Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview

Author(s): Steve Smith

Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 13-29
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Review of International Studies (1986), 12, 13-29

Theories
Steve

of foreign

policy:

Printed

in Great Britain

an historical

overview*

Smith

it is natural to consider
of the comparative
the development
Although
approach
source of theories of
known as Foreign Policy Analysis
(FPA) as the most obvious
on the
it is important to remember that all perspectives
foreign policy behaviour,
relations contain statements about foreign policy. Historic
subject of international
to the study of inter
ally this has been the case because virtually all approaches
as diverse
national relations took the state to be the central actor. Thus, approaches
as those concentrating
on political economy,
international
society and Marxism have
all included a notion of what the state is and how its foreign policy results, regardless
of the way in which policy might be defined. Theories of foreign policy are therefore
intrinsic to theories of international
relations, even for those who deny the centrality
of the state as an actor in international
society.
What has happened in the last decade or so is that the traditional notion of the state
as being the fundamental
unit of international
society has come under attack. The
state-centric perspective
is argued to be outdated as new actors have come on the
scene and as new forces, predominantly
have altered the nature of inter
economic,
national
states in a network of interdependencies.
This
relations by entangling
is to be contrasted with that of those who worked
in the 1960s in the area of
position
FPA, certainly as practised in the USA. The latter believed that there was some kind
of progressive quality to their work, which would lead ultimately
to a general theory
of foreign policy behaviour. For many, however, FPA as a subject-area was always
itwas neither social scientific in the way claimed to be the case in
problematic?since
the systems analysis of international
in the sense of using
relations, nor historical
evidence and hindsight
to make sense of, and give coherence
of
to, the perceptions
those who had made foreign policy decisions. By the late 1970s these concerns seemed
to be all too well supported by both the empirical enquiries that led many in inter
national
relations to proclaim
the obsolescence
of state-centric
theory and by the
theoretical
reached. At this juncture,
then, it is
impasse that FPA had apparently
to attempt an overview of where we have reached in the study of
very appropriate
foreign policy: to see if FPA was always a blind alley; to see if the contemporary
international
system militates against a focus on foreign policies; and to see to what
extent FPA, as a distinct (if eclectic) approach
to the study of foreign policy, has
to grand theories of international
relations or
anything to offer other than footnotes
historical case studies. In short, is FPA a discredited pseudo-science?
*
This paper was presented
at the 1984 annual conference
of BISA, held at Durham;
Charles Reynolds
and Geoff
at that conference.
for their helpful comments
Berridge
the two anonymous
referees of the journal and to Christopher
Hill, Mike Nicholson
their comments.

0260-2105/86/01/0013-17/$03.00

1986Review of International Studies

Iwould
like to thank
I am also grateful
to
and Brian White

for

14
Traditional

Theories

of foreign

policy:

an historical

overview

approaches

Before examining the decline of FPA as an approach to the study of foreign policy it
is important to clarify how foreign policy was explained by the major
theories of
international
relations before the sub-field of FPA opened up. This development
is
associated with the first publication
of the Snyder, Br?ck and Sapin
normally
framework
in 1954.l Of course, such precision over the formation of the sub-field is a
little misleading,
but it is nevertheless quite clear that this one framework, more than
into existence. This approach attempts
anything before, brought the FPA approach
to understand
as members
states
of a class of phenomena
foreign policy by treating
and seeks to generalize about the sources, and nature, of their behaviour,
focusing on
the decision-making
process in its varying aspects in order to produce explanations.
This at first sight seems applicable
to all theories of the foreign policies of states, but
it is not. Of the three main identifiable ways of thinking about international
relations
outside of the behavioural perspective
(idealism, realism and the international
society
process. Each has
approach),2 none takes as its focus of enquiry the decision-making
a more parsimonious
of international
events, one that sees decision
explanation
as
more
In
all
three general perspectives
determined
than
the
making
determining.
critical determinants
of foreign policy are to be found in the nature of the inter
national political system. The structural condition of 'anarchy', however mediated
laws and morality,
is generally the starting point for enquiry. In both
by conventions,
idealism and realism a powerful notion of human nature pervades
the analysis. On
the one side it was what a differently
international
let
constructed
system might
that must be managed.
Idealist thinkers,
flourish; on the other it was a constraint
of human nature and conflict,
searched
for
inspired by a liberal conception
to be built into international
mechanisms
society which would prevent it generating
since this was believed to be peace
any more war and for ways of building democracy,
relations would be marked by
these mechanisms
international
enhancing. Without
or to the existence of 'sinister'
the recurrence of war, due either to misperception
interests in unreformed
societies.
For idealists,
then, foreign policy was to be
an
of
human
what
through
beings could become and why
explained
understanding
stood in the way. The study of
existing structures, both domestic and international,
international
relations was intrinsically related to the task of improving international
relations. One did not need to focus on how policy was made to understand how this
feature led to that which we might observe in the way of foreign policy
overriding
nor how that behaviour could be transformed.
behaviour,
The decline of idealist thought was accompanied
by the rise of the dominant
theory
of international
relations in the subject's history,
realism. Much has been written
to suggest that he was the
about Morgenthau's
work, and, of course, it ismisleading
of realism, but the subtlety of his approach has led
only major
'founding-father'
relations.
many to see it as the most coherent and consistent
theory of international
to write-off Morgenthau
as in
Indeed, ten or twenty years ago it was fashionable
some important way pass?. What
is surprising is just how many of the critiques of his
work end up imputing to him things that he did not say, and simplifying what he did
It is therefore
less surprising to note that Politics
say almost beyond recognition.
texts in the subject, a book to be
one
most
is
Nations3
still
the
of
Among
widely-cited
dismissed at quite a cost. Morgenthau
has a very explicit view of why states behave as
of human nature on the one hand,
they do and this relates to his a priori conception

Steve

Smith

15

and to his belief in the structural determinance

of the international
system on the
nature of human
other. He claims that the inherent and immutable self-interested
results in states
anarchy,
beings, when faced with a structure of international
one thing, power. Although
he is at pains to point out that this concept of
maximizing
power is not to be imbued with one fixed meaning,
and, for example, he explicitly
discusses economic
of
dimensions
of power, he does believe that the association
of
interest can provide a universal explanation
power with the concept of national
of the main types of foreign policies
why states act as they do. In his classification
into categories of status quo, imperialist and prestige,4 he essentially
imposes onto
foreign policy behaviour a systemic rationale. That is, he finds the sources of foreign
system, with the overriding
policy in the situation of the state in the international
mechanism
of the balance of power constituting
the fundamental
explanation of the
behaviour of the units. That this allows him to develop a coherent explanation does
not detract from the problems of his view of the causes of foreign policy.
There are three main deficiencies:
first there is the common accusation
that his key
balance of power and national interest?are
of
concepts?power,
incapable
objective
definition.
To accept
that these are subjective
claim to
negates Morgenthau's
which
is central to his argument.5 Once
enters into the
objectivity
subjectivity
his epistemology
definitions
for this is not an account of what decision
collapses,
makers
think they are doing,
it is an account of what we think we know they are
for any linkage
doing. Second, one searches in vain through Politics Among Nations
between
the domestic
of
system. His discussions
polity and the international
domestic
on the resources of national
factors concentrate
power and on the
role of ideology, not on any domestic
justificatory
input to foreign policy. A third
and related problem is that his notion of what human nature objectively
is admits of
no variation; yet he does argue that foreign policy takes different forms. Specifically,
he provides no way of moving
from a 'knowledge* of what we are to an explanation
of why some states behave in certain ways in contrast to others. Why are some states
and others not? His answer appears to be that it is all to do with whether
expansionist
of power. Notwithstanding
his lengthy
they are content with the existing distribution
discussion
of the sources of imperialism,6
his explanations
of why some states are
on some objective
imperialist are structural ones, and they rely axiomatically
universal notion of power.
In summary, Morgenthau's
'theory' of international
relations does indeed have much to say on the question of why states do what they do,
but the ultimately determining
structure fails to carry the burden
role of international
on
once
it
the
nature
its
of
imposed
objective
driving force, power, is questioned.
the claim that his theory treats states as billiard-balls
Whilst
is indeed an over
it nevertheless
of his approach:
simplification,
captures the underlying
assumption
states are driven to behave in certain ways by the structure of the system and not by
the domestic
there is no mechanism
polity;
linking the internal to the external
his a priori conception
of human nature cannot explain why
aspects of behaviour;
states behave in such different ways; and, his central concepts are in quite funda
mental ways contestable.
The result of these objections
is that the logical coherence
and structure of his theory collapses.
It is essentially a deterministic
notion of foreign
of the driving forces of the
definitions
policy, one based on specific and disputable
international
system. The paradox is that he is himself forced to 'bring people back
in' to explain
'errors' (such as appeasement)
in history. There
is an ineluctable
tension between determinism
and voluntarism
in his work.

16
Behaviouralist

Theories

of foreign

policy:

an historical

overview

methods

It was, of course, these kinds of concerns

of
that led to the widespread
adoption
in the study of international
relations in the US in the 1950s
behaviouralist
methods
to studying the foreign policies of states resulted.
and 1960s. Two main approaches
These were summed up in the infamous paper by David Singer 'The level-of-analysis
in international
relations'.7 Two points about that paper are worth noting
problem
are necessarily and inevitably
here. First, Singer argued implicitly that explanations
in that there is no uncomplicated
distorted
existence of a world of facts. Theories
are thus to be seen as competing;
each, by focusing on a certain level of analysis,
is theory-dependent.
Although
imposes a bias on the data and in this way evidence
as
a model and a theory, it is
to
is
somewhat
his
between
unclear
distinction
Singer
implied by his argument that the common behavioural
goal of a general theory (as
in the natural
because
found
is fundamentally
sciences)
problematic
precisely
theories compete and in turn define their evidence. Second, Singer, while arguing for
an explicit choice of levels of analysis
in order to further the development
of a
set of theories and of evidence, virtually takes for granted the existence of
cumulative
one unit of analysis, the state. Indeed, John Vasquez has very clearly illustrated that
this assumption
the behaviouralist
relations.8 So
pervades
study of international
the dissatisfaction
with
for all its
the behavioural
movement,
realism,
despite
was
to be
in methodology
differences
that
what
and epistemology,
accepted
explained was the foreign policies of sovereign states.
Hence quite an extensive literature was built up during the late 1950s and the 1960s
that sought to explain the foreign policy behaviour of the state from a systems view
of international
behaviour
point. This was most clearly represented by the models
and Kenneth Waltz9 as well as the
by Morton Kaplan, Richard Rosecrance
developed
work on models
of polarity.10 These models
theories)
(and, in the case of Waltz,
one that had been
shared a common assumption
about foreign policy behaviour,
central to realism: that the key areas of foreign policy were essentially determined
by
for example,
this one
the structure of the international
system. In a bipolar world,
on all states regardless of their
structural feature would impose 'rules' of behaviour
be different from those that
'rules'
and
These
would
ideologies
political complexion.
would be explicable
behaviour
in
hence
characteristic
systems,
multipolar
applied
from a knowledge
of the polar structure of the system. In all this, the structural
one.
condition
of anarchy was both a given and theoretically
determining
so do these behavioural
to be overmechanistic,
But, just as realism appeared
theories (indeed there are many similarities on this level between realism and behavi
to their logical conclusion,
ouralist theories). Taking
their assumptions
people and
In the language of Singer's
to explanation.
processes are exogenous
decision-making
and
homogeneous
level-of-analysis
problem,
they imply that states are essentially
no
that the system has a determining
on
it.
There
need
the
is
units
comprising
impact
to run through the very serious problems of this view,11 but it is salient to note that
this perspective
forms of inter
still does seem able to account for some significant
seem very problematic.
national behaviour
Thus,
that, from a state level perspective,
for example,
just as it is clear that a systems view of foreign policy overemphasizes
the impact of the system,
it is also clear that focusing on the decision-making
its impact. The fact that multipolar
processes
systems are not
underemphasizes
that
accompanied
by the level of ideological
rigidity in foreign policy behaviour

Steve

Smith

17

applies in bipolar systems is, clearly, inexplicable from a state perspective. The fact
that bipolar systems are marked by forms of behaviour different from those of multi
In short, it appears
from a state perspective.
polar systems is likewise inexplicable
that certain aspects of foreign policy behaviour may be more economically
explained
from the systems level than from the state level.
difficulties with the notion of an
Of course, there are very considerable ontological
are equally serious problems
as
there
international
system, but,
Singer pointed out,
in the phenomenological
for
with the state level approach,
example,
certainly,
on
of decision-makers.
the
in
concentration
any
perceptions
assumptions
implicit
This level-of-analysis
problem remains in the study of foreign policy, and it also
applies to exactly the kind of issues dealt with in international political economy. For
of theory made explicit by
the present writer the problem
reflects the conception
in competition,
each explain
Waltz12 (and implied in Singer). Theories are essentially
ing some aspects of behaviour better than others. What this upsets most is those views
on
of international relations that see explanation being derived from a concentration
of a general theory
the thoughts of those who make decisions or as the achievement
that can explain all foreign policy at either the level of the state or the level of the
international
system. Quite simply, the study of foreign policy cannot afford to
system, since that does seem to provide for
ignore the structure of the international
as they do in certain situations than
more powerful
states
behave
into
why
insights
of the state. The problem
does any focus on the decision-making
is,
processes
though, that the international systems level can only deal with certain long-term and
general trends in foreign policy behaviour. On its own it is not sufficient to constitute
a theory of foreign policy.
took place at the inter
much work on the theory of foreign policy
Although
of the
national
systems level, it was eclipsed not only by the growing perception
central role of economic
factors, but more so by the rise in the 1960s of a distinct
approach to analysing foreign policy behaviour. This approach, which for the sake of
can be called the comparative
convenience
(CFP), was one
foreign policy approach
in the era of
relations
of the major growth areas in the study of international
were proposed
behaviouralism.
during the
many different
approaches
Although
was
a
common
was
to
them
belief
the
CFP
in
what
of
that,
1960s,
'heady days'
from natural science, foreign policy analysis
borrowed
through the use of methods
failure of such a general theory
could lead to a general theory. Given the subsequent
to materialize,
but it is important
and inappropriate,
this belief now seems misplaced
in the
to note that such a belief gave impetus to, and faith in, the CFP approach
1960s. As Charles Kegley has written
in his review of the history of the CFP
studies of foreign policy
'the goals advocated by those urging comparative
approach:
in intent.
in the 1960s might be classified as a paradigmatic
departure revolutionary
shared a cluster of
Those present at the creation of the . . . [CFP] paradigm
of inde
declaration
to justify?indeed,
demand?a
that seemed
assumptions
to the study of foreign policy. Certain
from pre-existing
pendence
approaches
convictions were held to be self-evident:
that all nations'
foreign policy behaviors
were determined
were comparable;
that patterns
in those behaviors
by certain
that to uncover
factors (among these were size, wealth, and political accountability);
nomothetic
statements about the relative potencies of these determinants,
powerful
. . .The declaration
were available.
accepted one set of
comparative methodologies
and rejected another.'13
epistemological
prescriptions

18

Theories

of foreign

policy:

an historical

overview

the CFP approach was the

all, what was rejected by those who adopted
to
case-study
approach
understanding
foreign policy.14 For reasons that I have
discussed
those following
the CFP approach were united more by a
elsewhere,15
it is critical
than by adherence to any one theory. Again,
rejection of certain methods
to note just what the study of foreign policy comprised
before the CFP approach
case studies with little attempt to introduce comparison.
developed:
single-country
Even the most widely-used
edited volume Foreign
foreign policy text, Roy Macridis's
in World Politics,
Policy
explicitly
rejected any notion of the use of comparative
'scientific' method
method
it implicitly used comparative
through such
(although
terms as power maximization
in
fifth edition
the
and national
interest). Thus,
on
in
the
the
of
1976,
published
foreign policy states that:
study
chapter
comparative
'the canons of science call for simplicity
in the formulation
of
and economy
are tested that the
that are to be tested. It is only when simple hypotheses
hypotheses
scientist moves
into the more complex, slowly relating and checking his findings with
to
in contrast,
find that we cannot test. ... To attempt
the outside world. We,
construct generalizations
and models
that will give us a rigorous scientific under
standing and prediction of foreign policy is a hopeless task . . . [we] believe that case
studies of the individual foreign policy-making
process,
including conflict of various
states in terms of the descriptive
would
give us considerable
suggested,
categories
food for thought and might lead us to more fruitful hypotheses.'16
kind of analysis of
The CFP approach,
to a very different
then, was committed
it. A
second
behaviour
than that which
foreign
policy
important
preceded
which
of
CFP
claimed to be
that
was,
assumption
therefore,
existing approaches,
in reality had to
based on case studies and on the careful sifting of historical evidence,
in most cases this was
rely on a more or less explicit theory of foreign policy?and
realist. Whilst
this work was given
scientific method,
eschewing
comparative
a
set
of
what
about
foreign policy was, about how
meaning by powerful
assumptions
it was made, and about what goals it was directed towards. This, of course, was the
motivation
behind
the one paper that served as the founding
document
of an
CFP approach,
and Theories
'Pre-Theories
of Foreign
identifiable
Rosenau's
as this
the history of the CFP approach,
Policy'.17 There is little need to document
has been discussed extensively elsewhere;18 but one should note that this one article
was seminal
in the development
of CFP. Not
only did it lead to the major
foreign policy research project of the 1960s and 1970s (the Inter Uni
comparative
the basis for the
versity Comparative
ICFP), it also provided
Foreign Policy Project,
most extensive development
frame
of behavioural
adaptation
theory, Rosenau's
to enumerate the causes of foreign policy per se, and
work. The pre-theory attempted
to be a dependent variable, with
it did this through positing foreign policy behaviour
and the
level
of
economic development,
variables
the
those
of
size,
being
independent
nature of political accountability
of the states concerned. These were connected by a
series of 'source-variables',
related to governmental,
societal, idiosyncratic,
systemic
and role factors. The aim was simply to make explicit the kinds of factors that caused
the patterns
was a theory that explained
foreign policy behaviour;
adaptation
variables.
Of
between independent,
and
course, the
(source),
dependent
intervening
and ICFP broke up in the mid-1970s.
theory had a series of formidable deficiencies,19
But for a period of about ten years the goal was general theory, with many roads
towards that goal being suggested. A distinct CFP approach dominated
the literature
in the United States. In Britain, however,
less popular, as witnessed
it was much
by
Above

Steve

Smith

19

attack on the dominance of traditional methods

in the study of British
of the possibilities
discussion
of applying
foreign policy,20 and Roy Jones's
behavioural
theory to Britain.21
Whilst
the 1960s saw a distinctive approach aimed at general theory emerge in the
United States, it also saw the rise of a number of less ambitious approaches,
which
theories. What was most salient about these was that
may be termed middle-range
the notion of the monolithic
they were concerned to disaggregate
state, a notion that
had dominated
realist (and much behavioural)
analysis. Not only this, but these
theories focused on a much narrower set of factors than did either
middle-range
realist or CFP analysis,
the underlying
assumption
being that foreign policy could
best be understood by examining the impact of certain processes within the decision
structure. While
various analysts
focused on different
making
aspects of that
work was that these operated
structure, the implication of much of this middle-range
in differing combinations
at different
levels, from country to country and from issue
to issue. Thus, Jervis concentrated
on the nature of perceptions;22 Janis looked at the
role of psychological
within
processes
decision-making
groups;23 Steinbruner
stressed the analogy
as a cybernetic
of decision-making
process;24 and Allison
views of decision-making.25
Neverthe
analysed bureaucratic and implementational
of these non-CFP
less, despite the contributions
scholars, by the early 1970s, the
study of foreign policy in the United States was marked by the existence of a powerful
and identifiable CFP approach which was aimed at the creation of a general theory.
Even in Britain such an approach was gaining some allegiance. As Christopher
Hill
wrote in 1974: 'we have concluded
the process of heart-searching
about methodology
however qualified,
should
by coming to beliefs that in principle some generalizations,
be possible about phenomena
can be both
in international politics,
that comparisons
and that at least we may hope to lend some precision?
practicable and productive,
our understanding
and evidence?to
of inter
by the ordered use of concepts
national action, whether highly specific or very general'.26
Brian White's

The

decline

of comparative

foreign

policy

Yet three sets of events occurred in the mid-1970s

that served to alter significantly
the
study of foreign policy. The first of these was the increased role of economic factors
in international
relations. Though
it was evident that economic
factors had always
the early to mid-1970s
seemed to witness a
played a significant role, to US academics
that foreign policy
qualitative
change in that role. This does not imply ipso facto
analysis cannot explain and account for the role of economic
factors, but it does
of FPA, which was a
represent a significant challenge to the dominant assumptions
scene. In and of itself the impact of
subject focused on the political-military
economic
factors does not cause problems
It did so because the rise in
for FPA.
economic
a
the
of
interdependence
challenged
subject focusing on the state to
ability
the actually dominant
between
Inter
societies.
explain
patterns of interactions
the utility of focusing on both the notion of
dependence,
then, called into question
was to challenge
the
foreign
policy (since one of the effects of interdependence
distinction between foreign and domestic policy) and the centrality of state decision
makers
had to turn to consider non-governmental
actors in the
(since attention
of the effects of interdependence).
In fact this problem was more serious
managing
for those who were involved in explaining foreign policy either in a realist perspective

20

Theories

of foreign

policy:

an historical

overview

or in a traditional case-study perspective. Nevertheless,

did call into
interdependence
doubt the credentials
of FPA, and though much of the work of behaviouralist
the relevance of economic
foreign policy analysts had already begun to discuss
of the subject.28
factors,27 it still seemed to cut away at the assumptions
A second factor was the perceived decline in the role of the state as an actor in
international
relations. Again, while the claims of those who forecast the demise of
that non-state
the realization
the state now seem to have been vastly exaggerated,
actors were central to international
in certain issue-areas did at the time
behaviour
a major challenge
on the
to FPA. What was the use of concentrating
constitute
actors were equally,
of states if non-state
if not more,
foreign policy behaviour
in certain issue-areas? At the very least the rise of non-state
actors did
important
of FPA; its impact along with that of inter
interrupt the confident
development
did call the whole
this was more
into doubt. Again,
dependence
enterprise
for
non-behavioural
than
for
the
problematic
CFP/middle-range
approaches
what had been
theorists, but it did lead to a massive
identity crisis in the mid-1970s:
taken for granted (that states were dominant,
that their foreign policies could be
studied comparatively
and that what foreign policy was could be accepted as applying
to all states) crumbled in the face of a new world order in which the twin forces of
and interdependence
transnationalism
seemed to alter both the structure and the
of international
processes
resisted, most
society. This challenge was, of course,
in Britain,29 but it was also welcomed
academics
vehemently
by traditionalist
by
in the United States precisely because of their epistemological
many behaviouralists
and methodological
commitments.30
The third problem applied specifically
it was evident
to CFP. By the mid-1970s
that, despite the hopes and despite the claims, a general theory of foreign policy
behaviour was simply not going to emerge. ICFP broke up in 1974; the pre-theory,
it led to large numbers of studies, had not advanced beyond being a pre
although
research had not led to
in quantitative
theory; and the investment of time and money
in 1974 Rosenau
line that 'all the evidence
could write the infamous
theory. Whilst
to the conclusion
that the comparative
points
study of foreign policy has now
emerged as a normal science',31 in a paper written a year later (althnough
ironically
in the same year, 1976, as was the paper in which the quote immediately
published
above appeared), he noted that: 'it appears that this process [of knowledge
building]
the long-term
may be grinding to a halt in the scientific study of foreign policy ...
seems to have slowed, and, even worse there are more
trend towards convergence
than a few indications
that we are going our separate ways'.32 The CFP approach
lost its paradigm. The result was that it
had, to use the words of Charles Kegley,
to
a
halt.
effectively
ground
The impact of these three factors was to lead to a decline in the comparative
study
of foreign policy. Many of the behavioural
analysts went off to study other aspects of
area
in the FPA
international
relations
and certainly
the rate of publication
an
as
declined.
in
this
occurred
identifiable
Britain
just
substantially
Paradoxically,
in what could be loosely called FPA started to emerge.
group of academics working
Since then, of course, world events have thrust the state and its political-military
behaviour
relations. The study of
back to the centre of the stage of international
a
in
with
rather
different world from
the
to
deal
has
1980s, however,
foreign policy
that of either the 1960s or the 1970s, since in the 1980s both economic
and military
a subject of
factors are of central importance
It is, nevertheless,
in foreign policy.

Steve

Smith

21

of creating a
study inwhich not only has much of the optimism as to the possibilities
one
the
which
in
but
also
beguiling simplicities of realist or
general theory declined,
case-study analysis seem most appropriate.
All in all, there has been a massive
retreat from CFP-type
analysis in the United
States and a resurgence of interest in an analytical focus on one country. The study of
of these iswhat can be labelled
foreign policy now has five main approaches. The//rs/
as represented most clearly in the work of Kenneth Waltz33 and as
neo-realism,
stress the centrality of
discussed
in a recent article by Richard Ashley.34 Neo-realists
state behaviour; as such this
the structure of the international system in determining
is a return to, as well as an advance on, realism. Foreign policy is to be understood by
seeing the situation in which the state has to operate. A powerful variant of this is the
work on nuclear strategy that relates to nuclear proliferation,
regional security, or
is the world
relations. A second
economy
superpower
perspective,
approach
and the world-systems
by the work of Immanuel Wallerstein35
popularized
of states is primarily
theorists.36 In this perspective,
the foreign policy behaviour
of states in the international
related to the varying influences of the involvement
economy. A third approach, which is essentially the residual of CFP, may be termed
et
the quantification
approach, as seen in the recent works by East et ai, Wilkenfeld
et al?1 For these writers foreign policy is to be explained by the
al., and Callahan
in
in foreign policy behaviour;
gathering of empirical data to discover regularities
fact each of these three volumes is an outgrowth of a data-collection
project (East et
et ai from the IBA model). The
ai and Callahan et ai from CREON, Wilkenfeld
a
case studies.
to single-country
return
and
most
involves
fourth,
popular, approach
Even a quick glance through the literature will reveal that the vast majority of work
on foreign policy consists of case studies of either a single country's foreign policy or
an event or series of events. If we were to characterize
the study of foreign policy as
a
said that, there is no
this.
be
would
dominant
it
having
Having
approach,
on appropriate methods,
nor on the variables
to be studied. The final
uniformity
one which stresses the development
of the study of foreign policy by the
approaches
use of middle-range
theories. In many ways this can be termed the 'residual FPA
FPA
it is now
To the extent that an identifiable
sub-field
exists,
approach'.
seems to be able to provide
concerned with a group of theories each of which
for certain types of states.
of certain types of foreign policy behaviour
explanations
are
Michael
of
work
of
this
the
crisis-behaviour
Brecher,38 the work on
Examples
as well as the
a
of
British
academics,39
implementation
group
foreign policy
by
extension of the work on bureaucratic politics, decision-making
groups, and percep
tions pioneered by Allison,
Janis and Jervis respectively.
The resulting situation could optimistically
be described as one of methodological
in
the subject-area of FPA as a distinct
that
it
evident
is
pluralism;
reality, however,
sub-field of the discipline of international relations is in a state of disarray. This is in
contrast to both the general agreement of how to study foreign policy found during
the period when realism dominated
and the sense of direction provided by the CFP
approach.
Ironically, the most popular recent text on foreign policy analysis, Lloyd
Jensen's Explaining
Foreign Policy,*0 for all its concern with discussing mainly CFP
theories of states' behaviour,
concludes by echoing sentiments similar to those which
motivated
the first major work in the subject-area,
that of Snyder, Br?ck and Sapin.
For Jensen, all the determinants
of foreign policy are important only insofar as they
affect the motivations
In that way^ of course,
of decision-makers.
they are not

22

Theories

of foreign

policy:

an historical

overview

at all; in this regard FPA has not come very far in the last thirty years.
determinants
This does not mean that foreign policy is not studied, quite the contrary, but it does
mean that if the 1960s and early 1970s witnessed
sub
the growth of an identifiable
field of FPA, then this sub-field has failed to develop in the last decade. Gone are the
claims for the possibility of a general theory, and gone are the large research projects
on the analysis of foreign policy behaviour;
there has been no major publication
events and theoretical short
from the CFP school in the last few years. Real-world
comings have, therefore, led to a reduction of interest in FPA: as a way of studying
in international
than rival approaches
foreign policy it is now far less significant
a return to
one
on
relations. Grand-scale
the
has
been
hand,
by,
theorizing
replaced
case studies, and, on the other, a concentration
on middle-range
theories.
The weaknesses

of foreign

policy

analysis

This leads us to discuss what have been the pitfalls in the study of foreign policy. Why
are we where we are now? The history of the sub-field of FPA has contained
five
main weaknesses
which
have prevented
of theory.
the development
Before
these it is important to note that the sub-field mirrors many of the central
discussing
in the nexus between social science and history. FPA has
methodological
problems
been no more able to resolve these than has any other discipline,
and so, in addition
to the specific weaknesses mentioned
below, one must add the critical issues of what
to the analysis
constitutes an explanation,
is applicable
and whether scientific method
of human behaviour.
In fairness,
these being part of much wider debates on the
of history and social science,
it is not surprising
that such problems
philosophy
remain unresolved,
but foreign policy analysts would do well to be aware of their
and of the weaknesses
(as well as the strengths) of any
methodological
assumptions
Given
that their training has tended to be in either history or
particular method.
to accept a priori the soundness of a
social science it is all too easy (and convenient)
to talk of decision-makers
Just as it is common
particular methodology.
being
so
closed
belief
this
also
systems
trapped by
applies to those studying them. Indeed
the history of FPA both in Britain and the United States indicates how beguiling are
the paradigms
in which
in a very important way,
the very
study is undertaken;
either to particular
division
of the sub-field
into identifiable
schools adhering
or to particular middle-range
or grand theories has served to foreclose
methods
on the central area of method.
discussion
Precisely because each approach has its
to leave on one side doubts as to the
utility in explaining events so is it convenient
coherence of its structure and the assumptions
itmakes as to questions of method and
epistemology.
the history of FPA does suggest that there have been five major
Nevertheless,
in the study of foreign policy. The first concerns
the search for a general
pitfalls
the
and 1970s a general
the
1960s
in
in
of
those
CFP
theory. Despite
hopes
engaged
theory did not emerge. This was not for lack of research in this area, nor for lack of
finance. Those approaches
that claimed to lead to general theory failed, inmost cases
never getting beyond
or even data collection
the pre-theory
stage, for the simple
reason of their epistemological
itwas assumed that if everyone used the
assumptions:
same concepts,
then theory would emerge. Quite
collected data, tested hypotheses,
how this was to happen was never specified. To take just the clearest case: the pre
research with many attempts to offer rank-orderings
of the
theory led to considerable

Steve

Smith

23

for certain types of states. Yet once this had been

potency of the source-variables
there was no easy way of turning findings into theory. No amount of data
achieved,
can lead to the entirely separate cognitive act of creating theory. Even had the pre
for each genotype of
theory led to an unambiguous
ranking of the source-variables
that
state, upon which all those engaged in this research could agree, the assumption
this would lead to theory seems unrealistic. This is not to argue that such findings
would be trivial, nor to suggest that they would not be important in the process of
building theory, but the rather naive belief that this route would lead to theory seems
could not even lead to
That
the work on the pre-theory
very questionable.
of coherence
the problems
and logical
unambiguous
findings merely highlights
structure that the model faced.
A second pitfall follows on from the first and concerns the quantitative
analysis of
foreign policy as represented most clearly in the recent work emerging from the
and IBA data-bases.
CREON
indicates only too well the inherent
Their work
of
is that the work is concerned with
inductive
this
research:
problem
quantitative
not
states. All too often quantitative
of
the
describing
explaining
foreign policies
with the findings telling us
work ends up being an exercise in elegant mathematics,
something not about foreign policy but about the utility of certain forms of data
for dealing with the data and
Each study develops certain measures
manipulation.
their utility in comparison
discusses
to those of other studies; this does little to
advance the understanding
of why states do what they do. It also reflects the weak
nesses of the simple positivist notion of social science in its implications about the
types of theory that can be built. This is not to say that data has no place in foreign
to
policy analysis, but that data cannot be analyzed only in terms of its relationship
certain quantitative measures.
In short, quantitative
analysis in FPA is in danger of
becoming an enclosed area of study that concentrates not on foreign policy behaviour
but on the advantages
and disadvantages
of certain quantitative
techniques. To
is not causation, and to the extent that the analysis
repeat the old adage, correlation
of foreign policy deals with the issue of how best to obtain correlation coefficients,
the risk is that the subject will not address the really important relationship between
data and behaviour.
It would become an exercise in how best to describe rather than
how best to explain.
The third pitfall has been the unwillingness
to
in the discipline
of those working
undertake cumulative work. Stated baldly, there has been little in the way of testing
the theories that have been developed.
Thus, for example, how many studies have
tested Allison's
to
bureaucratic politics approach, or Janis's groupthink approach,
name only two of the most widely-cited
theories? The study of foreign policy has
on the part of those who work in it to test the
simply not indicated a willingness
theories of others. While
some approaches
do suffer from serious problems
of
this does not apply to all approaches,
and the absence of tests of
operationalization
a serious impediment
theories has constituted
to the development
of the study of
foreign policy.
A fourth pitfall has been the rather surprising reliance on the seductive notion of
the national
interest. Despite all the very serious deficiencies
that have been found
with the term it is still very popular with foreign policy makers. But its continued
in many
the development
of the
popularity
foreign policy studies has hindered
it so popular with prac
subject. This is precisely because of the reason that makes
it can be used to mean whatever
titioners?that
In international
the user wishes.

24

Theories

of foreign

policy:

an historical

overview

to think
relations, the term has a commonsensical
appeal because it is still convenient
of each state having interests within a society of states. Yet it has proven impossible to
convert this appeal into a theory, unless one reverts to essentially a realist position.
The final pitfall relates to an inability to agree on what the state is and what
as opposed
to domestic,
of. In the last twenty years
foreign,
policy consists
of both the state and of the distinction
between domestic and foreign
conceptions
policy have shifted back and forth. As the Cold War led to detente and as this gave
way to the Second Cold War, foreign policy analysts have altered their views on what
this thing called the state is, on what its foreign policy consists of and on how this can
from domestic policy. In one sense it is no wonder that FPA has faced
be demarcated
serious problems given that these issues are central to its identity and to its way of
relations. Nevertheless,
it has posed very serious problems for
studying international
the subject area, and all the indications are that these will continue.
identified five major pitfalls in the history of the study of foreign policy, it
Having
to note that in an important sense there are also the problems of the
is necessary
relations as a whole.
In essence, and to differing degrees, they
study of international
apply to many of the other main areas of the discipline, yet they seem to have had a
more marked
impact on FPA than other sub-fields. This is because FPA is at the
intersection of four main epistemological,
and even ontological
diffi
methodological
culties that apply to varying extents to all areas of the study of international
relations.
The first of these is the theoretical
concern noted above: how do we construct a
of
international
behaviour?
theory
Exactly because FPA has to take into account the
of those who make decisions at the same time as it attempts to relate state
perceptions
to process or structural factors, it highlights
behaviour
the problem of any theory of
human behaviour. The easiest way out of this is to eschew any generalizations
and to
on
a
to
absurd
that
this
solves
it
is
of
course,
pretend
proceed
case-by-case basis; yet,
the problem as case study analysis
if implicit, theoretical pre
reflects powerful,
and assumptions.
Just because a historical case study does not have the
dispositions
of a general theory does not mean that it does not involve (questionable)
pretensions
notions of causation especially at the level of why do actors think what they do. The
failure of general theories in FPA does not mean that one can retreat to a safe-ground
case studies, and yet this has been the most
of uncontentious,
nontheoretical
reaction to the all-too-evident
noticeable
breakdown of the search for general theory.
A second reason for the pitfalls in FPA relates to the question of the impact of the
international
system on the behaviour of states. This problem besets many theories of
international
and afflicts FPA particu
relations, from the realists to the Marxists,
as a discipline,
has so far been unable to
International
larly strongly.
relations,
answer this question and inmany studies two mutually
exclusive answers will be used
to explain different forms of international behaviour; at one juncture the structure of
the international political system will be a powerful constraint on state behaviour,
at
another a state will be assumed
what
the
to have considerable
independence.
Quite
international
and these are at
system is poses considerable
ontological
problems,
their most acute when attempting
to explain the behaviour of the units of that system.
A third factor involves the role of individuals. Whilst
that any study
it is axiomatic
on the age-old
of human behaviour
of assumptions
involves an uneasy mixture
this problem head on. This
FPA confronts
question of free will versus determinism,
is because the most useful middle-range
theories have posited the impact of (often
structures
on the
context
and processes
within
the decision-making
hidden)

Steve

Smith

25

Janis and Jervis are correct, then

behaviour of decision-makers.
After all, ifAllison,
the individual is far less of a rational chooser than is usually assumed. But, for
that bureaucratic
example, how can we move from a statement (following Allison)
for explaining that and at the same
position affects policy preference to a mechanism
time accounting
for individual choice? FPA faces problems because it either has to
treat individuals as extraneous (as inmost of the CFP work) or it has to include them
but without giving them total autonomy when the evidence indicates that this is not
present. Because FPA clearly has to take individuals into account and yet, at the same
time, finds that their perceptions of what they are doing are unreliable guides to their
it faces this problem in a very stark form.
actions,
Finally, FPA's focus on the state and on the content of foreign policy has been
discussed above.
particularly problematic
given the recent empirical developments
Not only does FPA have to deal with a shifting and variable notion of the state, it also
has to deal with a rapidly changing relationship between foreign and domestic politics
and the changes that this implies for the domestic
setting of, and influence upon,
foreign policy.
a set of fundamentally
between
FPA,
then, has been at the intersection
areas
all
for
of the study of inter
issues
that
have
had
problematic
implications
national relations. This explains the peculiar difficulties
that have beset the develop
ment of the subject area and underlies the current breakdown of consensus on how
to suggest that there is an
best to undertake the study of FPA. Itwould be misleading
the
out
that
it
of
this
is
and
easy way
subject area will achieve
unlikely
problem
consensus
on how to study foreign policy precisely because
the impact of these
factors has been so marked. This syndrome has led some to portray FPA as a pseudo
science, a diagnosis made all the more appealing given the grandiose claims advanced
lead to general theory. The
by those who claimed that this 'normal science' would
manifest
loss of
failure to turn this claim into reality has led to a considerable
momentum
in the subject, and has resulted in a severe identity crisis. Yet it is the
strong belief of this writer that FPA has much to offer the study of international
relations. Foreign policy does form patterns; it is to be explained by structures and
that are common,
if to variable extents, among different
states; and the
processes
it provides are more economical
than other theories of state behaviour.
explanations
The all-too-obvious
failures of the grandest schemes have blinded us to our successes.
After all, there is no 'truth' out there waiting for discovery by one all-embracing
theories and
in the business of dealing with competing
theory. We are, therefore,
and in this light FPA has aided, and can continue to aid, the study of
explanations,
international
relations.
The way

forward

All of this raises the question of how is the study of foreign policy to proceed given
the problems
revealed in its history. This, of course, returns us to the issues of
and explanation. These are central issues and FPA, if it is to progress,
methodology
must become more self-conscious
as to its weaknesses
and potential pitfalls in these
areas. It must also, however, be aware of its strengths. What would not aid the
of an understanding
is a return to single-country
of foreign policy perse
development
case studies. This is not because these have little to offer but because what they do
as such. Their findings
have to offer does not advance comparative
understanding

26

Theories

of foreign

policy:

an historical

overview

are essential to any analysis of a country's foreign policy but they are of limited use in
case
on a comparative
basis. Because
the task of building cumulative
knowledge
are implicit rather
studies define key terms differently
and because their assumptions
their utility for
than explicit
to their methodology),
central
(although
equally
comparative analysis must not be overestimated.
focusing on the actors'
Specifically,
of their actions and deriving an understanding
of foreign policy from
perceptions
involves a set of con
of 'what happened',
this, albeit informed by our knowledge
siderable epistemological
problems. To understand how an actor perceived the world
is neither simple nor unproblematic.
about a theory of mind
It involves assumptions
and a very clear notion of what itmeans to say that one has made sense of an actor's
is dependent on a theoretical
structure, one that
perceptions. A verstehen approach
we
that actors are
that
know
Given
crucially relies on a problematic
epistemology.
not literally free to do what they wish, we immediately
introduce subjectivity
into
Nor will looking at
and these reflect implicit theoretical assumptions.
judgements,
actors' perceptions
tell us why they think what they think; for this we need wider
behavioural
laws in the sense of natural
rules and laws. These may not be physical
science, but the nexus between free will and conditioning
implies that a focus on how
actors perceive their world will not serve as a basis for understanding
their behaviour
without precisely the kind of general comparative
rules and laws that FPA explicitly
In other words,
case studies, despite their lack of what might be termed
utilizes.
can only work by relying on very strong, if implicit, assump
theoretical pretensions,
tions. To repeat, that FPA has suffered in the four ways noted above does not mean
can escape
that approaches
that do not have such explicit theoretical assumptions
into a problem-free
search for understanding.
an understanding
Nor would the task of developing
of foreign policy behaviour be
advanced by a return to a quasi-realist
of national
interest.
reliance on conceptions
Theories
of national
and con
interest not only involve questionable
assumptions
siderable problems of operationalization,
but they ignore areas of behaviour
(for
structures
that evidently
do affect
and processes)
example
decision-making
outcomes. Added to this is their own problem over the subjectivity of what purports
to be an objective
is far more complex
form of analysis. Foreign policy behaviour
than these theories imply and they cannot deal with that complexity.
A similar objection
can be made to any return to a search for a general theory of
data. Not only has this clearly failed in the
foreign policy via the use of quantitative
to
past, but it rests upon a positivist notion of science which is wholly
inappropriate
the analysis of human affairs. Behaviouralist
that itmay
analysis has to contemplate
have reached an intellectual dead-end. The process of applying a simplistic version
to foreign policy analysis will not lead to a theory of
of natural science method
on the problems
It
to
is
inherent in the transfer of methods
time
reflect
foreign policy.
of natural science (usually simple notions derived from physics) to social phenomena:
the failure of CFP to develop general theory was indeed inherent in its simplistic
notion of what science was about. Yet naive positivism
still pervades much of the
residual CFP work in the United States.
Yet if the positivistic
notion of social science needs to be rejected, so does the
that the study of human affairs cannot be studied by the use of
opposite contention,
This is because opponents
of any social scientific method have a
scientific methods.
rather simple notion of what natural science involves. Scientific
practice indicates
that there is no such thing as a 'true' explanation
facts.
and no theory-independent

Steve

Smith

27

The problems of epistemology

faced by social science are essentially similar to those
of natural science. Theories of nuclear physics, for example, are increasingly to do
with probability
theoretical concepts provide
in which non-observable
statements,
to explanation.
In short, all scientific
the mechanism
for moving
from observation
methods
all involve common problems over what
involve problems of epistemology,
constitutes an explanation.
This is not to imply that FPA can become a science just
like physics, but much of the attack on social science rests on a view of science that
does not accurately portray what scientists are engaged in.
The upshot of this argument
its
is that any theory of foreign policy, whatever
and it is no
is concept-dependent
Evidence
claims, involves a priori assumptions.
excuse to claim that one is 'only' looking at the facts, be they those contained
in
historical records or even those of the perceptions
of those who took the decisions.
Just as FPA involves contestable
so does historical analysis, and an
assumptions,
and facing attack on them is to be
explicit concern with stating these assumptions
to pretending
that they do not apply. Of course we can get excellent
preferred
accounts of why X did what they did but this is not an explanation of it. Itmay be an
essential part of such an explanation
but it cannot be it in its entirety without
as to the causes of behaviour, and the impact
involving wider theoretical assumptions
of the system on the state and the like. We have to accept that theories stand in
mutual antagonism,
and derives its
and any theory imposes bias onto its explanations
and the rejection of
of some assumptions
power by the acceptance
explanatory
others. FPA has, quite rightly, come under attack for many of its assumptions,
but
can be similarly attacked.
other seemingly
'less' theoretical approaches
The way forward, then, is not to return to convenient descriptions of events, nor to
return to the search for a general theory. FPA needs to accept that methodology
and to be more aware than it has been hitherto that it faces fundamental
matters,
and ontological
epistemological
problems. This paper has been concerned with the
historical development
of the (mainly American)
FPA, and the main
approach,
conclusion of the discussion
is that whilst the most grandiose claims have proved to
successes
be unfounded,
some major
in unearthing
the approach achieved
regu
larities in the causation of foreign policy. That these exist is beyond doubt, as the
work on belief systems, bureaucratic politics,
crisis behaviour and
implementation,
not
have
been unearthed by
indicates.
These
processes
decision-making
findings
on single country studies or on the actors' perceptions per se; they have
concentrating
resulted from the use of social scientific method,
albeit a method much removed
from the naive positivism of the general theorists. Thus, one promising way forward
is to develop the comparative middle range theories that exist, and this requires the
testing of these theories. This will not lead to an overall general theory because the
existence of factors such as the impact of the international
system on states, the
structures
of perceptions,
and
and the effect of decision-making
importance
processes will differ from state to state. But what itwill do is to enhance the ability of
FPA to explain foreign policy behaviour much better than does any rival theory. The
task of creating general theory must await the development
of identifiable areas in
which middle range theories dominate over alternative approaches. The point is that
the process of developing
much more
theory is, on past performance,
comparative
likely to emerge from the use of social scientific analysis than it is from single country
studies focusing on the perceptions of the decision-makers.
In summary,
then, FPA as an approach to explaining
foreign policy has distinct

28

Theories

of foreign

policy:

an historical

overview

over its rivals. In the past, the inappropriate

claims of the grandest CFP
advantages
schemes have cast a shadow over the subject's successes. These successes are con
The fact
siderable, and are intrinsically related to the use of a specific methodology.
that FPA stands at the intersection of the major difficulties
facing the study of inter
but these are
the subject a dead-end,
national
relations has led many to proclaim
to studying foreign
difficulties
that must be faced and not feared. Other approaches
that has charac
of these difficulties
policy may well avoid the tortuous discussion
them
terized FPA's history, but this does not mean that they can avoid the problems
selves. Those engaged in the comparative
study of foreign policy behaviour must be
It
aware of the subject's failures, but they must also not underestimate
its successes.
relations because it can explain parts of
has much to offer the study of international
the international
body politic that other theories cannot reach.

References

and notes

as an Approach
to the Study
C. Snyder, H. W. Br?ck and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making
Behavior
Princeton
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Politics
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(New York,
see E. H. Carr, The Twenty
2. For a classical critique of idealism and a statement
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5th Edition
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4. Ibid., see chapters 4, 5 and 6.
5. See Ibid., pp. 4-15.
6. Ibid., pp. 48-73.
7. J. David
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in Klaus Knorr and

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Deutsch
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by Waltz,
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13. Charles W. Kegley,
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14. See James N. Rosenau,
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Research:
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The Comparative
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Policy:
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Lost?
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15. See Steve Smith,

Political
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Foreign
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(London,

(Englewood

Cliffs,

in his The Scientific

NJ,

1976),

Study

of

Steve

Smith

29

18. See Kegley, op. cit.; see also Steve Smith,

Review
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in
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this is summarized
1981), pp. 131-148;
(Farnborough,
Steve Smith,
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20. See Brian White,
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Barber's
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Foreign
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British
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to the BISA annual conference,
paper presented
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Durham,
British Journal
Vol. 4(3),
White',
1978, pp. 266-269.
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of International
21. See Roy Jones, The Changing
Structure
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1974); for a (still) very
Policy
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helpful and incisive survey of the subject area, see Roy Jones, Analysing
Foreign
(London,
Policy
1970).
on Misperception',
Robert
Vol. 20(3),
See
World Politics,
Jervis,
1968, pp. 454-479.
'Hypotheses
also his The Logic ofImages
in International
and Mis
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NJ,
1970) and Perception
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in International
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NJ,
perception
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(Princeton,
23. Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink
(Boston,
1972).
24. John Steinbruner,
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NJ,
1974).
(Princeton,
Theory of Decision
25. Graham
Science
American
Political
Models
and the Cuban Missile
Allison,
Crisis',
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See also his Essence
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of Decision
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26. C. J. Hill,
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of Foreign
Millennium,
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22.

27.

James N. Rosenau
See, for example,
(New York,
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(ed.), Linkage Politics
in R. J. Barry Jones
28. This is discussed
in Steve Smith,
and Interdependence',
'Foreign Policy Analysis
and Peter Willetts
on Trial (London,
1984), pp. 64-82.
(eds.), Interdependence
29. See, for example, Fred Northedge,
Vol. 5(1),
the American
'Transnationalism:
Illusion', Millennium,
and Hedley
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in World
Role
Positive
1976, pp. 21-27,
Bull,
Affairs',
Daedalus,
Vol.
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30. See James N. Rosenau,
in a Transnational
Studies
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'International
World',
Millennium,
1976, pp. 1-20.
31. James N. Rosenau,
in James N. Rosenau
and Foreign Policy Analysis',
'Restlessness,
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Change
In Search of Global Patterns
(New York,
1976), p. 369.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

James N. Rosenau,
Jerusalem
Journal
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in Foreign
Relations,
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of International
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See Waltz,
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Richard
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38(2),
Ashley,
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Immanuel Wallerstein,
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See, for example,
1979).
(Cambridge,
World-Economy
For a collection
and James N. Rosenau
of essays on this theme see W. Ladd Hollist
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System Structure
1981).
(Beverly Hills, CA,
Maurice
Act (Beverly Hills, CA,
and Charles Hermann
East, Stephen Salmore
(eds.), Why Nations

and Stephen Andriole,

Gerald
Paul Rossa
1978); Jonathan Wilkenfeld,
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Foreign
Hopple,
Behavior
Hermann
Linda Brady and Margaret
(Beverly Hills, CA,
(eds.),
1980); Patrick Callahan,
1982).
Foreign Policy Behavior
Describing
(Beverly Hills, CA,
38. See, Michael
in Crisis Behavior
Studies
NJ, 1978); for examples of this
Brecheried.),
(New Brunswick,
in Crisis
see Michael
Brecher with Benjamin
approach
Geist, Decisions
applied to different
countries,

39.
40.

CA,
1980), and Avi
(Berkeley,
(Berkeley, CA,
1983).
Steve Smith and Michael
Clarke
Lloyd

Jensen,

Explaining

Foreign

Shlaim,

The

United

States

and

the Berlin

Blockade

(London,
(eds.), Foreign Policy
Implementation
NJ,
Cliffs,
1982).
Policy
(Englewood

1985).

1948-1949