound to a word sound, which in conjunction with the sound forms a
word" constitutes meaning which, when "enverbalized," comprises an actual and
potential stock of word meaning (pp. IlOff). The thorny hermeneutical problem
arises when the reader or critic must determine the operational status of potential
stock meanings in a text. Magliola notes Ingarden's pregnant suggestion that a
process of locating what is an empty or ready potentiality is possible because the
role of subjective operations in the formation of meaning units encompasses the
activity of intentionality.
As consciousness is "meaning-bestowing," and the life-world intersubjective, it
permits "meaning duplication." The latter, Ingarden carefully claims, is an assumption
that this reproduction corresponds to the primal speaker. However, the distance
between the spheres of intentional creation and duplication is paradoxical. In the
case of literature, the created works of an author and reader are spontaneously
autonomous or illusory because of their experiential givenness. And at that moment
of re-production they become heteronomous since they are based on inter-subjectively
constituted meaning units. In this way Ingarden brilliantly demonstrates how literature
both "changes" and "stays the same." Lastly, this distance, when aesthetically
controlled, may spawn an "opalescent multiplicity'" or ambiguity allowing any number
of interpretations without firmly excluding or favoring any of them. Magliola
follows Ingarden's view that those theorists who reject this kind of ambiguity commit
a basic flaw of imposing "the law of non-contradiction operative in the real world,
and in correlates which represent it, upon the world of those purely intentional
correlates which don't have real existing adequations (p. I2o)."
As imagined objects are the target of an intentionally directed act, and imaginational objects are free-floating und unintended, so represented objects (Ingarden's
third stratum) are proxies or simulations having the character of reality, but forever
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bereft of any real sense. A peculiar feature is that they are essentially riddled with
"spots of indeterminacy"; for just as the real object is radically determinate, though
forever horizonal, adumbrational, and infinite, so the represented object involves
the reader's choice or selection of possible meaning units to fulfill the formal intention
of the expression. In a sense, these spots of indeterminacy axe necessary schematic
counterparts to the opalescent multiplicity of meaning units, and are what Magliola
calls "fissures in the determinate topography of a represented object (p. x28 Cf. pp.
I24, I34)."
After discussing the fourth stratum of schematic aspects or "skeletons" which
permit the appearance of a thing to retain its self identity, and which are carefully
distinguished from concrete aspects, profiles, or adumbrations in the Husserlian
sense, Magliola concludes with Ingarden's valence theory of metaphysical qualities
(i.e. the shocking, sublime, demonic, holy, etc.), which, though not a stratum of
the literary work proper, are an important "atmosphere" that when well treated
indicates great literature. This leads to an insightful analysis of Ingarden's unique
formulation that "the literary work is a true w o n d e r . . . It is a 'nothing' and yet
a wonderful world in itself--even though it comes into being and exists only by our
grace (p. r4r)." Through a distinction between the literary work and its concretizations the farter's process restores "fulness" to intention tantamount to the
author's original intentionality. That is, the reader "sees" through the strata constituting a literary work, and its represented objects, but does not see a polyphony
(network of relationships among the strata) as the aesthetic object. Nor can the
unattended literary work be the aesthetic object, for contact and intersubjective concretization constitute the value and life of the literary work.
Raising the same questions addressed to Ingarden, Magliola next examines Mikd
Dufrenne's The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. Unlike the rest of his work,
this section strangely resounds in the negative, finding Dufrenne often at odds,
contradictory at many junctures, and referred to as "the Frenchman." Nevertheless, the
contrasts of Ingarden and Dnfrenne are decisively illuminating for Magliola's global
treatment of phenomenology and Iiterature's intersection. The attack on Ingarden
begins through a denial that the work of art is real and the aesthetic object ideal.
Dufrenne already considers the "perceived" most important, and against Sartre he
maintains that the poetic word is a "sound-thing," thus shifting the aesthetic locus
from imagined object to perceived object. In the end, this primacy of the perceived
leads to an idealization of the art work, existing in a universal time. Magliola quickly
indicates this defiance of the New Hermeneutic which stresses the radical historicity
of the art work. But what is called by Dufrenne an "irreducible reciprocal causality",
that intimate nexus between the spectator and the aesthetic object, is cited en passant
by Magilola thus regretably neglecting one of the more interesting and important
contributions of Dufrenne's phenomenology.
Where Genevan and structuralist criticism falls short of explicating the critic's
relationship to the text, Heidegger's hermeneutic foundationally laid in Section 32
of Being and Time and applied in essays from his later writings is suggestive of a
theoretical-practical coherence which justifies multiple interpretations in the literary
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work. "At this juncture Heidegger puts a theory of mutua! implication to brilliant
employ. He is not speaking of the exchange between self and outside (as the Geneva
School does), nor is he speaking here of the Heideggerian discourse between critic
and text. Rather, he applies the theory to the involution of Things and the World of
Dasein (p. 70)." In short, the author as conduit disappears with the completed text,
only to reappear phantasmally in practical criticism, in commemorative meditation.
Unfortunately, the practical side does not always carry its weight. Heidegger often
ignores verbal texture, and is either confusedly allegorical (viz. on H6lderlin), or
conventionally archetypal (viz. on Trakl), thus missing the pbenomenological criteria
of essential seeing or evidence.
After a discussion of the "As-Structures" which yield meaning, and the "ForeStructures" of interpretation, Magliola compares Heidegger with the previous authors
on the issue of meaning. Regarding Husserl, Magliola finds the HusserI of Ideas
much closer to Heidegger's position, though for Heidegger "meaning is neither in
the intending act of the critic nor in the literary text (nor in both per se). Meaning
is essentially nexical. Meaning is precisely the engagement of subject and object,
and the engagement is a unified As-Structure (p. i8o)." In the case of Ingarden,
Heidegger would question why it is imperative to duplicate the author's sense,
since the As-questions are equally valid from any approach. But with Dufrenne,
Magliola simply finds his contribution to be a "kind of amaurosis" emanating from
a position which vacillates between a Cartesian and Heideggerian epistemology. The
second point for comparison is the vindication of multiple interpretations. Heidegger,
here amounts to an inversion of Hirsch's claims, and "when Husserl and Heidegger
talk about communication, they are not talking about the same thing (p. 183)."
Ingarden, though, addresses the problem attentively, claiming an opalescent multiplicity as well as ambiguity abounds in the literary work which cannot be found in
the real world which is inherently non-contradictory. Here Heidegger demurs, because
literature is a revdation of the real "so that the literary word can be ambiguous
or contradictory because Being is;" or more accurately, he sees literature as the
privileged real, so that the ambiguity of the universe is "solidified" within (p. I85).
I would suggest that the two positions are perhaps not so disparate here, because
Ingarden is referring explicitly to the noematic correlate of non-contradiction whose
meaning is precisely its valid interpretation. As for the privileged status of the real,
we must recall Ingarden's formula for the literary work: that it is a wonder.
Finally, Magliola appends a statement on contradictory interpretations themselves,
showing how through the As-structures one can reveal the validity of various
psychoanalitic, sociological, and historical interpretations, because "Whether or not
human life is contradictory in ontological terms, it is often experienced as contradictory. Literature is an expression of human life, and as such, its role is to enverbalize human contradiction. Literary inte,pretations can be valid but contradictory
because experience seems that way (p. 187)." But as for Heidegger, the unusual
manner in which As-structures pursue and direct the author's "presencing'" of
being in the text harbors a danger, I suggest, that remains a serious issue for
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sure, it is a venture into the wilderness os human experience where nature and
beia-natural are inextricably interwoven in a pattern that does not demand explanation
or interpretation, but participation and contribution. Giving voice to the experience
of the world is more than just artistically echoing or philosophically resounding an
event from a privileged point of view. It expresses, in Merleau-Ponty's thought,
"a contact with the world which precedes all thought about the world," a nexus
from which the tasks of literature and philosophy can no longer be separated. Finally,
if the constituted text reveals the order of a microcosm to the literary theorist and
critic, the transcendental sources of that microcosm must be clarified by the philosopher. Rather than being the scalpel which cuts and separates interpretation at the
hand of the deft, phenomenology is the stitch which brings together text and
source in the corpus of the thinker.
David Karnos
Eastern Montana College