Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MUOZ
23 SCRA 1183 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Systems of Registration Prior to PD 1529 Spanish Titles
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) is a company engaged in logging. It was given a
Certificate of Private Woodland Registration so that it can operate in a 72,000 hectare land. It also has a Titulo de
Propriedad which it acquired in 1894 under the Spanish regime.
In 1964, the NAWASA (National Water and Sewerage Authority) director ordered the cancellation of Piadecos
certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and
Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement
with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry. The latter ruled
that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a Certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.
HELD: No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There should be no question
now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law.
Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department
head, to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public
forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and
regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end. Forestry Administrative Order
12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A
rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation, [a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes.
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan,
Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase
from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty
(30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or
prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from
forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-ininterest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment.
For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers
or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public
forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval Reservation
comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government.
Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued
a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to
some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for
extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon) promulgated on
December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary
timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the
Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March
9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago). Petitionerappellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the
motion.
ISSUES:
I. Whether
or
not
petitioners
timber
license
is
valid
(No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)
RULING:
I
Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is therefore void ab initio. In
the first place, in the general memorandum dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a
new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public
forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the
petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. (The license was released to the
petitioner onJanuary 6, 1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue license was
revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the
license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date of the
release or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his
timber license. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper
exercise of police power.
II
Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President has the power
to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is
failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.
the
Director
Whether
of
Forestry
elevated
or
not,
mangrove
the
case
swamps
to
the
are
Supreme
Court
agricultural
for
land
review
or
on
certiorari.
forest
land.
Held: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Furthermore the legislative definition embodied in
section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps or manglares form
part of the public forests of the Philippines hence they are not alienable. The evidence presented by the respondent in
its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of the land, he only presented tax declaration.
Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application for registration of title by the
respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.
to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and
inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will
not lie. There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and
against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case,
the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy
issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in
determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties
who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause.
Facts:
This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio
who were caught by one Pablo opinion to transport illegal pieces of lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio,
the Holy Cross Funeral Services. Here, the respondents alleged without proper documents. Here, Daraman and
Lucenecio had no permit to transport lumber although they that one Asan, owner of furniture shop ask the two to bring
also some pieces of wood to his house located near the funerals location.
DENR employee, saw the vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some lumber and issued an order of forfeiture. The
court granted bond and released the funeral car and lumber because it was found out that Daraman and Lucenecio
were not owners of the vehicle and lumber. Hence, this complaint was filed.
Issue: WON the respondents violated P.D. 705 section 68-A
Held:
Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A P.D. 705 is also applicable to those who transport lumber without
proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no permit to transport lumber although they were only asked to
bring the lumber to the house of one Asan.
The RTC has overstepped its jurisdiction of the case since DENR was given the power to confiscate the property in
favor of the state/government. The release of this property defeated the purpose of section 68-A of P.D. 705. Therefore,
SC granted the petition of DENR, RTCs decision was reversed and set aside.
CALUB V. CA
G.R. No. 115634
April 27, 2000
FACTS: the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles wherein Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the
vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the
vehicles and its load of lumber. Petitioner, Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then
filed a criminal complaint against Abuganda, for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
(Revised Forestry Code). Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even granted recovery of possession to them via
replevin.
Upon petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals denied said petition, stating that the mere seizure of a motor
vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not
automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the
Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of
illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is
subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court.
The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said.
Additionally, respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the
Secretary. Moreover, petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior
to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according
to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis
ISSUE: W/N said motor vehicles are in custodial legis pursuant to Section 68 of PD 705. YES.
RATIO: Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could
evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was
allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Note further that petitioners failure to observe the
procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not
submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd
day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles
from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the
second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice
to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin.
The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry
Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected
under the circumstances.
Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our
view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it
is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise
PAAT V. CA
G.R. No. 111107
January 10, 1997
FACTS: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from
Cagayan, was seized by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued an order of confiscation of the truck
and gave the owner 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private
respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. Later, the Regional Executive Director of DENR
sustained petitioner Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Respondents then appealed.
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against petitioner
Layugan and Executive Director, which thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.
Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia,
that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss, which the CA affirmed upon petitioners appeal.
ISSUES:
1.
W/N an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705. NO.
2.
W/N the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government. YES.
RATIO: Firstly, the Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. The premature invocation of
courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was
pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the
motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration
dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek
to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case.
Secondly, as to the power of the DENR to confiscate, SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or
His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any
forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land,
water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
and policies on the matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are
given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules
and regulations.
Lastly, as to the contention that since they are not liable for qualified theft, then they should not have
necessarily have committed a crime under Sec. 68. This is unmeritorious. With the introduction of Executive Order No.
277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products
without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty
of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the
words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code .
FACTS:
On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose,
Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel
in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck.
LOWER COURTS:
* CENRO: Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days
within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to
submit the required explanation.
* RED- DENR: On June 22, 1989,i[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner
Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28,
1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of
July 12, 1989.ii[2]
* DENR-SECRETARY (Pending resolution)
* RTC (action for replevin): denied motion to dismiss by Paat (DENR-RED)
* CA (review): denied, has legal questions involved.
(1) Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to
recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines?
NO, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.
(2) Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
YES.
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or
his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed,
or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the
authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor
of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter.
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic]
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not only because the
aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation
by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision
unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A.
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances,'
but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court' in a criminal action has
long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised
except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all.
it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained
by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry
laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
OBITER DICTA:
(1) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This
doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded
(2) the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest
lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
(3) The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
LAGUA V. CUSI
G.R. No. L-44649
April 15, 1988
Ponente: Guiterrez, Jr.
FACTS: This is a mandamus case filed against respondents for closing a logging road without authority. The private
respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of
respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging
roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing
as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The lower court affirmed the respondents defense, stating that the
petitioners must first seek recourse with the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the legality of the closure of
the logging roads, before seeking redress with the regular courts for damages.
ISSUE: W/N the regular courts can take cognizance of the damages case without first seeking the determination of the
Bureau regarding the legality of the closure. YES.
RATIO: P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such
determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by
the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such
closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the
private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and
authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award
or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN; HELD IN ABEYANCE
UNTIL RELEASED AS DISPOSABLE OR ALIENABLE. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands
of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, cell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for granting or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization. The
Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the
public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other
purposes.
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAVING JURISDICTION OVER LEASES OF PUBLIC LANDS FOR
DEVELOPMENT INTO FISHPONDS; PREFERENTIAL RIGHT AMONG APPLICANTS, NOT FEASIBLE WHERE
FILING OF APPLICATIONS PREMATURE. All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim
to have a preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications
filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year,
as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Petitioners application was filed almost two years
before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the
one-year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has
apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretarys order states that all
three applications must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the
Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private
respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.
DECISION
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld the orders of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition of swamplands
for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding
that
only
a
pure
question
of
law
was
involved
in
the
appeal.
There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the Solicitor-Generals brief.
We
do
the
same:chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
"The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or
less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the
potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications with the
Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed
her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both
applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as communal forest and therefore
not
yet
available
for
fishpond
purposes.
"On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the
Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed
their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed
by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was
only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the
attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in
favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal).
Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec.
on
Appeal).
"In an order dated April 5,1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set
aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three
portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective applications (pp. 45, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a petition for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by the Office of the President of the Philippines on
December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant on February 15, 1956
was likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also
denied on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance
against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V.
Gonzales,
and
Jose
M.
Lopez.chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the order of
the
Director
of
Fisheries
awarding
the
entire
area
to
him
be
reinstated.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff had not established
such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Office of the President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review
by
the
courts
in
a
special
civil
action.
The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH CAPRICIOUS AND
WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN
EFFECT ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE PRIORITY RULE ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION
OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING
THE APPLICATIONS OF THE APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING ONLY
AND IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS
AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE APPLICANTS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into fishponds gravely
abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case.
The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application. In determining the priority of application or right to a permit or lease the
following rules shall be observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied and unimproved, the first
applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.
x
"(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the Director of Fisheries by reason of the
fact that the area covered thereby has been certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes,
SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is certified by the Director
of Forestry as available for fishpond purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since the rejection
or cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond application which was rejected or cancelled before, shall
be reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond applications filed for the same area shall be rejected."
The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following
dates:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
1. Teofila L. de Ligasan January 14, 1946
2. Custodio Doromal October 28, 1947
3. Serafin B. Yngson March 19, 1952
4. Anita V. Gonzales March 19, 1953
The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper
administration of justice and processes of the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of
petitioners rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the resolution between him and respondents or file, as he
alleged he did, a criminal complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises factual considerations
including boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the court. (De Midgely v.
Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140, 142).
The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and punish. If any of his
property or other rights over his one-thirds share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct
action before the proper lower court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against Petitioner-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.