Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs.

Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning
FACTS:
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT WITH
BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND TENAZAS.
1.
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
i. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of
attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages
ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to
20% of the backwages.
1. Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
a. Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional
services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
i. Cipriano
10%
ii. Quintin Muning
10%
iii. Atanacio Pacis
5%
1.

1.
a.
b.
2.
1.

iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees,
whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers
Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that No justification for a ruling, that the person representing the partylitigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on
behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member does not entitle the representative to compensation
for such representation.
Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees:
i. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services.

a. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.
b. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral
character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was
eligible for 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake,
Juan M. Publico.
ii. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
iii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school
records or credentials.
3.
PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
4.
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
1.
September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground that his
witnesses had turned hostile.
i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
2.
Recommended PUBLICOs name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
i. Respondent falsified his school records

5.
1.
2.
3.

4.

ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
which require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in
elementary, high, pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never
received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of the
Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him.
He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to
Manila.
Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary
conduct from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous
awards, resolutions and/'or commendations he received,
i. Court denied the Petition.
ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for lack of merit.
5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through
the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and enrolled him
in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his demonstrations
i. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle; that being merely 16
year old, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still under the influence of
his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.
ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.
WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of
some of its members. YES.
It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review;
union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as
petitioners in the present petition. Their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.

HELD:
ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED 10% OF
BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEYS FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST MUNING.
Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is
not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications, for the ethics of the profession and for
the protection of courts, clients and the public.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated:
Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,
Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law
If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.

4.

In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from
the backpay of some of its members:
1.
YES because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action
in the industrial court on behalf of its members
2.
If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
appeal as an aggrieved party, under Sec 6, RA 875:
i. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved by any
order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
3.
Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.

Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court- Branch 81, Romblon,
Romblon-On The Prohibition From Engaging In the Private Practice of LawFACTS:
Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the RTC, Branch 81 of Romblon,
sheresigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter, she engaged in the
privatepractice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC Branch
81 of Romblonwithin 1 year after the effectivty of her resignation.
RA
6713, Code of Conduct and EthicalStandards for Public Officials and Employees, Section
7(b)(2)
places a limitation on publicofficials and employees during their incumbency and those
already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after
separation, in engaging in the private practice of theirprofession.
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.

In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in
theConstitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited actsand
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x
x (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.

Publicofficials and employees during their incumbency shall not: x x x (2)

Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
or

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) yearafter resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except inthe case of subparagraph (b) (2) above,
but the professional concernedcannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before theoffice he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shalllikewise
apply.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Buffe is guilty of professional misconduct.
HELD: YES.
She was fined in the amount of P10,000 and a stern warning that a repetition of thesame
violation and other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.The
letter-query
Why an incumbent can engage in private practice assuming not in conflict with his
official duties but a nonincumbent may not as is apparently prohibited under last par. of Sec 7
filedby Atty. Buffe and the petition for declaratory relief cannot cover her acts and did not
serve as amitigating circumstance for violating the abovementioned provision. It should be
noted that shehad already appeared before Branch 81 in at least 3 cases at the time she
filed the letter-query. Theterms of Section 7 (b)(2) of RA 6713 did not deter her in any way
and her misgivings about thefairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she
committed.
Section 7 of RA 6713
generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officialsand employees.
Subsection (b)(2
) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of theirprofession during their
incumbency.
As an exception, a public official or employee can engagein the practice of his or her
profession under the following conditions
:1.

The private practice is authorized b the Constitution or by the law;2.

The practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.
The prohibition under Section 7 continues to apply for a period of 1 Year after the public
official oremployees resignation, retirement, or separation from public office,
EXCEPT for the privatepractice of profession under subsection (b)(2),

which can already be undertaken even withinthe 1 YEAR PROHIBTION PERIOD.

As an exception to this exception, the 1 year prohibitedperiod applies with respect to any
matter before the office the public officer or employee
used to work with.

Futhermore, no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as
they are infact
expressly prohibited by Sec.5 Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
fromdoing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions, Atty. Buffe cannot escape
penalty. Saidprohibitions are based on the principle that public office is a public trust; and
serve to remove anyimpropriety which may occur in government transactions.Additional info:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of
thefollowing requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the
courts orconducts business with the Judiciary;(b) The outside employment can be performed
outside of normal working hours and is not
incompatible with the performance of the court personnels duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that
court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law
schools, review orcontinuing education centers or similar institutions;(d) The outside
employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose
confidentialinformation acquired while performing officials duties;(e) The outside
employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government,unless
specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.Where a conflict of interest exists, may

reasonably appear to exist, or where the outsideemployment reflects adversely on the

integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside employment.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 2361
February 9, 1989 LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO,
respondent. R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM: An affidavit-complaint, dated November
11, 1981, was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court Administrator on 5
February 1982 against respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics,
alleging that respondent, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant,
failed to remit to her the rentals collected by respondent on different dates over a twelvemonth period, much less did he report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after
approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent turned over his collections to
complainant after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment
and had demanded the same.
25. 25 In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received the payment
of rentals from complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but explained
that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his
success in collecting the rentals. We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were conducted and the
parties presented their respective evidence. After investigation, the Solicitor General
submitted the following Findings and Recommendation: Findings: The issue to be resolved
is whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in accounting for the
funds collected by him for his former client, the complainant herein, for which unprofessional
conduct respondent should be disciplined. A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to
delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to
his clients. Under paragraph 11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report
promptly the money of client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it
with his private property or use it for his personal purpose without his client's consent viz:
Money of the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should
be reported promptly, and except with the client's know and consent should not be
commingled with his private or be used by him. And paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal
Ethics further requires a lawyer to maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private
trust: ... But above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity
to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen. In
the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office. It is undisputed that the
relation of attorney and client existed between Licuanan and Melo at the time the incident in
question took place. The records disclose that on August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's
attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Aida Pineda whereby the latter was
directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October,
1978 and succeeding months thereafter. When several months had elapsed without them
hearing a word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter on February 4, 1980,
demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be
constrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client
(Exhibit "A", p. 8, record). On February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She
went to respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00 for which respondent gave her a receipt
for the said amount representing her rental payments for October, 1978 to February, 1980 at
the rate of P180.00 per month (Exh. "B", p. 9, Ibid.) At the end of March 31,1980, Pineda
again went back to respondent and paid the rentals of her apartment for the months of
March and April, 1980 in the sum of P360.00 (Exh. "C" p. 10, Ibid.). Not only that,
respondent again received from Pineda on June 30, 1980 rental payments covering the
months of May, June and July, 1980 in the total sum of

26. 26 P540.00 (Exh. "D" p. 11, Ibid.). And, on September 29, 1980, he received and issued
Pineda a receipt for P540.00 covering rental payments for the months of August, September
and October, 1980. (Exh. "E", Ibid.). After four months had elapsed, or on January 23, 1981,
he collected again from Pineda the total sum of P720.00 covering the months of October,
November, December, 1980 and January 1981 (Exh. "F", p. 12, Ibid.). During the entire
twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of
Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and
instead unnecessarily retained the money. He allowed the money to accumulate for a year
and kept complainant in the dark as to the progress of the case. He did not even attempt to
tell her about the money that had come into his possession notwithstanding the fact that
complainant used to call him and inquire regarding the case (pp. 14-15, tsn., Sept. 10,
1985). It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant,
wrote respondent a letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to
complainant that he accounted for it (Exh. "H", p. 15, Ibid.). But this was rather late because
as early as April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had been receiving the
rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her (Aida Pineda)
before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude"
arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court
of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her
just obligation (Exh. "G", p. 14, Ibid.). This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against
her (Licuanan) for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, for she
allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case Licuanan filed against her (Aida
Pineda), since as borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to
the lawyer of Licuanan, herein respondent (pp. 48-52, record). Clearly, this unfortunate
incident would not have happened had respondent been only true to his oath as a lawyer,
i.e., to be honest and candid towards his client. Thus, we find it hard to believe respondent's
defense that he kept the money of complainant for a year merely because he wanted to
surprise her with his success in collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On the contrary,
it is very much discernible that he did not surrender immediately the money to complainant
because he was using it for his own benefit. Common sense dictates that by unnecessarily
withholding the money of complainant for such length of time, respondent deprived her of
the use of the same. It is therefore too credulous to believe his explanation, which is flimsy
and incredible Respondent's actuation casts doubt on his honesty and integrity. He must
know that the "highly fiduciary" and "confidential relation" of attorney and client requires that
the attorney should promptly account for all funds and property received or held by him for
the client's benefit, and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct, as succinctly
held by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Fermina Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs. Atty.
Ramon Chaves Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304, to wit: A lawyer,
under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the
money of his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his
private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's
27. 27 consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust
(Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics). Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a
judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them
(Aya vs. Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11). xxx xxx xxx A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for any violation of the
lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27). The relation between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential in character, requiring
a high degree of fidelity and good faith (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that special

relationship, 'lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them
on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact
that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients does not
relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received. (Emphasis
supplied). In fine, we are convinced that respondent is guilty of breach of trust reposed in
him by his client. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has
besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re
David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA
131). By his deceitful conduct, he placed his client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a
damage suit; thus, instead of being a help to his client, he became the cause of her misery.
He, therefore, deserves a severe punishment for it. (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11; In re
Bamberger, April 17, 1924, 49 Phil. 962; Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi,
supra.) Clearly, respondent is guilty of professional misconduct in the discharge of his duty
as a lawyer. RECOMMENDATION WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of not less than one (1) year,
and that he be strongly admonished to strictly and faithfully observe his duties to his clients.
(pp. 78-85, Rollo) We find the foregoing findings well considered and adopt the same but
differ with the recommendation. The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal
benefit over a one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his
client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the
same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he
swore observance, and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics
particularly: 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY The lawyer should refrain from any
action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client.
28. 28 Money of the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not
under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by him. * Indeed, by his
professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He
has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorneyclient relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was compelled to
file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to
jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her By force
of circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another
counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which respondent had
unjustifiedly withheld from her. Respondent's unprofessional actuations considered, we are
constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has
displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay
any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has
proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He
deserves the severest punishment. WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to
maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve
undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent,
Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country
and spread on the personal record of respondent Atty. Manuel L. Melo. SO ORDERED.
LEONILA LICUANAN vs V ATTY MANUEL MELO pe t February 9, 1989 A.M. No.2361
FACTS: Melo was hired as counsel by Licuanan in an ejectment case filed against her
tenant, Aida Pineda. Melo, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor
against Pineda and was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly
rentals from October 1978 and succeeding months thereafter. When several months had

elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda, Licuanan decided to send her a letter
demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be
constrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client.
Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him rental
payments and continued paying her obligations religiously to Melo. During the entire twelvemonth period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did
not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead
unnecessarily retained the money Licuanan not knowing that Melo had been receiving the
rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her Pineda before the
Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from
her alleged failure to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in
Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just
obligation Pineda brought an action against Licuanan for damages before the then CFI of
Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings
and social humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case filed against her since
as borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of
Licuanan It wasonly when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by Licaunan,
wrote Melo a letter advising him to surrender the money to Licaunan, that he accounted for
it. Melo admitted having received the payment of rentals from Licaunan's tenant, but
explained that he kept this matter from the
29. 29 Licaunan for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals
ISSUE: Is Melo guilty of violating paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and
breaching the Lawyers Oath HELD: The court held in the affirmative. The actuations of
Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount received by
him on behalf of his client, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the same
despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore
observance, and an evident transgression of theCanons of Professional Ethics particularly
Canon 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY. By his professional misconduct,
respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit
for the confidence and trust which should characterize an ACR and the practice of law. By
reason thereof Licaunan was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for nonpayment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage
suit filed by said tenant against her by force of circumstances, complainant was further
compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover the amount
rightfully due her but which respondent withheld from her. - The court is constrained to find
him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of
honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money
or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the
severest punishment. Consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and
standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-atlaw, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of
law. His name is herebyordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 2361
February 9, 1989 LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO,
respondent. R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM

In 1979, Licuanan won a case against her tenant Aida Pineda whereby Pineda was ordered to
pay the rents due to Licuanan. Pineda complied and she started paying the rents to Licuanans
lawyer, Atty. Manuel Melo. So for 12 months, Melo received the rental payments but he did not
turn over the said payments to Licuanan. Licuanan did inquire about said payment but Melo
withheld information about the fact that Pineda was actually paying. As a consequence,
Licuanan filed a case against Pineda. Pineda in turn filed a damage suit against Licuanan as
she claims that the case filed by Licuanan against her is groundless as she was in fact paying
her rents.
Eventually, Licuanan find out that Melo failed to deliver to her the rents. Licuanan then filed an
affidavit complaint against Melo. Melo in his defense said that he withheld information about the
rent payments for a year because he merely wanted to surprise Licuanan about the success of
the collections. The Solicitor General subsequently recommended the suspension of Melo for
not less than one year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Melo should be suspended.
HELD: No. As ruled by the Supreme Court, he should be disbarred. Melos retaining of
Licuanans money for more than a year breached his oath and transgressed the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Such action did not merely deprive Licuanan of the use of her
money but also caused her to file a groundless suit against Pineda and on top of that, Licuanan
had to defend herself in a damage suit filed against her in turn by Pineda. In all, Melos
actuations make him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has
displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any
man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven
himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the
severest punishment of disbarment.

Ui v. BonifacioPetitioner: Leslie UiRespondent: Atty. Iris Bonifacio

Facts of the case: Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio ongrounds of
immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui,husband of Leslie Ui,
whom they begot two children. According to petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted tohim about the relationship between
them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront saidrespondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail.
According however to respondent, she is avictim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had
known him to be a bachelor butwith children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in Amoy, China.
Moreover, the two gotmarried in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of the
realstatus of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she and Carlos Uinever
lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually accept thesituation. Respondent
however presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage contract. Ruling: The practice of law is a privilege.A
bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy thepractice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can berevoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates
his oath and the dictates of legal ethics.one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant
must possessgood moral character.More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous

asa requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is aground for the
revocation of such privilege. A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct,or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar shouldhave moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.In the case at bar, Atty. Bonifacio was notproven to have conducted herself in a grossly
immoral manner. Thus, the case is dismissed. But sheis reprimanded and given a stern warning with regards to
the of her marriage contract with aninculcated date.
Philippine Aluminum Wheels Inc vs Fasgi Enterprises Inc
In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
California, USA, entered into a contract with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a
Philippine corporation, whereby the latter agrees to deliver 8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI
received the wheels and so it paid PAWI $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that the
wheels are defective and did not comply with certain US standards. So in 1979, FASGI sued
PAWI in a California court. In 1980, a settlement was reached but PAWI failed to comply with the
terms of the agreement. A second agreement was made but PAWI was again remiss in its
obligation. The agreement basically provides that PAWI shall return the purchase price in
installment and conversely, FASGI shall return the wheel in installment. PAWI was only able to
make two installments (which were actually made beyond the scheduled date). FASGI also
returned the corresponding number of wheels. Eventually in 1982, FASGI sought the
enforcement of the agreement and it received a favorable judgment from the California court.
PAWI is then ordered to pay an equivalent of P252k plus damages but FASGI was not ordered
to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was not able to comply with the court order in the US. So
in 1983, FASGI filed a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with RTC-Makati.
Hearings were made and in 1990, the trial judge ruled against FASGI on the ground that the
foreign judgment is tainted with fraud because FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining
wheels (unjust enrichment) and that PAWIs American lawyer entered into the agreements
without the consent of PAWI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned
so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing
before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in
procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country
from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.
In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California court. PAWIs insistence that its
American lawyer colluded with FASGI; that he entered into the compromise agreement without

PAWIs authority is belied by the fact that PAWI initially complied with the agreement. It did not
disclaim the agreement. It sent two installments (though belatedly) but failed to comply on the
rest. It cannot now aver that the agreement is without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for
the California court not to order FASGI to return the remaining wheels because of PAWIs
arrears.

Fernandez vs Grecia
A.C. No. 3694
Disbarment Cases
Facts:
Fernandez et al filed a disbarment case against Atty Grecia for theft of documents pertaining
tothe latters case against the petitioners. A certain Fe Linda Aves was admitted and diagnosed
of having a mild pre-eclampsia on December 20, 1990. Five days later, he was discharged to
celebrate Christmas with her family, unfortunately on December 26, 1990, the said patient died
with her unborn child, prompting the Aves family to brought an actgion for damages against the
doctors and the hospital. (Fernandez et al.)
During the litigation in the lower court, Atty Grecia, allegedly asked the clerk of court the medical
chart of the aforementioned patient which was at that time in the court's possesion, and
thereafter tore two pages identified as pages 72 and 73.
In view of Atty Grecia's unprofessional conduct, the petitioners filed the case for disbarment.
Issue:
WON the disbarment case is meritorious.

Held:
To quoute the Supreme Courts decision, they say that "by descending to the level of a common
thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has
demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of
lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR."
Atty Grecia was then ordered disbarred, his license to practice law in the Philippines cancelled
and his name was ordered to be stricken out of the Roll of Attorneys.

The Supreme Court cited Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 in the Rules of Professional Responsibility
being violated by Atty Grecia, notwitsanding that he was once disbarred to practice law on
November 12, 1987 for his 'unholy alliance' with a judge in Quezon city to rip off banks and
Chinese business firms. And that 8 months after the Supreme Court heeding his pleas for
compassion and promise to mend his ways, it was just eight months after that he is faced with
yet another disbarment case.

arellano university inc vs leovigildo h. mijares case digest

This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his
client.

The Facts and the Case

The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the
services of respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate
of title covering a dried up portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been
occupying. The property was the subject of a Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958
between the City of Manila and the University.
In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the
documents he needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was
given P500,000.00 on top of his attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for facilitation
and processing. He in turn promised to give the money back in case he was unable to get the
work done.
On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the
titling of the property, meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) to approve it and that the documents had already been sent to the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The University requested Mijares
for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably failed to comply despite his clients
repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce, prompting the University to withdraw all the
cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500,000.00 it gave him.
On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his
services in the titling matter and demanding the return of the P500,000.00. But the letter could
not be served because he changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the
University found his new address and served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares
personally received it yet he did not return the money asked of him.
In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of
courses of action relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the Universitys application for
a survey plan which the DENR-NCR approved for a facilitation cost of P500,000.00; second, get
a favorable MMDA endorsement for a facilitation cost of another P500,000.00; and, third, the
titling of the property by the Land Registration Authority for a facilitation cost of still
another P500,000.00.
Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to
get a favorable endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was
Undersecretary Cesar Lacuna. Mijares later met the latter through a common friend. At their
meeting, Mijares and Lacuna allegedly agreed on what the latter would get for recommending
approval of the application. Later, Mijares said, he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna through
their common friend on Lacunas instruction.
Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed
an identical application earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed that the University
deliberately withheld this fact from him. Lacuna said that, because of the denial of that prior
application, he would have difficulty recommending approval of the present application. It
appeared that Lacuna endorsed the previous application to the Mayor of Manila on July 23,
2003 but the latter did not act on it.
Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper
work but they were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave
him only P45,000.00 as his fees and that it was with the Universitys conformity that he gave
the P500,000.00 to Lacuna.

The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of
the complaint. Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the
Commissioner and adduce evidence in his defense.
On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation[1] in the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Phillippines Board of Governors. The Report said that the
University did not authorize Mijares to give P500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman
Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares had been unable to account for and return that money despite
repeated demands; and that he admitted under oath having bribed a government official.
Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01
and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he
be ordered to return the P500,000.00 and all the pertinent documents to the University; and c)
that Mijares sworn statement that formed part of his Answer be endorsed to the Office of the
Ombudsman for investigation and, if warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady
dealing with Deputy Chairman Lacuna.
On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631,
adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but modifying the
penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordering Mijares
to return the P500,000.00 and all pertinent documents to the University within six months from
receipt of the Courts decision.[2]
The Question Presented
The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of
misappropriating the P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in
facilitating and processing the titling of a property that it claimed.
The Courts Ruling
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension
of a lawyer for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the

lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.[3]
Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he
must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As
a mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and
make sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money
or property immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to
have misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him. [4] A lawyers conversion
of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.[5]
Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence
on record that the Court can consider is the Universitys evidence that he got P500,000.00 from
complainant for expenses in facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to
return the money if he did not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained
the MMDA approval of the application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money
despite repeated demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the
Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his
answer, the same does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave the P500,000.00 to
Undersecretary Lacuna, with the Universitys conformity, for a favorable MMDA endorsement to
the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in a complete turnaround, Lacuna later said that he
could not provide the endorsement because, as it turned out, the MMDA had previously given
such endorsement of the Universitys earlier application and the Mayor of Manila did not act on
that endorsement.
But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make
it see that it had no cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on
the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead, Mijares kept silent. He did not deny that the University
went all over town looking for him after he could not return the money. Nor did he take any
action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the University gave him. More, his not
showing up to testify on his behalf at the investigation of the case is a dead giveaway of the lack
of merit of his defense. No evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces.

Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government
official to act favorably on his clients application to acquire title to a dried-up creek. That is quite
dishonest. The Court is not, therefore, inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite
suspension which is another way of saying he can resume his practice after a time if he returns
the money and makes a promise to shape up.
The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBPs recommendation that the Court include
in its decision an order directing Mijares to return the P500,000.00 that the University entrusted
to him. The University knowingly gave him that money to spend for facilitation and processing. It
is not nave. There is no legitimate expense called facilitation fee. This term is a deodorized word
for bribe money. The Court will not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a
remedy for recovering bribe money lost in a bad deal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the
Bar, GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01
and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes
on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. He is, in addition, directed to return to complainant
Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his possession covering the titling matter that it
referred to him.
Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded to the Office
of the Ombudsman for whatever action it deems proper under the circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie [10 May 1985]

Facts: Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay sought to enjoin respondents from practicing law under the
name of Baker & McKenize, a law firm organized in Illinois.
A letter dated 16 November 1979, using the letterhead of the said firm and carrying the name of
the respondents, requested Rosie Clurman to release 87 shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay, in his reply dated 07 December 1979,
denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He asked whether Gabriel is represented by Baker &
McKenzie, and if not, why they misrepresented themselves by using the letterhead of another
law firm. Not receiving a reply, he filed this instant complaint.
Issue: Whether or not respondents can make use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie

Held: Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines. The
respondents, members of the Philippine Bar and practicing under the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres, are members or associates of Baker & McKenzie. Respondents use of the firm name
constitutes a representation that they could render legal services of the higher quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment. This is
unethical, as Baker & McKenzie is unauthorized to practise here.

Salvacion Delizo Cordova vs Atty. Laurence D. Cordova

179 SCRA 680 Legal Ethics Moral Delinquency
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo and with two children,
left his wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986, Salvacion and
Cordova had a reconciliation where Cordova promised to leave his mistress. But apparently,
Cordova still continued to cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again lived with another
woman and worse, he took one of his children with him and hid the child away from Salvacion.
In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually, multiple
hearing dates were sent but no hearing took place because neither party appeared. In 1989,
Salvacion sent a telegraphic message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating that she
and her husband has reconciled. The Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit her
evidence ex parte, merely recommended the reprimand and admonishment of Cordova.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.
HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has been
morally reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his wife. Before a
person can be admitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good moral character.
That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the
bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the
Bar in good standing. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage such was the case in the case at bar.
SLU vs. DELA CRUZ
Facts: A disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis UniversityLaboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS,
predicated on the following grounds:
1. Gross misconduct- he has pending case of child abuse, administrative case and labor case.

2. Grossly immoral conduct contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first
marriage.
3. Malpractice- notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
Issue: May a pending case constitutes facts that determines the existence of gross misconduct
by the respondent?
Held: Practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess the qualifications required by law. The purpose of suspending or disbarring an
attorney is to remove from the profession those unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities thereby protecting the public and those charged with the administration of
justice, rather than to punish an attorney.
Contracting a second marriage despite existence of first marriage is a violation of the
continous possession of good moral character as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice.
The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission to do so as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but
also the crime of falsification of public documents. Notarization of a private document converts
the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for
this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.
Pending case does not constitute facts that determine the existence of gross misconduct
by the respondent as these are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the
presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.

PEOPLE VS. TUANDA (A.M. NO. 3360 01/30/1990)

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In
1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a
total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the
notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed,
wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The AntiBouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed
further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves
moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted
arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in

violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiffappellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide
as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for
any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such
attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of
a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which
deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless
check transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of
which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the
land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

Facts;
Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the Supreme
Court finding her guilty of violating BP 22.
Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that

her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the
aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee
(Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.
Issue;
WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.
Ruling;
The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and
affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe
Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.