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G.R.No.129029

TodayisSunday,January29,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.129029April3,2000
RAFAELREYESTRUCKINGCORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESandROSARIOP.DY(forherselfandonbehalfoftheminorsMariaLuisa,
FrancisEdward,FrancisMarkandFrancisRafael,allsurnamedDy),respondents.
PARDO,J.:
Thecaseisanappealviacertiorarifromtheamendeddecision 1oftheCourtofAppeals2affirmingthedecision
andsupplementaldecisionofthetrialcourt,3asfollows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the appeals interposed by both
accused and Reyes Trucking Corporation and affirming the Decision and Supplemental Decision dated
June6,1992andOctober26,1992respectively.
SOORDERED.4
Thefactsareasfollows:
On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan an amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless
imprudenceresultingindoublehomicideanddamagetoproperty,readingasfollows:
That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being the driver and
personincharge of a Trailer Truck Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A867 registered in the name of Rafael
ReyesTruckingCorporation,withaloadof2,000casesofemptybottlesofbeergrande,willfully,unlawfully
and feloniously drove and operated the same while along the National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in
said Municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, rules
andordinancesandwithouttakingthenecessaryprecautionstopreventinjuriestopersonsanddamageto
property,causingbysuchnegligence,carelessnessandimprudencethesaidtrailertrucktohitandbumpa
NissanPickupbearingPlateNo.BBG957drivenbyFelicianoBalcitaandFranciscoDy,Jr.,@Pacquing,
duetoirreversibleshock,internalandexternalhemorrhageandmultipleinjuries,openwounds,abrasions,
and further causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount of P100,000.00 and to the
deathofFranciscoDy,Jr.@PacquinganddamagestohisNissanPickUpbearingPlateNo.BBG957in
thetotalamountofP2,000,000.00.
CONTRARYTOLAW.
Cauayan,Isabela,October10,1989.
(Sgd.)FAUSTOC.CABANTAC
ThirdAssistantProvincialProsecutor
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the
offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a
reservationtofileaseparatecivilactionagainsttheaccusedarisingfromtheoffensecharged.5OnNovember29,
1989,theoffendedpartiesactuallyfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourt,Isabela,Branch19,Cauayanacomplaint
againstpetitionerRafaelReyesTruckingCorporation,asemployerofdriverRomeoDuncaydeTumol,basedon
quasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle
involved in the accident). The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the
civilcasequasiexdelictotheyfiledagainstpetitioner.OnDecember15,1989,privaterespondentswithdrewthe
reservationtofileaseparatecivilactionagainsttheaccusedandmanifestedthattheywouldprosecutethecivil
aspectexdelictointhecriminalaction.6However,theydidnotwithdrawtheseparatecivilactionbasedonquasi
delictagainstpetitionerasemployerarisingfromthesameactoromissionoftheaccuseddriver.7
Uponagreementoftheparties,thetrialcourtconsolidatedbothcriminalandcivilcasesandconductedajointtrial
ofthesame.
Thefacts,asfoundbythetrialcourt,whichappeartobeundisputed,areasfollows:
The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
transportingbeerproductsfortheSanMiguelCorporation(SMCforShort)fromthelatter'sSanFernando,
PampangaplanttoitsvarioussalesoutletsinLuzon.Amongitsfleetsofvehiclesforhireisthewhitetruck
trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside from the
Corporation'smemorandumtoallitsdriversandhelperstophysicallyinspecttheirvehiclesbeforeeachtrip
(Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMC's Traffic InvestigatorInspector certified the roadworthiness of this White
TrucktrailerpriortoJune20,1989(Exh.17).Inadditiontoaprofessionaldriver'slicense,italsoconducts
arigidexaminationofalldriverapplicantsbeforetheyarehired.

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IntheearlymorningofJune20,1989,theWhiteTruckdrivenbyDuncaleftTuguegarao,Cagayanbound
toSanFernando,Pampangaloadedwith2,000casesofemptybeer"Grande"bottles.Seatedatthefront
right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00
o'clockthatsamemorningwhilethetruckwasdescendingataslightdowngradealongthenationalroadat
Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the
truck'srightlanegoingsouthandaboutsixmetersinlength.Thesemadethesurfaceoftheroaduneven
becausethepotholeswereaboutfivetosixinchesdeep.Theleftlaneparalleltothisdamagedportionis
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the
Nissanwithitsheadlightsoncomingfromtheoppositedirection.Theyusedtoevadethisdamagedroadby
takingtheleftlancebutatthatparticularmoment,becauseoftheincomingvehicle,theyhadtorunoverit.
Thiscausedthetrucktobouncewildly.Duncalostcontrolofthewheelsandthetruckswervedtotheleft
invadingthelaneoftheNissan.Asaresult,Dunca'svehiclerammedtheincomingNissandraggingittothe
leftshoulderoftheroadandclimbedaridgeabovesaidshoulderwhereitfinallystopped.(seeExh.A5,p.
8,record).TheNissanwasseverelydamaged(Exhs.A7,A8,A9andA14,pp.911record),anditstwo
passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly (Exh. A19) from external and
internalhemorrhageandmultiplefractures(pp.15and16,record).
For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh. I3). At the time of his
death he was 45 years old. He was the President and Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic Wood
Products and Development Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing establishment, from which he was
receiving an income of P10,000.00 a month. (Exh. D). In the Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the
spousesFranciscoDy,Jr.andRosarioPerezDyappeartobestockholdersof10,000shareseachwithpar
valueofP100.00pershareoutofitsoutstandingandsubscribedcapitalstockof60,000sharesvaluedat
P6,000,000.00(Exhs.K1&10B).Underits1988IncomeTaxReturns(Exh.J)theDWPChadataxable
net income of P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle University graduate in Business
Administration, past president of the Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the Philippine
Jayceesin1971and1976,respectively,andWorldVicePresidentofJayceesInternationalin1979.Hewas
also the recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. C). His children were all studying in
prestigiousschoolsandspentaboutP180,000.00fortheireducationin1988alone(Exh.H4).
Asstatedearlier,theplaintiffs'procurementofawritofattachmentofthepropertiesoftheCorporationwas
declaredillegalbytheCourtofAppeals.ItwasshownthatonDecember26,1989,DeputySheriffEdgardo
Zabat of the RTC at San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units of Truck Tractors and trailers of the
CorporationatitsgarageatSanFernando,Pampanga.ThesevehicleswerekeptunderPCguardbythe
plaintiffsinsaidgaragethuspreventingtheCorporationtooperatethem.However,onDecember28,1989,
theCourtofAppealsdissolvedthewrit(p.30,record)andonDecember29,1989,saidSheriffreportedto
thisCourtthattheattachedvehiclesweretakenbythedefendant'srepresentative,MelitaManapil(Exh.O,
p. 31, record). The defendant's general Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per day for the non
operation of the six units during their attachment (p. 31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran, proceedings on
December10,1990).8
OnJune6,1992,thetrialcourtrenderedajointdecision,thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingconsiderationsjudgmentisherebyrendered:
1.FindingtheaccusedRomeoDuncaydeTumolguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeofDouble
HomicidethroughRecklessImprudencewithviolationoftheMotorVehicleLaw(Rep.ActNo.4136),and
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstancetooffsetthesame,theCourtherebysentenceshimtosuffertwo(2)indeterminatepenalties
offourmonthsandonedayofarrestomayorasminimumtothreeyears,sixmonthsandtwentydaysas
maximum to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory
damages,P1,000,000.00asmoraldamages,andP1,030,000.00asfuneralexpenses
2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages in the
amountofP84,000.00and
3.OrderingthedismissalofthecomplaintinCivilCaseNo.Br.19424.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Cauayan,Isabela,June6,1992.
(Sgd.)ARTEMIOR.ALIVIA
RegionalTrialJudge9
OnSeptember3,1992,petitionerandtheaccusedfiledanoticeofappealfromthejointdecision.10
Ontheotherhand,privaterespondentsmovedforamendmentofthedispositiveportionofthejointdecisionsoas
toholdpetitionersubsidiarilyliableforthedamagesawardedtotheprivaterespondentsintheeventofinsolvency
oftheaccused.11
On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion by
insertinganadditionalparagraphreadingasfollows:
2:AOrderingthedefendantReyesTruckingCorporationsubsidiarilyliableforallthedamagesawarded
to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused but deducting therefrom the
damagesofP84,000.00awardedtosaiddefendantinthenextprecedingparagraphand...12
OnNovember12,1992,petitionerfiledwiththetrialcourtasupplementalnoticeofappealfromthesupplemental
decision.13
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated
December29,1994,theCourtofAppealsdismissedtheappealoftheaccusedinthecriminalcase.14
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OnJanuary6,1997,theCourtofAppealsrenderedanamendeddecisionaffirmingthatofthetrialcourt,asset
outintheopeningparagraphofthisdecision.15
OnJanuary31,1997,petitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationoftheamendeddecision.16
OnApril21,1997,theCourtofAppealsdeniedpetitioner'smotionforreconsiderationforlackofmerit17
Hence,thispetitionforreview.18
OnJuly21,1997,theCourtrequiredrespondentstocommentonthepetitionwithinten(10)daysfromnotice.19
OnJanuary27,1998,theSolicitorGeneralfiledhiscomment. 20OnApril13,1998,theCourtgrantedleaveto
petitionertofileareplyandnotedthereplyitfiledonMarch11,1998.21
Wenowresolvetogiveduecoursetothepetitionanddecidethecase.
Petitionerraisesthree(3)groundsforallowanceofthepetition,which,however,boildowntotwo(2)basicissues,
namely:
1.Maypetitionerasownerofthetruckinvolvedintheaccidentbeheldsubsidiarilyliableforthedamages
awardedtotheoffendedpartiesinthecriminalactionagainstthetruckdriverdespitethefilingofaseparate
civilactionbytheoffendedpartiesagainsttheemployerofthetruckdriver?
2. May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil
actionagainsttheemployerofthetruckdriverandinamountsexceedingthatallegedintheinformationfor
recklessimprudenceresultinginhomicideanddamagetoproperty?22
Wegrantthepetition,resolvingunderthecircumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to the trial court for
determinationofthecivilliabilityofpetitionerasemployeroftheaccuseddriverinthecivilactionquasiexdelicto
reopenedforthepurpose.
Innegligencecases,theaggrievedpartyhasthechoicebetween(1)anactiontoenforcecivilliabilityarisingfrom
crimeunderArticle100oftheRevisedPenalCodeand(2)aseparateactionforquasidelictunderArticle2176of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other
remedybecausehemaynotrecoverdamagestwiceforthesamenegligentactoromissionoftheaccused. 23
Thisistheruleagainstdoublerecovery.
1 w p h i1 .n t

Inotherwords,"thesameactoromissioncancreatetwokindsofliabilityonthepartoftheoffender,thatis,civil
liabilityexdelicto,andcivilliabilityquasidelicto"eitherofwhich"maybeenforcedagainsttheculprit,subjecttothe
caveatunderArticle2177oftheCivilCodethattheoffendedpartycannotrecoverdamagesunderbothtypesof
liability."24
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as
employer of the accused, based on quasidelict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private
respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be
vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is
foundedonatleasttwospecificprovisionsoflaw.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action
predicatedonquasidelicttobeinstitutedbytheinjuredpartyagainsttheemployerforanactoromissionofthe
employeeandwouldnecessitateonlyapreponderanceofevidencetoprevail.Here,theliabilityoftheemployer
forthenegligentconductofthesubordinateisdirectandprimary,subjecttothedefenseofduediligenceinthe
selectionandsupervisionoftheemployee.Theenforcementofthejudgmentagainsttheemployerinanaction
based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the
employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. 25 The
second,predicatedonArticle103oftheRevisedPenalCode,providesthatanemployermaybeheldsubsidiarily
civillyliableforafelonycommittedbyhisemployeeinthedischargeofhisduty.Thisliabilityattacheswhenthe
employeeisconvictedofacrimedoneintheperformanceofhisworkandisfoundtobeinsolventthatrenders
himunabletoproperlyrespondtothecivilliabilityadjudged.26
Asregardsthefirstissue,theanswerisinthenegative.RafaelReyesTruckingCorporation,asemployerofthe
accusedwhohasbeenadjudgedguiltyinthecriminalcaseforrecklessimprudence,cannotbeheldsubsidiarily
liablebecauseofthefilingoftheseparatecivilactionbasedonquasidelictagainstit.Inviewofthereservationto
file,andthesubsequentfilingofthecivilactionforrecoveryofcivilliability,thesamewasnotinstitutedwiththe
criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
arisingfromthesameactoromissionoftheaccused.27
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when
privaterespondents,ascomplainantsinthecriminalaction,reservedtherighttofiletheseparatecivilaction,they
waivedotheravailablecivilactionspredicatedonthesameactoromissionoftheaccuseddriver.Suchcivilaction
includestherecoveryofindemnityundertheRevisedPenalCode,anddamagesunderArticles32,33,and34of
theCivilCodeofthePhilippinesarisingfromthesameactoromissionoftheaccused.28
Theintentionofprivaterespondentstoproceedprimarilyanddirectlyagainstpetitionerasemployerofaccused
truckdriverbecameclearerwhentheydidnotaskforthedismissalofthecivilactionagainstthelatterbasedon
quasidelict.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner
employeroftheaccusedsubsidiarilyliablefordamagesarisingfromcrime(exdelicto)inthecriminalactionasthe
offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasidelict resulting in the
waiverofthecivilactionexdelicto.
Itmightbearguedthatprivaterespondentsascomplainantsinthecriminalcasewithdrewthereservationtofilea
civilactionagainstthedriver(accused)andmanifestedthattheywouldpursuethecivilliabilityofthedriverinthe
criminal action. However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made
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becauseprivaterespondentsdidnotwithdrawthecivilactionagainstpetitionerbasedonquasidelict. In such a
case,theprovisionofRule111,Section1,paragraph3ofthe1985RulesonCriminalProcedureisclearthatthe
reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other available civil actions arising
fromthesameactoromissionoftheaccused.Rule111,Section1,paragraph2enumeratedwhatarethecivil
actionsdeemedwaiveduponsuchreservationorfiling,andoneofwhichisthecivilindemnityundertheRevised
PenalCode.Rule111,Section1,paragraph3ofthe1985RulesonCriminalProcedurespecificallyprovides:
Awaiverofanyofthecivilactionsextinguishestheothers.Theinstitutionof,orthereservationoftheright
tofile,anyofsaidcivilactionsseparatelywaivestheothers.
Therationalebehindthisruleistheavoidanceofmultiplesuitsbetweenthesamelitigantsarisingoutofthesame
actoromissionoftheoffender.Therestrictivephraseologyofthesectionunderconsiderationismeanttocover
allkindsofcivilactions,regardlessoftheirsourceinlaw,providedthattheactionhasforitsbasisthesameactor
omissionoftheoffender.29
However,petitionerasdefendantintheseparatecivilactionfordamagesfiledagainstit,basedonquasidelict,
may be held liable thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously erred in dismissing plaintiff's civil complaint. And the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision. Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal
fromsuchdismissalandcouldnotbegrantedaffirmativerelief.30
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to promote their objectives and assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding" 31 or
exempted"aparticularcasefromtheoperationoftherules."32
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in
dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not appeal from the
dismissalofthecivilcase.However,petitionerdidappeal.Hence,thiscaseshouldberemandedtothetrialcourt
sothatitmayrenderdecisioninthecivilcaseawardingdamagesasmaybewarrantedbytheevidence.33
Withregardtothesecondissue,theawardofdamagesinthecriminalcasewasimproperbecausethecivilaction
fortherecoveryofcivilliabilitywaswaivedinthecriminalactionbythefilingofaseparatecivilactionagainstthe
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, 34 "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime
committed."TheonlyissuebroughtbeforethetrialcourtinthecriminalactioniswhetheraccusedRomeoDunca
ydeTumolisguiltyofrecklessimprudenceresultinginhomicideanddamagetoproperty.Theactionforrecovery
of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as
employeroftheaccusedtruckdriver.
Inthiscase,accuseddriverjumpedbailpendinghisappealfromhisconviction.Thus,thejudgmentconvictingthe
accused became final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The
damagesawardedinthecriminalactionwasinvalidbecauseofitseffectivewaiver.Thepronouncementwasvoid
becausetheactionforrecoveryofthecivilliabilityarisingfromthecrimehasbeenwaivedinsaidcriminalaction.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount of damages
alleged in the amended information, the issue is de minimis. At any rate, the trial court erred in awarding
damagesinthecriminalcasebecausebyvirtueofthereservationoftherighttobringaseparatecivilactionor
the filing thereof, "there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case
therewouldbenopronouncementastothecivilliabilityoftheaccused.35
Asafinalnote,wereiteratethat"thepolicyagainstdoublerecoveryrequiresthatonlyoneactionbemaintained
forthesameactoromissionwhethertheactionisbroughtagainsttheemployeeoragainsthisemployer. 36The
injuredpartymustchoosewhichoftheavailablecausesofactionfordamageshewillbring.37
Parenthetically,thetrialcourtfoundtheaccused"guiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeofDoubleHomicide
Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)". There is no such
nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the
accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum,tothree(3)years,six(6)monthsandtwenty(20)daysofprisioncorreccional, as maximum." This is
erroneousbecauseinrecklessimprudencecases,theactualpenaltyforcriminalnegligencebearsnorelationto
theindividualwillfullcrimeorcrimescommitted,butissetinrelationtoawholeclass,orseriesofcrimes.38
Unfortunately,wecannolongercorrectthisjudgmenteveniferroneous,asitis,becauseithasbecomefinaland
executory.
UnderArticle365oftheRevisedPenalCode,criminalnegligence"istreatedasamerequasioffense,anddealt
withseparatelyfromwillfuloffenses.Itisnotaquestionofclassificationorterminology.Inintentionalcrimes,the
actitselfispunishedinnegligenceorimprudence,whatisprincipallypenalizedisthementalattitudeorcondition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the
confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as "homicide through reckless
imprudence",andthelikewhenthestricttechnicalsenseis,moreaccurately,"recklessimprudenceresultingin
homicide"or"simpleimprudencecausingdamagestoproperty"."39
Thereisneed,therefore,torectifythedesignationoftheoffensewithoutdisturbingtheimposedpenaltyforthe
guidanceofbenchandbarinstrictadherencetoprecedent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997, and the joint decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal Case No. Br. 19311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19
424,datedJune6,1992.
INLIEUTHEREOF,theCourtrendersjudgmentasfollows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19311, the Court declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property, defined
andpenalizedunderArticle365,paragraph2oftheRevisedPenalCode,withviolationoftheautomobile
law(R.A.No.4136,asamended),andsentenceshimtosuffertwo(2)indeterminatepenaltiesoffour(4)
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monthsandone(1)dayofarrestomayor,asminimum,tothree(3)years,six(6)monthsandtwenty(20)
daysofprisioncorreccional,asmaximum,40withoutindemnity,andtopaythecosts,and
(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19424, the Court orders the case reopened to determine the liability of the
defendantRafaelReyesTruckingCorporationtoplaintiffsandthatofplaintiffsondefendant'scounterclaim.
Nocostsinthisinstance.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo,Melo,Kapunan,Buena,GonzagaReyes,YnaresSantiagoandDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Pleaseseedissentingopinion.
Puno,J.,Iconcurbutprohacvice.
Vitug,J.,Pleaseseeseparateopinion.
Mendoza,J.,Pleaseseemydissent.
Panganiban,J.,Intheresult.
Quisumbing,J.,ConcurinseparateopinionofJ.Vitug.
Purisima,J.,IjoininthedissentofMr.JusticeMendoza.

Footnotes
1InCAG.R.CRNo.14448,promulgatedonJanuary6,1997.
2IbaySomeraJ.,ponente,LipanaReyes+,andVasquez,JJ.,concurring.
3DatedJune6,1992,andOctober26,1992,respectively,inConsolidatedCriminalCaseNo.Br.19311

andCivilCaseNo.Br.19424,RegionalTrialCourt,Cauayan,Isabela,JudgeArtemioR.Alivia,presiding.
4Rollo,pp.3543.
5SeeManifestation,Rollo,p.55.
6Ibid,pp.5556.
7CivilCaseNo.Br.19424.
8Petition,Annex"F",Rollo,pp.6480,atpp.6769.
9Petition,Annex"F",Rollo,pp.6480.
10Rollo,pp.8182.
11Itisnotindicatedwhenthemotionforamendmentofthetrialcourt'sdecisionwasfiled,butthisfactis

mentionedinthetrialcourt'ssupplementaldecisionofOctober26,1992.
12Rollo,pp.8384.
13Rollo,pp.8586.
14CARecord,pp.9294.
15Rollo,pp.3543.
16Petition,Annex"J",Rollo,pp.8791.
17Rollo,p.45.
18FiledonJune13,1997,Rollo,pp.1133.
19Rollo,p.96.
20Rollo,pp.114120.
21Rollo,p.133.
22Petitioner,par.V,Rollo,pp.1133,atp.19.
23Rule111,Section1,paragraph5,1985RulesonCriminalProcedureArticle2177,CivilCodeViratavs.

Ochoa,81SCRA472[1978].
24Jarantillavs.CourtofAppeals,171SCRA429,436[1989].
25Art.2194,CivilCodeofthePhilippines.
26Francovs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,178SCRA331,338[1989].
27Maniagovs.CourtofAppeals,253SCRA674,681[1996].
28Rule111,Section1,paragraph2,1985RulesonCriminalProcedure.
29Pamaran,The1985RulesonCriminalProcedureAnnotated,1998editionpp.128129.
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30Policarpiovs.CourtofAppeals,269SCRA344,357[1997].
31Nervesvs.CivilServiceCommission,276SCRA610,617[1997].
32Blancovs.Bernabe,63Phil.124[1936].
33Guaring,Jr.vs.CourtofAppeals,336Phil.274,283[1997].
3472SCRA562,566[1976].
35Maniagovs.CourtofAppeals,supra,atp.686.
36Maniagovs.CourtofAppeals,supra,atp.687.
37Barredovs.Garcia,73Phil.607[1942],reiteratedinManiagovs.CourtofAppeal,supra.
38Quizonvs.TheJusticeofthePeaceofPampanga,97Phil.342,346[1955].
39Quizonvs.TheJusticeofthePeaceofPampanga,supra,atp.345.
40Thiswasthepenaltyimposedbythetrialcourt,whichhasbecomefinalandexecutory.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

SeparateOpinions
DAVIDE,JR.,C.J.,dissentingopinion
Iunderstandthatthisisanappealbyanemployerfromadecisionholdingitsubsidiarilyliablewiththedriver.The
driver's appeal from the judgment of conviction was dismissed because the driver jumped bail. Hence, the
decisioninthecriminalcaseinsofarasthecriminalliabilityisconcernedisalreadyfirmandfinal.Accordingly,for
thisreasonalonewecannotmodifythedecisionastohim.Themodificationsintroducedintheponenciaisvery
substantialforitdeletestheawardofindemnity.
Also,theplaintiffinCivilCaseNo.Br.19424theactionfordamagesbasedonquasidelictdidnotappeal
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the case. That decision had long become final and
executory.
SincetherewasnoappealfromthedismissalofthecivilcasetotheCourtofAppeals,itlogicallyfollowsthatit
wasnotbroughttothatCourt.Obviously,too,itwasneverbroughttoourjurisdiction.Accordingly,thereisnothing
toremandtothecourtoforiginforfurtherproceedings.
I believe that we cannot even suspend the rules accommodate the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 19424. Such
suspensionwoulddomuchviolencetotherulesandopenfloodgatestodangerousprecedents.
The simple solution in this case is to sustain the judgment of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
holdingpetitioner,asemployeroftheoffendingdriver,subsidiarilyliableforthedamagesadjudged.
Itissettledthateverypersoncriminallyliableforafelonyisalsocivillyliable.(Article100,RevisedPenalCode).
Employersaresubsidiarilycivillyliableforfeloniescommittedbytheiremployees.(Article103,id.).
The aggrieved parties in criminal cases may pursue their claims for damages either as delictual damages, or
quasidelictualdamagesunderArticle2176oftheCivilCode,whichtheCodeconsidersas"entirelydistinctand
separatefromthecivilliabilityarisingfromnegligenceundertheRevisedPenalCode."However,Article2177of
theCivilCodeexpresslyprovidesthat"theplaintiffscannotrecoverdamagestwiceforthesameactoromission
ofthedefendant."
The offended parties filed a separate action for damages under Article 2176. Itmust, however, be pointed out
that,ascanbegatheredfromtheponencia,onlypetitionerwasmadeasdefendantinthatcivilcase.Partofthe
firstparagraphofpagethreeoftheponenciareads:
On November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch
19, Cauayan, a complaint against petiitoner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation as employer of driver
RomeoDuncaydeTumol,basedonquasidelicts.
Obviously then there was no separate civil action for damages arising from the felony. It was then deemed
impliedlyinstitutedinthecriminalactionagainstthedriver.
Thecivilcaseagainstpetitioneralonewasconsolidatedwiththecriminalcasewherethecivilaspectarisingfrom
thedelictwasimpliedlyinstitutedagainstthedriver.Hence,therewasnolegalobstacleforthetrialcourttoaward
damagestherein,suchasindemnityforthedeath,etc.andpursuanttoArticle103oftheRevisedPenalCode,to
make petitioner subsidiarily liable for the awards. Considering, however, the abovestated proscription in Article
2177 of the Civil Code, the trial court had dismissed the civil case for damages against petitioner, which was
alreadymadesubsidiarilyliableforthedamagesinthecriminalcase.
Torecapitulate,boththetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealscommittednoerror.
IvotetoDENYthepetition.
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VITUG,J.,separateopinion
Anearlyestablishedruleunderourlawisthatanactoromission,extracontractualinnature,causingdamageto
another,therebeingfaultornegligencecancreatetwoseparatecivilliabilitiesonthepartoftheoffender,i.e.,civil
liabilityexdelictoandcivilliabilityexquasidelicto.Eitheroneofthesetwopossibleliabilitiesmaybesoughttobe
enforced against the offender subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offendedpartycannot"recoverdamagestwiceforthesameactoromission"orunderbothcauses.1Outsideof
this proscription, the two civil liabilities are distinct and independent of each other thus, and conversely against
theruleondoublerecovery,thefailureofrecoveryinonewillnotnecessarilyprecluderecoveryintheother.
Procedurally, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action under the Civil Code
may be brought separately from the criminal action, provides, nevertheless, that the right to bring it must be
reserved.Rule111readsinfull:
Sec.1.Institutionofcriminalandcivilactions.Whenacriminalactionisinstituted,thecivilactionforthe
recoveryofcivilliabilityisimpliedlyinstitutedwiththecriminalaction,unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthe
civilaction,reserveshisrighttoinstituteitseparately,orinstitutesthecivilactionpriortothecriminalaction.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles32,33,34and2176oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesarisingfromthesameactoromissionofthe
accused.
Awaiverofanyofthecivilactionsextinguishestheothers.Theinstitutionof,orthereservationoftheright
tofile,anyofsaidcivilactionsseparatelywaivestheothers.
Thereservationoftherighttoinstitutetheseparatecivilactionsshallbemadebeforetheprosecutionstarts
topresentitsevidenceandundercircumstancesaffordingtheoffendedpartyareasonableopportunityto
makesuchreservation.
Innocasemaytheoffendedpartyrecoverdamagestwiceforthesameactoromissionoftheaccused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constituteafirstlienonthejudgmentexceptinanawardforactualdamages.
Incaseswhereintheamountofdamages,otherthanactual,isallegedinthecomplaintorinformation,the
correspondingfilingfeesshallbepaidbytheoffendedpartyuponthefilingthereofincourtfortrial.
Sec.2.Institutionofseparatecivilaction.ExceptinthecasesprovidedforinSection3hereof,afterthe
criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until
finaljudgmenthasbeenrenderedinthecriminalaction.
(a) Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action as provided for in the first
paragraph of Section 1 hereof before the filing of the criminal action and the criminal action is
subsequentlycommenced,thependingcivilactionshallbesuspended,inwhateverstagebeforefinal
judgmentitmaybefound,untilfinaljudgmentinthecriminalactionhasbeenrendered.However,if
no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be
consolidatedwiththecriminalactionuponapplicationwiththecourttryingthecriminalaction.Ifthe
application is granted, the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional
evidencethatanypartymaywishtopresent.Incaseofconsolidation,boththecriminalandthecivil
actionsshallbetriedanddecidedjointly.
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceedsfromadeclarationinafinaljudgmentthatthefactfromwhichthecivilmightarisedidnot
exist.
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided for in articles 32, 33, 34,
and2176oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,theindependentcivilactionwhichhasbeenreservedmaybe
broughtbytheoffendedparty,shallproceedindependentlyofthecriminalaction,andshallrequireonlya
preponderanceofevidence.
In the recently decided case of San Ildefonso Lines,Inc.,vs. Court of Appeals et al.,2 the Supreme Court has
ruledthat,notwithstandingtheindependentnatureofcivilactionsfallingunderArticles32,33,34and2176ofthe
CivilCode,therighttoinstitutetheactionmuststillhavetobereserved.InthesternwordsoftheCourt:The"past
pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an unauthorized amendment to substantive law, i.e.,
the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling." Essentially, I share this view although I also understand San
Ildefonso as merely fortifying a procedural rule that unless a reservation is made, the court trying the criminal
case would not, for instance, be precluded from taking cognizance of the civil aspect of the litigation and that,
upon the other hand, the other court in the civil case might, motuproprio or at the instance of a party, hold in
abeyancetheconsideration.thereofpendingtheoutcomeofthecriminalcase.InManiagovs.CourtofAppeals,3
theCourthassaidthattherequirementofreservationisnotincompatiblewiththedistinctandseparatecharacter
ofindependentcivilactions.Indeed,thereisnoincongruencebetweenallowingthetrialofcivilactionstoproceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and mandating that, before so proceeding, a reservation to do so
shouldfirstbemade.
Infine
First The civil action is deemed instituted together with the criminal case except when the civil action is
reserved.4 The reservation should be made at the institution of the criminal case.5 In independent civil actions,
not being dependent on the criminal case, such reservation would be required not for preserving the cause of
actionbutinordertoallowthecivilactiontoproceedseparatelyfromthecriminalcaseininterestofgoodorder
and procedure.6 Indeed, independent civil actions already filed and pending may still be sought to be
consolidated in the criminal case before final judgment is rendered in the latter case.7 When no criminal
proceedings are instituted, a separate civil action may be brought to demand the civil liability, and a
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preponderance of evidence is sufficient to warrant a favorable judgment therefor.8 The same rule applies if the
informationweretobedismisseduponmotionofthefiscal.9
SecondThependencyofthecriminalcasesuspendsthecivilaction,except
(a) When properly reserved, in independent civil actions, such as those cases (a) not arising from the act or
omissioncomplainedofasafelony(e.g.culpacontractualunderArt.31, 10intentionaltortsunderArts32 11and
34,12andculpaacquilianaunderArt.2176 13oftheCivilCode)or(b)wheretheinjuredpartyisgrantedaright
tofileanactionindependentandseparatefromthecriminalaction(e.g.Art.33,14CivilCode)and
(2)Inthecaseofprejudicialquestionswhichmustbedecidedbeforeanycriminalprosecutionmaybeinstituted
ormayproceed(Art.36,CivilCode).
In the above instances, the civil case may proceed independently and regardless of the outcome of the
criminalcase.
ThirdAnacquittalinthecriminalcasemaybaranyfurtherseparatecivilaction,except
(1) In independent civil actions, unless the complainant, not having reserved a separate action, has actively
participatedandintervenedinthecriminalcase.15Suchactiveparticipationandinterventioncanonlybedeemed
tobeanunequivocalelectionbythecomplainanttosueunderexdelicturatherthanonanothercauseofaction
(arisingfromthesameactoromissioncomplainedofasbeingexdelictu).If,however,theacquittalispredicated
onthegroundthatguilthasnotbeenprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt,andnotuponafindingthatthe"factfrom
whichthecivil(action)mightarisedidnotexist,"anactionfordamagescanstillbeinstituted.16
(2) In dependent civil actions where the acquittal is premised on a failure of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
which the court shall so declare as its basis, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted.Suchactionrequiresonlyapreponderanceofevidence.Whereacquittalisthusbasedonthefactthat
thecrimedidnotexistorthattheoffenderdidnotcommitthecrime,andnotonmerequantumof proof, a civil
actionbasedonsuchexdelictuofwhichtheaccusedisalreadyacquittedwouldbeimproper.17
Thevicariousliabilityofanemployerforthefaultornegligenceofanemployeeisfoundedonatleasttwospecific
provisionsoflaw.ThefirstisexpressedinArticle2176,inrelationtoArticle2180,oftheCivilCodewhichwould
allowanactionpredicatedonquasidelicttobeinstitutedbytheinjuredpartyagainsttheemployerforanactor
omissionoftheemployeeandwouldnecessitateonlyapreponderanceofevidenceinordertoprevail.Here,the
liabilityoftheemployerforthenegligentconductofthesubordinateisdirectandprimarysubjecttothedefenseof
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the
employerforanactionbasedonArticle2176doesnotrequiretheemployeetobeinsolventsincethenatureof
the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is
solidary.18Thesecond,predicatedonArticle103oftheRevisedPenalCode,providesthatanemployermaybe
heldsubsidiarilyliableforafelonycommittedbyhisemployeeinthedischargeofhisduty.Thisliabilityattaches
whentheemployeeisconvictedofacrimedoneintheperformanceofhisworkandisfoundtobeinsolventthat
rendershimunabletoproperlyrespondtothecivilliabilityadjudged.19
Normally, the judgment in the criminal case concludes the employer not only with regard to the civil liability but
likewisewithregardtoitsamountsincetheliabilityofanemployerfollowsthatoftheemployee. 20Nevertheless,
dueprocessdemandsthattheemployerbeaccordedfullopportunitytobeheardtodisputethebasicthesisupon
which that liability is premised, i.e., the existence of an employeremployee relationship, engagement in an
industry by the employer, and commission of the felony by the employee in carrying on his tasks. In highly
meritoriouscases,theextentoftheliabilityoftheemployerhimself,includingtheamountofdamages,although
finalandconclusiveontheaccused,maybeshownbytheemployertobeclearlyunwarrantedorunconscionable
tobeavalidmeasureofhisownsubsidiaryliability.Insuchaninstance,thereislittleexcusefornotallowingthe
employerdueprocessandtobegivenachancetobeheardthereon.Therightoftheemployertohisowndayin
court,innoway,wouldamendornullifythefinaljudgmentrenderedbythecourtwhichstandsunaffectedinsofar
as the accused himself is concerned. It bears stressing that the employer takes no active role in the criminal
proceedings,norentitledtotakesuchrole,upuntilhesuddenlyfindshimselfopentoapossiblesubsidiaryliability
followingthejudgmentofconviction.
Finally, it may not be amiss to repeat that in independent civil actions only a successful recourse in one would
forecloserecoveryintheother.
Iconcur,therefore,withthemajorityinremandingthecasetothecourtaquoforthedeterminationandextentof
thesubsidiaryliabilityoftheemployerconformablywiththeforegoingopinion.

Footnotes
1Barredovs.Garcia,73Phil607Mendozavs.Arrieta,91SCRA113Padillavs.CourtofAppeals,129

SCRA558.
2289SCRA568.
3253SCRA674Emerenciavs.Gonzales,104Phil.1059.
4Sec.1,Rule111,RevisedRulesofCourt,seealsoArt.100,RevisedPenalCode.
5Abellanavs.Marave,57SCRA106.
6SeeReyesvs.SempioDiy,141SCRA208Jarantillavs.CourtofAppeals,171SCRA429Castillovs.

CourtofAppeals,176SCRA591.
7Cojuangco,Jr.vs.CA,203SCRA619.

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8Art30.Whenaseparatecivilactionisbroughttodemandcivilliabilityarisingfromacriminaloffense,and

nocriminalproceedingsareinstitutedduringthependencyofthecivilcase,apreponderanceofevidence
shalllikewisebesufficienttoprovetheactcomplaintof.
9SeeCalalangvs.IAC,194SCRA514.
10Art.31.Whenthecivilactionisbasedonanobligationnotarisingformtheactoromissioncomplainedof

asafelony,suchcivilactionmayproceedindependentlyofthecriminalproceedingsandregardlessofthe
resultofthelatter.
11Art.32.Anypublicofficeroremployee,oranyprivateindividual,whodirectlyorindirectlyobstructs,

defeats,violatesorinanymannerimpedesorimpairsanyofthefollowingrightsandlibertiesofanother
personshallbeliabletothelatterfordamages:
(1)Freedomofreligion
(2)Freedomofspeech
(3)Freedomtowriteforthepressortomaintainaperiodicalpublication
(4)Freedomfromarbitraryorillegaldetention
(5)Freedomofsuffrage
(6)Therightagainstdeprivationofpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw
(7)Therighttoajustcompensationwhenprivatepropertyistakenforpublicuse
(8)Therighttotheequalprotectionofthelaws
(9)Therighttobesecureinone'sperson,house,papers,andeffectsagainstunreasonable
searchesandseizures
(10)Thelibertyofabodeandofchangingthesame
(11)Theprivacyofcommunicationandcorrespondence
(12)Therighttobecomeamemberofassociationsorsocietiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolaw
(13)TherighttotakepartinapeaceableassemblytopetitiontheGovernmentforredressof
grievances
(14)Therighttobefreefrominvoluntaryservitudeinanyform
(15)Therightoftheaccusedagainstexcessivebail
(16)Therightoftheaccusedtobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel,tobeinformedofthenatureand
causeoftheaccusationagainsthim,tohaveaspeedyandpubictrial,tomeetthewitnessesfaceto
face,andtohavecompulsoryprocesstosecuretheattendanceofwitnessinhisbehalf
(17)Freedomfrombeingcompelledtobeawitnessagainstone'sself,orfrombeingforcedto
confessguilt,orfrombeinginducedbyapromiseofimmunityorrewardtomakesuchconfession,
exceptwhenthepersonconfessingbecomesaStatewitness
(18)Freedomfromexcessivefines,orcruelandunusualpunishment,unlessthesameisimposedof
inflictedinaccordancewithastatutewhichhasnotbeenjudiciallydeclaredunconstitutionaland
(19)Freedomofaccesstothecourts.
Inanyofthecasesreferredtointhisarticle,whetherornotthedefendant'sactoromission
constitutesacriminaloffense,theaggrievedpartyhasarighttocommenceanentirelyseparateand
distinctcivilactionfordamages,andforotherrelief.Suchcivilactionshallproceedindependentlyof
anycriminalprosecution(ifthelatterbeinstituted),andmaybeprovedbyapreponderanceof
evidence.
Theindemnityshallincludemoraldamages.Exemplarydamagesmayalsobeadjudicated.
Theresponsibilityhereinsetforthisnotdemandablefromajudgeunlesshisactoromission
constitutesaviolationofthePenalCodeorthepenalstatute.
12Art.34.Whenamemberofacityormunicipalpoliceforcerefusesorfailstorenderaidorprotectionto

anypersonincaseordangertolifeorproperty,suchpeaceofficershallbeprimarilyliablefordamages,
andthecityormunicipalityshallesubsidiarilyresponsibletherefor.Thecivilactionhereinrecognizedshall
beindependentofanycriminalproceedings,andapreponderanceofevidenceshallsufficetosupportsuch
action.
13Art.2176.Whoeverbyactoromissioncausesdamagetoanother,therebeingfaultornegligence,is

obligedtopayforthedamagedone.Suchfaultornegligence,ifthereisnopreexistingcontractualrelation
betweentheparties,iscalledaquasidelictandisgovernedbytheprovisionsofthisChapter.
14Art.33.Incasesofdefamation,fraud,andphysicalinjuries,acivilactionfordamages,entirelyseparate

anddistinctformthecriminalaction,maybebroughtbytheinjuredparty.Suchcivilactionshallproceed
independentlyofthecriminalprosecution,andshallrequireonlyapreponderanceofevidence.
15Mendozavs.Arrieta,91SCRA113,Ruizvs.Ucol,153SCRA14seealsoDiongBiChuvs.CA,192

SCRA554.
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16Art.29.Whentheaccusedinacriminalprosecutionisacquittedonthegroundthathisguilthasnotbeen

provedbeyondreasonabledoubt,acivilactionfordamagesforthesameactoromissionmaybeinstituted.
Suchactionrequiresonlyapreponderanceorevidence.Uponmotionofthedefendant,thecourtmay
requiretheplaintifftofileabondtoanswerfordamagesincasethecomplaintshouldbefoundtobe
malicious.
Ifinacriminalcasethejudgmentofacquittalisbaseduponreasonabledoubt,thecourtshallso
declare.Intheabsenceofanydeclarationtothateffect,itmaybeinferredfromthetextofthe
decisionwhetherornottheacquittalisduetothatground.
1 w p h i1 .n t

SeealsoArt.31,CivilCodeGulavs.Dianala,etal.,132SCRA245.
17Peoplevs.Amistad,108SCRA601.
18Art.2194,CivilCodeofthePhilippines.
19Francovs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,178SCRA333.
20Mirandavs.MalateGarageandTaxicab,Inc.,99Phil.670.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

MENDOZA,J.,dissenting
The question in this case is whether petitioner, as employer of the driver found guilty of reckless imprudence
resultinginhomicideanddamagetoproperty,canbeheldsubsidiarilyliablefordamagesawardedinthecriminal
case considering that a separate civil action for quasidelict had been filed against said petitioner, although the
casewaslaterdismissed.Basedonthefactsasstaredinthemajorityopinion,theanswerisyes.Myreasonsare
twofold:first,becausethefilingofthecaseforquasidelictagainstpetitionerwaswithoutbasis,thesamebeing
contrarytothereservationearliermadebytheoffendedpartiesoftheirrighttofileaseparatecivilactionarising
from the crime against the driver, and, second, because the action for quasidelict against petitioner was
dismissedpreciselybecausethecivilactionagainstpetitioner'sdriverhadbeenreinstitutedinthecriminalcase
againsthim.Letmeexplain.
Astherecordsshow,atthearraignmentonOctober23,1989ofthedriverRomeoDunca,theheirsofFrancisco
Dy,Jr.andFelicianoBalcitareservedinCriminalCaseNo.Br.19311theirright"toinstituteaseparatecivilaction
arisingfromtheoffensechargedagainstthehereinaccused.1InaccordancewithRule111,1ofthe1985Rules
onCriminalProcedure,2suchreservationoftherighttofileacivilactionexdelictowasawaiveroftherighttofile
anyothercivilactionunderArts.32,33,34and2176oftheCivilCodeforrecoveryofdamagesforthesameact
oromissionoftheaccused.Hence,thesubsequentfilingbyprivaterespondentRosarioP.Dyofacivilactionfor
quasidelict, based on Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporationwaswithoutanybasis,thesamehavingbeenwaivedbythereservationearliermadebyherofthe
righttofileaseparatecivilactionarisingfromcrime.
Bethatasitmay,therecordsfurthershowthatonDecember15,1989,privaterespondentfiledamanifestationin
the criminal case that she was withdrawing the previous reservation made by her to institute a separate civil
actionandthatshewasinsteadgoingtoprosecutethecivilactioninthecriminalcase.Hence,sheprayed"that
thereservationtoinstituteseparatecivilactioninthiscasebeorderedwithdrawnandtheHeirsofthevictimsbe
allowed to present evidence in support of the civil liability to the accused in this case."3 The trial court granted
private respondent's motion and allowed her to intervene in the criminal case. Consequently, the civil action ex
delictowasmergedwiththecriminalprosecution.
The civil action for quasidelict against petitioner, which had been docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 19424, was
subsequently consolidated and jointly tried with the criminal case (Criminal Case No. Br. 19311) against the
driver.Then,onJune6,1992,thetrialcourtrenderedjudgment,whichwasamendedonOctober26,1992
(1)findingthedriverRomeoDuncaguiltyofdoublehomicidethroughrecklessimprudenceandviolationof
theMotorVehicleLawandsentencinghimtotwoindeterminatepenaltiesof4monthsand1dayofarresto
mayor to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days and to pay the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr. in the total amount of
P5,030,000.00
(2) ordering private respondent to pay P84,000.00 as damages for wrongful attachment of petitioner's
trucksand
(3) dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 19424 but declaring petitioner subsidiarily liable to private respondent
heirsofFranciscoDy,Jr.intheeventofinsolvencyoftheaccuseddriver.
It is contended that, as the trial court had dismissed the action for quasidelict (Civil Case No. Br. 19424) and
privaterespondentdidnotappeal,noawardofdamagescanbemadeinherfavor.Thiscontentionhasnomerit.
Thecivilactionforquasidelictwasdismissedpreciselysothatpetitioner'sliabilityforitsdriver'snegligencecould
bedeterminedinthecriminalcase.Thus,thetrialcourtstated:
Since Civil Case No. Br. 19424 was admittedly instituted after the criminal case was filed, the Court
believesthatthewaivermadebytheHeirsofFranciscoDy,Jr.onDecember15,1969includedtheirright
to file a separate civil action against the Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, the accused's employer, for
the reason that under Section 1, Rule 111, actions arising from Article 2176 of the Civil Code or quasi
delicts are deemed included in the waiver. As such, since the latter raised as an affirmative defense the
defensethattheplaintiffscannotmaintainCivilCaseNo.[Br.]19424,thisCourtmusthavetorulethatthe
filingofsaidcasewasnotproper.Nevertheless,inasmuchastheplaintiffscannotrecoverdamagestwice
fortheoffensecommittedbytheaccused,underArticle103oftheRevisedPenalCode,intheeventthe
accusedwillbeinsolvent,theCorporationcouldbeheldsubsidiarilyliableforthesamedamages.4

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On the other hand, because of the subsequent withdrawal of the reservation to file a separate civil action the
samewasreinstitutedinthecriminalcase,asthoughnoreservationtofileitseparatelyhadeverbeenmade.The
trialcourt,therefore,properlyincludedinitsdecisioninthecriminalcaseafindingofthedriver'scivilliability,in
additiontohiscriminalliability.
Petitioner and its driver, Romeo Dunca, appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, while the appeal was thus
pending, Dunca jumped bail. The decision convicting him and imposing on him civil liability ex delicto thereby
becamefinalandexecutory.ThiscircumstanceallowsfortheapplicationofArt.103oftheRevisedPenalCode,
whichprovides:
Subsidiarycivilliabilityofotherpersons.Thesubsidiaryliabilityestablishedinthenextprecedingarticle
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
feloniescommittedbytheirservants,pupils,workmen,apprentices,oremployeesinthedischargeoftheir
duties.
To establish the subsidiary civil liability of the petitioner, the following must be shown: (1) that petitioner is
engaged in an industry (2) that its employee (Romeo Dunca) committed the offense in the discharge of his
dutiesand(3)thattheemployeeisinsolvent.5
Thefirstrequisitehasalreadybeenestablishedconsideringthatpetitioneradmittedinitsanswerinthetrialcourt
thatitisengagedinanindustryandthatDuncawasitsemployeeatthetimeoftheaccident.6
Thesecondrequisitemustlikewisebedeemedtohavebeenestablishedsinceitissettledthat,intheabsenceof
any collusion between the accused employee and the offended party, a judgment convicting the former is
conclusiveuponthepartysubsidiarilyliable.7Petitionercannotclaimthathehasbeendeprivedofdueprocesson
thegroundthatitwasnotapartytothesuit.ForasheldinMirandav.MalateGarage&Taxicab,Inc.:
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his
employeebutinsubstanceandineffectheis,consideringthesubsidiaryliabilityimposeduponhimbylaw.
Itishisconcern,aswellasofhisemployee,toseetoitthathisinterestbeprotectedinthecriminalcaseby
takingvirtualparticipationinthedefenseofhisemployee.Hecannotleavehimtohisownfatebecausehis
failureisalsohis.Andifbecauseofhisindifferenceorinactiontheemployeeisconvictedanddamagesare
awardedagainsthim,hecannotlaterbeheardtocomplain,ifbroughttocourtfortheenforcementofhis
subsidiaryliability,thathewasnotgivenhisdayincourt....8
Indeed, Civil Case No. Br. 19424 and Criminal Case No. Br. 19311 were jointly tried. All the parties in the two
casestheprosecutionandthedefenseinthecriminalcase,andtheDysandpetitionerRafaelReyesTrucking
Corporation in the civil case were duly heard, before the trial court, in its joint decision, rendered judgment
dismissingthecivilactionforquasidelictagainstpetitionerandfindingitinsteadsubsidiarilyliableinthecriminal
case.Petitioneranditsdriverwereinfactrepresentedbythesamecounsel,whoraisedallpossibledefensesthat
petitionercouldraise.9Theremandofthiscasetothetrialcourtshould,therefore,besolelyforthepurposeof
determining,intheexecutionofthedecision,whetherDunca,theaccuseddriver,isinsolvent.
TheCourtholds,however,thatpetitionercannotbeheldliableinthecriminalcaseonthegroundthattherightto
file a civil action ex delicto has been waived and that instead its liability for its driver's negligence must be
determinedunderArts.2176and2180oftheCivilCode.Forthispurpose,theCourtordersthereopeningofthe
actionforquasidelict(CivilCaseNo.Br.19424).Asbasisforitsdecision,theCourtstates:
Intheinstantcase,theoffendedpartieselectedtofileaseparatecivilactionfordamagesagainstpetitioner
asemployeroftheaccused,basedonquasidelict,underArticle2176oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines..
. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the
separatecivilactionbasedonquasidelictagainstit.Inviewofthereservationtofile,andthesubsequent
filingofthecivilactionforrecoveryofcivilliability,thesamewasnotinstitutedwiththecriminalaction.Such
separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the
sameactoromissionoftheaccused.10
Withduerespect,itisnottruethatprivaterespondentreservedtherighttofileaseparatecivilactionbasedon
quasi delict and thereby waived the right to recover from petitioner civil liability ex delicto in the event of the
insolvencyofthedriver.Theoffendedpartiesstatedveryclearlythatwhattheywerereservingwasthelight"to
instituteaseparatecivilactionarisingfromtheoffensechargedagainstthehereinaccused."Itis,therefore,error
tosaythatwhatwasreservedwastherighttobringacivilactionbasedonquasidelict.
FollowingRule111,1,thereservationoftherighttofileaseparatecivilactionexdelictoagainstthedriverwasa
waiveroftheoffendedparties'righttoinstituteacivilactionbasedonquasidelictagainstpetitioner.Thefilingof
CivilCaseNo.Br.19424againstpetitionerwas,therefore,withoutbasis,anditsdismissalbythetrialcourtinits
decisionwasinorder.Ontheotherhand,astheoffendedpartieshadwithdrawntheirreservationoftherightto
fileaseparatecivilactionagainstthedriversothattheycanpursuetheiractioninthecriminalcase,thetrialcourt
correctlydeterminedpetitioner'ssubsidiarycivilliabilityforitsdriver'snegligenceinthecriminalcase.
Itiscontendedthattheoffendedpartiesdidnotappealfromthedecisionofthetrialcourtinsofarasitdismissed
their complaint for quasi delict. That is because, as they had previously manifested in withdrawing their
reservationoftherighttofileaseparatecivilactionagainstthedriver,theyintendedtopursuetheiractioninthe
criminal case. That included the action to enforce the subsidiary civil liability of petitioner, as employer, in the
eventofthedriver'sinsolvency.
To relieve petitioner from its subsidiary liability, the Court has to declare the award of damages exdelicto void
because, by filing a civil action based on quasi delict, the offended parties allegedly waived the right to bring
actionexdelicto.Asalreadystated,itwastherighttobringanactionforquasidelictwhichwaswaivedasaresult
of the reservation to file a civil action ex delicto. Hence, as a consequence of the driver's jumping bail, the
judgmentfindinghimliablenotonlycriminallybutalsocivillybecamefinal.AsunderArt.103oftheRevisedPenal
Codetheemployerissubsidiarilyliable,thereisnowaybywhichpetitionermaybeabsolvedfromsuchliability
exceptuponashowingthatthedriverisnotinsolvent.
Evenassumingthattherightoftheoffendedpartiestorecoverdamagesexdelictohadbeenwaived,theaward
of such damages by the trial court simply constitutes an error of judgment. Hence, the award of damages ex
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delictototheoffendedpartiesisnotvoidandisnowfinal.TheCourthasnotonlysetasideafinaldispositionby
declaringitvoidithaslikewiseorderedthereopeningofacasealreadydismissedwithfinalityonthesimplistic
reasoningthatrulesofproceduremayberelaxed"inordertopromotetheirobjectivesandassistthepartiesin
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceedings." There is no reason for
doing so in this case since, as already stated, all the parties herein had been duly heard before the trial court
rendereditsdecision.
Indeed,forwhatpurposeisthiscasetoberemandedtothetrialcourt?Sothatpetitionercanpresentevidencein
its defense? But it has already done so. For the trial court to redetermine the amount of damages? But even
under Arts. 2176 and 2180, the employer is liable for the same amount the employee is liable, as the only
difference between its liability exdelicto and its liability based on quasidelict is that the former is subsidiary or
secondarytothatofthedriverwhileitsliabilityforquasidelictisprimary.
Idonotthinkitisworthsacrificinglegalrulestoreachthejudgmentthemajorityarrivesatinthiscase.Theaward
ofdamagesexdelictointhedecisionofthetrialcourt,isfinal,justasthedismissalofthecaseforquasidelictis
final. To ignore this fact is to set at naught the policy behind the finality of judicial decisions and deprive
adjudicationofstability.
Apparently realizing the cost to basic rules of its decision today, the majority says that it is ordering the
determinationofpetitioner'sliabilityforquasidelictonlyprohacvice.Apparently,themajorityisnotwillingtoapply
itsrulinginthiscasetosimilarsituationsshouldtheyariseinthefuture.Forthatiswhatprohacvice means
"forthisturnforthisoneparticularoccasion"only. 11Butadjudicationcannotbelimitedtotheimmediateparties
and declared to have no precedential value. Adjudication, such as this, is like a restricted or oneway railroad
ticket,goodforthisdayandtrainonly.12
Fortheforegoingreasons,IdissentandvotetoaffirmthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealswiththemodification
thatthiscaseshouldberemandedtothetrialcourtforthesolepurposeofdeterminingthesubsidiarycivilliability
ofpetitionerintheeventofinsolvencyofitsdriver,theaccusedRomeoDunca.

Footnotes
1Rollo,p.55.
2Rule111,1providesinpertinentparts:

Institutionofcriminalandcivilactions.Whenacriminalactionisinstituted,thecivilactionforthe
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waivesthecivilaction,reserveshisrighttoinstituteitseparately,orinstitutesthecivilactionpriorto
thecriminalaction.
SuchcivilactionincludesrecoveryofindemnityundertheRevisedPenalCode,anddamagesunder
Articles32,33,34and2176oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesarisingfromthesameactoromission
oftheaccused.
Awaiverofanyofthecivilactionsextinguishestheothers.Theinstitutionof,orthereservationofthe
righttofile,anyofsaidcivilactionsseparatelywaivestheothers....
3Rollo,p.55.
4Emphasisadded.
5BazaMarketingCorp.v.BolinaoSecurityandInvestigationService,Inc.,117SCRA156(1982).
6Rollo,p.57.
7Manalov.RoblesTrans.Co.,Inc.,99Phil.729(1956).
899Phil.670,675(1956).
9Rollo,p.69.
10CitingManiagov.CourtofAppeals,253SCRA674(1996).
11BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY1212(6thed1990).
12 Compare CIVIL CODE, ART. 8: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution

shallformpartofthelegalsystemofthePhilippines.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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