FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

THE FAMILY CODE
MARRIAGE

Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following
basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles
15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

NINAL vs. BAYADOG

328 SCRA 122

SAN LUIS VS. SAGALONGOS

GR No. 11743

FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on

September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and
Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5
years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a
car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted

three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March
17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2.

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the
declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?

HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted
an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because
from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit,
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee

Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974,
Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He
had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon
death of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death,
was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree
of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee
had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the
Family Code.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the
parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code

cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256.

GARCIA vs. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is

bigamous.

FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an

Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of
divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family
Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen.
Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a
Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and
Garcia lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Recio contended that
his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce
obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia.
The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between
Garcia and Recio dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence,
this petition.

HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which

absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as
well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. InGarcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must
be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso

facto capacitated him to remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive
evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that Recio
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated
to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcias prayer to declare
her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may
turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly

solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !2

accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO
GR No L-68470

fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for

adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both
criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge
denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both
accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with
direct contempt and fined.
ISSUE: Should the adultery case prosper?

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while

private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married
in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the
Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced
in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners
business in Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered
to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be
declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment
in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is
the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding
only to the alien spouse.
HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys
court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation
before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA
G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989
FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina
and Erich Geiling were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage,
Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in
January 1983.
Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila
on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On
January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce
decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery
alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner had an
affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city

HELD: NO. In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.
The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case was
upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued
in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse. The fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is admitted. Private
respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS
GR 133743 & 134029, 6 FEB 2007
FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo) contracted three (3)
marriages in his lifetime. The first was with Virginia Sulit in 1942 out
of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. In 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
The 2nd marriage was on May 1, 1968, with Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of
the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
ISSUE: Was the third marriage validly contracted by Felicisimo and
Felicidad?
HELD: The SC did not decide this particular case but remanded it to
the trial court for further reception of evidence. However, the SC made
the following pronouncements:
ART. 26.All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !3

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
The question is: whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving
this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to
file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.

by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, Fely

returned to the Philippines several times. She had been openly using
the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated
her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
HELD: Yes. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts
that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it
cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect
that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at
the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While
the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is
no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of
this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must
still have complied with the requirement laid down inRepublic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity
be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating
nature be fully explained.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly

solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.

FACTS: The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained
a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A. In 1981, Cipriano
Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the Philippines.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry

respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.

Sometime in 2000, his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live in California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577
FACTS: Crasus married Fely in 1961 (Cebu City). After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of
their five children.
Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
ISSUE: Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of
the celebration of themarriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !4

HELD: YES. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to

avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We

hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the
trial court.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
VOID MARRIAGES
1.
2.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.

CHI MING TSOI VS CA

FACTS: Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi
were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to
Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or
having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to
bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep.
No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third
and fourth night. From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept
together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was
then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a
closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found
to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no
sexual contact was ever made and according to him everytime he
wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided
him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed
his hands.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
LLORENTE VS COURT OF APPEALS
345 SCRA 592
FACTS: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a
parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the
United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was
naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines
he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife
was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo
returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia
LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children.
Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters
administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula.
On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of
whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated
him to remarry.

ISSUE: Whether the refusal of private respondent to have sexual

communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity.

HELD: If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to

perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one
of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
REPUBLIC v. MOLINA

HELD: In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the

nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v.
Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.In Pilapil v. IbaySomera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the status of persons.For failing to apply these

G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997

FACTS: On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married
Reynaldo Molina which
union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on
his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife
in regard to their finances,resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
The RTC granted Roridel petitionfor declaration of nullity of her
marriage which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Are irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
constitute psychological incapacity?
RULING: NO. Laid down hereinbelow are specific guidelines in

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !5

interpreting and applying Art. 36, to wit:

(a) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the
existence of the marriage and against its nullity.
(b) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (1)
medically or clinically identified; (2) alleged in the com-plaint;
(3) sufficiently proven by experts; and (4) clearly explained in
the decision.
(c) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebratiof the marriage,'' although the manifestation need not be
perceivable at suchtime.
(d) The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permaneor incurable, although the incurability may be relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
(e) Furthermore, the incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriageobligations, not to those not related to marriage like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
(f) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the pato assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(g) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Arts. 68-71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and
Arts. 220-225, same Code, in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-compliance must alsobe stated in the
petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the
decision.
(h) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of thCatholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling, should be given grerespect by our courts.
(i) The trial court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to
appear acounsel for the State. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General
and the fiscal shall submit such certification to the court within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is submitted for
resolution.
In the case at bar, finding that there was no psychological incapacity
on the part of the respondent- husband but more a difficulty'' if not
outright refusal'' or neglect'' in the performance of some marital
duties, and that the evidence merely showed that the parties could not
get along with each other, the Supreme Court denied the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner- wife.
MARCOS v. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000
FACTS: The spouses first met sometime in 1980 when both of them
were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts and then were married. The wife alleged that after the
downfall of President Marcos, her husband left the military service and
then engaged in different business ventures that did not however
prosper. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they
would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her.
He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness.
He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for
several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In
1992, they were already living separately. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On
that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her
and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, she
and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

The appellee submitted herself to psychologist for psychological

evaluationwhile the appellant on the other hand, did not. The court a
quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their
children, x x x. The ruling of the trial court was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
1.

2.

Was the CA correct in reversing the trial court as to its findings

of the psychology incapacity of the respondent in the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis that the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
Was the totality of the evidence presented in the present case
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner's sister and the social worker -- enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:
1. NO. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity
of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non
for such declaration.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
2. NO. The alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period
and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that
he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68
to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has
been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner,
however, has not faithfully observed them.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127358-449. March 31, 2005
FACTS: These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12,
1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent
filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !6

by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated

to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response,
respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she
was psychologically incapacitated. The TC and CA granted the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and awarded to the
respondent moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of
litigation and costs.

of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a

criminal case for bigamy.

ISSUE: Is the award of moral damages and exemplary damages

tenable in the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity?

HELD: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein.It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

HELD: The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 of

the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be
recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be
noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss
or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence
done in complete freedom.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of

celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration
of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. It should
be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided
all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a
subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for
the existence at the material time of the first marriage.

On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties
null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to
psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura.

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial

declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot
have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first.

Psychological incapacity has been defined as that incapacity which

causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage .
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. It is contradictory to characterize
acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the
control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same
time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding
moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of
moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering
into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done
deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or
her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence
appears to have been adduced in this case.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the
grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000
FACTS: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage
with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been
annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25,
1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Petitioner filed a complaint for Bigamy before the RTC of
Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action
for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on
the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of
the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The
trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order
dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.

The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for
bigamy. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he
thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the
civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of
frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. In the light of Article
40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to
have validly entered into the second marriage.
MORIGO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol.
They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete
and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got
married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991
she filed a petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.
In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint
for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved
for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty
claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of
his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be
free from the bigamy case
HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering
that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them
by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage
contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity
of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.
GOMEZ vs. LIPANA

ISSUE: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !7

G.R. No. L-23214. June 30, 1970

as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.

FACTS: The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two

marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second
with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second
marriage, the first was still subsisting but Lipana concealed it from the
second wife.

NINAL VS. BAYADOG

On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by

purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City. The Torrens title for
the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds
for Quezon City) was issued in the name of Joaquin Lipana married
to Isidra Gomez. On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and
childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On
August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate,
commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husbands
share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is
placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code. The society of joint
property concludes after the marriage dissolves or on having been
declared void. The conjuge that for his bad faith will have been a cause
of the nullity, will not have part in the community properties.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and
that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the
provision from the old Civil Code and declared his interest in the
disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased
second wife.

328 SCRA 122; March 14, 2000

FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa on September 26, 1974.
On April 24, 1985 he shot and killed her. After 20 months he remarried
Norma Badayog, the respondent herewith. After Pepito died, his heirs
by his first marriage filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the
marriage of their father with Norma Badayog on the ground of lack of
marriage license. Norma Badayog contends that the ground have no
legal basis for her marriage to Pepito according to Article 34 of the
Family Code no marriage license is necessary for person who have
cohabited for at least five years. The respondent also contends that
petitioners are not among those allowed by the law to file a suit for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Pepito. The trial court ruled in
favor of the respondent on the ground that indeed the Family Code is
silent as to situation. The Petition should have been filed before the
death of Pepito and not after his death. Thus, the petitioner appealed to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that no need of
marriage license was necessary for Pepito and her have
cohabited for at least five years.
2.

In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the

trial court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the
second marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio;
and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
ISSUE: Whether a collateral attack on the validity on the second
marriage in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio is proper
HELD: Yes. The party who challenges the validity of the second
marriage can be challenged collaterally. There is no suggestion here
that the defendants 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been
annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and
there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in subsection (b). the burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove
that he comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged that
burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at
the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven
years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then
generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
On the second issue, the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has
been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very
action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and when
Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.
Even though the said provision was no longer in force it is still
presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that
neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and
hence such spouse has no right to share in the conjugal properties; but
this legal effect of such presumption derives from the premise that
Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is of doubtful application
if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of the
other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership formed
thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its
existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize
the right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half

Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito valid.

HELD: Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally cohabited
for at least five years since Pepito was still married to Teodulfa
counting backwards from the time he and Norma celebrated their
marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized by exclusivity and
continuity. There should be no legal impediment on either party to
marry. Pepitos previous marriage to Teodulfa is a legal impediment
disqualifying him to the exception of a marriage license. Thus, his
second marriage should have a marriage license to be valid. In this
case, the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking the formal requisite of
a marriage license is therefore void.
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132955; October 27, 2006
FACTS: In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in
Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage.
He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry
Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him
and that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member
of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia
by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now
raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on
the other hand denied Orlys allegations and she said that Orly freely
cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that
shows Orlys affection and care towards her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case
at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is
untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul
his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case
[filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case,
Orlys allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not
able to prove that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for
fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done
against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well
abreast with self- defense and that the threat he so described done
against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !8

marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His

allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse
is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction
on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half
years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that
Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

FACTS: Leouel Santos and Julia Bedia got married on September 20,
1986. They lived with the latters parents. Because of the frequent
interference by Julias parents into the young spouses family affairs,
the couple would start a quarrel over a number of things. On May 18,
1988, Julia left for the US to work as a nurse. Seven months later, she
called Leouel for the first time and promised to go home upon the
expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance
to visit the US, he tried to locate Julia but to no avail. Leouel argues
that Julias failure to return home or communicate with him for five
years clearly shows psychological incapacity to enter into married life.

Dasmarinas when lucita was Marcios teacher for two consecutive

semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later on became
sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita
supported the family as her husband continued studying, supported by
his parents. The first few years of their marriage went okay. But this
eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-marital relation with another
student who was also married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked
Lucio to end it. He promised to but did not fulfill it and left their
conjugal home and child. After some time, he returned to Lucita and
she accepted him. However, his attitude worsened when he got
employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme
promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private
respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner
averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent
hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private
respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never
affectionate and hardly spent time with them. On July 10, 1992,
petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the annulment of her
marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under

Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his

marital obligations.

HELD: No. The use of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of

the Family Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychosis. It cannot be construed independently but must
stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic precepts of marriage, as expressed in Article
38 of the same Code. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter sensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

HELD: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for

declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the
celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity,
abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds
per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse. Certainly, petitionerappellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her
respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763; February 13, 1997

FACTS: In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had
four children since then. David then found out that Sharon is
irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage
Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly
with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children.
She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon is
psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr.
Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from AntiSocial Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of
infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity
for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa
Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in
handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.

SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112019; January 4, 1995

FACTS: Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina got married in 1985.

After a year, Roridel contended that Reynaldo manifested signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility both as a husband and a father,
preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his
money with. He became dependent on his parents for aid and
assistance and was never honest with his wife with regard to their
finances. Roridel seeks to annul their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Reynaldos acts may be considered as
psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. The marriage should remain valid and existing.
Irreconcilable differences and conflict of personalities do not amount
to psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the parties must
exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness. The
evidences show that they cannot get along with each other and had not
shown the gravity of incapacity nor its incurability. The expert
testimony likewise did not show the incurability of the disorder; it only
showed incompatibility.
HERNANDEZ v. CA
320 SCRA 76, December 8, 1999
FACTS: Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in

MEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS

421 SCRA 461, January 29, 2004

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity has been proven.

HELD: Psychological incapacity is not proven in court in this case.
The evidence is not sufficient. Psychological incapacity is intended to
the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be
incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharons
sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does
it constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !9

lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,

they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude
the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those
contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential
parameters are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of
the dissolution of marriage.

HELD: NO. From the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties,
we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have
perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently
falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos:

LAM vs. CHUA

G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004

FACTS: Lam and chua were married in 1984, and they had a son.
Chua claims psychological incapacity as a ground for the annulment of
their marriage. To justify the claims, she claims that he is irresponsible
and keeps ok asking for money. She also presented evidence that he
was married twice before, hence, the marriage was bigamous.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage may be dissolved on the ground of
psychological incapacity; Whether the proper ground was bigamy.
HELD: The proper ground was bigamy. The court held that it was
enough for Chua to prove that Lam had no capacity to marry her by
reason of the existence of a previous marriage.
MALLION vs. ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528; October 31, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner files a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage w respondent by reason of psychological incapacity. RTC
denied. Later, petitioner files another petition this time asserting that
their marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not second petition would prosper.
HELD: Yes. It involves the same cause of action, and allowing such
would be equivalent to the splitting of cause of action. He is barred on
the ground of RES JUDICATA.
CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896. October 27, 2004
FACTS: Respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner. He alleged that all
throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely
volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about
almost everything and anyone connected with him; that she would yell
and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the
hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement; that her psychological incapacity arose
before marriage; and that he endured and suffered through his
turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
Petitioner alleged that respondent invented malicious stories against
her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving
wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his
marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel
in all his endeavors despite his philandering.
The trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was
filed but was denied. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Is the marriage of Siayngcos null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity?

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a

divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR. vs. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO
G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that
he didnt have time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him
even before marriage when he could not give her the things she
wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his career. Even
marriage counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that when they
quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even told him to look
for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of their
marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made
pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him.
The trial court held that petitioner and respondent were both
psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations.
Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. She averred
that the trial court erred when it annulled their marriage instead of
decreeing their legal separation. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared that the marriage still subsists.
ISSUE: Is the marriage void on the ground of the parties
psychological incapacity?
HELD: NO. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we categorically said that
psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. These include the obligations
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. We likewise have repeatedly reminded that
the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
Petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the
part of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage
and respondents scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their
immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute psychological
incapacity. Thus so far, both petitioner and respondent have not shown
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral
element in their personality structure that effectively incapacitates

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !10

them from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to

marriage.
ANTONIO vs. REYES

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes,
36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting,
they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church
wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5
months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around
her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events
or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which
she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They
were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he
finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in
1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void
anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as
basis for declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD: Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand
the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply
with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying
and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live
in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological
incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was
sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage
without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate
pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is
incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16,
1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a
month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio
sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991,
she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not
bother to see her nor their child.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform

his marital obligation.

HELD: Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but
it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations
are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some
psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered
as psychologically incapacitated.
LANDICHO V. RELOVA
FACTS: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by
respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the
information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira
Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was
filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided
plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her
marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged
use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner
and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963,
petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third- party complaint,
against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse,
praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force
and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage
with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
ISSUE: Is the civil case filed a prejudicial question?
HELD: Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against
the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment
of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the
husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the
first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the
determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to
the second marriage is not in issue. "The mere fact that there are
actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy
case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically
raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case.
In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be
shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that
was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that
his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the
petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it
was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was
only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third
party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with
her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats
and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the
outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists.

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests 1! 1

ISSUE: Is the prior marriage is void or voidable?

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy."
DONATO vs. LUNA
GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988
FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato
was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This
was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before
the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on
September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz
consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second
since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married
to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed
that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's
consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second
marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit
executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the
requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of
the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November
1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already
previously married.

HELD: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage
was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art.
85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment
has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she
was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other,
for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court
a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time
she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel);
accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial

question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and
was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show
that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be
the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

FACTS: On May 29, 1991, Delia Domingo filed a petition entitled

"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against Roberto Domingo, alleging that they were married on
November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg.; unknown to
her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April
25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know
of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz
sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has
been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines
only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave
granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has
been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00,
which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties
without her knowledge or consent; he failed and refused to turn over
the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/
attorney-in- fact.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the

order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980
should be sustained.

ISSUE: Is a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage

necessary? If in the affirmative, is the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage?

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.

HELD: The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied

upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage.

ISSUE: Is the criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending
before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that
latter constitutes a prejudicial question?

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V.

SEMPIO-DIY
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
FACTS: In an action filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated
on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch
in Makati, Metro Manila) with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of
Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of
said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and
void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been
allegedly forced to enter said marital union.

In the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to

the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the
time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for
all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !12

from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous

marriage void.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is
meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the
precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as
it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in
which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of
remarriage."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Petitioner's
interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite
restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state
in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result
in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. When a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. It
stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity
of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to
decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
FACTS: After 24 years of marriage and 4 children, Meynardo L.
Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage against his wife
Charmaine E. Felix on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Art. 36 of the Family Code. Charmaine alleged that it was Beltran who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint
for Concubinage under Art. 334 of the RPC against Beltran and
Milagros.
Beltran filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the criminal case
arguing that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case.
ISSUE: Is the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage a prejudicial question to a criminal case for concubinage?
HELD: NO. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination
of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue/s raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
In Domingo vs. C.A., the Court ruled that according to Art. 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable

basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final

judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for
purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So
that in a case for concubinage, the accused need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in
the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
Moreover, even if there is a subsequent pronouncement that the
marriage is void from the beginning, it cannot be used as a defense in
the case of concubinage; for so long as there is no declaration of
nullity, the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity. The same must be submitted to judgment of the
competent courts. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN
G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000
FACTS: Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado and Ma. Consuelo Tan got
married. In the Marriage Contract, duly executed and signed by them,
the status of Mercado was single. At the time of the celebration of
the wedding, Mercado was actually in lawful wedlock with Ma.
Thelma Oliva. Both marriages were consummated when Oliva bore 2
children, and Tan a child, Vincent Paul, Jr., all sired by Mercado.
Tan filed a complaint for Bigamy. More than a month after the bigamy
case was lodged, Mercado filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Oliva, which was subsequently declared null and
void.
In the case for bigamy, while acknowledging the existence of the two
marriages, Mercado posited the defense that his previous marriage had
been judicially declared void ab initio. Mercado argues that unlike
voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a
competent court, a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place
at all. Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of.
ISSUE: Should Mercado be held liable for Bigamy notwithstanding
the subsequent declaration of nullity of his previous marriage?
HELD: YES. All the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed
that Mercado married Oliva and that while that marriage was still
subsisting, he contracted a second marriage with Tan, who
subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy. That he subsequently
obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. The crime had already been consummated by then. The
fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense
in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before a second
marriage may be contracted, as stated in Art. 40 of the Family Code.
The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the
fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
marriage before they should be allowed to marry again.
REPUBLIC VS. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993
FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British,
in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his
ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then
he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in
January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In
1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his
son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !13

cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by

securing another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several
letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio
petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his
wife, Janet, is already dead.
HELD: No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give
rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, is instructive as to degree of diligence
required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant
Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The
Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain
the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning
the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such
inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who
lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing
information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a
suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only
basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . .
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica
Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable
or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in
San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Respondent's testimony also showed that he confused London for
Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his
wife in England. Moreover, the Court also views respondent's claim
that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the
loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which
respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had
lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Furthermore, neither can this Court give much credence to
respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of
her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those
friends in his testimony.

and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the

estate would have been settled.
ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to
the absence of the declaration of presumptive death.
HELD: The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that
time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only
on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is
Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1)
(2)

The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted

during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio
unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2)
of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent
marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to
be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so
contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad
faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court
does not find these circumstances to be here extant. A judicial
declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long
as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that
the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of
Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in
these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.

ARMAS VS. CALISTERIO

GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the
respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land
estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of
Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January
1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11
years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico
were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a
petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that
marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is
thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be
appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent

bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the
following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or
two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances
stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse
present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so
provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's
first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had
disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !14

second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This

second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the
Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence
of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

there being no record of such. He further argued that his second

marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Is Tenebro is guilty of bigamy?

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
FACTS: Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to
Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was
charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never
seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in
January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months
after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in
Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first
marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and
Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he
married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo
Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in
his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in
good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know
that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against
him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to
ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first
marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage.
CARINO vs. CARINO
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was

not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent.
The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the
RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners wife be legally presumed dead under
Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of
presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code?
HELD: The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is
presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of
the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for
the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive
death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of
bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who
contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is
later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot
be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
TENEBRO vs. CA
G.R. No. 150758; February 18, 2004
FACTS: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two
lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas
thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas
countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact

FACTS: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino.

He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second
marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second
marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee.
In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the
spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to
claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of
P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee
admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the
subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the
absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil
registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous
marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: May the absolute nullity of marriage be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes?
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due
the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and
SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !15

to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous

marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled
to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party
shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is
entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their
marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to
marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their
property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides
that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to
have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries
and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other
may not have contributed at all.

defendant sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of pains in

her private parts. He also noticed that something was oozing therefrom
with an offensive smell.
Upon the advice of a physician, defendant submitted to a operation as
she had a tumor which infected her uterus and ovaries. With the
consent of plaintiff, her uterus and ovaries were removed thereby
making her incapable to procreate but not to copulate.
Plaintiff now comes before the courts to have his marriage annulled on
the ground in impotency.
ISSUE: May the marriage be annulled on the ground of incompetency?

TY vs. CA
346 SCRA 86

HELD: No. US law generally held that the meaning of impotency is

not the ability to procreate but the inability to copulate. It is thus a
defect of copulation and not of reproduction. Barrenness will not
invalidate the marriage.

FACTS: In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil

ceremony. They had a church wedding in the same year as well. In
1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their
marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license
and the subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the
parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia.
Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at
the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration
yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia
presented evidence proving the existence of a valid marriage license
including the specific license number designated. The lower court
however ruled that Ofelias marriage with Reyes is null and void. The
same was affirmed by the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of
the FC.

In this case, defendant is not impotent. The operation made her sterile
but by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse. It was due to
plaintiffs own voluntary desistance, memory of first unpleasant
experience, that made him give up the idea of again having carnal
knowledge with her even after she had already been rid of her disease
BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT

G.R. No. 47101 April 25, 1941

FACTS: Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in
March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in Nov
26. On February 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who
was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this,
Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.

ISSUE: Can the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes

be invoked in the case at bar?

On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the

grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that
she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, The absolute nullity of a

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he
must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous
marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes
other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the
declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the
lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both
marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the FC. The old
CC did not have any provision that states that there must be such a
declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelias marriage
with Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in 87)
cannot be applied retroactively especially because they would impair
the vested rights of Ofelia under the CC which was operational during
her marriage with Reyes.

ISSUE: Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be

granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the
marriage?
HELD: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a
marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where
society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did
not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was
in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical
manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach) when they got married.
FERNANDO AQUINO v CONCHITA DELIZO
G.R. No. L-15853; July 27, 1960

VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
SARAO vs GUEVARRA
GR No 4264 May 31, 1940
FACTS: Sarao and Guevarra got married in 1932. In the afternoon,
plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge with defendant but he was
asked to wait for the evening.
That night, he proceeded but though he found the orifice of the

FACTS: Fernando alleges that Conchita concealed the fact that she
was pregnant by another man at the time of their marriage. At about 4
months after their marriage, she gave birth to a child. Fernando then
instituted a complaint for the annulment of their marriage. Conchita
claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between
her and the plaintiff. CFI Rizal and CA dismissed petitioner's
complaint.

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !16

complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private

respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing
several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private
respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. The
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed
or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the
parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, the Court is convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the concealment of the wife of her pregnancy from a

man other than his husband constitutes fraud as a ground for the
annulment of their marriage.

HELD: Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. In the case
of Buccat vs. Buccat, which was also an action for the annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even
suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it
having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the
defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant
at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not
prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially
since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy,
the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus,
that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the
abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed
by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be
expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant
at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted
to conceal the true state of affairs.

CORPUS vs. OCHOTORENA

AM RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004
FACTS: Mariano Macias filed a petition for the nullification of his
marriage with Margie Macias. This was raffled to Judge Ochotorena.
Said judge immediately served summons to Margie which she did not
receive because her whereabouts were unknown and she only found
out about it through a newspaper. Margie then filed a Motion to
dismiss which the judge disregarded and proceeded with the petition of
Mariano. The judge proceeded with the hearing without the resolution
of the motions.

EMILIO TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted with bias and partiality as

well as ignorance of the law.

FACTS: Maria and Emilio got married on June 3, 1972 and from this
union, begot two children. She avers that Emilio was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations at the time of their marriage which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights between them. She alleges that:
(a) Emilio inflicted physical injuries on her that compelled her to
institute a criminal case against him; (b) he used prohibited drugs and
was even apprehended by authorities; (c) he was a womanizer and in
1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with 3 women in
succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife; (d) the
petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay
for the tuition fees of their children compelling her to accept donations
from her family and friends; and (e) he was a spendthrift incurring
large obligations with banks, credit card companies and other financial
institutions, without private respondents consent.
In 1989, Maria filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Emilio before the RTC of Makati. The trial court
declared the nullity of their marriage and awarded the custody of the
children to Maria.
ISSUE: Whether the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the parties is fatal to the validity of
the court proceedings.
HELD: A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default
is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for
annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state
for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to
take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The facts
in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and
60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default
by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the

HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. Then judge acted on the
petition for nullification and proceeded with it without acting on the
motion to dismiss which was filed within the period prescribed by law.
The judge performed a so called procedural shortcut and ignored the
motion of the petitioner. The judge also did not follow the Rules of
Court which requires an investigation to be made first by the
prosecuting attorney with regard to collusion and if none, to intervene
and check for fabrications in the evidence. It is only after this that a
case may be tried on its merits. Said order by the court did not take
place thus, the judges actions were erroneous.
CERVANTES vs. FAJARDO

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

FACTS: The minor was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and
Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents
offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-inlaw, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson
Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she
was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption
of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent
Gina Carreon. The adoptive parents received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00,
otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to
accede to the demand. Subsequently, the respondents took the child.
ISSUE: Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents
have custody over Angelie Ann Cervantes.
HELD: The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are
granted to petitioners, Zenaida and Nelson Cervantes, to whom they
properly belong. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !17

that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of
age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the
child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court
deviated from this criterion. It is undisputed that respondent Conrado
Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina
Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband
and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina
Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she
can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to
another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost
three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. Upon the
other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally,
physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor
and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not
only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man,
can most likely give her.
REPUBLIC vs. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005
FACTS: Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu
City. They begot five children. After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger
and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care
of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five
visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March
25, 1997.
ISSUE: Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute
psychological incapacity
HELD: No. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos,
Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no
basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article. At most, Felys
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the same Code.
ESPIRITU vs. CA
GR 115640, March 15, 1995
FACTS: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain
a common law relationship of husband and wife while in US. Teresita
works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National
Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a
child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the
Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married.
Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they
decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead
of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went

back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines

and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines
sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.
ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the two children should be
awarded to the mother.

HELD: No. In cases of care, custody, education and property of

children, the latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and that
even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from
the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is
the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not
conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were
both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was
found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the
position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the
crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the
daughter.
MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125041, 30 June 2006
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly
married when they were only 21 years old and 19 years old,
respectively. As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was subsequently
annulled. Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner,
she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon,
raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned
them. They are financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education
in the US where they now live. Petitioner likewise averred that
demands were made upon Federico and the latters father, Francisco,
for general support but it was left unheeded.
ISSUE: Whether the grandfather is liable for support pende lite when
the parents are financially incapable.
HELD: Yes. Under the Rules of Court, a court may temporarily grant
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully
into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this
relief. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. After the hearings
conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find
that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation
of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins entitlement
to support pendente lite. In the words of the trial court By and large,
the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied. They
had maintained constant communication with their grandfather
Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having
wrote several letters to Rica and Rina. Indeed, respondents, by their
actuations, have shown beyond doubt that the twins are the children of
Federico.
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial courts grant of
support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next question is

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !18

who should be made liable for said award. There being prima facie
evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the
parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are
primarily charged to support their childrens college education. In view
however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support
should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the
Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of
Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in
default of their parents.
ANAYA vs. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930, 26 November 1970
FACTS: Defendant Fernando Palaroan filed an action for annulment of
the marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained through force
and intimidation. Judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint,
upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora Anayas
(Aurora) counterclaim. Pending negotiation of the counterclaim,
Fernando divulged to Aurora that prior to their marriage he had
premarital relationship with a close relative of his. Aurora claimed that
the nondivulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret
on the part of Fernando definitely wrecked their marriage.
Consequently, Aurora argued that the marriage that was solemnized
between them constituted fraud, in obtaining her consent within the
contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code. Aurora prayed
for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether the non-disclosure of pre-marital relationship with
another is a ground for annulment of the marriage.

HELD: No. Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship

with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that
would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph of the article, providing that no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to... chastity shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such nondisclosure of pre-marital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated
into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not
assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested.
LEGAL SEPARATION

FRANCISCO vs. TAYAO

G.R. No. L-26435, G.R. No. L-26435

FACTS: Juanaria Francisco and Lope Tayao contracted marriage in the
City of Manila in 1912. They separated in 1917. The husband then
moved to Zamboanga. There he was later prosecuted for having
committed adultery with a married woman named Bernardina
Medrano, wife of Ambrosio Torres. As a result of that proceeding,
Lope Tayao was convicted. Juanaria Francisco then filed an action in
order that their marriage be dissolved was instituted in the CFI of
Manila but was denied. The trial judge based his decision principally
on the point that the plaintiff was not an innocent spouse within the
meaning of sections 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law. This findings, as well
as the dismissal of the complaint, is challenged by the plaintiff on
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can secure a divorce from the
husband, where the latter has been convicted of adultery and not of
concubinage, although the acts for which the husband was convicted
of adultery may also constitute concubinage.

HELD: No. In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are
prescribed by statute. The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the
part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. The
Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, is emphatically clear in this
respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce can only be
filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of
the husband . . . ."
Note well the adverb "only" and the conjunctive "or." The same
thought is again emphasized in section 3 of the Divorce Law which
provides that "The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. . . . " Later on comes
section 8 providing that "A divorce shall not be granted without the
guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal
action"that is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final
sentence in a criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband. The undeniable fact remains
that the defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime
of adultery and not the crime of concubinage.
GANDIONCO vs. PENARANDA
GR. No. 79284, November 27, 1987
FACTS: On 29 May 1986, private respondent Teresita Gandionco, the
legal wife of the petitioner Froilan Gandionco, filed with the RTC of
Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge Senen
Penaranda, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the
ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of
damages. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with
MTC, General Santos City, acomplaint against petitioner for
concubinage. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional
remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for
legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for
legal separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10
December 1986, ordered the payment of support pendente lite.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application
for support pendentelite, should be suspended in view of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending
the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
HELD: YES. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal
action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce
the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such
civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with
the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and
disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of
legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of
in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the
judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of supportpendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or
reduce the same.
ONG vs. ONG
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
FACTS: Lucita, married to William, filed a complaint for legal

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !19

separation under Art. 55(1) of the Family Code. Lucita claimed that:
soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William
would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga",
and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against
concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand;
the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or
their business; William would also scold and beat the children at
different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever
she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his
ire on her and box her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with
Williams decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod,
William slapped her and said, "it is none of your business"; on
December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from
Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left
cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach
and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then
pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to
her sisters house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other
siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following
day, she went to her parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment
of her injuries. Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous
accounts of the instances when William displayed violent temper
against Lucita and their children. William for his part denied that he
ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language
against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt.

left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more

possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally
alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor
to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

Whether or not Abandonment and sexual infidelity of

respondents wife constitute psychological incapacity.

(2) Whether or not Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code is

applicable.
HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not there must be legal separation.

(1) NO. Using the guidelines established in the cases of Santos v.

Court of Appeals, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, and
Marcos v. Marcos, the Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no
basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. It is worthy to emphasize that Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less,
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.

HELD: Yes. Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for
legal separation i.e. Art. 55(1). To these, all William and his witnesses,
could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents. As
between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial
for
35
William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former. William
also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal
separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the
conjugal properties. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code. Her
abandonment was justified. She left him because of his abusive
conduct. Thus, there should be legal separation.

(2) NO. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special

situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen
and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By
its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied
to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time
Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. At the time
she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005

GINEZ vs. BUGAYONG

FACTS: Respondent Crasus married at Bradford Memorial Church,

Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five.
After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered
that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely
left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving
all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to
the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he
sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request.
Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent
by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with
whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in
Cebu City but Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely. Fely continued to
live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines
and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus.
At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely

FACTS :In July 1951, Bugayong began receiving letters from

Valeriana Polangco and some anonymous writers informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity by his wife. He also informed the court of a
letter coming from his wife admitting that a certain Eliong kissed her.
He went to Pangasinan, where his wife was and stayed there with his
wife in one roof for two days as husband and wife. He filed a case for
legal separation
.

ISSUE: Does the act of living with his wife for 2 days constitute
condonation?
HELD: Yes. Despite belief that his wife was unfaithful, he chose to
stay with her in one roof in Pangisinan. There was condonation.
Pursuant to law, condonation, expressed or implied works as bar to the
subsequent filing of a legal separation case.

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !20

LAPUZ-SY vs. EUFEMIO

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy and Eufemio were married civilly on
September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived
together as husband and wife continuously without any children until
1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband
cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.
Hence, she filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio on
August 1953. She prayed that a decree of legal separation be issued
which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should
be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio
filed a counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go
Hiok. During trial, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio
moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on the ground that,
among others, the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an
action for legal separation, will abate the action even if property rights
are involved.
HELD: YES. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere
effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no
decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims
would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and
academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.
Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines could be resolved and determined
in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.

ISSUE: Whether the custody of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes

must be given to her natural parents notwithstanding the mere common
law relationship of the latter.
HELD: NO. Is it undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is
legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and
his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon
will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can
grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides,
respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child
by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3)
years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like
Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose father is
not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of
said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married
appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the
natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only
jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can
most likely give her.
ESPIRITU vs. CA
GR No. 115640, March 15, 1995
FACTS: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain
a common law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as
a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his employer, National Steel
Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in
1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines
for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they
had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate.
Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it,
she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his
sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his
sister to gain custody of the children.
ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be
awarded to the mother.

CERVANTES vs. FAJARDO

G.R. No. 79955
January 27, 1989
FACTS: Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to
Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband
and wife. They offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister
and brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes,
spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely
two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
was executed by respondent Gina Carreon. The petition for adoption
was filed by petitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which granted the
petition. Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida
Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid
the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioners refused. As a result, while petitioners were out at work, the
Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners'
residence, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her
mother. Gina Carreon brought the child to her house. Petitioners
demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying
that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the
affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully
explained to her.

HELD: In cases of care, custody, education and property of children,

the latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a
child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the
mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the
best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not
conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were
both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was
found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the
position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the
crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the
daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to
their father.
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs. CAMPOS RUEDA

FC Arts. 1- 73 4F Digests !21

G.R. No. 11263; November 2, 1916

FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y
Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for
a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It
was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform
such acts and demanded her husband to support her other than the
legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent
maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face
and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent
and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed
motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her
outside the conjugal home.
HELD: YES. The obligation on the part of the husband to support his
wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute.
The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home.
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ

G.R. No. L-17014; August 11, 1921

FACTS: Mariano and Dolores got married in 1910, and since then,
they have lived together as husband and wife in Iloilo until July 4,
1920, when Dolores went away to live separately from Mariano.
Mariano made efforts to induce her to resume marital relations but to
no avail. Thereafter, he instituted an action to compel her to return to
the matrimonial home and live with him as his wife. However, Dolores
answered by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been
compelled to leave by the cruel treatment on the part of her husband.
She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of the
conjugal partnership and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent
separate maintenance. The lower court favored the defendant.
ISSUE: Whether the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit
with each other.
HELD: It is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one
of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an
order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses
to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries
where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable.
The Court held that Mariano is entitled to the unconditional and
absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, though

he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to
return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to
the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores
Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without
sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return.