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FELICITAS M. MACHADO
vs.
RICARDO L. GATDULA,
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
G.R. No. 156287
February 16, 2010
Facts: On February 2, 1999, Gatdula wrote a letter 4 to the
COSLAP requesting assistance because the Machados allegedly
blocked the right of way to his private property by constructing a
two-door apartment on their property
The Machados contested these reports in their position paper
dated August 26, 1999. They alleged that Gatdula had no right of
action since they did not violate Gatdulas rights.5 They further
assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP, stating that the proper
forum for the present case was the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna.
The COSLAP Ruling
On October 25, 1999, the COSLAP issued a resolution directing
the Machados to reopen the right of way in favor of Gatdula. In
so ruling, the COSLAP relied on the verification survey made by
Engr. Arellano, which established that the Machados had
encroached on the existing alley in Gatdulas property.
The COSLAP declared the Machados estopped from questioning
its jurisdiction to decide the case, since they actively participated
in the mediation conferences and the verification surveys without
raising any jurisdictional objection. It ruled that its jurisdiction
does not depend on the convenience of the Machados.
Issue: WON COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case?
Held: NO.
The COSLAPs forerunner, the PACLAP, was created
on July 31, 1970 pursuant to Executive Order No. 251. As
originally conceived, the committee was tasked to expedite and
coordinate the investigation and resolution of land disputes,
streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold
and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or
recommend other solutions.
The PACLAP was abolished by EO 561 effective on September
21, 1979, and was replaced by the COSLAP. Unlike the former
laws, EO 561 specifically enumerated the instances when the
COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have
the following powers and functions:
xxxx
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to
the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the
following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems
or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering,
for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other
similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement
holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation
grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or

applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands
of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.
Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting
on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can
assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated
in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the
case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement
or resolution.21 In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over
a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the
COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land
involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the
questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent
action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or
destruction to property.
The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the
general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or
problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP
may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving
public lands or those covered by a specific license from the
government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber
concessions, or reservation grants.
Undisputably, the properties involved in the present dispute are
private lands owned by private parties, none of whom is a
squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government
reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any
cultural minority.
Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly be
classified as critical or explosive in nature that would generate
social tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require
immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the present
case primarily involve the application of the Civil Code provisions
on Property and the Easement of Right of Way.

UST v Sanchez
G.R. No. 165569
July 29, 2010
Facts: A Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B.
Sanchez (respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas
(UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant
Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar
for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondents
Transcript of Records (ToR).
Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
where they claimed that they refused to release respondents
ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not
been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. After
the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a
Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent
sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21,
2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary
jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies,
and the filing of the instant case was premature.
Issue: WON Rule on Primary Jurisdiction applies in this case

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Held: NO.
The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is
the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners
have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. Indeed,
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the
Higher Education Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any
express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power.
C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADA
G.R. No. 80916 November 9, 1990
Facts: The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville
Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to
private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments
having been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the
certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner
nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for
specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental.
C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and
decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board.
Issue: WON HLURB acquires jurisdiction
Held: YES.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and
empowered the National Housing Authority to issue writs of
execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957,
specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1.
In the exercise of its functions to regulate the
real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
A.

Unsound real estate business practices;

B.
Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C.
Cases
involving
specific
performance
of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Under E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, the regulatory
functions conferred on the National Housing Authority under P.D.
Nos. 957,1344 and other related laws were transferred to the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which was
renamed Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board by E.O. No.
90 dated December 17, 1986.
It is clear from Section 1(c) of the above quoted PD No. 1344
that the complaint for specific performance with damages filed by
Diongon with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental

comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use

Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot
seeking specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver
to him the corresponding certificate of title.
HLC CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
AND HENRY LOPEZ CHUA, petitioners, vs. EMILY HOMES
SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (EHSHA)
[G.R. No. 139360. September 23, 2003]
Facts: Respondents Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners
Association (EHSHA) and the 150 individual members thereof
filed on October 21, 1998 a civil action for breach of contract,
damages and attorneys fees with the Regional Trial Court of
Davao del Sur, Branch 19, against petitioners, the developers of
low-cost housing units like Emily Homes Subdivision.
Respondents alleged that petitioners used substandard materials
in the construction of their houses, like coco lumber and termiteinfested door jambs. Petitioners furthermore allegedly did not
adhere to the house plan specifications because the ceiling lines
were sagging and there were deviations from the plumb line of
the mullions, door jams (sic) and concrete columns.[3]
Respondents asked petitioners to repair their defective housing
units but petitioners failed to do so. Respondents had to repair
their defective housing units using their own funds. Hence, they
prayed for actual and moral damages arising from petitioners
breach of the contract plus exemplary damages and attorneys
fees.
On December 11, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, claiming that it was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the trial court which had
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: WON HLURB has jurisdiction
Held: YES.
In this case, respondents complaint was for the reimbursement
of expenses incurred in repairing their defective housing units
constructed by petitioners. Clearly, the HLURB had jurisdiction
to hear it. In the case of Arranza vs. B.F Homes, Inc. this Court
ruled that:
xxx the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from
contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or
those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply
with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the
subdivision a better place to live in.
The fact that the subject matter of the complaint involved
defective housing units did not remove the complaint from the
HLURBs jurisdiction. The delivery of habitable houses was
petitioners responsibility under their contract with respondents.
The trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioners so that the issues therein could be expeditiously
heard and resolved by the HLURB.
SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA,
v.
HON. JACINTO G. ANG
G.R. No. 156164
Facts: On February 11, 1999, the petitioners (as buyers) and FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as developers) executed a
Contract To Sel a condominium unit. Despite the lapse of three

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(3) years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted
condominium unit to the petitioners.
As a result, the petitioners filed a Complaint-Affidavitbefore
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the
private respondents of violating P.D. No. 957, specifically its
Sections 17 and 20, in relation with Section 39.
The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not
construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to
them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of
Deeds.
Of the seven (7) private respondents, only private
respondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc filed a Counter-Affidavit. She
countered that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the
case since it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
On November 4, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R.
Pastrana and Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (public
respondents), respectively issued and approved the Resolution
dismissing the complaint for being premature. The Resolution
held that it is the HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving real estate business and practices.
Issue: WON HLURB has authority to impose criminal penalties
Held: NO
HLURBs jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations of
parties under subdivision and condominium contracts comes out
very clearly. But hand in hand with this definition and grant of
authority is the provision on criminal penalties for violations of the

Decree, provided under the Decrees Section 39, heretofore

quoted. Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB
with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39 criminal penalties.
What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB to
impose administrative fines under Section 38, as implemented by
the Rules Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree. This Section of the Decree provides:
Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. The Authority may prescribe and
impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of
the provisions of this Decree or of any rule or regulation
thereunder.
Fines shall be payable to the Authority and
enforceable through writs of execution in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court.
The Implementing Rules clarify that The implementation and
payment of administrative fines shall not preclude criminal
prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of the Decree.
Thus, the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge
that two separate remedies with differing consequences may be
sought under the Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy
and criminal prosecution.
Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (and
in this case no such provision applies), the determination of the
criminal liability lies within the realm of criminal procedure as
embodied in the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 112 of these
Rules provide that the prerogative to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause lies with the persons duly
authorized by law.