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TodayisSunday,January29,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.130003October20,2004
JONASAONUEVO,Petitioner.
vs.
HON.COURTOFAPPEALSandJEROMEVILLAGRACIA,Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA,J.:
Thebicycleprovidesconsiderablespeedandfreedomofmovementtotherider.Itderivesacertaincharmfrom
beingunencumberedbyanyenclosure,affordingthecyclisttheperceptionofrelativeliberty.Italsocarriessome
obviousrisksonthepartoftheuserandhasbecomethesubjectofregulation,ifnotbythegovernment,thenby
parentalproscription.
Thepresentpetitionseekstobarrecoverybyaninjuredcyclistofdamagesfromthedriverofthecarwhichhad
struck him. The argument is hinged on the cyclists failure to install safety devices on his bicycle. However, the
lower courts agreed that the motorist himself caused the collision with his own negligence. The facts are
deceptivelysimple,buttheresolutionentailsthoroughconsiderationoffundamentalpreceptsonnegligence.
ThepresentpetitionraiseslittleissuewiththefactualfindingsoftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Branch160,of
PasigCity,asaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals.Bothcourtsadjudgedpetitioner,JonasAonuevo(Aonuevo),
liable for the damages for the injuries sustained by the cyclist, Jerome Villagracia (Villagracia). Instead, the
petition hinges on a sole legal question, characterized as "novel" by the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of the
NewCivilCode,whichpresumesthedriverofamotorvehiclenegligentifhewasviolatingatrafficregulationat
thetimeofthemishap,shouldapplybyanalogytononmotorizedvehicles.1
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the accident in question occurred on 8 February
1989,ataroundnineintheevening,attheintersectionofBoniAvenueandBarangkaDriveinMandaluyong(now
acity).VillagraciawastravelingalongBoniAvenueonhisbicycle,whileAonuevo,traversingtheoppositelane
was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the
employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad
Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his
hospitalizationseveraltimesin1989,andforcedhimtoundergofour(4)operations.
On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
AonuevobeforetheRTC.2HehadalsofiledacriminalcomplaintagainstAonuevobeforetheMetropolitanTrial
CourtofMandaluyong,butthelatterwassubsequentlyacquittedofthecriminalcharge.3Trialonthecivilaction
ensued, and in a Decisiondated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and
Aonuevo,orderingthemtopayVillagraciatheamountsofOneHundredFiftyThousandPesos(P150,000.00).
for actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00)forattorneysfees,aswellaslegalcosts.4BothdefendantsappealedtotheCourtofAppeals.
InaDecision5dated8May1997,theCourtofAppealsFourthDivisionaffirmedtheRTCDecisionintoto6.After
the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution7 dated 22 July 1997, Procter and
GambleandAonuevofiledtheirrespectivepetitionsforreviewwiththisCourt.ProcterandGamblespetitionwas
denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November 1997. Aonuevos petition,8 on the other hand, was
givenduecourse,9andisthesubjectofthisDecision.
InarrivingattheassailedDecision,theCourtofAppealsaffirmedthefactualfindingsoftheRTC.Amongthem:
thatitwasAonuevosvehiclewhichhadstruckVillagracia10thatAonuevosvehiclehadactuallyhitVillagracias
leftmidthigh,thuscausingacomminutedfracture11thatastestifiedbyeyewitnessAlfredoSorsano,witnessfor
Villagracia,Aonuevowas"umaarangkada,"orspeedingashemadetheleftturnintoLibertad12thatconsidering
Aonuevosclaimthatapassengerjeepneywasobstructinghispathashemadetheturn.Aonuevohadenough
warningtocontrolhisspeed13andthatAonuevofailedtoexercisetheordinaryprecaution,careanddiligence
requiredofhiminorderthattheaccidentcouldhavebeenavoided.14Notably,Aonuevo,inhiscurrentpetition,
doesnotdisputethefindingsoftortiousconductonhispartmadebythelowercourts,hinginghisappealinstead
ontheallegednegligenceofVillagracia.Aonuevoproffersnoexculpatoryversionoffactsonhispart,nordoes
hedisputetheconclusionsmadebytheRTCandtheCourtofAppeals.Accordingly,theCourt,whichisnotatrier
offacts,15isnotcompelledtoreviewthefactualfindingsofthelowercourts,whichfollowingjurisprudencehaveto
bereceivedwithrespectandareinfactgenerallybinding.16
Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting questions for resolution. Aonuevos arguments are
especially fixated on a particular question of law: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by
analogy to nonmotorized vehicles.17 In the same vein, Aonuevo insists that Villagracias own fault and
negligenceservestoabsolvetheformerofanyliabilityfordamages.
Its is easy to discern why Aonuevo chooses to employ this line of argument. Aonuevo points out that
Villagraciasbicyclehadnosafetygadgetssuchasahornorbell,orheadlights,asinvokedbya1948municipal
ordinance.18 Nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same
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ordinance.Finally,asadmittedbyVillagracia,hisbicycledidnothavefootbrakes.19BeforethisCourt,Villagracia
does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our attention instead to the
findings of Aonuevos own negligence.20 Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was contributory
negligence on his part, such would not exonerate Aonuevo from payment of damages. The Court of Appeals
likewiseacknowledgedthelackofsafetygadgetsonVillagraciasbicycle,butcharacterizedthecontentionas"off
tangent"andinsufficienttoobviatethefactthatitwasAonuevosownnegligencethatcausedtheaccident.21
AonuevoclaimsthatVillagraciaviolatedtrafficregulationswhenhefailedtoregisterhisbicycleorinstallsafety
gadgetsthereon.HepositsthatArticle2185oftheNewCivilCodeappliesbyanalogy.Theprovisionreads:
Article2185.Unlessthereisprooftothecontrary,itispresumedthatapersondrivingamotorvehiclehasbeen
negligentifatthetimeofthemishaphewasviolatinganytrafficregulation.
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil
Code.22Itsapplicabilityisexpresslyqualifiedtomotorvehiclesonly,andthereisnogroundtopresumethatthe
lawintendedabroadercoverage.
Still, Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles23. He points out
thatmoderndaytravelismorecomplexnowthanwhentheCodewasenacted,thenumberandtypesofvehicles
nowinusefarmorenumerousthanasofthen.HeevensuggeststhatatthetimeoftheenactmentoftheCode,
the legislators "must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be
specifically mentioned," yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has "inescapably become
matterofpublicconcern"soastoexpandtheapplicationofthelawtobemoreresponsivetothetimes.24
WhatAonuevoseeksisfortheCourttoamendtheexplicitcommandofthelegislature,asembodiedinArticle
2185,ataskbeyondthepaleofjudicialpower.TheCourtinterprets,andnotcreates,thelaw.However,sincethe
Courtisbeingaskedtoconsiderthematter,itmightaswellexaminewhetherArticle2185couldbeinterpretedto
includenonmotorizedvehicles.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of nonmotorized vehicles ranging from
humanpoweredcontraptionsonwheelssuchasbicycles,scooters,andanimaldrawncartssuchascalesasand
carromata.Thesemodesoftransportwereevenmoreprevalentontheroadsofthe1940sand1950sthanthey
aretoday,yettheframersoftheNewCivilCodechosethentoexcludethesealternativemodesfromthescopeof
Article2185withtheuseoftheterm"motorizedvehicles."IfAonuevoseriouslycontendsthattheapplicationof
Article2185beexpandedduetothegreaterinteractiontodayofalltypesofvehicles,suchargumentcontradicts
historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to nonmotorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was
significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has
been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant intraroad
dynamicbetweenmotorizedandnonmotorizedvehiclesismoreapropostothepastthantothepresent.
ThereisafundamentalflawinAonuevosanalysisofArt.2185,asapplicabletoday.Hepremisesthattheneed
for the distinction between motorized and nonmotorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of
thesevehicles.Themorepertinentbasisforthesegregateclassificationisthedifferenceintypeofthesevehicles.
Amotorizedvehicleoperatesbyreasonofamotorengineunlikeanonmotorizedvehicle,whichrunsasaresult
of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the
limitationsinphysicalexertion.iscapableofgreaterspeedsandaccelerationthannonmotorizedvehicles.Atthe
sametime,motorizedvehiclesaremorecapableininflictinggreaterinjuryordamageintheeventofanaccident
orcollision.Thisisduetoacombinationoffactorspeculiartothemotorvehicle,suchasthegreaterspeed,its
relativegreaterbulkofmass,andgreatercombustabilityduetothefuelsthattheyuse.
Therelonghasbeenjudicialrecognitionofthepeculiardangersposedbythemotorvehicle.Asfarbackas1912,
intheU.S.v.Juanillo25,theCourthasrecognizedthatanautomobileiscapableofgreatspeed,greaterthanthat
of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, "and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country roads,
puttingtogreathazardthesafetyandlivesofthemassofthepeoplewhotravelonsuchroads."26Inthesame
case,theCourtemphasized:
Adriverofanautomobile,undersuchcircumstances,isrequiredtouseagreaterdegreeofcarethandriversof
animals,forthereasonthatthemachineiscapableofgreaterdestruction,andfurthermore,itisabsolutelyunder
thepowerandcontrolofthedriverwhereas,ahorseorotheranimalcananddoestosomeextentaidinaverting
anaccident.Itisnotpleasanttobeobligedtoslowdownautomobilestoaccommodatepersonsriding,driving,or
walking.Itisprobablymoreagreeabletosendthemachinealongandletthehorseorpersongetoutoftheway
inthebestmannerpossiblebutitiswelltounderstand,ifthiscourseisadoptedandanaccidentoccurs,thatthe
automobiledriverwillbecalledupontoaccountforhisacts.Anautomobiledrivermustatalltimesuseallthecare
andcautionwhichacarefulandprudentdriverwouldhaveexercisedunderthecircumstances.27
American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between the motorist and the
cyclist.Motoristsarerequiredtoexerciseordinaryorreasonablecaretoavoidcollisionwithbicyclists.28Whilethe
dutyofusingordinarycarefallsalikeonthemotoristandtheriderordriverofabicycle,itisobvious,forreasons
growingoutoftheinherentdifferencesinthetwovehicles,thatmoreisrequiredfromtheformertofullydischarge
thedutythanfromthelatter.29
TheCodeCommissionwascognizantofthedifferenceinthenaturesandattachedresponsibilitiesofmotorized
and nonmotorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules
andregulations.Ifsuchwereindeedtheevilsoughttoberemediedorguardedagainst,thentheframersofthe
Codewouldhaveexpandedtheprovisiontoincludenonmotorizedvehiclesorforthatmatter,pedestrians.Yet,
thatwasnotthecasethustheneedarisestoascertainthepeculiaritiesattachingtoamotorizedvehiclewithin
thedynamicsofroadtravel.Thefactthattherehaslongexistedahigherdegreeofdiligenceandcareimposed
onmotorizedvehicles,arisingfromthespecialnatureofmotorvehicle,leadstotheinescapableconclusionthat
thequalificationunderArticle2185existspreciselytorecognizesuchhigherstandard.Simplyput,thestandards
applicabletomotorvehiclearenotonequalfootingwithothertypesofvehicles.
Thus,wecannotsustainthecontentionthatArt.2185shouldapplytononmotorizedvehicles,evenifbyanalogy.
ThereisfactualandlegalbasisthatnecessitatesthedistinctionunderArt.2185,andtoadoptAonuevosthesis
wouldunwiselyobviatethisdistinction.
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Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to Villagracia, this should not preclude any
possiblefindingofnegligenceonhispart.WhilethelegalargumentasformulatedbyAonuevoiserroneous,his
core contention that Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants serious
consideration,especiallysincetheimputednegligentactswereadmittedbyVillagraciahimself.
TheCivilCodecharacterizesnegligenceastheomissionofthatdiligencewhichisrequiredbythenatureofthe
obligationandcorrespondswiththecircumstancesofthepersons,ofthetimeandoftheplace.30However,the
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given
situation,butrather,itisthelawwhichdetermineswhatwouldberecklessornegligent.31
Aonuevo,assertsthatVillagraciawasnegligentasthelatterhadtransgressedamunicipalordinancerequiring
theregistrationofbicyclesandtheinstallationofsafetydevicesthereon.Thisviewfindssomesupportifanchored
onthelongstandingprincipleofnegligenceperse.
Thegenerallyacceptedviewisthattheviolationofastatutorydutyconstitutesnegligence,negligenceasamatter
of law, or negligence per se.32 In Teague vs. Fernandez,33 the Court cited with approval American authorities
elucidatingontherule:
"Themerefactofviolationofastatuteisnotsufficientbasisforaninferencethatsuchviolationwastheproximate
causeoftheinjurycomplained.However,iftheveryinjuryhashappenedwhichwasintendedtobepreventedby
thestatute,ithasbeenheldthatviolationofthestatutewillbedeemedtobetheproximatecauseoftheinjury."
(65C.J.S.1156)
"Thegenerallyacceptedviewisthatviolationofastatutorydutyconstitutesnegligence,negligenceasamatterof
law,or,accordingtothedecisionsonthequestion,negligenceperse,forthereasonthatnonobservanceofwhat
thelegislaturehasprescribedasasuitableprecautionisfailuretoobservethatcarewhichanordinarilyprudent
man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their
absoluteprohibition,doingtheforbiddenactisabreachofdutywithrespecttothosewhomaybeinjuredthereby
or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such
standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse.
Accordingtothisviewitisimmaterial,whereastatutehasbeenviolated,whethertheactoromissionconstituting
suchviolationwouldhavebeenregardedasnegligenceintheabsenceofanystatuteonthesubjectorwhether
there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from such violation. x x x." (65
C.J.S.pp.623628)
"Buttheexistenceofanordinancechangesthesituation.Ifadrivercausesanaccidentbyexceedingthespeed
limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough
thatitwasprohibited.Violationofanordinanceintendedtopromotesafetyisnegligence.Ifbycreatingthehazard
whichtheordinancewasintendedtoavoiditbringsabouttheharmwhichtheordinancewasintendedtoprevent,
it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has no reason to
ignorethecausalrelationwhichobviouslyexistsinfact.Thelawhasexcellentreasontorecognizeit,sinceitis
theveryrelationwhichthemakersoftheordinanceanticipated.Thiscourthasappliedtheseprinciplestospeed
limitsandotherregulationsofthemannerofdriving."(Rossvs.Hartman,139Fed.2d14at15).
"x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury intervened between the
violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action
can be maintained. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their
character and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
injurybytheinterventionofanotheragencyiftheoccurrenceoftheaccident,inthemannerinwhichithappened,
wastheverythingwhichthestatuteorordinancewasintendedtoprevent."(38AmJur841)34
InTeague,theownerofavocationalschoolstrickenbyafireresultinginfatalitieswasfoundnegligent,baseon
herfailuretoprovideadequatefireexitsincontraventionofaManilacityordinance.35InF.F.CruzandCo.,Inc.v.
CourtofAppeals36,thefailureofthepetitionertoconstructafirewallinaccordancewithcityordinancessufficed
to support a finding of negligence.37 In Cipriano v. Court of Appeals, 38the Court found that the failure of the
petitionertoregisterandinsurehisautorustproofingshopinaccordancewiththestatuteconstitutednegligence
perse,thusholdinghimliableforthedamagesforthedestructionbyfireofacustomersvehiclegaragedtherein.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an ordinance? It
cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to
promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value,
Villagracias mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated.
Aonuevo argues that Villagracias violation should bar the latters recovery of damages, and a simplistic
interpretationofnegligencepersemightvindicatesuchanargument.
But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Aonuevo was
speedingashemadetheleftturn,andsuchnegligentactwastheproximatecauseoftheaccident.Thisreckless
behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Aonuevos car as it turned into the
intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that
Villagraciawouldhaveavoidedinjuryhadhisbicyclebeenuptoparwithsafetyregulations,especiallyconsidering
thatAonuevowasalreadyspeedingashemadetheturn,orbeforehehadseenVillagracia.Evenassumingthat
AonuevohadfailedtoseeVillagraciabecausethebicyclewasnotequippedwithheadlights,suchlapseonthe
cyclistspartwouldnothaveacquittedthedriverofhisdutytoslowdownasheproceededtomaketheleftturn.
Thiscourthasappreciatedthatnegligenceperse,arisingfromthemereviolationofatrafficstatute,neednotbe
sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a
collisionbetweenatruckandaprivatelyownedCimarronvancausedthedeathofthreeofthevanspassengers.
The petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the Cimarron was committing multiple
violationsoftheLandTransportationandTrafficCode40atthetimeoftheaccident.Amongtheseviolations:the
Cimarron was overloaded at the time of the accident the front seat of the van was occupied by four adults,
including the driver and the van had only one functioning headlight. Similar as in this case, petitioner therein
invoked Article 2185 and argued that the driver of the Cimarron should be presumed negligent. The Court,
speakingthroughJusticeMendoza,dismissedthesearguments:
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[It]hasnotbeenshownhowtheallegednegligenceoftheCimarrondrivercontributedtothecollisionbetweenthe
vehicles.Indeed,petitionerhastheburdenofshowingacausalconnectionbetweentheinjuryreceivedandthe
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the
proximateorlegalcauseoftheinjuryorthatitsubstantiallycontributedthereto.Negligenceconsistinginwholeor
inpart,ofviolationoflaw,likeanyothernegligence,iswithoutlegalconsequenceunlessitisacontributingcause
of the injury. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during
nighttimecertainlyincreasestheriskofaccident,"thatbecausetheCimarronhadonlyoneheadlight,therewas
"decreasedvisibility,"andthatthefactthatthevehiclewasoverloadedanditsfrontseatovercrowded"decreased
itsmaneuverability."However,mereallegationssuchasthesearenotsufficienttodischargeitsburdenofproving
clearlythatsuchallegednegligencewasthecontributingcauseoftheinjury.41
SanitarySteam42iscontrollinginthiscase.ThebarefactthatVillagraciawasviolatingamunicipalordinanceat
the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such
negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If
anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracias failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government,
which would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is not
determinative of Villagracias negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative,
dependent upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular
circumstancesreasonablyrequire.43TodetermineifVillagraciawasnegligent,itisnotsufficienttorelysolelyon
the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracias behavior in relation to the
contemporaneouscircumstancesoftheaccident.
Theruleonnegligencepersemustadmitqualificationsthatmayarisefromthelogicalconsequencesofthefacts
leadingtothemishap.Thedoctrine(andArticle2185,forthatmatter)isundeniablyusefulasajudicialguidein
adjudgingliability,foritseekstoimputeculpabilityarisingfromthefailureoftheactortoperformuptoastandard
establishedbyalegalfiat.Butthedoctrineshouldnotberenderedinflexiblesoastodenyreliefwheninfactthere
is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while
convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit,
aimingtoprovidecompensationfortheharmsufferedbythosewhoseinterestshavebeeninvadedowingtothe
conductofothers.44
UnderAmericancaselaw,thefailuresimputedonVillagraciaarenotgrievousenoughsoastonegatemonetary
relief.Intheabsenceofstatutoryrequirement,oneisnotnegligentasamatteroflawforfailingtoequipahorn,
bell,orotherwarningdeviseontoabicycle.45Inmostcases,theabsenceofproperlightsonabicycledoesnot
constitute negligence as a matter of law46 but is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights
playedacausalpartinproducingacollisionwithamotorist.47Theabsenceofproperlightsonabicycleatnight,
as required by statute or ordinance, may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is
struckbyamotoristaslongastheabsenceofsuchlightswasaproximatecauseofthecollision48however,the
absenceofsuchlightswillnotprecludeordiminishrecoveryifthesceneoftheaccidentwaswellilluminatedby
streetlights,49ifsubstitutelightswerepresentwhichclearlyrenderedthebicyclistvisible,50ifthemotoristsawthe
bicycleinspiteoftheabsenceoflightsthereon,51 or if the motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle
evenifithadbeenequippedwithlights.52Abicycleequippedwithdefectiveorineffectivebrakesmaysupporta
finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition was a
contributingcauseoftheaccident.53
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety
practices,whetherornotimposedbyordinanceorstatute,isnotsufficienttonegateormitigaterecoveryunlessa
causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds
affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the
proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.54 Aonuevo had the burden of clearly
provingthattheallegednegligenceofVillagraciawastheproximateorcontributorycauseofthelattersinjury.
Onthispoint,thefindingsoftheCourtofAppealsarewellworthciting:
[As] admitted by appellant Aonuevo, he first saw appellee Villagracia at a distance of about ten (10) meters
beforetheaccident.Corrolarily,therefore,hecouldhaveavoidedtheaccidenthadhe[stopped]alongsidewithan
earlier(sic)jeepwhichwasalreadyatafullstopgivingwaytoappellee.Butaccordingto[eyewitness]Sorsano,
he saw appellant Aonuevo "umaarangkada" and hit the leg of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30). This
earlier (sic) jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but Aonuevo at an unexpected motion
(umarangkada)cameouthittingVillagracia(TSNMarch9,1990p.49).AppellantAonuevoadmittedthathedid
notblowhishornwhenhecrossedBoniAvenue(TSNMarch21,1990p.47).55
By Aonuevos own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been
decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting
Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Aonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any
possibilitythattheabsenceoflightsonthebikecontributedtothecauseoftheaccident.56Amotoristhasbeen
heldliableforinjurytoordeathofabicyclistwherethemotoristturnedsuddenlyintothebicyclistsoastocausea
collision.57
NeitherdoesAonuevoattemptbeforethisCourttoestablishacausalconnectionbetweenthesafetyviolations
imputedtoVillagraciaandtheaccidentitself.Instead,hereliedonaputativepresumptionthattheseviolationsin
themselvessufficientlyestablishednegligenceappreciableagainstVillagracia.SincetheonusonAonuevoisto
conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to
dischargehisnecessaryburdenofprovingVillagraciasownliability.
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence. The leading case in contributory
negligence,Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf58 clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant "in conjunction with
theoccurrence,[contributes]onlytohisinjury."59Toholdapersonashavingcontributedtohisinjuries,itmustbe
shownthatheperformedanactthatbroughtabouthisinjuriesindisregardofwarningsorsignsofanimpending
danger to health and body.60 To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link,
although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.61
1 w p h i1

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As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Aonuevo as solely responsible for the
accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the
same result would not have occurred even if Villagracias bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.
AonuevohimselfadmittedhavingseenVillagraciafromten(10)metersaway,thushecouldnolongerclaimnot
having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that Aonuevo was recklessly
speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracias bicycle had been equipped
with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car.
Moreover,itwasincumbentonAonuevotohaveestablishedthatVillagraciasfailuretohaveinstalledtheproper
brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that Aonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to
considersuchcausalconnectionasnotproven.
Alltold,thereisnoreasontodisturbtheassailedjudgment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SOORDERED.
Puno,(Chairman),AustriaMartinez,Callejo,Sr.andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
1Rollo,p.14.
2Id.at25.DocketedasCivilCaseNo.58784.
3Id.at27.
4Id.at25.
5PennedbyJusticeB.AdefuinDeLaCruz,concurredinbyJusticesG.ParasandR.Galvez.
6Rollo,pp.2539.
7Id.at52.
8DocketedasC.A.G.R.No.129966
9InaResolutiondated8December1996.
10Rollo,p.33.
11Ibid.
12Id.at3132.
13Id.at32.
14Id.at31.
15WRedConstructionv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.122648,August17,2000,392Phil.888,899(2000).
16Engresovs.DeLaCruz,G.R.No.148727,April9,2003,401SCRA217,220.
17Rollo,p.14.
18Id. at 18. Particularly Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1948. Section 3 thereof states: "x x x [No]

bicycleshallbeissuedaregistrationcertificateandplateunlessthebicycleisequippedwithaheadlightand
abicyclehornorbell."
19Id.at20.
20Id.at118.
21Id.at34.
22Tolentino,inhisannotationsontheCivilCode,statesthatthearticlerestatesaprincipleenunciatedin

theU.S.v.Crame,30Phil.2(1915).SeeA.Tolentino,VCivilCodeofthePhilippines(1999ed.),at625.
While the said case does not expressly state such a rule, its conclusion of negligence, derived from the
appreciationofthevarioustrafficviolationsofthedefendanttherein,isinaccordwiththeprinciplebehind
therule.
23 Rollo, p. 16. He cites the definition of vehicle as "every description of carriage or other artificial

contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation." Id., citing Philippine Law
Dictionary,p.618andWoodwardv.CollectorofCustoms,39Phil.516(1919).
24Rollo,p.16.
2523Phil.212(1912).
26Id.at222.
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27Id.at225.
288AMJUR2d675.
29Id.,citingLutherv.State,177Ind.619,98N.E.640(1912).
30SeeArt.1173,NewCivilCode.
31SeePicartv.Smith,37Phil.809,813(1918)CivilAeronauticsAdministrationv.CourtofAppeals,G.R

No.L51806,8November1988,167SCRA28,39Layuganv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.L
73998,14November1988,167SCRA363,372373Leaov.Domingo,G.RNo.84378,4July1991,198
SCRA800,804PBComv.CourtofAppeals,336Phil.667,676(1997)BPIv.CourtofAppeals,383Phil.
538,555(2000).
3265C.J.S.,p.623.SeealsoJ.CSangco,ITortsandDamages(1993),at12.
33151APhil.648(1973).
34Teaguev.Fernandez,151APhil.648,652653(1973).
35Id.at651652.
36G.R.No.L52732,29August1988,164SCRA731.
37Id.at736.
38331Phil.1019(1996).
39360Phil.199(1998).
40RepublicActNo.4136.
41SanitarySteamLaundry,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,360Phil.199,208209(1998).
42Id.
43Corlissv.ManilaRailroadCompany,137Phil.101,107108citing Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35

Pac549(1894).
44SeeM.Brazier,Streetontorts3(8thed.,1988).
458AMJUR2d678citingLongiev.Exline,659F.Supp.177(D.Md.1987)Greenv.Pedigo,75Cal.

App.2d300,170P.2d999(2dDist.1946).
46Id.citingTaylorv.Yukeic,273A.D.915,77N.Y.S.2d620Mastersv.Alexander,424Pa.225A.2d905

(1967).
47Id.citingHowiev.Bardwell,287mass.121,191N.E.640(1934)Brownv.Tanner,281Mich.150,274

N.W.744(1937)BaumanbyChapmanv.Crawford,104Wash.2d241,704P.2d1181(1985).
48Id.citingJohnsonv.RailwayExp.Agency,131F.2d1009(C.C.A7thCir.1942)Longiev.Exline,659F.

Supp. 177 (D. Md. 1987) Zachary v. Travelers Indm. Co., 533 So. 2d 1300 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988)
Haskinsv.CarolinaPowerandLightCo.,47N.Capp.664,267S.E2d587(1980)Everestv.Riecken,26
Wash.2d542,174P.2d762(1946).
49Id.citingLaCountv.Pasarich,205Cal.181,270P.210(1928).
50Id.citingLandisv.Wick,154Or.199,59P.2d403(1936).
51Id.citingAndersonv.Sterrit,95Kan.483,148P.635(1915).
52Id.citingHowiev.Bardwell,287Mass.121,191N.E.640(1934).
53Id.citingLongiev.Exline,659F.Supp.177(D.Md.1987)Greenv.Pedigo,75Cal.App.2d300,170

P.2d999(2dDist.1946).
54Supranote41.
55Rollo,p.34.
56Seesupranote42.
57TennesseeMill&FeedCo.v.Giles,211Ala.44,99So.84(1924),citedin8AMJUR2d675.
587Phil.359(1907).
59Id.at375.
60MaaoSugarCentralCo.,Inc.andAranetavs.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.83491,27August1990,189

SCRA88,93.
61Fuentesv.NLRC,G.R.No.L75955,28October1988,166SCRA752,757.
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