A Presentation By

LT COL LEONIDAS L HIDALGO (CAV) PA

(With the ARMY EOD BN)
To The Meeting of
Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the
CCW, Amended Protocol II to the Convention
(19 - 20 April 2010)

I.

Brief IED History

II. CY 09, IED Incidents

III. The IEDs
IV. Analysis
V. Lessons Learned
VI. Actions Taken

The significant use of IEDs started

at the height of AFPs campaign
against the MILF in CY 2000
Frequent targets then were Natl
Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power
line Towers in Mindanao
Recorded IED Incidents
9 60 incidents in 2000
9 27 in 2001
9 48 in CY 02
02 and
and 41 in CY 03
The increase from 2001 to
2002 due to alliance of MILFs
hardliners with the terror
groups Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
and Abu Sayaff Group (ASG)

IED incidents reduced to 24 in CY 2004 and

then
then 15
15 in CY 2005
9 Due to significant developments in the
government-initiated peace talks
CY 06 to CY 08
9 Gradual but steady rise of IED incidents
until the 1stst semester of CY 08 with
public places and business centers as
targets
9 Sharp rise of IED incidents after the
failed signing
signing of
of the
the MOA-AD
MOA-AD in
in Aug
Aug 08.
08.
9 National Grid Corp
Power-line Towers
the primary targets

of the Phil
were again

(NGCP)
one of

Calendar Year 2009

9 Maintained rise of IED incidents with
urban centers, transport facilities as
targets to include NGCP Power-line
Towers
Al Khobar Group
9 Claimed responsibility on the IED attacks
in Southern and Central Mindanao
9 Not to implicate the MILF with the terror
attacks
Lawless MILF Groups (LMG) also led to the
rise of IED incidents in CY 09 which generally
targets government troops.

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

46
36
Terrorism

27

25

21

Extortion
18

18
11
1

1stQuarter

Feud

12

10
4 5

2ndQuarter

Political
Total

4 3

3rdQuarter

3 3

4thQuarter

35
30

29

25
20

19
1stQtr

15
10
5

12
8

2ndQtr
9
6
0 2 1 0

1 1

3rdQtr

7
0

2 2 0

4thQtr
3
1 0 0 0
1
0

140

125

120
100
73

80
60
40
20

36

52

46

2016

28
18

16

1stQtr

2ndQtr

3rdQtr

25
9

9 9

RenderedSafe
Total

18

0
4thQtr

CompletedAttack

Total

300

282

250

218

200

KIA (Mil/PNP)
142

150
99
77

100
50

22

30
20

911

WIA (Mil/PNP)
48

20

0
1stQtr

2ndQtr

Killed (Civ)

110

3rdQtr

00

1111

4thQtr

37
19
8

Toital

Wounded

Recovered in the area of

Southern Mindanao

Main charge MOL 50m

commercial Detonating Cord
Booster MOL 3m coiled
Commercial Detonating Cord
in a sardine can
Detonator Two (2) each
Improvised Electric BC
Power-source 6/9V wet cell
battery
Container cylindrical metal
container w/ cone liner
Means of Initiation
Command activated via firing
wire

Recovered in the area of

Southern Mindanao

Main charge 23 cylinders (125 g)

water gel commercial explosives
Booster MOL 3mtrs coiled
commercial Detonating Cord in a
sardine can.
Detonator Two (2) each
Improvised Electric BC
Power-source - 6/9V wet cell
battery
Container Freon (Refrigerant)
tank
Means of Initiation Command
activated via firing wire

Recovered in the area of

Northern Mindanao

Main charge MOL 10Kg

Aluminized Ammonium Nitrate
Booster MOL 3m coiled
commercial Detonating Cord in
a sardine can
Detonator 2 ea improvised
Electric BC
Power-source 6/9V wet cell
battery
Container cylindrical metal
container w/ cone liner
Means of Initiation
Command activated via firing
wire

Recovered in the area of

Northern Mindanao

Main charge kg TNT &

Picric Acid
Booster MOL .25m
commercial Detonating Cord
Detonator 1 each Improvised
Electric BC
Power-source 6/9V wet cell
battery
Container metal container
fashioned to that of M18A1
APers claymore mine
Enhanced Fragmentation cut
corrugated steel bars
Means of Initiation Command
activated via firing wire

Main charge One (1) rd

Ctg, 60mm, HE
Booster Tetryl (standard
booster of the Ctg, 60mm,
HE round)
Detonator One (1)
Improvised Elect BC
Power-source 2 each 9V
Batteries
Disguise Container None
Means of Initiation Victim
activated via trip wire w/
improvised slide switch

Recovered along the main road towards Hqs 603rd Bde,

Camp Abu Bakr, Barira, Maguindanao

Main charge One (1) rd

Ctg, 60mm, HE
Booster standard booster
of the Ctg, 60mm, HE
round (Tetryl)
Detonator One (1) each
Improvised Elect BC
Power-source 2 each 9V
Batteries
Disguise Container None
Means of Initiation Victim
activated via trip wire w/
clothes pin

Recovered along a foot trail in the hinterlands of Camp Abu

Bakr, Barira, Maguindanao

An anti-lift and anti-open switch

Main charge One (1) rd

Ctg, 60mm, HE
Booster standard booster
of the Ctg, 60mm, HE
round (Tetryl)
Detonator One (1) each
Improvised Elect BC
Power-source 2 each 9V
Batteries
Disguise Container Lunch
Box (Plastic)
Means of Initiation Two
way (Timer rundown &
Victim activated

Main charge Two (2) rds, Ctg, 60mm, HE

Booster standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round (Tetryl)
Detonator One (1) each Improvised Elect BC
Power-source 2 each 9V Batteries
Container Carton Box
Means of Initiation Command activated via Remote Control Toy

IED Nr 01

two9vbatteries

Command
Command detonated
detonated means
means of
of Kenwood
initiation
initiation via
via Hand
Hand Held
Held Radio
Radio
Model:TH234
Note
Note 1:
1: Glass
Glass jar
jar containing
containing the
the Freq:173.11
same
same explosive
explosive as
as IED
IED #2s
#2s
main
main charge
charge was
was used
used as
as aa
booster.
booster.

PossiblyTNTpowdermixedwith
picricacidandANFOasthemain
charge

plastic
booster

A 20ltr plastic container

servedastheIEDcontainer

Asackservedasdisguise
containerfortheIED

IED Nr 02

cellphone

Command
detonated
means of initiation via
Nokia 3310 cell phone.
Anti-personnel with 10-12
lb main charge-Possibly
TNT powder

MOL12lbsTNTpowderasMainChargewithcutrebar
andballbearingsasenhancedfragmentation.

9Vbattery

4litercontainer

(3) IEDs w/ advanced circuitry

(4) 4-liter plastic containers filled w/TNT
(5) Improvised pressure switches
(1) 200 gram can filled w/ Tetryl explosive

(1) Plastic bottle w/schematic drawings

(1) 60mm HE mortar

Anti-lift & Anti-open

device/switches

Use of 555 IC
(Time Delay & Possible RCIED)

ItIt is
is suspected
suspected that
that this
this device
device works
works similar
similar to
to the
the (3)
(3) IEDs
IEDs recovered
recovered from
from
the
the ASG
ASG Camp
Camp at
at Tubora
Tubora hill
hill due
due to
to the
the same
same circuit
circuit board
board and
and components.
components.
Due
Due to
to disruption
disruption of
of the
the device,
device, exact
exact placement
placement of
of all
all the
the components
components could
could
not
not be
be determined
determined but
but initial
initial analysis
analysis suggests
suggests that
that the
the device
device would
would be
be
initiated
initiated by
by anti-open,
anti-open, anti-lift,
anti-lift, or
or timewhichever
timewhichever event
event took
took place
place first.
first.

Fuel Tank filled with HE (Picric Acid, TNT & Comp B)

Booster (Booster Charge for Ctg, 81mm, HE
Improvised Elec Blasting Cap

The circuit wires

One (1) 9Volt Battery (Power Source)
Quartz Table Clock w/ One (1) AA Btry

9
V

24

 VBIED with a Timer Rundown

Means of Initiation
It has various Artillery Ammunition
(UXO) as Main Charge.

 VBIED with a Timer Rundown Means of Initiation

It has various Artillery Ammunition (UXO) as Main
Charge.

The motorcycles Air Cleaner was used to contain the IED

components.

Command detonated means of initiation via Cell

Phone.
One of the Two (2) IEDs that detonated on same day
that wounded One (1) Bomb Tech from 63rd EOD Tm.

Command detonated means of initiation w/ an electronic

timer arming switch (UA 741 IC).

Command detonated via Two-Way Radio

Recovered from Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

members in Midsayap, North Cotabato

Command-detonated means of initiation via a remote

control activated Doorbell as switch.

A papaya fruit inside a plastic bag was used as a

container to hide the IED.

A wooden box (containing 2 RPG warheads) with a

pressure type means of initiation when stepped upon

An IED with a Jetmatic water pump body as casing and

has a command means of initiation via 3310 CP

An RPG 2 Launcher rigged as an IED with command

means of initiation to fire the RPG round via a 3310 CP

0New Peoples Army (NPA)

composed of two (2) types.

IEDs

are

Anti Tank/Material, shaped charge to harness the

optimum blast effect.
Anti personnel, patterned the design of M18A1 AP
claymore mine to focus the direction of the blast to
a desired target.
Both type of IED are emplaced as a road side IED to
ambush passing government troops, mounted or
infantry.
Command means of initiation via a firing wire.

0IEDs in Central and Western Mindanao

evolved from simple to a more complex
means of initiation.
Victim activated (Electro-Mechanical)
Timer Run down using alarm clocks
Initiation through Cell Phones, HH Radios, Radio
Controlled devices and Remote Doorbell Chimes
Others has electronic timer arming system (555 &
UA 741 IC) with remote means of initiation

0 Main charge of choice is

unexploded explosive ordnance.

generally

0 Different disguise containers are used to

blend the device with the environment.
0 IED used in targeting Natl Grid Corp of the
Phil (NGCP) Power line towers has multiple
main charges connected in parallel to the
power source.

0Mohammad Baehaqi, aka

Salman/Latif/ Tatoh
9 Indonesian JI operative captured on 17
Feb 08 in Davao Oriental Province
9 electronic circuits used in most IED
attacks are the same with the recovered
electronic circuits

Elect Circuits from TRANSCO Tower Nr 100, Bagontapay, Mlang,

Ncot, 25 Jun 08 and TRANSCO Compound, New Carmen, Tacurong
City, Sultan Kudarat, 05 June 08

ElectCircuitsrecoveredfrom
MohammadBaehaqi

Bandung Device, 2003, Item retained

by Indonesian Authorities

Electronic Switch, recovered

from Mohammad Baehaqi

Recovered fm Jimbaran, Nyoman

Cafe suicide bombings in Bali,
Indonesia on 01 Oct 05

Post Mortem Recovery fm

victims

Reference Components

The similarity of IED signatures indicate that

some threat groups have undergone the same
training.
The JI have conducted trainings on IED
construction attended by personalities from
different threat groups in order to sow greater
terror
Electronic devices used as component of IEDs are
available in any electronic shops.
Primary source of IED main charges are dud fired
(Unexploded
Explosive
Ordnance)
artillery
rounds.

Improper disposal of misfired artillery ammunition

leads to the recovery of same by the enemy
recycling it as an IED main charge.
The use of IED by the terrorists in a firefight is a
very effective counter mobility measure.
Operating troops fell victims to IED due to limited
knowledge regarding same.
EOD Technicians have limited Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE) in countering the IED threat.
EOD units are still poorly equipped to combat
IEDs.

Rationalized the deployment of EOD personnel

in order to provide continuous EOD support to
Army units in priority areas.
Conduct of in-service counter-IED operations
training taking into consideration the lessons
learned from past IED incidents.
Conduct of Explosive related trainings such as
Mine Countermine and IED Awareness
Training in coordination with DTUs and other
units in order to educate AFP personnel.

Conduct of public information campaign and

seminars on IED Awareness and Bomb Threat
Management in coordination with LGUs
targeting various sectors of society to protect
the populace from IED hazards.
Conduct of Ammunition Surveillance and
Inspection of issued ammunition to Army Field
Units in order to ensure serviceability of
ammunition when used.
Field improvisation of EOD tools & equipment

Conduct of Ammunition Storage and Handling

seminars/trainings in coordination with DTUs
and Forward Service Support Units (FSSUs) to
educate AFP personnel in the maintenance of
their issued ammunition.
Active participation in the formulation and
advocacy of the Inter-Agency Protocol on
Explosives-related Incident Investigations
under the auspices of NCTU, ATC.
Requisition of EOD essential equipment to
higher headquarters to upgrade the capability
of EOD units.