Gross immorality: 2 lawyers in love disbarred.

In the case of MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA
P. VALENCIA, En Bacn, A.C. No. 6593, the Supreme Court DISBARRED Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, in
violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty.
Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaintaffidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June
23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr.
Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely,
Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and
Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido; . That on May, 1991, during my light
moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that
sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that
the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But
when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on August
1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x 6. That I did
not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live
Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that
Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at
Hongkong sometime on 1978.. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal
home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x That since
he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial
support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial
constraints.That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as
alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their
immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x xIn his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Garrido
denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that
Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David
(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after
he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his
escapades and understood his bad boy image before she married him in 1962. As
he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido
met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his
difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial
support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were
educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino,
who finished a special secondary course. Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had
not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a
member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the
death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea
were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty.
Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since
the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing
marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea
knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea
and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with
Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially
helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that
Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent
when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that
Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the
respondents disbarment. The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation
with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This
resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which
lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P.
Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18,
2007.
Atty. Garrido then sought relief with the Court through the present petition for
review. He submitted that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross
immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argued that the offenses
charged had prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleaded that he be allowed on humanitarian
considerations to retain his profession; he was already in the twilight of his life, and
had kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his
situation.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her
Comment on the petition. She recommended a modification of the penalty from
disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment was very harsh
considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and
tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous
marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also noted that no other administrative case had ever
been filed against Atty. Garrido.

After due consideration, the Court resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to
Atty. Valencia. It thus held:

1. As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts
charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the
qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law,
and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this
perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before
Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v.
Castillo, the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral
fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer. Admission to the practice only
creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary even after admission to the Bar.
2. In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant
in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only
after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance.
We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to
disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion
(and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
3. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of
the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
communitys sense of decency. We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty
of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.
4. In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who
contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages
and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the
respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and
family institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for
the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate
other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta, the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his
marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of
contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified
the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma, where the respondent
secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong.
We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a

sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of
contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
5. In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions
of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible
to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies;
thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other
women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his
reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually
exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he
was already married to Constancia. This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse
to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding
the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an
illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his
two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and
emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his
six (6) children by his second marriage. Fifth, instead of making legal amends to
validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido
married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter. Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his
legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he
was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not
valid.Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union
entered into while another marriage was in place. Eighth, after admission to the
practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with
two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double
life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years. Lastly, Atty.
Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the
position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his
responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal
knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage
declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.
6. By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal
profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath,
and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath, Section 20(a) of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In
marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly
admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which

demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
7. As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and
that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and
the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal
needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public
impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to
free him from unwanted relationships.
8. The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards
and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye
and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public
and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized.
9. We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty.
Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross
immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978
when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good
moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the
lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his
marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from
responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was
subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited
conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar.
10. Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality. To have good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation,
i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or
she is held by the public in the place where she is known. The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to
protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is as important as the other.
11. Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer,
Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to
Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos
admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice;
instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years
during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with
the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances,
to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even
without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential
advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking
advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from
his wife and family. 12. While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage

with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that she took a man away from a
woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to
ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married
man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty.
Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido,
driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship
with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias
presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children
for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed
outside of the prism of law.13. We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed
belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt
free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and
was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to
Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief. 14. The
records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within
the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity
of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a
clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage
together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty.
Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent
valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong leads us to the
opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside
Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia
afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her
husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live
and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with
another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse
sense of moral values.
15. Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias
actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal
act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with
whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a
high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be
scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of
decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second
family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to
sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.
16. We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited
the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. In Barrientos v. Daarol, we held
that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to
these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a
member of the legal profession.17. Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the
lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to
withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for
this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the
power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal
professional and as an officer of the Court.We are convinced from the totality of the
evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the
parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of
mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the
court. 18. While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his
act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant
his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court
and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other
circumstances are commendable traits of character. In like manner, Atty. Valencias
behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious
flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the
dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration
of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances,
but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed
into the illicit.From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of respondent himself, we find that respondents act of engaging in sex
with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral
conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual
intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he
asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave
her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his
wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own
marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very
young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the
dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v.
Cordova, we held that the moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by
complainant, then a 13-year-old minor, who for a time was under
respondents care. Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent
and complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of no
moment.Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly
reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of
morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation
of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law. It
bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar
can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the
essentialqualifications required of lawyers.Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v.
Cabanting that a lawyer may be
disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya, the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required
for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to

practice law. The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the
pendency of this case is of no moment. Complainants Affidavit of Desistance
cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the public
service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as
a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not
meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts. Adisbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of
respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue
as a member of the Bar. Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with
disbarment,indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances. In
this case, respondentsgross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows
a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a
minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put
the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of
justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplis~ the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.
However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court
to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants,
vs. JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more
advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue.
[1]
The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some 400 years ago.
Today, it is still relevant and quotable. By the nature of their functions, judges are
revered as models of integrity, wisdom, decorum, competence and propriety. Human
as they are, however, magistrates do have their own weaknesses, frailties, mistakes
and even indiscretions. In the case before us, respondent Judge Esmeraldo G.
Cantero was charged administratively in the twilight of his government service, as a
result of a failed love affair that happened some 46 years ago. After an otherwise
unblemished record, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70
years on August 8, 1997 had death not intervened a few months ago on September
26, 1996. Notwithstanding his death, this Court still resolved to rule on this case, as
it may affect his retirement benefits.
Antecedent Facts
In a letter-complaint[2] dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her
daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the
respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly having
committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.
After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on February 5, 1996, referred
this case[3] to Executive Judge Gualberto P. Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu for investigation, report and recommendation. The latter

submitted his Report and Recommendation[4] dated July 26, 1996. Thereafter, the
Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court Administrator[5] for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
According to the complainants:
"Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff
(should be complainant) Maria Apiag, joined together in holy matrimony in marriage
after having lived together as husband and wife wherein they begot a daughter who
was born on June 19, 1947, whom they named: Teresita A. Cantero; and then on
October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born. Thereafter, defendant left the
conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff Maria Apiag to
raise the two children with her meager income as a public school teacher at
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant abandoned
them for no reason whatsoever. For several years, defendant was never heard of and
his whereabout unknown.
Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, whereupon,
plaintiffs begged for support, however, they were ignored by defendant. x x x"[6]
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a
letter to respondent as follows:
"Judge Esmeraldo Cantero
Pinamungajan, Cebu
Dear Judge Cantero:
We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, and your two legitimate
children by her, Teresita (Mrs. Sacurom) and Glicerio.
It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to you, you left your
conjugal home at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, and abandoned without any means
of support your said wife and children. Since then and up to now, they have not seen
or heard from you.
They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your duty as husband
and father to them, particularly that expressly provided under Art. 68 and Art. 195 of
the Family Code (Art. 109 and 195 of the Civil Code) in relation to Art. 203 of the
same Code.
You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for maintenance and support
for three of them, and a request that they be properly instituted and named as your
compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all legal documents now on file and to be
filed with the Supreme Court and other agencies or offices as may be required under
applicable laws, such as, the insurance (GSIS) and retirement laws.
We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you, your wife and children,
without having to resort to judicial recourse.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) REDENTOR G. GUYALA"[7]
The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently,
complainants learned that respondent Judge had another family. In their own words,

"x x x The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another wife by the name of
Nieves C. Ygay, a Public School teacher from Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu. According
to some documents obtained by plaintiffs, the herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay
have children of their own, named as follows with their date of births: Noralyn Y.
Cantero -- May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero -- February 4, 1970; Erwin Y. Cantero -April 29, 1979; Onofre Y. Cantero -- June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero -December 2, 1981.
It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents required of
defendant Judge Cantero to be filed with the Supreme Court such as his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, his personal data sheet (SC Form P. 001), income
tax returns and his insurance policy with the Government Service Insurance System,
defendant misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves C. Ygay, with whom
he contracted a second marriage. The truth of the matter is that defendant is
married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with whom they have two legitimate children,
namely: Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio A. Cantero."[8]
The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:
"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of the said complaint, but
vehemently deny the validity of its due execution, for the truth of the matter is that
such alleged marriage was only dramatized at the instance of our parents just to
shot (sic) their wishes and purposes on the matter, without my consent freely given.
As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go home to our town at
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from
Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama
marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly
prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of
age, and at my second year high school days."[9]
Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:
"x x x sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent and complainant, Maria
Apiag were still in their early age and in their second year high school days, they
were engaged in a lovely affair which resulted to the pregnancy of the said
complainant, and then and there gave birth to a child, named Teresita Apiag, having
(been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now Mrs. Teresita Sacurom, one of the
complainants. That in order to save name and shame, parents of both the
respondent and the complainant came to an agreement to allow the respondent,
and the complainant (to) get married in the (sic) name, but not to live together as
husband, wife for being close relatives, thereby forcing the respondent to appear in
a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers were all ready (sic)
prepared (sic), and duly signed by somebody; that after the said affair both
respondent and the complainant immediately separated each other (sic) without
living together as husband, and wife even for a day, nor having established a
conjugal home. From that time respondent and the complainant have never met
each other nor having (sic) communicated (with) each other for the last 40 years;
that respondent continued his studies at Cebu City, and eventually became member
of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examination in the year 1960, that is 14
years after the affair of 1947; that in 1964, respondent was first connected in the
government service as Comelec Registrar of the Commission on Elections, assigned
at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16 years after the affair of 1947; that in the year
1982, respondent was appointed as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the Department of
Justice, that is 35 years after the after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3,
1989, respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal Circuit Trial Judge
(MCTC) of the Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that

is 42 years from August 11, 1947; that respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the
government service up to the present time with more than 6 years in the Judiciary;
that respondent is already 69 years old, having been born on August 8, 1927, and
retirable by next year if God willing; that respondent has served in the government
service for the last 32 years, faithfully, honestly and judiciously without any
complaint whatsoever, except this instant case; that respondent as member of the
Judiciary, has live-up (sic) to the standard required by the (sic) member (sic) of the
bar and judiciary; that the charges against the respondent were all based or rooted
from the incedent (sic) that happened on August 11, 1947 and no other; that the
complainants are morally dishonest in filing the instant (case) just now, an elapsed
(sic) of almost 42 years and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next year,
1997; that this actuation is very suspicious, and intriguing;
xxxxxxxxx
That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man during her
public service as public school teacher and have begotten a child, name (sic) Manuel
Apiag and respondent promised (sic) the Honorable Court to furnish a complete
paper regarding this case in order to enlighten the Honorable (Court) that, he who
seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab (sic) hand;
That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial declaration (of nullity) of
the alleged marriage because it is the contention and honest belief, all the way, that
the said marriage was void from the beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided
or nullified, and to do so will be inconsistent with the stand of the respondent; that
this instant case (was) simply filed for money consideration as reflected in their
letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact, respondent and the complainant have
already signed a compromised (sic) agreement, copy of which hereto (sic) attached
as Annex '1', stating among other things that respondent will give a monthly
allowance to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in the (amount) of P4,000.00 and the
complainant will withdraw their complaint from the Supreme Court., and that
respondent had already given the said allowance for three consecutive months plus
the amount of P25,000.00 for their Attorney to withdraw the case, and that
respondent stop (sic) the monthly allowance until such time the complainant will
actually withdraw the instant case, and without knowledge of the respondent,
complainant proceeded (sic) their complaint after the elapsed (sic) of three (3)
years."[10]
Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was executed sometime in
March 1994 by Esmeraldo C. Cantero and Teresita C. Sacurom and witnessed by
Maria Apiag and Leovegardo Sacurom are reproduced thus:
"That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into by ESMERALDO C.
CANTERO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and with residence and postal address at
Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines, otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY, and TERESITA
C. SACUROM, also of legal age, married, Filipino, representing her mother and her
brother, and a residence (sic) of 133-A J. Ramos Street, Caloocan City, after having
duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say:

(a) That both parties have agreed voluntarily, the Second Party will get ONE FOURTH
(1/4) of the retirement that the First will receive from the GSIS, and the rest of it will
be for the First Party;
(b) That the Second Party and his brother will be included as one of the beneficiaries
of the First Party, in case of death;
(c) That the Second party and his only brother will inherit the properties of the First
party inherited from his parents;
(d) That the Second Party, representing her brother, is authorized to receive and
collect P4,000.00, monthly out of the second check salary of the First Party (The
second half salary only);
3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will cause the
withdrawal and the outright dismissal of the said pending case filed by her and her
mother;
4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, shall never be effective and
enforceable unless the said case will be withdrawn and dismiss (sic) from the
Supreme Court, and said dismissal be received by the First Party, otherwise the
above-agreement is void from the beginning; and the Second Party must desist from
further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal liabilities.
5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good faith, and in the interest of
good will and reconciliation and both parties is (sic) duty bound to follow faithfully
and religiously."[11]
In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter dated 14 March, 1994
addressed to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) designating Teresita
Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance
policy.[12]
The Issues
The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":
"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is
void;
2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7)
years raise the presumption that she is already dead, that there was no need for any
judicial declaration;
3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that
he committed the offense, he was not yet a member of the judiciary;
4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;

1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of PinamungajanAloguinsan, Cebu, is charged by Second Party for Misconduct before the Office of the
Court Administrator of the Supreme Court now pending action;

5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law."[13]

2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said case settled
amicably in the interest of family unity and reconciliation, and arrived at
compromise agreement based on law of equity, as follows:

Investigating Judge Gualberto P. Delgado recommended in his report that:

Report and Recommendation of Investigating Judge and Court Administrator

"After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties, this Office finds
respondent Guilty of the crime of Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of

Public Documents) however, considering his length of service in the government, it

is recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year without pay."[14]
The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its report[15] recommending
respondent Judge's dismissal, as follows:
"After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge.
Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent, he was married
to complainant Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 and have (sic) two (2) children with
her. Respondent's contention that such marriage was in jest and assuming that it
was valid, it has lost its validity on the ground that they never met again nor have
communicated with each other for the last 40 years cannot be given a (sic) scant
consideration. Respondent's argument that he was not yet a lawyer, much more, a
member of the bench when he contracted his first marriage with the complainant, is
unavailing for having studied law and had become a member of the Bar in 1960, he
knows that the marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of death.
Respondent's second marriage with Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was
contracted during the existence of a previous marriage.
We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he cannot be
held liable for misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a lawyer nor a judge
when the act(s) complained of were committed. The infraction he committed
continued from the time he became a lawyer in 1960 to the time he was appointed
as a judge in October 23, 1989. This is a continuing offense (an unlawful act
performed continuously or over and over again, Law Dictionary, Robert E.
Rothenberg). He can therefore be held liable for his misdeeds.
On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for
Judges, Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp.
99-102, rollo), that he had committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that his
spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8) children (with her) which is far from (the)
truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he had two (2) children.
Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the respondent
presupposes the imposition of an administrative sanction for the charges filed
against him. 'A judge's actuation of cohabiting with another when his marriage was
still valid and subsisting - his wife having been allegedly absent for four years only
constitutes gross immoral conduct' (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr., 249 SCRA 447). It is
evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership
in the legal profession. While deceit employed by respondent, existed prior to his
appointment as a x x x Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with x x x
began and continued when he was already in the judiciary. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his
everyday life. These are judicial guidepost to(sic) self-evident to be overlooked. No
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge be DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to re-appointment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations."
As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on September 27, 1996 while this case
was still being deliberated upon by this Court.

The Court's Ruling

In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits, in view of
the foregoing recommendation of the OCA which, if affirmed by this Court, would
mean forfeiture of the death and retirement of the respondent.
Gross Misconduct Not Applicable
The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the
following: abandonment of his first wife and children, failing to give support,
marrying for the second time without having first obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage, and falsification of public documents. Misconduct, as a
ground for administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.
"'Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform
legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such
cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of man
from the character of an officer. x x x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of official duties x x x .' More specifically,
in Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the
court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring 'to a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.' That is to abide by the
authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re Horilleno, a decision
penned by Justice Malcolm, which requires that in order for serious misconduct to be
shown, there must be 'reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of
were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules.'"[16]
The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal
life and have no direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds
directly relate to the discharge of his official responsibilities. Therefore, said acts
cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For any of the
aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x (t)o warrant disciplinary action, the act
of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is
necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the
officer."[17]
Nullity of Prior Marriage
It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Maria Apiag prior to marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that
the first marriage was void and that there was no need to have the same judicially
declared void, pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing. In the en banc case of
Odayat vs. Amante,[18] complainant charged Amante, a clerk of court, with
oppression, immorality and falsification of public document. The complainant Odayat
alleged among others " x x x that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada,
with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still
alive x x x." In order to rebut the charge of immorality, Amante " x x x presented in
evidence the certification (of the) x x x Local Civil Registrar x x x attesting that x x x
Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948.
Respondent's contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio,
because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales." This Court ruled that
"Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80

[4] of the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages."[19]

repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the
reformation of his life.

Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x x x a judicial
declaration of such fact"[20] before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise,
the second marriage will also be void."[21] This was expressly provided under Article
40[22] of the Family Code. However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay
took place and all their children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in
Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of respondent.

This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place some 46
years ago. He may have committed an indiscretion in the past. But having repented
for it, such youthful mistake should not forever haunt him and should not totally
destroy his career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished record. Indeed, it
should not demolish completely what he built in his public life since then. Much less
should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long
and dedicated service in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as
recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh.

On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is
based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the preceding
discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must the accusation of
falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge's belief in good faith that his first
marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public documents, a
valid defense in a charge of falsification of public document,[23] which must be
appreciated in his favor.

However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to
the needs of his children of his first marriage -- children whose filiation he did not
deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this
administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty.
But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the
case is now in order.

Personal Conduct of a Judge

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED.

However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not preclude
this Court from finding him administratively liable for his indiscretion, which would
have merited disciplinary action from this Court had death not intervened. In
deciding this case, the Court emphasizes that "(t)he personal behavior of a judge,
not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should be above reproach and
free from the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles
and sense of propriety without which he cannot preserve the faith of the people in
the judiciary, so indispensable in an orderly society. For the judicial office
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions
thereon, which he has to observe faithfully as the price he has to pay for accepting
and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice."[24] It is against
this standard that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero.

SO ORDERED.
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard
because the record reveals he had two families. The record also shows that he did
not attend to the needs, support and education of his children of his first marriage.
Such is conduct unbecoming a trial magistrate. Thus, the late Judge Cantero
"violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that '[a] judge's
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also
in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that '[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all activities.'"[25]

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had
four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui.
Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband,
Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living
together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted

Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Other than this
case, we found no trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial functions from
the time of his appointment up to the filing of this administrative case, and has to all
appearances lived up to the stringent standards embodied in the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Considering his otherwise untarnished 32 years in government service,[26]
this Court is inclined to treat him with leniency.
Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should
not look only at his sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio
for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of
complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant

then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced
herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that
she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over
between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent
and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her
husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met
again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship

persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been
employed by her husband in his company.

still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of
1989.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on
August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had
known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui
had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been
estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his
intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon
their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to
live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui
wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.[4]

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents
started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills,
San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos
left the same.

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would
only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew
legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was
surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful
wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of
Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and
returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few
days after she reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the
woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office,
demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because
they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered
Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that
Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a
house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house
was built exclusively from her parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent
sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00)
against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless
disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that
respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had
children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the
reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos
Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but
the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for
the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship,
illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants
evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of
respondents cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos
St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least
create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant,
worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and
Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their
respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be
dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the
Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a
Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged
respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a
supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the
Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among
others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a
Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file
in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not
October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to
complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to
impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation
of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the
Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her
Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral
perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent

averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because
the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy
because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage
certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone
issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which
she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of
good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in
an immoral manner.[17]

committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which

resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents
mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since
the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the
Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living
with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that
Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent
committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that
complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment.
Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no
showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to
complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man
does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the
victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was
already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off
all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at
that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent
so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.[18]

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline
submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was
highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her
Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there
was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui
took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and
Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the
latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated
that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible
for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and
complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this
matter.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to
be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The
reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer
single men.

Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of

respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage
with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the
same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car
bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not
prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value
according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security
agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent
presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427
dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the
appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that she was not
guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine,
respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and
that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it
suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be
single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with
him.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part
of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic)
anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without
cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family
life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she
prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui,
the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim
too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status
of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts
with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each
other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live
together.

x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and
willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy
the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a
privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the
practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is
that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession
of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of
the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining
membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when
a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met
Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him
and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2)
children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of
respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the
standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our

liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher
degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with
greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent
would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised
prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents
suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved
her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that
Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she
never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with
respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible
considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a
valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required
to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui
upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of
the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit.
After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise
its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her
Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely
relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos
Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would
verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride,
especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married.
Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an
attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate
with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point
cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are
called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a

photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof,
with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.SO ORDERED.