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G.R.No.L4977

TodayisSunday,January29,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L4977March22,1910
DAVIDTAYLOR,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
THEMANILAELECTRICRAILROADANDLIGHTCOMPANY,defendantappellant.
W.H.Lawrence,forappellant.
W.L.Wright,forappellee.
CARSON,J.:
Anactiontorecoverdamagesforthelossofaneyeandotherinjuries,institutedbyDavidTaylor,aminor,byhis
father,hisnearestrelative.
Thedefendantisaforeigncorporationengagedintheoperationofastreetrailwayandanelectriclightsystemin
thecityofManila.ItspowerplantissituatedattheeasternendofasmallislandinthePasigRiverwithinthecity
ofManila,knownastheIsladelProvisor.Thepowerplantmaybereachedbyboatorbycrossingafootbridge,
impassableforvehicles,atthewesterlyendoftheisland.
Theplaintiff,DavidTaylor,wasatthetimewhenhereceivedtheinjuriescomplainedof,15yearsofage,theson
ofamechanicalengineer,morematurethantheaverageboyofhisage,andhavingconsiderableaptitudeand
traininginmechanics.
Onthe30thofSeptember,1905,plaintiff,withaboynamedManuelClaparols,about12yearsofage,crossed
thefootbridgetotheIsladelProvisor,forthepurposeofvisitingoneMurphy,anemployeeofthedefendant,who
andpromisedtomakethemacylinderforaminiatureengine.FindingoninquirythatMr.Murphywasnotinhis
quarters,theboys,impelledapparentlybyyouthfulcuriosityandperhapsbytheunusualinterestwhichbothseem
tohavetakeninmachinery,spentsometimeinwanderingaboutthecompany'spremises.Thevisitwasmadeon
a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house
wheretheyhadaskedforMr.Murphy.
Afterwatchingtheoperationofthetravellingcraneusedinhandlingthedefendant'scoal,theywalkedacrossthe
open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces.Heretheyfoundsometwentyorthirtybrassfulminatingcapsscatteredontheground.Thesecapsare
approximatelyofthesizeandappearanceofsmallpistolcartridgesandeachhasattachedtoittwolongthinwires
bymeansofwhichitmaybedischargedbytheuseofelectricity.Theyareintendedforuseintheexplosionof
blastingchargesofdynamite,andhaveinthemselvesaconsiderableexplosivepower.Aftersomediscussionas
totheownershipofthecaps,andtheirrighttotakethem,theboyspickedupalltheycouldfind,hungthemon
stick,ofwhicheachtookend,andcarriedthemhome.Aftercrossingthefootbridge,theymetalittlegirlnamed
JessieAdrian,lessthan9yearsold,andallthreewenttothehomeoftheboyManuel.Theboysthenmadea
seriesofexperimentswiththecaps.Theytrusttheendsofthewiresintoanelectriclightsocketandobtainedno
result.Theynexttriedtobreakthecapwithastoneandfailed.Manuellookedforahammer,butcouldnotfind
one.Thentheyopenedoneofthecapswithaknife,andfindingthatitwasfilledwithayellowishsubstancethey
gotmatches,andDavidheldthecapwhileManuelappliedalightedmatchtothecontents.Anexplosionfollowed,
causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the
contentsofthecap,becamefrightenedandstartedtorunaway,receivedaslightcutintheneck.Manuelhadhis
hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of
whichinjuredhisrighteyetosuchanextentastothenecessitateitsremovalbythesurgeonswhowerecalledin
tocareforhiswounds.
Theevidencedoesdefinitelyandconclusivelydisclosehowthecapscametobeonthedefendant'spremises,nor
how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the
accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those
foundbytheboyswereusedinsinkingawellatthepowerplantneartheplacewherethecapswerefoundandit
alsoappearsthatatoraboutthetimewhenthesecapswerefound,similarlycapswereinuseintheconstruction
ofanextensionofdefendant'sstreetcarlinetoFortWilliamMcKinley.Thecapswhenfoundappearedtotheboys
whopickedthemuptohavebeenlyingforaconsiderabletime,andfromtheplacewheretheywerefoundwould
seemtohavebeendiscardedasdetectiveorworthlessandfitonlytobethrownupontherubbishheap.
Nomeasuresseemstohavebeenadoptedbythedefendantcompanytoprohibitorpreventvisitorsfromentering
andwalkingaboutitspremisesunattended,whentheyfeltdisposedsotodo.Asadmittedindefendantcounsel's
brief,"itisundoubtedlytruethatchildrenintheirplaysometimescrossedthefootbridgetotheislands"and,we
may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place
wherethecapswerefound.Thereisevidencethatanyefforteverwasmadetoforbidthesechildrenfromvisiting
thedefendantcompany'spremises,althoughitmustbeassumedthatthecompanyoritsemployeeswereaware
ofthefactthattheynotinfrequentlydidso.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland
transports.Laterhetookupworkinhisfather'soffice,learningmechanicaldrawingandmechanicalengineering.
About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that
employmentforsixmonthsatasalaryofP2.50adayanditappearsthathewasaboyofmorethanaverage
intelligence,tallerandmorematurebothmentallyandphysicallythanmostboysoffifteen.
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Thefactssetoutintheforegoingstatementaretoourmindfullyandconclusivelyestablishedbytheevidenceof
record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are
plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the
propertyofthedefendant,orthattheyhadcomefromitspossessionandcontrol,andthatthecompanyorsome
ofitsemployeesleftthemexposedonitspremisesatthepointwheretheywerefound.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently relying on the
ruleoflawwhichplacestheburdenofproofofsuchallegationsupontheplaintiff,offerednoevidenceinrebuttal,
and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a
findinginaccordwithhisallegationsinthisregard.
Itwasproventhatcaps,similartothosefoundbyplaintiff,wereused,moreorlessextensively,ontheMcKinley
extension of the defendant company's track that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the
company'spremisesafewmonthsbeforetheaccidentthatnotfarfromtheplacewherethecapswerefoundthe
companyhasastorehouseforthematerials,suppliesandsoforth,usedbyitinitsoperationsasastreetrailway
andapurveyorofelectriclightandthattheplace,intheneighborhoodofwhichthecapswerefound,wasbeing
usedbythecompanyasasortofdumpinggroundforashesandcinders.Fulminatingcapsordetonatorsforthe
discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen,
andunderallthecircumstances,andintheabsenceofallevidencetothecontrary,wethinkthatthediscoveryof
twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly
justifiestheinferencethatthedefendantcompanywaseithertheownerofthecapsinquestionorhadthecaps
underitspossessionandcontrol.Wethinkalsothattheevidencetendstodisclosethatthesecapsordetonators
werewillfullyandknowinglythrownbythecompanyoritsemployeesatthespotwheretheywerefound,withthe
expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that
neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the
evidenceissufficienttosustainafindingthatthecompanyorsomeofitsemployeeseitherwillfullyorthroughan
oversightleftthemexposedatapointonitspremiseswhichthegeneralpublic,includingchildrenatplay,where
not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were
likelytoroamaboutinpastimeorinplay.
Counselforappellantendeavorstoweakenordestroytheprobativevalueofthefactsonwhichtheseconclusions
are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the company's well and on its McKinley
extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed in
blastingthewellwasregularlyemployedbyJ.G.WhiteandCo.,afirmofcontractors,hedidtheworkonthewell
directlyandimmediatelyunderthesupervisionandcontrolofoneofdefendantcompany'sforemen,andthereis
noproofwhateverintherecordthattheblastingontheMcKinleyextensionwasdonebyindependentcontractors.
Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he understood that a part of this work was
donebycontract,hecouldnotsaysoofhisownknowledge,andknewnothingofthetermsandconditionsofthe
alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact having been
proventhatdetonatingcapsweremoreorlessextensivelyemployedonworkdonebythedefendantcompany's
directionsandonitsbehalf,wethinkthatthecompanyshouldhaveintroducedthenecessaryevidencetosupport
its contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material used in
theseoperationsandthatitwasresponsiblefortortiousornegligentactsoftheagentsemployedtherein,onthe
ground that this work had been intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent
superiorshouldnotbeapplied.Ifthecompanydidnotinfactownormakeuseofcapssuchasthosefoundonits
premises,asintimatedbycounsel,itwasaverysimplematterforittoprovethatfact,andintheabsenceofsuch
proofwethinkthattheotherevidenceintherecordsufficientlyestablishesthecontrary,andjustifiesthecourtin
drawingthereasonableinferencethatthecapsfoundonitspremiseswereitsproperty,andwereleftwherethey
werefoundbythecompanyorsomeofitsemployees.
Plaintiffappearstohaverestedhiscase,asdidthetrialjudgehisdecisioninplaintiff'sfavor,upontheprovisions
ofarticle1089oftheCivilCodereadtogetherwitharticles1902,1903,and1908ofthatcode.
ART.1089Obligationsarecreatedbylaw,bycontracts,byquasicontracts,andillicitactsandomissionsor
bythoseinwhichanykindoffaultornegligenceoccurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligenceshallbeobligedtorepairthedamagesodone.
ART.1903Theobligationimposedbytheprecedingarticleisdemandable,notonlyforpersonalactsand
omissions,butalsoforthoseofthepersonsforwhomtheyshouldberesponsible.
Thefather,andonhisdeathorincapacitythemother,isliableforthedamagescausedbytheminorswho
livewiththem.
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Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their
employeesintheserviceofthebranchesinwhichthelattermaybeemployedoronaccountoftheirduties.
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The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employedallthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilytoavoidthedamage.
ART.1908Theownersshallalsobeliableforthedamagecaused
1Bytheexplosionofmachineswhichmaynothavebeencaredforwithduediligence,andforkindlingof
explosivesubstanceswhichmaynothavebeenplacedinasafeandproperplace.
Counselforthedefendantandappellantrestshisappealstrictlyuponhiscontentionthatthefactsprovenatthe
trialdonotestablishedtheliabilityofthedefendantcompanyundertheprovisionsofthesearticles,andsincewe
agreewiththisviewofthecase,itisnotnecessaryforustoconsiderthevariousquestionsastoformandthe
rightofaction(analogoustothoseraisedinthecaseofRakesvs.Atlantic,GulfandPacificCo.,7Phil.Rep.,359),
whichwould,perhaps,beinvolvedinadecisionaffirmingthejudgmentofthecourtbelow.

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We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the
United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery,mustestablishbycompetentevidence:
(1)Damagestotheplaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond,wasguilty.
(3)Theconnectionofcauseandeffectbetweenthenegligenceandthedamage.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the
applicationoftheseprinciplestotheparticularfactsdevelopedinthecaseunderconsideration.
Itisclearthattheaccidentcouldnothavehappenedandnotthefulminatingcapsbeenleftexposedatthepoint
wheretheywerefound,oriftheirownerhadexercisedduecareinkeepingtheminanappropriateplacebutitis
equallyclearthatplaintiffwouldnothavebeeninjuredhadhenot,forhisownpleasureandconvenience,entered
uponthedefendant'spremises,andstrolledaroundthereonwithouttheexpresspermissionofthedefendant,and
hadhenotpickedupandcarriedawaythepropertyofthedefendantwhichhefoundonitspremises,andhadhe
notthereafterdeliberatelycutopenoneofthecapsandappliedamatchtoitscontents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant
company'spremises,andtheinterventionofhisactionbetweenthenegligentactofdefendantinleavingthecaps
exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in
anywisetotheaccident,whichshouldbedeemedtobethedirectresultofdefendant'snegligenceinleavingthe
caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the
accidentwhichoccasionedtheinjuriessustainedbyhim.
Insupportofhiscontention,counselforplaintiffreliesonthedoctrinelaiddowninmanyofthecourtsoflastresort
intheUnitedStatesinthecasesknownasthe"Torpedo"and"Turntable"cases,andthecasesbasedthereon.
Inatypicalcases,thequestioninvolvedhasbeenwhetherarailroadcompanyisliableforaninjuryreceivedby
an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the
railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good reason to suppose,
children would be likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad
company'semployees,oneofwhichwhencarriedawaybythevisitor,explodedandinjuredhimorwheresuch
infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it
probablethatchildreninplayingwithitwouldbeexposedtoaccidentorinjurytherefromandwheretheinfantdid
infactsufferinjuryinplayingwithsuchmachine.
Inthese,andingreatvarietyofsimilarcases,thegreatweightofauthorityholdstheownerofthepremisesliable.
AslaiddowninRailroadCo.vs.Stout(17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a
railroadcompanywasliableforininjuryreceivedbyaninfantwhileuponitspremises,fromidlecuriosity,orfor
purposesofamusement,ifsuchinjurywas,undercircumstances,attributabletothenegligenceofthecompany),
theprinciplesonwhichthesecasesturnarethat"whilearailroadcompanyisnotboundtothesamedegreeof
careinregardtomerestrangerswhoareunlawfullyuponitspremisesthatitowestopassengersconveyedbyit,
it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious
acts"andthat"theconductofaninfantoftenderyearsisnottobejudgedbythesamerulewhichgovernsthatof
adult.Whileitisthegeneralruleinregardtoanadultthattoentitlehimtorecoverdamagesforaninjuryresulting
fromthefaultornegligenceofanotherhemusthimselfhavebeenfreefromfault,suchisnottheruleinregardto
aninfantoftenderyears.Thecareandcautionrequiredofachildisaccordingtohismaturityandcapacityonly,
andthisistobedeterminedineachcasebythecircumstancesofthecase."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in
severalstatecourts,andthesupremecourtofMichiganinthecaseofRyanvs.Towar(128Mich.,463)formally
repudiatedanddisapprovedthedoctrineoftheTurntablecases,especiallythatlaiddowninRailroadCompany
vs.Stout,inaveryabledecisionwhereinitheld,inthelanguageofthesyllabus:(1)Thattheownerofthelandis
notliabletotrespassersthereonforinjuriessustainedbythem,notduetohiswantonorwillfulacts(2)thatno
exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to
attract them to the premises (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be
predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice (4) that there is no
differencebetweenchildrenandadultsastothecircumstancesthatwillwarranttheinferenceofaninvitationora
licensetoenteruponanother'spremises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the courts in
ConnecticutandMassachusetts.(Nolanvs.RailroadCo.,53Conn.,461154Mass.,349).Andthedoctrinehas
beenquestionedinWisconsin,Pennsylvania,NewHampshire,andperhapsinotherStates.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and approving the
doctrinelaiddowninEnglandintheleadingcaseofLynchvs.Nurding(1Q.B.,29,35,36),laydowntherulein
thesecasesinaccordwiththatannouncedintheRailroadCompanyvs.Stout(supra),andtheSupremeCourtof
theUnitedStates,inaunanimousopiniondeliveredbyJusticeHarlaninthecaseofUnionPacificRailwayCo.vs.
McDonalandreconsideredthedoctrinelaiddowninRailroadCo.vs.Stout,andafteranexhaustiveandcritical
analysisandreviewofmanyoftheadjudgedcases,bothEnglishandAmerican,formallydeclaredthatitadhered
"totheprinciplesannouncedinthecaseofRailroadCo.vs.Stout."
InthecaseofUnionPacificRailwayCo.vs.MacDonald(supra)thefactswereasfollows:Theplaintiff,aboy12
years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's premises,
without defendant's express permission or invitation, and while there, was by accident injured by falling into a
burningslackpileofwhoseexistencehehadnoknowledge,butwhichhadbeenleftbydefendantonitspremises
without any fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or
had reason the interest or curiosity of passersby. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be
regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the premises in question, against the
unseendangerreferredto,thedefendantwasundernoobligationtomakeprovision.

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Wequoteatlengthfromthediscussionbythecourtoftheapplicationoftheprinciplesinvolvedtothefactsinthat
case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of
defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no
duty,andinnocasecouldbeheldliableforinjurieswhichwouldnothaveresultedbutfortheentryofplaintiffon
defendant'spremises.
WeadheretotheprinciplesannouncedinRailroadCo.vs.Stout(supra). Applied to the case now before
us,theyrequireustoholdthatthedefendantwasguiltyofnegligenceinleavingunguardedtheslackpile,
made by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal
mine for purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all,
without regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the
minewasbyanarrowpathskirtingitsslackpit,closetoitsdepotbuilding,atwhichthepeopleofthevillage,
oldandyoung,wouldoftenassemble.Itknewthatchildrenwereinthehabitoffrequentingthatlocalityand
playingaroundtheshafthouseintheimmediatevicinityoftheslackpit.Theslightestregardforthesafety
of these children would have suggested that they were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath the
surfaceofwhichwasconcealed(exceptwhensnow,wind,orrainprevailed)amassofburningcoalsinto
which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad
companyoughtnottobeheardtosaythattheplaintiff,amerelad,movedbycuriositytoseethemine,in
thevicinityoftheslackpit,wasatrespasser,towhomitowednoduty,orforwhoseprotectionitwasunder
noobligationtomakeprovisions.
InTownsendvs.Wathen(9East,277,281)itwasheldthatifamandangeroustraps,baitedwithflesh,in
hisownground,soneartoahighway,ortothepremisesofanother,thatdogspassingalongthehighway,
or kept in his neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps, and in
consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted and thereby injured, an action on the case
wouldlie."Whatdifference,"saidLordEllenborough,C.J.,"isthereinreasonbetweendrawingtheanimal
intothetrapbymeansofhisinstinctwhichhecannotresist,andputtinghimtherebymanualforce?"What
difference,inreasonwemayobserveinthiscase,istherebetweenanexpresslicensetothechildrenof
thisvillagetovisitthedefendant'scoalmine,inthevicinityofitsslackpile,andanimpliedlicense,resulting
fromthehabitofthedefendanttopermitthem,withoutobjectionorwarning,todosoatwill,forpurposesof
curiosityorpleasure?ReferringitthecaseofTownsendvs.Wathen,JudgeThompson,inhisworkonthe
Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would
make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's
dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from
liabilityfortheconsequenceofleavingexposedandunguardedonhislandadangerousmachine,sothat
his neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might
therebybekilledormaimedforlife."
ChiefJusticeCooley,voicingtheopinionofthesupremecourtofMichigan,inthecaseofPowersvs.Harlow(53
Mich.,507),saidthat(p.515):
Children,wherevertheygo,mustbeexpectedtoactuponchildlikeinstinctsandimpulsesandotherswho
arechargeablewithadutyofcareandcautiontowardthemmustcalculateuponthis,andtakeprecautions
accordingly.Iftheyleaveexposedtotheobservationofchildrenanythingwhichwouldbetemptingtothem,
and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play
with,theyshouldexpectthatlibertytobetaken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit the
premisesofanother,says:
Inthecaseofyoungchildren,andotherpersonsnotfullysuijuris,animpliedlicensemightsometimesarise
when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed,
wheretheywouldbelikelytogatherforthatpurpose,maybeequivalenttoaninvitationtothemtomake
use of it and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things
temptingtochildren,thesameimplicationshouldarise.(Chap.10,p.303.)
ThereasoningwhichledtheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatestoitsconclusioninthecasesofRailroadCo.vs.
Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this
jurisdictionthaninthatwhereinthosecasesoriginated.Childrenhereareactuatedbysimilarchildishinstinctsand
impulses.Drawnbycuriosityandimpelledbytherestlessspiritofyouth,boyshereaswellastherewillusuallybe
foundwheneverthepublicispermittedtocongregate.Themovementofmachinery,andindeedanythingwhich
arousestheattentionoftheyoungandinquiringmind,willdrawthemtotheneighborhoodasinevitablyasdoes
the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises,
therefore,whereonthingsattractivetochildrenareexposed,oruponwhichthepublicareexpresslyorimpliedly
permittedtoenteroruponwhichtheownerknowsoroughttoknowchildrenarelikelytoroamaboutforpastime
and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the
premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express
permissionheisatrespassertowhomtheownerowesnodutyorobligationwhatever.Theowner'sfailuretotake
reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to
know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to
attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such
conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or
unseendangers,placeduponsuchpremisesbytheowner,isclearlyabreachofduty,responsible,ifthechildis
actuallyinjured,withoutotherfaultonitspartthanthatithadenteredonthepremisesofastrangerwithouthis
expressinvitationorpermission.Toholdotherwisewouldbeexposeallthechildreninthecommunitytounknown
perilsandunnecessarydangeratthewhimoftheownersoroccupantsoflanduponwhichtheymightnaturally
andreasonablybeexpectedtoenter.
Thisconclusionisfoundedonreason,justice,andnecessity,andneitheriscontentionthatamanhasarightto
dowhatwillwithhisownpropertyorthatchildrenshouldbekeptunderthecareoftheirparentsorguardians,so
astopreventtheirenteringonthepremisesofothersisofsufficientweighttoputindoubt.Inthisjurisdictionas
wellasintheUnitedStatesallprivatepropertyisacquiredandheldunderthetacitconditionthatitshallnotbeso
used as to injure the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided
January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a
community organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or
imprudenceineverycasewhereintheypermitgrowingboysandgirlstoleavetheparentalroofunattended,even
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ifintheeventofaccidenttothechildthenegligenceoftheparentcouldinanyeventbeimputedtothechildsoas
todepriveitarighttorecoverinsuchcasesapointwhichweneitherdiscussnordecide.
Butwhileweholdthattheentryoftheplaintiffupondefendant'spropertywithoutdefendant'sexpressinvitationor
permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without
otherfaultonhispart,ifsuchinjurywereattributabletothenegligenceofthedefendant,weareofopinionthat
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking,"attributabletothenegligenceofthedefendant,"and,ontheotherhand,wearesatisfiedthatplaintiffs
action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsiblefortheinjuriesthusincurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the
interventionofhisactionbetweenthenegligentactofthedefendantinleavingthecapsexposedonitspremises
andtheexplosionwhichresultedinhisinjuryshouldnotbeheldtohavecontributedinanywisetotheaccident
and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and
Torpedocases,thatwehavethoughtpropertodiscussandtoconsiderthatdoctrineatlengthinthisdecision.As
wassaidincaseofRailroadCo.vs.Stout(supra),"Whileitisthegeneralruleinregardtoanadultthattoentitle
himtorecoverdamagesforaninjuryresultingfromthefaultornegligenceofanotherhemusthimselfhavebeen
freefromfault,suchisnottheruleinregardtoaninfantoftenderyears.Thecareandcautionrequiredofachild
isaccordingtohismaturityandcapacityonly,andthisistobedeterminedineachcasebythecircumstancesof
thecase." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and
Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence
can be attributed to the plaintiff, a wellgrown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's
uninclosedpremiseswithoutexpresspermissionorinvitation'butitiswhollydifferentquestionwhethersuchyouth
can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and
placedamatchtothecontents,knowing,asheundoubtedlydid,thathisactionwouldresultinanexplosion.On
thispoint,whichmustbedeterminedby"theparticularcircumstancesofthiscase,"thedoctrinelaiddowninthe
Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the
"Torpedo"andanalogouscaseswhichourattentionhasbeendirected,therecorddisclosesthattheplaintiffs,in
whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they were held not to have the
capacitytounderstandthenatureorcharacteroftheexplosiveinstrumentswhichfellintotheirhands.
Inthecaseatbar,plaintiffatthetimeoftheaccidentwasawellgrownyouthof15,morematurebothmentally
andphysicallythantheaverageboyofhisagehehadbeentoseaasacabinboywasabletoearnP2.50aday
asamechanicaldraftsmanthirtydaysaftertheinjurywasincurredandtherecorddisclosesthroughoutthathe
was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusinghimself.Theseriesofexperimentsmadebyhiminhisattempttoproduceanexplosion,asdescribedby
the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity,followedbyhiseffortstoexplodeitwithastoneorahammer,andthefinalsuccessofhisendeavors
broughtaboutbytheapplicationofamatchtothecontentsofthecaps,showclearlythatheknewwhathewas
about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous,inviewofthefactthatthelittlegirl,9yearsofage,whowaswithinhimatthetimewhenheputthe
matchtothecontentsofthecap,becamefrightenedandranaway.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
whichheincurredbuthewellknewthatamoreorlessdangerousexplosionmightbeexpectedfromhisact,and
yethewillfully,recklessly,andknowinglyproducedtheexplosion.Itwouldbegoingfartosaythat"accordingto
hismaturityandcapacity"heexercisedsuchand"careandcaution"asmightreasonablyberequiredofhim,or
that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to
exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhapsimpossiblesotodo,forintheverynatureofthingsthequestionofnegligencenecessarilydependson
theabilityoftheminortounderstandthecharacterofhisownactsandtheirconsequencesandtheageatwhich
aminorcanbesaidtohavesuchabilitywillnecessarilydependsofhisownactsandtheirconsequencesandat
the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying
natureoftheinfinitevarietyofactswhichmaybedonebyhim.Butsomeideaofthepresumedcapacityofinfants
underthelawsinforceintheseIslandsmaybegatheredfromanexaminationofthevaryingagesfixedbyour
laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain
responsibilities,thoughitcannotbesaidthattheseprovisionsoflawareofmuchpracticalassistanceincases
suchasthatatbar,exceptsofarastheyillustratetherulethatthecapacityofaminortobecomeresponsiblefor
hisownactsvarieswiththevaryingcircumstancesofeachcase.UndertheprovisionsofthePenalCodeaminor
over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible
therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an
extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain
circumstances,choosewhichparentitpreferstolivewith(CodeofCivilProcedure,sec.771).At14maypetition
fortheappointmentofaguardian(Id.,sec.551),andmayconsentorrefusetobeadopted(Id., sec. 765). And
malesof14andfemalesof12arecapableofcontractingalegalmarriage(CivilCode,art.83G.O.,No.68,sec.
1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
dangertowhichheexposedhimselfwhenheputthematchtothecontentsofthecapthathewassuijurisinthe
sensethathisageandhisexperiencequalifiedhimtounderstandandappreciatethenecessityfortheexerciseof
thatdegreeofcautionwhichwouldhaveavoidedtheinjurywhichresultedfromhisowndeliberateactandthat
the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
recklessact,sothatwhileitmaybetruethattheseinjurieswouldnothavebeenincurredbutforthenegligence
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximateandprincipalcauseoftheaccidentwhichinflictedtheinjury.

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TheruleoftheRomanlawwas:Quodquisexculpasuadamnumsentit,nonintelligitursentire.(Digest,book50,
tit.17rule203.)
ThePatidascontainthefollowingprovisions:
Thejustthingisthatamanshouldsufferthedamagewhichcomestohimthroughhisownfault,andthat
hecannotdemandreparationthereforfromanother.(Law25,tit.5,Partida3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance should be
againsthimselfandnotagainstanother.(Law2,tit.7,Partida2.)
Accordingtoancientsages,whenamanreceivedaninjurythroughhisownactsthegrievanceshouldbe
againsthimselfandnotagainstanother.(Law2,tit.7Partida2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law touching
contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the
supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep.,
359),clearlydenytotheplaintiffinthecaseatbartherighttorecoverdamagesfromthedefendant,inwholeorin
part,fortheinjuriessustainedbyhim.
ThejudgmentofthesupremecourtofSpainofthe7thofMarch,1902(93JurisprudenciaCivil,391),isdirectlyin
point.Inthatcasethecourtsaid:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a source of
obligationwhenbetweensuchnegligenceandtheinjurythereexiststherelationofcauseandeffectbutif
theinjuryproducedshouldnotbetheresultofactsoromissionsofathirdparty,thelatterhasnoobligation
torepairthesame,althoughsuchactsoromissionwereimprudentorunlawful,andmuchlesswhenitis
shownthattheimmediatecauseoftheinjurywasthenegligenceoftheinjuredpartyhimself.
Thesamecourt,initsdecisionofJune12,1900,saidthat"theexistenceoftheallegedfaultornegligenceisnot
sufficientwithoutproofthatit,andnoothercause,gaverisetothedamage."
SeealsojudgmentofOctober21,1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in his Jurisprudencia del
CodigoCivil(1902Anuario,p.455),commentingonthedecisionofMarch7,1902oftheCivilCode,faultor
negligencegivesrisetoanobligationwhenbetweenitandthedamagethereexiststherelationofcause
andeffectbutifthedamagecauseddoesnotarisefromtheactsoromissionsofathirdperson,thereisno
obligationtomakegooduponthelatter,eventhoughsuchactsoromissionsbeimprudentorillegal,and
muchlesssowhenitisshownthattheimmediatecauseofthedamagehasbeentherecklessnessofthe
injuredpartyhimself.
Andagain
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is
apparentthatitisdutyofhimwhoshallclaimdamagestoestablishtheirexistence.ThedecisionsofApril9,
1896, and March 18, July, and September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first
settingforthindetailthenecessarypointsoftheproof,whicharetwo:Anactoromissiononthepartofthe
personwhoistobechargedwiththeliability,andtheproductionofthedamagebysaidactoromission.
Thisincludes,byinference,theestablishmentofarelationofcauseoreffectbetweentheactoromission
and the damage the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22,
1881,said,itisnecessarythatthedamagesresultimmediatelyanddirectlyfromanactperformedculpably
andwrongfully"necessarilypresupposingalegalgroundforimputability."(DecisionofOctober29,1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. (Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del
CodigoCivil,vol.6,pp.551552.)
(Cf.decisionsofsupremecourtofSpainofJune12,1900,andJune23,1900.)
Finallywethinkthedoctrineinthisjurisdictionapplicabletothecaseatbarwasdefinitelysettledinthiscourtin
the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while
"There are many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the
plaintiffwastheimmediatecauseofthecasualty"(decisionsofthe15thofJanuary,the19thofFebruary,andthe
7thofMarch,1902,statedinAlcubilla'sIndexofthatyear)noneofthecasesdecidedbythesupremecourtof
Spain"definetheeffecttobegiventhenegligenceofitscauses,thoughnottheprincipalone,andweareleftto
seekthetheoryofthecivillawinthepracticeofothercountries"andinsuchcaseswedeclaredthatlawinthis
jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely
deniedtherightofrecoverywhentheactsoftheinjuredpartyweretheimmediatecausesoftheaccident.
Thedoctrineaslaiddowninthatcaseisasfollows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered
immediatecausesoftheaccident.Thetestissimple.Distinctionmustbemadebetweentheaccidentand
theinjury,betweentheeventitself,withoutwhichtherecouldhavebeennoaccident,andthoseactsofthe
victimnotenteringintoit,independentofit,butcontributingtohisownproperhurt.Forinstance,thecause
of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This
producestheeventgivingoccasionfordamagesthatis,thesinkingofthetrackandtheslidingoftheiron
rails.Tothisevent,theactoftheplaintiffinwalkingbythesideofthecardidnotcontribute,althoughitwas
an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or
accident,forwhichhewouldhavebeenresponsible.Wherehecontributestotheprincipaloccurrence,as
one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributesonlytohisowninjury,hemayrecovertheamountthatthedefendantresponsiblefortheevent
shouldpayforsuchinjury,lessasumdeemedasuitableequivalentforhisownimprudence.
Wethinkitisquiteclearthatunderthedoctrinethusstated,theimmediatecauseoftheexplosion,theaccident
whichresultedinplaintiff'sinjury,wasinhisownactinputtingamatchtothecontentsofthecap,andthathaving
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"contributedtotheprincipaloccurrence,asoneofitsdeterminingfactors,hecannotrecover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's
premisesthedetonatingcaps,thepropertyofdefendant,andcarryingtherelationofcauseandeffectbetween
the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries
inflictedupontheplaintiffbytheexplosionofoneofthesecaps.UnderthedoctrineoftheTorpedocases,such
actiononthepartofaninfantofverytenderyearswouldhavenoeffectinrelievingdefendantofresponsibility,
but whether in view of the wellknown fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappersup of
unconsideredtrifles,"ayouthoftheageandmaturityofplaintiffshouldbedeemedwithoutfaultinpickingupthe
capsinquestionunderallthecircumstancesofthiscase,weneitherdiscussnordecide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below,
without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court
whereinitoriginated,wherethejudgmentwillbeenteredinfavorofthedefendantforthecostsinfirstinstance
andthecomplaintdismissedwithoutday.Soordered.
Arellano,C.J.,TorresandMoreland,JJ.,concur.
Johnson,J.,concursintheresult.

Footnotes
1Phil.Rep.,85.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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