Section 2, Art.

III, of the 1987 Constitution

Warrant of Arrest

Van Twest, cut off his private part, and proceeded to burn his
cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires.

ALLADO V. DIOKNO

The day after Umbals confession, the operatives of PACC armed

with a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of RTC
Manila, Br. 11, separately raided the two dwellings of Santiago.

Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, petitioners,

vs.
Hon. Roberto C. Diokno, Presiding Judge, BR. 62, Regional Trial
Court, Makati Metro Manila, and Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission, respondents.
G.R. No. 113630
5 May 1994
Ponente: Bellosillo

Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (to set aside a warrant of
arrest issued by the RTC of Makati, Br. 62)
BRIEF
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition on the warrant of
arrest issued by respondent Judge Diokno in Criminal Case No. 941757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
FACTS
Allado and Mendoza were accused and arrested without bail for the
kidnapping with murder of a German national, Eugen Alexander
Van Twest, by the PACC on the basis of an alleged extra-judicial
confession executed by security guard, Escolastico Umbal.
In a sworn statement, Umbal said that he and his companions, expoliceman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG agent Roberto Santiago and
SPO2 Sergio Antonio were hired by Allado and Mendoza in
exchange of Php2.5 million to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly
had an international warrant of arrest against him.
Four days after the abduction, Umbals companions, along with
Allado, Mendoza and SPO2 Bato, returned to the safe house where
Van Twest was being kept and where SPO2 Bato allegedly faked the
interrogation and made Van Twest sign certain documents.
Gamatero shot Van Twest the following day, while Antonino stabbed

Sr. Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred
the case to the Department of Justice for the institution of criminal
proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Santiago, SPO1 Antonino, SPO2
Bato, Ex-policeman Gamatero, Efren Madolid, as well as Atty. Allado
and Atty. Mendoza, for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and
usurpation of authority.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether Judge Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the warrant of arrest against Allado
and Mendoza without determining the admissibility of the evidence
against them and without even stating the basis of his findings and
in relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that
probable cause exists?
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Judge issued a warrant of arrest against Allado and
Mendoza.
SC: The petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the
requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant
of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
While it appears in that case that we have granted the prosecutor
and the trial judge seemingly unlimited latitude in determining the
existence or absence of probable cause by affirming the longstanding procedure that they can base their findings merely on
their personal opinion and reasonable belief, yet, this
permissiveness should not be interpreted as giving them arbitrary
powers and letting them loose in the determination of the existence
of probable cause, a delicate legal question which can result in the
harassment and deprivation of liberty of the person sought to be
charged or arrested.

Before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself

that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that
a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof.
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relied heavily on the sworn
statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his
participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest.
Based on the evidence thus far submitted, however, there is
nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate
petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived in the
meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately
exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrestfacts and
circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief
that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite
obviously, this has not been met.
In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court said that the judge (a) shall
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of
probable cause.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect
him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state
from useless and expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241,
citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).
The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to
withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process (see
People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277). However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that the
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary
investigation serves not only for the purposes of the State. More
importantly, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play
which are birthrights of all who live in the country. It is therefore

imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to
relieve the accused from the pain of going thru a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima
facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused (italics supplied).
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the
seeming immensity of government power which when unchecked
becomes tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the Constitution,
particularly the Bill of Rights, defines the limits beyond which lie
unsanctioned state actions.
The right of the State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for
government agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens
under the Constitution.
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against
arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 28 February 1994 in
favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L.
Mendoza, is made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against
them is SET ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is
ENJOINED from proceeding any further against herein petitioners in
Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from

them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists
abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the
room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations.
This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a
plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go
abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of
DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an
Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to
being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the
Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated
the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and
deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster
the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a
valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the common
good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement,
does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly
the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order
No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of
performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which
would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme
at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing

On June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon detailed at Precinct No. 3,

Matina, Davao City, received information regarding the presence of
an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came
to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first
week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer
when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the
motorcycle driver, accused Mula, as the pusher. As to accuse
Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the
arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused came to
the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.
Appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of
their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as

amended by Republic Act No. 7659
PEOPLE VS. MOLINA
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y
MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 133917
February 19, 2001
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF:
For automatic review to the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, finding the violation of appellants on Section 8 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
FACTS:
On August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, the appellants were found
in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are
prohibited.

ISSUE/s of the CASE:

Whether the warrantless arrest, search and seizure fall within the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC: Appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 8, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
SC: The decision of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and
seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion that is, by virtue or
on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence
of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward
indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board
a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not
that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will
settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such
response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting
officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute
probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that
were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in
the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting
officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does
not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not
be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court
is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accusedappellants.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City,
Branch
17,
in
Criminal
Case
No.
37,
264-96,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Molina and
Mula are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

Republic vs. Rosemoor

Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosemoor Mining and
Development Corporation, et al.
G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004
Panganiban, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation
after having been granted permission to prospect for marble
deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan,
succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in
commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biakna-Bato mountain range.
The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines
and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding
license to exploit said marble deposits.
License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the
herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda
cancelled the petitioners license stating that their license had
illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and

that there was no more public interest served by the continued

existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was
confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to
this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of
land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former
status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.
Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No.
84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is
a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the
cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the
constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an
ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in
its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which
merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national
park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in
character.
Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on
March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers
under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of
Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution,
granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and
convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also
explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution.

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC)

filed a Petition with the lower court praying that the Ordinance
7783 be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons
but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it
constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
FACTS
On 30 March 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7783
entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE
ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Said ordinance prohibited
establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from
operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a
red light district harboring thrill seekers. MTDC argues that the
ordinance is invalid because includes hotels and motels in the
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment.
Furthermore, MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do
they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that
under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit
their operation. The City argues that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City
likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote
morality in the City.

ORDINANCE NO. 7783. AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE

ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN
FORMS
OF
AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
CITY OF MANILA, petioners,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 118127 | April 12, 2005
BRIEF

ISSUE/S of the CASE

1 Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is constitutional/valid.
2 Whether or not the City of Manila validly exercised police
power.
ACTIONS of the COURT
The Petition is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Supreme Court ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void.
The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
1

must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2
3
4
5
6

must
must
must
must
must

not be unfair or oppressive;

not be partial or discriminatory;
not prohibit but may regulate trade;
be general and consistent with public policy; and
not be unreasonable.

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale

for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but
the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and farreaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The classification of hotels, motels, hostel, and lodging house are
different from sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls.
SC said that it is baseless and insupportable.
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable as it substantially
divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property.
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property
must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and
conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid. The Ordinance
however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit The foregoing premises show that the
Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property
and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an
undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

Writ of Amparo, extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances Petition

for Review/for prohibition, injunction and TRO
Petition seeking to set aside the CAs decision issuing Writ of Amparo
GR. No. 180906

Secretary of National Defense

v.
Manalo and Manalo
Facts:
CA Decision being appealed
1. The Manalo brothers filed, on 23 August 2007, a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against petitioners and
their officers from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic
rights.
The Writ of Amparo was approved on Aug 24, 2007 and petitioners filed
Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition.
2. The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Manalo brothers and ordered the
current petitioners to:
To furnish the Manalos and CA of all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already
on file.
To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of
M/SgtHilarioakaRollie Castillo and Donald Caigas
To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if
any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until
August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.

Feb. 14, 2006 - Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, brothers and herein
respondents, were abducted by elements of the military (AFP and Citizen
Armed Force Geographical Unit or CAFGU) from their house in
BuholnaMangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.

The abductors were looking for a certain Bestre. Manalo brothers were
suspected of being members of the NPA
The white L300 van was driven by M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo
The brothers were repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned about their
knowledge of the NPA.

o
o

o
o

Sometime in the third week of detention, Raymond attempted to escape. He

discovered that they were in Fort Magsaysay (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). He
was however recaptured and tortured. Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted for
3 and a half months.
One day, Rizal Hilario took the Manalo brothers to Pinaud, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan and then beaten up. They remained there for one or two weeks.
Then brought to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan to meet Maj. Gen.
JovitoPalparan, Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division.
Gen. Palparan told the Manalo brother to tell their parents to not go to rallies
and hearings regarding their disappearance. Instead, they should help in the
capture of Bestre.
Respondents were then brought to their parents house to deliver Palparans
message. Their parents agreed out of fear.

o
o
o
o

Manalo brothers were given medicine named Alive. Gen. Palparan said
that this would make them feel better, but the real effect was drowsiness and
a heavy feeling after waking up.
After 3 months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson. He was
ordered to clean outside the barracks of the Army Rangers.
Met SherlynCadapan, a UP student who was also abducted, tortured and
raped by the military.
Reynaldo was brought to Camp Tecson a week later. Other captives (Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino) also arrived.
All the captives were chained every night. They were told that their families
would be killed if they escaped.
Cadapan, Empeo and Merino would later on be killed. Merino would even
be burned.
November 22, 2006 the captives were transferred to a camp of the 24th
Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. They were continually beaten and made
to do chores.
Here, respondents witnessed how soldiers killed an old man suspected of
harboring the NPA and also of an Aeta who was subsequently burned.
The captives were then brought to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea.
They were brought back to Limay on June 2007 by Caigas, the commander
of the 24th Infantry Battalion.
June 13, 2007 Respondents were brought to Pangasinan to farm the land of
Caigas. Here, they started to save their earnings to aid in their escape. When
they saved 1000 pesos, they were able to acquire a cellphone.
August 13, 2007 Reynaldo and Raymond Manalo were able to escape and
board a bus bound for Manila.
The respondents were able to corroborate each others affidavits.

Dr. Benito Molino also corroborated the accounts of the Manalo brothers. He
specializes in forensic medicine. He conducted a medical exam on the
respondents
After their escape. The scars and wounds of respondents were consistent with
their account of physical injuries inflicted on them. He followed the Istanbul
Protocol in the medical exam.
Petitioners also submitted affidavits
Gen. Palparan and M/Sgt. Hilario filed their affidavits late.
Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall and witness for the petitioner,
conducted an investigation on May 29, 2006, from 8am to 10pm.
All 6 persons (CAFGU members) implicated in the abduction denied the
allegation. They had alibis (some were building a chapel, some were just at
home)
Discovered that KaBestre is actually Rolando Manalo, elder brother of
the respondents.
Recommendation was for the dismissal of the case.
Issue:
Whether the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly given

Ruling:
Petition dismissed. CA decision reaffirmed.
History of the Amparo Rule

o
o

The adoption of the Amparo Rule is a result of the two-day National

Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007.
It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights
Amparo literally means protection in Spanish
Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the
U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law
tradition which prevails in Mexico.
It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in
particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the
entire nation
This concept evolved into the (1) amparolibertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra

o
o

o
o

leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3)

amparocasacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of
a judicial decision; (4) amparoadministrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5) amparoagrario for the protection of peasants
rights derived from the agrarian reform process
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas.
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for
the writ of amparo, several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed
by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes,
amparocasacion, and amparoadministrativo. Amparolibertad is comparable
to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
Was the grant proper? YES
Promulgated in October 24, 2007. First time that the Supreme Court
exercised its expanded power in the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules to
protect the peoples constitutional rights (life, liberty, property)
Coverage of which is confined to:
Extralegal killings killings committed without due process of the law
Enforced disappearances an arrest, detention or abduction by the
government; refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts places
him outside the protection of the law
Amparo literally means protection in Spanish. Writ of Amparo originated
in Mexico (Yucatan State). Eventually incorporated into the Mexican
Constitution in 1847. Spread across the Western hemisphere and eventually
to the Philippines.
Provides for swift relief because of the summary nature of its proceedings.
Only substantial evidence is required.
There is still a threat to the life, liberty, and a violation of their right to
security of the Manalo brothers because their captors, whom they escaped
from, still remain at large.
Right to security is in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the right to enjoyment of life.

Three ways of exercising right to security:

Freedom from fear.
Enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
It is the right to security of person as the word security itself means
freedom from fear.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 9 (1)
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
Freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty
or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction;
threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. (PH is a signatory to both
conventions)
o Guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees against search
without warrant
ELKs and EDs involve Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe
invasion of bodily integrity.
It constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the
dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will
Note: The consti also guarantees against torture
o Guarantee of protection of ones right by the Government
The writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to
life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to securityof person under Article III, Section 2.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of ELKs and EDs as
well as their families
Right to security of persons can exist independently of the right to liberty.
(the court cited several cases here, Delgado Paez v. Colombia; Bwaya v.
Zambia; Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea)
They have a positive duty to protect right to liberty and not just a prohibition
for arbitrary deprivation of such rights. (ECHR in Kurt v. Turkey)

The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo brothers is apparent. This
threat vitiates their free will because they are forced to limit their movements
and activities. Threats to liberty, security, and life are actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo.
The military failed to provide protection for the respondents. They were even
the ones who actually tortured them. The one-day investigation conducted by
Jimenez was limited, superficial and one-sided.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from
threat is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of

person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government

is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part
of the military.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
NAVIA ET AL. v PARDICO
EDGARDO NAVIA,RUBEN DIO,and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,
v.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of
BENHUR V. PARDICO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184467
June 19, 2012
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO

Nature of Case:
Petition for Review on certiorari
BRIEF
This is a case against a petition for Writ of Amparo served on two security
guards upon the mysterious disappearance of the respondents husband
at Malolos City.
FACTS
Lolita went out of her house to investigate the two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle infront. One of them immediately asked
Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the
guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the
security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against
them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. The
supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also
arrived thereat.
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because
they received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand
Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a
post in said subdivision. The suspects admitted that they took the lamp
but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the

house of Lolita. Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the
complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since
there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and
Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the guards released
him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.. His mother Lolita also
signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again
harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the
security office. Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the
statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed and
without any injury.
According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They
were unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and
brought to the security office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the
security office, Navia lividly grumbled , Ikaw na naman? and slapped
him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas were
met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on different
parts of his body. Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and
said, Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben.
Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. However,
the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the
post from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan. . Since she
has poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it
and then left with Bong. At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded
not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and
Bong left the security office at once leaving Ben behind.
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to
visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already
released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for
Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could not still
find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband,
Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos
City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting
the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the trial court.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
WON Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginias petition and proved
during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls
within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.

ACTIONS of the COURT

RTC: Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective
and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the reasons
adverted to by the petitioners.
SC: The decision of the RTC is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an
expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity."
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article
9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The
right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and
security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in
accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of
life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in
our fundamental law.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ
of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the
person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an
amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale
Subdivision
in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and
their
principal,
the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government
and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some
covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to
fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement.
This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out
with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government. This indispensable element of State participation is not
present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the

government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In

fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or
implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or
accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that
the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that
they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case,
the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as
responsible or accountable persons.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ
of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.

Judicial Review
IMBONG V. OCHOA
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and
in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE
CARLOS
IMBONG
and
MAGNIFICAT
CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,

Contentions of the Petitioners

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
BRIEF:
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention on Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.

FACTS:
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012
March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.
Prior to RH Law Contraceptive Drugs and Devices were allowed to
be sold by duly licensed drug store and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner
the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women,
" which, among others, mandated the State to provide for
comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education
despite the foregoing legislative measures population kept on
growing. Thus RH law was enacted to provide Filipinos access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods,
and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to
reproductive health be achieved
To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to
carry out its mandates.

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn

the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables
which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception
RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems
RH Law violates the right to religious freedom
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use
of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed
to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional
mandate ensuring religious freedom
RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels
medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide
full and correct information on reproductive health programs and
service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in

schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious
belief
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present
danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to
free speech.
RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited
under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide fortyeight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under
threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment
RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is
claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use.
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague
RH Law violates the right to free speech
To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own
preferred way of family planning
RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected
by the Constitution.
Respondents Contention

There is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are

not yet ripe for judicial determination.
Some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and
The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court has power to exercise judicial review on the case
at hand
Whether RH Law violates several rights protected by our
Constitution
HELD:

Power of Judicial Review

The Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation
that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of the discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute
Actual Case
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion
it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a
duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute
Facial Challenge
is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning
not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment (freedom of expression)
foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny
Locus Standi
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act.

RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge

(embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights)
Transcendental Importance
"the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest
The case at hand raises the issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well-being of the nation
One Subject/one bill rule
RH law does not violate this rule The rule is sufficiently complied
with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation

o
o

Substantive Issues

o
o

Right to Life
Section 12 It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception.
well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning
word "conception" means that life begins at fertilization
ConCon: Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it
is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life.
There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
condoms are not classified as abortifacients
The court finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
Right to Health
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them
self-executing provision
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing

The effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated

proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the
prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place,
there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public
Freedom of Religion and Right to free speech
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable
the freedom to believe absolute
The free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice,
while the establishment clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to
deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices
the freedom to act on one's belief
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare
The RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs
and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be
compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will.
The guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with
the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought
and conscience.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter
what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.
RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed
consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden,
whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion
Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it
would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in
the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Life Threatening Cases
If it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is

against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As

quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical
practitioner in this case would have been more than justified
considering the life he would be able to save
The Family and the Right to Privacy
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual
decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who
would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the
husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger
the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of
the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the
protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would
encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution.
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to
exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the
spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the
very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal
and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with
respect to his family.
Academic Freedom
any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature
because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet
to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise
their objection to their participation in the reproductive health
education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the
ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it
Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness
and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health
service provider" among those who may be held punishable but
does not define who is a "private health care service provider."
They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only
makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service

and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from

being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures.
Equal Protection
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form
of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness
in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause
it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples
who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law
admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health.
Involuntary Servitude
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare.
A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Other than nonaccreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they
choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which
kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how
to provide it or whether to provide it all.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR

insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and nonmaternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility
or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RHIRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which
added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Team Patay" with an "X" mark which were classified according to

their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law.
Article III, Sec. 4- Freedom of Expression
Article III, Sec. 1- Right to Property
Article II, Sec. 6- Separation of Church and State
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728
January 21, 2015
Ponente: Assoc. Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Nature of Case:
Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
Brief:
Petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify COMELECs Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials
Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in
size posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law"
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act
No. 10354. The second tarpaulin, the subject of the present case,
contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as
either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH)

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her

capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev.
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra within three (3) days from receipt for
being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the
size requirement of two feet (2) by three feet (3).
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied requesting a (1) definite
ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin and (2)
pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the
tarpaulin be allowed to remain.
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter
ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will
be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated the case questioning
the respondents issued notice and letter. On March 5, 2013, the
Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and letter.
Issue/s of the Case:
1. Whether or not the order of removal of the tarpaulin is
unconstitutional for violating petitioners fundamental right
of freedom of expression.
2. Whether or not the removal would violate petitioners right
to property.
3. Whether or not the respondents directives violated the right
of the petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.
Actions of the Court
SC: The petition was granted and the temporary restraining order
previously issued made permanent.
Court Rationale on the Above Facts:

Relative to the issue on Freedom of Expression

In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public
concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on
votes made in the passing of the RH law. Petitioners posted the
tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. Thus,
petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression by making a
stand about the passage of the RH Law.
The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is a
political speech which is a form of speech both intended and
received as contribution to public deliberation about some issues
fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. Every citizens
expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection.
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section
4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
Respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against
the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, is not meritorious.
There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the
persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting.
Further, the Court ruled that had no power to regulate the tarpaulin
since the petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to
any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of
expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case. Hence, the
directive of the COMELEC is declared unconstitutional.
Relative to Petitioners Right to Property
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to
use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective

confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
Relative to the Free Exercise of Religion
The tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine
of the Catholic church." That the position of the Catholic Church
appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the
RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of
religious speech.
The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards
the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its
members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Supreme Court Ruling:
The instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby made permanent. The act of the
COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013
and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.

Issue 3: W/N the regulation constitutes prior restraints on free

speech
Yes. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to
freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals to express their preference, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and convince others
to agree with them.
1 Utak vs CoMELEC
GR 206020 April 14 2015
Facts:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules
that would implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act.
One of the provisions of the Resolution provide that the posting of
any election propaganda or materials during the campaign period
shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within the
premises of public transport terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list
organization, questioned the prohibition as it impedes the right to
free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on PUVs
and public transport terminals during the election pursuant to its
regulatory powers delegated under Art IX-C, Sec 4 of the
Constitution
No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to
operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles
used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a
form of political expression, but also an act of ownership it has
nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.
Issue 2: W/N the regulation is justified by the captive audience
doctrine
No. A government regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed captive audience
may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor
are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained
in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply
avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. Hence,
the doctrine is not applicable.

Issue 4: W/N the regulation is a valid content-neutral regulation

No. The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
where election campaign materials may be posted, but the
prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport
terminals is not necessary to a stated governmental interest. First,
while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on
posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport
terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there are more
than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would
ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in
elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid content-neutral
regulation was not satisfied.