G.R. No.

L-34666 October 30, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
ITONG AMISTAD respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether from a decision of acquittal, the complainant in a
criminal action for estafa, may appeal with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, under an
information which reads:
I N F O R M AT I O N
The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal accuses ITONG AMISTAD of the crime of Estafa penalized under
Article 316 Paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about January 30, 1965, October 11, 1965, and December 23, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously
(1) (January 30, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Ben Palispis an
unsegregated portion of 42,326 square meters of that parcel of land described in
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 0-105
A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-203086-Amd., Civil Reservation Case No. 1, L.R.C. Civil Reservation Record No.
211), situated in the Res. Sec. "J", City of Baguio. Bounded on the NE., by property of Honor Kingdoms; on the SW.,
by Lot 2; on the W and NW., by Public land. ... containing an area of EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
AND FIFTY THREE (84,653) Square meters, more or less, ... in the names of spouses I tong Amistad and Luisa
Tengdan.
(2) (October 11, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Teodoro Mat-an the
remaining 42,326 square meters of the above-described parcel of land; and
(3) (December 23, 1965) execute a supplemental deed of sale over the entire area covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-105 in favor of vendees Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an which effected the issuance of two separate
titles in favor of said vendees
knowing fully well and purposely withholding the information that on or about February 10, 1962, he had previously
entered into an agreement with one MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to convey to her an area of 10,000 square meters
from the above-described parcel of land for the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and had already
received from her the sum of FIVE THOUSAND ( P5,000.00) PESOS, thereby causing damage and prejudice to said
Mercedes L. Javellana in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
All contrary to law.
After trial, decision was rendered dated February 8, 1971, and promulgated on March 18, 1971 acquitting the
accused, respondent herein, the Court holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil in nature" and that "the guilt of
the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt."
From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant, the petitioner herein, appealed to the Court of Appeals insofar as the
civil liability of the accused is concerned. Without awaiting the completion of the transcript of the stenographic notes
in the case, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal merely on the legal proposition that an appeal by the
complainant from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.
The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1971, is set forth in full as follows:
This refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in Criminal Case No. 4205,
wherein the accused Itong Amistad who was prosecuted for the crime of estafa paragraph 2, Article 316 R.P.C.), was
acquitted. The decision was promulgated on March 18, 1971 and on that same day, the complainant, through
counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal from said judgment, "insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned."
Apparently the appeal was approved by the trial court, the records of the case were elevated to this Court, and this
Court required the completion of the same.
Now, while the right of the offended party to intervene in the criminal action (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules) as well as
to appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the
appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is recognized, the offended party however, cannot appeal if the accused is
acquitted as matters are (People vs. Herrera 74 Phil. 21). indeed, the trial court in acquitting the herein defendant
stated:
In the mind of the court, the case of the prosecution is civil in nature. In fact, the supervening acts of the parties after
the execution of Exhibit A until the execution of Exhibit D are clear and unequivocal which ineluctably lead this court
to believe that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance would perforce require a new determination of defendant's
criminal liability. This cannot be done. Besides, the offended party has the remedy of bringing a civil action
independently of the criminal action.

Indeed, this question is not new. It has already been so ruled by the Supreme Court in several cases (People vs.
Flores, G.R. No. L-7523, December 18, 1957, citing People vs. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026; People vs. Benjamin Liggayu et
al., No. 8224, October 31, 1955; People vs. Joaquin Lipana 72 Phil. 166; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679 [decided
under the new Rules of Court]; Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575, 572).
Considering that the complainant is appealing from a judgment acquitting the accused in a criminal case, her appeal
should be disallowed.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed. The stenographers who were required to submit their
respective transcripts of stenographic notes in this case are hereby excused therefrom. (pp. 6-7, Brief for the
Respondent, p. 78, Rollo).
A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals was filed but was denied on January 4, 1972.
From both aforesaid Resolutions dismissing the appeal and the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the
petitioner came to this Court on a petition for certiorari with prayer that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals be
reversed, and that judgment be rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent insofar as the latter's hability is
concerned
(a) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such sum as this Court shall adjudge to rightfully represent the value of
the one hectare portion of the land involved agreed to be conveyed to petitioner by respondent in accordance with
the Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit "A");
(b) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the expenses of litigation actually incurred by the latter; and
(c) Ordering respondent to pay the costs of suit. (p.28, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset, is whether an appeal by the complainant for estafa,
may be allowed from a decision acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the latter's civil liability is
concerned.
In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated, petitioner cites Section 2, Rules 122 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Who may appeal.The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy. In all other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. (p. 12, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
Additionally, she cites Section 3 of Rule 111, from which she quotes the following:
SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.In all cases not included in the preceding section the following
rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who
may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. (Rule 111, Rules of
Court in the Philippines.) (pp. 13-14, Id)
Finally, she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which reads:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
due to that ground. (p. 14, id).
From the aforequoted provisions, petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly granted to her inasmuch
as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, Criminal Case No.
4205 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, there having been no reservation to file a separate civil
action or a waiver of the right to file one. She had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle, primarily the civil aspect
of the case, the prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and control of the prosecuting Fiscal. The
private prosecutor presented evidence bearing on the civil liability of the accused. In a memorandum he filed, he also
discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite which, the trial court failed to rule on the latter's civil
liability to the complainant.
It is this omission, as alleged by petitioner herein, that con constitutes the thrust of her first assignment of error, the
only one We feel called upon to rule on, among her three assigned errors, the other two having relation to how the
trial court evaluated the evidence, and the extent of damages petitioner alleges to be entitled to under such evidence,
which evidently may not be passed upon in the instant proceedings, the evidence presented during the trial not
having been elevated to this Court, nor even to the Court of Appeals, at least not fully or completely.
Confining ourselves, therefore, to the first assigned error, We find no ground to reverse the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals on the purely legal question of whether the petitioner, as complainant in Criminal Case No. 4025 of the Court
of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, for estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting the accused, because
the trial court failed to declare the latter's civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly proven by the evidence.

The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the institution of a separate
action by the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused as the defendant therein, may file the
appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal action,
notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or
waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil
actions. The obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain
admission as to the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability
involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or
waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and as held in People vs. Herrera, 74
Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense, such as from law or contract or
quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as expressly provided in Article 29 of the
Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant. Then, all the defenses
available, such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, complete with pre-trial after
issues have been joined. Upon these considerations, it becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the
rule against multiplicity of action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth.
In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have been cited which held that an appeal from the dismissal
of the criminal case on motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the offended party (People vs. Lipana 72 Phil. 168;
People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679). In the case of People vs. Herrera, et al., 74 Phil. 21, the accused was acquitted
without the court making any pronouncement as to his civil liability, in exactly the same manner that the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Criminal Case No. 4025, was charged with a similar omission in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court did not permit an appeal by the offended party, the Court saying:
The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the charge and did not make any
pronouncement holding the defendant civilly liable put an end to the case, not only by freeing the defendant from
criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all liability for damages arising from the alleged crime of malicious
mischief. The offended parties not having reserved their right to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of
acquittal covered both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107, section l (a) of the new Rules of
Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of First Instance, as intended by the offended parties, would reopen
the question of defendant's civil liability arising from the alleged crime. And considering that such civil liability must be
based on the criminal responsibility of the defendant (art. 100, Revised Penal Code), any review or re-examination of
the question of civil liability would perforce require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability. But another
trial upon defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be held, in view of his previous acquittal in the justice of the
peace court. So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace court is not authorized by law.
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought simultaneously with the criminal
action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall
together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not
based on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required.
The futility of petitioner's instant recourse becomes all too evident upon consideration of the principles enunciated,
particularly in the Herrera case, since if the civil liability recoverable in a criminal action is one arising from the crime
charged, no longer may the respondent be found criminally liable upon a review of the evidence, after the verdict of
acquittal has been handed down by the trial court. Again, petitioner tries to show that the cases cited by the Court of
Appeals are not in point. But she has not cited one single case faintly supporting her position as she has tried to
maintain in the instant case.
Nevertheless, petitioner may not complaint, as she does of being denied due process for disallowing her appeal. She
can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict or one arising
from law, contract or any other known source of civil liability, but certainly not anymore from the offense of which
petitioner had already been acquitted. It is but fair to require petitioner to take this course of action, not only because
she would have to pay for the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she seeks from respondent,
from which she is spared in the prosecution of a criminal case, but also for the respondent or defendant to avail of all
defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil action not otherwise available in a criminal action that
carries with it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover civil liability arising from the crime
charged.
For all the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is affirmed, and the instant petition is, accordingly, dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner,

vs.
EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated May 20, 20041 and September 28,
20042 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.
In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine National Bank Check
No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds.
Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. Following
the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to
which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor,
hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.4
By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and
dismissed the case. The prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration was denied.6
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect7 of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that the
dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to
prove respondents criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted the appeal
of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the amount of P1,875,000 with legal interest.8
Upon respondents motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of
the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case."9 Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied,
he elevated the case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition for the following reasons:
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition does not fully comply with Section
4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, because it does not give the assurance that the
allegations of the petition are true and correct based on authentic records.
2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the record, (i.e.,
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to evidence and the opposition thereto, and the Municipal [sic]
Trial Courts Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 294690) as would support the allegations of the petition (Sec. 2,
Rule 42, ibid.).
3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court attached to the petition is an uncertified and
illegible mere machine copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in the petition.10
In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons of the appellate court in dismissing his petition.
The manner of verification for pleadings which are required to be verified, such as a petition for review before the CA
of an appellate judgment of the RTC,11 is prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.12 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence, hence, he chose
to affirm in his petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are "true and correct of my own personal
knowledge,"13 and not on the basis of authentic documents.
On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be interpreted in a conjunctive sense and construed
to mean as "and," or vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants.

A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified under either of the two
given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either ones own
personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition "or" connotes that
either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is
more than sufficient.14 Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a
construction that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the alternatives
standing alone.15
Contrary to petitioners position, the range of permutation is not left to the pleaders liking, but is dependent on the
surrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on personal
knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources.
As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions wherein the
greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or the court
a quo, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not have
affirmed, based on his personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his petition16 before the CA that at the
pre-trial conference respondent admitted having received the letter of demand, because he (petitioner) was not
present during the conference.17 Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its veracity.
Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere
expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath 18 to secure
an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not
merely speculative.19
This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of verification and certification and enunciating that obedience
to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if fair results are to be expected therefrom. Utter disregard of the
rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.20 While the requirement is not
jurisdictional in nature, it does not make it less a rule. A relaxed application of the rule can only be justified by the
attending circumstances of the case.21
To sustain petitioners explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple preference would trivialize the
rationale and diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in providing enough
assurance of the correctness of the allegations.
On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition that the petition was not accompanied by copies of
certain pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition (i.e., Motion
for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition thereto, and the MeTC February
27, 2003 Order dismissing the case) petitioner contends that these documents are immaterial to his appeal.
Contrary to petitioners contention, however, the materiality of those documents is very apparent since the civil aspect
of the case, from which he is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the same Demurrer.
Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to the CA copies of the enumerated documents, save
for the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order, as attachments to his Motion for Reconsideration.
The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies
of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court."22
A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that the only duplicate original or certified true copies attached as
annexes thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order granting respondents Motion for Reconsideration and the
March 29, 2004 RTC Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The copy of the September 11, 2003
RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner
later recompensed though by appending to his Motion for Reconsideration a duplicate original copy.
While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for Reconsideration that the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was
already attached to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G" bares a replicate copy of a different order, however. It was to
this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his
Reply to respondents Comment.
This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC Order, that dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner attached
to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true.
Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with respect to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner was
mandated to submit them in the required form.23
In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of which is discernible
thereunder and is well settled.24 He has not, however, advanced any strong compelling reasons to warrant a
relaxation of the Rules, hence, his petition before the CA was correctly dismissed.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined
to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules,
this we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be

prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.25
(Emphasis supplied)
As to the third reason for the appellate courts dismissal of his petition failure to implead the People of the
Philippines as a party in the petition indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no moment, he having appealed
only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court ruled:
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for
the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a
criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The
second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the
defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)
It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent.27 As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal
of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting
the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in
interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. 28
Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.29 At that
juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.30
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not
waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any.31
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.32
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.33
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the
court denies the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a
disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court
may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect,
for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same
evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not
follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the
demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an
acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case
must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.36
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing
the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however, that the
payments made by respondent pertained to other transactions.37 Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a
remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the
same.
Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when
the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33,38 and (2) when respondent orally
opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case
continue.
Petitioners position is tenuous.

Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect.1awphi1.net Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court
necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve.
One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the
initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.39
As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the records the
nature of the alleged oral objections of respondent to petitioners motion for reconsideration of the grant of the
demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in
the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon,40 hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against
it.41
This Court therefore upholds respondents right to present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of court to file
the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED
to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the
civil aspect of the case.
Costs against petitioner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas'
civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People
v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the
lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2
which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed
therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability
as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it
final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore
transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such
that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard,
the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no
hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan
well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by
final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that
"there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same
view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind
Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment
has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against
him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the
civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll,
68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be
enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil
aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in
a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs.
Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would
remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of
the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison
was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing
People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and
Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court
was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by
his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the administratorappellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled
therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil
action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does
not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and
second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while
the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of
his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose
death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of
the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated
differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of law.
In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his
conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively
dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction
despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express
waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil
liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De
la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,
October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if
no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of
the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names
and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed

judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other
words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the
criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to
revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the
criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there
a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his
death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that
no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence
and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action
despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives
upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because
whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused
while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability
ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under
Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and
separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such
cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it
will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the
civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the
offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil
liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability,
there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished

inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of
July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type
involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant
dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification
for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is
there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly
be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate
of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule
86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What
are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while
the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section
5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied.
It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be
no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased
accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged
but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury
to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17
of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons
thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for
money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to
purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be
filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment

terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability
is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) and
Rolito Calang, to challenge our Resolution of February 17, 2010. Our assailed Resolution denied the petition for
review on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error sufficient to warrant the exercise of this Courts
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Antecedent Facts
At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by Philtranco along
Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when its rear left side hit the front left portion
of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeeps
driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing along the
highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from the point of
impact. Two of the jeeps passengers, Armando Nablo and an unidentified woman, were instantly killed, while the
other passengers sustained serious physical injuries.
The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Calbayog City. The RTC, in its decision
dated May 21, 2001, found Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
thirty days of arresto menor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The
RTC ordered Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of
Armando; P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and P90,083.93 as actual damages to the
private complainants.
The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 25522. The
CA, in its decision dated November 20, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA ruled that petitioner Calang
failed to exercise due care and precaution in driving the Philtranco bus. According to the CA, various eyewitnesses
testified that the bus was traveling fast and encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a pushcart that was on
the side of the road. In addition, he failed to slacken his speed, despite admitting that he had already seen the jeep
coming from the opposite direction when it was still half a kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang
demonstrated a reckless attitude when he drove the bus, despite knowing that it was suffering from loose
compression, hence, not roadworthy.
The CA added that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and severally liable with petitioner Calang, for failing to
prove that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the accident.

The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In our Resolution dated February 17, 2010, we
denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed decision to warrant the exercise
of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
The Motion for Reconsideration
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that there was no basis to hold Philtranco jointly and
severally liable with Calang because the former was not a party in the criminal case (for multiple homicide with
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence) before the RTC.
The petitioners likewise maintain that the courts below overlooked several relevant facts, supported by documentary
exhibits, which, if considered, would have shown that Calang was not negligent, such as the affidavit and testimony of
witness Celestina Cabriga; the testimony of witness Rodrigo Bocaycay; the traffic accident sketch and report; and the
jeepneys registration receipt. The petitioners also insist that the jeeps driver had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision.
We partly grant the motion.
Liability of Calang
We see no reason to overturn the lower courts finding on Calangs culpability. The finding of negligence on his part
by the trial court, affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact that we cannot pass upon without going into factual matters
touching on the finding of negligence. In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are
devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
Liability of Philtranco
We, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang.
We emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in
this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 21761 and 21802 of the Civil
Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an
employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
If at all, Philtrancos liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil
liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or
some general or special police regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees.1avvphil
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices,
or employees in the discharge of their duties.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written into the
judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.3 Nonetheless, before the employers subsidiary
liability is enforced, adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The
determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal
and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of
the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.4
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the present motion. The Court of Appeals decision that affirmed in toto the RTC
decision, finding Rolito Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide,
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Philtrancos
liability should only be subsidiary. No costs.
SO ORDERED.