PEOPLE VS.

JIMMY AQUINO
G.R. No. 139181
October 27, 2003
Crime Charged: Statutory Rape
Where Filed: RTC OF Malolos, Bulacan
Doctrine:
While the appellant cannot be held guilty
of the charge of rape on the ground of
reasonable doubt, we find that his act of
directing Analyn to remove her lower
apparel
constitutes
an
act
of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code. Section 4, Rule 120
of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure authorizes, in cases of
variance between the offense charged
and that proved, the conviction of an
accused of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in that
which is proved.
Facts:
Analyn was 10 years and 11 months old
on the day of the alleged rape, having
been born on 23 June 1985. She filed the
complaint for Statutory Rape against the
accused with the assistance of her
mother, Lolita, who is Jimmys first
cousin. The accused contended that he
merely asked the victim to take off her
lower apparel to make tease her.
The lower court found the accused guilty
of rape and that the accused used a
deadly weapon in its commission thus
meting out the penalty of Death by lethal
injection. The case was elevated to the
Supreme Court of for Automatic Review.
SC: The court dismissed the case for the
likeliness of the defendant in committing
the crime. The testimony of the victim
was found to be dubious in character.

Also, It was only one-and-a-half years

after the incident, or in November 1997,
that a complaint for rape was filed by
Analyn and her mother before the MTC of
San Miguel, Bulacan. The court find her
reasons
for
the
delay
to
be
unsatisfactory.
Furthermore, the court cannot subscribe
to the conclusion of the trial court that
the witnesses of the appellant should be
discredited or otherwise disregarded
because they are his relatives. It must be
remembered
that
the
witnesses
presented were as much related to the
complainant as they were to the
appellant. On the one hand, a bias in
favor of the appellant does not, on its
face, exist. However the accused is found
guilty of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness.

PEOPLE VS. PEDRO FLORES, JR.

G. R. No. 128823-24
December 27, 2002
Crime Charged: Statutory Rape and
R.A. 7610
Where
Filed:
RTC
of
Urdaneta,
Pangasinan
Doctrine:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance
between allegation and proof. When
there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged,
or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
Facts:

FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old,

was allegedly raped by defendant, her
own father. The accused was charged
before the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
with statutory Rape after he succeeded
in having carnal knowledge with the
victim in two occasions. After trial, the
court a quo found accused-appellant
guilty of Statutory Rape and sentenced
her to death in both cases in its April 7,
1997 Joint Decision. Brought before the
Supreme court for Automatic Review
SC: The case at bar, however, is not one
of variance between allegation and proof.
The allegation in the information that the
therein
accused-appellant
sexually
abused the therein private complainant
by either raping or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient
averment of the acts constituting the
offense as required under Section 8 [of
Rule 110], for these are conclusions of
law, not facts. Nothing less can be said of
the criminal complaints in the cases at
bar. They are void for being violative of
the accused-appellants constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Neither
can
accused-appellant
be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of
any offense for that matter under our
penal laws. It is settled that what
characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or
information. For every crime is made up
of certain acts and intent which must be
set forth in the complaint or information
with
reasonable
particularity
to
constitute the crime charged.
And even under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act), accused-appellant cannot be held

liable. The information does not cite

which among the numerous sections or
subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been
violated by accused-appellant. Moreover,
it does not state the acts and omissions
constituting
the
offense,
CASED
DISMISSED for information being void.

TEVES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

December 17, 2004
G.R. No. 154182
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law
WHERE FILED: Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE: It is clear that the essential
ingredients of the offense proved
constitute or form part of those
constituting the offense charged. Put
differently, the first and second elements
of the offense charged, as alleged in the
information,
constitute
the
offense
proved. Hence, the offense proved is
necessarily included in the offense
charged,
or
the
offense
charged
necessarily includes the offense proved.
The variance
doctrine thus
finds
application
to
this
case,
thereby
warranting the conviction of petitioner
Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
FACTS:

Edgar Teves, the former Mayor of

Valencia, and his wife, Teresita Teves
were charged for allegedly violating
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for
possessing direct pecuniary interest in
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation.
Under Section 3(h) of the law, there are
two modes of committing the offense,
namely:
1. If, in connection with his pecuniary
interest in any business, contract,
or transaction, the public officer
intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity; or
2. When
the
public
officer
is
prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or any
law.
Although the Information filed against
them charged them for violating the law
under the first mode, they were
subsequently
convicted
by
the
Sandiganbayan under the second mode
of committing the offense. Specifically,
Sandiganbayan found that Mayor Teves
had pecuniary interest in the cockpit, in
violation of Section 89(2) of the Local
Government Code, which prohibits any
local government official to hold any
interest in any cockpit.
Spouses
Teves
faulted
the
Sandiganbayan for convicting them
under the second mode, when the
Information filed against them charged
them under the first mode of committing
the offense. According to them, their
constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation
against them were violated by the
conviction. Also, they asserted that the
variance doctrine, being a rule of
procedural law, should not prevail over

their constitutionally-guaranteed right to

be informed.
HELD:
Edgar Teves was convicted for violation
of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law,
while Teresita Teves was acquitted.
In ruling that Mayor Teves could be
convicted of Section 3(h) under the
second mode of committing the offense,
the Supreme Court cited Sections 4 and
5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. These Section laid down what
is known as the variance doctrine.
After examining the elements of Section
3(h) under the first and second modes,
the Court found it clear that the essential
ingredients of the offense proved
(second mode of Section 3(h)) constitute
or form part of those constituting the
offense charged (first mode of Section
3(h)).
Put differently, the first and second
elements of the offense charged (i.e., (1)
that the accused is a public officer; and
(2) that he has a direct/indirect financial
or
pecuniary
interest
in
any
business, ...) , as alleged in the
information,
constitute
the
offense
proved. Hence, the offense proved is
necessarily included in the offense
charged,
or
the
offense
charged
necessarily includes the offense proved.
The variance
doctrine thus
finds
application
to
this
case,
thereby
warranting the conviction of petitioner
Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
Case Title: PEOPLE VS NOQUE
Date:
January
15,
2010
Where Filed: RTC Manila
Crime Charged: Illegal sale and Illegal
possession of regulated drugs

Doctrine: minor variance between the

information and the evidence does not
alter the nature of the offense nor does it
determine or qualify the crime or penalty
so that even if a discrepancy exists, this
cannot be pleaded as a ground for
acquittal. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court, can be applied by
analogy in convicting the appellant of the
offenses charged, which are included in
the
crimes
proved.
Under
these
provisions, an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense
proved when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
At any rate, a minor variance between
the information and the evidence does
not alter the nature of the offense, nor
does it determine or qualify the crime or
penalty, so that even if a discrepancy
exists, this cannot be pleaded as a
ground for acquittal.
Facts: Senior Police Officer 4 (SPO4)
Norberto Murillo, went to Police Station
No. 4 of the Western Police District (WPD)
to tip off on the drug trafficking activities
of the appellant in Malate, Manila. SP04
Murillo immediately directed Police
Officers (POs) Balais and Borca to
conduct
surveillance
in
the
area
mentioned by the informant. The
surveillance confirmed appellants illegal
operations. Thereafter, SP04 Murillo led a
buy-bust team.
The buy-bust team, proceeded to the
address. PO1 Balais and the informant
called out the appellant. When PO1
Balais handed the marked money to the
appellant, the latter brought out from
under a table a pranela bag from which
he took two plastic sachets containing
white crystalline granules suspected to
be shabu. The informant slipped out of
the house as the pre-arranged signal to
the buy-bust team that the sale had been
consummated.

The confiscated articles were delivered

to
forensic
laboratory;
thereafter,
qualitative examinations yielded positive
results for ephedrine, a regulated drug.

The issue by the appellant in this petition

is that his conviction for the sale and
possession of shabu, despite the fact
that what was established and proven
was the sale and possession of
ephedrine, violated his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusations against him
since the charges in the Informations are
for
selling
and
possessing
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
SC: Petition is bereft of merit.
The drug known as ephedrine has a
central nervous stimulating effect similar
to that of methamphetamine. Ephedrine
is a regulated drug.
The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4
and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, 14
can be applied by analogy in convicting
the appellant of the offenses charged,
which are included in the crimes proved.
Under these provisions, an offense
charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
At any rate, a minor variance between
the information and the evidence does
not alter the nature of the offense, nor
does it determine or qualify the crime or
penalty, so that even if a discrepancy
exists, this cannot be pleaded as a
ground for acquittal.
The allegations in the Informations for
the unauthorized sale and possession of
shabu
or
methamphetamine
hydrochloride are immediately followed
by the qualifying phrase which is a
regulated drug. Thus, it is clear that the
designations and allegations in the
Informations are for the crimes of illegal

sale and illegal possession of regulated

drugs. Ephedrine has been classified as a
regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs
Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of
1988.
The prosecutions evidence satisfactorily
proved that appellant is guilty of illegal
sale of a dangerous drug and that
appellant
illegally
possessed
a
dangerous drug.

PAYUMO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
July 25, 2011
Where Filed: Sandiganbayan
Crime Charged: Murder with Multiple
Frustrated and Attempted Murder
Facts: A composite team of Philippine
Constabulary and Integrated National
Police units allegedly fired at a group of
civilians instantly killing one civilian and
wounding seven others, including Edgar
Payumo. The accused pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged. During the trial,
the accused interposed the defenses of
lawful performance of duty, self-defense,
mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted
that the incident was a result of a
military operation, and not an ambush as
claimed by the prosecution.
The Fifth Division promulgated its
judgment dated November 27, 1998,
convicting the accused of the crime of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder.
The accused filed their Supplemental
Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment
and for New Trial because there was
serious irregularity during the trial due to
the
erroneous
admission
of
the
testimonies of the witnesses of the
petitioners, such should be taken anew
and
to
afford
the
accused
the
opportunity to present in evidence the

records of the Judge Advocate General

Office (JAGO) relative to the shooting as
to whether it was an ambush or the
result of a military operation. The
omnibus motion was granted.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the
Sandiganbayan amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction for nullifying the
order of conviction and granting new
trial, Edgar Payumo and et. al, filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus
with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or
injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the scheduled
hearings for a second new trial.
Issues: Whether or not the respondent
court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in setting aside the
judgment of conviction (decision dated
27 november 1998) on the ground that
the promulgation thereof was done at the
time the ponente was already transferred
from the fifth division to the second
division.
Ruling:

The

Court

does

not

agree.

A judgment of a division of the

Sandiganbayan shall be promulgated by
reading the judgment or sentence in the
presence of the accused and any Justice
of the division which rendered the same.
Promulgation of the decision is an
important part of the decision-making
process. Promulgation signifies that on
the date it was made, the judge or
justices who signed
the
decision
continued to support it which could be
inferred from his silence or failure to
withdraw his vote despite being able to
do so. A decision or resolution of the
court becomes such, only from the
moment
of
its
promulgation.

A final decision or resolution becomes

binding only after it is promulgated and
not before. It is an elementary doctrine
that for a judgment to be binding, it must
be duly signed and promulgated during
the incumbency of the judge who penned
it. In this connection, the Court En-Banc
issued the Resolution dated February 10,
1983 implementing B.P. 129 which
merely requires that the judge who pens
the decision is still an incumbent judge,
that is, a judge of the same court, albeit
now assigned to a different branch, at
the time the decision is promulgated.
In People v. CFI of Quezon, Branch X, it
was clarified that a judge who died,
resigned, retired, had been dismissed,
promoted to a higher court or appointed
to another office with inconsistent
functions, would no longer be considered
an incumbent member of the court and
his decision written thereafter would be
invalid. Indeed, one who is no longer a
member of the court at the time the final
decision or resolution is signed and
promulgated cannot validly take part in
that decision or resolution. Much less
could he be the ponente of the decision
or resolution. Also, when a judge or a
member of the collegiate court, who had
earlier signed or registered his vote, has
vacated his office at the time of the
promulgation
of
the
decision
or
resolution, his vote is automatically
withdrawn
or
cancelled.
Guided by the foregoing principles, the
judgment of conviction dated November
27, 1998 penned by Justice Legaspi must
be declared valid. Apparently, it was not
necessary that he be a member of the
Fifth Division at the time the decision
was promulgated since he remained an
incumbent justice of the Sandiganbayan.
What is important is that the ponente in

a collegiate court remains a member of

said court at the time his ponencia is
promulgated because, at any time before
that, he has the privilege of changing his
opinion or making some last minute
changes therein for the consideration
and approval of his colleagues. After all,
each division is not separate and distinct
from the other divisions as they all
constitute
one
Sandiganbayan.
Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in
the judges or justices Thus, when a case
is filed in the Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction
over the case does not attach to the
division or justice alone, to the exclusion
of
the
other
divisions.

PEOPLE vs. CA (15th Division) and

Wilfred N. Chiok
Date: September 27, 2006
Where filed: RTC of Pasig
Crime Charged: Estafa
Doctrine: The last paragraph of Section
6 authorizes the promulgation of
judgment in
absentia in
view
of
respondents failure to appear despite
notice. It bears stressing that the rule
authorizing promulgation in absentia is
intended to obviate the situation where
the judicial process could be subverted
by the accused jumping bail to frustrate
the promulgation of judgment.

Facts:
Wilfred Chiok represented himself
a licensed stockbroker and an expert in
the stock market to Rufina Chua. He
encouraged her to invest money in
stocks and to designate him as her
stockbroker. On respondents prodding,
she agreed.
For several years, respondent
acted as Rufinas stockbroker. She made
a profit out of their transactions,
prompting her to trust respondent in
handling her stock investments.
In
1995,
respondent
encouraged Rufina to purchase shares in
bulk as this will increase her earning. She
entrusted
to
him
the
amount
of P9,563,900 for the purpose of buying
shares of stocks in bulk. She deposited
the amount of P7,100,000 in respondents
account. With
respect
to
the
remaining P2,463,900, she personally
gave it to him. He told her to wait for one
week. A week elapsed, but she did not
hear from him. Upon her inquiry, he
advised her to wait for another week, but
still there was no news from him. Finally,
when she was able to contact him, he
admitted that he spent the money. At
any rate, he issued two checks as
payment but when she deposited them
in the drawee bank, they were
dishonored for insufficient funds.

promulgation of judgment however

respondent and his counsel failed to
appear on said date. The promulgation
was re-set. The trial court rendered a
Decision convicting respondent of estafa.
During the promulgation of the
judgment,
respondent
and
his
counsel failed to appear despite
notice. Consequently, the prosecution
filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail on
the ground that respondent might flee or
commit another crime which the trial
court granted
The trial court issued a warrant
of arrest against respondent for the
reason that he has not surrendered
despite the lapse of the given period
(five days) as provided in the
Omnibus
Order
dated May
28,
1999. The
said
warrant
was
returned unserved because he could
not be found at his given address.
CA issued a TRO enjoining the
implementation of the trial courts
Omnibus Order. CA issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the
arrest of respondent, holding that the
latter should not be deprived of his
liberty pending resolution of his appeal
as the offense for which he was
convicted is a non-capital offense; and
that the probability of flight by
respondent during the pendency of his
appeal is merely conjectural.

Rufina demanded payment from

respondent, but this remained unheeded.

SC:

Rufina found out that respondent

was not a licensed stockbroker but only a
telephone clerk at Bernard Securities,
Inc. An information for estafa against him
was filed.

RTC
correctly
cancelled
respondents bail because of his failure
to appear during the promulgation of
judgment despite notice. He violated the
condition of his bail that he must appear
before the proper court whenever so
required by that court or the Rules. As

After the presentation of the

parties evidence, the trial court set the

such, his arrest, as ordered by the trial

court, is proper.
The last paragraph of Section
6 authorizes the promulgation of
judgment in absentia in view of
respondents
failure
to
appear
despite notice. It bears stressing
that
the
rule
authorizing
promulgation in absentia is intended
to obviate the situation where the
judicial process could be subverted
by the accused jumping bail to
frustrate
the
promulgation
of
judgment.
Here, respondent tried in vain to
subvert the judicial process by not
appearing during the promulgation of
judgment. Thus, he lost his remedies
against the judgment. In fact, he cannot
challenge successfully the cancellation of
his bail by the trial court. The Court of
Appeals certainly erred in enjoining the
arrest of respondent. Its declaration that
respondent might flee or commit another
crime is conjectural utterly lacks
merit. Respondent already demonstrated
that he is a fugitive from justice.
Petition GRANTED.

Villena and Doroja vs. People

January 31, 2011
Crime charged: robbery (extortion)
Where filed: RTC Las Pinas
Doctrine:
The accused who failed to appear
at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction shall lose the remedies
available under the Rules of Court
against the judgment(a) the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration
(Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the
judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
However, the Rules allow the accused to
regain his standing in court in order to
avail of these remedies by: (a) his
surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion
for leave of court to avail of these
remedies, stating therein the reasons for
his absence, within 15 days from the
date of promulgation of judgment.
Facts:
Petitioners
Police
Inspector
(P/Insp.) Villena and Police Officer 1
(PO1) Doroja, together with PO2 Lambas,
PO3 Fermalino, Police Chief Inspector
Bocalbos, PO3 Macalinao, PO1 Yumang,
and Imelda Borcelis, were indicted for the
crime of robbery (extortion) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202,
Las Pias City. After arraignment, where
the accused all pled not guilty, and
pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioners failed to appear before the
trial court to adduce evidence in their
defense. It was only PO3 Macalinao who
appeared before the court to present his
evidence.
RTC:
The RTC rendered its decision
convicting petitioners, together with PO2

Lambas, PO3 Fermalino, PO3 Macalinao,

and PO1 Yumang, of the crime charged.
During
the
promulgation
of
judgment (September 2007), petitioners
failed to appear despite proper notices to
them at their addresses of record. In
their absence, the promulgation was
made pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5,
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the
RTC issued warrants of arrest against
them. Petitioners, through their new
counsel, Atty. William F. delos Santos,
filed their separate notices of appeal
before the RTC, explaining that they
failed to attend the promulgation of
judgment because they did not receive
any notice thereof and because they
were transferred to another police
station. The RTC denied the notices of
appeal.
Subsequently PO1 Macalinao filed
a Motion with Leave of Court to
Reconsider the November 20, 2007
Order. Petitioners likewise filed a joint
Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order
of November 20, 2007). The RTC granted
the motion of Macalinao, but denied the
motions of petitioners. The denial was
due to petitioners failure to adduce a
valid excuse to set aside the Order. The
RTC noted that it was only Macalinao who
showed interest in the disposition of his
case, having actually and consistently
attended hearings. The same cannot be
said for the other 2 accused (Villena and
Doroja). The court noted that they have
not manifested nor informed the Court of
the cause of their nonappearances
despite notices and subpoenas sent to
them; it also observed that they both
failed to appear in several if not most of
the hearings set by the Court since the
commencement of the trial, including the
promulgation of judgment on Sept 2007.
CA:
Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari prohibition, and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

before the CA. The CA denied the same

for failure to show prima facie evidence
of any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC.

SC:
Petitioners argue that the CA erred
in upholding the RTC in its denial of their
respective notices of appeal since they
already
contained
the
required
manifestation and information as to the
cause of their nonappearance on the
scheduled promulgation on September 3,
2007, i.e., lack of notice. They contend
that their notices of appeal have
substantially
complied
with
the
requirement of Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, and have effectively
placed them under the RTCs jurisdiction.
The petition is without merit. While
it is true that an appeal is perfected upon
the mere filing of a notice of appeal and
that the trial court thereupon loses
jurisdiction over the case, this principle
presupposes that the party filing the
notice of appeal could validly avail of the
remedy of appeal and had not lost
standing in court. In this case,
petitioners have lost their standing
in court by their unjustified failure
to appear during the trial and, more
importantly,
during
the
promulgation
of
judgment
of
conviction, and to surrender to the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
By the provisions of Sec 6 Rule
120, the accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction shall lose
the remedies available under the
Rules of Court against the judgment
(a) the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an
appeal from the judgment of conviction
(Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the
accused to regain his standing in court in
order to avail of these remedies by: (a)
his surrender, and (b) his filing of a

motion for leave of court to avail of these

remedies, stating therein the reasons for
his absence, within 15 days from the
date of promulgation of judgment. If the
trial court finds that his absence was for
a justifiable cause, the accused shall be
allowed to avail of the said remedies
within 15 days from notice or order
finding his absence justified and allowing
him the available remedies against the
judgment of conviction.
Petitioners mere filing of notices
of appeal through their new counsel,
explaining their absence during the
promulgation of judgment, cannot be
considered an act of surrender, despite
the fact that said notices were filed
within 15 days from September 28, 2007,
the purported date when their new
counsel personally secured a copy of the
judgment of conviction from the RTC. The
term surrender under Section 6, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court contemplates
an act whereby a convicted accused
physically
and
voluntarily
submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court to
suffer the consequences of the verdict
against him. The filing of notices of
appeal cannot suffice as a physical and
voluntary submission of petitioners to
the RTCs jurisdiction. It is only upon
petitioners valid surrender, and only
after proper motion, that they can avail
of the remedy of appeal. Absent
compliance with these requirements,
their notices of appeal, the initiatory step
to appeal from their conviction, were
properly denied due course.
The
affirmed.

petition

was

denied.

CA

Case Title: Teope v. People

Date: April 14, 2004
Where Filed: RTC of Dumaguete City
Crime Charged: 2 counts of BP 22
Doctrine:
If the judgment is for conviction
and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these
Rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of judgment,
however, the accused may surrender and
file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the

reasons for his absence at the scheduled

promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he
shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within fifteen (15) days from notice.

for leave of court to avail of these

remedies. He shall state the reasons for
his
absence
at
the
scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he
shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within fifteen (15) days from notice.

Facts:

Here, petitioner escaped after her

arraignment. Under the Rules of Court,
petitioner is barred from availing of the
remedies allowed by the rules against
the judgment of the RTC, one of which is
the right to file an appeal with the Court
of Appeals. The reason for this rule is
because once an accused escapes from
prison or confinement, or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
of the court, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the
court.

Petitioner (Teope) was charged of

2 counts of BP 22. During the hearing,
Petitioner failed to appear. He filed a
motion for postponement asking the
resetting of the case. The reason given
was that the petitioners counsel has to
attend urgent family engagement. RTC
acceded to the motion and reset the
hearings to June 6,7,8,9 and 13, 1995,
but declared these hearings to be
intransferable considering the fact that
the termination of these cases has been
much delayed by the frequent absence
and/or postponements made by the
Accused.
Petitioner
ask
for
reconsideration but was denied. RTC
rendered judgment against the bonds for
failure of the bondsman to produce
petitioner. RTC issued another order
declaring petitioner as a fugitive from
justice and a warrant of arrest was issued
against her. He was tried in absentia and
was convicted of offense charged.
Petitioner filed a motion of appeal to
the RTC but was denied because he was
a fugitive of justice. Hence, petitioner
filed a petition for mandamus before the
CA which it subsequently denied. Is CA
wrong is denying the mandamus?
SC said no. ROC provides that if the
judgment is for conviction and the failure
of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these Rules against
the judgment (this includes right to
appeal) and the court shall order his
arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion

Case Title: Reyes v Mangino

Date: Jan 31, 2005
Where Filed:
Crime Charged: Gross ignorance of the
law, Extortion, Graft and Corruption,
Fraud and Deception

Doctrine:
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which requires the
promulgation of judgment to be read in
the presence of the accused.
Facts:
Yolanda Reyes filed a complaint
against Judge Marvin B. Mangino
charging him with gross ignorance of the
law, extortion, graft and corruption, fraud
and deception. Reyes is the accused in
acriminal case for other deceits where
Mangino is the presiding judge. She
avers that Mangino set up a meeting at
the lobby of Manila Hotel and assured
them of the dismissal of the case. At the
meeting, P20,000 was paid to the
respondent judge. Mangino subsequently
told the spouses not to appear at the
promulgation of judgment anymore and
promised to just send the copy of the
decision through mail. Another P40,000
was sent at the request of Mangino. The
spouses received a copy of the decision
finding them guilty and liable to pay civil
liability.

SC finds that the respondent Judge

is liable for gross ignorance of the law in
not requiring the presence of the
accused during the promulgation of the
decision in Criminal Case as admitted by
him in his Comment on the complaint.
There are two instances when
judgment may be promulgated even
without the personal presence of the
accused: (1) when the judgment is for a
light offense, in which case, the counsel
for the accused or a representative may
stand for him; and (2) in cases where
despite due notice to the accused or his
bondsman or warden and counsel, the
accused failed to appear at the
promulgation of the decision. The
evident purpose of this latter exception is
to afford the offended party the
opportunity to enforce the award of civil
indemnity which could not otherwise be
effected if the decision cannot be
pronounced on account of the absence of
the accused.

The complainant averred that the

promulgation of judgment in the said
case was a direct violation of Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure,
which
requires
the
promulgation of judgment to be read in
the presence of the accused. The
respondent Judge, however, admitted
that on the promulgation date of the
decision, only the prosecutor, the
complainant, the private prosecutor and
the counsel for the accused appeared,
and agreed among themselves that they
would just receive copies of the decision.
Masas vs. People

December 19, 2007

Calamba, Misamis Occidental, RTC
Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act

derive income from, he even filed to be a

pauper litigant.
Petition was granted.

Doctrine: Appeal may be dismissed

by the CA motu proprio or by motion
of the appellee, with notice to the
appellant,
for
failure
to
file
appellant's brief within prescribed
period, EXCEPT when appellant is
represented by a Counsel de Oficio.
Facts:
Masas and Ong were arrested in a buybust operation. They were caught to be
in possession of a sachet of shabu and
selling 2 sachets with aluminum foil to
the poseur buyer.
Ong
was
acquitted
reasonable doubt.

because

of

Masas on the other hand appealed to the

Court of Appeals. His appeal was
dismissed by the CA for his failure to file
appellant's brief within the prescribed
period of filing. He argued that the
appeal should nit be dismissed since he
falls under the exception of the rule
(dismissal by CA for failure to file
appellant's
brief
within
prescribed
period) being represented by a counsel
de oficio (Public Attorneys Office or PAO).
Issue: whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing the case on the ground of
failure to file appellant's brief within the
prescribed period.
Ruling: The CA is wrong. This a criminal
case, the liberty of the accused is at
stake, so the courts must apply the law
with care. And since the rule expressly
state that the exception is when the
appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio, and Masas is indeed represented
by counsel de oficio, his appeal must not
be dismissed on the ground of failure to
file appellant's brief within the prescribed
period. He is represented by counsel de
oficio because he has no real property to

Jose vs. CA
March 31, 1976
Floridablanca, Pampanga RTC.
Illegal
discharge
of
firearms,
robbery,
illegal
possession
of
explosives
Doctrine: The failure of the Court of
Appeals to appreciate the merits of
the situation, involving as it does
the liberty of an individual, thereby
closing its ear to a plea that a
miscarriage of justice be averted,
constitutes
a
grave
abuse
of
discretion which calls for relief from
this Court.
Facts: Lorenzo Jose was charged of illegal
discharge of firearms, robbery, and
illegal possession of explosives in
Floridablanca,
Pampanga.
He
was
convicted only or illegal possession of
explosives. He appealed right away to
the Court of Appeals on the same day.
Then asked for the reopening of the case
since he wants to introduce an additional
evidence that could exculpate him. (He
was actually legally permitted to carry
the hand grenade since he is an
undercover agent of the Philippine
Constabulary. But he opted not to reveal
that identity initially and took chance on
being acquitted without giving away the
identity). Jose only to,d the court the he
had permit but was not able to show the
permit since he did not want to reveal his
identity, then the judgment came for
conviction.
Jose asked the Court of Appeals for new
trial which was denied since there is no
newly discovered evidence nor error of
law/irregularities
during
trial
that
prejudiced the accused's rights.

Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in

not granting the new trial or letting the
accused introduce exculpatory evidence
since it is not newly found.
Ruling: The SC granted petition and
remanded the case to the court a quo to
receive the additional evidence to
determine the guilt.
Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that
the authority of respondent appellate
court over an appealed case is broad and
ample enough to embrace situations as
the instant case where the court may
grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons
other than that provided in Section 13 of
the same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of
the Rules of Court. 13 While Section 13,
Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121,
provide for specific grounds for a new
trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and
errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial. Section 11, Rule 124
quoted above does not so specify,
thereby leaving to the sound discretion
of the court the determination, on a case
to case basis, of what would constitute
meritorious circumstances warranting a
new trial or re-trial.

Case Title: People v. Efren G. Mateo

Date: July 7, 2004
Where Filed: MTC Tarlac
Crime Charged: 10 counts of Rape
Doctrine: Where life and liberty are at
stake, all possible avenues to determine
his guilt or innocence must be accorded
an accused, and no care in the
evaluation of the facts can ever be
overdone. A prior determination by the
Court of Appeals on, particularly, the
factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error of judgment. If the
Court of Appeals should affirm the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, it could then render
judgment imposing the corresponding
penalty as the circumstances so warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to
the Supreme Court for its final
disposition.

Facts:
On October 30, 1996, ten (10)
informations, one for each count of rape
of Imelda Mateo is the daughter of the

live-in partner of Efren Mateo, were filed

against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower
court found Mateo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor
General, however, assails the factual
findings
of
the
trial
court
and
recommends
an
acquittal
of
the
appellant.

Article VIII, Section 5. The

Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:

(2) Review, revise, reverse,

modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower
courts in:

Issue:
Whether or not the case should directly
be forwarded to the Supreme Court by
virtue of the express provision in the
constitution on automatic appeal where
the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death.

Held:
The case is REMANDED, and all pertinent
records are ordered to be forwarded to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.

Up until now, the Supreme Court has

assumed the direct appellate review over
all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment (or lower but involving
offenses committed on the same
occasion or arising out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed). The practice
finds
justification
in
the
1987
Constitution

(d) All criminal cases in which the

penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.

The same constitutional article has

evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, as
well as procedural rules contained in
Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule
122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3
of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must
be
stressed,
however,
that
the
constitutional provision is not preclusive
in character, and it does not necessarily
prevent the Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, from adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favor of
the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations

among the members of the Court, there
has been a marked absence of unanimity
on the crucial point of guilt or innocence
of herein appellant. Some are convinced
that the evidence would appear to be
sufficient to convict; some would accept
the recommendation of acquittal from
the Solicitor General on the ground of

inadequate proof of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion
best demonstrates the typical dilemma,
i.e., the determination and appreciation
of primarily factual matters, which the
Supreme Court has had to face with in
automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been
given the direct mandate to review
factual issues.

While the Fundamental Law requires a

mandatory review by the Supreme Court
of cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death,
nowhere,
however,
has
it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only
to ensure utmost circumspection before
the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment is imposed, the
Court now deems it wise and compelling
to provide in these cases a review by the
Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where
life and liberty are at stake, all possible
avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused,
and no care in the evaluation of the facts
can
ever
be
overdone.
A
prior
determination by the Court of Appeals
on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should
affirm the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, it could
then render judgment imposing the
corresponding
penalty
as
the
circumstances so warrant, refrain from
entering judgment and elevate the entire
records of the case to the Supreme Court
for its final disposition.

Statistics would disclose that within the

eleven-year
period
since
the
reimposition of the death penalty law in
1993 until June 2004, the cases where
the judgment of death has either been
modified or vacated consist of an
astounding 71.77% of the total of death
penalty cases directly elevated before
the Court on automatic review that
translates to a total of six hundred fiftyone (651) out of nine hundred seven
(907) appellants saved from lethal
injection.

Under the Constitution Article VIII,

Section 5, the power to amend rules of
procedure is constitutionally vested in
the Supreme Court.

Procedural matters, first and foremost,

fall more squarely within the rule-making
prerogative of the Supreme Court than
the law-making power of Congress. The
rule here announce additionally allowing
an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court,
before the case is elevated to the
Supreme Court on automatic review, is
such a procedural matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules

on Criminal Procedure, more particularly
Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122,
Section 13 of rule 124, Section 3 of rule
125, and any other rule insofar as they
provide for direct appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme
Court in cases where the penalty
imposes is death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, as well as the
resolution of the Supreme Court en banc,
dated 19 September 1995, in Internal

Rules of the Supreme Court incases

similarly involving the death penalty, are
to be deemed modified accordingly.

Case Title: People v. Rolando Zamoraga

Date: February 6, 2008
Where Filed: RTC of Panabo City, Davao
Del Norte
Crime Charged: Rape
Doctrine: Decision if opinion is equally
divided (Rule 125, Sec. 3)
Facts:
Appellant was charged for raping
his 9-yr. old niece, however he argued
that he could not have committed the
said rapes because he was far away from
the victims residence and was busy
working. During the conclusion of the
trial, the trial court held the appellant
guilty and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of
the two rapes as well as to indemnify
AAA. The case was directly appealed to
the CA pursuant to Sec. 3 and Sec. 10 of
Rule 122, Sec. 13 of Rule 124 and Sec. 3
of Rule 125 of the RoC as well as
referring to the jurisprudence in the case
of People v. Mateo wherein the Court
deemed
it
wise
to
provide
an
intermediate review by the CA before
such case is elevated to the SC. The SC
held that the decision of the CA in finding
the appellant GUILTY of 2 counts of rape
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Case Title: People v. Efren Mateo
Date: July 7, 2004
Where Filed: RTC of Tarlac
Crime Charged: 10 counts of Rape
Doctrine: Decision if opinion is equally
divided (Rule 125, Sec. 3)
Facts:
Accused was charged for raping
Imelda Mateo the 11 yrs. old daughter of
his live-in-partner Capulong. However the
appellant denied the said charges and
claimed that he was busy working and

added that the charges against him was

due to the malicious retribution of his
stepdaughter. Capulong, corroborated
the said testimony of Efren and believes
that the complaint was based on the
jealousy felt by her relatives against the
accused who was solely receiving her
remittances abroad. At the conclusion of
the trial, the court rendered the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10
counts of rape. As such the case went
directly to the SC by virtue of the
automatic appeal expressly provided in
our Constitution.
The issue in the case is w/n the case
should be directly forwarded to the SC,
based on the Automatic Appeal as
provided in our Constitution.
The Court held that the case should
be REMANDED and forwarded to the CA
for
the
appropriate
action
and
disposition. The RoC particularly Secs. 3
and 10 of Rule 122, Sec. 13 of Rule 124
and Sec. 3 of Rule 125, and cases
wherein the penalty to be imposed is
death,
reclusion
perpetua
or
life
imprisonment; the Court now deems it
wise to provide a review by the CA before
such case is elevated to the SC. Since, a
prior determination of the CA on the
factual issues would minimize the
possibility of an error in judgment.
Hence, the case is ordered to be
Remanded and all the pertinent records
are ordered to be forwarded to the CA.