Definition: Atienza vs Board of Medicine( Rule 128 section 1)

G.R. No. 177407 | February 9, 2011 | J. Nachura

Facts:
1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) for check-up on February 1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC
who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. She underwent kidney operation
after the tests revealed that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing.
3. Private respondents husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross negligence
and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine for the removal of Edithas fully functional
right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who allegedly participated in the kidney
operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of documentary
evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-Ray request forms where interpretation
of the ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated.
5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Edithas formal offer of exhibits, alleging that
said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified
and authenticated, intended to establish matters which are hearsay, and incompetent to prove
the purpose for which they are offered.
6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was admitted by the BOM.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied on the ground that BOM
should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when
it decides the case, and later on determine whether the evidence is relevant or not.
7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence
Held:
No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are

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enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence
which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held
that, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found
relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant
or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence)
is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive
rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced in light of Section 20, Article I of
the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure. As pointed out by the appellate
court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were
in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection with Edithas
medical case, which contained handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys were
both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation, need not be proved as it
is covered by mandatory judicial notice. These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of
the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys because the position and removal may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also inapplicable. Section 3 of
Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined
in
court

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without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for
gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left nonfunctioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at
the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed,
especially as one of the witnesses testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new
building and ultimately, the originals cannot be produced.
Scope: (Rule 128 Section 2-4)
SASAN vs.NLRC G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against EPCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal. In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had
become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were
employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for
more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and
methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and
void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of EPCIBank .For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI,
an independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform
janitorial and messengerial services thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an
independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related services
to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. On the basis of the parties
position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision
finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the
required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under
its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a laboronly contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to
petitioners. Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and
HI appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division. The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the
first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with
sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only contracting."
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the CA by filing a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC

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that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Hence,
the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed in labor cases.
RULING:The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules
of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling inlabor
cases.
The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has
been
held that
the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties f
or the firsttime on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice
the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.
The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical
rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases

PEOPLE VS. LAUGA

FACTS:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies revealed
that the victim was left alone at home while his father was having drinking spree at the

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neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her
mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also went out with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid inside the
blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the
victim not to shout for help. He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by
threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victims brother arrived and saw her
crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying out late. The two decided to leave
the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, victim recounted to her
brother what happened to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother and uncle who
sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing
only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which he obliged. Appellant admitted
to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
with modification the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellants extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in

evidence?

HELD: Negative.

Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the
"bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to
the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality
of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned.
Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as evidence, it does not warrant
the acquittal of the accused. The appellants conviction is upheld because of the strong
evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

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CASE No. 03 TATING vs. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
155208 | 2007-03-27
FACTS:
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over
the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property
in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years
1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the land remained in possession
Daniela. On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that
she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her
and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to
enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of
helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not
secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena
cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her. Daniela died on July 29, 1988
leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed
Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed on
December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return
of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not
reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile. Hence, her son filed a complaint
with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in
favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower
courts.
RULING: The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in
giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to
take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have
given probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the
contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence,
a trust relationship was created between them. Considering that the Court finds the
subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or
simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust
relationship was created between them. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is
DISMISSED.

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PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS and

MARIA
[G.R.

EFIGENIA
No.

107518.

FISHING
October

CORPORATION
8,

1998]

Facts:
This is a civil case for damages arising from a sea collision incident when plaintiff's
tanker
hit
respondent's
fishing
boat,
causing
the
boat
to
sink.
The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of documentary
exhibits presented, mainly the price quotations. These price quotations were issued
personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to
the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. However, these are not published in
any list, register, periodical or other compilation nor containing data of everyday
professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation.T
Issue:
Are price quotations considered commercial list, thus can be admissible in evidence?
Held:
NO. Price quotations are not within the purview of commercial lists as these are not
standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and
relied upon in the work of the occupation.These are simply letters responding to the
queries
of
Del
Rosario.
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The price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of
Court should have been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del
Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even
though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who
issued
the
price
quotations.
A
document
is
a
commercial
list
if:
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published
compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation,
and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.

RAMIREZ V CA 7NOV G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC
alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and
in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit
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and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation
of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR,
hence the instant petition.
Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the
conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,
provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent
courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to
make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications
taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

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The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The

substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a
tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As
the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should
be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word communication to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the
latin word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the
process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys
meaning of the phrase private communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms conversation and communication were interchangeably used by
Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA7NOVG.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:

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Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment
of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondents offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during
trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals
Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes
such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or

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secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording
of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress

Ganaan vs IAC 7NOVG.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainants residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico.
After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions
for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered Yes. Complainant then told Laconico to wait
for instructions on where to deliver the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of
the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainants consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

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The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the
present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under Rep. Act No.
4200
Held:
No. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or
the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Pollo vs David G. R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV
and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.
On January 3. 2007, CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an unsigned
complaint letter which was marked Confidential and was sent through a courier service (LBC)
from certain Allan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The letter contain allegations
that the petitioner have been helping many who have pending cases in the CSC and the letter
sender pleas that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and good
behaviour of their office.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in
information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and
specifically to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD)
and Legal divisions.
After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue,
Quezon City. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal
Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo
and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text
messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time,
informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the
CSC Chair.

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Issue: Legality of the search conducted in the petitioners office computer and the copying of
his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression of his
constitutional right to privacy.

Ruling: Yes.

In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement
make theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x for legitimate, work-related
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of
reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the
efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the
privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, workrelated purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by
the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:

Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must
consider whether theaction was justified at its inception, x x x ; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place, x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception

when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a
noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the [misconduct]. x x x39
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its
inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its
actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in
the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer has successfully passed the
test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the abovediscussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in
its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an

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investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the
warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that
a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having pending cases
with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious,
as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in
the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a
highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would
undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasijudicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an
impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so,
otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the
complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in
the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was
justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they
could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.
Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably
defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an
open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who
happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In
addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and
the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned
to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of
the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational
effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.

Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His
other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to

15 MARGRET

certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under
the aforecited authorities.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNIG.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
Facts
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was
identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him
as he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Issue:
Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and
seizure is violated
Ruling: The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules
of court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be
committed or had just been committed.
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.

In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear
that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the information they have
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine on his own
authority that a search warrant was not necessary
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law
enforcement agents. ACQUITTED
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were
three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in
Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.
The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to

16 MARGRET

run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live
ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them
and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed
before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified
that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police
including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm
or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on
him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of
the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the
offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a
penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy
street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

PEOPLE V. LAGUIO
Facts:
Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review to nullify and set aside the
resolution of RTC in criminal case, granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer to
Evidence and aquitting him of 3 charges filed against him.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the
search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental
search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof
are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.

17 MARGRET

Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that inasmuch as it
has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs
and unlicensed firearms in the accused possession had been validly made upon probable cause
and under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily
have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in
flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful. In effect,
the People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since
the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid
search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open
his BMW cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
Issue: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case
despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
Held:
NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any
suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably
invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and
searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later
on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
Section 5. It is settled that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is
clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested
mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who
were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not
even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in
flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early
morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may
be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted
surveillance operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the
description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required
in paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under
paragraph (c) of Section 5.The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is
that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal
arrest is likewise unlawful.

People vs. Carlos dela Cruz, G.R. No. 182348November 20, 2008, J. VELASCO,
JR.
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Facts: In the morning of October 20, 2002, a team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol.
Once there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with accused-appellant. Boy Bicol
engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant was seen holding
a shotgun through a window. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer pointed his
firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant.
They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug
paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. The RTC acquitted
accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted him
of possession of dangerous drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in convicting the accused-appellant
guilty of possession of an illegal drug
Ruling: NO. He was not in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely found
inside a room with shabu, not as the rooms owner or occupant but as a guest. There
is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa hut that was
subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over the nipa
hut. Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not
disputed by the prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy Bicol. The
prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu, whether in its actual or
constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant. Since accused-appellant was not
in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicols nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was
also invalid. Thus, CA Decision dated November 29, 2007 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE

REPUBLIC VS ROQUE
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari 1 are the April 23, 20122 and July 31, 20123 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92(RTC) in Special Civil Action (SCA) No.
Q-07-60778, denying petitioners motion to dismiss (subject motion to dismiss) based on
the following grounds: (a) that the Court had yet to pass upon the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9372,4 otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007," in the
consolidated cases of Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council5 (Southern Hemisphere); and (b) that private respondents petition for declaratory
relief was proper.
The Facts

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On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition 6 for declaratory relief before the
RTC, assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, 7 for
being void for vagueness;8 (b) Section 7,9for violating the right to privacy of communication
and due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships; 10 (c)Section
18,11 for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 12 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;13 (d) Section 26,14 for violating the right to travel;15 and (e) Section
27,16 for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 17
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, 18 averring that certain petitions (SC
petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality have been lodged before the
Court.19 The said motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007. 20
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision 21 in the Southern Hemisphere
cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss, 22 contending that
private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they
averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the
Southern Hemisphere cases.
In their Comment/Opposition,23 private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not
resolve the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as the SC
petitions were dismissed based purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for
declaratory relief were met.
The RTC Ruling
On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order 24 which denied the subject motion to dismiss,
finding that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private
respondents petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order
dated July 31, 2012.26 The RTC observed that private respondents have personal and
substantial interests in the case and that it would be illogical to await the adverse
consequences of the aforesaid laws implementation considering that the case is of
paramount impact to the Filipino people.27
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues Before the Court

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The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely
abused its discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.
Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents failed to satisfy the
requirements for declaratory relief and that the Court had already sustained with finality
the constitutionality of RA 9372.
On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements for declaratory relief
have been satisfied and that the Court has yet to resolve the constitutionality of RA 9372,
negating any grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.28 It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave"
must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. 29 In this relation, case law
states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 30 The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be
met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could
be ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents petition had met all the requisites for
an action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss
was altogether improper.
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any
definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those
consolidated cases were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the
remedy of certiorari was improper;31 (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi; 32 and (c)
petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or controversy. 33 Therefore, there was no
grave abuse of discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTCs ruling on the
sufficiency of private respondents petition for declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:

21 MARGRET

first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third ,
there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an
actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth ,
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.34
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the
first,35 second,36 and third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and
sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or
the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.38 Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued
facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has
accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle
that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and
inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.39
A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief would show that they have
failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain
some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not
far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which
the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would
remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were
addressed to the general public.40 They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended
towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of
RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to
any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief,
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
1wphi1

22 MARGRET

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is
not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle
actual
controversies
involving
rights
which
are
legally
demandable
and
41
enforceable. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern
Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or
the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents petition for
declaratory relief all the same.
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount
their constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of
RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case. 42 While it
has been previously held that transcendental public importance dispenses with the
requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct
and personal injury,43 it must be stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. 44 Towards this
end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct
necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi, 45 as in this case. To rule otherwise,
would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an
interest shared by the general public.46
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that
the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the
above-discussed allegations in private respondents petition, remain highly-speculative and
merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 47 This
private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.
1wphi1

Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a
discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the
private respondents exists in the first place.
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for
declaratory relief, as well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents
petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to
the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April23, 2012 and July 31, 2012
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 in SCA No. Q-07-60778 are

23 MARGRET

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition for declaratory relief before the said court is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

24 MARGRET