Higher Education Policy An International Comparative Perspective

ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Series Editor: GUY NEAVE, International Association of Universities, Paris, France

Editorial
Advisory
Board:
JOSE JOAQUIM BRUNNER, Director, FLASCO (Latin American Faculty for Social
Sciences), Santiago, Chile
BURTON R CLARK, Graduate School of Education, University of Los Angeles,
USA
DAN LEVY, Public Administration and Social Policy, State University of New York,
Albany, USA
LYNN MEEK, Department of Public Administration and Studies in Higher Education,
University of New England Armidale, New South Wales, Australia
HASSAN MEKOUAR, University Mohammed II, Morocco
KETI MSHIGENI, The Graduate School, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania
GUY NEAVE, International Association of Universities, Paris, France
AGILAKPA SAWYERR, African Association of Universities, Accra, Ghana
ULRICH TEICHLER, Director of the Research Centre for Higher Education and
the Local Market, University of Kassel, Germany
MORIKAZU USHIOGI, Department of Higher Education, Nagoya University, Japan
FRANS VAN VUGHT, Center for Higher Education Policy Studies, University of
Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
FANG MIN WEI, Institute of Higher Education at Beijing University, The People's
Republic of China
Other titles in the series include

NEAVE & VAN VUGHT
Government and Higher Education Relationships Across Three Continents: The
Winds of Change
YEE
East Asian Higher Education: Traditions and Transformations
Higher Education Policy

An International Comparative Perspective
Edited by
Leo Goedegebuure
Frans Kaiser
Peter Maassen
Lynn Meek
Frans van Vught
Egbert de Weert
Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS),
University of Twente, The Netherlands
Iff
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First published in the German language as Hochschulpolitik im
international Vergleich by the Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers,
Gtersloh, 1993. ISBN 3-89204-080-X
Copyright 1993 Bertelsmann Foundation, Gtersloh
English language edition 1993
ISBN 0 08 0423930 H
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Applied for.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

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Printed by Redwood Books, Trowbridge,
Wiltshire
Introduction to Issues in Higher Education
For the past q u a r t e r century, higher education has been high on the agenda
of governments and central to the fortune of nations. Similarly, this same
period has seen quite massive changes in direction, in the complexity of
systems, in the underlying rationale which has accompanied such changes
and in the sheer size of the enterprise in terms of students, staff and
budgets, not to mention social and economic purpose. It is not surprising
then that the study of higher education itself has b r o a d e n e d and now
encompasses some 20 different disciplines, ranging from Anthropology
through to W o m e n ' s Studies, each with its own particular paradigms,
methodologies and perspectives.
Against this background, the comparative analysis of higher education
policy which has always occupied a crucial place in understanding the
contextual setting of reform in individual countries, has acquired a new
significance as the pace of 'internationalization' itself quickens. T h e r e are
many reasons why this should be so: the creation of new economic blocs
and, in the case of E u r o p e , the gradual emergence of a trans-national policy
for higher education across the E C countries; the triumph of one industrial
ethic and the collapse of another, the rise of new economies in Asia etc.
T h e b r e a k d o w n of a seemingly established order has ushered in a renewed
interest in other models of higher education and in how other nations are
going about tackling often similar issues though in different ways.
This series has the purpose of examining issues and testing theories in
the field of higher education policy which are of current and practical
concern to its main constituencies national and institutional leadership,
administrators, teachers, those researching in this domain and students. A s
a series, it will focus on both advanced industrial and also on developing
systems of higher education.
Issues in Higher Education will be resolutely comparative in its approach
and will actively encourage original studies which are firmly based around an
international perspective. Individual volumes will be based on a minimum of
two different countries so as to bring out the variations occuring in a given
vi
Introduction to Issues in Higher Education
problmatique. Every encouragement will b e given to t h e drawing of clear

and explicit comparisons between the higher education systems covered.
A s t h e series editor, I wish t o t h a n k t h e m e m b e r s of the Editorial Advisory
B o a r d for their part in developing this series. They a r e :
Jose Joaquim Brunner, FLACSO
(Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences), Santiago, Chile
Burton R. Clark, Emeritus Professor,
Graduate School of
Education,
University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Dan Levy, Public Administration
and Social Policy. State University of New
York, Albany,
USA
Lynn Meek, Department of Public Administration
and Studies in Higher
Education, University of New England,
Australia
Hassan Mekouar, University Mohammed II, Morocco
Keto Mshigeni, University of Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania
Agilakpa Sawyerr, African Association of Universities, Accra,
Ghana
Ulrich Teichler, Research Centre for Higher Education and the Labour
Market, Universitt Kassel,
Germany
Morikazu Ushiogi, Department of Higher Education, Nagoya
University,
Japan
Frans van Vught, Center for Higher Education Policy Studies, University of
Twente, The Netherlands
Fang Min Wei, Institute of Higher Education at Beijing University,
The
People's Republic of China
GUY NEAVE
International Association of Universities
Paris, France
Foreword
T h e quality of education and higher education in industrial nations

today is m o r e important than ever before: it increasingly determines a
society's evolution potential, and, in economic terms, affects international
competitiveness and choice of industrial location. Since the early 1980s, a
debate on higher education reforms has re-emerged throughout the whole
of Western E u r o p e , and now, in the early 1990s, the higher education
systems of many Western countries are passing through a transitional
phase. C o m p a r e d to many other countries, the structure of higher education
institutions in G e r m a n y has proved relatively inflexible, and the problems
confronting G e r m a n higher education, both in terms of quantity and quality,
have come to a head in recent years. T h e quality of research and teaching
has been directly affected by cuts in public funding and constant increases in
student n u m b e r s , whilst high drop out rates and lengthy periods of study have
taken their toll in terms of social costs. T h e organizational and administrative
structures of the higher education institutions themselves have failed to
modernize, and this is certainly o n e reason why the performance of such
institutions is now called into question.
Structural improvement and evolution can only be achieved through a
fundamental reappraisal of state higher education policy and a reform of
the institutions. O n e of the foremost goals of higher education policy must
be to enable these institutions to react appropriately to social change and
development. In most countries, this will m e a n radical changes in structure,
the promotion of greater competitiveness and performance orientation at all
levels of the higher education sector, and clearly defined policy goals. A s far
as the institutions themselves are concerned, a high degree of autonomy and
responsibility is required, along with m o d e r n administrative structures and
professional m a n a g e m e n t .
A s part of its activities, the Bertelsmann Foundation has been working
for years to develop organizational concepts and m a n a g e m e n t instruments
for the public sector, including higher education, with a view to increasing
efficiency and improving performance. T h e Carl Bertelsmann Prize of 1990,
vii
viii
Foreword
"Evolution in Higher E d u c a t i o n " (Bertelsmann F o u n d a t i o n , 1990), demonstrated that such improvement is not always simply a question of coming
u p with entirely new solutions, but that there is a learning process to be
engaged in, i.e., a critical assessment of those concepts and strategies
which have proved successful in other countries, and, if a p p r o p r i a t e , the
implementation of these in a modified form ( M o h n , 1991; E m p t e r , 1991).
It was against this background that the Bertelsmann Foundation initiated
the project " H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n Policy in I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m p a r a t i v e
P e r s p e c t i v e " in 1991. By comparing G e r m a n higher education policy
with the relevant approaches, concepts, and instruments applied in other
countries, the study set out to illustrate the potential of higher education
policy, to look at the effects of such policy on the effectiveness of the
institutions involved, and to find appropriate solutions to the problems of
achieving efficient cooperation between the state, the intermediary bodies,
and the institutions themselves. F u r t h e r m o r e , the study sought to draw
public attention within G e r m a n y to a reform process that is long overdue.
T h e comparative analysis of 11 higher education systems was carried
out by the renowned Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS)
at the University of T w e n t e , T h e N e t h e r l a n d s , under the direction of
Professor Frans van Vught. T h e project t e a m was supported by an advisory
board under the chairmanship of R e i n h a r d M o h n , with the following
m e m b e r s : Professor Sir H e r m a n n Bondi (University of C a m b r i d g e , U K ) ,
Professor Karl G r o t e m e y e r (former Rector of the University of Bielefeld,
G e r m a n y ) , Professor Gisbert Freiherr zu Putlitz (University of Heidelberg,
G e r m a n y ) , D r K o n r a d Schily (President of the Private University of
W i t t e n - H e r d e c k e , G e r m a n y ) , Professor Hinrich Seidel (President of the
University of H a n o v e r , G e r m a n y , and of the Standing Conference of
Rectors, Presidents and Vice-Chancellors, G e n e v a ) , D r G e r h a r d Selmayr
(Chancellor of the University of Karlsruhe, G e r m a n y ) , Professor Dieter
Simon (former Chairman of the Wissenschaftsrat, Cologne, G e r m a n y ) , and
Professor Frans van Vught (Director of CHEPS, Universiy of T w e n t e , T h e
Netherlands). In close dialogue with the b o a r d and with experts in the
countries concerned, the researchers of CHEPS u n d e r t o o k a comparative
analysis of the principles, structure, implementation, and tendencies of
higher education policy in the 11 countries, while at the same time accessing
its successes and shortcomings.
T h e results of the study became available in J u n e 1992. After thorough
discussion in workshops with both the national experts and the board
m e m b e r s , the results were finally presented to representatives of G e r m a n
higher education policy at a symposium in Bielefeld in N o v e m b e r 1992.
T h e individual national reports and assessments a p p e a r e d in G e r m a n
in two publications issued by the Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers
( G o e d e g e b u u r e et al., 1992, 1993).
W e are delighted that Pergamon Press has decided to include the final
Foreword
ix
project report in its catalogue, making it accessible to higher education

specialists and political decision-makers further afield. It is certainly our
belief that this international comparison will provide stimuli for higher
education policy in other countries t o o , and we h o p e it will contribute to
the evolution of higher education worldwide.
W e want to express our gratitude to all m e m b e r s of the D u t c h project
t e a m , L e o G o e d e g e b u u r e , Frans Kaiser, and Egbert de W e e r t , together
with their Australian colleague Lynn M e e k and especially to the two
project h e a d s , Professor Frans van Vught and Peter Maassen, for their close
collaboration which extended beyond the immediate concerns of the project.
Special thanks are due to the national experts, who contributed significantly
to the success of the study with their willingness to report and engage
in dialogue: Professor A k i r a A r i m o t o (Hiroshima, J a p a n ) , Poul Bache
( C o p e n h a g e n , D e n m a r k ) , John Brennan (London, U K ) , D r Warren Fox
(Sacramento, California, U S A ) , D r Edgar Frackmann (Hanover, Germany),
D r Glen Jones (Toronto, Ontario, C a n a d a ) , Professor G u y Neave (Paris,
F r a n c e ) , D r G r a n Svanfeldt (Stockholm, Sweden), and Professor Karl
W e b e r (Bern, Switzerland).
Reinhard Mohn,
Chairman of the B o a r d ,
Bertelsmann Foundation.
D r Stefan E m p t e r ,
Director,
"Economics and Sociopolitics",
Bertelsmann Foundation.
Acknowledgements
T h e C e n t e r for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) was established at

the University of T w e n t e , E n s c h e d e , T h e N e t h e r l a n d s , in 1984 as a research
center focusing on policy issues in higher education. A t that time higher
education policy was not a popular object of research in E u r o p e . Only a few
researchers, mainly located in G r e a t Britain and Sweden, had specialized
in studying macro- and meso-level questions in higher education. Studying
higher education as a social system was mainly the domain of educational
scientists interested in the process of teaching and learning.
During the last decade the interest in higher education policy has grown
substantially. Everywhere in the industrialized world, higher education has
developed into an important and huge enterprise. It has b e c o m e a mass
activity touching upon the lives of m o r e and m o r e citizens, leading, amongst
other things, to a growing interest in and concern about the way it is
steered and regulated. A s a consequence, especially in E u r o p e , research
on this subject increasingly also is d o n e from disciplinary perspectives like
economics, political science, business administration, public administration
and policy analysis, and sociology. T h e CHEPS research p r o g r a m m e is one
of the m o r e prominent examples of this trend.
In this b o o k the results of o n e of the CHEPS research projects are presented.
It concerns a comparative research project on higher education policy
u n d e r t a k e n in the period S e p t e m b e r 1991-July 1992, the first phase of a
p r o g r a m m e initiated and funded by the G e r m a n Bertelsmann Foundation.
T h e main goal of this p r o g r a m m e was to gather information that could
be used to influence the public d e b a t e on higher education in G e r m a n y .
H o w e v e r , in the underlying project the situation in higher education neither
in G e r m a n y , nor in any o t h e r country, was used as the framework of
reference. Instead we developed a general conceptual framework, discussed
in C h a p t e r 1, for the analysis of the trends and issues to be observed in a
n u m b e r of countries. T h e 11 countries involved in the study were selected on
the basis of a thorough analysis of the relevant higher education literature,
and through discussions with a n u m b e r of experts on higher education
xi
xii
Acknowledgements
around the world and with the Bertelsmann Foundation staff. T h e final
selection, i.e., Australia, Canada ( O n t a r i o ) , D e n m a r k , F r a n c e , G e r m a n y ,
J a p a n , T h e Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, U K , and U S A (California),
can be regarded as a group of countries that, for various reasons, were
perceived to be exemplary for the developments as regards higher education
policy all around the industrialized world.
In a comparative project it is often tempting for researchers to rely on
existing literature, relevant documents, and "general k n o w l e d g e . " T h e
a d v a n t a g e of such an a p p r o a c h is t h e saving of cost and t i m e ; the
disadvantage of course is the danger of a poor accuracy of analyses and
conclusions. Therefore, we have chosen to use national experts on higher
education for all countries involved. W e have tapped their knowledge by
sending them a questionnaire they had to use to draft a country report. T h e
questionnaire consisted of four parts, i.e.: (1) higher education structure;
(2) authority distribution in higher education; (3) higher education policy;
and (4) the impact of structure, authority, and policy on the functioning of
the higher education system. T h e use of this questionnaire assured that the
draft country reports had comparable structures. T h e CHEPS research team
streamlined all the reports received into the 11 country chapters you will
find in this book. All the reports and other relevant literature available form
the basis for the overall analysis of trends and issues in higher education
policy presented in Chapter 13. Although this analysis was discussed with
the national experts and the Bertelsmann Foundation staff, the presented
interpretations and conclusions represent entirely the view of the authors
of Chapter 13.
It has to be stressed that higher education policy is not a static p h e n o m e n o n
it is as dynamic as the society of which a higher education system is
part. A s a consequence any attempt to analyze policies provides at best an
adequate picture at a given m o m e n t in time. During the time lag between
writing the final version of the analysis and having it published, policies can
be adapted and new strategies can be introduced. This has h a p p e n e d also
in our project. Recently new developments have occurred, for example,
in D e n m a r k , T h e Netherlands, O n t a r i o , and Sweden, that could not be
included in this book. Nevertheless we are confident that this b o o k is not
only of interest for the picture it provides, but also for the way concepts like
diversity, steering, a u t o n o m y , and regulation have been used to analyze the
trends and issues in higher education policy. W e would like to argue that the
way we have applied these concepts can be helpful in any higher education
system for interpreting policy developments at a certain m o m e n t in time.
A s a result the book is not only relevant for the 11 countries involved,
but for any higher education system in which the main stakeholders try to
understand and influence higher education policy.
Without the Bertelsmann Foundation the study would not have taken
place. W e are very grateful for the stimulating and professional way in which
Acknowledgements
xiii
Reinhard M o h n , chairman of the B o a r d of the Bertelsmann Foundation and

Stefan E m p t e r , Director of the section "Economics and Sociopolitics" of
the F o u n d a t i o n , have not only taken the initiative for this study but also
provided valuable input during the study.
Absolutely essential in writing the b o o k w e r e , of course, the contributions
from the national experts Akira A r i m o t o , Poul Bache, John B r e n n a n ,
W a r r e n Fox, E d g a r F r a c k m a n n , Glen J o n e s , Guy N e a v e , Tarla Shah,
G o r a n Svanfeldt, and Karl W e b e r . They have already been t h a n k e d in
the foreword of this book by the Bertelsmann Foundation. W e also
want to express our gratitude for their comments on and suggestions
for the questionnaire, their efforts in producing the country reports, their
participation in the discussions in Enschede on 11 J u n e 1992, and their
recommendations as regards the final versions of the country chapters.
W e are indebted to Di Davies for proof reading the entire draft of this
b o o k ; a formidable task in itself.
Finally we want to thank the CHEPS secretariat. A s always Agnes Nieuwenhuis
and Karin van der Tuin supported us very professionally in our attempts to
turn the large amounts of information into a readable manuscript.
Leo G o e d e g e b u u r e
Frans Kaiser
Peter Maassen
Lynn M e e k
Frans van Vught
Egbert de W e e r t
Enschede
September 1993
List of Contributors
Arimoto, ., Professor, Director, Research Institute for Higher Education
( R I H E ) , Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, J a p a n .
Bache, P., H e a d of Division, D e p a r t m e n t of Higher Education, Ministry of
Education and Research, C o p e n h a g e n , D e n m a r k .
B r e n n a n , J . , H e a d , Quality Support Centre ( Q S C ) , T h e O p e n University,
L o n d o n , United Kingdom,
de Weert, E., Research Associate, C e n t e r for Higher Education Policy
Studies ( C H E P S ) , University of T w e n t e , E n s c h e d e , T h e Netherlands.
Fox, W . H . , Executive Director, California Postsecondary Education Commission, Sacramento, California, United States of America.
Frackman, E., H e a d of Department, Hochschul-Informations-System (HIS),
Hanover, Germany.
Goedegebuure, L . C. J . , Senior Research Associate, Center for Higher
Education Policy Studies ( C H E P S ) , University of T w e n t e , E n s c h e d e ,
T h e Netherlands.
Jones, G. ., Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, Brock University,
Ontario, Canada.
Kaiser, F . , Research Associate, C e n t e r for Higher Education Policy Studies
( C H E P S ) , University of T w e n t e , E n s c h e d e , T h e Netherlands.
Maassen, P. A. M . , Associate Director, C e n t e r for Higher Education Policy
Meek, V. L . , Associate Professor, D e p a r t m e n t of Administrative, Higher
and Adult Education Studies ( D A H A E S ) , University of New England,
A r m i d a l e , Australia.
Neave, G., Professor, Director of Research, International Association of
Universities, Paris, France.
Shah, T., Staff M e m b e r , Quality Support C e n t r e ( Q S C ) , T h e O p e n University, L o n d o n , U n i t e d Kingdom.
Svanfeldt, G., Researcher, Ministry of Education and Science, Stockholm,
Sweden.
van Vught, F . ., Professor, Director, C e n t e r for Higher Education Policy
W e b e r , K., Professor, Continuing Education D e p a r t m e n t , University of
Bern, B e r n , Switzerland.
xvii
1
Higher Education Policy in International
Perspective: An Overview
LEO GOEDEGEBUURE, FRANS KAISER, PETER MAASSEN,
and EGBERT DE WEERT
Introduction
In many countries the structure and funding basis of higher education are
undergoing t r e m e n d o u s changes. M e t h o d s for administering and directing
higher education are being transformed and individual universities and
colleges are being asked to engage in new tasks and assume new responsibilities.
G o v e r n m e n t s are simultaneously devolving m o r e control over p r o g r a m m e s
and budgets to individual institutions while directly intervening in higher
education systems in order to ensure greater economic efficiency, quality of
o u t c o m e , student access and accountability the magic words of m o d e r n
day higher education policy-making. In this respect, an international trend
can be observed in the changing relationship between the government and
higher education, namely:
the trend for national governments to retain the prerogative to set broad policies,
particularly budgetary ones, while increasingly transferring the responsibility for
growth, innovation, and diversification in higher education to individual institutions.
A t the same time, however, it should be noted that change perceived

in the above m a n n e r is not an integral feature of all higher education
systems. T h e r e also exists a n u m b e r of countries that throughout the
last decades either have shown a remarkable stability in terms of their
structural arrangements and coordination strategies or have experienced
changes in another direction than the one mentioned above. In the present
volume examples of systems undergoing fundamental and radical change as
well as those portraying very stable characteristics are included. Through
this selection, an attempt is m a d e to identify and analyze the principles,
1
L. C. J. Goedegebuure et al.
structural features and modes of work of the different higher education

policies operating in these countries as well as their commonalities and
differences in the light of both general international trends and countryspecific factors.
This book is the result of a research project u n d e r t a k e n by the Dutch
Center for H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n Policy Studies (CHEPS) for t h e G e r m a n
B e r t e l s m a n n Foundation. In this project the most important principles,
structural features, and functionalities of higher education policies in
11 countries have been analyzed. T h e selected countries are: Australia,
C a n a d a (the province of O n t a r i o ) , D e n m a r k , F r a n c e , G e r m a n y , J a p a n , the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States of America (the state of California).
In order to gather the relevant information for the project, for each
country a national correspondent has been provided with a questionnaire
to guide his work and to ensure maximum comparability of the resulting
reports. This questionnaire has been constructed by CHEPS on the basis of a
n u m b e r of crucial concepts, theoretical notions, and structural characteristics
that feature predominantly in the study. These will be elaborated upon in
the next section and form the core of the country-specific descriptions and
analyses to be presented in Chapters 2-12. In the final chapter, the different
strands will be brought together in an attempt to identify the major trends in
higher education policy as they evolve from an international perspective.
Guiding Concepts and Theoretical Notions

Developments in higher education in general and in higher education
policy in particular can be analyzed from a multitude of perspectives. A
quick glance through the existing literature suffices to affirm this statement.
Since there are many different ways of looking at higher education policy,
it becomes of primary importance to locate an international comparative
project within an overarching framework in order to curb individual
hobby horses and maximize comparability of outcomes of the constituent
parts. T h e framework underlying this study on higher education policy in
an international perspective has been constructed by combining the key
elements formulated in the project remit of the Bertelsmann Foundation
and elements that have featured prominently, and proven viable, in prior
work u n d e r t a k e n by CHEPS in the area of comparative higher education policy
research. Using this framework, in this chapter the concepts of regulation
and control, autonomy and academic freedom, federalism, and intermediary
bodies will be discussed. Through this discussion the guiding principles for
b o t h the national reports and the synthesizing comparative analysis will be
highlighted.
Higher Education Policy in International Perspective
Regulation,
steering, and control in higher
education
During the past decades, the d e b a t e has intensified as to how the public
sector in m o d e r n democracies should be regulated. In general, regulation
refers to attempts to influence the decisions and actions of individuals or
organizations according to certain objectives, using certain instruments, and
as such is closely connected to issues of power and control. It can be defined
as "the intentional restriction of a subject's choice of activity, by an entity
not directly party to or involved in that activity" (Mitnick, 1980: 5). A n d
along these lines, government regulation in particular can be described as
"the efforts of government to steer the decisions and actions of specific
societal actors according to the objectives the government has set and by
using instruments the government has at its disposal" (Van Vught, 1989:
21). A s higher education in every country is part of the public sector
notwithstanding the fact that in a n u m b e r of countries a substantial private
sector exists alongside the public sector the debate on regulation and
control has also b e c o m e an issue h e r e . Questions that are increasingly
posed with varying degrees of v e h e m e n c e are the ones concerning the
legitimate concerns of government with higher education, the extent to which
government regulation threatens to lessen the vital functions of teaching and
research in higher education, and the way in which governmental pressures
force higher education to develop "managerial modes of o p e r a t i o n " and
"business-like behavior". D e p e n d i n g on the value-position taken by those
involved in the debate on steering and control, these kinds of questions
may be interpreted as a gross misunderstanding of the basic characteristics
of higher education, and thus seen as a full fledged attack on academia, or
they may be a sign of a changing role and function of higher education in
a society that m o r e and m o r e seems to rely on an increasingly large group
of highly trained professionals n e e d e d for economic growth and welfare. It
is not the intention of the present comparative project on higher education
policy to incorporate value judgements in the above m a n n e r . Nevertheless,
their "existence a contrario" highlights the importance of the issue of
steering (or coordination) and control in relation to the basic objectives
and functions of higher education an importance that is reflected in the
increasing attention these issues receive in the higher education literature
(e.g., Becher and Kogan, 1991; Clark, 1983; L a n e , 1990; Maassen and V a n
Vught, 1989; M e e k and G o e d e g e b u u r e , 1991; Neave and V a n Vught, 1991;
Premfors, 1984; Van Vught, 1989; W a t s o n , 1987).
T h e r e are many ways to observe and analyze issues of steering and control,
and thus an array of key factors, instruments, and actors could be identified
if o n e were interested. H o w e v e r , leaving the many idiosyncratic approaches
aside, there also appears to exist an overarching paradigm. Central to the
analysis and understanding of the coordination mechanisms that o p e r a t e
within higher education systems, appears to be the notion that such a
mechanism is the result of the interplay between various forces, interests,

or actors. For the present study, this interplay between different forces
that o p e r a t e within a particular higher education system is one of the key
notions for description and analysis. A s such, it is m o r e or less irrelevant
whether these forces should be approached from a quadrilateral, triangular
or diamond-shaped figure (viz. Becher and K o g a n , 1991; Clark, 1983;
N e a v e , 1991). T h e exact n u m b e r of forces might well be a matter of
country-specific factors; what is important, however, is the concept of
several forces pushing and pulling the system, through mutual interaction,
in a particular direction. For simplicity's sake, it can be useful to take
the typology developed by Clark (1983) as a point of d e p a r t u r e . In his
initial argument, Clark distinguishes between state authority, m a r k e t , and
academic oligarchy as the forces that d e t e r m i n e , through their interaction,
the way in which a higher education system is coordinated. H e combined
these forces in a figure called the triangle of coordination. Each corner of the
triangle represents the extreme of one form and a minimum of the other two.
Locations within the triangle represent combinations of the three elements in
different degrees (Clark, 1983: 136-181). It is interesting to see where Clark
located some of the countries included in the current project (Figure 1).
T h e position of the countries mentioned by Clark (1983) has, of course,
to be reconsidered in the light of recent developments. If at the m o m e n t
the locations for the countries involved in the comparative study were to be
determined within this triangle, a completely new picture would e m e r g e , as
is argued in some of the subsequent chapters. Before addressing the issue of
change, however, it is useful to spend a little m o r e time on the identification
State authority
Market
Academic oligarchy
Figure 1: Selected countries in the triangle of coordination.
and definition of the 'push and pull factors' that together constitute the
coordination paradigm of a particular higher education system.
Governments,
markets and
academia
In every higher education system, governments play a certain role

in shaping and coordinating the system. T h e actual involvement of a
government in higher education, however, can vary substantially. A s
extreme forms of a government's role, a distinction can be m a d e between
what has been called the "facilitatory s t a t e " and the "interventionary s t a t e "
(Neave and V a n Vught, 1991). T h e concept of the facilitatory state refers to
a government underwriting higher education as an opportunity for those duly
qualified to have access to higher learning, without actually directing policies
at the heart of academia: patterns of participation, internal governance,
academic p r o g r a m development and authority. T h e interventionary state
on the o t h e r h a n d refers to a government actively involved in attempts to
influence such dimensions as the nature of student output (e.g., an increase
in technological graduates), the internal affairs of the institution (improving
efficiency), and the relationship b e t w e e n an institution and its environment
(closer links with industry) (Neave and V a n Vught, 1991: xi-xii).
A l t h o u g h t h e role and n a t u r e of government influence over higher
education is something that can be relatively easily identified, this does
not p r e d e t e r m i n e the overall nature of steering and control. Absence of
direct government influence tells us very little of what then are the factors
and forces that coordinate the system: academia, buffers, the m a r k e t ? In
addressing this issue, let us focus on the often used but nevertheless difficult
concept of the m a r k e t . T h e first point to be m a d e is that we must concede to
the fact that " t h e " m a r k e t does not exist with respect to higher education,
neither as a p u r e form of coordination, nor as a unitary p h e n o m e n o n . With
respect to the first, pure markets are m o r e a theoretical construct than an
empirical reality. Even in those instances where m a r k e t s a p p e a r to exist,
there is always an element of public or government control over t h e m ,
for example through anti-trust and merger policies set u p to counteract
possible negative effects of a certain m a r k e t , such as monopoly power.
Higher education is n o exception to this, and quite possibly is even a case
for the argument that in fact it would be better to speak of "market-like"
behavior and the existence of quasi-market structures. Because, even if we
distinguish between different types of markets e.g., consumer m a r k e t s ,
labor m a r k e t s , and institutional markets (Lindblom, 1977) these are but
an approximation of actual m a r k e t s . T h e nature of the primary processes
of higher education (teaching and research), its positive external effects,
and the fact that it can b e considered a (quasi) collective good, are
such that the price mechanism will not work. This, in turn, implies
support of the good through the budget mechanism, and thus a certain
a m o u n t of government influence and control. Even within the American
higher education system, often used as an example of a higher education
market system, the government still plays a prominent role in, at least,
the public part of higher education. A s has been noted by Kerr (1963:
18): " T h e m a r k e t economy reputation and our public attitudes may be
quite misleading . . . Higher education in our country is often subject to
controls not that much different than those found in E u r o p e . " This view
was restated almost 30 years later by B i r n b a u m :
If autonomy is in many ways a reality in the private sector, it remains an institutionally
desired but unachieved myth in much of the public sector. In both sectors, the
Golden Rule of institutional finance and governance prevails: Those who have the
gold, rule. The saving grace is that while state steering mechanisms can sometimes
be highly intrusive into institutional affairs, the higher education policies of most state
governments appear focused primarily on fiscal accountability rather than ideology or
social policy. (Birnbaum, 1991: 137).
In general, therefore, the concept of m a r k e t s in higher education is

best addressed by focusing on the extent to which market-like elements,
most prominently competition, are part of the overall workings of the
higher education system. These elements can be approached by using the
different conceptualizations of markets mentioned above, or, in a different
terminology, by looking at the different actors involved. Examples could be
the role of students in the system (the extent to which students compete for
places and the way in which institutional or national selection mechanisms
influence their decisions; the extent to which institutions compete for
students because of their relationship within the funding mechanism); the
role of research (the extent to which research grants are allocated on a
competitive basis; the extent to which contract research is e m b e d d e d in
the system); and the role of inter-institutional competition (the extent to
which formal or informal hierarchies are a part of the system). T h e notion
of segmented m a r k e t s or market-like structures has also been identified by
Becher and Kogan, who claim a double meaning for it with respect to higher
education:
In the first meaning, basic units and individuals have services to sell: short courses,
consultancy and research, market-related degree programmes and the like. Money
might also be earned by recruiting more students . . . A secondary sense is that in
which reputation is the currency operating in a non-monetary market. It is generated
by good performance and may be transmuted into real resources because it is those
with good reputations who get the most resources and the best jobs (Becher and
Kogan, 1991: 171).
A n inventory and assessment of these kinds of elements the production

of which was a major purpose of the study presented in this book can
inform us of the influence of market-like structures in the steering and
control of a particular higher education system.
A s the third force in the steering process, academia itself can be a
powerful entity. A s Clark notes, "academics have also transmuted local

authority into national power in many systems, with national academics
thereby becoming worthy o p p o n e n t s of bureaucrats and politicians in putting
hands on the levers of decision" (Clark, 1983: 158-159). A l t h o u g h not the
only means of substantial academic influence, the intermediate (or buffer)
body is a very important o n e that can be observed in many higher education
systems. T h e British University G r a n t s C o m m i t t e e ( U G L ) is probably the
best known example of the role and influence of "central collgial b o d i e s "
in the coordination of a higher education system. W e will return to the role
and function of this kind of body later on. O t h e r examples of the "force of
academia" are the so-called faculty interest organizations like unions and
associations which, through various forms of interaction with dominant
societal actors, p r o m o t e the interests of their constituencies. A n d , last but
not least, as a consequence of the higher education adage that knowledge is
authority, the strength of individuals or relatively small groups of individuals
should not be neglected (Clark, 1983: 159).
In order to highlight the way in which the forces noted above play a
dynamic role in the coordination of higher education systems, and thus
are crucial to our understanding of higher education policy, a few examples
of the changing relationship between government and higher education
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter appear in order. First,
in "market-driven" higher education systems (e.g., the U n i t e d States),
governments are becoming m o r e and m o r e involved in shaping the goals
and functions of higher education. Second, in those systems in which the
state authority traditionally dominated higher education regulation (such as
in Continental Western E u r o p e ) , a fundamental reappraisal of government's
position can be witnessed.
Firm beliefs in the virtues of regulation, planning mechanisms, and government
coordination appear to be replaced by a philosophy in which the government's
role is confined more to setting the boundary conditions within which the higher
education system is to operate, leaving more room to manoeuvre at the institutional
level. (Meek et 0/., 1991).
This latter shift has been described as a move towards self-regulating

systems (Van Vught, 1989). T h e question remains: to what extent has the
trend towards m o r e self-regulation and institutional a u t o n o m y changed the
power balance between the government and higher education. Certainly this
shift does not m e a n that the government has lost its hold on higher education.
In many countries the policy of self-regulation has b e e n accompanied by
the development of a system of quality control, evaluation of performance,
application of positive and negative incentives, setting national priorities in
teaching and research, budget cuts, conditional contracting, involvement
in the internal affairs of institutions, and so on (for an overview of these
developments, see Neave and V a n Vught, 1991). In other words, the
increase of institutional a u t o n o m y , i.e., the power to govern without direct
L C. J . Goedegebuure et a!.
outside controls, has been accompanied by an emphasis on accountability

of higher education, that is the requirement to d e m o n s t r a t e responsible
actions to the government and other external constituencies. T h e extent
to which governments a d h e r e to this role varies and is in some countries
m o r e manifest than in others. O n e of the main aims of this study is to
describe the respective roles of higher education and government and to
give an assessment of changes that are currently taking place in the countries
selected. F o r this, the framework elaborated on above is considered a viable
working basis. Nevertheless, it can be useful to specify in some m o r e detail
what is m e a n t by additional concepts that have b e e n introduced in the process
of clarifying the notion of steering.
Autonomy and academic
freedom
T h e question as to what constitutes a u t o n o m y in universities is ambiguous,

and the patterns of a u t o n o m y that satisfy academics in different countries are
very diverse. In exploring autonomy issues, we consider it useful to m a k e
a distinction between academic freedom on the o n e h a n d , and procedural
and substantive a u t o n o m y on the other. Berdahl (1990) defines these terms
as follows:
Academic freedom is that freedom of the individual scholar in his/her
teaching and research to pursue truth wherever it seems to lead without
fear of punishment or termination of e m p l o y m e n t for having offended some
political, religious or social orthodoxy.
Substantive autonomy is the power of the university or college in its
corporate form to determine its own goals and p r o g r a m m e s the " w h a t "
of academe.
Procedural autonomy is the power of the university or college in its
corporate form to determine the m e a n s by which its goals and p r o g r a m m e s
will be pursued the " h o w " of a c a d e m e .
Berdahl's conceptualization closely relates to Ashby's "essential ingredients
of institutional a u t o n o m y " (1966: 296): (a) the freedom to select staff
and students and to determine the conditions u n d e r which they remain
in the university; (b) the freedom to determine curriculum content and
degree standards; and (c) the freedom to allocate funds (within the amounts
available) across different categories of expenditure.
W e consider it helpful for an analysis of the relationship between
higher education and the government to know whether the government
is intervening in procedural or substantive matters. T h e former concerns,
for example, pre-audits, and controls over purchasing, personnel, and capital
(large-scale) investments. These interventions can be a b o t h e r to institutions,
irritating and even counter-productive to efficiency, but still usually do not
prevent institutions from achieving their goals. It is questionable where the
precise boundaries between procedural and substantive a u t o n o m y can be

drawn. Since these boundaries will differ from country to country and since
their interpretation asks for country-specific knowledge, we have left it to
the individual country-correspondents to judge. T h e purpose is to give an
indication of the prevailing regulations that are considered to influence the
basic elements and functioning of the institution.
T h e attention paid in the higher education policy d e b a t e to a u t o n o m y
has b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d by g o v e r n m e n t ' s e m p h a s i s o n accountability.
A c c o u n t a b i l i t y refers to the r e q u i r e m e n t to d e m o n s t r a t e responsible actions
to the government as the provider of public tax funds. Accountability and
a u t o n o m y are not considered as being necessarily incompatible. In many
countries attempts are being m a d e to reinforce the pursuit of national goals
and priorities whilst at the same time giving institutions m o r e autonomy.
H o w e v e r , tension between the two concepts has been experienced. W h e r e
m o r e accountability is required, often less a u t o n o m y remains. C u r r e n t policy
issues intended to assess the performance of institutions through external
judgements of academic quality and performance indicators may form, as
some critics have argued, a threat to a u t o n o m y . It is far from obvious
that countries have arrived at a stable and satisfactory trade-off between
a u t o n o m y and accountability, an issue that will be addressed at some length
in the following chapters.
With some regularity, the issues of higher education policy are approached
from a two-actor perspective, the government and the institutions of higher
education, as if they form a bilateral relationship. In many countries,
however, other levels of authority can be identified, particularly in those
with a federal structure and in those in which intermediary bodies play an
important role. A few remarks about these other levels will suffice h e r e .
Federalism
In a n u m b e r of countries involved in this study, the concept of "state
authority" as o n e of the forces responsible for the way higher education
is coordinated has to be explained further since there is m o r e than o n e
governmental level that has important regulating responsibilities with respect
to higher education.
T h e nature of the role of government in authority matters d e p e n d s ,
amongst other things, u p o n whether it is national or regional. In national
systems the central government, with its relevant parts in b u r e a u s and
legislative bodies located in o n e or m o r e central ministry, is the main
actor, although in various countries efforts have continuously b e e n m a d e to
decentralize aspects of higher education policy to regional bodies. In federal
systems, however, the state or provincial government has authority and
legislative powers through a ministry, d e p a r t m e n t , or comparable body.
10
L. C. J . Goedegebuure et al.
In federal systems like Australia, C a n a d a , G e r m a n y , Switzerland, or the

United States, the distinct states (cf. Lnder, C a n t o n s , States, or Provinces)
have a constitutional responsibility for the higher education system within
their borders. In some of these systems, federal d e p a r t m e n t s have developed
an administrative arm and have expanded their jurisdiction to domains that
used to belong to the jurisdiction of individual states. Laws and regulations
have been issued that pertain to all institutions in all respective states.
T h e r e seems to be a continuous shift in emphasis between an extensive
network of laws and administrative regulations and efforts to pass not
specific legislation, but framework laws that cover m o r e activities but in
less detail.
T h e national-federal distinction is an important one for the analysis of
authority relationships between government and institutions. Theoretically
it may be assumed that developing higher education policy on a nationwide
scale and centralized efforts such as a national curriculum or central
admission policy, may bring about tensions between the different governmental
levels. W h a t is m o r e important here is that regulations emanating from
various levels may be issued in an uncoordinated and inconsistent fashion,
resulting in a danger of excessive bureaucratization for the institutions (for
example, minute controls of institutional expenditure). A n assessment of the
type of arrangements, preferably by making a distinction between procedural
matters and substantive affairs, will be part of the analysis.
Intermediary
bodies
A s mentioned above, in most higher education systems intermediary

bodies have traditionally been a key m e a n s of academic influence. According
to Clark (1983), these buffer organizations can historically be found in
those systems where institutional development took place in federative,
coalitional, or m a r k e t environments. Systems rooted in state control show
fewer buffers. Well known examples of intermediary bodies dominated by
academics were the University G r a n t s C o m m i t t e e (UGC) and the Council
for National A c a d e m i c A w a r d s (CNAA) as they functioned until recently in
the U n i t e d Kingdom.
In general a buffer organization can be described as a formally established
body set u p to link governmental bodies with independent (or semiindependent) organizations to accomplish a specific public purpose. In
higher education an intermediary body or buffer usually refers to an
organization set u p to link a government agency with a n u m b e r of higher
education institutions (El-Khawas, 1991). Since each buffer can have
different relationships with the government as well as with the institutions,
various functions can be ascribed to such a body. T h e first function concerns
influencing government policy. A buffer can act as a pressure group. In this
11
case it is the representative of the institutions. The second function relates

to carrying (part of the) responsibility for the implementation
of government
policy. Such a buffer can be regarded as a para-political organization; it
takes over part of the tasks of the government. A third function concerns
the extension of (individual) services. In such a situation a buffer organization
operates as a service organization ( D e B o e r , 1991).
T h e relationships of a buffer with both the government and with higher
education institutions can be regarded as exchange relationships.
Exchange
in this sense can be described as any voluntary activity between (two
or m o r e ) organizations having consequences for the realization of their
goals. A n exchange relationship is a form of bargaining in which each
organization involved seeks to maximize its advantage in acquiring resources
from another organization. A buffer bargains with both sides, i.e., with the
government as well as with the institutions. Regarding the relationships
with the two sides a buffer must build and maintain support of multiple
constituencies. In order to act as a real buffer, it must have legitimacy
with both sides. This can be very difficult since priorities and interests of
both sides will differ in general. Also, over time priorities and interests
will change, sometimes having an e n o r m o u s impact on the nature and
composition of a buffer.
Research Method
T h e following chapters, in which the higher education policy developments
in the 11 countries involved in this comparative study are analyzed, are
written on the basis of reports p r e p a r e d by national correspondents. These
reports themselves have been drawn u p on the guidelines included in
the questionnaire designed for this study by CHEPS. T h e structure of
this questionnaire reflects the issues discussed a b o v e , and contains four
sections. In part I, the structure of the higher education system is addressed
in terms of its position in the national education system, some key indicators
(e.g., student n u m b e r s , staff, d r o p outs, etc.), the history and rationale of
the system, and the functions and goals of its constituent parts. In part II,
the concept of authority within the higher education system is analyzed
by focusing, amongst other things, on the nature and effects of national
legislation, and the issue of autonomy and control with respect to teaching
and research p r o g r a m m e s , institutional m a n a g e m e n t , and funding. T h r o u g h
these first two parts, the stage is set for an analysis of and reflection on
higher education policy and institutional governance and m a n a g e m e n t , to
be addressed in the third and fourth parts. With respect to higher education
policy, in part III the core goals of higher education, key issues, structure,
and shifts in higher education policy, and the role and influence of the
main actors involved, are central elements in the analysis. T h e final part
12
L. C. J . Goedegebuure et al.
(part IV) reflects o n the impact of higher education policy, structure, and
legislation on the functioning of the institutions. It is in this section that
the themes discussed above are brought together by focusing on central
topics like diversity, quality, competition, missions, and profiles within the
framework of the system's coordinating mechanisms.
Structure of the Report

T o aid the reader to both understand the following country-specific
chapters and c o m p a r e the developments across systems, these chapters are
structured as much as possible along the lines of the questionnaire. That is,
each chapter begins with the evolution and structure of the higher education
system, followed by separate sections on authority, higher education policy
and reflections on impact. It should be emphasized that, while the research
team has attempted to structure the first three parts of each chapter along
a comparable format as much as possible, the impact reflections are the
personal observations and interpretations of the national reporters. In the
concluding chapter, a synthesis is presented of the major trends and issues
that can be identified across the systems, and some key issues are addressed
that figure prominently throughout the country reports. These include issues
of diversity, authority, policy instruments, quality and accountability and the
state of transition in which the various systems find themselves.
2
Higher Education Policy in Australia
LYNN MEEK
Introduction
It should be noted that Australia is a constitutional federation of six states
and two territories. Legislative responsibility for all forms of education
falls to state or territory governments. In recent years, the federal (or
C o m m o n w e a l t h ) government has b e c o m e the primary policy actor in
relation to higher education; it provides nearly all the public funding
for higher education and can be considered a major instigator of change
in the system. T h e federal government is also increasing its power and
influence over primary, secondary and Technical and F u r t h e r Education
(TAFE). Nonetheless, the states and territories retain formal legislative
responsibility for education and there is a good deal of d e b a t e over how
far the states and territory governments will be willing to go in abdicating
entirely their policy influence/power over educational m a t t e r s ; not far at all
it seems in relation to primary and secondary education, and currently the
control of TAFE is a hotly contested issue. These matters will be discussed
further in the last sections of this chapter. They are mentioned here to
highlight the facts that (1) Australian education higher education in
particular is in a state of flux, and (2) any description of Australian
education must gloss over state/territory differences of varying degrees of
importance.
Structure of the Higher Education System

The education
system
Figure 1 outlines the structure of the Australian educational system.

Children normally enter primary school at the age of five or six; education
is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 15 years. Primary education,
13
14
L Meek
grades o n e to six, lasts for six years, excluding Kindergarten which is before
grade o n e .
Secondary education, or high school, continues for another six years
and is uniform across the system. T h e last two years of high school are
regarded as the senior years, which upon completion students sit a state-wide
examination: the Higher School Certificate in New South Wales or its
equivalent in other states (the nomenclature varies from state to state,
but hereafter, for convenience, all such examinations will be referred to
as the HSC A student's score at this examination is used by higher education
institutions for selection purposes (see further, below).
Figure 1: The Australian educational system
The higher education system: history and rationale

With respect to the higher education system it can be stated that for
all intents and purposes, there are now only universities in the Australian
15
higher education system. This is a very new p h e n o m e n o n , brought about

by massive government restructuring of higher education, which, amongst
other things, abolished the College of A d v a n c e d Education (CAES, similar
to British polytechnics) sector, and replaced it with the Unified National
System (UNS) of higher education.
U p to immediately after the Second World W a r , Australian higher
education was h o m o g e n e o u s in the e x t r e m e . Besides teachers' colleges
and a few mostly poorly funded and undistinguished technical schools
(under the control of state d e p a r t m e n t s of education), the higher education
field consisted of six state universities founded in either the 19th century or
early part of the 20th century. During the Second World W a r there was an
unprecedented injection of federal funds into the universities for m a n p o w e r
training and other purposes geared to the war effort and, probably even
m o r e importantly, a heightened awareness amongst politicians and the
community of the social value of science and technology. In 1946, there
were 25,500 students enrolled at Australian universities. Shortly after the war
the C o m m o n w e a l t h government created the Australian National University
to further research and postgraduate study, and in 1949 the N e w South Wales
government established Sydney's second university: the University of New
South Wales (initially called the NSW University of Technology). In 1954
the N e w England University College received its independence from the
University of Sydney and, in 1958, Monash became M e l b o u r n e ' s second
university. T h u s , by 1960, Australia had ten universities with a student
population of about 53,000.
In the early 1960s, the political and social pressures to further expand
higher education intensified, and in 1961 the C o m m i t t e e on the Future
of Tertiary Education in Australia (the Martin Committee) was appointed
to charter the course of development of Australian higher education. T h e
196465 report of the Martin C o m m i t t e e r e c o m m e n d e d the creation of
colleges of advanced education as an alternative to the expansion of the
universities. Martin and his committee's report differentiated colleges from
universities by their function: vocational and teaching-oriented colleges on
the one h a n d , and academic and research-oriented universities on the other.
T h e substance of what later came to be called the binary system, following
an English precedent, lay in this doctrine. T h e binary experiment was to
last until 1988.
Although Martin envisaged that the expansion of higher education would
take place mainly within the advanced education sector, by the mid-1970s
nine additional universities had been added to the system. In 1973 and
1974, the Whitlam L a b o u r government reached three decisions that were to
have far-reaching consequences for higher education: (1) that student fees
would be abolished and replaced with a national student assistance scheme;
(2) that state education d e p a r t m e n t controlled teachers' colleges would be
recognized as CAES for funding purposes (to qualify for federal funding,
16
L Meek
the teachers' colleges had to b e c o m e independent of state d e p a r t m e n t s

of education); and (3) that the C o m m o n w e a l t h government would assume
responsibility for nearly all funding of higher education.
T h e binary system of higher education created in the mid-1960s took
little over ten years to transform itself into a "trinary" system. Though
some advanced education colleges were newly-founded, most had been
former technical institutions linked to state d e p a r t m e n t s of education or
state teachers' colleges. T h a t left a host of post-secondary residuals and
CAE cast-offs, many concerned with apprenticeship and adult education.
A s the colleges shed many of their responsibilities in the sub-diploma field
and moved into degree and postgraduate studies, Technical and Further
Education developed to fill the educational vacuum at the lower levels
left by the colleges as they drifted towards higher academic standards and
programmes. T h e C o m m o n w e a l t h Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC)
was established in 1977 to coordinate the three sectors of tertiary education,
including TAFE.
T h r o u g h o u t the late 1970s and early 1980s, the relevance of higher

education was q u e s t i o n e d increasingly by s o m e politicians, industrial
s p o k e s p e r s o n s , and other public opinion-makers. In 1978, the Williams
C o m m i t t e e (Committee of Inquiry into Education and Training) conducted
a major review of higher education and r e c o m m e n d e d the rationalization
of the system, but within the confines of the binary structure. T h e major
recommendations of the Williams Committee went largely u n h e e d e d and
in 1981 the Fraser conservative government pre-empted the consultative
process by simply announcing that 30 CAES had either to amalgamate or
receive no further federal funding; this dictate was mainly a cost-saving
measure. By 1983 all but four of the specified institutions had merged.
In late 1985, CTEC set up a committee under its own C h a i r m a n , H u g h
H u d s o n , to review efficiency and effectiveness in higher education. T h e
committee published its report in September 1986 and r e c o m m e n d e d
important modifications to the system, though once again within the confines
of a multi-sector structure (Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness, 1986). In
early 1987, CTEC suggested the creation of a committee to review the future of
the binary system. However, the then Minister for E m p l o y m e n t , Education
and Training, the H o n . J o h n Dawkins and the L a b o u r government were
interested in immediate action and m o r e radical reforms.
In D e c e m b e r 1987 the G r e e n Paper Higher Education: a policy
discussion
paper was issued. Profound changes were proposed. Higher education was
to b e c o m e m o r e adaptive and responsive to societal needs and d e m a n d s ,
and m o r e instrumental in bringing about the economic upturn d e e m e d
necessary to retain Australia's competitive position in the world market.
A decade of substantial enrolment growth was projected. G o v e r n m e n t was
unable to bear the whole additional cost, but it might b e able to find m o r e
"to the extent that other parties to the higher education system agree to
17
implement the structural changes and other reforms now r e q u i r e d . " T h e

price for the higher education party included another round of institutional
consolidations. Reactions and responses to the G r e e n Paper were invited,
resulting in sometimes hectic discussions on the federal government's
philosophy and restructuring policies. In July 1988 the White Paper Higher
Education: a policy statement was published, showing a virtually unchanged
government perspective on the future direction of the higher education
system. T h e White Paper argued for institutional consolidations in terms
of educational benefits, but concentrated mainly on the administrative
efficiencies to be derived from larger organizational units. Because of the
incentive/disincentive structure of the reform policy, in which institutional
size played an important role, "the bigger the b e t t e r " became the Australian
n o r m . A massive round of institutional mergers followed, reducing the
existing pre-1987 19 universities and 44 CAES, to 35 higher education
institutions (universities) that at present constitute the Unified National
System. T h e details of these changes will be discussed in the last two
sections of this chapter.
T h e universities in the UNS are not officially divided according to function
or task, although they are encouraged to develop particular educational
niches u n d e r their own initiatives. Nearly all higher education institutions
are public. T h e B o n d University in Queensland (which first o p e n e d its doors
to students in 1989) has been the only significant attempt to develop a private
university, although a privately funded Catholic university is being created
in Perth and other initiatives are being discussed.
After this brief introduction on the history and rationale of the Australian
higher education system, we will now turn to a m o r e detailed description of
some of the key features of the system.
Degrees and formal length of study

For the most part, all universities offer the same degrees: bachelor
and master degrees and the P h . D . T h e r e remains a small n u m b e r of
u n d e r g r a d u a t e diploma and certificate courses, but these are not a significant
aspect of the higher educational p r o g r a m m e . T h e first degree bachelor
of arts or science is completed after three years of full-time study, with
the opportunity of the m o r e capable students completing a fourth year for
h o n o u r s . A n u n d e r g r a d u a t e honours degree allows for direct entry into the
P h . D . T h e bachelor of education and the bachelor of engineering normally
take four years of full-time study, and medicine takes six years, including the
clinical experience c o m p o n e n t . Master degrees can involve all research, all
course work, or a combination of b o t h ; the length of study varies normally
from o n e to two years of full-time study. T h e doctoral degree is a three-year
full-time research degree. O v e r the last three years, many universities have
18
L Meek
introduced a professional doctorate (the E D D ) , along the lines of the

North American professional doctorate, which involves a combination of
coursework and research. T h e EDD normally takes two years of full-time
study to complete. It should be noted that many Australian students study
part-time and, as a rough rule of t h u m b , the time allowed for part-time
students to complete a degree is double that of full-time students.
Other forms of post-secondary
education
In addition to higher education, the other main system of post-secondary

education in Australia is TAFE. The extent of provision and the nature of
organization of TAFE varies from state (and territory) to state, TAFE is the main
provider in Australia of vocational, para-professional, and apprenticeship
training. Nationally, in the vocational and technical streams, there are
nearly one million TAFE students studying (mostly part-time) in some 220
major institutions or in another 1000 annexes and other institutions. In
addition, TAFE provides short-course adult education (recreation/leisure)
type activities to another half million students.
Admission and selection

Traditionally, admission to an Australian higher education institution has
been on the basis of academic merit displayed at the HSC examination (or its
equivalent) in the various states or territories. B u t , in recent years, other
avenues of entry have o p e n e d . For example, m a t u r e applicants are treated
as a special category, and some institutions accept a proportion of school
leavers on the basis of school based assessment rather than marks at the HSC.
Also, more emphasis is now being given to applicants who wish to transfer
from TAFE to higher education.
O n e of the most significant factors in the relationship between higher
and other forms of education is the increased retention rate to year 12 of
school and the corresponding increase in the n u m b e r of students transferring
direct to higher education from school, thus substantially changing the
characteristics of the student body enrolled in higher education. In the
early 1980s, retention to year 12 was about 3 5 % ; by 1991, this figure had
risen to over 7 0 % nationally, and even higher in some states. Between
1979 and 1989, the n u m b e r of new u n d e r g r a d u a t e students of m a t u r e age
rose by 2 4 % , from 52,000 in 1979 to 64,600 in 1989. But the proportion of
m a t u r e age commencing students has declined in relation to commencing
u n d e r g r a d u a t e students coming to higher education direct from school.
E n t r y selection is a distinctive characteristic of A u s t r a l i a n higher
education. Individual institutions faculties and disciplines set their own
selection criteria, although in each state there are centralized mechanisms
19
for handling the selection process. These bodies, such as the New South
Wales Universities Admission C e n t r e , are " c r e a t u r e s " of the universities
rather than government agencies. All institutions receive a government-set
quota of funded student places, and, since there are far m o r e applicants
than places, many students with minimum entry qualifications miss out on
a place in higher education. It was estimated at the beginning of 1992 that
nearly 50,000 qualified applicants did not gain entry to a higher education
institution. Students with minimum entry qualifications are free to select
the institution and discipline in which they wish to study, but there is no
guarantee that they will receive their first, or any, preference. O n their
centralized application forms, students normally list a n u m b e r of course and
institution preferences; whether they receive their first or any preference is a
matter of competition. Each institution, according to field of study, will rank
applicants on the basis of their HSC score and then accept applicants with
the highest scores until the quota is filled. Competition therefore is quite
fierce, especially for a place in popular courses with small q u o t a s , such as
medicine.
Students, staff, and drop out rate

A s can be seen from Table 1, the n u m b e r of students enrolled in Australian
higher education has increased substantially over the last decade. This table
also provides information on d r o p out rates. T h e r e have been only two
major studies of u n d e r g r a d u a t e student "wastage" in Australia: o n e based
on the 1961 cohort of students commencing university courses, and the
other conducted for the 1979 Williams C o m m i t t e e which surveyed the
1971 cohort of university students and the 1974 cohort of CAE students.
TABLE 1
N u m b e r of students and staff in the Unified National System
Students
Staff
academic support
Full time Part time N e w entrants students
staff
completing staff
study
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
1992
176,297
204,339
253,413
272,101
299,511
339,204
147,751
165,677
1567,437
168,975
185,564
220,161
138,960
168,916
181,102
201,440
210,599
73,435
86,859
90,482
94,399
120,000
24,026
24,276
25,935
28,830
30,659
32,642
31,830
32,262
34,918
37,751
39,370
41,917
20
L. Meek
While results vary substantially between institutions and courses of study,

the general conclusion to be drawn from the two studies is that on average
about two-thirds of full-time u n d e r g r a d u a t e students complete their course,
compared with about 4 0 % of part-time internal and external students.
T h e 1986 Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness
reports success rates
of bachelor degree university students by field of study and m o d e of
attendance for 1982 (see Table 2). Success rate is defined as the ratio of
the n u m b e r of subjects/units passed in a given year to the total n u m b e r of
subjects/units in which students were enrolled for that year. Success rates in
passing subjects do not correlate perfectly with completion rates. Students
discontinue their participation in higher education for a variety of reasons,
TABLE 2
Success R a t e s of Bachelor D e g r e e University Students by Field of
Study and M o d e of A t t e n d a n c e , 1982
Field of Study
Full-time
%
Part-time
%
External
%
Total
%
Agriculture
Architecture
Arts
Commerce,
economics
Dentistry
Education
Engineering
Law
Medicine
Science
Vet. Science
Other
86
89
79
71
76
54
71
86
87
78
80
94
88
86
87
94
81
96
87
69
80
80
79
79
74
59
78
94
85
85
86
94
80
96
85
Total
84
75
71
82
SOURCE:
77
60
74
77
Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness . . . , 1986.
academic performance being only o n e reason. But Table 2 does provide some
evidence that lack of progression through the higher education system may
not be a serious problem at the u n d e r g r a d u a t e level. H o w e v e r , it must be
r e m e m b e r e d that the data are dated, particularly in light of the major shifts
in higher education policy which have occurred since it was collected. Now
21
that students must pay a proportion of the cost of their higher education (see
further) there is anecdotal evidence that completion rates within minimum
time have improved.
T h e r e is also little hard data on the d r o p out rate of postgraduate students.
T h e 1986 Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness looked at what data were
available and concluded that there may be a serious problem with respect
to time taken by postgraduate students to complete their degrees. O n e study
of holders of C o m m o n w e a l t h postgraduate scholarships c o m m e n c e d in the
mid-1970s indicated that only one-half had completed after six years of
study, twice the normal time allowed. Some m o r e recent institutional based
studies reported m o r e encouraging results. But government and institutions
alike have recognized the lack of progression of postgraduate research
students as a serious problem and are taking measures to rectify it, such
as the earlier mentioned professional doctorate (EDD).
STUDENT-STAFF RATIOS
Neither the funding mechanism nor any other regulatory framework

specify a particular student-staff ratio. A " n o r m a t i v e " student-staff ratio,
of course, results from the fact that government funding is primarily based on
student load. Over the d e c a d e , while the n u m b e r of students has increased
significantly, funding per student place has declined. Between 1983 and
1991, funding per Effective Full-Time Student Unit ( E F T S U ) declined by
about 1 2 % , from $10,390 to $9,167. G o v e r n m e n t has now agreed to increase
funding for new student load.
A s can be seen from Table 3, there is a good deal of variation in
student-staff ratios between disciplines/fields of study.
TABLE 3
Student to A c a d e m i c Staff Ratios by Major Academic
Organisational Unit
Health science (including medicine)
Business, economics and law
Built environment (including architecture)
Mathematics/computing
Visual and performing arts
Engineering
Total
Note:
10.5
22.1
13.8
16.9
12.3
12.7
Agriculture
Humanities
Social Science
Science
Education
7.5
15.2
17.0
10.5
16.9
14.8
Based on number of E F T S U s / E F T teaching staff and teaching-research-staff,
excluding research only staff; 1991 figures.
22
L. Meek
Characteristics
of the higher education
structure
FUNCTIONS AND GOALS
T h e question regarding the functions and goals/tasks of the types of higher

education first requires a historical explanation. Differential functions and
goals are not spelled out for institutions in the UNS. However, in the pre-1988
binary structure of higher education, universities and CAES supposedly had
clearly defined and different functions and goals, and the differences were
expressed in funding policies and other regulatory relationships between
higher education institutions and government (both state and federal). But
the binary structure, and its underpinning philosophy, proved to b e both
unstable and contradictory. First, the "equal but different" philosophy (the
assumption that CAES were equal to the universities in status but different in
terms of educational function) on which the binary system rested had the
opposite effect to that intended. Institutions on both sides of the binary
divide came to equal o n e another in terms of educational function, but
remained different in terms of status. Second, the binary system denied the
reality of an institutional hierarchy in which the universities were placed at
the t o p and enjoyed the lion's share of status, prestige, and wealth.
T h e CAES, particularly the large institutes of technology, resented the
fact that their location in the advanced education sector gave them less
resources and much less opportunity to engage in research and postgraduate
programmes relative to the universities. A s the government recognized,
"several of t h e larger and m o r e diverse institutions not previously permitted
to offer higher degrees or funded for research have gradually developed
the necessary staff and resources to u n d e r t a k e both these functions in a
way which had traditionally been seen as the sole preserve of universities"
(Report of the Task Force on the Commercialisation
of Research, 1989: 1).
These institutions began to put considerable pressure on state governments
to recognize them as universities, which in turn put considerable pressure
on t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h to fund t h e m as such. T h e Western Australia
State Legislature was first to break ranks by recognizing the Western
Australian Institute of Technology as the Curtin University of Technology
in D e c e m b e r 1986. Initially, CTEC refused to recognize what it regarded as
state legislative sleight of hand, and continued to regard Curtin as a CAE for
funding purposes. But soon, other large CAES in other states were to follow
the Curtin precedent. Recognizing the circumstances in which Australian
higher education found itself, the Minister for E m p l o y m e n t , Education and
Training in 1987 announced the end of the binary system (see before), stating
that in future all higher education institutions would be funded for teaching
purposes on a basis determined by their respective educational profile rather
than by institutional title. Resources for research were to be m a d e available
on a competitive basis throughout the higher education system according to
institutional performance.
23
In general, the function and goals of institutions now belonging to the

UNS are teaching, research, and service. T h e government does not prescribe
different goals t o different types or categories of institutions. R a t h e r ,
government expects individual institutions to develop their particular goals
and missions their educational profile through a process of mutual
government/institution negotiation. According to the G r e e n Paper, " t h e
educational aspects that profiles and accompanying agreements . . . cover
could include student load by field of study, graduate targets and research
involvement. Staffing arrangements and detailed resource allocation are
operational matters better left for institutions to deal with through their
own internal planning processes . . . " (Australia, 1987).
While institutions are to develop their own particular mission, government
has specified particular goals which should form a part of the mission.
These a r e : increased participation in higher education, particularly by school
leavers; shifting of some of the student load towards science/technological
based fields of study; increased output at the postgraduate research level;
enhanced technological transfer and commercialization of research products;
closer links with industry in both teaching and research; improved management
efficiency; improved articulation with other education sectors, particularly
with TAFE; and increased participation in higher education by disadvantaged
groups. In essence, the goals of the UNS are a combination of the past goals
of the university and CAE sectors.
LOCATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Australia invests less in research and development ( R & D ) as a percentage

of GDP than most OECD countries; however, government funding of R & D as
a percentage of total R & D funding is quite high in Australia in comparison
to other OECD countries. A b o u t half of all C o m m o n w e a l t h funding of R & D
goes t o higher education institutions. T h e only significant public research
organization outside higher education is t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h Scientific and
Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), established in the 1920s. Higher
education is t h e main provider of scientific research in Australia. While in
the past the bias of university based research was towards curiosity-driven,
basic research, some emphasis is now given to applied research projects that
will yield results of commercial significance. W h a t research the former CAES
conducted was, supposedly, very applied in character.
Authority Within the Higher Education System

Higher education
legislation
A s higher education legislation is constitutionally a matter for the

states, federal Parliament has little legislative control over individual higher
24
L. Meek
education institutions. T h e exception to this is the Australian National

University which, because of its location in the Australian Capital Territory,
falls directly under federal legislation. Acts of federal Parliament affect
higher education, however, in two important areas: coordination and
finance.
COORDINATION
T h e federal g o v e r n m e n t can legislate for w h a t e v e r n a t i o n a l higher

education coordinating structures it so wishes. In 1987, the government
abolished the C o m m o n w e a l t h Tertiary Education Commission a statutory
"buffer" organization and replaced it with the National Board of
E m p l o y m e n t , Education and Training (NBEET), a ministerial advisory body.
A t the same time, various government branches were brought together to
form the D e p a r t m e n t of E m p l o y m e n t , Education and Training (DEET).
W h e r e a s formerly, universities dealt with CTEC, they now negotiate their
educational profiles with DEET and NBEET. T h e r e has been criticism within the
academic community that the abolition of CTEC has t h r e a t e n e d institutional
a u t o n o m y , but there is little or no evidence to support this claim, CTEC
adopted a highly regulatory posture towards higher education, a fact which
is often forgotten in the current d e b a t e . W h a t was lost with the demise of
CTEC was the knowledge and expertise of a group of people well immersed
in national higher education policy issues.
T h e C o m m o n w e a l t h can use its legislative power to create or abolish a
variety of other agencies that deal directly with higher education institutions.
For example, the Australian Research Council one of the main bodies
which allocates research funds to individual academics on a competitive basis
comes u n d e r the umbrella of NBEET and replaces the former Australian
Research G r a n t s Scheme. T h e r e are a host of other C o m m o n w e a l t h
research funding agencies established u n d e r federal legislation which deal
with academic researchers. Federal legislation also touches u p o n students;
for example, the enabling legislation for the recently introduced Higher
Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), a form of graduate tax, involved
an a m e n d m e n t to the federal taxation bill.
FINANCE
While the federal government has no direct legal power or control over the
universities, it exercises its influence through Section 96 of the constitution,
which allows it to m a k e grants to the states for specified purposes in this
case, higher education.
All 19 pre-1987 universities were established u n d e r separate state Acts of
Parliament, which provided t h e m with a good deal of institutional a u t o n o m y ;
25
most CAES, however, were not established by separate Acts of Parliament.

Because of the massive restructuring that has occurred over the last few
years, nearly every higher education institution has either been created
under new state legislation or has had existing Acts modified. For the most
part, changes to legislation have been necessitated by merger agreements.
Present legislation varies somewhat from institution to institution, due
mostly to the peculiarities of particular amalgamation negotiation agreements,
but, generally, the Acts are similar. Moreover, present university Acts d o
not differ dramatically from past Acts. T h e federal government has pushed
for m o r e streamlined m a n a g e m e n t and decision-making structures within
higher education institutions, reflected in smaller governing bodies and
greater delegation of responsibility and authority to chief executive officers.
H o w e v e r , apart from some reduction in size and broadening of stated
purposes of governing bodies in a few instances, University Acts have not
b e e n changed significantly.
T h e individual Acts provide a "framework" in which the institution is to
o p e r a t e ; they d o not provide detailed regulation. Australian universities
have what has b e e n t e r m e d a two-tiered system of academic governance.
Generally, legislation invests the legal power and responsibility to m a n a g e
the institution in a governing body (board of governors in New South Wales
or council in other states) having a high proportion of "lay" m e m b e r s .
T h e legislation also provides for the opportunity of the governing body to
devolve responsibility for academic matters to an academic b o a r d or senate.
With respect to matters involving courses of study, awarding of degrees,
academic staff a p p o i n t m e n t s , examinations, admission r e q u i r e m e n t s , etc.,
governing bodies usually act on the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of their academic
boards.
Control of education
programmes
Universities a r e financed as institutions, n o t on a p r o g r a m m e by

p r o g r a m m e basis. They have always had a high degree of a u t o n o m y over
approving new courses and/or p r o g r a m m e s . Course approval is accomplished
internally through a complex academic committee system, which usually ends
in the academic board/senate making a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to the council/board
of governors. If a new course involves new student places, the government
may not provide the funding, but universities are largely at liberty to approve
and accredit their own courses of study. F o r the purpose of registration in
certain professional areas, external professional bodies may have significant
influence over course content and structure.
There is no national curriculum for higher education, and the introduction of
such would be strongly resisted by the universities. Nonetheless, government
is making inroads into this area. A committee (the Mayer C o m m i t t e e ) has
26
L. Meek
been established to advise on "Key A r e a s of C o m p e t e n c e " which should

help form part of education or training u n d e r t a k e n by young people in
schools or TAFE. With regard to higher education, government has asked
for uniformity with respect to course length and nomenclature. Some
disciplines, such as engineering, have been reviewed on a national basis.
A t the end of 1991, the Minister requested NBEET to investigate how best
to introduce quality control mechanisms into the higher education system;
however, there is a fear in some quarters that national mechanisms to assess
quality and standards of performance could lead to something like a national
curriculum (quality control is discussed in m o r e detail later in this chapter).
In order to p r o m o t e a national system of higher education, the Minister has
called for uniformity across the states with respect to the Higher School
Certificate examination but, except for developing procedures for calculating
equivalences for interstate applicants, little has h a p p e n e d on this front.
Control of research
programmes
A s stated earlier, research in Australian universities has traditionally

been curiosity-driven, initiated through the interests of individual academics
or teams of academics, who therefore are in control of the research
p r o g r a m m e s . H o w e v e r , o t h e r influences o n t h e p r o g r a m m e s can b e
discerned as well through the mechanisms of funding procedures. In the
past, universities were funded for research through recurrent grants under
the assumption that all university academics would spend about one-quarter
of their time engaged in research (the CAES were not funded for research).
Funding for research in addition to that contained in the recurrent grant was
(and still is) sought on a competitive basis from various external research
funding agencies. Generally, these agencies allocate grants using peer review
in o n e form or another to assess the merit of applications. O v e r the last
decade or so, the federal government has set aside grants for the creation
of special/key research centers within universities; these key centers fall into
areas of national priority, but are allocated on a competitive basis through
the use of peer review. Proposals are initiated at the institutional level,
although government may ask institutions to either rank their proposals
or allow only o n e proposal to go forward. In this sense, institutions play
a role in deciding what research projects are carried out and by w h o m ,
but again the institution is d e p e n d e n t on the interest and expertise of its
academic staff for the generation of proposals.
T h e most recent initiative in the special research center area is the
creation of the Cooperative Research C e n t r e (CRC) p r o g r a m m e . T h e CRC
p r o g r a m m e was announced by the Prime Minister in May 1990 with the
objectives of: providing further support to scientific and technological
research targeted to contribute to national objectives; strengthening the links
27
between research and its commercial and other applications; building centers
of research concentration by promoting cooperative research with industry;
and stimulating education and training by active involvement of researchers
from outside higher education in graduate p r o g r a m m e s , and involvement of
graduate students in major research p r o g r a m m e s . U p to 50 centers will be
funded, and by 1993/94 government will be contributing $100m per a n n u m .
H o w e v e r , government will contribute only 5 0 % of the costs of establishing
and operating each center, with the other costs coming from participating
institutions. Each center has o n e or m o r e higher education partners as well
as partners drawn from CSIRO, other government agencies, and industry. T h e
CRC p r o g r a m m e is a good example of how government helps determine the
research agenda through its power of the purse, and as such is one example
of a m o r e general policy shift towards targetting research funding on areas
d e e m e d to be of national economic priority. H o w e v e r , despite this type of
government intervention, the bulk of research carried out within Australian
universities remains curiosity-driven, academic initiated, research.
Institutional
management
and control
T h e two-tiered academic m a n a g e m e n t structure imposed by institutional

Acts is described above. H o w e v e r , besides this general structure, the Acts
allow for a great deal of latitude for individual institutions to formulate
their particular m a n a g e m e n t structures. A general trend throughout the
system has been for many institutions to devolve decision-making (including
financial decisions) to faculty and departmental levels. T h u s , legislation has
relatively limited control in determining institutional governance structures.
T h e effects of legislation are m o r e p r o n o u n c e d in the area of personnel
policies. In recent years, Australian academic staff have moved from
a normative position of being " a u t o n o m o u s professionals" to one of
employees, at least insofar as industrial legislation applies to academic
terms and conditions. This shift has been pushed as much by the academic
unions as by government. In all industrial areas, there is a long tradition in
Australia of centralized wage fixing. With respect to higher education, when
the unions initiate a national wage case, the three main parties that come
before the Commission are the unions, the employer organization, and the
government as paymaster. T h r o u g h what can be a long and complicated
process, the three parties reach agreement on wages and other related
industrial matters covering terms and conditions of employment, like the
proportions of tenured and non-tenured staff. T h e agreement does not
specify the n u m b e r of staff, as such, and is legally binding on all parties.
Much of what is in these agreements strengthens the hand of m a n a g e m e n t
within institutions, and the language used is managerial. But it must be
r e m e m b e r e d that academic staff through their unions are a party to the
28
L. Meek
agreement. Also, to a large degree, the agreements merely codify already

accepted practice. Institutions now have m o r e latitude with respect to reward
systems than in the past; national wage cases specify minimum salaries for
specific categories of staff, but institutions may pay m o r e . H o w e v e r , this
has not h a p p e n e d on any significant scale.
In terms of their legal status, staff are employees of the institutions, not
civil servants, and can be hired and fired by the institution, although very
few academic staff have actually been dismissed.
Institutional
funding
C O R E FUNDING
T h e core funding mechanism is the same for all institutions in the UNS. T h e
way in which the budgets of the institutions are determined by government
is a mix of normative funding and bargaining between individual institutions
and government. T h e normative aspect of the funding is the student load
driven character of recurrent funding, as contained in the "Relative Funding
M o d e l , " introduced by the federal government. U n d e r this m o d e l , teaching
costs are differentiated by discipline and course level, and student load
weighted accordingly. It remains to be seen to what degree this student
load driven character will change in t h e future. T h e bargaining aspect in t h e
funding model can be found in the process of negotiations on the educational
profiles, in which, amongst others, the student loads are determined.
Next to the student load driven model, recurrent funding also contains
a research c o m p o n e n t based on a competitive grants index. This index
incorporates research load proportions, including n u m b e r of postgraduate
research students, competitive research grants, and research grants from
other sources. Funds allocated through this index represent around 6 % of
total recurrent funds.
O v e r the last few years, the government has transferred a small part of
the operating grants to specific funds. F r o m 1989, t h e government has set
aside 1% p e r a n n u m of the base operation grants for all institutions to
create a Reserve F u n d . T h e Reserve F u n d is distributed each year on the
basis of institutions' responses to specific C o m m o n w e a l t h initiatives or areas
of identified national priority. M o n e y from the Reserve F u n d is allocated
to institutions o n a competitive basis. F u r t h e r money has b e e n transferred
from the operating grants of the previous university sector to the Australian
Research Council (ARC) for competitive reallocation: $5m in 1988, $20m in
1989, $40m in 1990 and $65m in 1991. G o v e r n m e n t has agreed that there
will be n o further transfer of university operating funds to t h e ARC. T h e ARC
funds postgraduate research scholarships and various research infrastructure
schemes as well as research project grants.
29
Recurrent funding is on a rolling triennial basis. For 1990, higher education

was allocated a total of $3,360.3m from the government, including $3,033.7m
for operating grants and $162.4m for capital works.
Recurrent operating grants are now paid to institutions as a lump sum; this
replaces previous fragmented funding arrangements. Capital works grants
have been allocated on a project by project basis but, from 1994, capital
works will be included in the operating grant. Institutions are allowed to
invest their funds and retain the interest; they can also decide on the
financing of large-scale investments.
While institutions now have control over core funding, it must be
r e m e m b e r e d that they too are constrained by historical precedent. Somewhere
between 70 and 9 0 % of recurrent grants is spent on staff salaries. Therefore,
unless an institution receives additional student load (which has to be
negotiated within the frame of the educational profile exercise), it has very
little latitude within its core funding to engage in new initiatives. With respect
to supplementary funding, however, the case is different.
SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDING
T h e government has m a d e it clear that institutions must find nongovernment sources of funding. This is being accomplished in a variety
of ways: research grants from industry and other private sources; full-fee
paying overseas students; and, in some instances, charging fees to Australian
students. Institutions are pursuing donations and e n d o w m e n t s , engaging
much m o r e than in the past in contract teaching and the sale of short
courses, consultancy, and other similar exercises. Every university has
established its own company to m a r k e t its academic products, research
products in particular.
It has already been mentioned that research grants from public sources
are allocated on a competitive basis. O v e r the last few years, there has
b e e n a large injection of public m o n e y into research. T h e budget for the
ARC, for example, will rise from about $89m in 1988 to over $250m by
1993. H o w e v e r , the a m o u n t of money from industry going to university
based research has been disappointing. For a variety of reasons, Australian
industry has been reluctant to invest in R & D . T h e government is attempting
to stimulate greater industry interest in R & D through such initiatives as the
CRC p r o g r a m m e described above.
T o a large extent, Australian higher education institutions have accepted
the challenge of finding non-government sources of funding. Overall, about
3 0 % of the funding comes from fees and charges and other sources, such
as donations, investment income, and loans (see Table 4). H o w e v e r , as
Table 4 also d e m o n s t r a t e s , there is great variation amongst institutions in
their ability to generate non-government sources of funds.
30
L. Meek
TABLE 4
1
Sources of funds for higher education institutions in 1990

All institutions
$m
%
Commonwealth
recurrent
capital
2
other
3
State
4
Fees and c h a r g e s
5
Other
Total
2607
54
152
322
242
20
554
978
4855
3
7
5
8-46
11
Range
%
Range
34-77
0-18
1-18
0-53
11-46
2-27
41-66
0-18
1-18
1-18
3-27
100
Institutions with total annual income greater than $25 million

Mainly research funds
Includes State funding for nursery education
4
Student fees and fees for service
5
Includes donations, bequests, investment income, etc.
6
Excluding A N U and N T U which are heavily atypical
SOURCE:
Karmel, 1992
2
3
ALLOCATION OF FUNDS WITHIN INSTITUTIONS
Internal budget allocations vary from institution to institution, but,

as already mentioned, many institutions are establishing decentralized
m a n a g e m e n t structures. T h e r e are clear indications that the allocative
models used by the national government are used also albeit in a slightly
modified form by the institutions allocating internal budgets, although
government is opposed to that. T h e University of New England (UNE) can
serve as an example of this p h e n o m e n o n . U N E receives a global budget from
the C o m m o n w e a l t h based on the relative funding m o d e l , which in turn is
divided amongst the campuses of this multicampus institution. E a c h campus
has a good deal of local autonomy. O n the Armidale campus of UNE, the total
budget is divided using a modified form of the relative funding model
amongst the faculties, which then pay back the central administration
for services. T h e faculties also take a proportion of the budget for their
running costs. T h e remaining money is divided amongst the d e p a r t m e n t s
according to a formula based on student load and a research c o m p o n e n t .
By 1994, departments will receive 7 5 % of their budget based on student
load and 2 5 % based on a research/consultancy index. After the removal
31
of administrative costs, the d e p a r t m e n t s retain any money raised through

entrepreneurial activities, such as the teaching of full-fee paying overseas
students. D e p a r t m e n t s have a good deal of flexibility in how they allocate
their budget. This is one example of how de-regulation nationally is filtering
down to the departmental level within higher education institutions. Even
though UNE will be dis-amalgamated at the beginning of 1994, the example
remains relevant.

The goals of higher education
policy
F r o m a government policy perspective, several " c o r e " goals with respect

to higher education can be identified. First and foremost, government views
higher education as a significant contributor to macro-economic reform and
future economic prosperity. It is government's "intention that an increasing
share of total higher education resources should be directed to those fields
of study of greatest relevance to the national goals of industrial development
and economic restructuring (Australia, 1988)."
G o v e r n m e n t is committed to increasing participation in higher education
and this is being achieved. T h e 1987 G r e e n Paper had as its targets "growth
in total enrolments, including higher degrees, from 475,000-495,000 in
1987 to 530,000-550,000 by 2001; and growth in all graduate n u m b e r s
from about 88,000 in 1986 to just over 100,000 by 2 0 0 1 " (Australia,
1987). Both targets were achieved by 1991, ten years ahead of schedule.
G o v e r n m e n t also wishes to see an increase in the n u m b e r of postgraduate
research students, and to this effect has significantly increased the n u m b e r
of C o m m o n w e a l t h postgraduate research scholarships. T h e n u m b e r of
commencing postgraduate research students (that is, students undertaking
a higher degree by research rather than by coursework) rose from 4,019
in 1987 to 6,965 by 1991. In its restructuring of the economy, government
requires a m o r e highly educated and skilled workforce, and it appears that
higher education is helping to achieve this goal.
G o v e r n m e n t also believes that the "benefits of higher education need
to be shared m o r e widely and m o r e equitably in the future." (Australia,
1988). Various strategies to increase access and participation have either
been put into place or are being investigated. For example, institutions
providing bridging courses to students lacking the minimum qualifications
for a particular field of study are now allowed to count those students as
part of their government funded student load.
G o v e r n m e n t continually stresses the need for improved efficiency within
higher education, particularly with regard to m a n a g e m e n t structures and
the use of resources. Part of the rationale behind the recent amalgamations
has been improvement of m a n a g e m e n t efficiency and the lowering of unit
32
L. Meek
costs. In addition, the government has also encouraged institutions to find

non-government sources of funds. N o set proportion of non-government
funding has been identified as a policy objective, although o n e recent report
suggested that "by the end of 1996, each higher education institution should
be required to find an a m o u n t equivalent to 5 % of its total Commonwealth
funding for research from industry. In addition, at least 10% of Australian
Research Council expenditure and 10% of National Health and Medical
Research Council expenditure should be set aside for projects that have
demonstrated commercial commitment by industry" (Report of the Task
Force on the Commercialisation
of Research, 1989).
T h e r e is now concern in some quarters of the academic community that
too much emphasis is being placed on commercially relevant applied research
and that higher education's traditional commitment to basic research will be
downgraded. In a similar vein, some people fear that vocationally relevant
fields of study are being emphasized to the detriment of general "academic"
education. Such arguments, however, are difficult to sustain in a system that
is expanding across all fields and disciplines.
Shifts and key issues in higher education
policy
T h e shifts in focus as regards higher educational goals and policy issues

which have taken place since 1987 can be summarized as follows:
abolition of the so-called binary system, which m a d e a clear distinction
between universities and CAES with respect to roles and funding, and
replacement by a new unified national system of higher education;
major consolidation of institutions through amalgamation to form
larger units;
substantial increases in the provision of student places and various
efforts to improve student progress rates in o r d e r to increase the output
of graduates;
increased emphasis on fields such as applied science, technologies,
computer science, and business studies, perceived to be of crucial importance
to economic recovery and economic growth;
a m o r e selective approach to research funding, with increased emphasis
on research on topics of national priority, and substantial increases in
research funding;
changes to the composition of governing bodies to m a k e t h e m more
like boards of companies, and strengthening of m a n a g e m e n t of universities
and colleges, particularly to give much greater power and authority to chief
executive officers;
major changes in staffing, particularly aimed to increase the flexibility
of institutions, improve staff performance, and enable institutions to m o r e
successfully compete in staff recruitment in priority areas;
33
changes to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness of the higher

education system, including reduced unit costs in teaching, improved credit
transfers, and rationalization of external studies;
moving of some of the financial burden for higher education to
individuals and the private sector, and encouraging institutions to generate
some of their own income.
In contrast to earlier years, the above reforms have been motivated by
expansion and the desire to tie higher education more closely to national
economic growth and development. Clearly, Australia is experiencing the
transformation from an elite to a mass system of higher education.
T h e policy reforms outlined above are still being implemented and
evaluated and remain the key issues confronting higher education. However,
o n e can add to that list the following:
quality and its m e a s u r e m e n t , including the use of p e r f o r m a n c e
indicators;
the degree to which the higher education system should be allowed
to continue to expand and the consequent diversion of students from
vocationally oriented courses in Technical and Further Education (TAFE)
to higher education;
the future role and structure of TAFE and its relationship to higher
education; there has been discussion that TAFE should become a nationally
funded system which would create a de facto new binary system;
the commercialization of science and the setting of the science/research
agenda through national priorities rather than curiosity-initiated research
projects;
the maintenance of diversity within the higher education system and
the creation of reward structures which p r o m o t e diversity;
the degree and speed at which de-regulation of the system will be
allowed to continue.
Policy development
and implementation: main actors in Australian

education
higher
T h e r e are a variety of actors involved in setting higher education goals

and developing policy. T h e influence of certain actors, such as state
governments, wax and wane with time and circumstance, and it is often
difficult to ascertain which individuals and groups have the most power and
influence. But there can be little doubt that the institutions themselves and
their academic staff play a significant role in setting higher education goals
and developing policy. Within the institution, the single most powerful and
influential person is the Vice-Chancellor, and many institutional Acts not
only designate the Vice-Chancellor as the chief executive officer but also as
the chief academic. It is often noted, however, that Vice-Chancellors have
34
L. Meek
more influence than formal power, both of which can be constrained by

traditions of collgial governance. Vice-Chancellors also exercise influence
through the Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee (AVCC), established in
1935 as a private company financed by subventions from universities. Before
the recent reforms, the AVCC was regarded somewhat as an "elite c l u b , " but
is now a much larger and more powerful body representing all institutions
in the UNS.
T h e success or failure of higher education policy initiatives ultimately
d e p e n d s on the actions of a c a d e m i c staff belonging to a variety of
departments and disciplines. Their influence is difficult to m e a s u r e , but
it is decisive. Academic staff also exercise influence through their unions,
the most important on the national level being the Federated Australian
University Staff Association.
A n o t h e r obvious key actor in the higher education policy network is the
Commonwealth government. T h e Minister for E m p l o y m e n t , Education and
Training, and his junior, the Minister for Higher Education and E m p l o y m e n t
Services, are responsible to cabinet and Parliament for higher education. As
we have seen, the Minister's influence on and power over higher education
policy and goals is considerable; however, a variety of other government
departments and ministries have an interest in higher education.
G o v e r n m e n t or its agencies establish from time to time expert committees
to inquire into the performance of higher education, and the reports of
these committees usually have direct policy implications. Some of the most
influential reports of the past were those of the Murray Committee in 1957,
the Martin C o m m i t t e e in 1964/65, and the Williams Committee in 1979. It
was unusual for government to proclaim in 1988 such far-reaching policy
changes without first appointing a committee of inquiry, but, on the other
hand, some of these policies were foreshadowed in previous reports.
Yet another key actor in setting higher education policy and goals is
the corporate sector. A s the major employer of graduates, the corporate
sector has an obvious interest in higher education policy and, increasingly,
it wishes to have a voice in policy discussions. Various schemes have been
established to link higher education and industry with respect to research
and postgraduate training, and there are a n u m b e r of forums on higher
education in which the corporate sector is represented.
T h e learned academies may attempt to influence policy, particularly with
respect to research. M o r e on the micro-level, accreditation bodies in the
fields of engineering, medicine, and other professions have an influence on
(but not power over) curriculum development.
T h e r e are probably a variety of actors other than those mentioned who
influence higher education policy and goals. W h a t must be avoided is an
"us/them" mentality that regards higher education policy as the outcome
of mortal combat between institutions and government. Fortunately, it is
far m o r e complicated than that.
Incentives, planning,
and institutional
35
autonomy
T h e r e is a strong incentive structure which directs Australian higher

education institutions to areas of national priority. With respect to the
educational profile negotiations, government is m o r e likely to fund new
student load in areas it regards as having a national priority. In the area
of research there are clearly articulated areas of national priority, and the
ARC sets aside about 2 0 % of its budget for the funding of projects that fall
under priority areas. T h e present arc research priority areas are: materials
science and minerals processing; cognitive science; scientific instruments and
instrumentation; and Australia's Asian context. G o v e r n m e n t itself uses the
Reserve Fund to direct institutions to certain national priority areas.
NBEET and DEET play a role in planning the higher education system at
the national level. T h e functions of NBEET are to enquire into and provide
information and advice to the Minister for E m p l o y m e n t , Education and
Training, primarily in response to formal references from the Minister.
A l s o , DEET commissions various studies under its Institutional Evaluation
P r o g r a m m e , the results of which may be fed back into the planning
process. T h e states and territories are involved in the planning process
through joint s t a t e / C o m m o n w e a l t h consultative c o m m i t t e e s . H o w e v e r ,
state/territory higher education offices have been downgraded, except in
Victoria. Supposedly, the main and detailed planning exercise takes place
with respect to the educational profile exercise. In o t h e r words, individual
institutions are given much m o r e latitude and responsibility for planning
the future than has been the case in the past.
W h e n the educational profile mechanism was first introduced, some
m e m b e r s of the academic community saw it as a threat to institutional
autonomy. H o w e v e r , this does not seem to be the case. U n d e r the present
system, one can find on different campuses of the one institution parallel
academic developments, such as the initiation of two M . B . A . programmes
and two law schools. This evidence hardly supports the hypothesis of the
erosion of institutional a u t o n o m y , though it may bring into question the
adequacy of rational planning at the institutional level.
Reflections on Structure, Authority, and Higher Education Policy on

Institutional Governance and Management
The dynamics of change
N o higher education system operates entirely in accord with " m a r k e t "
principles. Nonetheless, Australian higher education policy is being driven
by many market-related notions: managerial efficiency and strong executive
leadership; unit-cost effectiveness; institutional responsiveness to socio-
36
L. Meek
economic demands; technological transfer and commercialization of research

products; effective utilization of resources (academic staff in particular);
funding diversification, particularly in relation to non-government sources
of funds; and the introduction of user-pays principles.
In terms of Clark's (1983) triangle of coordination, Australia is moving
substantially towards the market vertex. If we look at the changes that have
occurred over the last four or five decades, Australian universities would
have started from a position close to that of the U K in Clark's (1983) diagram
and moved in an arch that first took t h e m closer to state authority and then
turned much m o r e towards the m a r k e t . C A E S would have started somewhere
near the state authority vertex, and then moved m o r e or less in a straight
line until they converged with the universities. It is likely that the UNS will
move even further in the market direction.
State authority
Market
Academic oligarchy
Figure 2: The movement of Australian higher education
A n y government will find it increasingly difficult to fund the e n o r m o u s

expansion of higher education that is occurring, and necessity as well as
political ideology will force government to encourage alternative, nongovernment funding strategies. Australia is well indeed in the throes of
the transition from an elite to a mass system of higher education. T h e r e
seems to be no opportunity for turning away from this reality, although
many academics have not been grateful for the way in which it has been
forced upon t h e m .
But o n e must be careful in using such words as "force" in the Australian
higher education policy context. T h e Australian academic community is still
reeling from the brunt of the blow of rather sudden and dramatic change.
T h e case is often m a d e that all that has h a p p e n e d is due solely to the will
of government, but this is simply not t r u e . In one sense, Australian higher
37
education has suffered change because of its very success. Because a much
larger proportion of the population wishes to participate in higher education
because higher education is regarded as a significant contributor to
both national and individual wealth and prosperity institutions have had
to respond to new environmental influences. According to B u r t o n Clark
(1983: 236):
Particularly in systems where tasks and powers are extensively divided and dispersed,
change in structure is what fundamental change means. Structural change modifies
who does what on a regular basis; and w h o decides regularly on who will do what.
A powerful reason why so many top-down reforms have no lasting deposits is that
they do not alter the understructure of actual operations. Changes that proceed by
altering the structure alter the fundamental biases of a system, changing the source
of opinion and power expressed in the agendas of decision and in the procedures of
daily operation.
T h e degree to which policy reform and the demise of the binary structure
have altered the "understructure of actual operations" is probably demonstrably
higher for the CAES than for the universities, particularly in those instances
w h e r e CAES have b e e n amalgamated with universities. In university/CAE
m e r g e r s , the n o r m s and values underlying the university's m o d u s operandi
seem to prevail. In those instances where university values have not
prevailed, the future of the merger has b e e n placed u n d e r threat.
T h e demise of the binary system was pressed u p o n government by
other significant actors in the higher education field. T h e binary structure,
however, was not the only point of dissatisfaction. T h e highly regulated
control of higher education provided by CTEC hindered the ambitions of
several of the large and prestigious universities. Vice-Chancellors and college
principals desired greater institutional a u t o n o m y in relation to setting staff
terms and conditions, borrowing and raising capital resources and, within
the CAES, for approving and accrediting courses. In a m o r e general sense,
it can be argued that institutional leaders accepted, at least to a d e g r e e ,
the same market-driven ideological imperatives on which government based
its policy decisions and w e r e in accord with government's reasoning that
the Australian system should develop into a m o r e adaptive, responsive,
and competitive system. T h e r e is some empirical evidence to support this
supposition ( M e e k and G o e d e g e b u u r e , 1989).
It is likely, however, that rank-and-file academic staff are far less
enthusiastic about the direction in which policy is leading higher education
than are institutional leaders. F o r o n e thing, the policies attempt to extend
the authority of chief executive officers over staff, and, for a n o t h e r , they
place university and former college staff at loggerheads with one a n o t h e r
in the same institution through amalgamation. A l s o , academic workload
has increased with high student-staff ratios, though this is not a direct
result of recent policy initiatives. While there has been grumbling at
the "workface," t h e r e has b e e n little concerted action to u n d e r m i n e the
reforms, and some signs of tacit support. For e x a m p l e , no university/CAE
38
L Meek
amalgamations have proceeded without the approval of university academic

boards, and in 1989 the academic unions agreed to the second-tier wage
rise which contained a productivity clause, and they agreed to the terms
and conditions of employment set out in the 1991 wage case. Change and
conflict are taking place in higher education, but they are not the sole result
of government policy.
W h a t is important is not just the seeming accord between the attitudes of
institutional leaders and the philosophy behind many of the government's
policies, but also the intersection b e t w e e n t h e n o r m s and values of
institutional leaders, the contents of the policies, and the steering strategies
employed by government. Merger is a good example of how these forces
intersect to bring about change. G o v e r n m e n t did not provide a blueprint
of planned amalgamations, but rather changed the boundary conditions in
which the system operates and specified minimum student load as a criteria
for participation in the system. T h e minimum load criteria explains why small
institutions merged it was a matter of survival but it does not explain
why many institutions well over the minimum load have attempted to grow
as large as possible through amalgamation. In a comparative study of change
in higher education in Australia and the Netherlands ( G o e d e g e b u u r e and
M e e k , 1991: 25), it was proposed that:
A n explanation for this can be found if we assume that institutions . . . have
perceived the restructuring and associated changes towards more market-oriented,
competitive higher education systems as real. That is, they have anticipated the
changing environment by displaying strategic behaviour. Within a competitive system
the power base of an institution, defined as "the ability to bring in scarce resources
or cope with critical contingencies" (Pfeffer 1981: 131), is an essential element, since
it largely determines the chances of success vis-a-vis its competitors; in this case,
the other higher education institutions in the environment. When we look at the
merger processes in terms of attempts to solidify or strengthen the existing power
base of an institution, we can very clearly identify the overt strategic behaviour that
is shown by most of the institutions. If we focus our attention on those institutions for
which merger is not an absolute necessity . . . we can see that they have "diversified
their product" through mergers . . . [It] can be argued that large institutions joined
the merger process in order to (a) retain their competitive edge in terms of size,
thus securing their ability to bring in scarce resources from the dominant provider
(government); and (b) diversify in order to cover as much of the subject fields as
possible to be able to cope with critical contingencies.
The conflict in higher education is not so much between "higher education"

and " g o v e r n m e n t " as it is between and within institutions themselves. T h e
destruction of the so-called binary system destabilized the structure of
Australian higher education, and what is now occurring is a restructuring
of the system in which institutions will achieve their "class" location vis-a-vis
other institutions through a complex process of competition over scarce
resources. T h e old binary system clearly placed Australian universities at
the top of the institutional status hierarchy; what will be interesting to
observe is the degree to which past conventions influence future status
differentiations within Australian higher education. It can be expected that
39
those institutions which benefited from past definitions of higher education

will attempt to p e r p e t u a t e t h e m .
It is far too early to offer any definitive assessment of the new policies,
policy instruments, and legislation on the operation of institutions. It is
fairly clear that, in particular instances, some of the policy initiatives
have proven unsuccessful. Some of the amalgamations brought about
by both the necessity and desire of institutions to increase in size may
fail, but the marriage annulments will be forced not by government but
by the wishes of individual institutions. T h e r e is little likelihood that
amalgamations between institutions on adjacent or nearly adjacent sites
will be discontinued. But some of the amalgamation arrangements that
involve a n u m b e r of campuses between which there are large geographical
distances are proving u n w o r k a b l e , and in particular instances it appears
that merger has been achieved in n a m e only. This brings into question the
benefits government claimed for institutional consolidation:
greater breadth and depth of course offerings available to students;
advantages to staff in the form of wider options for career advancement
and teaching/research arrangements;
economies in administration and other overheads; and
stronger foundation for growth in the institution.
Some of the benefits claimed for institutional amalgamation have been
achieved, particularly with respect to institutions on nearby sites which have
consolidated their activities, but whether they have been achieved for the
system as a whole is doubtful.
Also, government policy is proving to be contradictory in some respects.
G o v e r n m e n t wishes to see a m o r e diversified system of higher education,
with each institution developing its own particular mission, goals, and niche
in the higher education " m a r k e t . " A t the same time, government funding
arrangements encourage institutional imitation in some areas. Increased
activity in the area of C o m m o n w e a l t h funded research has implications
for future funding, so every institution wishes to develop a research
culture. Postgraduate research students are funded at a higher rate than
other students, so the new institutions in the UNS (the former CAES) are
developing graduate p r o g r a m m e s and shifting m o r e of their student load
in that direction. T h e centralized wage fixing/industrial relations system
enforces a high degree of uniformity on the terms and conditions of
academic work.
But there can be little doubt that for the large part institutions have
taken u p the gauntlet thrown down by government, a glove they themselves
helped manufacture. With continued de-regulation, what will be interesting
to observe is the extent to wish the system will tolerate " b a n k r u p t c y " as one
possible o u t c o m e of m a r k e t competition.
A s elsewhere, no Australian government will totally abdicate its control
over higher education. The move towards a more self-regulating system is
40
L Meek
definitely accompanied by a greater emphasis on accountability: development

of a system of quality control, evaluation of performance, application of
positive and negative incentives, setting national priorities in teaching and
research, etc.
T h e way in which individual institutions negotiate their educational
profiles/mission with government has been mentioned and will be discussed
further u n d e r the topic of buffer bodies, but first m o r e should be said about
quality and a u t o n o m y .
Quality and
accountability
F r o m the outset, the Dawkins reform package placed emphasis on

quality control mechanisms. In 1989, the government commissioned a
review of performance indicators in higher education, and a n u m b e r of
mechanisms has been established to evaluate institutional performance. The
CRCS have an evaluation c o m p o n e n t written into the contract, and the ARC is
developing a comprehensive evaluation strategy for monitoring the quality
of research. T h e Special Research Centres and Key Centres of Teaching
and Research are currently being reviewed, and a few discipline reviews
have been completed. However, it was not until the O c t o b e r 1991 policy
statement by the Minister for Higher Education and E m p l o y m e n t Services,
the H o n . Peter Baldwin, that quality was placed m o r e firmly on the higher
education agenda. Baldwin's paper was entitled Higher Education:
Quality
and Diversity in the 1990s (Australia, 1991).
O n the topic of quality control mechanisms, the Minister announced: the
provision from 1992 of seeding funds from the Reserve F u n d to enable
institutions to establish quality m a n a g e m e n t mechanisms; the establishment
in 1992, again using the Reserve F u n d , of a National Centre for Teaching
Excellence; a reference to the higher education Council of NBEET to explore
the characteristics of quality in higher education; and following the Council
report on its quality reference, the establishment of a national quality
assurance structure, independent of government, responsible for reporting
and commenting on the adequacy of quality m a n a g e m e n t arrangements at
the institutional level. T h e government intends to continue its support for
the further development of quantitative performance indicators, but states
that it "has no intention of prescribing performance indicators to be used by
institutions, nor will normal operating grants be redistributed on the basis
of comparative quantitative indicators" (Australia, 1991: 4). Nonetheless,
a financial incentive will be closely tied to the question of quality and
performance. T h e government will direct funds from the Reserve Fund
from 1992 to encourage and reward good teaching practices with grants
of up to $250,000; in addition grants of up to $300,000 will be available
for institutional initiatives aimed at enhancing teaching quality:
41
The Government's principal initiative in relation to quality is its decision to provide

additional funds of $80 million, equivalent to 2 % of operating grants, annually from
1994 for a quality assurance and enhancement programme (established early 1993).
These funds, which are additional to the operating grants . . ., are intended to act as a
catalyst for institutions to allocate their total resources in ways which will maximize the
quality of provision. The funds will be allocated in recognition of good performance in
the use of all available resources to attain the best quality, including the achievement
of equity objectives, taking account of such factors as quality management practices,
the composition of the student population and the extent of progress in implementing
articulation and credit transfer arrangements (Australia, 1991: 33).
T h r o u g h o u t the discussion of quality, the Minister's statement goes to

great length to assert that government has no intention of interfering with
institutional autonomy:
It is for institutions to determine their mission, to define what they mean by quality
and standards of performance against their own objectives, and to identify and
provide the evidence necessary for them to gauge their success and satisfy their
various stakeholders. It is also the responsibility of institutions to develop their
own management structures taking account of their specific mission. Contrary to
the claims of s o m e , the Government is not seeking to impose a uniform model of
corporate management on the system, to the detriment of concepts of collegiality
(Australia, 1991: 31).
T h e following quote from the statement is of particular relevance to this

report:
The majority of OECD countries have some arrangements for quality assurance in
higher education and, in most cases, there is provision for quality assessments to be
taken into account in funding decisions. Some of the approaches adopted elsewhere,
particularly in the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, would be counter
to our traditions of institutional autonomy in the extent of central intervention they
involve (Australia, 1991: 34).
Not all of the Australian academic community have been p r e p a r e d to

take the Minister at his word. But while such bodies as the AVCC have
expressed concern over how far quality measures should go, there has been
no general outcry against the concept itself. Some argue that academic
staff performance, as o n e c o m p o n e n t of quality, is already well monitored
through the promotions and t e n u r e system. H o w e v e r , it is generally accepted
that a balance between institutional a u t o n o m y and public accountability must
be maintained.
It is far too early to assess how quality control mechanisms will actually
work. In my opinion, the real danger rests not on the question of institutional
a u t o n o m y , but relates to that of uniformity. R a t h e r than penalize institutions
for p o o r performance, the government is going to reward institutions for
good performance. T h e r e is nothing wrong with this in itself, but there
could well be a tendency for institutions to imitate each other's "good
performance" in order to get the rewards attached to it we already see
this happening in the areas of research and postgraduate study. W h a t e v e r
quality control mechanism is put into place needs to ensure diversity as well
as quality, and the two concepts may not always be compatible. In fact, there
42
L. Meek
may be an inverse relationship between diversity and high profile measures

of quality and performance, particularly if financial rewards are part of the
quality formula.
freedom
Australian universities have always enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.

T h e government's reform package has not t h r e a t e n e d the academic freedom
or autonomy of the universities, and has demonstrably increased the
autonomy of former CAES and increased procedural autonomy of all higher
education institutions.
Of course, one can m o u n t the counter argument along the lines that
the CAES absorbed by existing universities through amalgamation lost all
institutional a u t o n o m y ; and the argument can be extended by pointing out
that even those CAES which combined to form a new university lost their
previous institutional identity. While all this is t r u e , it must be r e m e m b e r e d
that the institutions negotiated their individual fate it was not forced
on them by direct government intervention. H a d government intervened
more directly in particular amalgamation negotiations, possibly some of
the more "irrational" merger arrangements, based on expediency rather
than on sound educational and administrative principles, would not have
occurred. Through the Task Force on A m a l g a m a t i o n s , government did
attempt to guide the merger process by rewarding cooperative institutions
and threatening the m o r e stubborn ones with financial starvation; but the
Report of the Task Force on Amalgamations,
in most instances, merely
reflected what was happening anyway. G o v e r n m e n t was not even able to
use its "funding stick" to achieve mergers it thought particularly desirable,
such as combining Murdoch and the University of Western Australia, and
the ANU and Canberra CAE (these amalgamations did not occur). Moreover,
as mentioned above, it is likely that some campuses which abdicated their
autonomy to join a multicampus university will regain it in the not too distant
future but this will h a p p e n through local institutional politics, not through
direct government intervention. It may be some time yet before the final
n u m b e r of a u t o n o m o u s Australian higher education institutions is known.
R a t h e r than viewing autonomy as an absolute, one can regard it as
a relational issue involving the balance of power between institutions
and government, on the one hand, and between administration and the
academic profession within institutions, on the other. I suspect that direct
threats to academic freedom are more closely associated with the internal
balance of power between executive and collgial governance than with
external intervention, though the executive arm of the institution may act
as a proxy for government bureaucrats. Institutional autonomy provides no
43
absolute protection of academic freedom. H o w e v e r , there is no evidence that

academic freedom in Australia is being directly threatened by either internal
or external forces. Certainly, various incentive structures are influencing
individual scholars in their teaching and research scholars will gravitate
towards those areas where there is money. But, unless one regards such
matters as government setting aside a proportion of public money for
research in areas of national priority as undue political interference in
academic a u t o n o m y , there has been little or no bruising to the principles
of academic freedom in Australia. This does not m e a n , however, that
government incentive structures and other policy instruments do not have
implications for academic freedom.
O n e area of concern is the maintenance of scientific freedom in the
context of the push towards greater commercialization of research and
joint university/industry research ventures. T h e r e are various incentives,
such as the CRC p r o g r a m m e mentioned above, to encourage researchers
and universities to engage in joint commercial ventures with industry.
But the impact of these ventures on such issues as the ownership of
intellectual property has yet to be clearly addressed. Academics have
always been keen to lay claim to their scholarly and scientific property, but
traditionally this ownership related to property publicly displayed through
publications. Publication, however, can contradict commercial interests:
important research results may need to be kept secret for commercial
reasons, or to protect patent rights. These issues involve much m o r e than
the interests of the academics concerned, and affect the overall patterns of
communication in science. T h e free flow of information and ideas to which
scientific research and universities have been committed may be constrained
by commercial interests, compromising not only the norms of the academic
community but also the public's right to information. T h e r e is no evidence
yet of this happening in Australia, but concern is being expressed. T h e
AVCC, for example, is preparing guidelines on the ownership of intellectual
property; but the possible threat here is not so much from government as
from the ambitions of some academic researchers. If academics are going to
be self-regulating in a m a r k e t environment, then they will need to develop
their own codes of conduct.
Universities are accountable for the public money they spend. Like all
public institutions, universities are legally obliged to submit to external
financial audits. A n d , because universities are largely d e p e n d e n t on public
money, they must o p e r a t e within the b r o a d framework set by government.
But rarely has the C o m m o n w e a l t h government intervened directly in
the affairs of individual institutions. In the area of industrial relations,
institutions must legally abide by national agreement. H o w e v e r , it needs
to be r e m e m b e r e d that both staff through their unions, and institutions
through the Australian Higher Education Industrial Association (AHEIA)
are parties to these agreements.
44
L Meek
Procedural autonomy in the Australian context has been increased.

Institutions have a large degree of control over such matters as purchasing,
investments, capital works, and so on. In terms of substantive a u t o n o m y ,
universities have the freedom to select staff and students, to determine
curriculum content and degree standards, and to allocate funds across
different categories of expenditure. T h e r e are some restraints, of course,
such as the influence of some professional associations on curriculum in
specific fields; and there is probably little merit in having autonomy over such
matters as the determination of degrees if no funding is to follow. However,
in general, the principles of substantive and procedural autonomy have been
extended, both to institutions and, within at least some institutions, to
faculties and d e p a r t m e n t s . Institutions themselves are devolving m o r e of
the control and responsibility for budgets and academic decision-making to
faculties and d e p a r t m e n t s . This often increases the workload of academics,
but it hardly threatens their autonomy and freedom.
T h e federal government can force higher education institutions to do
things against their will through the threat of withholding funding. A s
mentioned, the Fraser government in the early 1980s used this threat
very effectively to force a n u m b e r of institutional amalgamations. The
H a w k e L a b o u r government accomplished an even greater n u m b e r of
amalgamations through the use of more subtle tactics. But, as already
argued, institutional ambition as well as government relating funding to
size, has driven the recent round of mergers. H o w e v e r , it is probably the
case that the federal government would intervene directly in the affairs of
individual institutions much m o r e than it does if it could, but it is restrained
from direct legal/legislative intervention by the federal political system. T h e
C o m m o n w e a l t h does have legislative control over the Australian National
University (ANU) and has used or a t t e m p t e d to use its legislative and other
powers to interfere with the internal m a n a g e m e n t of the ANU. G o v e r n m e n t
is presently divesting the ANU of administrative and financial control of the
J o h n Curtin School of Medical Research through transfering funding of the
School from the ANU to the D e p a r t m e n t of H e a l t h , Housing and Community
Services. Legislatively, the government can accomplish the financial transfer
through the Appropriations Bill. H o w e v e r , even in its own backyard, the
C o m m o n w e a l t h does not always get its own way. In 1989, the Minister
wished to see a merger between the ANU and the then C a n b e r r a CAE and
introduced legislation to this effect, but the legislation was defeated in the
U p p e r H o u s e by the Liberals and the D e m o c r a t s . I think what can be seen
here is the importance of a balance of power in any higher education system.
Recently, there has been some suggestion in Australia that legislation for
higher education be transferred from the states to the C o m m o n w e a l t h
but this could be disastrous for both academic freedom and institutional
a u t o n o m y , particularly since now there is no buffer body between institutions
and the federal government.
Intermediary
45
bodies
CTEC was a statutory authority that served as a buffer or intermediary

between institutions and government. It consisted of three councils
university, CAE, and TAFE and advised government on funding and other
institutional needs. It had a p e r m a n e n t secretariat as well as a n u m b e r of
full-time and part-time commissioners drawn from the academic community
and other sections of society. According to a senior Australian educator and
long-term Chairman of CTEC, Professor Peter Karmel, the CTEC arrangement
had several advantages:
The institutions were protected from direct political interference: they were at arms
length from governments. The recommendations of the commissions and the reasons
for them were public. Decisions were open and even-handed. The commissions
built up a knowledge of institutions and an understanding of their aspirations
and operations. They were sensitive to their ethos and acted to support them.
The commissions exercised only comparatively light controls over the institutions,
mainly through capital programs and the approvals of major developments . . . The
Department of Education had little role in the areas covered by the commissions,
and the Minster tended not to be greatly involved (Karmel, 1989: 1112).
Karmel probably paints a rather rosy picture of the role of CTEC, and
there are several reasons why government abolished it in 1987. Both the
universities and the CAES felt disadvantaged by the funding mechanisms
employed by CTEC. By the mid-1980s, CTEC itself had become somewhat
politicized and there was a degree of antagonism between the then Chairman
and the Minister. T h e demise of CTEC was also caught u p in the major
restructuring of cabinet portfolios and public service d e p a r t m e n t s to form
so-called super-ministries and super-departments that was occurring at the
time. T h e H a w k e L a b o u r government was assuming m o r e direct stewardship
of the economy and did not wish to see any m o r e government d e p a r t m e n t s
or statutory authorities between itself and the economy than was absolutely
necessary. Education became part of a combined portfolio of employment,
education, and training, which fused elements of the former portfolios of
education, and employment and labour, together with some aspects of the
former portfolio of science.
T h e r e p l a c e m e n t of CTEC with NBEET r e m o v e d t h e buffer b e t w e e n
institutions and federal government. N B E E T and its four councils schools,
higher education, employment and skills formation, and the ARC are
well integrated with DEET. T h e r e is n o clear line where DEET ends and
NBEET begins. O n e consequence of this is that in the profile exercise,
institutions must now deal directly with a government d e p a r t m e n t . W h e n
these arrangements were first a n n o u n c e d , there was a great deal of fear in
the Australian academic community that institutional autonomy would be
seriously e r o d e d ; but, as stated above, there is no evidence to suggest that
this has h a p p e n e d , and criticism of the profile exercise has lessened. T h e
AVCC has supported "the educational profile concept as it has been refined,
46
L. Meek
with annual reviews and updates [which are] preferred to the former CTEC
'wish list' arrangement and associated triennial visits" (AVCC, 1990).
T h e criticism of the DEET/NBEET arrangement does not so much concern
autonomy at the institutional level, but m o r e the lack of independent advice
to government at the national level and a body of experts to provide that
advice. NBEET and obviously DEET are under the direct control of the
Minister, and, however strongly NBEET and its Higher Education Council
(HEC) may argue that they provide independent and unbiased advice to
government, they will be seen as instruments of government. T h e HEC is
small and, as is the case with many government d e p a r t m e n t s , there is a
regular turnover of staff within NBEET and DEET. This works against the
build-up of a group of specialists in the field of higher education. T h u s ,
there appears to be a need for some form of higher education statutory
body at the national level, not so much to counter threats to institutional
autonomy, but to provide independent expert advice and long-term planning
to both government and institutions.
Federalism
A good deal has already been said about the Australian federal political
structure. But a few additional points are worth making. Even before
the recent reforms, the role of most state higher education coordinating
authorities was diminishing, and now, in most states, offices of higher
education are run on a very small scale; Victoria is the notable exception.
However, there are signs that the states may start to take a greater interest
in higher education. This may actually be forced on them by two factors:
rising unmet d e m a n d and the upgrading of TAFE.
Education is legally a state m a t t e r , and primary and secondary educational
issues have always had a strong influence on the electorate. If u n m e t
d e m a n d continues to rise which m e a n s it will start affecting a larger
proportion of the electorate (students and their families) it is likely that
higher education will become m o r e politicized at both the state and federal
levels. State politicians may be forced to take a greater interest in higher
education.
G o v e r n m e n t is attempting not only to upgrade TAFE, but also to siphon
some of the u n m e t d e m a n d for higher education into it. A t the same time,
government wishes to see a smoother articulation between TAFE and higher
education. Currently the federal government has proposed that it assumes
funding for TAFE; the states are resisting, but there are obvious financial
advantages for the states to pass funding of TAFE to the C o m m o n w e a l t h . If
TAFE becomes funded like higher education, there will be strong pressures
within TAFE for it to become another higher education sector, something
along the lines of the CAE sector that the government got rid of as recently
as 1988. If this h a p p e n s , both the states and the nation will be left without
a tertiary education system to offer training in the lower level vocational
47
and technical fields. Much of this training is state-specific, and the states
will have to take strong measures to prevent the same academic drift within
a national TAFE system which occurred in the CAE sector.
Conclusion
So far this chapter has examined the effect on higher education of recent
government policy and has attempted to identify where policy has succeeded
or failed to bring about intended change. But the question remains whether
or not government policy in all its intricacies has fundamentally transformed
the structure, function, and character of Australian higher education.
T h e answer to this question is both yes and n o . First, it is yes insofar
as the demise of the binary system has dramatically altered the boundary
conditions between different types of institutions and forced them to
reassess their interrelationships. T h e answer is yes also in that at the
base operating level, academic staff, individually and collectively, have
b e e n given both m o r e freedom and m o r e responsibility for their actions.
Second, the answer is no insofar as government policy has been the primary
instigator of change, and is but a reflection of change occurring elsewhere
in the system and in society. O n e of the main motivators of change has been
the transformation of Australian higher education from a small elite system
to a mass system. Elite systems of higher education which recruit a small
n u m b e r of the most academically able from society to participate do not
need to worry about issues concerning quality, relevance, responsiveness
to socio-economic needs, a u t o n o m y , competition, and even funding but
mass systems d o .
T h e r e is a place in Australia for "elite" higher education institutions; there
is, however, no place for an elite system of higher education. G o v e r n m e n t
wishes to now fund institutions for what they d o , not for what they are called.
Nearly all higher education institutions are now called universities. Tradition
is a powerful force, and destabilized systems have a tendency to reconstruct
themselves in light of past images. G o v e r n m e n t policy initiatives will have
failed if all universities in the UNS attempt to imitate one another, as they
did in the past.
T h e UNS does not formally differentiate between types of institutions, but
an informal "institutional class system" is already emerging, containing at
least four "types" of higher education institutions, each formed from both
their own unique history and merger arrangement:
the older research universities (e.g., Sydney and M e l b o u r n e ) ;
the universities of technology ( e . g . , Q u e e n s l a n d University of
Technology);
universities on the social and geographical fringe of the higher education
system (e.g., D e a k i n and the University of New E n g l a n d ) ; and
48
L. Meek
CAE and CAE combinations redesignated as universities (e.g., the

University of Western Sydney and Charles Sturt University).
T h e r e is no inherent problem with the emergence of different types of
institutions: quite the contrary. T h e problem rests with the possibility that
a classifactory system will develop, based on a status hierarchy, where
imitation of the institutions at the top of the hierarchy is the guiding
principle for all other institutions. A mass system of higher education
requires diversification and differentiation of institutional functions and
goals; a mass system must serve the many diverse needs of society and
its students. If the UNS tends to converge on the past traditions and values
of an elite system of higher education, not only will some legitimate societal
expectations of higher education be ignored, but also some institutions will
become but pale images of their m o r e "elite" counterparts. G o v e r n m e n t
policy has yet to adequately address this issue, and moving TAFE into the
national arena may merely exacerbate the problem.
Political expediency forced on government by high u n m e t d e m a n d for
higher education is one factor motivating government to upgrade TAFE to the
national level but if this h a p p e n s , it is likely that TAFE will become the sink
into which higher education institutions pour their less "desirable" clientele.
A national TAFE system will, for a time, protect higher education from some
of the less desirable aspects of mass higher education, but TAFE in turn will
have its own ambitions for status and "eliteness," and can be expected to
begin to shed lower level courses designed for students with non-academic
vocational interests. In effect, the binary system will be recreated and
probably in time suffer the same fate as the previous binary system. T h e
losers will not be the institutions, but society insofar as it will be limited in
its choice of valued and viable post-secondary educational opportunities.
3
Higher Education Policy in California
WARREN FOX
Introduction
Public postsecondary education in California began with the opening of
the California State Normal School (now California State University, San
Jose) in 1862, the creation of the University of California in the Organic
Statutes Act of 1868, and the establishment of the first Junior College
p r o g r a m m e in Fresno in 1910. By 1920, there were seven normal schools,
and the legislature decided to abolish their local governing boards and
r e n a m e t h e m teachers' colleges. In 1935, the legislature acted to change
their n a m e to state colleges and formally authorized the expansion of their
curriculum beyond teacher education into the liberal arts and sciences and
various technical fields, including agriculture.
In the m e a n t i m e , the University of California, which from its founding
has enjoyed unique status as a public trust governed by a B o a r d of Regents
"not subject to the G o v e r n o r or Legislature except as to extent of financial
s u p p o r t , " had grown beyond its original campus in Berkeley to include
campuses in San Francisco and Davis. In 1919, it took over the Los Angeles
Normal School as its fourth campus. During this period, the Junior Colleges
continued to evolve as two-year academic and vocational p r o g r a m m e s
offered by public school districts. In 1921, the legislature authorized the
creation of separate Junior College districts, but throughout the first half
of the century the majority of Junior Colleges continued to be operated by
high school and unified school districts.
T h e University of Santa Clara and the University of the Pacific, which
were established in 1851, and Mills College established in 1852, were the
first of the state's many independent (private) institutions of postsecondary
education. Unlike their sister institutions in the eastern states, these
institutions grew up in the shadow of a strong and ambitious collection
49
50
W. Fox
of public institutions. Yet among the independents were colleges and

universities, large and small, that quickly gained national and international
recognition for their a c a d e m i c a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . T h e most i m p o r t a n t
m o d e r n influence on higher e d u c a t i o n in California was u n q u e s t i o n a b l y
t h e 1960 M a s t e r Plan for Higher Education. By 1959, competition among
the public segments for students and p r o g r a m m e s developed into what
University of California President Clark Kerr t e r m e d "real anarchy." In
response to massive pressures for growth and limited state resources to
finance it, the Master Plan Survey T e a m was appointed by system leaders to
carry out this study. It was m a d e u p of representatives from the three public
systems and from independent institutions. T h e Master Plan Survey T e a m
endorsed much of what had evolved in higher education u p to that time,
but also forwarded several important recommendations. It r e c o m m e n d e d
that the State Colleges be given their own independent governing b o a r d ,
that efforts be m a d e to develop Junior Colleges in areas not yet adequately
served, and that differentiation of function continue to be a guiding principal
for the tripartite public system. It reaffirmed the "tuition-free" policy of the
university and State Colleges, but stated that they should charge students
for certain operating costs and that all auxiliary services should be self
supporting.
T h e Survey T e a m d e p a r t e d significantly from earlier p r o p o s a l s in
recommending that lower division enrolment in both four-year systems
be reduced from approximately 51 to 4 0 % of total enrolment by 1975, and
that 50,000 lower division students be diverted to the Junior Colleges by
that time. It also r e c o m m e n d e d that the legislature establish a Coordinating
Council for Higher Education to advise the systems, the legislature, and the
G o v e r n o r on the planning and coordination of higher education.
T h e Survey T e a m also r e c o m m e n d e d expansion of the State Scholarship
P r o g r a m m e that had been established in 1955 and was becoming an
important source of support for the independent institutions and a counterbalance to the state's "tuition-free" policy for California residents attending
public institutions.
T h e Survey T e a m ' s recommendation that the State College B o a r d ,
the Coordinating Council (now the California Postsecondary Education
Commission), and a statement of functions of each system be placed in
the state Constitution was rejected, but, with minor modifications, most
of the recommendations that required legislative action were enacted in
the D o n a h o e Act of 1960. Thus in statute and in administrative action, the
1960 Master Plan became the guiding document for the growth of both public
and private higher education for the second half of this century. By 1992, the
University of California had grown to a nine-campus system serving 165,000
students, the California State University has grown to 20 campuses serving
360,000 students, and the California Community Colleges encompass 107
campuses serving 1.3 million students.
51

The education
system
Secondary education, as with the primary grades, is offered both through

public and privately operated schools. Approximately 8 5 % of all primary
and secondary students attend public schools. F r o m a curricular standpoint,
all primary and secondary schools are quite similar. Private schools are
often religiously affiliated. In the public schools, the concept of magnet
schools is emerging, in which individual public high schools offer a full
breadth curriculum, but may also specialize and provide especially d e e p
course offerings in a particular area, for example the fine arts or sciences.
Overall, however, there is great similarity in the primary and secondary
education p r o g r a m m e s provided across California. Secondary education is
a four-year course of study in virtually all cases (grades 9-12). T h e structure
of the educational system in California is shown in Figure 1.
California
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
uc
csu
ccc
private I
institutions
17
16
15
high school
14
13
12
11
10
9
primary school
8
7
6
5
4
pre-primary school
3
Age
Figure 1: The Californian educational system
52
W. Fox
The higher education system; history and rationale

T h e r e are four distinct systems of higher education in California, three
public and one private. T h e public systems' missions are spelled out in T h e
Master Plan for California Higher Education such that in combination they
are expected to complement each other in carrying out the broad range of
needed postsecondary education services in California. T h e three public
higher education systems are the University of California, the California
State University, and the California Community Colleges. I n d e p e n d e n t
(private sector) colleges and universities are seen as the fourth education
system, although they operate in complete a u t o n o m y from the state and
from each other.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
T h e University of California (uc) is California's primary state supported

academic agency for research; it offers four-year undergraduate (baccalaureate)
programmes and graduate programmes in a wide variety of fields. It is
governed by a lay B o a r d of Regents appointed by the G o v e r n o r . A s part
of the Master Plan's differentiated functions between the systems, u c has
exclusive jurisdiction among public institutions over graduate instruction in
dentistry, law, medicine, and veterinary medicine. A m o n g public institutions
it has sole authority to award the doctoral degree, except in limited instances
where it offers the joint doctoral degree in conjunction with the California
State University. Dentistry, medicine, and veterinary medicine are generally
four-year programmes (beyond the baccalaureate), while law is three years.
Master degree programmes are generally two years long, while doctoral
programmes can vary widely. For example, completion of a doctoral
degree in chemistry averages approximately five years, while a similar
degree in the humanities and social sciences averages approximately seven
years. Discipline-based differences in research expectations, as well as wide
differences in financial support for research activities, account for much of
the disparities in the length of degree courses between disciplines.
T h e University of California admits freshmen from among the top 1 2 . 5 %
of the graduating high school class, as defined in the system's admissions
requirements. In addition, u c is expected to maintain overall u n d e r g r a d u a t e
enrolments of approximately 4 0 % lower division (freshman/sophomore)
and 6 0 % upper division (junior/senior) in order to accommodate transfer
students from the community college system. Transfer students attend
community college for the first two years of their undergraduate p r o g r a m m e ,
then they transfer to either the University of California or the California
State University to finish their d e g r e e . Finally, t h e California State
C o n s t i t u t i o n grants t h e University of California nearly complete autonomy
from direct governmental control, despite the fact that the institution is
publicly financed.
53
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY
T h e primary mission of the California State University (csu) is instruction

of u n d e r g r a d u a t e and master degree students in the liberal arts and
sciences, applied fields, and professions, including teaching. Its faculties
are authorized to u n d e r t a k e research to the extent that it is consistent with
this primary instructional function. In addition, the State University offers
limited joint doctoral p r o g r a m m e s with t h e University of California and
with independent institutions in California. T h e California State University
is governed by a lay Board of Trustees, appointed by the G o v e r n o r .
Like t h e University of California, the baccalaureate p r o g r a m m e s offered
by the State University are four years in length, although this system caters
to a somewhat older and m o r e " p a r t - t i m e " clientele, meaning that the actual
time required t o complete an u n d e r g r a d u a t e degree is often longer than four
years, csu master p r o g r a m m e s are usually two-year p r o g r a m m e s , while t h e
teacher-training p r o g r a m m e s generally take o n e year after completion of
the baccalaureate.
Csu admits its freshmen from the t o p one-third of California's high
school graduates, as defined by the system's admissions requirements.
Like the University of California, the State University is expected to
maintain u n d e r g r a d u a t e enrolments of approximately 4 0 % lower division
(freshman/sophomore) and 60% upper division (junior/senior) to accommodate
transfer students from the community college system.
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES
California Community Colleges (ccc) offer instruction through but not

beyond the second year of college. T h e primary functions of the colleges are
vocational education and preparation for university transfer. T h e community
colleges grant vocational and technical certificates and the associate in arts
and associate in sciences degrees. T h e community colleges have also come
to offer extensive p r o g r a m m e s in basic adult education and remedial
p r o g r a m m e s , as well as English as a Second Language (ESL) p r o g r a m m e s for
California's many immigrants. T h r o u g h their community service and adult
education p r o g r a m m e s , the community colleges offer non-credit classes in
literacy, health, civic, technical, and general education. Many colleges offer
apprenticeship training in a variety of vocational fields. All community
colleges offer p r o g r a m m e s fulfilling requirements for the first two years
of work at a four-year college or university; 4 5 % of all community college
courses are eligible for transfer to four-year institutions. T h e community
colleges are governed by a lay B o a r d of G o v e r n o r s , appointed by the
G o v e r n o r . This system has 107 campuses that o p e r a t e u n d e r 71 local
districts throughout the State of California. A n y o n e w h o possesses a high
school diploma or equivalent, or w h o is 18 years of age and can benefit from
instruction, is eligible for admission to a California community college.
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CALIFORNIAS PRIVATE POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS
Privately supported postsecondary education in California encompasses

a wide and diverse n u m b e r of institutions. In all, over 2500 non-state
supported postsecondary institutions o p e r a t e in California, only 1 5 % of
them granting degrees. Of this 1 5 % , less than 6 0 % approximately 195
are accredited or candidates for accreditation by agencies recognized by
the U S Secretary of Education. T h e remaining 4 0 % of the degree-granting
institutions operate in California u n d e r licensure by the California Council
on Private Postsecondary Education.
Of California's 195 private accredited degree-granting institutions, 125 are
accredited by the regional accrediting agency T h e Western Association
of Schools and Colleges (WASC), the same agency that accredits California's
public colleges and universities. T h e remainder of the private institutions
are accredited by specialized accrediting agencies. Of the 125 regionally
accredited institutions, four are proprietary (for profit). Of the remaining
121 regionally accredited, non-profit institutions, 64 are m e m b e r s of the
Association of I n d e p e n d e n t California Colleges and Universities (AICCU)
and enrol approximately 9 5 % of the students who are enrolled at such
institutions. Virtually all of the non-AICCU m e m b e r s are schools offering
specialized instruction, such as the A c a d e m y of A r t College, American
Film Institute, Brooks Institute of Photography, and the California College
of Podiatric Medicine, to n a m e a few. T h e majority of AICCU institutions
are comprehensive colleges and universities offering the full spectrum of
academic subjects and disciplines.
Of the 64 AICCU m e m b e r s , 41 have admission standards comparable
to California's public four-year institutions, as evidenced by the grade
point averages and course taking patterns of their entering students. M o r e
narrowly, 21 have admissions standards comparable to the University of
California, while the remaining 20 have standards more comparable to the
State University. It should be noted that these 41 u c and csu comparable
institutions enrol approximately 8 5 % of all students enrolled in private
degree-granting California colleges and universities.
Beyond the private degree-granting institutions, nearly 2500 institutions
p r e p a r e students in specific skills or for specific careers, offering diplomas
or certificates of attainment rather than academic degrees. T h e most
n u m e r o u s of these career-related p r o g r a m m e s are those that offer flight
training, business training, preparation for real estate salesperson licences,
and cosmetology. D a t a on the n u m b e r of students enrolled in private
unaccredited institutions are scattered and incomplete, since California
requires only its public institutions to supply these facts annually. T h u s ,
state policy-makers have little reliable information on which to base their
decisions affecting the private unaccredited sector.
Private unaccredited institutions both degree- and non-degree-granting
55
have recently been a m a t t e r of ongoing concern for educators and

policy-makers. Concerns over lax state oversight in ensuring the integrity
of these p r o g r a m m e s , and resultant charges that California protects "degree
mills," have resulted in the recent formation of a new state licensure body,
the California Council for Private Postsecondary Education. This new
organization is currently in the process of developing the regulations
u n d e r which it will review and authorize such unaccredited institutions
for operation, but it is expected that they will provide on-site reviews of
all unaccredited institutions before they are allowed to o p e r a t e . Formal
standards likely to be considered in approving these institutions include:
institutional objectives, administrative methods, educational record-keeping,
scholastic regulations, and graduation requirements, as well as a review
of the fiscal stability of the institution. The state interest is not so much
to prescribe a set educational approach or curriculum, but to set general
standards. In fact one of the main benefits of the independent sector is its
ability to innovate and develop non-traditional educational p r o g r a m m e s .
R a t h e r , the state, interest is aimed m o r e at providing a d e q u a t e consumer
protection for the students involved, as well as ensuring that a basic
level of rigor and integrity is maintained in the conduct of these private
programmes.
It is estimated that California's unaccredited institutions may enrol as
many as one million students inside and outside of the state; however,
as previously n o t e d , little attention has been paid to t h e m by either state
policy-makers or the educational establishment as a whole. A s a result, little
comprehensive data are available on the overall contribution this sector
makes towards meeting California's educational goals. After the Council
on Private Postsecondary Education begins implementing its regulations
and starts building its own data system, it is the hope of many in California
that this serious deficiency in the understanding the state's own educational
system will be rectified.

T h e typical preparatory path that students follow in anticipation of college
depends largely on the higher education system to which a student aspires. A s
previously noted, a high school diploma is all that is required for admission
to the community college system, but the prerequisites for admission to
the other systems are substantially more complex, and vary depending
on the system. In general, admissions criteria considered by the four-year
institutions fall into three categories:
high school preparatory course work;
minimum G r a d e Point Average (GPA);
college entrance examinations.
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Within the broad Master Plan framework, the University of California

selects from among the top 1 2 . 5 % and the California State University
selects from among the top 3 3 % of high school graduates. T h e institutions
themselves develop and implement admissions requirements with the goal
of defining their respective "eligibility p o o l s , " consistent with the Master
Plan goals. T h e state occasionally conducts a study to determine how close
each system's admissions requirements come to capturing their appropriate
share of high school graduates. If the results show that a system's admissions
requirements define substantially m o r e or less than its share of high school
graduates as eligible, the system itself takes the lead in adjusting its
TABLE 1
Students and staff (fte) in Californian higher education
Full-time
Students
New entrants
Part-time
uc
1979
1980
1985
1987
1989
1990
126,014
136,479
144,337
151,639
154,747
9,654
11,478
12,994
12,966
11,800
29,073
29,544
31,290
30,496
csu
1979
1980
1985
1987
1989
1990
191,286
203,175
209,322
221,686
226,131
122,564
121,451
133,454
139,152
142,922
69,704
67,433
67,747
68,301
ccc
1979
1980
1985
1987
1989
1990
286,517
261,876
269,876
305,166
304,974
1,097,551
911,693
991,843
1,101,783
1,110,103
404,843
298,237
329,740
355,389
Note:
Staff
Academic
Support
13,499
42,323
12,733
13,335
58,322
47,085
53,046
11,529
14,609
11,721
11,731
15,282
15,532
16,149
15,872
18,974
14,217
15,354
18,822
18,344
20,488
with respect to the c c c system, historic data is available for full-time faculty
only; e.g. in 1987 the community colleges also employed 25,056 temporary
and part-time faculty.
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admissions standards. Within these b r o a d guidelines, institutions have wide

discretion over t h e selection of their students.

D R O P OUT RATE
T h e r e is n o national target for an acceptable d r o p out rate. In fact,

only very limited data are available within California on d r o p outs per
se. Because of the high mobility of California students, the high rates of
transfer between campuses, and the p h e n o m e n o n of stop outs (taking time
off from studies with an intention to r e t u r n ) , d r o p out rates have b e e n seen
as having only limited utility. Instead, California has looked at measures of
degree productivity (degrees granted as a proportion of total e n r o l m e n t ) ,
and persistence rates (the proportion of students w h o continue from o n e
year to t h e next) in lieu of drop out statistics see Table 1.
Student-staff ratios are easily derived, but are not often used for budgeting
or other policy purposes. T h e actual student-staff ratios as of 1989 were
as follows: University of California 2.8:1 (some of this staff is related to
the University's teaching hospitals); California State University 22.4:1;
California Community Colleges 67.5:1; independent institutions u n k n o w n .

Higher education
legislation
In the U S A there does not exist national higher education legislation,

since higher education is a responsibility of the states. T h e three major
areas where the federal government takes an active role in higher education
are accreditation, student financial aid, and research funding.
programmes
ACCREDITATION
T h e federal government has traditionally stayed out of direct oversight

and regulation of higher education, but nevertheless provides assurance of
quality control through the less direct mechanism of accreditation. R a t h e r
than passing judgement on institutions directly, the federal government has
instead chosen, through the U S D e p a r t m e n t of Education, to officially
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recognize a wide variety of non-governmental accrediting agencies. O u t of

the need for national standards of quality, two basic types of accrediting
bodies have developed: institutional, and programematic or professional.
Institutional accrediting bodies review the entire institution including its
educational offerings, student services, financial condition, and administrative strength. These bodies are either regional or national in scope.
Programematic or professional accrediting bodies, as a rule, review a
specialized part of an institution. These bodies are generally associated
with an occupation or profession, such as law or medicine, and are concerned
with those parts of an institution which contribute to the training for that
profession. T h e key to accreditation is that it is a process of peer review,
in which the people in charge of the accrediting bodies are themselves
educators rather than politicians or bureaucrats. In fact, in most cases
the accrediting bodies are associations m a d e u p of the institutions to be
accredited. Generally, a specific accreditation team is created to review
a particular institution or p r o g r a m m e , and the reviewers are faculty and
education professionals from other institutions within the region who come
together for the specific purpose of conducting an institutional review.
It can be argued that overall the accreditation process works well. It
encourages continuous institutional self-study and improvement in a nonthreatening environment and, probably most importantly, has provided an
effective mechanism through which quality can be ensured without direct
governmental involvement. T h e federal government has maintained an
indirect role in higher education through its recognition of the various
accrediting agencies. By keeping the government one step removed from
direct oversight, while empowering educators to conduct critical peer
reviews, accreditation has protected the public interest in maintaining
high standards of quality, and has simultaneously served the institutional
interests of preserving academic freedom.
STUDENT FINANCIAL AID
Federal student financial aid is funded through the Higher Education Act
of 1965. Institutional eligibility for receipt of these funds generally depends
only on p r o p e r accreditation or state licensure, as well as compliance with
federal non-discrimination regulations.
T h e result of this liberal eligibility policy is that the federal government
largely divorces itself from direct involvement and oversight of institutional
activities, leaving that responsibility in the hands of the accreditation and
state licensure processes.
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R E S E A R C H FUNDING
T h e third major area of federal involvement is funding of research

activities. T h e federal government is the largest single source of institutional
research funds, although elaborate steps have been taken to remove politics
as much as possible from the research funding process. A s part of the federal
budget process, funds are appropriated to n u m e r o u s federal agencies for the
purpose of financing a wide variety of basic a n d applied research activities.
These funds are generally disbursed through a competitive grant process,
in which higher education institutions (and sometimes private research
institutes or corporations) submit grant proposals requesting funding for
specific research projects. Most often the grants are awarded on the basis of
"peer review," a process through which recognized experts in the field where
research is being funded review the various grant proposals and determine
which ones offer t h e greatest potential for success.
Beyond these three areas, higher education policy is left largely to the
50 states, with minimal involvement from the federal government.
APPROVAL OF NEW COURSES AND PROGRAMMES
T h e processes for approving new courses and programmes are extremely

decentralized, and e m a n a t e generally with individual faculty or within
individual academic d e p a r t m e n t s on a campus. T h e specific process for
establishment of a new course varies between campuses, but if funding
is available, formal approval generally needs to go n o higher than the
d e p a r t m e n t chair o r the dean of the college. Within the general p a r a m e t e r s
established by a system's mission as defined in t h e Master Plan, and the
size of an institution's budget, the development and implementation of the
curriculum is exclusively a province of the faculty.
T h e process for approval of a new academic p r o g r a m m e can b e somewhat
m o r e involved. A s with new courses, in almost all cases the proposal for
establishing a new academic p r o g r a m m e will originate with the faculty.
If the funding for the p r o g r a m m e can be generated or diverted within
the existing budget of a system, and the p r o g r a m m e has sufficient faculty
support, institutions have wide latitude to create, eliminate, or combine
academic p r o g r a m m e s as they see fit. H o w e v e r , if an institution intends
to request supplementary state funding for the p r o g r a m m e , then there is a
formal " p r o g r a m m e review process" in which the California Postsecondary
Education Commission conducts, on behalf of the state, an analysis of
the need for the p r o g r a m m e , and passes along a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to the
legislature and G o v e r n o r as to whether additional funding should be
provided for creation of the p r o g r a m m e . T h u s , the power of the purse
provides the state with de facto veto power over the establishment of new
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p r o g r a m m e s , or at least of those p r o g r a m m e s that institutions cannot or

will not fund within their existing resources.
There is no national or state curriculum, and specified student achievement
levels or student competencies are determined exclusively by the faculty.
In certain highly specialized fields, such as law and medicine, there are
state licensure processes in which students must pass approved examinations
before being authorized to practise their profession. Even in these cases the
examinations are developed and administered by professional associations
recognized by, but independent of, the government. Finally, it is important
to note that these examinations relate to professional licensure and not the
conferring of the academic degree. In matters relating to academic degree
requirements, the faculty has the final word.
Control of research
programmes
Individual faculties define and pursue their own research interests with
almost complete autonomy. In many ways, the university research environment
is entrepreneurial in nature. Faculties are free to pursue research interests with
total freedom, but the relative scarcity of research funds forces faculties
into a competitive environment in which their research proposals must be
sufficiently compelling to generate support in the "peer review" funding
process. Since most funding for research is generated from sources external
to the universities, institutional administrators (generally the dean or the
vice-chancellor for research) must review and approve all grant proposals
submitted by individual and self-formed groups of faculty to external funding
sources. But this institutional review centres on ensuring that the proposal is
of a quality that reflects well on the university; it does not revolve around
content control or the assignment of specific faculties to submit specific
proposals. T h e individual faculty m e m b e r s determine their own research
priorities and try to gain financial support for them in the market place of
the grant process.
T h e point has to be m a d e that the University of California does have a
substantial a m o u n t of internal funding that is available to support faculty
research efforts. A s with external funding of research activities, this money
is generally disbursed through a variety of competitive grant processes.
H o w e v e r , while the internal research funding is substantial in absolute
dollars, it is sufficient to fund only a small portion of the University's
overall research activities.
If the research pursued by an individual faculty m e m b e r is inexpensive in
nature or can be self-financed, then the faculty m e m b e r has total autonomy.
If the research requires external financing, then the final word rests with the
aggregate of decisions m a d e by the various corporations, foundations, and
governmental and institutional funding sources to which a researcher may
have applied.
Institutional
management
61
and control
For the public higher education systems, the governance structure is

defined in law. For each of the three public systems, state law establishes
a citizen board to govern institutional activities. Each governing board is
m a d e up of persons appointed by the G o v e r n o r and confirmed by the state
Senate. They are charged with governing their respective systems in the best
interests of the people of the State of California, and beyond that operate
much like the B o a r d of Directors of a private corporation. In addition to
the citizen m e m b e r s , the G o v e r n o r , the Speaker of the State Assembly,
and the President pro tempore of the state Senate sit as ex-officio voting
m e m b e r s of each of the three governing boards. In addition, each governing
b o a r d has a student and alumni m e m b e r selected by the recognized student
and alumni associations. T h e University of California is governed by the
B o a r d of R e g e n t s , the California State University by the Board of Trustees,
and the California Community Colleges by the Board of G o v e r n o r s . T h e
governing boards have official authority over the m a n a g e m e n t structure of
the institutions, although as a practical matter the boards select the CEO of
the system and the Presidents of the individual campuses; these persons then
exert the most direct control over the m a n a g e m e n t structure of the system
and of individual campuses.
National legislation affects institutional personnel practices only insofar
that receipt of federal funds requires that all institutions abide by federal nondiscrimination policies relating to employment practices. State legislation
and the state budget have a much m o r e direct effect on institutional
personnel practices than federal policies. In 1982, state legislation was
passed that established a process through which employees in all three
public higher education systems could choose to organize and collectively
negotiate labor contracts with institutional m a n a g e m e n t . T o d a t e , the faculty
and support staffs at both the California State University and the California
Community Colleges have unionized and negotiated contracts. A t the
University of California most support personnel are unionized, although
the faculties have repeatedly rejected efforts at unionization. For all public
higher education employees, whether they are unionized or not, contracts
are signed at the institutional level.
Institutions have varying degrees of latitude regarding reward systems,
although to the extent that there are restrictions they have been largely
self-imposed or required due to budget limitations. For example, the
University of California has m a d e a conscious and a u t o n o m o u s decision
to commit substantial funds to merit salary adjustments (MSAS). These are
base salary adjustments, independent of cost-of-living adjustments, which
are awarded to faculty and other employees on the basis of outstanding
performance. A critical and extensive peer evaluation process serves as the
basis for awarding MSAS at the University of California. O n the other hand,
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the California State University and the California Community Colleges

have chosen to provide salary adjustments for faculty and staff on a more
even-handed basis, with a resultant decline in funds available for incentive
purposes. Minimum faculty and staff requirements are established by the
recognized accreditation organization for a particular institution. These
minimum staffing standards vary widely depending on the type of institution
and the programmes offered. However, it is important to r e m e m b e r that
since accreditation is essentially a peer review process, these standards are
established by academics themselves. T h e r e are no limits on the maximum
n u m b e r of staff, except those imposed implicitly by the size of a system's
budget.
Higher education support staff are not part of the state civil service
system per se, but for all practical purposes they enjoy the same rights
and protections as civil servants. Most staff are employed u n d e r collective
bargaining agreements with provisions similar to those of civil servants.
In addition, if employees of the higher education systems ever leave and
enter the civil service, their service credits earned in higher education are
transferable to the state civil service system.
Faculty are hired, p r o m o t e d , and dismissed by their colleagues within the
faculty. Personnel decisions rest largely at the departmental level, with the
tenured faculty and d e p a r t m e n t chair having e n o r m o u s influence over hiring
and promotional decisions. T h e college dean also has substantial input into
personnel matters. O n occasion, the campus president may become involved
in personnel matters and can even exercise unilateral authority, although this
is extremely rare. Technically, the governing board of a system could choose
to exert its authority in individual personnel matters; however, outside of the
system CEO and the campus presidents, this authority is never exercised.
Institutional
funding
In this section the budgeting process used to appropriate state funds to

California's public higher education systems is described in two parts: first,
with an overview of the state budget process; and second, with a description
and an analysis of the support budget process for California's three public
higher education systems.
OVERVIEW OF THE STATE BUDGET PROCESS
In California, almost all expenditures and revenues are put into a single
budget bill, which must be enacted by the Legislature by J u n e 15 of each
year to go into effect on July 1. This budget system contrasts with most
other states and with the federal government, which each year generally
pass several separate appropriations bills: a highway bill, a health bill, an
education bill, and the like.
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Excluding the community colleges, California public higher education

unlike most other major state budget categories does not enjoy statutorily
required workload and inflation funding increases. Since a majority of the
budget categories are protected by such statutory funding requirements,
the a m o u n t of G e n e r a l F u n d money available for appropriation to those
categories without statutorily defined funding formulae, such as higher
education, is further constrained.
For state operations budgets, the formulae generally translate workload
into personnel or positions required for the work to be d o n e . For all
p r o g r a m m e s , each year's budget is m a d e up of the previous year's base
budget, adjusted by some formulae for workload increases, plus additional
funds to cover inflation and salary increases. Virtually all budget formulae
are developed through studies of actual spending patterns, which serve as
b e n c h m a r k s for negotiations upward or downward. Because of this, budget
formulae tend to p e r p e t u a t e status q u o spending patterns: a p r o g r a m m e that
has received money in the past will continue to receive funding at that level
provided that its workload continues at a similar level.
New p r o g r a m m e initiatives are then added to the adjusted base. In most
years, new p r o g r a m m e initiatives comprise a very minor percentage of total
funds spent.
Since California uses an incremental approach to budgeting, the process
strongly influences agencies to maximize their base budget, since virtually all
new money flows from adjustments to the base. This incremental approach
to budgeting also means that agencies' budgets are adjusted only at the
margin, typically with no or minimal systematic review of what is already
funded in the base. F u r t h e r m o r e , it is a curious trait of budgetary behavior
that adjustments to the base budget are rarely thought of as real budget
increases.
T h e process used to m a k e "baseline adjustments" to the public higher
education budget differs between p r o g r a m m e s classified as state operations
and those known as local assistance. This categorization is a throw-back
to the pre-Proposition 13 era, when local government had the primary
responsibility for managing and paying for local assistance services and
p r o g r a m m e s . T h e severe cutbacks in property taxes that resulted from the
voter approved initiative Proposition 13 have blurred these distinctions,
since the state now pays for the majority of local assistance p r o g r a m m e s .
T h e community colleges differ from the other higher education systems in
that it is the only one funded as a local assistance p r o g r a m m e .
COMMUNITY COLLEGE FINANCE
The method by which the state provides funding for California's community
colleges differs significantly from that used for its two public university
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systems. T h e primary reason for this stems from the fact that as a result
of the voter approved initiative Proposition 98, the community colleges
are constitutionally guaranteed a certain percentage of the state's G e n e r a l
Fund revenue. Proposition 98 guarantees a level of funding at least equal to
the amount received in the prior year, plus full adjustments for enrolment
growth and inflation.
The California Legislature established the current community college
apportionment funding formula in 1983, and extended its provisions through
July 1, 1991 with the passage of Assembly Bill 1725. Assembly Bill
1725 establishes "differential or p r o g r a m m e - b a s e d " funding as the funding
mechanism for financing the community colleges. This model establishes
five major categories: (1) instruction; (2) instructional services and libraries;
(3) student services; (4) maintenance and operations; and (5) institutional
support. Each category defines workload measures for each of these
p r o g r a m m e categories and specifies appropriate funding standards for
determining how much money should be allocated to each p r o g r a m m e
category to fund a given level of workload. Based on these workload
measures and funding standards, the model can be used to determine
allocations for each community college district. T h e " p r o g r a m m e - b a s e d "
funding model went into effect on July 1, 1991. While the workload
standards defined under programme-based funding are not currently fully
funded by the state, these standards are the " b e n c h m a r k s " for future
budget proposals. T h e community colleges estimate that the state presently
funds approximately 5 8 . 6 % of the workload standards identified in the
programme-based funding model.
While the programme-based funding model incorporates many of the
features used in funding the two senior public universities, a lack of
consistency still exists in the budgetary process briefly, these are:
(1) their place in the budget process; (2) the lack of state-wide faculty
salary scales; (3) the block or categorical budget allocations; (4) the lack
of state expenditure controls; (5) the B o a r d of G o v e r n o r s ' lack of budgetary
flexibility; and (6) their related governance structure.
As previously indicated, community colleges receive their inflationary
adjustment in the same way as local assistance budgets. A cost-of-living
adjustment (COLA) that must be given is set in statute for local assistance
budgets. Unlike the two university systems, which separate salary, merit,
and price-increase funding, community colleges receive a lump sum COLA
on their entire base. The COLA for community colleges is statutorily set to
be the Gross National Product price deflator, which in 1988 was 3 . 8 % .
Once the institutions receive the funds, it is up to the individual districts to
determine how to spend the money whether on across-the-board raises,
for promotions, or for non-salary increases. In most districts, these decisions
are reached through the collective bargaining process.
T h e result of the baseline inflationary adjustment process is that there
65
are funding disparities between inflationary, cost-of-living, and merit salary

adjustments between the two universities and the community colleges. In
periods of inflation, where there are separate price categories for items
of expenditure such as postage or utilities that are greater than the Gross
National Product deflator, these disparities result in an a p p a r e n t underfunding of the community colleges' budget. In periods of low inflation or
during times when the deflator is greater than the parity figure for university
salaries, the opposite is true. This latter condition where the disparities
have advantaged the community colleges has not occurred during the
post-Proposition 13 years. A s a result, an accumulated under-funding of
community college budgets has occurred over the years, not because of
an explicit policy decision, but because of the technical deficiency of the
funding formulae.
Appropriations
to the system. O n May 15 each year, the D e p a r t m e n t
of Finance notifies the Legislature and the Chancellor's Office of the
community colleges of the a m o u n t of property tax revenue expected to
be available during the next fiscal year. T h e final Budget Act enacted
by the Legislature takes that estimate into consideration in figuring how
much G e n e r a l F u n d s should be appropriated to the community colleges. If
the Legislature and the G o v e r n o r agree that, for example, $1.5 billion will
be needed to support the community colleges, and the May 15 estimate of
property tax revenues is $500 million, then the Budget Act will appropriate
$1 billion in G e n e r a l Funds to m a k e up the difference.
Unlike the two university systems, most funds for community colleges are
appropriated on a cash grant basis, based on enrolment, and not tied to fulltime equivalent faculty. With the exception of categorical aid p r o g r a m m e s
(such as Education Opportunity P r o g r a m m e s and Services), each college
is then free to take the funds and spend t h e m on new faculty positions,
for counsellors, travel, utilities, or whatever, depending on the area of
highest need. In the absence of normal audit controls, the only expenditure
control on community colleges' main apportionments is the so-called 5 0 %
law, which requires that at least 5 0 % of each district's " C u r r e n t Expense
of E d u c a t i o n " expenditures be spent on instructors' salaries.
Allocation of statutory amounts among districts. T h e community colleges

have recently been shifting from an allocation system which measures
enrolment workload average daily attendance (ADA) to full-time equivalent
student (FTE). Prior to this change, the a m o u n t of money that each district
received per ADA was sometimes known as the "foundation" or "revenue
limit" level; this level is a function of various formulae that try to equalize
the funding between districts and protect other legislative priorities. T h e
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W. Fox
"factors" that influence the a m o u n t per ADA that a district gets are: credit
or non-credit, growth or decline of a district, size and wealth of a district,
and decline in student n u m b e r s .
A n n u a l revenue is determined by the prior year's base revenue adjusted
for cost-of-living (based on a state-wide average for credit and non-credit
courses) and growth (in the five p r o g r a m m e category areas). This minimum
funding level (base + COLA + growth) establishes a funding level which
must be reconciled with the available revenues provided to the community
colleges under the Proposition 98 minimum funding g u a r a n t e e .
FINANCING THE FOUR-YEAR UNIVERSITIES
T h e baseline adjustment process for the University of California and the

California State University is the same as for all state agencies, determining
adjustments needed for both inflation and workload increases.
Inflation adjustments. In determining the a m o u n t of funding necessary for

inflationary increases, the budget process includes two calculations: (1) for
salary and benefit increases (which includes both cost-of-living adjustments
(COLAS) and merit salary adjustments (MSAS)); and (2) for price increases.
Salary increases in the universities. For faculty salaries, the California

Postsecondary Education Commission conducts an annual survey of faculty
compensation at institutions across the country which are thought to
be comparable to the University of California and the California State
University systems. O n the basis of this survey, the Commission then
computes what percentage increase (or decrease) is needed to bring salary
levels at California's public universities to parity with those offered by
comparable institutions. This parity figure then becomes a b e n c h m a r k for
the two Governing Boards in preparing their budget requests, as well as
for the D e p a r t m e n t of Finance in deciding what a m o u n t to propose to the
Governor. For calculating the a m o u n t needed to provide MSAS, formulae
which are negotiated between the institutions and the D e p a r t m e n t of Finance
are used to calculate the a m o u n t of money which will be n e e d e d to pay
for normal merit increases and for promotions for faculty and staff. T h e
formulae are based on studies d o n e in the distant past of institutional
advancement and promotion patterns, and differ somewhat between the
institutions. T h e University of California receives merit and promotion
funds as a percentage of the base, while the State University receives the
funds on a position-by-position basis. Approximately 1% of the salary base
is allocated for merit and promotion increases for each of the two systems.
67
Once the Legislature is through with the budget, funds for COLAS and for
MSAS are generally lumped into a single budget category to be spent by the
institutions for employee compensation. Following the collective bargaining
process, it is up to the institution (in consultation with employee groups if
there is formal collective bargaining, or less formally if there is not) to
decide how to allocate these funds.
Price increases in the universities. For non-salary price increases in the Fall
of each year, the D e p a r t m e n t of Finance sends each state agency something
known as the "price letter," which gives that year's guidelines for how much
the agencies can request for inflationary adjustments. For items where
inflation has been particularly high, the d e p a r t m e n t will create a separate
price category that allows higher-than-average inflationary adjustments.
Workload formulae. T h e second part of the adjustment procedure is a

process that adjusts the base budget for changes in workload. A t both the
University of California and the State University, the workload formulae
are a function of the n u m b e r of full-time equivalent (FTE) students enrolled
within each system (1991/92 marks the first year that the community college
system will move to measuring workload changes by FTE). This m e a n s
that the resources needed to fund all categories of expenditures from
instruction to administration are related to the n u m b e r of students
enrolled in the institution.
T h e critical measure that drives the n u m b e r of F T E students is the
student credit hour. A student credit hour is the credit (that counts
towards graduation) that each student receives for taking a class. Credit
hours/units relate to the a m o u n t of time a student spends in a class for
instance, a class that meets o n e hour a day five days a week is generally
a five-unit class. Student credit hours translate into full-time equivalent
students without regard to differences in discipline, or resources required
to teach.
A t the University of California, every 45 u n d e r g r a d u a t e quarter credit
units or 30 u n d e r g r a d u a t e semester credit units equal o n e FTE student. T h e
same is also true at the State University regardless of whether the credits
are at the u n d e r g r a d u a t e or graduate level. A t the University of California,
every 36 graduate quarter credits or 24 graduate semester credits are equal to
one FTE student. T h u s , the University of California receives m o r e resources
for graduate enrolments than does the State University. A t the University of
California, once a P h . D student has advanced to candidacy and is no longer
enrolled in courses, each is counted as an FTE for nine quarters, after which
they can no longer be counted for enrolment purposes.
T h e University of California, as a m a t t e r of policy, discourages part-time
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enrolments for undergraduates and graduates; 9 2 % of its undergraduates

and 9 6 % of its graduate students are full-time students. T h e State University
system is m o r e e n c o u r a g i n g of p a r t - t i m e s t u d e n t s ; only 7 2 % of its
undergraduates and 2 3 % of its graduate students are enrolled full-time. This
means that there are almost twice as many students in the California State
University per full-time equivalent than in the University of California.
The University of California s workload formulae. T h e enrolment-related

workload formulae for the University of California are relatively simple.
The University receives one new faculty position accompanied by related
support for every 17.61 FTE students. ( O n c e a position is established, it
typically receives COLAS and MSAS each year as previously described.) T h e
University also receives o n e teaching assistant (TA) position for every 44.20
FTE undergraduates; it does not receive TA funds for FTE graduate students.
T h e University's formulae generate enough money to pay for clerical support
and additional library circulation personnel, as well as employee benefits
for each new faculty full-time equivalent. O n c e the University receives its
state appropriation, it makes decisions about how to expend it: on faculty,
staff, or instructional support. While the University's state General Fund
appropriation may increase as a result of u n d e r g r a d u a t e enrolment workload
increases, the University need not spend those funds on undergraduate
enrolment, but rather it has the flexibility to use such funds to support
graduate p r o g r a m m e s .
The State University's workload formulae:

mode and level. T h e State
University's workload formulae are much m o r e elaborate and complex
than the University of California's. T h e State University has well over a
hundred different workload formulae that are used to negotiate baseline
adjustments with the D e p a r t m e n t of Finance. Virtually all of these formulae
are enrolment-related. Like the University of California, the key academic
components new faculty and staff positions, library resources, and the
like are all driven by FTE students. Unlike the University of California,
requirements for student service staff and expenditures are driven by head
count enrolment rather than FTE enrolment. For new faculty positions, the
State University and the D e p a r t m e n t of Finance calculate the n u m b e r of
positions required using a system known as the mode-and-level approach.
U n d e r this approach, the State University weights the student credit units
by different levels and types of instruction, to take into account differences
in costs for different kinds of instruction. W h a t this m e a n s as a practical
matter is that the system uses historical information (from the 1973/74
academic year) to evaluate how faculty time was spent, and then projects
the n u m b e r of positions required to continue that level of support against
69
each year's enrolments. T h e weights that have been developed earn more
faculty full-time equivalents for upper-division and graduate courses than
for lower-division coursework. T h e effect of the formulae on the average
is to allocate one new faculty position for each 18.00 FTE student, a ratio
that has historically been very close to the o n e used by the University of
California. Because of the mode-and-level approach, however, the State
University may find itself in the position where its enrolment goes u p and
its budget goes down. Such was the case in 1985/86, when lower-division
enrolments went u p , causing an overall shift towards lower-cost instruction;
because of the shift, the State University had its budget cut by 86 FTE faculty
m e m b e r s . Unlike the University of California, the State University does
not receive positions for teaching assistants, and the formulae separate
allocations for new faculty positions, staff positions, and support. For every
1000 new FTE students, the mode-and-level workload formulae provide the
State University with 55.49 new FTE faculty, 15.25 new support staff, and
15.73 new administrative positions. In 1992/93, the State University's m o d e and-level workload formulae provided the State University with an average
of $4400 for each additional FTE student. A s a result of the complexity and
other nuances associated with the mode-and-level workload formulae, the
State University is currently in the process of developing and working with
the D e p a r t m e n t of Finance on a new set of formulae to govern future
workload adjustments to its base budget. In general, the State University
would like to move to workload formulae that are less complex, that would
rely upon only a few formulae, and which are m o r e akin to those used to
adjust the University of California's base budget for workload changes.
Internal allocation flexibility: internal distribution of resources. O n c e the

universities receive funds from the state, they are free to allocate the
resources in the way they see fit to meet current priorities and accommodate
student d e m a n d . T h e re-allocation can occur in either of two places. First,
the central administration may m a k e some re-allocation decisions between
the campuses. This generally happens when enrolment patterns are uneven
between the campuses, and one campus experiences declines while another
grows. In both systems, if one campus is in a period of enrolment decline,
resources are frequently pulled away from other campuses in order to shore
them u p . Second, re-allocations also occur at the campus level: faculty and
other resources that are e a r n e d through enrolments in one d e p a r t m e n t may
be allocated to other areas, sometimes because they are under-enrolled and
need the help, or because the campus wants extra money to support that
area. In general terms, resources are re-allocated away from lower-division
classes to upper-division and graduate areas.
T h e issue of internal flexibility for reallocation becomes contentious
primarily in periods of enrolment decline. If the enrolment declines are
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slight or temporary, or if d e m a n d is not uneven between d e p a r t m e n t s , the

problem can be accommodated. However, if enrolment declines continue,
the political as well as the educational costs of protecting positions in
under-enrolled areas become severe. A t that point, decisions have to be
made about whether to try to increase enrolments or to take away positions.
Because tenured faculty positions are essentially owned by the d e p a r t m e n t
where tenure is earned, scaling down academic p r o g r a m m e s when student
d e m a n d shifts is a very long and slow process. Since the process is such
a slow o n e , and extracts such costs from the institutions, the preferred
m a n a g e m e n t option for both institutions is to keep some percentage of total
faculty resources in temporary positions, assigned to faculty who cannot or
will not be tenured.
For the two university systems, the issue of internal re-allocation and
uneven d e m a n d is kept within the institutions, since overall enrolment has
been stable or growing.
Higher education institutions are encouraged to raise extramural funds

through solicitation of research funds, private contributions and e n d o w m e n t s ,
and development of auxiliary enterprises (bookstores, etc.). Student fee
levels are determined annually as part of the state budget process, with a
strong predisposition towards keeping student charges as low as possible.
Extramural fundraising activities have increased substantially among
public institutions in the past 10-15 years. Increasing percentages of
campuses' budgets are d e p e n d e n t upon outside revenue, and campuses'
strategies are becoming more sophisticated in obtaining funds from the
community, businesses, and alumni. Often a campus office is dedicated
specifically to these purposes.
Table 2 shows the public systems' budgets, as viewed at the state level.

policy
T h e watchwords for California's changing society are diversity and growth.

California is continuing a well d o c u m e n t e d trend towards becoming the first
mainland U S state with no absolute ethnic majority population. Already,
Black, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific children comprise the majority of the
state's school students from kindergarten through eighth grade. In 17
counties from Sacramento southwards, 2 0 - 5 0 % of the children speak a
language other than English in the h o m e .
In terms of total population over the next 20 years, California will continue
71
TABLE 2
Budgets of the California public higher education system
(1990-1991, in mln dollars)
UC
Budgeted
programs
State general fund
Federal funds
University funds
Income and fees
O t h e r funds
2135
9
2417
471
55
Extramural
programs
Federal funds
O t h e r funds
3064
637
Total
8789
csu
State general fund
Federal funds
Income and fees
O t h e r funds
1653
108
434
598
Total
2793
ccc
State general fund
Local property taxes
Income and fees
O t h e r funds
1735
791
108
159
Total
2762
to grow at a remarkable pace m o r e than twice the national r a t e , to

be specific. Between 1992 and 2005, California's population will grow by
almost 2 5 % , representing almost 7 million additional people. In order to
accommodate this population growth and maintain current college-going
patterns, public higher education will need to a c c o m m o d a t e m o r e than
700,000 additional students by 2005.
T h e challenges posed in addressing growth and ethnic/racial diversification
on this magnitude are m o n u m e n t a l , even in a good budgetary environment.
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W. Fox
T h e capacity of California to provide the support funds required to provide

quality and accommodate growth in its public colleges and universities will
depend on availability of tax revenues, growth pressure from competing
state budget categories, and spending flexibility under the state's spending
limit. State financing for higher education does not occur in a vacuum, and
higher education will be competing over the coming years with other state
services for limited funds. If enrolment or caseload for a particular budget
is growing faster than state revenues, then funding for that growth has to
be found from some other portion of the budget. This does not present a
problem so long as other parts of the budget are growing at rates lower than
general revenue growth. Unfortunately, the age groups within the population
that most d e p e n d on state funding are growing at a faster rate than overall
revenues.
Current long-range expenditure and revenue forecasts indicate that state
expenditures will grow at an annual rate of 7 . 5 % through the 1990s,
whereas revenues will grow by only 6 . 9 % . By this estimate, any budget
that grows m o r e than roughly 6.9% will either have trouble being funded
or will squeeze funding from other budget categories. In order to fund
enrolment growth alone, higher education will need to grow, on average,
by approximately 7 . 5 % between 1992 and 2001; any new funding for
p r o g r a m m e improvements or to overcome existing funding deficiencies
will be in addition to these costs. T h e question naturally arises as to
whether other parts of the budget will be growing at a lower rate so as
to allow funds to be re-allocated to post-secondary education: the answer
is a resounding " n o . "
policy
Overall, this analysis of long-range expenditure and revenue forecasts

leads inescapably to the conclusion that there is a growing structural
imbalance between d e m a n d s for state services and the ability of the
existing revenue structure to meet those d e m a n d s . In dollar terms, the
Commission on State Finance projects a state budget deficit in the current
year of between $4.9 and $7 billion, representing 1 0 - 1 5 % of total projected
expenditures in the fiscal year 1992-93. In the long t e r m , these same forecasts
indicate that these deficits will not go away, even in the event of broad
economic recovery. A s a result, chronic deficits are projected through the
decade, culminating in a $6 billion deficit in 2001-02. Frighteningly, these
are among the m o r e optimistic estimates available. T h e state D e p a r t m e n t
of Finance projects an expanding funding gap culminating in a $20 billion
deficit by the end of the decade.
This zero-sum budgeting environment promises to leave higher education
extremely vulnerable in the event of future revenue shortfalls, if only
73
because of its relatively low rate of growth c o m p a r e d to other budget

areas and the absence of constitutional or statutory funding guarantees
for the four-year systems.
Since t h e four-year systems are part of t h e 2 6 % of the state budget where
funding is not guaranteed in some way, they d e p e n d on the annual state
budget process for determining funding levels. Most of t h e state budget is
protected statutorily or constitutionally through formulae that have removed
the decision-making process from t h e G o v e r n o r and legislature. T h u s , very
few parts of the budget are available or accessible to absorb budget cuts that
may be n e e d e d in any given year d u e to revenue shortfalls or appropriations
limitations.
W h a t this m e a n s as a practical m a t t e r is that if revenue shortfalls occur,
and we have every reason to believe that they will, then it is technically as
well as politically easier t o reduce funding for the two university systems
than for most other parts of the budget. This budgetary vulnerability is a
particular problem for the State University, because its funding structure
m a k e s it much m o r e d e p e n d e n t on state G e n e r a l F u n d dollars than the
University of California.
California has entered a period of unprecedented growth and diversification
a period requiring an expansion, not a r e t r e n c h m e n t , in available
educational services. T h e University of California estimates that it will
need as many as three new campuses by the year 2005, the State University
estimates it will need as many as five, and the community colleges will need at
least 30 new campuses within the next 15 years. A t the same time, the systems
have taken real reductions in their base budgets, and are now regularly losing
funding after controlling for inflation. Massive efforts are now under way to
look for possible cost savings and new efficiencies. H o w e v e r , while all agree
that there is potential for savings, no-one is claiming that higher education
costs are out of control. R a t h e r , demographic trends coupled with intractable
state finance limitations are forcing consideration of options that all agree
will be detrimental to the health of higher education. These discussions
are now in the early phases, but they have already m a d e impossible the
consideration of reforms that cost money.
and institutional
autonomy
M A I N ACTORS IN SETTING HIGHER EDUCATION GOALS
T h e main actors in setting higher education goals and developing policy

are the faculty and the administrative leadership of the higher education
institutions. T h e G o v e r n o r and the legislature also play a major role through
the budget process. By setting the aggregate appropriation of state funds to
be received by each public system, the G o v e r n o r and legislature determine
the broad financial p a r a m e t e r s within which each system must o p e r a t e . T h e
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W. Fox
California Postsecondary Education Commission plays an active role by

providing critical state-wide analyses on the short- and long-term planning
activities of the systems. T h e legislators who serve on the education policy
committees can also play active roles on particular issues for which they
develop interests.
T h e California Postsecondary Education Commission is the closest thing
in California to a central educational planning authority. However, the
Commission's specific charge is to provide independent advice on important
educational planning issues to the G o v e r n o r , the legislature, and the
educational systems themselves. T h e Commission has no direct regulatory
authority, and thus it owes its substantial influence to its independence and
the persuasiveness of its analysis, as opposed to any unilateral decisionmaking authority. Specifically, the Commission conducts long-range planning
studies which attempt to define, from a state-wide perspective, California's
future educational needs. In addition, the Commission reviews system plans
for new campuses, off-campus centers, and new academic p r o g r a m m e s . It
then provides advice to the systems on ways to improve their planning, as
well as to the legislature and G o v e r n o r on whether the new facilities or
programmes should be funded. Finally, the Commission provides shorterterm advice to the systems, the legislature, and the G o v e r n o r on questions
related to the annual state budget or other educational policy issues.
The Effects of Structure, Authority, and Higher Education Policy on

T h e system of higher education that California has structured through its
Constitution, statutes, budget appropriations, and administrative policies
provides a great deal of campus level autonomy and discretion. It has been
the intention of the state not only to provide the broad policy framework for
higher education, but also to provide the resources that result in obtaining
the best m a n a g e m e n t that is, campus chancellors and presidents, d e a n s ,
d e p a r t m e n t chairs, and the best faculty possible to fulfil the mission of an
institution, whether it be a research campus or a community college. T h e r e
is a long and legally protected tradition of academic freedom in the U S A
and in California, and there are no extensive governmental regulations that
impede the ability of campuses to pursue their missions, design curricula,
teach, conduct research, and innovate as they see fit. Public monies are
expended for the public good, and public policy is intended to assist that
process.
While institutions have wide discretion on how best to pursue their
missions, it should not be overlooked that these missions do place substantial
restrictions on institutional activities. T h e four-year systems, funded on
the basis of enrolment, could greatly expand their financial bases by
75
admitting higher n u m b e r s of u n d e r g r a d u a t e s ; but their missions limit

t h e m to prescribed eligibility pools and force t h e m to maintain a 40-60
balance between lower and upper-division enrolment. T h e California State
University could, by some m e a s u r e s , enhance their academic prestige by
offering doctoral p r o g r a m m e s and expanding their research activities, but
the Master Plan prohibits it. C o m m u n i t y colleges on occasion have proposed
expanding their scope to offer the baccalaureate degree, but the Master Plan
does not allow it. T h e constraints imposed by the Master Plan present very
real limits on the size and p r o g r a m m e breadth to which institutions can
aspire. T h e balance that the state is trying to strike here is to limit the
systems' missions to prevent unbridled competition and infighting between
the public systems, while at the same time providing institutions with wide
latitude within their missions to p r o m o t e innovation and support academic
freedom.
A s evidence of the broad based trust that California's political establishment
has historically conferred on its educational systems, it is important to
r e m e m b e r that the authors of the Master Plan were themselves appointed by
the leaders of the educational systems. They were not political appointees or
products of the state bureaucracy. In this sense, and even though the Master
Plan was eventually enacted into law, the limits in the systems' missions
were largely self-imposed. Even though over time there have certainly been
conflicts between the systems and the state, as well as conflicts between the
systems themselves, taking the long-term view this approach has generally
worked. Overall, the state has been well served by pursuing a strategy that
can be summarized as follows:
Define each system or sector of higher education, spell out in unambiguous terms
the missions and general groundrules under which the systems must operate, finance
the systems well enough so that they can recruit and retain the highest quality faculty
and administration, and then let them function with a good deal of independence.
In the context of the "triangle of coordination" (Clark, 1983; see Figure

2) cited in this study, the previous discussion indicates that California
would most appropriately be placed somewhere between " m a r k e t " and
"academic oligarchy," with relatively weak " s t a t e " influence. In a sense,
the state holds absolute veto power over public institutions because of its
control over their budgets; but, as a practical matter, the state's belief in
the long-term benefits of a free and unfettered educational system has
resulted in an almost universal rejection of efforts to use that authority.
Not only is it a complex process to strike the right balance between
state-wide planning, state financing, and institutional a u t o n o m y , but there
are other forces at work as well. T h e effects that population growth,
ethnic diversification, and funding limitations are bringing to bear on
educational planning and m a n a g e m e n t are stark evidence that higher
education does not take place in a vacuum, even with systems as a u t o n o m o u s
as California's. These external forces are having a profound influence within
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W. Fox
State authority
Market
Academic oligarchy
Figure 2: California's location within the triangle
higher education in shaping expectations of what is possible and what is out

of the question.
Institutional perceptions on the likely availability of funds shape the
systems' planning assumptions as they p r e p a r e for the future. These
estimates inevitably affect which short- and long-range goals come to be
viewed as realistic, and may even force institutions to plan on how
to accommodate a reduced resource base. Likewise, knowledge of the
demographic avalanche facing California higher education has a major
effect in shaping the nature of educational planning. Activities are not so
much focused on what new p r o g r a m m e s are n e e d e d , but rather on how to
deliver current services to an ever-increasing student population. Ethnic
diversification trends are having similar effects. H o w can a higher education
system rooted in the history and tradition of Western E u r o p e accommodate
and address the unique and diverse cultural, social, and academic needs
of equal n u m b e r s of Hispanic, Asian, Black, and White students? These
are the pressing questions of the day in Californian higher education. It
is possible that the only certainty is change. Despite p h e n o m e n a l growth,
higher education has been remarkably stable in its basic structure over the
past 30 years, but that too may be passing. T h e key during this difficult
period will be good educational planning. T h e only way to avoid stop-gap
crisis m a n a g e m e n t in this environment is to inform short-term budgetary and
policy actions with a c o m m o n understanding of where an institution hopes
to be heading in the long term. F r o m the state's perspective, this means
giving the systems the tools necessary to do their own planning, as well as
supporting the kind of collaborative and b r o a d based state-wide planning
that is provided by the California Postsecondary Education Commission. T h e
following discussion outlines the kind of planning processes and state-system
interactions that will be necessary if California is to meet the challenges of
the coming decade.
Long-range planning as a basis for state-institutional
77
interaction
In California the h u b around which state-institutional relations revolve

is the state budget. T h e state largely stays out of the shorter-term and
o p e r a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n a l policy-making processes of t h e systems. T h e
extensive autonomy that institutions enjoy has many advantages, but it
can also create certain problems. W h e n state level political leaders divorce
themselves from much of educational policy-making, there is also a risk that
over time they will become less informed of and sensitive to the overall
policy framework in which higher education exists. This can be especially
dangerous during times of extreme growth and fiscal crisis, where California
now finds itself.
Partially in response to these risks, as well as in response to the long-range
demographic and budget trends outlined earlier, in 1988 the state of
California e m b a r k e d upon a comprehensive long-range planning process
with its higher education systems, including the independent accredited
sector. This process has resulted in much greater understanding between
c a m p u s , system, and state-wide leaders on the c o m m o n assumptions upon
which education planning and educational policy is being based. Certainly
there are occasional tensions in this p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s , but t h r o u g h extensive
collaboration and consensus building it has b e e n possible to reach
understanding. Through this process of informal discussion and negotiation,
the state attempts to communicate and exert some influence on the broad
direction of the higher education systems, while simultaneously respecting
the campus and system-wide decision-making prerogatives of the educational
leaders themselves.
In order to establish a policy context within which to ground these recent
developments in California, the following paragraphs outline the general
uses to which institutional and state level planning can and should be put, as
well as some of the characteristics of effective short- and long-range planning
in California. H o w e v e r , this discussion should not be considered prescriptive
or definitive; in fact, to do so would run contrary to the fluid and responsive
approaches necessary for effective planning. R a t h e r , it should be viewed as
an effort to discuss some of the c o m m o n c o m p o n e n t s of good state and
institutional planning as well as assess the extent to which it has furthered
the joint goals of state accountability and local autonomy.
CAVEATS ABOUT PLANNING
Certain dangers are inherent in over-reliance on the plans generated by

long-range planning activities. N o matter how effective and comprehensive
the planning process, the plans it generates will (and should) evolve as time
goes on, when better and m o r e recent information is introduced into the
process. T h e essential frame of reference, therefore, is the view that the
78
W. Fox
planning process itself, rather than the plans it generates, is the essential
product of good planning. A s Dwight D . Eisenhower said: "Plans are
nothing. Planning is everything."
While self-evident, one additional factor must be carefully considered
when examining and making judgements about the systems' planning efforts:
the systems differ dramatically with regard to size, clientele, and institutional
mission. These differences in size and mission may appropriately manifest
themselves in substantial disparities in the specific planning approaches
pursued by the various systems. For example, it may be that the m a n a g e m e n t
complexities associated with administering the 71 district, 107 campus
community college system require a somewhat m o r e centralized planning
approach than is necessary in the nine-campus University of California
system. These differences must be recognized by state level policy-makers,
and in some cases encouraged.
A s noted earlier, uniformity of approach in planning is not nearly as
important as ensuring that each system possesses an a d e q u a t e planning
capacity, structured to address and articulate the unique needs and goals
of that system. A s a result of these fundamental differences, the state must
be careful to avoid the trap of making comparisons of planning processes
across system lines that may not be appropriate or useful.
COMMONALITIES OF PLANNING
With these caveats firmly in mind, adequate and effective planning

capacities are still central to the ability of all the systems to perform a
wide variety of m a n a g e m e n t functions, including the capacity to effectively
articulate current and future needs. For this to occur, and regardless of the
specific structure employed to achieve it, planning must take place on several
institutional levels, and the information gleaned from planning should be
utilized in a variety of ways to support and augment n u m e r o u s aspects of
institutional m a n a g e m e n t .
Starting from this premise, several commonalities become evident when
examining successful institutional planning efforts. These similarities are
not specific prescriptions on how to plan, but rather represent the general
features of a planning process that serve to encourage and reinforce the sort
of integrated, multi-dimensional perspective towards planning mentioned
above.
Projection of future trends. In

tool for establishing quantitative
such as future enrolments, future
the like. This sort of institutional
its simplest form, planning is an effective

estimates of a variety of important factors
physical plant needs, personnel trends, and
research is central to the planning process,
79
not only because of the value of the information it generates, but often
because of the iterative process employed to determine which questions
should be asked. T h e state's interest in this portion of the systems' planning
activities is to ensure that the long-range projections being conducted are
reasonable and, where a p p r o p r i a t e , comparable between systems.
Establishment
and evaluation of programme
and institution-wide
goals.
T h e merging of departmental and institutional academic objectives with
quantitative trend data allows those involved in planning to establish
realistic and attainable goals and objectives. In this dimension of planning,
the process of goal setting operates on a broad conceptual level, distinct
from the specific strategies designed to accomplish the goals. T h e state's
interest in this aspect of the systems' planning processes is to ensure that
an appropriate linkage exists to integrate major state-wide educational goals
(e.g., accommodation of eligible applicants, achievement of educational
equity goals, maintenance of educational excellence, etc.) into the goal
setting processes of both individual d e p a r t m e n t s and entire institutions.
Conversely, this examination also must be sensitive to the extent to which
institutional goal setting recognizes and supports the unique local objectives
of individual campuses and d e p a r t m e n t s .
Institutional assessment in relation to goals. It is difficult, if not impossible,

to plan for the future if an institution does not know where it is in the
present. Planning is therefore an important mechanism not only for assessing
future needs and articulating future plans, but also for evaluating and
defining where an institution currently stands. Planning can and should be
viewed as an important mechanism through which institutions can integrate
a systematic assessment of current needs and priorities with state and
institutional policy directions for the future. T h e state's interest in the
evaluation of institutional planning is to determine the extent to which
p r o g r a m m e review and institutional assessment are being informed and
guided by the broad educational goals and objectives operating at the
system-wide and state-wide levels, while at the same time preserving the
degree of local autonomy and discretion necessary to ensure that individual
p r o g r a m m e s and campuses are aware of, responsive t o , and supported in
addressing the unique circumstances in which they find themselves.
Assessment
and articulation of present and future resource needs. T h e
most effective planning processes create a vital analytic base on which
the p r o g r a m m e and resource needs of individual d e p a r t m e n t s and entire
institutions can be grounded. As noted earlier, the justification for present
80
W. Fox
p r o g r a m m e and resource needs is sounder and more persuasive when placed

in a context, not only of what is necessary to provide current levels of
service, but also of what is required in the present to ensure that the
d e p a r t m e n t or institution is where decision-makers want t h e m to be at
some point in the future. In addition, effective planning allows institutions to
provide "advance warning" to state level decision-makers about likely future
resource requirements, enhancing the credibility of proposals when they are
m a d e and, hence, increasing the likelihood of their eventual adoption. In this
area, the state examines the planning efforts of the systems to determine the
extent to which both the short- and long-range resource needs of the segments
are integrated and justified as a means of achieving clearly articulated
long-range institutional and state-wide goals. A c c o m m o d a t i n g projected
enrolments, increasing student retention, achieving educational equality,
and improving educational quality are examples of b r o a d institutional goals
which can and should be directly incorporated into short- and long-range
assessments of the resource needs of the systems.
Strategy setting. Effective institutional planning often comprises the crucial

link between broadly stated academic and other institutional goals and the
development of specific strategies n e e d e d to achieve t h e m . Strategy setting
can also serve as the setting in which d e p a r t m e n t s and institutions plan
on how to narrow the gap between p r o g r a m m e and institutional goals
and the resources required to achieve them. In this context, the planning
process also serves as the h u b around which the different p r o g r a m m e
and administrative components of an institution (faculty, finance, facility
planning, etc.) come together to ensure that the translation of goals
into strategies occurs in an integrated environment, with all relevant
operational and administrative units playing important roles. T h e state's
interest in this aspect of institutional planning is to assess the extent to
which the development of specific p r o g r a m m e and institutional strategies
is linked to broad p r o g r a m m e , institutional, and state-wide goals of the
kind outlined previously. Further, it is important to assess the extent to
which the process of strategy setting involves the wide variety of campus
and system-wide constituencies necessary to ensure that a b r o a d based,
institution-wide perspective is brought to bear on this critical phase of the
planning process.
Planning as an integrated management

tool. Through integration of
planning with ongoing p r o g r a m m e review and evaluation, and the short-term
budgetary and m a n a g e m e n t processes of an institution, long-range planning
is informed by the latest assessment of the status of the institution, and the
evaluative and short-term m a n a g e m e n t processes are informed by a better
81
understanding of the long-range goals of the institution. T h e integrated

planning approach also helps ensure that planners are aware, as soon as
possible, of any deviations in projected enrolment, budgetary, and personnel
trends. T h e state's interest in this area focuses on the level of integration
achieved in the systems' individual planning processes, with special emphasis
placed on the extent to which state-wide planning is informed by the local
circumstances of individual d e p a r t m e n t s and campuses, and the extent to
which local departmental and institutional planning is informed by broad
system-wide and state-wide goals of the type outlined above.
STATE LEVEL INFLUENCES ON INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING ACTIVITIES
While the external influences brought to bear on institutions by the state

Legislature, t h e G o v e r n o r , and various state agencies are not part of the
planning processes of the systems per se, they stand as a stark reminder
that institutional planning is not conducted in a vacuum. With this in
mind, the state's interest in the planning activities of the systems proceeds
alongside a careful and self-critical assessment of the statutes, policies,
practices, and traditions imposed at the state-wide level that may have
positive or detrimental effects on the planning processes of the systems.
In this area, t h e state seeks to identify any official or unofficial constraints
on the systems' behavior, imposed at the state-wide level, which serve to
compel or encourage institutional activity inconsistent with either effective
planning or the achievement of broadly accepted educational goals. For
example, if some aspect of the state budget process creates disincentives
(or contains no positive incentives) for a system to conduct long-range
fiscal planning, it is essential that the state identifies and addresses this
deficiency.
Conclusion
F r o m the state's view, it is not essential, and maybe not even possible,
for all three public systems to u n d e r t a k e planning in identical ways.
H o w e v e r , the iterative process employed in discussing these issues holds
great benefit for both local and state-wide decision-makers. T h e planning
process gives state level decision-makers the opportunity to be directly
involved in influencing the broad future direction of the systems, while
campus and system leaders retain t h e flexibility and autonomy t o m a n a g e
their institutions and pursue their missions without u n d u e involvement
from t h e state. This balance is difficult to maintain, but it is essential.
By encouraging close and informal interaction between state, system, and
campus planners, the goal here is to achieve a sort of synergy a synergy
in which the resultant plans reflect something of a consensus, incorporating
82
W. Fox
the concerns and priorities of leaders at all levels. A t the same time, this
process provides something of an escape valve for state level policy-makers,
providing a mechanism for direct involvement in development of higher
education's long-range policy framework, while simultaneously reducing
the available avenues for state level micro-management of the institutions.
In this way, the plans generated through collaborative long-range planning
represent better products than could have been accomplished at any level
with persons working in isolation, and ultimately these plans provide a much
improved analytic base for short-term decision-making. While not perfect,
in California this balance has been struck. Given the multiple pressures
facing California as a whole, and higher education in particular, to do any
less would be to deny both the system's and the state's educational policymakers important insights into possible options for California postsecondary
education as it prepares to enter the 21st century.
4
Higher Education Policy in Denmark
POUL BACHE and PETER MAASSEN
Introduction
T h e University of C o p e n h a g e n , founded in 1479, was for centuries the
only university in D e n m a r k . T h e Royal A c a d e m y of A r t s and the Royal
Veterinary and Agricultural University were established in the 18th century,
and the Technical University in the beginning of the 19th century. O t h e r
institutions of the laereanstalt type were founded in the following years.
H o w e v e r , the second university, the University of r h u s , was not established
until the 1920s.
Before 1976, anyone with the studentereksamen
was entitled to enrol in
o n e of the two universities, while admission to the other higher education
institutions was restricted for capacity reasons. In the 1960s and 1970s
three new universities (in O d e n s e , Roskilde, and Aalborg) were established
to satisfy the growing d e m a n d for university education. T h e influx into
long-cycle and medium-cycle higher education grew from 1 4 . 1 % of the
age cohort in 1960 to 2 6 . 7 % in 1975. T h e n u m b e r of students enrolled at
the universities grew from 9100 in 1960 to 54,500 in 1975. Student n u m b e r s
were also growing in the other parts of higher education, but at a much
slower rate.
P a r l i a m e n t decided in 1976 to i n t r o d u c e n u m e r u s clausus at the
universities. In addition, a general regulation on student intake to higher
education in the university and college sectors was accepted. A s a result
the distribution of students over various types of courses has changed
dramatically, which has led to a better balance on the graduate labor
m a r k e t . T h e large n u m b e r of rejected applicants, however, represents a
growing problem.
Expansion of higher education outside the university sector since the
mid-1970s has been an important ministerial policy but, in spite of this,
83
84
P. Bache and P. Maassen
in the 1980s the university sector received a growing share of the influx
into higher education. T h e colleges, mostly small and rather specialized
institutions, have not been a competitive alternative to the universities,
although short-cycle courses in the vocational sector are expected to receive
an increasing share of the students in the 1990s.

The education
system
Over 9 0 % of Danish children attend the public education system, i.e.,

the Folkeskole, for the 9-year compulsory learning span. T h e
Folkeskole
covers primary and the lower secondary education p r o g r a m m e s , including
an optional tenth year after the compulsory ninth year. T h e r e are three types
of upper secondary education primarily for the age group 16-19 years:
general upper secondary education;
vocational education and training;
basic social and health education.
General upper secondary education qualifies students for higher education,
while the two other types primarily have a vocational orientation. A t the
general upper secondary level there are four different p r o g r a m m e s . T h e first,
the Gymnasium,
is a coherent three-year education p r o g r a m m e that can be
started after the ninth year in the Folkeskole. T h e Gymnasium is completed
by the upper secondary school leaving examination (the
studentereksamen),
which qualifies for admission to universities and other higher education
institutions. T h e second, the so-called HF courses, offers general education
which is also a preparation for continued studies. T h e last two, the HHX
and the HTX p r o g r a m m e s , have a m o r e vocational orientation, but are
also preparation for higher education. T h e total n u m b e r of examinations
from the four streams of general upper secondary education, 31,700 in
1991, corresponds to 4 4 % of the age cohort. A n overview of the Danish
educational system is presented in Figure 1.
The Higher Education System: History and Rationale

In this chapter "higher education" is defined as tertiary education in
general, i.e., all forms of formal education following 12 years of primary
and secondary education.
In Danish higher education there are programmes of different levels:
shorter programmes of 1-2 years, very often including practical
vocational training;
medium-level programmes of 3-4 years, for example, teacher training,
engineering, social work, and business studies;
85
Denmark
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
vocational schools
universities
h0jere lranstalter
music and art academies
colleges
19
18
17
gymnasium
| HHX | HHX |
general upper secondary
16
vocational
education
and
training
basic
social and
health
education
15
14
13
12
folkeskole
11
10
9
6
5
pre-primary school
4
3
Age
Figure 1: The Danish educational system
long p r o g r a m m e s , with normally a nominal length of five years, leading

to the kandidat degree.
T h e long and medium-level p r o g r a m m e s are located within two groups
of institutions: the university sector, consisting of the five universities
and a n u m b e r of university level institutions, with long and medium-level
p r o g r a m m e s ; and the college sector, with a large n u m b e r of relatively
small institutions offering only medium-level p r o g r a m m e s . T h e short-level
p r o g r a m m e s are offered by vocational schools and other institutions.
This chapter shall concentrate on higher education in the college and
university sectors. T h e mechanisms of funding, steering, and the educational
policies described will apply primarily to these sectors. Although the
academies of art, the conservatories of music, and the schools of architecture
belong to the university sector, they are not covered in this chapter these
86
institutions differ in a substantial n u m b e r of ways from the other university

level institutions.
Some higher education institutions are state institutions, others are
formally independent foundations. The foundations have a board of governors
as the formal leadership of the institutions. T h e state institutions can have a
b o a r d , but are most often managed by a rector, appointed by the Ministry,
or by a collective body, elected by the staff. A p a r t from this, differences
between state institutions and foundations are mostly m e r e formalities. T h e
institutions can be divided into two main sectors: university and college.
UNIVERSITY SECTOR
This sector consists of the five Danish universities, 13 other university

level institutions (h0jere laereanstalter) and eight music and art academies,
all concentrated in the larger Danish towns, especially in the C o p e n h a g e n
and r h u s areas. These institutions are the only ones entitled to offer
programmes for the kandidat and P h . D degrees. Traditionally, the kandidat
degree has been the first degree at the Danish universities, and until recently
the institutions in the university sector did not with a very few exceptions
offer programmes shorter than the (nominal) five-year programmes
for the kandidat degree. Since 1988, a university p r o g r a m m e as a rule
consists of a three-year bachelor degree course, followed by a two-year
p r o g r a m m e leading to the kandidat degree (comparable t o , but not the same
as, a master's degree). In most cases, a degree subject is a self-contained
structure, and students choose their degree subjects at the start of their
studies. O n t o p of the kandidat degree there are three-year postgraduate
programmes for the P h . D degree. T h e highest academic award is the doktor
degree, awarded for an individual research work. In addition to these
degrees, some institutions offer a few study p r o g r a m m e s shorter than three
years for various diplomas at sub-degree level.
T H E COLLEGE SECTOR
Higher educational programmes shorter than the long degree courses in

the university sector have been reserved traditionally for institutions which
specialized in middle-level educational p r o g r a m m e s . T h e r e are 90 of these
institutions, almost all small, and they offer teaching only within a very
narrow range of subjects. T h e institutions are distributed over the whole
country. Typical examples of such colleges are Colleges of Engineering,
Teacher Training Colleges, Pre-school Teacher Colleges, Colleges of Social
W o r k , and Colleges of Physiotherapy and Ergonomics.
Other forms of postsecondary
87
education
T h e schools for vocational training have as their main task vocational

training and education at upper secondary level, but these institutions also
offer courses at tertiary level. Tertiary p r o g r a m m e s in nursing are offered
by schools connected to larger hospitals all over D e n m a r k . These schools
are financed and administered by the regional authorities.

In general, the entry requirements to higher education are:
an entry examination: studentereksamen,
HF, HHX, or HTX;
a similar qualification from another country; or
o t h e r relevant qualifications ( d e p e n d i n g on the type of study
p r o g r a m m e chosen).
Some programmes require more specific qualifications, usually examinations
in specific subjects at a certain level. For instance, most p r o g r a m m e s in
science and technology require specific qualifications in mathematics and
physics, either as a part of the entry examination or in the form of
supplementary courses. Approximately 6 0 % of the applicants to higher
education have the studentereksamen
from the Gymnasium,
2 0 % have HF,
HHX, or HTX, while almost 2 0 % of the applicants do not have an entry
examination, but have other qualifications.
Although the n u m b e r of places in higher education has increased during
the last half of the 1980s, there is annually a large n u m b e r of applicants
to higher education who are refused admission for capacity reasons. In
1991, for example, 22,000 of 60,000 applicants were rejected. W h e n the
n u m b e r of applicants fulfilling the entrance requirements for a given study
p r o g r a m m e is higher than the n u m b e r of available places, the institution
makes a selection according to criteria determined by the Ministry. T h e
available places are divided into two quotas: the places in the first quota
are reserved for the applicants with the highest average grades from the
entry examination, while the selection for the second quota is based on the
institution's assessment of the qualifications of individual applicants.

STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
T h e n u m b e r of students in the university sector has been growing

substantially through the 1980s, while the n u m b e r of students in the college
sector has been more or less stable. Owing to the longer period of study at
the universities, the size of the student population in the university sector
is m o r e than twice the size of that in the college sector (see Table 1).
88
TABLE 1
N u m b e r of students in higher education
University sector
Full-time
Part-time
1980
1985
1990
61,400
69,400
81,900
College sector
Full-time
Part-time
6600
10,100
12,300
31,000
27,900
31,700
1100
700
1200
D R O P OUT RATE
T h e relatively high drop out rates in the university sector are considered
a disturbing problem. Most institutions in the university sector are making
efforts to minimalize drop outs, as lower d r o p out rates m e a n increased
government funding. In recent years these efforts seem to have been
successful, as drop out rates have declined slightly.
T h e drop out rates in Table 2 below are calculated on the basis of a crosssectional survey of student behavior in a particular year. Students who leave
a p r o g r a m m e without having passed the final examination are registered
TABLE 2
Drop-out rates for selected fields of higher education
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
42 .7
69 .3
36 .1
48 .9
45..1
68..1
33,.6
42..5
47..6
67..4
31,.7
53,.4
49,.2
70,.1
38,.1
46,.4
54..5
69,.5
31..9
54..9
49,.6
67,.5
34,.3
46..6
50 .1
65 .3
38 .9
51,.4
24..1
28..4
8..4
21,.6
26.,4
23..9
17..0
23..6
28.,7
23..6
18.,5
29.,0
29.,8
27. 1
17.,7
42..0
28.,5
30.,0
17.,2
39..9
27.,5
28.,5
18.,5
38..5
26,.4
30,.9
19,.8
35..8
University sector
(long programs)
Economics
Languages
Engineering
Architecture
College sector
(medium-level programs)
Teacher Training
Engineering
Social work
Librarianship
SOURCE:
Undervisningsministeriet, Datakontoret
89
as drop outs. Some of these may have moved to another p r o g r a m m e or

another institution, w h e r e they might complete the p r o g r a m m e .
Characteristics
structure
STAFF AND BUDGETS
In 1990 total state funding in the university and college sectors a m o u n t e d

to D k r . 6300 million. Of this sum, 19% was core funding for research
in the university sector, and 2 2 % was for infrastructure (buildings and
administration).
In D e n m a r k , as in many other E u r o p e a n countries, a reduction of
public expenditure has been an important goal for the government. A s
a consequence, the higher education institutions have experienced a series
of reductions in the funding of research and especially teaching. This
development is shown in Tables 3 and 4 below.
Table 3 shows that the total n u m b e r of staff has increased only slightly
TABLE 3
Personnel (full-time equivalents) in university sector
1985
1990
Academic Staff
Support Staff
6600
7100
6000
5700
TABLE 4
Normative student/teacher ratios 1982-1991 for selected field
of higher education
Humanities
Business language
Social science
Business economics
Science
Medicine
Engineering
SOURCE:
1982
1985
1991
13.0
15.0
20.0
17.0
7.0
13.0
7.5
13.5
15.5
20.0
20.0
8.5
13.5
9.0
20.6
20.6
24.9
24.9
11.5
17.0
12.2
Undervisningsministeriet 8.
90
in spite of the growth in student n u m b e r s , which can be illustrated by the

changes in s t u d e n t - t e a c h e r ratios.
T h e normative ratios, which are a p a r a m e t e r in the funding system, are
defined as the n u m b e r of "study step increments" (ssi), a measure of the
n u m b e r of full-time equivalent active students divided by the n u m b e r of
full-time equivalent academic staff for teaching (research not included). T h e
institutions are not obliged to employ staff in accordance with the ratios.
Full professors and executive administrative officers are civil servants
(tjenestemænd),
subject to direct regulation by national legislation.
O t h e r academic staff are employed according to agreements between the
government (the Ministry of Finance) and the academic unions. This means
that institutions have very little influence on salaries, retirement conditions,
working hours, and other conditions of employment.
Research at the
universities
M o r e than half of publicly financed research takes place at the institutions

in the university sector (see Table 5). T h e universities' core budgets for
research represent a very large share of these funds, but the role of
supplementary funds from research councils and the like is becoming m o r e
and m o r e important.
TABLE 5
Public R & D expenditure (fixed prices 1989 in % and mill D k r . )
1979
University sector
O t h e r G o v e r n m e n t institutions
Private sector
Total
Million D K R
SOURCE:
1989
54%
44%
2%
55%
42%
3%
100%
3.197
100%
5.354
Undervisningsministeriet 9.

Higher education
legislation
T h e Danish national higher education legislation consists of the following

acts:
Access Regulation A c t ;
91
University Administration Act; and

various Acts for different types of colleges.
T h e Access Regulation Act entitles the Minister of Education to determine
the n u m b e r of places available in higher education p r o g r a m m e s and to m a k e
rules for the selection procedure when the n u m b e r of applicants is higher
than the n u m b e r of places. Since 1976, the available n u m b e r of places for
each study p r o g r a m m e at each institution has been defined annually by
the Minister of Education on the recommendations of the institutions. T h e
Minister used this Act to steer participation in higher education. Recently,
however, in most cases the Ministry has accepted the recommendations
of the institutions, and from 1992 the Ministry has formally given the
institutions the power to decide the size of the student intake for a
substantial part of the study p r o g r a m m e s . F o r the academic year 1991/92
the Minister of Education was technically still responsible for determining
the size of the intake. For this purpose the disciplines were divided into
three groups:
disciplines for which the institutions are free to decide the size of the
intake, i.e., technical sciences, natural sciences, and disciplines in the area
of technology;
disciplines for which the institutions can decide the size of the intake
within fixed margins, i.e., humanities and social sciences;
disciplines for which the Ministry of Education still determines the
capacity, i.e., in general, expensive p r o g r a m m e s like medicine and dentistry.
T h e University Administration Act covers the institutions in the university
sector. T h e Act defines the institutions' mission (research and teaching to
the highest level), prescribes in detail the organization and procedures of
institutional administration and governance, and entitles the Minister to
m a k e regulations for the teaching p r o g r a m m e s .
Acts for Colleges, while differing considerably from each other, contain
regulations for the institutional organization and m a n a g e m e n t , and for the
study p r o g r a m m e s at specific types of colleges.
Control of education and research
programmes
TEACHING PROGRAMMES
T h e legislative basis of the p r o g r a m m e s offered by the institutions of the

university sector is the University Administration A c t , which empowers
the Minister of Education to lay down regulations for individual education
p r o g r a m m e s . This Act does not comprise any provisions about the structure
and contents of the p r o g r a m m e s . F r a m e w o r k provisions of a similar nature
can be found in the Act on Engineering Colleges and the Act on Business
Schools. In some areas, especially in the area of teacher training, the
legislation does contain provisions about the structure and contents of the
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courses. Educational changes are thus only in exceptional cases a legislative

matter.
T h e Ministry of Education lays down the overall guidelines for the
individual courses in education orders or regulations. T h e guidelines contain
provisions about the aims, duration, structure, main contents, examinations,
etc., of the courses. In the case of some courses, the education orders contain
rather detailed provisions about the organization of the courses, but a great
and ever-growing part of the orders are framework orders that define the
overall framework of the courses without containing any detailed provisions
about their organization. Within the framework of the orders, individual
institutions draw up a curriculum that describes the contents and structure
of the course. This implies that curricula in the same discipline can vary
from institution to institution. H o w e v e r , graduates of, for example, kandidat
degree level are expected to have achieved the same level of competencies
as other graduates in the same discipline from other institutions. In some
cases, universities can introduce new p r o g r a m m e s without the approval of
the ministry.
T H E ROLE OF ADVISORY BODIES
T h e Minister uses various bodies to advise him in questions relating to

the capacity, content, and structure of higher education. Most important
are the five councils of higher education, one for each of the following
areas: humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, technical sciences, and
health education. T h e m e m b e r s of the councils are experts in the field
of education and labor market relations. L a b o r m a r k e t representatives
are also m e m b e r s of the councils. Beyond this, businesses, labor m a r k e t
organizations, professional bodies, authorities, and individuals outside of
the education sector play a role of varying importance in connection with
the introduction of new study p r o g r a m m e s . This role is often of an informal
n a t u r e . Six research councils act as advisors on research matters and allocate
funds for research projects. A Council for Research Policy gives advice on
general research policies and strategies.
RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
C o r e funding for research is allocated to institutions by the Ministry

of Education. T h e proportion of these funds not e a r m a r k e d for specific
projects or types of research are allocated by the faculty councils to individual
institutes. In addition Research Councils allocate e a r m a r k e d research funds
to institutions for specific projects, and, within government funded strategic
research p r o g r a m m e s , ad hoc steering committees allocate funds for research
projects.
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A t the institutional level, decisions on allocation of research funds and

other research matters are taken by faculty councils or the institute boards.
Individual researchers will often have a strong influence on this process, as
these funds are often allocated on an individual basis.
Institutional
management
and control
INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT IN THE UNIVERSITY SECTOR
Provisions for the m a n a g e m e n t of institutional units in the university

sector are included in the 1973 University Administration A c t . This Act
gives institutions autonomy in scientific matters. F o r instance, the institutions
themselves determine what research should be d o n e , and researchers may
freely select their own research projects. T h e Act contains provisions in
academic matters which ensure that certain decisions based on professional
educational assessment cannot be overruled by the Ministry.
According to the A c t , the decision-making responsibility of institutions is
vested in elected bodies comprising staff and student representatives. T h e r e
are three levels of governing bodies:
boards of governors (Konsistorium),
h e a d e d by a rector;
faculty councils, headed by a dean;
study committees and institute councils.
A rector is elected for three years by all m e m b e r s of the
Konsistorium
and the faculty councils; he is responsible for the day-to-day m a n a g e m e n t
of an institution, but his formal powers are very limited. T h e Konsistorium
and the faculty councils consist of representatives of full-time teaching staff,
students, and technical/administrative staff in a ratio of 2:1:1. T h e primary
duties of the Konsistorium
are t o determine the institutional m a n a g e m e n t
structure and work out overall budget proposals within the framework laid
down by the Ministry. Traditionally the Konsistorium
has had almost no
influence in financial m a t t e r s , as funds from the state have been e a r m a r k e d
for faculties.
A faculty council is headed by a d e a n , elected by the council in question.
A s the faculty councils are responsible for financial matters, the deans are
often the most influential leaders in internal university matters. T h e primary
duties of the faculty councils are to work out a budget and allocate the funds
available. They also decide on the appointment of professors and other
full-time teachers and on the awarding of degrees and doctorates. These
matters are subject to previous consideration by c o m p e t e n t assessment
committees. Faculty councils have no authority with regard to teaching
or examinations.
Each faculty consists of a n u m b e r of institutes ( d e p a r t m e n t s ) . Institutes are
managed by an institute b o a r d , headed by an institute manager. T h e board
is elected by the institute's full-time academic staff plus representatives of
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the students and technical/administrative personnel. Study committees are

composed of equal numbers of teacher and student representatives from
one or several study p r o g r a m m e s ; they m a k e decisions concerning course
organization, syllabuses, and examinations.
During the last ten years the Act has attracted growing criticism, directed
primarily at the following points:
the time consumed by the work of the many institutional bodies;
the unwieldy study committee structure, with indirect election of
central study committees and a lack of coordination between the study
committees' responsibilities with regard to studies and the authority of the
faculty councils with regard to resources;
decisions on research matters are often taken by bodies of which only
about half the m e m b e r s are competent in research matters;
the difficulties elected bodies have in dealing with situations created by
reduced appropriations, that may necessitate cutbacks in p e r m a n e n t staff;
the lack of representatives from society in internal governance matters
of universities.
INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT IN THE COLLEGE SECTOR
Institutional governance of the colleges is regulated by the different Acts

covering the college sector. Some colleges have m a n a g e m e n t structures
similar to that of the universities, while others have different structures.
T w o main types are:
colleges which, being foundations, are governed by a board of
governors (in which representatives of the college staff are in a minority),
and a rector appointed by the b o a r d ;
colleges which, being state institutions, are governed by a rector
appointed by the Ministry of Education.
Institutional
funding
C O R E FUNDING
T h e system of higher education is financed by the Danish state, and

full-time students do not pay any fees. T h e core budget of each institution
in the college and university sector is composed of four main components:
funds for teaching;
funds for research;
funds for other activities (e.g., m u s e u m , collections, libraries);
funds for administration and buildings.
T h e teaching resources are calculated on the basis of an annual registration
of the n u m b e r of "active" students an "active" student is one who has
95
passed an examination corresponding to o n e year's study load. By that

the institution earns one "study step increment" (ssi), so that the ssi is in
this respect a performance indicator measuring one year's full-time study
of one student. By dividing the total n u m b e r of earned ssis for each
faculty by a normative ssi/academic staff ratio, the n u m b e r of academic
full-time equivalents to be allocated for teaching is calculated. By using
other standards for support staff and other costs, one gets the total
teaching appropriations. By this m e t h o d , the institution receives no funds
for students who are still enrolled but not active. This mechanism for
funding of education gives institutions a financial incentive to increase the
intake of students and to maximize the n u m b e r of students who complete
their studies within the scheduled time. T h e r e is also an incentive for a
vocational orientation of study p r o g r a m m e s , as institutions usually are not
allowed to increase the intake of students to study programmes with high
graduate unemployment rates.
T h e core funds for research are kept m o r e or less constant. In addition
to the core budget, the institutions receive supplementary research funds
from other sources; these economic contributions have increased rapidly in
size during the last decade. Only institutions in the university sector receive
funds for research.
Budgets for other general activities, such as library functions and computer
service centers, are kept separate in the overall budget. Funds for libraries
are allocated on a formula basis, while funds for the other activities are
based on an estimate of the actual costs.
Funds for administration and buildings are given as a lump sum, based
on an estimate of the actual costs of the institutions. A formula funding
m e t h o d , mainly based on student n u m b e r s , is being prepared. Buildings
and equipment of state institutions are owned and financed by the state;
institutions which are foundations own their own buildings, financed through
loans. In both cases decisions on large-scale investments are m a d e by
the Minister of Education and approved by the finance committee of the
Parliament.
T h e institutions are allowed to receive funds from other sources as a

supplement to core funding. Such supplementary funds can be research
grants from research councils or private foundations, and revenues from
research contracts or sale of services. T h e institutions are not allowed to
receive tuition fees for their ordinary full-time study p r o g r a m m e s , but they
can have supplementary income from courses m a d e for special purposes and
from part-time study p r o g r a m m e s .
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policy
Traditionally, m o r e or less implicit and widely accepted goals in Danish

higher education policy have been:
higher education must be 100% government funded, and students are
not to pay any fees;
anyone with a studentereksamen
or equivalent secondary school
examination is in principle qualified for admission to any higher education
programme;
higher education in university sector institutions is based on research;
university sector institutions must have a high degree of autonomy and
freedom of research.
policy
A t the beginning of the 1990s the political debate on higher education

policy was concentrated primarily on a n u m b e r of items, as summarized
below.
T H E LARGE NUMBER OF REJECTED APPLICANTS TO HIGHER EDUCATION
During the 1980s the n u m b e r of applicants for places in higher education

has grown from 26,200 in 1982 to 60,000 in 1991. Part of the increase can
be explained by the fact that the definitions of study p r o g r a m m e s belonging
to higher education have been expanded. T h e n u m b e r of places has been
increased t o o , but not sufficiently to prevent a gradual growth in the n u m b e r
of rejected applicants. T h e capacity of higher education p r o g r a m m e s as well
as how an expanded capacity can be obtained have been recurrent political
issues in the second half of the 1980s. Parliament granted funds for an
increase of 4000 places in 1991 and after new negotiations between
government and opposition parties a further 5000 places in 1992.
REVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION ACT
O n e of the recommendations of the 1989 OECD review on Danish research

policy was that the University Administration Act had to be revised:
It is essential to give the universities an organisational structure which provides them
with more authority and leadership. This means that the existing, highly participative
system for research decision-making must be modified to enable the university
management to act and function more efficiently. When the opportunity arises, the
1973 Act on the Administration of Universities and Institutions of Higher Education
should be changed, reverting more closely to the previous system of government where
subject areas were represented by their professions in the governing bodies. Such a
97
change would facilitate a reduction in the bureaucratic system of research "pools" and
allow the direct allocation of larger discretionary funds to the universities, (OECD)
This r e c o m m e n d a t i o n is typical of a series of criticisms, launched initially

from circles outside t h e universities, but later also coming from university
rectors and prominent academics. T h e r e is wide support for a m o r e efficient
system of internal university m a n a g e m e n t , but little agreement among
academics on h o w such a system should b e accomplished.
R E F O R M OF POSTGRADUATE PROGRAMMES
T h e P h . D degree has hitherto been awarded to students w h o have

completed an individual research project u n d e r the guidance of a professor.
T h e Ministry of Education and t h e research council have given high priority
to t h e development of m o r e structured postgraduate P h . D p r o g r a m m e s
as training of future researchers and university teachers. T h e Minister of
Education has presented a proposal for postgraduate research p r o g r a m m e s ,
which is presently being discussed in the Parliament. T h e main elements of
the proposal a r e :
t h e introduction of m o r e structured P h . D p r o g r a m m e s ;
t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of g o v e r n m e n t funding for such p r o g r a m m e s
(universities, which until now have received n o funds for postgraduate
students, are t o have a fixed sum p e r student in such p r o g r a m m e s ) ;
t h e funding of p r o g r a m m e s t o be financed by a cut in t h e scholarships
for P h . D students, which by international standards have been relatively
high.
This proposal has been m e t with rather strong opposition from university
circles. T h e criticism most frequently raised is that the reduced scholarships will
be too low to attract the most qualified students to the P h . D p r o g r a m m e s .
D E M A N D S FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY
Since the mid-1980s the government has required an annual 2 % productivity

increase of all government funded institutions, including institutions of
higher education. Accordingly, the core funding of the institutions has been
cut 2 % every year, although the cuts have not always been distributed evenly
among the institutions. T h e result has been an increase in s t u d e n t - t e a c h e r
ratios, which are causing growing concern for the quality of higher education.
T H E QUALITY OF EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
In 1990 t h e Ministry of Education introduced a p r o g r a m m e for quality

development in education. A s a part of this p r o g r a m m e , a n u m b e r of
98
evaluations of teaching programmes have been carried out, and the procedure
for the functions of external examiners in higher education is being revised.
T h e quality debate is also going on at the institutional level, and there is
an increasing awareness of quality problems among students and academics.
T h e continuing increase in student-staff ratios has drawn public attention
to the resource situation of the institutions and the possible links between
resources and quality. In some cases, planned increases in student-staff
ratios (for example, at the technical colleges) have been cancelled by the
Ministry for quality reasons.
and institutional
autonomy
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY SECTOR
T h e University Administration Act grants the freedom of research

for the academic staff of the universities. This is generally undisputed
as a fundamental principle, but the balance between the rights of the
TABLE 6
Degrees of institutional autonomy
Decisions on
Intake of students:
- H o w many?
- W h o to be accepted?
A r e taken by
Institution/ministry
Institution (but a part of the students
according to selection rules m a d e by
the ministry)
Study programs:
- Curricula
- F r a m e w o r k for programs
- Which programs
Institution
Ministry
Institution/ministry
Research:
- Which research?
Institution/academics
Resources:
- Staff appointments
- Salaries, retirement
- Allocation of funds
- Larger investments
Institutions (following procedures

according to ministerial regulations)
Ministry
Institution (within the main components
of the budget)
Ministry
99
individual academic and the managerial powers of the institution is u n d e r

discussion. T h e growing importance of m a r k e t forces puts greater d e m a n d on
institutional leadership and planning, and this could conflict with individual
academic freedom.
According to the University Administration A c t , the institutions are free
to decide on research matters, while the Minister of Education is e m p o w e r e d
to m a k e regulations for educational activities. In financial and staff matters,
the institutions are subject to the general regulations covering all Danish
state institutions. A schematic overview of the degrees of institutional
autonomy in significant matters is given in Table 6.
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY IN THE COLLEGE SECTOR
T h e r e is n o legislation covering t h e college sector as a whole, and the

different types of colleges enjoy varying degrees of autonomy. T h e status
of some colleges, such as t h e technical colleges, is close to that of t h e
universities. O t h e r colleges have been subject to a m o r e detailed ministerial
steering, but in recent years substantial administrative responsibilities have
been moved from t h e ministerial level to the colleges. A s a result of this
development, the general p a t t e r n of institutional autonomy in the college
sector is getting close to the situation in t h e university sector, as shown in
Table 6.
A N OPEN MARKET FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
In the a u t u m n of 1991, the Minister of Education specified the policy

goals for higher education for the coming period in a statement to Parliament
called An open market for higher education. These goals are:
higher degrees of freedom in supply (for institutions) and choice (for
students) of education;
higher e d u c a t i o n as an o p e n e d u c a t i o n a l n e t w o r k , i . e . , b e t t e r
possibilities for student mobility between institutions and expansion of
part-time education;
m o r e places in tertiary education, especially in short-cycle courses and
in part-time education;
simplified, "taxameter"-based funding of higher education;
focus on quality and internationalization in higher education and
research;
focus on m a n a g e m e n t of institutions and institutional size (institutional
mergers).
T h e statement, presenting these goals, has b e e n relatively well received
in Parliament. A s a consequence, in J u n e 1992 the government and the
major opposition parties agreed upon three important decisions concerning
100
higher education. First, a general agreement was reached on t h e capacity

of and public expenditure on higher education for the period 1992-96. T h e
n u m b e r of places for students in higher education, increased from 33,600 in
1990 to 41,000 in 1992, will b e maintained at the 1992 level in 1993-96. T h e
recent annual budget cuts will be ended and the funding level p e r student
will be constant during the period. T h e universities will receive a lump sum
instead of e a r m a r k e d funds for teaching and research. T h e institutions will
be granted the power to decide within certain limits upon the size of
the student intake and the m e t h o d s for selecting students.
Second, a reform of P h . D p r o g r a m m e s will be implemented in J u n e
1992, including funding of universities for this purpose and new principles
for student scholarships. Third, an agreement was reached on a revision
of the University Administration Act to be implemented in 1992/93. T h e
University A c t , passed by Parliament in J u n e 1993, strengthens the power
of the deans and especially the rector. T h e n u m b e r of elected bodies are
reduced and their powers are substantially diminished. Although the Act
was met with some resistance from the universities, especially from the
students, it was passed with a large majority by the Parliament.

T H E INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR MARKETS
T h r e e kinds of markets exert influence on higher education institutions in

different ways and to varying degrees: educational, labor, and research.
The educational market. O n this m a r k e t , the institutions are suppliers

of higher education, responding to the d e m a n d from (potential) students.
However, m a r k e t forces have only a limited influence on supply and d e m a n d
for higher education, as the intake capacity of the institutions and the study
programmes have b e e n regulated by t h e Ministry of Education. In addition
higher education is funded entirely by the Danish state students d o not
have to pay fees. In this sense, on the educational market the clients of
higher education are not the buyers of higher education.
Some institutions are totally unaffected by m a r k e t forces, as they are
monopolies offering p r o g r a m m e s in a field very attractive to students. Also,
a n u m b e r of other faculties and study p r o g r a m m e s where access is highly
selective (e.g., medicine, law, and dentistry) are relatively unaffected by
m a r k e t forces. In other cases, however, institutions have to c o m p e t e for
the best-qualified students; this is typically the case for p r o g r a m m e s in
101
science and technology, where institutions have displayed much creativity

in developing educational innovations in order to attract m o r e students.
T h e " o p e n education" p r o g r a m m e for part-time education, introduced in
1989, is to a certain extent based on m a r k e t regulation, since institutions
are free to establish as many part-time courses as the m a r k e t will bear.
The labor market. Higher education institutions are suppliers of graduates

for the labor m a r k e t . A s unemployed graduates are entitled to receive
unemployment benefit almost immediately after graduation, the graduate
unemployment situation attracts much attention.
T h e Ministry has generally not accepted increased intakes to study
programmes with high graduate unemployment rates, and has often m a d e
cuts in the intake of p r o g r a m m e s with poor employment prospects. Although
the influence of the labor m a r k e t is indirect, it is very important in those
disciplines where unemployment is a problem, e.g., humanities, psychology,
and other parts of the social sciences. T h e result of this influence has
b e e n much m o r e contact between universities and industry, introduction
of career guidance services, and m o r e vocationally-oriented programmes
at the institutions.
The research market. T h e funding of research has become increasingly

competitive during the 1980s. T h e growth in state funds for research has
almost exclusively been allocated through the research councils or through
specific research p r o g r a m m e s , while there has been little growth in the
core research funding for the universities. This m e a n s that universities
increasingly have to c o m p e t e for funds from councils and p r o g r a m m e s .
In addition, research contracts with industries are playing an increasing
role. T h u s , universities are influenced by a growing "research m a r k e t . "
H o w e v e r , the core funding still accounts for by far the largest part of the
university research budget.
freedom
T H E PARADOX OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY
During the latter half of the 1980s, the policy of the Minister of Education
has been to increase the self-government of higher education institutions,
and to replace central ministerial steering with m a r k e t regulation. In the
same period, universities have frequently complained about increasing
ministerial interference in university matters, and the Ministry has even
been accused of Stalinist tendencies. T w o recent reports on university
m a n a g e m e n t confirm that the institutions, in the opinion of university
102
leaders and m e m b e r s of institutional governing bodies, are subject to a

rather centralized regulation from the Ministry. H o w can this paradox be
explained?
Seen from the Ministry's point of view, a n u m b e r of steps have been
taken to increase institutional self-government. Concerning the intake of
students, from 1991 the institutions can decide, on the basis of their own
criteria, which students they want to accept, apart from proportion of the
intake that has to be selected according to secondary school marks. Also,
during the second half of the 1980s the Ministry accepted, to an increasing
extent, the institutions' proposals concerning the size of the intake to the
individual study p r o g r a m m e s . From 1992 on, the decision on the size of
the intake for most study p r o g r a m m e s has been formally transferred to the
universities.
Relating to the study programmes, details concerning contents of individual
p r o g r a m m e s have been removed from the ministerial regulations, leaving
only the general framework of the programmes (duration, overall structure,
general examination rules, etc.) subject to ministerial steering. In the matter
of resources, e a r m a r k e d funding for specific teaching and research activities,
frequently used in the mid-1980s as a part of the core funding, has been
almost totally abolished and replaced by lump sums for academic activities.
Finally, concerning institutional self-government in general, a recent
a m e n d m e n t to the University Administration Act has created the possibility
for institutions to opt for status as a "free university." A free university is
not b o u n d by the provisions of the A c t , and the institution in question
is free to shape its internal decision-making structure. T h e Ministry has
offered higher degrees of freedom in educational and financial matters to
institutions willing to use this possibility to strengthen their m a n a g e m e n t
structure. However, an application for free university status has to be
approved both by the governing bodies of the institution in question and
by the Minister of Education. So far only one such "free institution," i.e.,
the faculty of science at the University of A a r h u s , has been approved. Two
other applications are presently being negotiated.
Seen from the institution's point of view, their attitudes might be explained
by five major factors. First, the frequent budget cuts have put institutional
budgets under severe pressure. Although the institutions formally have a
relatively high degree of freedom in the internal allocation of funds, the
scarcity of funds means that the resource allocation decisions to be m a d e
at the institutional level are often of a negative nature. A s this is a result
of government policies, it is perceived as an increased centralized influence
on institutional matters.
Second, reforms initiated by the Ministry are often not welcomed by
the institutions. Such reforms represent a disturbance in research and
educational activities, as they mean extra work and changes in wellknown procedures. Therefore, changes from above are often regarded
103
as unwanted ministerial interference, even if the purpose is to expand

institutional a u t o n o m y ; and ministerial reforms affecting universities have
been frequent in recent years.
Third, the ministerial policy of increased institutional self-government has
been linked to a d e m a n d for institutional accountability. Expressions of this
d e m a n d have been in the form of an increasing n u m b e r of evaluations of
study p r o g r a m m e s and research activities, a higher emphasis on quality
control, and d e m a n d s for performance indicators. These innovations are
often regarded as new manifestations of ministerial centralism.
F o u r t h , the aim of the Ministry has been to strengthen the powers of
the central administration of institutions. A s universities are governed
by a n u m b e r of elected bodies in a rather fragmented and bottomheavy institutional structure, increased " a u t o n o m y " at the institutional
top level is in potential conflict with the autonomy of decision-making
bodies at the faculty and d e p a r t m e n t levels, and therefore increased
institutional a u t o n o m y represents, seen from the lower levels, a threatening
centralization.
Fifth, the growing importance of m a r k e t mechanisms can be seen as
governmental steering in a new disguise. Traditional centralized ministerial
regulation is replaced by m a r k e t regulation, perceived by some as just
another, m o r e sophisticated strategy for the accomplishment of ministerial
goals. Some institutions may prefer the traditional, m o r e bureaucratic
m e t h o d s , as ministries might be seen as m o r e predictable and certainly
m o r e sensitive to political arguments than are markets.
It must be added that this picture of university attitudes to self-government
and m a r k e t regulation does not represent the whole truth. T h e r e are rectors,
deans, and other academics who support an increased m a r k e t orientation;
however, they have not been in the front line in the public d e b a t e . Although
there have b e e n divergent opinions on the nature of university a u t o n o m y ,
both Ministry and universities agree on the necessity of increased autonomy
for higher education institutions. This goal is also supported by most of the
political parties in Parliament, who have supported the new University Act
which underlines the autonomy of the higher education institutions and
places the responsibility for institutional m a n a g e m e n t in the hands of rectors
and deans. For the first time given the formal power of leadership, rectors
and deans are expected to be protagonists in the shaping of the future role
of Danish universities.
5
Higher Education Policy in France
FRANS KAISER and GUY NEAVE

The education
system
R e c e n t l y , p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n in F r a n c e has b e e n r e o r g a n i z e d . T h e
p r o g r a m m e of primary education used to consist of five consecutive years.
Pupils entered at the age of six. T h e r e was also a system of pre-primary
education, in which children could enrol in their second year. After the
reorganization, the p r o g r a m m e now consists of two three-year cycles. T h e
first cycle follows the last year of pre-primary education. Although the first
year of this cycle is not compulsory, most of the children attend these classes.
T h e rest of pre-primary education remains m o r e or less unchanged.
Secondary education also consists of two cycles. In the first cycle, all
pupils attend the collges d'enseignement
secondaire for four years. But
after two years, some of these pupils attend the special classes preparatory
to technical education. T h e second cycle of secondary education can be
subdivided into two streams: the long stream, leading to the baccalaurat,
and the short stream, which is mainly technical, leading to the certificat
d'aptitude professionelle (CAP). A n overview of the French education system
is presented in Figure 1.
The higher education system: history and
rationale
For a good understanding of the structure of the French system of higher

education, it is necessary to know some basic characteristics of the history
of the system.
T h e first important characteristic is that there are two primary types of
higher education institutions: universities and Grandes coles ( G E ) . Grandes
104
France
26
105
25
24
23
22
21
20
Matrise
Licence
19
18
IUT
Universit
STS
Bac Pro
17
16
second degr 2me cycle
BEP
CAP
CAP
15
CPPN
14
CEP
13
12
second degr 1er cycle
11
10
9
8
enseignement lmentaire
7
6
5
4
enseignement prlmentaire
3
Age
Figure 1: The French educational system
coles were created in the 18th century to train and educate officers and
engineers to high standards for the civil service. In the 19th century, the
n u m b e r of Grandes coles grew and diversified into the field of industry and,
later on, c o m m e r c e . It is not the existence of higher education institutions
outside universities that m a k e s this situation typical for F r a n c e , but rather
their age and importance (in a qualitative rather than a quantitative sense).
T h e second feature is the relatively young age of universities. T h e
universities of the Ancien Rgime were abolished by the French Revolution.
Napoleon did not restore t h e m but installed u n d e r the n a m e of Universit
a system for educating secondary and tertiary teachers. A t the end of the
19th century there was a move towards the creation of real universities but
a law of 1896 created a new type of university that still was not a real
university. These new universities were a "collection" of five faculties (the
106
F. Kaiser and G. Neave
same in all universities), with a university council with virtually no power and
a president who was appointed by the central government. F r o m 1896 to 1968
the faculties constituted higher education in practice, not the universities.
T h e law of 1968 granted universities their autonomy.
The third feature of the French higher education system is the development
of short technical and vocational courses. These courses emerged in the
1950s outside universities (STS) and in the 1960s inside the university sector
(IUT).
Based on the historic characteristics described above and influenced by

the way French higher education policy has reacted to the changes in the
higher education environment, the French system of higher education has
evolved a rather complex structure. Two main sectors can be distinguished:
a university sector and a non-university sector. T h e non-university sector
consists of two main types of institutions or courses, both selective in
admission, with different goals.
T h e first type is the "schools for higher education" or Grandes
coles.
These institutions select their students through a highly selective competition.
T o participate in such a competition two years of preparatory study are
required, mainly in special preparatory classes (CPGE). T h e r e are two main
streams in the courses of the highly selective schools: liberal arts and sciences.
T h e Grandes coles are traditionally vocationally oriented and educate
executives for both the public and private sectors. They have limited the
n u m b e r of their students in order to maintain good employment prospects
for their graduates on the labor m a r k e t . H o w e v e r , the GES are correcting
the friction on the labor market caused by this deliberate limitation of the
supply of graduates by doubling the n u m b e r of graduates. Grandes coles
traditionally did not have any significant research activities, but they are
becoming m o r e responsive to the m a r k e t as well: research activities are
starting to develop.
T h e second type of non-university class is the Sections de
Technicien
Suprieur (STS). The two-year courses, located at Lyces, are very vocationally
oriented and lead to the Brevet de Technicien Suprieur (BTS). Their
graduates (technicians of the middle echelon) are expected to enter the
labor m a r k e t .
Next to these two main streams are a n u m b e r of schools that are very
much oriented to a specific profession, e.g., social workers, professions in
the health services, etc.
T h e university sector consists of two parts. T h e first part is the Instituts
Universitaires de Technologie (IUT). T h e IUT are m o r e or less a u t o n o m o u s
components of the universities. E n t r a n c e to the vocationally oriented twoyear courses which IUT provide, is selective. T h e IUT were intended to attract
baccalaureates of an average level but instead they attract a very high level,
which is considered to be a problem. T h e graduates of IUT (technicians and
executives of the middle echelon) are expected to enter the labor m a r k e t
107
but, instead, a relatively high proportion of I U T graduates, holders of the

Diplme Universitaire de Technologie ( D U T ) , continue their study at the
universities.
T h e second part of the university sector, and by far the largest c o m p o n e n t
of French higher education, is the universities. T h e universities are often
characterized as the " o p e n " sector, i.e., with no selection of students at
admission. H o w e v e r , this characterization is an oversimplification. T h e
medical sector within universities has a selection at the end of the first
year. T h e other university courses have, in theory, no selection during the
first two years; in practice, however, universities may limit the n u m b e r of
freshmen according to capacity. T h e Parisian universities in particular have
to limit their intake.

T h e " n o r m a l " university courses start with two-year p r o g r a m m e s (first
cycle) leading up to the D E U G degree. T h e holders of the D E U G are entitled to
continue higher education in the second cycle, which consists of two stages.
T h e first stage leads to the Licence degree (which is needed for applying for
jobs in public service), while stage two leads to the Matrise degree. In the
second cycle a reform is envisaged to reduce the n u m b e r of courses from
250 to 50.
This "basic" structure of the "normal" university courses is not homogeneous
throughout the French system: m o r e and m o r e exceptions from this general
pattern appear to occur at the institutions. Next to the above mentioned
"basic" structure, a n u m b e r of specialized courses has been established. In
the mid-1970s a selective second cycle was established, leading to specialized
Matrise degrees, e.g., informatics applied to public administration, management, and applied sciences. F u r t h e r m o r e , a relatively small, vocational
track was added to the first cycle, leading to the D E U S T degree. In the
1980s the Magistre, a highly selective three-year p r o g r a m m e , has been
established. In 1991 the latest type of p r o g r a m m e started: the I U P . This
three-year p r o g r a m m e , which can be entered after one year of D E U G courses,
is vocationally oriented and issues a degree after each completed year.
T h e structure of the university courses is completed by the third cycle
courses. T h e r e are two distinct types, both selective. T h e first type is
vocationally oriented ( D E S S ) and the second is a preparation for a scientific
career ( D E A ) .
TYPICAL PREPARATORY PATH
T h e typical preparatory path of students entering higher education is

through the long second cycle of secondary education, leading to the
108
baccalaurat. T h r e e comments need to be m a d e regarding this preparatory

path so as to understand the current problems regarding access to higher
education. First, "long" secondary education has diversified rapidly and
the n u m b e r of sries within the baccalaurat p r o g r a m m e has grown also.
Second, the n u m b e r of baccalaurat holders has increased (by 7 2 % between
1980 and 1990), and will probably continue to do so at a rapid rate . A n d
third, in the same time, the proportion of students continuing their studies
after the baccalaurat has increased as well. These three factors cause both a
qualitative and a quantitative stress on the provision of higher education.
Students, staff and drop out rate

TABLE 1
N u m b e r of students (headcount) in French higher education
1988
1989
1990
67,315 117,766 145,053 162,057

40,123 47,334 53,267 57,881
122,879 152,890 150,227 157,741
91,741 78,160 72,032 71,682
178,523
62,811
169,855
70,144
199,084
67,465
191,679
70,385
1980
1985
1987
Non-university
sector
STS
CPGE
GE
Schools in
paramedic
and social
sector
University sector
IUT
Universities *
Other
schools
53,667 61,905 63,780 67,101

69,894
74,293
792,729 885,755 903,797 945,339 1,018,637 1,080,234
8376
14,087
14,974
15,276
15,425
15,576
including medical courses; excluding IUT and ENSI
T h e above tables do not specify the size of the special courses in the
universities ( M S T , M I A G G E , M S G , Magistre, I U P ) . T h e n u m b e r of students in
these courses, however, is relatively small.
Because of the diversity of the French system, d r o p out rates vary
substantially between the different types of institutions. In 1989 a cohort
study was published. T h e report looked into the results of the students in
the first cycle (two year programmes) after three years. If d r o p out rates
109

TABLE 2
N u m b e r of new entrants (headcount) in French higher education * *
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
61,467
25,239
66,583
26,135
75,270
29,474
84,249
31,996
26,704
166,242
27,146
165,676
27,103
169,000
29,369
189,532
Non-university sector
STS
CPGE
GE *
**
University sector
IUT
Universities *
*
**
including medical courses; excluding IUT

figures are not completely comparable to Table 1 because in this table students in
overseas territories are included. Furthermore, the figures do not cover all tracks but
only the most important ones.
*** the entrants in Grandes coles are no new entrants in the French higher education
system because they have entered higher education two years before, in CPGE
are defined at the institutional level, (a student leaving the specific type of
institution without a diploma is counted as a d r o p o u t ) , d r o p out rates vary
between 4 1 % and 2 4 % . Defined on the system level (a student leaving the
higher education system without a diploma is counted as a d r o p o u t ) , the
drop out rates are much lower, as Table 3 shows.
D r o p out rates within the Grandes coles are relatively low, partly because
of the competition amongst prospective students for entrance.
T h e n u m b e r of staff presented below gives a rather rough picture of the
situation in French higher education. Because of the diversity of the system
and the administrative regulations concerning personnel in the different
types of institutions, it is hard to give comparable information on staff
TABLE 3
D r o p out rates in first cycle higher education
Universities
IUT
STS
CPGE
24
11
30
22
38
(DEUG)
Institution level
System level
*
41
15
CPGE do not deliver any diplomas. The drop out rate mentioned refers to the students
who do not enter a Grande cole
110
n u m b e r s . Table 4 therefore does not include data on staff of C P G E and

STS (since they are part of secondary education institutions, Lyces), nor
does it include personnel paid for by the institutions themselves (through
the "supplementary hours funds"), nor personnel of certain Grandes coles
and institutions that are not under the realm of the Ministry of Education.
C N R S research personnel are also not included. A c a d e m i c staff on universities
spend an average of approximately 8 0 % on teaching activities.
TABLE 4
Academic staff in part of French higher education
1986
1987
1988
1989
ENSI
1187
1229
1325
Other
Grandes
coles **
2041
2036
2150
2313
5397
37,194
5518
37,014
5766
38,329
5945
40,566
University sector
IUT
Universities *
*
including medical courses
**
ENI, INS A , ENS, ENS A M , CNAM
1451
TABLE 5
Non-academic staff in part of French higher education
1986
1987
1988
1989
ENSI
Other
Grandes
coles **
University sector
IUT
Universities *
*
including medical courses
**
ENI, INSA, E N S , E N S A M , CNAM
1349
5968
1525
5146
2254
5855
3193
27,691
3101
27,500
3049
25,970
Characteristics
111
structure
FUNCTIONS AND GOALS
Universities in F r a n c e have t w o functions that a r e m o r e or less

contradictory. O n the o n e hand they have to take in all students who d o
not or cannot enter the selective types of higher education. O n the other
hand they have to maintain a high standard of research and to educate
and train high level researchers. O n e way universities attempt to escape
this dilemma is by the reduction of (undergraduate) students by selection
during the courses, which gives rise to a n o t h e r problem: t h e already noted
relatively high d r o p out rates.
A s mentioned above, Grandes coles are starting to enter the field
of research, which used to be the exclusive domain of universities. T h e
reverse is also occurring. Universities traditionally educated and trained
teachers, researchers and m e m b e r s of the legal and medical professions.
During the last d e c a d e , universities have started to educate executives in
other professions as well, thereby becoming competitors for the Grandes
coles, which traditionally educated those executives.
LOCATION O F PUBLICLY F U N D E D SCIENTIFIC R E S E A R C H
Publicly funded scientific research takes place both inside and outside
universities. This situation cannot be understood without knowing the
workings of a n u m b e r of "grand research organizations" ( C N R S , I N S E R M ,
etc). These organizations have a legal status of their own and are situated
outside universities. This clear-cut separation however does not exist in
practice. These organizations fund scientific research by providing funds and
researchers to "associated g r o u p s " within universities on four-year contracts.
These associated groups use resources provided by both the research
organizations and by the universities. Universities and "grand research
organizations" are further intertwined because of the influence academics
have on the decision-making process in the research organizations.
Authority within the Higher Education System

Higher education
legislation
Higher education legislation has changed quite often during the last 25
years. In the 1968 Loi d'Orientation
(Loi Faur) the universities got a
new status, based on three principles: a u t o n o m y , pluri-disciplinarity, and
participation of students and all levels of staff. T h e faculty organization
was changed and the m a n a g e m e n t of the institutions was put in t h e hands
of a representative council. In 1984, a new law was accepted: the Loi sur
112
renseignement
suprieur (or Loi Savary). This law gave the institutions
the opportunity to sign contracts concerning educational activities with the
government. F u r t h e r m o r e the administrative organization was changed.
During the period 1970-1988, there was a general hesitation to use the
opportunities which the legislative framework provided; later o n , this issue
will be addressed. Since 1988, the signing of contracts has b e c o m e m o r e
common.
Although the 1984 legislation has certain elements of a framework law,
it also contains a n u m b e r of very detailed regulations, especially concerning
the issuing of diplomas. It can therefore be said that higher education
legislation is in this respect a "mixed" legislation.
programmes
Based on the maquettes nationales (a national format), universities may

propose new p r o g r a m m e s or courses. A t the m o m e n t , these initiatives have
to coincide with the time schemes of negotiations and evaluations, which are
e m b e d d e d in the contract between the institution and the government (and
other partners). A s far as the proposed courses lead to National Diplomas
the Minister of Education has the final say. If the institution wants to start
a p r o g r a m m e which leads to an institutional diploma, the university has full
discretion. H o w e v e r , the central government does not fund those university
p r o g r a m m e s . National curricula exist on the level of D E U G , Licence,
Matrise,
and Doctorat.
Control of research
programmes
In the 1984 Higher Education Guideline Law, researchers are guaranteed

full independence regarding their research activities. It states also the "full"
autonomy of universities and other public institutions with a scientific
character regarding the definition of their own research policies. H o w e v e r ,
this autonomy is worth little in practice if there are no funds available for
research activities.
Institutional
management and control
T h e governance and m a n a g e m e n t structure of universities are imposed by

law. T h e governance structure consists of three councils and the president.
T h e composition of these councils, in terms of the constituents represented,
is strictly regulated by law, but there is a certain margin regarding the
percentages of the various constituents to be represented.
T h e competencies of the governance and m a n a g e m e n t bodies are also
113
regulated by national law. A s far as personnel policies are concerned,

these competencies are very limited. All staff are civil servants, u n d e r
direct control of national regulations; universities have no influence on the
status, rewards, or tenure of the staff. H o w e v e r , with the implementation
of the contractual policy and the new system of funding which will b e c o m e
operational in 1993, m o r e options for institutional personnel policies may
b e c o m e possible.
Institutional
CORE
funding
FUNDING
T h e funding of research activities has a very distinct character. A s

discussed earlier, the largest part of publicly funded research is funded
through personnel and other resources by "grand research organizations"
(e.g., C N R S ) . T h e decision-making process regarding the research projects
concerned is described above, so the following description of the funding
mechanism excludes these research activities; also, the description covers
the regulations regarding only those institutions under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Education.
C o r e funding consists of three parts: funding of personnel, of research
activities, and of non-research activities. Personnel is paid for by the state,
therefore there is n o item " p e r s o n n e l " on the institutional budgets. Research
funds are determined by the Direction de la recherche et des tudes doctorales
of the ministry. T h e criteria used are related to the research in the four-year
research contracts that are signed by the institutions and the ministry. T h e
final part of core funding is the most complex. Until 1989 funds for buildings
(construction and maintenance) were determined by the state, so that these
funds did not appear on the institutional budgets. Since 1989 funds for
maintenance have gone to the institutions, and construction grants may be
a little m o r e accessible for the institutions.
T h e remaining funds consist of three major grants based on objective
criteria, and a n u m b e r of smaller, e a r m a r k e d grants. T h e criteria used for
the three major grants are: floor surface of educational facilities; n u m b e r of
contact hours (based on national models); and n u m b e r of complementary
hours, covering for (capacity) shortages due to enrolment. Since 1989,
the three major grants have been provided as lump sums. In 1991 and
1992, a transitional period existed during which the ministry negotiated
contracts with the institutions regarding teaching activities. A t the end of
this period, contracts had to be signed by all institutions, so that the new
funding mechanism could b e c o m e operational in 1993. During this period,
the funds were based on the funds received in 1988, with an adjustment for
enrolment changes.
T h e flexibility which institutions have using core funds has grown since
114
1988, but is still limited: in 1989, 8 3 % of the current funds for universities
was e a r m a r k e d (74% for Grandes coles). A n d one has to k e e p in mind that
the major part of institutional resources personnel is determined by
the state, on which the institutions have no influence whatsoever. Reserving
funds for alternative appropriations is allowed in a few cases.
SUPPLEMENTARY
FUNDING
Institutions are allowed to raise their own funds, as long as it does

not involve student fees. For national degree p r o g r a m m e s , tuition fees
are fixed on the national level. N o additional fees may be levied for
compulsory activities. For p r o g r a m m e s leading to institutional diplomas,
however, institutions are free to fix their tuition fees.
TABLE 6
Composition of institutional resources (%) *
Universities
(incl I U T )
coles
d'ingnieurs
Personnel on the state budget

Core funding (grants on the
institutional budget)
Supplementary funding
(institutional sources)
64.4
19.6
47.4
24.6
16.1
28.0
Total
100%
100%
1989
(28)
not including resources for research funded by CRNS

T h e r e are two forces outside the higher education system that play an
important role in the formulation of the core goals of higher education
(essentially through the political authorities):
(a) the strong growth in enrolment;
(b) the issue of adaptation to the labor m a r k e t .
T h e ever-rising n u m b e r of new entrants to higher education has influenced
the quality of that influx, by increasing its heterogeneity if not by lessening
its quality. A n o t h e r aspect of this issue is the tendency of new students to
enrol in programmes which are most promising in terms of success. T h e
unwanted effects of these tendencies are amplified by the structure of the
115
French system, notably the " o p e n n e s s " of the long p r o g r a m m e s and the
selectivity of the short p r o g r a m m e s . A n a d e q u a t e adaptation to the labor
m a r k e t requires a certain "vocationalization" of the p r o g r a m m e s , and the
creation of continuous and closer links between academics and industry.
T h e former gives rise to some problems because vocationalization requires
a multi-disciplinary p r o g r a m m e , which is hard to realize in a discipline
based university. T h e latter is resented by the academics. It is some kind
of a French tradition to protect higher education from the influences of
industry.
Partly because of the two forces m e n t i o n e d , France has started a policy
p r o g r a m m e to attain a rate of participation at the baccalaurat level of at
least 8 0 % of each age group at the beginning of the next century (Programme
Universits 2000). This p r o g r a m m e has two principle aspects:
study of how the efficiency of higher education can be stimulated. T h e
reform of the p r o g r a m m e s and diplomas is o n e aspect, in combination with
the measures to be taken to solve the problematic situation in the first cycle
of higher education;
partnerships with the regional authorities.
These aspects of Programme
Universits 2000, besides the intended
adaptation of the possibilities for institutional personnel policies to the
new goals and an active policy to maintain a high standard of research,
are the current key issues in French higher education policy.
Reflection on Structure, Authority, and Higher Education Policy on

T h e concept of "adjusting higher education to the m a r k e t " , or the
transformation of the system from being social d e m a n d driven to " m a r k e t
driven," is a constant t h e m e across most Western E u r o p e a n countries over
the past decade or so. H o w e v e r , what is understood by that concept is
nation-specific, contextual, often influenced by both political and historical
ideologies, and constrained if not defined by administrative and
institutional provision already in place. T o this general axiom, France is no
exception. Yet, contemporary policies are seldom set in a vacuum. Some may
be a break from the past; others a r e , to adopt a Clausewitzian perspective,
the pursuit of similar objectives by other m e a n s . It follows from this that
some attention should be paid to the factors antecedent to the present
situation. T h e r e are good reasons for adopting a semi-historical approach.
T h e first springs from the fact that previous policies, successful or not, tend
to influence contemporary priorities. Second, the historical approach, eo
ipso, gives us a sense of the m o m e n t u m that has built up behind today's
initiatives. Third, that same historical perspective allows us to assess the
radical nature of the measures taken by comparison with those which went
116
before (Barraclough, 1968). In evaluating the factors which have facilitated

or prevented governments acting according to their will, comparison over
time within a particular country is therefore no less useful than comparing
countries at a particular time.
Structures, segmentation
and policy style: aspects of French
exceptionalism
T h e first aspect that deserves stressing in the French context is that

changes in governance and m a n a g e m e n t h a v e , until very recently, had to
be pursued independently from the goal of harnessing higher education to
market forces. This is not to say that today, both themes are independent
in their development. They a r e , on the contrary, closely entwined. But
the binding together of these two strands, the linkage of m a n a g e m e n t and
governance to a very specific species of " m a r k e t rationale," may be seen
as one of the most significant aspects of France's contemporary higher
education policy. Indeed, it can and has been argued, though perhaps
indirectly, that the rationale of meeting changes in the m a r k e t whether
the internal French m a r k e t or the b r o a d e r E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y has
been a major factor in creating an acceptable rationale for bringing together
what political caution, and often internal opposition within the universities,
sought to hold apart.
T h e second aspect which requires underlining is the segmented nature of
the French higher education system. This segmentation carries across three
dimensions: institutional form, sectoral admissions policy, and institutional
linkage with the labor m a r k e t . Previous sections of this report have set out
the structure of French higher education, distinguishing between selective
and o p e n access and between short cycle and long cycle in study duration.
It is important to bear in mind the background factors that have contributed
to this institutional and curricular differentiation, not merely because such
differentiation has been a long-term response to economic and thus market
change in the past, but also because it provides considerable insight into
current priorities of reform in the university sector.
Segmentation is not confined to the three dimensions just mentioned it
also has an administrative dimension. If universities and university institutes
of technology together with certain public sector Grandes coles come under
the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, there are other
Grandes coles the elite of French higher education which come under
the ambit of other ministries such as Agriculture, Defence, or Public Service.
Yet a third group in the state sector, schools of fine art, music, etc., fall
under various authorities some in central government, others under the
responsibility of local government.
This particular dimension of administrative segmentation is itself the end
product of a very specific form of adaptation to economic change in the past.
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Such change was essentially accretive. It consisted of adding institutes, often

of a highly specialized n a t u r e , to the nation's higher education provision but
outside the university stricto sensu. T h e setting up of specialized institutes
was largely a response to changes in m a n p o w e r needs, mostly, though by no
m e a n s exclusively, in the public sector labor m a r k e t . A n u m b e r of reasons
have been advanced for this form of system adaptation in France. O n e
has been the difficulty of getting acceptance of such innovation within
the established university. T h e second explanation is m o r e political, legal,
but also logistical. In a system of higher education based on a concept of
centrally defined homogeneity of provision within sectors, change has to
be introduced and implemented simultaneously across the whole sector to
which it is applied. Just as such a procedure requires considerable political
will to overcome natural inertia, so it gives rise to significant upheaval. T h u s ,
while formal and legal homogeneity ensures a certain formal similarity of
mission, purpose and resources which were held in France to be the
touchstone of Republican equality it also tends to exclude organic reform
at institutional level. If reform is to be u n d e r t a k e n , it has, according to the
rationale of legal homogeneity and formal similarity between institutions,
to be applied to all, if it is to be applied to o n e . T h e exclusion of organic
reform or what has been known in other circumstances as "rolling
reform" stood as symptomatic of what o n e sociologist has t e r m e d a
"stalled society" (Crozier, 1970). F r o m this, two consequences flow which
have had direct implications both for the mechanisms of change in French
higher education and for what has been t e r m e d the nation's "policy style" in
higher education. In respect of the first, accretive change the creation of
specialized establishments outside but in parallel to the university acted
as a functional substitute for organic change at institutional level within the
university sector. In respect of the second, absence of an organic capacity
for reform at institutional level served to underline the fact that reform,
when it c a m e , was largely in response to intolerable pressures which had
built u p in default of such a capacity. Higher education policy was then
characterized "by immobilism and stagnation most of the time and by abrupt
and radical change some of the time in short a policy of fits and starts"
(Premfors, 1981).
Two transitional
phases
It is against this long-term backdrop that France's drive towards a very

particular form of " m a r k e t ideology" must be set. Broadly speaking, the
decade from the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies revealed in lurid and
dramatic form the fundamental inability of accretive change combined
with major "one off" systems reform to deal with the problems associated
with mass higher education, not simply in its quantitative aspects, but also,
and no less significant, in those matters associated with power, authority,
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and participation at institutional level. From this standpoint, the transition

towards a " m a r k e t driven" policy style, as well as a " m a r k e t driven" system
of higher education, was preceded by two separate phases of reform;
these phases, retrospectively, can be seen to highlight the weakness of a
mechanism of reform, the roots of which may be traced back to the latter
part of the nineteenth century.
T h e end of the accretive change mechanism may be seen as coterminous
with the establishment in 1966 of the first university institutes of technology,
institutions whose mission was to provide specialized training of a short
cycle, terminal n a t u r e , specifically aimed at the private sector and designed
to supply mid-level m a n a g e m e n t and technician cadres. T h o u g h legally
part of the university, organizationally the I U T S differed fundamentally in
curriculum content, in the structure of their studies, and in the closer
administrative oversight exercised by the Ministry of Education. Though
in one way the I U T S stood as the last exercise in "extra university accretion",
in another they also heralded the shape of things to come in the sense
that they constituted an explicit link with the economy, which increasingly
became a feature of the university sector, once the pressing issue of internal
governance and authority had reached some form of equilibrium in the
higher education Guideline Law of 1984.
Factors of limitation
T h e separation of the issues of governance and authority on the one hand
from the explicit articulation of higher education with the private sector
labor market on the other, has been a highly sensitive issue in France which
still retains a virulent subterranean existence; its re-emergence is a matter
of occasional preoccupation for the authorities. T h e tensions involved and
the accompanying changes in authority at institutional level can be traced
through the issue of the presence of "external personalities," people chosen
to sit on the university b o a r d who represented the interests of the external
community. Provision for "lay m e m b e r s " had been m a d e in the Higher
Education Guideline Law of 1968 a controversial Act since it was often
interpreted by student radicals as harnessing the university to the chariot
wheels of industry. T w o issues revolved around this ideological stance:
the former concerned the role of higher education as a spearhead for
radical political change in society; the latter, the balance of power and
authority at institutional level. External personalities were regarded by the
radical factions of students and younger staff m e m b e r s as reinforcing the
conservative interests in university, and by extension in society, through the
subordination of the university to industrial rather than to the " c o n s u m e r "
needs of students, and by tipping the balance of power within the structures
of university decision-making towards senior m e m b e r s of academic staff.
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This essentially political vision of the university, which could be

interpreted as a latter day reassertion of the medieval Bologna model
of authority based on students rather than the Paris model based on the
authority of teachers, may not have the strength it once possessed. N o r
today does it expend its energies in contesting the n u m b e r of seats assigned
to the different interest groups and constituencies on the three main organs
of governance and decision-making at institutional level. But it does retain a
powerful though often erratic and unpredictable presence, acting in defence
of the formal right of baccalaureate holders to a place in higher education.
T h o u g h it can be argued that the student estate is but another form of
corporative interest, protecting established rights and privileges foremost
of which is the right to study irrespective of the economic consequences
that follow from the freedom of individual choice, and that with extremely
low enrolment fees it is nevertheless an interest which d e m a n d s careful
consideration even though it too may be seen as contributing to a "stalled
society".
T h e issue of the formal balance of powers at institutional level, between
the degree of external presence and between staff and students, was
settled by the Higher Education Guideline Law of 1984, though occasional
intervention by Parliament in 1979 to shift it in favor of senior professors
shows both the sensitivity and the importance that both Right and Left
attached to it. In addition, the 1984 Guideline Law set internal governance
and authority on a course which converged with the issue of placing the
driving force of higher education firmly in the market domain.
It is at this point that a distinction should be drawn between what may
be t e r m e d "curricular adjustment" to changes in the skills the economy
requires, and the rather b r o a d e r range of issues which come together around
the notion of moving towards a " m a r k e t driven" system of higher education.
Curricular adjustment is, not surprisingly, a m o r e limited exercise and may
just as well take place in the context of higher education operating in a
c o m m a n d economy as it can in a university set in a "free m a r k e t " economy.
Admittedly, the transition from o n e to a n o t h e r will almost certainly involve
a high degree of "curricular revision", but that aspect on its own by no
m e a n s covers the full range of activities which now appear to accompany
the b r o a d e r strategic priority. F u r t h e r m o r e , this distinction has particular
relevance to understanding the underlying dynamic of change which led on
to the present day reforms.
Curricular adjustment: the second transitional
phase
T h e process of "curriculum adjustment" in French higher education stands

as the second of the transitional phases in the evolution of the mechanism
of reform towards the " m a r k e t m o d e l " . T h e essential characteristic of this
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second p h a s e , which may be seen as running from 1972 to 1984, was the
partial a b a n d o n m e n t of what has b e e n described earlier as the "accretive
mechanism" in higher education reform. T h e premise which underlay this
approach had, hitherto, involved a certain reticence to intervene in the
university. T h e stresses revealed by 1968 swiftly overcame such scruples.
T h e creation in 1972 of the D E U G , involved, in essence, the realignment
of study duration for the first university diploma on the 2-year model
already established in the university institutes of technology. In 1976, a
requirement was enunciated that all second cycle studies showed clearly the
occupational outlets to which they led. A l s o , the creation of the Diploma of
Higher Specialised Studies ( D E S S ) encouraged a burgeoning vocationalism.
These three developments formed the basis of the government's policy of
realigning both the content and the structure of the curriculum to the
perceived d e m a n d s of the economy.
Curricular adjustment: its limited
success
With the advantage that only hindsight can bring, it is now apparent that
the policy of curricular adjustment was a significant break from the past in
at least two respects. First, at a time of continuing growth in d e m a n d for
higher education, the established technique of institutional accretion could
only cater for a relatively small proportion of the population in higher
education. Second, curricular adjustment in effect extended the vocational
rationale which had coloured thinking about the I U T S into the university
sector, though without the radical redefinition of the traditional boundaries
of the academic disciplines to the extent that was visible in the "short cycle
sector." T h e central assumption beneath the phase of curriculum adjustment
was its highly limited nature on the one h a n d , and on the other the belief that
a clear statement of the type of employment to which such qualifications led
w e r e , on their own, sufficient levers to carry out major change in the subject
options and curricular pathways students would take.
If necessary, this solution was not on its own sufficient. Though some
students may have behaved as homo economicus, the economic conjuncture
was such that the main consideration which b o r e down on the student estate
was precisely one that impelled t h e m to respond, but to a very different
rationale, namely to prolong study time as a way of sheltering from the
economic blizzard of the late seventies. Far from being deflected o n t o a
vocational track, the student estate extended its study time and, in effect,
m a d e use of the university not as a place to obtain rare skills, but as a
"parking lot," thus temporarily uncoupling higher education from the labor
m a r k e t . Such inconsiderate behavior added to the fact that vocationalization
revealed m o r e the difficulties that French universities faced than it posed
viable solutions; vocational p r o g r a m m e s , if too closely defined to what are
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d e e m e d m a r k e t n e e d s , tend to contain a high degree of in-built obsolescence

and thus may accentuate the basic problem of "mismatch" between higher
education's o u t p u t in terms of qualifications in the m e d i u m term. Finally,
it should be noted that "curricular adjustment" in no way altered the
systems of control, validation, and the general relationship between higher
education and the polity. A s an adjustment, it took place within the long
established p a r a m e t e r s of centralization and detailed ministerial oversight of
the university system. Succinctly put, the changes of the seventies obeyed a
thoroughly technocratic rationale that is, it derived from the belief that a
solution was to b e had from the manipulation of a few key functions without
altering the institutional structure within which they took place.
Political dimensions of current reforms: the origins

T h e constraints under which higher education policy developed in France
during what we have t e r m e d the two transitional phases, had considerable
bearing b o t h on the new reform strategies and on the new priorities
that emerged in the move towards harnessing higher education to the
labor m a r k e t in a m a n n e r m o r e extensive than simply matching output
to the d e m a n d of industry for appropriately qualified graduates. H e r e it is
relevant to recall that the first moves in this direction were not, as in Britain
and the Netherlands, for example, the outcome of expenditure reductions.
They were n o less a political decision, but o n e which firmly endorsed the
principle of abiding by equality of educational opportunity, of continuing
to m a k e higher education available to those qualified and wishing to avail
themselves of it. This strategic decision in turn rested on the conviction that,
if the nation were to maintain its competitive stance at a time of major change
in the economic and occupational structures, a higher level of education
and training was required of the population in general. Operationally and
politically, the touchstone of contemporary higher education policy in France
was the aim first stated in 1983 (Bienaym, 1984) of m o r e than doubling
the n u m b e r s in higher education to a r o u n d 2.5 million students enrolled and,
at secondary education, of bringing forward some 8 0 % of the age group u p
to a level equivalent to the baccalaurat. This latter objective has since been
enshrined as education's A r k of Covenant in the Education Guideline Law
of 1989, a target which is to be realized in the course of the coming ten
years (Ministre de l'Education, de la Jeunesse et des Sport, 1989).
The French vision of the market place

Clearly, the political context in which the second wave of expansion in
French higher education took place is profoundly different from that of its
neighbors. A n d whilst there are parallel features, particularly in respect
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of what has been t e r m e d the theory of the " O v e r l o a d e d State" (Rose &
Peters, 1978), that theory is supplemented by additional dimensions which
are very specific to France. T h e first of these dimensions was that of the
decentralization of government which had been an element in the political
agenda of the government prior to its advent to power in J u n e 1981.
T h e second dimension, which is not absent from other political versions
of the "Overloaded State", possessed certain technocratic connotations
in the French context. T h e feature c o m m o n to both the French and,
say, the British version of this concept lay in the conviction that in
a system as complex as higher education, central administration could
no longer efficiently and effectively maintain detailed control over its
day-to-day administration. If policy were to be steered on the one side,
or if institutions were to be sensitive to changes in the skills the economy
required on the other, increased autonomy had to be conferred at the level
of the individual institution. T o be sure, certain groups in the C h a m b e r of
Deputies inside the R P R did press for a m o r e radical interpretation of the
freedom for m a r k e t forces to shape higher education by rolling back the
frontiers of the state, a stance largely inspired by what was held to be
American practice. It was a view which, whilst influential, had limited
reception. T h e third dimension, which brought together both political and
technocratic considerations in support of decentralization, was the wish to
de-politicize the process of change itself. T h e r e is plenty of evidence from the
recent history of French higher education reform to suggest that centralized
decision-making concentrates political conflict and political conflict in turn
paralyzes decision-making. T h e combination of decentralization on the o n e
hand with greater institutional self-management on the other was then not
simply the implementation of a political reform. It was also an attempt to find
a solution to the politicization that previous reforms had s u m m o n e d forth. A s
such, the policy of decentralization stands as a remarkable revision to many
of the most cherished assumptions about centralized planning, quite apart
from the historical and legal fiction of all universities being on a footing of
formal equality.
The market place as a new mechanism for
reform
T a k e n at face value, what is involved is nothing less than discarding a

model of change that of system-wide, simultaneous implementation laid
down by central administration and the e n d o r s e m e n t of what we have
t e r m e d earlier the concept of "organic c h a n g e " , operated incrementally and
in response to d e m a n d s from the immediate local environment. T h e m a r k e t
is not necessarily a substitute for technocracy, for ultimately, as previous
sections have shown, the weight of finance, the overall goals to be set,
and, as a further example of innovation, their evaluation by an independent
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central body, remain firmly set in Paris. R a t h e r , the role of the m a r k e t in

the French setting is to provide a degree of latitude at institutional level to
allow the fine-tuning of general directives to the circumstances of the region
or city, ensuring the efficient delivery and translation of national goals into
the local setting.
F r o m this it is apparent that the concept of a higher education system
driven by " m a r k e t forces" is very different in its French variation from
its counterparts in, say, Britain or the United States. T h e r e have been
notable devolutions of responsibility from central administration to regional
authorities and to the institutional level, above all in the areas of u p k e e p of
buildings, for the development of branch campuses, and for the conditions
of e m p l o y m e n t for non-academic staff. In essence and it is a paradox
not limited to France m a r k e t forces are those defined as such by central
administration and the ways in which they are linked into higher education
are set down by that same source. Succinctly stated, " m a r k e t forces" applied
to higher education turn a r o u n d three main spheres of development.
These spheres are decentralization of responsibility, the development of
an extensive system of " p a r t n e r s h i p s , " and the introduction of a contractual
system of financing.
Policy objectives and their
interpretation
It is important to note the various interpretations that may be placed

on this general strategy. T h e first and key consideration is the objective
to double student n u m b e r s by the end of the century. This objective has
already d e m a n d e d , and will d e m a n d in the future, considerable financial
effort. O v e r the eight years from 1984 to 1992, the higher education budget
expressed in current Francs has risen by some 9 0 . 5 % . T h e corresponding
statistic, expressed as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product, is an increase
from 0.43 to 0.50% ( R o n t o p o u l o u & L a m o u r e , 1992). T h e wish to distribute
this growing b u r d e n away from central government explains, in part at least,
some of the motives in bringing in other " p a r t n e r s " regional authorities,
municipalities, and industry.
T h e strengthening of regional or middle layer of administration is evident
in a n u m b e r of ways: the emergence of Regional Outline Plans (Schmas
rgionaux d'amnagement),
the increasing a m o u n t of monies injected into
universities from Regional Councils (approximately Ffrs 2 billion in 1989),
and a m o r e active role assumed by regional authorities in pressing for the
development of certain areas of excellence in keeping with regional needs.
T h e creation of various groups is a clear pointer to the decentralization of
the planning function. These include o n e , h e a d e d by the Chief Educational
Officer (Recteur), for the planning of higher education provision and needs
on a coordinated basis across all sectors within the region, and another,
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headed by the Prefect, to work out the financial implications this former
stage has for the local authorities. Such decentralization, however, does
not involve a change in the public n a t u r e of the m o n e y coming into higher
education, even though the administrative level from which it comes is a
major innovation. T h e money is still public money.
T h e recognition of regional authorities as legitimate partners in the
enterprise of higher education may be seen as a further extension of
the principle enunciated in the 1984 Higher Education Guideline Law
of increasing the participation of "external interests" in the university.
Conferring upon regions a coordinated planning capacity plus the ability
to pass contracts with the university, suggests that the regions have b e c o m e
far m o r e than just another constituency with which the university must come
to terms. If it is a p a r t n e r , it is most certainly a "privileged p a r t n e r , " and
o n e whose influence is all the greater for its proximity. Equally significant,
viewed from a m e d i u m term perspective, is the likelihood that the regions, in
pressing their specific d e m a n d s for services, qualifications and research, will
act as powerful levers for diversification u p o n a university which, as we have
pointed out earlier, was e m b e d d e d in the legal principle of homogeneity.
Clearly, the drive towards the m a r k e t in the French context, as perhaps
elsewhere as well, involves a considerable multiplication in the n u m b e r of
constituencies and interests with which the university is involved. O n its
own, this p h e n o m e n o n has major implications for the role of university
administration, and most particularly so in those systems which, like F r a n c e ,
have tended to confine the functions of administrators at institutional level
to the role of verifying the application of ministry regulations and overseeing
accounting procedures. T h e multiplication of constituencies, actors, or
participating authorities is not the only process visible. T h e r e are two
others and each in its own fashion has its place in the scheme of things.
T h e first of these is the changing status of those constituencies, affording
t h e m weight of official legitimacy in place of a simple right of participation.
T h e second process, which refers us back to the question of diversifying
political attention away from the center, is the multiplication of the centers
of decision-making. For the most important distinction between a participant
and a decision-maker is whether the individual or the organization has at its
disposal resources which it is prepared to m a k e available, and the terms
on which it is prepared to do this. T h e participant does not have these
resources, but the decision-maker does. T h e m o r e sources a university relies
u p o n , therefore, the m o r e diffused the external decision-makers and the
m o r e incremental its response is likely to be in function to their changing
demands.
If decentralization of responsibility, the emergence of partnerships, and
the development of the "contractual" principle are visible at the regional
level, they require a certain degree of innovation at central level, above all
in the area of university financing. H e r e we see a fundamental reappraisal
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in the historic relationship between state and higher education, a reappraisal

encapsulated in the notion of explicit contacts between ministry and
individual university. F r o m a formal point of view, the notion of placing
the finance of teaching and research on a contactual basis was foreseen in
the Higher Education Guideline Law of 1984. This provision was not acted
u p o n until 1989 and is still in the process of being implemented progressively
across the face of the university landscape. O n e should a d d , as a parenthesis,
that such contracts do not, at the m o m e n t , involve research financing, though
it is envisaged they will do so later. N o r does university finance include the
p a y m e n t of personnel salaries which are directly allocated by the state.
Contract
financing
The two central characteristics which underlie the development of "contract

finance" are the intention of central government to progressively disengage
from the detailed and daily administration of the university and, second,
the obligation upon the individual establishment, as a condition prior
to negotiating its contact, to draw u p a detailed "mission s t a t e m e n t " of
resources to h a n d , objectives to be fulfilled, the resources required to do this,
and the way in which the establishment proposes to evaluate the o u t c o m e .
In principle, contract financing obliges the individual establishment to take
greater initiative in assessing its strengths and planning its future positioning
on the m a r k e t . In reality, it has b e e n argued that the absence of a d e q u a t e
resource m a n a g e m e n t systems in many of France's universities at present
may well prove a hinderance to their drawing u p unambiguous objectives,
let alone carrying out self-evaluation of the outcomes.
T h e fundamental question which arises from this, and to which, at the
present state of our knowledge, no definitive answer has been given, is what
the consequences will be for the internal distribution of power and authority
within the individual establishment. Will it m a k e for a greater concentration
of power a r o u n d the position of the University President? In law, it is the
President whose formal responsibility is to sign agreements and legal accords
on behalf of the university. O r , as an alternative possibility, will it increase
the influence of the Directors of the Units of Training and Research? Will
the effect of placing greater initiative at institutional level bring about a de
facto redefinition of the President, making the position analogous to the
A m e r i c a n Chief C a m p u s Executive a feature that has been noted in
other countries seeking to adapt to a m a r k e t rationale? These are important
questions, even though the transitional nature of the system of financing
France's universities might seem to suggest that they are p r e m a t u r e .
This potential for a major realignment in the balance of power within
academia has yet to be realized. It may well be that the stance taken by
elected representatives in the Regional Councils will be weighty, though
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perhaps not a determinant of such displacements on its own. Much will

d e p e n d on the relationship between President and local politicians or with
certain internal constituencies within academia to which the President allies
him or herself. Either way, the influence of local political authorities will
grow. W h e t h e r this will in its turn cause academia to take a defensive
stance, and turn in upon itself, are matters that only time and circumstance
can tell.
Curricular control and
validation
The budgetary and political channels are not, however, the only instruments
for bringing the university into closer contact with its environment and which
serve, at present, as powerful instruments for steering the universities in
this direction. T h e r e are also substantial and far-reaching changes in the
system of validating degrees and in the procedures involved in curricular
development and innovation. A s the replies to the country questionnaire
have already m a d e plain, France's system of curricular development and
validation of degrees rests on the concept of National Diplomas that
is, degree courses the quality of which is underwritten by the state in the
form of outline syllabuses, a prescribed n u m b e r of hours students must fulfil
over a stipulated n u m b e r of years in order to obtain a given qualification.
U n d e r this control, universities submitted proposals for degree courses to
central administration which, after ascertaining that they corresponded to
nationally prescribed norms (maquettes nationales), conferred the right upon
the individual university to put on the course leading to a National Diploma
in the stipulated field. T h e provision for universities to teach their own
degrees was never absent. But such degrees did not confer on their holder
the eligibility to be admitted to public competitive examinations for a post
in public service. In short, purely university awarded diplomas were less
highly prized, if indeed they were seen as a prize at all!
T h e system of National Diplomas poses a n u m b e r of issues, the importance
of which is both symbolic and operational and which may only with difficulty
be underestimated in French society. I n d e e d , in many respects this system
may be seen as the operational heart of centralization in higher learning.
Originally intended to provide equality of opportunity irrespective of
geographical location by upholding a similarity in their quality and their
content, National Diplomas locked the university firmly into being an
institution that looked to the national, not to the regional level. It also
locked the university into public service as the major occupational reference
point for a considerable n u m b e r of its students. T o this extent, National
Diplomas may be seen as a carry over into post-industrial society of a
mission originally conferred upon France's universities in the early 19th
century, namely to supply highly qualified m a n p o w e r to the services of
the state.
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T h a t said, it should not be thought that centralized control over curriculum

development and validation was, from the consumers' standpoint, an
unwelcome imposition. Quite on the contrary, the right to sit National
Diplomas has been o n e of the m o r e fiercely defended issues amongst
all strata of the student estate. I n d e e d , it may not be exaggerated to
see National Diplomas as higher education's equivalent of the A r k of
Covenant which even the faithful lay hands upon at their peril. It is, in
short, a highly charged issue and it is precisely because of its immense
potential for rallying student opposition that the government has been
obliged to pursue the goal of decentralizing curriculum control down to
the institutional level with extreme delicacy and caution.
T h r e e main considerations p r o m p t e d the policy of decentralizing elements
of curriculum control. In the first place, the target of 2.5 million students by
the end of the decade implies a far wider range of ability and careers than
can be accommodated in public service alone. In the second place, it could
no longer be assumed that the range of motivation and ability in a system
of higher education moving steadily beyond the mass stage of development,
would be the same as it was when 1 5 % of the age group attended university.
Third, the sheer complexity of the n u m b e r of regulations governing National
Diplomas (the figure of 250 different regulations for second cycle studies had
b e e n quoted (Guin, 1990)) b o r d e r e d on the counter-functional.
T h e procedure adopted to give universities greater independence in
defining their diploma p r o g r a m m e s in keeping with student need and
local circumstances, is itself revealing of some of the tensions inherent in
France's higher education. For whilst universities were given this latitude
to develop what essentially were university degrees, the ministry granted
such diplomas national status, thus preserving outward appearances, falling
in with student sensitivities, and upholding tranquillity on the campuses.
T h e r e can be no example m o r e telling of the stoked fires that dwell b e n e a t h
the surface of France's higher education policy-making than this procedural
compromise.
With course development in the hands of the individual university, the
latter possesses, at least in theory, the instrumentality to realize and to
implement d e m a n d s for specific p r o g r a m m e s to meet regional needs. O t h e r
policy instruments were also placed at their disposal, particularly in the
area of continuing education. T h e right to set u p , for example, a Public
Interest G r o u p ( P I G ) which allows the selling of services, whether for
industrial training and short courses or for signing research contracts with
local firms and industries is one such provision, though it has a n u m b e r
of limitations, P I G S may only be created for a specified period, and their
Director is nominated by the Ministry of Education.
128
Strengthening
the mechanisms of
accountability
So far, we have concentrated on those policy instruments that permit

steering at the national and regional level. W e have also examined their
most significant counterparts which are being put into place within the
individual establishment. Policy instruments tend to be somewhat blunt if
they are not accompanied by the setting u p of "feedback" mechanisms and
systems of accountability. Broadly speaking, there tend to be two major
systems which operate across the teaching function at institutional level.
Evaluation of research units comes u n d e r the C N R S and has long been in
place. W e will leave it aside.
Since 1986 t h e c o u n t r y has seen t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of institutional
evaluation with the creation of the National Evaluation C o m m i t t e e . T h e
National C o m m i t t e e is separate from budgetary allocation procedures.
Its main task is to provide the individual establishment with an overall
assessment to enable it to plan its strategic development in the future.
Strictly speaking the C o m m i t t e e is not an accountability mechanism in the
sense that it involves the establishment in "rendering accounts" to public
authorities, even though, at system level, the C o m m i t t e e makes annual
reports on the state of higher education to the President of the Republic.
T h e second m e c h a n i s m c o r r e s p o n d s m o r e closely to the classical
interpretation of accountability in (higher) education and is linked in with
the contracting policy mentioned above. If each establishment develops its
"mission s t a t e m e n t " , it is also required to take into consideration what is
being u n d e r t a k e n by other universities in the region. In effect, contract
financing also contains, on p a p e r , formal provision for cross-institutional
coordination. Within the regional administration of education
(acadmies),
the jurisdiction of the Regional Education Councils has, u n d e r the terms
of the 1989 Education Guideline Law, been extended to higher education.
T h e Chief Education Officer for the region (Recteur), whose authority also
extends to higher education as Chanceliier des universits, is required to
present an annual report on the state of higher education in the region.
Conclusion
Over the past eight years or so, higher education in France has undergone
very significant revisions in its mechanisms of finance, in its capacity for
coordinated development at regional level, and in the latitude for individual
establishments to take initiatives in the teaching as well as in the research
domain. These reforms are at various stages of implementation, and, as
we have pointed out, have far-reaching implications for both academic
authority, for the role, place and competence of institutional administration,
for leadership, and, last but very far from being least, for the overall size and
institutional profile of the system. H o w far the m o r e subtle and qualitative
129
changes which the legislator would wish to see introduced have t a k e n

root at the institutional level must remain, for the m o m e n t , a m a t t e r of
some conjecture. A c a d e m i c values are the product of disciplinary cultures
(Becher, 1989) and of the organizational m e m o r y which, in universities, is
imbued with a high degree of historic weight. Such factors are powerful
indeed even to those w h o , as u n r e p e n t a n t advocates of reform, are apt
to dismiss t h e m under the convenient label of "resistance to c h a n g e . " A s
any student of implementation is well a w a r e , the heartfelt enthusiasm and
commitment of the legislator and of public authorities to root and branch
reform are not always echoed by those who have to carry it out and have to
live with the consequences. This does not m e a n to say that the suspension
of belief by those w h o have reform d o n e to t h e m reflects the absence of
commitment by those who do reform.
T h e underlying t h e m e of this stock-taking exercise, which we believe
also stands as the quintessential element in France's current reform, has
b e e n the search to adapt the procedures and mechanisms which d e t e r m i n e
the way in which reform itself is propagated and, m o r e to the point,
negotiated. T h e fundamental difficulty that France has faced until very
recently lay in what we have t e r m e d the "accretive" approach to minor
adjustments that could be a c c o m m o d a t e d within individual institutions,
and the formal mechanistic, top down approach to major system-wide
change. Such mechanisms of policy implementation may have been effective
provided that the scale of operation and thus the cost involved were both
marginal to the political process and marginal in the a m o u n t s required
from the state budget. With the advent of mass higher education, neither
marginality applied any longer.
O n the contrary, the centralized nature of decision-making contributed t o ,
where it did not actively encourage, the opposing parties (the o n e favoring
change and the other supporting the status quo ante) to concentrate their
efforts and to fight the issues out through the central political process.
Regionalization, decentralization, and the increased powers of individual
institutions to mold their own fate, are not simply a shift of the focus of
conflict away from the center. It also involves replacing national conflict with
local negotiation, and the replacement of formal mechanistic change with an
institutionally d e t e r m i n e d , organic, and incremental version of the same.
T h e question all these issues raise is, of course, whether what was involved
and what will result in these reforms may truly be said to constitute a
" m a r k e t driven" system of higher education? H e r e , much turns a r o u n d
the purity of the model one has in mind. M u c h also d e p e n d s on those
aspects financing being o n e , student fee levels a n o t h e r , and conditions
of employment for academic staff a third which o n e is p r e p a r e d to open
to the unfettered workings of A d a m Smith's invisible hand. In the university
sector, though not necessarily in France's private sector Grandes
coles,
the regionalization and the contractualization of finance have not greatly
130
shifted the b u r d e n away from public funds. T h e contribution of industry

has certainly increased it could hardly do otherwise. Still, it is a d r o p in
the ocean of higher education's overall budget. A n d , though the issue of
increased student fees has b e e n regularly aired, it is yet another example of
tranquillity on the campus being the better part of financial valor. T h e same
might be said about conditions of service for teaching staff. A t a time when
the country faces a dire need to expand the n u m b e r s of university teachers,
not merely to accommodate growing student n u m b e r s but also to replace the
swathe of those who will reach pensionable age over the next 5-15 years, to
raise the issue of tenure and the separation of pay scales from public service
n o r m s , is not just imprudent it is undiluted folly.
Clearly, if we take these three aspects as pointers to the degree to which
France has in reality moved to a m a r k e t system Amricaine,
then one
is obliged to conclude that the road yet to be covered remains long and
doubtless very arduous. But this is to forget the importance of the political
symbolism involved in the constant references to " m a r k e t forces" that color
public d e b a t e . " M a r k e t forces," as we intimated a b o v e , is not an absolute
term. It acquires meaning and significance in function to the context
political, ideological, historic, and technical to which it is applied. By
changing our perception of what are considered to be the driving forces
that motivate individuals and, by extension, the community, it fulfils two
vital roles. First, it provides an alternative diagnosis of the way higher
education, in this instance, functions. Second, it provides a legitimacy for
solutions which otherwise would not be acceptable under other ideological
conditions.
In France, the linking together of administrative decentralization with
m o r e opportunities for "the grass r o o t s " to present their d e m a n d s and
to have t h e m met by institutions capable of doing so without continually
having to pass through, and to refer t o , the center, has been grafted onto
an economic theory which is very different in its original A m e r i c a n form.
It is probably fair to say that in place of central administration as the
main intermediary between the higher education system and society an
arrangement that some may see as incarnated in the Napoleonic university
France's adaptation of the " m a r k e t ideology" has added two other
intermediaries: the region and its political authorities, and industry and its
senior m a n a g e m e n t . These latter institutions do not act as prime nor even
exclusive channels of negotiation. They a r e , as current political vocabulary
has it, partners of the state. They do not substitute for the state which, by
definition, retains its full powers even if it has chosen to share them or to
put in place a policy of self-limitation, creating areas of discretion within
which the individual university may evolve.
T h e way the " m a r k e t m o d e l " has been adapted t o , and modified by,
French circumstances is not an unusual process. Constitutional and economic
models, like les petits vins du terroir, do not travel easily. A n d the purer the
131
vision of the m o d e l , like exquisite yet delicate vintages, the less likely they
will be to retain their original b o u q u e t once transplanted to foreign climes
or uncorked. But that is not to deny the use externally developed models
may have in altering the public's perception of those institutions to which
they are applied, and from there creating a general climate and consensus
for change where previously only the boldest dared tread. It is in this aspect
that the concept of " m a r k e t forces" in France has, so far, r e n d e r e d its most
single service.
Higher Education Policy in Germany

EDGAR FRACKMANN and EGBERT DE WEERT
Introduction
G e r m a n higher education consists of two main sectors, the university
sector and the Fachhochschul-sectov.
T h e universities, some of which
are h u n d r e d s of years old, are based on the traditions of the " G e r m a n
Research University." They represent the H u m b o l d t i a n principle of the
"unity of research and teaching." Besides this m o r e or less h o m o g e n e o u s
system of universities, new institutions, forming the
Fachhochschul-sector,
were gradually established to meet the increasing d e m a n d for higher
education since the early 1960s. In many cases these institutions were
not new but upgrades of existing specialized higher learning institutions
which became part of the higher education system. All middle level
civil servants (Gehobener Dienst), for example, are now educated in the
Fachhochschulsector.
Besides these two sectors there has been a continuous debate in Germany on
the mutual relations and benefits of both sectors, culminating in the fusion of
both types of institutions into comprehensive universities
(Gesamthochschulen).
The comprehensive university was once the model for the future development
of higher education. According to the Hochschulrahmengesetz
in 1976, the
establishment of Fachhochschulen
was considered as part of the evolution
towards an integrated higher education system. In the 1980s this policy was
changed and higher education consisting of two main sectors, each with
different tasks and goals, was stressed.
Higher education policy in G e r m a n y is in fact an aggregate of sixteen
potentially different policies, according to the sixteen states
(Lnder)
responsible for higher education. T h e government role regarding higher
education is traditionally rather strong, as can be noticed from the various
supervisory rights of government and the public funding mechanisms. O n
132
133
the other hand the notion of academic freedom is considered of p a r a m o u n t

importance. T h e emphasis on the research function of the university means
that scientists d e t e r m i n e teaching and research, and that their right to
administer the internal affairs of higher education institutions is respected.
Higher education policy in the 1980s has a t t e m p t e d to influence this situation
by introducing elements of competition and quality differences. With the
slogan "differentiation and competition" (Wilms, 1983), government intends
to m a k e higher education m o r e competitive with regard to the acquisition of
research funds, the quality of p r o g r a m m e s , and general performance of the
institutions. H o w these elements can be incorporated into higher education
policy is o n e of the current issues. Also, the growing n u m b e r of students,
high costs, and study duration are major concerns. Finally, in discussing
higher education policy, the reunification of East and West G e r m a n y has
to be taken into account.
The universities (Wissenschaftliche Hochschulen) and the
Fachhochschulen
are the two main sectors of G e r m a n higher education. A s an additional
sector the colleges of arts and music can be taken into consideration. Studies
at the universities lead either to the Diplom, awarded by the respective
institutions, or to the state examination (Staatsexamen)
(for teachers, law,
medicine, and p h a r m a c y ) . T h e normal length of studies is supposed to be
10-12 semesters (this varies by subject). University studies do not provide
for an " i n t e r m e d i a t e " examination, i.e., one leading to the award of a degree
which might qualify for the labor m a r k e t , such as the Anglo-American
bachelor degree. T h e institutions of the university sector have the exclusive
right to award the P h . D and the venia legendi (the prerequisite to becoming
a university professor).
Fachhochschulen
award the Diplom ( F H ) , which is supposed to be passed
after a normal length of study of 8-9 semesters. T h e Fachhochschulen
are
vocational education oriented, and their professors conduct only applied
research to a certain extent. While university professors have to teach
only 8 hr per week a semester, the Fachhochschul-yxoitssoxs'
teaching
load amounts to 18 hr. Fachhochschulen
are expected to play the role
of providing short courses with practical and vocational orientation. Most
programmes require their students to spend some time before or during their
studies in practice (internships). Industry does not differentiate significantly
between the Fachhochschul-Diplom
and a university Diplom with regard
to starting salaries. But this is not true for the public service, where the
salary differences between the types of graduates are considerable. T h u s , in
fact, the Fachhochschul
degree is regarded as a "lower" level qualification
than the university Diplom. For a full overview of the G e r m a n educational
system, see Figure 1.
134
. Frackmann and . de Weert
Germany
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
Gesamthochschule
Universitt
Pdagogische
Hochschule
Kunsthochschule
Gesamthochschule
Fachhochschule
Berufsakademie
19
18
17
Fachgymnasium
16
Fachoberschule j
15
Berufsfachschule
Abend-und
Aufbauschule
Akademie
Fachschule
Duales System
(Berufsausbildung)
14
13
12
Gymnasium
Gesamtschule
Realschule
Hauptschule
11
10
9
8
7
Grundschule
6
5
4
Kindergarten/Vorschule
3
Age
Figure 1: The German educational system
Access to universities, in principle, is o p e n to all those who have passed

the final examination of secondary education (after 13 years of attending
school; in the East, after 12 years), and have been awarded the general
Abitur (allgemeine Hochschulreife).
Those holding the Abitur degree have
the right to study at any category of higher education institution, in whatever
subject they want. T o be admitted at the Fachhochschulen,
a specialized
Abitur (Fachhochschulreife)
is required, which is awarded at the so-called
Fachoberschulen.
T h e individual degree holder is eligible to study a special
subject only, according to the specialization of his/her Abitur. In 1989,
8 0 % of those entering the Fachhochschule with the specialized Abitur came
through the vocational training system ( B M B W , 1990: 176). In 1990-1991,
4 3 % of the new entrants at the Fachhochschulen
held the general Abitur
135
degree, which would have entitled t h e m to enrol at a university ( H I S , 1991:

12).
G e r m a n higher education institutions are open for access only "in
principle." Institutions have to admit students based on the n u m b e r of
student places available in the respective fields of study at the respective
institutions. T h e n u m b e r of student places is calculated on the base of
national norms (student-staff ratios according to the
Kapazittsverordnung).
In those fields of study in which student d e m a n d exceeds regionally or
nationally the n u m b e r of student places available, access is administered by
a national admission office (Zentralstelle fr die Vergabe von
Studienpltzen,
zvs). Nationally agreed (among the Lnder-Ministers for Higher E d u c a t i o n ) ,
in this case, a field of study is either declared to fall u n d e r limited admission
(numerus clausus), or under an "allocation system"
(Ortsverteilungsverfahren),
in which students, who have to apply for a student place at the central office,
are not sure of being "allocated" to the institution of their first choice. In
the case of a n u m e r u s clausus, Abitur scores and social c o m p o n e n t s (such
as "queuing t i m e " for a student place) count for being admitted immediately
or being delayed. In the case of medicine, a n u m b e r of criteria for different
proportions of applicants are applied, such as Abitur scores, tests, entry
interviews, and social criteria. In 1977, while a considerable decline of the
student population was still expected for the mid-1980s, the Prime Ministers
of the Lnder decided to generally " o p e n " the higher education institutions
(ffnungsbeschlu).
T h e institutions, in order to cope with the student
d e m a n d , were to carry a 1 5 % teaching overload (calculated according to
the national norms of the Kapazittsverordnung).
If this overload were
exceeded by student d e m a n d , additional funds, so-called " o v e r l o a d - m o n e y , "
were to be allocated to the institutions on a time limited basis. Neither the
(demographically) expected decline of student d e m a n d e m e r g e d , nor did the
Lnder k e e p pace with the financial appropriations to the institutions, with
the consequence that teaching overload, n u m e r u s clausus, and the central
allocation system are still being applied.

M a y b e due to the still "non-advanced a g e " of the
only one-fourth of the student population is educated in this sector (in
1989, 2 1 . 1 1 % in the general Fachhochschulen
and 2 . 5 5 % in the civil service
institutions, B M B W , 1990: 139), while in the universities together with the
arts and music colleges (1.55%) the remaining students are enrolled. Of
the 244 institutions in West G e r m a n y (the 53 institutions in the East are
still in a process of restructuring and adjustment to the Western sectoral
structure), 93 are universities, 30 are arts and music colleges, and 121 are
Fachhochschulen
(of which 24 educate only civil servants) ( B M B W , 1990:
136
136). Fachhochschulen
are usually smaller in size according to student
n u m b e r s , while some universities have grown to "threatening" dimensions
(e.g., 1989: L M U Munich 60,000 students; F U Berlin 58,000; University
of Cologne 47,000; University of Mnster 42,000; University of H a m b u r g
41,000). Forty-nine institutions are non-public, but the n u m b e r of students
in private institutions c o m p a r e d with the overall population is negligible.
With only few exceptions (two universities run by the Defense Ministry
and a n u m b e r of civil service Fachhochschulen
run by the federal H o m e
Ministry), higher education institutions are governed and financed within
their respective states. Their legal status is as a public institution and at the
same time an organizational unit of the state (Krperschaft des
ffentlichen
Rechts und zugleich staatliche
Einrichtung).
TABLE 1
E n r o l m e n t in higher education (headcount)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
SOURCES:
University
West G e r m a n y
Fachhochschulen
Total
GDR
Total
841,832
896,642
951,757
996,820
1,021,788
1,036,380
1,055,231
1,081,931
1,127,292
1,151,043
1,212,099
1,256,982
201,953
224,650
251,364
276,129
292,100
301,268
312,468
328,625
342,968
356,981
372,599
389,710
1,043,785
1,121,292
1,203,121
1,272,949
1,313,888
1,227,648
1,367,699
1,410,556
1,470,260
1,508,024
1,584,698
1,646,692
129,970
130,633
130,442
130,097
129,628
129,885
131,560
132,602
132,423
134,440
133,335
127,780
Federal Ministry of Education and Science, Basic and Structural data.

AKTUELL Bildungswissenschaft: Studenten an Hochschulen, 1975 bis 1991,
7/92,
BMBW
In the reunified G e r m a n y in 1991, 1,774,478 students were enrolled in 301

institutions of higher education. This student n u m b e r represented 2 1 . 8 % of
the 19-26 years old age group, and the new entrants into higher education in
1991 represented 3 1 . 8 % of the 19-21 years old age group. T h e former G D R ,
with its 132,423 students in 1988, had a relatively low enrolment percentage
of the age group ( 1 3 . 1 % newly enrolled of the age group in 1988) compared
with Western standards. A s in many other countries, enrolment in G e r m a n
higher education has grown tremendously since the 1960s: in 1960 only 4 . 3 %
137
of the 19-26 years old group were enrolled in higher education in West
G e r m a n y compared with 2 5 . 1 % in 1991, while the newly enrolled students
in 1960 and 1989 represented 7 . 9 % and 2 9 . 1 % of the 19-21 years old g r o u p ,
respectively. This percentage of the newly enrolled age group continued
to increase in 1990 (in West G e r m a n y 3 3 . 5 % , in the whole of G e r m a n y
30.1%) and in 1991 (35.6% in West G e r m a n y , 3 1 . 8 % in all G e r m a n y ) ,
in spite of a decline of new enrolments in 1990 (3.4% in the whole of
G e r m a n y ) c o m p a r e d with the previous year ( B M B W , 1990, recent figures not
yet published).
T h e d r o p out rate is methodologically not well conceived in G e r m a n higher
education. It is difficult to " g r a s p " exact figures. Longitudinal studies have
provided evidence that the d r o p out rate averages about 16% at universities
and 1 5 % at Fachhochschulen
( H I S , 1990: 326). A methodological look at
these figures leads to the conclusion that the average for higher education
in general is between 24 and 2 7 % (Griesbach, 1992). T h e proportion of
students "disappearing" from o n e institution or o n e p r o g r a m m e (due to
changing majors, change of institution, interruption of studies, e t c . ) , is, of
course, higher than the d r o p out rate, which indicates that students definitely
gave u p their goal to earn a university or
Fachhochschul-egree.
T h e provision of positions for scientific personnel in higher education
institutions (Wissenschaftliches
Personal, including professors, assistants,
employees in teaching and research, and specialized teaching personnel)
did not k e e p pace with the growing student n u m b e r s . T h e student-staff
ratio suffered considerably: for the university and arts/music colleges sector,
it worsened from 9:1 in 1965 to 16:1 in 1989 ( B M B W , 1990: 205), while the
TABLE 2
Teaching staff in higher education (West G e r m a n y )
Germany
University
Full time
Part time
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
76,013
78,211
79,544
33,685
32,249
30,737
9221
9649
10,064
8464
9669
10,402
81,171
82,639
85,618
88,254
91,447
31,973
33,734
33,661
33,385
34,994
10,204
10,277
10,437
10,548
10,611
11,221
12,362
12,487
13,380
13,929
SOURCE:
Fachhochschulen
Full time
time
Part time
Federal Ministry of Education and Science, Basic and Structural
data.
138
change in the ratio in the Fachhochschul-sector

appears to be of even m o r e
concern (from 16:1 in 1970 to 37:1 in 1989).
It should be mentioned here that this ratio, although now published
officially by the federal Minister of Education, is not used for funding
higher education; it only reflects how higher education has been funded
with regard to personnel expenditures. T h e official ratio or p a r a m e t e r
applied (Curricularnormwert)
indicates the hours per semester and week
an individual teaching staff m e m b e r is supposed to commit per individual
student (varying between subject groups). This key p a r a m e t e r is used
to calculate the balance between supply (of student places according to
teaching staff available) and student d e m a n d , in order to decide (nationally
coordinated) whether admission to a subject is administered at the central
admission office (applying a numerus clausus or the distribution mechanism)
or decentrally at the individual institutions. It is also used to determine the
capacity of an institution in order to decide whether the institution for
specific subject groups is eligible to receive overload funds (after having
surpassed a teaching overload of 1 5 % ) .
Characteristics
structure
In order to understand the role of higher education fully in its social and
educational context, o n e has to consider its distinctive role c o m p a r e d with
that of its "competitors." By having an education function, higher education
institutions, most evidently, fulfil the task of preparing students for the labor
market.
Regarding this function, we first have to consider the different roles and
"competition" within the higher education system. T h e
Fachhochschulen
have a clear-cut role of preparing, in a shorter time, in vocational oriented
courses, students for the labor m a r k e t . Fachhochschul-students
are required
to have practical experience before or during their studies, while professors
of the Fachhochschulen
have to have 5 years of practical experience outside
the higher education system after their university graduation before being
appointed. Fachhochschulen
seem to be quite attractive to students as well
as to employers. Although they educate only one-fourth of the students,
the n u m b e r of new entrants to Fachhochschulen
has grown m o r e than those
at the universities. T h e n u m b e r of those holding the general Abitur and
enrolling at the Fachhochschulen,
although being eligible for universities,
increased between 1975 and 1988 from 7 to 14% (Lewin and Schacher,
1989: 71); and, as mentioned earlier, m o r e than 4 0 % of the new entrants at
these higher education institutions hold the general Abitur degree. In 1990,
2 2 % of the new entrants in higher education enrolled in
Fachhochschulen,
but 3 5 % of the higher education graduates, graduated from t h e m . Twothirds of engineers are trained at Fachhochschulen,
and 5 0 % or m o r e
139
of computer science graduates hold a Fachhochschul-degree.

Regarding
industry's advertisements for vacancies to be filled, 5 2 % d o not differentiate
between university and Fachhochschul-degrees
(Wissenschaftsrat,
1991).
Finally, the u n e m p l o y m e n t rate of the Fachhochschul-graduates
is lower
than that for university graduates.
Universities traditionally have no such clear-cut role and self-perception with
regard to instruction and vocational preparation as do the
Fachhochschulen.
Education according to the tradition of the G e r m a n University is m o r e or
less a "by-product" of research, and the educational progress rests with the
student rather than the institution. O n the o n e h a n d , the
Fachhochschulen
seem to c o m p e t e with the universities in that they provide what the students
and the labor m a r k e t increasingly seem to expect from higher education. O n
the other h a n d , universities still have the traditional image and reputation
of providing the academic credentials which lead to the higher ranks in
the hierarchy of industry, and even m o r e so in the public services. T h e
although educating only one-fourth of the academic
qualified labor force, may be regarded as a relief-valve: the sector absorbs
some of the pressure of n u m b e r s placed on the universities and, thus, helps
the universities to maintain their "elite" status. T h e Fachhochschulen
seem
to provide for a differentiation within the academic labor force, which may
or may not be required by the labor m a r k e t , but which has its adherents
among the university academics for this very reason. Consequently there
are voices not only from industry and politicians, but also from within the
university sector, pleading for an expansion of the
which is countered by the complaint that an increasing level of funding in
this direction would take place at the expense of the universities.
External to the system, the main competitor is vocational education. For
the majority of professions, the vocational education system in G e r m a n y is
a dual system. Apprentices have a contract with a company in which part of
the training takes place with additional teaching in public schools. G e r m a n s
are somewhat p r o u d to have this system, which covers a large proportion
of the young generation. For example in 1989, 7 2 % of all school leavers,
including those with the special and general Abitur, entered dual vocational
education ( B M B W , 1989: 64). T h e assumption is widespread in G e r m a n y that
the high proportion of the well trained, skilled labor force
(Facharbeiter)
is the source of success and survival of G e r m a n industry in international
competition. T h e dual vocational education system has some " a d v a n t a g e s "
which the higher education system cannot c o m p e t e with:
it is in the " o w n e r s h i p " of those who employ the graduates, and it
is financed by the employers, thus the identification and interest of the
employers are ensured;
an inter-company, national coordination of the curricula, based on
consensus between employers and employees, provides for the responsiveness
of the system, i.e., the adjustment of p r o g r a m m e s to new challenges
140
is guaranteed, and a narrow-minded training for company specialties is

avoided;
external examinations and monitoring of the inter-company training
have the same function of ensuring the quality of vocational preparation;
the school part of the educational p r o g r a m m e s provides for the theory
and general education, while companies provide for the broad based
practical experience and theoretical foundations as well. Inter-company
training facilities, or training modules in large size companies, compensate
for limited training facilities in small companies.
In 1990, for the first time, m o r e students were enrolled in the higher
education system (1.59 million) than in the vocational education system
(1.48 million) (this does not m e a n that the proportion of the academic
labor force is greater than that of the Facharbeiter).
A s a consequence,
complaints are heard that the attractiveness of dual vocational education
so important for G e r m a n industry is being u n d e r m i n e d in favor of
higher education. These contentions might be raised, on the one hand,
because there is no consensus (not even a process in which a consensus is
sought) about how many higher education graduates the labor m a r k e t needs,
compared with the n u m b e r the vocational training system graduates. T h e
other reason might b e seen in fears that, with the higher education system
providing an increasing n u m b e r of the skilled labor force, the preparation
for work is shifting away from the proven, well established, and generally
accepted forms of the G e r m a n dual vocational training system.
This concern about potential deficiencies of higher education compared with
the vocational training system might account for certain pressure, especially
from industry, to m o r e widely establish a n o t h e r form of higher education
which already exists in o n e Land, ( B a d e n - W r t t e m b e r g ) , and which is in
a developmental stage in two other states. T h e so-called
Berufsakademien
provide a degree of a similar level to the Fachhochschul-Diplom.
However,
the Berufsakademien
are different from the Fachhochschulen
in that they
represent the transfer of the philosophy of the dual vocational education
system to the higher education system: students have a contract with a
company, and the three-year p r o g r a m m e s are organized "sandwich-like"
so as to alternate theoretical phases at the institution with practical phases
in the respective companies. T h e main focus is on business administration
and engineering. T h e student population of the L a n d B a d e n - W r t t e m b e r g
is already significantly different from the G e r m a n average, due to the
existence of the Berufsakademien:
of the 56,317 students in 1990, 50.78%
were enrolled in universities, 29.48% at the Fachhochschulen,
and 19.74%
at the Berufsakademien
( H I S , 1991a).
With regard to the important role of the vocational education system in
G e r m a n y compared with higher education, another fact should be taken
into consideration: of those freshmen enrolling in higher education (and thus
holding either the special or the general Abitur degree) in 1989, 3 5 % had
141
already accomplished a vocational education and held a professional degree

in a field m o r e or less related to their field of study. This might be somewhat
self-evident for those entering the Fachhochschulen,
but it is not so for those
holding the general Abitur degree (Allgemeine Hochschulreife), of which
the proportion with previous vocational training experiences increased from
1 5 % in 1985 to 2 4 % in 1989 ( B M B W , 1990).
Research, especially basic research, is a traditional core duty of the
G e r m a n university. T h e r e is some worry a m o n g those who would like
to see this traditional role of G e r m a n universities maintained, that the
large n u m b e r s of students to be instructed may cause some d a m a g e
to the traditional research role of universities. T h e r e seems to exist a
consensus in G e r m a n y that the universities should adhere to the role
of basic research, in spite of the b u r d e n of educating still by far the
majority of the higher education clients. O n e of the remedies proposed
is a closer cooperation between the "competitors": university researchers
and non-university research units.
In a third function, closely related to research, universities do not have
competitors, neither within nor outside the higher education system: with
their exclusive right to grant the P h . D and the venia legendi, universities
provide the future researchers and professors for both the
Fachhochschulen
and the universities as well as for the non-university research institutions.
For the Fachhochschw/-professorship
a P h . D is a prerequisite which is only
to be e a r n e d at the university. Having this role of universities in mind
together with the existing teaching overload, it has b e e n decided that public
m o n e y from special purpose funds for special postgraduate units within the
institutions (Graduiertenkollegs)
should be m a d e available to maintain this
role of the universities within the higher education system.

Higher education
legislation
G e r m a n y has a federal system of higher education, with this area

being the responsibility of the respective state governments. T h e federal
government has almost n o p o w e r over higher education; only through the
budget is it able to have a certain influence on related policy. Since 1969
the federal government has provided 5 0 % of the investments in higher
education, for which decisions are m a d e on a national base within a
federal/state coordination body (Planungsausschau
fr den
Hochschulbau),
based on an annually renewed plan (Rahmenplan).
O t h e r p e r m a n e n t or
time-limited (financial) p r o g r a m m e s are shared by the federal government,
thus providing for a certain, modest influence on higher education by the
federal government: for example, teaching overload p r o g r a m m e , "newblood" p r o g r a m m e , student aid, etc.
142
O n the other hand, some coordination a m o n g state governments has to

take place, in o r d e r to provide for "equality" of higher education across the
states, a value which seems to be based on a c o m m o n consensus among
those within the system, those responsible for higher education policy, and
the general public as well.
O n e basis for equality is the national higher education framework
act (Hochschulrahmengesetz),
which has to be passed by the national
Parliament (Bundestag)
as well as by the national "State-representingC h a m b e r " (Bundesrat).
T h e higher education framework act was passed
for the first time in 1976, and a m o r e or less important a m e n d m e n t was m a d e
in 1985. T h e higher education framework act, once passed at the national
level, was subsequently translated into 11 (and t h e n , after reunification, 16)
state higher education laws within the respective states.
O n e might interpret some aspects of the 1976 framework act as an
attempt to strengthen higher education institutions. T h e former "dual
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " of higher e d u c a t i o n institutions was abolished. D u a l
administration consisted of the head of central administration
(Kurator,
Kanzler) representing, u n d e r close supervision of the state government, the
governmental (legal) concerns within the institution, and the rector (elected
for a period of only two years) representing the so-called "self-administration
of academia" (akademische Selbstverwaltung).
T h e 1976 framework act (with
reference to A m e r i c a n terminology and the American higher education
model) provided for the role and function of a president (elected for a
period of four to eight years) who is head of both parts of higher education
administration (Einheitsverwaltung),
the "legal" and the academic. T h e
Kanzler thus no longer reports to the state government but to the president.
T h e new law in 1985, however, reintroduced the post of a rector as head of
the institution as one option for institutional administration.
programmes
Planning of education and higher education on a national base (i.e.,

goal setting as a coordinated effort among the state governments and the
federal government) failed in 1972 and has not been attempted since. In
higher education, apart from the investment planning (Rahmenplan),
no
nationally agreed plan or goal setting procedure exists. O n the state level,
however, planning was not a b a n d o n e d . T h e 1976 framework act provided
for a state level planning procedure according to which the d e p a r t m e n t s
(Ausstattungsplne)
and the institutions (Hochschulentwicklungsplne)
were
to provide input into the state higher education plan
(Hochschulgesamtplan).
T h e state plan was s u p p o s e d to define t h e p r e s e n t role and future
development of the individual institutions within the respective states
as well as develop a framework for resources to be devoted to higher
education.
143
With the 1985 a m e n d m e n t , the planning sections were removed totally

from the law. Only recently, many states launched so-called structure
planning (Strukturplanung)
initiatives. T h e Strukturplanung might be based
on the assumption that restructuring of higher education with regard to
subject group balance and research fields is feasible during the 1990s, due
to a high n u m b e r of professors reaching retirement age. In general, structural
planning is to be regarded as "state planning" and governmental "assignment
of roles" to the individual institutions, in contrast to institutional strategic
planning.
Not only for the purpose of national equality in higher education, the
framework act of 1976 provided for a nation-wide procedure to "reform"
the higher education curricula (Studienreform).
In all states, and also at
the national level, study reform commissions
(Studienreformkommissionen)
for all subjects were established in order to develop nation-wide adjusted
curricula and examination regulations on a rather detailed level. A s the state
Ministries of Education had the right to approve (validate) curricula as well
as examination regulations, these national regulations, indeed, would have
restricted the leeway which institutions, d e p a r t m e n t s , and individuals have
with regard to their institutional tasks. T h e study reform, however, has not
been pursued. T h e framework act of 1985 provided the institutions with
even m o r e competencies. T h e distinctions which can be m a d e with respect
to educational matters are covered in the next section.
PROGRAMMES TO BE OFFERED
T h e aggregate of p r o g r a m m e s in certain subject groups leading to degrees

represents the specific role and mission of an institution, on the one h a n d ,
and is based on an infrastructure (personnel, laboratories, e q u i p m e n t ,
services, etc.) already existing or to be provided, on the other. T h e role
and mission of an institution in G e r m a n higher education is m o r e or less
assigned to it. T h e final decision as to whether or not a certain p r o g r a m m e
or degree should be offered by an institution lies with the state Minister of
Higher Education. A s degrees are based on examinations, and examination
regulations are based on national coordination, p r o g r a m m e s reflect a certain
national standard. Institutions may be ingenious and innovative in proposing
to offer non-standard p r o g r a m m e s and degrees (e.g., instead of just o n e
language, a combination of languages and a certain field of engineering;
instead of business administration and law, a combination of both public
administration, etc.). These non-standard p r o g r a m m e s again have to be
approved by the Minister. For all decisions relating to the organization
of studies and examinations and the organizational and subject related
structure, the national framework law for higher education defines a
"cooperation between institution and the s t a t e . " In reality this means that
144
while the initiative for establishing a p r o g r a m m e may come from either the
institution or the state, the final decision rests with the latter.
CURRICULUM
T h e new framework law (1985) leaves the decisions on curricula with the
institutions. T h e institutions (i.e., the d e p a r t m e n t s , in which the p r o g r a m m e s
are offered) have the final decision. T h e curriculum has to be presented to
the Minister, who may ask the institution to change the curriculum in case
it does not meet the requirements of the examination regulations.
EXAMINATION
REGULATIONS
There are two different examinations (and degrees): the state examinations
(education, law, medicine, p h a r m a c y ) , and the university and Fachhochschul
examinations. T h e former are conducted by state officials and are based on
national coordination mechanisms through the conference of the ministers
of education ( K M K ) . T h e degrees are awarded by the state. T h e latter are
awarded by the university or Fachhochschule.
T h e examination regulations
have to be approved by the Minister, who checks their conformity as to
length of study and with national standards. These examination regulations
(Diplom-Rahmen-Prfungsordnung)
are passed by the standing conference
of the ministers of e d u c a t i o n ( K M K ) and the rectors conference.
Control of research
programmes
A p a r t from having the final decision on the creation and removal of

organizational and discipline oriented subunits within the institutions, and
apart from sponsoring specific research projects, the state has no decisionmaking power with regard to research. T h e individual researcher is free to
decide upon his/her research projects and research priorities. In the case
of the involvement of third party funds, the academic community with its
eminent researchers ("academic oligarchy") has the major influence on
selection and direction of research and research topics on the base of peer
review processes.
T h u s , control in higher education again reflects the balance of power
between government on the one hand and the individual researchers on the
other. T h e power of government based on regulations, laws, and the final
right of decision, is t e m p e r e d by the respect that the individual researcher
earns from government, and by the actual freedom granted to individual
researchers.
Institutional
management
and
145
control
T h e organizational structure of the institution, including the establishment,

modifications, or closing down of d e p a r t m e n t s , institutes, or central units,
has to be approved by the Minister. Similarly, the m a n a g e m e n t and
decision-making structure is determined by Landes-law, which has to follow
the national framework law. Usually the alternative authority structures are
allowed: rector, rectorate, president, presidential council
(Prsidialkollegium).
The president is elected for a longer term (4 years minimum) than is
the rector (2 years m i n i m u m ) . T h e rector has to be a professor from
his/her own university. T h e president is m o r e clearly the head of the
administration as well as an academic leader. T h e Secretary G e n e r a l
(Kanzler) reports to the president. T h e collegiate forms of institutional
m a n a g e m e n t provide for additional vice-presidents or vice-rectors, and the
Kanzler is also a m e m b e r of this collegiate group. Institutional decisions
are m a d e by the senate, and the departmental decisions by d e p a r t m e n t a l
councils. T h e voting m e m b e r s of these decision-making bodies are elected
by professors, assistants, administrative staff, and students. T h e president
or rector is also elected. H e or she, however, is appointed by the Minister,
who may reject the elected candidate. With regard to the appointment of
professors, a committee selects three candidates from the applicants. T h e
three candidates are rank ordered and the list submitted to the Minister,
who may or may not agree with the ranking and who finally appoints the
professor. T h e professor is a civil servant with life-long t e n u r e .
T o strengthen the organizational decision-making structures within higher
education institutions (which go beyond the power of individuals) and in
o r d e r to limit the power of the chair holders, the d e p a r t m e n t
(Fachbereich)
should play an important role within higher education institutions. T h e
Fachbereich, by the framework act, is regarded as the basic unit of the
institutions, having the responsibility for teaching and research within
the respective disciplines. C o m p a r e d with the old Fakultt, it should be
smaller in size and m o r e discipline focused. T h e next level, the institutes
(Wissenschaftliche
Einrichtungen),
should b e large enough so as not to just
represent o n e chair. In reality, however, it appears that the d e p a r t m e n t did
not develop to be a powerful organizational unit, the president did not
become significantly m o r e powerful than the rector, the state influence on
higher education institutions did not diminish with the establishment of the
presidential structure, and the chair holders' power has not been restricted.
In the 1985 a m e n d m e n t of the framework act, the individual professors, in
order to stimulate their entrepreneurial behavior, were even granted m o r e
rights and leeway with regard to attracting and using research funds.
With respect to personnel policies, a distinction has to be taken into
account between employees (e.g., in the administration) and civil servants
(academics as well as administrative staff). Employes' salaries are negotiated
146
between unions and the federal H o m e Minister, and are fixed for each category
of employees in the wage agreement called B A T
(Bundesangestelltentarif).
Instead of funds for personnel, the institutions receive "positions" according
to categories fixed by the wage agreement from their state governments.
Promotion means that a staff m e m b e r has to be " m o v e d " from o n e position
at a lower salary category to another which permits a higher salary category.
Civil servants' salaries are fixed and adjusted by a national law. Individual
professors, in the course of appointment negotiations, may be granted a
supplement either from institutional funds or from the ministry.
Institutional
funding
G e r m a n higher education is publicly funded, and institutions have to

follow the budgeting and accounting laws of G e r m a n public administration.
These laws, although set by the individual states, are m o r e or less similar
all over the country. T h e main restrictions derive from rules, such as:
the line item budgets (representing expenditure categories) are fixed
prior to the fiscal year;
the budget may not be spent "across" the line items;
institutions do not get lump sum funding for staff expenditure, rather,
it is allocated on a position by position basis; thus, institutions cannot spend
personnel funds for other purposes, even if this is d e e m e d to be necessary
and appropriate;
funds may not be transferred to the following fiscal year.
T h e r e are signs that state governments are willing to give institutions
m o r e flexibility with regard to the allocation of funds according to their own
discretion, and with less limitations fixed in advance. T w o states provided
all institutions with a certain extended flexibility to spend across the line
items ( B a d e n - W r t t e m b e r g and Niedersachsen). In quite a n u m b e r of states,
pilot attempts are planned or underway to test "block grant budgeting"
(Globalhaushalt),
which should give the institutions m o r e leeway in the
internal allocation of funds and positions and with respect to budget carryover to the following fiscal year.
In 1987, 20,504 million D M was spent from the public purse on higher
education. T h e percentage allocation was as follows:
basic subsidies: 8 1 % ;
additional research grants ("third party funds": Drittmittel): 9 % ;
student aid, postgraduate study grants, etc.: 1 0 % .
T h e federal government (Bund) provided only 1 6 . 5 % of these funds,
while the Lnder governments financed the residual and major share of
the higher education expenditure (Wissenschaftsrat,
1990: 19-20).
Universities, m o r e than the Fachhochschulen
have additional "research
i n c o m e . " Of the funds devoted to universities in 1986, 8 4 % were considered
to be for basic subsidies and 16% as additional research income. Of this
147
additional research money only one-fourth originated from private sources

(Wissenschaftsrat,
1988: 243).
T h e total research budget (expenditure for research in G e r m a n y ) in
1987 was allocated to the different sectors as follows: industry and private
research institutions ( 7 0 . 8 % ) , higher education institutions ( 1 2 . 5 % ) , public
non-university research institutions (13.5%) and international research units
( 3 . 1 % ) (Wissenschaftsrat,
1988).
Academics c o m p e t e for "third p a r t y " research funds, which account for
16% of the universities' budgets on average. T h e total a m o u n t of money
available is limited, and those who want to benefit from these funds have
to apply. Applications are usually scrutinized by peers (peer review), before
the respective foundation or the G e r m a n Research Society ( D F G ) funds
projects. This is, however, not a competition between institutions but rather
between individual researchers or research groups.
Higher education's main competitor for both public and private research
funding is, without any d o u b t , the publicly maintained non-university
research institutions. Reviewing the research budget of these institutions
c o m p a r e d with research money spent at universities, the
Wissenschaftsrat
came to the conclusion that, indeed, the proportions changed exactly at
the time when universities had to bear a teaching overload. While in 1975
universities spent 47.2 % of the G e r m a n public institutions' research budget,
the share a m o u n t e d to only 4 2 . 8 % in 1987, which might not tell the whole
truth since funds devoted to research are not easily separated from the
overall funds devoted to higher education institutions. T h e share of the
non-university research units grew from 43.1 to 4 6 . 3 % within the same time
period (Wissenschaftsrat,
1988).
BUDGETING, EXPENDITURE AND FUND RAISING
T h e annual budget, in which the state subsidies for the individual

institution is determined, is set by a state law. T h e budget is subdivided
into expenditure categories (line items) and positions (for personnel).
Usually the budget is already subdivided according to the institutional
structure, and the positions are already assigned to the d e p a r t m e n t s and
institutes. T h e budget thus pre-determines the total expenditure process for
the fiscal year. Institutions, i.e., the professors and the research groups, may
raise Drittmittel for research projects. T h e majority of the research money
is public money. Researchers have to indicate to the institution that they
have accepted an externally funded research project. F u n d s and positions
are administered by the institutional administration; professors, however,
are allowed to take over the resource administration of their research
projects. O v e r h e a d costs are not usually charged to the research project or
the sponsors. Professors also may attract funds and contracts as individuals,
in addition to their institutional duties; they have to indicate this additional
148
" j o b " (Nebenttigkeit)

to the ministry. T h e r e are cases where they have to
give a certain proportion of the additional income to the institution.
INVESTMENT
Financial investment in new buildings, in equipment for new buildings, and

equipment above a certain investment level (150,000 D M ) is financed jointly
by the Lnder and the federal Minister of Education. T h e Lnder ministers
may decide to bear the total a m o u n t of these investments. H o w e v e r , if
they want to receive federal money, they have to process the project
through the national planning procedure (Rahmenplan),
in which the
Wissenschaftsrat
evaluates the application and a joint national body of
the Lnder and the federal government m a k e s the decision on whether or
not to allocate funds. Construction and maintenance of buildings is neither
decided nor administered by the institutions themselves. Special Lnder
administration "offices" (Staatshochbauverwaltung)
are in charge of these
tasks. Only the operating of the buildings is budgeted and administered by
the institutions.

The goals of the higher education
system
Goals as to how many students G e r m a n higher education should educate

or as to what proportion of the labor force should be academically qualified
do not exist. N o clear-cut policy is apparent as to how many student places
should be funded in a higher education system which is generally free of
charge for the students and financed publicly.
T h e only goal that is stated nationally refers to student places as counted
by square metres available in higher education for educational purposes.
T h e goal of 850,000 student places guides the investments in buildings and
construction in higher education, which is a joint effort of the Lnder and the
federal government. It seems evident that with 1.6 million students (in West
G e r m a n y ) , the 850,000 student place figure is only an "artificial n u m b e r "
based on an "arithmetic calculation" and does not reflect reality.
If the growth of higher education is not following a clearly stated political
goal it seems to be determined by d e m a n d . Some of the determining factors
are:
demographic patterns with respect to the relevant age group at a given
time;
the proportion of the age group holding the Abitur degree, and thus
being eligible for entering higher education;
the Abitur holders deciding to gain admission to higher education
institutions.
149
I n d e e d , the Prime Ministers of the G e r m a n Lnder officially decided in

1977 that all G e r m a n youth who had the qualifications (i.e., the Abitur)
and wanted to proceed to higher education should have the opportunity
to do so. This generous social d e m a n d driven policy was influenced by a
perceived demographically induced decline of the relevant age group (about
4 0 % ) , forecasted for the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s. In addition to this
demographic development, the percentage of those having the qualifications
and finally deciding to enrol in higher education showed a significant fall
(from 8 0 % for the 1976 high school leavers with Abitur to 6 7 % for the 1986
Abitur year).
But u p to now, 1992, almost at the end of the "demographic valley",
apart from an interruption of enrolment increase in 1984 and 1985, and
apart from a slight decrease in the n u m b e r (not the percentage of the
age group) of newly enrolled students in 1991, the d e m a n d driven growth
patterns in higher education did not fundamentally change. A n u m b e r of
reasons might be responsible for this steady growth:
the Abitur holder percentage of the age group and thus the potential
higher education students increased from 2 1 . 7 % in 1980 to 3 5 . 8 % in 1989
( B M B W , 1990a);
school leavers do not usually proceed immediately to higher e d u c a t i o n ,
o n e of t h e significant r e a s o n s being to a t t e n d a vocational training
p r o g r a m m e , as mentioned earlier; thus, a demographic decline of the
age group does not immediately influence enrolment figures in higher
education;
after a decline up to 1986, many m o r e school leavers decided to continue
their educational career at a university or Fachhochschule.
According to a
survey held a m o n g the 1990 school leavers, 7 8 % of the West G e r m a n s and
7 6 % of the East G e r m a n s intended to study in higher education ( H I S , 1991b:
2). T h e so-called study quota (Studierquote) has thus again reached the levels
of the mid-1970s.
T h e overload policy could have been justified for an interim period, such
as being a policy of "tunnelling through the h u m p " (of an interim student
n u m b e r p e a k ) . N o w , as n o declining enrolment figures are a p p a r e n t , the
question for G e r m a n higher education policy (which is in fact an aggregate
of sixteen potentially different policies, according to the sixteen Lnder)
is becoming m o r e urgent: what d o we expect from higher education? It is
a question of quantity and structure. T h e r e are many options for higher
education, some discussed overtly, others still " t a b o o " . They are outlined
as follows.
O n e might continue letting the d e m a n d increase and worsen the
conditions of higher teaching and learning. T h e cynical might wonder
whether this is intended in o r d e r to discourage d e m a n d for higher education
and whether it really does discourage potential students.
T h e question as to whether the labor m a r k e t needs a m o r e academically
150
qualified labor force can only be answered through political decision making.
Even if d e m a n d is left to one side, o n e could politically influence the
differentiated structure of higher education output. If the
Fachhochschulgraduates are held in high regard by industry and the labor m a r k e t in
general and there are indeed advocates of this "belief" among politicians,
academics and industrialists one could provide an increasing proportion
of Fachhochschul-student
places as compared to universities. For example,
Bavaria decided to found a n u m b e r of new Fachhochschulen,
BadenW r t t e m b e r g has a certain priority on extending the
and especially for the new Lnder in the East, a policy is r e c o m m e n d e d by
the Wissenschaftsrat and widely adhered to by the politicians to establish a
considerable n u m b e r of Fachhochschulen
in the course of restructuring the
whole higher education system there. T h e Fachhochschul-scctor
has taken
over an increasing proportion of higher education (from 15.2% in 1960 to
2 3 . 7 % in 1989 of the students in higher education, with an increase in intake
of newly enrolled students from 2 1 . 2 % in 1960 to 3 0 . 8 % in 1989). But still the
universities bear the main burden of higher education. F r o m an expansion
of the Fachhochschul-sector
the universities expect better opportunities to
maintain their traditional role of research.
O n e might select m o r e rigorously so as to limit the n u m b e r of students
enrolled in higher education. O n e form of selection is the n u m e r u s clausus,
i.e., the "closing" of the universities. T h e former right to enter higher
education with the Abitur degree would be restricted in this case. This is the
remedy the G e r m a n rectors conference now heavily urges the politicians to
adopt, if they are not willing to devote m o r e resources to higher education. If
the n u m e r u s clausus is "administered" on the base of the Abitur scores, then
the selection is left to the high schools, and the Abitur still has the function of
the exclusive entry qualification for higher education. T h e other possibility
is an entry examination held by the institutions which would select their
students and thus, hopefully, develop an increased responsibility for the
educational development of their clients. After years of reluctance, higher
education seems to be m o r e and m o r e willing to proceed with examinations.
Entry examinations therefore seem to be becoming politically feasible. T h e
third form of selection is based on course failure, leading to an " i n t e n d e d "
proportion of drop outs. T h e drop out rate is neither methodologically nor
politically well conceived in G e r m a n higher education, and " d r o p o u t " will
become one of the political issues in higher education in the near future.
Politicians and even institutions w o n d e r why so many students enrol and
why so few show up at the examinations. A "planned d r o p out r a t e " does
not exist in G e r m a n higher education.
T h e length of time G e r m a n students need to study to receive a degree
is held to be too long in G e r m a n higher education (7 years average at
the universities). It is not only the required normal length of studies for
a university diploma, but the real time finally spent by the students in
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the higher education system (which exceeds by far the normal length of
studies) which contributes to the total n u m b e r of students enrolled in higher
education and to the academic workload. T h e r e are many recommendations
on how to reduce the length of study time. O n e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n is based
on international comparisons of higher education systems and seeks to
alter the normal length. Why should the students not be provided with
the opportunity to attend p r o g r a m m e s and to pass an examination,which
qualifies t h e m for the labor m a r k e t at an earlier stage than is the case at
present? I n d e e d , some universities (e.g., the University of Augsburg in
Bavaria) seem to have received the right by their higher education Minister
to run a (pilot) p r o g r a m m e leading to a bachelor degree
(Baccalaureate).
A final option to be mentioned here has not yet been given serious
consideration. Given the social d e m a n d for higher education, why should
access to higher education be restricted (by government decisions), or,
why should the qualification conditions be worsened only due to the fact
that higher education is publicly funded? Could not supply and d e m a n d
patterns be better matched if the clients of higher education (students,
p a r e n t s , employers) contributed to the funding of higher education?
In addition to the issues mentioned a b o v e , a general development with
regard to the higher education system should be mentioned. G e r m a n higher
education is based on equality and equivalence throughout the country,
across the Lnder boundaries. Coordinating mechanisms with regard to
the Abitur, and, for example, the frames of reference for the examination
regulations, guarantee the equality and equivalence of higher education
institutions, degrees, etc. Institutions and their p r o g r a m m e s are d e e m e d to
be equal with regard to their quality t o o . T h e only differentiation G e r m a n
higher education seems to afford, and which has nothing to do with quality
but rather with different roles assigned, is the differentiation between
universities on the o n e hand and Fachhochschulen
on the other. In 1983
the federal Minister of Education came u p with the idea of m o r e competition
and differentiation as steering mechanisms in the higher education system
(Wilms, 1983). T h e whole system of financing higher education should be
revised in favor of m o r e competition, accepting m o r e differentiation a m o n g
institutions of the same category. T h e institutions should be p r e p a r e d
at least to cope with increasing competition for students. In 1985 the
Science Council followed the federal Minister with a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n
(Wissenschaftsrat
1985), of which the main message was that differences
in quality and performance in higher education should be m a d e visible and
funds should be allocated within higher education competitively, taking these
differences into account. Although students seem to respond significantly in
their choices of institutions to differences between institutions m a d e public
(as shows an unpublished investigation of new e n t r a n t s ' first choices after the
publication of the so-called "Spiegel R a n k i n g , " where conditions of teaching
and learning and the learning environment in G e r m a n higher education
152
came under review), an institutional competition for students could not

become reality due to the d e m a n d for student places still exceeding supply.
A n d as long as funding mechanisms are not changed (funding of G e r m a n
higher education might be best characterized as incremental, even without
student or graduate n u m b e r driven formulas for the funding allocation to
the institutions), competition and differentiation remain the "buzzwords"
of the higher education discussions of the mid-1980s. In this context it
should be noted that there is a certain competition between the Lnder
with regard to information technology, outstanding research, etc., to be
found in their higher education institutions; this kind of competition even
impedes competition between institutions of higher education, as they are
somewhat " p r o t e c t e d " by their respective governments against a hostile
environment.
Intermediary
organizations
T h e most important buffer body, consisting of Lnder and federal

government representatives on the one hand and academics (appointed by
the President of the Federal Republic) on the other, is the
Wissenschaftsrat.
It:
provides recommendations on the investment applications in the
context of the joint LnderlitatvdX financing of buildings and investments
(Rahmenplan);
in the course of these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , the Science Council,
in fact, evaluates the "potential" of the o n e or the other unit or subunit in
G e r m a n higher education;
evaluates the non-university research units, jointly financed by the
federal government and individual Lnder (Blaue Liste
Institutionen);
delivers general recommendations on higher education topics, such
as:
competition in higher education;
research in higher education;
allocation mechanisms for funding within the institutions;
the role of the
Fachhochschulen;
the duration time of studies and remedies against extended length of
studies;
perspectives of higher education in the 1990s.
T h e Wissenschaftsrat
also evaluated the A c a d e m y of Science and the
higher education institutions in East Germany and developed recommendations
on how to restructure and adjust the eastern system to West G e r m a n
patterns.
Another important organization is the German Research Council (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, D F G ) . Of the "third party funds" devoted to
research at the universities, 4 3 % originated from D F G sources in 1986. T h e
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D F G administers Lnder and federal funds to be allocated for basic research.

T h e decision-making bodies of the D F G consist again of Lnder, federal,
and academic representatives from those institutions who are m e m b e r s by
cooptation. For assessing applications and research units, peers are elected
from the scientific community (every scientist of the m e m b e r institutions
w h o holds a P h . D degree has the right to v o t e ) .
T h e D F G " h o s t s " o t h e r important committees, such as a library subcommittee and the G e r m a n C o m p u t e r B o a r d (Rechnerkommission).
The
c o m p u t e r b o a r d scrutinizes the applications for large c o m p u t e r i n v e s t m e n t s
a n d special c o m p u t e r i n v e s t m e n t p r o g r a m m e s , a n d delivers g e n e r a l
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s and guidelines for information technology investments
in higher education (e.g., networking in higher education).
A l s o , the G e r m a n Research N e t w o r k , although still subsidized heavily
by the federal Minister of R e s e a r c h and Technology, is organized following
the p a t t e r n of the "self-organizing academic c o m m u n i t y . " A member
organization (DFN-Verein), of which institutions are the members, administers
the G e r m a n Research Network ( W I N ) . In this organization again the eminent
academics of the relevant fields exercise the main influence.
Reunification
and higher
education
T h e reunification of G e r m a n y has a major influence on all policy issues.

Generally, the idea prevails that East G e r m a n y should incorporate the
values and structures that have shaped West G e r m a n y . For higher education
this m e a n s that the eastern system should be adjusted to the western system.
Reunification has not b e e n used to review G e r m a n higher education, nor
to develop a systematic critique and to question the underlying values and
structures of the system. O n the contrary, with the b r e a k d o w n of the eastern
system, the West G e r m a n higher education system has b e e n "confirmed"
with all its strengths and deficiencies. In spite of some ideas which e m e r g e d
in the dawn of reunification, no effort has b e e n m a d e to benefit from this
opportunity of renewal, for example by establishing at least o n e or two
non-traditional, experimental higher education institutions in the East.
T h e main policy issues and goals concerning higher education and
reunification are as follows:
avoid brain drain and student migration from the East to the West.
T h e eastern institutions have to be m a d e as quickly as possible as attractive
as the western institutions;
re-integrate basic research into higher education institutions and set u p
some non-university research units, i.e., dissolve the A c a d e m y of Science;
reduce staff and achieve proportions similar to the West. A t the m o m e n t
this m e a n s that administrative staff in particular are being dismissed;
adjust the curricula and p r o g r a m m e s . This m e a n s that the ideological
154
biases have to be abolished. Social science, e c o n o m y , history, e t c . ,

experience a considerable input from West G e r m a n teaching staff and new
professorial appointments;
adjust the structure of the system. T h e G D R did not provide for
Fachhochschulen.
Engineering schools at a lower level than higher education
still exist. Some universities will b e c o m e Fachhochschulen
(downgraded).
Engineering schools will be upgraded to Fachhochschulen
or else will be
closed. Specialized institutions will become m o r e general higher education
institutions. Mergers are being implemented.
In spite of this unquestioned process in which the western system is being
implemented in East G e r m a n y , three problems are listed below which can
be identified as consequences of this process which the West G e r m a n higher
education system cannot ignore.
T h e whole eastern system (higher education system and the A c a d e m y
of Science) has been evaluated by western scientists (organized by the
Science Council) in order to gain information for the "reconstruction"
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . T h e p r o c e d u r e , which was not without controversy,
proved that evaluation is possible in G e r m a n y . D o e s this imply that,
as a future step, the western institutions and p r o g r a m m e s are subject to
evaluation as well?
How many student places have to be provided in the East? (Ausbauziele).
This question involves personnel resources as well as investments in buildings
and construction. Even if we were to assume that the same participation rate
occurs in the East as in the West, o n e problem remains, which seems to
be relevant for the whole system: the n u m b e r of student places as regards
physical plant categories, which has been declared as a political goal
(850,000), is quite artificial c o m p a r e d with the present n u m b e r of enrolled
students (1.6 million in the W e s t ) . Should this artificial student/square metre
ratio be a b a n d o n e d ? If not, how could it be extended to the East?
T h e Fachhochschulen
seem to be very attractive for students as well
as for employers. But the Fachhochschulen
serve only one-quarter of the
student population at present. With the reconstruction of the eastern system
o n e would be able to change proportions in favor of the
Fachhochschulen.
B u t , since the structural decisions are left ultimately to the respective states,
it seems to be very difficult to achieve this goal in a " p l a n n e d " way. A l s o , the
new states are somewhat eager to have their own "research universities."
T o conclude, the reunification does not provoke real challenges for
the G e r m a n higher education system. T h e solution of problems and the
systematic identification of weaknesses and strengths of the West G e r m a n
higher education system have been eclipsed by the task of adjusting the
eastern system to western values and standards. If there are any challenges
for the system as a whole, they derive from the E u r o p e a n context rather
than from any clear-cut identification of internal problems.
155
Reflection on Structure, Authority and Higher Education Policy on

It should be evident that the underlying problems which G e r m a n higher
education faces in the 1990s remain to be solved. This section will be devoted
to a discussion of these problems u n d e r four topics. A clear-cut answer to
the problems is not easy to find. Higher education maybe m o r e than any
other social domain is resistant to change and external values, cultures,
and political processes. A n d all those who are assumed to change a system
of higher education are involved in this very system, its internal processes,
values, cultures, and policies. T h u s , change is a slow process in higher
education, and impatience will not be rewarded. Perhaps G e r m a n y has
to find a consensus about the main problems of higher education before
discussions about solutions can start.
THE
QUANTITATIVE
PROBLEM
G e r m a n higher education is m o r e or less exposed to the quantitative

processes of social d e m a n d in G e r m a n y . Social d e m a n d for higher education
starts with a growing n u m b e r of parents deciding to send their children
to the Gymnasium
(leading to the Abitur) instead of sending t h e m to
the Hauptschule.
Parents increasingly decide to let their children achieve
the Abitur degree, which provides t h e m with the right to study at higher
education institutions. T h e social d e m a n d for higher education continues
with a growing proportion of those holding the Abitur degree deciding
to continue their educational career at the university or
Fachhochschule.
Social d e m a n d for higher education is still growing in G e r m a n y it even
overshadows a demographically induced decline of the relevant age g r o u p ,
thus not allowing demographic forces to influence the growth patterns.
E d u c a t i o n , from primary to higher education, is free of charge for the
individual, while the governments have to provide the necessary funds.
But government funds have not kept pace with the growing student
n u m b e r s . It did not follow the social d e m a n d forces. A s the growth patterns
will not change due to demographic forces, the questions are whether
governments allocate funding m o r e closely in line with social d e m a n d ,
change the social d e m a n d policy, or change the funding mechanisms and
the policy on which they are based.
THE
R O L E A N D MISSION O F H I G H E R
EDUCATION
In addition to d e m a n d driven p r o b l e m s , some fundamental structural

decisions remain for higher education policy. T h e r e are structures of
156
"offerings" of higher education, determined by political decisions, which

not only influence the d e m a n d patterns of the students but also those of
the labor m a r k e t . T h e G e r m a n higher education system offers the student a
choice between three sectors with different roles and missions, with different
curricula and degree profiles, and with different roles which the respective
graduates are supposed to play in the world of work:
the Berufsakademie-scctoT,
with a quantitatively significant role (as
counted by the n u m b e r of enrolled students) in o n e state only;
the Fachhochschul-sector,
hosting close to 2 5 % of t h e s t u d e n t
population;
the university sector, educating the majority of higher education
students ( 7 5 % ) .
Is this the right proportion within a differentiated system, the right
proportion which a publicly financed higher education system should offer,
having social d e m a n d as well as the structural requirements with regard to
the labor force in view?
With a growing proportion of the young generation being educated in
higher education, especially in universities, the institutions, willingly or
not, have to take over vocational education functions. M o r e and m o r e
students expect from universities a preparation for work which goes beyond
the preparation for a future research career, and far beyond providing the
first phase of preparation for "public services." (For all majors ending
with a state examination, i.e., education, law, and medicine, a second
state examination after a m o r e practical oriented training phase outside
the university is required before the graduates enter their professions.)
G e r m a n universities, however, have another function, namely to carry
out basic and applied research. M o r e than that, research is the core function
of the traditional G e r m a n university, shaping the culture, motivation, and
career patterns of the G e r m a n university system. H o w does a vocational
education function for a growing n u m b e r of the younger generation fit into
the traditional research pattern of the G e r m a n university?
Having the vocational education requirements of a working force outside
the education and public services sector in mind, as well as r e m e m b e r i n g
that G e r m a n higher education is based on the freedom of the individual
researcher on the o n e h a n d , and government steering on the other, the
question arises: how is the necessary feedback from the world of work being
organized? This question refers to the profile of p r o g r a m m e s , curricula, and
degrees with regard to professions, to the problem of m o r e theoretical or
m o r e practical orientation, to the role of research orientation in the course
of the studies, to the meaning of "academic" in higher education studies,
to the a d e q u a t e a m o u n t of content and length of study, and so on.
T h e problem of role and mission of higher education refers to the
structure and content of higher education. T o put it succinctly, the structure
(i.e., the sectoral differentiation, and the assignment of different roles to
157
the institutions) is determined by the state, while the content depends

on the actions of the individual researchers. T h e question is, whether
these "coordinating" mechanisms in higher education are still a d e q u a t e
in providing the structure and content required in a changing G e r m a n
higher education system. Alternative mechanisms for shaping the higher
education structure as examples from other countries show could rely
on a "unified" system, without any sectoral differences, where institutional
differentiation is left to forces other than government decisions, and
where quality control mechanisms go beyond the individual efforts of the
researcher/teacher.
Quality and
accountability
Quality of higher education has to do with meeting the values, goals, and
expectations of the providers and the "customers" of higher education. T h e
customers are the students (graduates on the one h a n d , indirectly the society
at large on the other, with its requirements for a specifically educated labor
force). A s higher education provides the labor force with a growing n u m b e r
of its m e m b e r s , it has to face increased scrutiny with regard to the quality
of its educational services.
So far, responsibility for quality of education rests mainly with the
students, who have to care for their own educational progress and career.
Teachers/researchers are rather m o r e exposed to external scrutiny (peer
review, career and promotion incentives, reputational p a t t e r n s ) with r e g a r d
to their r e s e a r c h function t h a n to their teaching functions. E x t e r n a l
e d u c a t i o n a l quality a s s u r a n c e m e c h a n i s m s (such as the approval of the
examination regulations by the Ministry of Education, the appointment
of the professors, the adjustment of the entry qualifications, the capacity
regulations, the teaching load regulations, etc.) are mainly " i n p u t " oriented,
and they focus mainly on the assurance of equality and equivalence
throughout the national higher education system. T h e feedback from the
labor m a r k e t relies heavily on the individual contacts of the professors with
industry and c o m m e r c e .
If information about the quality of higher education is not m a d e public,
then quality problems cannot be identified. T h e r e a r e , however, signs that
G e r m a n higher education faces quality problems. Discussions on this subject
have started, with increasing attention being devoted to the length of time
of study, which is recognized as being too long. T h e discussion, however,
has become somewhat b r o a d e r , questioning the quality of the educational
processes as a whole. Claims and "actions" to put m o r e emphasis on the
quality of teaching are underway ( F r a c k m a n n , 1991). In addition, a new
issue is beginning to enter the arena of d e b a t e : the d r o p out rate. O n e
seems not to have the right figures d r o p out rates and the proportion
158
of students "disappearing" in the course of studies seem to be higher than

assumed so far ( 1 5 % ) . M o r e and m o r e students enter the higher education
system, but the n u m b e r of graduates is not growing to the same extent. All
these signs lead to the public becoming more concerned about institutional
responsibility for higher education quality, beyond the responsibility of the
individual student. This discussion is leading to the question of "quality
control."
T h r e e forms of quality control can be identified as follows.
The market. Student d e m a n d for higher education and financial rewards
and sanctions according to these m a r k e t forces provide for the external
quality control and quality assurance in higher education. This alternative
for quality control is not discussed at all in G e r m a n y , and it seems unlikely
that the market mechanism will receive a consensus.
Market "replacements".
T h e quality control function of a market is
replaced by other external forms of educational quality control, such as
external peer review (where " p e e r s " are not only professors but also
professionals). This kind of quality control by intermediate agencies,
between higher education on the one hand and the governments and
society at large on the other, is not discussed intensively in G e r m a n y ,
although one might regard the Science Councils' activities in the course
of G e r m a n reunification as going in this direction to a certain extent. T h e
problem with another or a strengthened central buffer body is always a
certain centralization in a decentralized federal system. This is not really
welcomed by the relevant forces.
Internal quality control and quality assurance mechanisms.
These
mechanisms refer to quality control and assurance activities of the individual
professor or the institutions and d e p a r t m e n t s . They rely on a shift of
"culture," on m a n a g e m e n t structures, and on internal and external incentives
for educational quality improvement. O n e might immediately agree that
this kind of quality control and assurance mechanisms come closest to the
G e r m a n higher education traditions, and higher education policy in many
G e r m a n states seems to rely heavily on incentives for internal mechanisms.
T h e question remains, however, whether these mechanisms provide for
enough change with regard to the existing G e r m a n higher education culture
and tradition.
Autonomy
and academic
freedom
With increased functions and the growing complexity of higher education,

with the changing questions of structure and contents, with the increasing
vocational education function of higher education for a b r o a d e r range of
labor m a r k e t sectors, and with the focus on educational quality, the question
arises whether coordination decisions may continue to rely on government
159
decisions on the one hand, and on individual researchers' freedom and

motivation, on the other.
If government wanted to decentralize decision-making in higher education,
it could delegate decisions to the institutions and departments. This would
guarantee decision-making structures and processes going beyond the individual
researcher and thus being closer to higher education and discipline problems.
If, however, institutional decision-making is to be m o r e relevant than it is
at present, then well functioning decision-making structures and procedures
are n e e d e d within higher education institutions. A strengthening of the
institutional and the d e p a r t m e n t a l m a n a g e m e n t levels is widely held as a
prerequisite for an improvement in institutional decision-making in higher
education. A strengthened institutional and departmental m a n a g e m e n t
might rely on the three dimensions listed below.
A "chief executive culture" and leadership characteristics which fit
the chief executive role for an institutional or departmental manager.
G e r m a n rectors, presidents, and d e a n s , however, are regarded by the higher
education community as "first a m o n g e q u a l s , " according to tradition, rather
than as chief executives.
T h e responsibility structure. G e r m a n rectors, presidents, and deans
are elected from within their units. Presidents and rectors, in spite of being
appointed by the Minister, still have difficulties in making hard decisions
within their institutions. Active leaders who m a k e the difficult and at times
unpopular decisions risk the danger of not being re-elected by their peers.
T h e decision-making power. Decisions are m a d e by the senate and
the d e p a r t m e n t council, not by the president or dean. These collegiate
bodies represent elected individuals, rather than the discipline structure of
the institution or d e p a r t m e n t .
A s mentioned before, institutional autonomy is a topic discussed in
G e r m a n higher education. Once institutional autonomy is defined m o r e
precisely, e.g., in the process of legislation, then the implications of
institutional a u t o n o m y might b e c o m e visible. W h e n this h a p p e n s , the
relevant partners might find arguments against institutional a u t o n o m y ,
and arguments in favor of the continuation of existing structures, because
institutional autonomy seems not to fit into the G e r m a n higher education
traditions. Some of the possible reasons for this are listed below.
T h e state ministry would lose influence in t h e field of policy
implementation and the justification SOT posts. In addition, while stepping
back, it would risk the national government stepping in.
T h e individual professors are already a u t o n o m o u s . They are the real
beneficiaries of the weakness of decision-making power at the departmental
and institutional level. Institutional a u t o n o m y would imply a strengthening
of institutional and departmental decision-making power at the expense of
the individuals "at the b o t t o m . "
Presidents and Kanzlers, under the present circumstances, may be
160
happy not to be forced to m a k e the "ugly" decisions, which would " h u r t "
o n e colleague at the expense of another. T h e selective, unequal decisions
can be left to the ministry.
Higher education, e m b e d d e d in governmental responsibility and
supervision, cannot be held responsible for the bad (overloaded) conditions
of higher education. T o cry for m o r e money and resources seems to suffice
as a remedy to be applied on the higher education side as long as the state
government is the responsible supervisor of higher education.
For students and industry (the customers of higher education),
institutional autonomy and a government step back might be combined
with asking the customers to pay for higher education services.
O n e might come to the following conclusion: G e r m a n higher education
and the relationship between governments and higher education have not
changed significantly in the last two decades, in spite of new legislative
efforts (in 1976) and later drawbacks (i.e., partial reconstruction of the
old legal status in 1985). T h e legislative efforts, together with the overall
growth of the higher education system, might even be characterized as
empowering the individualistic structures in higher education, at the expense
of organizational s t r u c t u r e s a n d c o m m i t m e n t of individuals to their
organizational context.
In Burton Clark's triangle (Clark, 1983), G e r m a n higher education is
located between state authority and academic oligarchy. According to legal
constructions and regulations, one might see higher education very close
to the government vertex. With regard to influence and acceptance based
on academic reputation, one may d e e m the balance of power closer to
academic oligarchy. O n e may not only find these eminent researchers and
well respected academics with considerable influence in one or the other
outstanding research "corner" of an individual university, but also in interinstitutional and national coordination and buffer bodies, which provide the
G e r m a n higher education system with a touch of academic self-organization.
In essence, the system reflects a tension between government authority
on the one h a n d , and academic oligarchy and self-regulation (more with
regard to research than education) on the other, while the m a r k e t does not
play a role.
T h e question is whether o n e should add another angle in Clark's model
of alternative regulation m o d e s , i.e., the angle of "institutional control."
Institutional and departmental m a n a g e m e n t would be strengthened at the
expense of the individuals in this model, whereas instead of the external
control of the m a r k e t , intermediate bodies would represent the external
audiences of higher education together with the academic community. T h e
authority of the government would be restricted by the institutions and
the intermediate bodies representing special societal interests in higher
education. T h e power of the individual academics would be mediated by
the increased departmental and institutional decision-making power. T h e
161
m a r k e t would be replaced by intermediate bodies providing external scrutiny

of institutional performances.
It is interesting to notice that in o n e state in G e r m a n y , Lower Saxony
(Niedersachsen), in the course of the a m e n d m e n t of the higher education
law, a n u m b e r of civil servants of the higher education ministry tried to revisit
the relationship between government and higher education institutions.
Decision-making power as conceptualized (at least in the discussions held
during the a m e n d m e n t process) should be removed from the ministry in
favor of the institutional and d e p a r t m e n t a l levels in higher education.
T o g e t h e r with giving the institutions certain rights of decision-making, the
necessity is seen to improve institutional decision-making structures and
processes and to strengthen institutional and departmental m a n a g e m e n t . If
this proceeds, this steering model would represent the fourth missing angle
in Clark's conceptualization.
Conclusion
G e r m a n higher education (and the public discussion of higher education)
seems to include a few unquestioned assumptions, some of which represent
the underlying c o m p o n e n t s of the coordinating mechanisms characterizing
the G e r m a n higher education system:
professors are civil servants of t h e respective states w h e r e t h e
institutions are located, with life-long t e n u r e . They are thus m o r e responsible
towards the government than towards "their" institution;
the individual freedom of the researcher/teacher has far-reaching
organizational impacts;
abitur degree holders have the right to enter higher education;
higher education is free of charge for the "customers;"
universities are "research universities;"
G e r m a n higher education is e m b e d d e d in a federal system, which
provides decentralized state responsibility for higher education.
G e r m a n higher education must face the challenges of a large and still
growing system, and address the question of the extent to which the
assumptions identified above contribute to the strengths or weaknesses of
the higher education system. This is necessary to m a k e the system fit for
the challenges of the 1990s and the next century.
Higher Education Policy in Japan

AKIRA A R I M O T O and EGBERT DE W E E R T
Introduction
O n e of the unique features of J a p a n ' s higher educational system is
its dual structure: a small public sector controlled by central and local
governments, and an e n o r m o u s market-driven private sector. One-fourth
of the total student population enrols in public higher education, forcing the
majority of students to attend the m o r e costly, but generally educationally
disadvantaged and crowded, private universities. A n o t h e r feature of J a p a n ' s
higher education is its hierarchical structure. A few universities (both
public and private) enjoy high esteem and their graduates attain the m o r e
prestigious positions in society. O t h e r types of institutions are distinguished
in the status order, ranging from middle-class universities to junior colleges.
Colleges of technology and science were established in the 1960s.
A t present, higher education in Japan is confronted with various important
issues relating to changes in Japanese society at large, such as internationalization, an aging of the population, the diversification of lifestyles, and
the dissemination of information technology. In the context of these
changes, higher education is considered to play an important role in
society. In the latest White Paper of the Ministry of Education, Science
and Culture ( M O E , 1992), the major directions for higher education reforms
are indicated. In order to achieve the reform objectives, the position of
the government vis-a-vis higher education will be changed considerably. In
general, government intends to relax control so that individual institutions
may develop their educational and research activities in a m o r e diverse way.
T e r m s like a u t o n o m y , independence, and de-regulation are frequently used
in the White Paper, as are appeals to the self-organizing and self-innovating
capacity of the institutions. T h e new steering model may be close to that
adopted in some other countries, but it has a specific Japanese character.
162
163

T h e system of higher education before the Second World W a r had three
tracks: the first track comprised universities and pre-university institutions
called higher schools (kotou gakko), the second comprised colleges (senmon
gakko), and the third consisted of higher normal schools (kotou sihan gakko)
and other teacher-training institutions. T h e first m o d e r n institution of higher
education modelled along Western lines, the Imperial University (teikoku
daigaku), was established in 1886 under the Imperial University Law. Its
creation consisted of a r e a r r a n g e m e n t of the former T o k y o University
(established in 1877).
In subsequent years, other universities were established and developed.
In 1897 Kyoto Imperial University was created as the second university in the
country, followed by the establishment of other imperial universities such as
T o h o k u (in 1907), Kyushu (in 1910), H o k k a i d o (in 1918), Osaka (in 1931),
and Nagoya (in 1939). These universities have enjoyed high prestige and
have played (or: and they continue to play) key roles in higher education and
research as core institutions among all the institutions of higher education in
J a p a n (Ministry of Education, 1992; A r i m o t o , 1991c).
When the University Order was introduced in 1918, a number of institutions
were chartered as universities for the first time by the national government:
private universities including W a s e d a , Keio, Meiji, C h u o , N i h o n , and
Doshisha; national universities including T o k y o University of C o m m e r c e ,
T o k y o Institute of Technology, and O k a y a m a University of Medicine; public
universities including O s a k a University of Medicine, Aichi University of
Medicine, and Kyoto Prefectural University of Medicine. O t h e r national,
local public, and private universities, including colleges and higher schools,
were founded and developed in the first two decades of this century.
In 1935, there were 45 universities, 32 higher schools, 177 colleges, and
4 higher normal schools (Ministry of Education, 1992: 7). T h e proportion
of the relevant age group enrolled in these categories was only 2 . 5 % , a very
small percentage compared with 3 6 . 8 % in 1990 in an almost equivalent
category of institutions.
After the Second World W a r , the quantitative expansion of higher
education developed in conjunction with rapid economic growth. In 1949
the F u n d a m e n t a l Law of Education (kyouiku kihonhou)
and the School
Education Law (gakko kyouikuhou)
were enacted. T h e educational system
which had consisted of multiple tracks was transformed into a single-track
6 - 3 - 3 - 4 system, which led to a rapid expansion of secondary and higher
education in subsequent years.
A t present, institutions of higher education are divided into three sectors:
university, non-university, and the miscellaneous sector.
T h e university sector (daigaku: u n d e r g r a d u a t e and graduate courses), as
164
A. Arimoto and E. de Weert
centers of learning, conducts in-depth teaching a n d research in specialized

academic disciplines, and provides students with broad knowledge.
daigaku)
T h e non-university sector consists of junior colleges (tanki
and colleges of technology (kotou senmongakko).
Junior colleges aim at
conducting in-depth teaching and research in specialized subjects a n d at
developing abilities in t h e students which are required in vocational and/or
practical fields. T h e duration of courses is two or three years. Colleges of
technology offer engineering courses; t h e duration of courses is five years
for engineering courses, a n d five and a half years for merchant marine
courses.
T h e third sector consists of m a n y specialized training schools a n d
miscellaneous schools. Until 1975, all educational institutions providing
education similar t o formal education available in schools, colleges, and
universities in such subjects as a c c o u n t i n g , d r e s s m a k i n g , a n d electric
techniques h a d been defined as miscellaneous schools. In 1975 they were
Japan
26
25
24
will
23
22
21
20
19
18
university
junior college
17
16
upper secondary school
15
colleges of
technology
specialized
training
school
14
13
lower secondary school
12
11
10
9
8
primary school
7
6
5
4
pre-primary school
3
Age
Figure 1: The Japanese educational system
165
p r o m o t e d to specialized training schools (senshu gakko),

and some of
them offer advanced courses, admitting u p p e r secondary school graduates.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the Japanese educational system.
Table 1 lists the n u m b e r of institutions according to whether they are
national, local public, or private institutions. T h e private sector comprises
7 5 % of universities, junior colleges, and colleges of technology, a unique
feature of Japanese higher education c o m p a r e d to most other countries.
TABLE 1
N u m b e r of higher education institutions by type of control (1990)
National
Local public
Private
Universities
96
19%
39
8%
372
73%
Universities
with grad. schools
95
30%
23
7%
195
63%
Junior colleges
41
7%
54
9%
498
84%
Colleges of
technology
54
87%
4
6%
4
6%
153
6%
170
6%
2,408
88%
Special training
schools

Admission to universities and junior colleges is granted to those who are
graduated from u p p e r secondary schools; (those who) have completed twelve
years of schooling; or those who are recognized by the Ministry of Education
as having qualifications equivalent to those who have graduated from
upper secondary schools. In addition to these qualifications, entrants are
selected by means of scholastic achievement tests, including the nationwide
examination administered by the National C e n t e r for University E n t r a n c e
Examinations, and other tests assessing students' ability and aptitude.
Recently the n u m b e r of institutions adopting a screening system based
solely on r e c o m m e n d a t i o n from the applicants' u p p e r secondary school
principals is increasing. A s a consequence, admission policies are becoming
m o r e diverse. Colleges of technology require the completion of lower
secondary schooling for admission, though the aim is almost equivalent
to that of junior colleges.
166

Universities grant the degrees of bachelor (gakushi), master
(shushi),
and doctor (hakushi),
while junior colleges award the associate degree
(jungakushi) which was introduced recently through a recommendation of
the University Council ( u c , daigaku shingi kai). Recently the Organization
for D e g r e e Conferment (gakui juyo kiko), a formal organization outside
the universities, was given the right, by recommendation of the u c , to offer
doctoral degrees. This is the first time in the history of higher education
in J a p a n that this has h a p p e n e d . T h e P h . D (gakujutsu hakushi), which is
equivalent to the other 19 doctoral degrees including D . S c , D . L i t . , D . E d . ,
L L . D . , M . D . , and D . E n g . , was introduced in 1974 and since then no new
doctoral degrees have been added. Based on uc's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , the
integration of the various kinds of bachelor degrees, such as bachelor of
education, literature, science, law, etc., into a unified bachelor degree has
been achieved.
STUDENTS
Table 2 shows the development of student n u m b e r s in the various types of

institutions. In 1990, the total enrolment (in full-time courses) was 1,989,000
in university undergraduate courses, 90,000 in graduate schools, 473,000
in junior colleges (two- or three-year courses), and 19,000 in colleges of
technology (in the 4th and 5th years). T h e private enrolment (excluding
postgraduate courses) of all institutions was 7 8 % of the total. T h e majority
(62.3%) of universities with graduate schools were private institutions, but
the majority of students (64.1%) enrolled in graduate schools were in
national institutions (Ministry of Education, 1992: 16).
T h e proportion of the relevant age group advancing to university, junior
college, or colleges of technology (the fourth year) was 3 6 . 8 % in 1990.
T h e proportion of the age group advancing to universities was 3 3 . 4 % for
males and 15.2% for females in 1990, while that advancing to universities
and junior colleges was 3 5 . 2 % for males and 3 7 . 4 % for females (Ministry
of Education, 1992: 14).
With respect to the percentage distribution of entrants to universities
and colleges by major field of study, the share is highest in social science
(39.9%), followed by engineering (19.4%) and humanities (15.5%), education
(7.1%), science ( 3 . 4 % ) , agriculture ( 3 . 4 % ) , pharmacy and nursing ( 2 . 2 % ) ,
medicine and dentistry ( 2 . 1 % ) , and others ( 7 . 0 % ) . National universities
have their highest percentage of students in engineering ( 2 8 . 8 % ) , education
( 2 1 . 9 % ) , and social sciences ( 1 5 . 6 % ) , while in private universities social
sciences ( 4 6 . 5 % ) , humanities ( 1 7 . 7 % ) , and engineering (17.1%) dominate
(Ministry of Education, 1992: 17).
167

TABLE 2
Students and staff per type of institution and control
% Control
Local/public
Total
National
Private
1,835,312
1,848,698
1,994,616
2,066,962
2,133,362
22
24
25
24
24
3
3
3
3
3
75
73
72
73
73
102,989
112,249
118,513
121,140
123,838
46
46
45
44
44
6
5
5
5
5
48
49
50
51
51
Universities
Students
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
Teachers
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
Junior colleges
Students
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
371,124
371,095
450,436
461,849
479,389
4
5
4
4
4
5
6
5
5
5
91
89
91
91
91
Teachers
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
16,372
17,760
19,264
19,830
20,489
5
6
6
6
6
10
11
10
10
10
85
83
84
84
84
85
84
85
86
86
9
9
8
8
8
6
7
7
6
6
Colleges of technology
Students
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
46,348
48,288
50,934
51,966
52,930
168

T A B L E 2 (cont'd)
Total
Teachers
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
3721
3770
3881
3954
4003
National
% Control
Local/public
Private
86
86
86
87
87
9
9
9
9
9
5
5
5
4
4
Special training schools

Students
1980
432,914
1985
538,175
699,534
1988
1989
741,682
1990
791,431
4
3
3
2
2
5
4
4
4
4
91
93
93
94
94
Teachers
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
4
3
3
3
2
7
7
6
6
6
89
90
91
91
92
20,211
24,238
28,780
30,277
31,773
Total enrolment in all types of courses, including short-term courses,

correspondence courses, courses at the University of the Air (houso
daigaku),
and a d v a n c e d courses at special training schools, r e a c h e d
approximately 3,410,000 in 1990. T h e total n u m b e r of entrants to institutions
of post-secondary education a m o u n t e d to approximately 1,080,000 in 1990,
representing 5 3 . 7 % of the age group, i.e., m o r e than one-half of all 18 year
olds gained access to higher education.
Percentage distribution of university graduates by their first destination
out of a total of 376,688 in 1989 was as follows: enrolled in postgraduate courses
6.7%; employed 7 9 . 6 % ; medical interns 1.9%; temporarily employed 1.0%;
unemployed 6 . 2 % ; other 4.5 % (Ministry of Education, 1992: 27). T h e r e
are no up-to-date accurate statistics on d r o p out rates amongst university
students, but it is supposed to be around 10% maximum ( A r i m o t o , 1991c).
According to a national survey covering the period 1971-1980, d r o p out rates
before graduation amongst students ranged between 6 . 5 - 9 . 9 % in junior
colleges and 9 . 8 - 1 7 . 8 % in universities: 4 . 8 - 1 2 . 3 % in national universities;
169
10.6-20.2% in private universities; 11.0-19.2% for male and 4 . 2 - 1 1 . 4 % for

female students ( M a r u y a m a , 1984).
ACADEMIC
STAFF
Academic staff as well as institutions and students increased rapidly, as

Table 2 shows. It appears that the proportion of national institutions is fairly
low compared to the other two categories, especially the private institutions.
With respect to the n u m b e r of universities, the proportion is 18.9% national
and 7 3 . 4 % private, with the n u m b e r of students being 2 1 . 8 % national and
75.4% private (Ministry of E d u c a t i o n , 1992: 26). T h e n u m b e r of students
per teacher in national universities is smaller than that in private universities:
the former is 8 . 1 % and the latter 2 3 . 6 % .
Of 120,520 teaching staff in 1989, 3 5 . 2 % w e r e professors; 2 3 . 3 %
associate professors; 1 3 . 3 % lecturers; and 2 8 . 1 % assistants ( M o n b u s h o ,
1990). According to a national survey, in 1986 the average age of full-time
teachers in universities was 45.2 years old. A s for sector, the national average
age was 44.2; the local average was 44.4 and the private was 46.2 ( M o n b u s h o ,
1986). F r o m these statistics, it is possible to predict a future trend in which
the average age of the academic staff will gradually shift towards a more
aging population.
According to the national survey, of 113,932 full-time teachers, 1 5 . 3 %
were in humanities; 10.7% in social sciences; 11.4% in sciences; 16.2% in
engineering; 5.2% in agriculture, 3 0 . 8 % in health care; 0 . 1 % in merchant
marine; 1.2% in domestic science; 5.9 % in teacher training; 2 . 9 % in
art; 0 . 1 % others; undecided 0.4% ( M o n b u s h o , 1990). Health care and
engineering are two dominant groups in the n u m b e r of academic staff.
Although total participation in tertiary education has increased sharply
over past decades, it should be pointed out that female teachers still play
a relatively minor role in terms of their participation in the academic
profession. Of all teachers in 1989, only 9.0% were female, and the
proportion of female teachers amongst all graduate school teaching staff
was only 3 . 8 % ( M o n b u s h o , 1990). In addition to the problem of the low
n u m b e r of female teachers, it should be noted that foreign teachers compose
a minute proportion of all teaching staff: in 1989, the n u m b e r of full-time
foreign academics teaching at Japanese universities and colleges was 1,960,
or 1.6%, of all full-time faculty ( M o n b u s h o , 1990).
Characteristics
structure
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION O F H I G H E R EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS
R e a r r a n g e m e n t of the pre-war prestige hierarchy of institutions with

Teikoku Daigaku (Tokyo University) at the top of the pyramid into the
170
post-war hierarchy through the establishment of new universities brought

about a m o r e steep pyramid like a status structure ( A r i m o t o , 1978).
According to a classification of research universities based on the Carnegie
classification, for example, this category in the 1970s contained only 24
institutions, or 5 . 4 % , of the then 443 universities, and included 15 national
universities, 4 private, and 5 local public universities ( A m a n o , 1984). T h e
research universities, especially the national o n e s , occupied the top of the
academic prestige hierarchy. M o r e recently, however, and as participation
has increased rapidly, m o r e competition has occurred amongst various
sectors and universities, giving some fluidity to the academic prestige
hierarchy. In general, there has been an upward mobility of the private
sector and a downward mobility of the national and public sectors.
T h e characteristics of higher education have changed substantially during
the post-war period, as the White P a p e r on higher education reports
(Ministry of Education, 1991). Firstly, in 1947 both the Education Basic
Law and School Education Law were established, which institutionalized
a single-track school system from kindergarten to university. Reformation
of the old plural-track system into the new 6 - 3 - 3 - 4 system led to the
development of higher education as well as u p p e r secondary education.
Basically, one university was to be established in each prefecture, and in
accordance with this principle 69 new universities were founded in 1949.
Secondly, the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of private schools was accomplished.
Introduction of the Private School Law (shiritu gakkohou) brought about the
reinforcement of private schools' a u t o n o m y , school incorporation law, and
public support to private schools. In 1947, the total n u m b e r of universities
increased to 180, including 70 national, 18 local public, and 92 private
universities.
Thirdly, the establishment of junior colleges increased the opportunity
for w o m e n to participate in higher education. Partial reform of the School
Education Law applying to the former colleges of technology, which lacked
the qualifications to b e c o m e universities, and which also did not desire
university status, brought about the two- or three-year junior colleges.
T h r o u g h this reform, 149 junior colleges, including 17 public and 132 private,
were chartered. This new type of institution became a key organization
for post-war w o m e n ' s higher education, and was finally authorized as a
p e r m a n e n t system in 1962. In addition to this new system, new colleges
of technology were established in 1962. Miscellaneous schools, conducting
"education equivalent to school education," were recognized as special
training schools in 1975. Each type of higher education described above
has its own function, goal, and task. In general, the social functions of
universities are considered to be teaching, research, social service, and
campus administration. T h e School Education Law states that "a university
shall be aimed at conducting in-depth teaching and research in specialized
arts and sciences, as well as providing students with broad knowledge, as a
171
center of learning, and thus at helping students develop their intellectual,

moral and practical abilities" (School Education Law, Article 52).
T h e law for the Establishment of National Schools was enacted in May
1949, and 69 new-system national universities became operational. In
addition, the Private School Law was enacted, containing three major
characteristics: first, it paid high regard to the autonomy of private institutions;
second, with a view to securing the public nature of private institutions,
the law created a new category of public corporation for the purpose of
founding and operating o n e or m o r e educational institutions; and third, it
authorized the national and local governments to grant financial subsidies
to private institutions in ways not contradictory to the provisions of Article
89 of the Constitution of J a p a n , which prohibited spending public m o n e y on
private enterprises "not u n d e r the control of the public authority" (Ministry
of Education, 1992: 11).
T h e aim of graduate schools, which are also included in this sector, is to
be engaged in teaching and conducting research in theory and application
of sciences, and in pursuing sciences in d e p t h , thus contributing to cultural
development (School Education Law, Article 65). For the first time in the
history of higher education in J a p a n , the role and mission of the graduate
school was officially authorized, under this law.
Junior colleges and colleges of technology are involved in teaching and
social service. A recent national survey, however, r e p o r t e d that most
Japanese academics in all institutions, from graduate schools to junior
colleges and colleges of technology, are mainly oriented to research rather
than to teaching ( A r i m o t o , 1991b). This result reflects a dominant research
paradigm among academic m e n and w o m e n , who increasingly believe that
research activity has much m o r e visibility than teaching and other activities,
as a m e a n s of gaining better rewards within and outside academia.
RESEARCH
In J a p a n , publicly funded scientific research is located in universities

as well as in research institutions either inside or outside universities.
Organizations conducting academic and scientific research include universities,
and also research institutes or centers of the following types: inter-university;
those attached to universities or university faculties; those u n d e r the direct
supervision of the Ministry of Education; or those founded by non-profit
scientific research corporations. Private firms also have many research
institutions within their operation.
It is obvious that J a p a n is m o r e similar to the U S A than to France or the
former U S S R in the fact that universities are committed to both teaching
and research as basic and intrinsic functions at both the u n d e r g r a d u a t e
and graduate levels. Academics tend to emphasize research in their daily
activities. Most of t h e m belong to three or four learned societies in various
172
disciplines, and these learned societies play an important role in the

evaluation of research activities and hence the development of science.
In spite of the relative importance of the university's research function,
especially in the field of pure and basic sciences, government funding of
universities, particularly national universities, has decreased to the extent
that journalists have called national universities "coffins for brains," due to
much deterioration of buildings, facilities, and equipment during the past
ten years.

Higher education
legislation
T h e School Education Law enacted in 1947 defines the aims of universities

and other matters relating to universities and faculties. T h e law covers
elementary schools, junior high schools, senior high schools, universities
and colleges, colleges of technology, schools for the blind, schools for the
deaf, nursery schools, and kindergartens (School Education Law, Article
1). In addition to this, there are definitions relating to school establishers
(Article 2), school establishment standards (Article 3), aims of the university
(Article 52), entrance to the university (Article 56), etc. T h e Ministry of
Education, Science and Culture controls these schools.
Authority within the national higher education system can be divided
into three parts: the u p p e r , the middle, and the lower levels. T h e upper
level consists of the national government, the Ministry of Education,
and other ministries. T h e middle level is composed of various bodies
including, for example, the Association of National Universities (kokuritsu
daigaku kyokai), the League of Private Universities (shiritu daigaku
renmei),
University A c c r e d i t a t i o n Association (daigaku kijun kyokai),
47 local
a u t o n o m o u s bodies, and individual universities and colleges (which contain
levels of campus authority with respect to the presidents, the boards of
trustees, and the university senates). T h e lower level authority is based on
faculties, d e p a r t m e n t s , and chairs.
T h e above generalization should be modified depending on whether the
institution is national, local public, or private. In the national university
sector, the structure of authority from t o p to b o t t o m locates the Ministry
of Education at the t o p , followed by the president (gakucho), the university
administrative council or university s e n a t e (hyogikai),
faculty bodies
(kyojukai), d e p a r t m e n t s (gakka), and chairs (kouza). In private universities
or colleges, the distribution of authority goes from the Ministry of Education
to the b o a r d of trustees (rijikai), to the president, to the faculties and
d e p a r t m e n t s . T h e local public university or college consists of the Ministry
of Education, 47 prefectures (including to, doh,fu, ken, etc.), the president,
the university senate and the faculty bodies.
173
T h e most substantial difference in authority between the public and private

sectors is seen in the function of presidents. In J a p a n , the presidents of
the national (and local public) universities function as the arm of the
professoriate or the faculty bodies. T h e professors or faculty bodies,
and hence the university senate (which is composed of representatives
of professors or faculty bodies), have the initiative in decision-making and
determination of campus policies. T h e private sector is different: as in
most A m e r i c a n private universities, the boards of trustees and presidents in
Japanese private institutions are stronger than professors in decision-making,
including matters of administration, m a n a g e m e n t , personnel, and sometimes
even curriculum, teaching, research, etc.
Control over educational and research
programmes
Generally, those who are involved in the process of approving new courses
and/or p r o g r a m m e s at the national level are civil servants in the Ministry of
Education and related agencies, w h o also sit on committees in the various
advisory councils related to the establishment of universities and colleges.
A t the level of universities and colleges, those who are involved in this kind
of process are mainly professors.
A p p r o v a l of new research p r o g r a m m e s goes through various stages. A t
the top level, the Ministry of Education plans and decides the types
of p r o g r a m m e s but each p r o g r a m m e needs funds to support it and
accordingly needs approval of the Ministry of Finance. A t the campus
level, every professor can select and conduct his or her own research
p r o g r a m m e without consulting others. H o w e v e r , in some fields, especially
in the fields of natural sciences where collaboration a m o n g colleagues and
graduate students is indispensable for conducting fruitful research, senior
professors usually have the right to select topics and themes of research. In
general, large and old traditional universities, especially national research
universities, have chair-systems (kouza) where full professors rule over
the chair and related territories, including junior professors and graduate
students who take part in work u n d e r his or her administration.
Institutional
management
and control
A s the School Education Law (Article 59) requires, every university

should hold faculty meetings open to attendance by not only full professors
but also associate professors and other academic staff. This law clearly
guarantees that every national, public, and private university has to set
u p faculty meetings to discuss important matters. T h e rights of faculty are
defined as follows: "a president's selection of academic staff in recruitment
and promotion should be based on the decision of related faculty meetings;
174
president's selection of deans should be based on the decision of related

faculty meetings" (Special Law of Education Civil Servants, Articles 4,
12, 25).
A s an exception, T s u k u b a University, which was established as an example
of a system of new universities, introduced a definition of committee
participation intended to counter the problems brought about by the
traditional a u t o n o m y of faculty m a n a g e m e n t .
T h e University Administrative Council, or University Senate, was set
u p in parallel to faculty bodies with the introduction of the Special Law
of Education Civil Servants ( S L E C S , kyouiku komuin tokureihou)
enacted
in 1949. T h e law clearly defined the senate as the supreme administrative
organization in relation to academic personnel. A senate may be established
in a university consisting of a single faculty. It is usually composed of a
president, a dean from each faculty, a dean of general education, two
professors per faculty and general education college, directors of attached
institutions, and other people holding important positions.
T h e rights of the senate include the following: the establishment and
abolition of the institution's rules and other important rules; budget; the
establishment and abolition of faculties and important facilities; criteria for
the appointment and promotion of staff, etc. F u r t h e r m o r e , S L E C S permits
the senate the following rights: recruitment and selection of the university
president; criteria and standards of recruitment and promotion of the
president and academic staff; appointment of heads of institutions except
deans of faculties; assessment of the promotion of presidents and academic
staff; assessment of downward promotion and dismissal of presidents and
academic staff, etc.
In contrast to other national universities where the senate is considered
to be an advisory committee to the president, T s u k u b a University m a d e
the senate a consultative body. This newly established university, formed
after the abolition of the former T o k y o University of E d u c a t i o n , is similar
to A m e r i c a n universities in its forms of governance and m a n a g e m e n t .
Nevertheless, it is quite different from private universities. Contrary to
the national universities, there is no legal regulation regarding the senate
in private universities.
Traditionally, universities respect autonomy in order to guarantee academic
freedom. T h e concrete content of this autonomy in national universities
includes decisions concerning teaching and research, and also the personnel
m a n a g e m e n t relating to presidents and academic staff committed to teaching
and research.
Institutional
funding
N a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t , p r e f e c t u r e s , and municipalities have s h a r e d

responsibilities for public finance. National subsidies and grants, including
175
specific subsidies for education as well as the local allocation tax grant, are
provided for aid to prefectures and municipalities.
Educational expenditures of the national government are classified into three
categories: (1) direct expenditure for national educational activities such as operating
national universities and schools; (2) specific subsidies for educational activities of other
institutions such as those of prefectures, municipalities, private schools and research
organizations; and (3) the local allocation tax grant, a part of which is expended on
education (Ministry of Education, 1991: 46).
With regard to the funding of higher education by the national government,

an account called the Special Account for National Educational Institutions
(kokuritu
gakko tokubetu kaikei) was set u p in 1964 to separate the
budgetting and accounting of national educational institutions from those
of other bodies. This account is independent from the general account of
the national government, and a larger part of the account is derived from
a transfer from the budget of M O E . T h e total budget of the special account
for the 1990 fiscal year was 1.2 trillion yen, accounting for about 6 0 % of
the total budget for national educational institutions (Ministry of Education,
1992: 67, 70).The M O E also provides private institutions of higher education
with subsidies, amounting to 261.9 billion yen in 1990.
In addition to support for institutions, the national government expenditures
include grants to university teachers and researchers for scientific research
projects, and the government provides national funds for student aid
p r o g r a m m e s through the J a p a n Scholarship Foundation. In 1990, the
former expenditure a m o u n t e d to 55.8 billion yen, and the latter 78.3
billion yen. T h e share of national and local public expenditures on higher
education in national income is 0 . 8 % this a m o u n t is relatively small from
an international perspective (Ministry of Education, 1992: 68-69).
In 1987, 1,044 billion yen was spent on education and research in national
universities and colleges, and about 1 5 % (154 billion yen) of this expenditure
came from student fees. In contrast, in four-year private institutions, 6 5 % of
the general revenue came from students in various kinds of payments ( O E C D ,
1988: 291). Recently, student fees have increased the proportion of total
higher education expenditures derived from student fees was 3 4 % in 1990,
and this percentage is relatively high (Ministry of Education, 1992: 70).
G e n e r a l l y , d u e to the severe b u d g e t a r y restraint on the national
government since the early 1980s, the expenditure on higher education,
especially on national institutions, has been reduced. This has caused
difficulties for many universities with respect to repairing and reconstructing
obsolete buildings and facilities, and promoting their educational and
research activities. H o w to cope with this problem has become one of
the main issues facing Japanese education ( A r i m o t o , 1991b).
176

policy
W h e n Japan started modernization in the era of Meiji Restoration, about

120 years ago, the goals in various sectors of society were focused on catching
up with the advanced Western countries. Today these goals have been
attained to a considerable extent and the level of economic and social
development is comparable to that of many other advanced countries. Japan
is now undergoing various social changes, such as internationalization, the
aging of the population, dissemination of information technology, etc. In
u
this context, the national government and M O E are stressing that t h e role
of higher education in the promotion of scientific research and the training of
qualified m a n p o w e r will be increasingly i m p o r t a n t " (Ministry of Education,
1992: 122).
Based on this recognition, the government's ideas relating to the future
of higher education are: (1) development of distinctive and diversified
programmes at individual institutions and the revision of the national
standard regulations to m a k e them b r o a d e r ; (2) decrease in the 18 year
old population and its impact on higher education; and (3) coping with
internationalization and with the information age (Ministry of Education,
1992: 125-128).
ACTORS AND MECHANISMS
G o v e r n m e n t ministries and various councils are the main actors in the

process of policy-making in the national higher education system. Power
is exercised through the selection process of representatives on various
councils. Sometimes people are selected who are apt to protect the rights
and policies of the national government and related ministries.
A uniquely unified power elite a "triad" of bureaucracy, business, and
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party ( L D P ) is considered to be effective in
the Japanese policy-making system. In recent years, however, the system
has become more pluralistic, though it is still fundamentally elitist, i.e.,
some actors have more direct influence on the policy process than others.
James Schoppa called it "patterned pluralism" (Schoppa, 1991: 9). In this
pluralism, the ministries play a central role in the policy process because they
are charged with the task of drafting legislation and exerting administrative
guidance. In addition to the central role of the bureaucracy, the L D P ,
which has been dominant in electoral politics since 1955, has increased
its control over the decision-making process through a D i e t m e n known as
Zoku (literally tribes) of unofficial policy-specialized cliques.
T h e r e is sometimes conflict between the bureaucracy and the L D P as well
as intimate partnership. W e cannot forget to add to the policy-making mix
177
the sectoral conflicts among sub-government units. A s Campbell observed,

the varying degrees of internal conflict can be found within individual
sub-government units, especially in the budget process (Campbell, 1977).
T h e Ministry of Finance ( M O F , O k u r a s h o ) , which stands in the center of
this sub-government conflict, is charged with providing a "balanced" final
budget to many ministries within the limits of the governmental financial
capabilities. T h r o u g h such conflict, as well as partnership, the close ties
b e t w e e n the L D P , the bureaucracy, and certain interest groups constitute
the budget and policy-making processes, closing out the opposition parties
and related progressive interest groups.
T h e Ministry of Education is a typical bureaucracy, and its officials are
bureaucrats w h o are charged with the actual drafting of policy proposal.
In the actual policy-making process these bureaucrats utilize ringi sei
and nemawashi,
which do not allow t h e m to overcome conservatism
(cf. Saito, 1984). T h e M O E does not have the ability to push through
legislation or increase budgets in areas where it does not have support
of the L D P . Although these facts m a k e M O E a conservative organization in
the policy-making process, the ministry seems to k e e p a neutral position
and an objective perspective on policy issues, as can be seen in the fact
that it usually relies on a set of advisory councils (shingikai); the councils
are important to the M O E because they give the ministry's policy-making
activities neutrality and rationality, and a degree of legitimacy.
T h e M O E requested, in April 1989, the Central Council for Education ( C C E ,
chuo kyoiku shingikai) to consider "reforms of various systems in education
to m a k e t h e m relevant to a new a g e . " With regard to reforms of higher
education, in O c t o b e r 1987, M O E requested the University Council ( u c ,
daigaku shingikai) to consider "specific strategies for developing heightened,
distinctive and invigorated activities in education and research at universities
and other institutions of higher education." This council was set u p on advice
to the M O E of the National Council on Educational Reform ( N C E , rinji
kyoiku shingikai), an ad hoc committee to the Prime Minister. T h e N C E
laid down three basic concepts for the current educational reform: to carry
out the transition to a lifelong learning system; to place m o r e emphasis on
the importance of such contemporary changes as internationalization; and
development towards an information-oriented society.
policy
In a series of reports drafted by councils to the Ministry of Education

following the Second World W a r , quantitative higher education goals with
respect to issues like access, non-government funding, efficiency, etc., were
emphasized.
178

ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION
With regard to access, the Council for University Chartering and School
Juridical Person (cue) and the University Council drafted a report on basic
master plans for higher education. C u e drafted in 1984 the "plan of higher
education beyond 1986" (New Higher Education Plan), covering the 15
years 1986-2000. Its plan up to 1992 states that the arrangement for opening
higher education institutions, the promotion of internationalization of higher
education, the development of unique higher education institutions, etc., are
considered to be important for the policy of promoting quality in higher
education institutions. It also estimates that the 18 year old population
the age group going on to higher education is projected to reach
a peak in 1992 with a rapid decline afterwards; at the peak, enrolment
will reach 3 5 . 6 % , requiring an additional 86,000 in admission quotas by all
institutions.
In 1991 the c u e drafted a new master plan of higher education beyond
1993 until 2000. It estimates that the 18-year old population will reach its
peak of 2,005,000 in 1992, then decrease to 1,510,000 by the year 2000,
and then continue to decrease year by year. With respect to this trend,
it is anticipated that new d e m a n d for access to higher education will be
created by admitting m o r e adults and m o r e foreign students, while overall
the higher education system is compelled to reduce its total enrolment.
Given the economic and demographic circumstances, the u c is demanding
that every university initiates educational and research programs that include
self-evaluation and innovation, and that take due account of the efficient
allocation of financial resources.
NON-GOVERNMENT
FUNDING
A s for non-governmental funding as a way of strengthening financial

resources, there is much debate particularly amongst those who experienced
the campus turmoil of the 1960s and early 1970s. H o w e v e r , in the light
of increasing budget cuts, past sensitivities to private financing of higher
education are weakening, even in national universities, which are traditionally
sensitive to the relationship between universities and the business world.
Recently many universities have introduced the so-called kanmuri
koza
(literally crown-chair set up by d o n a t i o n ) , where non-government funds
from firms and other agencies of the business world are available even to
the national and public universities.
EFFICIENCY
Introduction of university evaluation, or strictly speaking of university

self-monitoring and self-evaluation, is related to problems of efficiency. For
179
many reasons, amongst t h e m the tight budget, the government introduced

a policy of less control over university and college activities, giving much
m o r e freedom and a u t o n o m y to institutions in terms of curriculum and
m a n a g e m e n t of teaching and research. In exchange for reinforcing autonomy
in university administration, the government has advised all institutions,
from graduate schools to colleges of technology, to introduce systems of selfmonitoring and self-evaluation. Based on their response, the government is
likely to financially either reward or punish institutions. This policy, which
leans towards de-regulation and competition, is probably a reflection of the
m o r e market-driven coordination mechanisms which are being considered
in some other countries (Van Vught, 1989).
Reflection of Structure, Authority, and Higher Education Policy

on Institutional Governance and Management
This section will focus on the problem of the actual relationship between
the central institutional administration and the faculties and d e p a r t m e n t s .
A s discussed earlier, the triad connection of government, bureaucracy, and
political party has strong power in the policy-making process of higher
education, and bureaucracy especially has strong hegemony.
In consideration of the effect of structure on institutional governance
and m a n a g e m e n t , the control of bureaucracy has effects on the individual
institutions through legislation and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of various councils
and other m e a n s . T h e establishment of a university or junior college,
or a college of technology, requires the approval of the M O E based on
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n from the Council for University Chartering and School
Juridical Person (daigakusecchi
oyobi gakko houjin shingikai),
which
e x a m i n e s t h e establishment of institutions on the basis of standards for the
establishment prescribed by ministerial regulations. All institutions come
under the jurisdiction of the M O E , even if the institution is controlled by its
own governing body.
In 1987, based on a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of the N C E , the u c set u p a
council charged with basic matters concerning universities, junior colleges,
and upper secondary special training schools, such as standards for the
establishment of a university and other institutions and planning for the
development of higher education institutions.
AUTHORITY, GOVERNANCE, AND MANAGEMENT
Institutional governance and m a n a g e m e n t are diversified by type of

institution, which in turn varies according to size of enrolment and n u m b e r
of faculties. National universities, for example, are managed by the rule
180
of law: the establishing body of national universities is the Minister of

Education, Science and Culture, and governing bodies consist of the
president, the university's senate, d e a n s , and faculty. Every president is
selected by election.
Private universities have been managed in a variety of ways, but newly
established private universities are usually adopting the same m e t h o d of
governance as national universities. T h e founder of a private university is
a school juridical person to w h o m the chairman of the board of trustees
is responsible, while the president is responsible to the school. O t h e r
responsible persons are a secretary-general and a dean of student affairs,
just as in national universities. T h e chairman of the board of trustees is
selected amongst the trustees (Private School Law Article 35-2) but the
selection of the president and dean is not prescribed by any law. Even so,
they are usually selected by election. This custom may be different from
that in the U S A , where they are rarely selected by election.
Faculty meetings are composed of all the full professors, associate
professors, lecturers, and in some cases some other staff. They discuss and
determine most "important m a t t e r s " affecting faculty, including recruitment
of new faculty m e m b e r s (School Education Law, Article 59). Though
"important m a t t e r s " are not necessarily clear, such matters as student
entrance and d r o p out, school transfer, absence, graduation, etc., are to be
decided by the president after faculty discussion (School Education Practice
Rules, Article 67).
The Research Institute for Higher Education ( R I H E ) , Hiroshima University,
conducted a survey on university governance and m a n a g e m e n t and comm e n t e d as follows:
According to our survey it is clear that university teachers of Japanese Universities
who play main roles in decision-making are thinking that they themselves proclaim
both increased "participation" and "efficiency" of decision-making but also need their
harmony . . . (but) at present Japanese universities have not discovered management
which simultaneously satisfies both "decentralization of authority" and "efficiency"
(Research Institute for Higher Education, 1976: 117).
This survey reveals that in the process of decision-making in Japanese

universities there exist d e m a n d s of decentralization and of efficiency, and
that they sometimes bring about confusion and struggle. T h e fact that the
power of the trustee is stronger in the private sector may bring about the
possibility that the great share of leadership and efficiency of top-down
m a n a g e m e n t is effective, while equivalent power is rather weak in the
national sector, as was seen in the relatively weak power of the president
and university senate compared with that of faculty.
Quality and
accountability
University evaluation is the hottest issue in the field of quality control.

Its introduction has been carried out m o r e through the initiative of the
181
national government than through that of individual institutions, though

some proposals relating to the necessity of university self-evaluation were
previously drafted by such agencies as t h e University A c c r e d i t a t i o n
Association, the Association of National Universities, the League of Private
Universities, etc. Based on the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of the u c , the M O E changed
the ministerial ordinance relating to the establishment of universities and
colleges, and, according to this new policy, a university or college cannot
u n d e r t a k e any reorganization, including integration or abolition of faculties
and d e p a r t m e n t s , or the establishment of graduate schools, without first
submitting a self-evaluation report.
After the Second World W a r , chartering and accreditation were adopted
as the processes for establishing and evaluating universities. Accreditation,
however, has not worked effectively. T h e recent trend towards introducing
self-evaluation systems into universities seems to reflect the philosophy
which pertained during the initial stage of the post-war period. T h e
government has decided to loosen regulations on chartering, and expects
institutional self-evaluation to maintain the quality of teaching, research,
and social services.
In any case, the present struggle is between the two great powers of
government and oligarchy, using Clark's term (1983). In the middle is o n e ,
the University Accreditation Association, which should work effectively,
but does not.
Officially, every institution is obliged to conduct self-monitoring and
evaluation activities. A recent survey, however, found that only 3 % of
all four-year institutions throughout the country set up committees of selfevaluation (Research Institute for Higher E d u c a t i o n , 1991). T h e survey also
notes that, in both national (and public) and private sectors, the upper strata
of administration presidents and trustees are positively wrestling with
the problem, while people on the lower strata, i.e., professors at the level
of operating units, faculties, and d e p a r t m e n t s , are not so concerned. W e
might see in this trend that the campuses' response to the new government
policy of university self-evaluation is being conducted by a t o p - d o w n m e t h o d
rather than a b o t t o m - u p o n e . People's response towards the new policy at
the b o t t o m level, or operating units, is likely to b e c o m e the key in deciding
whether this new policy is really supported by all academic m e m b e r s . T h e
result of the survey may give a somewhat negative impression in the extent to
which the development of self-evaluation can be successful in the future.
O n e of the problems faced by self-evaluation in an academic organization
is that the priority may be put on the needs of local interest groups rather than
on those of the whole university. A s a result, localism may sometimes prevail
over cosmopolitanism and particularism over universalism. If the president
has strong leadership, he or she may establish a new semi-permanent
committee for practising self-evaluation for the whole campus, and hence
government policy can p e r m e a t e into the operating units of the university
182
organization by way of a t o p - d o w n process. Contrary to this, if the

president's proposal is rejected by the senate as a usual p r o c e d u r e , it
may become clear that the discrepancy between the d e m a n d of national
government and that of oligarchy is m o r e enlarged. In this context, the
president's leadership is the crucial factor in governance and m a n a g e m e n t
of Japanese universities and colleges. In other words, m o r e reinforcement of
authority at the middle level between the government and oligarchy appears
to be required. Private universities, of course, are somewhat different in that
presidents are likely to have m o r e power.
Higher education policy: problems and
dilemmas
T h e Japanese national system of higher education seems to be successful

to a considerable degree. Turning to the institutions, however, it can be seen
that not all of the reforms have been successful. T h e unsolved problems fall
into three areas: input, throughput, and output. In the input phase exists the
problem of access; in throughput the problems of teaching, research, and
social service; and in output the problem of job placement of students. Also
there is the problem of internationalization and the international exchange
of scholars and students.
T h e problems of access and equality of educational opportunity are
important issues, and some substantial gains have been m a d e in these
areas. T h e r e has been an increase in w o m e n ' s participation and an increase
in general enrolment in the junior colleges, colleges of technology, and other
institutions of higher education. T h e enrolment rate in higher education has
reached a high level in international comparison, and the goals of equality
of access and educational opportunity have been partially achieved. But
problems remain, particularly with respect to access to higher education
for those from certain regional, familial, or social backgrounds (Kikuchi,
1990).
Governmental policy with respect to mitigating excessive competition in
entrance examinations and the improvement of procedures for selecting
university entrants by individual institutions has gradually been achieved.
Individual universities, public and private, have tried unique and diverse
methods of selecting students. T h e methods include reports submitted by
the principal of each secondary school, interviews, essay tests, and practical
skills tests, in addition to scholastic aptitude tests held by the National
Center for University Entrance Examination ( N C U E E ) . T h e reform of the
entrance examination has become one of the crucial issues in J a p a n , which
has been called a "degreeocratic" society by O E C D ' S educational reviews,
and it is hoped that each university carries out its own creative ideas.
With respect to throughput, contrary to the positive policy initiatives at
the government level, the reactions of individual universities and colleges
have not been entirely positive. T h e national survey mentioned above
183
reported that many professors accept the necessity of campus reforms but
they are very reluctant to act, except for a few professors who are actively
wrestling with reform issues ( A r i m o t o , 1990).
Over the last few decades, the social, scientific, and technological context
in which universities and colleges exist has changed dramatically, compelling
institutions to rethink their approach to knowledge, curriculum, and teaching
m e t h o d s . In fact, the M O E recently a n n o u n c e d , in its White Paper on
Higher E d u c a t i o n , principles for guiding the coming educational reforms:
(1) enhancing higher education; (2) developing m o r e distinctive and m o r e
diverse activities at individual institutions of higher education; (3) coping
with a lifelong learning society; and (4) carrying out innovative educational
and research activities, with the aim of achieving the objectives of (1), (2),
and (3) continuously and effectively (Ministry of Education, 1992: 122).
M O E principles are based on recommendations from two important
councils: the National Council on Educational Reform, which reviewed
J a p a n ' s educational system as a whole from 1984 to 1987, and the u c ,
which is deliberating on "specific strategies for developing heightened,
vitalized and m o r e unique activities in education and research at individual
institutions of higher education."
Concerning the principle of enhancing higher education mentioned above,
the M O E has formulated three main policies: (1) improvement and e n h a n c e m e n t
of graduate schools; (2) improvement of the system of academic degrees; and
(3) strengthening the educational functions of the university. With respect to
the importance of strengthening the educational functions of the university,
the M O E (1992: 125) recognized that:
There has been a criticism that universities in Japan are carrying out their
educational functions rather inadequately as compared to those in many other
countries. Universities need to listen to this criticism seriously. The quantitative
expansion of universities might inevitably bring about a greater difference among
individual universities in their qualitative aspects. However, it cannot be denied that
Japanese universities have placed excessive emphasis on their research activities and
have not devoted sufficient attention to developing a systematic approach towards the
teaching of students.
Some leading universities have already started carrying out reforms to

improve general education, professional education, curriculum, teaching,
etc. Some 15 years ago, Hiroshima University, as an example, introduced
a new type of faculty called Sogokagak u-bu, or faculty of integrated arts
and sciences. This involved the integration of the old Kyoyo-bu,
or twoyear course of general education, with general and professional education.
T h e same kind of reform has taken place in Osaka University with the
introduction of the faculty of h u m a n science (Ningenkagaku-bu).
T h e reform
was also introduced in teacher-training colleges, which were obliged to
reorganize teacher-training courses into a general education course because
of diminishing student d e m a n d and a sharp decline in the n u m b e r of students
of elementary and secondary school age.
184
In response to rapid social change involving information, science and

technology, internationalization, and h u m a n centerdness, many institutions
have introduced new words into their titles, such as "international,"
"information," " h u m a n being," "general education," etc. Moreover, with
the recent impact of the u c draft, most prestigious ex-imperial universities
like T o k y o , K y o t o , Nagoya, and T o h o k u have started to reorganize faculties
either along the lines mentioned above or through creating their own
innovative models.
Some universities are following the faculty development or staff development
movements which were initiated during the 1960s and 1970s in E u r o p e and
the U S A . F r o m the late 1980s, some academic staff have paid much attention
to faculty development as one of the important steps toward campus reform
( A r i m o t o , 1990, 1991b).
G r a d u a t e school reform is also urgently n e e d e d in Japanese universities,
which is the M O E ' S first objective in dealing with the matter of enhancing
higher education. Before the Second World W a r , the national system of
graduate schools was similar to that in E u r o p e a n countries: a single-tier
system with no separation from u n d e r g r a d u a t e teaching, and faculties
were committed to both undergraduate and graduate education in terms
of resource, budget, personnel, m a n a g e m e n t , etc. After the Second World
W a r , the old system remained despite the introduction of the American
system. G r a d u a t e schools are d e p e n d e n t on u n d e r g r a d u a t e faculties, which
are committed mainly to undergraduate education, and have practically no
facilities, equipment, or staff of their own.
A s the statistics of 1990 show, of 507 universities, 90 offer masters courses
and 207 offer the doctoral degree (Ministry of Education, 1992: 42). T h e
rapid growth of graduate schools is the result of various policies, including
the establishment of new universities, the introduction of credit transfer
between institutions, the separation of graduate schools from undergraduate
faculties, of Kanmuri Koza, and the acceptance of adult students who are
older than 30 years. These students are in addition to the traditional student
age groups of 18-22 years for undergraduate and 23-27 years for graduate
courses.
PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED
In spite of the rapid development and introduction of reforms, there are

many problems to be solved and rectified. First, the scale of graduate school
activity is still small compared to systems in many other countries in E u r o p e
and North America. T h e proportion of graduate to u n d e r g r a d u a t e students
was 4 . 4 % in Japan in 1988, while it was 1 7 . 5 % in the U S A (1985), 3 3 . 9 %
in the U K (1986), and 2 2 . 2 % in France (1985). If we use the data concerning
the share of students to 100,000 people, it is 0 . 7 % in J a p a n , 6.9% in U S A ,
1.6% in U K , and 2 . 9 % in France (Ministry of Education, 1992: 43).
185
Second, viewed from the perspective of the academic discipline, we can

recognize that mobility and flexibility of professors and students a m o n g
academic disciplines and hence institutions have not improved for decades,
though multidisciplinary approaches have been improved to some extent.
T h e chair system is still strong in research universities and u n d e r some
conditions impedes academic mobility.
According to a survey of the academic m a r k e t place, there is now
a trend towards increased mobility but barriers remain, including the
monopoly of prestigious positions by the special institutions, the inbreeding
p h e n o m e n o n mainly in prestigious universities, and little m o v e m e n t of
professors between the former imperial universities, traditional national
universities, new national universities, private universities, and other universities and colleges (Shinbori, 1984). A s the Mertonian model on scientific
ethos asserts, this kind of closed mobility is related to particularism rather
than universalism, impeding the progress of science ( M e r t o n , 1973). A s
just m e n t i o n e d , the chair system is an important operating unit in Japanese
universities, especially in research universities, and may be responsible for
the climate of particularism. T h e question of how to change such a climate is
connected to reforming the quality of teaching and research at the operating
unit level, for it is here that particularism has its base which allows it to resist
pressure for reform both from within and outside the universities.
Conclusion
This summary will discuss the changing relationship between government
and higher education, focusing on the way higher education is regulated
and controlled. According to some observers (Clark, 1983; V a n Vught,
1989), three forces are distinguished, amongst others, as having influence
on the nature of regulation in a higher education system: state authority, the
m a r k e t , and academic oligarchy. According to Clark (1983), these forces are
combined in a figure called the triangle of coordination. J a p a n was described
in Clark's model in the following terms:
Japan, given its complexity, is difficult to place in a summary fashion: on the one
hand, national coordination is formally left largely to ministerial officials and not
to bodies analogous to the British University Grants Commission; on the other, the
chair system, mixed with certain Japanese characteristics of small-group loyalty and
cohesiveness, has given senior professors a strong power base. The towering status
of the Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto has also given academics at those institutions
national influence as well as privileged autonomy (Clark, 1983: 144).
A s Clark indicates, government and academic oligarchy constitute the

most powerful forces in the Japanese higher education system, especially
in the national and public sectors. T h e most prestigious universities were
established by the government and hence they are sponsored by the
government, which had a policy of catching u p with the advanced countries
186
in the fields of science, technology, and education. G o v e r n m e n t provided

these universities with many resources and high prestige. Sponsored by the
government, these universities enjoyed much m o r e academic freedom and
autonomy than other national, public, and private universities and colleges,
but, at the same time, they have had to struggle against government
regulation, though to a lesser extent than some other types of higher
education institutions. F r o m the tension between government and oligarchy,
several trends emerge.
First, most national and public universities except for the few prestigious
research universities, have been regulated and controlled to a considerable
degree by the government budget and resource allocation, even though the
system located on Clark's triangle is a position somewhat removed from
state authority. It should be m e n t i o n e d , however, that the government
has proposed de-regulation in a series of recent policies and has let each
university have much m o r e autonomy. T h e government strongly expects
a shift towards self-regulating systems. Almost the same thing can be
said with respect to the situation in the private sector, but in this sector
governmental regulation, thus far, is not so direct as in the national and
public sectors. Trustees and presidents in the private sector have much
m o r e power than professors and faculty bodies in the public sector with
respect to administration and m a n a g e m e n t . They also enjoy some distance
from government control, though they have lost some independence since
the introduction of the financial support policy set forth in 1980.
T h e r e is a question to what extent the trend towards m o r e self-regulation
and institutional autonomy has changed the power balance between the
government and higher education. It seems in J a p a n that the government
still maintains strong power despite the introduction of the de-regulation
policy, because every institution has to report to the M O E about the present
situation of self-monitoring and evaluation if they want to carry out new
plans and reforms concerning the establishment of faculties, d e p a r t m e n t s ,
and other changes at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Without these
reports, no plans and reforms will be approved by the government. T h e
government still regulates and controls in this sense.
Second, the most remarkable trend in the present context is the beginning
of a shift toward market-driven coordination as seen in a series of policymaking processes. Since national and public universities are supported
mainly by public money, accountability as well as market competition
play a significant role in the public sector. Private universities are m o r e
involved in institutional competition for survival, which involves gaining
m o r e and better students. T h e private sector is directly placed in a
market-driven situation. W h e n the public sector introduced a preliminary
unified entrance examination used throughout the country, many private
institutions, which did not participate, could still get excellent students via
their own examinations. Recently some private universities, especially in
187
large cities such as T o k y o and O s a k a , set m o r e difficult entry requirements

than public universities. Probably in the next ten years, competition between
the two sectors will increase because of the reduction in size of the potential
student population, and an emphasis on accountability will increase to the
extent that the real quality of teaching and research will determine the
prestige of institutions. This implies that the coordination of higher education
is shifting in a market-driven direction, much closer to that of the U S A as
depicted in Clark's figure.
Third, with regard to a u t o n o m y and academic freedom, in particular
"substantive a u t o n o m y " and "procedural a u t o n o m y " as defined by Berdahl
(1990), the trends in J a p a n are difficult to explain in summary fashion.
G o v e r n m e n t ' s policy seems to provide m o r e substantive autonomy to
individual institutions through de-regulation. Institutions can plan in a
flexible way, for example, the combination of general education and
professional education in the curriculum within the context of a framework
regulation that only requires 124 credits to be gained by students before
graduation. Also, it seems that institutions and academics now enjoy m o r e
procedural autonomy than in the past. H o w e v e r , government regulation
can both enhance or restrict a u t o n o m y . T h e monitoring function of the
M O E with respect to self-evaluation activity of each institution is a good
example of this dual process. Procedural autonomy may be extended further
if a good assessment of the institutional self-evaluation is obtained, but a
p o o r assessment by the M O E will result in reduced autonomy. A s a result,
some institutions and academics will gain m o r e procedural a u t o n o m y , while
others will lose it. If a good self-evaluation score is not gained, public funds
as well as subsidies can be reduced, and hence the institution will lose not
only procedural but also substantive autonomy.
J a p a n is not based on a federal system, though she has 47 prefectures.
In this national system, the central government is a main actor exercising
power through its ministries, sub-ministries, b u r e a u s , and various councils
such as the u c and C C E . Academics have a great deal of influence on these
councils through their m e m b e r s h i p , although they are appointed by the M O E
and related ministries. Still, there is no significant trend in this country with
respect to replacement of academics on the councils by representatives
from business, the government, or industry. T h e r e are no intermediary
bodies strictly comparable to the University G r a n t s C o m m i t t e e ( U G C ) or
the Council for National Academic A w a r d s ( C N A A ) (as they functioned until
recently in the U K ) , except for the University Accreditation Association
and the Organization for Academic D e g r e e Conferment which have been
established recently.
8
Higher Education Policy in The Netherlands
and EGBERT DE WEERT

The education
system
In T h e Netherlands, children's school life begins at the age of four

or five. Primary education lasts eight years and children enter secondary
education around the age of 12. T h e D u t c h secondary education system
contains a variety of forms with possibilities of transfer from one type
to another. Five categories of secondary education can be distinguished:
pre-university education (vwo), senior general secondary education ( H A V O ) ,
junior general secondary education ( M A V O ) , junior secondary vocational
education ( V B O ) , and senior secondary vocational education ( M B O ) . Except
for M B O , all these categories follow immediately after primary school. In
terms of their function, these types of schools either p r e p a r e students for
further education or for direct entry into the labor m a r k e t . T h e boundaries
between the categories of secondary education are p e r m e a b l e , e.g. M A V O
graduates can transfer to a senior grade of H A V O and H A V O d r o p outs can
transfer to (a senior grade of) M A V O . All forms are regulated through the
Secondary Education Act. A n overview of the education system is presented
in Figure 1.

In the Dutch higher education system, two sectors can be distinguished:
the university sector and the sector for higher vocational education (in
D u t c h , Hoger Beroepsonderwijs,
abbreviated as H B O ) . T h e universities and
the H B O institutions developed under very different circumstances and are
188
189
based on quite different rationales. A s a separate type of institution, the

O p e n University was established in 1984 by the O p e n University Act. It
offers fully accredited university and H B O degree p r o g r a m m e s , all in the
form of distance learning. Leaving the latter aside for the m o m e n t , T h e
Netherlands has a formal binary system, based on the concept of "equal
but different" institutions on either side of the binary line.
4^the Netherlands^
26
25
24
doctoraal
23
22
21
20
19
18
HBO
17
MBO
16
15
14
13
MAVO
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
Age
Figure 1: The Dutch educational system
T H E UNIVERSITY SECTOR
T h e history of the university sector dates back to 1575, when the

University of Leiden was founded as a reward for its citizens' persistence
in fighting the Spaniards during the Eighty Y e a r s ' W a r . T h e establishment
of other universities followed in subsequent years, e.g., the Universities
of Groningen (1614), A m s t e r d a m (1632), and Utrecht (1634). Over the
centuries additional universities were founded, recently also as part of an
190
L C. J. Goedegebuure et al.
explicit government policy to further economic activity in some disadvantaged

regions, for example, the University of Twente (1961) and the University of
Limburg (1976) (Florax, 1992). A t present, the university sector consists of
13 institutions.
Until the 1970s, the university sector was left m o r e or less on its own by
the government. It appeared to function according to its own purposes, and
little policy attention was directed towards the universities; this situation,
however, was not to remain. Substantial problems arose, the most important
of which at the end of the 1970s were considered to be the high student
d r o p out rate, and the long time students n e e d e d to finish their degree in
comparison with other countries. In addition, many of the academic staff
appointed during the sharp rise in student n u m b e r s lacked the qualities and
motivation needed to cope with the challenges of the coming decade (In
't Veld, 1987), while institutional m a n a g e m e n t in general appeared rather
weak and not very professional. A s a result the universities were seen to
be run inefficiently. Consequently, major restructuring operations were
initiated to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the university sector.
T h e most important ones were the restructuring of university education
through the introduction of the so-called two-tier structure, a revision of the
personnel structure, two retrenchment operations resulting in the closure of
several departments and a reshuffling in terms of courses offered by the
universities, and the introduction of a system of conditional funding of
research. These ad hoc restructuring operations lasted until the mid-1980s,
when a new approach towards the steering and functioning of the Dutch
higher education system was introduced.
THE
SECTOR FOR HIGHER VOCATIONAL
EDUCATION
T h e H B O sector also has a long history. Most of the older institutions

have their roots in the 19th century and evolved out of the guilds. In 1968
higher vocational education was introduced as a separate type of education
with the passing by Parliament of the Secondary Education Act ( S E A ) that
codified all forms of education between primary and university education.
O n e of the characteristics of the S E A , and the way in which the Ministry
of Education and Science used it, was a detailed regulation of institutional
affairs, thus severely restricting the further development of the H B O sector
a sector that, among other things, was extremely diverse and fragmented
in those days.
T h e period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s can be characterized as
o n e of substantial growth. Student n u m b e r s rose rapidly in higher education,
creating the beginning of budgetary pressures that were to dominate the
1980s. In line with developments in other countries, the non-university
sector was considered ideal to take care of a large part of this increase,
191
as it (1) was considerably cheaper than the university sector and "education
on the c h e a p " even then was considered an asset; (2) catered for part-time
education; and (3) provided the kind of orientation perceived as beneficial
to the growth of the D u t c h economy. Expansion of the H B O sector, however,
also gave rise to discussions about both the internal structure of the sector
and its relationship with the university sector. This resulted in a multitude
of G r e e n and White Papers with different scenarios. H o w e v e r , it took until
1983 before decisive action was taken by the Dutch government.
In 1983 the then Minister of Education and Science published the
White Paper Scale-enlargement,
Task-reallocation
and Concentration
(STC),
p r o p o s i n g a major r e s t r u c t u r i n g of t h e H B O sector with far-reaching
consequences for the structure and functioning of the Dutch higher education
system (for a detailed discussion, see G o e d e g e b u u r e , 1992). T h e Minister
envisaged that as a result of the implementation of the S T C operation,
a limited n u m b e r of multidisciplinary, medium sized institutions with
considerable autonomy would arise. T h e outcomes of the merger processes,
however, surpassed all expectations. By July 1987 the original 350+
institutions had merged into 85, of which some 45 were mostly large
to very large, multi-purpose institutions. T h u s , in terms of structure, the
Dutch higher education institutional landscape had changed dramatically.
In terms of function, increased autonomy was to be attained through the
implementation of the new governmental steering philosophy as well as
through the framework provided by the new H B O Act (1986). T h e latter
finally took H B O out of the realm of secondary education and placed it
formally in higher education, thereby formalizing the already existing binary
structure.
The higher education system: some basic
characteristics
Within the framework of the binary system, universities in The Netherlands

engage in initial academic training, u n d e r t a k e scientific research, provide
post-graduate training for researchers and technological designers, and
transfer knowledge on behalf of society at large. H B O institutions engage
in initial professional education, u n d e r t a k e research to the extent that this
is related to teaching in the institution, and also are active in the transfer of
knowledge; next to this, they contribute to the development of the profession
to which the teaching p r o g r a m m e s are geared. Of the 13 universities, eight
offer p r o g r a m m e s in a wide range of disciplines while one has a m o r e limited
scope, three provide mainly technical and engineering p r o g r a m m e s , and one
specializes in agriculture. T o g e t h e r the universities offer some 175 different
p r o g r a m m e s , including part-time p r o g r a m m e s . Besides these 13 traditional
universities, there are a limited n u m b e r of "designated institutions": a
university for business administration, four institutes for theological training,
192
and a humanistic university. These are formally part of the higher education
system, but are usually not included in the educational statistics and only
to a limited extent are they influenced directly by overall higher education
policy; therefore, they will not be included in the descriptions and analyses
of the Dutch system in this chapter. T h e H B O institutions offer around 3 0 0
p r o g r a m m e s , including a substantial n u m b e r of part-time p r o g r a m m e s .
In terms of legal status, the often used public-private distinction raises
some problems with the D u t c h situation. T h e above mentioned higher
education institutions are all funded by government and can thus be
considered "public" on the c o m m o n interpretation of this concept. However,
a n u m b e r of institutions, both universities and H B O institutions, were founded
under private law, mainly on the basis of religious orientation. This can
be considered one of the idiosyncrasies of Dutch higher education. A s it
has hardly any consequences for the functioning of the institutions, this
p h e n o m e n o n will be discarded in the subsequent discussion.
T h e Dutch universities' initial degree roughly equates with the master
degree. T h e degree is obtained after four years of study. This can be followed
by a doctoral degree, also awarded by universities, taking approximately
another four years. T h e H B O institutions award the bachelor degree as their
first and final qualification after a maximum of four years of study; they
do not award a doctorate, but graduates can qualify for a doctoral degree
at a university at the discretion of the university. A n alternative route to
the master degree has been developed recently by H B O institutions who
offer, as part of their post-initial training programmes in association with
U K institutions, one- to two-year programmes that lead to a U K master
degree.
Next to the institutions discussed above, T h e Netherlands has a large
n u m b e r of private teaching institutes that offer recognized diplomas in
various professional fields like accountancy, administration, etc. Quite often
these are structured as "external studies" in the sense of correspondence
courses with limited face-to-face interaction.
A t the level of post-initial higher education, a variety of programmes have
been developed by both universities and H B O institutions. They do not lead
to recognized degrees and in general have a strong market orientation.
Admission
and
selection
Admission to higher education can be obtained in a variety of ways. For

university education, the typical route is direct enrolment after graduating
from pre-university education (vwo). For H B O education, the enrolments
intended by law from senior general secondary education ( H A V O ) are being
replaced m o r e and m o r e by enrolments from senior secondary vocational
education ( M B O ) , but still constitute approximately 3 0 % . M B O graduates
take up 2 5 % of enrolments, with vwo graduates following with some 1 6 % .
193
With respect to university e n r o l m e n t s , it can be noted that the n u m b e r

of H B O graduates enroling through special short p r o g r a m m e s is increasing
substantially, as will b e elaborated on in the last section of this chapter.
For those people who d o not have the required diplomas to enrol in higher
education, it is possible to take a separate entrance examination.
In T h e Netherlands no selection mechanism exists other than the above
mentioned formal entry requirements. T h u s , in principle a student can
enrol in an institution of his own preference if he has the legally required
secondary education degree. T h e only limitation to this freedom is the
system of n u m e r u s clausus, based on either labor m a r k e t considerations
or the teaching capacity of an institution. In case of a n u m e r u s clausus,
students are selected through a lottery, weighted in favor of those with
the highest secondary education examination results. Yearly the n u m e r u s
clausus is applied to some ten p r o g r a m m e s like, e.g., medicine, dentistry,
and veterinary sciences.
TABLE 1
N u m b e r of students in universities and H B O institutions
Universities
Students (per academic year/per calendar year)

Students (ft)
New
leaving without
ime
Part-time
entrants
diploma
Full-time
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
135,300
150,168
147,929
146,900
151,609
154,880
153,858
4035
10,102
12,917
14,057
14,513
13,221
12,442
22,848
26,657
32,836
34,427
34,512
35,653
33,695
11,952
8834
9087
6700
7421
131,771
146,087
168,231
179,435
193,733
204,368
78,438
61,012
54,208
53,305
52,956
49,656
55,768
58,232
64,569
63,488
65,130
67,399
13,740
14,298
15,101
16,583
19,260
HBO
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
1991
SOURCE:
CBS: Statistical Bulletins, Statistics of University Education, Statistics of

H B O Education, Education Matrix, 1985-1990; Dutch Ministry of Education
and Science, 1993.
194
Students, staff and drop out/completion
rates
In Table 1 an overview is presented of the n u m b e r s of students that are

enroled in the Dutch higher education system. T h e funding mechanism for
universities specifies a normative student-staff ratio, depending on the
discipline. For liberal arts the ratio is 34.5:1, for social sciences 3 0 : 1 ,
and for other disciplines 20:1. T h e student-staff ratios for H B O institutions
vary from 19.5:1 (for social work, etc.) through 16.6:1 (technical and
administrative/commercial programmes) and 9.6:1 (arts) to 5.5:1 ( d r a m a ) .
STAFF, UNIVERSITY SECTOR
A s is illustrated in Table 2, the earlier mentioned re-organization of the

personnel structure has had a major effect on the n u m b e r of traditional,
mostly tenured, academic staff positions, i.e., full professors, associate
professors, and assistant professors. C o m p a r e d to the situation in 1983 the
n u m b e r of associate professors, for example, has d r o p p e d by more than
6 0 % in the period 1983-1989. Overall, a decrease in staff positions of some
3 0 % took place. T h e category "other academic staff" m o r e than doubled
since 1983. Over 9 0 % of the positions in this category are temporary, as
are all positions in the new category of "research trainees."
TABLE 2
University academic staff (in fte's)
1988
1989
1990
1991
20,970
2446
2280
6175
7496
2674
21,294
2391
2351
5973
7381
3814
20,867
2387
2350
6030
5862
4683
20,616
2385
2391
6059
5864
5120
20,946
39,432
42,365
42,777
41,929
42,764
1983
Hgl
Whm/Uhd
Wm/Ud
Ov.wp
AIO/Ontw.
Nwp
Total
SOURCE:
NOTE:
2761
6073
6494
3134
D M E S , 1990, p. 269; W O P I , 1991, 1992.

Hgl = Full Professor; W h m / U h d = Associate Professor (or Senior Lecturer);
W m / U d = Assistant Professor (or Lecturer); O v . w p = other academic staff;
AIO/ontw. = Research Trainees; N w p = non-academic staff.

HBO
195
SECTOR
In the H B O sector the n u m b e r of full-time teaching staff increased by

almost 2 5 % between 1985 and 1989. A s can be seen in Table 3, since 1989
the size of the teaching staff has remained m o r e or less stable, while the
n u m b e r of support staff has increased.
TABLE 3
HBO-staff (in fte's)
Total
Teaching staff
(fte's)
Female
Teaching staff (fte's)
Total teaching
and support staff
(fte's)
SOURCE:
1989
1990
1991
13,309
12,420
12,540
3229
3059
3144
19,853
19,323
20,003
C B S , 1991.
D r o p out and completion rates play a prominent role in the present

discussion on the efficiency of the D u t c h higher education system. H o w e v e r ,
elaborate information on this is not very readily available. In a recent study,
Bijleveld (1993) shows a rather consistent pattern for the generations of
university students enroling over the period 1982-1986. O n average, 6%
complete their study in the nominal four-year period, which rises to 2 0 %
after five years, 4 3 % after six years, and 5 3 % after seven years. Of the
1984 cohort, 1 1 % was still enroled after seven years. T h e r e are substantial
differences in completion rates if they are b r o k e n down by discipline. In the
medical disciplines, approximately 8 0 % of the students graduate. For law,
agriculture, and technical sciences the competion rate varies between 60 and
7 0 % . All other disciplines have lower rates, in particular the relatively young
disciplines like political science and psychology (respectively 39 and 4 5 % )
(Bijleveld, 1993).
A slightly different picture emerges for the H B O sector. O n the basis of
1992 student data, it appears that on average 5 8 % of the full-time students
graduate ( 5 7 % part-time). In full-time studies, smaller differences exist
between the disciplines than is the case for the university sector. T h e lowest
196
completion rate can be found in the language and culture disciplines ( 5 1 % ) ,

while the technical disciplines show the highest rates with 6 8 % . In part-time
studies, however, the differences are far m o r e substantial: the technical
disciplines show a completion rate of 3 3 % , while for the health disciplines
the completion rate is the highest with 7 9 % ( D M E S , 1993).

Higher education
legislation
Recently, a new framework law for the whole of higher education has
been passed by parliament, which will be operational as of August, 1993.
This Higher Education and Research Act, abbreviated as W H W (1992) is the
codification of a comprehensive government policy initiated in 1985 through
a policy document entitled Hoger Onderwijs: Autonomie en Kwaliteit ( H O A K )
(in English Higher Education: A u t o n o m y and Quality). This policy and
the ensuing legislation has had far-reaching consequences for the authority
distribution in Dutch higher education. For a good understanding of these
changes, a brief introduction is necessary.
In 1985 many in and around the higher education system were of
the opinion that the administrative and legislative framework for higher
education could no longer be considered as optimal for meeting the
future d e m a n d s to be placed on the system ( D M E S , 1985: 9). Basically,
governmental control was considered to be too detailed, policy and steering
instruments appeared ineffective, institutional responsibility was neglected
and undervalued, and quality control was underdeveloped. Based on the
assumption that a positive causal link exists between institutional autonomy
and the quality of higher education, a new policy framework was developed
in the H O A K document. This showed a new image of administrative thought
and action. Institutions were expected to o p e r a t e m o r e in accordance with
market developments. Attention was focused on profiles, improvements in
performance, a decrease in d r o p out rates, a diversified student supply,
and better adjustment of course supply to labor m a r k e t d e m a n d s . In order
to facilitate these shifts in institutional behavior, governmental steering no
longer would be detailed and directed at the discipline level, but become
m o r e global and directed at macro issues an approach that became known
as "steering from a distance." In line with this, a new biennial planning
system was developed. In this system in year o n e a draft version of the
governmental plan (the Higher Eduaction and Research Plan, abbreviated
H O O P ) is published, and in year two institutions react to this in their
development plans. T h e H O O P document offers an image of the future
of the higher education system from the governmental perspective; the
development plans provide the complementary institutional perspective. In
the new planning system a great deal of prominence is given to planning by
197
m e a n s of dialogue based on expressions of intent. T h e final building block

of the new approach has been the introduction of a formal system of quality
control that is now in operation in both the university and the H B O sector.
W e will return to these different elements of the new policy approach later
in this chapter.
In the W H W , the regulatory capacities of the government have been
reduced substantially. Not only is this examplified by the actual n u m b e r
of regulations incorporated in the law, which have been brought down from
some 2000 to 300 plus, it is best illustrated by the nature of governmental
influence on the operation of the higher education system. For it is not
so much the a m o u n t of regulation that matters but the extent to which
specific stipulations effect the day-to-day practices in the institutions. T h e
r e m o t e government position, or the "selective steering g o v e r n m e n t " as is
the current phrase to d e n o t e the implementation of the H O A K philosophy,
is most apparent in areas like quality control, educational p r o g r a m m e s , and
entrance/selection. Quality control basically is left to the institutions, but
through the Inspectorate the government monitors the way in which the
system operates (the evaluation of the evaluations); institutions are free to
start new p r o g r a m m e s , but ultimately the government is responsible for an
efficient p r o g r a m m e supply on the macro level; and although institutions
have b e e n given m o r e freedom to "select" students during the p r o g r a m ,
e.g., through a compulsory "advice" to the student to leave if he/she
appears unfit to follow a particular p r o g r a m m e , evidenced by insufficient
grades or skipping of crucial courses, selection is not possible right from the
start. T h e W H W states that everyone with the formally required secondary
education degree has the legal right to enrol, i.e., institutions have to accept
all students with appropriate secondary training, unless labor m a r k e t or
capacity conditions are such that limitations are necessary.
Overall, the legislative framework within which the higher education
institutions o p e r a t e is such that functional freedom to a large extent exists
at the institutional level, with the government keeping ultimate control over
most o f the boundary conditions. This will be further discussed for some
particular areas.
Control of teaching
programmes
T h e question of who is in control of p r o g r a m m e s has to be considered in

the context of the present debate on the strengthening of the institutional
autonomy of institutions and the process of de-regulation.
Under current legislation, institutions wishing to establish new programmes
need approval from the Minister. In principle, this is a quite lengthy and
bureaucratic p r o c e d u r e . Several external committees have to give their
advice, programmes are first started on an experimental basis, and it can
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take up to ten years before a p r o g r a m m e is finally approved by the Minister

and receives official status.
U n d e r the new legislation, a fundamentally different situation arises. T h e
overall planning of p r o g r a m m e provision has been shifted far m o r e to the
institutional side. Institutions can start any p r o g r a m m e they want, as long as
this does not lead to an inefficient supply of p r o g r a m m e s from a macro point
of view. T o guarantee this macro level efficiency, a p e r m a n e n t p r o g r a m m e
supply committee will be established. In the new p r o c e d u r e , an institution
has to register its intention to start a new p r o g r a m m e with the Minister.
This registration has to be accompanied by an advice from the p e r m a n e n t
committee which evaluates the institution's intent on the basis of (1) the
overall national supply of programs, (2) the regional provision, and (3) the
specific institutional profile. It is expected that this system will operate in
the following way: if an institution wants to start a new p r o g r a m m e which is
already offered by a n u m b e r of institutions and for which the labor market
prospects for graduates are not very good, the committee's advice will be
negative. T h e same can be expected if the particular p r o g r a m m e is already
being offered by another institution in the region, or if the p r o g r a m m e is
way out of line with the institution's profile (e.g., a general university wants
to start a p r o g r a m m e in mechanical engineering). In these situations, an
inefficient p r o g r a m m e supply situation will arise. It is also expected that
the Minister will follow the advice of the p e r m a n e n t committee; if he does
not, he has to report to Parliament. W h e n the advice is positive and the
Minister follows the advice, the p r o g r a m m e will be included in the newly
created "central register of higher education p r o g r a m s , " a listing of all
publicly funded programmes offered by the D u t c h institutions leading to
recognized degrees, for which the students receive student support. If a
p r o g r a m m e is not included in the register, an institution can still offer it,
but this implies no recognized degree, no public funding, and no rights for
students in terms of financial support.
T h e new situation differs with existing practices in the following ways. A t
present, an institution has to convince the Minister of the need and viability
of a new program. From August 1993 onward, the burden of proof is the
other way around: the Minister has to prove that a new p r o g r a m m e would
h a r m an efficient supply of p r o g r a m m e s ; if he cannot, or does not succeed,
the new p r o g r a m m e can legally be offered by the institution. Also, an ex
ante evaluation with respect to p r o g r a m m e content is no longer part of the
p r o c e d u r e ; the quality of the new p r o g r a m m e will be judged ex post as part
of the established quality control system. A n d finally, if a p r o g r a m m e had
the experimental status in the old p r o c e d u r e , this implied that no other
institution could offer this p r o g r a m m e until it was officially recognized,
which, as mentioned above, could take up to ten years. A s the recognition
procedure has been changed to a registration p r o c e d u r e , this rather archaic
situation belongs to the past. T h e basic expectation is that through the
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lighter and speedier p r o c e d u r e , the institutions are able to respond in a

m o r e appropriate way to the needs and d e m a n d s of society. T h e new role
for the Minister at least appears to typify the notion of steering at a distance;
for a m o r e thorough assessment, we have to await the evolving practices of
the new system.
Control of research
programmes
Decision-making on research projects is d e p e n d e n t on the nature of

project funding. F o u r types of research funding can be distinguished (the
actors involved as well as the decision-making process varies accordingly):
the funding of research activities that are considered to be closely
related to teaching;
the system of "conditional funding" of university research;
the system of research councils;
research through contracts between higher education institutions and
external clients.
R E S E A R C H ACTIVITIES CLOSELY RELATED T O TEACHING
With respect to teaching related research activities, a new funding

mechanism for universities was introduced in 1982 as part of the overall
funding mechanism. These funds are determined by enrolment. The institutions
and the faculty control their use.
"CONDITIONAL FUNDING" OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH
T h e new funding mechanism also introduced a system of "conditional

funding." This m e a n t a shift of the funding of university research from
enrolment driven formulae to a funding scheme m o r e based on assessments
of quality and social relevance. R a t h e r than receive a block grant from the
government for their research, universities are obliged to " e a r n " a part of
their budget. In this way the government aims to p r o m o t e both quality
and systematic discussion of research priorities and the use of resources.
Research proposals are subjected to external evaluation procedures and, if
approval is granted, the funding of a p r o g r a m m e is guaranteed for a five-year
period before a new assessment is m a d e . In this way, the new funding
system provides an instrument to re-allocate budgets a m o n g universities.
T h e relative success of universities in getting p r o g r a m m e s accepted for
conditional funding, after a certain a m o u n t of time may have implications
for their total funding. With respect to decisions on research projects,
the assessments of external committees (mainly consisting of disciplinary
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representatives) play a dominant role. These are ex post rather than ex

ante assessments, implying that only after many years will a re-allocation of
research budgets becomes possible. Currently the system is u n d e r revision
and it is not clear yet in what direction it will be changed. It d e p e n d s , among
other things, on the form the postgraduate research schools will assume.
RESEARCH
COUNCILS
T h e research councils are part of T h e N e t h e r l a n d s ' Organization for

Scientific Research ( N W O ) . This organization subsidizes research proposals
submitted by individual researchers or research groups in a competitive way.
Competition is limited by the structure and operation of the research council.
Divided into disciplinary-based communities, scientists (peers) in a given
field look for an acceptable division of labor, and m a k e recommendations
for funding. T h e research councils have the final word in deciding what
research projects will be d o n e by w h o m .
CONTRACT
RESEARCH
Clients for contract research are mostly business firms but, increasingly,
are also public organizations and ministries. Obviously, the contract partner
who has commissioned the research has a good deal of influence on the
nature of a particular project.
Institutional
management
and
control
With respect to issues of institutional m a n a g e m e n t it should be noted

that differences exist between universities and H B O institutions. T h e internal
structure of the universities to a large extent is specified in the W H W Act;
however, this Act includes but a few specific regulations for the internal
m a n a g e m e n t structure of the H B O institutions. T o a large extent this
difference is the result of the recent "upgrading" of the H B O institutions
discussed before. Because of the mergers, the situation regarding institutional
management and control issues is still volatile. Institutions are trying to find a
structure that is best suited to the particular circumstances that have evolved
out of merger; this implies that no uniform m a n a g e m e n t and control model
exists. For example, differences are apparent with respect to the powers of
executive boards in institutions, the role and influence of faculty bodies, and
in the relationship between boards of "trustees" and the executive boards.
A t present, the institutional m a n a g e m e n t structure for both universities and
H B O institutions is a topic of discussion, as will be elaborated in the next
section. Nevertheless, despite the exisiting variety in the H B O sector, several
generalizations can be m a d e .
201
First, since both universities and H B O institutions are largely funded by

the national government, institutional personnel are civil servants, and
since the government is constitutionally responsible for education, there
is a fair a m o u n t of governmental influence on institutional m a n a g e m e n t .
This is most apparent in the area of personnel policy, where relatively little
r o o m for m a n e u v e r exists for the institutions, tied as they are by (1) the
civil servant status of staff, and (2) specifications on staffing as laid down
in national regulations and funding formulae.
Second, as indicated a b o v e , the university m a n a g e m e n t structure is
specified in detail. T h e current organization evolved from the traditional
continental university model. In t h e traditional university, a sharp distinction
existed between professionals and administrators. Administrative power was
concentrated in an Executive B o a r d of G o v e r n o r s ; the B o a r d determined
policies regarding material a n d personnel provisions, and in performing its
task it was aided by a small supportive staff. T h e academic structure had
a n u m b e r of largely a u t o n o m o u s professors, who had their own staff for
teaching and research; t h e professors cooperated only when necessary on
a voluntary basis. Since 1970, the organization of universities has evolved
to a collgial, democratic organization. T h e essential differences between
the traditional and collgial organization a r e :
within t h e academic structure, formal power shifts from individual
professors to d e p a r t m e n t s and faculties. In their governing committees, the
policy decisions regarding teaching and research are m a d e ;
the sharp division between administration and the professoriate is
replaced by a system of negotiation between the Executive Board and
the faculties with respect to articulation between administrative policies
and policies regarding teaching and research (Frissen, 1986: 65).
T h e present structure, as formalized in the W H W , is depicted in Table 4.
F r o m this table, it can be seen that a division exists between governance
and administration that is reflected in the specification of bodies and
authorities. This division results in a dual role for the Executive B o a r d :
on the o n e hand preparing and implementing decisions of the University
Council, a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d acting as an i n d e p e n d e n t executive
responsible to and appointed by the Minister of Education and Science.
This dual role is r e p e a t e d at the faculty level in t h e faculty b o a r d . Decisions
regarding the content of teaching and research are the prerogative of the
academic d e p a r t m e n t s . A t the same time, resource allocation for these
faculties takes place at the central institutional level through negotiations
between the Executive B o a r d and the faculty boards. In its role as
institutional executive, the central b o a r d , of course, has its own policy
objectives that might or might not coincide with d e p a r t m e n t a l or faculty
priorities regarding teaching and research. T h e allocative powers of the
Executive B o a r d provide it with an important instrument to exert influence,
albeit in an indirect way, on faculty policies. This, in turn, can result
202
in situations where tensions exist between m a n a g e m e n t and academic

a u t o n o m y , especially in the present atmosphere of emphasizing efficiency,
effectiveness, and managerial capacities. W e will return to this issue in the
last two sections. But before focusing m o r e closely on the developments
and effects of (national) higher education policies, some attention must be
paid to the way in which the higher education institutions are funded in T h e
Netherlands.
TABLE 4
G o v e r n a n c e organization of D u t c h universities
Executive
body
Academic
membership
of executive
body
Controlling
& decision
making
body
Advisory
body
Central level
Executive
Rector
University
Board of
Faculty level
Board
Faculty
Board
Council
Magnificus
D e a n , majority Faculty
Council
of academics
Professors,
D e p a r t m e n t a l Executive
level
D e p a r t m e n t a l mainly
academic
Council
members
Institutional
Deans
Several
Committees
regarding
teaching
& research
Departmental
Council
members
funding
UNIVERSITIES
Recurrent expenditure.
T h e formula t h a t d e t e r m i n e s t h e funding of
recurrent expenditure consists of two parts: o n e part determining the
budgets for personnel expenditure ( P G M ) , and the other part determining
the material expenditure ( O L M ) . T h e first part of the formula covers virtually
all teaching activities and a considerable part of basic research activities;
this part is determined partly by weighted enrolment (weights vary by
discipline; 6 categories), fixed a m o u n t s , and the system of conditional
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funding. Budgets for current material expenditure are determined partly

by actual expenditure, and partly by n u m b e r of staff and floor surface.
Although the determination of the budgets for recurrent expenditure is
compartmentalized, the funds are provided for most parts as a lump sum.
Universities are free to spend these funds the way they want (under only
very general conditions).
T h e government determines the total budget for recurrent expenditure
on universities. H o w e v e r , this budget is lower than the budget that results
from the implementation of the t w o models described above. Therefore,
the government applies a general reduction rate to the results of the models
(1989: 2 . 7 % ; 1990: 4 % ; 1991: 6 . 6 % ; 1992: 6 . 3 % ) , leaving the t w o models
to b e only re-allocation mechanisms within the university sector.
Capital expenditure. Based on the investment plans o f the institutions, the

government draws an investment plan in which all p r o g r a m m e s that will be
funded are listed. These budgets are strictly e a r m a r k e d .
HBO
INSTITUTIONS
Recurrent expenditure. T h e budgets for personnel expenditure are determined by the weighted enrolment and the average salaries. E n r o l m e n t is
weighted by the m o d e of study (full-time or part-time), the n u m b e r of
drop outs and graduates, a standardized duration of study of d r o p outs
and graduates, and seven educational profiles (discipline-based).
T h e budget for material expenditure is determined partly by the weighted
enrolment, and partly by the actual expenditure on rent and maintenance
of the buildings.
T h e funding mechanism does not provide for research activities, since
conducting research is not seen as a task of H B O institutions.
Because of the absence of fixed a m o u n t s in core funding, it stimulates
small institutions to grow (e.g., through merging operations).
T h e funding mechanism for recurrent expenditure is o p e n - e n d e d . T h e
budgets that result from using the models described above are not limited by
any "overall budget decisions" of the government. H o w e v e r , in D e c e m b e r
1990, the government and the institutions agreed, as part of covenants or
"higher education gentlemen's a g r e e m e n t , " on fixed budgets for the next
four years. By fixing the budgets the government tries to control the massive
increase in budgets caused by the increase in enrolment. O n the other h a n d ,
the institutions have the guarantee that n o major cutbacks will be m a d e
during that period. If, however, the "normative b u d g e t " (the budget when
applying the funding formula) exceeds the fixed budget by m o r e than 1 0 % ,
the total ("fixed") budget may be increased.
204
Capital expenditure. Until recently the same situation as in the university

sector o c c u r r e d . H o w e v e r , recently, o w n e r s h i p of buildings of H B O
institutions was being t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e n a t i o n a l government to the
institutions. This m e a n s that institutions are going to get m o r e latitude in
planning their housing capacities.
SUPPLEMENTARY
FUNDING
Teaching. A major potential source of income related to teaching activities

is fee income. In both universities and H B O institutions, fixed fees exist.
H o w e v e r , institutions do not own these fees; they are deducted from the core
funding. U n d e r the new funding arrangements, the ownership of fees (that
will not be fixed any m o r e ) will go to the institutions collecting the fees.
Both types of institutions provide courses outside the regular curricula on
a contract base.
Research. Core funding of universities comprises two ways of funding

research activities. Next to these t h e r e are two additional ways for
universities to get their research activities funded; first, by entering the
competition for fundamental research funds of N W O (see above); and second,
to sign research contracts with industry or national/local authorities. T h e
latter has b e c o m e a vital source of income for universities: 2 4 % of academic
research staff is paid by such contracts.
T h e H B O institutions do not have a significant infrastructure for contract
research. Some institutions have started research activities, but these
activities are not yet very significant.
Other. Next to the core funding, government provides strictly e a r m a r k e d

funds. T h e main reason for the government to use these funds is to have an
instrument for direct financial steering (the main part of the core funding
is not e a r m a r k e d , which leaves the government only a few instruments
for indirect steering through finance). Most of these funds are allocated
to projects that intend to stimulate and innovate teaching and research in
specific fields of study. Part of these funds is reserved for unemployment
subsidies and social plans for unemployed employees of institutions for
higher education. Recently the government has striven to reduce the n u m b e r
of these specific funds in order to increase the transparency of the funding
arrangements.
Private donations are not very c o m m o n in T h e Netherlands, which
is partially due to the absence of tax incentives. Universities and H B O
institutions are allowed to reserve funds from core funding for alternative
205
appropriations; these reserves may generate an additional source of income

(interest). T h e supplementary budgets, as far as they originate from the
government, are e a r m a r k e d and are determined in bilateral negotiations
between government and institutions. In Table 5, the composition of the
institutional budgets is summarized.
TABLE 5
Budgets of higher education institutions (1988, in Dfl millions)
University sector
Core funding
Current
Capital
Subtotal
3522
399
3921
1932
115
2047
Specific funds
Research contracts
O t h e r sources
Subtotal
145
915
43
1103
182
3
21
206
Total
SOURCE:
5024
2253
CBS (F-65/1990), 1992, p. 2 2 - 2 3 ; Financiele schema's 1990-1994.
Recent changes in the funding
mechanisms
T h e funding mechanisms described earlier have recently been replaced

by one funding mechanism for all higher education institutions. This new
mechanism was part of the draft versions of the law on higher education and
research, which was d e b a t e d in Parliament in the Spring of 1992. H o w e v e r ,
the discussions on the funding mechanism proved to be m o r e difficult
than expected; the proposals for the new mechanism have therefore been
discussed separately from the main law. T h e new funding mechanism makes
a clear distinction between teaching and research (in calculating the amount
of funds). T h e teaching part was supposed to be based on a course credit
system, but it proved impossible to get the information needed in a relatively
short time period. Therefore, a transitional model has been presented. T h e
basic considerations underlying the new funding mechanism are:
creating a m o r e simple and transparent mechanism for funding;
globalizing the prices for different types of disciplines. For determining
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the n u m b e r of staff (and through that the main part of the b u d g e t ) , the
existing funding mechanisms use different "weights" for different types of
courses or disciplines, whereas in the new mechanism only two weights or
prices are used;
transferring capital expenditure to operating budgets. Institutions will
have to " b u y " the buildings they are using and will have to finance them
themselves. T h e fonds perdu financing of investments in housing will be
abolished;
transferring tuition fees from the government to the institutions (the
current situation is that tuition fees are deducted from the governmental
grant);
equal prices for both types of higher education institutions. T h e
determination of the budget will be based on a few performance indicators.
For each "performance unit" the institution will receive an a m o u n t of money
(depending on the type of discipline), and this "price" will be the same in
universities and non-university institutions.
Except for the reduction of weights for the different types of profiles,
the calculation of the budgets for the non-university sector looks very much
like the existing system. T h e changes for universities are m o r e drastic.
In d e t e r m i n i n g t h e b u d g e t s , t e a c h i n g and r e s e a r c h are two s e p a r a t e
c o m p a r t m e n t s in the funding m e c h a n i s m . T h e teaching c o m p a r t m e n t
consists of two parts: the main part which is based on the n u m b e r of
students (only those who are enroled less than five years) and final degrees,
and a "compensating c o m p o n e n t " (which is a typical transitional element
in this transitional funding mechanism). T h e funding of research activities
is determined by a four-part c o m p a r t m e n t . T h e main part (80% of the
total research budget) is determined incrementally by the existing research
budgets. T h e second part provides for an a u t o n o m o u s , basic body of research
and is determined by the n u m b e r of students and final degrees (first part of
the teaching c o m p a r t m e n t ) ; this determines 1 5 % of the research budget.
T h e third and fourth parts are bonuses for doctoral theses and recognized
research schools. T h e total budget for each type of higher education will
not change with the introduction of this new funding mechanism.

T h e r e is a clear p a t t e r n to be distinguished in t h e g e n e r a l policy
developments on higher education in T h e Netherlands since the late 1970s.
O n the one hand there have been the m o r e or less ad hoc restructuring and
retrenchment operations that characterized the period until 1985, such as
the introduction of the two-tier system in university education, the personnel
restructuring, selective budget cuts, and the like. O n the other hand there
has been the development of the m o r e comprehensive steering and control
207
policy from 1985 onwards, initiated by the H O A K policy p a p e r and to an

extent finalized by the W H W Act in 1992.
I m p o r t a n t as the implementation of the new steering philosophy has been
for the evolution of the D u t c h higher education system, it does not imply
that higher education policy over the last years has been directed solely
at this, nor that with the passing of the W H W Act the development has
e n d e d once and for all. A n u m b e r of key policy issues can be identified
that have been on the policy agenda over the last years and still warrant
attention from b o t h the government and the higher education institutions.
These issues are: (1) the effectiveness of higher education, (2) the social
d e m a n d for graduates, (3) quality assessment and quality control, and (4)
differentiation and selectivity.
The effectiveness
of higher
education
T h e central t h e m e as formulated in H O O P ( D M E S , 1992) is to increase

the effectiveness of higher education. It is believed that this can be
reached by improving the conditions u n d e r which students are supposed to
complete their studies, such as improvements in the structure of courses and
examinations, and in the operation of the orientation and selection functions
of the first year programs. O t h e r elements are the improvement of student
supervision, and m o r e use of didactical approaches in which students are
m o r e actively involved, such as problem-based learning (see also: C o m m i t t e e
Wij-nen, 1992). In this context discussions will be intensified about the
creation of m o r e freedom for the institutions regarding the organization of
the learning process. Part of the discussion also is about the desirability of
introducing financial and other incentives for both students and institutions
to shorten the enrolment period of students. For students this means that
the current scholarships, based on a mix of grants and additional loans
that are provided for the nominal length of studies plus o n e year, will be
changed. If a student does not pass the first, propaedeutic year, the mixed
scholarship will be changed to a loan until the first year is completed. This
measure is m e a n t to diminish the difference between the nominal and the
actual duration of studies. Institutions on the other hand are rewarded if
they m a k e curricula m o r e conducive to shortening the study period of their
students.
The social demand for
graduates
Recently the economic functions of higher education have come m o r e

u n d e r t h e a t t e n t i o n of p o l i c y - m a k e r s . A highly skilled workforce is
considered to be an important factor in economic growth, and, with the
recent downturn in economic activity, the importance of higher education
208
has been restated. T h e H O O P (1992) acknowledges the importance of the

report on skills shortages in E u r o p e by the Advisory C o m m i t t e e of the
Commission of the E u r o p e a n Communities ( I R D A C , 1991) and supports the
major recommendations, namely the increase of graduates in science and
technology, more investment in recurrent education, and improvement of
the productivity of educational systems. This is a policy position that can
also be found in the ministerial budget statements of 1992 and 1993.
Current statistical data on future employment need show that mismatches
might increase between on the one hand the distribution of students over
the various disciplines, and on the other hand the d e m a n d s for graduates
on the labor market. E n r o l m e n t in humanities and social sciences continues
to grow, whereas in these sectors the unemployment rate is relatively high.
Therefore, the stimulation of higher participation in subjects where shortages
are expected (science and technology), and a decrease of enrolment in
subjects with poor employment prospects, is an important policy issue.
G o v e r n m e n t attempts to influence choice patterns of students by providing
m o r e adequate information on employment prospects for new students.
Moreover, the government legally has the power to limit enrolment in
courses where discrepancies between the n u m b e r of graduates and d e m a n d
on the labor m a r k e t are continuously large. So far there have been quotas
in only a few subjects, among them some medical and teacher-training
courses. Application of quotas to other subjects that show relatively high
unemployment rates is considered. Application of this instrument of the
"labor market-fixus," however, is surrounded with careful procedures
because of the uncertainty of future employment needs. F u r t h e r m o r e ,
government aims to improve the participation of those groups that still
are under-represented in (specific disciplines in) higher education such
as females, ethnic groups, and non-traditional age groups. For the last
group the system of continuing education should be extended. However,
no quantitative goals are explicitly stated.
Quality assessment and quality
control
T h e system of quality control has been expanded in the last few years,
and two components of it in particular have become visible, namely
self-evaluation by faculties/departments and external evaluation by peers
through site visits. Both components have been developed by the institutions
themselves. In the university sector m o r e than half of all faculties have been
visited, while in the H B O sector the visitation procedure commenced in 1991
(for an overview of the system, see G o e d e g e b u u r e et al., 1990).
Policy issues concern:
the responsibilities of the actors involved;
the utilization of the results of the visiting committees;
209
the quality of the external evaluation;

the follow-up activities.
A s has b e e n agreed, the institutions themselves are responsible for the
functioning of a system of quality control. T h e system not only contributes
to an improvement in the quality of education, but also allows institutions
to publicly account for their activities. It has been agreed that if the results
of a visitation report are such that further action is required, institutional
m a n a g e m e n t has to state what consequences it will draw from the results.
This has to be reported to the Minister. If the Minister judges that
institutional efforts are below standard, he has the legal capacity to take
measures, for example by reducing funding or refusing further registration
of courses.
A s far as the quality of the external evaluation and follow-up activities is
concerned, government intends to improve the whole quality control system.
Generally, the government takes a rather distant position. T h e Inspectorate
has a task in making policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s with regard to the functioning
of the system. Research about the effects of the system of quality control is
currently being carried out to assess whether the system actually contributes
to a real improvement of education. T h e indications from the side of the
universities are that their experiences with the operation of the first cycle
of quality assessment are positive ( V S N U , 1993).
DIFFERENTIATION
AND
SELECTIVITY
In recent policy documents the differentiation of higher education has

been indicated as one of the central issues. Large-scale operations like the
earlier mentioned S T C in the H B O sector, for example, aim at developing
institutions from mono-sectoral to multi-sectoral institutions that offer a
b r o a d range of courses. Higher education should be organized in such
a way that it can a c c o m m o d a t e a very heterogenous group of students.
G r e a t e r differentiation will result in a better fit between education and the
interests and talents of potential students. According to the H O O P (1992),
this differentiation will not be attained through a continuous structural or
institutional differentiation, but rather through an approach in which the
individual student is central. T h a t is, the most optimal curriculum has to
b e designed o n the basis of wishes of the student, w h o should b e supervised
through the system in an efficient way. T h e student is supposed to play an
active role in this process. In relation to this, attention is paid to selection
processes in higher education. A t the m o m e n t selection at entrance is
not a policy issue. In the first, propaedeutic year, however, students
will have to show by their study results that the curriculum chosen fits
their motivation, capabilities, and interests. It is believed that such a
"selection," in the form of personal advice to refer students to specific
210
courses, may contribute to the prevention of wastage in the system.

Besides selection within specific institutions, it is proposed to improve
selection across institutions. T h e current practice of graduates from H B O
to continue a p r o g r a m m e in universities is considered to be inefficient. If
there are reasons for students to transfer from one to the other sector,
they should be encouraged to do so at an early stage. Institutions are
supposed to concentrate on this selection process in the propaedeutic
year of their students. A t the same time, it has been noted by both
employer organizations and various visiting committees that, especially in
the H B O sector, an e n o r m o u s variety in p r o g r a m m e titles and disciplinary
sub-divisions exist that cloud the transparency of the education m a r k e t ,
so that differences and similarities between p r o g r a m m e s and graduates
become unclear. This has resulted in repeated pleas and advices for a
stricter organization of disciplines. Part of the discussion on differentiation
is the distinction between the university and the H B O sector. W e will return
to this in the last section.
T h e policy issues described show that an incentive structure directing
institutions in certain directions is not absent. New steering instruments are
in the process of development, based on the notion of dialogue between the
Minister and the higher education institutions that forms the central concept
of the H O O P planning cycle.
Effects of Structure, Authority, and Higher Education Policy on Institutional

Governance and Management
According to Teichler (1989), T h e Netherlands offers the most interesting
case in Western E u r o p e for studying recent changes in the relationship
between the government and higher education institutions. T h e r e is no other
Western E u r o p e a n country in which government authorities claim a change
of the state regulatory system to the extent that the D u t c h government does.
T h r o u g h this strategy government claims to facilitate the adaptive power and
flexibility of higher education institutions to respond to the rapidly changing
d e m a n d s of m o d e r n society. By strengthening the institutional a u t o n o m y ,
government also claims to stimulate the levels of quality and differentiation
of the higher education system. This "facultative policy" (Teichler, 1989;
Van Vught, 1991) consists of a mixture of:
reduction of direct supervision and control of administration and the
use of resources;
development of semi-structured interventionist policies, whereby on
the one hand a relatively tight frame exists, but on the other hand freedom
is left for decision and maneuver on the part of the institutions;
the establishment of a system of positive and negative sanctions based
on a mixture of criteria and procedures, whereby the goals are partly defined
211
by the government, partly left open to the diversity of rationales underlying

academic evaluation, partly determined by institutional policies, and partly
determined by the m a r k e t .
Such a mixture means that the "facultative policy" does not aim to
establish a strict demarcation of the competences between government
and institutions. Institutional autonomy is acknowledged insofar as it is
instrumental in bringing about innovation in teaching and research. In
practice this means that autonomy has to be contested.
Central institutional administrators have supported this shift of policy,
as it seems to pave the way for a situation in which the institutions really
would be a u t o n o m o u s and self-regulating with respect to essential parts
of their operations (see Binsbergen & D e B o e r , 1988). F u r t h e r m o r e , the
proclamation of a policy shift towards steering from a distance is of utmost
symbolic significance because it entitles the universities to c o m p a r e every
actual policy measure with this steering philosophy.
O n e of the most profound effects of the changes in the governmental
steering philosophy for higher education has been the increased importance
of the central institutional m a n a g e m e n t . First of all, the institutional
executive boards have b e c o m e m o r e visible because of the consultative,
dialogue character of the planning and information system. T h e r e are
regular, formal meetings between the Minister and the executives regarding
the active policy issues. This implies that the executives occupy a m o r e
and m o r e central position within the institution in terms of information
channeling regarding key policy issues. Second, government policy itself
becomes increasingly directed at the institutional level. Because of the m o r e
global nature of the steering, policies are no longer predominantly directed
at the faculty or disciplinary level, but at the institution as a whole. A s a
result, the central institutional governing boards increasingly have to take
u p a managerial role, with ensuing responsibilities. This can be clearly seen
in the present discussion on the changes in m a n a g e m e n t structures.
In line with the philosophy of the H O A K policy p a p e r , institutions are
expected to b e c o m e m o r e adaptive to their environments. Consequently,
the new W H W Act d e m a n d s flexibility from the institutions. A t the same
time, the administrative organization for the universities is regulated in
a singular, uniform m a n n e r a uniformity that inhibits diversity in
m a n a g e m e n t practices that are considered necessary by both the universities
and the government because of the differences in institutional environments.
A s most partners in the higher education sytem have recognized the
shortcomings of the situation, a n u m b e r of national conferences were
organized on the required a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e a n d r e f o r m s , necessary
to stimulate a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e institutional m a n a g e m e n t . These
conferences, in turn, have lead to the establishment of a ministerial
committee that published its advice in N o v e m b e r 1991, followed by a
ministerial position p a p e r in J u n e 1992.
212
T h e central lment in these discussions has been the necessity to

strengthen institutional m a n a g e m e n t . Because of the existing regulations,
tensions were noted between on the one hand the central and the faculty
level, and between governance and administration on the other hand.
T h e present structure would leave no room for integral governance of
the institutions. In order to tailor the institutional m a n a g e m e n t structure
m o r e to the local situation and needs, the concept of a "charter" has been
proposed. A charter would give an institution the possibility to implement
a new structure, diverging from the formal stipulations in the W H W Act. T h e
Minister has reacted positively to this suggestion, but at present it is still
unclear if, w h e n , and how charters are to b e c o m e reality. T h e discussion,
however, clearly shows the importance that is given to increasing the role
and function of the central institutional m a n a g e m e n t as a consequence of
the new governmental policies.
A t the same time, however, it should be emphasized that these policies
introduce a substantial a m o u n t of tension into the system because of the
notions of autonomy and self-regulation on the one h a n d , and coherence and
macro level efficiency on the other. For example, parliament has stated that
the freedom to establish new p r o g r a m m e s should not be unlimited and there
should be steering instruments to prevent the system from inefficient growth
and wastage of resources. T h e crucial question within the D u t c h context
therefore becomes whether institutions are capable of self-regulation and
will they take responsiblity for the total system, or whether the government
will use its power to interfere in institutional affairs.
This question cannot be answered in a straightforward m a n n e r . A s has
been indicated before, a strict demarcation of the competences between
government and institutions has not been established. Institutional autonomy
has increased, particularly with respect to procedural matters (see the
discussion on this concept in C h a p t e r 1). T h e government exercises less
control over purchasing and capital investments; institutions have m o r e
freedom in establishing new curricula and in developing m a n a g e m e n t
structures. T h e procedural power of institutional administrators in the
area of financial m a n a g e m e n t , for example, has increased. T h e quality
control system offers the institutions through their intermediary bodies a
considerable a m o u n t of a u t o n o m y , although the government ultimately can
use its power through a system of positive and negative sanctions. T h e policy
of stepping back from direct control of higher education, however, does
not imply that government renounces its responsibilities to steer the higher
education system. T h e division of power in the D u t c h situation cannot be
conceived in a static m a n n e r , as two examples can show.
T h e first is the discussion on the binary structure and the general
tendency of the university and the H B O sector of becoming m o r e alike.
T h e government is not convinced that increased autonomy has resulted in an
increase of diversity between institutions. Following the d e b a t e that has been
213
introduced in the H O O P 1992 on the demarcation of the two higher education

sectors within the overall framework of diversity, the H O O P 1994 expresses
a governmental position of reinforcing the binary system by putting m o r e
emphasis on the differences that should exist between the two sectors. It is
proposed that student mobility between the sectors should be restricted, that
the n u m b e r of students entering university education should be somewhat
limited, that universities should stress the academic components of their
curriculum, and that the H B O institutions should enrol m o r e students and
should emphasize the professional c o m p o n e n t s of their curriculum. It is
the assumption that by putting m o r e emphasis on the boundary conditions
within which the institutions have to o p e r a t e , these differences between
the sectors can be reinforced. This policy may have profound effects on
the power of institutions in determining their goals and the nature of their
programmes.
T h e second example concerns the legally determined duration of studies.
For virtually all programs, H B O and university, this has been set at four
years. O v e r the last couple of years, the technical universities have put much
effort in showing the inadequacy of the four-year framework for engineering
studies, supported by the central employers organization and professional
bodies. A s an outcome of these pressures, the government has proposed
in the H O O P 1994 to expand the formal length of study for engineering
p r o g r a m m e s to five years. This means a fundamental break in the equality
philosophy that u p until now has governed the steering approach to higher
education.
These examples show how the government on the one hand sets the broad
p a r a m e t e r s in which the higher education system is supposed to o p e r a t e ,
thereby intervening in matters of substantive a u t o n o m y , but on the other
hand is o p e n to substantive changes in the system. This combination of
governmental steering and institutional influences amplifies the statement
m a d e earlier that autonomy is not a goal in itself but has to be considered
as an instrument to improve the mechanisms operating in the system, and
as such is neither static nor one-dimensional. T h e boundaries between what
the role of the government is or should b e , and what belongs to the domain
and responsibility of the institutions, are not established once and for all, but
move continuously back and forth, depending on the outcomes of "pushes
and pulls," the interactions between the various actors in the system. T o
what extent these dynamics in the end will result in an adaptive, effective,
and efficient higher education system remains to be seen. H o w e v e r , the
experiment has already brought forward interesting results, as has been
indicated before, and no doubt will continue to do so. A s such, the D u t c h
higher education system will remain one of the m o r e prominent cases
to study the complex issue of institutional autonomy and governmental
steering.
9
Higher Education Policy in Ontario
GLEN JONES

The education
system
T h e first c o m p o n e n t of the Ontario school system, generally referred to

as elementary school, runs from Junior Kindergarten to G r a d e 8 (ten years).
By law, children must begin their education at the age of six years ( G r a d e
1), but approximately 7 5 % of four year olds attend Junior Kindergarten and
almost all five year olds attend Kindergarten. In 1989, for example, 9 4 % of
students entering G r a d e 1 had attended Kindergarten.
Until recently, the second c o m p o n e n t of the O n t a r i o school system,
secondary or high school, operated from G r a d e 9 to G r a d e 13. T h e formal
structure of G r a d e 13 has now been eliminated and replaced with a system
of O n t a r i o Academic Credits ( O A C ) . Many students continue to spend a fifth
year in the secondary school system in order to complete the O A C S necessary
to enter higher education.
Ontario operates two parallel publicly funded school systems. T h e r e are
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 113 Public School B o a r d s which o p e r a t e a p p r o x i m a t e l y
3000 e l e m e n t a r y schools and 600 s e c o n d a r y schools, and there are
59 R o m a n Catholic School Boards which o p e r a t e approximately 1400
elementary schools and 175 secondary schools. B o t h systems include schools
where English is the primary language of instruction and some schools where
French is the primary language (Ontario Ministry of E d u c a t i o n , 1991). A n
overview of the system is presented in Figure 1.

T h e r e are two publicly funded higher education sectors in O n t a r i o : the
university sector and the community college sector. T h e university sector
214
215
Ontario
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
university
CAAT
19
18
17
16
secondary school
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
primary school
8
7
6
5
4
pre-primary school
3
Age
Figure 1: The educational system in Ontario
is composed of 15 universities, Ryerson Poly technical Institute, the O n t a r i o

College of A r t ( O C A ) , and the O n t a r i o Institute for Studies in Education
( O I S E ) . With the exception of O C A and O I S E , all of the institutions in the
university sector have the legal authority necessary to grant degrees,
though Ryerson's ability to d o so is limited by its current legislative
charter. All of the universities o p e r a t e some combination of professional
and academic, graduate and u n d e r g r a d u a t e , degree p r o g r a m m e s . T h e period
of formal study necessary to obtain a degree varies by p r o g r a m m e and, in
some instances, by institution. Generally speaking, the requirements of an
u n d e r g r a d u a t e p r o g r a m m e (e.g., Bachelor of Arts) involve 3-4 years of
study, a master degree (e.g., Master of Arts) 1-2 years, and a doctoral
degree (e.g., D o c t o r of Philosophy) two or m o r e years. A v e r a g e time to
completion rates are often much longer.
T h e community college sector is composed of 23 Colleges of Applied
A r t s and Technology ( C A A T S ) . While English is the primary language
216
G. Jones
of instruction in most C A A T S , several are bilingual, and French is the

primary language of instruction in o n e . Each college operates a range of
post-secondary programmes with a formal length of study of 1-3 years.
T h e r e are four broad post-secondary p r o g r a m m e categories: general and
applied arts; business; health sciences; and technology. A student who
successfully completes a p r o g r a m m e is awarded a diploma or certificate.
Within the health sciences category, for example, all colleges operate a
diploma p r o g r a m m e in nursing (2V2-3 years) and several operate other types
of specialized health science related p r o g r a m m e s . Within the technology
category, colleges offer three-year technologist p r o g r a m m e s , two-year
technician p r o g r a m m e s , and certificate p r o g r a m m e s . Each college operates
a distinct mix of programmes (Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities,
1990). Approximately 2000 p r o g r a m m e s have been approved by the
G o v e r n m e n t of Ontario (Stokes, 1989).
All of the institutions described above are public institutions in the
sense that the provincial government provides the bulk of their operating
support. O t h e r degree-granting institutions in Ontario include the Royal
Military College (a federally funded university operated by the Ministry
of Defence), one small privately funded institution which has the legal
authority to award secular degrees, and a n u m b e r of small private church
supported institutions which o p e r a t e theological degree p r o g r a m m e s . O t h e r
non-degree-granting post-secondary institutions in Ontario include four
small colleges of agricultural technology which operate two-year diploma
p r o g r a m m e s , the Michener Institute for Applied Health Sciences, the
Canadian Memorial Chiropractic College, and the Canadian Coast G u a r d
College.
education
In addition to their post-secondary education p r o g r a m m e s , Ontario C A A T S

operate a variety of other educational programmes. They operate preparatory
programmes for academic upgrading, including the Basic Training for Skill
D e v e l o p m e n t ( B T S D ) p r o g r a m m e , and also provide the classroom training
c o m p o n e n t of many apprenticeship p r o g r a m m e s . Many apprentices spend
approximately 10% of their training p r o g r a m m e in a college and about 9 0 %
in on-the-job training. In addition, C A A T S run industrial training p r o g r a m m e s
funded by private industry and/or government (Ontario Ministry of Colleges
and Universities, 1990).
All privately owned and operated vocational schools must be registered
under the Private Vocational Schools Act which is administered by a unit
in the O n t a r i o Ministry of Colleges and Universities. T h e r e are over 200
registered schools (see W e b b , 1989: 312-324).
217

T h e requirements and prerequisites for admission to O n t a r i o universities
and community colleges are determined by the institutions. Generally
speaking, students must have completed high school in order to gain
admission to a post-secondary p r o g r a m m e in a C A A T , and there may be
additional requirements for specific p r o g r a m m e s , while less formal education
is required in order to gain admission to a non-post-secondary p r o g r a m m e
such as an apprenticeship or other skills training p r o g r a m m e . Minimum
requirements for admission to a university u n d e r g r a d u a t e p r o g r a m m e
usually include a high school diploma and reasonably high marks in a
specified n u m b e r of O A C S . Specific entrance requirements vary somewhat
by institution and degree p r o g r a m m e .
Students are completely free to apply for admission to any institution
(university or C A A T ) or p r o g r a m m e as long as they possess the minimum
prerequisites for admission. T h e institutions, in turn, are free to determine
the n u m b e r of students who will be admitted to each p r o g r a m m e . Since the
n u m b e r of students who apply to university p r o g r a m m e s is often greater than
the n u m b e r of available spaces, admission is often competitive based on
the grades that students obtain from their high school or other educational
institution.
While secondary school grades are the most commonly used factor in
determining admission to C A A T and u n d e r g r a d u a t e university p r o g r a m m e s ,
some p r o g r a m m e s also use personal interviews, portfolios, and other
means of obtaining data on t h e suitability of p r o s p e c t i v e s t u d e n t s for
admission. T h e r e are n o province-wide or n a t i o n a l tests for g e n e r a l
university admission, though some professional p r o g r a m m e s require and
use recognized tests (such as the Law School Admission Test for potential
law students). W h e r e a student has already attended a post-secondary
institution, the student's prior academic record is taken into consideration
in the admission process. Most universities also provide special consideration
for the admission of m a t u r e students, individuals who are 21 years of age or
older but do not have the formal educational qualifications for admission
through the traditional r o u t e . O n t a r i o C A A T S do not o p e r a t e "feeder"
p r o g r a m m e s for the universities, and questions concerning credit transfer
are left to the discretion of the institutions (Jones, 1991; Skolnik, 1990).

D a t a on students in the university sector is provided in Table 1. D a t a on
students enrolled in post-secondary p r o g r a m m e s in O n t a r i o C A A T S , excluding
apprenticeships and o t h e r non-post-secondary p r o g r a m m e s , is provided in
Table 2.
218
G. Jones
TABLE 1
Students and staff in the university sector
Full T i m e
1980-81
1985-86
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
SOURCE:
160,217
185,016
192,717
201,188
208,527
Students
Full Time
4
2
Part T i m e O n t a r i o First First Y e a r Academic
3
Staffs
Year
87,819
96,845
98,569
101,523
102,721
2
27,027
30,767
33,574
36,406
51,521
55,465
59,627
63,206
12,865
13,586
13,794
14,091
14,402
Statistics Canada; Source: Statistics Canada; Number of students who

graduated from an Ontario secondary school and enrolled in a full-time
undergraduate program at an Ontario university the next year. These figures
represent the number of students who flow directly from Ontario secondary
schools to Ontario universities, they do not include those students who
interrupted their studies or those who graduated from an out-of-province
school. Source: Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities; i n c l u d e s all
students enrolled in the first year of an undergraduate program, including
5
returning students; Note that these are full-time academic staff rather than
FTE academic staff. Source: Statistics Canada.
Participation rates in O n t a r i o higher education have increased in the last

five years. Total full-time enrolment related to the 18-24 year old age group
in 1985/86 was 2 5 % (25.4% for males and 2 4 . 5 % for females); in 1989/90
the figure was 2 8 . 9 % (27.4% for males and 3 0 . 6 % for females) (Statistics
C a n a d a , 1991).
D a t a on full-time university faculty are also presented in Table 1, while
data on full-time teaching staff associated with post-secondary p r o g r a m m e s
are shown in Table 2.
T h e r e are no published data available on support staff in the university
sector. Staff are employed at the institutional level and there are different
ways of categorizing employee groups. Some functional activities are
contracted out to private industry in some institutions, while they are the
responsibility of university staff in others. In 1989/90, total expenditures for
Ontario universities a m o u n t e d to $3,386,936,000. Total salaries a m o u n t e d
to $1,992,226,000, or 5 8 % of total expenditures. Academic salaries equalled
$913,331,000, or 2 7 % of total expenditures, while other instruction and
research salaries equalled $197,728,000, or 6% of total expenditures, and
other salaries a m o u n t e d to $881,167,000, or 2 6 % of total expenditures
(Council of O n t a r i o Universities, 1991). T h e Ministry of Colleges and
Universities has estimated that there were a total of 16,483 full-time
staff employed by the O n t a r i o C A A T S in Fall 1989, including individuals
219
associated with both post-secondary and non-post-secondary p r o g r a m m e s .

This total includes 8356 academic, 2068 administrative, and 6059 support
staff (Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities, 1990a).
TABLE 2
Students and staff in post-secondary p r o g r a m m e s
Full T i m e
1980-81
1985-86
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
75,780
94,574
95,029
94,421
93,337
Students
Full Time
2
4
Part T i m e O n t a r i o First First Y e a r Teaching
Year3
Staffs
66,454
76,498
76,076
75,844
24,730
23,934
22,320
21,166
40,870
45,478
46,518
45,303
5,651
6,019
6,975
7,054
7,100
Full-time student enrolled in post-secondary programs (e.g. excluding trade programs).

2
Source: Statistics Canada; Part-time students enrolled in post-secondary programs. Statistics
3
Canada began to collect data on part-time students in 1983 ; Number of students who
graduated from an Ontario secondary school and enrolled in a full-time post-secondary
program at an Ontario C A A T the next year. Source: Ontario Ministry of Colleges and
4
Universities; N e w entrants to the first year of a post-secondary program in a C A A T .
5
Source: Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities; Full-time teaching staff associated
with post-secondary programs. These figures do not include teachers associated with non-post
secondary programs. Source: Statistics Canada.
T h e r e have been surprisingly few studies on d r o p out or attrition rates

in O n t a r i o higher education, and most of the published literature suffers
from methodological problems (Dietsche, 1988; Tinto, 1982). In its review
of the O n t a r i o C A A T system, the Vision 2000 Task Force reviewed attrition
data for those students entering the college system during the period 1976
to 1984, and estimated that 4 3 % of the entering cohort had not graduated
by D e c e m b e r 1988. T h e r e were significant differences in attrition rates by
division and duration of p r o g r a m m e . Attrition data for students entering in
1982 are provided in Table 3. Studies on attrition in Canadian universities
have indicated non-completion rates ranging from as high as 5 0 % in some
u n d e r g r a d u a t e arts p r o g r a m m e s (Dennison et al., 1982; G o m m e and Gilbert,
1984) to as low as 2 . 5 % in specific health related u n d e r g r a d u a t e programmes
(Stewart, 1990). A recent study by Clark (1989) indicates that there are
significant differences in d r o p out rates by major field of u n d e r g r a d u a t e
study ranging, in 1986/87, from 3 . 1 % in the health professions to 18.7%
in general arts and science. Clark also reports that, with the exception of
220
G. Jones
part-time undergraduates, the drop out rate has declined between 1976/77
and 1986/87. In terms of 1986/87 data on " a p p a r e n t d r o p o u t s , " Clark found
that approximately 11.7% of full-time u n d e r g r a d u a t e , 4 7 . 1 % of part-time
u n d e r g r a d u a t e , 13.9% of full-time g r a d u a t e , and 2 4 % of part-time graduate
students, did not complete their degree p r o g r a m m e s .
TABLE 3
Attrition R a t e s By Division and D u r a t i o n of Ontario C A A T Program,
Fall 1982
Program Division
1 Year
Programs
2 Year
Programs
3 Year
Programs
TOTAL
Applied Arts
Business
Health
Technology
35.1
30.4
18.4
23.6
40.6
45.1
22.7
46.1
54.7
47.6
22.9
46.6
43.5
44.4
21.8
45.6
Total
26.8
42.8
44.0
41.7
SOURCE:
Vision 2000, 1990a, p. 13.
STUDENT-STAFF RATIO
T h e r e are no normative student-staff ratios specified by government

policy; in fact accurate information on student-staff ratios is difficult to
obtain because neither the university nor college sector calculates F T E staff.
T h e Council of Ontario Universities has developed an estimated F T E using
average salary data and financial data on salary expenditures, and by using
this data the student-staff ratio in the university sector can be estimated
at 16.9:1 for the 1989/90 academic year (Council of O n t a r i o Universities,
1991a).
Characteristics
system
FUNCTIONS AND GOALS
In 1979 the O n t a r i o Council on University Affairs identified five basic

goals for Ontario universities:
to develop a m o r e educated populace;
to educate and train people for the professions;
to provide for study at the highest intellectual level;
221
to conduct basic and applied research including development and

evaluation;
to provide service to the community (Ontario Council on University
Affairs, 1979: 11-12).
This statement of goals and objectives was later approved by the provincial
government, and it continues to be used as a means of describing the role
of the university sector in O n t a r i o (Ontario Council on University Affairs,
1991).
In 1965, the new O n t a r i o community colleges were given the responsibility
to:
provide courses of types and levels beyond, or not suited t o , the
secondary school setting;
meet the needs of graduates from any secondary school p r o g r a m m e ,
apart from those wishing to attend university;
meet the education needs of adults and out-of-school youth, whether
or not they were secondary school graduates.
Four additional principles were articulated in 1967 to guide the new
institutions:
they must embrace total education, vocational and non-vocational,
regardless of formal entrance qualifications, with provision for complete
vertical and horizontal mobility;
they must develop curricula that meet the combined cultural aspirations
and occupational needs of the student;
they must operate in the closest possible cooperation with business and
industry, and with social and other agencies, including education, to ensure
that curricula are at all times abreast, if not in advance, of the changing
requirements of a technological society;
they must be dedicated to progress, through constant research, not only
in curricula but also in pedagogical technique and administration (Ontario
D e p a r t m e n t of E d u c a t i o n , 1967: 32; Vision 2000, 1990: 6-7).
These statements describe the broad goals of Ontario's two higher
education sectors. O n t a r i o universities provide academic p r o g r a m m e s and
are heavily involved in research and service activities. O n t a r i o C A A T S provide
vocational and basic skill development p r o g r a m m e s .

Higher education
legislation
C a n a d a is a federation of ten provinces and two territories, and the

division of authority between jurisdictions is prescribed by a constitution.
While education is a provincial responsibility, there is little doubt that
the federal government has played an extremely important role in the
historical development of higher education throughout the country. T h e
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G. Jones
federal government, for example, was a major financial sponsor of the

t r e m e n d o u s growth of the higher education system, both in terms of
operating and capital support, following the Second World W a r . While the
influence of the central government in higher education has been increasing
in a n u m b e r of other federal systems (e.g., Australia), the influence of the
Canadian government in terms of higher education policy has been gradually
decreasing since the introduction of the Established Programs Financing
( E P F ) arrangements in 1977. U n d e r the E P F p r o g r a m m e , federal government
support for post-secondary education is provided through unconditional
cash and tax point transfers to the provinces. R e c e n t federal budgets have
frozen or reduced the level of these transfers. T h e federal government
continues to be a major sponsor of university research, m a n p o w e r training,
and cultural activity, and to support a variety of p r o g r a m m e s which are
directed or indirectly accessed by institutions of higher education. T h e
federal government, therefore, continues to play a role in Canadian higher
education but it is a role which is secondary to the provinces in terms
of the regulation of the system. T h e r e is no federal d e p a r t m e n t of higher
education or education, and no broad federal policy for higher education
( C a m e r o n , 1991; Skolnik, 1991).
T h e provinces, therefore, play the primary role in terms of higher
education legislation and regulation. In O n t a r i o , the provincial government
deals with the two major sectors (universities and C A A T S ) differently and
separately. T h e question of authority within the O n t a r i o higher education
system can be addressed in quite different ways for each of the two
sectors.
THE
UNIVERSITY SECTOR
Each institution in the university sector is a distinct corporate entity

operating under an institution-specific legislative Act. Generally speaking,
these legislative charters describe the powers of the corporation, and
delegate authority over the corporation to an internal governance structure,
usually a b o a r d of governors and a senate. U n d e r their corporate charters,
universities have powers which parallel other corporations: they can enter
into contracts, employ staff, etc. In the case of the 15 universities, their
corporate charters provide them with the ability to grant degrees and to
determine the n a t u r e of their academic p r o g r a m m e s and activities, while
Ryerson Polytechnical Institute's degree-granting powers are somewhat
limited by its charter. In other words, provincially legislated charters provide
a legal framework under which university sector institutions o p e r a t e .
Aside from these corporate charters, the only other piece of provincial
legislation which has a major impact on the university sector is the
D e g r e e Granting Act approved in 1983. U n d e r this Act, no corporation
223
or organization in the province of O n t a r i o can award degrees unless they

have been granted explicit authority to do so u n d e r provincial legislation.
T h e legislation also requires out-of-province institutions which wish to offer
degree programmes in O n t a r i o to obtain prior approval from the Ministry
of Colleges and Universities. A relatively small n u m b e r of out-of-province
institutions have received this approval after demonstrating the " n e e d " for
their academic programmes within the province.
These two types of legislation charters and the D e g r e e Granting Act
provide the legal framework for the university sector. O n the one h a n d , the
provincial government controls, and in practice severely limits, the n u m b e r
of institutions which have the authority to grant degrees, while on the other
hand the provincial government has provided a high degree of autonomy to
Ontario universities.
THE
CAAT SECTOR
In 1965 the provincial government approved framework legislation which

allowed for the establishment of Colleges of Applied A r t s and Technology.
C A A T S are created by order of the lieutenant-governor-in-council, and each
is governed by a board of governors and by the regulations of the Ministry
of Colleges and Universities. Advice on the operation of the college sector
is provided to the government by the Council of Regents, a body composed
of government appointed m e m b e r s . Most m e m b e r s of college boards are
appointed by the Council, though each board now has at least one faculty
and one student m e m b e r . Each C A A T board is responsible for selecting and
hiring a president for the college, establishing college goals and policies, and
ensuring that the college serves the local community (Council of R e g e n t s ,
1977).
While college staff are employed by the institutions, almost all nonm a n a g e m e n t employees are m e m b e r s of a provincial union. T h e r e are two
major unionized groups - faculty and support staff - and each bargains on a
province-wide basis with the Council of Regents u n d e r the provisions of the
Colleges Collective Bargaining Act. While some matters are bargained at
the institutional level, most issues, including salary and benefits, are handled
provincially, and this obviously constrains the a u t o n o m y of the institution.
Control over education
programmes
In terms of educational p r o g r a m m e s , it is the university which determines

the curriculum of each degree p r o g r a m m e , what courses will be offered
in a specific year, and who will be admitted to these p r o g r a m m e s . New
courses are generally developed in academic d e p a r t m e n t s and formally
approved by the institution's senior academic body, the senate. New
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G.
Jones
degree p r o g r a m m e s are usually developed at the d e p a r t m e n t or faculty

level and formally approved by the board of governors, though all new
graduate and professional u n d e r g r a d u a t e programmes must be approved by
government before the enrolment in these p r o g r a m m e s will be funded under
the provisions of the funding formula (see below). G o v e r n m e n t decisions
on new programmes are traditionally based on the recommendations of the
intermediary body, the O n t a r i o Council on University Affairs, which, in
turn, bases its recommendations on a p r o g r a m m e review process conducted
by the Ontario Council on G r a d u a t e Studies ( O C G S ) . T h e O C G S , composed
wholly of university representatives, conducts a review of all relevant new
programmes including input from external appraisers. Existing graduate
p r o g r a m m e s are appraised periodically by O C G S , and a positive review is
required for the enrolment in these programmes to continue to be counted
as part of the funding formula.
While there is no such thing as a "provincial curriculum" for degree
p r o g r a m m e s , there is little doubt that a n u m b e r of professional associations
exercise considerable influence over curricular matters relating to their
professions (e.g., medicine, law, engineering, etc.). A number of professional
associations, for example, operate accreditation mechanisms.
Post-secondary p r o g r a m m e s operated by the C A A T S must be approved by
the Ministry of Colleges and Universities before they will be eligible for
funding through the allocative formula. T h e colleges are free to develop
and offer non-formula funded p r o g r a m m e s , and these decisions are made
at the institutional level. Since many non-post-secondary programmes
are sponsored by external agencies, such as governments and industry,
these agencies obviously play a role in determining the nature of these
programmes.
Control over research
programmes
Individual university professors are free to determine their own research

agendas, though they must follow university policies concerning research
ethics. While professors decide what types of research projects they will d o ,
these decisions may be influenced by the availability of research funding.
Most universities have a central research support unit which disseminates
information on university and external research grant application procedures.
Colleges are teaching institutions, and research is not an explicit component
of the C A A T system. O n the other h a n d , research, especially applied research,
is commonly viewed as an acceptable form of professional development for
college faculty (Geis and J o n e s , 1990), and many faculties are involved in
applied research and/or consulting activities (Bell and J o n e s , submitted).
T h e r e are few restrictions as long as these activities do not interfere with
an individual's teaching responsibilities.
Institutional
225
management and control
Most universities have two major governing bodies: a b o a r d of governors

which is responsible for administrative m a t t e r s , and a senate which is
responsible for academic matters. T h e university charter describes the
composition and powers of these bodies, and there are differences in
governance structure by institution. Generally speaking, university boards
are composed of lay-members (often in the majority and often appointed
by the provincial g o v e r n m e n t ) , alumni, and representatives of the university
community including faculty and students, while senates are composed of
faculty (always in t h e majority), academic administrators, students, and
lay-members. In legal t e r m s , the board appoints all staff, including the
president. All staff are employees of the university, and where unionization
exists, it involves a collective agreement between an employee group and
the university. Decisions concerning employee salaries, benefits, reward
systems, n u m b e r of staff, hiring and firing of staff, and so o n , are all m a d e
at the institutional level or within the institution. Like all corporations,
universities must act in accordance with legislation concerning labor and
collective bargaining, h u m a n rights, employment equality, etc.
T h e basic structure of college governing boards is determined by provincial
regulation, but each board has considerable discretion in determining t h e
specific m a n a g e m e n t structures and policies of the institution. Each college
is responsible for hiring (and firing) staff, though, as noted above, many
elements of the e m p l o y e r - e m p l o y e e relationship are determined by the
province-wide collective bargaining process.
Institutional
CORE
funding
FUNDING
University sector institutions receive core funding from the provincial

government in the form of operating grants. Each year the intermediary
body, the O n t a r i o Council on University Affairs, provides the government
with advice on the total sum that should be m a d e available to t h e sector.
T h e government has provided a smaller increase to t h e sector than t h e level
r e c o m m e n d e d by O C U A since 1977/78. T h e total a m o u n t of funding available
to the university sector is determined by government. O n c e the level of
operating support is a n n o u n c e d , the O C U A provides recommendations to
government on the allocation of grants to each institution.
Operating grants are allocated on t h e basis of a formula. T h e formula is
enrolment based using a p r o g r a m m e weighted calculation of F T E students,
though the mechanism also includes moving-average calculations based on
historical data and a funding corridor for each institution which severely
limits the impact of immediate shifts in enrolment on allocations. O n c e the
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G. Jones
a m o u n t that is available for operating grants is announced by government,

the formula is used to determine the a m o u n t that will be allocated to each
institution. Formula allocated operating grants are designed to support the
general operating expenses of universities, and they are not e a r m a r k e d or
targeted in terms of any specific type of expenditure.
In addition to formula based operating grants, the province also operates
capital and targeted funding programmes. Institutions apply to the government
for capital grants, and it is the government which determines which projects
will be supported. Targeted grants are usually allocated on the basis of some
mechanism r e c o m m e n d e d by the O n t a r i o Council on University Affairs after
consultation with representatives of the university sector. T h e two northern
universities, for example, access the N o r t h e r n G r a n t s mechanism, which
provides support for the higher costs associated with serving the region
and for special p r o g r a m m e s required by the region. Institutions which
o p e r a t e degree programmes where French is the language of instruction
have access to the Bilingualism G r a n t s p r o g r a m m e . E a c h of the targeted
programmes represents an attempt to support the special needs of client
groups, institutions, or regions using an allocative mechanism which is
theoretically available to all sector institutions.
C o r e funding for operating purposes in the C A A T sector is provided by the
provincial government. T h e government determines the total sum available
for these p r o g r a m m e activities, and this sum is allocated to institutions
using a formula. This formula, while recognizing a variety of institutional
factors including location and size, emphasizes enrolment, and since it is
responsive to enrolment growth, each institution's share of provincial grants
is influenced by fluctuating enrolment patterns within the sector. Formula
grants account for approximately 5 0 % of total college revenues. Funds for
capital projects are administered separately, and college applications for
capital support are reviewed on a case-by-case basis by government.
SUPPLEMENTARY
FUNDING
T h e provincial government has the ability to specify the maximum amount

that universities can charge for tuition fees through provisions of the funding
formula. T h e formula includes a tuition fee calculation. Institutions are free
to charge m o r e than the fee established in the formula, but the value of
additional revenues will simply be deducted from the government grant.
Tuition fees have increased at a greater rate than formula grants for the
last few years. Universities are free to engage in fund-raising activities, to
sell services, solicit donations or grants, etc.
In addition to formula allocated and capital grants, colleges obtain funds
under a variety of provincial and federal government p r o g r a m m e s which
support specific skills training activities. They are also free to enter into
227
agreements with private industry. These non-formula sources of revenue

are increasingly becoming a larger c o m p o n e n t of total college revenues,
and colleges are constantly seeking out, and responding t o , new d e m a n d s
for p r o g r a m m e s and services. Tuition fee levels for formula funded postsecondary p r o g r a m m e s are set by provincial regulation. Colleges are free
to engage in fund-raising activities.
Budgets of
universities
While targeted funding p r o g r a m m e s have increased in importance in the

last d e c a d e , they continue to represent a relatively small c o m p o n e n t of
university revenue compared with formula allocated operating grants. In
1989/90, for example, the O n t a r i o Ministry of Colleges and Universities
provided universities with $1,778,430,000, and of this sum, 8 3 % was
provided through formula operating grants (Council of O n t a r i o Universities,
1991). Formula grants accounted for m o r e than 6 6 % of total university
operating revenues. Operating revenues do not include such items as
research grants and revenues from ancillary enterprises (e.g., such units
as residences and food services which are operated on a break-even basis).
O t h e r grants from M C U accounted for approximately 9 . 3 % of university
operating revenues. Fees for credit courses represented approximately
18.9% of operating revenues.
Given the points discussed above, the university sector ( U ) , and the C A A T
sector (C) can be assigned a position on Clark's triangle of coordination, as
shown in Figure 2.
State authority
Academic oligarchy
Figure 2: Ontario within the triangle of coordination
228
G. Jones

policy
Accessibility has been a " c o r e " goal in both sectors, especially in terms of
university u n d e r g r a d u a t e and C A A T p r o g r a m m e s , though in practice access
is often limited or influenced by supply-driven pressures. Access in the
university sector is usually discussed in terms of those students who are
"qualified" to enter, and the institutions are responsible for determining who
is "qualified." This determination is obviously influenced by institutional
decisions (or the decisions of local units within institutions) concerning the
n u m b e r of students who will be accepted given the level of provincial grants.
Since students pay only a small portion of the total costs of their education
through fees, and since the total a m o u n t of provincial grants available for
allocation to institutions is not directly related to changes in enrolment,
demand-side market forces play a limited role in both sectors.
There are no explicit, quantitative policy goals with respect to participation,
access, or non-governmental funding. T h e negotiated enrolment "corridor"
provisions of the university sector allocative formula obviously imply
an assessment of a reasonable level of enrolment for each institution.
Institutions are encouraged to seek non-government sources of revenue.
T h e O n t a r i o economy is currently going through a major recession, and
funding is an important policy issue. T h e r e has b e e n a large increase in
u n e m p l o y m e n t , a dramatic increase in d e m a n d for social services such
as welfare, and a decrease in the provincial tax base. T h e province is
predicting a deficit of over $9 billion for the 1991/92 fiscal year. Given the
economic environment and the state of the provincial government budget,
it is not surprising that the provincial government will be providing the
higher education sector with an increase of only 1% in operating support
in 1992/93. In an attempt to provide institutions with some additional
revenue, universities will be allowed to increase tuition by 7 % . Given the
funding structure, there is little doubt that at least some universities will
further decrease or limit first year u n d e r g r a d u a t e enrolment. T h e economic
environment has also forced such recurring issues as accountability and
system/sector efficiency back into the spotlight, and while there has been
n o attempt to date to increase institutional accountability as has occurred in
many other nations, these matters are currently u n d e r review by government
and institutional officials.
Funding is not the only policy issue currently under discussion. "Vision
2000," a task force review of the community college sector in O n t a r i o , was
published in 1990. Generally speaking, the report reaffirmed the historic role
of the colleges, but it also r e c o m m e n d e d that greater attention be given to
course transfer between colleges and universities and to the possibility of
introducing some form of p r o g r a m m e assessment/accreditation mechanism
using standards developed within the system. These matters are now the
229
subject of some discussion both within government and within the college
constituencies.
E m p l o y m e n t equality has become an issue of some concern, especially
within the university sector. T h e federal government now requires that
employment equality policies be in place in all institutions which receive
major federal contracts. Some universities have established targets or quotas
in terms of the hiring of w o m e n and racial minorities. This issue has been
extended to the student population and there are now p r o g r a m m e s which
are designed to encourage w o m e n , for example, to enter traditionally male
dominated professions such as science and engineering.
Nipissing College is currently seeking a change in status. T h e College,
currently regarded as a campus or sub-unit of Laurentian University, has
asked that it be awarded i n d e p e n d e n t , degree-granting status. This has led
to a review of the procedures by which such requests might be evaluated.
T h e O n t a r i o Council on University Affairs has recently provided government
with advice on this matter. O n e of the items being considered is a periodic
review of the activities of all universities using some form or type of
performance indicators. T h e government is also reviewing the issue of
private universities in the sense of trying to determine how applications
for the establishment of private, free-standing, degree-granting institutions
might be reviewed and evaluated.
W h e t h e r any of these current policy issues will result in basic changes
to the organization, structure, or operations of Ontario's higher education
system or to one of the sectors within the system is extremely difficult to
predict. T h e basic structure of the system has remained relatively stable
for m o r e than 20 years even though there have b e e n n u m e r o u s calls for
change.
A variety of actors are involved in the development of higher education
policy. T h e provincial Ministry of Colleges and Universities plays a central
role in terms of determining government policy for higher education, but
the government has traditionally acted only after extensive consultation
with interested parties and has generally respected, or at least tolerated,
a high level of institutional a u t o n o m y , especially in the university sector.
In political t e r m s , higher education policy is developed within what Pross
(1986) has referred to as sector "policy communities."
T h e policy community in the university sector is composed of officials of
the Ministry of Colleges and Universities, the O n t a r i o Council on University
Affairs, the Council of O n t a r i o Universities, the O n t a r i o Confederation of
University Faculty Associations, and the O n t a r i o Federation of Students.
F r o m time to time other organizations and pressure groups attempt to lobby
government policy for higher education. T h e O n t a r i o Council on University
Affairs is an intermediary, advisory body. Composed of government appointed
members including faculty, m e m b e r s of the provincial community, and at
least o n e student, the Council provides the government with advice on
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G. Jones
policy matters including funding, the allocation of government support,

the approval of new graduate and u n d e r g r a d u a t e professional p r o g r a m m e s ,
and other matters. T h e Council regularly consults with university officials
and other interested parties on policy matters. T h e Council of Ontario
Universities (cou) is a university supported organization composed of sector
institutions. T h e c o u operates a variety of sector-wide services including a
central admissions office and a transportation system, and plays a major role
in the policy community in terms of conducting research on policy issues
and representing the interests of its m e m b e r institutions through lobbying
and media-related activities. T h e O n t a r i o Confederation of University
Faculty Associations and the Ontario Federation of Students represent the
interests of their respective constituencies in policy discussions. Institutions,
represented by their presidents, are also involved in policy discussions.
T h e policy community in the C A A T sector includes the provincial Ministry
of Colleges and Universities, the Council of R e g e n t s , the Association of
Colleges of Applied A r t s and Technology of O n t a r i o , provincial unions
representing faculty and support staff, the O n t a r i o Federation of Students,
the provincial Ministry of Skills D e v e l o p m e n t , and a variety of other
organizations, pressure groups, and government agencies. T h e Council of
R e g e n t s , composed of government appointed m e m b e r s , negotiates collective
agreements with the two major union groups, and provides the government
with advice on sector policy matters. T h e Association of Colleges of Applied
A r t s and Technology is a college funded organization that represents the
interests of the institutions in policy discussions. T h e unions and the
O n t a r i o Federation of Students represent the interests of their respective
constituencies. T h e Ministry of Skills D e v e l o p m e n t is a major sponsor
of skills training p r o g r a m m e s located in the colleges and negotiates with
the federal government on issues related to federal skills development
p r o g r a m m e s (see J o n e s , 1991: 580). College presidents and other senior
officials are also involved in provincial policy discussions.
Issues which involve both sectors are discussed by both policy communities,
and while there are few formal structures for cross-sector articulation
(Skolnik and J o n e s , submitted), a n u m b e r of committees have recently
b e e n formed to discuss such issues as college-university relations and credit
transfer.
While these policy communities play a major role in terms of influencing
provincial government policy for higher education, it must be recognized
that government decisions concerning the a m o u n t of funding that will be
available to the system reflect the priorities of the entire government, not
just the Ministry of Colleges and Universities. A s such, funding decisions
are influenced by d e m a n d s for support from other government departments
and agencies, by the state of the provincial budget, and by a variety of other
economic and political factors.
T h e r e is little doubt that changes in the society at large have at least some
231
influence on higher education policy. A s already n o t e d , recent changes in

the economic circumstances of the province have had a major impact on the
provincial budget which, in turn, has had an impact on the funding of higher
education. Given the high level of institutional a u t o n o m y , many policy
changes take place at the institutional rather than at the sector or system level
of authority. M a n y institutions, for e x a m p l e , have responded to societal and
university community concerns regarding such issues as employment equality
and sexual harassment by developing and implementing new institutional
policies.
In terms of provincial policy, t h e r e are a variety of incentive structures
designed to encourage certain types of activity. A n accessibility funding
envelope created in the late 1980s, for e x a m p l e , provided targeted support
to encourage institutions to respond to increased d e m a n d s for u n d e r g r a d u a t e
admission. T h e r e are a variety of research incentive p r o g r a m m e s which
are designed to encourage university-industry linkages, and a Centres of
Excellence p r o g r a m m e which supports research activities in a n u m b e r of
pre-defined "strategic" areas.
T h e r e is no centralized planning mechanism in the O n t a r i o higher
education system. T h e r e is some centralized planning in the college sector
in terms of the operation of skills development p r o g r a m m e s and in terms
of responding to regional requirements for training.
Reflections on the Impact of Structure, Authority, and Higher Education

Policy on Institutional Governance and Management
This section represents an attempt to discuss the relationship between the
institutions of higher education and the state, and the impact of state policy
on institutional governance and m a n a g e m e n t . T h e section is composed of
three related parts: institutional a u t o n o m y , a discussion of provincial policy,
and a discussion of how these policies relate to institutional governance.
Institutional
autonomy and academic
freedom
T h e earliest universities in O n t a r i o were religious institutions supported

by various denominational groups. Following a period of public battles
between denominational groups for public support for institutions of higher
education, the G o v e r n m e n t of O n t a r i o declared in 1868 that it would only
provide grants to institutions which offered secular degrees. For many
years this state support also implied government interference in terms of
the internal affairs of the universities, but these problems were in large
part resolved when a review of institutional governance at the University
of T o r o n t o in 1906 provided a structural model for university-government
relations that was acceptable to all parties. T h e authors of the Flavelle
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G. Jones
Commission argued that the process by which universities m a k e decisions

should be a u t o n o m o u s from the political whims of government. T h e public
interest in this internal decision-making process should b e delegated to a
corporate b o a r d composed of government appointed citizens, and this board
would assume responsibility for administrative policy. Academic matters
would be the responsibility of a senate, composed primarily of m e m b e r s
of the university community. T h e draft Act prepared by the Commission,
which incorporated these basic notions, was quickly passed into legislation,
and this broad framework became a model for many other institutions.
Given these structural arrangements, the universities were viewed as
a u t o n o m o u s corporations, and the central element in university-government
relations became the issue of government grants. This continued to be the
central issue in university-government relations during the long period of
expansion following the Second World W a r . This period of expansion,
supported in large part by federal government initiatives, reflected an
increased level of d e m a n d for university admission and a changing attitude
about the role of higher education in the economic development of the
province, and resulted in the creation of new universities and a t r e m e n d o u s
growth in enrolment in existing institutions. Decisions concerning provincial
government operating and capital support were becoming m o r e complex,
and the government turned to advisors and then to advisory committees for
assistance. In 1967 a funding formula was introduced, and the institutions
were soon encouraged to develop an appraisal mechanism to review requests
for new graduate p r o g r a m m e s . By the early 1970s, the basic structures and
arrangements which currently define the university sector in O n t a r i o were
in place.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, every O n t a r i o university conducted
an internal review of its governance structure. A i d e d by a national study
of university governance conducted by Sir J a m e s Duff and R o b e r t Berdahl
(1966), supported by the Association of Universities and Colleges of C a n a d a
and the Canadian Association of University Teachers, these review processes
led to reforms in governance which were incorporated in university charters.
T h e composition of governing boards was changed to allow for faculty and
student participation, university senates were given b r o a d e r responsibilities,
and the governance process was m a d e m o r e o p e n and transparent. T h e basic
principles which supported increased faculty and student participation on
boards and senates were often extended to support reform at other levels
of decision-making within the institutions. New advisory committees were
created in order to allow for increased input from m e m b e r s of the university
community, and the terms of reference of standing committees were often
revised to allow for greater student and faculty participation. T h e governance
process became m o r e decentralized, participatory, and complex. T h e basic
structures and governing principles which emerged during this period of
reform continue, with a few important exceptions, to be employed today.
233
O n t a r i o universities, therefore, can be described as highly a u t o n o m o u s

public utilities. E a c h has substantive a u t o n o m y in that the corporate
university has the authority, through its internal governance process, to
determine its own goals and p r o g r a m m e s . E a c h has procedural a u t o n o m y in
that the corporation has the authority to d e t e r m i n e how it will accomplish its
goals and objectives. Institutional a u t o n o m y , however, is constrained by the
fact that the provincial government controls the two largest components of
institutional revenue: operating grants and student fees. Institutions continue
to determine what they will d o and how they will do it, but these decisions
are obviously limited by the practical realities of government underfunding.
They are a u t o n o m o u s in terms of determining who will teach, what will be
taught, and w h o will be taught. They are free to determine who they will
employ, what they will purchase, and how funds will be allocated within
the institution. A t the same time, these decisions are obviously influenced
by the revenue side of the accounting ledger, and their ability to influence
institutional revenue is constrained by the provisions of the allocative
formula which serve to partially insulate universities from m a r k e t forces,
and the provincial regulation of tuition. Formula allocated funds associated
with graduate p r o g r a m m e s are tied to a p r o g r a m m e appraisal mechanism
which, though largely controlled by the universities themselves, represents
a constraint on institutional a u t o n o m y .
While O n t a r i o universities, like universities in other Canadian provinces,
are not completely a u t o n o m o u s , they arguably enjoy as much autonomy as
any other publicly funded system of universities in the world. A s Skolnik
has argued (1991: 4):
each university is answerable only to its own board of governors; provincial governments
intervene hardly at all in the operation of universities; and there is little, if any,
provincial direction of the planning and development of university systems. In
fact, the so-called "public" universities in Canada may be subjected to less direct
intervention into their activities by government than are the private universities in
the United States.
Provincial
policy
In a n u m b e r of other jurisdictions, governments have attempted to

increase the influence of " t h e m a r k e t " on institutions of higher education.
It is clear that the government of O n t a r i o has not followed this route in
fact, provincial governments in C a n a d a have generally restricted competition
by tightly limiting the n u m b e r of institutions with the authority to grant
degrees, preventing or constraining the development of a private higher
education sector, and even controlling or influencing the level of university
fees. T h e current allocative formula in the O n t a r i o university sector is
relatively insensitive to enrolment growth, thus discouraging institutions
from competing for a greater share of the m a r k e t than the level established
234
G. Jones
within the enrolment corridors. Even if the formula were m o r e responsive

to enrolment growth, as it is in the C A A T sector, o n e would still be left with
a very limited form of competition, since it is the government, and not the
formula, that determines the total a m o u n t of funds that are available for
allocation.
O n e might describe the O n t a r i o government approach to university
sector policy as "managerialism at the margins" (Jones, 1990). Institutions,
especially the universities, continue to o p e r a t e with a relatively high level of
autonomy. T h e government continues to control the a m o u n t of funds that
will be allocated to the institutions, and the vast majority of these funds are
allocated without strings attached to institutions using a formula mechanism.
T h e formula is based on criteria agreed to by sector institutions and it is
designed to treat all institutions within each sector as equals. In other words,
the heart of the O n t a r i o system is a relatively clear division of authority and
responsibility a system of checks and balances that allows the province to
control the purse-strings while discouraging government intervention in the
central teaching and research activities of the a u t o n o m o u s universities. A t
the same time, the provincial government has a t t e m p t e d to stimulate change
in certain specific policy areas. In other words, while governments in other
countries have employed a direct, head-on approach in order to stimulate
b r o a d , system-wide change, the O n t a r i o approach appears to have been
o n e of adopting new strategies to regulate the margins. By managing the
margins, the Ontario government has been able to encourage or stimulate
certain types of activities without changing the basic structure of the system
or directly intervening in the affairs of the a u t o n o m o u s institutions.
T h e most c o m m o n tool for managing the margins of university activity
has been targeted funding. A n u m b e r of research grant p r o g r a m m e s , for
example, target areas of research that the provincial government views as
"strategic," or encourage linkages between universities and industry that
the government believes are important for economic development. T h e
O n t a r i o Centres of Excellence p r o g r a m m e clearly represents a form of
"conditional contracting" a r r a n g e m e n t , and the contractual arrangements
that establish each center involve terms governing the objectives, as well
as the evaluation, of the corporation. Bilingualism G r a n t s and N o r t h e r n
G r a n t s represent attempts to target funds towards specific types of activities.
W h e n studies indicated an increase in d e m a n d for u n d e r g r a d u a t e admission
caused by changes in participation rates and the elimination of G r a d e 13
in the secondary school system, the government created a targeted funding
mechanism, the Accessibility E n v e l o p e , instead of revising the enrolment
provisions of the allocative formula. T h e Research Overheads/Infrastructure
Envelope is targeted towards providing support for the indirect or overhead
costs of university research activities. E a c h of these p r o g r a m m e s represents
an attempt on the part of the government to support a specific type of
activity while at the same time employing an allocative mechanism, or
235
a competitive mechanism in the case of the Centres of Excellence, that

theoretically treats university sector institutions as equals. Most of these
p r o g r a m m e s were created in an attempt to address a " n e e d " identified by
one or m o r e sector institutions.
O n t a r i o community colleges have substantially less a u t o n o m y than the
universities, and the government has regularly intervened in this sector.
A t the same time, the basic structures and features of the sector have
remained relatively stable, though concerns regarding access to French
language p r o g r a m m e s were a contributing factor in the creation of a new
C A A T in 1990 in which French is the only language of instruction. Generally
speaking, government policy in terms of post-secondary p r o g r a m m e s has
changed very little in the last decade.
T h e r e will undoubtedly be changes in the college sector in the near
future as the government responds to the recommendations and challenges
presented in the final report of a recent review of the O n t a r i o C A A T S (Vision
2000, 1990). A m o n g other things, the Vision 2000 report r e c o m m e n d e d
the establishment of sector-wide standards for all p r o g r a m m e s leading to
a college credential and that "all programs leading to a college credential
should be subject to regular, system-wide program review for the purposes
of accreditation" (p. 170). T h e government is currently reviewing m e t h o d s
of implementing these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s in consultation with the colleges.
T h e government is also interested in encouraging greater articulation, and
m o r e joint programming, between colleges and universities.
T h e dominant issue in government policy in the last few years, however,
has been funding. T h e provincial government is faced with a major deficit
and there are few signs of a speedy economic recovery. T o date the
province has continued to provide the higher education system with modest
increases in support ( 1 % for 1992/93). W h e t h e r the province will continue
with this approach or whether it will seriously consider restructuring or
"rationalizing" the system, or a sector within the system, is impossible to
predict. It is certainly clear that funding will continue to b e a major issue
and that institutions of higher education cannot expect major increases in
government support for some time to c o m e .
Government policies and institutional
governance
While the government of O n t a r i o has continued to provide modest

increases in funding to the higher education system, this level of support
continues to be far below the a m o u n t that is necessary, and, in the university
sector, far below the m o r e modest r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s on government support
suggested by the intermediary body. O n t a r i o universities have responded to
these funding problems in three ways. First, universities have reduced, or
limited the growth of, their expenditures. This has usually been accomplished
236
G. Jones
in a decentralized fashion; central institutional budgets have reduced

allocations to the faculties which have, in turn, reduced allocations to the
academic d e p a r t m e n t s . Generally speaking, universities have not responded
to their financial problems by eliminating academic p r o g r a m m e s . Instead
they have squeezed the budgets of local units and sought ways of reducing
the costs associated with central university services.
Second, universities have been forced to look for external, non-governmental
sources of revenue. Universities are increasing their emphasis on private fundraising, and several institutions have recently completed highly successful fundraising campaigns. T h e r e have been attempts to increase linkages with the
business sector. Reductions in operating support have also forced many
units within universities to increase the prices they charge for services or
p r o g r a m m e s , though tuition fees continue to be controlled by provincial
regulation.
Finally, universities have a t t e m p t e d to ensure that higher education
continues to be viewed as a high priority in terms of public expenditures.
T h e Council of O n t a r i o Universities plays an extremely important role in
the university sector policy community in terms of conducting research
on policy issues and lobbying and advising government. University sector
policy is created in the context of a policy community w h e r e t h e r e is regular
contact and consultation between sector agencies and groups. This policy
community has b e e n less successful in terms of convincing the provincial
cabinet that universities should be given a higher priority in terms of public
expenditures. While maintaining their active involvement in sector policy
issues, some institutions and organizations within the sector have begun
to place a greater emphasis on political activities at the grass-roots level.
These activities represent attempts to increase and mobilize public support
for higher education through participation in broadly based interest group
coalitions, by encouraging students and staff to play an active role in the
political process, and through the creation of a new provincial pressure
group, supported by the Council of O n t a r i o Universities, business interests,
and citizens.
Given their role as relatively a u t o n o m o u s public utilities, universities have
also been forced to respond to changing pressures from both internal and
external forces. Institutions, for example, have attempted to respond to
public and internal concerns regarding gender and employment equality
by revising their employment policies, though some critics argue that
the universities have responded too slowly and that these new policies
fail to adequately address these issues. Concerns that teaching is an
" u n d e r v a l u e d " activity within the university have led to the creation of
new teacher development resource centers within some institutions, and
also to debates within governance structures concerning the relative weight
and importance that should be given to teaching in the faculty t e n u r e and
promotion process. Institutions are also faced with the challenge of change
237
in response to their economic circumstances and in response to both internal

and external pressure in the context of institutional governance mechanisms
which are highly decentralized and participatory. O n e of the major issues
that O n t a r i o universities may have to face in the next decade is whether
their current governance structures create an environment where difficult,
strategic decisions can be m a d e .
T h e C A A T S have also responded to their changing economic circumstances
by reviewing expenditures and searching for additional sources of revenue.
T h e colleges have responded quickly to new public and private d e m a n d s for
programmes and services and, given their centralized internal governance
process, they have been forced to m a k e strategic decisions, sometimes
involving the elimination of expensive p r o g r a m m e s or modifying their
p r o g r a m m e mix.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the provincial government has continued to limit competition
in the O n t a r i o university sector by controlling the n u m b e r of institutions
that have the authority to grant degrees, by allocating funds using a
formula mechanism that is relatively insensitive to enrolment growth, and
by regulating tuition fees. While the government continues to provide the
bulk of its financial support to universities in the form of general operating
grants, there has been an increase in the use of targeted funding mechanisms
in the last decade. T h e r e have been no recent changes in government policy
concerning university accountability. Since the universities are a u t o n o m o u s
corporations viewed as public utilities, it is the institution, and not the state,
which is generally assigned responsibility for responding to the changing
needs of society. O n t a r i o C A A T S are less a u t o n o m o u s , and institutions
are restrained by government regulation and by province-wide collective
bargaining arrangements. Institutions in both sectors have a t t e m p t e d to deal
with what they view as government underfunding by reducing or controlling
expenditures and seeking alternative sources of revenue.
T h e O n t a r i o higher education system represents an example of a relatively
h e a l t h y , publicly funded p o s t - s e c o n d a r y system with a high level of
institutional a u t o n o m y , little direct g o v e r n m e n t intervention (especially
in the university sector), and limited competition. A s o n e observer recently
argued:
. . . the present balance between public and private in Canadian higher education is
quite likely more a source of strength than of weakness. In the medium to long run,
a little bit of insulation of universities from either or both the immediate instrumental
designs of government and the transient faddishness which often characterizes private
market demand will likely even if perhaps paradoxically protect the capacity
238
G. Jones
for more solid and more lasting contributions to the economy than a strategy which
involves capitulation to either of these pressures. Even if reflecting ambivalence and
paradox rather than certainty and consistency; if achieved more by accident than by
design; if resulting more from ignorance than prescience n o , probably because of
these characteristics the Canadian approach to the management of higher education
may represent a not only viable, but valuable, third way (Skolnik, 1991: 7),
10
Higher Education Policy in Sweden
GRAN SVANFELDT

The education
system
T h e general structure of the Swedish education system is shown in Figure

1. All children are entitled to pre-school education, and u p to now the
age for school entrance has been seven years (but will be reduced to six
years during the 1990s). For m o r e than 20 years Sweden has had nine
years of comprehensive compulsory schooling. This is followed by noncompulsory, comprehensive secondary education, consisting of a system
of two- or three-year p r o g r a m m e s (in the future t h e r e might b e only threeyear p r o g r a m m e s ) . T h e education system provides all pupils with at least
some training for further studies, and it gives m o r e than half of the pupils
vocational training or preparation (at the m o m e n t a m o r e integrated system
of study alternatives and three-year vocational p r o g r a m m e s is being trailed).
T h e p u r e theoretical p r o g r a m m e s have no vocational subjects, while the
three-year vocational p r o g r a m m e s may in the future have a practical third
year conducted at the workplace away from school.

Before 1977, Sweden had a h e t e r o g e n e o u s structure of higher education
which consisted of a large n u m b e r of different institutions. T h e oldest
institutions are the University of Uppsala founded in 1477 and the University
of L u n d founded in 1666. During the 19th century, private academic colleges
were founded in the two largest Swedish towns, Stockholm and G o t h e n b u r g .
Also, many different types of professional schools were created during the
19th century and the beginning of this century. After the Second World W a r
239
240
G. Svanfeldt
Sweden
Figure 1 : The Swedish educational system
there were a great variety of schools, colleges, and courses, but the total
educational capacity was nevertheless insufficient. B o t h labor m a r k e t and
economic forces, as well as democratic and welfare oriented reasons, caused
the government to introduce a very ambitious policy and administrative
measures that would expand the whole education system above grade seven.
This led to a huge increase in enrolment in secondary schools, and as a result
the n u m b e r of new entrants to u n d e r g r a d u a t e studies increased much faster
than was foreseen in the late 1950s and early 1960s. T h e expansion of higher
education was probably faster than in any other O E C D country. T h e main
expansion of students occurred within the less costly and easily organized
studies in social sciences and humanities, although financial investments
were mainly directed at medicine, engineering, and natural sciences. This
resulted in the establishment of a parliamentary committee in 1968; its 1973
241
report led to the thorough reform of the Swedish system of higher education
in 1977.
T h e capacity of the existing institutions was not sufficient to a c c o m m o d a t e
the "student explosion." Therefore, the government took over private
schools and colleges, transformed some of t h e m into universities, reorganized the system, and started new universities and academic colleges.
A s already m e n t i o n e d , the final change was the total re-organization of
higher education institutions in 1977.
T h e 1977 reform comprised the creation of a new structure (in terms of
institutional classification), and re-organization of the institutional structure,
of access to higher education, and of the instructional process (new
organization of p r o g r a m m e s , courses, and the credit system).
F u r t h e r decentralization was enhanced by the 1983 reform, which on the
o n e hand gave universities and colleges m o r e autonomy to determine the
structure of their internal decision-making structures, but on the other hand
m a n d a t e d that representatives of external interests should be a substantive
part of governing boards. A n o t h e r aspect of that reform was the move
towards less bureaucratization.
Since 1977 Sweden has had an integrated, unitary system of tertiary
level education (hgskolan),
created by bringing together nearly all public
(government) financed tertiary level education into the same organization
and funding system (military schools, the police school, and a few others
were not included). A s a result of the 1977 reforms, the universities and
professional schools incorporated other types of post-secondary p r o g r a m m e s
(e.g., teacher education). Outside university towns, academic p r o g r a m m e s
mostly in liberal arts were integrated into the teachers' colleges,
which then formed "academic colleges." In Stockholm the professional
p r o g r a m m e s in music, arts, theater, e t c . , formed eight separate "aesthetic"
schools, while the same type of p r o g r a m m e s outside Stockholm were
integrated with the local university or academic college. T h e nursery schools,
administered by the county parliaments, formed a separate branch of the
hgskolan, mainly financed by the county parliaments (about one-fourth is
funded by the g o v e r n m e n t ) .
T h e public higher education system today consists of six traditional
universities, o n e university of agriculture (with forestry and veterinary
medicine), five professional schools with research, and eight aesthetic
schools and 16 local academic colleges with little or no research. In every
county there is also o n e or m o r e nursery schools (31 in total). All universities
and colleges are financed by the Ministry of Education except the university
of agriculture, which is financed by the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition
there is also a private school of business administration (Stockholm School
of Economics) which has a good deal of research, and a few small colleges
and seminaries belonging to different churches.
T h e university of agriculture differs from the other universities in several
242
G. Svanfeldt
respects. It has a higher share of research and development ( R & D ) than the
other universities, due to the quite small n u m b e r of students, and it has
many d e p a r t m e n t s in different parts of the country.
T h e institutions differ very much in size. T h e University of L u n d , with
22,000 u n d e r g r a d u a t e students, is the largest university; it has eight faculties,
including a large faculty of technology. T h e university of Linkping founded
in 1970 is the youngest university and has 9000 u n d e r g r a d u a t e students. T h e
largest academic colleges in Vxj and r e b r o have 4000 u n d e r g r a d u a t e
students each, but the recently founded institution in Ronneby-Karlskrona
has only 500 undergraduates. A s the county of G o t l a n d has only 55,000
inhabitants, it is the only county without an academic college; instead it
has a "college office" with government money to buy extramural courses
and p r o g r a m m e s from
hgskolan.
Continuing education is an important feature of higher education in
Sweden. A substantial n u m b e r of u n d e r g r a d u a t e students are older than
25 years and study part-time. T h e average age of students differs very much
between different p r o g r a m m e s . T h e political goal has been that it is never
too late to go on with further studies, and that education is an important
resource both for the individual and society.
T h e institutional structure has not changed substantially since 1980, except
that four new (small) academic colleges have been created. Recently, there
has been renewed discussion about whether the nursery schools should be
run by the state and perhaps integrated into the state institutions. It should
be noted that the same types of p r o g r a m m e s are offered within all types of
institutions (except nursery schools), the difference being the size of the
institution and whether research is carried out or not. (Sweden has for
instance six faculties of engineering, three within universities, while the
two older ones and one new o n e are professional schools.)
But even if the institutional structure has been stable since 1980, there
have been structural changes within hgskolan. For instance, the n u m b e r
of first year students in technical education has increased by 5 0 % while the
n u m b e r of new students in teaching p r o g r a m m e s has decreased by nearly
3 0 % . This mainly reflects decisions m a d e by the Parliament (for instance,
some short technical p r o g r a m m e s have been upgraded and moved from
secondary school to the academic colleges). T h e comprehensive organization
makes these changes easier although there are problems than if the
resources for technical and teaching programmes were located at totally
different institutions.
T h e new non-socialist government now plans to change the higher
education system. Some universities and colleges might become private,
non-profit organizations, and government steering will be further reduced.
T h e government wants to have a less uniform system, with competition
between the different universities and colleges.
Degrees and formal

THE
243
length of study
STRUCTURE OF PROGRAMMES WITHIN U N D E R G R A D U A T E
EDUCATION
While the actual system is described h e r e , a new system is u n d e r discussion

at the m o m e n t in Parliament. This will be discussed further below.
T h e formal structure of u n d e r g r a d u a t e studies is based on nearly 120
u n d e r g r a d u a t e study p r o g r a m m e s . In addition there are 25 mainly
paramedical post-certificate and graduate p r o g r a m m e s within the undergraduate study system which, like the other p r o g r a m m e s , are sanctioned
by Parliament. A p r o g r a m m e might have several branches, grant degrees
on m o r e than o n e level, or have streams for students according to their
educational background. Besides the central p r o g r a m m e s , the universities
and colleges also have locally determined p r o g r a m m e s (at present, there
are about 70 different local p r o g r a m m e s with less than 10,000 students).
T h e central p r o g r a m m e s cover the traditional subjects of law, medicine,
dentistry, technology, natural and social sciences, humanities, teacher
education, etc. But, also, there are p r o g r a m m e s for nurses, sea captains,
musicians, opera singers, stage directors, and other very specialized groups.
Most p r o g r a m m e s are of 3-4 years' duration, but there are also p r o g r a m m e s
of both longer and shorter periods, for instance, two years for nurses and
five and a half years for medical doctors.
F o r every p r o g r a m m e there is a certificate of examination or a degree
stating the type and level of qualification, e.g., B.Sc. in mathematics,
M.Sc. in earth sciences, university certificate (uc) in fishery sciences and
m a n a g e m e n t , u c in dispensing pharmacy, and so on. Medical, p a r a m e d i c a l ,
and t e a c h e r e d u c a t i o n usually grant d e g r e e s that automatically give
certification or formal vocational qualification. G r a d u a t e s from the medical
p r o g r a m m e s , though, have to work within a hospital for 21 m o n t h s before
they are fully certified as medical doctors.
Within hgskolan there are also some technical-vocational p r o g r a m m e s
which are intended for qualified (blue collar) workers in different fields
w h o need further theoretical education. It might be unique to have this
type of p r o g r a m m e within the same organization as traditional university
education. T h e students within the technical-vocational p r o g r a m m e s have
adult study assistance to compensate for the loss of income.
Most central study p r o g r a m m e s are supplemented by (locally decided)
courses of mainly 3-10 weeks in length, which may be either compulsory
or lectives. Many courses mainly within the fields of natural sciences,
social sciences, and humanities are also open to students who do not
follow a study p r o g r a m m e or follow another p r o g r a m m e . (In principle, most
p r o g r a m m e s provide for a liberal combination of courses. A n equivalent
course credit system was introduced in 1977 for the whole higher education
system to further this e n d . ) At the same time there are many separate
244
G. Svanfeldt
TABLE 1
Formai length and enrolment in the main programs and courses
Formal length
of study
New students
(89/90)
Enrolment
(89/90)
Medicine
5.5
863
4210
Civil engineering and

corresponding
programs (15)
4.5
4264
20,327
M a t h , and natural
sciences
1281
2570
Law
122
5170
Economics and
business
administration
3.5
3030
11,907
3-3.5
4377
7976
2269
2728
Nursing
Postcertificate and
postgraduate spec,
(paramedical fields)
Primary teacher
(lower)
3.5
1381
2226
Primary teacher
(upper)
3.5^.5
875
1444
Pre-primary teacher
2.5
3405
7040
O p e r a singers
3.5
20
55
Church musicians
25
106
Total in u n d e r g r a d u a t e
programs and
courses (1990)
Of which only in
separate courses
164,900
55,700
245
courses (also called single subject courses) which are intended not to be
incorporated into a p r o g r a m m e but only intended for continuing education.
This m e a n s that there are many students who only follow separate courses.
A m o n g these there are young students w h o have not chosen or yet been
admitted to a p r o g r a m m e . But the majority are older students ("adults")
with or without a degree. Courses o p e n to students outside the p r o g r a m m e s
are often offered on a part-time basis and in the evenings. A l s o , students
within the p r o g r a m m e s can to some extent study part-time or in the evenings.
Separate courses are also offered as extramural courses, or courses with
lessons condensed into a few days a m o n t h . Students who have passed
separate courses of at least three years' duration and have studied a main
subject for at least three semesters may gain a bachelor's degree based on
separate courses only. Therefore, although the p r o g r a m m e system is stable
and centrally d e t e r m i n e d , there is great freedom for students within the
system. In addition to courses, a p r o g r a m m e may also prescribe one or
m o r e periods of practical work experience during the study period. Practical
experience is necessary for admission to some p r o g r a m m e s , and in some
instances a necessary prerequisite to becoming a licensed practitioner.
Educational p r o g r a m m e s within hgskolan
often seem to be shorter
in Sweden than in many other E u r o p e a n countries. D u e to the short
p r o g r a m m e s in combination with the liberal rules for taking separate
courses or another p r o g r a m m e , it is not unusual in Sweden to find that a
graduate has followed m o r e than one p r o g r a m m e or continues with separate
courses after graduation. A hypothesis is therefore that graduates in Sweden
d o not necessarily have shorter academic studies than graduates in many
countries with, on an average, longer academic p r o g r a m m e s .
POSTGRADUATE
PROGRAMMES
T o improve the " p r o d u c t i o n " of P h . D s there are special four-year

p r o g r a m m e s for postgraduate students within all faculties (with research).
It is also possible to have a licentiate degree after two years of postgraduate
studies (and sometimes a master's degree after one year).
Admission and
selection
T h e admission of students is another typical aspect of the Swedish

comprehensive system of higher education. T h e principle rules, for instance,
are decided by Parliament, and the detailed rules mainly by government.
This reflects the political goals, the Swedish authority traditions, and a
service attitude towards the students. (Proposals for new rules are under
discussion at present in Parliament, see below.)
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G. Svanfeldt
T h e admission system can be divided into five steps:

the capacity of different p r o g r a m m e s is decided by Parliament (see
below under authorities);
general entrance requirements c o m m o n for nearly the whole hgskolan
are at least a two-year p r o g r a m m e in secondary school with two years of
study in Swedish and English or (at least) 25 years of age, four years of
labor market experience, two years of study in English within secondary
school, and knowledge of the Swedish language (the 25:4 rule);
specific p r o g r a m m e or course requirements: every p r o g r a m m e and
every separate course has a specified requirement which is usually the study
of certain subjects within certain p r o g r a m m e s within secondary school (or
the equivalent within adult education);
rules on how to select students if there are m o r e applicants than
available places;
rules and organization for centralized admission of students to the
p r o g r a m m e s . T h e students are free to apply for any p r o g r a m m e they want,
and an application with a maximum of 12 alternatives in priority order is
sent by the student to the office for central admission.
T h e general aim of the admission rules is that the requirements should
be as liberal as possible. A t the same time, it is accepted that the
specific requirements differ substantially between p r o g r a m m e s . Academic
p r o g r a m m e s in natural sciences, medicine, and technology usually require
three years of study in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and perhaps also
biology within secondary school. Most students in traditional academic
subjects come from the three-year p r o g r a m m e within secondary school;
but some students are at least 25 years old and have n o t fulfilled
p r o g r a m m e p r e r e q u i s i t e s within s e c o n d a r y school, but h a v e fulfilled
t h e specific r e q u i r e m e n t s by studies within adult education.
O n the other hand there are many mainly quite short vocationallyoriented programmes within hgskolan which receive most of their students
from the corresponding vocational p r o g r a m m e s in secondary school. For
instance, many students in the paramedical p r o g r a m m e s at the nursery
training schools come from the paramedical stream in secondary education.
T h e separate courses often have a lower level of specific admission
requirements, and some have only a general requirement; however, there
are separate courses which require several academic subjects or even a full
degree for admission. Applicants to separate courses who are 25 years
old and have four years of labor m a r k e t experience (the 25:4 rule) may
themselves judge if they fulfil the special requirements in terms of secondary
school courses.
T h e general admission requirement is decided by Parliament, which has
also expressed the opinion that the specific requirements shall be liberal but
not in contradiction to the importance of quality within academic studies.
T h e specific requirements for the programmes have been decided u p to now
247
by the National B o a r d of Universities and Colleges ( N B U C ) , which means

that a certain p r o g r a m m e until now has had the same special requirements
at all universities and colleges, but in the future these requirements will be
decided u p o n by the individual university or college itself; thus, in future,
the p r o g r a m m e s may have different requirements. T h e specific requirements
for separate courses have always b e e n decided by the institution.
A s an extension of the secondary school reform which took place 20
years ago (which amalgamated different types of secondary schools, thus
forming the comprehensive secondary school system), it has been the
political aim to open higher education u p to students from all types of
secondary school p r o g r a m m e s . Students from the two-year theoretical and
vocational p r o g r a m m e s who were unable to fulfil the specific requirements
did so by additional studies within adult education. H o w e v e r , it is very
difficult to compare students from different p r o g r a m m e s within secondary
school. T h e solution to this problem has been to divide the applicants (to a
certain p r o g r a m m e at a certain institution) into different groups according
to their educational background, and then distribute the available places to
the different groups in proportion to the n u m b e r of applicants who fulfil the
requirements (the quota system).
Within the different groups the main criterion instrument has been the
results from secondary school and, to some extent, work experience.
Applicants who do not have a full diploma from secondary school have
been selected by length of work experience and results on a study aptitude
test.
In A u t u m n 1991 the selection system for the p r o g r a m m e s was changed.
T h e selection of up to about 4 0 % of places (different percentages for
different programmes) is now m a d e by the one-day study aptitude test
(of a traditional type). T h e rest of those admitted are selected on the basis
of secondary school results (still within the quota system). A n extra score
is added to applicants' aptitude test scores if they are at least 25 years of
age and have five years of work experience.
There is a central admission system which covers nearly all the programmes
within the state system, except aesthetic p r o g r a m m e s . It is administered by
the National B o a r d of Universities and Colleges ( N B U C ) . T h e main reason
for this system has been to avoid the occurrence of the best students being
admitted to several p r o g r a m m e s concurrently. T h e r e is a corresponding
system for the nursery training schools run by the county councils. T h e
centralized admission system produces a lot of statistics about the d e m a n d
for p r o g r a m m e s within u n d e r g r a d u a t e education, the applicants, and those
who are admitted. It indicates the popular p r o g r a m m e s as well as the
p r o g r a m m e s in least d e m a n d . H o w e v e r , quite a n u m b e r of those admitted
do not attend the p r o g r a m m e to which they gained entry, which is a real
problem for the whole admission system.
E a c h university and college admits students to its own separate courses.
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G. Svanfeldt
Earlier there were some central rules, but these were abolished in 1991.
Also, Parliament recently decided that the universities and colleges shall be
responsible for the admission to the p r o g r a m m e s from A u t u m n 1993, but
that the central admission system will be retained in o n e form or another.
It is u n k n o w n at this m o m e n t what the result of this will b e , but the central
admission system might b e c o m e purely a coordinating system like those in
other countries.

STUDENTS
T h e students are difficult to classify: part-time students are n u m e r o u s and

exist both within and outside the p r o g r a m m e s . A student admitted to one
or m o r e than o n e p r o g r a m m e might study a separate course which
may or may not be counted within the p r o g r a m m e . A student outside the
p r o g r a m m e s might later on be admitted to a p r o g r a m m e where his earlier
TABLE 2
E n r o l m e n t in undergraduate and graduate programs/courses (1989/1990)
Undergraduate
Universities
Graduate
90,000
9300
2300
533
Prof, schools
with R & D (5)
23,400
2700
Academical
colleges (16)
29,400
Estetical
schools (8)
1600
Nursery
schools (34)
7000
Priv. school of
economics
1700
(6)
University of
agriculture
Total
156,300
100
12,633
249
credits could be accepted. A student on a part-time course may at the

same time study another course or p r o g r a m m e , not necessarily at the same
university or college. Some extramural courses, organized by a university
or college, are paid for by a company. Such courses are not counted as
education within hgskolan, although the credits are sometimes accepted
within a degree.
A b o u t one-third of all students admitted to a p r o g r a m m e have earlier
b e e n studying within hgskolan. T h e median age for all beginners in the
p r o g r a m m e s is 21 years, and the median age for all u n d e r g r a d u a t e students
is 25 years.
STAFF
Swedish statistics on pupils and students are very detailed and based
mainly on a central registry of students. D a t a on staff are less detailed. T h e
academic staff within hgskolan (except nursery training schools) consists
of approximately 21,000 p e o p l e , of w h o m many are working mainly within
the area of research. T h e r e are about the same n u m b e r of support staff.
H o w e v e r , there are data on changes in personnel profiles for the 1980s.
For example, the level of qualification (for instance, doctors' degrees) has
increased, and the proportion of teachers has increased. Probably, also,
teaching has b e c o m e m o r e efficient in that the utilization of the educational
capacity has improved during the last years.
In Sweden data on s t u d e n t - t e a c h e r or student-staff ratios have not been

used as a m e a s u r e of educational quality. T h e r e f o r e , there are very few data
available on this, and no significant trends from a quality point of view
are k n o w n . A statistical problem is that many staff classified as " t e a c h e r s "
within the universities are mainly or solely researchers.
D R O P OUT RATE
Continuing education is encouraged both by government regulation

and by the opportunities available for students to take study breaks or
change p r o g r a m m e s during their studies. This m a k e s it difficult to exactly
define and m e a s u r e d r o p out rates, although there are plenty of statistics
available. T h e professionally oriented shorter p r o g r a m m e s within hgskolan
usually have low d r o p out rates ( 3 - 5 % , for example, for teacher education
and paramedical p r o g r a m m e s ) , while some of the traditional academic
p r o g r a m m e s within social sciences and humanities have very high d r o p out
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G. Svanfeldt
rates (officially, students should complete the p r o g r a m m e after two years,

but only about 5 0 % or even less pass the degree within this time). D u e to
the great variety there is no defined accepted level for d r o p outs.
D r o p out rates have been discussed on many occasions. W h e n criticized
for high d r o p out rates, teachers usually argue that academic studies have an
intrinsic value over and above the completion of a degree. It is also argued
that many drop outs from one academic p r o g r a m m e sooner or later achieve
a certificate or degree in another p r o g r a m m e .
Since the 1950s the government has tried to improve graduate studies
by modernizing the rules for a doctor's degree (now a "doctor's e x a m " ) ,
improving teaching within graduate studies, and improving scholarships. It
has been difficult to achieve these goals, so postgraduate studies in many
faculties still suffer from long duration and high d r o p out rates.
Characteristics
structure
FUNCTIONS AND GOALS
T h e 1977 Law on higher education clearly states the three functions of

higher education:
teaching;
research;
informing society about the results of research and development, and
the potential use of these results.
POSITION OF RESEARCH AND TEACHING
T h e r e is a clear political ambition to concentrate research within the seven

universities and the five professional schools with one or m o r e faculties. T h e
reason is to strengthen the quite decentralized hgskolan as much as possible
for the benefit of both research and teaching. A b o u t 3 % of the Swedish
G N P is used for R & D , mainly within hgskolan and within large companies.
International comparative figures of a few years ago showed that 0 . 7 % of
the Swedish G N P was spent on R & D within the higher education sector, which
was higher than for any other O E C D country.
Within the research structure decided by Parliament, the research councils
play an important role in allocating research money in the most efficient way.
T h e councils also regularly u n d e r t a k e research evaluations using experts
from abroad.
T h e expansion of teaching during the 1960s led to a shortage of university
teachers and a w e a k e n e d connection between teaching and research. It also
m a d e it easier for the politicians to propose new colleges which did not
have a role in research. After 1977 the political interest has been directed
251
mainly towards research and development. N e w resources for hgskolan

therefore were directed mainly to research, as was the case for the new
academic colleges (although intended to be without research). T h e r e has
been a growing interest in improving the connection between research and
teaching and in improving the research qualifications of teachers special
m o n e y has been given by the government for these purposes. T h e a m o u n t
of research at the academic colleges is growing, although it is not supported
by the government.
T h r e e years ago the government appointed a commission to improve the
quality of teaching within hgskolan. T h e commission has now presented
its proposals, including the proposal that in the future all teachers within
hgskolan
should have a practical course in pedagogy. According to
another proposal, t h e r e should be external teachers who take part in the
examination.

Higher education
legislation
A special law for the whole of hgskolan was passed by the Parliament in
1977. A n interesting detail in this law, from an international point of view,
is that it clearly states that hgskolan, in addition to education and R & D ,
shall also report results of R & D and how these might be used.
In addition to the law there is a government ordinance with very detailed
regulations (148 pages) about organization, decision-making, etc., within
hgskolan,
which extends to activities within individual academic units.
Since the hgskolan is composed of so many different types of institutions,
p r o g r a m m e s , etc., the ordinance has rules for different types of institutions
and situations.
O n e of the most detailed parts of the actual ordinance is the chapters
concerning admission of students, which include general rules and also
special rules for some specific groups of p r o g r a m m e s . T h e aesthetic prog r a m m e s are not covered by these rules; the boards responsible for these
p r o g r a m m e s may admit students according to their own rules.
A new law and ordinance is foreshadowed for 1993. It will be much less
detailed and will give vice-presidents and the local boards much greater
freedom to administer their university or college. A n important part of the
new law proposed by the government is the reform of the degree system.
T h e new system, a national system of degree recognition, aims at reducing
the present 120 p r o g r a m m e s to about 47 degrees. G o v e r n m e n t will set the
length of study (for most degrees, four years) but will leave it up to the
institutions to decide how to use this time. This reform, which may stimulate
competition between institutions, is in line with even m o r e far-reaching
proposed changes. T h e government intends to allow some institutions in
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G. Svanfeldt
the future to become private, non-profit organizations, independent of the

new ordinance.
T h e Swedish universities and other state institutions within hgskolan
are formally state authorities, following the same rules with respect to
personnel, decision-making, accounting, etc., as other state authorities.
Control of education and research
programmes
CENTRAL AND REGIONAL BOARDS
Traditionally, Sweden has had a strong centralized administration and,

at the same time in some sectors, a localized and democratically based
administration. A characteristic of Swedish government is that the ministries
have been quite small, with their main function being to p r e p a r e bills
for Parliament. Central administration is executed by central boards and
offices which work on the basis of laws and ordinances, independent of the
ministers.
Higher education, by tradition, has been one of the centralized branches
of administration. This m e a n s for instance that the Parliament decides what
p r o g r a m m e s should be offered at different universities and colleges, while
the government appoints the professors (on proposals from the faculty).
For some time there has been a central "office" for the universities, the
"university chancellor" and from 1964 the National B o a r d of Universities
and Colleges ( U H or N B U C ) . This central executive administration for higher
education has also been responsible for the comprehensive budget proposal
for hgskolan to the Ministry of Education (based on budget proposals from
all institutional boards and faculties).
During the period of expansion of higher education, mainly 1958-1970,
the N B U C had a strong influence on the implementation of different reforms.
Following this period, the budget proposals for hgskolan have been the
main duties. During the last ten years there has been a growing request from
the government for evaluation and follow-up studies. A s far as the evaluation
of teaching is concerned, no mechanism for assessment of the quality of
teaching has b e e n created. T h e only way to control quality of teaching
is through the selection of new professors. T h e assessment of research
activities is m o r e c o m m o n . Assessments by research councils occur rather
frequently but the procedures are not institutionalized, and no financial
consequences are linked to the results of the evaluation. T h e follow-up
studies provide information on graduation rates, the use of facilities, the
n u m b e r of students, and the n u m b e r of credits attained by students.
Besides the N B U C there are also other central boards and agencies involved
in higher education:
the National Board of Educational Assistance (CSN) handles the student
grants;
253
t h e N a t i o n a l B o a r d for Public Building ( K B S ) h a n d l e s all state

construction p r o g r a m m e s , including those for the universities and colleges
(the organization will be changed from 1993);
the National B o a r d of University E q u i p m e n t ( U U H ) provides expert
advice on buying equipment for universities and colleges;
nine research councils allocate money (from Parliament) for research,
mainly to the universities and professional schools (if there are projects good
enough, they may also finance research at the academic colleges);
a board of appeal handles complaints from students w h o have not b e e n
admitted to p r o g r a m m e s within hgskolan;
to p r e p a r e reforms and other changes the government often appoints
a commission with m e m b e r s h i p drawn from parliamentarians, university
teachers, or other experts, and often student representatives; and
since 1937, the National B u r e a u of Statistics has maintained a register
of all students within universities, and from 1977 within the whole hgskolan.
T h e B u r e a u collects data on admission to p r o g r a m m e s , registration within
different institutions, and p r o g r a m m e s and degrees.
F r o m 1 July 1992 the N B U C and T h e National B o a r d of University
E q u i p m e n t will be replaced by a central service office for hgskolan and
a b o a r d of appeal (for complaints on both admission and appointments).
T h e service b o a r d will administer the admission system, collect data on
the activities within hgskolan,
produce an annual activity report to the
government, and also give different types of services which the institutions
d e m a n d and are willing to pay for. Research and teaching within hgskolan
will be evaluated by the different scientific academies.
A s already m e n t i o n e d , the problems for government in handling the
fragmentation of higher education resulted in the unified organization
created in 1977. Also, the 1977 reform was intended to decentralize
administration and strengthen higher education outside the university towns.
A political compromise designed to achieve this purpose resulted in the
division of Sweden into six higher education regions. E a c h region had a
b o a r d ("regional b o a r d " ) which had to plan for the improvement of higher
education within the region. T h e boards received money for funding all
separate courses within the region. T h e regional boards had a majority
of representatives external to the region. T h e boards obviously played
an important role for the new academic colleges which started in 1977.
H o w e v e r , in the long run the criticism that the boards were overly
bureaucratic became a political p r o b l e m , so they were abolished in 1988;
government decided that each state institution should have an institutional
board with a majority of m e m b e r s from outside of hgskolan, see below.
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G. Svanfeldt
Institutional
management
and control
T h e ordinance is very detailed about hierarchical structure within the

institutions, i.e., which boards, committees, e t c . , should be established,
how they should be composed, and what their responsibility should b e . In
summary:
t h e institutional b o a r d is a p p o i n t e d by t h e g o v e r n m e n t o n
recommendation from the vice-president with (normally) the vicepresident as the chairman, two representatives from the staff, two students,
and six external representatives. T h e main task for the board is to decide
on the budget and institutional organization;
the vice-president shall be a teacher elected within the institution by
teachers, students, and support staff; he is then appointed by the government
for six years. H e is assisted by a head of the administration, appointed by
the government (new heads will probably not be appointed by government
after 1992);
the faculty and faculty board consist of professors and other qualified
teachers. T h e faculties are defined by t h e ordinance, but there may be
several locally determined sections within a faculty;
the programme boards consist of teachers, students, and representatives
from industry relevant to the specific educational programme or programmes;
as an alternative there can be a combined board for both research
and educational p r o g r a m m e s within a specific field (for instance, dentistry
or p h a r m a c y ) ;
departments are specified by the institutional board. A n academic shall
be the administrative head of the d e p a r t m e n t , assisted by an elected steering
group consisting of teachers, students, and support staff. T h e professors are
responsible for research within the d e p a r t m e n t s ;
the students have to belong to the local student union, which elects
student representatives for various administrative bodies, and also has some
responsibility for student welfare.
In 1993 most of the above arrangements will probably be changed.
Institutional b o a r d s , h o w e v e r , will still h a v e a majority of external
representatives.
DECISIONS ON PROGRAMMES AND COURSES
T h e programmes ( n a m e , goal, and length) are created by Parliament,

which also decides which programmes shall be given at what university or
college. Together with the budget allocation, the Parliament, until 1992,
decided the n u m b e r of new students for every p r o g r a m m e at every university
or college (to some extent the Parliament sets the n u m b e r of new student
places for a group of p r o g r a m m e s , so the university or college itself can
decide the capacity for the single p r o g r a m m e s within the given frame).
255
T h e p r o g r a m m e s have been divided into five (occupational) areas:

technical and natural sciences (41 programmes)
economics, administration and social sciences (16 programmes)
medicine and paramedical p r o g r a m m e s (14 programmes)
teaching (16 programmes)
culture and information (27 p r o g r a m m e s ) .
T h e Parliamentary decision on p r o g r a m m e s gives a short description of
the purpose of each p r o g r a m m e and the normal length. Within this frame
every institution has the freedom to organize the p r o g r a m m e s (courses,
specializations, etc.) as they want. Decisions about courses, examination,
etc., for each p r o g r a m m e are a local responsibility.
Every state institution receives a sum of money from Parliament for
separate courses, and the locally determined p r o g r a m m e s are financed from
this money. T h e Parliament allocates to specific institutions a certain n u m b e r
of full-time equivalent student places with respect to separate courses and
locally determined p r o g r a m m e s . T h e Parliament or government may provide
guidelines for the course p r o g r a m m e s (special subjects, courses for certain
groups, extramural courses, e t c . ) , but most courses are completely locally
determined. Local p r o g r a m m e s are constructed by the institution within
their field of competence (a local p r o g r a m m e may not be similar to any
of the centrally determined p r o g r a m m e s ) .
T h e m e t h o d of decision-making r e g a r d i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e
p r o g r a m m e s and courses may differ substantially between a university and
a college. In a university, the d e p a r t m e n t s and special boards connected
to a p r o g r a m m e or group of p r o g r a m m e s m a k e the decisions; in a small
institution, the board might have the main influence.
CONTROL OVER EXAMINATIONS AND DEGREES
Except for assessment of a thesis for a doctors' degree, examinations are

not overly formalized. T h e r e is always consideration within the university,
college, or d e p a r t m e n t as to who has the right and responsibility to
examine different courses, etc. But usually there are no rules as to how
the examination should be conducted, and in most cases there is only one
responsible teacher. Diplomas for different degrees are awarded by the
institutional administration, which merely checks that all requirements for
the degree have been fulfilled. For a doctors' degree thesis, there are clear
rules in the ordinance about public defence, approval, publishing, etc.
CONTROL OVER RESEARCH
T h e r e are three main ways of funding R & D within hgskolan.

First,
Parliament provides core funding to each faculty within the universities and
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G. Svanfeldt
professional schools which conduct research. This money is then allocated

within a faculty by the faculty itself. C o r e funding pays research staff and
provides some additional support for research activities.
Second, research councils, which receive their funding from Parliament,
support researchers and projects on a competitive basis. T h e councils
use peers appointed by the faculties to review and approve projects. A
coordination board of the research councils (which includes non-academic
members) allocates money for expensive equipment needed for R & D . It also
has money for interdisciplinary research and for information dissemination
to the public about research and its results. (The government recently
proposed the abolition of the coordinating b o a r d , but this was not accepted
by Parliament.) Using m e t h o d s similar to those of the research councils,
private agencies allocate a good sum of m o n e y to research as well.
T h e policy to concentrate R & D in the universities and professional schools
which conduct research, results in a substantial flow of funds for R & D
into universities and corresponding units from many sources. That is the
third avenue of research funding, and m e a n s that private companies, nonprofit organizations, and different types of authorities pay for R & D within
hgskolan.
New buildings and equipment are n e e d e d regularly for R & D . Until now,
the investment in new buildings was mainly determined and funded by
Parliament. F r o m 1993, all buildings for hgskolan now owned by the state
will probably be administered by a state owned company which, like other
estate companies, may hire t h e m out at m a r k e t prices and invest in new
buildings with borrowed money.
T h e need for new equipment is a persistent problem. Money from all
types of sources is used by the institutions for this purpose. During the three
years 1987-1990, the government had an agreement with all the commercial
banks that they collectively pay 200 million Swedish crowns a year for new
equipment within hgskolan, instead of paying an extra tax on profits.
T h e question of how research projects are decided is not easy to answer,
but mostly research depends on who has the money and the necessary physical
facilities (buildings and e q u i p m e n t ) . T h u s , most academics, d e p a r t m e n t s ,
and institutions constantly try to get m o r e money from institutional grants,
research councils, and other sources for research. Lack of buildings,
equipment, and qualified personnel occasionally stops projects even if
the money is available; but if the project is urgent the government,
research councils, or private companies will also pay for these facilities.
T h e administrative rules are that all monies raised externally shall be
approved by the head of the d e p a r t m e n t , and that every contract above
a certain sum shall be approved by the institutional board. All donations
of land, estates, etc., that might lead to state costs in the future require
government approval.
A n o t h e r type of economic rule is that all externally financed projects
257
( R & D , courses, etc.) shall be fully costed. A t the m o m e n t 12% of the

money is paid to the institution for overhead costs. (Insufficient financing
is a c o m m o n problem within hgskolan, which is a much discussed topic.)
PERSONNEL POLICY
In the past, appointments within the universities were mainly decided by

the government or N B U C (sometimes even by Parliament). A s the higher
education sector has grown in size, m o r e and m o r e of the appointments
are m a d e by the institutions. During the time of expansion largely during
the 1960s the n u m b e r of assistant teachers and support staff grew mainly
through local appointment. A special (centrally determined) new category of
teachers was the assistant professors, who had only the duty to give lessons
within u n d e r g r a d u a t e studies.
T h e thorough appointment process, with the final appointment of tenured
professors m a d e by the g o v e r n m e n t , and the fact that these professors
normally cannot be discharged, have given the professorships a very
high status in Sweden. N e w t e n u r e d professorships are mainly decided
by Parliament, which is o n e of the few ways for the politicians to have
an influence on research within the faculties. F r o m 1993 all professors
will probably be appointed by the local faculty, or by the vice-president.
Parliament, in the future, may also give extra money for e a r m a r k e d
professorships.
All personnel within hgskolan are civil servants functioning mainly under
the same rules as other civil servants. T h e same type of central and local labor
collective contracts are in force within hgskolan as for other authorities.
Gradually the responsibility for salaries, etc., have been decentralized, as
also is the case for personnel within hgskolan. In the past, all professors
had similar salaries (with additional m o n e y for years of service), but now
salaries are locally determined and can be set in accordance with the m a r k e t
price for different groups and personal qualifications. During recent years
the general salary system for all civil servants has been replaced by personal
salaries.
Beside about 1500 tenured professors in Sweden, there are also about
500 extra professors (full-time) and " c o o p t e d " professors (on 2 0 % of time)
appointed by the local faculties or the research councils.
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDING
G o v e r n m e n t funding is mainly based on proposed budgets (which the

government usually cuts), and then lump sums are given for different
occupational areas and different faculties. T h e different sums are mainly
based on historical data, but changes occur in light of specific requirements.
258
G. Svanfeldt
Extra money is given for raising quality, but also cutbacks have been
c o m m o n . A m o r e normative system, with extra funding for d o c u m e n t e d
improvements, is now under discussion. Also a normative system which
will exclude historical differences is being discussed. T h e funding criteria
being considered in this context are partially output oriented: enrolment
and graduation rates. Some e a r m a r k e d funding might still occur, such as
for new initiatives.
T h e institutions can transfer unused government grants to the following
year, but they also have to reimburse any deficit. State money is only
available when used in the p r o p e r way, which m e a n s that it is not paid to the
institutions until results can be shown. External m o n e y from private sources
is often paid in advance, which gives the large institutions (having m o r e
external money than small ones) financial flexibility. Small institutions have
problems with financing necessary investments in equipment due to lack of
capital. State money for R & D also comes from some state authorities (for
instance, central boards for social welfare, food and drugs, environment,
new technology, etc.).
The political goal to concentrate R & D as much as possible within universities
and some academic colleges, m e a n s that many of the other institutions have
to get a large share of their money from sources other than the government,
e.g., by selling courses to companies and other organizations (not directly
to students, as there shall not be any educational fees within hgskolan
other than the low student union fees). Of the total income, the a m o u n t
which does not come directly from the government differs widely between
TABLE 3
Total funding of hgskolan
1991/1992 (in min. Skr)
Core funding
Direct grants
u n d e r g r a d u a t e p r o g r a m m e s and courses
research and postgraduate studies
buildings and others
G o v e r n m e n t money via research councils
Payment for courses
O t h e r government money
O t h e r Swedish funding
Foreign funding
O t h e r sources
Total
10,260
4609
3546
2105
786
225
2105
1400
130
295
16367
259
different universities and colleges, with the universities having the highest
share ( 2 4 - 5 0 % ) .
Even if the figures are formally correct, they give a somewhat too low
estimate of the total economic activity within the institutions. O n e reason
is that donations (e.g., some e q u i p m e n t ) are not shown in the accounts,
nor are direct payments by central b o a r d s . A n o t h e r reason is that some
activities based on non-governmental money within the institutions
are organized as separate commercial organizations, or even as separate
companies. T h e former government tried to restrict these types of "outside
economic activities."

Swedish higher education policy naturally has two c o m p o n e n t s : ideals and
economic reality. T h e r e has b e e n great political interest in both aspects, and
to a large extent these two c o m p o n e n t s have interacted in a positive way.
For most political parties it has been important to offer individuals better
educational opportunities, to improve the educational facilities outside the
big towns, to help children from families without educational traditions, and
give adults new educational chances. These have been important motives for
Swedish educational policy since the Second World W a r .
Some decades ago Sweden suffered from a shortage of educated people;
this was a problem both for the economy and the welfare p r o g r a m m e s . This
shortage lead to a political consensus to create an effective education system,
mainly based on economic reasons. O t h e r goals of the new education
system, e.g., the integration of adult education, had m o r e support within
the left wing parties than a m o n g the others. T h e economic rationale has
also been important for funding research.
Many educational reforms, therefore, were based on consensus or, at
least, on agreement between the social democrats and o n e or two nonsocialist parties.
policy
Some of the political goals deserve special c o m m e n t ; o n e is the regional

aspect. It has been mentioned already that Sweden is a sparsely populated
country and that it is important for many politicians to try to help the
inhabitants in the most sparsely populated parts (which is m o r e than half of
Sweden). Also some research projects have been initiated at the academic
colleges often financed by local interests to help the local college with
the h o p e that R & D in the long run will also help the local economy.
Continuing education has been an important goal of educational policy
in Sweden for m o r e than 20 years. It is stated as a goal within the law for
260
G. Svanfeldt
hgskolan, and the students have in their own m a n n e r reinforced this way
of studying within hgskolan.
A n o t h e r political goal has been to try to equalize participation between
females and males. In this respect the 1977 hgskole reform can be seen
both as a success and a failure. T h e integration of short post-secondary
programmes (mainly p r o g r a m m e s for nurses, pre-school teachers, and
primary teachers) within hgskolan has resulted in 5 6 % of all u n d e r g r a d u a t e
students now being females. H o w e v e r , still the females are mainly found in
the short p r o g r a m m e s or in p r o g r a m m e s with a less favorable labor m a r k e t
situation. In contrast to stated policy, there are only 3 3 % females amongst
postgraduate students and 5 % amongst the professors.
For economic reasons there is constant political pressure for m o r e
technical and natural sciences within hgskolan. New government money
mainly goes to education and R & D in these fields, but often there have
b e e n difficulties in recruiting new students to these p r o g r a m m e s . This has
been a regular problem over the last 30 years. Especially during the 1960s,
much work was d o n e to try to calculate the future needs and supply of
qualified m a n p o w e r ; but m a n p o w e r planning has often been unsuccessful,
resulting in strong scepticism about this type of labor m a r k e t projection,
even though, whenever serious problems have occurred due to shortage
or surplus of certain educational groups, there has always been a d e m a n d
for new m a n p o w e r projections. But the actual trend at the m o m e n t is that
the politicians do not want to have responsibility for the balance between
supply and d e m a n d of different groups for the labor m a r k e t . T h e belief in the
m a r k e t system is strong at the m o m e n t . H o w e v e r , at the same time politicians
will always be forced to take some responsibility for the supply of qualified
m a n p o w e r . (The five occupational areas within u n d e r g r a d u a t e education
introduced for planning and funding purposes in 1977 never fully worked
in the supposed way and will probably be totally a b a n d o n e d in 1993.)
During the last 40 years, Swedish educational reforms have usually
been supported by the argument that they will give better educational
opportunities for children (students or adults) w h o come from families
and social groups without educational traditions. T h e result has been that
the level of education has gone up by at least four years for children
from families without educational backgrounds, and that hgskolan has a
higher percentage of students from these h o m e s than the universities had
earlier. H o w e v e r , if comparisons were to be m a d e between the same type
of academic p r o g r a m m e s now and, say, 25 years ago, the result would be
that there are either no changes or even a stronger u p p e r class selection
today than during the 1960s. T h a t is a disappointment for at least some
politicians.
T h e 1977 reform resulted in, among other things, teaching and research
(together with graduate studies) being separately funded. T h e rationale was
that the government and the Parliament wanted separate policies within
261
these two areas. It is a general problem for the politicians to find reasonable
ways to influence the research they fund. Today they have an influence
mainly through funding R & D within different faculties, by earmarking some
p e r m a n e n t professorships and by decisions on new buildings. T h e politicians
do not usually want to be involved with details at the faculty level, which is a
reason why government does not want to have separate specialized research
institutes, for which the government and the Parliament every year would
have to decide the budget.

T h e Swedish 1977 reform of higher education which led to hgskolan
had many c o m p o n e n t s , most of which have already been mentioned: the
comprehensive organization, the new academic colleges, a comprehensive
funding system with lump sums for the different occupational areas and
faculties, the regional planning boards, further decentralization of responsibility
to the institutions, a more comprehensive system with p r o g r a m m e s and
separate courses, the introduction of p r o g r a m m e s within the liberal arts
(before, there were only subject courses), a m o r e systematic planning and
follow-up system of the activities within hgskolan,
better participation
from students, support personnel and the external society in institutional
governance, and new m o r e uniform and m o r e liberal entrance rules for
admission of students.
T h e 1977 reform, in connection with the new decentralized responsibility
for the economy and planning, resulted in many unforeseen problems.
H o w e v e r , the main criticism was directed at the new rules for admission
of students and the consequences of the absence of a total n u m e r u s clausus.
T h e decision on a total n u m e r u s clausus for the whole hgskolan came within
two years and the admission system has gradually been changed, with the
main change decided in 1988 and in use from 1991.
Before the reform, there was n u m e r u s clausus for all p r o g r a m m e s except
within law and theology. T h e intention was that the 1977 reform should
introduce n u m e r u s clausus for the whole hgskolan,
with the capacities
decided by Parliament. H o w e v e r , the new non-socialist majority within
the Parliament, elected in 1976, decided that there should be no n u m e r u s
clausus for three liberal arts p r o g r a m m e s (mathematics, economics, and
social sciences) or for separate courses within the traditional fields of liberal
arts. This, in combination with the m o r e liberal entrance rules, resulted in
the n u m b e r of new students rising by about 10,000. T h e government was
not ready to pay all the extra cost for these new students. Therefore the
Parliament against the government in 1978 decided to introduce a
numerus clausus for the whole hgskolan from 1979.
262
G. Svanfeldt
T h e main objections to the admission system were that it unduly favored

adult students and that labor m a r k e t experience was given too much
attention compared to competence gained at secondary school. A n o t h e r
problem was that the admission rules favored students from the short
and/or easier p r o g r a m m e s within secondary school, and disadvantaged
students from the natural science p r o g r a m m e within secondary school.
T h e commission appointed by the government in 1983 therefore proposed
increased use of the already existing student aptitude test, and that the
admission rules could differ between p r o g r a m m e s (for instance, some
p r o g r a m m e s could admit young students while other p r o g r a m m e s could
admit students on the basis of life experience after secondary school).
Many components of the 1977 reform are now natural parts of hgskolan,
and there is no discussion on going back to the situation before 1977. L u m p
sum funding, the new academic colleges, the comprehensive credit system,
external membership on the institutional b o a r d s , much m o r e decentralized
responsibility, and the m o r e ambitious m e t h o d s of evaluation are inherent
and well accepted aspects of the system.
In A u t u m n 1990, the economic problems in Sweden on the national
level forced the government (of social democrats) to propose cutbacks and
changes within all parts of the public sector. Instead of proposing cutbacks
for hgskolan, the government proposed changes in administration, which
would further local responsibility: the centrally determined programmes
should be replaced by centrally determined degrees (which means local
freedom to construct the p r o g r a m m e s ) , and the N B U C should concentrate
o n follow-up studies, evaluation, and administrative control, together with
central admission of students, but not m a k e a comprehensive budget
proposal for the whole hgskolan.
T h e new non-socialist government, elected in A u t u m n 1991, mainly
fulfilled the changes planned by the former government, but it also has
proposed to transform some universities and academic colleges into private,
non-profit organizations. T h e Parliament has already decided to replace the
N B U C and the National Board of University E q u i p m e n t with a service office
with restricted duties.
A main steering philosophy for higher education from 1970 to 1990 has
been that m o r e and m o r e of the details and changes should be decided
locally within the organization. T o assure the politically desired direction of
decision-making and change, much of the political steering has concentrated
on the decision-making structure within hgskolan, and on whose interests
(teachers, support staff, students, labor m a r k e t representatives, local groups,
etc.) should have an influence on different boards and committees. Examples
of both success and failure of this m e t h o d of steering can be mentioned. T h e
introduction of politicians into the institutional board seems to have had the
desired effect. However, the introduction of labor m a r k e t representatives
into several hundreds of p r o g r a m m e boards within all institutions has
263
probably not had the desired effect, due to the difficulties of finding a
sufficient n u m b e r of such representatives who understand what to d o , how
to do it, and have the time to do it.
During the first ten years following the 1977 reform, the external
representatives on the institutional boards were in the minority. It was
uncontroversial that most of the external representatives were politicians
(parliamentarians or local politicians). T h a t gave these politicians an insight
into the higher education system which very few of them had had before. A t
the same time, it gave the different institutions new influential spokesmen.
Higher education institutions, for instance, came into direct contact with
the decision-makers within Parliament. A l s o , the external representatives
brought ideas and knowledge from the external society, which had an
influence on how the institutions allocated m o n e y and renewed their own
activities.
During the last decade there have been economic problems within
Sweden, and the different governments have been forced to m a k e unpopular
cutbacks. H o w e v e r , hgskolan has mainly escaped serious cutbacks. Instead,
the Parliament has decided on " m o r e students for the same m o n e y " and,
thus, higher education has received m o r e m o n e y for research and new
academic colleges. This seems to be o n e of the most important consequences
of the 1977 hgskolan reform, although it is not often recognized.
W h e n the regional boards were abolished in 1987 and the institutional
boards received a majority of external representatives, there was fear
within the universities of u n d u e political influence. A s a compromise, the
government promised that the external representatives would be mainly
"unpolitical" and that the vice-president would have a clear influence on
the appointment of the institutional board. This change in the long run
may reduce the contact between hgskolan and the political sphere, which
might be unfavorable to hgskolan.
F r o m the end of the 1980s, the discussion on the steering of higher
education has been m o r e and m o r e a discussion of economic steering.
Mainly, the discussion has gone on a m o n g those involved with different
levels of funding of hgskolan. T h e main problem has b e e n to define from
a technical point of view a better funding system. T h e present funding
system does not fit current institutional realities, w h e r e the institutions
have large incomes from sources other than the government and have
local responsibility for personnel, e q u i p m e n t , building contracts, etc. T h e
funding system is too primitive and old-fashioned c o m p a r e d to the size
of today's institutions and their large financial resources. T o change the
system the government has to change the rules for government funding and
accounting. T h e pressure group in this discussion is those staff responsible
for economic planning within the institutions; the economic administration
within the institutions has been modernized during the last few years, but it
264
G. Svanfeldt
has been too slow according to the responsible staff m e m b e r s . A new system
with a m o d e r n approach will be introduced from 1993.
A n o t h e r aspect of economic steering is the idea, mainly among some
politicians, that t h e r e should be m o r e competition between institutions, and
the notion that both the government and the students should be regarded
as buyers of education. This discussion is only just beginning, but it might
come into conflict with some ideas and principles which hitherto have been
guidelines for Swedish education policy. For example: there might be higher
d r o p out rates for adult students, resulting in lower funding, if no special
consideration is given to adult students; extramural courses will probably
be viewed unfavorably by the institutions, as they are m o r e expensive and
have higher d r o p out rates; and so o n ) . A n o t h e r problem of coordination is
the internationalization of higher education, involving a growing movement
of students and educated people between different countries; in Sweden, the
discussion of this problem is only just beginning.
11
Higher Education Policy in Switzerland
KARL WEBER

Switzerland's first university was founded in the 15th century in Basel.
Until the 19th century, Swiss universities changed little, even though access
to higher education was b r o a d e n e d as a result of the French Revolution.
Most of the universities which exist today were founded during t h e 19th
century in the context of a growing liberal m o v e m e n t ; some of t h e m had
predecessors in the form of theological academies.
A decisive phase in the m o r e recent development of higher education
in Switzerland began after the Second World W a r . During the 1960s and
1970s, university development was a top political priority. T h e r e were plans
at that time to convert the cantonal universities into federal ones. T h e
main institutions of educational policy-making and administration relating
to higher education were created during this period.
T h e r e are eight universities in Switzerland and two federal institutes
of technology. These ten institutions constitute the b a c k b o n e of Swiss
university-level tertiary education. A r o u n d this core, there are n u m e r o u s
non-academic institutions of higher learning: advanced technical colleges,
schools of business and public administration, etc.
Educational policy in Switzerland is largely formulated at the cantonal
(state) level. With few exceptions, the c o m p e t e n c e of the federal government
is limited. T h e country, therefore, does not have a uniform system of
education. T h e r e are twenty-six cantonal education systems; they have
many aspects in c o m m o n , but there are also significant differences. T h e
terminology used for the various levels and types of schooling is not unique,
a circumstance which m a k e s it difficult to orient oneself in the field of Swiss
265
266
. Weber
educational policy. T h e country's federalist, decentralized education system

can be characterized only in simplified form in the present report. T h e
synopsis in Figure 1 does not do justice to the full range of particularities
encountered in the system.
Primary and secondary
education
Compulsory schooling usually begins at the age of seven. Primary school

extends over a period of four years in four cantons (Bern, Basel-Stadt, Jura,
V a u d ) , five years in four other others ( A a r g a u , Basel-Land, Neuchatel,
Ticino), and six years in the remaining cantons.
Secondary schooling is separated into two tiers in Switzerland. T h e first
secondary level is within the period of compulsory schooling (usually nine
Switzerland
26
25
24
23
22
21
Lehrkrfteausbildung
20
Universitt
hhere technische
Lehranstalt
19
Hochschule
Techniker- |
hhere Berufsausbildung! schule
18
17
16
15
Maturittsschule
Berufsschule
Diplommittelschule
14
13
Sekundrschule Stufe 1
12
11
10
9
Primarschule
7
6
5
4
Kindergarten
3
Age
Figure 1: The Swiss educational system
Lehrerbildungsanstalt
267
years, including primary education). T h e second tier extends beyond the

legal period of compulsory education.
Five types of training are distinguished in the second tier of secondary
schooling. T h e high schools leading to the maturit degree (the basic
requirement to enter university), various types of finishing schools, and
teachers' training colleges, are all full-time schools. Vocational training and
apprenticeships, in t u r n , consist predominantly of practical training in firms
and enterprises, rather than formal classroom instruction.
Tertiary or higher
education
T h e structure of the Swiss tertiary (higher education) sector is different

from that found in other E u r o p e a n countries. Non-academic institutions of
higher learning account for a considerable part of this sector. During the
1989-1990 academic year, the total n u m b e r of tertiary-level students was
132,767. Of these, 83,277 were registered at an academic institution and
49,490 were pursuing advanced non-academic studies. T h e considerable
weight of the non-academic tertiary sector is explained by the fact that,
in Switzerland, all advanced technical colleges and professional schools are
counted in this domain.
T h e non-academic and the academic tertiary subsectors play different
but complementary roles. Training at an advanced technical college is
usually t a k e n u p after the completion of vocational education. T h e advanced
technical schools offer specialized technical training oriented to serve the
practical needs of business and the applied professions.
Non-academic
tertiary
education
Educational opportunities in the non-academic sector are varied and

n u m e r o u s . T h e r e are differences with respect to the content and design of
courses, the duration of studies, the conditions and standards of admission,
and the legal and political framework within which the schools o p e r a t e .
T h e federal g o v e r n m e n t (in Switzerland often referred to as t h e
C o n f e d e r a t i o n ) p r o m o t e s t h e uniformization of training in t h e various
applied fields by defining minimal standards for government recognition
of p r o g r a m m e s and schools. These standards refer to the content of the
curricula, credit r e q u i r e m e n t s , and the conditions of admission, examination, and minimum grades required for p r o m o t i o n and graduation. A s
a result, many schools and p r o g r a m m e s have b e c o m e m o r e comparable in
past years. H o w e v e r , due to the absence of a comprehensive legal framework
at the federal level, diversity is still a defining characteristic of the system.
T h e rules regarding admission to schools in the non-academic tertiary
field remain highly variable. All schools require the successful completion of
268
. Weber
secondary school. For some p r o g r a m m e s a n u m b e r of years of practical work

in the corresponding trade are required. T h e admission procedures may
include an examination, aptitude tests, admission interview, graphological
tests, and other requirements.
T h e various advanced technical institutes constitute the main branch of
non-academic tertiary-level education. A m o n g these institutes, the advanced
technical colleges ( H T L S ) and the business and public administration colleges
( H W V S ) are of particular significance. Next to these institutions one should
mention the advanced colleges of h o m e economics ( H H F S ) , the colleges for
social work and social pedagogy ( S A S S / S A H ) , and the special institutes for
design ( H F G S ) . Educational opportunities in the non-academic tertiary field
also include the so-called technicians' schools ( T S S ) , organized programmes
to p r e p a r e candidates for advanced examinations in various fields, and
special schools such as music c o n s e r v a t o r i e s , t h e a t r e schools, hotel
administration and tourism schools, druggist schools, and foresters' schools.
Academic
tertiary
education
Access to university is basically conditional u p o n the maturit certificate

in Switzerland. T h e relatively small fraction of young people who earn a
maturit degree (12.6% of all 19-year olds in 1988) explains, therefore,
the low percentage of university students in the population ( 1 5 . 3 % of the
resident population aged 20-24 in 1988).
T h e country's ten academic institutions of higher learning are: the two
Federal Institutes of Technology in Zrich and L a u s a n n e ; the seven cantonal
universities located in Basel, B e r n , Fribourg, G e n e v a , L a u s a n n e , Neuchatel,
and Zrich; and the University of St Gall, which specializes in economics
and law.
T h e bulk of the academic p r o g r a m m e s offered by these institutions are
degree p r o g r a m m e s leading to a license (French pronunciation; Lizenziat in
G e r m a n ) , diploma, or doctorate. Of the 12,000 university diplomas conferred
in 1989, 6 0 % were licenses and diplomas, and 1 5 % were doctorates. T h e
remaining 2 5 % were post-graduate certificates, so-called non-academic
certificates, and applied degrees for which university courses are required
but which are issued by governmental authorities or trade associations rather
than by the university.
Admission
procedures
Universities do not practice selectivity in their admissions procedures; any

maturit certificate entitles the bearer to c o m m e n c e studies at a university, as
mentioned. (The maturit degree is nationally standardized and controlled by
the federal government.) Political authorities and university administrations
269
d o not have the right to limit the n u m b e r of students in any university or

discipline. It is only in non-academic tertiary-level institutions that students
are selected via admissions rules and procedures (see above). Non-academic
institutions can therefore limit the n u m b e r of new entrants in accordance
with the absorption capacity of the school. This is not possible in the case
of the universities and the two Federal Institutes.
T h e r e is no quota system (numerus clausus) in Swiss universities. Students
are free to choose not only their discipline, but also the university they want
to attend. T h e only exception is medicine, w h e r e students may b e referred
to a school other than their first choice for reasons of absorptive capacity.
Length of studies
T h e r e are n o national guidelines regarding the minimum or m a x i m u m
duration of studies leading to a first academic degree, with the exception
of medicine and the curricula offered at the two Federal Institutes. D a t a
regarding the effective duration of studies can be obtained from the
Swiss University Information System ( S H I S ) . T h e data are published by
the Federal Office of Statistics. A study year, in these statistics, is the
corresponding fall and spring t e r m . O n average, students w h o graduated
during the 1989/90 academic year required about 12 semesters to earn their
diploma or license. But t h e r e is considerable variation in this figure between
universities, disciplines, and regions.
Size of student
population
In the S H I S data, students are defined as persons w h o were registered at

a Swiss university or Federal Institute during the fall term in question. T h e
data do not permit analysts to distinguish between full-time and part-time
students, since the universities themselves (which are the original source) d o
not m a k e this distinction. In 1980/81 there were 61,374 university students
in Switzerland; in 1990/91, the figure was 85,940.
Drop-out
rates
T h e S H I S data provide information regarding the n u m b e r of both graduates

and drop-outs. T h e point of d e p a r t u r e for analysis is given by the population
of first-year students in the 1979/80 academic year. It is interesting to ask
how many of these students have e a r n e d a first degree by the 1990 spring
term. T h e data refer to o n e cohort only, and they are not of good quality.
T h e estimated drop-out rates should be considered approximate values.
T h e d e n o m i n a t o r (the n u m b e r of first-year students) is relatively easy to
270
. Weber
determine. T h e n u m e r a t o r , in turn (i.e., the n u m b e r of graduates), cannot

be determined without ambivalence.
Until the 1990 spring t e r m , 5 3 % of the initial population had earned a first
academic degree and 7 % a so-called non-academic degree. A b o u t 4 % were
at this time still registered without a first degree. T h e remaining 3 6 % had
a b a n d o n e d their studies without graduating. T h e drop-out rate is calculated
at 3 9 % .
Several interesting aspects can be gleaned from the data. For example,
w o m e n are found to end their academic career without obtaining a degree
at a m o r e frequent rate than m e n ; by the 1990 spring t e r m , 4 2 % of the
population of female students and 3 2 % of the m e n had a b a n d o n e d their
courses without earning a degree. T h e r e are also considerable differences
between universities with respect to the drop-out r a t e , as shown in Table
1. This is, in part, a consequence of p r o g r a m m e differences between the
universities.
TABLE 1
D r o p - o u t rates of selected institutions
University
D r o p out R a t e
Geneva, Lausanne, Fribourg, Neuchatel, Zurich

between 4 0 % and 5 0 %
Basel, Bern, St. Fall
Fed. Inst, of Technology, Lausanne
Fed. Inst, of Technology, Zurich
between 3 0 % and 4 0 %
about 4 0 %
about 2 0 %
T h e r e are also considerable differences in drop-out rates between the

various disciplines. T h e highest (greater than 6 0 % ) are found in the liberal
arts; theology and history (between 50 and 6 0 % ) are also above average.
In contrast, in medicine and engineering sciences the observed rates are
30%.
Student-teacher
ratios
T h e data on s t u d e n t - t e a c h e r ratios are again somewhat deficient. Trends

in this ratio can only be estimated approximately. Table 2 shows the ratio
of students to teachers during the 1985 academic year
(Schweizerischer
Wissenschaftsrat,
1989, p p . 48 ff).
It should be noted that s t u d e n t - t e a c h e r ratios have b e c o m e progressively
m o r e unfavorable in recent years.
271
TABLE 2
S t u d e n t - t e a c h e r (St/T) ratios (teachers expressed as full-time equivalents,
S H I S categories I and II)
BS
BE
FR
GE
LS
NE
SG
ZH
E P F L E T H Z Total
St
6540 8810 5395 11,367 6398 2243 2856 18,128 2992
192 234 145 319

247 98
53
321
114
St/T 34.1 37.6 37.2 35.6
25.9 22.9 53.9 56.5
26.2
9695
275
35.3
74,806
2013
37.2
SOURCE:
Federal Office of Statistics and Swiss Science Council
ABBREVIATIONS:
B S (Basel), B E (Bern), FR (Fribourg), G E ( G e n e v a ) , LS (Lausanne),
N E (Neurchatel), H S G (St. Gall), Z H (Zrich), E P F L (Federal
Institute at Lausanne), E T H Z (Federal Institute at Zrich).

T h e analysis presented in the remainder of this article refers to the
academic sector only. W e focus on the eight cantonal universities and
the two Federal Institutes of Technology which were identified above.
T h e reasons for this delimitation include the fact that there is no legal or
organizational structure which covers all institutions of higher education in
Switzerland. T h e non-academic sector is a world of its own, as we have seen,
and it is highly differentiated with respect to disciplines covered, ownership
(public or private) and, in part, admissions rules. T h e tertiary educational
sector, therefore, may be viewed as a collection of n u m e r o u s subsystems
with loose interconnections.
Legal basis
T h e legal framework for educational policy at the academic level rests on
three pillars which exhibit differing principles of construction, as described
below.
Article 27 of the federal constitution authorizes the Confederation
to establish or maintain institutions of higher learning. Until now, the
Confederation has twice m a d e use of this competence: in 1854 it created
the Federal Institute of Technology in Zrich, and in 1968 it took over the
then cantonal Polytechnical School in L a u s a n n e . Based on the so-called E T H
Law, both of these institutes are financed almost exclusively by the federal
government.
In 1971, a Federal Act on financial assistance to the cantonal university
system was enacted. T h e following universities and academies are currently
benefiting from federal support through this Act: Basel, B e r n , Fribourg,
272
. Weber
G e n e v a , L a u s a n n e , Neuchatel, Zrich, St Gall, the theological seminary

at L u c e r n e , and the pedagogical institute at St Gall. T h e Act permits
two forms of support: Basic grants and investment grants. T h e revised
Act (1988), which will enter into force shortly, makes it possible for the
Confederation to grant extraordinary contributions for priority projects of
national interest.
T h e universities fall under the political authority of the cantonal
Departments of Education. Cantonal and federal legislation is complementary.
This legal framework the product of a long historical tradition is quite
complex. Cantonal university legislation is part of the respective cantonal
constitutions. T h e institutional framework within which universities operate
varies considerably between cantons. T h e autonomy of the university
administration is not the same everywhere. T h e remuneration of faculty
m e m b e r s varies, as does the delegation of competence to the university
rector or president, including his or her autonomy in the area of personnel
policy. Personnel policy, in fact, is strongly influenced by cantonal civil
service rules and, in the case of the Federal Institutes, the personnel policy
of the federal government. Personnel policy therefore varies between
universities. T h e r e are no national guidelines regarding the desired (or
efficient) personnel e n d o w m e n t of given disciplines or d e p a r t m e n t s . Faculty
m e m b e r s are normally appointed (the term used in Switzerland is "elected")
by the cantonal governments (the Federal Council in the case of the Federal
Institutes) on the basis of proposals m a d e by the university. Professors are
normally appointed for four-year periods with the possibility of renewal of
contract.
Room for educational policy makers to
maneuver
Swiss university legislation permits the federal government to take direct

action in its area of c o m p e t e n c e , i.e., the Federal Institutes of Technology.
T h e Confederation supports cantonal universities on a subsidiary basis only.
This is also the case because federal financial support is graded according to
a canton's economic status. Federal contributions a m o u n t to 6 0 % of total
university expenditure in financially weak cantons, and u p to 3 5 % in the
stronger cantons. Switzerland lacks a comprehensive, federal-level legal
framework for the promotion of university education (except insofar as the
two Federal Institutes are concerned). Current rules represent a compromise
between centralist and federalist tendencies in Swiss university policy.
T h e far-reaching autonomy enjoyed by the cantons in the formulation of
their university policy means that there are no national curricula in most
disciplines. Uniform and binding curricula exist only in medicine, dentistry
and pharmacology; in these fields the federal government guarantees the
quality of the training by prescribing the curricula and required grade
273
point averages for graduation. In all other disciplines, the credit and other
requirements to graduate vary between universities, and in some cases
significantly so. T h e curricula in the various disciplines, therefore, display
a local profile. Psychologists, for e x a m p l e , obtain a different education in
Bern and G e n e v a . Also, there are substantive differences between G e r m a n
and French speaking Switzerland. In the former region, the orientation is
toward G e r m a n y ; in the latter, toward France. T h e requirement of the
Habilitationsschrift
(a thesis-length post-doctoral study which candidates
for a faculty position must show on their C V ) , for example, is only found
in universities in the G e r m a n speaking part of the country.
In the past, there have been repeated attempts to coordinate the academic
curricula in terms of content and timing. T h e last time this was attempted
was in the early 1970s. H o w e v e r , in the Swiss federalist system, these
attempts are perceived as unacceptable top-down measures, and they have
always been d o o m e d to failure. In the m e a n t i m e , the diversity of the
educational profiles offered by various universities is seen as an advantage
by many; this diversity enables the various institutions to develop areas of
comparative advantage and to a c c o m m o d a t e regional needs.
Study p r o g r a m m e s and syllabuses are thus p r e p a r e d at the level of each
individual university. In the cantonal universities, the academic d e p a r t m e n t s
and institutes play a key role in this process. In the Federal Institutes, the task
is led by the presidents' offices. Definitive decisions in this field are normally
m a d e by cantonal D e p a r t m e n t s of Education in the case of the universities
and by the Schulrat in the case of the Federal Institutes (the Schulrat is
the B o a r d of the Federal Institutes). In addition, in the case of certain
post-graduate courses, two or m o r e universities have developed agreements
regarding the joint execution and recognition of the respective course of
study. Such agreements, however, have always been the result of voluntary
and ad-hoc cooperation, rather than being imposed by government. A s a
rule, they are limited to the sciences and the universities in the French
speaking part of the country.
T o the extent that research is funded by the regular budget of an institute
or chair, the respective faculty m e m b e r s and institute directors are free in
the choice of their research projects. A formal research policy is defined only
for the two Federal Institutes. H e r e , research committees decide on resource
allocation on the basis of submitted proposals. But the most important
public source of funding for academic research is the Nationalfonds
(the
national research fund administered for the federal government by a socalled Research Council). T h e Research Council approves or rejects projects
for funding based on the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of the corresponding sectoral
d e p a r t m e n t of the Nationalfonds.
T h e sectoral d e p a r t m e n t s develop their
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n on the basis of expert advice which is often obtained
abroad.
274
. Weber
Funding
structure
It will not come as a surprise at this stage that the funding provisions for
the Swiss university system are complex. A first point to k e e p in mind is that
the level of resources is a matter of negotiation between the universities and
governmental authorities.
A t the cantonal level, this negotiatory process works according to a variety
of rules. Local peculiarities and traditions play an important role. In some
cases, the cantonal governments hand down an initial budget, whereas
in others, the first draft budget is produced jointly by government and
university administrators. In principle, budgeting for the Federal Institutes,
and the federal contributions to cantonal universities under the Federal Act,
is d o n e in this latter way.
A t the national level the University Conference coordinates and supervises
university development plans. (The Swiss University Conference is a coordinating body responsible for bringing about cooperation between the
universities and reviewing academic programmes.) The University Conference
operates on the basis of a b o t t o m - u p approach. Commissions, composed of
faculty m e m b e r s and delegates from university administrations, are formed.
Local development plans are brought together in a national university
development plan (Schweizerische Hochschulkonferenz,
1980). This is then
used by the federal government to define the level of financial contributions
to the university system (cantonal contributions are normally already known
at this stage). H o w e v e r , the effective federal contribution is usually a
function of the federal budget situation, rather than the agreed needs of
the university system. This m e a n s , among other aspects, that the federal
share in total university spending may vary considerably between years.
T h e coordination of university development plans at the national level
includes: the definition of principal goals and content of the plan; the
fine-tuning of plans in terms of timing and content; articulation of any
need to coordinate with, and divide tasks between, various universities;
and joint definition of financial needs. T h e guidelines for this work include
the policy orientations issued by the Science Council every four years. (The
Science Council is the advisory body of federal government for university
education and research.) It is in the nature of this process that there are no
objective data, valid for the country as a whole, for the provision of financial
resources to the universities. O n e consequence of this is, for example, that
a professor is expected to tutor 100 students at university x, whereas 150
students are considered normal at university y. Financial planning and the
planning of physical (including personnel) resource needs are often only
loosely coupled at the local level. This is characteristic for the system.
In addition, large investment projects must b e approved by the cantonal
parliaments or even the voters themselves. A t the federal level, the federal
parliament must give its consent for federal contributions to the university
system.
275
Cantonal and federal financial means constitute the basic resource envelope
of the universities (Table 3). Decisions regarding the local development
of the universities are taken by the cantons. T h e federal government has
few ways to influence this process it functions re-actively, rather than
pro-actively.
TABLE 3
Financing of university expenditure, 1989
Public funding
Confederation
Cantons
a) coverage by university cantons
b) contributions by non-university cantons
Townships
Income
D o n a t i o n s and grants
Interest income
Rental income
Fees, tuition
Income from study assignments
O t h e r income
Total
SOURCE:
Fr. 1000
2,743,438
1,165,616
94.4
40.1
1,403,775
165,226
8821
48.3
5.7
0.3
163,052
14,919
7209
5609
50,151
53,201
31,963
5.6
0.5
0.3
0.2
1.7
1.8
1.1
2,906,490
100%
Federal administration of finance
Tuition fees contribute to a varying part of university expenses. In general,

however, this is a minor source of university funding. T h e r e are no political
efforts to raise university tuition appreciably, but in the area of continuing
education there is a trend toward raising user charges to a level sufficient
to pay for a high share of the cost of teaching.

Higher education policy b e c a m e an issue in Swiss politics during the 1950s.
T h e public debate became m o r e structured during the 1960s. A t the outset,
the federal government began to m a k e available research funds (with the
establishment of the Nationalfonds).
A t the end of the 1960s the Federal
Office of Education and Science was created, as well as the University
276
. Weber
TABLE 4
University expenditure by type, 1989
in Fr. 1000.-
% A
1,536,223
52.9
62.5
164,132
44,776
22,012
16,840
5.7
1.5
0.8
0.6
6.7
1.8
0.9
0.7
Construction and furniture

Student services (excl. scholarships)
337,646
5671
11.6
0.2
13.7
0.2
Various expenditures
Materials (teaching and research)
Other
148,607
183,811
5.1
6.3
6.0
7.5
Effective spending, bills

University hospitals (20%)
2,459,718
446,772
84.6
15.4
Total
2,906,490
Salaries
all personnel
Scientific equipment
Investment and maintenance
B o o k s , journals, etc
R e n t a l payments
Real estate transactions
100
100
A : including teaching hospitals

B: excluding teaching hospitals
SOURCE:
Federal administration of finance
Conference and the Science Council. T h u s , but for measures related to the
Federal Institute of Technology in Zrich, national-level higher education
policy does not have a long tradition in Switzerland.
Institutional
overview
Swiss higher education policy is the result of the coming together of

many forces and actors at many levels of government. A t the federal level
an inner circle of actors can be discerned: the University Conference, the
Science Agency, the Federal Office of Education and Science, the Science
Council, and the B o a r d of the Federal Institutes. Interaction in this circle
is intensive. T h e r e is also an outer, concentrical circle: it consists of the
Conference of Swiss University Rectors, the four scientific academies, the
Maturit Commission, and the Conference of Education Directors (heads
of cantonal D e p a r t m e n t s of E d u c a t i o n ) .
277
Let us now consider the responsibilities of these various actors and

institutions, as they are provided by law or have manifested themselves
in the course of the years.
T h e University Conference is a joint organ of the federal and cantonal
governments. Its main task is to p r o m o t e collaboration a m o n g Swiss
universities. T h e instruments at its disposal include planning, coordination,
and information. Over the years, the University Conference has spawned
many subcommissions. These work on particular aspects of higher education
including information sciences, medicine, library science, continuing education, ecology, construction projects, and so on. T h e University Conference
includes representatives from the universities, the cantonal education directors,
the governments of the cantons without universities, the Science Council, the
Federal Office of Education and Science, and the student body.
T h e Science Agency (created in 1990) is the youngest institution in
higher education policy planning. Its task is to coordinate research and
science. It pays special attention to the coordination of developments at
the universities and the two Federal Institutes. T h e C o m m i t t e e maintains
international science contacts and develops strategies for a national science
policy.
T h e Federal Office of Education and Science is the executive body of
the government for science policy. It implements the legislation on university
development; it also plays a role in international science cooperation and
participates in long-term energy and space exploration. It has a staff of
about 50.
T h e Science Council is the advisory board of the federal government
for all matters of university education and research. It evaluates the
medium-term and long-term development of the university system, develops
orientational guidelines every four years, and pronounces itself on sizeable
university projects on behalf of the government. The Science Council is
composed of scientists, politicians, and private sector (business) representatives.
T h e Board of the Federal Institutes, finally, is the managing body
of the two Federal Institutes and their associated research agencies, as
stated earlier. This body formulates policy, defines goals and strategies, and
carries out a coordination role between the two Federal Institutes. Like the
Science Council, this body includes scientists, politicians and private sector
(business) representatives.
T h e actors of the outer circle will not be described in the same detail,
because many of t h e m are also represented on the inner circle (cumulation
of offices). O n e should n o t e , however, that the actors of the inner and the
outer circle meet periodically in the so-called Coordination Conference,
which is chaired by the Minister of the Interior of the Swiss government.
This body, however, is devoted to the exchange of information; it does not
have the competence to m a k e decisions.
278
. Weber
The dilemma between planning
and
legitimacy
T h e fact that there is no coherent framework and hierarchy of objectives

in the area of higher education policy is a consequence of the particular
historical, legal, and institutional conditions which have shaped the Swiss
system in the course of time. Instead, there exists what might be called goals
and perspectives. They are articulated by the institutions identified above,
and most notably by the University Conference which works " b o t t o m - u p , "
and the Science Council whose approach is " t o p - d o w n . " T h e University
Conference and the Science Council are the two premier bodies in Swiss
higher education policy.
In its report Hochschulplatz
Schweiz Horizont 1995 (published in
1989), the Science Council identified five major goals:
significant improvements in the conditions of teaching (by exploiting
reserves and opportunities for action within the competence of the universities);
m o r e effective responses by the universities to the needs of society
(including, for example, expansion of the n u m b e r of female scientists,
reduction of regional differences in access to university education, raising
the n u m b e r of graduates in the technical and engineering disciplines, and
promotion of continuing education);
energetic promotion of scientific cadres to meet the needs of the
1990s;
opening toward E u r o p e (student exchange, mutual recognition of
diplomas and equivalencies);
identification of areas of concentration in research.
In the document Hochschulen Schweiz 1992-1995 (1990), the University
Conference stressed three priority objectives:
expansion of the pool of qualified academics in view of the generational
change in the population of university professors expected in the 1990s, and
raising the proportion of women in this group;
e n h a n c e m e n t of teaching and research efforts in the following fields:
position of Switzerland in E u r o p e and the world, ethics, communication,
and environmental sciences;
provision of new-generation technical equipment and m o d e r n computer
support.
T h e University Conference and the Science Council are agreed that
the federal government will have to raise its financial contribution to the
university system very significantly in the future. H o w e v e r , neither body
has so far attempted to quantify this.
T h e methods of achieving the goals formulated by the two bodies is
currently a matter of political d e b a t e . T h e institutions participating in
this debate include the Federal Office of Education and Science, the
University Conference, the Schulrat or B o a r d of the Federal Institutes,
the Nationalfonds,
and the Science Council.
279
T h e federal government does not define coherent goals for the Swiss
university system. It nevertheless articulates objectives as n e e d e d to convince
Parliament to authorize the funding to be provided to the Federal Institutes
and the universities; these objectives legitimize the government's budget
requests. They should not be interpreted as objectives for direct government
action, because the federal government has no instruments to enforce action
at the cantonal level. This only works on a consensual basis.
T h e main topic of the higher education policy debate today is the financial
bottleneck of the Confederation and the various university cantons. A s late
as last year prior to the elections the federal Parliament promised
greater commitment for universities and research. Two m o n t h s later, the
promises were retracted and budget cuts were put into effect. Universities
will o p e r a t e u n d e r stringent budget constraints in the coming years. For
some university cantons like G e n e v a and Bern the problem is as severe as
it is for the Confederation. Cumulative negative effects are to be expected.
For example, the university of Bern is currently reviewing and re-prioritizing
its p r o g r a m m e of teaching and research; a n u m b e r of p r o g r a m m e areas
and projects will have to be a b a n d o n e d . O t h e r universities are learning
to function with a zero-growth budget. T h e federal government is also
providing less money for targeted priority p r o g r a m m e s for which funding
had been promised.
Beyond this, there are topics which the Science Council, in particular,
proposes to address and which relate to the E u r o p e a n higher education
d e b a t e . They include the shortening of curricula and the average duration
of studies, the evaluation of performance in the social sciences, and the
organization of higher education at large. T h e issue of evaluation of a
university's performance has been discussed sporadically in the past (for
example, concerning - Z r i c h and the University of Basel). Discussions
are currently underway on how to introduce the notion of evaluation into
a federalist system.
In the context of Swiss education policy making, it is logical that the
Science Council in its capacity as the advisory body of the government
plays an important role in setting the agenda of the d e b a t e . H o w e v e r ,
years pass between the identification and articulation of a problem and the
implementation of solutions. For example, the Science Council had pointed
as early as 1984 to the problems of continuing education and the expected
academic personnel bottlenecks of the 1990s, but measures only began to
be taken in 1990-91.
H o w e v e r , it is undisputed that five developments have elicited a significant
policy debate in recent years: science policy in the E u r o p e a n Community;
the newly overarching role of technical sciences in economic competitiveness
(in particular biotechnology and information technologies, as well as the
development of new materials); the associated dearth of engineers; new
forms of pragmatic cooperation between universities and the business
280
. Weber
sector; and the heightened expectations of w o m e n regarding science and

the university.
Negotiating
in higher education policy in a system of "checks and
balances"
Every four-year planning cycle starts with an update of educational policy

goals. T h e policy goals, which are accepted by the Federal Council after
preparatory work by the Science Council and the University Conference, are
the result of a process of negotiation in a system of checks and balances.
This system is characterized by the following poles: autonomy versus
h e t e r o n o m y of the universities, and centralism versus federalism. T h e notion
of autonomy refers to the institutional r o o m for m a n e u v e r enjoyed by each
university. T h e term h e t e r o n o m y refers to the universities' d e p e n d e n c e on
political institutions (cantonal and federal governments). T h e concept of
federalism relates to the fact that the cantonal government plays a key role
in shaping its university, with the federal government playing a subsidiary
role. T h e notion of centralism, finally, refers to how strongly federal-level
institutions are able to influence cantonal universities. Within these four
poles very different alliances can arise, depending on the issue at hand.
For example, the Federal Institutes of Technology are represented on the
planning commission of the University Conference. But the decisions of the
commission are not m a n d a t o r y for these Institutes, since the legal basis for
their funding is not the Federal A c t , but the E T H Law.
O n e might say that, in the system described, the Science Council (a
body with a centralist perspective) argues the case of a (non-existent)
Swiss national university. It therefore articulates the above-mentioned
development perspectives. They are reviewed critically by the cantonal
universities, and ideas from the Council are used on a selective basis.
T h e planning commission of the University Conference, in turn, melts
the cantonal university growth plans into an overall plan for Switzerland,
taking into account the specificities of each university. It is of an additive
n a t u r e , due to the fact that the University Conference has a coordination
function, but is unable, by its m a n d a t e , to enforce priorities. Every canton
can veto its proposals.
T h e University Conference is rightly considered the most important arena
of the higher education policy d e b a t e . T h e main reason for this is the fact
that all actors of Swiss university life are represented on it, and so it is viewed
as a joint organ of the Confederation and the cantons. But it is not difficult
to see that, because "everybody" is represented on it, the Conference
is unable to spearhead truly innovative and long-term perspectives. T h e
defence of the interests of the cantons and their universities always looms
large in Conference deliberations. It is therefore not surprising that there
are frequent tensions in this body between representatives of the Science
281
Council and the Federal Office of Education and Science, on the one
h a n d , and those of the cantonal governments and their universities, on
the other. In this constellation, the cantons' goal to maintain jurisdiction
over higher education is constantly articulated. But there are also conflicts
at the cantonal level, which often arise between university administrations
and cantonal political authorities.
New instruments
of the federal
government
Existing legislation (in particular the Federal Act) m a k e s it almost

impossible for the federal government to introduce changes in cantonal
universities which may be necessary from a national point of view. T h e
instruments of basic contributions and investment contributions provided
for by the Federal Act presuppose that the federal government supports the
effort of the cantons in a subsidiary fashion. Decisions regarding construction
projects at universities are basically cantonal ones. T h e Confederation
reserves the right to formulate a prior opinion only in the case of major
projects, and, as a rule, these opinions lead to only marginal changes in
the cantonal projects. Therefore, the traditional promotional instruments
of the Confederation have b e e n c o m p l e m e n t e d in recent years.
T h e i n s t r u m e n t of so-called special m e a s u r e s e n a b l e s t h e federal
government to influence certain developments by providing targeted, special
funding. These extraordinary measures a r e , however, limited in time. This
leads to the issue, at the level of the cantons, as to who takes over the
continuation of funding after the federal impulse ends. Special measures
are therefore greeted with varying interest. Some cantons with a relatively
strong financial basis (e.g., Zrich) view t h e m very skeptically.
Special m e a s u r e s h a v e so far b e e n t a k e n in t h e following a r e a s :
information sciences, c o n t i n u i n g e d u c a t i o n , mobility of s t u d e n t s and
teachers, and measures to ensure an a d e q u a t e pool of scientists in the
1990s. These measures have led to developments in the universities which
would not have been possible without such incentives. But the existence of
special measures forces the universities to decide if they want to use certain
funds for certain tasks or if they want to renounce new funds.
F r o m 1992 onward, the special measures relating to training and teaching
will be c o m p l e m e n t e d by core research p r o g r a m m e s (based on the research
law). P r o g r a m m e s in biotechnology, information science, and environmental
science are u n d e r preparation.
T h e r e can be n o doubt that the federal government is capable of putting
in motion certain changes in the cantonal universities by m e a n s of two new
types of instruments, i.e., special measures and core research p r o g r a m m e s .
T h e government also thereby introduces a minimal a m o u n t of competition
into the university system, in the sense that, in order to obtain funding for
282
. Weber
continuing education, project proposals must be submitted. T h e described

instruments do not only represent a reaction to the relatively limited steering
possibility of the Federal Act, but such instruments are probably needed in
general, in order to obtain the required financial m e a n s from the federal
Parliament. M e m b e r s of Parliament want to know the concrete projects for
which they authorize funding.
Reflection of Structure, Authority, and Higher Education Policy on

If one wants to discuss the ways in which educational policy affects the
university system and how the institutions of higher learning react to new
policy incentives, one has to recall some of the basic conditions which
currently shape higher education in Switzerland. These conditions are the
result of past political decisions, and they will play an important role in
shaping the future evolution of the university system.
Attractive general
appearance
T h e teaching and research profile encountered in Swiss universities is

diverse. T h e r e are shorter and longer course p r o g r a m m e s in o n e and the
same discipline, the content of curricula varies a m o n g universities, and the
education offered is in some cases specifically adapted to regional needs. In
addition to the university system, there exists the trade-oriented, applied,
and differentiated non-academic tertiary sector. T h u s , the general outlook
of Swiss higher education seems m o d e r n , flexible, and up-to-date: one can
find something to respond to almost any need. It is not surprising that the
Swiss system is studied by educators and education planners abroad. Is their
interest justified? Let us first look at the universities in the narrow sense of
the term.
Disparities in the Swiss higher education
system
T h e r e are many factors which point to growing disparity in the Swiss

higher education system, and we will mention two of t h e m h e r e . First, the
two Federal Institutes and the universities of the financially strong cantons
Zrich and G e n e v a are better endowed than the remaining institutions. This
does not mean that the s t u d e n t - t e a c h e r ratio is necessarily better in these
schools, but it is certain that their scientific potential is higher. This can be
shown by means of a comparative analysis of the n u m b e r of faculty and
assistant professor positions, the sophistication of laboratory e q u i p m e n t ,
and the degree of specialization in research (Weber/Niederberger, 1984).
283
Second, the identified differences between universities are the result of

cumulative differences at the level of individual d e p a r t m e n t s and disciplines.
In general, the engineering and natural sciences are better endowed than
the liberal arts. This is true if one looks at the issue across universities, but
the magnitude of the differences varies. T h e liberal arts d e p a r t m e n t s in the
financially weak cantons are particularly ill e n d o w e d .
T h e s e inequalities are not, of course, wanted by the higher education
policy process. They are neither a consequence of competition between the
various institutions, nor are they the product of deliberate university-level
m a n a g e m e n t decisions. T h e inequalities are rather the unintended result
of the federalist structure of higher education policy in a country whose
constituent states, the cantons, enjoy a high degree of i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e cantonal universities are rooted in local traditions. Their current
state of development is the result of a long negotiatory process with
cantonal authorities. T h e patterns of decision-making in this process are
influenced by many checks and balances, a fact which is not without its
p r o b l e m s , since science, in turn, is increasingly organized according to
globally accepted principles. F u r t h e r m o r e , the development possibilities
of individual universities are a function of economic conditions in the
corresponding canton.
Neither the cantonal universities nor the Federal Institutes have reformed
their legal basis in the last 20 years. Since the 1968 period, their structures
have remained the same: the position of t e n u r e d , full professors is strong;
the various d e p a r t m e n t s view themselves as guardians of quality in teaching
and research; the liberal arts and law d e p a r t m e n t s are not yet modernized
(research is undifferentiated in these disciplines); and so on. University
reform has not so far been possible at the cantonal level.
T h e local roots of the universities may also explain why the issues
of university a u t o n o m y and academic freedom have not acquired the
prominence they have in o t h e r countries. A t the cantonal level, political and
academic processes of decision-making interact. A u t o n o m y is re-interpreted
pragmatically on a daily basis, mostly in the framework of informal face
to face relations. F u r t h e r m o r e , in a small polity such as Switzerland, the
self-interest of science is less clearly articulated than elsewhere. This can, in
particular, be observed in the case of the small universities in small cantons.
T h e r e are perhaps structural reasons for this p h e n o m e n o n . It is thus not
surprising that the term a u t o n o m y used in the context of educational policy
refers not so much to the a u t o n o m y of the universities in Switzerland, but
to that of the cantonal D e p a r t m e n t s of Education. Smallness has its price:
in view of unequal conditions between and within disciplines and schools,
it is hardly possible for competition to arise. Instead, there are signs of
segmentation in teaching and research. For example, the exchange of
personnel between universities is asymmetric. It is quite normal for an
284
. Weber
assistant professor from the university of Zrich to obtain a full chair at

the small university of Neuchatel; the reverse rarely h a p p e n s .
These disparities are not only symptoms of the fact that educational policy
is inclined to give preferential t r e a t m e n t to the economically and technically
competitive disciplines. T h e liberal arts have missed the chances which
existed in the 1960s to extend their personnel e n d o w m e n t . Obviously, there
was not only a lack of motivation for modernization in various disciplines in
this field, but also a lack of pressure from the outside. T h e r e are indications
that the above-mentioned disparities are becoming m o r e important. T h e
growing importance of international cooperation and p r o g r a m m e s in science
and continuing education, whether they are funded publicly or privately, acts
to re-enforce the position of federal science and education authorities. T h e
same process also strengthens applied research and development, and, in
general, the sciences and engineering professions. T h e two Federal Institutes
and the universities of Zrich and G e n e v a are particularly favored in this
process. T h e conclusion is therefore inescapable that a multi-class system
may be in the making.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that there are also tendencies which
point in the opposite direction. T h e new outlook toward E u r o p e not only
strengthens the position of federal institutions of higher education policy
planning, but it also implies a re-valuation of the universities located near
the borders. For example, the University of Basel collaborates m o r e closely
than ever with the University of Freiburg ( F R G ) and institutions in Karlsruhe
and Strassburg; the University of G e n e v a works with the universities of Lyon
and G r e n o b l e ; and the University of Neuchatel is establishing contacts with
the University of Besanon. This opening toward the outside could in future
render internal coordination even m o r e c u m b e r s o m e , and it could change
the domestic distribution of power between universities. It may be that at
some point in the future the universities, which due to their geographical
location are unable to establish links with foreign partners and which do
not achieve a critical size of their own, may be at a disadvantage. Examples
of institutions in this category are B e r n , Fribourg, and L a u s a n n e .
All told, there are many indications to the effect that the Swiss higher
education system is caught in a process of progressive segmentation. O n e
can identify the contours of five segments which are not identical with
individual institutions of higher learning. Their respective genesis is the
result of a unique logic in each case:
there is, first, a segment characterized by international orientation
of teaching and research. It includes most of the science d e p a r t m e n t s and
medical schools and is located in particular at the two Federal Institutes and
the universities of Zrich and G e n e v a , as well as in medicine B e r n ,
Basel, and L a u s a n n e ;
a second segment is both applied and internationally oriented and
o p e r a t e s , among other aspects, with a view to the needs of the chemical
285
industry. Some of the engineering sciences belong to this segment, as well

as the m o d e r n "hybrid" sciences, especially biotechnology;
a third segment is national in scope, and it is often culturally oriented
(liberal arts, social science, and law schools). Teaching is m o r e important
than research in this segment;
a fourth segment is defined with a view to local needs. It includes in
particular the university-level teachers' colleges;
a fifth segment, finally, is in the making. It consists of the non-academic
tertiary institutions.
W e can thus conclude: the Swiss higher education system is composed
of universities of unequal size and scientific potential. O n e can, in effect,
talk of a hierarchy of universities. T h e university system as a whole has
grown only moderately by international standards, and (perhaps because
of this reason) the legitimacy of academic institutions is not in d o u b t ;
u n e m p l o y m e n t a m o n g academics is almost nil. A university education is
still a major asset in the j o b m a r k e t . This is why there has b e e n little pressure
from the labor m a r k e t for a renewal of higher education. Inequalities in
resource e n d o w m e n t , and regarding organizational and structural conditions
largely explain why inter-university coordination frequently desired and
announced by federal authorities succeeds only with difficulty. Successful
coordination requires conditions which permit all participants to gain from
joining forces, as opposed to going it alone. In a system of unequal partners
there will, however, necessarily be winners and losers. Also, the identified
structural conditions m a k e it difficult to introduce true competition between
universities.
Knowledge and science policy
decisions
It is curious to note that, in comparison with other countries of similar

size, little systematic knowledge about universities and higher education
policy has been developed in Switzerland (cf. W e b e r , 1988). Switzerland
does not have a center for research on higher education, nor do the social
sciences address the universities as objects of research on a regular basis.
This situation may be considered a consequence of the limited felt need for
systematic knowledge in the policy process as it relates to higher education.
T h e r e is and has b e e n a tendency in our self-administered universities
and governmental education bureaucracies to have non-specialists work
on solutions to new problems. Available staff are asked to address new
issues regardless of their qualification. O n e and the same person often
acts both as a planner and a decision-maker. A t the local level, politicians
and university administrators interact informally; face to face encounters
are quite frequent. Because the decision paths between universities and
local authorities a p p e a r short and transparent (university d e p a r t m e n t s
286
. Weber
and institutes address themselves directly to the corresponding cantonal

D e p a r t m e n t of E d u c a t i o n ) , there has been no felt need for systematic
knowledge about the university system. In general terms one might say
that, at the local level, the quality of personal relations is m o r e important
in educational and managerial decision-making than scientific insights into
the genesis of these decisions.
G o v e r n m e n t a l offices dealing with higher education are small and little
professionalized, both at the federal and the cantonal level. T h e two
Federal Institutes are managed by the federal government (as opposed to
the administrations of the Institutes themselves) with very limited personnel
resources. U n d e r these conditions it is not possible to build a systematic body
of knowledge on the subject of higher education policy. H e n c e , cooperation
between governmental authorities and the universities is an absolute must.
Can policy-making
circumstances be improved
differentiation ?
by means
of
organizational
T h e r e is no doubt that observers' and users' expectations regarding

the university system have grown. First, many people are arguing that
the universities should organize themselves better in order to strengthen
their capacity to innovate (cf. Wissenschaftsrat, 1989). Efforts a r e , in
effect, underway to delegate greater autonomy and authority to university
administrators. In several institutions the n u m b e r of years during which a
rector (or president) can remain in office is being extended (e.g., B e r n ,
Zrich), and the n u m b e r s of managerial staff are being increased. It is still
t o o early to tell what the impact of these changes will b e on the universities,
however.
Second, measures have been taken to m a k e higher education policy more
effective. A process of organizational differentiation can be observed on
the Swiss higher education policy scene. T h e University Conference has
created subcommissions to deal with new tasks. T h e federal government
created the Science Agency, whose director carries the title of Secretary
of State. T h e secretariat of the Conference of University Rectors has been
expanded and is responsible, among other tasks, for the implementation of
special measures to p r o m o t e mobility.
This differentiation of organizational structure permits the recruiting
of specialists to staff new commissions. Dissenting opinions are being
incorporated into the decision process. Students are, for example, represented
on many committees. But it cannot be overlooked that the described process
of differentiation raises the required communications and coordination
effort. W h e r e the required additional effort is not m a d e , a fragmentation
of views and positions will ensue. In addition, the new commissions and
committees produce a large n u m b e r of documents of a half scientific and
287
half political character. A n d the federal organs dealing with educational

policy are developing a relatively detailed understanding of topics in
international science policy. (This is facilitated by the general trend toward
internationalization of the educational policy debate.) But the identified
organs may not have the m e a n s required to feed their newly gained
knowledge into national educational policy decisions.
In the Swiss higher education system, therefore, the response to the
pressure of new and growing problems seems to be one of organizational
differentiation. N o organizational unit has been abolished in recent years,
but many new ones have been created. But the process of differentiation
is not accompanied by the disentangling of functions increasingly, the
contrary is true. T h e organizational structures and the decision processes
are becoming m o r e complex and o p a q u e . Perhaps one may formulate the
hypothesis that a decentralized and dissimilar system gropes toward a lack
of transparency; the apparent effect is o n e of a waning federal authority
compensated by growing cantonal a u t o n o m y which cantonal governments
want to be able to display to their voting public.
O n e may think that the described organizational differentiation is costly
and wasteful, but this is not really the case. In a federal system characterized
by considerable and growing disparities and the need to submit many
elements of higher education policy to the voters for confirmation, there
is much need for public and committee-level d e b a t e . T h e challenge in this
debate is to overcome particularisms and to conjure up the c o m m o n interest,
to define the core objectives shared by almost everyone, to point to the
social benefit of academic institutions, and thereby to lead the expectations
and interests of key decision-makers onto realistic paths. In this sense, the
higher education debate is an important instrument to secure peace in this
field and to develop consensus for public support of the university system.
Is the Swiss university system equal to the challenges
of the
future?
T h e decentralized structure of the Swiss university system has performed

well in the past. I d o u b t , however, that it is as capable of withstanding the
pressures of the future, and this for the reasons listed below.
First, a decentralized system of education, such as the one found in
Switzerland, prospers in the first place under the condition that resources
are growing and that the socio-economic disparities between cantons do not
b e c o m e too great. T h e r e are indications that these conditions will not hold in
the future. O n the o n e h a n d , the financial situation of some cantons do not
permit them to k e e p u p with the needs of high-cost scientific research. O n
the other, the federalist structure does not permit focused prioritization.
Second, in the last four years both the E T H Law and the Federal
Act have been revised. Both revisions required years to be completed.
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. Weber
T h e c u m b e r s o m e , consensus-oriented organization of decision-making in

educational policy has remained intact, as has the cumulation of offices of
o n e and the same person in various planning and policy-making bodies.
Third, the debate on "where-to in Swiss higher education" is alive and well.
T h e Science Council takes u p many issues (duration of studies, organization
of the tertiary sector, etc.). But the decision-making structures do not permit
the full-scale t r e a t m e n t of these topics and the single-minded implementation
of reforms. T h e problem is not a lack of ideas, but a lack of power to ensure
the implementation of change.
F o u r t h , the E u r o p e a n question plays an important role in the educational
policy d e b a t e . T h e r e are currents in favor of re-valuing the n o n - a c a d e m i c
tertiary institutions a n d study p r o g r a m m e s . T h e Swiss C o n f e r e n c e of
E d u c a t i o n D i r e c t o r s has a d o p t e d initiatives in this direction. But it is
not clear to what extent this will lead to an effective process of renewal
of domestic institutions in this sector.
Conclusions
T h e general appearance of the Swiss higher education sector is m o d e r n
and up-to-date: it can be analyzed in a diversified m a n n e r from systemic,
programme-related, and structural points of view. T h e observed diversity
is not so much the result of policy decisions taken at the national level.
Diversity, in the Swiss context, is essentially an expression of t h e w e a k n e s s
of federal-level actors a n d bodies in educational policy making, or,
alternatively, of the strength of the cantons in this domain.
H o w e v e r , higher education requires a certain a m o u n t of "modernization,"
if the negative aspects of the model are not to be allowed to become
too prominent. T h e following elements need to be singled out: the rules
governing access to the institutions of higher learning; the porosity between
the university and the non-university sector; the need for equalization of
financial e n d o w m e n t s across universities; and the professionalization of
m a n a g e m e n t in the higher education institutions.
Selected bibliography (Swiss contribution)

Garke, Esther (1991). Switzerland, in: Wickremasinghe, Walter, e d . , Handbook
of world
education, American Collegiate Services, Houston, 751-758.
Mller-Marzohl, Alfons (1992). Bildungs- und Wissenspolitik in der Schweiz,
Schweizerischer
Studentenverein,
CIVITAS Nr. 1, Baden.
Schweizerische Hochschulkonferenz (1990). [Swiss University Conference]. Hochschulen
der
Schweiz, 1992-1995, Bern.
Schweizerische Wissenschaftsrat (1984). [Swiss Science Council]. Frderung des wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses, E D M Z , Bern.
Schweizerische Wissenschaftsrat (1984). [Swiss Science Council]. Frderung der Weiterbildung,
E D M Z , Bern.
289
Schweizerische Wissenschaftsrat (1989). [Swiss Science Council]. Hochschulplatz Schweiz Horizont 1995, E D M Z , Bern.
Weber, Karl and Niederberger, J. Martin (1984). V o n der Nachwuchs- zur Mittelbaupolitik,
E D M Z , Bern.
Weber, Karl (1988). Zur Lage der Hochschulforsschung in der Schweiz, in: Oehler, C. and
Webler, W . - D . (eds.) Forschungspotentiale sozialwissenschaftlicher Hochschulforschung,
Deutscher Studienverlag, Weinheim, 5 1 - 6 2 .
Weber, Karl (1992). D i e Saat geht auf. Beabsichtigtes und Unbeabsichtigtes in der
Wissenschaftspolitik, in: Vortrge gehalten anlsslich der Jahresversammlung
1991 der
Schweiz. Akademie fr Geistes-und Sozialwissenschaften ( S A G W ) , ed. Bern, 7-15.
12
Higher Education Policy in the United Kingdom
JOHN BRENNAN and TAR LA SHAH
Introduction
British higher education has traditionally been regarded as an example
of a system in which national government influence has been limited.
Based on a strongly developed concept of academic freedom, steering
and control of the system to a large extent was left to the institutions and
their buffer organizations. T h e last decade has shown a m a r k e d d e p a r t u r e
from this principle, with increasing government attempts to influence higher
education. O n e of the consequences of this shift is the fact that at present
the British higher education system is in a period of change, the outcomes
of which are still o p e n . Therefore, it should be noted that the comments
and assessments m a d e in this chapter on the recent developments are of a
somewhat provisional nature. A p a r t from this, it should also be mentioned
that there are substantial structural differences between the Scottish and
the English and Welsh educational systems. T h e general trends discussed in
this chapter apply to the whole of the U n i t e d Kingdom, but m o r e detailed
analysis refers to the English system only.

The education
system
Figure 1 outlines the structure of the British educational system. Children

enter compulsory primary education when they are five. T h e r e are various
forms of pre-school education, ranging from voluntary play schools to
full-time nurseries and kindergarten, state or private. Approximately 5 0 %
of children have some form of pre-school education.
P r i m a r y school lasts for six y e a r s , usually divided ( s o m e t i m e s b e t w e e n
290
291
.(England & Wales)
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
universities
colleges
open
univerJ
sity
further education
17
16
15
14
13
grammar
schools
secondary schools (comprehensive)
12
11
10
9
8
7
primary schools
6
5
4
3
nursery schools
Age
Figure 1: The educational system in the U K
different schools) into infants ( 5 - 7 years) and j u n i o r s ( 8 - 1 0 y e a r s ) ,

children m o v e on to s e c o n d a r y school w h e n they are 11 years old.
T h e comprehensivization of state secondary schools during the 1960s
and 1970s removed the formal post-war tripartite distinction between
g r a m m a r , secondary m o d e r n , and technical schools. T o d a y , a variety
of systems are provided by local education authorities, and recently the
government introduced provision for individual state schools to opt out of
local government control. If the impetus behind comprehensivization was
equality of opportunity, the impetus behind recent government policy has
b e e n diversity and greater parental choice.
Compulsory education ends at 16 years of age with the G e n e r a l Certificate
of Secondary Education ( G C S E ) , but most secondary schools provide some
form of "sixth form" education leading to G e n e r a l Certificate of Education
( G C E ) A d v a n c e d ( A ) levels. A n alternative model is the sixth form college,
292
J. Brennan and T. Shah
providing a comprehensive sixth form curriculum and taking children from

several 11-16 year secondary schools. T h u s , for all secondary schools, the
formal length of study is five years to G C S E and the minimum school-leaving
age is 16 years. T h e r e is then a further two years to G C E A levels for some
students. This extra two years is a norm in some schools and an exception
in others, depending on type of school and social catchment.
A national " c o r e " curriculum is currently being introduced in all state
schools, covering the entire period of compulsory education. This militates
against diversity between different schools and different traditions. T o some
extent, the national curriculum brings together grammar and technical
traditions and represents the first attempt in the to secure a c o m m o n
educational base for all children.
Alongside the state system is a substantial private sector of "public"
fee-paying schools. These schools vary enormously in size, reputation and
educational standards, but in general are modelled on traditional g r a m m a r
school forms.
The higher education system: history and
rationale
Although some of the British universities can trace their history back
to the 12th and 13th centuries the establishment of the Oxford and
Cambridge collegiate universities it was not until after World W a r
II that the present system began to take shape and an explicit, albeit
sometimes contradictory, rationale evolved. A s a consequence of rising
post-war d e m a n d for higher education from both the student body and
society at large, a substantial expansion of the system took place. A t
first, this was realized by upgrading a n u m b e r of university colleges to
full universities, the creation of the Colleges of A d v a n c e d Technology
( C A T S ) , and the establishment of a n u m b e r of new universities, as well as
through a substantial increase in student n u m b e r s for the already existing
institutions. H o w e v e r , by the end of the 1950s it b e c a m e clear that this
route was not going to yield the expansion required universities raised
their entry requirements to cope with the increased d e m a n d rather than
accommodate larger groups of students within the existing infrastructure
(Fulton, 1991). T h e growing tensions inside and outside the system resulted
in the establishment of the Robbins C o m m i t t e e to enquire into the future of
higher education in Britain. T h e Robbins R e p o r t was published in 1963 and
became best known for the explicit statement of the principle that "all young
persons qualified by ability and attainment to pursue a full time course in
higher education should have the opportunity to do s o " (Higher Education
[the Robbins R e p o r t ] , 1963:49). This provided a guiding rationale for the
development of the British system thereafter.
Contrary to the recommendations of the R o b b i n s C o m m i t t e e , however,
the bulk of the further expansion of higher education did not take place
293
within the universities (the " a u t o n o m o u s " sector), but through the creation
of a second sector in higher education, the polytechnics and colleges, or
"public" sector. In 1965 Crosland, then Secretary for E d u c a t i o n , formulated
the principles for the binary system in his Woolwich speech and further
elaborated it in the 1967 Lancaster speech. It was formalized in the White
Paper A Plan for Polytechnics
anes
d other Colleges. This policy d o c u m e n t resulted in the upgrading of the
C A T S to university status (e.g., B a t h , Bradford, Brunei, L o u g h b o r o u g h ) ,
the freezing of the existing n u m b e r of universities, the creation of 30
polytechnics through amalgamation of former colleges of art, education and
technology, and placing all other institutions (the colleges and institutes for
higher education) in the public sector u n d e r the control of Local Educational
Authorities (including the polytechnics). Underlying the public sector was a
second principle of British higher education at the time, namely the notion
of "equal but different" sectors of higher education. T h e universities were
to retain their traditional academic role, including basic research, while the
public sector institutions were to develop vocational and "relevant" types
of higher education and to cater for a different student body, in particular
by offering part-time and sub-degree courses. A s will b e elaborated later,
the polytechnics took a m o r e complex view of their role in the system,
striving to b e c o m e m o r e equal and, by some accounts, less different from
the universities through the so-called process of "academic drift" (Pratt and
Burgess, 1974).
By the end of the 1980s, the polytechnic and college sector rivalled the
universities in size if not in status. F r e e d from the control of the Local
Education Authorities in 1987, the polytechnics were granted university
titles in 1992. If not completely removed, the binary divide had shifted
very substantially, with some 74 universities accounting for a r o u n d 9 0 %
of all students and an assorted group of 143 other institutions providing
the remaining 1 0 % . H o w e v e r , the extent to which the polytechnics have
changed or will do so in the future as a result of their university status
is by n o m e a n s clear. A n alternative view is that Britain has.extended its
conception of what a university is and that many "old" universities may find
themselves u n d e r pressure to take on "polytechnic" features.
A s indicated above, the British higher education system over the last
25 years was characterized by its binary structure. H o w e v e r , o n e must
stress that although it is conventional to emphasize the binary division,
by international standards most of the institutions, whatever their binary
origins, offer a similar type of higher education. Virtually all institutions
offer the three year bachelor p r o g r a m m e , and most also offer postgraduate
degrees leading to master and doctoral qualifications. Some institutions offer
294
part-time variants of these courses, particularly in the case of postgraduate

awards. T h e ex-polytechnics and the colleges also offer some lower level
qualifications, in particular, the two year p r o g r a m m e s leading to diplomas
and certificates of the Business and Technician Education Council ( B T E C )
and other vocational qualifications.
Although there are not rigid differences between institutions, there are
real differences in emphasis, and these relate to their binary origins.
In the ex-polytechnics and colleges there are m o r e part-time students,
r a t h e r m o r e sandwich degrees (courses involving substantial periods of
work experience), and m o r e courses with a vocational or employment
related emphasis. Education in the "old" universities is m o r e likely to be
based on traditional academic disciplines, and there is a higher proportion
of postgraduate work.
It should be noted that the main variant from the traditional three year
honours degree type of higher education is the part-time distance learning
provision of the O p e n University. H e r e again the bachelor degree has
b e e n the n o r m , but it is intrinsically multidisciplinary, and p r o g r a m m e s of
study are taken part-time by distance learning over many years. T h e O p e n
University has moved increasingly into continuing professional education
in recent years. Some of the m e t h o d s and approaches to higher education
pioneered by the O p e n University are being introduced into other parts of
the system.
With only one significant exception, the University of Buckingham, all
higher education institutions in the are public institutions.
education
T h e other main forms of post-secondary education are:

further education; and
adult education.
F u r t h e r education colleges are local colleges providing post 16 years
education of all types, but particularly vocational courses and courses
linked to apprenticeship training. Most colleges also provide some G C E
courses, particularly part-time evening provision. T h e precise curriculum
mix provided in further education colleges varies enormously according to
the local system of secondary education and policies concerning sixth form
education. Further education shades into higher education with some of the
colleges offering three year degree courses and even some postgraduate
work. H o w e v e r , such courses constitute only a small proportion of further
education college provision and a small though increasing part of higher
education provision. O n e area of recent substantial growth, however, is the
development of franchised higher education courses in further education
colleges. These are degree courses, or m o r e commonly the first year or
two of t h e m , of universities which are offered on a franchised basis by a
295
local further education college. A significant proportion of recent higher

education expansion in the has b e e n through franchising.
T r a d i t i o n a l l y , adult e d u c a t i o n refers to t h e w o r k of " e x t r a m u r a l "
d e p a r t m e n t s of universities, and courses provided by bodies such as the
W o r k e r s Educational Association. These courses have typically led to
no qualification and reflect a liberal humanistic approach to education,
usually directed towards adults who had themselves not received higher
education. T h e term adult education is now frequently extended to include
higher education for adult students in universities and colleges. T h u s , all of
the O p e n University work would count as adult education, as would most
part-time courses in universities and colleges.
Relationships
between the different forms of education
T h e typical preparation for students entering higher education is to

continue secondary education until the age of 17 or 18 years and take
advanced level subjects in the G C E examination. T h e normal minimum entry
requirement to enrol in a degree course is two advanced level passes; this
is the same across the system. H o w e v e r , there are other entry routes into
degree courses. O n e is via vocational qualifications, e.g., the B T E C diplomas
mentioned above. T h e other, restricted to older students, is based on a
non-explicit "capacity to benefit" from a degree p r o g r a m m e , assessed on the
basis of students' educational and work experience, whatever this might b e .
A minority of such students may take a special "access" course of generally
o n e year's duration prior to entry to the degree course. Students without A
level qualifications remain in a minority across the system, although there are
some courses in the " n e w " ex-polytechnic universities where such students
may approximate 5 0 % of the intake.
Selection for all courses d e p e n d s on the ratio of applications to places.
Institutions set requirements for grades of passes at G C E advanced level,
and these requirements vary enormously according to level of d e m a n d for
particular subjects and particular institutions. Within the context of this
d e m a n d - s u p p l y ratio, students are entirely free to choose an institution and
a discipline of their preference. With the exception of certain professional
areas, e.g., teacher e d u c a t i o n , g o v e r n m e n t d o e s n o t i m p o s e rigid e n t r y
m a x i m a for specified disciplines a n d institutions. T h e r e is, h o w e v e r ,
regulation through the funding mechanism whereby institutions are funded
on the basis of their academic plans submitted to the funding councils.

A n overview of the n u m b e r s of students and staff that populate British
higher education is presented in Table 1. Normative student-staff ratios
296
( S S R S ) are not specified explicitly although funding methodologies affect

t h e m directly (see further). Actual student-staff ratios vary enormously.
A t the end of the 1970s an approximate average would have been 12:1.
Today a figure of 16:1 would be m o r e accurate, with many examples of ratios
over 2 0 : 1 . T h e worsening of S S R S in recent years particularly affected the
ex-polytechnics and colleges, and reflected the responses of these institutions
to changes in funding methodologies and corporate status. In some ways, it
was a response to a new-found "freedom."
Research
T h e bulk of publicly funded scientific research is located within the
universities. T h e r e are also specialist research institutes in certain scientific
areas but, overall, research is located inside the higher education system.
T h e universities of Oxford, C a m b r i d g e , and L o n d o n are pre-eminent in
research and obtain a very high proportion of available research funds.
H o w e v e r , there is no separate class of "research university," and a research
function is expected of all institutions.
TABLE 1
Students and staff in higher education by type of institution
1980
1985
1988
1989
SOURCE:
F/t
students
Universities
P/t
students
307,000
310,000
334,000
351,000
101,000
120,000
135,000
143,000
Staff
Polytechnics and Colleges

F/t
P/t
students
students
Staff
34,000
31,000
31,000
31,000
228,000
290,000
311,000
338,000
192,000
217,000
251,000
262,000
89,000
93,000
94,000
90,000
education statistics for the U K , 1991

Higher education
legislation
In May 1991, the government published a White Paper, Higher

Education:
A new framework,
and legislation followed a year later. T h e legislation
allows the polytechnics, and some other institutions accredited by the
Council for National Academic A w a r d s , to award their own degrees, and
contains a provision for these institutions to adopt the title of "university."
T h e legislation has produced three new funding councils for England,
297
Scotland, and Wales which fund all higher education in their respective
countries. T h e legislation has also created a new national quality assurance
agency called the Higher Education Quality Council. In addition, quality
assessment at the p r o g r a m m e level is to be u n d e r t a k e n by the funding
councils.
Prior to the above, the most recent legislation was the Education Reform
Act of 1988. A major feature of this was the removal of polytechnics and
most of the colleges from the control of the local education authorities,
and the creation of a new funding council, the Polytechnics and Colleges
Funding Council ( P C F C ) , which assumed responsibility for the allocation
of government funds to the institutions of its sector. In parallel, a new
Universities Funding Council ( U F C ) was created for the university sector,
replacing the old University G r a n t s C o m m i t t e e ( U G C ) . B o t h new funding
councils were responsible to the government D e p a r t m e n t of Education
and Science. T h u s , the 1988 Act m a r k e d a major convergence between
the so-called " a u t o n o m o u s " university sector, and the locally controlled
polytechnics and colleges sector, within the overall educational responsibilities
of the Department of Education and Science (there were somewhat different
features in Scotland and Wales although the general trend was the s a m e ) .
T h e 1988 Reform Act also m a r k e d several changes in the governance
of institutions. In the polytechnics and colleges, the boards of governors
assumed major new powers over the direction and m a n a g e m e n t of t h e
institutions. D i r e c t o r s b e c a m e in p r a c t i c e , and s o m e by title, chief
executives, a n d t h e p o w e r s of t h e institutions' own a c a d e m i c boards
were generally reduced. G o v e r n o r s were appointed mainly from within the
local communities by the Minister with responsibility for higher education.
In the universities, changes were not so dramatic but, here t o o , the university
councils (equivalent to the boards of governors in polytechnics) assumed
greater powers, vice-chancellors b e c a m e m o r e like chief executives (but
never assuming that title), and the decision making powers of university
senates were somewhat reduced.
Notwithstanding the a b o v e , higher education in the has b e e n and
remains m a r k e d by a considerable degree of institutional autonomy.
programmes
In universities, the power to approve new courses and p r o g r a m m e s is

vested entirely in the senate of the university. Essentially, courses are
designed by the staff w h o teach t h e m . T h e r e is n o such thing as a national
curriculum. T h u s , an economics p r o g r a m m e in o n e institution might take a
quite different form from an economics p r o g r a m m e in another institution.
T h e exception to this are courses which require recognition by professional
bodies, such as in engineering, where the profession may stipulate in some
detail the content of the course curriculum. H o w e v e r , it should be noted that
298
external influence does not limit the autonomy of the institution. It concerns
the external recognition of the course for professional purposes, but it is
quite open to a university to ignore the strictures of the professional body
and grant degrees to students for whatever curriculum it wishes to provide.
Clearly, however, lack of professional recognition could severely limit the
employment opportunities of graduates from the course..Not surprisingly,
the level of influence of professional bodies is directly proportionate to the
extent to which they control entry to a particular occupation.
Prior to the legislation resulting from the publication of the government
White Paper Higher Education: A New Framework in 1991, most of the
degree courses in polytechnics and colleges led to the awards of the Council
for National A c a d e m i c A w a r d s ( C N A A ) and required prior approval of
that Council. T h e Council approved courses individually, although it was
not prescriptive about the curriculum content. It responded to proposals,
developed by course teams in individual institutions, testing their ideas
and competence against those current across the system using academic
and other experts who were m e m b e r s of the C N A A . In 1987, however,
the Council introduced a policy of "accreditation," whereby the practical
business of approving courses was delegated to the institutions. O n c e the
Council had satisfied itself that the institutions had effective course approval
and review mechanisms, involving external peer review, delegated authority
to approve individual courses was granted to the academic boards of the
institutions.
Although the above controls have now been removed with the awarding
of university status, they leave a legacy of quality control procedures and
culture within these institutions. All universities and colleges now face
systems, if not of external control, of external scrutiny and accountability.
These are described later.
Control of research
University academics are expected to u n d e r t a k e research, and the Higher
Education Funding Council allocates part of its funding according to the
research productivity of d e p a r t m e n t s . Research funding from this source is
not generally e a r m a r k e d for particular purposes. It is to enable university
teachers to engage in research what they do is a matter for the individuals
concerned, sometimes mediated by departmental or institutional priorities
or missions.
A n o t h e r major source of research funding is from the various research
councils (discipline based). T h e research councils fund projects, and also
p o s t g r a d u a t e p r o g r a m m e s of s t u d y / r e s e a r c h , at individual institutions.
A c a d e m i c s design projects and submit t h e m to t h e councils for consideration and approval, in virtually all cases involving a process of peer review.
Sometimes research councils announce particular initiatives and priorities to
299
which an a m o u n t of funding is e a r m a r k e d ; but, in addition, there is scope

for institutions to submit proposals in areas of their choice.
T h e r e is also substantial research funding from private foundations,
government d e p a r t m e n t s , and industry. T h e s e are generally much m o r e
applied and policy driven. Project proposals may be drawn u p by the
funding body and put out to tender to selected institutions.
Institutional
management
and
control
Institutional m a n a g e m e n t has b e e n increasingly subject to e x t e r n a l

influences stressing c o n c e p t s of efficiency a n d managerialism within the
"higher education e n t e r p r i s e . " U n d o u b t e d l y , the most clear enunciation of
the managerial-enterprise approach has been the proposals for transformation of university m a n a g e m e n t practices contained in the 1985 Jarratt
R e p o r t . It specified that vice-chancellors should be chief executives, that
there should be a corporate plan in which lay m e m b e r s of council together
with the vice-chancellor and his senior m a n a g e m e n t t e a m should lay down
the objectives of the university, and that the power of the d e p a r t m e n t s should
b e replaced by m o r e corporate planning (Becher and K o g a n , 1991: 69). Its
recommendations sought to eliminate the functional duality of academic
life in which there are both collective and highly individual concerns. It
postulated a role in which leadership is not disputed, a view which many
regard as callow managerialism based upon an insufficient organizational
analysis (Becher and Kogan, 1991: 69).
For the then polytechnic sector, the National Advisory Body's G o o d
M a n a g e m e n t Practice G r o u p produced a corresponding d o c u m e n t in 1987.
This, however, contained a somewhat different perspective on institutional
m a n a g e m e n t , by voicing the conviction that control should not be a
unique central institutional device, but ought to be divested throughout
the institution in the various d e p a r t m e n t s , sub-units and individuals.
It is beyond doubt that both reports, as well as the subsequent Reform A c t ,
have had an impact on the role and function of institutional m a n a g e m e n t .
H o w e v e r , the extent of the impact remains an issue for d e b a t e . T h e r e has
undoubtedly b e e n an increase in chief executive-like behavior, emphasizing
the managerial function within the institution. O n the other h a n d , for
example, Becher and Kogan (1991: 182) note that the traditional balance
between central and individual initiatives in the framing of purposes and
the allocation of tasks is still the way in which many of the institutions
o p e r a t e . T h e differences in approach reflect in part the different traditions
and cultures of the " n e w " and "old" universities, although there are many
exceptions in individual institutions.
A major change brought about by the 1988 Act was the removal of tenure
from university employment contracts after that d a t e . Contracts are now
within the framework of ordinary labor law. National systems of collective
300
bargaining are increasingly breaking down in favor of locally negotiated

agreements and performance related deals. All of this has b e e n very much
with the encouragement of central government. T h u s , traditionally, labor
contracts have been agreed at the national level but are increasingly
being seen as an institutional matter. Consequently, there is growing
institutional latitude regarding reward systems. T h e r e are no national
regulations regarding minimum or maximum n u m b e r of staff, although
funding formulae clearly exert a major influence. Staff are not civil servants,
and staff recruitment is the responsibility of individual institutions.
Institutional
CORE
funding
FUNDING
In t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , t h e universities' funding has u n d e r g o n e

substantial changes. Traditionally they received block grants from the
University G r a n t s C o m m i t t e e ( U G C ) for their current expenditure, and this
was agreed in quinquennial settlements, which in principle left them free
to spend as they wished. T h e size of the grant was determined largely on
the basis of formulae of student n u m b e r s , but universities could m a k e their
own internal resource allocation decisions. T h e non-university institutions
were funded by formulae, as far as current expenditure was concerned, and
budget heads could only vie for funds to a limited degree.
After 1988, however, the funding of both sets of institutions underwent
substantial changes. Increasingly, the m o n e y allocated to universities for
research, which was implicit in the block grant, is being separated and
h a n d e d over to the research councils to w h o m applications for money will
have to be m a d e ad hoc (see "supplementary funding"). T h o s e elements of
funding for research which remain are identified and allocated to institutions
on judgements of their research productivity by the Higher Education
Funding Council.
A s regards educational activities, funding is determined on the basis
of proposed budgets submitted by institutions to the funding councils.
H o w e v e r , in considering the proposed budget, the funding councils have
increasingly introduced a competitive element, relating to student d e m a n d ,
price, and quality.
E a c h year the funding councils guarantee to institutions a high percentage
of their funding in real terms in each element (academic subject category,
m o d e , level) which is determined in the light of the efficiency gain which the
G o v e r n m e n t seeks from higher education institutions in setting the funding
councils' annual grant. T h e core funding is determined by first increasing
the previous year's funding in the relevant element by the G o v e r n m e n t ' s
estimate of the Gross Domestic Product deflator, and then reducing this
by an assumed efficiency gain. T h e level of reduction will vary according
301
to the institution's average unit of Council funding per enroled h o m e and

E u r o p e a n Community student in each academic subject and m o d e the
institution having the lowest average unit will receive the lowest reduction
in its funding.
In addition to the core funding, each year the funding councils also
determine the funds for growth in the n u m b e r of additional student places
to be m a d e available for each academic subject category, each m o d e and
level. This takes account of an institution's own plans for growth.
Capital funding for e q u i p m e n t a n d n o n - e a r m a r k e d m i n o r w o r k s is
allocated on an academic year basis. Funding for purchasing major computer
equipment is the responsibility of the Joint Information Systems C o m m i t t e e
of the funding councils.
SUPPLEMENTARY
FUNDING
A n increasingly significant proportion of recurrent funding comes from

student fee income. Most students are able to obtain reimbursement
for their course fee from their local education authority, which in turn
receives funding from the Treasury for this p u r p o s e . T h e proportion of
funding received through fee income has b e e n increased deliberately by the
government over the last few years. M a n y institutions, particularly colleges
and polytechnics, recruited large n u m b e r s of students without any funding
beyond that received from the student fee, thus driving down the average
unit of resource.
T h e r e are two major sources of research funding, next to core funding:
research councils on the one h a n d , and private foundations, government
d e p a r t m e n t s , and industry on the other. These have already b e e n described
above u n d e r the heading "Control of research." Table 2 shows the amounts
of research funding to come from each source in o n e academic year.
TABLE 2
Research funding per sector 1989/90 (in m)
U F C sector
C o r e funding
Research councils
External grants/contracts
Total
SOURCE:
McVicar, 1992
P C F C sector
860
260
500
20
10
40
1620
70
302
Since institutions are positively encouraged to engage in fund-raising

activities to supplement their core funding, most of the other forms of
supplementary funding are found: contract teaching, donations, etc. Unlike
in the U S A , there has been relatively little emphasis placed upon obtaining
donations through alumni. Table 3 shows a b r e a k d o w n of the budgets of
higher education institutions.
TABLE 3
Budgets of higher education institutions (in % )
U F C sector
(1988/89)
C o r e funding
Students fees
Research councils
External grants/contracts
Other
Total
SOURCE:
P C F C sector
(1987/88)
53
15
7
75
14
1
25
10
100%
100%
Williams, 1991

Probably the single most important event for British higher education
over the last 13 years has b e e n Mrs Thatcher's election victory in May 1979,
which brought a Conservative government to power. T h e general themes
of this government may be summarized in the slogans " m a r k e t , " "value
for m o n e y , " "economy, efficiency, and effectiveness," "privatization," and
"diminishing government b u d g e t s . " T h e higher education system has not
been exempt from these general trends. G o v e r n m e n t expenditure on higher
education has declined sharply. T h e drive for m o r e value for less money has
been the overriding characteristic of the policy context for higher education,
and has set the stage for drastic changes in policy on the part of the key
actors. Although change and external pressures to change have been a
constant in both higher education and the policies that have been directed
towards it over the past d e c a d e , two distinct phases in government attitudes
to this subject can be discerned.
T h e first p h a s e , covering the first half of the 1980s and the first years of
the T h a t c h e r administration, saw considerable mutual animosity between
government and higher education. T h e academic world in general was seen
to be antagonistic towards the values and goals of government. It was part of
303
a public sector which in general was the object of considerable government

suspicion and antagonism. T h e period was m a r k e d by n u m e r o u s attempts
at government interference with the work of individual higher education
institutions. Accusations of Marxist bias in curricula, and of p o o r and
unprofessional teaching, were m a d e and investigated. T h e major financial
cuts to universities in 1981 were b o r n e of this period. A s Becher and Kogan
(1991: 42) note:
The year 1981 was one of drastic policy change. A positive reduction in university
places for the first time became inevitable. The members of the SUGC were required
by the government to make a painful decision. It was left to them whether to
reduce student numbers or to reduce the unit of resource . . . In a much-criticized
decision . . . they decided to reduce student numbers by about 20,000 . . . The cuts
were visited differentially on the universities . . . The UGC allocations were significant
in that they purported to incorporate quality judgements, thus beginning the process
of stratifying universities and departments which became more explicit in the 1986
research grading exercise . . . Within a five-year period, some 14 per cent of UGC funds
to universities were to be distributed according to the hierarchy of esteem established
by such gradings. The notion that all British universities formed part of an elite group
was thus called in question.
T h e reduction in university student n u m b e r s had m a r k e d effects on

enrolments in the non-university sector. T h e polytechnics and colleges
responded to the d e m a n d for higher education by gross expansion. Over
the first half of the decade a 3 0 % increase in enrolments occurred. By
meeting the increased d e m a n d , the public sector gained considerable
political credit, also because this was realized within reduced unit costs.
T h e second difference between the university and the public sector in the
first half of the 1980s was in the relation with the planning bodies. While, as
Fulton (1991: 597) argues, the universities were at war with their planning
body (the U G C ) , the polytechnics and colleges acquired one for the first time
in 1982:
The National Advisory Body ( N A B ) was a somewhat bizarre organisational hybrid,
a two-tier body with a lower, planning level representing academic and other
interests, and an upper, decision making level consisting of representatives of the
LEAS . . . chaired by the Minister for higher educatio . . . Despite the ultimately
irreconcilable conflicts that this arrangement produced, the N A B was effective both
in retaining the trust of most of its institutions and in promoting their interests. It
achieved this largely by the simple if un-British technique of totally eschewing secrecy
for any of its planning documents; and by placing itself firmly and publicly on the
institutions' side in arguments about resources.
In these two latter respects, the N A B thus differed substantially from

the role in which the U G C had to o p e r a t e in the early years of the 1980s.
Accompanying the government's critical notions on the effectiveness and
efficiency of higher education during this period, was an increased concern
with the quality of provision in terms of acceptable standards in both sectors,
a concern evidenced by the publication of the Lindop (1985) and Reynolds
(1986) R e p o r t s . T h e evolving issue of quality in education, however, can
also be perceived as an indication of a changing government perspective on
304
the position, role and function of higher education throughout the latter part
of the 1980s.
T h e second half of the decade saw the second phase of the Conservative
government's relationship to higher education. This period was one of
reform. T h e polytechnics and colleges were removed from local authority
control, and new funding regimes were introduced. T h e overall objective
appears to have been to m a k e higher education institutions m o r e efficient
and m o r e responsive to the d e m a n d s of the wider society. T h e instrument
for achieving both objectives was the mechanism of the m a r k e t . T h e second
phase was m a r k e d by a m o r e positive relationship between government
and higher education, although not m a r k e d by any appreciable generosity
in funding. H o w e v e r , kinder words were being said!
Kinder words were particularly said about the polytechnics. These institutions
had grown rapidly during the 1980s, reducing their unit of resource radically
in the process. T h e expansion was particularly m a r k e d in vocational areas
such as business and m a n a g e m e n t . But it was the combination of expansion
and cost-cutting that most e n d e a r e d the polytechnics to government.
T h e policy of expansion has been driven largely by perceived economic
needs. T h e extension of opportunities to underprivileged groups has been
a m o r e minor t h e m e , although o n e adopted with enthusiasm in the mission
statements of some institutions. Continuing education for adults including
re-training provisions has been part of an emphasis on flexibility and
life-long learning endorsed by government.
It must be emphasized that government policy directives to higher
education are today minimal, in the belief that developments should be
steered by the m a r k e t . Neither government nor funding councils engage
in detailed academic planning. A n increasingly pluralistic funding regime
is intended to ensure that higher education developments are in line
with society's requirements as defined through the decisions of students,
employers, and research contractors. T h e G o v e r n m e n t believes that the real
key to achieving effective expansion lies in greater competition for funds and
students. This was the rationale for breaking down what was becoming an
increasingly artificial and unhelpful barrier between the universities on one
hand, and the polytechnics and colleges on the other (Higher
Education:
A New Framework,
1991).
T h u s , the policy mechanisms are de-regulation and the m a r k e t , and the
policy goals are efficient expansion and greater responsiveness to society's
needs. It should be noted that most of the funding sources ultimately derive
from the public p u r s e , albeit via different routes. Most student fees are
reimbursed by government, and government d e p a r t m e n t s are major research
contractors. H e n c e , to some extent the market is artificial, but government
funding is increasingly transmitted to institutions via their customers and
users in a competitive environment.
T h e government has sought to influence the operation of the m a r k e t in
305
several ways. T h e r e have been a n u m b e r of special initiatives designed

to induce specific changes across the higher education system. Examples
are the D e p a r t m e n t of E m p l o y m e n t ' s Enterprise in Higher Education
Initiative designed to "develop qualities of enterprise" in graduates
and the Alvey P r o g r a m m e on Information Technology consortia of firms,
academic t e a m s , and research establishments geared towards stimulating I T
development in the . These and other initiatives involved government
funding for which institutions had to bid competitively. Although the sums
of m o n e y were relatively modest as a proportion of total higher education
budgets, these initiatives a p p e a r to have been largely successful in inducing
change and innovation in institutions. They have certainly introduced a
"bidding culture" into the system. A n objective of such schemes that has
not been so successful has been the securing of (often matching) funding
from private industry. Most targets in this respect a p p e a r not to have
been achieved, although lack of monitoring of these initiatives m a k e s firm
conclusions difficult.
A second area of modification of the m a r k e t concerns the government's
attitude towards quality. This partly reflects the early period of mistrust and
interference, but it also partly reflects an acceptance that higher education is
a sphere of activity where m a r k e t forces d o not necessarily ensure quality.
T h u s , government enjoins the funding councils to take account of price and
quality in dealing with bids. This has posed questions about how quality
should be assessed, a live issue particularly in connection with teaching
quality. T h e r e is also a frequently voiced view that for the m a r k e t to
o p e r a t e effectively, there should be better information provided to users,
especially information about the relative quality of particular institutions
and courses. O n the other h a n d , government commitment to de-regulation
claims to see the primary responsibility for quality resting with institutions
and the newly created (in May 1992, as a result of the F u r t h e r and Higher
Education Act 1992) Higher Education Quality Council ( H E Q C ) . T h e H E Q C
is a company limited by guarantee and is owned collectively by the higher
education institutions. It has replaced, for the polytechnics and colleges, the
i n d e p e n d e n t Council for National Academic A w a r d s , and the Universities'
A c a d e m i c A u d i t Unit. T h e H E Q C , through its Division for Quality A u d i t ,
carries out quality audit at institutional level throughout the . T h e 1992
Act also placed a statutory obligation on the funding councils to "secure
that provision is m a d e for assessing the quality of education provided in
institutions for whose activities they provide, or are considering providing,
financial support u n d e r this part of the A c t . " T h e funding councils carry
out assessment at the subject/programme level. T h u s , institutions face two
parallel forms of external accountability for quality, notwithstanding the
government's emphasis on the responsibilities of individual institutions and
the claimed effectiveness of m a r k e t competition.
306
T h e then Secretary of State for Education and Science, K e n n e t h Clarke,

outlined in 1991 the key principles for future funding of higher education:
First, that there should be a means of specifying clearly what it is that institutions are
expected to provide in return for public funds; funding should be seen to reward both
quality and efficiency. Second, that means need to be in place for assessing quality
in both teaching and research. Third, that there will need to be arrangements for
measuring and rewarding institutional efficiency. Fourth, that allocations should have
regard to the distinct missions of individual institutions and to the need to ensure that
the best features are maintained and built upon. Such missions might evolve over time,
but the funding methodology should not encourage abrupt change, or development into
areas where the institution concerned has no natural advantage. A n d fifth, that the
resulting selectivity and allocations should be tempered by regard to academic and
financial viability. In particular, allocations should not lead to year on year changes
in income greater than institutions can reasonably be required to accommodate.
T o sum u p , there is no central planning but an incentive structure

introduced into the funding mechanisms to ensure that a " m a r k e t " operates
to steer higher education in desired directions.
Reflection of Structure, Authority, and Higher Education Policy on

Power and
decision-making
Two influential reports on the management of higher education institutions

were published in the 1980s. T h e Report of the Steering Committee
on
Efficiency Studies in Universities was published by the C o m m i t t e e for ViceChancellors and Principals ( C V C P ) in 1985, and was followed by the National
Advisory B o a r d for Public Sector Higher Education ( N A B ) report on Good
Management Practice. Both reports reflected government pre-occupations
with achieving greater efficiency in the use of "public m o n e y " by public
sector organizations and were paralleled by similar initiatives in areas such
as the health service and the nationalized industries. T h e changes called for
by these reports, and by the general political climate, implied a m o v e m e n t
away from collgial towards managerial styles of institutional governance
and m a n a g e m e n t . In a report published by the C V C P , Middlehurst (1991)
noted that:
The political impact of change in the public sector can be seen in demands for
greater efficiency and value-for-money; for accountability in the use of public funds
and provision of services; for increased entrepreneurialism in the acquisition of funds
and markets; and for effectiveness in the quality of individual and institutional
performance.
Middlehurst and others have noted the institutional consequences of these

changes in calls for stronger leadership and the centralization of managerial
authority. This has meant in most institutions a shift in the balance of
power between collgial authority structures and managerial structures, the
307
latter increasingly backed by the authority of lay governors and councils.

In practice, this had m e a n t :
increasing the number of senior staff carrying the burden of strategic management
and leadership, by introducing a notion of cabinet government at the centre and,
where possible, by drawing on the expertise of key lay officers (Middlehurst, 1991).
M o r e academic staff are required to see themselves primarily as managers.

Although the practice of electing and rotating university leaders has never
been the n o r m in the (university vice-chancellors and polytechnic
directors are p e r m a n e n t full-time a p p o i n t m e n t s ) , the trend in the universities
has been to increase the n u m b e r of p e r m a n e n t appointments to second and
third tier posts such as pro vice-chancellor and dean. This had long b e e n the
case in polytechnics, although the parallel is not exact due to the absence in
the polytechnics of a strong central administration (i.e., university registrar's
d e p a r t m e n t ) separate from the academic structure. But the overall effect in
virtually all institutions has been the creation of a discernable m a n a g e m e n t
t e a m an executive committee or senior m a n a g e m e n t group. This would
typically comprise the vice-chancellor plus deputies, the registrar, and deans
of faculty. T h e r e is normally n o formal link between the m a n a g e m e n t team
and the academic committee structure (and supposedly decision-making
structure) of the institutions. Links and communication are achieved through
over-lapping m e m b e r s h i p and through the institution head's joint roles of
chief executive and chair of academic b o a r d or senate.
T h e effects of these changes in o n e polytechnic were described by the
director as a strengthening of the academic focus of academic and faculty
b o a r d s . W h e r e a s previously they had t e n d e d to discuss "everything," their
role was now in the director's view, m o r e appropriately focused on
matters of academic policy.
According to Middlehurst's report, the changes tend to be welcomed by
senior managers and lay governors who reported " m o r e professional and
open approaches to m a n a g e m e n t , closer attention to planning and financial
control, accompanied by clearer managerial authority at institutional and
departmental or basic unit levels." T h e downside was reported by many
academics who saw less academic involvement in decision-making and less
consultation about policy matters. " S o m e academics evidently fear the
erosion of traditional university values of a u t o n o m y and academic selfgovernance (although) others recognise a need for change, in response to
changing times and circumstances" (Middlehurst, 1991).
A second discernable trend in institutional m a n a g e m e n t has been the
increasing devolution of decision-making and financial control along
with it to local units (faculties or d e p a r t m e n t s ) . This is in line with
current m a n a g e m e n t thinking, which advocates the greater delegation of
responsibility for operational m a n a g e m e n t to those most closely associated
with the area of work and tasks concerned. A consequence of such
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J . Brennan and T. Shah
devolution is that many m o r e academic staff most notably at the level

of head of d e p a r t m e n t find themselves devoting considerable time to
managerial tasks.
A third aspect inextricably linked to the previous two arises
directly from the changed environment in which institutions have to exist.
G r e a t e r selectivity in funding, increased competition between institutions,
and greater accountability these and other features of the environment
require institutions to have effective decision-making structures in place.
They have to m a k e decisions quickly, to provide information and evidence to
support t h e m ; the mixture of evolutionary change and "custom and practice"
procedures no longer serves.
Obtaining resources and allocating
them
"Making the books balance" is probably the major single concern of

the institutional h e a d ; and in an increasingly pluralistic funding regime,
it is a concern of both academic and managerial time at all levels in the
institution.
In one polytechnic, the deans and departmental heads saw their most
vital task as forecasting student n u m b e r s and determining the "bid" price
to the funding council. Research selectivity has b e e n the pre-occupation of
university heads where research activity is increasingly devoted to securing
a good "score" rather than the intrinsic objectives of the research. T h e two
are not of course necessarily in conflict, although the system undeniably
encourages an emphasis on quantifiable outcomes of research. Fund-raising
of various sorts is an increasing pre-occupation of all academic institutions,
and considerable staff time is devoted to it. It can create tensions of various
sorts. W h e r e a s the academic seeks a research grant in order to u n d e r t a k e
research, the institution, with its overriding concern to "balance the b o o k s , "
may look on it in a different light. T h e costing of university services
the "creaming off" in overheads and other charges of grant income
is undergoing careful scrutiny in most institutions. In a recent report,
Williams notes a general tendency to under-cost services and hence to
subsidize contracted services out of funding for core activities of teaching
and basic research. In Williams' (1992: 73) view the subsidy should be in
the other direction, and the d e b a t e calls into question fundamental issues
of institutional mission:
A t what point does a university providing consultancy and similar services become
a consultancy firm that also provides some degree courses? A t what stage does
competition from institutions with charitable status become unfair to other enterprises
operating in similar areas?
In reviewing the bidding process in institutions, Williams concludes that

the cost-benefit ratio is generally favorable, although this disguises the fact
309
that for many institutions/departments, the chances of success may be too

low to m a k e the bidding process worthwhile. It should be noted that bids
which are multidisciplinary or even institution-wide (such as the Enterprise
in Higher Education Initiative) are very much m o r e expensive than single
researchers applying for grants, several m o n t h s of staff time being involved
in drawing u p the bid in some cases.
A general point about the methodologies for the funding of teaching
employed by the funding councils, is that in various ways they require
institutions to expand and to do so at a lower cost p e r student. For example,
the funding council rewards with larger n u m b e r s of full-cost student n u m b e r s
those universities which had previously increased their intakes of fees only
(low-cost) students. It is only really possible for a university to opt out of
this expansionary and cost-cutting cycle if it can acquire maximum research
funding through the research selectivity exercise. It is anticipated that in
time this will produce the creation of a small n u m b e r of elite research
universities. T h e changing balance between funding council and student fee
income in favor of the latter has encouraged many institutions to increase
substantially the recruitment of "fees only" students. This drives down the
average cost per student still further, and this is incorporated into the
funding council's formula in the succeeding year. A cycle of continuing
expansion and downward average costs in thus achieved.
Central government cuts in funding towards the end of 1992 have
modified but not fundamentally changed this cycle. Marginal funding
is currently directed to supporting "in-built" expansion from previously
enroled students, rather than continuing the rate of increase of " n e w "
enrolments. T h e incentive structure to institutions remains unchanged.
A n o t h e r consequence of the funding regime faced by institutions is seen in
the internal resource allocation process. T h e emphasis on devolved budgets
and income generation makes "profitable" d e p a r t m e n t s very conscious of
their earnings and unwilling to give them u p . T h u s , the ability of institutions
to cross-subsidize their various activities in relation to overarching institutional
objectives is lessened. In some cases there are pressures to "hive off"
profitable parts e.g., business schools into separate companies.
Williams (1992: 73) notes that:
Discussions, and frequently tensions, between departmental cost centres and central
administration usually focus on pricing policy, the allocation of surpluses, the use of
departmental discretionary funds and, above all, the staffing of income generating
activities.
In the universities, the n u m b e r s of full-time academic staff paid for out of

non-core funding rose from 2 4 % in 1981/2 to 3 5 % in 1987/8. T h e terms and
conditions of service for many of these staff who no longer have good
prospects of p e r m a n e n t tenured posts a m o u n t , according to Williams, to
the "emergence of an intellectual proletariat."
310
Autonomy
and academic
freedom
F r o m a governmental perspective, a system whereby institutions sell their

services to a variety of purchasers amounts to an increase in institutional
autonomy. W h e r e there is a single or dominant purchaser, namely the
state, then institutional autonomy and academic freedom are t h r e a t e n e d ,
according to this view. H o w e v e r , as has already been pointed out, many of
the purchasers are in fact the state in disguise. W h a t is actually happening
is that government is using financial incentives as a m o r e effective way of
influencing the pattern of activities in higher education institutions than
administrative intervention. T h e " a u t o n o m y " of the m a r k e t has replaced
the collgial system of incremental block grants in universities, and the
bureaucratic system of line by line budgets in the polytechnics and colleges
(Williams, 1992). M o r e o v e r , many institutions are now introducing internal
m a r k e t s , where d e p a r t m e n t s buy and sell services from each other and from
the center.
A feature of the present system is that relatively modestly funded
initiatives can have a major impact on the system. Williams describes four
special government initiatives the Alvey P r o g r a m m e on Information
Technology, the Engineering and Technology P r o g r a m m e , the Enterprise
in Higher Education Initiative, and interdisciplinary research centers
which taken together only a m o u n t e d to 3 % of total recurrent income
of higher education institutions and which required t h e m to "bid for
funds on a competitive basis in accordance with specifics set out by the
funding agency." All of these developments represented an external steer
to academic developments within institutions, and all appear to have had
significant impact. W h e r e a s institutions and academics have been reluctant
to respond to administrative fiat, the present system of financial incentives
and penalties seems to bring about much greater compliance.
W h a t all this amounts to is that institutions are shaped increasingly by
market forces. De-regulation has provided, in the words of one faculty d e a n ,
"the freedom to go b a n k r u p t . " T h e r e has been m o r e than one case where
this fate has nearly occurred. Fears about the financial viability of small
colleges have led to the merger of some of t h e m with larger institutions.
O n e new university with a student-staff ratio already at 25:1 saw its future
survival in rapid expansion, with a doubling of student n u m b e r s in the
next five years. It already, for historical reasons, had almost the lowest
average cost per student of any university, and future expansion was to be
achieved mainly through fees only students, with a consequent further sharp
reduction of average costs. Failure to expand substantially would m e a n that
the institution would have to reduce its staffing base, and it was this " t h r e a t "
that gained staff acceptance to deteriorating work conditions and "changing"
definitions of quality within the institution.
Although arguably funding formulae give institutions little choice but to
311
e m b a r k upon rapid expansion of this sort, there may also b e a "managerial

effect" at work, where maximizing growth and m a r k e t share b e c o m e prime
managerial objectives, strongly supported by lay governors from the business
world. Certainly, many senior and middle managers a p p e a r to be embracing
their new j o b definitions with considerable gusto. T h e cultural changes which
occurred in British society during t h e Thatcher period of government h a d
"gone to the head of m a n a g e m e n t " in at least o n e institution, according to
a senior m e m b e r of staff.
T h e evident need for rapid institutional change in order to respond
to environmental pressures, had affected not only managerial structures
of institutions but also the academic structures. D e p a r t m e n t s and faculty
structures formerly defined in terms of academic objectives are increasingly
being re-shaped according to financial and managerial imperatives. T h e
structure of academic p r o g r a m m e s is being "modularized" within many
institutions, in order to achieve greater flexibility and low-cost p r o g r a m m e
development for the maximum n u m b e r of students. This is also partly
justified in terms of the need to provide greater p r o g r a m m e variety for
an increasingly diverse student body, with the distinct possibility that the
traditional "single h o n o u r s " discipline-based p r o g r a m m e s will b e c o m e the
preserve of a relatively small n u m b e r of elite universities.
Mission
statements
T h e shift from block grant subsidy funding to purchase of services by a

variety of customers, requires institutions to be much m o r e explicit about
their goals. Planning requires objectives, and both government and the
funding councils have m a d e it clear that individual institutions are the
planning units, a n d funding decisions are m a d e in terms of t h e strategic
plans p r e p a r e d by the institutions themselves. Additionally, the expansion
and diversification of the system is encouraging role specialization.
W h e r e a s o n e vice-chancellor described his objectives as being "to attract
t h e best s t u d e n t s , t h e best staff, r e s e a r c h m o n e y , to establish good
relationships with t h e c o m m u n i t y a n d to m a k e t h e b o o k s b a l a n c e "
(Middlehurst, 1992), some institutions are emphasizing an access and equal
opportunities mission, and others are proclaiming a mission of community
service.
T h e r e is a certain a m o u n t of rhetoric about all this, and many academic
staff would claim to be completely untouched by institutional mission
statements. T h e r e remains a tension possibly a creative o n e between
b o t t o m - u p academic developments arising from research, and scholarly
interests and mission-related developments geared to client needs.
In practice, higher education may b e moving from a system m a r k e d
by formal divisions of institutional status and role but with remarkable
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J . Brennan and T. Shah
homogeneity of academic practice, culture, and standards, to o n e without

formal divisions but with increasingly sharp actual differences in practice,
culture, and standards. Several universities appear to be attempting to
b e c o m e elite research and postgraduate centers, leaving others to b e c o m e
mass teaching institutions for the traditional school leaver entrant, and yet
others to concentrate on the m a t u r e and non-traditional entrants from the
inner cities. Mobility between different kinds of institutions may b e c o m e
increasingly limited, both for academic staff and for students.
Quality and
accountability
The prime responsibility for maintaining and enhancing the quality of teaching and
learning rests with each individual institution. A t the same time, there is a need for
proper accountability for the substantial public funds invested in higher education.
A s part of this, students and employers need improved information about quality if
the full benefit of increased competition is to be obtained (Higher Education: a New
Framework,
1991).
T h e above quotation from the 1991 White Paper indicates the uncertain
position of quality in a m a r k e t driven system of higher education. T h e
Conservative government had long expressed doubts about quality and
standards in education generally. Ideally, the m a r k e t should address these
by increasing d e m a n d for high quality education and lowering d e m a n d for
poor quality education. T h e latter should eventually "go out of business."
G o v e r n m e n t policy is effectively an attempt to expand the good and
eliminate the bad. It is ironic that in expanding it without resourcing
it the good may be jeopardized. T h e instrument of policy is again the
funding mechanisms, both directly and indirectly. Institutions are to "bid"
for student n u m b e r s on the basis of price and quality. Quality is to be
measured by Quality Assessment Units attached to the three new higher
education funding councils for E n g l a n d , Scotland, and Wales. T h e main
elements of the assessment methods to be adopted by the funding councils
are institutional self-assessment and statistical indicators, followed by an
assessment visit by subject experts drawn from other institutions. Such
visits are only m a d e where a prima facie case is m a d e that an institution is
providing excellent quality education in the specific subject being assessed,
or where there are grounds for concern that quality may be at risk. Visits
are also m a d e to a small sample of institutions where satisfactory quality
education is believed to be provided. T h e precise nature of the financial
rewards to accrue from "excellence," and the punishments to result from
"unsatisfactory," remain to be seen. T h e indirect approach is through the
influence on student d e m a n d of the publication of quality assessments
by the funding councils, and the provision of additional information on
quality by the institutions' new collectively owned Higher Education Quality
Council.
313
For institutions, accountability for the quality of academic p r o g r a m m e s is

giving rise to a growing concern with the development of institutional quality
assurance systems. In the older universities, these have so far primarily
b e e n driven by performance indicators, but academic audit appears to be
causing a major re-think and the development of m o r e elaborate systems
of self-evaluation. In the new universities, well-established systems of peer
review developed by the C N A A are firmly in place. But in all institutions this is
an area of substantial development. In particular, accountability for quality
within the academic community (the p e e r review principle) is n o longer held
to b e sufficient, and much quality assurance effort is now geared towards the
needs of higher education's customers.
Underlying the rise of the "quality issue" u p the political and academic
agenda may be a need to re-define t e r m s , to distinguish process from
o u t c o m e , quality from standards. A s has b e e n emphasized a b o v e , traditional
"custom and practice" in almost all spheres of British higher education is
undergoing often painful re-examination in most institutions. If the student
experience of higher education is different from what it used to be and
different across institutions, quality if not in decline ; may also be
different and, as many institutions a p p e a r to accept, in need of re-definition.
H o w e v e r , since the two parties entrusted with quality responsibility
the funding councils and the institutions collectively have n o obvious
self-interest in identifying a major decline in quality resulting from their own
actions, the effectiveness of the new quality assurance bodies in addressing
these issues may be o p e n to some doubt.
Appraisal
Linked to the issue of quality are the issues of staff appraisal and of
performance related pay. T h e former is now near universal, having been a
government condition attached to recent pay awards. Performance related
pay is being introduced for senior academic staff in many places and is
frequently connected with the achievement of financial targets.
It is too early to assess the impact of staff appraisal schemes and to
determine how far they genuinely address questions of competence in
teaching as well as research productivity. T h e process is however giving
rise to increased interest in student feedback mechanisms as a source
of information about teaching and course quality although, as a recent
A c a d e m i c A u d i t Unit ( A A U ) report points out, such mechanisms are
generally in a pretty rudimentary form. Not for the first time, policy
imperatives require what available methodologies cannot deliver.
314
Conclusion
University lecturers are u n d e r greater pressure to publish in order to
boost research ratings. They are also teaching larger n u m b e r s of students in
order to maintain existing funding levels. Middle managers find themselves
budget holders and spending substantial time in income generating activities.
Institutions have b e c o m e m o r e managerial internally and m o r e market and
consumer oriented externally. Mission statements are refined and polished.
T h e last five years have been m a r k e d by a substantial expansion of
student numbers but, unlike previous expansions, not accompanied by
similar expansion of funding. Institutions have not only expanded but have
d o n e new things, catered for new clients, and entered new markets. T h e
drive towards greater efficiency in higher education appears to have been
successful. M o r e is being d o n e with less. That there are costs is scarcely in
d o u b t , although evidence of declining standards has not been forthcoming;
indeed, such evidence as exists points to the reverse. T h e quality of working
conditions for staff and for students has declined in most institutions but, it
may be argued, this has enabled greater n u m b e r s to enjoy the benefits of
higher education.
Judged on its own terms, the government would appear to be achieving
its objectives of steering higher education towards greater expansion and
responsiveness through the mechanism of greater competition and m a r k e t
orientation.
T h e r e f o r e , higher e d u c a t i o n in t h e mid 1990s boasts s o m e 74
universities and some 143 other institutes and colleges. A r o u n d 9 0 % of
undergraduate students and virtually all postgraduates are in the universities.
But the university system is m o r e diverse than ever before, both in terms of
curricular offerings and in relation to mission and culture.
It is far too early to know whether the transformation of the polytechnics
into universities heralds accelerated "academic drift," or a re-definition of
"university" possibly m o r e attuned to the needs of a mass system. It is
equally too early to know what impact new funding and quality assurance
mechanisms are going to have on institutions. Perhaps the most remarkable
fact is that they are there at all. For the former polytechnics they are nothing
new and possibly mild compared with past bureaucratic terrors, but for the
old universities they must surely signal the end of a u t o n o m y , a near complete
defeat in the battle between state and university that has been waged over
the last fifteen years.
13
International Perspectives on Trends and Issues
in Higher Education Policy
LYNN MEEK, FRANS VAN VUGHT and EGBERT DE WEERT
Introduction
T h e first chapter of this volume outlined the main theoretical frames of
reference for the 11 country studies to follow. T h e concepts presented
touched upon such important issues as: changing patterns of government/
institutional relationships; autonomy and academic freedom; accountability
and quality; the role of market-like forces in shaping higher education
systems; public-private and state-federal relationships in higher education;
and the role of intermediary bodies. T h e data and interpretations in each of
the 11 country studies address the main themes in one form or another. It
is the task of this concluding chapter to draw the different and sometimes
disparate threads of the country-specific experiences together. T h e tapestry
to be woven by these threads is multifaceted, reflecting the great variety
of history, culture, size, age, and geographical location of the countries
included in this study. But close observation does reveal a few c o m m o n
t h e m e s , as well as substantial differences in country-specific experiences.
This chapter will not summarize the country reports. E a c h report is
fairly succinct and concludes with its own overview. R a t h e r , here we will
concentrate on what appear to be the main trends and issues emerging from
the country reports t a k e n as a whole. T h e discussion will concentrate on:
diversity in higher education systems (systemic, programmatic, and
structural diversity);
authority, governance, and m a n a g e m e n t in higher education systems
(systems and institutional level);
policy instruments (systems and institutional level);
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316
L. Goedegebuure et al.
quality and accountability;

the state of transition.
Diversity in Higher Education Systems

T h e literature on higher education often emphasizes the remarkable
stability of the university and its various derivatives t over most of
its extensive history. Kerr, for example, observes that:
about eighty-five institutions in the Western world established by 1520 still exist
in recognizable forms, with similar functions and unbroken histories, including the
Catholic church, the parliaments of the Isle of Man, of Iceland and of Great Britain,
several Swiss cantons, and seventy universities. Kings that rule, feudal lords with
vassals, guilds with monopolies are gone. These seventy universities, however, are
still in the same locations with some of the same buildings, with professors and
students doing much the same things, and with governance carried on in much the
same ways (Kerr, 1982: 152).
Insofar, then, that diverse means "unlike in nature or qualities; varied,

changeful" (Oxford English Dictionary), what relevance does the concept
of diversity have for higher education?
A n u m b e r of authors have argued that it is the very diversity of higher
education that provides its stability. T h e thesis is that the division of labor in
higher education based on professional knowledge and professional expertise
produces diversity and structural disintegration, which in turn protect the
equilibrium of the whole. A national system of higher education can also
b e regarded as a set of disciplines and professions, but each isolated from
the other, and with its own particular set of n o r m s , values, and culture.
A s Clark (1983: 14-15) states: "the harsh fact is that those who handle
the materials of microbiology and those w h o deal in medieval history do
not need o n e another to get on with the work, either in teaching or
research or service." Even m o r e to the point is the fact that pressures and
conflicts produced by increasing professionalism and specialization in higher
education have been met with increasing differentiation, not unification. "In
separating tasks, specialization pulls apart groups that otherwise may have
to fight it out . . . "; for example, "biochemists and chemists d o not have
to fight over turf within a chemistry d e p a r t m e n t if biochemists can develop
their specialty to the point of a separate d e p a r t m e n t " (Clark, 1983: 219).
T h e idea that groups in potential or actual competition with o n e another
create boundaries between themselves, in order to avoid direct conflict and
possible defeat, is a central sociological construct (cf. D u r k h e i m ' s theory of
the division of labor in m o d e r n society).
T h e issue of diversity is important for a n u m b e r of reasons, o n e of which
concerns the wish to optimize the responsiveness of higher education systems
to societal needs. Changes in government policy towards higher education
often have the stated intention of creating higher education systems that are
International Perspectives on Higher Education Policy
317
m o r e flexible, adaptive, and responsive to community needs and economic

priorities. Complex societies and differentiated economic m a r k e t s display a
wide variety of needs that, supposedly, cannot be fulfilled by a single type
of higher education institution, hence the need to diversify. Systems that
are m o r e diversified are better able to respond to a wide variety of needs.
In this respect it is often claimed that the strength of the A m e r i c a n system
of higher education lies in its diversity. According to the Carnegie Council
(1987: 2), "we [i.e., the U S A ] celebrate the diversity, acknowledging that
o u r system of higher education is the envy of the world . . . ."
B i r n b a u m draws on a biological m e t a p h o r to explain the importance
of diversity along another line. Differentiation "leads to stability that
protects the system itself. Species diversity must be maintained to ensure
the specialized functions upon which the system depends and to prevent
the unpredictable b r e a k d o w n of the system if a critical element is removed.
Evolution of the system occurs as organizations seek their resources within
available niches; those most fitted to a particular niche survive" ( B i r n b a u m ,
1983). Stadtman (1980) lists six benefits of diversity for higher education:
diversity increases the range of choices available to learners;
it m a k e s higher education available to virtually everyone;
it matches education to the needs and abilities of individual students;
it enables institutions to select their own mission and confine their
activities;
it responds to the pressures of a society (complex and diversified in
itself);
it becomes a precondition of college and university freedom and
autonomy.
Some of these benefits overlap with the reasons just mentioned. O t h e r s
seem to be elaborations of the arguments in terms of responsiveness and
stability. W h e t h e r or not Stadtman's p r e s u m e d benefits of diversity are
achieved in reality is an empirical question. B u t , obviously, diversity is a
fairly broad concept. In order to get a better idea of how the 11 countries
in this study have approached diversity, we will look at it from three
angles, using three categories of the general concept of diversity: systemic,
programmatic, and structural diversity.
Systemic
diversity
This form of diversity refers to differences between institutions as regards

their tasks, size, and control ( B i r n b a u m , 1983: 45). T h e higher education
systems covered in this study show r e m a r k a b l e differences as regards their
systemic diversity. A l s o , some of the countries involved are experiencing
a fundamental transformation of their higher education systems, Australia
and the United Kingdom in particular, having important consequences for
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the nature of their systemic diversity. Over the last decade other countries,
like Sweden and the Netherlands, have experienced quite extensive reforms
of their higher education systems, that might in the near future have a
far-reaching impact on their systemic diversity. Still other systems, such as
the one in O n t a r i o , seem to have been remarkably stable during the period
of time covered by this report.
W h e t h e r stable or not, one of the main issues confronted by the
different higher education systems is the problem of what tasks to allocate
to universities and what higher education functions to place in other
" t y p e s " of higher education institutions. Neave (1983) argues that "all
systems of higher education display a dynamic towards integration." While
government policy may be aimed at sustaining a non-integrated system,
"there is nevertheless," according to N e a v e , "an undisputable move towards
integration, even though from the policy-makers perspective, it constitutes
a regression toward the priorities, values and practices found in the 'noble'
[university] sector."
T h e data presented in this study cannot falsify this "hypothesis." Clearly,
in some countries, institutional ambition and systemic differentiation have
worked against o n e another. This seems to be particularly the case for the
binary systems in Australia and the United Kingdom, which have collapsed,
mostly u n d e r the weight of the campaign by non-university institutions to
gain funding parity and equal status with universities. Also, in the binary
system of the Netherlands, the relationship between the universities and the
non-university institutions for higher vocational education is u n d e r pressure.
T h e latter challenge the monopoly of the universities with respect to some of
the tasks traditionally assigned to the universities, like doing research and
having the right to award Master and P h . D degrees. In contrast, the complex
tripartite structure of the public sector in California has been held together
by conscious legislative decision. O n e could almost view the Californian
system as a treaty of mutual benefit between the three public sector higher
education domains. But even in this relatively stable system, tensions exist
between the different types of institutions, especially as a consequence of
the ambitions of some of the California State Universities to enter the
domain assigned in the 1960 Master Plan to the University of California
institutions.
Probably the key to stability in diverse higher education systems lies in the
legitimation of roles and tasks for different types of institutions. T h e r e are
at least two aspects to the issue of legitimation: one concerns institutional
self-interest in the context of the spread of benefits from a limited pool of
resources, and the other relates to the permeability of boundaries between
different types of institutions. In the Calif ornian system, for example, each
type of institution benefits from the hierarchical tripartite structure. T h e
"elite" research institutions belonging to the University of California are
insulated from mass d e m a n d by the community colleges, and at least some
319
of the popular support enjoyed by the community colleges is based on the

notion that a student can progress from an associate diploma at the local
college to a P h . D at Berkeley (even though not many do so). A b r e a k d o w n
of that structure would probably result in a "war of all against all" which
would benefit no o n e . T h e Californian system is p e r m e a b l e with respect to
students, but closed (at least in theory) as regards type and level of course.
In Australia and the United Kingdom, the opposite situation prevailed.
Universities and colleges/polytechnics taught much the same type and level
of course and recruited m o r e or less from the same pool of students, but
the latter received less financial and social benefit for doing so. T h u s , the
success of the campaign against the binary structure in these two countries
is not surprising. W h a t will be interesting to observe in the future is whether
(and if so, how) the newly established unitary systems in these two countries
begin to diversify.
In France systemic differentiation is not imposed by law. Diversity is
safeguarded by the specialized and profession oriented focus of institutions
outside the universities. These institutions have a clear self-interest in
training students for specific vocations. T h e r e are some indications, however,
that the stability of the French system may be t h r e a t e n e d : the " u n w a n t e d "
inflow of I U T and STS graduates in universities, along with the start of the
opening u p of universities (contracting policy) and Grandes coles to the
needs of society, may blur the clear segmented structure of French higher
education.
W h e t h e r formally differentiated or not, Trow (1984: 132) maintains that
all higher education systems are stratified: higher education is itself "a
stratified system of institutions, graded formally or informally in status
and prestige, in wealth, power, and influence of various k i n d s . " M o r e o v e r ,
there is not only a r e m a r k a b l e degree of stability to the various types of
stratified structures across time and place, but also a great deal of similarity
in their basic elements, involving "(1) the stratification of sectors of higher
education; (2) the stratification of institutions within sectors; and (3) the
stratification of units and d e p a r t m e n t s within institutions" (Trow, 1984:
137). But it is not always the universities that are on the " t o p of the h e a p . "
In France, for example, the "elite" institutions are the m o r e technically
and vocationally oriented Grandes coles; and with respect to the Grandes
coles there are elites amongst the elites.
T h e structure of G e r m a n higher education also presents some interesting
examples of diversification. First, it is interesting to note that the 1970s
experiment to create comprehensive universities is generally regarded as
a failure (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986). Second, the introduction of the
vocationally oriented Fachhochschulen
in the 1970s appears to have b e e n
quite successful. T h e G e r m a n universities traditionally enjoy a higher
societal prestige, and yet the Fachhochschulen
are strengthening their
societal esteem, because they are in general m o r e successful in their
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relations with the labor m a r k e t . T h e distinction between the two sectors

appears to be the sole form of systemic diversity in the G e r m a n system. In
recent years there have b e e n proposals for structural reform to stimulate
the development of meaningful differences between institutions of the
same category by introducing elements of institutional competition. D u e
to the funding mechanism and other aspects of G e r m a n higher education
policy-making, up until now mainly lip service has been paid to this
matter. Third, G e r m a n unification presents particular problems for higher
education, finance being one of the obvious ones. But structurally, it does
not appear that unification as such has challenged the hegemony of the
G e r m a n university. While unification may have presented the nation with
the opportunity to rethink the entire structure and character of higher
education, it does not seem that this option has been exercised. R a t h e r ,
the former East G e r m a n institutions are being recast in the image of
the traditional West G e r m a n university. With respect to diversification
of higher education, history and tradition, as well as vested interest, play
most important roles.
In nearly every country, the most important factor that seems to differentiate
universities from other types of higher education institutions is research, pure
or basic research in particular. While, in some countries, non-university
institutions may be supported for some applied research, almost everywhere
the bulk of money spent on research in higher education goes to the
universities. Some countries, like the Netherlands, have even formally
prohibited their non-university higher education institutions from engaging
in basic research. Research seems to be o n e factor that helps support the
sectoral hegemony of the universities, but the research differential is also
a double edged sword. While universities may jealously guard their control
over research, other institutions may resent t h e m for having this privilege,
which in turn can lead to campaigns to break the sectoral hegemony of
the universities. It is interesting, for example, to observe in France that
the Grandes coles are now assuming some research functions, while the
universities are engaging in executive m a n a g e m e n t education for the public
service, once the sole province of the Grandes coles. In J a p a n the goals of
the various sectors are not clearly discriminative. In addition, as is suggested
by the outcomes of a national survey, most academics, in all institutions
from graduate schools to junior colleges and colleges of technology, are
m o r e oriented towards research than towards teaching.
In addition to research, the nature of their student bodies distinguishes
universities from the non-university institutions in the countries covered in
this study, in that the best students enroll in the (top) universities. France
is the exception to this rule, since the most prestigious Grandes coles and
not the universities attract the best students. Even in countries where
the formal differences between universities and non-university institutions
are blurring or have disappeared, like Australia, the N e t h e r l a n d s , and
321
the U n i t e d Kingdom, the old universities still attract the most talented
students.
Before concluding the discussion on systemic diversity, it is worthwhile to
note that in those countries that have moved from sectoral differentiation to
unitary systems of higher education, there is some expectation on the part of
policy-makers that institutional diversity will be maintained through m a r k e t
competition. Competition and market-like forces rather than policy per se
are to produce diversity. It has b e e n noted in some of these countries,
however, that the reward structures may increase institutional imitation,
not diversity, and, in this sense, policies a p p e a r to be self-contradictory
(Maassen and P o t m a n , 1990). W e will c o m e back to the issues of competition
and m a r k e t s later on in this chapter.
Programmatic
diversity
This form of diversity concerns institutional differences in their supply of

educational and research p r o g r a m m e s , and services activities. Clearly, there
is a close interrelationship between programmatic diversity and systemic
diversity. Within a higher education system various types of higher education
institutions can exist, with these different types offering similar educational
p r o g r a m m e s . This appeared to b e the case for the Australian and British
systems just prior to the recent reforms. In contrast, formally unified
systems can contain institutions doing quite different things with respect
to both teaching and research. This form of programmatic diversity is quite
apparent in some private sectors of higher education, such as in the U n i t e d
States. While institutions may share "privateness" in c o m m o n and the
related authority structures that derive from belonging to the private sector
there is great diversity of level and type of educational p r o g r a m m e s
between institutions. In California, for example, the Clairmont Colleges
(except for the Clairmont G r a d u a t e School) concentrate their teaching at
the u n d e r g r a d u a t e level and do not attempt to c o m p e t e with other private
institutions, such as Stanford or Cal Tech, for research p r o g r a m m e s and
funding.
It was already mentioned above that there appears to be some relationship
between the way in which programmatic diversity is handled and the stability
of systemic differentiation. But it also seems that if "upward academic drift"
in type and level of course offering is not to occur between sectors within
formally differentiated systems, there need to be clear government policies
that prevent this from happening. T h e O n t a r i o Provincial government, for
example, seems to k e e p a rather tight reign on the C A A T S , while allowing
the universities much m o r e a u t o n o m y and freedom of action.
Looking across the 11 different countries, o n e is impressed by the degree
of diversity in what courses are offered at different levels of higher
322
education. For example, in some countries, nursing education is regarded

as a non-university course, while in others it is offered by the universities.
T h e same applies t o , for example, teacher training p r o g r a m m e s .
In addition there are some striking differences in the length of the
p r o g r a m m e s offered by different types of institutions. In D e n m a r k , for
example, the colleges are only allowed to offer medium-level p r o g r a m m e s
of 3-4 years, while the universities can offer medium-level as well as
long p r o g r a m m e s of five years. In the N e t h e r l a n d s , on the other h a n d ,
the nominal length of the p r o g r a m m e s offered by the universities is the
same in practice as the length of the H B O - p r o g r a m m e s , i.e., four years.
These differences have their specific impact on the national debates on the
relationship between the universities and the non-universities. Switzerland
can be regarded as another interesting example in this matter. In the nonuniversity sector there are considerable differences between institutions with
respect t o , for e x a m p l e , the nominal length of the educational p r o g r a m m e s
and admission policies. In the university sector, n o general guidelines exist
regarding the length and nature of the curricula with the exception of
technical and medical p r o g r a m m e s .
Structural
diversity
This form of diversity has to do with differences in the legal foundation

of institutions, i.e., external structural factors, as well as with differences
in governance structures of institutions, i.e., internal aspects. T h e r e are
immense differences amongst the countries in the types of legislation that
apply to higher education and how legislation is used to steer higher
education systems. H o w e v e r , the topic of legislation and governance is
better left to the sub-section on authority. H e r e , we will address the topic
of public-private and state-federal differentiation of higher education.
Although all of the countries have some form of private higher education
institutions, only two of the cases contained in this b o o k have significant
private sectors of higher education: California and J a p a n . While some
institutions in the other countries, such as the N e t h e r l a n d s , can formally
be called "private" (usually those with a religious affiliation), they are, for
all intents and purposes, public institutions. Also, the private institutions of
G e r m a n y , France, Sweden, and the U n i t e d Kingdom can be regarded, at
least in size, as being rather peripheral to those countries' systems. (Private
funding of public institutions will be discussed u n d e r policy instruments.)
T h e r e are a n u m b e r of observations to be m a d e about systems with
significant private sectors of higher education. First, there is no such
thing as truly "private" higher education. G o v e r n m e n t and the public
sector intervene in private higher education in a n u m b e r of ways. Many
private institutions receive a substantial proportion of their funding from
323
the public sector. Research activities at Stanford, for example, are heavily
d e p e n d e n t on federal government research funds. Also, as is the case in
California, the State usually plays some role in the licensing/accreditation of
private institutions. In J a p a n , private institutions have recently been placed
under the supervision of the Minister of E d u c a t i o n ; this implies that each
institution, private as well as public, must be chartered by the Minister
through the review of the University Chartering Commission. Second, in
dual public-private systems, like in California, the most prestigious of the
private institutions may hold equal esteem with the most prestigious of the
public institutions. H o w e v e r , rarely, if ever, do private institutions uniformly
enjoy m o r e prestige than public institutions. For example, while J a p a n
has an extensive private sector of higher education, it is the older public
universities that form the top of the status hierarchy. Third, there appears
to be a greater variety of institutional type, and particularly of institutional
quality, in the private than in the public sector. Both California and J a p a n
express significant doubts about the quality of some of their private higher
education institutions. Somewhat paradoxically, however, a certain range
in quality amongst some higher education institutions can serve to protect
both the quality and diversity of the system as a whole (cf. T r o w , 1974).
W e will return to this issue under the topic of quality and accountability.
Significant private sectors have their roots in the historical development of
particular systems of higher education. "Privatization" (taken here to m e a n
the growth of "privateness" within public higher education) and market-like
competition, however, have arisen on the higher education agenda of many
countries, whether primarily public or with dual public-private sectors. Also,
shifts in public-private relationships have led to changes in many spheres,
not only within higher education. Changing socio-economic relationships
in Central and E a s t e r n E u r o p e , for example, point to a significant push
towards privatization on a grand scale. With respect to higher education, as
Levy (1991: 7) notes, "privateness is . . . seen as providing m o r e incentives
for efficiencies for actors from students to administrators. Supporters of
privatization find vindication in the trends of the last fifteen years or so. In
the most developed countries, this marks a striking reversal of the decreasing
privateness of post-war decades. T h u s , the public universities of E u r o p e have
come to look much m o r e favourably on private finance to augment resources,
offset lost government funds, and provide energizing competition."
Privatization is being e m b r a c e d as an ideology in its own right and as a
reaction to what is perceived as "public failure." Behind many of the changes
in the relationships between governments and higher educational institutions
is the philosophy of "economic rationalism" a belief that m a r k e t forces,
rather than state intervention, will m a k e institutions m o r e cost-effective
and better m a n a g e d , as well as making higher education systems m o r e
fluid and responsive to client needs and d e m a n d s . T h e m a r k e t competition
"is posed as the solution to good government, the condition for a healthy
324
economy, and the chance for a better education" (Perkins, 1987:1). It has,
for example, been argued that privatization since 1979 has gradually become
one of the major policy priorities of the Conservative government in the
United Kingdom, in higher education as in other areas (Walford, 1991).
In the first chapter of this volume, it was pointed out that " p u r e " m a r k e t
coordination is not feasible in higher education; only quasi-markets can be
designed to o p e r a t e in this sector. H o w e v e r , the idea of m a r k e t coordination
appears to have gained great popularity in higher education policy-making.
T h e higher education policies of many of the countries reviewed in this
book appear to be leaning towards enhancing institutional competition and
providing institutions with m o r e opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial
activities. Only in C a n a d a , it seems, has a conscious decision been m a d e to
curtail institutional competition. E v e n in countries with highly centralized
systems of higher education, there is talk (and some action) of greater
institutional competition and the promotion of entrepreneurial activities of
public higher education institutions.
Privatization and m a r k e t c o m p e t i t i o n m a y be m e r e fads in higher
e d u c a t i o n policy, but t h e pursuit of t h e s e t r e n d s from a variety of different
directions would lead o n e to believe otherwise. A l s o , the significance of the
lean towards competition, de-regulation, and entrepreneurialism is given
some credence by the fact that it seems that kindred forces are pushing
different higher education systems in similar directions. G o v e r n m e n t s in
different places seem to be formulating similar responses to the problems
facing their respective higher education systems. This may be d u e , in part,
to similar responses to similar environmental circumstances. Economic
instability, rising u n e m p l o y m e n t , flagging export m a r k e t s , trade imbalances,
and inflation know no national boundaries. Traditional manufacturing
industries are being replaced by the so-called "knowledge processing sector,"
to which, seemingly, higher education has a particular economic contribution
to m a k e . T h e social service b u r d e n on national treasuries is rising everyw h e r e , coupled with "pressures to cut government expenditure and to
d e m a n d greater efficiencies from public sector institutions and enterprises"
( H a r m a n 1989: 6).
If the push towards institutional competition, de-regulation, and privatization
is a pervasive and long term trend, then it is an interesting p h e n o m e n o n
indeed, for it appears to represent a reversal of governments' attitudes
in their relationship with higher education. T r o w (1984: 143) notes that
during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s most Western governments were not
willing to trust to the private sector the achievement of basic social
goals: "governments since World W a r II have intervened directly in higher
education systems to democratize access and governance, to increase the
relevance of studies for the economy and careers, a n d , perhaps above all, to
increase their own influence over the size, shape, costs, and future direction
of the higher education system." A n d Trow goes on to claim that "states on
325
the whole do not like the m a r k e t principle: its results are unpredictable;
it gives power to institutions and their m e m b e r s , or to students and their
parents, rather than to society and state officials" (1984: 143). W e will return
to this topic in m o r e detail in the discussion of authority in higher education,
but first a few words need to be said about state-federal relationships.
Of the countries reviewed in this study, five are political federations:
Australia, Canada (Ontario), Germany, Switzerland, and the U S A (California).
But within these federations, legislative control of higher education does not
necessarily translate into actual control. T h e California State legislator and
the O n t a r i o Provincial legislator have direct and substantial control of higher
education. In Australia, although higher education is the direct legislative
responsibility of the states, at the system level the federal government
makes most of the important decisions through its power of the purse.
In terms of the balance of p o w e r between the state and national levels,
G e r m a n y and Switzerland seem to fall somewhere between the O n t a r i o
and Australian extremes. T h e G e r m a n Lnder each have substantial control
over higher education, but they also act collectively through the P e r m a n e n t
Conference of the State Ministers of Culture. O t h e r influential national
bodies are the Federal and Lnder Commission on Educational Planning
and Research Support, and the Science Council. T h e situation in Switzerland
is c o m p a r a b l e , although on a smaller scale. Higher education legislation is
mainly a responsibility of the individual cantons, and a framework law
for Swiss higher education does not exist. T h e b o t t o m - u p approach is
strongly rooted in the Swiss system, as each canton has a de facto veto
position. Recently, however, the federal government has a t t e m p t e d to
push the institutions into certain directions. Specific p r o g r a m m e s are being
developed and measures are taken with respect to those subjects that are
considered to be of national importance. This shift from cantonal towards
federal influence entails an element of inter-institutional competition, that
can be regarded as a completely new aspect in Swiss higher education.
T h e Californian system is also influenced by national bodies, such as the
National Science F o u n d a t i o n for the funding of research, and agencies
that allocate federal aid to students. It appears to be difficult to find a
general trend in state-federal (national) relations in higher education. O n
the one hand there is an increase of the influence of the national level in
federative systems; this development is, for example, quite pronounced in
Australia. O n the other hand this process is virtually non-existent in O n t a r i o .
A p p a r e n t l y , a dominant general trend cannot be formulated regarding the
state-federal relations in higher education.
In t e r m s of s t u d e n t access to higher e d u c a t i o n institutions, state
boundaries are quite p e r m e a b l e in Australia and G e r m a n y , but in California,
out-of-state students are charged substantially higher tuition fees in the
public institutions.
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Conclusion
In all countries covered in this b o o k , diversity is an important policy
issue. In general, it is regarded as desirable to maintain (California, C a n a d a ,
France, G e r m a n y , Switzerland), or enlarge (Australia, D e n m a r k , J a p a n , the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United K i n g d o m ) , the diversity of the system.
H o w e v e r , since it is not always clear which form of diversity is m e a n t , as
the point of d e p a r t u r e differs from country to country, it is obvious that
the purposes of and instruments for maintaining or enlarging diversity, as
well as the results u p until now, show r e m a r k a b l e differences between the
11 countries involved.
Authority
It is often noted that the authority of higher education is ultimately derived
from knowledge, and that its governance is determined by the way in
which knowledge is handled. Authority over higher education and authority
of higher education are not the same thing. T h e r e is some expectation,
however, that government policy on higher education should take account
of higher education's fundamental characteristics (Maassen and Van Vught,
1992). Higher education can be regarded as a social system in which the
handling of knowledge is the most crucial activity. F r o m this core activity,
a n u m b e r of organizational principles can be derived. T h e first principle
is that knowledge areas form the "building blocks" of a higher education
institution. This principle leads to a fragmented organizational structure
consisting of specialized cells that are only loosely coupled.
T h e second principle concerns the need to diffuse decision making
power. Since the basic production processes in universities and colleges
are knowledge-intensive, there is a need to decentralize. A s a consequence,
a university takes m o r e after a federal system or an organization like the
U N , than a unitary state.
T h e third principle has to do with the innovative powers of higher
education institutions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, change is a crucial
characteristic of universities and colleges. T h e primary processes, teaching
and research, are adapted continuously, although in most occasions only
incrementally. Because of the fragmentation of tasks and the extreme
diffusion of decision making power, major, sudden, and comprehensive
changes are rare in higher education institutions.
T h e final principle, typical for higher education in continental E u r o p e ,
is the way authority is distributed. Traditionally, authority as regards the
primary processes is concentrated at the "lower levels" of higher education
institutions, i.e., at the level of the academic professionals. Responsibility
with respect to the procedural matters can be found in the Ministries of
Education and other government agencies. This has resulted in a weak
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institutional administration. T h e relative weakness of authority at the

institutional level in E u r o p e a n higher education comes to the fore when
(strategic) institutional decisions have to be t a k e n . Very often such decision
processes consume a lot of time, involve a large n u m b e r of academics and
administrators, and often result in watered-down compromises (Maassen
and Van Vught, 1992: 10).
Higher education is not a unified mono-purpose enterprise, but a collection
of diverse disciplines and professions, each pursuing its separate goals,
aims, and interests. T h e discipline is the basic organizational and political
unit within higher education, which itself both structures and is structured
by knowledge. It is the academic division of labor based on knowledge
that provides higher education with its particular characteristics and poses
special problems of m a n a g e m e n t and coordination both at the institutional
and system levels.
T h e relationship between higher education institutions and system-wide
authority structures clearly influences such matters as change, quality
and structure, and diversity. But the n a t u r e of this relationship, and its
effects, have not been adequately examined until recently. Past theories
on the ability of higher education institutions to exercise initiative in the
context of system-wide authority structures have often been organized on
a continuum. A t o n e end of the continuum is the " b o t t o m - u p " type of
system, w h e r e government policy follows rather than leads a change process
initiated at the d e p a r t m e n t a l , faculty, or institutional level; at the other
end of the continuum is the " t o p - d o w n " type of system, where institutions
merely respond to government-inspired policy initiatives which are enforced
by the power of the state. " B o t t o m - u p " systems are characterized by
high institutional a u t o n o m y and control mechanisms that rest m o r e on a
competitive m a r k e t than on state legislative authority; " t o p - d o w n " systems
are characterized by the opposite. Such a conceptualization of change,
however, has limited explanatory value ( M e e k , 1991). T h e location of a
national system of higher education on the continuum may assist in the
identification of the relative p o w e r of individuals and groups, but this
explains little of the dynamics of change.
In a " t o p - d o w n , " centrally funded, national system of higher education,
government is a highly significant actor. But no government has absolute
power, or at least it cannot exercise it absolutely. G o v e r n m e n t s are
themselves part of the higher education system, and their policies are
either constrained or furthered by the n o r m s , values, and interests of o t h e r
parties within the system.
A n o t h e r view of change in the public arena focuses attention on the
impotence of government policy: however rational or equitable the goals
of public policy, the policies themselves are often rejected or negated by
an implementation process highly influenced by entrenched institutional
tradition and vested interest (Wildavsky, 1979; W u r z b u r g , 1989). Much
328
of the writing in the field of higher education is about the remarkable

social stability exhibited by the university organization despite attempts by
governments and others to change it.
Certainly, academia has been a rather stable, socially cohesive and
resilient institution since its inception in mediaeval E u r o p e . But there
are occasions when entire higher education systems have been knocked
off balance and extensive, fundamental change has occurred. H e r e , Clark's
(1983: 236) definition of fundamental change is useful: "particularly in
systems where tasks and powers are extensively divided and dispersed,
change in structure is what fundamental change m e a n s . Structural change
modifies who does what on a regular basis; and w h o decides regularly on
who will do w h a t . "
T h e degree and extent of change in a complex system, such as higher
education, is d e p e n d e n t upon the intersection of interests, strategic behavior,
norms and values, and ideologies of all concerned. T h e question is not
solely o n e of government intervention (effective or otherwise), but one of
how and why conditions prevail to the extent that systems d o engage in
extensive and far-reaching change. Until recently, however, it seems that
several governments in their steering strategies on higher education have
insufficiently realized that they are only o n e c o m p o n e n t in the dynamics of
higher education.
V a n Vught (1991) identifies two primary traditions in government steering
of higher education: the state control model (or what was referred to in
C h a p t e r 1 as the interventionary state), and the state supervising model (or
the facilitatory state). T h e state control model treats higher education as a
h o m o g e n e o u s enterprise, with government attempting to regulate all aspects
of the dynamics of the higher education system: access, curriculum degree
requirements, the examination system, a p p o i n t m e n t and remuneration of
academic staff, and so on. This model does not recognize the loosely
coupled, multidimensional character of higher education.
In contrast, in the state supervising/facilitatory m o d e l , the influence
exercised by the state is weak, with many of the basic decisions on such
matters as curriculum, degrees, staff recruitment, and finance, left to the
institutions themselves. T h e state sets the b r o a d p a r a m e t e r s in which higher
education o p e r a t e s , but fundamental decisions about missions and goals are
the province of the system and its individual institutions. T h e state control
model has a strong tradition in (continental) E u r o p e . H o w e v e r , in several
Western E u r o p e a n countries there are signs of changes in the relationship
between higher education institutions and government. G o v e r n m e n t s have
for a long time relied on tight regulation of higher education and have been
somewhat disappointed with the results. H e n c e , this has led to the argument
that if institutions were given, within clear government guidelines, m o r e
responsibility to formulate their own missions and goals, higher education
would be m o r e innovative and responsive.
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T h e shift from a state control to a state supervisory m o d e l of higher

education regulation appears to b e having the desired results. V a n Vught
presents evidence to suggest that self-regulation is positively associated
with innovation in higher education and argues that "the strategy of selfregulation appears to be better suited to the context of higher education"
(Van Vught, 1989: 114). According to V a n Vught, self-regulation:
acknowledges the fundamental characteristics of higher education institutions and it
tries to make use of some of these characteristics to stimulate the innovativeness of
the whole system of higher education. By limiting itself to only global forms of steering
and by putting its confidence in the self-regulatory capacities of the professionals and
the basic units of the higher education institutions, this strategy has the potential to
become an effective approach to reach the basic objective of many . . . nations.
Steering/coordination
principles at systems level
T h e evidence from the country studies in this volume suggests that a

n u m b e r of governments are either willing to consider stepping back from
the direct control of higher education, or have taken substantial measures
to move in this direction. T h e evidence presented also clearly shows that
n o government is going to abdicate its responsibility to steer the higher
education system, but the trend is towards steering at a distance setting
the b r o a d p a r a m e t e r s for higher education development, while leaving most
of the details and initiatives to individual institutions. This is accompanied by
de-regulation in a n u m b e r of areas, and a strategy of market-like competition
and privatization as discussed above. C h a n g e in government policy is not
uniform across the 11 countries, nor are all policies totally consistent with
o n e another within countries, but the trend appears prevalent.
Of course, we must be careful not to overstate the extent and significance
of trends towards de-regulation in higher education. First, " m o v e m e n t "
and " c h a n g e " are probably the wrong words to use with respect to the
higher education coordination mechanisms in California and O n t a r i o . These
systems have traditionally allocated a good deal of freedom and a u t o n o m y to
their higher education institutions, particularly to their research universities.
A l s o , it should b e noted that while N o r t h A m e r i c a is held u p as the paradigm
of market-driven higher education, we find in both California and O n t a r i o a
good deal of government control over structures and p r o g r a m m e s . W h e r e
change is occurring in the coordination of higher education, it is not occurring
at the same pace. Australia, the N e t h e r l a n d s , and the U n i t e d Kingdom
appear to be well down the road towards the state supervisory model
of higher education. These countries are followed closely by D e n m a r k ,
J a p a n , and Sweden. In J a p a n , for e x a m p l e , the government has quite
recently announced a policy to move away from a paternalistic strategy with
detailed instructions and guidelines, towards b r o a d e r regulations that leave
basic decisions to the institutions, allowing t h e m to develop their teaching
330
and research activities in a m o r e flexible and a u t o n o m o u s way. In G e r m a n y

and Switzerland, however, partly as a consequence of the federal structure,
the direction is less clear. U p until now, it seems that the governments in
these countries have increased the a u t o n o m y of the institutions in words
rather than actions. Nonetheless, in general, the changes in government
attitude towards higher education coordination and control are significant,
and the fact that they are quite similar in a n u m b e r of countries indicates
that a general trend is found in this field.
T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of state supervisory m o d e l s of higher e d u c a t i o n
coordination has not been without its trade-offs. A t the same time that
some governments are giving higher education institutions m o r e freedom of
m o v e m e n t , they are demanding the e n h a n c e m e n t of internal m a n a g e m e n t
efficiency and effectiveness and the institutionalization of measures to assure
accountability and quality. But there is little or no evidence to suggest that
government action has e r o d e d substantive a u t o n o m y (as defined in Chapter
1), while it appears that in a n u m b e r of areas, procedural autonomy has
b e e n extended, or at least adapted.
R a t h e r than viewing a u t o n o m y as an absolute, o n e can regard it as
a relational issue involving the balance of power between institutions
and government on the o n e h a n d , and between administration and the
academic profession within institutions on the other. Possibly, direct threats
to the substantive a u t o n o m y of academic professionals are m o r e closely
associated with the internal balance of power between executive and collgial
governance than with external intervention, though the executive arm of the
institution may act as a proxy for government bureaucrats. Institutional
a u t o n o m y provides no absolute protection of substantive autonomy.
It seems that the m o r e governments move in the direction of self-regulation
and steering at a distance, the more they will desire the strengthening of
management authority. Neave and Van Vught (1991: 242) argue that the
recent "managerial revolution" that has swept through higher education
has a n u m b e r of components to it, but few so important as the withdrawal
from what has b e e n t e r m e d the political model of institutional m a n a g e m e n t .
This model, being the result of the political debates on higher education
in the 1960s and early 1970s, is now being superseded by another model:
the model of managerial professionalism. In fact, the degree to which
m a n a g e m e n t authority is strengthened may b e an indicator of the degree
to which self-regulation is practised. T h e coupling of self-regulation with
enhanced m a n a g e m e n t authority seems to be occurring both within countries
with a tradition of weak m a n a g e m e n t authority at the institutional level
(most Western E u r o p e a n countries) and in countries with relatively stronger
traditions of m a n a g e m e n t authority at the institutional level (such as G r e a t
Britain and Australia).
A s explained earlier in this section on authority, traditionally, in the
continental E u r o p e a n higher education systems, authority as regards primary
331
processes was concentrated at the "lowest" level of the systems, i.e., at

the level of the academic professionals, while authority with respect to
procedural matters was located at the "highest" level, i.e., at the level
of the national, Lnder, or canton ministries of education and science.
A s a consequence, institutional administration was rather powerless. In
looking at the recent dynamics of higher education coordination in many
of these countries, it is clear that serious attempts are m a d e to strengthen
the authority of the " m i d d l e " level, i.e., the level of the institutional
administration. Especially in the N e t h e r l a n d s , these attempts have resulted
in a n u m b e r of measures increasing the procedural power of institutional
administrators in the area of finance and personnel m a n a g e m e n t . In
D e n m a r k also, institutional administration has b e e n reinforced. In other
countries, e.g., G e r m a n y , the discussions on strengthening institutional
administration have in practice not (yet) led to actual measures in this
matter.
Changes in the direction of government steering of higher education
have not b e e n without resistance. In several countries, a proportion of
the academic community has b e e n most vocal in criticizing government
for draconian tactics, u n d u e interference in institutional affairs, erosion of
institutional a u t o n o m y , and so on. If de-regulation and the e n h a n c e m e n t
of institutional a u t o n o m y are what is really happening, then how can the
criticism of government policy be explained? T h e chapter on D e n m a r k offers
a n u m b e r of plausible explanations, and these are summarized below.
A l t h o u g h i n s t i t u t i o n s ' d e g r e e s of f r e e d o m o v e r i n t e r n a l b u d g e t
allocations has i n c r e a s e d , b u d g e t cuts or s t a g n a t i o n in relation to rising
student participation have put both academics and administrators u n d e r
pressure. This, in t u r n , results in m o r e stringent internal budget allocations.
T h e stinginess of government as pay-master (which actually may be n o
fault of the government) is interpreted as increased centralized government
interference in institutional affairs.
W h e r e changes from above disturb research and educational activities,
increase workload, and disrupt well-known procedures even if the purpose
of the policies is to enhance institutional a u t o n o m y they are regarded as
unwelcome government interference.
G o v e r n m e n t policy on increased institutional self-regulation is often
linked with d e m a n d s for institutional accountability: e v a l u a t i o n of study
p r o g r a m m e s , e m p h a s i s o n quality c o n t r o l , a n d t h e introduction of performance indicators. Accountability d e m a n d s are e q u a t e d with government
centralism in a new disguise.
G o v e r n m e n t policy designed to strengthen the power of central
institutional a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is n o t always w e l c o m e d . Universities are
g o v e r n e d by a n u m b e r of elected b o d i e s , a n d , in a f r a g m e n t e d and
bottom-heavy institutional structure, increased a u t o n o m y at the central
institutional administrative level is in potential conflict with the a u t o n o m y
332
of decision-making bodies at the faculty and d e p a r t m e n t levels. Institutional

autonomy may be in conflict with department/faculty autonomy.
T h e replacement of traditional centralized ministerial regulation by
m a r k e t regulation is perceived by some as just another, m o r e sophisticated
strategy for the accomplishment of ministerial goals. Some institutions
may prefer the traditional bureaucratic m e t h o d s , as ministries are m o r e
predictable and certainly m o r e sensitive to political arguments than are
markets.
Of course, in n o n e of the countries, including D e n m a r k , is there unified
academic opposition to government policy. G o v e r n m e n t reformers also have
strong allies in the academic community. In addition, it must b e r e m e m b e r e d
that in every institution there is always a degree of conservative reaction to
any change.
A s stated above, substantial change in higher education m e a n s change at
the basic academic unit level. T h e expressed concerns of many academics
certainly suggest that change is touching their day-to-day lives. H o w e v e r ,
it is far to soon to tell whether recent government policy initiatives in
some countries are substantially altering the basic sub-structure of academic
organization, and there is also a question of whether it should. But where
change is most a p p a r e n t , and where many of the policies are directed, is at
the institutional level.
Authority and management at the institutional
level
Clearly, the governments of some countries in this study, i.e., Australia,

D e n m a r k , the Netherlands, Sweden and the U n i t e d Kingdom, wish to
see a substantial strengthening of institutional m a n a g e m e n t . This is to be
accomplished through: changes in the composition of governing bodies
to change t h e m into company-like b o a r d s ; the streamlining of decisionmaking within institutions, providing greater power and authority to chief
executive officers; and changing the n a t u r e , task, and role of the democratic
institutional senates and councils from control oriented to advice oriented.
If institutions are to be m o r e competitive in a market-like environment,
t h e n , it is p r e s u m e d , they must be faster and m o r e responsive in their
decision-making.
It appears that the new model of managerial professionalism brings along
several features. O n e is the new balance that seems often to be created
between the various constituent interest groups at the institutional level.
"External interests" (regional industry and c o m m e r c e , social partners)
appear especially to gain increased influence in several countries, e.g.,
France and Sweden. A n o t h e r feature is the growing attention at the
institutional level to strategic m a n a g e m e n t approaches. Enlarged a u t o n o m y
forces institutions to assume responsibility for their own strategic choices
333
and to formulate long-term plans, and institutional missions and profiles.

A third feature is the extension of m a n a g e m e n t accountability. T h e new
responsibilities lead institutional m a n a g e r s to the use of sophisticated
accountability s c h e m e s a n d o u t p u t - d r i v e n financial allocation m o d e l s ,
thereby often creating new tensions within the institutions.
T h e r e remains o n e issue with respect to institutional m a n a g e m e n t which
has not yet b e e n touched u p o n : the role of intermediary bodies ("buffer"
organizations).
Buffer
organizations
Insofar as they have b e e n constituted by the academic profession and

represent academic interests, buffer organizations can be regarded as a
collective extension of institutional m a n a g e m e n t . T h e p a r a g o n of this
model was the U G C in Britain. In several instances, these types of buffer
organizations, w h e r e they existed, have either b e e n transformed to serve
m o r e directly g o v e r n m e n t interests, such as in the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , or
r e m o v e d , like in Australia. T h e transformation or removal of buffer
organizations is often interpreted as a desire on the part of g o v e r n m e n t
to have m o r e direct control over higher education institutions and systems,
but this is only partially t r u e . M a n y governments faced with severe fiscal
problems are attempting to assume m o r e direct stewardship of the e c o n o m y ,
and have regarded statutory intermediary bodies in a variety of spheres as
c u m b e r s o m e , wasteful, and inhibiting of the full play of m a r k e t forces. T h e
transformation or demise of higher education buffer organizations have
been caught u p in a m o r e general trend of government disenchantment
with statutory authorities which seems to be the case in Australia and
Britain as well as in Sweden. H o w e v e r , t h e r e is little evidence to suggest that
the removal of buffer organizations has challenged institutional a u t o n o m y
in fact, in Australia it appears to have actually e n h a n c e d procedural
a u t o n o m y . In the U S A , most state governments seem to have rejected
the lure of centralized authority (of the so-called consolidated governing
boards) in favor of the somewhat greater a u t o n o m y e m b o d i e d in t h e
so-called coordinating b o a r d s (Schmidtlein a n d B e r d a h l , 1991: 8). Most
us states a p p e a r to prefer the type of buffer organization that acknowledges
the importance of a reasonable level of institutional a u t o n o m y .
Examples of buffer organizations dominated by institutional representatives
can be found in most countries. In the N e t h e r l a n d s , for e x a m p l e , both the
universities and the -institutions have their own umbrella organization.
The HBO-Council, has played an important intermediary role in the discussions
taking place in the 1980s on the transformation of the - s e c t o r . Since these
discussions have resulted in a major restructuring of the sector, the role of
the H B O - C o u n c i l also can be expected to change from a m o r e or less real
334
intermediary organization into an organization looking after the interests of

its m e m b e r s , i.e., the HBO-institutions.
In the university and C A A T sector of O n t a r i o , several buffer organizations
exist, of which the most p r o m i n e n t in the university sector are the Council of
O n t a r i o Universities ( c o u ) , a voluntary association, representing universitysector interests to government and facilitating and promoting cooperative
activities, and the O n t a r i o Council on University Affairs ( O C U A ) , an
i n t e r m e d i a r y b o d y , providing the minister with advice on the university
sector. In the university as well as the C A A T sector, the n a t u r e of the system
level policy making processes are such that these intermediary bodies play
an important role in stabilizing the system, i.e., in preventing major, sudden
changes taking place.
In general, it can be suggested that buffer organizations in higher
education are rather vulnerable. Only if a buffer (or a group of buffers,
like in Ontario) can sustain itself as a neutral body "standing b e t w e e n " the
government and the institutions, can it k e e p its legitimacy in the eyes of both
sides. A s soon as it gets "a distinctive tilt towards o n e or the other of its
constituencies" (El-Khawas, 1991: 12), it will confront a crisis of legitimacy,
as has h a p p e n e d t o , for example, the U G C in the U n i t e d Kingdom.
Policy Instruments
Policy instruments at the systems
level
G o v e r n m e n t has at its disposal a n u m b e r of policy instruments to steer and

bring about change within higher education. T h e most important instruments
are funding, planning, evaluation, and regulation. W e will discuss each of
these instruments briefly.
FUNDING
Funding is the most powerful instrument available to government for

steering and changing higher education systems and institutions. Funding
is the golden rule of policy; he w h o pays the piper calls t h e t u n e .
T h e r e are several discernible trends in the funding of higher education
across the 11 countries. First, with the exception of F r a n c e , funding has
either remained stable or actually fallen, while student intake has risen
dramatically in most countries. This has put heavy pressure on every higher
education system reviewed, and has resulted in rising staff-student ratios
and deteriorating infrastructure.
Second, most governments are asking their higher education institutions
to find non-government sources of funding and to engage in various
entrepreneurial activities. This appears to be o n e of the driving forces
335
behind de-regulation and market-like competition. T o a surprising degree,

many institutions have actually been able to significantly diversify their
funding base.
Third, several governments have moved away from e a r m a r k e d funding to
the allocation of block grants with respect to recurrent grants. T h e United
Kingdom has even gone one step further by replacing block grants with a
system based on the buying and selling of educational services. Sweden
also is considering a system where government and students are regarded
as buyers of educational services. These m o v e m e n t s are in line with the
trend towards allowing institutions to set their own priorities and to live
with the financial consequences. A t the same time, the funding of research
has b e c o m e m o r e targeted towards areas d e e m e d to be of national priority.
This is in line with the expectation that academic research has a particular
contribution to m a k e to economic development. Also, in several countries,
it is expected that business and industry contribute m o r e directly to the
funding of research, and that higher education research forms stronger
links with industry. Some countries have been m o r e successful than others
in this respect.
F o u r t h , in several countries the approach of "conditional contracting" is
being introduced (Neave and Van Vught, 1991: 244). G o v e r n m e n t s have
realized that public expenditure assigned to the higher education sector
has reached its limits. Besides, these governments want to m a k e sure
that the budgets for higher education are being used according to the
priorities that government assumes to exist for society. T h e developments
in France are especially worth mentioning. In this country the 1984 Law
(Loi D'Orientation)
has introduced the instruments of contracts. In 1989 the
contract principle was extended to all the activities of the institutions. T h e
French universities are stimulated by the contracts to develop longer-term
objectives, and by negotiating about these objectives to ensure their
fulfillment.
Fifth, several countries are introducing user-pays schemes for higher
education. T h e U S A has always had a strong c o m m i t m e n t to the principle
of individual financial contribution to higher education. H o w e v e r , increased
student fees, loans, or graduate tax are being introduced in countries
with a tradition of "free" public higher education, with the exception of
G e r m a n y . A n increased emphasis on a user-pays policy seems to be driven
by two factors: an increased awareness that it is the children of the upper
professional families that benefit most from higher education, while the
funding of higher education comes from the taxes of the entire spectrum
of society; and, once again, the desire to diversify funding. Also, in some
countries it is believed that user-pays schemes will enhance market-like
competition between institutions for students, and thus improve efficiency
and effectiveness. In addition, there is a belief that if students have to
336
financially contribute to their education, they will be m o r e committed to

their studies.
T h e privatization of funding of public higher education is a strong trend
embraced with some enthusiasm by many institutions. Overall, this is a
trend that should be judged positively. T h e r e is certainly evidence to
suggest that a diversified funding base enhances institutional autonomy
and freedom of m o v e m e n t . But privatization also has its down-side: for
example, commercial scientific ventures can inhibit the free-flow of scientific
knowledge, and user-pays schemes can disadvantage certain groups within
society.
PLANNING
T h e m o v e m e n t towards "steering at a distance" and state supervisory

models of higher education, is not compatible with detailed centralized
planning, where planning is based on the assumption that policy is derived
from a rational process of assessment of all available data. A s mentioned
above, the drive towards privatization is fuelled, in part, by a public
disenchantment with governmental planning. A n d if we look at the results
of centralized planning, such as in the area of m a n p o w e r planning with
respect to higher education, the results are not encouraging. H o w e v e r ,
governments are not completely giving u p their planning prerogative. They
are merely changing their traditional planning conceptions into forms of
" r e m o t e control," thereby transferring the m o r e detailed aspects of the
planning process to individual institutions. T h e most prominent example is
the Netherlands, where a new planning cycle has been introduced recently
based on the conception of "communicative planning."
Some institutions appear to resent that planning has been thrust upon them
as one m o r e administrative burden. H o w e v e r , it should not be forgotten
that the responsible chartering of one's own future is an important aspect
of autonomy and freedom in a democratic society.
EVALUATION
Evaluation is a strong policy instrument. In some quarters it is believed

that evaluation is strengthened even further by tying it directly to funding,
but others have realized that too close a connection between evaluation and
funding can have negative consequences. For one thing, if an institution
believes that evaluation will directly affect next year's funding, the institution
will only provide the evaluators with the "correct" information. This stultifies
evaluation as an effective tool for p r o g r a m m e renewal and institutional
development.
Evaluation in one form or another plays an important role in the higher
337
education system of each of the 11 countries reviewed. A s regards E u r o p e a n

higher education, the recent interest of governments in evaluation has b e e n
described as "the Rise of the Evaluative S t a t e " (Neave, 1988: 8). In some
countries, various instruments (such as the use of performance indicators in
the U n i t e d Kingdom) are used to evaluate and rank the research o u t p u t of
different academic d e p a r t m e n t s . E x p e r t committees of review are appointed
from time to time to evaluate particular issues and policies. T h e Science
Council in G e r m a n y collects and evaluates a great deal of data that is
fed into higher education policy debates in that country. In other words,
evaluation in higher education as well as in other fields is an important
aspect of m o d e r n industrial society.
A t the systems level, evaluation is closely tied to issues of quality and
accountability, and the details are best discussed u n d e r that topic. H e r e ,
however, it is worth mentioning that evaluation of higher education in some
countries is moving from an emphasis on inputs to highlighting outputs. This
brings into play the concept of "value a d d e d . " If, for a m o m e n t , we can
regard students as raw material, the argument is that it is not so important
what is fed into the higher education process, but what is produced at the
other end.
REGULATION
T h e trend in many countries appears to be de-regulation. H o w e v e r , it

should b e realized that de-regulation does not necessarily lead to increased
institutional autonomy. It refers to less governmental legal m e a n s in the form
of rules and regulations. If the abolished rules and regulations are replaced
by general strategies like the "strive for macro-efficiency," translated into
indicators, criteria, and targets, of which the legal and political status is
unclear, the institutions could confront so much uncertainty that in practice
they perceive their a u t o n o m y to have decreased instead of enlarged. Neave
(1988) has used the term de-juridification for this p h e n o m e n o n .
In addition, higher education is subject to many government regulatory
frameworks, a substantial n u m b e r of which are set outside the education
portfolio. Higher education institutions are subject to anti-discrimination
laws, industrial acts and agreements, equal opportunity legislation, freedom
of information, and so on. T h e important point is that, as educational
ministries (or their equivalent) move away from direct control of higher
education institutions, t h e institutions t h e m s e l v e s must a s s u m e m o r e
responsibility for managing the regulatory agreements set elsewhere in
society. Personnel policy is a good example of how de-regulation in the
higher education sphere places other regulatory d e m a n d s on institutions.
In those cases in the past (and which is still the case in some instances now)
where ministries appointed professors and set their terms and conditions
338
of employment, institutions did not have to be too concerned about

personnel policies; but when the institution becomes the employer, the
situation changes dramatically.
Policy instruments
at the institutional
level
For many countries in this study, institutional policy is a somewhat

novel event. Strong and detailed centralized planning has m a d e for weak
institutional policy and planning. But in a move towards a m o r e de-regulated
environment, institutions must confront the same policy instruments with
which governments grapple: funding, planning, evaluation, and regulation.
FUNDING
In many instances, institutions must now m a n a g e their own budgets

much m o r e so than was the case in the past. Total e a r m a r k e d funding
and centralized accounting procedures do not call for much budgetary
expertise. T h e administration of government block grants and substantial
extraneous funds d e m a n d s a high level of budgetary expertise, something
which it appears many institutions are only starting to develop. But if the
trend towards de-regulation of higher education systems is to continue,
sophistication in financial administration must b e c o m e a top priority for
many institutions.
Of course, some institutions are already quite adept at fiscal matters.
T h e higher education institutions in California, public as well as private,
have a long history of knowing the value of a dollar and how to get it.
T h e private institutions in J a p a n could not survive without the know-how
to balance the budget. Block grants, except for targeted research funding,
is the n o r m in Australia, D e n m a r k , the N e t h e r l a n d s , O n t a r i o , Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. But in o t h e r instances, i.e., France and G e r m a n y , the
pay-master that is, the State either retains detailed budgetary control,
or has only recently relinquished control.
If taken as a whole, o n e must be impressed with the extent to which the
public higher education institutions covered by this study have taken control
of their own financial affairs and moved towards a degree of independence
from the government purse. For example, Australian higher education gets
something like 3 0 % of its revenue from non-ministry sources, and private
e n d o w m e n t s for public academic research in Sweden is considerable. British
institutions are becoming much m o r e entrepreneurial, as are those in the
Netherlands.
Some governments have transferred financial responsibility and control
from the central to the local level, with, of course, varying degrees of
success. A t the institutional level, what is interesting to note is that, in
339
some instances, the same thing appears to be happening, that is, central
institutional administrations are transferring budgetary responsibility to
faculties and d e p a r t m e n t s . Some institutions have even gone so far as to
introduce internal markets where d e p a r t m e n t s buy and sell services from
each other and from the center. It may be pointed out that, whether we
look at these transfers of responsibility at central government level or
institutional level, the rationale is the same: budgets are m o r e effectively
and efficiently managed if those who are mainly responsible for expenditure
are also accountable for allocation.
PLANNING
While it appears that several governments have moved away from detailed
centralized planning, this has forced much m o r e planning at the institutional
level. T h e institutions must now decide for themselves what their priorities
are and how they are going to be achieved. This is no easy task for institutions
without a planning tradition. T h e setting of priorities is often a painful
exercise, for the process must assess both priorities and posteriorities, as
well as identify strategies for future development.
This growing attention at the institutional level for planning brings along
the need for procedures and techniques of strategic planning. It may be
emphasized here that, because of their specific characteristics, higher
education institutions should not automatically take over the strategic
planning models that are being used in the private sector. Higher education
institutions are confronted with the task of developing their own strategic
planning approaches, that fit the organizational characteristics of these
institutions (Maassen and V a n Vught, 1992).
EVALUATION
Internal systematic evaluation of the higher education processes at the

department/faculty level is a fairly novel idea for some of the countries
covered in this b o o k . H o w e v e r , this statement needs to be qualified. T h e U S A
has a fairly long tradition of internal evaluation, particularly of teaching. In
all countries, staff are extensively evaluated for promotion to a higher level
of appointment; also, in the research oriented universities, research activities
of individuals and groups are subject to p e e r review (especially for funding
purposes). In most countries, non-university institutions of higher education
have been subjected to much m o r e rigorous internal and external evaluation
procedures than the universities. Also, ad hoc evaluation procedures have
b e e n employed from time to time as special circumstances have required,
such as when a d e p a r t m e n t or unit is experiencing particular difficulties.
Nevertheless, the idea of the institutionalization of evaluation (especially
340
of teaching) on a broad scale is for most of the countries a fairly novel or

relatively recent idea.
H o w e v e r , as institutions take m o r e responsibility for setting their own
missions, goals and priorities, evaluation assumes greater importance.
Internal research m a n a g e m e n t plans, for example, need to be based on
an evaluation of the internal research strengths and weaknesses of the
institution. Obviously, effective internal m a n a g e m e n t also requires the
evaluation of n u m e r o u s other areas of the institution's operation.
REGULATION
De-regulation at the national/state policy level appears to result in

increased regulation at the institutional level. T h e r e is no paradox in this if
government is going to step back from the direct steering of higher education,
then the institutions themselves must take responsibility for the regulatory
frameworks once administered centrally. A s mentioned above, increasingly
institutions are being "forced" to take responsibility for such matters as:
anti-discrimination, industrial agreements, equal opportunities, freedom
of information, and personnel policy and staff development. G r e a t e r
institutional involvement in these areas is sometimes interpreted as a loss
of a u t o n o m y , but such a stance confuses autonomy with accountability.
Quality and Accountability

T h e issue of quality (and the question how the various stakeholders in
higher education are to be assured of quality) has m u s h r o o m e d as a priority
on the higher education political agenda nearly everywhere. B u t , while it
is generally recognized that institutions must be held accountable for the
quality of their activities, there is an abundance of different interpretations
of quality. According to Birnbaum (1989):
conflicting definitions suggest two aspects of the quality dilemma. The first dilemma
is whether quality can or should be considered by either absolutist or relativistic
criteria. The second dilemma is that, regardless of the position taken, the various
dimensions of quality often have structural or procedural requirements that are in
conflict. For example, improving quality by making undergraduate instruction "better"
may require uses of faculty time, delivery system, administrative support and financial
resources that would hinder improvements of quality in research or service (Birnbaum,
1989: 24).
Theory can do little to resolve the dilemmas produced by the trade-offs

inherent in the pursuit of quality, except to suggest that quality priorities
and institutional missions should coincide. But with regard to definitions
of quality, the literature comes down heavily on the side of a relativistic
perspective. Quality is a relative concept: multidimensional, interpretive,
and contextually determined. Quality of higher education "can only be
341
defined in relation to a set of goals. It cannot be assumed that the goals

of different national higher education systems are identical, not even that
there will be consensus about goals with any one system. For these reasons,
comparisons of quality cannot be hierarchical but should be descriptive of
the qualities of different systems. T h e extent to which qualities are similar
across and within systems is an empirical question . . . " (Brennan et al.,
1991: 1). F r o m this perspective, the concepts of quality and relevance
converge. Quality relates to the degree to which an institution is fulfilling its
goals, and relevance relates to the degree to which those goals are applicable
to the needs and d e m a n d s of society.
It is possible (and valuable as well) to assess the degree to which a
higher education institution is achieving its stated missions, goals, and
aims, and also it is possible to assess the relevance of the institution's
activities to the needs of society. But if this is to occur, both the goals of the
higher education institutions and the needs of society must be pre-specified
in such a way that lend themselves to assessment. Also, there should
be some correspondence between the goals of the institutions and their
relevance to society, otherwise the risky outcome can be that we end u p
with quality institutions of little relevance, or vice versa. H o w e v e r , in that
there are a variety of stakeholders with diverse and sometimes divergent
views and interests involved in determining both the goals of the higher
educational institutions and the needs of society, specification of goals and
needs becomes problematic indeed.
M o r e o v e r , while it appears logical to have as much correspondence
as possible between the goals of higher education institutions and their
relevance to the needs of society, past efforts to achieve such correspondence
with any precision have proved to be fairly dismal failures. T h e p o o r results
in most countries of m a n p o w e r planning and its use to structure higher
education outputs, is a good example of how rational, centralized planning
can go astray. H o w e v e r , given society's investment in higher education,
quality and relevance must be assured. But how is this to be achieved?
T h e r e is no definitive answer to this question. But there is some evidence
to suggest that the details of higher education missions and goals are best
left to the institutions themselves, while the task of government is to set
the broad p a r a m e t e r s the social relevance in which these goals are
to be pursued. This approach adopts what V a n Vught terms the state
supervising m o d e l , and rejects what he calls the state control m o d e l , as
was discussed above:
In a quality assessment system which is in accordance with the state supervising model,
government should refrain from trying to completely steer the activities of the higher
education institutions. The tasks of government are to make sure that the institutions
themselves will operate a quality assessment system, that in that operation the needs
of society are addressed and that the institutions respond to societal demand. The
actual design and operation of the quality assessment system can be left to the higher
education institutions themselves. They should use their autonomy to discuss (and
342
judge) the levels of quality of various teaching and research programmes that are
executed by units within the institutions. In those discussions and judgements they
should of course pay attention to societal needs. A n d if they fail to d o so, they will
be held accountable by government (Van Vught, 1991: 47).
U n d e r this a p p r o a c h , quality control begins with institutional selfevaluation, which has several advantages. First, it provides those who must
deal with issues of quality, ownership of the evaluation process (Kells,
1988). This should enhance people's commitment to quality improvement
where deficiencies are identified. Second, self-evaluation places m e m b e r s of
higher education institutions in m o r e direct contact with both their clientele
and the community. All institutional self-evaluations should gather opinions
from graduates and employers about the " p r o d u c t " being produced. Third,
self-evaluation "forces" institutions to go beyond m o t h e r h o o d statements in
identifying their goals and missions in such a way that can be measured.
Of course, m e a s u r e m e n t in the quality m a n a g e m e n t process should not be
seen as an end in itself. Evaluation data are only useful as an input into
m a n a g e m e n t decisions about quality.
Finally, self-evaluation recognizes the fundamental characteristic of higher
education, based on knowledge production and dissemination. It is the
disciplinary expert who is best placed to m a k e initial judgements about
quality in his/her area of expertise. Self-evaluation may m a k e use of external
peers in specific disciplinary areas; peer review is a fundamental aspect of
the academic process. But it is the internal professionals who must ultimately
judge and be held responsible for the quality of the knowledge they produce
and m a n a g e .
Quality assessment
and its purpose
Not surprisingly, the 11 countries show as much vagueness and lack of

agreement on interpretation of quality assessment and its purposes as is
found in the literature. B u t a strong, a n d , in some countries, a fairly recent,
emphasis on quality can be found in each of the higher education systems.
T h e purpose of quality assessment is m o r e difficult to discern. In many
countries, there is a concern that the quality of higher education has fallen
due to a lack of financial resources and rising student n u m b e r s . In some
countries, quality assessment particularly with respect to the external
use of performance indicators has been used to target research funding,
and in some instances to penalize poor performance. O t h e r countries intend
to use quality assessment to lift institutional performance and to reward best
practice. In several places, the emphasis on quality assessment is tied to a
rising expectation in society for effective and efficient public expenditure.
In the U S A , quality assessment has a relatively long tradition, but in other
places, such words have an unfamiliar ring to t h e m . This has bred some
resistance amongst certain academic communities to quality assessment.
343
Also, resistance, where it exists, is based on the notion that quality

assessment is an interventionist instrument of government used to control
higher education. Recent past experience in G r e a t Britain and elsewhere
gives some credence to such fears. Finally, where governments have moved
towards competition and market-like regulation of higher education, there
appears to be a recognition that m a r k e t forces do not necessarily ensure
quality.
W h a t the purpose of quality assessment "is" and what it "should b e " are
two quite different things. Many of the countries covered by this book are
still grappling with this issue.
Institutionalization
of quality assessment
mechanisms
If we look across the 11 country reports, the variety and degree of

e n t r e n c h m e n t of quality assessment m e c h a n i s m s is b o t h variable a n d
impressive. In some countries, the institutionalization of quality assessment
mechanisms is only at the "good idea" stage, while in other places, the actual
process has already begun. Elsewhere, quality assessment is well entrenched.
In the United Kingdom, for example, performance indicators have b e e n
used to rank university d e p a r t m e n t s for the purpose of research funding.
T h e A c a d e m i c Audit Unit, charged with monitoring the quality assurance
procedures being u n d e r t a k e n in universities, has developed a sophisticated
approach to quality assessment. In the N e t h e r l a n d s , the effort to assess
the quality of teaching and research has b e e n institutionalized through the
introduction of a rather successful quality assessment system for university
and higher vocational education, the system of conditional funding for
scientific research, and an increasing n u m b e r of output-oriented p a r a m e t e r s
in funding models. Since 1984, the French Comit National d'Evaluation
des
Universits has m a d e a periodical assessment of the quality of individual
French higher education institutions. While the French committee is a
government body, its chairman is appointed by the president of the
republic, not by the Ministry of Education. Supposedly, this frees the
committee from the interests of the higher education bureaucracy. In
Scandinavia, efforts have been u n d e r t a k e n to coordinate the activities
of the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish governments to set u p national
systems of quality assessment in higher education. In J a p a n it appears that
the government wants to maintain the authority concerning the institutional
quality assessment processes. It can be questioned whether this top-down
approach will have the intended effect.
T h e r e appear to be two primary issues at stake in the institutionalization
of quality assessment mechanisms amongst the countries. T h e first concerns
the degree to which national (or state) quality assessment bodies should
be independent of both government and the higher education institutions.
344
Second, there is some apprehension that the very institutionalization of

quality assessment will impose uniformity on the higher education system
and hence stifle diversity.
Possibly the quality and relevance of higher education are to be found
in its very diversity, a diversity that even allows for some institutions to
be of a different or lower quality and relevance than others. Birnbaum
(1989: 25) makes a similar point with respect to the quality of higher
education in the United States. H e identifies three views of quality: the
meritocratic, the social, and the individualistic. Meritocratic views refer to
quality based on "institutional conformity to universalistic professional and
scholarly norms and use the academic profession as a reference g r o u p . " T h e
social view considers "the degree to which the institution satisfies the needs
of important collective constituents." T h e individualistic view emphasizes
"the contributions that the institution m a k e s to the personal growth of
students." Birnbaum concludes that:
when one focuses on institutions, there is a tendency to expect them all to give major
attention to meritocratic values. However, given the limited resources available, such
expectations inevitably require less attention to other aspects of quality, and thereby
diminish the diversity of the system. It may be argued that the American system
of higher education would be weakened significantly if any of these three views of
quality disappeared or diminished. It is the tension between the views that provides
the diversity that protects and strengthens the higher education system . . . It is
probably important that efforts to strengthen institutions on universalistic meritocratic
criteria continue; it is equally important that these efforts not be successful universally
(Birnbaum, 1989: 33).
A n over-emphasis on quality control mechanisms and narrow definitions

of relevance and accountability, could force higher education into a straitjacket that serves the interests of no-one.
Quality and
funding
The undesirability of closely tying quality assessment to funding mechanisms

was mentioned above. It appears that in those countries where this has
occurred, there has been a m o v e m e n t away from too closely basing funding
on quality assessment. Nonetheless, it seems that if quality assessment is to
be taken seriously at either the system or institutional level, it has to have
consequence. Possibly the D u t c h approach, where lengthy evaluation and
consultation precedes any penalty for p o o r performance, presents a viable
model.
State of Transition
All of the higher education systems reviewed in this book have gone
through profound periods of growth and social transformation since the
345
Second World W a r . O u r concern h e r e , however, is with m o r e recent change,

and in this respect we find that some systems a p p e a r to be m o r e stable than
others, but each system is subject to pressures which have very similar
origins. Many of these pressures have already been discussed. But before
looking at degrees of transition amongst the countries, a few additional
words need to be said about two global pressures that seem to be pushing
change in higher education: expansion and the advent of postindustrial
society.
O n e of the main sources of tension in the transformation of higher
education is associated with expansion, that in turn affects various dimensions
of the higher education enterprise: finance, governance, relations with government, student recruitment and the curriculum, maintenance of academic
standards, and relations to the secondary school system. Expansion has its
impact on every form of activity and manifestation of higher education.
Over the last three to four decades, higher education systems have
expanded and world-wide enrolments have increased dramatically. In the
history of the universities, the greatest expansion of higher education has
occurred since the Second World W a r . According to Ramirez and Riddle
(1991: 91), "out of 1,854 universities founded between 1200 and 1985,
1,101 (59 per cent) were established between 1950 and 1985." T h e older
universities have also doubled and tripled in size, and nearly everywhere
an increasing proportion of the relevant age group is participating in higher
education. In 1955 the "national tertiary enrollment average for developed
countries was 6.0 percent in contrast to 0.9 percent for developing countries."
By 1985 these averages had risen to 9 % for developing countries and 2 5 %
for developed countries (ibid.: 95). Most O E C D countries have achieved
mass higher education, and are rapidly heading towards universal higher
education.
T h e idea of transition from elite systems of higher education to mass
systems, and then towards universal access, has come from T r o w . Trow's
argument is that growth and various associated problems which affect higher
education should not be treated in isolation. R a t h e r , he claims, a range of
problems:
are understood better as different manifestations of a related cluster of problems arising
out of the transition from one phase to another in a broad pattern of development
of higher education that is under way in every advanced society: from elite to mass
higher education and subsequently towards universal access. Underlying this pattern
of development lies growth and expansion (Trow, 1975: 55).
Elite higher education directly affects the lives of only relatively small
n u m b e r s of individuals in any country and, even though the provision
by governments in terms of funding per student unit may be generous,
the total d e m a n d s on the society are not great. But as higher education
systems expand and b e c o m e mass systems, they touch the lives of increasing
n u m b e r s of the population, and also lead to much greater financial d e m a n d s
346
for both capital and recurrent expenditure. H e n c e the societies as a whole

understandably want m o r e say in what higher education institutions do and
how they go about their work. T h e internal dynamics of institutions also
change. Collgial traditions are inevitably e r o d e d as academics come to
form a large unionized profession, and as institutions grow in size they
become m o r e bureaucratic and regulated.
A t times there is often a measure of resistance to the transformation from
one stage of development to another for example, from associations
of academic staff or student groups in defence of special privileges, from
governments sometimes reluctant to find the necessary funds to m a k e
substantial expansion possible, and from particular social groups keen to
restrain educational ambition and social mobility. B u t , at the same time,
expansion is often strongly supported by other interests and groups.
T h e transition from elite to mass higher education, t h e n , affects public
perceptions about access and about the functions of higher education, as
well as causing changes of perception within the academy. It also leads
to very considerable tensions and conflicts about these matters, and about
academic standards.
Certainly such factors as social equity and cultural enrichment have helped
fuel the world-wide growth of higher education, but m o r e basic reasons for
this massive expansion are to be found in the global economic restructuring
of society. According to Perkins:
The reasons for the unprecedented expansion of higher education are twofold: (1)
the demand of a more complex and highly geared economy for applied science and
technology and for the social and administrative sciences for managing large institutions
and corporate structures; and (2) the demand in a postindustrial society providing more
sophisticated services for highly educated personnel to operate and service them. Both
are the product of a new kind of society, a further stage in human development, based
more on services than on agriculture and manufacturing. It is in fact a third industrial
revolution . . . It is not that the service industries have replaced manufacture, any more
than manufacturing in the Industrial Revolution replaced agriculture. O n the contrary,
what is happening to manufacturing in the Postindustrial Revolution is what happened
to agriculture in the last Industrial Revolution, when food production became so
efficient that it could feed the majority of the population with a minority of the work
force, and release most of the people for work in other industries. N o w manufacturing,
with the aid of automation and electronic technologies, is becoming so efficient that it
takes a minority of the work force to produce the material goods for the majority, so
that most people can be released for work in other areas . . . Professional experts are
needed not only for the service industries but also for the more sophisticated operation
of high technology agriculture and manufacturing industry (Perkins, 1991: 199).
Higher education occurs in a context much influenced by changing

economic patterns, and, as what Bell has called "knowledge w o r k e r s "
begin to replace factory workers, both governments and industry are going
to increasingly have m o r e interest in higher education. In fact, the nearly
world-wide government restructuring of higher education systems which
occurred throughout the 1980s was not, as is often popularly believed,
347
brought about by a universal dissatisfaction with higher education, but by

a recognition of its importance.
Degree of
transition
Either actual or foreshadowed transition of higher education appears

apparent in most of the countries reviewed. T h e question is not so much
whether there is change, but the degree of change. O n t a r i o seems the most
stable of the systems addressed in this study. T h e Californian Master Plan
has been kept in place for three decades, but the expected substantial
increase in student d e m a n d will put substantial pressure on the state system.
Turmoil is almost a standard feature of the French system, although within
a context of underlying structural stability. But if France is to achieve the
expected strong increase in participation rates by the year 2000, change will
probably b e c o m e the order of the day. J a p a n has already reached a high level
of participation in higher education, and the pressure there may result from
negative population growth; but experience in other countries shows that
demography is only o n e of several factors related to participation. Australia
and the United Kingdom have experienced dramatic structural reform by
anyone's standards, and many of the Western E u r o p e a n countries a r e , or
are about to relinquish much of their central control over higher education.
For what is often claimed to be a remarkably stable and change-resistant
enterprise, the higher education systems reviewed in this b o o k a p p e a r to
be astonishingly flexible and adaptable although in n o n e of the countries
has change been resistant free.
Where is it all
heading?
T h e future is unpredictable. T h e best that can be achieved in chartering

the future course of such complex systems as higher education, is to offer
a few tentative suppositions based on past experience. W e are fortunate,
however, in this regard, for the history of the higher education systems
presented in this b o o k is both rich and informative.
T h e first point to m a k e is that change is much m o r e of a constant in higher
education than is often p r e s u m e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , as d e m a n d increases (there
is no evidence that overall it will slacken), and as higher education is asked
to fulfil new needs and d e m a n d s of postindustrial society, change is likely
to remain on the higher education agenda.
Identifying the direction of change is a much m o r e difficult matter.
A n y statements on where the different systems a p p e a r to be heading
can be tentative at best. But it does a p p e a r that the dual process of
relaxing government control, and strengthening institutional m a n a g e m e n t
and a u t o n o m y , will continue in several countries. This process, it seems,
348
will be accompanied by enhanced institutional competition, a degree of

privatization in funding of both teaching and research, and some degree
of reliance on market-like regulation. A t the same time, institutions will
be held m o r e accountable for their quality and services. These trends are
neither ambiguous nor ubiquitous, but clearly their outcomes will require
careful monitoring.
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Subject Index
Australia, higher education policy in

13-48
Australian H.E. Industrial
Assoc. (AHEIA) 43
Australian Research Council
24, 28-9, 32, 3 5 , 4 0 , 4 5
authority within H.E system
23-31
control of education
programmes 25-6
control of research
programmes 26-7
institutional funding 28-31
institutional management and
control 27-8
legislation 23-5
Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research
Organization (CSIRO) 23,
27
Commonwealth Tertiary
Education Commission
(CTEC) 16, 24,45-6
Cooperative Research Council
(CRC) Programme 26-7,
29,40,43
Dept. of Employment,
Education and Training
(DEET) 24, 34-5,45-6
deregulation in H.E. 31, 33, 39
effects of structure, authority
and H.E. policy on
institutional governance
and management 35-47
freedom 42-4
change, dynamics of 35-40
federalism 46-7
intermediary bodies 45-6
quality and accountability
40-2
higher education policy 31-5
goals of 31-2
incentives, planning and
institutional autonomy 35
policy development and
implementation 33-4
shifts and key issues in 32-3
Minister for H.E. and

Employment Services 34,
40
National Board of
Employment, Education
and Training (NBEET) 24, 26,
35, 40,45-6
National Health and Medical
Research Council 32
research (R&D) 22-4, 26-33,
35,40-1,43
priority areas 35, 43
structure of H.E. System 13-23
admission and selection 1819
characteristics of H.E.
structure 22-3
degrees and formal length of
study 17-18
students, staff and drop out
rate 19-21
TAFE (Technical and
Further Education) 16,
18, 2 3 , 3 3 , 4 6 - 8
California, higher education policy in
49-82
Association of Independent
Califoraian Colleges and
Universities (AICCU) 54
authority within the H.E.
system 57-70
programmes 57-60
control of research
programmes 60
control 61-2
California community colleges
49-50, 52-3,57, 61-2, 73,
78,318-19
financing of 63-6
California Postsecondary
Education Commission 59,
66, 74, 76
California State University 50,
52-3,56-7, 61-2, 7 3 , 3 1 8
financing of 66-70, 73
colleges, junior 49-50, 52-3
357
358
Subject
Index
colleges, private/independent
49-50,54-5, 57
colleges, state/public 49-50, 52
Council on Private
Postsecondary Education
55
and H.E. policy on
long-range planning as a
basis for stateinstitutional interaction
77-81
ethnic/racial diversification 701,76
goals of 70-2
institutional autonomy
73-4
Master Plan for Higher
Education (1960) 50, 52,
56,59,318
population growth 70-2
research 59-60
structure of H.E. system 51-7
admission and selection 55-7
history and rationale of H.E.
system 52-5
rate 57
University of California 49-50,
52,56, 60-1,73,78,318-19
financing of 66-70, 73
Canada 10, 214-38
see Ontario, higher education
policy in
Denmark, higher education policy in
83-103
system 90-5
control of education and
research programmes 913
control 93-4
legislation 90-1
and H.E. policy on
freedom 101-3
goals of 96
institutional autonomy
98-100
structure of H.E. system 84-90
structure 89-90
system 84-7
research at universities 90,
92-3, 96
rate 87-9
European Community, science policy
in 279
France, higher education policy in
104-31
system 111-14
programmes 112
control of research
programmes 112
control 112-13
legislation 111-12
decentralization trends in H.E.
123-5, 127, 129-30
and H.E. policy on
accountability, strengthening
mechanisms of 128
contract financing 125-6, 128
curricular adjustment 119-21
curricular control and
validation 126-7
factors of limitation 118-19
market place, French vision
of 121-2
market place as new
mechanism for reform
122-3, 130-1
policy objectives and their
interpretation 123-5
Subject Index
political dimensions of
current reforms 121
structures, segmentation and
policy style 116-17
transitional phases 117-18
grandes coles (GE) 104-6,
109-11, 114, 116,319-20
Higher Education Guideline
Law, 1968 118
Higher Education Guideline
Law, 1984119, 124-5
research 106, 111-12, 128
structure of H.E. system 10411
structure 111
study 107-8
system 104-7
rate 108-10
Germany, higher education policy in
10, 132-61
system 141-8
programmes 142-4
control of research
programmes 144
control 145-6
legislation 141-2
and H.E. policy on
freedom 158-61
157-8
GDR, former 136, 153-4
goals of 148-52
intermediary organizations
152-3
reunification and H.E. 153-4
research 132, 144
reunification 133,153-4, 320
structure of H.E. system 13341,319
structure 138-41

rate 135-8
vocational education 139-41,
319-20
Higher education policy, international
1-12, 264, 278,315-48
authority 326-9
authority and management at
institutional level 332-3
buffer organizations 333-4
steering/coordination
principles at systems
level 329-32
freedom 8-9
diversity in H.E. systems 31626
programmatic diversity 3212
structural diversity 322-6
system diversity 317-21
federalism 9-10
governments, markets and
academia 5-8
intermediary bodies 10-11
policy instruments 334-40
at institutional level 338-40
at systems level 334-8
quality and accountability 34044
quality and funding 344
quality assessment and its
purpose 342-3
quality assessment
mechanisms,
institutionalization of
343-4
regulation, steering and control
3-5
research 320, 335
state of transition 344-8
degree of transition 347
future, the 347-8
International higher education policy
see Higher education policy,
international
Japan, higher education policy in
162-87
system 172-5
control over educational and
research programmes
173
359
360
Subject
Index

control 173-4
legislation 172-3
deregulation policy,
introduction of 186
and H.E. policy on
H.E. policy, problems and
dilemmas 182-5
quality and accountablility
180-2
goals of 176-7
Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) 176-7
research 171-3
structure 169-72
study 166
history and rational of H.E.
system 163-5
rate 166-9
Netherlands, higher education policy
in 188-213
system 196-206
control of research
programmes 199-200
control of teaching
programmes 197-9
funding mechanisms, recent
changes in 205-6
control 200-2
legislation 196-7
and H.E. policy on
effectiveness of H.E. 207
graduates, social demand for
207-8
quality assessment and
quality control 208-10
Netherlands Organization for

Scientific Research (NWO)
200
Open University 189
system 191-2
history and rational of H.E.
system 188-91
students, staff and drop
out/completion rates 1946
vocational education 190-1
OECD (countries) and higher
education 41, 182, 250, 345
Ontario, higher education policy in
214-38
system 221-8
budgets of universities 227
control over education
programmes 223-4
control over research
programmes 224
control 225
legislation 221-3
Council of Ontario
Universities 229-39, 236
and H.E. policy on
and management 231 -7
government policies and
235-7
institutional autonomy and
academic freedom 231 -3,
237
provincial policy 233-5
French as language of
instruction 226, 235
goals of 228-31
Ontario Council on University
Affairs 225-6, 229-30
system 220-1
system 214-16
Subject Index
post-secondary education,
other forms of 216
rate 217, 220
Sweden, higher education policy in
239-64
system 251-9
control of education and
research programmes
252-3
control 254-9
legislation 251-2
and H.E. policy on
goals of 259-61
research (R&D) 241-2, 248,
250-3,256-61
structure 250-1
study 243-5
system 239-43
1977 reform 241, 250-1,253,
260-3
Switzerland, higher education policy
in 10, 265-89
system 271-5
programmes 272-3
legislation 271-2
Board of the Federal Institutes
276-8
and H.E. policy on
disparities in H.E. system
282-5
knowledge and science
policy decisions 285-6
organizational differentiation
and policy-making 286-7
Swiss university system and
the future 287-8
Federal Office of Education

and Science 276-8, 281
institutional overview 276-7
negotiating in H.E. policy
280-1
new instruments of federal
government 281-2
planning and legitimacy,
dilemma between 278-80
international orientation of
teaching and research 2845
Science Agency 276-7, 286
Science Council 274, 276,
278-91,288
structure of H.E., system 26570
admission procedures 268-9
length of studies 269
primary and secondary
education 266-7
rate 269-70
tertiary education, academic
and non-academic 267-8
University Conference 276-8,
280, 286
United Kingdom, H.E. policy in 7,
10,290-314
authority within the H.E. system
296-302
programmes 297-8
control 299
legislation 296-7
Education Reform Act, 1988
297, 299-300
Council for National
Academic Awards (CNAA)
10
and H.E. policy on
freedom 310-11
mission statements 311-12
obtaining resources and
allocating them 308-9
power and decision-making
306-8
312-13
staff appraisal 313
361
362
Subject
Index

National advisory Board
(NAB) 303, 306
Open University 294-5
research 296, 298-301,305,
308
Robbins Committee 292
structure of H.E. systems 2906
degree and formal length of
study 293-4
system 292-3
post-secondary education,
other forms of 294-5
relationship between the

different forms of
education 295
research 296
rate 295-6
Universities Funding Council
(UFC) 297-8
University Grants Committee
(UGC)7, 10, 187, 297,
300, 303
Workers Educational
Association 295
U.S.A. 6-7, 10,49-82, 321
see California

Higher Education Policy An International Comparative Perspective

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ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Series Editor: GUY NEAVE, International Association of Universities, Paris, France

Other titles in the series include

Higher Education Policy

Pergamon Press Ltd, Headington Hill Hall,

Pergamon Press, Inc., 660 White Plains Road,

Pergamon Press Korea, ... Box 315,

Pergamon Press Japan, Tsunashima Building Annex,

Copyright 1994 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Printed by Redwood Books, Trowbridge,

Introduction to Issues in Higher Education

Introduction to Issues in Higher Education

problmatique. Every encouragement will b e given to t h e drawing of clear

T h e quality of education and higher education in industrial nations

project report in its catalogue, making it accessible to higher education

T h e C e n t e r for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) was established at

Reinhard M o h n , chairman of the B o a r d of the Bertelsmann Foundation and

A t the same time, however, it should be noted that change perceived

structural features and modes of work of the different higher education

Guiding Concepts and Theoretical Notions

Higher Education Policy in International Perspective

steering, and control in higher

mechanism is the result of the interplay between various forces, interests,

Higher Education Policy in International Perspective

In every higher education system, governments play a certain role

In general, therefore, the concept of m a r k e t s in higher education is

A n inventory and assessment of these kinds of elements the production

Higher Education Policy in International Perspective

powerful entity. A s Clark notes, "academics have also transmuted local

This latter shift has been described as a move towards self-regulating

outside controls, has been accompanied by an emphasis on accountability

Autonomy and academic

T h e question as to what constitutes a u t o n o m y in universities is ambiguous,

Higher Education Policy in International Perspective

precise boundaries between procedural and substantive a u t o n o m y can be

In federal systems like Australia, C a n a d a , G e r m a n y , Switzerland, or the

A s mentioned above, in most higher education systems intermediary

Higher Education Policy in International Perspective

case it is the representative of the institutions. The second function relates

Structure of the Report

Structure of the Higher Education System

Figure 1 outlines the structure of the Australian educational system.

Figure 1: The Australian educational system

The higher education system: history and rationale

Higher Education Policy in Australia

higher education system. This is a very new p h e n o m e n o n , brought about

the teachers' colleges had to b e c o m e independent of state d e p a r t m e n t s

T h r o u g h o u t the late 1970s and early 1980s, the relevance of higher

Higher Education Policy in Australia

implement the structural changes and other reforms now r e q u i r e d . " T h e

Degrees and formal length of study

introduced a professional doctorate (the E D D ) , along the lines of the

Other forms of post-secondary

In addition to higher education, the other main system of post-secondary

Admission and selection

Higher Education Policy in Australia

Students, staff, and drop out rate

While results vary substantially between institutions and courses of study,

Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness . . . , 1986.

Higher Education Policy in Australia