NOTES IN LEGAL ETHICS

THE LAWYERS OATH: I, ________________________, of ___________________________,

do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent
to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any
mans cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntarily without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
1. LEGAL PROFESSION group of men and women pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of public service (note: three elements of Legal
Profession - (a) organization, (b) learning, and (c) spirit of public service).
2. LEGAL ETHICS embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that
should govern the conduct of every Bar member; branch of moral science that
treats of the duties which a lawyer owes to the Court, his client, his Colleagues, and
the Public; is embodied in the Constitution, rules of Court, Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canons of Professional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral laws and special
laws.
3. PRACTICE OF LAW any activity in and out of court which requires the
application of laws, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience (Cayetano
vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991).
4. TITULO DE ABOGADO not mere possession of academic degree of LLB but
membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice
of law.
5. BAR and BENCH Bar refers to the whole body of attorneys and counsellors;
collectively, the members of the legal profession. Bench denotes the whole body of
judges (Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th edition).
6. LAWYER general term for a person trained in law and authorized to advice or
represent others in legal matters; a person licensed to practice law (Blacks Law
Dictionary, 6th edition).
7. TRIAL LAWYER one who personally handles cases in court, administrative
agencies or boards.
8. PRACTISING LAWYER one who is engaged in the practice of law.
9. CLIENT one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice or for
purposes of prosecuting or defending a suit in his behalf and usually for a fee.

10. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW class of persons who are by license, officers of the court
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence.
11. COUNSEL DE OFFICIO a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court who by
reason of experience and ability, may adequately defend the accused. He is
normally appointed to represent one who is indigent in a criminal case.
12. ATTORNEY AD HOC one named or appointed by the court to defend an
absentee defendant in the suit in which the appointment is made.
13. ATTORNEY OF RECORD one whose name must appear somewhere in
permanent records or files of the case, or on the pleading or some instrument filed
in the case or on the appearance docket.
14. OF COUNSEL an associate attorney or employee of law offices.
15. AMICUS CURIAE friend of the court. He is a person with strong interest in or
views on the subject matter of an action, but not a party to the action, may petition
the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to
suggest a rationale consistent with its own views. Such amicus curiae briefs are
commonly filed in appeals concerning matters of a broad public interest like civil
rights.
16. AMICI PAR EXCELLENCE Bar associations which appear in court as friends to
expound in some matters of law for the information of the court.
17. BAR ASSOCIATION is an association of members of the legal profession like
the IBP where membership is integrated and compulsory.
18. ADVOCATE one who pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or court.
19. BARRATRY offense of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits either at law or
otherwise except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his
duty to do so; the act of fomenting suit among individuals and offering legal
services to one of them for monetary motives.
20. AMBULANCE CHASING figuratively, lawyers act of chasing the ambulance
chasing the victim of an accident for the purpose of talking to him or his relatives
and offering his legal services to file a case against the person who caused the
accident; a lawyer who haunts hospitals and visits the home of afflicted persistently
offering his legal services on contingent fee.
21. ATTORNEYS FEES reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal
services he has rendered to a client; indemnity for damages ordered by the court to
be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party in litigation.
22. GENERAL RETAINER fee/s intended to secure services for future legal
problems.
23. SPECIAL RETAINER fee/s paid for the engagement in a particular case.

24. CONTINGENT CONTRACT an agreement whereby the fee, usually a fixed

percentage of what may be recovered, is made to depend on the success of the
action.
25. CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT an agreement whereby an attorney agrees to
pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the clients rights; is against public policy
especially where the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his won expense
in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute.
26. RETAINING LIEN attorneys lien over the property of the client held by the
lawyer to apply to his claims upon due notice to the client.
27. CHARGING LIEN a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments; a lawyer causes a statement of
his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court that rendered
judgment or issuing execution with written notice to the client and adverse party
(Rule 138, S3c. 37, Rules of Court).
28. GENERAL APPEARANCE one that is done by a lawyer for any act except to
question the courts jurisdiction.
29. SPECIAL APPEARANCE one solely intended to question the courts
jurisdiction.
30. SUSPENSION temporary withholding of a lawyers privilege to practice his
profession for a certain period or for an indefinite period of time.
31. DISBARMENT the act of the Supreme Court in withdrawing from an attorney
the privilege to practice law.
32. REINSTATEMENT restoration to a disbarred lawyer of the privilege to
practice; readmission to the membership in the Bar.
33. JUDICIAL ETHICS branch of moral science which treats of the right and
proper conduct to be observed by all judges and magistrates in trying and deciding
controversies brought to them for adjudication which conduct must be
demonstrative of impartiality, integrity, competence, independence and freedom
from improprieties. The freedom from improprieties must be observed even in the
judges private life.
34. COURT a board or other tribunal which decides a litigation or contest.
35. JUDGE a public officer who by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial
authority. A public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in
accordance with law.
36. DE JURE JUDGE one who is exercising the office of judge as a matter of right;
an officer of a court who has been duly and legally elected or appointed.
37. DE FACTO JUDGE an officer who is not lawfully invested with all of the powers
and duties conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some
color of right.

38. COURT STAFF includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.
39. JUDGES FAMILY includes a judges spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, and
any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree, or person
who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judges
household.
REQUIREMENTS FOR BAR CANDIDATE: - (i) Philippine citizen; (ii) Philippine
resident; (iii) at least 21 years of age; (iv) must be of good moral character; (v) must
not have been charged of a crime involving moral turpitude; and (vi) must have met
the required educational requirements (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION INTO THE BAR: (1) must meet all academic
requirements; (2) pass the bar exam; (3) oath-taking before the Supreme Court, (4)
signing of the Attorneys Roll and issuance of certificate of membership from Clerk
of Court of the Supreme Court (must be in good standing).
DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF A LAWYER (Four-Fold Duty to the Court, to the Public,
to the Bar and to his Client): (a) maintain allegiance to the Republic and support the
Constitution and obey the laws; (b) observe and maintain respect due to courts and
their officers; (c) counsel or maintain such actions/proceedings only as appears to
him to be just and defenses as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
(d) employ means only consistent with truth and honor and never to mislead the
judge; (e) maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the clients secrets; (f)
abstain from all offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party/witness unless required by the justice of the cause he is
charged with; (g) not to encourage suit/delay any mans cause for corrupt motive;
(h) not to reject the cause of defenceless/oppressed for any personal consideration;
(i) to present every defense permitted by the law by all fair and honourable means,
in the defense of a person accused of a crime regardless of his personal opinion as
to the accuseds guilt, so that due process may be ensured (Rule 138, Sec. 20, Rules
of Court).
PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW General Rule: Any person admitted
as a member of the Bar in good and regular standing is entitled to practice of law.
Exceptions (a) person representing himself or a friend in the MTC (Sec. 34, Rule
138, Rules of Court); (b) in criminal proceedings in a municipal court in a locality
where a licensed member of the bar is not available (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules of
Court); (c) person representing himself in the RTC (Sec. 33, Rule 138, Rules of
Court); (d) persons authorized to represent the government in a case (Sec. 133,
Rule 138, Rules of Court); (e) complainant himself or union representatives in labor
cases (Labor Code); (f) law students who have completed 3 rd year law and enrolled
in a recognized law schools Supreme Court-approved legal education program to
represent indigent clients, provided that, such appearance if before the RTC should
be accompanied at all times by a supervising lawyer (Rule 138-A).
PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
(a) Judges and other officials or employees of Superior courts (Rule 138, Sec. 35,
Rules of Court); (b) Officials and employees of the Office of the Solicitor General; (c)
Government Prosecutors; (d) President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, their
deputies and assistants (Art. VII, Sec. 13, Constitution); (e) Members of

Constitutional Commissions (Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, Constitution); (f) Ombudsman and his
deputies (Art. XI, Sec. 8[2]); (g) Governors, city and municipal mayors (Ra. 7160,
Sec. 90); and (h) those who by special law are prohibited from engaging in the
practice of law.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS WITH RESTRICTED RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW: (a) personal
appearance as counsel by Members of Congress before any court, electoral tribunal
or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Constitution); (b)
Sanggunian members may practice their legal profession provided that they shall
not (i) not appear in court in any civil case where the local government or any
governmental office, agency or instrumentality is the adverse party; (ii) appear as
counsel in any criminal case wherein an national or local government
officer/employee is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; (iii)
collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which they are officials; and (iv) use property and
personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the governments interest (RA7160); (c) a retired justice or judge
receiving pension from the government cannot act as counsel in any civil case in
which the government or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or
in a criminal case wherein an officer/employee of the government is accused of an
offense in relation to his office (RA 910, Sec. 1).
GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL: (a) client pursues an illegal or
immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; (b) client
insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of the canons and rules; (c) his
inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client; (d)
the mental and physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry
out the employment effectively; (e) client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement; (f) lawyer is elected or
appointed to a public office; and (g) other similar cases (Rule 22.01, CPR).
INSTANCES WHEN COUNSEL CANNOT RECOVER FULL AMOUNT DESPITE
WRITTEN CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEYS FEES (1) when stipulated attorneys
fees are in excess of what the law expressly provides; (2) when the attorney is guilty
of fraud or bad faith against the client; (3) when counsels services were worthless
because of his negligence; (4) when the contract of employment is illegal; (5) when
counsel served adverse interest, unless he acted with consent of both parties.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING ATTORNEYS FEES (Rule 20.01, CPR) (a) time
spent and extent and services rendered and required; (b) novelty and difficulty of
question involved; (c) importance of subject matter; (d) skill demanded of lawyer;
(e) customary charges for similar services and IBP schedule of fees; (f) probability of
losing other compensation; (g) amount involved in the controversy and benefits
resulting from the service; (h) contingency or certainty of compensation; (i)
character of employment whether occasional or established; (j) the lawyers
professional standing.
INSTANCES OF ATTORNEYS FEES ON QUANTUM MERUIT (as much as he
deserves) (a) no express contract for attorneys fees; (b) court determines fees
stipulated in the contract to be unconscionable or unreasonable; (c) contract for
attorneys fees is void due to purely formal matters or defects in the execution; (d)

counsels inability, for justifiable cause, to finish the case to its conclusion; (e) when
lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorneys fees; (f) charging of fees
beyond what is fixed by law.
OBJECTIVES OF DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION (a) Compel attorney to deal
fairly and honestly with his client; (b) remove from the profession, a person whose
misconduct has proved him UNFIT to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney; (c) punish lawyer although not
so much as to safeguard the administration of justice; (d) set as an example or
warning for other members of the Bar; (e) safeguard the administration of justice
from incompetence and dishonesty of lawyers; (f) protect the public.
NATURE OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS being sui generis (class by itself), it
has the following characteristics: (a) neither civil or criminal; (b) double jeopardy
cannot be availed of in a disbarment proceeding against a lawyer as such a lawyer
who is convicted like for falsification cannot claim double jeopardy; (c) can be
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP and can be initiated without
a complainant; (d) can proceed regardless of the interest or lack thereof, if facts
proven warrant; (e) imprescriptible and as such the ordinary statues of limitations
have no application to disbarment proceedings however, unexplained delay in filing
of an administrative case creates suspicion over the motives of the complainant; (f)
conducted confidentially being confidential in nature until its final determination; (g)
it is itself due process of law; (h) whatever has been decided in a disbarment case
cannot be a source of right that may be enforced in another action like
reconveyance or damages;
GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT (Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court) (a)
Deceit; (b) Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (c) Grossly immoral
conduct; (d) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (e) Violation of the
Oath of Office; (f) Wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (g)
Corrupt or Wilful appearance as attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so.
QUALIFICATIONS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES (a) Justices of the Court of Appeal
and Supreme Court natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 40 years of age, 15 years
in the practice of law [Section 7(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution]; (b) judges of
lower courts natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 35 (for RTC) and 30 (for MTC)
years of age, 10 years (for RTC) and 5 years (for MTC) in the practice of law [Section
7(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution].
INSTANCES OF MANDATORY INHIBITION OF JUDGES (a) judges actual
bias/prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of dispute evidentiary facts
concerning proceedings; (b) judge previously served as a lawyer or a material
witness in the matter in controversy; (c) judge, or a member of his or her family,
has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy; (d) judge
served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter
in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; (e) judges ruling
in a lower court is the subject of review; (f) judge is related by consanguinity or
affinity to a party litigant within the 6 th civil degree or to counsel within the 4 th civil
degree; or (g) judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as

heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy

or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceedings.
RE: APPLICATION FOR BAR ADMISSION (VICENTE CHING), BM#914,
10/1/1999 Vicente Ching passed the 1998 Bar Exam but was prohibited from
taking his oath due to a citizenship issue having been born on April 11, 1964 to a
Chinese father and Filipino mother. Despite, his oath of allegiance and affidavit of
citizenship executed in 1999, Supreme Court denied his motion to take the lawyers
oath reasoning that, when he was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution which required a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien
father to follow the latters citizenship, unless electing Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The
span of 14years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly beyond the
contemplation of the requiring of electing upon reaching the age of majority.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE VS. EDWIN RANA, BM#1036, 6/10/2003
Respondent, a 2000 Bar exam passer was precluded from signing the Attorneys Roll
because of a complaint charging him of appearing as counsel for a local candidate
before the Municipal Board of Canvassers prior to his oath-taking in May 2001. In
denying him admission into the Bar, the Supreme Court held that, before one is
admitted to the Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership
in the legal profession. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law
even if he passes the bar examinations. Respondent was engaged in law practice
when he appeared before the canvassing board without being a member of the Bar.
It is the signing in the Attorneys Rolls that makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that Respondent passed the bar exams is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become a lawyer, Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely, his lawyers
oath to be administered by the Supreme Court and his signature in the Attorneys
Roll.
ROMULO VILLA VS. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ET AL., BM#674, 6/14/2005
Junel Ama, was one of the members of Aquila Legis Fraternity implicated and
charged for the death of Lenny Villa. Despite passing the bar in 1992, Junel was
not allowed to take his lawyers oath. He later petitioned to be admitted to the Bar
when his conviction for homicide through conspiracy was set aside by the Court of
Appeals finding him only liable for physical injuries and sentencing him to 20-days
imprisonment. Supreme Court admitted him into the practice of law reasoning that
the crime for which he was convicted was only slight physical injuries, a light
offense which cannot be considered a grave violation of the moral sentiment of the
community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility or revenge a crime certainly
not involving moral turpitude.
SOLIMAN SANTOS, JR. VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, AC#4749, 1/20/2000
Respondent who last paid his IBP membership dues in 1992 subsequently failed to
indicate his IBP number in his pleadings and used at times the same IBP number for
the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. Supreme Court rejected Respondents claim that he

honestly thought that he was exempted from payment of IBP dues being a senior
citizen and being engaging in limited law practice only as he was principally into
farming. Rule 139-A, Section 9 requires every member of the IBP to pay annual
dues. Non-payment of such dues may warrant suspension or removal from the
Attorneys Roll pursuant to Section 10 of the same rule. Respondent can engage in
law practice only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is
limited. Further, exemption from taxation of senior citizens does not include
exemption from payment of membership or association dues.
PETITION TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,
Petitioner, BM#1678, 12/17/2007 Petitioner, a Philippine Bar member migrated
to Canada and became a citizen thereof. Pursuant to RA9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003), Petitioner reacquired Filipino citizenship and
petitioned the Supreme Court to allow him to resume his law practice. In
readmitting Petitioner, Supreme Court held that, Philippine citizenship lost by reason
of naturalization as a citizen of another country but later reacquired pursuant to RA
9225, is deemed never to have been lost. However, although deemed never to have
terminated his Bar membership, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Hence, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from the Supreme Court authority to
do so, conditioned on: (a) updating and payment in full of the annual IBP
membership; (b) payment of professional tax; (c) completion of at least 36 credit
hours of mandatory continuing legal education; and (d) retaking of the lawyers
oath.
JULIETA B. NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, AC#3405, 6/29/1998
Respondent, while engaged as a teacher had an illicit relationship with his 17-year
old student with whom he later lived after abandoning his family. Supreme Court
disbarred Respondent reasoning that, good moral character is a continuing
qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet
the exacting standard of moral integrity, the privilege to practice law may be
withdrawn. Immoral conduct is conduct so wilful, flagrant or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
Such conduct, must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.
HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. VS. ATTY. RICHARD FUNK, AC#9094,
8/15/2012 Hocorma Foundation hired Respondents legal services in connection
with, among others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of several suits and
over which same property he later instituted a suit in behalf of Mabalacat Insttitute
without the foundations written consent. Supreme Court suspended Respondent
from the practice of law reasoning that a lawyer owes his client undivided
allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound policy
dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging
inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention
on the erring lawyers part does not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a
lawyer acquires knowledge of his former clients doings, whether documented or

not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and
confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship.
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO VS. ATTY. RODOLFO GALING, AC#6174, 11/16/2011
Respondent accepted Complainants engagement and wrote in her behalf a demand
letter to Ms. Koa for dishonored checks. Subsequently, he filed a motion for
consolidation and appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa in the estafa and BP22 cases
filed against her by Complainant. The latter charged this as representation of
conflicting interests. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice
holding that, a lawyer-client relationship can exist despite close friendship. This
relationship was established the moment Complainant sought Respondents legal
advice regarding the dishonored checks. Respondent confirmed this relationship by
drafting the demand letter and referring to Complainant therein as my client. The
fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that
Complainant hired another lawyer is of no moment. Non-payment of professional
fee will not exculpate Respondent from liability. Absence of monetary consideration
does not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing
cases with conflicting interests (Canon 15) which prohibition attaches from the
establishment of attorney-client relationship extending beyond its duration. This
prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of
the relationship, the lawyer learns facts connected with the clients case, including
the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers must not only keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also avoid appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
SPS. VIRGILO & ANGELINA ARANDA VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL ELAYDA,
AC#7907, 12/15/10 Respondent failed to notify Complainants who were here
clients in a civil case of the scheduled hearing which resulted in the submission of
the case for decision. Later, Respondent took no steps, or at the very least,
informed his clients of the adverse decision rendered which became final and
executory. Respondent claimed that he did not have Complainants contact number
or address and that the clients were the ones remiss in making a follow up of their
cases status. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice citing
amongst others, his duty of fidelity to his clients cause (Canon 17) and his duty to
serve his client with competence (Canon 18), mindful not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him (Rule 18.03). It is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients
to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant
communication with each other. While communication is a shared responsibility
between counsel and client, it is counsels primary duty to inform his clients of the
status of their case and the court orders issued. He simply cannot wait for his clients
to make an inquiry about the development in their case. Close coordination
between counsel and client is necessary for them to adequate prepare for the case,
as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.
DOLORES VDA. DE FAJARDO VS. ATTY. REXIE BUGARING, AC#5113,
10/7/2004 Complainant engaged Respondent to handle two cases affecting
inherited land. When asked about his fees, Respondent said, huwag na ninyo
alalahanin iyon, para ko na kayong nanay o lola. After the cases were settled,
Complainant offered Respondent P100k but he rejected. Years later, Complainant

learned that her property had been attached by Respondent after he filed a civil
case for sum of money against her. Supreme Court suspended Respondent
reasoning that, the proper time to deal with the issue of professional fees is upon
commencement of the lawyer-client relationship. Respondent should have
determined and entered into an agreement regarding his fees when he was first
retained by Complainant. Such prudence would have spared the Court this
controversy over a lawyers compensation, a suit that should be avoided except to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. While, a lawyer is entitled to the courts
protection against any attempt on the clients part to escape payment of legitimate
attorneys fees, such protection however must not be sought at the expense of
truth. Complete candor or honesty is expected from lawyers, particularly when they
appear and plead before the courts for their own causes against former clients.
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD VS. ATTY. GODWIN VALDEZ, AC#7902, 9/20/2008
After receipt of about P900K to represent Complainant, a Dutch national, in several
cases filed by and against him, Respondent failed to give any update as to the case
status, he also failed to enter his appearance in some cases. Respondent also failed
to inform Complainant of the arraignment dates in the criminal cases against him
and even failed to mention that he was entitled to prepare counter-affidavits.
Warrants for Complainants arrests were subsequently issued for his non-attendance.
Supreme Court disbarred Respondent holding that, he had indubitably fallen below
the exacting standards demanded of Bar members. He did not only neglect his
clients case, he abandoned his client and left him without any recourse but to hire
another lawyer. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. A lawyer is
bound to serve his client with competence and diligence. A lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ VS. ATTY. MANUEL SAN JOSE, AC#3569,
2/23/2007 Respondent was paid to file an unlawful detainer suit. When he did not
file the case, Complainant demanded for the return of her documents. Due to noncompliance by Respondent, the case prescribed. Supreme Court suspended
Respondent. A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the
responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty
to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best
efforts to protect, within the bounds of law, the interest of his client. An attorney
who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.
LUCILA S. BARBUCO VS. ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, AC#5092,
8/11/2004 Complainant hired Respondent to appeal her case to the Court of
Appeals. Later, she learned that her appeal had been dismissed for failure to file
appellants brief. Respondent claimed that he timely filed the appeal only that he
was late in filing the required brief because he was physically incapacitated for
several days due to a vehicular incident. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme
Court reasoned that, Respondents conduct relative to the belated filing of the
appellants brief falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and
commitment to their clients cause. Failure to file brief within the reglementary
period constitutes inexcusable negligence. That Respondent was suffered physical
injuries from a vehicular accident cannot serve to excuse him from filing his

pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not
just one lawyer. He could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file the
brief or, at least, to seek extension of time to file such pleading.
FERNANDO MARTIN PENA VS. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO, AC#7298, 6/25/2007
His demand for separation pay for his client in an illegal dismissal case having
been rejected by the Complainant, Respondent wrote threatening to file criminal
cases for tax evasion and falsification against Complainant. Respondent alleged that
the disbarment complaint against him should be dismissed for want of certification
against forum-shopping. Supreme Court held that, as to the necessity of a
certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint, the filing of multiple
suits and conflicting decisions rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering
that said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the
IBP upon verified complaint of any person, thus, if the complainant fails to attach a
certification against forum shopping the pendency of another disciplinary action
against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. Supreme Court
reprimanded Respondent that, while a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of law, his duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice his clients success is wholly subordinate and his conduct must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The writing of demand letters is standard
practice and tradition in this jurisdiction, but, the letter in this case contains more
than just a simple demand to pay containing as it did a threat to file retaliatory
charges against Complainant which have nothing to do with his clients claim.
ALEX ONG VS. ATTY. ELPIDIO UNTO, AC#2417, 2/6/2002 For failing to heed
his demand letters seeking child support for his client, Respondent filed criminal
cases against Complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization
Law and Anti-Dummy Law plus administrative cases before the Bureau of Domestic
Trade, the Commission on Immigration and the Office of the Solicitor General.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent reasoning that, Canon 19 requires a lawyer
to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and not to present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent had not
exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in handling of his clients legal affairs.
He tried to coerce Complainant to comply with his demand letter by threatening to
file various charges against the latter. After non-compliance, he made good his
threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases this act is malicious
as the cases filed did not have any bearing or connection to his clients cause.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. VS. ATTY. LEOVIGILDO MIJARES III, AC#8380,
11/20/09 Respondent was disbarred for failing to turn over certain papers which
he supposedly secured for Complainant after the latter had paid him P500k to
Respondent as facilitation and processing expenses for the titling of a certain
property. Supreme Court held that, every lawyer has the responsibility to protect
and advance his clients interest such that he must promptly account for whatever
money or property his client may have entrusted to him. A lawyers conversion of
funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.
NICANOR GONZALES VS. MIGUEL SABACAJAN 249 SCRA 276 Respondent
held Complainants owners copies of land titles purportedly. Despite demand,

Respondent refused to surrender to Complainants said titles claiming that he was

holding them in behalf of a client to whom Complainants were supposedly indebted.
In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court posited that, if complainant did have
alleged monetary obligations with his client, that did not warrant Respondents
summarily confiscating their titles since there was no showing in the records that
the same were given as collateral or any court order authorizing Respondent to take
custody of said title. A lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance
with laws and principles of fairness.
ATTY. RICARDO SALOMON, JR. VS. ATTY. JOSELITO FRIAL, AC#7820,
9/12/2008 Upon his own undertaking, Respondent (who was counsel for the
plaintiff in a civil case) took possession of Complainants two vehicles which were
attached. Complainant claimed that, several times, one of the cars was used by
unauthorized persons and the other car was destroyed in a fire while parked in
Respondents residence. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. A writ of
attachment issues to prevent defendant from disposing of attached properties to
secure satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff. When
attached objects are destroyed then the attached properties would necessarily be of
no value and attachment would be for naught. A lawyer should refrain from any
action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client. Thus, money of the client or collected for
the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance be
commingled with his own or be used by him.
REYNARIA BARCENAS VS. ATTY. ANORLITO ALVERO, AC#8159, 4/23/10
Respondent received P300k from Complainant to be used to redeem the latters
rights as tenant of a ricefield. Respondent told Complainant that he would deposit
the money in court because the creditor refused to accept it. Later, Complainant
found out that Respondent was losing a lot in cockfights and no judicial deposit was
made. Complainant demanded for the return of his money but Respondent failed to
comply. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. When a lawyer received money
from the client for a particular purpose, he is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for that purpose. If he does not use the
money for the intended purpose, he must promptly return the money to his client.
MELVIN D. SMALL VS. ATTY. JERRY BANARES, AC#7021, 2/21/2007
Respondent received money for acceptance and filing fees. Despite Complainant
constant follow-up as to the status of the cases, Respondent merely answered that
he was still preparing the documents. Months passed, Respondent failed to present
any document prompting Complainant to demand for a full refund. Respondent
failed to comply. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, every
lawyer holds in trust moneys of his client that may come into his possession.
Further, he should account for all money received from the client and deliver funds
of the client upon demand. Respondent received money and since he failed to
render any legal service to Complainant, he should have promptly accounted for
and returned the money, but he failed to do so.
CLETO DOCENA VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, SR., AC#2387, 9/10/1998
Respondent asked for P10k to post a bond to stay the execution of a decision in a

civil case pending appeal. After favorable judgment in the appeal, Complainant
went to court to withdraw his bond only to discover that no such bond was posted,
much less required. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent. While the amount
involved may be small, the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier penalty.
The Code mandates that, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but must also be possessed at all times in order
to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. If it has to
remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives,
accord continuing fidelity to them. By extorting money from his client through
deceit and misrepresentation, Respondent reduced the law profession to a level so
base, so low and dishonorable and most contemptible.
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON VS. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, AC#6116,
8/1/2012 After failing to pay Complainant the agreed commission for a case
referral, Respondent wrote informing Complainant that the client would shoulder
payment of the commission because he agreed to reduce his attorneys fees.
Respondent was suspended from law practice. The Supreme Court held that,
practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.
Respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from
dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
MANUEL CAMACHO VS. ATTY LUIS PANGULAYAN, ET. AL., AC#4807,
3/22/2000 Complainant who represented expelled students in a civil case against
the school complained that the latters lawyer secured the dismissal of said
complaint by brokering a deal with the students allowing them readmission into the
school without Complainants presence or knowledge. In suspending Respondent,
the Supreme Court held that Canon 9 provides that, a lawyer should not in any
way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by
counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
JOSE C. SABERON VS. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, AC#6567, 4/16/2008
Respondent as counsel for a bank filed various pleading using abusive and offensive
language hinting that Complainant was merely blackmailing/coercing his client for
financial gain. Supreme Court imposed a fine with a warning on Respondent. The
Code mandates for a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel
and, in his professional dealings, refrain from using language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper. The adversarial nature of our legal system has
tempted members of the bar to use strong language in the pursuit of their duty to
advance their clients interests. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his
case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ VS. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, AC#5737, 10/25/2004

Complainant was a 4th year law student who personally instituted and appeared in
cases in his own behalf. In one case, Respondent who was the opposing partys
counsel remarked, Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna. The Supreme Court
admonished Respondent to be more circumspect in his performance of his duties as
an officer of the court. Respondents comment was intended to point out to the trial
court that Complainant was not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of
Complainants appearance as the judge in her order noted that Complainant was a
lawyer. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to
warrant Respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or
the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. Respondent
was reminded that Complainant is not precluded from personally litigating his cases
pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA VS. ATTY. ANA LUZ CRISTAL-TENORIO, AC#6290,
7/14/2004. Charged with assisting in the illegal law practice of Felicisimo Tenorio
who was not a Bar member, Respondent admitted that Felicisimo is named as a
senior partner because of investments in her law office. While the disbarment case
was pending, Complainant withdrew her complaint claiming that it was all a mere
misunderstanding. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. An affidavit of
withdrawal of the disbarment case does not, in any way, exonerate Respondent. A
suspension/disbarment case may proceed regardless of Complainants interest/lack
of interest such proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance and are solely for the public welfare, that is, to prevent courts of
justice from the official ministrations of person unfit to practice in them. If the
evidence on record warrants, respondent may be suspended/disbarred despite
complainants desistance or withdrawal of charges. Respondent is guilty of assisting
in the unauthorized practice of law. The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very
least not assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
FLORENCE MACARRUBO VS. ATTY. EDMUNDO MACARRUBO, AC#6148,
2/27/2004 Respondent married and fathered two children with Complainant by
representing that his previous marriage was void. Later, he abandoned Complainant
and entered into a third marriage with another woman. In his defense, Respondent
presented the decree of nullity of his marriage with Complainant and denied
employing deception in marrying her insisting that, despite her full knowledge of his
prior marriage, Complainant dragged him against his will to a sham wedding to
protect her and her familys reputation due to her pregnancy. The Supreme Court
disbarred Respondent reasoning that, while his marriage to Complainant has been
annulled by final judgment, this did not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of
impropriety. Having lived with Complainant as husband and wife while his first
marriage was subsisting made him liable for concubinage conduct inconsistent
with the good moral character required for continued right to practice law. Such
conduct imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage.

WILSON CHAM VS. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, AC#7494, 6/27/2008

Respondent leased an apartment owned by Complainants company. Despite
repeated demands, she failed to settle her unpaid account and vacated the leased
premises without notifying Complainant. The Supreme Court suspended Respondent
from law practice reasoning that, having incurred just debts, she had the moral and
legal responsibility to settle them when they became due. Respondents
abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for rent and electric
bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of Canon1.
ISIDRA BARRIENTOS VS. ATTY. ELERIZZA LIBIRAN-METEORO, AC#6408,
8/31/2004 Respondent issued several checks in payment of a pre-existing debt.
Due to their dishonor, Complainant filed BP22. In suspending Respondent, the
Supreme Court held that the issuance of checks later dishonoured for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series
of worthless checks also shows Respondents remorseless attitude, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and order. It also manifests a
lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined
her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she
should hold in high esteem.
JOSELANO GUEVARRA VS. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, AC# 7136,
8/1/2007 Respondent, a married man cohabited with Irene, a married woman. In
his defense, Respondent posited that, his special friendship with Irene was lowprofile and not scandalous and that he did no damage to the institution of marriage
as he was still civil and in good terms with his own wife. Supreme Court disbarred
Respondent holding that Respondent did not deny his adulterous relationship with
Irene, what he denied was having flaunted such relationship maintain that it was
low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families.
Respondents denial is a negative pregnant a denial with admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. The
Rules of Court employs the term grossly immoral conduct as a ground for
disbarment and not under scandalous circumstances as used in Art. 334
(concubinage) of the Revised Penal Code. While the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction
for illicit behaviour, it is not so with respect to the betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is deemed disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
ROSARIO MECARAL VS. ATTY. DANILO VASQUEZ, AC#8392, 6/29/10
Complainant, who was the secretary of Respondent, later became his lover and
common-law wife. Respondent brought Complainant to a religious cult which he
headed up in the mountains. There Respondent left her where she was tortured,
brainwashed and drugged and held in captivity until her mother and law officers
rescued her. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent holding that his acts of
converting his secretary into a mistress, contracting two marriages are grossly
immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. Further,

Complainants subsequent detention and torture is gross misconduct which only a

beast may be able to do.
ALFREDO ROA VS. ATTY. JUAN MORENO, AC#8382, 4/21/10 In selling a piece of
land, Respondent issued, instead of a deed of sale, a temporary receipt and a
certificate of land occupancy assuring Complainant that he could already use the lot.
When he could not register the certificate with the Register of Deeds, Complainant
confronted Respondent and learned that the latter was not the property owner and the
land was in fact subject of pending litigation. Supreme Court suspended Respondent.
His credibility is highly questionable he even issued a bogus certificate of land
occupancy to Complaint whose only fault what that he did not know better. To the
unlettered, said certificate could have easily passed as document evidencing title.
Respondent violated Rule 1.01 (not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct). Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to performance of a
lawyers professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
RODRIGO MOLINA VS. ATTY. CEFERINO MAGAT, AC#1900, 6/13/2012
Respondent was counsel for an accused against whom Complainant filed a case for
assault upon an agent of a person in authority and breach of peace and resisting
arrest. Respondent move for quashal of said cases alleging double jeopardy as
supposedly a similar case for slight physical injuries had been filed against his
client. The records revealed however that no such case was filed by Molina. The
latter claimed that the filing of the motion to quash was in bad faith to mislead the
court. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law finding that,
there was deliberate intent on his part to mislead the court when he filed the
motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. He should
not make any false and untruthful statement in his pleadings. If it were true that
there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all
he had to do was secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was
filed.
PARALUMAN AFURONG VS. ATTY. ANGEL AQUINO, AC#1571, 9/23/1999 To
stay the execution of a decision obtained by Complainant in an ejectment case he
filed multiple petitions and even a motion to postpone a scheduled hearing
supposedly due to his appearance in another case when there was actually none.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. It is an attorneys duty to counsel or
maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just and such
defences only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. Because the
decision in the ejectment case had reached finality and execution was being
effected, Respondent should not have filed a petition for certiorari considering that
there was no apparent purpose for it than to delay execution of judgment.
Respondent likewise committed a falsehood when he stated in his motion for
postponement that he had to attend another hearing. He himself admitted that he
only included such statement in order to give more force to his motion. Such act
violates a lawyers duty to avoid concealment of the truth from the court. A lawyer
is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO VS. ATTY. JAMES FLORIDO, AC#5624,
1/20/2004 Respondent went to the Complainant who was his estranged wife to

demand custody of their children supposedly based upon a resolution of the Court
of Appeals granting him temporary custody. Per certification from the Court of
Appeals, no such resolution had been issued. In suspending Respondent, the
Supreme Court held that, candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The
burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value
what is asserted by counsel.
ATTY. JOSABETH ALONSO VS. ATTY. IBARO RELAMIDA, JR., AC#8481, 8/3/10
Respondent was counsel for the complainant in a labor case for constructive
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruling that there was voluntary resignation, dismissed
the labor case. This decision was sustained by the Supreme Court and became final
and executor. Respondent filed a second complaint for illegal dismissal based on the
same cause. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. All lawyers must bear in mind
that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. A lawyer owes
fidelity to his clients cause but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice. Filing multiple petitions constitutes abuse of court processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice
punishable as contempt of court.
HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS VS. ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, AC#6442,
10/21/2004 Respondent who was counsel for the protestee in an electoral protest
before Complainant filed a motion to withdraw as counsel citing heavy workload.
After his motion was granted, Respondent executed an affidavit saying that he
really withdrew from the case because Complainant pre-judged the case and even
insinuated that protestee would lose. This affidavit became the basis of protestees
motion for inhibition against Complainant. Supreme Court suspended Respondent
holding that, all members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia,
do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their
clients. When Respondent executed his affidavit retracting his reason for
withdrawing as counsel, he admitted under oath his misrepresentation. He misled
the court in clear violation of his oath as a lawyer and failed to abide by the Code.
Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. In fact,
this obligation to the bench for candor and honesty takes precedence. Thus, saying
one thing in his motion and another in his subsequent affidavit is a transgression of
this imperative which necessitates appropriate punishment.
LIBIT VS. ATTY. EDELSON OLIVA 237 SCRA 375 Respondent was charged with
falsifying the sheriffs return of summons in a civil case where he was counsel for
the plaintiff. In disbarring Respondent, the Supreme Court held that he committed
acts of misconduct which warranted the exercise by the court of its disciplinary
powers. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the qualifications
required by law. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyers first duty is not to his client
but to the courts as he is above all an officer of the court sworn to assist the courts
in rendering justice to all. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing in any in court.

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN, JR. VS. ATTY. RIZALINO SIMBILLO, AC#5299, 8/19/2003
- Respondent posted paid ads in two national newspapers advertising his services
as an annulment expert at P48,000.00 within 4 to 6 months. He admitted to the
ads but reasoned that there was nothing wrong with such conduct. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent. The practice of law is not a business but a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is
not primarily meant to be a money-making venture and law advocacy is not capital
that necessarily yields profits. Gaining of a livelihood should be secondary
consideration as duty to public service and to administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers. Solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
legal professions dignity. If made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring
no injury to lawyers and to the Bar. Use of simple signs stating the name/s of the
lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Calling cars are acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable.
PEDRO LINSANGAN VS. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, AC#6672, 9/4/09
Respondent solicited Complainants client by persistently texting and calling them
to transfer legal representation with promises of financial aid and expeditious
collection of claims. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. Lawyers are reminded
that the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares as the contrary would
commercialize the legal practice, degrade the profession in the publics estimation
and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every Bar member is called. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutions malpractice a ground for disbarment.
MANUEL VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. BEBE TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012
Supreme Court warned Respondent that, an agreement like the one supposedly
forged between him and Complainant for the latter to receive 10% of the formers
attorneys fees for every judicially-approved corporate rehabilitation plan prepared
by the Complainant, is violative of Rule 9.02. proscribing a lawyer from dividing or
agreeing to divide fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to
practice law.
Respondent owned what purports to be a financial and legal consultancy company
which was in reality a vehicle for Respondent to procure professional employment,
specifically for corporate rehabilitation. A company letterhead proposing that should
the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, Respondent would render legal
services related to the formers loan obligation with a bank proves that Respondent
violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit. In suspending Respondent, Supreme Court held that, a lawyer is
not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises though when the business is of such nature or is conducted in such a manner
as to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This

inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer, or that can be used as a
cloak for indirectly solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of such a nature that, if
handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as practice of law.
ATTY. JULITO VITRIOLO, ET. AL. VS. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, AC#4984, 4/1/2003
Respondent who was the Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service of the
Commission on Higher Education was charged with solicitation of money from
various applicants for correction of names pending before her office. In disbarring
Respondent, the Supreme Court ruled that, generally speaking, a lawyer who holds
a government office may not be disciplined as a Bar member for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by the Court as a Bar member. Respondents misconduct as a CHED
lawyer is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a Bar member. As a
lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to
demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office.
DAN JOEL V. LIM VS. ATTY. EDILBERTO BARCELONA, AC#5438, 3/10/2004
Respondent who was the chief of the NLRC-Public Assistance Center purportedly
demanded money from Complainants to in settlement of labor cases purportedly
filed by their employees and even threatened to close their businesses and put
them in jail if they refused to settle. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent reasoning
that, if a lawyers misconduct in the discharge of official duties as a government
official is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral
delinquency, he may be disciplined as a Bar member on such ground. Lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks have more restrictions
than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.
WILFREDO M. CATU VS. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, A.C. No. 5738,
2/19/2008 Respondent, as barangay captain presided over the Lupon conciliatin
proceedings over a land dispute and later entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in the subsequent ejectment case instituted involving the same parties.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice reasoning that, while Sec.
90 of the Local Government Code subjected certain elective local officials to the
proscription to practice their profession, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and members of the sangguniang baragay, however, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the the Secretary of DILG before he
entered his appearance as counsel pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 18 of the Revised Civil
Service Rules. Non-compliance therewith constituted a violation of his oath as a
lawyer to obey the laws.
AURELIO M. SIERRA, VS. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, ET. AL., A.C. No. 7549,
8/29/2008 Complainant charged Respondent who were all city prosecutors with
dereliction of duty and gross ignorance of the law for not requiring the parties in
certain criminal cases instituted by Complainant to simultaneously appear during
preliminary investigation. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint holding that, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court does not require a confrontation between the parties.

Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits

and supporting documents through exchange of pleadings.
ANGEL BAUTISTA VS. ATTY. RAMON GONZALES 182 SCRA 151 Respondent
accepted a civil case on contingency basis at 50% of the value of the litigated
property. After termination of the engagement, Respondent transferred to himself
of the property subject of litigation. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. In
executing a document transferring of the subject properties to himself,
Respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his
clients property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by
virtue of his profession (Art. 1491, CC). While a lawyer may in good faith advance
litigation expenses, the same should be the subject of reimbursement. An
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expense proceedings to enforce the
clients right is CHAMPERTOUS. Such an agreement is against public policy,
especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry out the action at
his own expenses of some bargain to have part of the thing in litigation.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM LAW PRACTICE IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF
ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA, BM#793, 7/30/2004 Atty. Maquera who was
admitted to the Philipppine Bar was later admitted to law practice in Guam. The
Superior Court of Guam suspended him from practicing in Guam due to misconduct
for acquiring his clients property as payment for his legal services. The Guam court
transmitted certified copies of his suspension to the Philippine Supreme Court. May
a Philippine Bar member be suspended/disbarred for an infraction for which he has
been
suspended/disbarred
from
law
practice
in
a
foreign
country?
Disbarment/suspension of a Philippine Bar member by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
constitutes a ground for disbarment/suspension from law practice in the Philippines.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment/suspension.
CRISTINO CALUB VS. ATTY. ABRAHAM SULLER, AC#1474, 1/28/2000 A
lawyer, under the pretext of borrowing a blade, went to his neighbors house and
raped her. Due to reasonable doubt however he was acquitted. He argued that such
acquittal should warrant the dismissal of the disbarment case against him. In
disbarring Atty. Suller, the Supreme Court reasoned that acquittal due to
prosecutions failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not determinative of
the administrative case. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and equally important, morally.
MAXIMO DUMADAG VS. ATTY. ERNESTO LUMAYA, AC#2614, 6/29/2000
Suspended indefinitely from law practice, Respondent filed various pleadings
including a petition to lift his suspension seeking among others, clarification as to
the exact term of his suspension considering he was already 62 years of age and
the lack of law practitioners in their locality. Later he wrote the Chief Justice again
imploring but also chiding the Court for slumbering on acting on his petition
although still insisting his innocence. Instead of lifting his suspension, the Supreme
Court fixed his period of suspension at 10 years. The insolence of Respondents

remonstrations that the Court was sleeping on its job in acting on his case not only
underscores his callous disregard of the myriad administrative and judicial travails
the Court has to contend with as the Court of Last Resort, it also betrays his
absolute lack of appreciation and disrespect for the efforts and measures
undertaken by the Court to cope with these concerns. Needless to state, such
presumptuousness is only too deserving of rebuke. Indefiniteness of Respondents
suspension, far from being cruel or degrading or inhuman has the effect of placing,
as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his
own hands that sanction has the effect of giving Respondent the chance to purge
himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging
such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly
demanded from every Bar member and officer of the courts.
LIGAYA MANIAGO VS. ATTY. LOURDES DE DIOS, AC#7472, 3/30/10
Respondent who had been suspended for 6 months from law practice was charged
of violating the order of her suspension by service as counsel for a Japanese
national. In dismissing the petition against Respondent, the Supreme Court noted
that Respondent had already served her prior 6-months suspension and had written
a manifestation to the Court of such fact. To be sure, the Supreme Court laid the
following guidelines in relation to resumption of practice following full service of
suspension, to wit: (a) the suspended lawyer must first present proof of his
compliance by submitting certifications from the IBP and Executive Judge that he
has indeed desisted from law practice during the period of suspension; (b)
thereafter, the Court, after evaluation and upon favorable recommendation from the
Office of the Bar Confidant, will issue a resolution lifting the suspension order and
allow him to resume his practice. It was only unfortunate that this procedure was
overlooked with regards to Respondents prior suspension.
CARLOS REYES VS. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, AC#5835, 8/10/10 Suspended
for an aggregate period of 2 years as a result of four administrative cases,
Respondent petitioned the Supreme Court for reinstatement as a member in good
standing of the Bar and to be allowed to practice law. Supreme Court granted
Respondents application for reinstatement effective upon his submission to the
Court of a sworn statement that: (a) he has completely served the four suspension
orders imposed on him successively; (b) he desisted from the law practice during
the period of suspension; (c) he has returned the sums of money to the
complainants as ordered by the court in the previous administrative cases; (d) he
has furnished copies of his sworn statement to the IBP and the Executive Judge.
LEONARD RICHARDS VS. PATRICIO ASOY, AC#2655, 10/12/10 In 1987,
Respondent was disbarred for grave professional misconduct and ordered to
reimburse P16,000 to Complainant. The latter wrote the Court several times to
report non-payment by Respondent. Respondent then sought readmission to the Bar
in 1996, claiming that he had consigned the money with the Courts cashier.
According to Respondent, his belated compliance, that is, 9 years from the order to
reimburse was due to his inability to locate complainant. Supreme Court denied
Respondents petition and the a later petition in 2010 reasoning that, Respondents
justification flimsy as it is, considering that Complainants address was readily
available with the Court what with the numerous letters reporting Respondents
non-compliance, glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not

defiance of Court orders, qualities that do not endear him to the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers. Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling by
displaying a lack of candor towards the Court. By taking his sweet time to effect
reimbursement of the P16,000.00 and through consignation with this Court at that
- he sent out a strong message that the legal processes and orders of this Court
could be treated with disdain or impunity.
FIDELA AND TERESITA BENGCO VS. ATTY. PABLO BERNARDO, AC#6368,
6/13/2012 Complainants charged that Respondent with a certain Magat enticed
them to pay money supposedly to expedite titling of their property without having
performed the task for which he was engaged. The Supreme Court found untenable
Respondents defense of prescription that the complaint was filed two years after
the supposed deceit was committed. Administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act
to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer.
ELPIDIO TIONG VS. ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, AC#4428, 12/12/2011
Complainant confirmed that Respondent who was his lawyer was having an affair
with his wife when he overheard, through the extension phone, Respondent say I
Love You to Complainants wife. Later, and in the presence of their spouses,
Respondent and Complainants wife admitted their amorous affair and then and
there, executed an affidavit before a notary public attesting to their illicit and
seeking their respective spouses forgiveness. This affidavit signed by Complainant,
Respondent and their spouses provided that no criminal or legal action would be
taken against the offending parties. Despite such stipulation, Complainant sought
for the disbarment of Respondent who interposed the defense of pardon. Supreme
Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law holding that his act of having
an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity
of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. Undeniably, this illicit
relationship amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting
disciplinary action from the Court. A case for suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is
intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in
order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the
respondents acts as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his
fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the affidavit, which is akin to an
affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the proceedings.
GRACE M. ANACTA VS. ATTY. EDUARDO RESURRECCION, AC#9074,
8/14/2012 Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by
misrepresenting that he had already filed a petition for annulment of marriage on
Complainants behalf after receipt of P42,000.00. He went to the extent of
presenting to Complainant a supposed copy of the petition duly filed with the court.
Later, Complainant found out from the court that no such petition was filed. Finding
Respondent guilty of deceit and gross misconduct, the Supreme Court suspended
him from law practice reasoning that, there is no ironclad rule that disbarment must
immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is not
mandated to automatically impose the extreme penalty of disbarment where a
lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

Anent the issue of whether Respondent should be directed to return the money he
received from Complainant, this case is the opportune time to harmonize the
Courts ruling on this matter. When the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the
mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal
fraternity, the issue of whether respondent be directed to return the amount
received from his client shall be deemed within the Courts disciplinary authority. In
this case, it is clear that Respondent violated his lawyers oath and code of conduct
when he withheld the amount of P42,000.00 despite his failure to render the
necessary legal services and after complainant demanded its return. He must be
therefore directed to return the same.
RODOLFO ESPINOSA VS. ATTY. JULIETA OMANA, AC#9081, 10/12/2011
Respondent purported advised that Complainant and his wife could live separately
and dissolve their marriage, preparing for that purpose, a Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay. Respondent claimed that, it was not her but a part-time office staff
who notarized the document. In suspending Respondent from law practice and
being a notary public, the Supreme Court held that, extrajudicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void and a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,
which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.In preparing and notarizing a void
document, Respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 (duty not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful). Respondent knew fully that the Kasunduan has no
legal effect and is against public policy. Even granting arguendo that, it was her
part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Respondents negligence
in doing her notarial duties. A notary public is personally responsible for the entries
in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by
passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.
TAN TIONG BIO VS. ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES, AC#6634, 8/23/2007
Respondent was duly commissioned as a notary public for Quezon City but
notarized a deed of sale in Pasig City. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court
reasoned that, while seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, Respondents
act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by
his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. Respondent
by performing through the years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so
authorized indulged in deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public,
Respondent violated Canon 7 directing every lawyer to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
JESSICA UY VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL SAO, AC#6505, 9/11/2008 For notarizing
documents despite expiration of his notarial commission, Supreme Court suspended
Respondent holding that, practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show they posses, and continue to possess, qualifications
required by law for conferment of such privilege. A lawyers act of notarizing without
the requisite commission therefor is reprehensible constituting as it does, not only
malpractice but also the crime of falsification of public documents. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act but one invested with substantive public
interest converting a private document into a public document making it admissible
in evidence without further proof of authenticity. As such, only those who are
qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. Respondents reliance upon his

aides representation that his commission had been renewed shows disregard of the
requirements for issuance of a notarial commission.
DOLORES DELA CRUZ VS. ATTY. JOSE DIMAANO, JR., AC#7781, 9/12/2008
Respondent notarized a deed which allowed Navarro (Complainants sister) full
ownership over the estate of their deceased parents. Complainants signature on
this deed was forged and Complainant did not even appear before Respondent.
Supreme Court gave no credence to Respondents defense that he simply relied
upon Navarros representations because they had been long time neighbours and
he believed she would not lie to him. Supreme Court held that notaries public
should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless
the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed it and personally
appeared before them to attest to the truth of what are stated therein, otherwise,
notaries public would not be able to verify the genuineness of the signatures and
whether the document is the partys free act or deed. Notaries public are required
by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged
and presented the proper residence certificate.
LORENZO BRENNISEN VS. ATTY. RAMON CONTAWI, AC#7481, 4/24/2012
Complainant, being a US resident, entrusted the administration of his land along
with its title to Respondent. Via a spurious Special Power of Attorney, Respondent
mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to Roberto Ho. Supreme
Court suspended Respondent for violating Canon 1 for disposing his clients
property without his knowledge or consent and partaking of the proceeds of the sale
for his own benefit. Respondents contention that he merely accommodated the
request of his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious
SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature
reflected thereon was forged.
ATTY. FLORITA LINCO VS. ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL, AC#7241, 10/17/2011
Respondent is charged with dishonesty and violation of the Notarial Law for
notarizing a deed of donation allegedly executed by Complainants husband (Atty.
Alfredo Linco) in favor of his illegitimate minor child, despite Respondents
knowledge that affiant died a day prior to notarization. Respondent claimed affiant,
whom he meet prior to his demise, asked him to notarize the deed of donation
which affiant signed in Respondents presence. Since Respondent did not have his
notarial register, he told affiant to bring the deed to his office anytime for
notarization. Hence, despite knowledge of death, Respondent notarized the deed to
accommodate a colleague. The Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law
practice and being a notary public finding that, affiants previous personal
appearance before Respondent does not justify the notarization of the deed due to
affiants absence on the day of notarization. The rule requires Respondent not to
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to its contents
and truthfulness. Further, in the notarial acknowledgment, Respondent attested to
affiants personal appearance before him on the day of notarization, yet, affiant
clearly could not have appeared as he already died a day before. Clearly,
Respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

CORAZON NEVADA VS. ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, AC#7591, 3/20/2012

Complainant is the principal stockholder of a hotel where One in Jesus Christ Church
holds its services. Respondent and Complainant being both church members,
became friends. Respondent took advantage of their friendship by failing to deliver
the P90,000 rental deposit paid, after Respondent represented himself as hotel
administrator and entered into a lease contract with Jung Chul for office space in the
hotel. Complainant also entrusted to Respondent several jewelries intended for sale.
Respondent however, failed to return the proceeds of the sale or the unsold articles
to Complainant. In suspending Respondent from law practice and being a notary
public, the Supreme Court held that, he was guilty of misrepresentation, when he
made it appear that he was authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of
Nevada when, in fact, he was not. For failing to return or remitting proceeds of the
sale, upon demand, he also breached his duty to hold in trust property belonging to
his client (Canon 16, Rule 16.03). Moreover, Respondents act of affixing his
signature above the printed name Edwin Nevada, without any qualification,
veritably made him a party to the lease contract. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed
to which he is a party is a plain violation of the Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial
Rules.
HON. JULIETA DECENA VS. JUDGE NILO MALANYAON, AM#RTJ-02-1669,
4/14/2004 During a municipal session wherein the revocation of two resolution
granting authority to permit a cockpit was being deliberate, Respondent whose
nephew was one of such cockpit operators, heckled and interruption the session by
hurling accusatory remarks and insults toward the municipal official. Respondent
claimed that he was merely present during the council session in his private
capacity as a taxpayer. In imposing a fine on Respondent, the Supreme Court held
that, he should be reminded that his judicial identity does not terminate at the end
of the day when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when garbed in casual wear
outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority and moral
ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala. A judges official life cannot simply
be detached or separated from his personal existence. As such, he should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, as well as behave at
all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
SALVADOR SISON VS. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., AM#RTJ-03-1771,
5/27/2004 Respondent ordered Complainant who was an MMDA traffic enforcer to
appear in his court and explain why he issued a traffic ticket to Respondents son
even if the latter had introduced himself to be a son of a judge. For failure to appear
and explain, Respondent cited Complainant in contempt, ordered him arrested and
only discharged him after admitting before Respondent that he made a mistake.
Supreme Court dismissed Respondent from the service. Initially, he appeared to be
justified in holding Complainant for contempt due to the latters refusal to comply
with his order. However, Complainant was not a party to any pending cases. What
triggered the contempt charge was the traffic incident involving Respondents son
this being a personal matter involving his son, Respondent should have refrained
from ordering Complainants arrest and detention. A judge should so behave at all
times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CARLOS DIONISIO VS. HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, AM#RTJ98-1400, 2/1/1999
Respondent posted an ad in the court bulletin board for attractive waitresses and

personable waiters for the family-owned restaurant. He even interviewed some

applicants in his court. A news ad accepting such applicants even listed the address
of his court. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. His conduct constitutes
involvement in private business and improper use of office facilities for the
promotion of the family business. Judges must not allow themselves to be distracted
from the performance of their judicial tasks by other lawful enterprises.
ZENAIDA BESO VS. JUDGE JUAN DAGUMAN, AM#MTJ-99-1211, 1/28/2000
Respondent was a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita. He solemnized Complainants
marriage in his residence in Calbayog City. In imposing a fine on Respondent, the
Supreme Court held that, a person presiding over a court of law must not only apply
the law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without
resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to
apply the law; he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly,
judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties. Considering that Respondents jurisdiction covers the
municipality of Sta. Margarita, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in Calbayog City.
SALVADOR RUIZ VS. JUDGE AGELIO BRINGAS, AM#MTJ-00-1266, 4/6/2000
In a hearing before Respondent, Complainant who was the fiscal got into a verbal
exchange with Respondent after Complainant requested time to submit his
recommendation to an accuseds guilty plea. Respondent directed that it be put on
record that Complainant does not know how to compute the proper penalty and that
he even took the bar three times. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. The duty
to maintain respect for the courts dignity applies to members of the Bar and bench
alike. A judge should be courteous both in conduct and language especially to those
appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties
to the court, their clients and the public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing
or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and remember
always that courtesy begets courtesy.
RUFINO CASIMIRO VS. JUDGE OCTAVIO FERNANDEZ, AM#MTJ-04-1525,
1/29/2004 After the dismissal of the criminal case against Complainant,
Respondent failed to return the cash bond posted. Respondent only later issued a
check to refund Complainants cash bond. Per SC Circular No. 50-95, all collections
from bail bonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited
within 24 hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, in the name of the court, with its Clerk of Court and the
Executive Judge as authorized signatories. While there is no direct and hard
evidence that Respondent made personal use of the cash bond, his wifes issuance
of her personal check to Complainant in the amount of the cash bond, indicates so.
By his actuations then, Respondent placed his honesty and integrity under serious
doubt. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of such in all activities.
ENGRACIO DIALO, JR. VS. JUDGE MARIANO MACIAS, AM#RTJ-04-1859,
7/13/2004 Complainant and a companion, who were both witness in the
administrative case for immorality filed against Respondent by his wife. On their

way to Manila for the hearing of the administrative case, they were arrested and
detained by police reports based upon Respondents report that they were would-be
assassin. During the pendency of the administrative case against Respondent for
oppression, Complainant withdrew his complaint. Supreme Court fined Respondent.
Complainants withdrawal/disavowal of the contents of his administrative complaint
does not necessarily warrant its dismissal. Administrative actions cannot depend on
complainants will/pleasure who may, for his own reasons, condone what may be
detestable. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and
decide the complaint against the respondent because public interest is at stake in
the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary. By
respondents act of requesting for complainants and his companions warrantless
arrest, he violated complainants constitutional right, an act which partakes of the
nature of oppression, defined as an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction,
domination or excessive use of authority.
ATTY.
GLORIA
LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU
VS.
JUDGE
RAPHAEL
B.
YRASTORZA, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1793, 2/5/2004 When Complainant asked for a
resetting, Respondent cut her off saying, Do not give me so many excuses x x x I
dont care who you are! x x x You can file one thousand administrative cases against
me. I dont care. In another case, Respondent scolded Complainant for failure to
file pre-trial brief. Subsequently, when pre-trial was conducted and Complainant was
absent due to another engagement, Respondent ordered Complainants client to
produce the original documents in five minutes or the case would be dismissed.
Supreme Court reprimanded Respondent. Mere desistance on Complainants part
does not warrant dismissal of an administrative complaint against any member of
the bench and the judiciary. Courts interest in the judiciarys affairs is a paramount
concern that knows no bounds. Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an
ordinary mortal and becomes the visible representation of the law and, more
importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. The tenor of Respondents statement can easily instill in the minds
of those who heard them that as a judge he is above the law. Respondents
unfounded act of insulting Complainant in open court and cutting her off in midsentence while she was still explaining her side exhibited a manifest disregard of his
duty be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct
proceedings in court with fitting dignity and decorum.
HEINZ R. HECK VS. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, AM#RTJ-01-1657,
2/23/2004 Prior to his appointment as RTC judge, Respondent supposedly violated
the notarial law by notarizing documents in 1980 to 1984 without being
commissioned as notary public. May a retired judge disciplined for notarizing
documents without the necessary commission more than 20 years ago? Supreme
Court fined Respondent. A judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary. Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the
practice of law. Thus, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Respondent is being charged
not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. Even then,
though Respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a

member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
RODRIGO Q. TUGOT VS. JUDGE MAMERTO COLIFLORES, A.M. No. MTJ-001332, 2/16/2004 Respondent dismissed an ejectment case wherein Complainant
was one of the plaintiffs. The latter appealed the dismissal but were advised to refile their notice of appeal because the records transmitted to the appellate court did
not have a notice of appeal. As it turned out, the notice of appeal was not lost but
was simply misplaced in Respondents office. Supreme Court fined Respondent.
Courts exist to dispense and promote justice. Realization of this solemn purpose
depends to a great extent on the intellectual, moral and personal qualities of the
men and women who are called to serve as judges. Misplacement of the notice of
appeal indicates gross negligence. Respondent should have been more prudent in
determining the cause of its temporary loss, which caused unnecessary
inconvenience to Complainant, whose right to appeal was affected. As
administrative officers of the courts, judges should organize and supervise court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. He should
adopt a system of records management, so that files are kept intact despite the
temporary absence of the person primarily responsible for their custody.
ELENA R. ALCARAZ VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1539,
4/14/2004 Having declared Complainant and her co-defendants in a civil
collection suit in default, Respondent proceeded with plaintiffs ex parte
presentation of evidence and thereafter, rendered judgment in plaintiffs favour.
rendered judgment in a civil case Complainant alleged that she was not furnished
various pleading and orders including plaintiffs motion to declare defendants in
default and the order granting the same. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Rule 9,
Sec. (a) of the Rules on Civil Procedure requires that a party in default shall be
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial . So,
even when a defendant is already declared in default, he is entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings. Respondents failure to comply with the elementary
dictates of procedural rules constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Code is explicit in its mandate that, a judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. Competence is the mark of a good judge.
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his own
fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the dignity of
the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law.
SPS. RODOLFO & SYLVIA CABICO VS. JUDGE EVELYN DIMACULANGANQUERIJERO, AM#RTJ-02-1735, 4/27/2007 Respondent dismissed a criminal
case for rape on ground of full payment of civil liability and disinterest to prosecute,
despite the manifestation in court that Complainants who were the parents of the
17-year old victim would not settle and their refusal to sign the affidavit of
desistance. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Respondent dismissed the criminal
case after the accused had paid their individual civil liability. This is in utter
disregard and in gross ignorance of the law because payment of civil liability does
not extinguish criminal liability. When a law or rule is basic, a judge owes it to his
office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. As an
advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to
keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretations of our laws. Having

accepted the exalted position of a judge, Respondent owes the public and the court
she sits in proficiency in the law.
MARISSA MONDALA VS. JUDGE REBECCA MARIANO, AM#RTJ-06-2010,
1/25/2007 Respondent supposedly misrepresented in her report of pending cases
that a decision had already been rendered in a certain case when in fact, it was still
with Complainant (legal researcher) for research and drafting. Respondent claimed
mere oversight and not misrepresentation, i.e., at the time the monthly report was
made, a decision had actually been prepared. Supreme Court fined Respondent. A
decision in a civil case is rendered only upon the signing by the judge who penned
the same and upon filing with the clerk of court. A draft of a decision does not
operate as judgment on a case until the same is duly signed and delivered to the
clerk for filing and promulgation. Under Sec. 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, judges ought to ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Integrity is
essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
GIDEON JUSON VS. JUDGE VICENTE MONDRAGON, AM#MTJ-07-1685,
10/3/2007 Respondent purportedly delayed for over three year in resolving
Complainants motion to intervene in a civil case for recovery of a land. Respondent
admitted the delays citing failing health due to a stroke and his load of supervising
three courts at a time as causes therefor. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Rules
prescribing time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings
taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Judicial office exacts
nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the
discharge of official duties. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates
that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved within
three months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. His failing
health, as an excuse for the delay hardly merits serious consideration. Even if he
was stricken by an illness hampering his due performance of his duties, it was
incumbent upon him to inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide the
cases assigned to him. As to his additional work in supervising three courts at a
time, such will not exonerate him. His failure to decide the case on time cannot be
ignored. Respondent should have know that if his caseload, additional assignments
or designations, health reasons or other facts prevented the timely disposition of his
pending cases, all he had to do was simply ask this Court for a reasonable extension
of time to dispose of his cases.
CONRADO LADIGON VS. JUDGE RIXON GARONG, AM#MTJ-08-1712,
8/20/2008 Respondent used his title as judge and his courts official stationary
in writing a letter-complaint to the Chairman of the First United Methodist Church in
Michigan, USA about the surreptitious manner of the incorporation of the Banard
Kelly Memorial United Methodist Church, singling out Complainant to be part of the
deception. Admitting that he used his courts letterhead and signed his letter using
the word judge, Respondent reasoned that he merely used an ordinary bond
paper and typed thereon his courts station to indicate the return or inside
address. Supreme Court admonished Respondent. What is involved here is the rule
that Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities. Respondents transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead,

but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances
surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title. Use of a letterhead should not be
considered independently of the surrounding circumstances of the use the
underlying reason that marks the use with the element of impropriety or
appearance of impropriety. Respondent crossed the line of propriety when he
used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged violation of church
rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter
addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the
impression of official recognition or notice of the reported violation.
JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN VS. JUDGE SIBANAH USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 215-11 Complainant and her co-party litigants filed a motion to inhibit Respondent.
During the hearing for said motion, Respondent became emotional, forced
Complainant to testify without counsel, demanding a public apology, relentlessly
interrogating her and finally ordering her detained for direct contempt finding her in
direct contempt until she divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the court
but not exceeding 30 days. Supreme Court fined Respondent. No amount of
rationalization can reconcile the limit of the 10-day period of imprisonment for
direct contempt set in Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court with the 30-day
maximum period of imprisonment fixed by Respondent. By virtue of his office,
Respondent knows or should have known this so basic a rule. The glaringly clarity of
the rule tripped Respondent to commit a glaring error which was made even more
flagrant by the fact that Respondent was actually detained for 19 days. Failure to
follow basic legal commands as prescribed by law and the rules is tantamount to
gross ignorance of the law.
OCA VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO LEONIDA, AM#RTJ-09-2198, 1/18/11
Per judicial audit and inventory conducted when Respondent availed of optional
retirement, the Office of the Court Administrator determined that Respondent failed
to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases as well as to resolved motions in 10
civil cases. Supreme Court fined Respondent. A judges failure to decide a case
within the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats
such cases with utmost rigor for delay in the administration of justice, no matter
how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not
only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary lowering its standards and bringing it to disrepute. The
administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to
comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them. As frontline officials of the
judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are
duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional
competence. The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the
least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public
reposed on them and the institution they represent.
OCA VS. JUDGE BENJAMIN ESTRADA, AM#RTJ-09-2173, 1/18/11 In the
review of the monthly report of cases from MTCC Malaybalay, Bukidnon, the OCA
noted that Respondent issued orders dismissing certain cases even when he was no
longer the judge of said court having been promoted to the RTC. Likewise the RTC
Executive Judge (Bacal) issued similar orders affecting certain MTCC cases. Both
judges admitted the acts claiming that they did not intend to violate the law, acting
as they did out of their desire to uphold the accuseds right to liberty in the cases
they took cognizance of. Both judges were fined by the Supreme Court. Their shared

intention to uphold the accuseds right to liberty cannot justify their action in excess
of their authority in violation of existing regulations. The vacuum in a first level
court (MTC) due to the absence of a presiding judge is not remedied by a take-over
of the duties of the still-to-be appointed or designated judge for that court, which is
what they did. Instead of allowing Respondent and herself to act on pending MTCC
cases, the RTC Executive Judge should have designated a municipal judge within her
area of supervision to act on the pending cases.
IMELDA MARCOS VS. JUDGE FERNANDO PAMINTUAN, AM#RTJ-07-2062,
1/18/11 In 1996, then Judge Reyes issued an order which later became final and
executor releasing the Golden Buddha status in custodial egis to the heirs of Rogelio
Roxas. In implementing said order, Respondent in his May 2006 Order added a
statement to the effect that the Golden Buddha in the courts custody was a fake
or mere replica. Having been previously warned and punished for various
infraction, Respondent was dismissed from the service by the Supreme Court. While
judges like any other citizen are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary. It is axiomatic that when a judgment
is final and executor, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in ay respect either by the court which rendered it or even by the Supreme
Court. It is inexcusable for Respondent to have overlooked such basic legal principle
no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to
be well-informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and
procedural rules at all times. When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act
as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
ATTY. NORLINDA DESCALLAR VS. HON. REINERIO RAMAS, AM#RTJ-06-2015,
12/15/10 For omitting to reflect his absences in his May and June 2005
Certificates of Service, Supreme Court FINED Respondent for dishonesty.
Respondent admitted he reported for work intermittently or did not report at all,
after his Order that he had to temporarily stop working due to the death threats he
receiving in relation to a decision he made over an electoral protest case. Indeed,
there may be threats to his life as alleged in his order but such threats do not justify
cessation from performing judicial functions. Threats are concomitant peril in public
office especially in the judiciary, where magistrates decide and determine sensitive
issues that normally generate or provoke reprisals from losing litigants. This is a
consequence that a judge should be prepared of. Their exalted position entails a
great responsibility unyielding to ones personal convenience. Respondent is
presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of Judicial
Conduct - a judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and
diligence (Canon 3), a judge be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence (Rule 3.01), and a judge to observe high standards of public service
and fidelity at all times (Rule 3.09). Respondent irrefragably failed to observe these
standards by making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service to cover up
his absences.

GAUDENCIO PANTILO III VS. JUDGE VICTOR CANOY, AM#RTJ-11-2262, 2/9/11

Supreme Court FINED Respondent for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority, and appearance of impropriety for verbally ordering the release of the
accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide even when
no information was yet filed. Respondent also granted accuseds motion to release
his impounded vehicle despite said motion despite violation of the 3-day notice rule.
In his defense, Respondent invoked accuseds constitutional right to bail which
supposedly did not require that a person be charged in court before one could apply
for it. While, It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional
right to bail, herein-complaint focused on the manner of accuseds release from
detention. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit
from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written
undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release order. While Respondent
insisted that such may be considered as constructive bail, there is no such species
of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not
be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of another.
JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN VS. JUDGE SIBANAH USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 215-11 In a hearing on a motion for inhibition filed by Complainant relative to a
suit pending before Respondent, the latter forced Complainant to take the stand,
then and there, demanded a public apology and relentlessly interrogated her till
Respondent issued an order finding Complainant guilty of direct contempt and
ordered her detention until she divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the
Court but not to exceed 30 days. Supreme Court FINED Respondent reasoning that,
no amount of rationalization can reconcile the limit of the 10-day period of
imprisonment for direct contempt set in Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court with
the 30-day (maximum period of) imprisonment that Respondent fixed in his order.
By virtue of his office, Respondent knows or should have known this so basic a rule.
The glaring clarity of the rule tripped Respondent to commit a glaring error, which
was made even more flagrant by the fact that Complainant was actually imprisoned
for 19 days. Failure to follow basic legal commands as prescribed by law and the
rules is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. By accepting the exalted position
of a judge, Respondent ought to have been familiar with the legal norms and
precepts as well as the procedural rules.
DANIEL SEVILLA VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO LINDO, AM#MTJ-08-1714, 2/9/11
Complainant charged that Respondent repeated reset the hearing of the BP22 case
he filed so as to force him to enter into a compromise agreement evident from
Respondents comment to him that, Mr. Sevilla, ang hirap mo namang pakiusapan.
Konting pera lang yan. Bahala ka maghintay sa wala. In imposing a FINE on
Respondent, Supreme Court held that, a trial judge who allows, or abets, or
tolerates numerous unreasonable postponements of the trial, whether out of
inefficiency or indolence, or out of bias towards a party, is administratively liable.
Postponement of a hearing in a civil/criminal case may at times be unavoidable, the
Court however, disallows undue/unnecessary postponements of court hearings,
simply because they cause unreasonable delays in the administration of justice and,
thus, undermine the peoples faith in the Judiciary, aside from aggravating the
financial and emotional burdens of the litigants. Thus, the Court has enjoined for
postponements and resettings to be allowed only upon meritorious grounds. The
strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force and greater reason
to prosecutions involving violations of BP 22, the prompt resolution of which has
been ensured by their being now covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure a

rule precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive

determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the
speedy disposition of cases. Respondent flagrantly violated the letter and spirit of
both of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to
administer justice impartially and without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, which required him as a trial judge to be prompt in disposing of all
matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied.
LYDELLE CONQUILLA VS. JUDGE LAURO BERNARDO, AM#MTJ-09-1737,
2/9/11 Respondent was charged with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct
and ignorance of the law for conducting a preliminary investigation and finding
probable cause therein to charged Complainant with direct assault. Supreme Court
SUSPENDED Respondent, reasoning that, Respondents conduct of such preliminary
investigation directly contravenes A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (effective October 5, 2005),
amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The latter
removed the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level
courts and making it incumbent upon them to forward the records of the case to the
Prosecutors Office for preliminary investigation. Indeed, competence and diligence
are prerequisites (Canon 3) to the due performance of judicial office. Hence, when a
law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything
less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules and should be diligent in
keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.
ELADIO PERFECTO VS. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO ESIDERA, AM-RTJ-11-2270,
1/31/11 Respondent was charged with soliciting and receiving money from a fiscal
and a private practitioner supposedly to defray expenses for a religious celebration
and barangay fiesta. In her answer, Respondent brushed off the affidavit of Fiscal
Ching who witnessed the solicitation, claiming that the fiscal who was a former law
student to whom she gave a 3-grade because her codigo was still inserted in the
examination booklet, is of dubious personality with a narcissistic personality
disorder. FINED for impropriety and conduct unbecoming, the Supreme Court held
that, use of acerbic words was uncalled for considering Respondents status.
Further, her act of soliciting (under the guise of a religious cause) betrays not only
her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as
an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high esteem and respect by the local
community, which must be preserved at all times. It spawns the impression that she
was using her office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer
appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into donating money through her
charismatic group for religious purposes. A judge must be like Caesars wife - above
suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondents act discloses a deficiency in prudence
and discretion that a member of the judiciary must exercise in the performance of
his official functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to
caution Respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action,
keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under
constant observation.
FLORENDA TOBIAS VS. JUDGE MANUEL LIMSIACO, AM-MTJ-09-1734, 1-19-11
Complainant who charged Respondent with corruption for allegedly offering

package deals to litigants, claimed that the court stenographer informed

her sister that Respondent required P30,000 to provide counsel, prepare

pleadings and ensure a favorable decision in an ejectment case. Respondent

did not personally accept the initial payment of P10,000 but admitted to
talking with Complainants sister, recommending a lawyer and subsequently
preparing a motion for counsel to withdraw. Fined for gross misconduct, the
Supreme Court held that, although the alleged offer of package deals by
Respondent to litigants was unsubstantiated, it was improper for Respondent
to talk to prospective litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to
handle cases. The act of preparing the motion for counsel to withdraw is
likewise improper and unethical. The conduct of a judge should be beyond
reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office. Said acts of Respondent
violate Sec. 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Sec. 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and
Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.
ANTONINO MONTICALBO V. JUDGE CRESENTE MACARAYA, AM#RTJ-09-2197,
4/13/11 In admonishing Respondent for citing a non-existent case Jaravata v.
Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on
April 25, 1990 in his order, the Supreme Court held that, a search of available
legal resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme
Court. Further, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, CA G.R.
and, it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent was the Court of
Appeals. This was counter to the standard of competence and integrity expected
of those occupying Respondents judicial position. A judge must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. While a judge may not
be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it was made with a deliberate
intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to observe propriety, discreetness
and due care in the performance of his official duties.
Compiled, digested and prepared by:
ATTY. ROMEO A. REYES, JR.