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G.R.No.172547

TodayisTuesday,August30,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.172547June30,2009
PRECYBUNYIandMILABUNYI,Petitioners,
vs.
FES.FACTOR,Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING,J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated January 16, 2006 and Resolution2 dated April 26, 2006 of the
CourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.90397,whichhadaffirmedtheDecision3datedMarch7,2005oftheRegional
TrialCourt(RTC)ofLasPiasCity,Branch198inCivilCaseNo.LP040160.
Theantecedentfactsareasfollows:
RespondentFeS.Factorisoneofthecoownersofan18hectarepieceoflandlocatedinAlmanza,LasPias
City. The ownership of the land originated from respondents paternal grandparents Constantino Factor and
Maura MayugaFactor who had been in actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession
andoccupationofthelandevenbefore1906.4
OnDecember9,1975,thechildrenofConstantinoFactorandMauraMayugaFactorfiledaPetitionforOriginal
Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title to the said parcel of land, or Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Psu253567,
beforetheRTCofPasigCity,Branch71.5OnDecember8,1994,thetrialcourtgrantedthepetitioninLRCCase
No. N9049 and declared the children of Constantino Factor and Maura MayugaFactor as coowners of the
property. 6 The children of Constantino Factor and Maura MayugaFactor thereafter sold seven (7) hectares of
theFactorfamilypropertyduringthesameyear.Thesiblings,exceptEnriqueFactor,respondentsfather,shared
anddividedtheproceedsofthesaleamongthemselves,withtheagreementthatEnriquewouldhaveashisshare
theportionofthepropertylocatedinAntiochStreet,PilarExecutiveVillage,AlmanzaI,LasPiasCity,knownas
theFactorcompound.
Following his acquisition thereof, Enrique caused the construction of several houses in the compound including
the subject property, a rest house, where members of the Factor family stayed during gettogethers and visits.7
Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her mother, Mila Bunyi, were tenants in one of the houses inside the compound,
particularlyinNo.8AntiochSt.,PilarVillage,Almanza,LasPiasCitysince1999.8
When Enrique Factor died on August 7, 1993, the administration of the Factor compound including the subject
resthouseandotherresidentialhousesforleasewastransferredandentrustedtoEnriqueseldestchild,Gloria
FactorLabao.
Gloria FactorLabao, together with her husband Ruben Labao and their son Reggie F. Labao, lived in Tipaz,
Taguig,MetroManilabutvisitedandsometimesstayedintheresthousebecauseGloriacollectedtherentalsof
the residential houses and oversaw the Factor compound. When Gloria died on January 15, 2001, the
administration and management of the Factor compound including the subject rest house, passed on to
respondent Fe S. Factor as coowner of the property. As an act of goodwill and compassion, considering that
RubenLabaowassicklyandhadnomeansofincome,respondentallowedhimtostayattheresthouseforbrief,
transientandintermittentvisitsasaguestoftheFactorfamily.
OnMay31,2002,RubenLabaomarriedpetitionerPrecyBunyi.OnNovember10,2002,RubenLabaodied.
Ataboutthistime,respondentdiscoveredthatpetitionersforciblyopenedthedoorsoftheresthouseandstoleall
the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then audaciously occupied the premises. Respondent
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alleged that petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family of the subject propertys lawful use and
possession. Respondent also added that when she tried to enter the rest house on December 1, 2002, an
unidentified person who claimed to have been authorized by petitioners to occupy the premises, barred,
threatened and chased her with a jungle bolo. Thus, on September 12, 2003, respondent Fe S. Factor filed a
complaint9forforcibleentryagainsthereinpetitionersPrecyBunyiandMilaBunyi.
Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fes claim of ownership of the subject property and the alleged prior
ownershipofherfatherEnriqueFactor.TheyassertedthatthesubjectpropertywasownedbyRubenLabao,and
that petitioner Precy with her husband moved into the subject property, while petitioner Mila Bunyi, mother of
Precy,remainedinNo.8AntiochSt.
OnJuly13,2004,theMetropolitanTrialCourt(MeTC)ofLasPiasCity,Branch79ruledinfavorofFeS.Factor.
Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavoroftheplaintiffandagainstthedefendantsorderingthelatter
andallpersonsclaimingrightsunderthemto:
1.Toimmediatelyvacatethesubjectpremisesandsurrenderpossessionthereoftotheplaintiff.
2. To pay the monthly rental of P2,000.00 from December 1, 2002 up to the time they finally vacate the
premises.
3.TopayattorneysfeeofPhp10,000.00.
Thecounterclaimisdismissedforlackofmerit.
SOORDERED.10
PetitionersappealedthedecisiontotheRTCofLasPiasCity,Branch198,which,however,affirmedintotothe
decisionoftheMeTCandlaterdeniedtheirmotionforreconsideration.11Undaunted,petitionersfiledapetitionfor
reviewbeforetheCourtofAppealsbutitwasdeniedalso.Hence,theinstantpetitionbeforeus.
PetitionerssubmitthefollowingissuesfortheCourtsconsideration:
I.
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT
FORCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION AND STEALTH HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN
OCCUPYINGTHESUBJECTRESIDENTIALHOUSE
II.
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
MISAPPRECIATEDTHEFACTTHATTHERESPONDENTHASABETTERRIGHTOFPHYSICALAND
MATERIALPOSSESSIONOFTHESUBJECTPROPERTY
III.
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE REGIONAL [TRIAL] COURT HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PAY THE
MONTHLY RENTAL OF P2,000.00 FROM DECEMBER 1, 2002 UP TO THE TIME THEY FINALLY
VACATEPREMISES.12
The resolution of the firstissue raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence
presented below, a course of action which this Court will not do, consistent with our repeated holding that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.13 The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose
findingsonthesemattersarereceivedwithrespectandconsideredbindingbytheSupremeCourtsubjectonlyto
certainexceptions,noneofwhichispresentintheinstantpetition.14Noteworthy,inthiscase,thecitedfindingsof
theRTChavebeenaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals.
As to the second issue, the resolution thereof boils down to a determination of who, between petitioners and
respondent,wouldbeentitledtothephysicalpossessionofthesubjectproperty.
Both parties anchor their right of material possession of the disputed property on their respective claims of
ownership.PetitionersinsistthatpetitionerPrecyhasabetterrightofpossessionoverthesubjectpropertysince
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sheinheritedthesubjectpropertyasthesurvivingspouseandsoleheirofRubenLabao,whoownedtheproperty
beforehisdeath.
Respondent,ontheotherhand,hingesherclaimofpossessiononthefactthatherpredecessorininteresthad
priorpossessionofthepropertyasearlyas1975.
Aftercarefulconsideration,wefindinfavoroftherespondent.
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
propertyinvolved,independentofanyclaimofownershipsetforthbyanyofthepartylitigants.Theonewhocan
provepriorpossessiondefactomayrecoversuchpossessionevenfromtheownerhimself.15Possessiondefacto
isthephysicalpossessionofrealproperty.Possessiondefactoandnotpossessiondejureistheonlyissueina
forcibleentrycase.16Thisruleholdstrueregardlessofthecharacterofapartyspossession,provided,thathe
hasinhisfavorpriorityoftimewhichentitleshimtostayonthepropertyuntilheislawfullyejectedbyaperson
havingabetterrightbyeitheraccionpublicianaoraccionreivindicatoria.17
Petitionersarguethatrespondentwasneverinpossessionofthesubjectpropertysincethelatterneveroccupied
thesame.Theyclaimthattheyhavebeeninactualpossessionofthedisputedpropertyfromthetimepetitioner
PrecymarriedRubenLabaoin2002.
Inthisinstance,however,petitionerscontentionisunconvincing.
Foronetobeconsideredinpossession,oneneednothaveactualorphysicaloccupationofeverysquareinchof
thepropertyatalltimes.18Possessioncanbeacquirednotonlybymaterialoccupation,butalsobythefactthata
thingissubjecttotheactionofoneswillorbytheproperactsandlegalformalitiesestablishedforacquiringsuch
right.19 Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and
theinscriptionofpossessoryinformationtitles.20
While petitioners claim that respondent never physically occupied the subject property, they failed to prove that
theyhadpriorpossessionofthesubjectproperty.Onrecord,petitionerPrecyBunyiadmittedthatGloriaFactor
Labao and Ruben Labao, as spouses, resided in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila and used the subject property
whenevertheyvisitthesame.21Likewise,aspointedoutbytheMeTCandtheRTC,RubenandpetitionerPrecys
marriagecertificaterevealedthatatthetimeoftheirmarriage,Rubenwasresidingat123A.LakeSt.,SanJuan,
MetroManila.EvenRubensdeathcertificateshowedthathisplaceofdeathandresidencewasat#4LabaoSt.,
Tipaz,Taguig,MetroManila.Consideringthatherhusbandwasneveraresidentofthesubjectproperty,petitioner
PrecyfailedtoexplainconvincinglyhowshewasabletomoveinwithRubenLabaointhesubjectpropertyduring
theirmarriage.
On the other hand, it was established that respondents grandparents, Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga
Factor,hadbeentheoccupantsandinpossessionofvariousagriculturalparceloflandssituatedinAlmanza,Las
PiasCity,intheconceptofowners,formorethanthirtyyearspriorto1975.Infact,theRTCinitsDecisiondated
December 8, 1994 in LRC Case No. N9049 has confirmed the rights of respondents predecessors over the
subjectpropertyandorderedtheissuanceofthecorrespondingcertificateoftitleintheirfavor.22
Therightofrespondentspredecessorsoverthesubjectpropertyismorethansufficienttoupholdrespondents
right to possession over the same. Respondents right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings
from the moment of their fathers death.23 As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property,
whichisoneoftheattributesofownership.Suchrightsareenforcedandprotectedfromencroachmentsmadeor
attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent acquired hereditary rights even before judicial
declarationintestateorintestateproceedings.24
AfterthedeathofEnriqueFactor,itwashiseldestchild,GloriaFactorLabaowhotookovertheadministrationof
the subject property. And as a consequence of coownership,25 soon after the death of Gloria, respondent, as
one of the surviving coowners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased coowner, which includes the
righttotheadministrationandmanagementofthesubjectproperty.
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners unsupported claim of possession must yield to that of the
respondent who traces her possession of the subject property to her predecessorsininterest who have always
beeninpossessionofthesubjectproperty.Evenassumingthatrespondentwasneveraresidentofthesubject
property, she could legally continue possessing the property. Visiting the property on weekends and holidays is
evidenceofactualorphysicalpossession.26Thefactofherresidencesomewhereelse,byitself,doesnotresult
inlossofpossessionofthesubjectproperty.Thelawdoesnotrequireoneinpossessionofahousetoresidein
thehousetomaintainhispossession.27For,again,possessionintheeyesofthelawdoesnotmeanthataman
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has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession.28 There is no
cogentreasontodeviatefromthisdoctrine.
Allthingsconsidered,thisCourtfindsthatrespondentFeS.Factorsuccessfullyprovedtheextentandcharacter
ofherpossessionoverthedisputedproperty.Asaconsequenceofherownershipthereof,respondentisentitled
toitspossession,consideringpetitionersfailuretoprovepriorpossession.TheCourtstresses,however,thatits
determination of ownership in the instant case is not final. It is only a provisional determination for the sole
purposeofresolvingtheissueofpossession.Itwouldnotbarorprejudiceaseparateactionbetweenthesame
partiesinvolvingthequietingoftitletothesubjectproperty.29
As regards the means upon which the deprivation took effect, it is not necessary that the respondent must
demonstrate that the taking was done with force, intimidation threat, strategy or stealth. The Supreme Court, in
Baesv.LutheranChurchinthePhilippines,30explained:
Inordertoconstituteforcethatwouldjustifyaforcibleentrycase,thetrespasserdoesnothavetoinstituteastate
of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertionofforceoverthepropertywhichisallthatisnecessaryandsufficienttoshowthattheactionisbasedon
theprovisionsofSection1,Rule70oftheRulesofCourt.31
AsexpresslystatedinDavidv.Cordova:32
Thewordsbyforce,intimidation,threat,strategyorstealthincludeeverysituationorconditionunderwhichone
personcanwrongfullyenteruponrealpropertyandexcludeanother,whohashadpriorpossessiontherefrom.Ifa
trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful
possession,butwithouttheconsentofthelatter,andthereplantshimselfandexcludessuchpriorpossessorfrom
theproperty,theactionofforcibleentryanddetainercanunquestionablybemaintained,eventhoughnoforceis
used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the
groundandexcludingtheotherparty.33
Respondent, as coowner, has the control of the subject property even if she does not stay in it. So when
petitionersenteredsaidpropertywithouttheconsentandpermissionoftherespondentandtheothercoowners,
thelatterweredeprivedofitspossession.Moreover,thepresenceofanunidentifiedmanforbiddingrespondent
fromenteringthesubjectpropertyconstitutesforcecontemplatedbySection1,34Rule70oftheRulesofCourt.
1 a v v p h i1

Astothelastissue,wehavepreviouslyruledthatwhilethecourtsmayfixthereasonableamountofrentforthe
use and occupation of a disputed property, they could not simply rely on their own appreciation of land values
without considering any evidence. The reasonable amount of any rent could not be determined by mere judicial
notice but by supporting evidence.35 In the instant case, we find no evidence on record to support the MeTCs
awardofrent.
Onthematterofattorneysfeesawardedtotherespondent,weareinagreementtodeleteit.Itisawellsettled
rulethatwhereattorneysfeesaregranted,thecourtmustexplicitlystateinthebodyofthedecision,andnotonly
inthedispositiveportionthereof,thelegalreasonfortheaward.36Again,nothinginthebodyofbothdecisionsof
RTCandMeTCexplicitlystatedthereasonsfortheawardofattorneysfees.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision dated January 16, 2006 and Resolution
datedApril26,2006oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.90397areAFFIRMEDwithMODIFICATIONthat
theawardofrentalsandattorneysfeesareDELETED.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO*
AssociateJustice
MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO**
AssociateJustice

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DIOSDADOM.PERALTA***
AssociateJustice
ATTESTATION
IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassigned
tothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionandtheDivisionChairpersonsAttestation,Icertifythatthe
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterof
theopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
*DesignatedmemberoftheSecondDivisionperSpecialOrderNo.645.
**DesignatedmemberoftheSecondDivisionperSpecialOrderNo.658.
***DesignatedmemberoftheSecondDivisionperRaffleofJune17,2009.
1Rollo,pp.5967.PennedbyAssociateJusticeJuanQ.Enriquez,Jr.,withAssociateJusticesGodardoA.

JacintoandVicenteQ.Roxasconcurring.
2Id.at68.
3Id.at278284.PennedbyJudgeErlindaNicolasAlvaro.
4Id.at279.
5Id.
6CArollo,pp.210217.PennedbyJudgeCelsoD.Lavia.
7Rollo,p.279.
8CArollo,p.18.
9Rollo,pp.6974.
10Id.at126.
11Id.at278284,310.
12Id.at2122.
13FarEastBank&TrustCo.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.123569,April1,1996,256SCRA15,18.
14Id.
15Somodiov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.82680,August15,1994,235SCRA307,311.
16SeeReyesv.Sta.Maria,No.L33213,June29,1979,91SCRA164,168.

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17Somodiov.CourtofAppeals,supraat311312.
18HabagatGrillv.DMCUrbanPropertyDeveloper,Inc.,G.R.No.155110,March31,2005,454SCRA653,

671Quizonv.Juan,G.R.No.171442,June17,2008,554SCRA601,612.
19 Habagat Grill v. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc., supra at 671, citing Spouses Benitez v. Court of

Appeals,334Phil.216,222(1997)Quizonv.Juan,supraat612.
20Quizonv.Juan,supraat612.
21Rollo,pp.2930.
22CArollo,pp.215217.
23SeeMorales,etal.v.Yaez,98Phil.677,678679(1956).
24Id.
25CivilCode,

Art.484.Thereiscoownershipwhenevertheownershipofanundividedthingorrightbelongsto
differentpersons.
xxxx
26DelaRosav.Carlos,G.R.No.147549,October23,2003,414SCRA226,234.
27Id.
28Id.at235.SeealsoRoalesv.DirectorofLands,51Phil.302,304(1927).
29Boocv.FiveStarMarketingCo.,Inc.,G.R.No.157806,November22,2007,538SCRA42,55.
30G.R.No.142308,November15,2005,475SCRA13.
31Id.at34.
32G.R.No.152992,July28,2005,464SCRA384.
33Id.at399400.
34 SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next

succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
anylandorbuildingisunlawfullywithheldaftertheexpirationorterminationoftherighttoholdpossession,
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholdingofpossession,bringanactionintheproperMunicipalTrialCourtagainstthepersonorpersons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitutionofsuchpossession,togetherwithdamagesandcosts.
35SeeBadillov.Tayag,G.R.Nos.143976and145846,April3,2003,400SCRA494,507,citingHerrerav.

Bollos,G.R.No.138258,January18,2002,374SCRA107,113.
36DelRosariov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.118325,January29,1997,267SCRA158,175,citingScott

Consultants & Resource Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112916, March 16,
1995,242SCRA393,406.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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