Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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[1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen
has "standing".Mani kx
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from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be
supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the
Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality
argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be
obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S.
District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain
grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil
of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial. Oldmis o
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition
Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on
extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar
situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation
process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may
result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In
the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the
Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty;
Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners theory,
because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that
for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which
states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is not
available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the
extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential
Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section
13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended " Can
petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue
of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated
guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient
thereto? Ncm
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs.
NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457
[1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC,
276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602
[1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural
due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.,
283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard
of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.
Petitioners fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections
to the Requested States non-performance of its commitments under
the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given
paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we
limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service
Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go
vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we
ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No.
807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission
in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential
Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the
Integrated National Police who may be charged for ServiceConnected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the
Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707,
although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity
of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process
still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening
sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or dismissed even
without formal investigation, in certain instances.
It is equally clear to us that an employee must be
informed of the charges preferred against him,
and that the normal way by which the employee
is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of
the charges against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with
and still remain consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum
requirement is that the employee charged with
some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a
reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present
evidence in support of his defenses. Ncmmis
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature,
yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and
present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty
itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a
foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents
liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction,
which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed
of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267
SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677
[1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call
for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due process
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SO ORDERED.
The Facts
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and
MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled
to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In
general, the answer to these two novel questions is
No. The explanation of
and
the reasons for,
as
well
as
the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
GR
No.
139465
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alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant
issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection
with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1)
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion,
in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in
violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and
(5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code
Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In
order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the
issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6
of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez
filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,[10] which
prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion
of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that
hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case
to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he
be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on
June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July
3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in
cash.[11] After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
I.
The Courts Ruling
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to
go on provisional liberty because:
Preliminary Matters
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no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent
factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is
extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give
Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4)
the issues raised are purely of law.[16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner
submits the following reasons: (1) even if the petition is lodged with
the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of
the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter
to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all
[and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to
follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case[17] ruled
on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to
recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might
likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending
issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of
Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable
Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of
the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee
and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to
comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties.[18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court
will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a
motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to
it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised
is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency.[19] As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy
of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the
same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[20] Aside from being of
this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions
of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special
and important reasons therefor.[21] In Fortich v. Corona[22]we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which
has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et.
al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs.
Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary
jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice
and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of
Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher
interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We
reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[23]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and
excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of
the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional
Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we
entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important
reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the
important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to
take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an
interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is
to ascertain and give effect to its intent.[25] Since PD 1069 is intended
as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory,[26] understanding certain postulates of
extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of
Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime[27] by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer[28] of a fugitive[29] from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international
travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for
the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend
international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have
come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of
international co-operation in the suppression of crime.[30] It is the only
regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the
jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with
municipal and international law.[31]
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle
that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try
and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge
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Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC -informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition
Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his
arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid
extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set
a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke
it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should
not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to
liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no
specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed
in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the
discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their
arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of
Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding
judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused
to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in
the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of
the accused which may be served any where within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or
should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer
within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if
issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the
attorney having charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of
immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
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Summation
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EN BANC
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SO ORDERED.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings.
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While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her
from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
SECOND DIVISION
SO ORDERED.
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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Consolidated on 11 December 1989, these two cases involve the
validity of the claim of immunity by the International Catholic
Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice Research
Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from the application of Philippine labor laws.
I
Facts and Issues
A. G.R. No. 85750 the International Catholic Migration
Commission (ICMC) Case.
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese
refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted
the international community.
In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an Agreement was
forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for
processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other
countries was to be established in Bataan (Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 2232).
ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to
operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was
incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a
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III
Findings in Both Cases.
There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has, in fact, been
granted ICMC and IRRI.
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine
Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status
"similar to that of a specialized agency." Article III, Sections 4 and 5
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized
Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November
1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution
No. 19 on 17 May 1949, explicitly provides:
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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972
THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR.
LEONCE VERSTUYFT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of
Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, MAJOR
WILFREDO CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, and
CAPTAIN PEDRO S. NAVARRO of the Constabulary
Offshore Action Center (COSAC), respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for petitioners.
Emilio L. Baldia for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24294 May 3, 1974
DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic
Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Bataan, and EDGARDO
GENER, respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna Manalo & Feliciano for petitioner.
A. E. Dacanay for private respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Camilo D. Quiason as amicus
curiae.
FERNANDO, J.:p
There is nothing novel about the question raised in this certiorari
proceeding against the then Judge Tito V. Tizon, filed by petitioner
Donald Baer, then Commander of the United States Naval Base,
Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, seeking to nullify the orders of
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a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The
principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such
general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof." 22 Then came Marvel Building Corporation v.
Philippine War Damage Commission, 23 where respondent, a United
States agency established to compensate damages suffered by the
Philippines during World War II was held as falling within the above
doctrine as the suit against it "would eventually be a charge against
or financial liability of the United States Government because ..., the
Commission has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying
money judgments." 24 The Syquia ruling was again explicitly relied
upon in Marquez Lim v. Nelson, 25 involving a complaint for the
recovery of a motor launch, plus damages, the special defense
interposed being "that the vessel belonged to the United States
Government, that the defendants merely acted as agents of said
Government, and that the United States Government is therefore the
real party in interest." 26 So it was in Philippine Alien Property
Administration v. Castelo, 27 where it was held that a suit against the
Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the United
States involving vested property under the Trading with the Enemy
Act is in substance a suit against the United States. To the same
effect is Parreno v. McGranery, 28 as the following excerpt from the
opinion of Justice Tuason clearly shows: "It is a widely accepted
principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the
land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state
may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its
own courts without its consent." 29 Finally, there is Johnson v.
Turner, 30 an appeal by the defendant, then Commanding General,
Philippine Command (Air Force, with office at Clark Field) from a
decision ordering the return to plaintiff of the confiscated military
payment certificates known as scrip money. In reversing the lower
court decision, this Tribunal, through Justice Montemayor, relied
on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 31 explaining why it could not be
sustained.
The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What was
sought by private respondent and what was granted by respondent
Judge amounted to an interference with the performance of the
duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers
possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases
Agreement. This point was made clear in these words: "Assuming, for
purposes of argument, that the Philippine Government, through the
Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a Timber
License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases Agreement
subjects the exercise of rights under a timber license issued by the
Philippine Government to the exercise by the United States of its
rights, power and authority of control within the bases; and the
findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the
Philippine and United States Governments, that "continued logging
operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base
would not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base,"
is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. .. The doctrine of state
immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary
charge against the sovereign or would require the doing of an
affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an
affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most
important public function of any government - the defense of the
state is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative
act." 32 That such an appraisal is not opposed to the interpretation of
the relevant treaty provision by our government is made clear in the
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