1A

Association of Small Landowners in the

Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
175 SCRA 343

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call
for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was
promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD
27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their
tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short,
they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a
different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine
just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in
bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the
form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from
the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these
same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears
that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just
compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and
the government even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation
determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with
the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of
eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash if

everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

1B
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs.
Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742

July 14, 1989

Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines

Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation
No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend
that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the
E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required
under the above-quoted decree.

Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain
that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on
the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain

2. Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation
and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr.,
Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged
that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled
to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of
the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the
benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations
is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature which
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

3. Metro Manila Development Authority vs Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay

574 SCRA 661 Political Law Ministerial vs Discretionary Functions Mandamus
Constitutional Law Right to a Healthful Ecology
In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action for mandamus to compel
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government agencies to clean
up the Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the environmental state of the Manila Bay is already
dangerous to their health and the inaction of MMDA and the other concerned government agencies
violates their rights to life, health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB
also averred under the Environmental Code, it is MMDAs duty to clean up the Manila Bay.
The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA
assailed the decision on the ground that MMDAs duty under the Environmental Code is merely a
discretionary duty hence it cannot be compelled by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the
RTCs order was for a general clean up of the Manila Bay yet under the Environmental Code, MMDA
was only tasked to attend to specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive clean up
such as that ordered by the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila Bay.
HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the Environmental Code, the
process of implementing usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But
this does not mean that their function or mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking
closer, MMDAs function to alleviate the problem on solid and liquid waste disposal problems is a
ministerial function. In short, MMDA does not have the discretion to whether or not alleviate the
garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay area. While the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
Anent the issue on whether or not MMDAs task under the Environmental Code involves a general
clean up, the Supreme Court ruled that MMDAs mandate under the Environmental Code is to
perform cleaning in general and not just to attend to specific incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA,
together with the other government agencies, must act to clean up the Manila Bay as ordered by
the RTC.

3B Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable
and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming,
diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Cleanup Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.

Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u
sage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed
water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter
to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In
case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and
clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or
entities responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when
a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality
has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general
application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila
Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation
of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus ,
the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure
for environmental cases.

4. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain
as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing
in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right
to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land
title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.

4b
Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount toan unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domainsand ancestral lands which
might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law violate the rights of privatelandowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7
vote. They deliberated again and the same resulttranspired. Since there was no majority vote,
Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may
includenatural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

5. CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his
inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes beenpossessing in the then municipality of

Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State
opposed thepetition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled
in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred thata grant should be given
to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez &
Tiglao vs Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it
for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still
the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine).Further, Mateos possession of the land has
not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it
for manyyears. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant
portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it hasapparently not been used by the
petitioner for any purpose.While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a
deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has alwaysinsisted that he
must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his
deed, and until he did the State remained theabsolute owner.

6.A titiw V. Zamora

G.R. No. 143374
En Banc, J. TingaCase Digest
Facts: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in
MuslimMindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant
to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President
Cory Aquino shepromulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act
providing for organicact for the cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not
approve by the people. Thecourt declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until
properly repealed or amended. Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the
General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) whichincludes the assailed special provisions,
then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of thewinding up of operations of the
CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328.The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of
paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000) directing that the appropriation for
the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay theseparation and retirement benefits
of all the affected members and employees.
Issue:
1. Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional.

2. Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO

220.
3. Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO.220
Ruling:
In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an appropriations bill
covers abroader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared to an
ordinary bill. Thetitle of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not
feasible to come out with a titlethat embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill
xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of theRA8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard
that a provision in an appropriations bill mustrelate specifically to some particular
appropriations.On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O
220 is rejected, there is nosuch thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the
Congress from amending or repealingthe E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other
law.The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes
mutual respect.Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while the
sourcing of funds iswithin the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any grave abuse of
discretion, the court cannotcorrect the acts of either the Executive or the Legislative in respect
to policies concerning CAR.
8. Vicente Villaflor vs . Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95694, October 9, 1997 J. Panganiban
FACTS
In 1940, Cirilo Piencenaves, in a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold to Vicente Villafor, a
parcel of agricultural land (planted with Abaca) containing an area of 50 hectares . The
deed states that the land was sold to Villaflor in1937, but no formal document was then
executed, and since then until the present time, Villaflor has been in possession
and occupation of the same. Before the sale of said property, Piencenaves inherited
said property from his parents and was in adverse possession of such without interruption
for more than 50 years. On the same day, Claudio Otero, in a Deed of Absolute Sale sold
to Villaflor a parcel of agricultural land (planted with corn), containing an area of 24
hectares.Hermogenes Patete, in a Deed of Absolute Sale sold to Villaflor, a parcel
of agricultural land (planted with abaca and corn), containing an area of 20 has , more or
less. Both deed state the same details or circumstances as that of Piencenaves. In
1940, Fermin Bocobo, in a Deed of Absolute Sale sold to Villaflor, a parcel of
agricultural land (planted with abaca), containing an area of 18 hectares, more or less.
In 1946, Villaflor leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a parcel of land, containing an area
of 2 has, together with all the improvements existing thereon, for a period of 5 years at a
rental of P200.00 per annum to cover the annual rental of house and building sites for

33 houses or buildings.
In 1948, in an Agreement to Sell Villaflor conveyed to Nasipit Lumber, 2 parcels of land.
From said day, the parties agreed that Nasipit Lumber shall continue to occupy the
property not anymore in concept of lessee but as prospective owners.
On 7 December 1948, Villaflor and Nasipit Lumber executed an
Agreement, confirming anAgreement to Sell, but with reference to the Sales
Application filed with the Bureau of Land. Sales Application of Villaflor
were rejected for having leased the property to another even before he had acquired
transmissible rights thereto.
In August 1950, Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a Deed of Relinquishment
of Rights, in favor on Nasipit Lumber, in consideration of the amount of P5,000 that was
to be reimbursed to the former representing part of the purchase price of the land, the
value of the improvements Villaflor introduced thereon, and the expenses incurred in the
publication of the Notice of Sale; in light of his difficulty to develop the same as Villaflor
has moved to Manila. Pursuant thereto Nasipit Lumber filed a Sales Application over the
2 parcels of land . Order of Award was then issued in favor of Nasipit Lumber.
In 1973, Villafor wrote a letter to Nasipit Lumber, reminding the latter of their verbal a
greement in 1955; but the new set of corporate officers refused to recognize Villaflors
claim. In a formal protest dated 31 January 1974 which Villaflor filed with the Bureau of
Lands, he prot tested the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that th
e company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed of Relinquishment
of Rights dated 16 August 1950. The Director of Lands found that the payment P5,000.00
in the Deed and the consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly proven, and ordered t
he dismissal of Villaflors protest.
In 1978, Villaflor filed a complaint in the trial court for Declaration of Nullity of Contract
(Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land
subject of the contract), and Damages. In 1983, he died. The trial court ordered his
widow, Lourdes D. Villaflor, to be substituted as petitioner. CFI dismissed the complaint
.
The heirs of petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, rendered
judgment against them
.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights is fictitious
HELD
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Simulation not existing in the present case
Simulation occurs when an apparent contract is a declaration of a fictitious will,
deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purpose
of deception, the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from
that which was really executed. Such an intention is not apparent in the
agreements. The intent to sell, on the other hand, is as clear as daylight. The fact, that the
agreement to sell (7 December 1948) did not absolutely transfer ownership of the
land to private respondent, does not show that the agreement was simulated. Petitioners

delivery of the Certificate of Ownership and execution of the deed of absolute

sale were suspensive conditions, which gave rise to a corresponding obligation on the part
of the private respondent, i.e., the payment of the last installment of the
consideration mentioned in the Agreement. Such conditions did not affect the
perfection of the contract or prove simulation. Nonpayment of the consideration does not
prove simulation Nonpayment, at most, gives the vendor only the right to sue for collection.
Generally, in a contract of sale, payment of the price is a resolutory condition and the
remedy of the seller is to exact fulfillment or, in case of a substantial breach, to resci
nd the contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. However, failure to pay is not even a
breach, but merely an event which prevents the vendors obligation to convey title from
acquiring binding force

11. Montano v. The Insular Government

ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL.
Facts: :
Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of
land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805
square meters, and bounded as set out in the petition; its value according to the last assessment being
$505.05, United States currency. This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the
Director of Lands, and by the entity known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground
that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was the
absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery. The Court of Land
Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions without costs and
decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication and registration of the property described in the
petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public
Lands appealed to this court. and precisely Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10
years' occupation pursuant to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano
Held:
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items. The first includes not
only the second, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or
subject to private right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof. Government property was of two kinds first, that
of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private character or
use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their public character are
inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore, there is much real property belonging to the
Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands.
Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or other
governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not extend to tide
lands. It provided that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands. As

said inNewhall vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong
to the State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no application in the present case
inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled

12. Menguito vs Republic

Facts:
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the CA decision reversing the
RTC order granting Menguitos application for registration of land.Menguito et al applied for
registration of title alleging they are owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land
situatedin the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. They maintained they
acquired the land by inheritanceand have been paying taxes for the said land and no other
persons have any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion
or expectancy.The Republic opposed the application alleging that
neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been inopen, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 orprior thereto and the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if
any, attached to or alleged in theapplication, do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied foror his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
sinceJune 12, 1945, or prior thereto . Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and
indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent vintage. Further,
the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging tothe Republic of the Philippines
not subject to private appropriation

.ISSUE: WON Menguito has title to the disputed land

HELD: Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.Petitioners were duty-bound
to prove two legal requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and(2) the
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land
openly, continuously,exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. The records show that
petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.To prove that the land in question formed
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners cite asurveyorgeodetic engineers notation in Exhibit E indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land.Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question.Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands
of the public domain. Such proof is insufficient as Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of theinalienable public
domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
intoownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by theapplicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered
remains inalienable.Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the
land is alienable, their Petition for confirmationof their imperfect titles and registration thereof
under the law will still be denied. The reason is that they have failed toestablish possession of the
lots in question -- openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely -- in the concept of owner for
at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945. Petitioners do not claim that they are the original

possessors of the lots inquestion, which had allegedly belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he
donated it to his son Pedro. When Pedro died in1978, these lots allegedly passed down to
petitioners. Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from asfar back as 1968
only, they would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession
thereof even before the Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to
support such claim.

13. G.R. No. L-14722 May 25, 1960IGNACIO MESINA,

plaintiff-appellant,vs
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL.,
defendants.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA,
defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Mesina claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land located in San Antonio, Nueva,Ecija. She has
been in possession of the subject land openly, publicly and peacefully since 1914.The said lot was
subject of registration proceedings. Surprisingly, the defendant Pineda withoutknowledge of the Plaintiff
was able to procure a homestead patent in the same court were theregistration of property was
pending of the same land by the plaintiff, despite of the fact thatdefendant had not complied with the
requirements of CA 141.Plaintiff sought to annulled and cancelled the patent issued to defendant and
prayed thatthis registration case pending in the same court be given due course.
ISSUE:
WON the homestead patent given to defendant Pineda be declared null and void.
RULING:
In view of the fact that plaintiff was able to proved his open, continuous, exclusive possession of the
disputed land for more than thirty years or since 1914 and that lot is at presentsubject of registration
proceeding. Plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by grant of the state,it follows that the same
had ceased to part of the public and had become private property andtherefore beyond the control of
the Director of Land.The homestead patent issued to defendant therefore is null and void and for having
it issuedthrough fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

17. Delos Angeles vs Santos

In the matter of the application for registration of land. Leonor de los Angeles, et al. vs Isidoro
O. Santos, Antonio Astudillo, et al., the Director of Lands and the Provice of Rizal G.R. No. L19615 December 24, 1964
Facts: Leonor de los Angeles and seven co-applicants filed an application for registration of title
to 12 parcels of land in Ampid San Mateo Rizal. They alleged that they were owners proindiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid land. Subsequently, the Director of Lands filed an
opposition stating that the land is a portion of the public domain while other private
oppositors filed their written opposition claiming they are the lawful owners of the parcels of
land in question for having acquired homestead patents over said lots. A report filed in court by
the Land Registration Commissioner stated that the parcel of land described as Lot 11, applied
for in the same case, is a portion of a previously patented land awarded to one of the oppositors
(Julio Hidalgo) and recommended that the case be dismissed with respect to Lot 11, giving due
course, however, to the other lots in the application. The court required the applicants to show
cause why their application should not be dismissed as to Lot 11 to which the applicants filed an
opposition to motion to dismiss. However, the court issued an order dismissing the
application with respect to Lot 11. The applicants filed a motion for reconsideration but were
denied, hence, this appeal. They alleged that the lower court erred in dismissing the application
for the registration as regards to Lot 11, over which a homestead patent was issued by the
Director of Lands during the pendency of the registration proceeding.
Issue: Whether a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of
land for registration of title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent
administrative act consisting in the issuance by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent
covering the same parcel of land
Ruling: It is well settled that the Director of Lands jurisdiction, administrative supervision
and executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to lands already of
private ownership. Accordingly, a homestead patent issued by him over land not of the public
domain is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against the owner. The applicants contended that
they were already owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid land when they
applied for registration on November 21, 1959. If they were to successfully prove this and show
their alleged registrable title to the land, it could only result in the finding that when Julio
Hidalgos homestead patent was issued over Lot 11 on June 12, 1961 said lot was no longer
public. The land registration court, in that event, would have to order a decree of title issued in
applicants favour and declare aforesaid homestead patent a nullity which vested no title in
the patentee as against the real owners. Since the existence or non-existence of applicants
registrable title to Lot 11 is decisive of the validity or nullity of the homestead patent issued as
aforestated on said lot the court a quos jurisdiction in the land registration proceedings could
not have been divested by the homestead patents issuance. Further, proceedings for land
registration are in rem whereas those for acquisition of homestead patent are not. A homestead
patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the land as far as
courts upon in rem are concerned. The applicants should thus be given opportunity to prove
registrable title to Lot 11. The case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
X

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057 (January

17, 2005) Case Digest
Alienation

of

Public

Agricultural

Lands

Facts:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application
sought
a
judicial
confirmation
of
imperfect
title
over
the
land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the
government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming,
wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father
to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and
paid
the
corresponding
taxes
due
on
the
subject
land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for
registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first
be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could
not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14
of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter
the
length
of
unchallenged
possession
by
the
occupant.

Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a
bona
fide
claim
of
ownership
could
even
start.
Held:
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings,
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing
laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide
claim
of
ownership
since
June
12,
1945
or
earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section 14(1) had been met by
Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the tax
declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's bona fide
claim of ownership.

20. HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC, GR NO. 179987, 29 APR. 2009

FACTS: On Feb 20, 1998 Malabanan fled an applicaton or land registraton, covering a parcel of
land inSilang Cavite. He bought the land from one Velasco and had been in open, notorious,
contnuous andadverse and peacful possessionor more than 30 years. He also presented tax
declaraton since 1948.
ISSUE: Whether Malabanans possession of the land had already ripened to ownership.
RULING:There are two ways how Malabanan can acquire the property:(A) Under SEC 14(1) of
PD1529, which states that whose who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupaton of alienable
and disposable lands of public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisiton ofownership since
June 12, 1945. Under this, the land need not to be alienable and disposable during theentre
period of possession. One can secure judicial confrmaton as soon as it is declared alienable
anddisposable.
(B) Under SEC 14(2) of PD1529, which pertains to prescripton as a mode of acquiring
ownership overPATRIMONIAL PROPERTY of the state but there must be an express
declaraton that such property isalready patrimonial. The prescriptve period is 10 years if with
just title and 30 years if no just title.
Petition was denied because Malabanan is not qualifed under the two circumstances. In the first,
there is no evidence of possession since June 12, 1945 since his tax declaraton is only since
1948. While under the second circumstance, the property becomes patrimonial only since 1982
and the 30-year period of prescripton is not yet met.

21. Palomo vs Court of Appeals

PALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
FACTS:
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40.
On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio
and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive
Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of
the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The
Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and
introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual
mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine
Islands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.
HELD:
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not

registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is
no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the
government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.