Board of Assessment Appeals QC v MERALCO

Posted on June 22, 2013

Board of Assessment Appeals, Q.C. vs Meralco
10 SCRA 68
GR No. L-15334
January 31, 1964
FACTS
On November 15, 1955, the QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax.
After the denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken to the QC Board of
Assessment Appeals, which required respondent to pay P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for
the years 1952 to 1956.
MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
which rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the refunding to MERALCO
by the QC City Treasurer of P11,651.86.
ISSUE
Are the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO considered real or personal properties?
HELD
Pole long, comparatively slender, usually cylindrical piece of wood, timber, object of metal or the like; an
upright standard to the top of which something is affixed or by which something is supported.
MERALCO's steel supports consists of a framework of 4 steel bars/strips which are bound by steel cross-arms
atop of which are cross-arms supporting 5 high-voltage transmission wires, and their sole function is to
support/carry such wires. The exemption granted to poles as quoted from Part II, Par.9 of respondent's franchise
is determined by the use to which such poles are dedicated.
It is evident that the word poles, as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner's franchise, should not
be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat the very object for which the franchise was granted.
The poles should be taken and understood as part of MERALCO's electric power system for the conveyance of
electric current to its consumers.

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an
industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Following these classifications, MERALCO's steel towers should be considered personal property. It should be
noted that the steel towers:
(a) are neither buildings or constructions adhered to the soil;
(b) are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner they can be separated without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object;
are not machineries, receptacles or instruments, and even if they are, they are not intended for an
industry to be carried on in the premises.
PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS
153 SCRA 390

FACTS:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they
executed a real estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also
the right to occupy the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the
spouses for the lot to which the building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses
secured another from the same bank. To secure payment, another real estate
mortgage was executed over the same properties.
The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which
was later on mortgaged to the bank.
The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and
sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses. The respondent court held that
the REM was null and void.

Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property:

(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxx
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
xxx

HELD:
A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging
to another.
The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can
only mean that the building itself is an immovable property.
While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation
of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by
itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as

a REM for the building would

still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the
land.
The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed
before the issuance of the sales patent and before the government was divested of
title to the land. Under the foregoing, it is evident that the mortgage executed by
private respondent on his own
building was a valid mortgage.

FACTS
Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. The land upon which the business was conducted was leased from
another person. On the land, Davao Sawmill erected a building which housed the machinery it used. Some of the
machines were mounted and placed on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease, Davo Sawmill agreed to
turn over free of charge all improvements and buildings erected by it on the premises with the exception of
machineries, which shall remain with the Davao Sawmill. In an action brought by the Davao Light and Power Co.,
judgment was rendered against Davao Sawmill. A writ of execution was issued and the machineries placed on the
sawmill were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. Davao Light and Power Co., proceeded to purchase the
machinery and other properties auctioned by the sheriff.

As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was issued and thus
prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act.

ISSUE
Are the machineries real or personal property?

SIBAL v. VALDEZ
SIBAL v. VALDEZ
FACTS: The deputy sheriff of Tarlac attached and sold to Valdez the sugarcane planted by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff asked for the redemption of the sugarcane. Valdez said that it cannot be subject to redemption because it is
a personal property.

HELD
Art.415 of the New Civil Code provides that Real Property consists of:
(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxx

ISSUE: WON the sugarcane in question is a personal or real property.

HELD:Sugarcane is under real property as ungathered products. The Supreme Court of Louisiana provided that
standing crops are considered as part of the land to which they are attached but the immovability provided for is
only one in abstract. The existence of a right on the growing crop is mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it
were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquired therein.
-A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs to the lessee and may be
sold by him.
-Act 1508 (Chattel Mortgage Law) recognize growing crops as personal property.
Crops whether growing or ready to be harvested, when produced by annual cultivation, is not part of realty.
Paragraph 2 of Art. 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by Sec. 450 of Code of Civil Procedure and Act no.
1508 in the sense that for purposes of attachment and execution and Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products
have the nature of personal property.
Davao Sawmill Co. vs Castillo
61 PHIL 709
GR No. L-40411
August 7, 1935

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an
industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Appellant should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale of the property. While not conclusive,
the appellant's characterization of the property as chattels is indicative of intention and impresses upon the
property the character determined by the parties.
Machinery is naturally movable. However, machinery may be immobilized by destination or purpose under the
following conditions:
General Rule: The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed in a plant by the owner of the property or
plant.
Immobilization cannot be made by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right.
Exception: The tenant, usufructuary, or temporary possessor acted as agent of the owner of the premises; or he
intended to permanently give away the property in favor of the owner.
As a rule, therefore, the machinery should be considered as Personal Property, since it was not placed on the land
by the owner of the said land.

A tenant placed machines for use in a sawmill on the landlord's land.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Alexander Lao

Facts:
Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She
allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma.
Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the
land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by
transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act 141
(Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests open, public, actual,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide
claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence
constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax
declarations in her and her predecessors names. The court approved the application. The
petitioner represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which
re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The
petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of the title
to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts of possession
mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the
qualifications required by law on the manner of possession (continuous, adverse,
notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a bonafide claim of
ownership under C.A. 141?
Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was
disposable and alienable land of the public domain?
Ruling:
The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his title
over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years and the land
subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner
was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by incontrovertible evidence that
she possessed the property in the manner and time required by law. She did not provide
the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest started occupying the property. No
extrajudicial settlement of the property from its previous owners was shown and she did
not show any relationship between the parties where she obtained her deed of sale. She
further did not present any certification from appropriate government agency to show that
the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of the public domain. It is
incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these incontrovertible
evidences to support her claim for her application. In the absence of these evidences, her
application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her application was denied.
Case Digest: RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO

Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They had a dispute over a piece of
land which was a dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying to obtain a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) alleging that he had been the owner of that land
whereon he built a house and other improvements. However, Celestial protests that she has preferential right over
the land because it is adjacent to and is the only outlet from her house. According to the Bureau of Land, the land
in dispute was a creek and is therefore outside the commerce of man. The first MSA was denied by the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) prompting Cachopero to obtain another MSA which was granted by the DENR. Due to
conflicting interests of the parties, the land in dispute must be sold in a public auction.
Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the DENR with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC.
Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachoperos petition for certiorari as it is in the
nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of the CA and that the Cachopero has not exhausted all
administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is classified as outside the commerce
of man
HELD:
RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over original petitions for certiorari, prohinition
and mandamus.
Celestial has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e. through a petition for review
of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil action for certiorari
(i.e. through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).
Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ of
certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and not a
commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a courts jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires
the commencement of a new and original action therefore, independent of the proceedings which gave rise to the
questioned decision or order. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Section 21 of B.P. 129.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals conclusion that the instant case falls under the
recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, which provides that such is
inapplicable if (1) it should appear that an irreparable injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he should
await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter as a result
of a patently illegal order or (2) where appeal would not prove to be speedy and adequate remedy.

This requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being instances when it may
be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which are: 1) when the
question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when
strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto proceedings.
A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to acquisitive prescription
As for Celestials claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek,
based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre,
even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of
accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must
fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the
Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry,
cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
Hilario v. City of Manila [GR No. L-19570 April 27, 1967]
Facts: Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49 hectares in area (Barrio
Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal). Upon his death this property was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a
new certificate of title was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiffs father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the
western side by the San Mateo River.3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch
was constructed on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For
years, these safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which
inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on
the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a
lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between
the old riverbed site and the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the
premises, and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas along the
River. The operations eventually extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was
filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr. Hilarios estate. The US Army
paid. In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its operations.
On 22 October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages against the defendants City
Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-incharge of the plant. Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to
join the litigation as intervenors; as per issue of fees and penalties for materials (sand and gravel) extracted. On 14
March 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case,
alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement had between the latter
and the Director of Public Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their operations but subject to
the final outcome of the pending suit. On 13 May 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint and impleaded as
additional defendants the City of Manila, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, and Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new
Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against the
City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of

materials taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their operations. On 21
December 1956, the lower court rendered its decision, ordering the City of Manila and Director of Public Works to
pay Hilario in solidum the sum of P376,989.60 as cost of gravel and sand extracted from the plaintiffs land, plus
costs; and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to reimburse intervenor Calalang of P36.80 representing
gravel fees illegally collected. None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought
a reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions to reconsider with an
order, holding that the 2/5 portion of the area in controversy to Hilario, and dismissing the case against the Bureau
of Public Works insofar as money claims are concerned without prejudice to Hilario taking action against proper
party in such claim. Hilario and Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the lower court denied.
Hence, the appeal.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed from, and entered another judgment to the effect
that the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, and his agent and employees, are absolved of liability
from extracting materials from subject property (of public domain); and the portion within the strip of land
question declared not part of public domain and confirmed as part of Hilarios private property. No Costs.
12. Ordinary and extraordinary flood
There are two types of floods in the area during the rainy season. One is the so-called ordinary flood, when the
river is swollen but the flowing water is kept within the confines of the primary and secondary banks.
This occurs annually, about three to four times during the period. Then there is the extraordinary flood, when the
waters overflow beyond the said banks, and even inundate the surrounding areas. However, this flood does not
happen regularly. From 1947 to 1955, there were only three such floods.
13. Movement of the river, west bank, from 1945-1955
From 1945 to 1949, the west bank of the River extended westward up to the secondary bank line; from 1950 to
1952, this bank had moved, with the River, to the east, its lateral borders running along a line just 20 meters west
of the camachile tree; and from 1953 to 1955, the extremities of the west bank further receded eastward beyond
the camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters east of said tree.
14. Floodings not accidental as they are annual; Government v. Colegio de San Jose does not apply
Evidence shows that the River floods with annual regularity during the rainy season. These floods can hardly be
called accidental. The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in point. What was mainly considered there was
Article 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes, ponds and pools. In the present case, none of these is involved.
15. Movement of the river not due to excavation and extraction of materials
The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the American period, have been made only on the strip of
land west of the River. Under the following-the nature-of-things argument advanced by plaintiff, the River
should have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been lowered. But the movement has been in the
opposite direction instead. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to defendants operations. Moreover, Hilarios own
evidence indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. The movement eastward of the
channel by as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two typhoons which caused the erosion of the
east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which increased its level from as much as .93 to 2
meters.

16. River of different width; claim of unnatural widening unfounded

Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943, the river was only 60 meters wide, whereas in
1950, it was already 140 meters wide. Such area sampled shows only the width of the River near the southwestern
boundary of the Hilario estate. It does not indicate how wide it was in the other parts, especially up north.
17. Extraction confined on the banks of the river and not beyond limits of the west bank to invade his
private estate; Hilario cannot recover damages from defendants

19. Defendants did not unjustly profit at plaintiffs expense as they are not responsible for the shifting of the
river
Defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiffs expense. They were not responsible for the
shifting of the river. It was due to natural causes for which no one can be blamed. Further, defendants were
extracting from public property then, under proper authorization. The government, through the defendants, may
have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.
DE LA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations only in the New Accretion Area
along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the watercourse then. This zone, City Engineer Manila, is about 1
km. long and extends northward up to pt. 50.35. However, no extractions nor excavations were undertaken west of
this zone, i.e., above the temporary bank line. This line is located east of the secondary bank line, the lateral
extremity of the west bank then. In the latter part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from extracting along
the New Accretion Area and constructed a fence across the same. This forced the defendants to go southeast of the
Excavated Area. From 1954 to 1955, defendants area of operation was still farther east of the New Accretion
Area. They were. working within a confined area along the west waterline, the northern and western boundaries of
which were 20 meters away east from the camachile tree. It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that
defendants have not gone beyond the receding western extremities of the west riverbank. They have confined their
extraction of gravel and sand only from which the banks of the River, which constitute part of the public domain
wherein they had the right to operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that defendants have gone
beyond the limits of the west bank, as previously established, and have invaded his private estate. He cannot,
therefore, recover from them.
18. Plaintiff not denied of property without just compensation
The Court does not declare that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between the secondary bank line and the
primary bank line, has permanently become part of the riverbed. What is held is that at the time the defendants
made their extractions, the excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks then. All that space to the west
of said receding line would still be part of plaintiffs property and also whatever portion adjoining the river is, at
present, no longer reached by the non-inundating ordinary floods. Further, it is not correct to say that plaintiff
would be deprived of his property without any compensation at all. Under Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the
abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the other riparian owners.
And had the change occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines, plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the
old bed in proportion to the area he has lost.
19. Defendants did not unjustly profit at plaintiffs expense as they are not responsible for the shifting of the
river
Defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiffs expense. They were not responsible for the
shifting of the river. It was due to natural causes for which no one can be blamed. Further, defendants were
extracting from public property then, under proper authorization. The government, through the defendants, may
have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.
abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the other riparian owners.
And had the change occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines, plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the
old bed in proportion to the area he has lost.

A positive act of the govt is needed to reclassify land and until such reclassification, property remains part of
the forest reserve incapable of alienation and cannot be acquired by prescription.
FACTS:
In 1973, the subject lot, a 407 sq. m. residential lot was the subject of an application under the Land Registration
Act by the Ramos bros. Eugenio de la Cruz [petitioner] opposed. After trial, the application was dismissed on the
ground that the land was not yet reclassified and remains part of the forest reserve. The Ramos bros. pursued the
reclassification of the land and were subsequently awarded ownership of it. Cristina Villanueva, the private
respondent, subsequently purchased the same lot from the brothers. Upon learning of the said sale, petitioner filed
a complaint for reconveyance claiming ownership of the said land having possessed and occupied it openly,
publicly, notoriously and adversely against the whole world and in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years. His complaint was dismissed. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court thus the case at bar.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner is vested with a better right over the residential lot to which he possessed and devoted
time, effort and resources
HELD: NO
Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it was declared by the Govt as part of the forest zone. Forest
lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private property.
A positive act by the government is needed to declassify land and to convert it to alienable or disposable land. And
until such declassification, there is no disposable land to speak of.
Laluan vs Malpaya
Facts:
In 1950 the Laluans, 1 the Laguits 2 and the Sorianos 3 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) filed with the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint against Apolinario Malpaya, Melecio Tambot and Bernardino Jasmin
(hereinafter referred to as the respondents) for recovery of ownership and possession of two parcels of land. The
petitioners seek a declaration that they are the owners pro indiviso of A PARCEL OF RICELAND, situated in the
barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, Philippines and the owners pro indiviso of one-half of A PARCEL OF
RICELAND AND CORNLAND, situated in the barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.

They base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal succession, from Marciana Laluan (the respondent
Malpayas wife) who died intestate on July 17, 1948 and without any children.

written. In cases of doubt as to the lands identity, the court may conduct an investigation in the form of hearing or
an ocular inspection, or both, to enable it to know positively the land in litigation. (Laluan v. Malpaya, supra.)

The first parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan. They claim that the
respondent Malpaya, taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land to the respondent Tambot, as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated June 26, 1948. The second parcel of land they
allege as conjugal property of the spouses Malpaya and Laluan, and charge that the respondent Malpaya, with
right to sell only one-half thereof, sold the whole property, four days after the death of his wife, to the respondents
Tambot and Jasmin, as evidenced by the Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 21, 1948.

All contrary to the basic rule that in an action to recover, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must prove both ownership and identity (Laluan vs. Malpaya, L-21231, July 30,1975, 65 SCRA 494;
Article 434, Civil Code) Article 434 which states : In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and
the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.

The respondents filed their answer, 4 denying the allegations of the complaint and claiming that the parcels of land
belonged to the respondent Malpaya as his exclusive property. The respondents Tambot and Jasmin further aver
that the respondent Malpaya had the perfect legal right to dispose of the said parcels of land and that they
bought the properties in good faith, unaware of any flaw in the title of their vendor.

Facts: At Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his children
Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. Clemente Ermac registered the said Lot to his name alone without regards to the
other predecessors-in-interests.The respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they as
well as their predecessors-in-interests had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of owners.

There were marked variance between the respective areas of those parcels described in the deed of donation and
the parcel subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
The parcels of land contiguous to those described in the deed of donation passed in ownership from one hand to
another, or changes in the man-made or natural boundaries used to indicate the confines of the parcels set forth in
the said document occurred. This could very well explain the discrepancies between the names of the boundary
owners of the piece of land described in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property and the names of the
adjacent owners of the parcels subject of the deed of donation as well as the absence of any mention of the payas
and colos in the later Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. In addition, the variance between the location of
the land described in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property and those of the parcels set forth in the deed of
donation could reasonably be due to the creation of new barrios in the municipality of Pozorrubio Pangasinan, or
the alteration of the boundaries of the barrios therein.
However, the apparent difference between the area of the land described in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property and the areas of the parcels included in the deed of donation propter nuptias should be fully and
properly explained. The record shows that the petitioners neither offered nor attempted to offer any evidence
indicating that the land sold by the respondent Malpaya to his co-respondent Tambot corresponds with any of the
three parcels described in the deed of donation. The petitioners failed to specify precisely which of the three
parcels its location, area, and contiguous owners subject of the deed of donation constitutes the very land
delimited in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the specific identity of one of the parcels of land in dispute which the
court a quo neither noticed nor considered notwithstanding the obvious fact that the location, area and boundaries
of the land covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property do not coincide with those of any of the
parcels described in the deed of donation propter nuptias.
Held:
(a) Doubt as to identity of land. Where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity of the land claimed, a court
should resolve the question by recourse to the pleadings, and the record as well as to extrinsic evidence, oral or

HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC, vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC

According to the appellate court, [t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates of title which
apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein [has] no
discrediting effect upon plaintiffs claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing
valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by succession were effectively disregarded.
The Issues
1. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the property in
the names of petitioners predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco[;]
2. Whether or not laches ha[s] set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666[.]
The Courts Ruling
First Issue:
Ownership of the Disputed Lot
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as
well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio
Ermac.
We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue
already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions
of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial courts findings of
fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.19

Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute
strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.20
Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there is legal basis
for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.
Second Issue:
Prescription and Laches
Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it took
the latter 57 years to bring the present action. We disagree.
When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is created in
favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original
owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all
the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust,
and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.
Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.23 It cannot be
used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.24 Its application should not prevent the rightful owners
of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.

YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an
action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because
ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an
estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in possession of
the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over
ownership this does not in any way justify their act of forcible entry. It must be stated that regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a
strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were
using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening to remove
the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better
right over the land must resort to judicial means to recover the property from another person who possesses the
land.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. As
clearly stated in Article 536- In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS

Jacinto v. Director of Lands [G.R. No. 26374. December 31, 1926.]

FACTS:

In the case of Jacinto vs. Director of Lands (1926) 49 Phil. 853, the Supreme Court held that the acused friar
lands, to which the government of the Philippines holds title, are not public lands but private or patrimonial
property of the government.

Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan,
San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose executed a special power
of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property. They have already
acquired the proper permits to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20
other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmers Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the
last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the
property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The
respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due process of law by trespassing,
demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed
the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?
RULING:

En Banc, Ostrand (J): 7 concur

Facts: During the period from 1911 to 1913, sales certificates were issued by the Bureau of Lands to Frank W.
Carpenter for more than 100 lots of the Tala and Piedad Friar Lands states located in Novaliches, Caloocan, Rizal
including the lots 670, 690, 691, 695, 696, 697 698, 699, 700, 701, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, and
1050. The total area of the land covered by the sales certificates being over 1,490 hectares and the purchase price
amounting to about P56,600, of which amount Carpenter up to the year 1923, had paid in installments the sum of
P16,272. Under a judgment rendered against Carpenter in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case 24607), execution was
levied upon all of his right, title and interest in the lots purchased together with the improvements thereon, and on
16 November 1923, the sheriff of Rizal sold the property to Nicanor Jacinto. The sheriffs sale was registered in
the Bureau of Lands, assignments of the Bureau of Lands sales certificates were duly recorded, and certificates of
assignment were issued and delivered to Nicanor Jacinto in September 1924.
On 31 March 1925, the Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the CFI Rizal for the condemnation
of certain parcels of land situated in the municipality of Caloocan for the construction of an earth dam and a firstclass highway 3 kilometers long, in connection with the so-called Angat Water Works Project, and on the same
date the CFI Rizal issued an order authorizing the Metropolitan Water District to take possession of said parcels of
land upon deposit with the provincial treasurer of the sum of P3,000 as the provisional value, fixed by the court, of

the parcels so to be condemned. By virtue of this order, the Metropolitan Water District entered into occupation of
the land and began the construction of permanent improvements thereon. Copies of the complaint as well as of the
order of 31 March 1925, were filed with the register of deeds of the Province of Rizal on 11 February 1926, to be
recorded as notices of lis pendens. The lots enumerated above were included in the land sought to be expropriated
and Nicanor Jacinto was made a party defendant in the proceedings. He admitted the existence of the right of
condemnation and the necessity for the expropriation, but demanded the sum of P64,839.33 as indemnity for the
expropriation. As the actual purchase price to be paid by the purchaser from the Government only amounts to
P13,725, including interest, the Metropolitan Water District considered Jacintos demand excessive and declined to
pay the claim.

By section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is charged with the duty of receiving the purchase money
payable under that Act and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to receive, as a purely ministerial act, such
purchase money when tendered.
City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia et.al
FACTS:

In the month of July 1926, the applicant tendered payment to the Director of Lands of the sum of P4,650 to cover
the remaining balance of the sales price of the lots in question and demanded a corresponding deed of conveyance
for said lots. The Director of Lands, upon the advice of the Attorney-General, rejected the tender and refused to
execute and deliver the instrument of conveyance demanded from him. Applicant filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the applicant for the lots
enumerated belonging to the Tala Friar Lands Estate in Novaliches.

1.Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants
occupied the property and built their houses.2.Having discovered, plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant
written permits, each labeled as lease contract to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were
charged nominal rentals.3.After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals and
vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary Schools expansion.4.Despite the demand,
defendants refused to vacate the said property. Hence, this case was filed for recovery of possession.5.The trial
court ruled in favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 appropriating P100k for the construction
of additional building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School.6.Defendants appealed.

The Supreme Court ordered the Director of Lands to receive the balance of the purchase money for any or all of
the lots in question if and when payment thereof is tendered by Jacinto, and denied the petition as to the execution
of deeds of conveyance; without costs.

ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes
HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff

1. Proprietary rights, except that of occupation, not affected by condemnation proceedings

The proprietary rights, except the right of occupation, are not affected by the condemnation proceedings until the
title has passed to the plaintiff and that does not occur until the award of compensation or damages has been
satisfied.
2. Petition for a writ of mandamus not proper remedy to compel a conveyance
Mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely contract rights, such as that in the present case sought to be
enforced. (18 R. C. L., 121; Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil., 337.)
3. Land is patrimonial property of the Government; Duty to execute deeds of conveyance devolved upon the
Governor-General
The writ cannot issue in the present case unless it appears that the Director of Lands unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
(Section 222, Code of Civil Procedure.) The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the Philippine
Government and we can find no law specially enjoining upon the Director of Lands the duty to execute deeds of
conveyance to purchasers of such lands; on the contrary, that duty, under section 567 of the
Administrative Code, appears to devolve upon the Governor-General.
4. Director of Land has duty to receive purchase money payable under Act 1120

Certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board which recites the amount of
P100k had been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the construction of additional building of the said school.
But then the decision under review, the trial court revised his views. He then declared that there was a need for
defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document. Because of the courts
contradictory stance, defendants brought this case on appeal. However, the elimination of the certification as
evidence would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because
he was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that the city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.
And, Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside
for the construction of additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Further defendants entry to the said property is illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits. The city
mayor doesnt have the authority to issue permits. The permits issued are null and void.
Jacinto v. Director of Lands [G.R. No. 26374. December 31, 1926.]
In the case of Jacinto vs. Director of Lands (1926) 49 Phil. 853, the Supreme Court held that the acused friar
lands, to which the government of the Philippines holds title, are not public lands but private or patrimonial
property of the government.
En Banc, Ostrand (J): 7 concur
Facts: During the period from 1911 to 1913, sales certificates were issued by the Bureau of Lands to Frank W.
Carpenter for more than 100 lots of the Tala and Piedad Friar Lands states located in Novaliches, Caloocan, Rizal

including the lots 670, 690, 691, 695, 696, 697 698, 699, 700, 701, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, and
1050. The total area of the land covered by the sales certificates being over 1,490 hectares and the purchase price
amounting to about P56,600, of which amount Carpenter up to the year 1923, had paid in installments the sum of
P16,272. Under a judgment rendered against Carpenter in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case 24607), execution was
levied upon all of his right, title and interest in the lots purchased together with the improvements thereon, and on
16 November 1923, the sheriff of Rizal sold the property to Nicanor Jacinto. The sheriffs sale was registered in
the Bureau of Lands, assignments of the Bureau of Lands sales certificates were duly recorded, and certificates of
assignment were issued and delivered to Nicanor Jacinto in September 1924.
On 31 March 1925, the Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the CFI Rizal for the condemnation
of certain parcels of land situated in the municipality of Caloocan for the construction of an earth dam and a firstclass highway 3 kilometers long, in connection with the so-called Angat Water Works Project, and on the same
date the CFI Rizal issued an order authorizing the Metropolitan Water District to take possession of said parcels of
land upon deposit with the provincial treasurer of the sum of P3,000 as the provisional value, fixed by the court, of
the parcels so to be condemned. By virtue of this order, the Metropolitan Water District entered into occupation of
the land and began the construction of permanent improvements thereon. Copies of the complaint as well as of the
order of 31 March 1925, were filed with the register of deeds of the Province of Rizal on 11 February 1926, to be
recorded as notices of lis pendens. The lots enumerated above were included in the land sought to be expropriated
and Nicanor Jacinto was made a party defendant in the proceedings. He admitted the existence of the right of
condemnation and the necessity for the expropriation, but demanded the sum of P64,839.33 as indemnity for the
expropriation. As the actual purchase price to be paid by the purchaser from the Government only amounts to
P13,725, including interest, the Metropolitan Water District considered Jacintos demand excessive and declined to
pay the claim.
In the month of July 1926, the applicant tendered payment to the Director of Lands of the sum of P4,650 to cover
the remaining balance of the sales price of the lots in question and demanded a corresponding deed of conveyance
for said lots. The Director of Lands, upon the advice of the Attorney-General, rejected the tender and refused to
execute and deliver the instrument of conveyance demanded from him. Applicant filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the applicant for the lots
enumerated belonging to the Tala Friar Lands Estate in Novaliches.
The Supreme Court ordered the Director of Lands to receive the balance of the purchase money for any or all of
the lots in question if and when payment thereof is tendered by Jacinto, and denied the petition as to the execution
of deeds of conveyance; without costs.
1. Proprietary rights, except that of occupation, not affected by condemnation proceedings
The proprietary rights, except the right of occupation, are not affected by the condemnation proceedings until the
title has passed to the plaintiff and that does not occur until the award of compensation or damages has been
satisfied.
2. Petition for a writ of mandamus not proper remedy to compel a conveyance
Mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely contract rights, such as that in the present case sought to be
enforced. (18 R. C. L., 121; Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil., 337.)
3. Land is patrimonial property of the Government; Duty to execute deeds of conveyance devolved upon the
Governor-General

The writ cannot issue in the present case unless it appears that the Director of Lands unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
(Section 222, Code of Civil Procedure.) The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the Philippine
Government and we can find no law specially enjoining upon the Director of Lands the duty to execute deeds of
conveyance to purchasers of such lands; on the contrary, that duty, under section 567 of the
Administrative Code, appears to devolve upon the Governor-General.
4. Director of Land has duty to receive purchase money payable under Act 1120
By section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is charged with the duty of receiving the purchase money
payable under that Act and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to receive, as a purely ministerial act, such
purchase money when tendered.
DEPRA V. DUMLAO 136 SCRA 475
FACTS:
Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered, situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo.
Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot. When DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot,
the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRAs property, After the
encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRAs lot made on November 2,1972, his mother,
Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from his encroachment, filed an
action for Unlawful Detainer. Said complaint was later amended to include DEPRA as a party plaintiff. After trial,
the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code.
DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals so that DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court. In
this case, the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res
judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. The court conceded in the MCs decision that Dumlao is a
builder in good faith.
Held: Owner of the land on which improvement was built by another in good faith is entitled to removal of
improvement only after landowner has opted to sell the land and the builder refused to pay for the same. Res
judicata doesnt apply wherein the first case was for ejectment and the other was for quieting of title.
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA 160 SCRA 379

Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land, situated at the corner of F. Flores and Cavan Streets, Cebu City. An action for
partition was filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and defendants are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot
in the proportion of and 1/3 share each, respectively. The trial court appointed a commissioner in accordance with
the agreement of the parties. ,the Id commissioner conducted a survey, prepared a sketch plan and submitted a
report to the trial court on May 29, 1976, recommending that the property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A
with an area of 30 square meters for plaintiffs and Lot No. 1161-B with an area of 15 square meters for the
defendants. The houses of plaintiffs and defendants were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The house of
defendants occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of plaintiffs. The parties manifested
their conformity to the report and asked the trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties
should take possession of the 5 square meters of the land in question.
Issue: Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable to a builder in good faith when the property
involved is owned in common.
Held: When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or
occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in
good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi
agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has
been established.
Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the
house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However,
if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built
thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the
plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the
terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense,
if they so decide.
Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Mercado v. CA [G.R. No. L-44001. June 10, 1988.]
Facts:
The private respondents Bulaong Group, had for many years been individual lessees of stalls in the public market
of Baliuag, Bulacan; from 1956 to 1972. The market was destroyed by fire on February 17, 1956; the members of

the Bulaong Group constructed new stalls therein at their expense; and they thereafter paid rentals thereon to the
Municipality of Baliuag.
In 1972, the members of the group sub-leased their individual stalls to other persons, referred to as the Mercado
Group. After the Mercado Group had been in possession of the market stalls for some months, as sub-lessees of
the Bulaong Group, the municipal officials of Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the Bulaong Group
and declared the persons comprising the Mercado Group as the rightful lessees of the stalls in question, in
substitution of the former.
The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed several individual complaints with the Court of First Instance
seeking recovery of their stalls from the Mercado Group as well as damages. 1 Their theory was anchored on their
claimed ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their own expense, and their resulting right, as such
owners, to sub-lease the stalls, and necessarily, to recover them from any person withholding possession thereof
from them.
On October 24,1975, respondent Judge rendered a summary judgment in all the cases. 3 It rejected the claim of the
Municipality of Baliuag that it had automatically acquired ownership of the new stalls constructed after the old
stalls had been razed by fire, declaring the members of the Bulaong Group to be builders in good faith, entitled to
retain possession of the stalls respectively put up by them until and unless indemnified for the value thereof. The
decision also declared that the Bulaong and Mercado Groups had executed the sub-letting agreements with full
awareness that they were thereby violating Ordinance No. 14; they were thus in pari delicto, and hence had no
cause of action one against the other and no right to recover whatever had been given or demand performance of
anything undertaken. The judgment therefore decreed (1) the annulment of the leases between the Municipality
and the individuals comprising the Mercado Group (the defendants who had taken over the original leases of the
Bulaong Group); and (2) the payment to the individual members of the Bulaong Group (the plaintiffs) of the
stated, adjudicated value of the stalls, with interest IF
The members of the Mercado Group are now before this Court on an appeal by certiorari, this time timely taken,
assailing the above rulings of the Court of Appeals. Their appeal must fail for lack of merit. No error can be
ascribed to the judgment of the Court of Appeals which is hereby affirmed in toto.
Held: It was held that to be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the land on
which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Lessees cannot be considered builders in good faith (taken from Haystacks, by Berne Guerrero)
The members of the Bulaong group were admittedly lessees of space in the public market; they therefore could
not, and in truth never did make the claim, that they were owners of any part of the land occupied by the market so
that in respect of any new structure put up by them thereon, they could be deemed builders in good faith (in
accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code). To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person
assert title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. It is such a builder in good faith
who is given the right to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he has been reimbursed in full not
only for the necessary expenses but also for useful expenses. On the other hand, unlike the builder in good faith, a
lessee who makes in good faith useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended,
without altering the form or substance of the property leased, can only claim payment of one-half of the value of
the improvements or, should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, remove the improvements, even though
the principal thing may suffer damage thereby.

Thus, Article 445, establishing the basic rule of industrial accession, prescribes that
GABOYA V. CUI 38 SCRA 85

Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong
to the owner of the land subject to the provisions of the following articles. while Article 449 states:

FACTS:
Don Mariano Cui, widower, as owner of 3 lots situated in the City of Cebu, sold said three lots to three of his
children named Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de Ramas and Antonio Ma. Cui, pro indiviso for the sum
of P64,000. However one-third of the property corresponding to Rosario C. de Encarnacion was returned to the
vendor because she was not able to pay for the purchase price which resulted to the cancellation of the 1/3 sale.
Because of the sale of these lots pro indiviso and because of the cancellation of the sale to one of the three original
vendees, Don Mariano and his children Mercedes and Antonio became co-owners of the whole mass in equal
portions. In the deed of sale vendor Don Mariano retained for himself the usufruct of the property. Subsequently, a
building was erected on a portion of this mass facing Calderon street and was occupied by a Chinese businessman
for which he paid Don Mariano P600 a month as rental. The date when the building, was constructed and by
whom do not appear in the record.
Sometime after the sale to Mercedes and Antonio the two applied to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC)
for a loan of P130,000 with which to construct a 12-door commercial building presumably on a portion of the
entire parcel corresponding to their share. On January 7, 1947 Don Mariano, executed an authority to mortgage
authorizing his two children co-owners to mortgage his share. The loan was eventually granted and was secured
by a mortgage on the three lots in question, Don Mariano being included as one of the three mortgagors and
signing the corresponding promissory note with his two co-owners. He did not however, join in the construction of
the 12-door commercial building.
The 12-door commercial building was eventually constructed and the builder-owners thereof Mercedes and
Antonio received and continued to receive the rents thereof amounting to P4,800 a month and paying therefrom
the installments due for payment on the loan to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.
The complaint alleges that the usufructuary right reserved in favor of Don Mariano Cui extends to and includes the
rentals of the building constructed by Antonio Cui and Mercedes Cui on the land sold to them by their father; that
the defendants retained those rentals for themselves; that the usufructuary rights of the vendor were of the essence
of the sale, and their violation entitled him to rescind (or resolve) the sale. It prayed either for rescission with
accounting, or for delivery of the rentals of the building with interests, attorneys fees and costs.
Issue: Whether or not the usufruct reserved by the vendor in the deed of sale, over the lots in question that were at
the time vacant and unoccupied, gave the usufructuary the right to receive the rentals of the commercial building
constructed by the vendees with funds borrowed from the Rehabilitation and Finance Corporation, the loan being
secured by a mortgage over the lots sold.
Whether or not the failure of the vendees to pay over its rentals to the usufructuary entitled the latter to rescind, or
more properly, resolve the contract of sale.

He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right
to indemnity. (Emphasis supplied)
Articles 447 and 445, in turn, treat of accession produced by the landowners building, planting and sowing with
the materials of another and when the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person other than the
landowner or the builder, planter or sower.
Nowhere in these articles on industrial accession is there any mention of the case of landowner building on his
own land with materials owned by himself (which is the case of appellees Mercedes and Antonio Cui).
The Civil Code itself limits the cases of industrial accession to those involving land and materials belonging to
different owners
The usufruct over the land did not entitle the usufructuary to either the gross or the net income of the building
erected by the vendees, but only to the rental value of the portion of the land occupied by the structure (in so far as
the usufructuary was prevented from utilizing said portion), and that rental value was not liquidated when the
complaints were filed in the court below, hence, there was no default in its payment. Actually, this theory of
appellants fails to take into account that Don Mariano could not retain ownership of the land and, at the same time,
be the usufructuary thereof. His intention of the usufructuary rights in itself imports that he was no longer its
owner. For usufruct is essentially jus in re aliena; and to be a usufructuary of ones own property is in law a
contradiction in terms, and a conceptual absurdity.
Bachrach v. Seifert [G.R. No. L-2659. October 12, 1950.]
Facts:
The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last will
and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate. The estate of E. M. Bachrach,
as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000
shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald
Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and
Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock
dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend,
although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life
tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the
stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the
usufructuary but to the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that
a stock dividend is not, but merely represents an addition to the invested capital.

Whether the action for rescission due to breach of the contract could still be enforced and was not yet barred.
Issue:
Held: Under the articles of the Civil Code on industrial accession by modification on the principal land (Articles
445 to 456 of the Civil Code) such accession is limited either to buildings erected on the land of another, or
buildings constructed by the owner of the land with materials owned by someone else.

Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary.

Held:
The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct.
The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil
fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said
dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares,
just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother. If the dividend be in fact a
profit, although declared in stock, it should be held to be income. A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock,
is income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well
as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it were declared out of the capital it
would be a serious violation of the law.

amount of P11,076.02 which was Mariano Lacson Ledesmas bonus, and it ordered the central to deliver said sum
to Bachrach Motors. PNB appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, as it found no merit in the appeal;, without express
finding as to costs.
1. Civil Fruits under Article 355 of the Civil Code
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings;

Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the capital and belongs to the remainderman;
while under the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when declared as dividends in whatever form,
made during the lifetime of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our
statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule.

second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar
sources of revenue. According to the context of the law, the phrase u otras analogas refers only to rents or
income, for the adjectives otras and analogas agree with the noun rentas, as do also the other adjectives
perpetuas and vitalicias. The civil fruits the Civil Code understands one of three and only three things, to
wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.

Bachrach Motors v. Talisay-Silay Milling [G.R. No. 35223. September 17, 1931.]

2. Bonus not a civil fruit; not an income of the land

En Banc, Romualdez (J): 7 concurring

The amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not based upon the value,
importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt thereby
secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and independent of the property
referred to. As the bonus is not obtained from the land, it is not civil fruits of that land. It is neither rent of
buildings, proceeds from lease of lands, or income under Article 355 of the Civil Code.

Facts: On 22 December 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the PNB. To secure the
payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to
mortgage their land to the bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running with
their property under that mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on the same date, and amended on
23 March 1928, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to
2% of the debt secured according to the yearly balance, the payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part
from time to time, as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the bank, and of those contracted by
virtue of the contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said
bank authority to make such payment.
<It seems Mariano Lacson Ledesma is indebted from Bachrach Motor; the circumstance of which is not found in
the case facts.>
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the
amount of P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable on 30 June 1930, as
bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. The complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to
render an accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or otherwise,
and to pay Bachrach Motors a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale
made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void. The PNB filed a third
party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled
from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Talisay-Silay answered the complaint that Mariano Lacson Ledesmas credit
(P7,500) belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchase it. Cesar Ledesma claimed to be an owner by
purchase in good faith. At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar
Ledesma of the P7,500 part of the credit in question, for which reason the trial court dismissed the complaint and
cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma authorizing the central to deliver to him the sum of P7,500. And upon
conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to receive the

SPOUSES BENITEZ V. CA 266 SCRA 242

The Facts
On January 22, 1986, petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a parcel of land with improvement from
the Cavite Development Bank.
Subsequently, private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a lot adjacent to the petitioner wherein
a Civil Case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, against petitioners for the recovery of possession of
an encroached portion of the lot they purchased. The parties were able to reach a compromise in which private
respondents sold the encroached portion to petitioners at the acquisition cost of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)
per square meter.
On July 17, 1989, private respondents purchased still another property, a lot adjacent to that of petitioners. After a
relocation survey was conducted, private respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters of their property
was occupied by petitioners house. Despite verbal and written demands, petitioners refused to vacate. A last
notice to vacate was sent to petitioners on October 26, 1989.
On January 18, 1990, private respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Civil Case for
ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of San Juan decided in favor of the former, with the following
disposition:[i][3]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, affirmed said decision.

The controversy in this case is not an encroachment or overlapping of two (2) adjacent properties owned by the
parties. It is a case where a part of the house of the defendants is constructed on a portion of the property of the
plaintiffs. So that as new owner of the real property, who has a right to the full enjoyment and possession of the
entire parcel covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41961, plaintiffs have the right to demand that defendants
remove the portion of the house standing on plaintiffs realty. . . .
On further appeal, the respondent Court found no merit in petitioners plea. In a Resolution dated March 24, 1992,
the Sixth Division of said Court found the petition to be a mere rehash of the issues and arguments presented
before the lower courts. It ruled in part that:[ii][7]
3)
Petitioners were fully aware that part of their house encroached on their neighbors property, while
respondents became aware of it only after purchasing said property. Petitioners cannot claim good faith as against
the respondents.
4)
Since petitioners are not builders in good faith, they cannot demand that respondents sell the disputed
portion; what the law provides is that the builders in bad faith can be ordered to dismantle said structure at their
own expense. In the interim period that petitioners structure remains, they should pay reasonable rent until they
remove the structure.
The Court find the appeal without merit and deny it due course, with costs against the petitioners.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not possession of a lot encroached upon by a part of anothers house be recovered in an action
for ejectment, not accion publiciana. Corollarily, petitioners question (a) the validity of the imposition of rental
for the occupancy of the encroached portion, (b) the denial of their claimed pre-emptive right to purchase the
encroached portion of the private respondents land, and (c) the propriety of a factual review of the CAs finding of
bad faith on the part of petitioners.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit and should be denied.
Second Issue: Compensation For Occupancy
Petitioners erroneously construed the order of the MeTC to pay private respondents Nine Hundred Thirty Pesos
(P930.00) a month starting July 17, 1989 until they (petitioners) finally vacate the subject premises as rentals.
Technically, such award is not rental, but damages. Damages are recoverable in ejectment cases under Section 8,
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. These damages arise from the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which private respondents may have suffered but which have no direct relation to
their loss of material possession. Damages in the context of Section 8, Rule 70 is limited to rent or fair rental
value for the use and occupation of the property.
There is no question that petitioners benefited from their occupation of a portion of private respondents property.
Such benefit justifies the award of the damages of this kind. Nemo cum alterius, detrimenti locupletari potest. No
one shall enrich himself at the expense of another.

Third Issue: Option To Sell Belongs To Owner

Article 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds,
plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.
The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowners choice. Not even a declaration of the builder, planter, or
sowers bad faith shifts this option to him per Article 450 of the Civil Code. This advantage in Article 448 is
accorded the landowner because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing. There can be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this
prerogative belongs solely to the landowner. No compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what
petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts were
correct in rejecting the petitioners offer to buy the encroached land.
FILIPINAS COLLEGES INC. vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL.[G.R. No. L-1281, September 29,
1959]BARRERA, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated May 10, 1957 (a) declaring the
Sheriffs certificate of sale covering a school building sold at public auction null and void unless within 15 days
from notice of said order the successful bidders, defendants-appellants spouses Maria Garcia Timbang and
Marcelino Timbang, shall pay to, appellee Maria Gervacio Blas directly or through the Sheriff of Manila the sum
of P5,750.00 that the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriffs sale; (b) declaring the other
appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. owner of 24,500/3,285,934 undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a covered by
certificate of tile No 45970, on which the building sold in the auction sale is situated; and(c) ordering the sale in
public auction of the said undivided interest of theFilipinas Colleges, Inc., in lot No. 2-a aforementioned to satisfy
the unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of appellee Blas and against Filipinas Colleges, Inc. in the amount of
P8,200.00 minus the sum of P5,750.00mentioned in (a) above. The order appealed from is the result of three
motions filed in the court a quo in the course of the execution of a final judgment of the Court of Appeals rendered
in 2 cases appealed to it in which the spouses Timbang, the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., and Maria Gervacio Blas were
the parties. The Timbang spouses presented their opposition to each and all of this motion. In assailing the order of
the court a quo directing the appellants to pay appellee Blas the amount of their bid (P5,750.00) made atthe public
auction, appellants counsel has presented a novel, albeit ingenious, argument. They contend that since the builder
in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof exercised theiroption under Article 448
of the Civil Code, the builder has lost his right andthe appellants as owners of the land automatically became the
owners ipso facto.
ISSUE/S:
1.Whether or not the contention of the appellants is valid. If not, what are the remedies left to the owner of the
land if the builder fails to pay?
2.Whether or not the appellants, as owner of the land, may seek recovery of the value of their land by a writ of
execution; levy the house of the builder and sell it in public auction.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS.

There is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of
appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the landowner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. Although it is true, it
was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has
chosen this alternative, the builders right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was
nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building. The remedy
left to the parties in such eventuality where the builder fails to pay the value of the land, though the Code is silent
on this Court, a builder in good faith not be required to pay rentals. He has right to retain the land on which he has
built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him.

sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. When he failed to pay for the land, the defendant herein lost his right of
retention.

Possibly he might be made to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not to appropriate the
improvement and requires the builder in good faith to pay for the land but that the builder is unwilling or unable to
pay the land, and then they decide to leave things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and
should they disagree as to the amount of rental then they can go to the court to fix that amount.

The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by eliminating therefrom the reservation made in favor
of the defendant-appellant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. In all the respects, the same is affirmed,
without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered

This was ruled in the case of Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al ., 97 Phil.,801. A further remedy is indicated in the case
of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, supra , where this Court approved the sale of the land and the improvement in a public
auction applying the proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of the land and the excess, if any, to be
delivered to the owner of the house in payment thereof.
The second contention was without merit.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to the payment of the
unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. With respect to the order of the court declaring
appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of the land to the extent of the value of its personal properties sold at
public auction in favor of the Timbang, this Court likewise finds the same as justified, for such amount represents,
in effect, a partial payment of the value of the land. Failure of the Timbang spouses to pay to the Sheriff or to
Manila Gervacio Blas said sum of P5,750.00 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final judgment, an order
of execution shall issue in favor of Maria Gervasio Blas to be levied upon all properties of the Timbang spouses
not exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the said amount.
Bernardo v. Bataclan G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938
Facts:
By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of a parcel of land of about 90 hectares.
To secure possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff, on July 20, 1929, instituted a civil case. The
trial court found for the plaintiff in a decision which was affirmed by this Supreme Court on appeal (G.R. No.
33017). When plaintiff entered upon the premises, however, he found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan,
who appears to have been authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make
improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in the civil case, plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted against
him a civil case. In this case, plaintiff was declared owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good
faith, entitled for reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work done and improvements made.
The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has
not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of
article 453 of the Civil Code. In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R. No. 37319, the plaintiff expressed
his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the land. The said defendant could have become owner
of both land and improvements and continued in possession thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was

Issue:
Whether or not there is good faith.
Held:

The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff himself (p. 22, bill of exceptions) and the purchase
price of P8,000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason to justify a rapture of the situation thus
created between them, the defendant-appellant not being entitled, after all, to recover from the plaintiff the sum of
P2,212.
SARMIENTO v. AGANA
FACTS:
Before Ernesto Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo wed, Rebeccas mother offered a lot in Paranaque that they could
build their house on. In 1967, they finally built their home which cost about PhP8,000-10,000, thinking that
someday, the lot would be transferred to them in their name. It turns out, though, that the lot was owned by the
Spouses Santos who , in turn, sold the same to Leonila Sarmiento in 1974. A year later, Sarmiento ordered the
Valentinos to vacate their lot, then eventually filed and Ejection Suit against them.

The lower court ruled in Sarmientos favor and ordered her to pay 20,000 as the value of the house. But the case
was then elevated to the CFI of Pasay (w/ Agana as Judge), and pursuant to Art.448 of the CC (March 1979), the
Court ordered Sarmiento to exercise the option in 60 days to pay Ernesto 40,000 as the value of the house or to let
them purchase the land for 25,000. Sarmiento was not able to exercise this option, and the CFI allowed Ernesto to
deposit the 25,000 purchase price with the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land owner is compelled to exercise either option: to buy the building or to sell the land?
HELD:
Ernesto and his wife (BPS) were clearly in good faith as they believed that Rebeccas mother has the capacity to
eventually transfer the title of the land to them. In line with this, Sarmiento (LO) was required to exercise only 2
options: To purchase the house or to sell the land to them, in this case, based on the value decided by the courts.
Since Sarmiento failed to exercise the option within the allotted period, and based on Art. 448, the LO is
compelled by law to exercise either option. Not choosing either is a violation of the law.
OSEFINA S. DE LAUREANO vs. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,

Facts
Josefina S. de Laureano in this special civil action of certiorari assails the interlocutory orders of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, denying her motions for execution and for a preliminary mandatory injunction in an ejectment
suit which was decided in her favor by the city court of Iloilo City and which was appealed by the lessee, Ong Cu
(Civil Case No. 10370).
Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of Lots 996 and 1004-B with a total area of 3,107 square meters located at
the corner of Iznart and Solis Streets, Iloilo City. The lots were leased to Ong Cu for fifteen year period which
allegedly expired on August 31, 1974.
In view of Ong Cus failure to vacate the lots and remove his improvements thereon. Mrs. Laureano filed against
him an ejectment suit in October, 1974 in the city court of Iloilo City.
After trial, the city court on September 23, 1975 rendered a judgment ordering Ong Cu to vacate the lots, to
restore their possession to Mrs. Laureano, to remove his buildings and other improvements thereon and to pay
P12,428 monthly as compensation for the use and occupation of the lots from September 1, 1974 up to the time he
vacates them, with interest at twelve percent per annum from the date of accrual plus P10,000 as moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Held: As a lessee, who constructed a building on the leased land, Ong Cu cannot be characterized as a builder in
good faith. Under article 448 of the Civil Code the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good
faith may appropriate the building after payment of the indemnity provided in articles 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code.
Article 448 applies to a case where one builds on land of which he honestly claims to be the owner and not to
lands wherein ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract. A contrary rule would place it within
the power of the lessee to improve his landlord out of his property (Alburo vs. Villanueva, 7 Phil. 277, 280;
Cortes vs. Ramos, 46 Phil. 184; Fojas vs. Velasco, 51 Phil. 520; Bantug vs. Montinola, 73 Phil. 13).
In other words, article 448 refers to a possessor who occupied the land in the belief that he was the owner thereof.
It does not apply to the lessee because the lessee knows at the outset that he is not the owner of the land (Lopez,
Inc. vs. Philippine & Eastern Traiding Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348). The tenant has no pretension to being the owner of
the land (Rivera vs. Trinidad, 48 Phil. 396, 401).
BALUCANAG VS. FRANCISCO122 SCRA 344
FACTS:The petitioner bought a lot owned by Mrs. Charvet which was then previously leased by the latter to one
Richard Stohner. The said lease contract provided that the lessee may erect structures and improvements which
shall remain as lessees property and he may remove them at any time. It further provided that should the lessee
fail to remove the same structures or improvements within two months after the expiration of the lease, the
lessor may remove them or cause them to be removed at the expense of the lessee. Stohner made fillings on the
land and constructed a house. When he failed to pay the rent, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Stohner a
demand letter ordering him to vacate the lot. The lessee contended that he is a builder in good faith.

HELD:No, the lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith. The provision under Art. 448 of the New Civil
Code (Philippine) on a builder of good faith applies only to the owner of the land who believes he is the rightful
owner thereof, but not to a lessee whos interest in the land is derived only from a rental contract. Neither can
Stohner be considered a possessor in good faith. A possessor in good faith is a party who possesses property
believing that he is its rightful owner but discovers later on a flaw in his title that could indicate that he might not
be its legal owner. It cannot apply to a lessee because he knows right from the start that he is merely a lessee and
not the owner of the premises.As a mere lessee, he introducesimprovements to the property at his own risk
suchthat he cannot recover from the owner thereimbursements nor he has any right to retain the premises until
reimbursements. What applies in this case is Art. 1678 (NCC) which provides that, if the lessee, makes, in good
faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form
or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee 1/2 of the
value of the improvements at the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove
the improvements even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not.however, cause any
more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
Tan Queto v. CA [G.R. No. L-35648. February 27, 1987.]; Resolution
En Banc, Paras (J): 10 concur, 1 votes to deny reconsideration, 1 dissents, 2 took no part
Facts: Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot (Lot 304-B of the Cadastre Survey
of the Municipality of Centro, Misamis Occidental) either as a purported donation or by way of purchase on 11
February 1927 for P50.00 as the alleged consideration thereof. The transaction took place during her mothers
lifetime (her father having predeceased the mother) and consummated while Restituta was already married to her
husband Juan Pombuena. On 22 January 1935, Juan filed an application of Torrens title over the land for himself
and his supposed co-owner Restituta. On 22 November 1938, a decision was promulgated (GLRC 1638, Cadastral
Case 12) pronouncing Juan (married to Restituto) as the owner of the land. On 22 September 1949 a contract of
lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta (with the consent of her husband) for
a period of 10 years.
Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease contract having
expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis City.
On 22 April 1962, as a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was issued in Juans name. On 10 October
1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed
lot, and the spouses in turn became the owners of a parcel of land with the house constructed thereon previously
owned (that is, before the barter) by Tan Queto. Thereafter, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete
building, without any objection on the part of Restituta.
The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case; but on appeal in the CFI, the
entire case was dismissed because of an understanding (barter) entered into by Juan and Tan Queto.
Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for
annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. The CFI and the Court of Appeals found the
disputed lot as paraphernal and that Tan Queto was a builder in bad faith. These findings were regarded by the
Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. Tan Queto filed for a motion for
reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dated 16 May 1983.

ISSUE:Is the lessee a builder in good faith?

The Supreme Court set aside its decision promulgated on 16 May 1983, and rendered a new one declaring the
questioned lot together with the building thereon, as Tan Quetos exclusive property; without costs.

1. Findings of the lower courts ordinary conclusive upon the Court; exception, if erroneous
The findings of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals were regarded by the Supreme Court as
findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. Assuming they are factual findings, still if they are
erroneous inferences from certain facts, they cannot bind the Court.
2. Land not transferred to Restituta by donation, for it to be paraphernal
The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation inter-vivos because it was not executed in a public
instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not
complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to Restituta of her hereditary share in the estate
of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally
prohibited.

Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith (this phrase presupposes ownership in another);
much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is a builder-possessor (jus possidendi) because he is the owner himself.
8. Jus possessionis, jus possidendi; good faith and bad faith
The Chapter on Possession (jus possessionis, not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a possessor other than
the owner. The difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the former is
not aware of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is aware of such defect or flaw
(Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In the present case, there is no such flaw or
defect because it is Tan Queto himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of the property.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V COURT OF APPEALSGR No. L-45038, April 30, 1987
FACTS:

3. Land is conjugal, not paraphernal; Ownership by tradition

The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. Ownership was acquired by the spouses by tradition (delivery) as a
consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the
cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru
onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal, there being no proof that Restituta had paraphernal
funds of her own).
4. Sale not fictitious nor simulated; Allegation of simulation cannot prejudice a stranger
The sale cannot be said to be fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) as there was a valid consideration
therefor. Assuming that there had indeed been a simulation, the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to
prejudice a stranger to said strategem (like petitioner herein).
5. Tan Queto recognized Restituta as an owner, not the owner
Tan Queto admitted Restituta was an owner (not the owner) of the lot in his Answer, and this is true, for she was
a co-owner (with Juan, and therefore an owner.) There is no admission of Restitutas exclusive ownership.
6. Assuming Tan Queto recognized Restituta as the owner; bad faith of one neutralizes the bad faith of the
other
Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as conjugal, Tan Queto nursed the belief that the lot was actually
Restitutas (making him in bad faith), still Restitutas failure to prohibit him from building despite her knowledge
that construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would
entitle Tan Qyeto to the rights of a builder in good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be
given him if Restituta decides to appropriate the building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code).
7. Tan Queto an owner-possessor
Tan Queto having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot with Juan (who has been adverted
to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the owner-possessor of the lot.

Felipe Madlangawa, respondent claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de
Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the
subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the lot.
April 2, 1950
o The owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties covering
the lot occupied by the respondent were placed under custodia legis.
April 22, 1950
oVicente Legarda, husband of Tambunting received the deposit of respondent amounting to P1,500 for the lot
oRespondent had a remaining balance of P5,700which he did not pay or was unable to paybecause the heirs of
Tambunting could notsettle their differences.
April 28, 1950
oDon Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate and the respondent remained in
possession of the lot in question.
March 13 and 20, 1959
oPetitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. became the successful and vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision
pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company, as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale
provided for terms and conditions.
Petitioner caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba

advising the occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow.
This includes respondent among others who refused to vacate the lots
Trial Court dismissed the petitioners action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce
the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor (Don Vicente
Legarda).
ISSUE:
Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the paraphernal property?
DECISION: NO.
Decision of CA is reversed and set aside
RATIO:

FACTS: Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered
under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez
married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to
Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.
On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia
Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) coowners in her favor.
Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the
lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC.
MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other
1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been
established as a forgery.

The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of
DonaClara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was entered into
by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Clara Tambunting and
was entered into by the Don Vicente on behalf of Clara Tambunting but was only consummated after her death.
Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator
of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting. Art. 136 NCC.

RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their pleadings.

The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.

On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners house without any special permit of
demolition from the court.

Art. 137 NCC.

The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same tothe husband by
means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it. In this case, the public instrument shall be
recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables, the husband shall give adequate security. The Court
concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio,the former being
neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property.

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private Virginia
Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff
upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion
of the premises that used to serve as the houses toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she
was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum.
RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

Such being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the
probate court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should
have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the private respondent.

CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Held:
Co-ownership; nature

If the probate court approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed
of sale in favor of the respondent. But Don Vicente Legarda had no effort to comply with the above-quoted rule of
procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the instalments to the court
appointed administrator.
LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding
Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, respondents.

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the
private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things
subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the
same.

Co-ownership; characteristics
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or
material indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is
the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights
and obligations of the co-owners.
Co-ownership; relationship
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he
may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.

divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the partition
and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses.
Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.
RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the revenues and the expenses were
compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or
suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned,
Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence
presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That motion was denied
by the lower court. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned property.

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust
among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for
the others.
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently
of the other co-owners.
But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common
because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not
been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other coowners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her
definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the
rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME,
defendants-appellants. 1912 Nov 18 1st Division G.R. No. 4656
FACTS:
Appeal by bill of exceptions.
Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior to her
death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children,
named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her
property. Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.
In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial
agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and collected
the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicentas interest. Despite repeated demands to

RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and
in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them
according to their rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of
joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment
to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said
upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an
accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the
reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every
one of the coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz,
defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named, assisted by her
husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of
the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and
difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in
common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the
country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-ownership of the
defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of
their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the
rents which might have been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much
less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings
and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying
with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister

Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining
to her as a coowner of the property.

Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his coowners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

JOSEFINA VALDEZ, JAIME VALDEZ, ROGELIO ALMONTE, RAQUEL ALMONTE and RAUL
ALMONTE, the latter two minors, represented in this action by their father, FRANCISCO ALMONTE,
plaintiffs-appellees

Insofar as the aspect of extinctive prescription referred to in this article is concerned, it is but a restatement of
Article 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides: As between co-heirs, co-owners, or proprietors of
adjacent estates, the action to demand the partition of the inheritance or of the thing held in common, or the survey
of the adjacent properties, does not prescribe.

Facts:
This is an action for partition filed by the living children and grandchildren of the late spouses Federico Valdez, Sr.
and Juanita Batul against the heir and widow of Federico Valdez, Jr. The action concerns a Lot in Puerto Princesa
Cadastre in the name of Federico Valdez, Jr.
Upon the death of the spouses Federico Valdez, Sr and Juanita Batul left the following children as their heirs: (1)
Avelina Olorga, who died in 1941, leaving as her heir co-defendant Renato Olorga; (2) Elisa Valdez-Almonte, who
died in 1947, leaving Rogelio, Raquel and Raul, all surnamed Almonte, as her heirs; (3) the plaintiff Josefina
Valdez; (4) Federico Valdez, Jr., who died in September, 1960, leaving as his heirs defendants Teofila Olorga, his
wife, and Carmen Valdez, his daughter; and (5) Jaime Valdez, co-plaintiff herein.
In 1930, the old Valdez family, as vendees, occupied and lived in the premises of Lot No. 18. After the death of
Federico Valdez, Sr., Juanita Batul, in the year 1936, executed a contract of lease over a portion of Lot No. 18 in
favor of the protestant church of Puerto Princesa. The same Juanita Batul leased in 1939 a portion of Lot No. 18 to
Mr. Gregorio Quicho.
The transfer of the lot in the name of Federico, Sr., was never done because the owners original certificate of title
was lost.
Josefina Valdez and Federico Valdez, Jr. commissioned their cousin Concepcion Castro to negotiate with the
Gutierrez family in 1948 in order that the property in question may be transferred to them. It turned out that the
Gutierrez family was asking for an additional amount of P2,500.00.
The name of Federico Valdez, Jr. appeared as the only vendee. This was done pursuant to the wishes of Mr.
Quicho who advanced the money, in order that he could facilitate the deed of sale between him and the Valdezes,
with the understanding that Federico Valdez, Jr. will hold the same in trust for his other brother and sisters
(Testimony of Mrs. Castro).
When Federico Valdez, Jr. was still living, he never attempted to exclude the herein plaintiffs from ownership of
the land in question. Said plaintiffs have been in open continuous and uninterrupted possession of the premises
they are occupying inside the lot in question long before the execution of the deed of sale. It was only after the
death of Federico Valdez, Jr. that the widow Teofila Olorga tried to eject the plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not prescription applies in the case.
Held: No. Given the antecedents of the property and the fact that its acquisition by Federico Valdez, Jr. was for
the benefit not of himself alone but also of his brother and sisters, although for purposes of convenience he was
made to appear as the sole vendee, the juridical relation that arose among them was one of co-ownership, with the
plaintiffs-appellees actually in possession of a portion of the property.

And from the standpoint of acquisitive prescription, or prescription of ownership, this Court has held in numerous
decisions involving fiduciary relations such as those occupied by a trustee with respect to the cestui que trust that
as a general-rule the formers possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a title by prescription.
Adverse possession in such a case requires, the concurrence of the following-circumstances: (a) that the trustee
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) that such,
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust and (c) that the evidence thereon should
be clear and conclusive. * These circumstances are not present in this case.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix,
petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA.DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27,
1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to
be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en plenodominio in satisfaction of her legitime; the
other part or free portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez en nudapropriedad. Furthermore, one third
(1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in
favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
-widow
-French who lives in Paris
-received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez

-two grandnephews

a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over which he could impose no
burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]

-lives in Malate
-received the (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski

-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free
portion of the testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the testators express will. The Court
erred for Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate enpleno dominio as her legitime and which is more than
what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more
than her legitime will run counter to the testators intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her
legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain

b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar substitution
can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance
therefore it is VALID.

-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion

-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix

BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not related
to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution
does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed
on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts
the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be
sold upon mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked owners.

-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because

c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio
Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants violates
testators express will to give this property to them
-LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widows legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD

-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public
domain in the Philippines.[4]
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law
but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary
succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an
alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the
usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
MARIANO DISTRITO, LUISA DISTRITO, MARIANO CIMAFRANCA, EDUARDO DOMICIANO
DISTRITO, ELIZABETH DISTRITO and SEGUNDINO CATIPAY, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO MIQUIABAS, PACITA MIQUIABAS, and ENRIQUE
SAMSON, Respondents.
Facts
This petition involves the legal redemption of real property.
Private respondents seek to redeem as co-owners from petitioners a parcel of land of the Dumaguete Cadastre.

Plaintiff-appellants evidence tend to establish that the property in question was originally owned by Simeona
Amistad now deceased, their predecessor-in-interest. The heirs of the late Simeona Amistad are Eufrocina
Potenciana, Librada, Catalina, Gabina and Anecito all surnamed Villamil. Libradas house was constructed in the
lot, where Libradas husband and children are presently staying after Libradas death. Plaintiff Pacita MiquiabasSamson are also living in Libradas house. Pedro Miquiabas also stays in the house when he visits Dumaguete
City.
Appellant Pacita Miquiabas-Samson testified that she had bought the share of Librada Villamil and agreed with
the heirs of Gabina Villamil to buy their respective shares and would like to redeem the shares of Catalina and
Anecito both surnamed Villamil to preserve the family lot for sentimental reasons.
Plaintiff-appellants claim that they only came to know about the sale of the lot in question in July 1984, when
Eduardo Distrito, one of the defendant-appellee [sic] notified them that the defendants were constructing a
building on the portion they bought from Catalina Villamil and Anecito Villamil. However, appellant Pacita
Miquiabas-Samson refused as the shares of Catalina Villamil and Anecito Villamil has [sic] not yet been
segregated as there was no partition over the lot in question.
Plaintiffs-appellants offered to redeem the land in the amount of P4,566.00, but the defendants-appellees refused.
Hence a tender of payment was made (Exh. B), with the court, and notice of consignation was sent to the
defendants-appellees. (Exhibit C).
On the other hand, the evidence of the defendant-appellees tends to prove that the whole lot 716 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre was the subject of a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, and the said court
adjudicated to the six (6 ) heirs of Simeona Amistad Lot No. 716-B-2, the land in litigation with the one sixth (1/6)
pro-indiviso shares.
On April 16, 1976 the defendant-appellees acquired by purchase one-half (1/2) portion pro-indiviso of Lot No.
716-B-3, from Atty. Marcelo Flores which the latter acquired as payment of his attorneys fees in the Civil Case.
(Exhibit 3).
Subsequently, upon representation of Plaintiff-Appellant Pedro Miquiabas, who acted as middle-man, defendantappellant bought the shares of Catalina and Anecito Villamil. On April 30, 1975, the instrument of sale was
notarized by Juan A. Lapisan, Jr. who testified that Pedro Miquiabas accompanied Eduardo Distrito and himself to
Siaton, Negros Oriental where Catalina Villamil is living in order for the latter to sign the document as Catalina
was too old to travel to Dumaguete City.
Appellant Pedro Miquiabas also offered to sell his share and that of his sister to the defendant-appellee but the
latter hesitated.
Appellee Eduardo Distrito testified that his co-defendant and himself also bought the share of Eusebio Amistad
who owns the adjoining lot through the representations of appellant Pedro Miquiabas. (Exh. 4).
Issue: Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to redeem the land in question.
Held: The complaint is dismissed as to private respondent Pedro Miquiabas who had lost his right to redeem.
In this case, it appears that private respondent Pedro Miquiabas acted as middleman and was present when the
vendor signed the deed of sale. It is obvious that he had actual knowledge of the sale.Thus, a written notice to him

as required by Article No. 1623 of the Civil Code is not necessary. The only purpose of such written notice is to
insure that all the co-owners shall be actually notified of the sale and to remove all doubt as to the perfection of the
sale.
When as in this case the co-owner was actually present and was even an active intermediary in the consummation
of the sale of the property he is and must be considered to have had actual notice of the sale. A written notice is no
longer necessary.
As to private respondent Pacita Miquiabas she was not present when the aforesaid sale of the property was
undertaken. There is no evidence that she was informed or that she ever learned about the sale soon thereafter. It
was only in July, 1984 that she was notified by petitioners of their intention to construct a building on a portion of
the property in question which they bought. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, that is, on August 3, 1984, said
private respondent filed a complaint for legal redemption in court and at the same time deposited the amount of
P4,588.85 with the court as the purchase price.
As the law requires a written notice of such sale to the co-owners, such actual notice to private respondent Pacita
Miquiabas is not sufficient compliance with the requirement. Moreover, said respondent filed the complaint for
legal redemption within thirty (30) days from the time she was verbally notified thereof by petitioners. Hence, her
right to redeem the property as co-owner must be sustained.
SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and EUTIQUIANO
CAMARILLO and LIBERATA CACABELOS, respondents.
Facts:
EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA CACABELOS who are husband and wife, had instituted a
complaint before the CFI for ejectment and recovery of possession against SULPICIO CARVAJAL, alleging that
they are the owners of a parcel of commercial land, pro-indiviso, consisting of 150.8 sq. meters, more or less,
situated in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan, having bought the same from Evaristo G. Espique by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on April 15, 1964. They also demand that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use of the
property all P40.00 until the property is surrendered to them.
The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq. meter land originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and his
wife, both dead. After their death their five children, namely: Maria, Evaristo, Faustina, Estefanio and Tropinia
succeeded them in the ownership of the whole lot.
Petitioner occupies two-fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique children. Petitioner alleges
that he purchased the northern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents)
from Estefanio Espique and that the southern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by
respondents) from Estefanio Espique and that the southern one-half portion is leased to him by Tropinia Espique.
The land subject of the controversy is the most southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique children
which petitioner claims he had bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967 and which respondents claim they had
bought from Evaristo on April 15, 1964.
Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending before the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Held: The respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for the use of the property
in dispute. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in the pending
partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor
respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in dispute.
Ratio: Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited,
by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in
common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or
ideal portion without any physical adjudication. An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim
title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial
decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire
thing owned in common by all the co-owners. What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot
share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. Before partition, a co-heir
can only sell his successional rights.
In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. Espique in favor of respondents and the sale
executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition of the property among the coheirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However, the interests thereby
acquired by petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio
and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate subject to provisions on subrogation of the other coheirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code. Respondent courts ruling
that the sale by Estefanio in favor of petitioner is not valid because of lack of notice to his co-heirs is erroneous.
Such notice in writing is not a requisite for the validity of the sale. Its purpose is merely to apprise the co-heirs of
the sale of a portion of the estate, for them to exercise their preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of
the New Civil Code, that is, the right to redeem the property sold within one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by a co-heir.
SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.
OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX, PASAY CITY and AGUILAR-BERNARES
Facts:
The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporationis a condominium corporation within the meaning of
Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of
the Sunset View Condominium Project located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner is
the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited common areas.
The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship owned and operated by the spouses
Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, Solana, in the Sunset View
Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial, Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated bought the Solana unit on installment from the Tower Builders, Inc. The petitioner, Sunset View
Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares
Realty.

The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not
state a cause of action: (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature other action; and (3) that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The petitioner filed its opposition.
The motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent Judge, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a
holder of a separate interest and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation; and that
the case should be properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission which has exclusive original
jurisdiction on controversies arising between shareholders of the corporation. the motion for reconsideration
thereof having been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, filed
the instant petition for certiorari praying that the said orders be set aside.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have jurisdiction over the claims filed by Sunset View, the
condominium corporation.

Held: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder in the corporation. The Mater Deed
determines when ownership of the unit and participation in the corporation vests in the purchaser.
The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction.
The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon
full payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even
under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch
as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a
unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a
shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred only upon full payment of the purchase
price.
Private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence they are not shareholders and the SEC has no
jurisdiction over the claims.
*now, special courts handle intra-corporate disputes

AMOR vs. FLORENTINO ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-48384
October 11, 1943

Easement
TAEDO v BERNAD- Extinguishment of Easement
An easement continues by operation of law. Alienation of the D and S estates to different persons is not a ground
for extinguishment of easements absent a statement extinguishing it.

FACTS:
Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501-A and 7501-B). He constructed an
apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B he constructed an apartment, house, bodega and a septic tank for common
use of the occupants of the two lots.

Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Taedo (pet). He also agreed that should be decide to sell
Lot B he would sell it to Taedo. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to Spouses Sim (resp). Sim blocked the sewage
pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the septic tank. He also asked Tanedo to remove that portion of his
building encroaching Lot B.

FACTS: Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had and
still has, on the north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these
windows the house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands. Maria Florentino made a will,
devising the house and the land on which it is situated to Gabriel,one of the respondents herein, and to Jose, father
of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the warehouse and the lot where it is situated to
Maria Encarnancion. Upon the death of the testatrix in 1882, nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to
the windows in question.
Maria Encarnacion sold her lot and the warehouse thereon to the petitioner Amor, the deed of sale stating that the
vendor had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. Later, petitioner destroyed the old warehouse
and started to build instead a two-story house.
Respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from building higher than the original structure and from
executing any work which would shut off the light and air that had for many years been received through the four
windows referred to.
The trial court declared that an easement of light and view had been established in favor of the property of the
plaintiffs (respondents herein) and ordered Amor to remove within 30 days all obstruction to the windows of
respondents house, to abstain from constructing within three meters from the boundary line, and to pay for
damages.
The CA affirmed the judgment of the CFI, hence this petition asking for the setting aside of said decision.
ISSUE:

Taedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against resps. Cardenas admitted that he had agreed to
sell the lot to pet and claimed by way of cross claim against spouses Sim that the Deed of Sale he had executed
was only intended as an equitable mortgage. RTC dismissed the complaint and the cross claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its
subsequent sale to different owners.
RULING: NO.
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the
extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law as provided
in Art 624 because no abolishment or extinguishment was provided in the deed of absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas
stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the spouses Sim cannot impair,
in any manner, the use of the servitude.

1.

1. WON the easement of light and view under review has been established in favor of the property of
respondents through prescription

2.

2. WON Art 541 of the civil code is applicable in this case, especially regarding the correct time of death
of Maria Florentino

3.

3. WON the Yu-tibo case applies in the case at bar

4.

4. WON Amor is an innocent purchaser for value

HELD: the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed

1. YES; The easement involved in this case is of two aspects: light and view and altius non tollendi. These two
aspects necessarily go together because an easement of light and view prevents the owner of the sevient estate
from building to a height that will obstruct the windows. This court in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo, supra, held that the
easement concerned when there is an apparent sign established by the owner of two estates is positive. This being

so, and inasmuch as the original heirs of Maria succeeded to these two estates either in 1885 or in 1892 and as
petitioner bought one of the lots in 1911, the prescriptive period under any legislation that may be applied the
Partidas, Civil Code or Code of Civil Procedure has elapsed without the necessity of formal prohibition on the
owner of the servient estate. The respondents action was brought in 1938. The persons who were present, and 20
years between absentees. According to article 537 of the Civil Code, continous and apparent easements may be
acquired by prescription for 20 years. Under sections 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the period is 10
years.
At the time the devisees took possession of their respective portions of the inheritance, neither the respondents nor
Maria Encarnacion said or did anything with respect to the four windows of the respondents house. The
respondents did not renounce the use of the windows, either by stipulation or by actually closing them
permanently. On the contrary, they exercised the right of receiving light and air through those windows. Neither
did the petitioners predecessor in interest, Maria Encarnacion, object to them or demand that they be closed. The
easement was therefore created from the time of the death of the original owner of both estates, so when petitioner
bought the land and the camarin thereon from Maria Encarnancion, the burden of this easement continued on the
real property so acquired because according to Article 534, easements are inseparable from the estate to which
they actively or passively pertain.
It is well known that easements are established, among other cases, by the will of the owners. (Article 536 of the
Code.) It was an act which was, in fact, respected and acquiesced in by the new owner of the servient estate, since
he purchased it without making any stipulation against the easement existing thereon, but, on the contrary,
acquiesced in the continuance of the apparent sign thereof. As is stated in the decision itself, It is a principle of
law that upon a division of a tenement among various persons in the absence of any mention in the contract of a
mode of enjoyment different from that to which the former owner was accustomed such easements as may be
necessary for the continuation of such enjoyment are understood to subsist. It will be seen, then, that the phrase
active enjoyment involves an idea directly opposed to the enjoyment which is the result of a mere tolerance on
the part of the adjacent owner, and which, as it is not based upon an absolute, enforceable right, may be considered
as of a merely passive character
2. YES; Art. 541 provides:
The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be
considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at
the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of
them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed
Petitioner assigns as an error of the CA the supposed failure of that tribunal to pass upon his motion to consider
certain allegedly new evidence to prove that Maria Florentino, the original owner of the properties, died in 1885.
Petitioner alleges that Maria Florentino died in 1885 and, therefore, the Law of the Partidas should be followed in
this case and not the Civil Code.

Granting, arguendo, that Maria Florentino died in 1885, as contended by petitioner, nevertheless the same
principle enunciated in article 541 of the Spanish Civil Code was already an integral part of the Spanish law prior
to the Civil Code, the easement in question would also have to be upheld. The law before the Civil Code was the
same as at present.

3. NO; petitioner contends that the doctrine in that case is controlling in the present one, but the facts and theories
of both cases are fundamentally dissimilar. In that case, Cortes sought an injunction to restrain Yu-Tibo from
continuing the construction of certain buildings. Cortes wife owned a house in Manila which had windows that
had been in existence since 1843. The defendant, who occupied a house on the adjoining lot, commenced to raise
the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in the house owned by plaintiffs wife had
been covered. This Court, in affirming the judgment of the lower court which dissolved the preliminary injunction,
held that the opening of windows through ones own wall does not in itself create an easement, because it is
merely tolerated by the owner of the adjoining lot, who may freely build upon his land to the extent of covering
the windows, under article 581, and that his kind of easement is negative which can be acquired through
prescription by counting the time from the date when the owner of the dominant estate in a formal manner forbids
the owner of the servient estate from obstructing the light, which had not been done by the plaintiff in this case.
It will thus be clear that one of the essential differences between that case and the present is that while the Yu-Tibo
case involved acquisition of easement by prescription, in the present action the question is the acquisition of
easement by title, or its equivalent, under article 541. Therefore, while a formal prohibition was necessary in the
former case in order to start the period of prescription, no such act is necessary here because the existence of the
apparent sign when Maria Florentino died was sufficient title in itself to created the easement.
Another difference is that while in the Yu-Tibo case, there were wo different owners of two separate houses from
the beginning, in the present case there was only one original owner of the two structures. Each proprietor in the
Yu-Tibo case was merely exercising his rights of dominion, while in the instant case, the existence of the apparent
sign upon the death of the original owner ipso facto burdened the land belonging to petitioners predecessor in
interest, with the easements of light and view and altius non tollendi in virtue of article 541.
Finally, the Yu-Tibo case was decided upon the theory if the negative easement of altius non tollendi, while the
instant case is predicated on the idea of the positive easement of light and view under article 541.
4. .The petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the lot and camarin thereon, and that he
was not bound to know the existence of the easement because the mere opening of windows on ones own wall
does not ipso facto create an easement of light. Such contention might perhaps be in point if the estates had not
originally belonged to the same owner, who opened the windows. But the petitioner was in duty bound to inquire
into the significance of the windows, particularly because in the deed of sale, it was stated that the seller had
inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. Referring to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain
dated February 7, 1896, which applied Article 541, this Court in the case of Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo already cited, said
that the establishment of the easement was an act which was in fact respected and acquiesced in by the new
owner of the servient estate, since he purchased it without making any stipulation against the easement existing
thereon, but on the contrary acquiesced in the new owner of the servient estate, since he purchased it without
making any stipulation against the easement existing thereon, but on the contrary, acquiesced in the continuance of
the apparent sign thereof. (p. 31). Moreover, it has been held that purchasers of lands burdened with apparent
easements do not enjoy the rights of third persons who acquire property, though the burden it not recorded.
(Sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, April 5, 1898).
When petitioner bought this lot from the original coheir, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, the windows on
respondents house were visible. It was petitioners duty to inquire into the significance of those windows. Having
failed to do so, he cannot now question the easement against the property which he purchased.
NOTES:

1. According to Article 536, easements are established by law or by will of the owners. Acquisition of easements is
first by title or its equivalent and secondly by prescription. What acts take the place of title? They are mentioned in
Articles 540 and 541, namely,

RULING: YES
A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of Florete as the servient estate in favor
of the L. Borres Elementary School and the nearby lands as dominant estates since it has been in continuous use
for no less than 15 years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby adjacent lands.

(1) a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate;

(2) a final judgment; and
(3) an apparent sign between two estates, established by the owner of both, which is the case of article 541.
2. under article 541 of the Civil Code, the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that
characterizes its existence .
3. As to the implied contract. Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3 provided that easements were acquired by contract, by
will and by prescription. There was consequently an implied agreement between Maria Florentina and the devisees
of the house with the four windows to the effect that the service of these windows would continue, thus creating
the easement of light and view and the concomitant easement of altius non tollendi. Hence, the easement in
question was acquired by Gabriel and Jose through contract under Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3
JAVELLANA V. IAC- Positive Easement
When a positive easement is constituted, the servient owner is prevented from impairing the use of such by the
dominant estate.
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land adjoining the Iloilo River up to the
adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is located. There existed a main canal from the Iloilo River which
passes through the Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the school property going towards Lot 2344.
Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and later on demolished the portions of the main dike connecting the main
canal to the canal running thru the school grounds. This closure caused flooding in the premises of the school and
its vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of rain or flood water that empties into the river. This prompted the
school and barangay officials to complain to higher authorities about the closure of the canal. When Florete was
about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open canal, he was prevented from doing so by the district supervisor, Javellana,
thus he instituted a complaint for recovery of damages for allegedly denying his access to the use of the canal to
his property.

The RTC ruled in favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed to the IAC which reversed the decision thus the case at
bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established in favor of the school property

As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the use of the canal without violating Art. 629 of the CC
which provides that The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude. Nevertheless if by reason of the place originally assigned or of the manner established for the use of the
easement, the same should become very inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him
from making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be charged at his expense, provided he
offers another place or manner equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner
of the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the easement.

When Florete closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions of the main dike it impaired the use of the
servitude by the dominant estates.

Additional Facts:
> One witness almost drowned
> One witness saved a woman, who while picking shells fell into the canal
> 2 witnesses took a bath in the canal, 1 when he was still a child, the other when he was still single
> Canal is used by residents for salt-making using plastic bags, which is in competition with Marsal & Co. in the
production of salt
> the canal is a source of salt water, it is fresh and clean since the tide changes from the Iloilo River while the
fishpond is stagnant and polluted
> before the closure of the dikes, there were no floods in the vicinity
> tube to be buried: 10-inch rubber tube
> canal:
o for the 1st 100 meters = 3 meters wide
o 200 meters = 2 meters
> depth of canal:
o high tide or rainy season = main canal = meter; canal that traverses school = 2 meters
o ordinary days = no water
> Florete only caused the canal to be deeper
ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS- Easement of Right of Way
An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has no access to a public road and
the needs of such property determines the width of the easement which requires payment of indemnity which
consists of the value of the land and the amount of the damages caused.

FACTS:
Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which is bounded on the north by the servient estates of
Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a dried river and the Taal Lake. The servient estate is
bounded on the north by the National Highway.

Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient estate at no particular point. In
1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but provided a roadpath 25 meters long and about 1
meter in width. At this time, Encarnacion started his plant nursery business on his land. When his business
flourished, it became more difficult to transfer the plants and garden soil through the use of a pushcart so
Encarnacion bought an owner-type jeep for transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not pass through the
roadpath so he approached Sagun and Masigno asking them if they would sell to him 1 meters of their property
to add to the existing roadpath but the 2 refused the offer.

Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way
over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed the complaint for there is another outlet, which is
through the dried river bed. This was affirmed by the CA thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to an widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way
RULING: YES
Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is
absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is
grossly insufficient. In the case at bar, although there is a dried river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge
and there is no egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally
jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is impassable due to the floods. When a private property has no
access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the nonavailability of the dried river bed as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of the
dominant estate. Art. 651 provides that the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient
for the needs of the dominant estate To grant the additional easement of right of way of 1 meters,
Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land occupied plus amount of the damages
caused until his offer to buy the land is considered.

RULING: NO.
GENERAL RULE: No part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a party wall a window or
opening of any kind (Art. 580)
The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may be the basis for acquisition of a prescriptive title without
the necessity of any active opposition because it always presupposes the express or implied consent of the owner
of the wall, which in time, implies a voluntary waiver of the right to oppose.

EXCEPTION: When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is need of a prohibition from
exercising that neighbor's right to build on his land or cover the closed window on the party wall.
The period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the neighbor consents to it.
Note: The law refers to all kinds of windows, even regulation windows. According to article 528, windows with
"similar projections" include sheds.

The exception applies in this case because

1) what is concerned is a party wall;
2) there was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the Cortes' window (Yu-Tibo wanted to
raise his roof which would in effect cover 1/2 of the window).
REYES V. MOSQUEDA- Donation Inter Vivos
The nature of the disposition made is the determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos or
mortis causa and not the title given to a deed of donation.

FACTS:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters,
herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI
for the administration of Pascuals estate. Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some properties included alleging
that these were donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without prejudice
to its final determination in a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining
the CFI from enforcing the order.

CORTES vs. YU-TIBO- Easement of Light and View

FACTS:
Easement disputed here is the easement of light and view. Plaintiffs wife has certain windows on her property
which open on the adjacent lot. It has been established that the plaintiffs hasnt done any formal act prohibiting the
owner of the house of the adjacent house prohibiting them to make any improvements. Plaintiff claims that period
of prescription started when those windows were made and acknowledge by the owner of the adjacent lot.
Defendant however claims that there should be a formal act prohibiting them from doing a certain act to trigger
the prescriptive period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs have acquired the easement through prescription?

Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of donation inter vivos
in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation. When she reached the age of
majority, she had the donation registered but found out that the certificate of title was missing so she filed a
petition for reconstitution of title which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in
her name.

Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Ofelias TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against Benjamin Reyes. The CFI

issued a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelias TCT was null and void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal
to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis causa
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula
(2) Whether or not the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos
RULING:
(1) YES
It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final determination in a
separate action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties, it
can determine whether or not the properties should be included in the inventory to be administered. Such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.
(2) YES
Although the donation was entitled donations mortis causa it has been held that dispositions in a deed of
donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body of the document which
should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

RULING:
It was donation inter vivos. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations, and that they
needed to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since it has a different application to a donation mortis
causa. Also, the court stated four reasons to the matter: (1) that the spouses donated the parcels of land out of love
and affection, a clear indication of a donation inter vivos; (2) the reservation of a lifetime usufruct; (3) reservation
of sufficient properties for maintenance that shows the intention to part with their six lot; and (4) respondent's
acceptance, contained in the deed of donation. Once a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be revoked,
except for officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to invoke.
Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. CA/RIETA

G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991

FACTS:
1.

For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be present:
1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over the property
2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will
3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee

The following are not present in the case. The transfer of ownership was immediate and independent of the death
of the donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved sufficient properties for himself to maintain him for
life confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership immediately after execution of the deed of
donation.
GESTOPA VS. CA FACTS- Acceptance in Donation
Acceptance is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not
required to be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime.
FACTS:
Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they executed a donation mortis causa in favor of
respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving donor's rights to amend, cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell
or encumber such properties. Years later, they executed another donation, this time inter vivos, to six parcels of
land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits of the land during their lifetime and for prohibiting
the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners,
spouses Gestopa, and eventually revoking the donation. Respondent filed a petition to quiet title, stating that she
had already become the owner of the parcels of land. Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.

RIETA FILED NULLIFICATION OF DEED OF DONATION, RECISSION OF CONTRACT

AND RECONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY WITH DAMAGES against Ignao and
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, CAVITE/MANILA.
a.

Executed deed of donation covering a parcel of land

i. CONDITION: Donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred
(100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise would render ipso facto
null and void; deed and property would revert back to donors.
b.
2.

Bishop of Imus executed a deed of absolute sale to Ignao for P114,000

IGNAO: MOTION TO DISMISS

a.

No legal capacity to sue

b.

No cause of action

c.

Prescribed (added by Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus)

d.

Not a real party in interest (Bishop of Manila)

Was ruled that the complaint for cause of action has already prescribed.

3.

APPEALED TO CA:

Judgment SET ASIDE and another judgment DISMISSED.

DEED HAS AUTOMATIC REVERSION EXPRESSED, JUDICIAL DECLARATION NOT NECESSARY
HENCE.
a. Judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that
it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.
b. Judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting the
power of cancellation.

1.
a.

WON the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of
sale) has prescribed

b.

WON the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed of

donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the
dismissal of the main action for reconveyance.

CA held that action not prescribed.

ISSUE:
Has the cause of action already prescribed? NO.
ARTICLE 764: "(t)his action shall prescribe after 4 years from the non-compliance with the
condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the
donee's heirs.
Is there a cause of action? UNJUSTIFIED CAUSE OF ACTION
HELD:

2. UNDUE RESTRICTION ON RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY.

a. DONATION: effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
b. Condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.