POWER OF CONGRESS

#1. GENERAL (PLENARY) LEGISLATIVE POWER

1.

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY COMMISSION

151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board was enacted which gave
broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic
effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The
proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss
may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the
LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the
law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to
deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.
In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax
provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the
VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides,
in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited period with
the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].
2. LIDASAN VS. COMELEC
21 SCRA 496 Political Law Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato
were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor
of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not
clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared
from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title
did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns
and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the
prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

3. RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No.
9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election
Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than
the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No.
9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an
elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or

election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive
officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law.
The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act
shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which
require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been
repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.

ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple
or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections
through Fair Election Practices.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who
run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be
done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is
bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy
is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or
propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic
theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious

conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to
repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair,
honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue
of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its
approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the
rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be
shortened or extended.
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express
statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not
involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch
of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been
shown in this case.

4. Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then
proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr.
Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,

the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned.
The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for
the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
5. PHIL. JUDGES ASSO. VS. PRADO
227 SCRA 703 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from
certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal
service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the
judiciarys use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking
privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed
that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking
privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs.
The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut
expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the
judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the
loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it
is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is
different because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need
on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

6. De Guzman vs Commission on Elections

GR 129118 19 July 2000
Facts:
Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters registration act. The
act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or municipality for more than 4 years. Petitioners
claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the
prohibition.
Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section 44 is unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause
enshrined in the constitution; that it violates constitutional guarantee on security of civil servants; that it undermines
the constitutional independence of comelec and comelecs constitutional authority; that it contravenes the basic
constitutional precept; that it is void for its failure to be read on 3 separate readings
Issue: Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional
Ruling: No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the
impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of
election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.
G.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)
FACTS Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a
particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who
were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the provision was not expressed in the title of the law,
which is An Act Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration,
Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Fund Thereof.
HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure
the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the Comelec to follow in the reassignment of
election officers.

FACTS: Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a particular
municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were
election officers to other stations. Petitioner argue that the law undermined the constitutional authority of the Comelec
to appoint its own officials.
HELD: The law merely provides the basis for the transfer of an election officers and does not deprive the Comelec of
its power to appoint its officials.
7. ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.
Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in
question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly
urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.
Issues: WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the
legislative districts.
Ruling: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1)
saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such

requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to
increase the number of the members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
8. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORP. VS. VALENCIA

1 SCRA 486 Political Law Veto Power Condition Attached to an Item

Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and
Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They
were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired.
Valencia claimed that because of CBNs continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to
his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to
cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting
Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow
appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no
damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencias department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot
claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is
illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has
been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and
the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations
Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez
averred the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for
that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative
to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in
separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming
arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not
provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the
purpose of the Presidents veto power.
9. BENGZON VS. DRILON
208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were repealed during the time of former
President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the
constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those
unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted
additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made
an item entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of
the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in
the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by
the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic
Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court
neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal
of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or
items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said
item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done.
The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or
not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the
portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other
departments of the government.
10. PHILCOSA VS. ENRIQUEZ
235 SCRA 506 Political Law Veto Power Part of the Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel Countrywide Development Fund

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they
cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took
steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Taada et al contest the constitutionality of:
(1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In
the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president
particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by
other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o
vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered
inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making
the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use
of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that
there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding
and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted
may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987
Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein
is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of nonimpairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund
to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an

administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a
separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations
specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the
authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained
the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in
his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior
Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the
president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc

In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IXB of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall
maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada et
al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the
Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were
placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate
that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere
reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be
treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts know more about the
problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge,
the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
11. GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3
Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177,
entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the

budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest
budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for
education.
HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the highest
budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the
power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably
service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially,
the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger
than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional

12. TOLENTINO VS. SEC. OF FINANCE

235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by
Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax
(EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what

Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the
bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note
that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply
means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances
before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere
matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been
done.
13. Remman Enterprises, Inc., and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association vs. Professional Regulatory
Board of Real Estate Service and Professional RegulationCommission (G.R. 19767)
Petition: Petition for injunction
Petitioners: Remman Enterprises, Inc., and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
Respondents: Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and ProfessionalRegulation Commission
Ponente: Villarama Jr., J.

Date: February 4, 2014

Facts: Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9646.R.A. No. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was signed aims to professionalize the real estate service
sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate
brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate
service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade
Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now
transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate
Service(PRBRES) created under the new law. The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were
promulgated by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.Petitioners filed a petition in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, asking the court to declare as void and unconstitutional Sections 28 (a), 29 and 32, of R.A. 9646 that the trial
court denied thus, this petition.
Issues: 1. W/N R.A. No. 9646 is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under Section 26 , Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution
Ruling: NO. The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under theConstitution is satisfied if all the parts
of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title. It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute detailstherein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect. R.A. No.
9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." The new law
extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties. The inclusion of real estate developers is
germane to the laws primary goal of developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real
estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of
the real-estate industry." R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.
Decision: Petition is DENIED.

#2. POWER OF APPROPRIATION

14. DEMETRIA VS. ALBA
148 SCRA 208 Political Law Transfer of Funds Power of the President to Realign Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of
the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria
assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers
the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to
which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law
in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.
15. Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of
Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil.
Legislature, contemplates religious purpose for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a
particular sect or church, but the purpose was only to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist and the government
just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on
the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Emphasizing that, when the
Filipino people implored the aid of Divine Providence, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies
of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.

Aglipay v. Ruiz - A case digest

GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the

fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly

announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and
sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the
petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held / Ruling: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if
we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still,
the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of
the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.

16. Garces Vs. Estenzo

G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981 ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS DAGAR and
JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO,
Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA
MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.
Facts : This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the
acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. On March 23, 1976,
the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April
"of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia That resolution designated the members of nine
committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the
selling of tickets and cash donations On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in
accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta,
would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and
until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash
donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was
constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred
pesos A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return that image to
the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition.
Because Father Osmea did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the
council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a
replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the barangay council passed
Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9). Later, he and three other persons,
Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against
the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City,
praying for the annulment of the said resolutions. The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the
resolutions
ISSUE: WON The Barangay Council has the right over the custody of the Relic
HELD : The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor

appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private
funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter The wooden image was purchased in
connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights
of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be
branded as illegal. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any
suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay
council. The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of
the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money
or property

17. GONZALES VS. MACARAIG

Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations
Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez
averred the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for
that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative
to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in
separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming
arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not
provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the
purpose of the Presidents veto power.

18. DELA CRUZ VS. PARAS

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the
Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage
in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due
hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR
CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that

the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of
night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in
pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping
exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a
worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its
face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit
the business of cabarets.
19. Insular v Ebrado G.R. No. L-44059 October 28, 1977
Facts:
J. Martin:
Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., a policy for P5,882.00 with a rider for Accidental Death. He
designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. He referred to her as his wife.
Cristor was killed when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. Insular Life was made liable to pay the coverage in the total
amount of P11,745.73, representing the face value of the policy in the amount of P5,882.00 plus the additional benefits
foraccidental death.

Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds as the designated beneficiary therein, although she admited
that she and the insured were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the
insurance proceeds.
Insular commenced an action for Interpleader before the trial court as to who should be given the proceeds. The court declared
Carponia as disqualified.
Issue: WON a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man can claim the
proceeds in case of death of the latter?
Held: No. Petition
Ratio: Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "the insurance shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of
the person in whose name it is made"
The word "interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the "insured" and not to the beneficiary, since a contract of
insurance is personal in character. Otherwise, the prohibitory laws against illicit relationships especially on property and
descent will be rendered nugatory, as the same could easily be circumvented by modes of insurance.
When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is governed by the general
rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of the same Code, any person who is forbidden from receiving
any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a fife insurance policy by the person who cannot make a
donation to him. Common-law spouses are barred from receiving donations from each other.
Article 739 provides that void donations are those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of donation.
There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between legitimate spouses and those between illegitimate ones should
be enforced in life insurance policies since the same are based on similar consideration. So long as marriage remains the
threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate that the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be
imposed upon extra-marital relationship.
A conviction for adultery or concubinage isnt required exacted before the disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate.
The article says that in the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the
donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

The underscored clause neatly conveys that no criminal conviction for the offense is a condition precedent. The law plainly
states that the guilt of the party may be proved in the same acting for declaration of nullity of donation. And, it would be
sufficient if evidence preponderates.
The insured was married to Pascuala Ebrado with whom she has six legitimate children. He was also living in with his commonlaw wife with whom he has two children.

20. BELGICA,ET.AL. VS. HON. EXEC.SEC. OCHOA

710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the
lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional
Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects
like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood
programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.

Presidential Pork BarrelThe president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around
since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by
Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim
Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-

government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are
in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred
with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES: I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following
principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the
other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the
law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled
that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power
but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated
by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of
war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go
to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress
(in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions
does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to
be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator
can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils
(LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on
the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate
a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is
a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF
becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section
29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by
PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part
of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other
purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund
(the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910
and PD 1869.
21. ARAULLO,ET.SL. VD. AQUINO III,ET.AL
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World
Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program
called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds
from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP
was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor
will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds
are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns
out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation
Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain
Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292
(power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD: I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive
and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by
the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse
to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the
GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres
no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of
the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or
realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred
to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA.
Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are
still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings
in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is
completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow
moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for
the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by
the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have
exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good.
The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially
so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith.

#3. POWER OF TAXATION

22. GARCIA VS. EXEC. SEC

211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties,
taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into
the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the
previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative
from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume
such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other
bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that
therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be
exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this
case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
23. LLADOC VS. CIR
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental;
the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the
donors gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donees gift tax against the parish. The priest
lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption
is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A
donees gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not
rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving
the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.
24. PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO
107 SCRA 104 Political Law Exemption From Taxes The Church

The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge Harold Hernando
dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that there is no question that the real properties
sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. Likewise,
there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that charitable institutions, mosques, and nonprofit cemeteries are required that for the exemption of lands, buildings, and improvements, they should not only be
exclusively but also actually and directly used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not
favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, in this case, there
is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.
25. PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN
Facts: Ordinance 110 was enacted by the City of Butuan imposing a tax of P0.10 per case of 24 bottles of softdrinks or
carbonated drinks. The tax was imposed upon dealers engeged in selling softdrinks or carbonated drinks. When Ordinance 110,
the tax was imposed upon an agent or consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or corporation engaged in
selling softdrinks or carbonated drinks, with agent or consignee being particularly defined on the inserted provision Section
3-A. In effect, merchants engaged in the sale of softdrinks, etc. are not subject to the tax unless they are agents or consignees of
another dealer who must be one engaged in business outside the City. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. filed suit to recover sums paid by
it to the city pursuant to the Ordinance, which it claims to be null and void.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance is discriminatory.
Held: The Ordinance, as amended, is discriminatory since only sales by agents or consignees of outside dealers would be
subject to the tax. Sales by local dealers, not acting for or on behalf of other merchants, regardless of the volume of their sales ,
and even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or consignees of producers or merchants established outside the city,
would be exempt from the tax. The classification made in the exercise of the authority to tax, to be valid must be reasonable,
which would be satisfied if the classification is based upon substantial distinctions which makes real differences; these are
germane to the purpose of legislation or ordinance; the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the
same class. These conditions are not fully met by the ordinance in question.