Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1964-1968
Volume II, Vietnam
January-June 1965
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
Editors
David C. Humphrey
Ronald D. Landa
Louis J. Smith
General Editor
Glenn W. LaFantasie
Contents
Preface
Selection and Editorial Policies
Sources
Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a
bombing pause,
March 8-May 8
Documents: 189 - 287
Preface
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary
historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the
United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the
formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the
policy positions ultimately adopted.
The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the
preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau
of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This
documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of
historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and
editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B.
Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series
through 1991.
A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was
signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a
new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et
seq.).
The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable
record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States
diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide
comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United
States Government, including facts that contributed to the formulation of policies and
records that provided supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately
adopted.
The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign
Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records
should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a
deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major
importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of
concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be
published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.
The statute also requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all
records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions
and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies,
departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of
State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy
decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.
In preparing each volume of the Foreign Relations series, the editors are guided by some
general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the
General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be
documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made
regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in editorial
or bibliographical notes.
The editors of this volume, which was originally compiled in 1984 and 1985 and revised
and updated in 1993 and 1994, are convinced that it meets all regulatory, statutory, and
scholarly standards of selection and editing.
An explanation of the selection policy for the series and of this particular volume and a
detailed description of the sources available to the editors of the series as well as a list of
specific files consulted for this volume follow this preface.
Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series
This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that
documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the 5 years (1964-1968) of the
administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. In planning and preparing the 1964-1968 subseries,
the editors chose to present the official record of U.S. foreign policy with respect to
Vietnam in seven volumes. Volume I documents U.S. policy toward Vietnam during 1964.
Volume II (presented here) documents the period from January 1, 1965, through June 12,
1965. Volumes III through VII document the following periods: III, June 13, 1965, through
December 31, 1965; IV, 1966; V, 1967; and VI and VII, 1968.
These seven volumes focus on Vietnam. They do not record activities in the rest of
mainland Southeast Asia except as they may relate immediately to the conduct of the war in
Vietnam. U.S. relations with Laos are documented in Volume XXVIII. U.S. relations with
Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and SEATO are documented in Volume XXVII.
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the
Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations
concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall
compilation and editorial process of the series and assists with any access and/or clearance
problems that arise. Time constraints prevent the Advisory Committee from reviewing all
volumes in the series.
This volume has not been reviewed by the Advisory Committee.
Declassification Review
The declassification review of this volume resulted in the decision to withhold .03 percent
of the documentation originally selected; no documents were withheld in their entirety. The
documentation provides an accurate account of the main lines of U.S. policy toward
Vietnam during the January 1 -June 12, 1965 period.
The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information,
Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State,
conducted the Department of State declassification review of the documents published in
this volume. The Declassification Coordination Division of the Historian's Office
coordinated the interagency and foreign government declassification review. The review
was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on
National Security Information and applicable laws.
Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following
categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security, requires classification:
1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to
the national security;
3) foreign government information;
4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
8) cryptology; or
9) a confidential source.
The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to
the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed
concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of
State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign
governments regarding specific documents of those governments.
Acknowledgments
The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Lyndon B. Johnson
Library, in particular Regina Greenwell and Charlaine Burgess; the Department of Defense,
in particular Sandra Meagher; the National Defense University, in particular Susan Lemke;
the Minnesota Historical Society, in particular Dallas Lindgren; the University of Montana;
the Library of Congress; and officials at other specialized repositories who assisted in the
collection of documents for this volume. The editors also wish to thank senior Foreign
Service officer William H. Marsh for reading the manuscript and for his comments and
suggestions.
Ronald D. Landa and Louis J. Smith originally compiled this volume, and David C.
Humphrey contributed to the collection, selection, and substantive editing of the material
presented in this volume. Edward C. Keefer and Charles S. Sampson also reviewed the
book manuscript. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the
editorial and publication process. Student intern Shelby Hunt assisted in the preparation of
the lists of sources, abbreviations, and persons. The Declassification Coordination Division,
David H. Herschler, David C. Geyer, Kerry E. Hite, and Donna C. Hung, coordinated the
declassification review. Editors Vicki E. Futscher and Rita M. Baker prepared the book
manuscript for publication and performed the editorial review, and Barbara-Ann Bacon of
the Publishing Services Division oversaw the production of the volume. Max Franke
prepared the index.
William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
October 1995
of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions
are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency,
rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the
time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.
Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows
Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief
technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia
or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed
according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the
limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each
document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as
found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected.
Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a
correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the
source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in
the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.
Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated
subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic
type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of
lines or pages of source text that were omitted. The amount of material omitted from this
volume because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been
delineated. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by
footnotes.
The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification,
distribution, and drafting information. This footnote also provides the background of
important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers
read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been
previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.
Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the
volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to
important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide
summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed
documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been
used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.
Sources
The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations
series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign
policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government
agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the
Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to
foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The
editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in accordance with the
standards and mandates of this statute, although access to some records was restricted, as
noted below.
The editors have had complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department
of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the
Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's
Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level
official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State,
and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign
officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. Intelligence-related files maintained by
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research became available to the Department historians only
after this volume was compiled. Arrangements have been made for Department historians to
have access to these records for future volumes; if any documentation relevant to this
volume is found, it may be included in a subsequent volume.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President
Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and
preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairsrelated documentation from other federal agencies including the National Security Council,
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
National Security Agency, and the United States Information Agency. All of this
documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the
consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and
Records Administration.
The Department of State has arranged for access to the audiotapes of President Johnson's
telephone conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. The first audiotapes became
available to the editors in late 1994, with most audiotapes, including those for the year
1965, to follow during 1995 and 1996. The editors decided not to delay publication of this
volume, but if relevant records are found among these telephone conversations, they may be
included in a later Foreign Relations volume.
Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense,
particularly the records of the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants and the
records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The editors of this volume also had access to the Papers
of General William Westmoreland at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and the
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, the Papers of General Maxwell Taylor at the National Defense
University, the Papers of General Harold Johnson at the U.S. Military History Institute, and
the Files of Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton at the Lyndon B. Johnson
Library.
Since 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanded access to Department
historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records still in the custody of that
Agency. Department of State historians' access is arranged by the History Staff of the
Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992
memorandum of understanding. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work
out the procedural and scholarly aspects of this access, and the variety of documentation
made available and selected for publication in the volumes has expanded. The editors of this
volume made particular use of the files of Director of Central Intelligence John McCone
and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms.
The following are the particular files and collections consulted and cited in this volume.
Unpublished Sources
Department of State
Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files. In February 1963, the Department of State changed
its decimal central files to a subject-numeric central file system. The subject-numeric
system was divided into broad categories: Administration, Consular, Culture and
Information, Economic, Political and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these
divisions were subject subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contained four
subtopics: POL (Politics), DEF (Defense), CSM (Communism), and INT (Intelligence).
Numerical subdivisions further defined them.
The following were the most important files used in this volume:
EP 6-1 Hue, emergency and evacuation policy and plans
POL UK-US, political relations, U.S.-United Kingdom
POL 1 US-USSR, general policy, U.S.-Soviet Union
POL 1 VIET S, general policy, Vietnam
POL 1-1 VIET S, contingency planning and coordination re Vietnam
POL 12 VIET S, Vietnamese political parties
Emb, Embassy
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ELINT, electronic intelligence
EST, Eastern Standard Time
ETA, estimated time of arrival
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/GER, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, exclusive distribution
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Flaming Dart, code name for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam in February 1965
FNL, Front National de Liberation (National Liberation Front)
ForMin, Foreign Minister
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
GOB, Government of Burma
govt, government
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
H-H, Hanoi and Haiphong
HK, Hong Kong
HMG, Her Majesty's Government
HNC, High National Council
Hop Tac, Government of Vietnam program for pacification of Saigon and surrounding
provinces
HQ, headquarters
ret, retired
RG, Record Group
RKG, Royal Khmer Government
RLAF, Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG, Royal Laotian Government
ROK, Republic of Korea
Rolling Thunder, code name for long-running program of U.S. air operations in North
Vietnam
RR, railroad
RRU, Radio Research Unit
RT, Rolling Thunder
Rupert, code name for Mai Van Bo
RVN, Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S, Office of the Secretary of State
SA-2, Soviet-made surface-to-air missile
SAC, Strategic Air Command
S/AL, Office of the Ambassador at Large
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAR, search and rescue
SC, United Nations Security Council
SE, Southeast
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEACOORD, Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Persons
Acheson, Dean, Secretary of State from 1949 until 1953
Aka, Moise, Ivory Coast Representative to the United Nations General Assembly
Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States until October 1965
Arends, Leslie C., Republican Representative from Illinois, Republican Whip
Arkas-Duntov, Urah, intermediary in U.S. contacts with Mao Van Bo
Ayub Khan, Field Marshal Muhammad, President of Pakistan
Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State
Bell, David E., Administrator of the Agency for International Development
Black, Eugene R., Special Adviser to the President for Southeast Asia after April 9, 1965
Boggs, Hale, Democratic Representative from Louisiana
Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France
Bowles, Chester A., Ambassador to India
Bowman, Colonel Richard C., Member of the National Security Council Staff
Brezhnev, Leonid I., First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
Brown, Harold, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, until
October 1, 1965; thereafter Secretary of the Air Force
Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Buffum, William B., Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of
State, until September 11, 1965; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Chung Tan Cang, Admiral, Vietnamese Navy Commander and Member of the Armed
Forces Council until April 1965
Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
until September 8, 1965; thereafter Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Clifford, Clark, unoffical adviser to President Johnson
Cline, Ray, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
Co, see Nguyen Huu Co
Colbert, Evelyn S., Chief, Southeast Asia Division, Office of Research and Analysis for Far
East, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Colby, William E., Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency
Cooper, Chester L., Member of the National Security Council Staff
Corcoran, Thomas J., Director, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, until July 1965; thereafter First Secretary of the Embassy in Vietnam
Cousins, Norman, President and Editor, Saturday Review
Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister
Cutler, Lloyd N., Washington lawyer
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France
De Silva, Peer, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon; thereafter
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency
Dean, David, Mainland China Affairs Officer and then Deputy Director, Office of Asian
Communist Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States after April 13, 1965
Denney, George C., Jr., Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
DePuy, Major General William E., Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations), U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam; thereafter Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs,
Central Intelligence Agency
Devillers, Philippe, French historian and journalist
Diem, see Ngo Dinh Diem
Givan, Walker, Officer in Charge, Italian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department
of State
Goldberg, Arthur J., Representative to the United Nations after July 28, 1965
Gomulka, Wladyslaw, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party
Goodell, Charles E., Republican Representative from New York
Goodpaster, Lieutenant General Andrew J., USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Green, Marshall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until June
1965; Ambassador to Indonesia after July 26, 1965
Greene, General Wallace M., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps
Greenfield, James L., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister
Gronouski, John A., Ambassador to Poland after December 7, 1965
Gullion, Edmund S., unofficial U.S. envoy ("X") in the XYZ negotiations with Mai Van Bo
Hammarskjold, Dag, former Secretary-General of the United Nations
Hand, Lloyd, Chief of Protocol, Department of State, after January 21, 1965
Hannah, Norman B., Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Harlech, see Ormsby Gore, Sir David
Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 1965;
thereafter Ambassador at Large
Helms, Richard N., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until April 28,
1965; thereafter Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Herfurt, Jack A., Counselor for Administration at the Embassy in Vietnam
Hertz, Gustav C., Public Administration Adviser, Agency for International Development
Mission in Vietnam; captured by the Viet Cong in 1964
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Republican Senator from Iowa
Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietam
Ho Giac, Buddhist leader
Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States after January 20, 1965
Huong, see Tran Van Huong
Huynh Van Cao, General, ARVN, Secretary to the Armed Forces Council
Huynh Van Ton, Colonel, ARVN, participant in anti-Khanh coup attempt, February 19-20,
1965
Javits, Jacob K., Republican Senator from New York
Johnson, General Harold, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army
Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States
Johnson, Robert H., Member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam until September 1965; Deputy Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs after November 1, 1965
Jorgensen, Gordon L., Chief of Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon after Peer De
Silva
Katzenbach, Nicolas deB., Attorney General of the United States
Kent, Sherman, Director, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
Khang, see Le Nguyen Khang
Khanh, see Nguyen Khanh
Khiem, see Tran Thien Khiem
Killen, James S., Director, Agency for International Development Mission in Vietnam;
Senior Evaluation Officer, Office of Administration, Agency for International
Development, after October 10, 1965
Klaus, Josef, Chancellor of Austria
Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Kosygin, Alexei N, Soviet Premier
Kraft, Joseph, j ournalist and syndicated columnist
Kuchel, Thomas H., Republican Senator from California
Pham Xuan Chieu, General, ARVN, Member and Chairman of the National Legislative
Council; Member of the National Leadership Committee
Phan Huy Quat, Vietnamese Premier from February 16 until June 11, 1965
Phan Khac Suu, Vietnamese Chief of State until June 11, 1965
Phap Tri, Buddhist leader
Plimpton, Francis T.P., Deputy Representative to the United Nations
Porter, William J., Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam after September 13, 1965
Procter, Carolyn J., Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State
Quaison-Sackey, Alex, Ghanaian Representative to the United Nations; President,
Nineteenth Session, United Nations General Assembly
Quang Lien, Buddhist leader
Quat, see Phan Huy Quat
Raborn, William F., Jr., Director of Central Intelligence after April 28, 1965
Radhakrishnan, Sir Sarvepalli, President of India
Radvanyi, Janos, Charge d'Affaires at the Hungarian Legation in Washington
Ramani, Radhakrishna, Malaysian Representative to the United Nations Security Council
Rapacki, Adam, Polish Foreign Minister
Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of
the Department
Reedy, George, Press Secretary to the President until July 8, 1965
Resor, Stanley R., Under Secretary of the Army from April 5 until July 5, 1965; thereafter
Secretary of the Army
Reston, James B., Associate Editor, New York Times
Ribeiro, Miguel A., Ghanaian Ambassador to the United States
Rifa'i, Abdul Monem, Jordanian Representative to the United Nations Security Council
Rogers, Colonel Jack A., USA, Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Rolz-Bennett, Jose, United Nations Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs
Rosenthal, James D., Political Officer at the Embassy in Vietnam
Rostow, Walt, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of
State
Rowan, Carl, Director of the United States Information Agency until July 10, 1965
Rowen, Henry S., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget
Rupert, see Mai Van Bo
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State
Rusk, Howard, physician, founder of the American Southeast Asia Foundation
Salinger, Pierre, Press Secretary to President Kennedy
Schwartz, Abba P., Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of
State
Scott-Murga, Guillermo, Bolivian Representative to the United Nations Security Council
Seaborn, J. Blair, Canadian Delegate to the International Control Commission
Sevareid, Eric, author and correspondent, Columbia Broadcasting System
Sharp, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Indian Prime Minister
Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs after
September 10, 1965
Smathers, George A., Democratic Senator from Florida
Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Sparkman, John J., Democratic Senator from Alabama
Splitt, Orville S., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Springsteen, George S., Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State
Stanton, Frank, President, Columbia Broadcasting System
Stevenson, Adlai E., Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965
Wiggins, James Russell, Editor and Executive Vice President, Washington Post
Williams, G. Mennen, Assisistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency
Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister
Winiewicz, Josef, Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
X, see Gullion, Edmund
Y, see Sturm, Paul
Yost, Charles W., Deputy Representative to the United Nations
Zorthian, Barry, Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs at the Embassy in Vietnam;
Minister-Counselor for Information at the Embassy after September 1965
Zuckert, Eugene M., Secretary of the Air Force until September 30, 1965
government's advisory organ for military affairs, but to have rather opposite function.
Initially (New Year's eve) military had said that body would have no civilian members; next
morning, however, they intimated that they might envisage some civilian membership but it
was clearly still to be under military control. Vien said military even possibly envisaged
letting office of chief of state be merged with new organ, but said military would have
authority. Vien said that in response to Khanh's observation that this "would prevent coups",
he said government acceptance of this would be "the coup."
/2/The dissolution of the High National Council.
In response to Johnson's questions, Vien said that Khanh and Admiral Cang had argued
most heatedly for new organ, with other generals appearing less enthusiastic. Vien said he
had impression that Cang in particular was behind proposal.
Vien stated that he and Oanh had pointed out to military that neither chief of state nor Prime
Minister could create such new body. Suggested that military wait two or three months for
establishment of National Congress and then make their proposal to Congress. Khanh had
rejected this, saying that military wanted to establish this new organism soon in order to
"give maximum stability to government." Admitted that government now in provisional
status, but indicated that provisional status could last longer. Establishment of National
Congress could wait for five or six months. Vien said that Khanh's main concern now
seemed to be to create organ of control, not to establish Congress. Vien said he considered
matter "very serious."
In reply to question, Vien said that during discussion of new organ there had been no
allusion to US role; re issue between Ambassador and military,/3/Vien said he had
impression that this was on road to resolution.
/3/Taylor had expressed strong opposition to the dissolution of the High National Council in
conversations with certain Vietnamese military leaders on December 20, 1964, and with
Khanh on the following day. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Documents 451 and
454.
Johnson asked whether Vien believed that new body would be intended by Khanh to lead
towards negotiated solution possibly including neutralization. Vien replied in rather vague
fashion, saying that he had impression from whisperings among Buddhists and others that
Khanh might be thinking about neutralization. Noted particularly whisperings to effect that
Khanh would not let himself be subjected to foreign (i.e., US) control. Also pointed to
activities of Khanh's brother-in-law Phan Quang Tuoc who, Vien said, had returned to
Saigon around December 17 from trip to Hong Kong, Paris, and perhaps Germany. Vien
observed that Tuoc had close liaison with Buddhist Institute.
Long exchange developed over what to do next. Vien said he knew of nothing in particular
which US could do to assist government right now, but would let us know. Said he would
see Prime Minister and Suu later to chart next steps. Vien thought Prime Minister and Suu
would call in Khanh early next week in order to get clear statement on record of what
Khanh wants. In response to Johnson's suggestion, agreed it would be good idea to invite
other generals also. He thought that Prime Minister and Suu would attempt at meeting to
"confront generals with their responsibility"; would tell them to liberate prisoners and
would tell them it was necessary to let HNC function, either under other name or with
changed membership, would also indicate that government not prepared to accept military
control organ. Johnson suggested it was desirable that issue be presented in clear manner
and resolved as quickly as possible. From the hardening of the military position it no longer
appeared that the passage of time was contributing toward finding a compromise solution.
Suggested that if Khanh insisted on demand for control organ, Huong might say that in this
event he would have no alternative but ask Suu to relieve Khanh in accordance with
provisions of the charter. This would present other generals with clear issue of whether to
support government or publicly to take position of insubordination. Johnson did not know
how generals would react but issue would have been clearly posed. Vien said he thought
Prime Minister's position might be "more flexible". Said government had no power to
enforce decision to relieve Khanh. When Johnson noted that government could resign, and
observed that he had impression most generals did not want this to happen, Vien said that
Prime Minister did not want to give Khanh chance to take power by default by government
resignation. Intimated government might prefer force military take over by coup d'etat.
Later hinted, however, that government might retire if Khanh and generals did not agree to
what Prime Minister and Suu would present to them at their meeting. Johnson said he
thought that issue of new control organism was strong one for government. Vien agreed that
issue had to be clearly presented, adding that in present situation it was impossible for
government to operate and this was increasingly reflected in attitudes of provincial
officials./4/
/4/In telegram 1381 to Saigon, January 2, the Department of State noted its surprise that the
crisis was deepening, since this contradicted certain recent intelligence reports. The
Department observed further:"From this distance problem still seems to be to persuade
more moderate generals such as Co, Dong, Thieu and Vien to take lead in pressing for a
compromise with government. Realize generals have spent past several days in Vung Tau
and may have been inaccessible; but we would be interested in results of any efforts
Embassy and MACV officials are able to make to get in direct contact with moderate
military elements. Object would be to attempt reverse process of consolidation of military
behind Khanh's idea of a military 'organ of control.'" (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 15 VIET S)
Taylor
2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 4, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. VIII. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a typewritten,
undated, and unsigned note apparently addressed to the President which reads: "This was
Mr. Bundy's covering memo on that Newsweek article (or was it U.S. News and World
Report) that you read the end of last week."
The attached report/2/ has the ring of truth to me, all the way through. The most important
thing it says is that our personnel policies in Vietnam are wrong. The Army is running it in
a regulation way, and that means that we have too much staff, too much administration, too
much clerical work, too much reporting, too much rotation, and not enough action. (I was
an Army staff officer for three years, so this is not just imagination.)
/2/An article entitled "Can U.S. Win in Vietnam? An Inside Report," which appeared in the
January 4 issue of U.S. News & World Report. The article was in the form of an interview
of reporter Sol W. Sanders, who had just returned to Washington after covering the war in
Vietnam.
Taylor and Westmoreland are probably the ablest regulation officers we have, but that is not
what we need, and in any case much of the trouble is here in Washington, which sets the
policy on rotation and reporting and other forms of paper work.
For reasons that are not clear to me, Bob McNamara has always been hesitant about going
behind the regulations on this side of the matter. But today I found him more responsive
than ever before.
It may be that a real push from you would produce quite new results on the military side
now.
It is true that Bob is very much opposed to larger U.S. forces. But when I asked him why, it
turned out that what he is against is more of the overhead and administration and general
heaviness that the attached report describes. I think he would be responsive to an instruction
to develop a new plan for volunteer fighting forces that would proceed with a minimum of
overhead and a maximum of energy in direct contact with the Vietnamese at all levels. At
the very least it is worth asking him. We plan to have a meeting with you on Wednesday/3/
on this subject.
/3/January 6.
McG. B.
5. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 4, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. VIII. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Comment from Bob McNamara on the State of the Union
1. Bob McNamara called this morning on other matters, and I asked him what he thought of
the State of the Union./2/ He said he liked it, but had one worry. He wonders whether the
statements on Vietnam on pages 6 and 7 are too strong in the light of our current policy. I
said that they were no stronger than things we had said a dozen times before, but I gathered
from Bob that he thought they were stronger than our actions. I get the implication that he
fears that if we do not intend stronger action, we may regret these sentences.
/2/President Johnson delivered his Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union at 9:04 p.m. on January 4, 1965. For text of the address, see Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1-9.
2. My own view is that, whatever we may decide to do on particular matters in the coming
months, it is absolutely essential to maintain a posture of firmness today. I believe that
without firm U.S. language, the danger of further erosion in Saigon is bound to grow. I
therefore not only approve, but strongly recommend, the language on pages 6 and 7.
Nevertheless, I think you should know Bob's worry.
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
SUBJECT
Meeting of the Principals on Vietnam
5 January 1965
PARTICIPANTS
Defense: Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Wheeler
State: Assistant Secretary Bundy, Ambassador Unger, Mr. Forrestal
White House: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Cooper
CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby
1. Laos Action Program: Mission against Ban Trim was approved. Mission against Ban Ken
was suspended until the 9 January meeting because it would involve a considerable stepup
in scale. JCS recommendations will be obtained before the 9 January meeting.
2. OPLAN 34-A: Approval was given to the attached cable/2/ authorizing air cover to
maritime operations between the 18th and 17th parallels in order to permit maritime
operations to be mounted against targets further north than hitherto. Mr. William Bundy,
however, declined for the time being to authorize SAR operations by U.S. forces north of
the 17th parallel.
/2/Not attached and not further identified.
3. DeSoto Patrol: Mr. Forrestal said that this question would be suspended until the 9
January meeting for a review in connection with the overall scale of operations. General
Wheeler commented that he expected considerable trouble from Congress if we were to
send destroyers into the Gulf of Tonkin on a regular basis. He said JCS will come up with
some alternate thoughts. In this connection, it was pointed out that the intelligence from
DeSoto Patrols is useful but not compelling and it would only require one patrol every six
months or so.
4. It was suggested that a general checklist of increases in the scale of operations against
North Vietnam be worked up preparatory to the 9 January meeting, to include such matters
as Barrel Roll, 34-A, DeSoto and reprisals. General Wheeler commented that the signal
Hanoi is receiving may not be the one we intend. Mr. William Bundy made the point that
the basic signal Hanoi seems to have received is that the U.S. decided not to go north after
Ambassador Taylor's trip to the United States.
5. Cooper Report on Infiltration: /3/ It was agreed that this should be suspended during the
current political crisis in Saigon.
/3/See Document 171.
6. Third Country Aid: The attached memorandum/4/ was circulated on the status of this
program. Mr. Cooper and Mr. Forrestal questioned whether Saigon was ready to receive
substantial third country contingents, especially on the civilian side. Mr. Cooper also
suggested the desirability of an orientation program for third country representatives
coming to Vietnam, to be mounted by the GVN with U.S. support. Mr. Forrestal will look
into this.
/4/Not attached and not further identified.
7. Binh Gia: General Wheeler gave a detailed rundown of the Binh Gia operation/5/
commenting that the piece-meal commitment of GVN forces seemed to be the main cause
for the results. He said the action did not necessarily indicate any move to a new stage of
Viet Cong combat, although there were indications of uniformed and steelhelmeted Viet
Cong troops. The DCI commented that the attached analysis/6/ did not indicate a move to
Stage III. There was then an inconclusive discussion on the effectiveness of GVN
operations and intelligence on the enemy, it being stated that both have reasonably
improved. However, there is considerable leakage of operational information to Viet Cong
intelligence, both through their special intelligence and ordinary intelligence operations.
The DCI suggested that a review be made of the ARVN desertion rate in recent weeks and
the causes for this increase. Secretary Vance and General Wheeler indicated some surprise
and will look into this matter. The DCI again suggested attention to the effectiveness of the
psychological effort on the South Vietnamese people and commented that Mr. Zorthian, the
PAO, seemed to be unduly tied down by his U.S. press briefing responsibilities. Mr.
Forrestal will look into this matter.
/5/In the Binh Gia engagement near Saigon early in January 1965 the Viet Cong killed
nearly 200 South Vietnamese soldiers.
/6/Memorandum from Carver to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, January 5, on "The
Significance of Binh Gia in Light of Giap's Three-Stage Doctrine," attached but not printed.
8. In parting, Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that he hoped that the Mission in Saigon
would not push Huong into a vigorous fight with the Young Turk Generals. It was agreed
that this would be unfortunate and that the cautioning notes given the Embassy on this
should be continued.
WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division
7. Editorial Note
According to Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book, he met with Under Secretary Ball and
Secretary McNamara at about 5:30 p.m. on January 5. They were joined by Special
Assistant McGeorge Bundy at 5:46, and the meeting ended at approximately 7:20. (Johnson
Library, Rusk Appointment Books) No record of the discussion at the meeting has been
found. Prior to the meeting, at 1:05 p.m. that afternoon, McGeorge Bundy called Rusk. A
memorandum of part of their conversation reads as follows:
"Re Viet Nam meeting, B wondered whether we were ready to talk to the President at 5
tomorrow; McNamara wanted to have a discussion with just Sec and B first. It was agreed
they would meet at 5:30 today, following the larger 5 pm meeting. Sec will arrange with
McNamara and have Ball there too." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Calls)
For a record of the larger meeting scheduled for 5 p.m. on January 5, see Document 6.
Regarding the January 6 meeting at 5 p.m. with the President, see Document 17.
8. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Honolulu, January 5, 1965, 4:49 p.m.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup, #12. Secret.
Repeated to General Westmoreland.
A. JCS 5485-64/2/ eyes only.
/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 479.
1. Your 5485-64 year end wrap up of Washington view on Vietnam was very helpful,
especially the reasons why our recommendations for action get turned down.
2. I have always deferred to Westy and Amb Taylor's views on retaining dependents in
Vietnam because I felt they were best judge of danger to dependents and advantages of
keeping them in country. Your message introduces a new factor into this problem.
3. If we are still operating under policy of NSAM 314/3/ and if presence of dependents is a
block on decision for action, then I think we should move dependents out ASAP. Realize
there are other factors which influence decision makers even if dependents moved, but other
factors you mention are less of a positive block. Decision to move dependents should
include all, not just military. Since movement of dependents takes considerable time, we
cannot wait until we are ready to take offensive action before initiating dependents
withdrawal.
/3/For text, see ibid., pp. 758-760.
4. Brink bombing/4/ once again demonstrates that VC have capability to attack dependents
any time. Seems entirely possible Saigon could lapse into state of lawlessness under current
lack of government control. So, movement dependents justified for other reasons than to
facilitate decision for U.S. action.
/4/See footnote 11, Document 9.
5. Announcement of removal dependents should be carefully worded and timed to get most
political mileage. Might mention continued unstable political conditions; let them wonder if
all U.S. personnel would soon depart.
6. As you know, we are ready to take reprisal action on short notice, if that is required. I
recommend against including VNAF in the first strike. They can follow on after Westy gets
them cranked up, but they should not be allowed to hold up our forces.
7. On another subject. I concur completely with DIA's assessment of how Barrel Roll is
influencing the DRV given in his memo to you of 31 Dec,/5/ which was passed to us. We
will have to make a good sized strike on a reasonably important target before the DRV will
know that we are doing anything different.
9. Apart from inadequate forces and frontiers open to infiltration, the inability to give SVN
adequate security is a by-product of the weakness of govt already discussed. Effective
pacification calls for an intricate blending of military, economic, social and psychological
resources which, thus far, has exceeded the capability of the changing Saigon govts. The
Hop Tac experiment/8/ is producing some encouraging results but the country-wide
pacification program as a whole has a long time to go--years in fact--before we can hope to
bring security to SVN by present methods and at current rates of progress.
/8/Hop Tac (Working Together) was a campaign begun in mid-1964 by the South
Vietnamese Government, at the urging of MACV, to pacify the area around Saigon.
10. The third cause of the present situation, war-weariness, is easy to understand. It grows
out of 20 years of uninterrupted conflict with the Japanese, the French, the religious sects
and the VC. It has increased as the result of disappointed hopes following the overthrow of
Diem and the failure of the heralded new revolution. It exists more in the cities and among
the intellectuals than in the provinces among the peasants and soldiers. The only cause for
surprise is that morale is not worse than it is. There is a toughness in the countryside which
is a very encouraging phenomenon. One cannot escape the feeling that there is nothing in
the psychological situation here which a few victories, military or political, could not turn
around.
11. If these are the causes--unstable govt, lack of security and war-weariness--the next
question is what we can do to eliminate or modify these factors and thus change the
situation for the better, bearing in mind that we have limited time. Some things we clearly
cannot do--change national characteristics, create leadership where it does not exist, raise
large additional GVN forces or seal porous frontiers to infiltration. If one accepts such
limitations, then it is equally clear that in the time available we cannot expect anything
better than marginal govt and marginal pacification progress with continued decline of
national morale--unless something new is added to make up for those things we cannot
control.
12. Thus, we are faced with considering what we can do. We can probably compromise the
current governmental crisis in a way which will salvage Huong but will leave him pretty
much under military domination. If Huong goes, he will probably be followed by some kind
of military government. If it is controlled by Khanh, we will have to do hard soul-searching
to decide whether to try to get along with him again after previous failures or to refuse to
support him and take the consequences--which might entail ultimate withdrawal. If we can
mislay Khanh and get a military chief of state like Co or Dong, we have a fresh option
worth trying. But whether a jerry-built civilian government under military domination or a
brand new military government, it will not get far unless a new factor is added which will
contribute to coalescing the political factions around and within the government and thus
bolster its position.
13. To speed pacification, we could consider increasing the U.S. support by increasing the
advisory effort or by adding combat units. With regard to the first possibility, during the last
year we have already increased our advisory effort by 42 percent. The increase has taken
place at several echelons and has involved not only the military but USOM and USIS
representation as well. In the military sphere, the positioning of advisory teams at district
(county) level and the augmentation of battalion teams account for most of the increase.
Americans are now advising all elements of the regular forces down to battalion and a very
large part of the paramilitary forces. Americans are also flying all manner of fixed and
rotary wing aircraft, and are operating an extensive communications system. By February 1
there will be 23,700 officers and men in country; and, in addition, approximately 750
civilian advisors. We believe that our capability to stiffen further, by advisory means, is
very limited; indeed, we have probably reached about the saturation point.
14. The introduction of U.S. ground units to help fight the Viet-Cong is still another
question. To take this decision would in effect change the basis of our conduct of the war.
This is in itself no argument against such a change, but for the reasons discussed in Section
V, we are still of the opinion that we should not get into this guerrilla conflict with our
ground units.
15. In the search for some course of action which will help pull the government together,
stimulate pacification and raise the morale, I can find only one which offers any chance of
the needed success in the available time. This is the program of graduated air attacks
directed against the will of the DRV, referred to in reference B as Phase II./9/ The purpose
of such attacks would be fourfold: (1) convey to Hanoi the message that it will become
increasingly costly to support the VC; (2) eventually create a situation favorable to talking
with Hanoi; (3) turn SVN attention from internal feuding to attacking the external source of
their troubles; (4) restore U.S./GVN camaraderie through a joint military effort.
/9/Phase II operations referred generally to graduated military actions against infiltration
routes in Laos and eventually North Vietnam.
16. I know that this is an old recipe with little attractiveness but no matter how we
reexamine the facts, or what appear to be the facts, we can find no other answer which
offers any chance of success. The other choices are to continue as we are, making marginal
improvements and hoping for the best, to open negotiations with enemy, or to withdraw.
Nobody on the spot here believes that any one of these will result in ought but loss of SVN
and eventually of SEA. It is true that our recommended course of action offers no certainty
of success and carries some risks. We are presently on a losing track and must risk a
change. How long it will take to arrive at a denouement if we do not change I cannot say but
to take no positive action now is to accept defeat in the fairly near future. Furthermore, the
action required goes beyond any mere improvement, necessarily limited, in what we have
been doing up to now. The game needs to be opened up and new opportunities offered for
new breaks which hopefully may be in our favor. The new breaks may also be unfavorable
but scarcely more so than those we have been getting thus far.
17. I have shared your feeling that a stable government in Saigon should be a prerequisite to
our undertaking offensive action against DRV. As stated in reference C, the minimum
criteria of performance which should be met include the ability of the government to speak
for and to its people, to maintain law and order in its principal cities, to make plans for the
conduct of operations and assure their effective execution by military and police forces
completely responsive to its authority. The present Huong government does not reach this
standard primarily because of the uncertain responsiveness of the armed forces to its
commands. We will make every effort in adjusting the present governmental crisis to
encourage legitimate participation by the armed forces in the government and an acceptance
of a degree of responsibility for it. We have some leverage on the generals in the form of
the increased aid which I was authorized to discuss with the government upon my return
from Washington last month. The most important single item in the package is the matter of
joint planning in contemplation of Phase II operations. My present authority permits me
now to initiate planning for Phase II with GVN with the understanding that the USG does
not commit itself to any form of execution of such plans. Actually, because of the recent
climate of our relations, we have not initiated this planning and should not until we are surer
of our future course of action. It would be of great assistance in reaching a compromise of
the present crisis if I were authorized to state explicitly to GVN leaders that we are prepared
to initiate Phase II operations in case the new government meets or shows reasonable
promise of meeting your criteria. What I am suggesting is undertaking a conditional
commitment that if, in the U.S. judgement, the GVN reaches a certain level of performance,
the USG will join in an escalating campaign against the DRV. Hopefully, by such action,
we could improve the government, unify the armed forces to some degree, and thereupon
move into the Phase II program without which we see little chance of breaking out of the
present downward spiral.
18. With regard to your feeling that this guerrilla war cannot be won from the air, I am in
entire agreement, if we are thinking in terms of the physical destruction of the enemy. As I
conceive it, the Phase II program is not a resort to use bombing to win on the Douhet
theory/10/ (which I have spent considerable past effort in exposing) but is the use of the
most flexible weapon in our arsenal of military superiority to bring pressure on the will of
the chiefs of the DRV. As practical men, they cannot wish to see the fruits of ten years of
labor destroyed by slowly escalating air attacks (which they cannot prevent) without trying
to find some accommodation which will exorcise the threat. It would be to our interest to
regulate our attacks not for the purpose of doing maximum physical destruction but for
producing maximum stresses in Hanoi minds.
/10/Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) was an Italian military theorist and proponent of strategic
air power and strategic bombing.
19. Thus far I have not specifically discussed reprisal bombing in response to some major
VC atrocity such as the Bien Hoa attack or the Brink bombing./11/ I gather that the decision
not to react to the Brink affair resulted from a combination of considerations such as the
political turmoil in Saigon at the time, the initial uncertainty as to the authorship of the job,
the feeling that the local security had left something to be desired and that, when all
considerations had been taken into account, too much time had elapsed to warrant making a
reprisal. Without undertaking to discuss each one of these points, I would say that the
problem looks quite different here than from Washington. If we are so unfortunate as to
have another atrocity warranting consideration of reprisal bombing (and I feel sure that we
will), we think this event should be viewed as an opportunity to strike DRV appropriately
which should be welcomed. It would not only signal Hanoi but would give the local morale
a much needed shot in the arm and should dampen VC enthusiasm for terrorism especially
against Americans and thus aid in protecting our people. If, as is usual, the investigation to
ascertain the facts takes some days, that delay should be no bar to retaliation. Our intent will
be perfectly clear when we act and the advantages derived therefrom will be unaffected. We
think here that our policy should be to retaliate promptly after receiving Presidential
approval for each case. To justify a reprisal, the stability of the GVN (or lack thereof) at the
time appears to us to have much less importance than in the case of the deliberate initiation
of Phase II bombing.
/11/On October 31, 1964, the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa airfield with mortars, killing 4
U.S. servicemen and wounding 30. On December 24, 1964, a bomb exploded at the Brink
Hotel in Saigon, killing 2 and injuring 50 people.
20. The matter of the evacuation of dependents is closely linked to the foregoing
considerations. Because of its importance and your personal interest in it, I have given it
separate treatment in Section II which follows. In brief, the study concludes that the flow of
dependents should be stopped now. Numbers presently here should be reduced by
administrative measures but the order to evacuate all dependents, because of its political
impact, should await a decision to execute a retaliatory strike against the DRV or to initiate
the Phase II program.
21. If the foregoing reasoning is generally accepted, then we should look for an occasion to
begin air operations just as soon as we have satisfactorily compromised the current political
situation in Saigon and set up a minimal govt in accordance with the procedure of para 17.
At the proper time, we can set the stage for action by exposing to the public our case against
infiltration, and by initiating aggressive DeSoto patrols. We can be ready with prompt
reprisal bombing in response to further VC terrorism. As an earnest of our intent, we can
open joint planning with the GVN against the North and stop the flow of our dependents.
When decided to act, we can justify that decision on the basis of infiltration, of VC
terrorism, of attacks on DeSoto patrols or any combination of the three.
22. In conclusion, I would request authority to act in accordance with para 17 in order to
establish as soon as possible a govt meeting the minimum criteria for justifying the
extension of air strikes against the DRV in accordance with the Phase II concept. In the
meantime, I would hope that, regardless of GVN performance in respect to the criteria, the
USG would be ready at any time to approve reprisal strikes to respond as appropriate to
major VC terrorism.
Amb Johnson and Gen Westmoreland concur in this cable.
Taylor
withdrawal of dependents to reinforce wider action we are taking elsewhere, we should seek
to do all we can to reduce the size of the problem. We have already done much to reduce
their numbers by voluntary and administrative action. For some time USOM has hired no
new personnel with small children. MACV has also been reducing the number of positions
requiring two-year tours and thus, under present DOD policy, the presence of dependents if
desired by their sponsor. All the agencies have also informally discouraged the bringing of
dependents and encouraged the voluntary return of those already here. However, we can,
and subject to your own thoughts, I propose to do much more.
We could have all agencies immediately initiate a policy of not permitting newly assigned
personnel or those returning from home leave to be accompanied by their dependents. We
could also initiate a policy of encouraging the advanced departure of dependents whose
sponsors are scheduled to leave Viet-Nam permanently or on home leave orders in the next
few months. Additionally, all the agencies represented here could take a harder look at their
staffing patterns to see whether staff members, particularly those with dependents, could be
reduced without impairing our effectiveness. All of this will inevitably result in some
publicity but I think that this is manageable.
With respect to the remaining dependents, I would propose that at the time we initiate a
retaliatory strike against the DRV or initiate Phase 2 action against the North we
simultaneously announce and undertake an evacuation of all remaining dependents. I
suggest that such an announcement should be carefully timed in relation to whatever else
we will publicly be saying at the time. I believe that an orderly evacuation of the remaining
dependents could be carried out at that time over a period of say seven to ten days with
minimum personal hardship and risk to them and without the seriously adverse effects of
doing it before that.
Needless to say, if at any time civil disorders in Saigon or other developments indicate an
imminent and serious risk to dependents, I will have no hesitancy in ordering their
immediate evacuation.
All of my principal colleagues strongly agree with the foregoing views except Jim Killen
who, while recognizing the political problems of immediate evacuation, favors a complete
evacuation initiated now phased over perhaps a two-month period.
Taylor
34-battalion equivalents of army or marine infantry, together with the necessary logistic
support. He considers that the total manpower requirement would approximate 75,000 U.S.
personnel.
/2/Sections I, II, IV, and V are Documents 9, 10, 12, and 13.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 477.
The reason for this high figure is basically the large number of installations in which we
have important U.S. interests. They total 16 important airfields, 9 communications facilities,
one large POL storage area, and 289 separate installations where U.S. personnel work or
live. Any one of these is conceivably vulnerable to VC attack in the form of mortar fire or
sabotage; and any are vulnerable to attack by VC ground forces. To keep mortar fire off any
given point, one must secure an area roughly 16 square miles (a circle whose radius is 4,000
yards, the maximum range of 81mm mortar). Thus large airfields would, in the opinion of
General Westmoreland, require up to 6 battalions of U.S. ground forces.
Even with such a commitment of U.S. forces, there would be no absolute guarantee against
clandestine sabotage or covert mortar attacks. With few exceptions, critical installations are
located in or near towns or cities, or in heavily populated farm land. In most of these areas,
it is neither practical nor politically feasible to clear away a 4,000 yard-wide belt that could
be controlled by U.S. forces. Consequently, U.S. troops would be faced with discharge of
guard mission within populated areas and would lack the authority as well as ability to
control the movements of population and to execute the search and seizure procedures
required by such a mission. It is likely that such an effort to give greater security to our
people would bring us into greater conflict with the Vietnamese people and government.
In connection with guarding U.S. personnel billets and dependent quarters, we are presently
conducting a detailed survey of requirements. Under present arrangements, the main burden
for security rests upon the Vietnamese police and military services, and we believe that
responsibility should remain theirs. However, we have concluded that an additional U.S.
military police battalion is required in Saigon area to augment the Vietnamese in order to
raise the level of security provided.
Over the past several months and in view of the foregoing considerations General
Westmoreland has initiated or has recommended taking the following actions:
A. An increase of the Vietnamese armed forces by approximately 80,000 and the National
Police by 10,000 in 1965 in order to provide, among other things, additional forces for the
protection of U.S. installations.
B. A long series of unilateral U.S. measures such as the dispersal and revetment of U.S.
aircraft, the provision of sandbag personnel shelters where appropriate, provision of
additional air and military police for close-in security of U.S. aircraft on major airfields, the
augmentation of marine security elements to reinforce company strength for close-in
protection of aircraft at the Danang airfield, and the emplacement of counter-mortar and
ground surveillance radar near certain sensitive installations.
C. Persuasion of the Vietnamese military to take complementary steps, to include the
clarification of command responsibility for airbase defense, the emplacement of additional
artillery and mortar batteries at certain airfields, and the establishment of better intelligence
systems, particularly around key installations.
We have no illusions that when the foregoing measures have been taken, we will have
created complete safety for our installations and for our people. However, we consider that,
on balance, our present plans to increase the size of the armed forces of Vietnam, to
improve their combat effectiveness, and, in conjunction with an expanded police force, to
maximize their contribution to pacification are preferable to the commitment of a large
number of U.S. security forces to static guard missions in South Vietnam. We believe that
the current program will, in the end, produce that degree of security which is reasonably
attainable.
Taylor
intimate and daily contact with their Vietnamese counterparts. They are linked together by a
US communications system which allows us very quickly to pass them appropriate
guidance on current matters. We have been using them extensively in the current crisis to
make known the US position.
On the whole, the quality of our personnel in Vietnam is high and I believe they meet pretty
well your description of "sensitive, persistent and attentive Americans." We could perhaps
improve on our use of them but we definitely do not need more. The Vietnamese may even
be somewhat smothered now by the quantity of US contacts.
In our use of these contacts, there are two aspects of communications with the Vietnamese
which we must bear in mind--the long term and the short term. The long term is directed
toward influencing the basic attitudes and characters of the Vietnamese people. The short
term is directed against working with these Vietnamese as they are today in order to
accomplish our immediate purposes. No amount of persuasion or communication is going
to make them other than what they are over the short term. Nothing that anyone can say in
the short term is going to change their deep-seated suspicions and fears of each other, their
political fragmentation and their lack of any true sense of nationhood. The French
background and education of most of the elite have caused them to absorb some of the less
desirable French characteristics in this regard and, in addition, given them a certain
schizophrenia, being torn between the native Vietnamese and the French cultural
backgrounds. Thus, they have no single frame of reference in which to react to events-hence the seeming volatility of their attitude and the lack of firm principle to guide their
judgment.
With such an unstable audience, the question is what to say in order to influence them in the
direction of US policy. No doubt with greater experience we can become more effective,
but our overriding problem is the inability up to now to give them any hope for an eventual
end to their tribulations imposed by 20 years of war. In the absence of a light at the end of
the tunnel, they tend to blame us rather than themselves for the continued darkness.
I realize that the foregoing sounds as if we were saying that we are doing as well as possible
in this vital area of political relationships. Rather I would say we do not see how additional
reinforcements would help us to do better and that this is not an area in which likely
improvement offers a hope of reversing the declining situation. The gains here are likely to
be for the long term whereas our immediate problem is to change a situation which is very
much with us now.
In order to assure yourself that we are missing no real bets in this political field, would you
consider sending someone like Mac Bundy here for a few weeks to look at this particular
field? I think of Mac particularly because of his perceptiveness in such matters and the fact
that he has been physically detached from the local scene and hence would have an
objectivity which an old Vietnamese hand would lack. I can think of no one from the
outside who could give you a better first hand report on this subject.
Taylor
Advantages: Reaction to VC attacks would be under de facto U.S. control, thus increasing
the likelihood of rapidity and aggressiveness. VC casualties would increase.
Disadvantages: U.S. would be directly involved in ground combat. It is inevitable that
casualties would occur among Vietnamese noncombatants, thus creating adverse reaction
by Vietnamese against U.S. which VC would strongly exploit. Command relationships
would be difficult. The Vietnamese Army (ARVN) might tend to leave the tougher
problems to U.S. troops and thus gradually abdicate its responsibilities. U.S. casualties
would be high.
B. Second Alternative:
Concept: Integration of ground combat battalions into ARVN infantry regiments.
Forces: In summary, 31 infantry battalions plus combat and service support troops as well
as U.S. fighter and transport squadrons would be required. Total force would approximate
66,000 personnel.
Advantages: Each ARVN regiment would have a trained hardcore U.S. combat unit to lead
the way and set the standards.
Disadvantages: U.S. troops would be under the command of Vietnamese officers. As in the
first alternative U.S. troops would be engaged in populated areas with many political
problems stemming from noncombatant casualties and the appearances of a white man's
war against the brown. Again ARVN could develop a tendency to hold back, leaving the
U.S. battalions to do the bulk of the fighting. U.S. casualties would be high.
C. Third Alternative:
Concept: Establish three coastal enclaves at locations such as Da Nang, Tuy Hoa and Phan
Rang defended by U.S./GVN/multinational forces. These enclaves would be large enough
for security of ports, airfields and local population centers. GVN force thus relieved could
be available for counterinsurgency operations throughout the country. As a last resort these
bridgeheads could be held by free world forces as spring boards for pacification or
reconquest and, after massive economic, social and public works, would demonstrate
advantages associated with free world and GVN.
Forces: The equivalent of one division would be required in each enclave. Air support,
logistical support and Navy requirements for coastal patrol would generate a total Allied
strength of approximately 75,000.
Advantages: Provide basis for free-world presence in RVN and Southeast Asia; demonstrate
visible contrast between free world and Communist economic systems; facilitate application
of full range of free world military capabilities should such become necessary; provide
future connecting link between free world and people of Southeast Asia.
Disadvantages: Commits U.S. and free world to indefinite direct confrontation with Asiatic
Communists; cost in U.S. resources and forces is unpredictable; provides pretext for
Communist propaganda charges of U.S. colonialism; multinational support might be
difficult to obtain or sustain. It may also be difficult to confine the force to such an enclave
in the face of guerrilla attacks which would require ever extending defensive actions beyond
the perimeter defense.
D. Fourth Alternative:
Concept: Increase U.S. operations support to the maximum in areas which involve the least
political liability. This would include:
Air forces--in-country use of U.S. jet aircraft (including USN) in close support of GVN
forces, including the use of CBU-2 munitions.
Naval surface forces--commitment of U.S. naval forces in coordination with the Vietnamese
Navy to coastal patrol and blockade as a means of denying supplies to the Viet Cong.
Forces:
Air forces: One squadron equivalent of U.S. jet aircraft is now available. Base loading could
accommodate one more squadron on random basis with remainder of support as required
from carriers of 7th Fleet.
Naval surface forces: Subject to review by CINCPAC, one destroyer squadron and small
carrier from Cambodian border to Vung Tau; one destroyer division south of demilitarized
zone; and one destroyer division and sea plane tender from Da Nang to Vung Tau.
Advantages: Minimum adverse political impact. Increased operational effectiveness.
Disadvantages: An extension of U.S. commitment and involvement in combat operations.
No assurance that these steps will have any significant effect on the overall situation.
3. In weighing the advantages and disadvantages, only the last alternative appears to be
acceptable but none is recommended at this time.
A. It may seem as though we have weighted too heavily the political problems associated
with the introduction of U.S. ground forces. However, after much soul searching we have
reluctantly concluded that their military value would be more than offset by their political
liability. The Vietnamese have the manpower and the basic skills to win this war. What they
lack is motivation. The entire advisory effort has been devoted to giving them both skill and
motivation. If that effort has not succeeded there is less reason to think that U.S. combat
forces would have the desired effect. In fact, there is good reason to believe that they would
[have] the opposite effect by causing some Vietnamese to let the U.S. carry the burden
while others, probably the majority, would turn actively against us. Thus intervention with
ground combat forces would at best buy time and would lead to ever increasing
commitments until, like the French, we would be occupying an essentially hostile foreign
country.
B. We have reviewed the tactical operations of the past two years for occasions where
employment of U.S. ground forces would have been desirable and feasible. We have found
such instances to be few and far between. On balance, they do not seem to justify the
presence of U.S. units, even disregarding the political problems involved.
C. We are not prepared to recommend that U.S. troops be placed under Vietnamese
command and thus reject the second alternative.
D. While the military/political enclaves have some attractive features they will not
contribute in large measure to the counterinsurgency war and could be political and
financial liabilities.
4. Recommendations:
A. That we adhere to the advisory system improving and expanding it as necessary.
Additional district advisors will be required if the GVN presses on with the war.
B. That the U.S. continue to provide only operational support along current lines augmented
and reinforced as the situation requires.
Taylor
carefully for the ensuing actions. The government forces arrived on the scene battalion by
battalion and took the inevitable losses of a piecemeal commitment into battle in the
presence of the enemy. The losses on our side presently include about 200 killed in action,
190 wounded and almost a hundred missing. This includes 16 U.S. losses (5 killed, 8
wounded and 3 missing). GVN are claiming 140 VC killed.
/5/Reference is to the battle at Binh Gia, 40 miles southeast of Saigon, which took place
December 28, 1964-January 4, 1965, the longest battle of the war to that point.
This action was a serious defeat but not a disaster, and the consequences should not be
overstated. However, it is a reminder of the distracting effect upon military actions of the
continuing immersion of the generals in politics. Had the senior generals not been closeted
during this period in Vung Tau plotting against the Huong government, I am quite sure that
the leadership of the action would have been of a higher quality and the outcome might
have been quite different.
Elsewhere the progress in pacification as in recent weeks was almost undetectable. The
effects of the political impasse in Saigon gradually are making an appearance in the
provinces. Civilian officials, in particular, are uncertain how to act and normally follow
their instinctive tendency toward timidity when there is not a clear voice of authority to
direct them.
The general public is strangely unaware what is taking place. Because of the double
censorship in Saigon, first by the government and second by the military, the news is not
being published in the local press. Although the word is gradually seeping out that there is a
conflict between the civilian Huong government and the military, no one seems to be
particularly agitated or anxious to take sides on behalf of either party. An exception are the
political monks of the Buddhist Institute who are taking advantage of the opportunity to
renew their harassment of the government.
Taylor
15. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 6, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, January-March
1965. Top Secret. Printed also in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 684-686.
SUBJECT
Notes on the South Vietnamese Situation and Alternatives
For your meeting this afternoon with the President,/2/ and even though Ambassador
Taylor's incoming messages have not been released by the President except to yourself and
Mr. Ball, I thought it might be helpful to have notes prepared among Mike Forrestal, Len
Unger, and myself.
Southeast Asia. On the other hand, it would still be virtually certain that Laos would then
become untenable and that Cambodia would accommodate in some way. Most seriously,
there is grave question whether the Thai in these circumstances would retain any confidence
at all in our continued support. In short, the outcome would be regarded in Asia, and
particularly among our friends, as just as humiliating a defeat as any other form. As events
have developed, the American public would probably not be too sharply critical, but the real
question would be whether Thailand and other nations were weakened and taken over
thereafter.
5. The alternative of stronger action obviously has grave difficulties. It commits the US
more deeply, at a time when the picture of South Vietnamese will is extremely weak. To the
extent that it included actions against North Vietnam, it would be vigorously attacked by
many nations and disapproved initially even by such nations as Japan and India, on present
indications. Most basically, its stiffening effect on the Saigon political situation would not
be at all sure to bring about a more effective government, nor would limited actions against
the southern DRV in fact sharply reduce infiltration or, in present circumstances, be at all
likely to induce Hanoi to call it off.
6. Nonetheless, on balance we believe that such action would have some faint hope of really
improving the Vietnamese situation, and, above all, would put us in a much stronger
position to hold the next line of defense, namely Thailand. Accepting the present situation-or any negotiation on the basis of it--would be far weaker from this latter key standpoint. If
we moved into stronger actions, we should have in mind that negotiations would be likely
to emerge from some quarter in any event, and that under existing circumstances, even with
the additional element of pressure, we could not expect to get an outcome that would really
secure an independent South Vietnam. Yet even on an outcome that produced a progressive
deterioration in South Vietnam and an eventual Communist takeover, we would still have
appeared to Asians to have done a lot more about it.
7. In specific terms, the kinds of action we might take in the near future would be:
a. An early occasion for reprisal action against the DRV.
b. Possibly beginning low-level reconnaissance of the DRV at once.
c. Concurrently with a or b, an early orderly withdrawal of our dependents. We all think this
would be a grave mistake in the absence of stronger action, and if taken in isolation would
tremendously increase the pace of deterioration in Saigon. If we are to clear our decks in
this way--and we are more and more inclined to think we should--it simply must be, for this
reason alone, in the context of some stronger action.
d. Intensified air operations in Laos may have some use, but they will not meet the problem
of Saigon morale and, if continued at a high level, may raise significant possibilities of
Communist intervention on a substantial scale in Laos with some plausible justification. We
have gone about as far as we can go in Laos by the existing limiting actions, and, apart from
cutting Route 7, we would not be accomplishing much militarily by intensifying US air
actions there. This form of action thus has little further to gain in the Laos context, and has
no real bearing at this point on the South Vietnamese context.
e. Introduction of limited US ground forces into the northern area of South Vietnam still has
great appeal to many of us, concurrently with the first air attacks into the DRV. It would
have a real stiffening effect in Saigon, and a strong signal effect to Hanoi. On the
disadvantage side, such forces would be possible attrition targets for the Viet Cong. For
your information, the Australians have clearly indicated (most recently yesterday) that they
might be disposed to participate in such an operation. The New Zealanders are more
negative and a proposal for Philippine participation would be an interesting test.
William P. Bundy/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
16. Paper Prepared by Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff/1/
Washington, January 6, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Special
Intelligence Material, Vol. III. Secret. Cooper forwarded this paper to McGeorge Bundy on
January 6 with a covering memorandum which read: "Attached is a quick and dirty
exposition of some of the views I expressed this morning. It might be useful in connection
with your meeting later this afternoon." (Ibid.) Regarding the meeting, see Document 17.
Re the War
There are three distinct aspects to the Bombing-of-the-North gambit:
a. Retaliation in kind against major VC terrorism or North Vietnamese actions against U.S.
personnel or installations. We should do this with or without a stable government in Saigon,
but after evacuation of dependents.
b. Limited, selective attacks against infiltration-related targets. We should do this only if
there is a stable government in Saigon and after evacuation of dependents.
c. Large scale bombing of military and industrial targets. We should not initiate this with or
without a stable government in Saigon.
We should not underestimate the risk of bombing the North. (A summary of a recent CIA
study on Communist military readiness capabilities is attached.)/2/ But aside from the risk
of greatly expanded hostilities, there is the considerable risk that the object of the exercise
(i.e., forcing Hanoi to call off its dogs in the South and/or to improve our negotiating
posture) won't be attainable by this means. The risks involved in retaliation are less than
those in the other two categories.
/2/Attached, but not printed.
I assume that our objective in Vietnam is to reduce the insurgency to a point where the
GVN can handle the problem itself or alternatively to establish sufficient leverage to
achieve by negotiation what we are unable to achieve (at least achieve in a reasonable
period of time) on the ground. If this be so, then the war must still be fought and victories
achieved in South Vietnam. A major (and well-publicized) military victory a month would
do much to convince Hanoi that the cost of the insurgency is high and would entail
infinitely less risk than bombing important North Vietnamese installations. Moreover, a few
important military victories are now essential for Vietnamese (and U.S.) morale. But how?
Thus far, U.S. military advisers at Division level and above have had virtually no significant
influence on the planning and execution of major military operations. We advise period. In
large part this is because we have been understandably reluctant to go beyond this. In large
part, too, ARVN officers resist relying on U.S. advice at this level because of (not
unnatural) regard for face and pride. Thus we find ourselves critiquing rather than executing
a Binh Gia-type operation.
Simply, briefly, crudely we have, or think we have, the best staff officers in the world; our
intelligence on VC operations and concentrations, while still not good enough is improving;
regular ARVN forces are nothing to be ashamed of. What is needed is to undertake the kind
of top-level strategic and tactical planning using ARVN forces that we would be using if it
were indeed our war. This will take some new arrangements with the GVN, some additional
high powered U.S. staff officers and a willingness to assume the risk of authority and
responsibility for failure as well as success.
Re Evacuation
Depending on accompanying and subsequent U.S. moves, the evacuation of U.S.
dependents can signal determination or weakness. My own feeling is that we should pare
down sharply. We have more use for MPs than to ride school buses; the presence of so
many women and children in Saigon is an inhibition, conscious or subconscious, on action.
To wait until we have to evacuate in haste and possibly in confusion would be folly.
Re the Government
All we need--and all we should press for--is a government that is in charge, that is prepared
to continue the war, that is receptive to our advice, and that has enough support or at least
acceptance among the various political groups to stay in power for a couple of years--or, at
least, have its personnel shuffled and structure modified only in reasonably orderly fashion.
Whether it's a military, civilian, democratic or autocratic government is beside the point
now.
Developments in the last day or so indicate that there may be a thaw in the relationships
between Huong and Khanh and Khanh and the Embassy. This is fine and we should move
forward carefully and gently rather than worrying about the fine print of any Huong-Khanh
confrontation.
However, we still confront the Buddhists, who will continue to retain the power to move
[make] any government unworkable, even if they cannot actually topple it--a fact of
contemporary Vietnamese political life we will simply have to accept and reckon with. The
problem is that the Buddhists--or, more accurately, the militant bonzes who now control the
"Buddhist movement"--don't know what they want, in a positive sense. The Buddhist
leadership enjoys the exercise of political power but prefers to veto rather than propose. It
does not want the responsibility of office or, actually, direct participation in the
governmental process. This leadership is hypersensitive to affronts to its honor or present
suggested changes."
The attached draft, which is labeled "Draft 2 (changes from Draft 1 underlined)", bears
several revisions in President Johnson's hand. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, NODIS-LOR, Vol. I) The reply as sent to Taylor is Document 19.
In telegram 1418 to Saigon, January 7, the Department of State noted that further messages
in the series initiated by CAP-64375 should henceforth bear the slug "LOR" to "facilitate
prearranged highly restricted handling." Such messages were to be addressed only to the
Secretary of State, "since messenger delivery will be utilized here except in most urgent
cases." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1420 to Saigon,
McGeorge Bundy informed Taylor that his recommendation that CINCPAC be included in
the distribution of high-level cable traffic on Vietnam had been discussed. Bundy remarked:
"We agree that before final decisions are taken, he should be cut in. But recent leaks in
Washington have redoubled determination here that preliminary analyses and decisions be
private. For this reason it has been decided that we need to hear your reactions to President's
message of today before circle is enlarged." (Ibid.)
/3/Document 12.
/4/In telegram 2085 from Saigon, January 8, Taylor expressed thanks for the President's
support of Embassy recommendations. Taylor added that he thought "we can accomplish
much with the authority contained therein" and that the Embassy would forward its
comments as soon as they were in order. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
Rusk
have tentative Washington thinking prior rather than subsequent to an "unpleasant surprise"
in Saigon.
Thrust of Khanh's remarks to Johnson and to the CAS/2/ together with reports and rumors
of a Khanh coup lead us to believe that chances that Khanh will take over control of the
Government, directly or behind a transparent facade are sufficient to warrant our developing
broad contingent guidelines to extent possible.
/2/U. Alexis Johnson's account of his January 9 meeting with Khanh was sent in telegram
2102 from Saigon, January 9. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S) Khanh's views as reported to the
Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon on January 8 are in TDCS-314/00099-65, January 9.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXV)
We are very much aware that the eclipse of any form of meaningful civilian government in
Saigon will create awkward and even serious problems for the Embassy, responsible
officials in Washington and our Vietnam policy generally. We would be faced, as you have
pointed out in your thoughtful Saigon 2010 of December 31,/3/ with two difficult and
unpleasant choices: To work as best we can with Khanh, or virtually disengage from an incountry military and economic role.
/3/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 478.
Choice between these alternatives would obviously involve most serious issues and might
hinge on judgment that could only be made over period of days as to whether new military
government or present one effectively dominated by Khanh had some degree of popular
support, would get on with war, and was ready to work genuinely with US. If so we might
well have to swallow our pride and work with it. Hence our only short-term guidance would
be to avoid to extent possible action that commits us one way or the other. This might well
involve, for example, taking no early initiative to see Khanh, letting him come to us, but
also doing nothing to change pattern of working relations at all levels until situation
clarifies.
Realize above does not get us very far, and would appreciate your thinking on possible
shape of events and additional measures we might take if it happens. So far as we can see
here, you are doing all you can to prevent it.
Rusk
2055./5/
/2/Document 19.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 434.
/4/See ibid., Document 433.
/5/Document 10.
1. We have drawn much satisfaction from your message (Ref. A). With its indication of
general agreement with our thesis that the deteriorating situation here requires prompt
action to pull the government together, to stimulate pacification and to raise the public
morale. Also, I hope I am correct in assuming agreement that the action required includes a
prompt passage into Phase II operations against the DRV as soon as possible and the
adoption of a policy of prompt and clear reprisals for what has variously been termed "an
unusual hostile act" (Ref. B) of the VC or any major or spectacular VC action in SVN
whether against U.S. personnel and installations or not (Ref. C). However, it is clear from
your message that final approval of either of these courses of action, Phase II operations or
reprisal bombing, is subject to certain conditions.
2. It is these conditions which I should like to discuss because, frankly, some of them seem
to work against the broad thesis that it is to our interest to act rapidly along the two lines
indicated above. I think that I can best set forth the issues by discussing the following
problems which arise from analyzing Ref. A.
A. How to establish the firmness of a reprisal policy by public announcement so that the
evacuation of our dependents will not appear to be running.
(1) The problem here is how we could get our dependents out before taking any retaliatory
action without creating panic in SVN and creating misunderstanding of our motives in the
U.S., in North Vietnam and in other interested foreign countries. Within SVN, there are the
reactions of three groups which we shall have to consider, the government, the Vietnamese
armed forces and the Vietnamese general public. The suggestion in Deptel 1419 is that we
get across our intentions and motives by "inconspicuous background briefings rather than
by formal public announcement". We are very doubtful here that any public statement
without action will carry conviction to any of the audiences mentioned above. We are sure
that background briefings are not an adequate vehicle for this kind of communication.
While background briefings are a well understood and much [used] technique in the U.S.,
they are by no means as useful with the Vietnamese officialdom or public. The latter are so
accustomed to ignoring, discounting or, according to their mood, being alarmed by rumors
and half-truths published in the scores of little sheets which pass for their press, that we
cannot expect to communicate an authentic, credible message by this technique to the
Vietnamese whom we wish to reach. A formal public statement would be somewhat more
effective but it runs counter to our conviction which is also strongly shared by Souvanna
Phouma in Vientiane and by various Thai leaders in Bangkok that in dealing with the North
we should act first, and, if necessary to talk at all, talk later.
(2) There are also certain dangers in making any advance statement on the subject of
reprisals even if such a statement had a high order of credibility. We are not sure how the
DRV would react to such a statement. But they might undertake to present us with a series
of fuzzy and ambiguous provocations to which we would not wish to respond but to which
we would be pressed to respond by public opinion aroused by our brave statement of
intention. In particular, I am sure that we would be under constant pressure from the GVN
to take actions in cases where we would not feel reprisal warranted. In short, I do not
believe that a statement of reprisal policy in advance of initiation is the best way to cover
the withdrawal of our dependents.
There is no good way to do so which will avoid creating serious difficulties but, if the
decision is made to withdraw dependents, I personally would prefer to base our action upon
the need to reduce the number of non-essential U.S. personnel to exposure to terrorist
actions and on the need to clear the decks for the accelerated military activities which are
expected to follow the termination of the recent political crisis.
(3) I am sorry if we seem to be belaboring the point of the timing and manner of the
withdrawal of our dependents. We will, of course, cheerfully abide by whatever decision is
made, but all of us here deeply feel that in the present situation this action, for whatever
expressed reason taken, is fraught with serious adverse consequences. Even if prior
withdrawal of our dependents had only a marginal effect on the totality of the situation here;
our margins are already too thin to warrant paring them further. None of us feel that the
program set forth in Embtel 2055 subjects our dependents to undue hazards and in the light
of the practical difficulties of making an adequate explanation in advance of a reprisal, we
feel that our former recommendation (Embtel 2055) remains the preferred course of action.
B. How to make a reprisal within 24-hours after the provocation.
(1) I doubt very much that this requirement can be met, although certain actions can be
taken to reduce the required time between the provocation and the retaliatory strike. We can
submit to you and Prime Minister Huong a number of possible targets associated with
infiltration and located within the Southern DRV. Six such targets have already been
identified and plans have been made to expedite their attack. With prior Presidential
agreement before the fact to these plans for the strikes, we would then require only the final
authorization for execution of one or several of these approved plans.
(2) General Westmoreland is of the opinion that he could assure execution within 24 hours
of receipt of your authorization to strike but that it would be unwise to count on a shorter
time. The Vietnamese aircraft which would participate in such a strike are normally
involved in operations in areas often remote from the bases from which the reprisal strikes
would be launched. Also, one must always take into account the need for crew rest and
thorough briefing. Likewise, varying conditions depending on the time of day at which the
order to execute may be received and the uncertain conditions of weather at the time make it
unrealistic to be overly precise in fixing a mandatory time of reaction.
(3) While we recognize that generally speaking the faster we get off a retaliatory strike the
better, it seems to us that there are strong arguments to avoid fixing a time of reaction which
might become a self-imposed and unnecessary straight-jacket on our freedom of decision. A
lapse of even several days will not prevent establishing a clear linkage between the VC
action and our reprisal and under certain circumstances may be desirable to permit us to
take action under the most favorable conditions. Let us not hurry ourselves if it is not
necessary.
C. How to initiate Phase II actions as rapidly as possible and under as favorable conditions
as possible.
(1) With regard to Phase II operations, you will recall that, based upon the authorizations
contained in references B and C. I have already broached the matter of joint planning for
Phase II with the GVN senior authorities in early December. At that time, General
Westmoreland and General Khanh designated chief planners to represent each side and
reached agreement on the general purpose of the planning. However, because of the
subsequent political events, they agreed to defer further action. Khanh has tried recently to
reopen the matter with General Westmoreland and has asked him whether he was now
ready to proceed. At my instructions, General Westmoreland indicated that he could not
give a final answer until the termination of the political crisis.
(2) In Embtel 2052, I asked for authority to go somewhat farther than my December
instructions and, upon resumption of joint planning, to tell our Vietnamese counterparts that
we definitely intended to initiate Phase II operations provided the new government reached
the criteria which were communicated to them following my return from Washington. As I
read Deptel 1419, I am not entirely sure whether the effect (paragraph 3 and paragraph 5) is
to extend my authority in the way requested or, on the contrary, to increase the conditions
precedent to initiation of Phase II. I would like to assume that I can [garble--indicate our?]
intention to the GVN with regard to initiating Phase II but with the understanding that there
is no present commitment as to timing and or as to scale. At the same time, I would like to
interpret the language of paragraph 5 as adding nothing to the requirements previously
transmitted to the GVN in December.
(3) In view of the nature of the recent political truce, in applying the criteria for
governmental performance, I am sure we will have to use much common sense and great
leniency if we are ever going to take action. The weakened civil government which has
resulted from the political compromise with the generals is not going to make in the coming
months much measurable progress toward real political stability and strength. If we are ever
to get into Phase II and, as you know, we consider it essential do so, we may have to be
satisfied with little more than the continued existence of a government in whose name we
can act and to whose request for assistance we can respond. If, after giving about another
month's run to our efforts in Laos, the Huong government is still in business, my feeling is
that we should be ready to embark on Phase II operations, if only for the pulmotor effect
upon the internal situation in SVN.
D. How to improve joint efforts to achieve victories within SVN.
(1) General Westmoreland would say that he feels that we have gone about as far forward in
influencing the planning and execution of operations as the advisory concept will permit.
Inherent in that concept is the fact that Vietnamese commanders make the final decisions
and assume the ultimate responsibilities. It is estimated that a good advisor can influence his
counterpart with respect to a decision about 80 percent of the time. Less effective advisors
will, of course, have a lower batting average. A few Vietnamese officers are not disposed to
take any advice--these we usually manage to have removed, but it takes time.
(2) The proof of the effectiveness of the system is the evidence of its results. A summary of
actions and results in 1964 indicates that some 7,000 members of the armed forces of VietNam were killed in action as against about 17,000 Viet-Cong. Out of some 2,400 large unit
actions (those most influenced by U.S. advisors), about 60 percent made contact with the
Viet-Cong. During the last four months (the period of keeping records in this form) 1,539
large and small actions which made contact were observed and rated by U.S. observers. Out
of these engagements, the U.S. observers considered 1,377 or approximately 90 percent to
have been successful.
(3) The Binh Gia battle has made recent headlines as I mentioned in my last week's report to
you./6/ This unsuccessful action was not the fault of American advisors, but rather the result
of their difficulty in getting to the senior commanders who were preoccupied with political
matters. Unfortunately, commanders here will not delegate authority to their subordinates so
that in their physical absence it is very difficult to get any decision. This was the case at
Binh Gia where Khanh did not really get into the action until the battle was virtually over.
/6/Document 14.
(4) Now that there is a political truce, we will make every effort to get these commanders
back to their primary business of fighting the war. I think most of them are pretty sick of
political involvements and can be expected to turn in an improved military performance, at
least for a while.
3. The foregoing represents the principal problems which we see arising from Deptel 1419
and our comments thereon. We are very glad to know that you are asking the concerned
Departments and agencies to examine the situation with respect to the assignment and
rotation of our personnel in the light of the prospective withdrawal of dependents.
Seen from here, we feel that our supporting agencies in Washington have done extremely
well by us in terms of the quality of Americans sent here. There will, of course, have to be
changes made in the rules of assignment and rotation if dependents are withdrawn.
4. As a summary to the discussion presented in the foregoing paragraphs, I would like to
recommend for your approval the following policy statements to serve as guidance to all
interested agencies of USG:
A. In case of any major or spectacular Viet-Cong action in SVN (Tab E, Ref. C) whether
against U.S. personnel and installations or not, the GVN/U.S. forces will execute a reprisal
air attack as quickly as possible against an appropriate DRV target upon approval of the
U.S. President and GVN chief executive. Starting now, the number of U.S. dependents will
be reduced by administrative measures as described in Reference D. The remainder will be
withdrawn in an orderly manner following the first reprisal attack.
B. It is the intention of the USG to initiate Phase II operations as soon as the GVN meets or
shows reasonable promise of meeting the criteria [of] being able to speak for and to its
people; to maintain law and order in principal cities; and to make plans for the conduct of
operations and to assure effective execution of such plans by military and police forces of
SVN.
C. Phase II operations will be initiated and each specific strike thereunder executed by joint
agreement of the President and the GVN chief executive. U.S. dependents will have been
evacuated prior to initiation of Phase II operations.
D. The U.S. Ambassador is authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary for those
always, intimate and cordial while tomorrow evening, Chief of State Suu is giving a "tea
party" for the wrap-up conciliation of the principal participants, Vietnamese and U.S., in the
recent coolness. Hopefully thereafter, we will make a new start forward.
/2/Document 14.
The Ministry of Interior announced Sunday/3/ evening that the detained HNC members had
been released and permitted to return home. The Minister of Interior has informed us that
March 21 is the current target date for the convocation of the National Assembly and that he
now envisages a mixed procedure of elections in the cities and appointments in the
countryside for choosing the Assembly's membership. Lower Interior officials have
indicated privately to us that the Cabinet will consider a proposed election law this week.
/3/January 10.
Despite these indications of conciliation between the armed forces and the government,
General Khanh, in talking with Alex Johnson on January 9/4/ just before the signing of the
first communiqu, made it quite clear that he still considers the armed forces the only true
guardian of the nation's anti-Communist spirit with the responsibility to intervene whenever
they consider that there are undesirable elements working their way into the government.
He intimated that he was seeking the Buddhists as colleagues in this monitorship of the
government.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 21.
The suggestion of an alliance of some sort between Khanh and the Buddhists, long
predicted by Huong, finds some verification in the Buddhist encouraged strikes and
demonstrations in the Hue-Danang area. Young Turk General Thi who is responsible for
law and order in the region is doing little, if anything, to suppress the demonstrators. The
Buddhist Institute will certainly raise the level of their anti-Huong activities if the word gets
about that the army will not intervene. Fortunately, in the Saigon area, the local commander,
General Dong, is a staunch character apparently loyal to Huong.
Thus, the basic unbalanced political equation remains with us: the civilian government,
weak in prestige and authority, is caught between two forces whose objectives are not
identical--the army and the Buddhist Institute--but both of which desire some degree of
indirect control over the government without assuming corresponding responsibilities. An
added element of instability is that both of these turbulent elements have their own internal
lines of division.
Viet-Cong military activity declined during the week, following the major battle at Binh
Gia the week before. The week was marked by Viet-Cong harassment of thirteen district
capitals by mortar fire--mostly in the Delta. Similarly, on the government's side, although
the number of ground operations increased, contact with the Viet-Cong was down.
The personnel strength of the armed forces has continued to rise slowly but steadily during
recent weeks and will not fall much short of the year end goal. Furthermore, a conscription
law is under revision and a new draft is expected to be completed this month. The proposed
law specifies that deferment is a privilege and not a right, and may be voided.
While there have been some indications of public relief over the termination of the internal
political tension, press censorship has prevented many of the facts from being generally
known. The preparations for Tet, the lunar new year festival, have attracted far more
popular interest than the political goings-on./5/
/5/In forwarding this telegram to the President, McGeorge Bundy, in a January 12
memorandum, wrote that Khanh's own ambition was the principal unknown in the political
situation: "If he were really content to maintain a watchdog position, we could move
forward with some confidence. But there is good reason to suspect him of a desire to return
to full power in the manner of de Gaulle, and that is why we are dealing with an interim
government. "Moreover, the recent telegrams make it fairly clear that serious
communications between Khanh and the United States Government do not now exist. After
a little time for cooling off, we may wish to raise with Max the question of real contact with
Khanh. After all he exists." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, President/Taylor NODIS CLORES)
Taylor
25. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, January 13, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI,
Memos. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Reply to Taylor's Telegram/2/
/2/Document 22.
Bill Bundy, McNaughton, Unger and I met late yesterday afternoon and agreed on the
following.
With respect to Evacuation: We are inclined to feel that Taylor makes a great deal of sense
on the undesirability of a prior announcement either through a background statement or
directly. We are taking the following line:
1. Arrangements for evacuation should be re-examined so that the 7-10 day period referred
to by Taylor can be telescoped into, say, 2 or 3 days. (There are, altogether, slightly more
than 1600 U.S. dependents in South Vietnam, of whom only about 100 are outside Saigon.
We think that, if necessary, we can move some ships from the Seventh Fleet into Saigon
harbor and get everybody out in one fell swoop.)
2. We feel that there should be a direct relationship between evacuation and a major reprisal
against a VC spectacular. Thus:
a. At the moment approval is given to Saigon to undertake reprisal, dependents should be
alerted (if this is leaked, we should indicate in background briefings that ordinary prudence
requires such preparation).
b. Actual evacuation should occur upon the initiation of reprisal action.
c. Immediately after the reprisal targets are hit, the President should issue a statement to the
effect that we have responded to the latest VC atrocity, our planes have carried out their
mission, are on the way back to their bases, and that U.S. dependents are in the process of
being evacuated. The announcement should be put in terms of our readiness to respond to
further VC provocations, and our desire to relieve both GVN and U.S. forces of
diversionary efforts to protect dependents' schools, homes, etc.
With respect to Phase II: We are recommending that we inform Ambassador Taylor that we
can provide no guidance beyond that given to him in early December. The decision on the
timing and scale of Phase II operations will have to be made at the Presidential level.
Note: There are some sticky details on evacuation that have not been dealt with: What to do
about working wives, older children, etc? What to do about British and other foreign
dependents (for whom I think we have expressed some responsibility--they number about
1000)? Whether we evacuate them all directly back to the U.S.?
I have been brooding about another approach to evacuation. Briefly--Send mothers and
school children under 12 home and not recruit any one with young children. Send older kids
to boarding school in HK or elsewhere in SEA (there are some good ones) and permit
mothers to stay on at own risk (parents can visit kids, but not vice versa). Raise medical and
psychological requirements for all civilians. Comme ca.
Chester L. Cooper/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
26. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 14, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. VIII. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Our last exchange with Taylor
Taylor came in on Monday with a long answer/2/ to your message of last Thursday./3/ We
owe him an answer.
/2/See Document 22.
/3/See Document 19.
Taylor still resists the immediate withdrawal of dependents. He says that it would not be
practicable to cover it with hints of a reprisal policy in Saigon, and he says that if we tie the
GVN to reprisals in this way, they will feel a right to request reprisals after nearly any small
act of provocation. So he goes back to his own recommendation that we wait on dependents
until after the reprisal is ordered. Rusk, McNamara and I agree that we should go back to
him with another proposal, but because we think this is a poor week to ask you for any
major decisions, I suggest we send this one over Rusk's name without committing you at
this stage. Our suggestion is that we stick to the notion of immediate withdrawal of
dependents, by proposing to him that he sound out the Prime Minister on this matter and
authorizing Max to propose to Huong that the withdrawal be covered and explained by a
Presidential statement here. The object of this statement would be to indicate our firmness
and determination without explicitly discussing reprisals. The experts think it might well do
the job, but we need to give Max a chance to comment.
The statement/4/ we suggest is as follows:
/4/ The statement was sent to Saigon for comment; see Document 27.
"I have asked Ambassador Taylor to arrange for the evacuation of the dependents of all
official American civil and military personnel in South Vietnam. In taking this action I
recognize the personal hardships that will be imposed on these loyal Government servants
who are already working in trying circumstances. Nevertheless, I feel a personal
responsibility for the safety of the wives and children involved and consider that in view of
the ever-present danger of indiscriminate attacks, and the irresponsibility of the Communist
terrorists, they must depart. We continue to seek peace in South Vietnam as in all Southeast
Asia, but as long as the Communists persist in their efforts to take over the country there
will be danger to Americans as, of course, there also are to the long-suffering Vietnamese
people themselves. I also regard it as essential that American officials and military
personnel in South Vietnam be relieved of every duty or responsibility unrelated to the
effective execution of aid to the GVN and also that that Government not be asked to bear
any burdens of support or protection which are not absolutely essential to its own safety.
This evacuation therefore will begin at once and will, of course, be carried out in a manner
to minimize hardship and difficulty for all those concerned."
Max's incoming also tries to tighten your commitment to Phase 2 operations. (Air attacks
against North Vietnam that are not specifically reprisals.) We would propose to answer by
saying that you would not be ready at this stage to go beyond the position stated in your last
message, namely, that you are willing to have joint planning but must make it very clear
that any decisions by the President on Phase 2 will "necessarily be affected by performance"
in reprisal actions, in military efforts within Vietnam, and in the struggle for political
stability.
If the truce of the tea party holds and this line of action seems reasonable to you, we would
try to keep Vietnam quiet until after Wednesday.
McG. B./5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
(3) We continue to believe that reprisal must be undertaken as fast as possible following
provocation and that this should not exceed 24 hours except when absolutely unavoidable.
B. It is not possible now for us to make any commitment on Phase II actions going beyond
our guidance of December 3./3/ The criteria which you have set out are highly pertinent and
relevant to the President's eventual decision but are not the only factors which must be
considered.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 435.
C. We agree that when it is possible to authorize the initiation of Phase II operations, this
will call for the agreement of the President and of the GVN Chief Executive, as will each
specific strike thereunder.
D. You are authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary for those actions in
Subparagraph 4.A of your message 2116, in the light of the foregoing discussion of
evacuation of dependents and reprisals. You are also authorized to seek agreement of the
GVN as necessary on a contingency basis for Phase II actions on the basis specified in our
previous message, paragraph 5(5)./4/
/4/See Document 19.
E. You are authorized to communicate to the appropriate GVN officials the pertinent
information on Laos. However, before acting on this matter we would like to see a summary
of the information you have in mind communicating and would like this summary also to be
repeated to Vientiane; the message on this subject should not be in this highly restricted
channel./5/
/5/In telegram 2159 from Saigon, January 15, Taylor indicated that on the basis of a
previous instruction from the Department of State he had already briefed Huong, Khanh,
and Vien on recent Barrell Roll operations. The briefing was described in telegram 2158
from Saigon, January 15. The previous instruction was telegram 1471 to Saigon, January
14, which was in response to Taylor's request in telegram 2146, January 14, for
authorization to brief senior South Vietnamese officials on air operations in Laos. (All in
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
/2/Document 27.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 433.
1. I was pleased to receive the authority to discuss the matter of the evacuation of
dependents with Huong and will seek an appointment as soon as I receive a reply to this
cable which raises matters which need to be pretty well settled to permit response to
questions he is likely to raise. Incidentally, because of Huong's limited perceptiveness in
such matters as assessment of political and psychological reactions, Alex Johnson and I feel
that Vien should be included in our discussions with Huong. We will do so unless you
indicate an objection.
2. Our main problem remains how to explain our evacuation of dependents in way which
will seem reasonable and straightforward and thus avoid alarming SVN, and third countries
who have nationals here, or who are providing or may provide free world aid. In developing
such statement of our case, VC have given us some assistance in the explosive charge found
January 16 at the special services pool near Tan Son Nhut Airfield. Assuming it remains
your view that dependents should be withdrawn, statement such as following appears to us
about the best we can do:
"A. The finding of the explosive charge at the special services swimming pool on January
16 confirms previous indications that American personnel, including their wives and
children, will henceforth be targets for VC terrorist actions. This conclusion has been
reached at a time when USG has been reviewing its policy regarding dependents in SVN in
light of developments of situation in that country and clear need to concentrate all US
efforts on assisting people of Viet-Nam in their efforts to resist Communist subversion.
Under such circumstances, it has been question for some time as to whether continued
presence of dependents is consistent with desire of US to maintain a posture of maximum
readiness to meet whatever contingencies may be forced upon US and Vietnamese people.
"B. The probability of further VC terrorist activities, added to these other considerations,
has led to decision to adopt policy of removing wives and children from South Viet-Nam.
Movement of dependents to SVN will cease at once and movement of dependents from
SVN will begin at once on phased and orderly schedule. It is not possible at this time to
estimate length of time required to complete this movement. Inevitable personal problems
of affected households will be given sympathetic consideration in carrying out this policy."
3. Foregoing seems to me best argument we can make. You will note that we avoid
suggesting that presence of dependents is cause for personal concern by heads of families or
is significant burden on US and Vietnamese authorities. We do not believe these could be
accepted as valid points here and their inclusion in US statement would weaken its
credibility.
4. There are several additional questions related to evacuation upon which I need guidance
as they are likely to arise in our discussions with Huong.
A. When and how do we propose to inform other friendly govts of our decision and what do
we think they are likely to do about their dependents? (We presume initial notification
would take place in Washington and we would chime in shortly thereafter. We have here no
real estimate of governmental reactions as we have avoided any discussion of subject and
/3/January 16.
General "Little" Minh as Armed Forces Minister seemed an excellent choice. General
Thieu, as second Deputy Vice Prime Minister, is able and relatively experienced but, as a
Catholic with Dai Viet political connections, is a sure target for Buddhist criticism. General
Vien, the Minister of Information, is intelligent and cooperative but without experience in
the information field. General Ky, the erratic Chief of the Air Force, had apparently
accepted the post of Minister of Youth, Sports and Civil Defense but was known to be
insisting upon retaining his military assignment concurrently. Prime Minister Huong had
taken a position in opposition to any "double hatting" but was willing to leave the final
decision on the matter to the military themselves. Events seemed to be moving smoothly
just up to the time for the presentation of the new Cabinet to Chief of State Suu at Gia Long
Palace on Tuesday afternoon./4/ Shortly before the hour fixed for the ceremony, General
Khanh, speaking for the Armed Forces Council, called everything off and threw the entire
matter into renegotiation.
/4/January 19.
We now know that the issue raised at this last minute was a complaint championed by
General Ky that, while the military were contributing some of their best officers to the
Cabinet, on the civilian side there had been no purging of undesirable ministers. I have just
learned that Prime Minister Huong has acceded to this complaint and will replace the
present Foreign Minister, Lam, and Minister of Health Dieu shortly after the Tet holiday,
that is to say, about February 5. The principal count against Lam appears to be a past
association with General "Big" Minh, a fact which suggests that General Khanh as well as
Ky had a hand in tossing this last minute monkey wrench. The presentation of the Cabinet
to the Chief of State has been rescheduled for 5:00 o'clock today, January 20, but we will
keep our fingers crossed until the tea and cakes have been served.
While we have felt that the introduction of some military officers into the Cabinet is
desirable in order to oblige them to share the responsibility, the foregoing events show how
fragile is any agreement reached with General Khanh and his generals. As a group, they are
basing their actions and decisions upon a "consensus of views" which thinly disguises a
caucus procedure. Working in such an atmosphere, the generals have been unable to
develop any basic unity of purpose and have displayed lack of responsibility in their actions
and little reliability in fulfilling their undertakings. Khanh is in the middle of this turmoil
pulling the strings and seeking to maneuver to his personal advantage. Thus far, he has got
away with it by virtue of his agility of wit and foot, but one senses that this cannot last
indefinitely. Needless to say, it is a sad way to conduct military business.
Tuesday, January 19 was a bad day not only because of the disappointment at Gia Long
Palace but because of the renewed indications of new Buddhist difficulties. Several of the
Buddhist Institute leaders told us yesterday/5/ that they are embarking on a hunger strike "to
the death" if necessary in a desperate effort to bring down the Huong government. There are
some indications that Khanh is equally a Buddhist target, but we have been misled on this
point before. Last Saturday, Alex Johnson and I met for two hours with three of the
Buddhist leaders trying to find some ground for accommodation./6/ All we got was another
repetitious airing of grievances which ring true only in the ears of the leaders of the
institute. They have no identifiable program other than getting Huong out of office in the
hope of replacing him with another civilian cabinet filled with officials of their own
choosing. They refuse to recognize that the overthrow of Huong is almost certain to bring
policy. Secretary McNamara would be going to the Hill later to spell out our defense
posture, part of which had already been made public in the Defense message sent to
Congress.
The President said he was available for personal meetings with individual legislative leaders
at any time.
Turning to substantive matters, the President said that since the last meeting with
Congressional leaders in October/2/ the Administration had studied the situation in Vietnam
intensively. He spoke of his conference with Ambassador Taylor in December./3/ Our worst
problem continues to be Vietnam which he wrestles with all the time, day and night. The
objective today is to put the problem out on the table for all those present. Secretary Rusk
and Secretary McNamara would go into the details later but the basic fact is that we need to
have in Saigon a stable government as a base for further actions.
/2/The President met with Congressional leaders on October 19, 1964, from 1:34 p.m. to
4:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of the meeting has been
found.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 432.
[Here follow comments about various European matters, the Congo situation, relations with
Egypt and Indonesia, and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson's recent visit to the United
States.]
Returning to the problem of Vietnam, the President said that he would ask Secretary
McNamara to spell out the details of the increased military activity we are carrying on in
Southeast Asia but first he wished to discuss the question of U.S. dependents in South
Vietnam. He expressed concern that the Viet Cong might attack U.S. citizens in Saigon in
the event we carry out air strikes in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese might react by
dropping bombs on Saigon. General Taylor and other U.S. military and civilian officials in
South Vietnam are opposed to bringing home our dependents, however, he had thought we
should do so for over 14 months.
The President said that because he does not have a "Lincoln Cabinet," (i.e., one which votes
for an action unanimously, only to have the President decide against the action) the decision
as to whether to withdraw dependents is still being explored. The President said he was
concerned that the communists might take some irrational action which would result in the
loss of many American women and children. If that happened, the American people would
hold him responsible for not having ordered the dependents returned home earlier.
The President said he believed our relations with other nations should be dealt with on a
non-political basis. President Kennedy was fortunate to have had in the Congress
Republicans who supported his foreign policy. President Truman had Senator Vandenberg.
The Administration has no mortgage on patriotism. The Republicans have ideas we want to
know about. Republicans should be in on foreign policy take-offs rather than merely at the
time of crash landings. The President said that the responsibility for foreign policy decisions
was his but he wanted the views of all. These views would be studied and given full
consideration. All of us want to do the right thing in respect to foreign policy and our
defense posture. Never in recent history has there been greater willingness to consider these
two subjects from the point of view of the national interest rather than party politics.
The President praised CIA Director McCone, adding that he was keeping the Director from
leaving government. He praised Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, noting that the
latter had lost over $4 million as a result of his having left industry to run the Department of
Defense.
The President said his objective is to try to unite the United States so that in the eyes of the
world it is a united country. In his relations with other nations, his objective is to seek to
avoid a nuclear holocaust while ensuring the defense of the nation. He appealed to those
present to give him their attention, the benefit of their wisdom and their judgment.
The President then asked Secretary Rusk to go into greater detail on major foreign policy
problems.
Secretary Rusk said our greatest problem in South Vietnam is political instability. Our overriding objective is to achieve political unity there. The President interrupted to point out that
the leaders of allied and friendly states are hesitant to send aid to South Vietnam because of
the political instability there. They fear that they might appear foolish if, after they send aid,
the country goes to pieces politically.
Secretary Rusk continued by saying that Hanoi believes that if it can hold on a little longer
it can win South Vietnam for communism because political instability is increasing. The
Secretary spelled out the details of the current compromise between the South Vietnamese
civilians and the military leaders which has resulted in the formation of a new cabinet. The
Secretary made clear that we are keeping the political lines open so that, if there is any
interest on the other side, a settlement based on either the 1954 or the 1962 agreement can
be negotiated. If the communists will not negotiate with us on a return to the earlier
agreements, we are in for a very difficult time in Southeast Asia.
Referring to Laos, Secretary Rusk said that that country provided a thermometer registering
what is politically possible in Southeast Asia. Current discussions among the three factions
in Laos may possibly lead to a 14-nation conference. If we could settle the difficulties in
Laos on the basis of the 1962 agreements, the effect in South Vietnam would be beneficial
to us.
[Here follows discussion of Indonesia, West New Guinea, the Congo, Burundi, the Sudan,
the Middle East, Germany, and the Alliance for Progress.]
The President then asked Secretary McNamara to discuss the military side of the
Vietnamese problem.
Secretary McNamara began by stating that our estimates of Viet Cong strength in South
Vietnam were up. In addition, we have evidence that the number of guerrillas being
infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam has increased substantially. From 1959 to
date, we estimate that between 19,000 and 34,000 North Vietnamese have crossed into
South Vietnam to take part in guerrilla activity below the 17th parallel. The current annual
rate of those infiltrating to South Vietnam may be in the neighborhood of 10,000.
At the same time that the Viet Cong strength is increasing, the military strength of South
Vietnam is also rising. This is because the number of South Vietnamese recruits has
increased even though the number of desertions remains high. Hopefully the South
Vietnamese forces will be increased by 87,000 men in 1965.
In reply to a question by Senator Saltonstall, Secretary McNamara said that those who
desert from the South Vietnamese army do not join the Viet Cong but simply go back home.
Senator Dirksen, addressing the President, said that a reliable correspondent, Mr. Keyes
Beech, Correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, had made certain statements about
Vietnam. The President interrupted to challenge Senator Dirksen's description of Mr. Beech
as a reliable correspondent. The President said Mr. Beech had reported last December that
General Taylor was returning to Washington threatening to resign unless the President
ordered attacks on North Vietnam. The President said General Taylor had flatly denied any
such intention and had telephoned the White House from Honolulu to explain that Beech's
report was entirely without foundation.
Secretary McNamara resumed his presentation by saying that in 1964, 17,000 Viet Cong
and 7,500 South Vietnamese were killed in the fighting. A total of 245 U.S. personnel had
been killed in South Vietnam since 1954.
Senator Saltonstall asked why there was such a disparity between Viet Cong forces and the
much larger South Vietnamese forces. Secretary McNamara replied that on the basis of
extensive experience we had concluded that a numerical advantage of 10 to 1 is required to
win a guerrilla war. We need currently more South Vietnamese troops but not more U.S.
forces.
The President said we have decided that more U.S. forces are not needed in South Vietnam
short of a decision to go to full-scale war. The ratio is now approximately 5 South
Vietnamese to 1 Viet Cong. The war must be fought by the South Vietnamese. We cannot
control everything that they do and we have to count on their fighting their war.
Senator Long asked why we do not push into North Vietnam in an attempt to overcome the
existing disparity between the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong forces.
The President intervened to say that he had called the leaders together today not to discuss
all the details of our programs but to inform them in general and to work out procedures
under which such meetings could take place every few weeks. He again cautioned against
leaking to the press information about today's discussion. He said if reporters learned of the
information being made available to the leaders all would be lost.
Senator Long replied that perhaps he should not be told all of the details. He did not want to
hear things that he should not know about but he did want some response to his question as
to why we did not move against North Vietnam in some way.
Secretary McNamara responded by summarizing our covert operations in North Vietnam.
During the past year we have been carrying out our program by building up the South
Vietnamese forces necessary. Some of these forces, having completed their training, are
now being used. All are non-U.S. personnel, but all have been trained by our forces.
Infiltration teams are being dropped in North Vietnam and attacks from the sea are being
launched against the coast of North Vietnam. Semi-covert operations consist of
reconnaissance missions in Laos carried out at Souvanna's request. We have facilitated the
carrying out of more than 450 reconnaissance missions over Laos in order to obtain needed
information. We have discovered there has been a substantial movement of Pathet Lao
forces into the Panhandle of Laos. We have so far lost 4 U.S. aircraft in these operations.
The recent bombing of the bridge at Ban Ken in Laos, which we have not officially
confirmed, was part of the U.S. armed reconnaissance program. This bombing was carried
out by U.S. planes because the bridge was heavily defended by anti-aircraft guns. The Laos
Air Force was not able to carry out this particular mission with their T-28 planes.
Senator Saltonstall asked whether the objective was to affect the situation in Laos or that in
Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said we wanted to affect both situations. The armed
reconnaissance affected the power situation in Laos but also affected the infiltration of Viet
Cong to South Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara then turned to the problem of withdrawing U.S. dependents from
South Vietnam. The U.S. political and military officers in Saigon do not want to send the
dependents home. They are concerned about the effect which a withdrawal would have in
Southeast Asia as well as the effect on personnel in South Vietnam. The number of U.S.
dependents of government personnel totals 1700 plus the dependents of non-U.S. personnel
and some other non-governmental U.S. personnel.
Senator Dirksen said he could not understand why we did not bring the dependents home.
We are pampering our forces in South Vietnam. Why do we have to send all our civilization
to war.
The President said that for 14 months he had agreed with those who want to bring our
dependents home, but the officers in Saigon are still opposed.
Congressman Ford said he wanted to reassure the President that he shares the Vandenberg
philosophy. His relations with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Director McCone
are excellent. This meeting had been extremely helpful and he hoped there would be more
such meetings. He believes the opposition party will cooperate with the Administration and
will not take positions which are harmful to the national interest. Personally, he agrees with
the course of action being followed in South Vietnam. We had to keep our commitment to
the South Vietnamese. Referring to the 25,000 to 30,000 persons who had been infiltrated
into South Vietnam since 1959, he asked how it would be possible to get a better ratio than
5 to 1 if this infiltration keeps increasing. Should military action be taken to cut down the
infiltration? He concluded by repeating his view that the meeting had been wholesome and
hoped that frequent and regular meetings of this kind would be held.
[Here follows discussion primarily on Germany, the U.S. defense posture, the Middle East,
and China.]
Senator Smathers asked why the U.S. Navy was not being used to halt infiltration by sea
from North to South Vietnam. Without associating himself with the information, he
summarized the views of some Navy officers to the effect that there are many ways we have
not used which could bring about an end of infiltration by sea. Secretary McNamara replied
by saying that sea infiltration had almost been completely stopped because of a program we
had initiated and were carrying out which makes possible the patrol of all sea area by South
Vietnamese forces. All junks moving south are now stopped and searched by South
Vietnamese ships. However, some of the land border is under water and although we have
made extensive efforts to deal with this problem no solution so far has turned out to be
feasible. The seacoasts have been taken care of but much infiltration is still taking place
across the water borders.
[Here follows discussion of the Department of Defense research and development program,
Soviet nuclear testing, the Kennedy Round tariff agreements, the question of nuclear
proliferation, and the state of Sino-Soviet relations.]
The President read parts of a draft press statement which he said he wished to issue at the
conclusion of the meeting. He asked whether there were any objections, and hearing none,
he authorized the issuance of the statement. A copy of the statement is attached to this
record./4/
/4/Not printed.
Bromley Smith
appear unnecessary. With regard to first of those two sentences we are also concerned lest
initial release might invite communists to press terrorist actions. We also feel that final
sentence Para 2A suggests too passive an approach on our part; for this reason would prefer
final phrase to read "desire of U.S. to maintain a posture of maximum readiness to take
whatever action may be required in support of those efforts."
(4) With respect to points raised Para 4 your message the following guidance is provided:
(a) We agree that notification other friendly governments should take place here first and it
would be in essentially same terms we have proposed to discuss question with Huong.
Although evacuation our dependents will bring in its train closing down of facilities and
termination arrangements which may raise difficulties for dependents of other governments,
each is obviously free to make its own decision on this matter. We recall that when we
evacuated our dependents from Laos in 1960, dependents of most other friendly
governments remained and never were withdrawn.
(b) With regard to dependents of private Americans and tourist travel we would envisage
issuance general notices objectively describing situation and leaving it for individuals to
make their own decisions, taking responsibility on themselves for risks if they visit as
tourists or if, as private Americans, they keep their dependents on hand. We would of
course still have residual responsibility to help them with emergency evacuation if there
were real and immediate threat to their safety.
(c) We agree that there is distinct possibility Pan Am may drop its commercial passenger
service to Saigon although we would expect that both here and through U.S. Mission
Saigon efforts will be made to keep them coming. For most part dangers which make
necessary withdrawal dependents do not seriously interfere with airline operations.
(d) We can also foresee possible added difficulties to securing additional free world
personnel, particularly non-military, for service outside Saigon. We have some reason to
hope that there will be cases where this will not be problem.
(e) Taking as much as one month to execute evacuation appears acceptable, even though a
longer period than we would have thought would be necessary, provided the very
announcement of evacuation does not increase risks to dependent population and there is no
evidence of stepping up terrorist activities. If need for reprisal should arise we would wish
to see simultaneous with reprisal a very much stepped up evacuation of remaining
dependents.
(5) With foregoing in hand assume you will now open discussions with Huong and Vien.
Rusk
the DRV failure to meet our conditions. The DRV will, of course, also perceive this and we
could expect some tough negotiations on this point. Our conditions should, of course, also
embrace Viet Minh withdrawal from Laos and freedom for the ICC to operate throughout
Laos and, in particular, in the corridor area.
8. The next question is what we and the GVN might offer in return for DRV compliance
with whatever conditions we establish. Implicit in our statements that we would observe the
Geneva Agreements if they were observed by the DRV is a willingness to return at least to
that level of military advisory strength in SVN which it was recognized we were entitled as
replacements of the French, i.e., about 600. This, we could, of course, well afford to do if
the VC armed insurgency and its support and direction from the DRV had, in fact, ceased.
Progressive reduction of US advisory effort would, of course, have to be related to VC foldup and GVN progress in long-term pacification program against remaining VC
infrastructure and VC war zone complexes, since DRV likely [to] issue instruction for VC
to go underground. It might also be possible to obtain GVN agreement to offer to enter into
trade talks looking toward the normalization of economic relations between the DRV and
GVN. Subject to faithful compliance by the DRV, we and the GVN could also give
assurances that we would not use or support the use of force against the DRV. An essential
part of any offer would also be an undertaking by the GVN (perhaps with ICC observation)
to permit VC desiring to do so to return to the DRV and to grant amnesty to those
peacefully laying down their arms desiring to remain in SVN.
9. If the foregoing commends itself as a general framework for an arrangement the question
arises as to whether it can be embraced within the concept of a "return to the 1954 Accords"
or whether it inherently requires a new international agreement.
10. The 1954 Accords with respect to Vietnam embrace two principal elements: First the
"agreement on cessation of hostilities" signed "for the CINC of the Vietnam Peoples Army"
and "for the CINC French Union forces in Indo-China" and secondly the "final declaration"
of the conference in which the GVN and USG did not join, but made separate statements.
11. Without attempting to go into details there is much in the first document of a transitory
nature and much (such as the provisions on introduction of war material) that have been
overtaken by events on both sides. However, both documents embrace the principle that
they were not to be "used for resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy".
The second document, i.e., the final declaration, contains the principle of respect by all the
parties for "the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity" of
"Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam," and "to refrain from interference in their internal affairs."
Only the first document embodies the definition of the "provisional military demarcation
line", i.e., the 17th parallel, the DMZ and the ICC.
12. Thus from a legal point of view the 1954 Geneva Accords leave much to be desired as a
definitive international framework for an independent and secure SVN with appropriate
international safeguards. However, all the basic elements are present in one form or another
and thus it is our conclusion that a new international agreement with respect to Vietnam is
not essential.
13. If this is the case, the question arises as to what needs to be negotiated prior to
terminating Phase II actions against the DRV and how we should seek its negotiation.
14. It is suggested that in general terms our demands on the DRV could be encompassed in
the following: strictly observe the spirit of the 1954 Geneva Accords with respect to SVN,
that is, "refrain from interference in the internal affairs of SVN", specifically, stop
infiltration into SVN and bring about a cessation of the VC armed insurgency in SVN,
thereafter ceasing all support for and communication with any dissident elements in SVN.
With respect to Laos strictly observe the 1962 Accords with respect to Laos, including the
withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces and personnel from Laos and recognize that the freedom
of movement granted the ICC in Laos under those accords is not subject to veto or
interference by any of the parties in Laos.
15. In turn the GVN could offer safe passage to VC (including their families) desiring to
proceed to the DRV and an amnesty to those peacefully laying down their arms. Subject to
faithful compliance by the DRV with the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph the
GVN could also give assurances that they would not use force or support the use of force by
any other party against the DRV and that it would return over a period of time to the 1954
ceilings with respect to the presence of foreign military personnel in South Vietnam.
Additionally, as noted above, consideration might be given to an offer by the GVN, subject
to the same conditions, to enter into trade talks with the DRV looking toward some type of
normalization of economic relations between the DRV and the GVN.
16. There are two aspects with respect to any negotiation within the foregoing framework.
First, their timely and accurate communication to the DRV (as well as to others)
emphasizing the limited nature of the demands and, secondly, if and when the DRV
indicates any interest in accepting them, the actual negotiation of any agreement or
understanding.
17. It will be noted that all of the conditions and offers with respect to Vietnam are framed
in terms solely of the GVN with the thought that, in spite of the problems it will present,
when it comes to an actual negotiation it will be preferable that the principle be that of a
GVN/DRV arrangement, thus seeking to avoid the problems of a formal USG/DRV
negotiation. With respect to the conditions pertaining to Laos it would not be entirely
inappropriate for the GVN to put forward, in agreement with the RLG, proposals such as
suggested herein inasmuch as the GVN was a participant in the 1962 conference and the
conditions relate directly to the use by the DRV of Laotian territory for infiltration into
SVN. Nevertheless, it will probably be necessary to seek to orchestrate simultaneous
RLG/PL/DRV negotiation.
18. The concept with respect to Vietnam would be that if and when direct negotiations were
undertaken between the GVN and the DRV they could take place at the military level in the
DMZ under the auspices of the ICC. Throughout, it will be very important to avoid the twin
dangers of, on the one hand, becoming involved in a cease-fire vis-a-vis the DRV
accompanied by strung-out negotiations, or, on the other hand, making conditions so
stringent as to be unreasonable from an international point of view. We should also avoid
any acceptance of the National Liberation Front as a party to the negotiations.
19. It is well recognized that the foregoing concept presents many possible difficulties.
Above all its success would depend on a degree of political and negotiating sophistication
and capabilities which no one in the GVN, and especially the military, have thus far
demonstrated. It also assumes an intimacy of relations and cooperation between ourselves
and the GVN that we have thus far been unable to achieve. It is suggested that this might in
part be overcome without entirely sacrificing the principle if the US were also directly to
participate in the negotiation at the military level on the basis of the direct participation of
US forces in the actions against the DRV.
20. It is also realized that the situation could so develop as to make such negotiating tactic
entirely impractical. However, it is suggested that whatever the negotiating tactic the
essence of our demands and offer would remain the same.
21. In any event, whatever the substance of our position and the negotiating tactics, we
should at an early stage of our discussions with the GVN on Stage II, undertake also to
discuss and arrive at agreement on our terms. At best, this will be a long job of education.
22. We would appreciate the comments and views of Vientiane and Bangkok, as well as
those of the Department.
Note: In view Ambassador Martin's presence in US, this message not now being transmitted
to Bangkok. Would appreciate Department making copy available in Washington to
Ambassador Martin for his comments there. Or if he desires we will transmit to Bangkok
for Charge.
Taylor
of reprisals for "unusual hostile acts". It now seems timely to develop such procedures.
I mentioned the strong feeling on our side of the need for rapid reaction if and when a
decision were taken to execute a reprisal, indicating that a 24-hour reaction capability
should be taken as the norm. To reach such a reaction capability, several preliminary actions
should be taken. First, we could select possible reprisal targets in south DRV and work out
detailed strike plans for them. In making such plans, we should be guided by certain
principles, such as the desirability of joint VNAF/USAF participation regardless of whether
the victims of an "unusual hostile act" were Vietnamese, US nationals or both. Another
basic consideration would be that US participation would be at the request of the
Vietnamese Government and that the first bombs would preferably be dropped by VNAF
pilots.
Once these strike plans were jointly developed, they should then be approved by the
appropriate officials of the GVN and USG for possible use in case a decision were taken by
both governments to execute a reprisal. To implement such a decision, it would be
important for agreed procedures to exist as to the channel of transmittal of such approval. I
would undertake to expedite communications on the US side.
Finally, it would be useful to consider as a preparatory measure the need for explanatory
statements to be issued by both governments in the time of execution of a reprisal strike.
Having laid out the problem in the foregoing terms, I asked Huong for his reaction. If he
were in general agreement, would he authorize the opening of discussions with his military
leaders? In this connection, we were uncertain as to where the military contact should be
made. Was it with new second Deputy Prime Minister Gen Thieu, Defense Minister Gen
Minh or with C-in-C Gen Khanh?
The Prime Minister showed quiet satisfaction that we were now willing to undertake such
discussions. He said that he had been very much surprised that no retaliation had taken
place following the Bien Hoa and Brink incidents. He said that he was inclined to discuss
the matter at once with Vien, Thieu, Minh, and Khanh. We discussed at some length the
best way of broaching this matter with the military and ended by deciding that Johnson and
I should call on Vien today and go over the same ground with him as we had with Huong/4/
and that, following the Monday/5/ meeting of the US mission and the Internal Security
Council, Johnson, Westmoreland and I would meet on this subject in closed session with
Huong, Vien and the three generals mentioned above. I believe this is a satisfactory
arrangement and gets around the possible consequences of inaccurate reporting by Huong of
our proposal to his colleagues. It is not that I would expect deliberate distortion, but we are
dealing in matters in which Huong has no experience and hence is liable to error.
/4/TaylorTaylor and Johnson's conversation with Vien later that day is described in
telegram 2260 from Saigon, January 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
/5/January 25.
discussed with Vien the possible evacuation of American dependents. Their conversation
was reported in telegram 2261 from Saigon, January 23. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor
Operation Triangle. Cooperation between neutralists and right wing developed favorably, if
in fits and starts, and neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma appears to be taking increasingly
tough anti-Communist line.
DRV domestic political scene remained relatively stable during 1964, with no change
apparent in top-level leadership or in major policies. Possibly significant development was
decline in public manifestations of internal struggle resulting from Sino-Soviet split.
Editorials denouncing modern revisionists and listing their shortcomings fell off during
spring and dropped further after Khrushchev ouster. Political personalities who had been
principal spokesmen of emerging pro-Chinese line during 1963 (e.g., Nguyen Chi Thanh,
Le Duan) receded into background, to be replaced gradually on center of stage by
traditional national personalities such as Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ho Chi
Minh himself.
Despite its successes during 1964, year was not all favorable to DRV, and Hanoi still faces
host of problems in coming year. GVN military establishment performed better than might
reasonably have been expected in view of political unrest, and was able to deal Viet Cong
number of damaging blows. Moreover, increasing number of countries committed
themselves behind GVN struggle. In 1965 Viet Cong victory by military means is still not
in sight, unless political fabric in South tears completely or unless GVN Army is split and
rendered ineffectual by internecine political struggle. Outlook is still for protracted struggle
of indeterminate duration, with war becoming more expensive for North (increased pace of
infiltration and accelerated supply of new and larger weapons). While there has so far been
nothing to suggest that this has placed any significant strain on North Vietnam's economy, it
might ultimately do so. DRV has also been forced into greater public involvement with Viet
Cong by dispatch of Northern-born draftees to Viet Cong forces.
We estimate that Hanoi is more concerned about what might be termed "international
political escalation" of conflict. Basic DRV goal, which appears increasingly difficult to
realize, is to win wars in Laos and South Vietnam and to repay full and exclusive benefits of
victory without bringing on excessive international attention or involvement. Large scale
US presence and commitment represents clear and serious potential danger, of which
Tonkin Gulf incidents served as powerful and painful testimony. Soviets and particularly
Chinese, while offering welcome expressions of support, may well demand increasing voice
as their own commitment and/or assistance grows. Indeed, if major powers become heavily
committed, danger arises that they may ultimately reach accord among themselves which
will not sufficiently take DRV interests into account. Ho Chi Minh's international political
position is stronger than it had been in 1954, when he was forced to accept less than ideal
settlement. He is therefore relatively well insulated against danger that this might happen
again, but possibility cannot be excluded if major powers continue to increase pressure.
Entire operation will become increasingly difficult and delicate for DRV, and will require
extremely adroit and sophisticated political maneuvering.
Hanoi's ability to continue to walk ideological fence during coming year as successfully as
during last months of 1964 will depend largely on events beyond its control. If Soviets and
Chinese can arrive at arrangement which will permit worldwide Communist attendance at
March 1 gathering and at subsequent conference, or if other means are found to reduce
polemics, Hanoi's situation will be eased considerably. If, however, gap widens further and
altercations become increasingly bitter, DRV may find it impossible to pursue relatively
neutral course. In latter case, despite grave Vietnamese reservations about Chinese, it
appears likely that Hanoi will choose to or be compelled to support CPR. DRV will
37. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 26, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI,
Memos. No classification marking.
I attach a summary of the Vietnamese situation which I think is better than the spate of
confusing cables from all and sundry that we have had in the last two or three days. At the
end of this memorandum (by my staff man Cooper) two choices are offered. One is to let
the political mess play itself out in its own way, and the other is to try to keep it pinned
together in roughly its present form at least until March. The latter is Cooper's choice, and it
is clearly Max Taylor's as well. It has the advantage that in March under cover of a new
National Assembly meeting there could be a reconstruction of the government without
Huong.
It is certainly true that if Huong goes now, the Buddhists will be more irresponsible than
ever. On the other hand, it is equally clear that Huong himself does not have the authority to
govern without very heavy and visible U.S. support.
The one additional thought I have is that we might make one more effort to talk sense to the
Buddhists through some American that they trust. Their particular hero is Cabot Lodge, but
the dangers of sending him are obvious. The only way it could be done is on the basis of a
direct invitation from Max Taylor, and I have asked my brother Bill to consider whether the
idea is sufficiently promising for us to ask Max if he would like to do it. I feel sure myself
that in this context Lodge would be a team player and I would be glad to know your own
feelings about this.
McG. B.
/7/The word "(neutralist)" is written in the margin of the source text at this point.
Meanwhile, security forces have surrounded the Buddhist Institute in Saigon and banned all
unauthorized entry. In Hue, local authorities have declared martial law, and have reportedly
marked some areas where there are U.S. installations as off-limits to marchers. Press reports
stated that one crowd of marchers had approached the U.S. Consulate, but all U.S.
dependents have been relocated within the MACV compound. Most of the demonstrators
have been orderly, but the theme of exhortations to them is anti-government and antiAmbassador Taylor. The homes of the Vietnamese information director and of the local
national police director were burned by students. A general strike in both Da Nang and
Quang Tri, a sit-down strike in Nha Trang, and demonstrations in Hoi An, capital of Quang
Nam Province are also underway.
More than 200 arrests have been made, including a number of monks. The government
claims that some monks arrested have not been bona fide. Meanwhile, the Buddhists over
the weekend called for further sacrifices, similar to that of the first monk last year to
commit self-immolation. There are press reports indicating that some of the five monks on a
hunger-strike may be in poor condition, but they are unidentified. However, government
officials had a rumor that Tri Quang hoped to make Tam Chau, already frail, a martyr by
allowing his death. A bonze-ess has burned herself to death in Nha Trang, and a Catholic
was set on fire by a Buddhist in Saigon.
A State Department outgoing cable over the weekend/8/ suggested that the Buddhist
problem might be defused, and a Khanh-Buddhist cabal, if any, curbed if Huong undertook
a course of action which would maintain a firm posture against disorders, but
simultaneously issue a policy statement guaranteeing freedom of religion and offering to
meet Buddhist leaders and resolve any legitimate grievances. It was felt that this might
undercut any developing Buddhist support. Huong, however, continues to indicate a
preference for firm measures, isolating the Buddhist leaders by trying to separate sects from
the United Buddhist Organization, and publicly attacking the Buddhists as tools of the
Communists. No reply has as yet been received from Saigon.
/8/Telegram 1521 to Saigon, January 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET
S)
Military Situation
The VC has ordered a cease-fire for the period of the New Year (31 January through 6
February); unarmed "rebel" (ARVN) forces will be permitted to go through VC lines to visit
their families. However, there are reports that military activities in the Saigon area are to be
stepped up in the days immediately preceding the New Year. The detonations in the MACV
compound yesterday (no casualties) may have been in response to this order. In general,
however, VC activity during the past week was at a relatively low level.
The ARVN has been active during the past week or so. There was a very successful
operation in the Delta which netted 51 VC killed and 26 PWs. Two other operations, both
south of Saigon, were described by MACV as "highly successful"./9/
/9/Not further identified.
Evacuation
Johnson approached Huong and Deputy Prime Minister Vien on the evacuation issue./10/
They expressed concern over the effects on SVN morale, but agreed to think the matter
over, especially in the light of possible compensating military reinforcements. Bill Bundy's
sounding of the Australians here was inconclusive; the Ambassador felt the effect would
depend on future U.S. policy and operational moves./11/
/10/See Document 34 and footnote 4 thereto.
/11/William Bundy described the Australian Government's response to evacuation of U.S.
dependents in a January 25 memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, McCone, and McGeorge
Bundy as "lukewarm, but not really striking weight one way or the other." (Department of
State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Jan.-Mar. 1965)
In line with our conversation on Sunday,/12/ I am urging State to query nearby Far East
posts on available school facilities. I am also looking into the question of AID establishing a
special boarding school nearby (perhaps moving the school now in Saigon). We have not
yet received a breakdown of dependents, but preliminary data indicate that about 60% are
children.
/12/January 24.
Outgoing to Saigon today gives DOD OK to Hawk battalion for Saigon, and puts
evacuation in context of "if and when"./13/
/13/See Document 35.
Infiltration
The edited, updated infiltration study was given to relevant Congressional Committees
yesterday;/14/ Saigon gave a backgrounder today (preliminary reports indicate no static;
questions mostly technical);/15/ Bill Bundy and I are backgrounding late this afternoon./16/
/14/See footnote 7, Document 9.
/15/No report on the January 26 Saigon background press briefing has been found.
/16/The Washington background briefing by Cooper and William Bundy was summarized
in telegram 1540 to Saigon, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
Outlook
We have two broad options:
A. Let the situation continue to slip and slide, use our presently limited assets to influence,
guide and protest, and hope that the forces involved will reach some modus vivendi.
B. Take a more active role in a last effort to get a fix that will last at least until the National
Assembly meets in March (at which time Huong can be replaced with some measure of
legality).
I favor the latter in full recognition that it is easier said than done and that it may mean
difficulties with Taylor, State and sundry others. I will have some specific, if far-out, ideas
by noon tomorrow.
C
b) Is there a possibility of backstopping such an effort by aligning some Cao Dai, Hoa Hao,
Dai Viet and non-Institute Buddhist elements behind Huong?
c) Can Ambassador Tran Thien Khiem play a useful role in developing the sort of military
combination described in (a) above?
4. If the answers to at least (a) and (b) are yes, we would be inclined let it be known
discreetly but immediately to the appropriate military officers individually that Khanh and
the Institute are skating on thin ice in their undercutting of the lawful government and we
should not be sorry to see them fall through.
Rusk
39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 26, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI.
Secret.
The attached intelligence memorandum represents a CIA assessment that a coup by Khanh
is quite likely tonight. The State Department agrees that the chances are substantial, but
rates them a little lower.
McNamara, Rusk and I all agree that we can't second guess Alexis Johnson from here. He is
the man on the spot, Max Taylor being in Bangkok on a long-delayed visit.
I discussed with a number of people whether we should try to move Max back in a hurry.
The consensus is against it. He has less personal influence with these people than Alexis
and is perhaps slightly less skillful in palaver. But what is more important--if there is a
coup, we do not want an emotionally explosive reaction from the Ambassador in the first
twenty-four hours. We will want time to turn around, and it may even turn out that a change
of government could provide the framework for a repair of our relations with these people.
Finally, no matter what happens in this particular rumor, there is strong feeling which I
share that this back-and-forth in the government in Saigon is a symptom, not a root cause of
our problem.
It is this basic issue of our own purpose and policy that I hope we can discuss in our 11:30
meeting with you tomorrow, and I will have a paper on that in the morning./2/
/2/See Document 42.
Attachment/3/
Intelligence Memorandum
0751/65
Washington, January 26, 1965.
/3/Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by the Directorate of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(as of 1400 EST)
1. There are strong indications that General Khanh is preparing imminent action to remove
Premier Huong, possibly tonight. Although Khanh has given no timing, General Thi, the
commander of I Corps in the north, has told the press that there may be a change of
government on 27 January Saigon time (tonight EST). On 25 January, Tri Quang stated
that, in two more days, a "new element" would be involved in the Buddhist-Huong dispute.
On the same day General Ky stated that he was charged with interviewing civilian
candidates for a new government, with a three-day deadline. The US Embassy will not
necessarily get advance notice, despite Khanh's promise.
2. Khanh saw Deputy Ambassador Johnson again on 26 January, and repeated the views he
had expressed over the weekend, viz.: the problem with the Buddhists was grave; the
Buddhists cannot retreat and Huong's handling of them is inflexible; and a blow-up in the
near future is inevitable. Khanh still insists that Huong and Chief of State Suu have
"offered" to turn over power to the military, and says he desires a US "go-ahead." There are
signs that the military may try to move behind a figleaf of legality by convening a
reconstituted High National Council, which would call for Huong's resignation.
3. Khanh maintains that he fears prolongation of the present situation will lead to Huong's
downfall and a proneutralist successor. He says he has a written agreement from the
Buddhists to a military takeover, a moratorium on Buddhist politics, and the departure from
the country of some Buddhist militants. Although there is evidence that the Buddhist
leadership is trying to induce a military coup and may be willing to use Khanh, the Embassy
has observed to Khanh that Buddhist leaders cannot be relied on to honor any such
agreement or to refrain from similarly obstructing or attacking any successor government.
This appears to be a valid assessment.
4. Premier Huong maintains that he never offered to resign, he will not leave office unless
forced out. He argues that the Buddhist leaders lack a solid following and can be isolated,
provided the military support a strong course, at least until elections can be held. However,
although the Buddhist anti-Huong campaign has until now lacked widespread public
backing, the campaign is gathering steam. The Buddhist hierarchy has considerable
influence among student groups, and the self-immolation by a Buddhist girl on 26 January
in Nha Trang may further rouse passions in their favor. This is particularly true in I Corps,
where the government's emissary General Thieu has described the situation as grave and
where General Thi and his deputies show little inclination to curb Buddhist-student
demonstrations.
5. Although Khanh's views of the present danger appear to be widely shared by the military,
reporting indicates considerable disagreement among the generals over courses of action.
There are reports of military opposition to Khanh, both by elements favoring cooperation
with the Buddhists and those urging curbs on the Buddhists. Some early move against
Khanh cannot be ruled out.
40. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 27, 1965.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia, Vietnam, 1965 General,
1/65-2/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limit Distribution.
SUBJECT
The Situation in South Vietnam: the Quiet Coup/2/
/2/The implications of the coup were also analyzed in Assistant Secretary of Defense
McNaughton's draft memorandum of January 27, which he showed to and discussed with
Secretary of Defense McNamara at 7:45 a.m. on January 27. The memorandum is printed,
along with McNamara's comments on certain points McNaughton raised, in Pentagon
Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 686-687.
During the morning of January 27, Vietnamese Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief
General Khanh, with the support of at least some of the other generals, initiated a series of
actions to take control of the government of Chief of State Suu and Prime Minister Huong.
Strong indications of Khanh's intentions were evident in reports from the US Mission in
Saigon at least during the preceding 48 hours./3/
/3/See also CIA Intelligence Memorandum, The Situation in South Vietnam (as of 2:00 pm
EST), January 26, 1965, No. 0751; and informal INR Note to Mr. Hughes (as of 1:30 p.m.
EST), January 26, 1965. [Footnote in the source text. The CIA intelligence memorandum is
in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI; the INR
note has not been found.]
1. At about 10:00 a.m. on January 27 (Saigon time), the Vietnamese Armed Forces Council
issued a communiqu stating that in view of the inability of Chief of State Suu and Prime
Minister Huong to cope with the current political crisis, the Council withdrew its
confidence in the government and entrusted General Khanh with the task of solving the
crisis. Khanh would immediately establish a 20-man council representing the armed forces,
major religious groups, and regional interests and responsible for "advising the government
in making important decisions." An announcement by Khanh shortly thereafter reiterated
the actions and stated intentions of the Armed Forces Council. This was followed by a
statement by General Dong, Commander of the Capital Military District, that (a) the
proposed military-civilian council was the equivalent of the High National Council
dissolved last December, (b) the new council would choose a Chief of State who in turn
would appoint a Prime Minister, and (c) the Buddhist hierarchy had agreed not to interfere
in politics and to send its leading three monks, including Thich Tam Chau and Thich Tri
Quang, out of the country.
2. Khanh had indicated to the US Embassy and to MACV the previous day that he planned
a "solution" along these lines. US protestations apparently did not dissuade him, but he
agreed to inform Ambassador Johnson prior to proceeding any further. However, Khanh in
effect presented the US with a fait accompli by informing General Westmoreland (through
an intermediary) and requesting merely to talk with Ambassador Johnson at the Vietnamese
General Staff headquarters virtually at the very moment Khanh was proceeding to execute
his plan. Khanh then proceeded to outline his "solution" in greater detail to Ambassador
Johnson, noting that (a) his proposed military-civilian council would probably reappoint
Suu as Chief of State, (b) the Chief of State's selection of a new Prime Minister would have
to be approved by this council, (c) there would be minimum changes in the government and
military officers currently in the cabinet would remain, (d) Deputy Prime Minister Vien
would serve as acting Prime Minister in the interim, and (e) the Armed Forces Council
would be the supreme governmental body until these measures had been completed
whereupon it would then revert to its function as the "executive body within the military."
Khanh also stated that the Buddhist leaders had agreed to refrain from politics and that Tam
Chau and Tri Quang would leave the country.
3. In subsequent talks with Suu and Huong, Ambassador Johnson confirmed that both Suu
and Huong were not disposed to oppose Khanh's moves and that Suu had agreed to remain
in a caretaker status at least until a new Chief of State was selected. Beyond this, Suu
wished to wait and see "what kind of a government" would emerge before accepting
reelection as Chief of State. Both Huong and Suu, as well as Deputy Premier Vien who
confirmed that he agreed to serve as acting Premier, advised the US also to "wait and see"
what develops, expressing concern nonetheless with the apparent alliance between Khanh
and the Buddhists and with the political orientation of future developments.
4. Khanh's assumption of power was achieved without any fighting or public disorder. The
coup was completely bloodless and, with the exception of some security forces apparently
in the vicinity of Suu's and Huong's residences, no troops were deployed in Saigon. Neither
has there been as yet any criticism or opposition by general public in or outside Saigon. In
short, the general public attitude is one of indifference.
5. It is not entirely clear just how much support Khanh has mustered within the military
leadership for his move. Previous reports had indicated a three-way split among the
generals, the largest group reportedly not in favor of a military takeover. Some generals and
even middle-echelon officers were apparently considering a pre-emptive coup against
Khanh. It remains an open question whether the anti-Khanh elements will now move
against him or adopt a wait-and-see position, pending further moves by Khanh, together
with public and US reaction.
6. Khanh has almost certainly acted in conjunction with the Buddhist leadership. Buddhist
religious and political leaders, Khanh, and some of the other generals, particularly Thi
(Corps I Commander) and Ky (Airforce Chief), reportedly agreed on a "solution" similar to
the one now in progress. However, this coalition is at best a marriage of convenience which
cannot be expected to last given basic Buddhist suspicions of Khanh, not to mention the
personal ambitions of Both Khanh and Tri Quang. Despite Khanh's apparent belief that he
can control the Buddhists, he has voiced some concern as to their ultimate political
direction, and there are already indications that the Buddhist leadership does not intend to
hold to the alleged agreement particularly regarding the claimed willingness of Tam Chau
and Tri Quang to leave the country.
7. Khanh's overriding ambition, coupled with his repeated maneuvers against known US
positions, have in the span of one year precipitated five major crises in Saigon. In the
process, he has seriously reduced if not almost eliminated any public respect for US
political advice or for those who accept it. Moreover, his actions, coupled with those of the
Buddhists, have fostered a rising crescendo of anti-American feelings.
These developments pose the serious question whether Khanh has considered an alternative
course, i.e., a negotiated "neutralist" solution for South Vietnam. Should his short-sighted
actions prompt him to explore this possibility, Khanh may ultimately overreach his power
and be overthrown by his more dedicated colleagues.
elections in late March for a national assembly. It remains to be seen whether we ever reach
that destination or whether we are on a treadmill.
Until we see more clearly the form of the new government to emerge, I am of the opinion
that we not commit ourselves publicly with regard to the action of the Armed Forces
Council. I have recommended elsewhere/2/ that we should restrict ourselves for the time
being to a simple statement that it is premature for us to comment on these events until we
see more clearly their implication.
/2/In telegram 2316 from Saigon, January 27. (Ibid., POL 1 US-VIET S)
I know that the question of the evacuation of our dependents is constantly on your mind as
it is on mine. We have been very much concerned during the last three days for the safety of
our dependents--indeed of all Americans--in Hue area. While that danger appears to have
subsided, these events in the North have been a reminder of the ease with which antiAmerican emotions can be whipped up. At the meeting of the U.S. Mission Council today, I
found for the first time all members in agreement as to the need to evacuate dependents
although none of us yet has a really satisfactory formula to overcome the very dangerous
psychological problems in initiating this action. I believe that this latest change of
government offers us a possibility to link evacuation of dependents with our acceptance of a
new regime. I will forward recommendations on this score as soon as the governmental
situation clarifies.
Taylor
42. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. VIII. Secret.
Washington, January 27, 1965.
Re
Basic Policy in Vietnam
1. Bob McNamara and I have asked for the meeting with you at 11:30/2/ in order to have a
very private discussion of the basic situation in Vietnam. In a way it is unfortunate that we
are meeting the morning after a minor coup, because that is not the present point. All of us
agree with Alexis Johnson that nothing should be done on that until we have particular
recommendations from Saigon (though at that point we may well want to urge Taylor and
Johnson to make the best of the matter and not try to undo it).
/2/On another copy of this memorandum a handwritten marginal notation by McNamara
reads: "1/27/65 Mac & I presented these views orally to the Pres., who had already read this
report, in a mtg with Dean Rusk Wed. mtg [January 27] B Mac." (Washington National
Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam Statements and
Supporting Papers)
2. What we want to say to you is that both of us are now pretty well convinced that our
current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat. What we are doing now, essentially, is to
wait and hope for a stable government. Our December directives make it very plain that
wider action against the Communists will not take place unless we can get such a
government. In the last six weeks that effort has been unsuccessful, and Bob and I are
persuaded that there is no real hope of success in this area unless and until our own policy
and priorities change.
3. The underlying difficulties in Saigon arise from the spreading conviction there that the
future is without hope for anti-Communists. More and more the good men are covering
their flanks and avoiding executive responsibility for firm anti-Communist policy. Our best
friends have been somewhat discouraged by our own inactivity in the face of major attacks
on our own installations. The Vietnamese know just as well as we do that the Viet Cong are
gaining in the countryside. Meanwhile, they see the enormous power of the United States
withheld, and they get little sense of firm and active U.S. policy. They feel that we are
unwilling to take serious risks. In one sense, all of this is outrageous, in the light of all that
we have done and all that we are ready to do if they will only pull up their socks. But it is a
fact--or at least so McNamara and I now think.
4. The uncertainty and lack of direction which pervade the Vietnamese authorities are also
increasingly visible among our own people, even the most loyal and determined. Overtones
of this sentiment appear in our cables from Saigon, and one can feel them also among our
most loyal staff officers here in Washington. The basic directive says that we will not go
further until there is a stable government, and no one has much hope that there is going to
be a stable government while we sit still. The result is that we are pinned into a policy of
first aid to squabbling politicos and passive reaction to events we do not try to control. Or
so it seems.
5. Bob and I believe that the worst course of action is to continue in this essentially passive
role which can only lead to eventual defeat and an invitation to get out in humiliating
circumstances.
6. We see two alternatives. The first is to use our military power in the Far East and to force
a change of Communist policy. The second is to deploy all our resources along a track of
negotiation, aimed at salvaging what little can be preserved with no major addition to our
present military risks. Bob and I tend to favor the first course, but we believe that both
should be carefully studied and that alternative programs should be argued out before you.
7. Both of us understand the very grave questions presented by any decision of this sort. We
both recognize that the ultimate responsibility is not ours. Both of us have fully supported
your willingness, in earlier months, to move out of the middle course. We both agree that
every effort should still be made to improve our operations on the ground and to prop up the
authorities in South Vietnam as best we can. But we are both convinced that none of this is
enough, and that the time has come for harder choices.
8. You should know that Dean Rusk does not agree with us. He does not quarrel with our
assertion that things are going very badly and that the situation is unraveling. He does not
assert that this deterioration can be stopped. What he does say is that the consequences of
both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that we simply must find a way of making our
present policy work. This would be good if it was possible. Bob and I do not think it is.
9. A topic of this magnitude can only be opened for initial discussion this morning, but
McNamara and I have reached the point where our obligations to you simply do not permit
us to administer our present directives in silence and let you think we see real hope in them.
McG. B.
prestige, already inflated by their victory over Huong and the USG. These political bonzes
have been and still are attacking the U.S. Ambassador because the USG ventured to
continue to support a government which they had decided to pull down and, to show further
their displeasure, have conducted anti-American demonstrations and destroyed U.S.
property. While all this has been taking place, Buddhist spokesmen have been making
veiled statements which have earned them a country-wide reputation as probable neutralists.
The picture of an American of Lodge's stature coming around the world to confer with them
in their triumph somehow goes against my grain and may raise suspicions in a highly
suspicious country that the U.S. is trafficking with neutralists. Even these unpleasant
consequences would be tolerable if frank discussions offered any hope of changing the
course which Tri Quang and company are following. Would it be reasonable to propose that
we await the outcome of Bundy's visit before deciding about Lodge?
Taylor
4. Upon questioning the motives of the Buddhists, Khanh said he had made a secret
agreement with the Bonzes which he expected them to fulfill. This involved removing the
Buddhist chaplains from the Armed Forces (this is part of a general policy to remove all
chaplains which he stated was also acceptable to the Catholics); the Buddhist Institute
would get out of politics; Tri Quang and Ho Giac would leave the country; and [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] would exile himself in a pagoda to pursue his religious
studies. If the Bonzes continued to create trouble, he would be forced to take strong
measures against them, if necessary "kill" them.
5. Khanh personally plans to appoint the members of the Armed Forces and People's
Council (some may be "good" members of the former High National Council) which
organization will select the Chief of State who will in turn appoint a Prime Minister and
subsequently form a Cabinet acceptable to the Armed Forces Council. He expects both the
Chief of State and the Prime Minister to be civilians and would prefer such an arrangement,
although I received the impression that Khanh could easily change his views in this regard.
The new government would be staunchly backed by the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces
would retain the ministerial posts recently acquired plus that of the Minister of Interior.
6. Khanh does not expect any particular trouble from the Catholics since he had talked to
Catholic leader, Bishop Binh, who had agreed to lend his support to his efforts to stabilize
the situation. He was prepared to deal forcibly with the students if they create trouble.
7. Khanh has not made his plans public but intends to do so. His first step in this regard was
at his press conference yesterday where he attempted to pave the way for further public
explanation of his approach at later conferences.
8. If his efforts to form a new government are unsuccessful and destructive elements
attempt to destroy his country, Khanh says he will have no choice but to take over as a
military dictator.
9. I expressed my concern about the anti-Ambassador Taylor theme in recent
demonstrations in Hue/2/ and Da Nang, pointed out that Ambassador Taylor was perhaps
the best friend Vietnam ever had but more fundamentally an attack on the Ambassador was
an attack on the United States Government since he was the official representative of the
United States. Khanh said he well understood and stated that one reason that he was going
to Da Nang was to explain this matter plus the fact that Ambassador Taylor supported the
government of Vietnam and therefore its head. In the past, the U.S. Ambassador had
supported Mr. Diem, General Minh, himself, and now Mr. Huong. The fact that the people
in Hue and Da Nang did not like Mr. Huong was no basis for disliking Ambassador Taylor.
"The people are simple minded and follow the old adage, 'The friend of my enemy is also
my enemy'."
/2/Signs denouncing Taylor as a lackey of Prime Minister Huong appeared throughout Hue
on January 23, the same day that a mob attacked the USIS Library in Hue. (Westmoreland,
A Soldier Reports, p. 95)
10. As we returned to Saigon, General Khanh stated that he had spoken with approximately
forty leaders from the northern provinces representing all political and religious factions and
students. He had spoken for over an hour and then answered questions for another hour. He
had urged them not to show animosity against Ambassador Taylor because of his support of
Mr. Huong in his capacity as the head of government. He emphasized that the United States
supports the government of Vietnam and not individuals. He thought his remarks were
understood, well received, and accepted. He assured me that all "anti-Taylor signs" would
be down or painted over in both Hue and Da Nang by morning.
W.C. Westmoreland/3/
General, United States Army
Commanding
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
he takes this position, we think you should certainly respond that US is equally determined
to go on supporting Vietnamese government and people. You could then make use of plan
for DeSoto patrol next week as indication our position. Object of meeting should be to
establish firmness of both sides and create atmosphere that would begin to bury past
problems and get us into position to talk hard with him on all subjects including evacuation
when I come or earlier if you think wise. So far we have been holding off on public
statement our continued support, but we think we should make this just as soon as Khanh
has made right noise to you. If trend of talk is in this direction, you are authorized join with
Khanh in joint statement at time of call if you desire./3/
/3/In telegram 2347 from Saigon, January 29, Taylor reported on a meeting he had with
Khanh that morning before receiving McGeorge Bundy's cable. Taylor stated: "I would not
favor making any commitment now to this present interim government or to Khanh and
would hold out any action such as the DeSoto patrol for use in connection with our plan for
dependent evacuation." Taylor also suggested that Bundy delay his arrival until February 4
and offered reasons for reducing the number of people in the mission. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
6. My own current thought is that my party would include men like McNaughton, Gaud,
Cooper, Colby, and Unger or Corcoran from Department. Central purpose of meeting would
still be for me to have a conference with you and others as you think wise, but unless you
object we would like to use the trip also for exchanges with country team members too.
Statement on purpose of trip would be framed as you suggest.
7. Bob McNamara is lending us a plane. Let us know what we can bring you./4/
/4/In telegram 1563 to Saigon, January 29, McGeorge Bundy told Taylor that his telegram
2347 "makes sense to us, but we do persist in view that next week is best time for these
talks and suggest we agree definitely on arrival early February 4." Bundy also offered
further comments on the details of the trip. (Ibid.)
Ball
Bohlen
consultative organ of the AFC, he expects the members to recommend to him the procedure
contained in Ref A. Thus, the new government will come about at the recommendation of
this body broadly representative of the principal national groupings.
Once this recommendation is made to the AFC, it will be quickly accepted and the
procedure will be carried out whereby the Civilian-Military Council will pick a Chief of
State who in turn will pick a Prime Minister who will then present a new government to the
Civilian-Military Council for approval. In short, the Civilian-Military Council will act as a
reconstituted High National Council.
Khanh believes that all this can be done by the end of next week even though the Tet
holidays intervene.
Johnson alluded to the obvious difficulty of getting good men to come into a government
which the public understands will last only until elections. Khanh thinks this difficulty can
be overcome, pointing out that the Civilian-Military Council may recommend a
postponement of elections. In this case, the new government might continue indefinitely,
even if elections are held, since the provisions of the old charter still govern which require a
two-thirds majority in the National Assembly in order to remove the existing government.
I asked about the Buddhist attitude toward this program--were they satisfied? Khanh seems
to be sure that they will be, although it is far from clear to us why the Institute would be
satisfied with only two representatives in the total of 20 of the Civilian-Military Council. I
asked further about the status of the "treaty" between the armed forces and the institute
(Reference C). Khanh says that the treaty is still valid although certainly the government
which it is discussing looks nothing like the all-military dictatorship referred to in the
"treaty". Khanh says that this was the extreme case and since the Buddhists had indicated a
willingness to support such a military dictatorship, they certainly would be satisfied with a
government considerably less drastic in form. He repeated that he expects Tri Quang and
Ho Giac to leave the country and Thich Tam Chau to go into a remote pagoda. Prior to
these actions, the Institute would presumably choose new leadership.
Khanh talked at some length about the need to eliminate the Buddhist chaplains from the
armed forces since they were a source of subversion. He has in mind removing all chaplains
of all faiths, at least for a period of some months. He anticipates difficulties with the
Catholics in getting agreement, but by appealing to their patriotism he is hopeful.
We then talked at some length about the problems in the Hue-Danang area. Khanh is clearly
concerned about the situation there which results, he says, from the traditional spirit of
regionalism which dominates the provinces around Hue. I told him that we had viewed very
seriously the anti-American demonstrations in that area and that I felt I had probably made a
mistake in not withdrawing all Americans during that period. Even now although
tranquillity had been restored for the moment, the same disruptive factors are present in
Hue. Hence, I felt obliged to give continued consideration to the need to evacuate at least
U.S. dependents from that part of Viet-Nam.
Khanh tried to explain away the anti-U.S. demonstrations as of limited importance and
reacted strongly to the suggestion of withdrawing dependents. He urged me not to be
precipitate and at least to wait until after Tet, thus providing a pause for the calming of
emotions. After Tet, he suggested that we consult together again on the matter.
I agreed that it was important to move slowly but undertook no commitment to act one way
or another.
We then talked about the public attitude which the Embassy should take toward the
government. I told him that it was impossible to be more explicit at this time than to say that
we were continuing routine operations with the interim government. Meanwhile we were
waiting to see what government would emerge in a more permanent form. He agreed that
this attitude was reasonable but showed concern that the public understand that we were in
contact with him again. I told him that it was routine for us to inform the press at the end of
the day whom I had visited in the government and that such an announcement would be
made today. We would not indicate, however, the discussion of any specific items. Khanh
agreed to this proceeding.
Khanh then talked somewhat about the future form which he had in mind for the
government. He is thinking of forming the ministries into three groups, one including
Defense, Information and Interior to constitute the war-making bloc; a second, a Finance
and Economics bloc; and the remaining ministries (less Foreign Affairs and Justice)
categorized as the development bloc. Foreign Affairs and Justice would report directly to
the Prime Minister. We made no particular comment upon this proposed organization other
than to mention the desirability of keeping the Bureau of the Budget directly under the
Prime Minister.
In general, Khanh tried to paint to us a picture of the armed forces thoroughly in control of
the situation and ready to deal with the Buddhist Institute as one of several power groups
which must be taken into account in the formation of a government. I told him that the
situation was being viewed quite differently abroad where the overthrow of the Huong
government is being interpreted as a Buddhist Institute victory over a government supported
by the United States. Since no one believes that the Buddhist Institute could have done this
alone, it is a natural inference that the armed forces were allied with the Buddhist Institute
in sabotaging Huong. Khanh insists that coming events will soon disprove this theory and
that the Buddhist leaders will be shelved, as was Huong. I told him that this would be all to
the good when it occurred but meanwhile we should all be thinking about ways and means
of dispelling the impression of a Buddhist Institute victory which may be the first step
toward a neutralist government.
We are not at all sure whether Khanh really believes that he can carry out the program
which he has outlined to us. Even if sincerely committed to it, he is going to encounter
difficulties in setting up the Civilian-Military Council, in getting it to act in accordance with
his behest, and finally in obtaining suitable ministers for the new government.
It may be that he recognizes these facts but wants to make the visible effort. If he fails he
can always say that he tried and continue to live with present interim government. The
composition of the latter must be particularly appealing to him, with vague old man Suu and
Chief of State and pliable "Jack" Oanh as acting Prime Minister. We can think of no better
lineup from his point of view to allow indirect control of the government by Khanh and his
generals.
Taylor
51. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-70-65
Washington, January 29, 1965.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Viet
381. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Reprisal to Significant Incidents in the RVS
1. US reprisals for Viet Cong (VC)/Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) significant
incidents have been the subject of national policy deliberations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
desire to review past actions on the subject and to provide their current views and
recommendations. Initially, the concept of reprisal against the DRV appeared in NSAM
288, dated 17 March 1964./2/ That NSAM recognized the DRV as the instigator, the
motivating and sustaining force behind the VC and considered reprisals only by
Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces against North Vietnam.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 87.
2. VC/DRV deliberate actions against US personnel and forces have increased. For a
compilation of the 1964 incidents, see Appendix A./3/
/3/Attached but not printed.
3. Subsequent to attacks against US Navy destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, NSAM 314, dated
10 September 1964,/4/ ordered preparedness to respond against the DRV in the event of any
attack on US units or any special DRV/VC action against South Vietnam (SVN). On 1
November 1964, a mortar attack against the Bien Hoa Airfield resulted in the loss of a
portion of a USAF B-57 squadron and the death of four US military personnel and the
wounding of 72. A recent act--the bombing of the Brink BOQ in Saigon on 24 December-killed two US personnel and wounded 64 US and 43 Vietnamese.
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 345.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff by JCSM-933-64, dated 4 November 1964,/5/ recommended
strong reprisal actions be taken against the DRV for the attack on the Bien Hoa Airfield. In
addition, by JCSM-955-64, dated 14 November 1964,/6/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised
that they considered the reprisals recommended for the Bien Hoa incident equally
applicable for any subsequent provocation of a similar nature in Southeast Asia. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1964, by JCSM-1076-64,/7/ again recommended an air
attack be conducted against the DRV as a reprisal for the Brink BOQ bombing incident.
/5/Ibid., footnote 3, Document 395.
/6/Ibid., Document 411.
/7/Ibid., footnote 3, Document 472.
5. The lack of US response to major VC/DRV attacks against US personnel and forces in
the RVN could be misconstrued, with the result that further anti-US incidents could take
place, to include attacks against US dependents. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted
Ambassador Taylor's views and agree with him that reprisal actions should be taken to
dampen further terrorist acts.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the next such significant provocation should be
met with a positive, timely, and appropriate response in order to demonstrate to the DRV
that these provocations will bring prompt and destructive response from the United States.
Reprisals should be undertaken, preferably within twenty-four hours, against selected
targets in the DRV. GVN forces should be used to the extent feasible.
7. As you are aware, US military forces can respond to provocations on short notice. To
apprise you of military planning actions, a resume of possible reprisal actions of varying
intensities for which US plans are available for execution in a minimum of time is contained
in Appendix B./8/ This resume sets forth strike forces available for reprisal actions in both
Laos and North Vietnam, together with the target designations and sorties required for four
preplanned actions.
/8/Attached but not printed.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a. A US reprisal with VNAF participation as feasible be taken for the next significant
provocative act.
b. This action be initiated promptly, preferably within twenty-four hours.
In order to reduce the time involved in the decision-making process, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff will, insofar as practicable, recommend reprisal actions based upon the actions
contained in Appendix B./9/
/9/In a February 4 memorandum to Wheeler, Vance replied that he had noted the Joint
Chiefs' comments and indicated that copies of this memorandum had been given to the
Department of State and to McGeorge Bundy. Vance concluded by stating that the Joint
Chiefs' views "will be given the fullest consideration in determining future courses of
action." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489,
Vietnam 381)
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Nodis; LOR. Drafted in the White House; cleared by William Bundy, McNaughton, and
Unger; and approved by McGeorge Bundy.
1570. For Ambassador Taylor from McGeorge Bundy.
1. Thanks for your 2348/2/ confirming plans for visit. This message deals with preliminary
thoughts for our talks.
/2/Dated January 29. (Ibid.)
2. I hope we can avoid extended organized briefings. I do not learn well that way, and in
any case the point of this visit is to get a chance to exchange thoughts with you on hard
fundamental future problems. The more time we can spend in very small groups on these
central problems the better.
3. Nevertheless I think we need to compare our pictures of the existing situation and
especially of two basic elements of it. First, how is the struggle against the Viet Cong
going? In this we need to look (1) at Viet Cong capabilities now and in the future, (2) at
present and future prospects for our pacification efforts, and (3) at state of Vietnamese
morale, civil and military. Washington is assuming that the course of this contest has been
generally unfavorable for more than a year and that in the absence of major changes it is
likely to get worse. If in your view this assumption is wrong, we need to work hard on this
specific question.
4. The other central aspect of current situation is the present and future prospect for "stable
government." Present directives make such a government an essential prerequisite for
important additional U.S. major action, but we now wonder whether this requirement is
either realistic or necessary. If not, then we need to consider what actions are possible both
within SVN and against the North while GVN lacks desired stability. We also need to
consider what positive or negative effect additional U.S. action may have on this problem.
Sample questions are, whether Phase II actions could be used to strengthen GVN and
whether U.S. could organize its own efforts at all levels within SVN detached from political
problems of central government.
5. These questions lead away from estimate of present situation to discussion of U.S.
courses of action, and in this area we see particular importance in the following:
(1) Review of our existing efforts within SVN. One recurrent question here is that of size
and shape of U.S. presence, both military and civilian. We sense possible differences of
judgment on wisdom of more Americans in different fields.
(2) Review of planning for reprisals and discussion of relation of reprisal planning to Phase
II.
(3) Possible value in SVN of stronger and clearer U.S policy statements.
(4) Shape of U.S. negotiating posture, going forward from analysis in your 2235./3/
/3/Document 32.
6. In addition to these broad aspects of present situation and U.S. policy, we see urgent need
to discuss immediate problems, of which the most important are:
(1) The ways and means of evacuation of dependents, to include both timing and means of
preventing misunderstanding.
(2) The third country programs.
(3) Contingency planning against unpleasant political or military developments in the near
future.
Ball
2369. For McGeorge Bundy. The following document on dependent evacuation was
approved this date as representing the latest views of the US Mission Council on the
subject. It is proposed to use this paper as a basis for discussion during McGeorge Bundy's
visit to Saigon.
Procedure for Announcing Decision To Evacuate Dependents
1. The decision has been taken to evacuate all US dependents from SVN as expeditiously as
possible without giving the impression of a US retreat or creating uneasiness among the
Vietnamese officials and public. This decision results from a consideration of the following
factors:
A. A sense of growing potential danger to our dependents from VC terrorism and mob
violence.
B. Need to clear the deck as a preliminary to any extension of military actions in DRV.
C. The political and psychological effect here and in US of an atrocity committed against
dependents which might result in a stampede evacuation.
D. Desirability of freeing family heads of any concern for their dependents and of all
domestic distractions.
E. Desirability of avoiding an increase in the US presence in SVN while meeting the
continuing need for military reinforcements.
2. The foregoing are the honest reasons for reaching the conclusion that the dependents
should return home. The problem is how to state our reasons publicly in such a way as to
convince GVN and our own people of the reasonableness of our action. We must take into
account that the explanation to these audiences requires differing shades of emphasis.
3. In discussions with GVN officials, our explanations could cover all the points of
paragraph 1 except for any mention of fear of mob violence. It will be most important to be
able to emphasize 1B and 1E, stating that there can be no extension of military action until
the dependents are gone and that their removal will be more than compensated for by the
additional military units and individuals in the approved pipeline. We should ask the GVN
officials for advice and cooperation in presenting the case for evacuation to the VN public.
4. In consideration of what kind of public statement to make, the following would appear to
be the bare bones of the best explanation of our action: "The GVN and the USG announced
today extensive plans and action for 1965 to raise the level of effectiveness of the struggle
against the VC and to clear the boards for possible future contingencies. By agreement
between the two governments, the armed forces of SVN will be increased as rapidly as
possible from about 450,000 to around 600,000 and the National Police from 20,000 to over
50,000. The USG is increasing its military personnel in SVN from 23,000 to (this figure
may be as high as 32,000, the strength recommended by MACV and at a minimum for the
requirement of this announcement should exceed somewhat 25,300 to compensate for the
departure of approximately 2,300 dependents), in order to support the proposed increase in
GVN forces and to strengthen the air defense of SVN. For the latter purpose, the USG will
introduce a battalion of Hawk surface-to-air missiles, the first appearance of this highly
effective weapon in SEA. To offset this increase in the US military population and to
assume an increased posture of readiness on the part of the US community, it has been
decided progressively to remove all US dependents. Some have already departed and the
others will depart as personal plans can be made for their relocation. In combination, the
foregoing actions and others in preparation should permit major progress in 1965."
5. The effectiveness of such a statement is weakened by the public knowledge of the recent
anti-American demonstrations and our known concern over the safety of our dependents in
Hue. The American press, in particular, will probably bear down on this point and try to
make it appear the real reason for our action. We can try to temper this reaction by
background briefings but they are not likely to be effective unless we can be fairly explicit
about the meaning of "clearing the boards."
6. The foregoing procedure is the best treatment of a highly sensitive problem which the US
mission can suggest. It is predicated on Washington agreement to the following points:
A. The military reinforcements mentioned are definitely approved and will be carried out.
B. There is a firm intention to carry the war to the DRV following the evacuation of
dependents.
C. As agreed in Deptel 1509,/2/ the evacuation may be spread over a month or more.
/2/Document 31.
Taylor
(3) I plan to take your advice and stay one extra day for the purpose of getting out into the
country. I assume that Sunday/10/ will be the best day for this.
/10/February 7.
(4) I will make a bland arrival statement and have a press backgrounder on departure. (We
will prepare and forward arrival statement here based on your suggestions.)/11/ Beyond
this, we plan to keep our press contacts at minimum Zorthian permits. Announcement of the
visit will be made by WH this afternoon./12/
/11/The text of the arrival statement has not been found.
/12/A transcript of the White House News Conference at 4:30 p.m. on February 1, during
which Press Secretary George Reedy announced the composition of the Bundy mission and
stated that it planned to depart the following day, is in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II.
(5) Please discourage GVN from arranging "spontaneous" arrival and departure
demonstrations.
(6) We have postponed De Soto operation until after Tet. It is now scheduled for 7
February.
(7) I have not worked out a definite order of march for my colleagues. We will have a better
idea upon our arrival, but in any case will play it fairly loose. We may find it worthwhile for
some of my group to have separate discussions with other members of the Mission./13/
/13/In telegram 2376 from Saigon, February 2, Taylor informed McGeorge Bundy that the
agenda was being revised in light of his comments and that the diplomatic reception was
being eliminated from the schedule. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Ball
Volume I.
Johnson made no commitments pointing out difficulties of USG intervening directly with
generals and saying that generals having ostensibly supported moves Khanh had been
making which have led to present situation, it was up to generals to seek to resolve them,
not to seek to shift responsibility to others.
Cao has been accurate reporter in past, giving us through Westmoreland first definite
information on January 27 coup and information he gave to Johnson on January 29 on
withdrawal Buddhist Institute commitments has also now been confirmed by other sources
(FVS-11286)./2/ We are urgently seeking through selected other generals confirmation that
AFC meeting called for Friday morning and anything that we can gather on their knowledge
of Khanh's intentions.
/2/The same as TDCS DB-315/00350-65, February 2, which reported the decisions and
discussion at the Armed Forces Council meeting on January 31 as described by Brigadier
General Pham Van Dong, Commander of the Capital Military District. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVII)
Comments and recommendations follow.
Taylor
many of the generals. If Khanh does not play along with the Buddhists, sooner or later they
can be counted upon to take to the streets and present Khanh with the same problem which
he faced in August, 1964. At that time, he capitulated quickly under Buddhist pressure to
the disgust of ods [his?] generals. If this situation were to be repeated, we would expect the
generals to split on the issue of Buddhist domination with unpredictable results other than
confusion approaching anarchy.
3. Let us suppose that Khanh, in spite of these obvious difficulties, somehow succeeds in
keeping the generals in line while satisfying the Buddhists. In that case, the Catholics, the
Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai and the other elements generally suspicious of Khanh can be
expected to cause him trouble. Whether their opposition would be sufficient to overthrow
his govt may be doubtful but the consequences could well be serious and possibly include
bloody outbreaks of religious strife.
4. [Garble] combination in which Khanh is maintained as the governmental leader with
Buddhist support. We foresee a likely trend toward neutralism and anti-Americanism. The
Buddhists are suspect on both counts and are so notified [identified?] in the public mind.
We know General Khanh's deep feeling about the necessity of Buddhist support and have
long suspected him of wishing to become the Sihanouk of South Vietnam able to treat the
U.S. with similar disregard.
5. In summary, I can see no good coming out of a Khanh govt--not even that minimum
stability which would allow us to continue the struggle against the Viet Cong and Hanoi at
present levels of success. The probable outcomes as we foresee them would be either civil
disturbance approaching anarchy or a neutralist Khanh in a Sihanouk role. Both are
unacceptable solutions from the point of view of the U.S.
6. With this conviction in mind, we next raise the question of how to avoid a Khanh govt?
Only with the acquiescence of the large majority of the influential generals can he accede to
head of state. We know that he is politicking now to see whether he can get the necessary
support. Unless the U.S. reps decide to let matters run their course without an attempt to
influence them and take the heavy responsibility of doing nothing, it is most important that
we communicate a timely message to the generals to persuade them to withhold a vote of
confidence for Khanh and to prevent his coming to power. While the exact text of such a
communication would have to be tempered carefully to the character of each of the generals
contacted, the bare bones of such a message would be that the U.S. Govt will not recognize
and will not support a govt headed by General Khanh. It is our opinion that such word
conveyed at the proper time to selected generals and perhaps also to certain civil leaders
would accomplish our purpose.
7. There is, of course, always the possibility of an unfavorable reaction. The generals might
rally to support Khanh because of this "foreign pressure." Then, if in spite of our efforts,
Khanh came into power, we would have to do what we had promised, namely, withdraw
recognition from the govt and await developments. It would not be necessary to withdraw
all support at once because we would still have the hope that Khanh's opponents would
shortly drag him down, although with the danger of civil disorders which has been cited at
the outset of this paper.
In summary, I feel that the U.S. cannot win with Khanh as Chief of State and that every
possible action should be taken to prevent his accession to power. Our main weapon
available for this purpose is the use of the message referred to in para 6 above. If we fail,
the consequences will be no more serious than if we had not tried. This matter will be made
the first item of business with Bundy. After a full discussion, I will forward appropriate
recommendations.
Taylor
could be brought to their attention that Hoach said last July he was in touch with NLFSVN
and implied Khanh's knowledge and consent this activity. We could stress that we informed
Khanh of Hoach's reported activity and Khanh apparently did nothing about it.
Ball
The President asked if this would not bring in the Chinese Communists in the air or on the
ground. I said there was a possibility that they would come in on the ground but they had
little capability in the air. I said we had to face this contingency and be prepared to handle
any possible development but added that while Chinese Communist ground intervention
was a possibility, I did not estimate it as a probability under the course of action advocated.
The President then asked that I communicate with Bundy through our Chief of Station and
develop immediately a cast of characters that might formulate a compatible Government,
i.e., military, Buddhists, etc. With respect to Catholics, I said they would be difficult to
handle but I did not think they would resort to extreme measures unless the Government
established in this way represented a threat to the Catholic community.
The President questioned me concerning consequences of our withdrawal from Vietnam
and I said that it would pave the way toward Communist takeover of all of Southeast Asia. I
mentioned current moves in Thailand, the situation in Indonesia, and the probable
developments in Malaysia under such circumstances.
[Here follows discussion of the Soviet test of January 15 and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.]
62. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), at Saigon/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File,
McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I. Secret. The date and time stamped on the source text are
February 4, 11:13 a.m., which is apparently the time of reception in Saigon. This would
make the time of transmission in Washington in the late evening, February 3.
Please pass this message in one copy only to McGeorge Bundy from Mr. McCone:
1. After reviewing all current traffic and today's Watch Report,/2/ I advised the President in
a long private discussion/3/ that there appeared, first, a high probability of continuing
political instability in Saigon and that serious dissension existed among the general officers.
Secondly, analyzing Kosygin mission which includes high ranking party officer and
officials of Defense, Civil Air Transport and Foreign Economic Relations, we were inclined
to predict Soviet assistance to augment subversion and guerrilla activities, that they would
warn Hanoi against overt military moves which would invite U.S. reprisals. President stated
that we must exhaust every possibility of assisting the establishment of a Saigon
government which would bring together discordant groups, most particularly military and
the Buddhists, and felt that the USG, having had experience in SVN, might suggest
particular military or civilian leaders who could accomplish this objective. President
continues to feel that a reasonably viable and stable Saigon government is an essential
prerequisite to other actions and asked me to communicate this view to you with the
suggestion that you give attention to devising a cast of characters which might be able to
accomplish this objective.
/2/Not found.
SUBJECT
Agenda Item I--Current Political Situation--Imminence of a New Khanh Government
After reviewing essential elements of situation as reported on February 3, Ambassador
Taylor called for reports on results on contacts with key Vietnamese during the previous
evening. Mr. de Silva, General Westmoreland, and Mr. Manfull supplied following new
information:
(a) General Ky had been contacted by arrangement previously made and the following two
points conveyed attributing them to Embassy (Embtel 2389):/2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 60.
1) That we are in no way propping up General Khanh or backing him in any fashion, and
2) that we share the concern that General Ky says he and his colleagues have about the
situation.
Ky received the information with welcome approval and said he was most happy to hear
this expression of U.S. views. He said he would be seeing other members of the Armed
Forces Council (AFC) on February 4 and would have more information at the next meeting.
(b) General Pham Van Dong had been contacted and a full account of the conversation had
been circulated./3/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 58.
(c) General Stilwell saw General "Little" Minh who gave the impression of not being in the
inner circle and unable to impart significant information.
(d) Colonel Metaxis saw General Co, Commander II Corps, who conveyed the impression
that he had not been contacted by other members of the so-called "watchdog group" of the
AFC.
(e) Luong Trong Tuong, Hoa Hao leader and respective Military-Civilian Council (MCC)
member, said that the MCC had not officially convened as yet but was expected to convene
today. He added that he personally would refuse to participate but that Hoa Hao would be
represented by two or three others yet to be selected.
(f) One member of the AFC had observed that if General Ky took a firm position in
opposition to Khanh, the floodgates would be open for the other AFC members to line up
against Khanh.
In response to a question from Mr. Cooper as to the extent of Khanh's support in the
military and as to what form AFC opposition to Khanh might take, it was pointed out by
Ambassador Taylor that:
(a) Firm support for Khanh to date has been based primarily in the Marines, Airborne
Brigade, Armor and Navy--not the Army;
(b) Opposition in the AFC to Khanh would probably take form of a vote of no-confidence
in Khanh as a candidate for Chief of State and perhaps as Commander-in-Chief;
(c) The departure of Khanh from the scene would still leave problems since the Young
Turks as a group were not particularly well-disciplined or responsible.
Mr. Bundy inquired whether Khanh had in the past played the card of strong US backing
and apparent lack of any suitable alternative. Ambassador Taylor responded in the
affirmative.
Mr. McNaughton asked whether the U.S. press was under the illusion that the U.S. was
backing Khanh. Mr. Zorthian replied that the U.S. press was under no such illusion;
however, other members of the international press and a considerable number of the local
press believed this to be the case. Therefore, the state of public opinion was somewhat
confused on this question.
In response to a question from Mr. Unger, Ambassador Taylor noted that Khanh's failure to
obtain a representative MCC need not impede Khanh in attempting to dominate the
Government. Khanh could either force the issue with the MCC as it exists or he could stand
on the status quo with a pliable "Jack" Oanh as Acting Prime Minister. The latter was a
likely possibility.
Ambassador Taylor then suggested the meeting address two problems:
(1) Should we proceed forthwith in conveying the same message as that conveyed to
General Ky to other key military officers and to selected civilian personalities;
(2) Should we now request of Washington authority to invoke withholding of recognition of
a Khanh Government should this prove necessary emphasizing at the same time that we
would use only minimum U.S. pressure necessary to forestall a Khanh bid to become Chief
of State.
With respect to (1) above it was the consensus that the immediate focus of action rests in
the AFC and that approaches to civilians at present should not be made with the possible
exception of Nguyen Luu Vien.
With respect to (2) above, it was questioned whether it is necessary to request such
authority at this time. If Ambassador Taylor in effect puts in a PNG for Khanh, it might stop
Khanh or on the other hand it might backfire. It was noted that there had been various
Chiefs of State to date but none have wielded much power. Ambassador Taylor observed
this was not the basic issue and reviewed in detail the analysis contained in Embtel 2391./4/
Ambassador Johnson added there is no magic formula, that we faced the dilemmas set forth
in Embtel 2391. In response to Mr. McNaughton's question as to how confident the Saigon
team was that Khanh's succession to the position of Chief of State would ultimately lead to
chaos, Ambassador Taylor said this was the unanimous view of the Mission.
/4/Document 59.
Mr. McNaughton then referred to the possibility that Khanh's position as Commander-inChief might be in jeopardy and inquired as to likely successors. General Westmoreland
replied that the prime candidates were General Co, General Pham Van Dong, and to a lesser
degree General Thieu. Westmoreland felt that the first two were well qualified and that
Thieu was bright, popular with his colleagues and nimble enough to keep himself in an
uncommitted position so that he is not swept away in changes of regime. He had done an
effective job on previous assignments and could be voted into office by his colleagues,
although this is likely to prompt a Buddhist reaction since Thieu is both a Catholic and a
Dai Viet. General Westmoreland believed that General Khiem also has a role to play in
South Viet-Nam but not necessarily at the present time.
Mr. Unger inquired whether the Buddhists would not present a problem regardless of what
evolved from the current situation. Ambassador Taylor responded that Huong was on the
verge of success in his confrontation with the Buddhists until Generals Khanh and Thi
deliberately withheld military support of the Government in mid-central Vietnam. General
Westmoreland observed that General Thieu had informed him that the Generals had
"learned a lesson" with regard to standing up to the Buddhists.
Mr. McNaughton asked for an estimate as to what would happen if we pulled out all stops
and invoked threat of non-recognition of a Khanh Government. Mr. de Silva said that it
depended a great deal on how we handled the situation. If American views were
communicated informally but authoritatively our views would fall on receptive or fertile
ground and could force a showdown tomorrow. Mr. Bundy inquired as to Khanh's reaction
should information concerning our actions get back to Khanh. Mr. de Silva replied that
Khanh would undoubtedly try to use it and to play up the anti-American theme to his
advantage. General Goodpaster inquired whether the Generals to whom we would be
conveying the "message" would fully understand the reasons lying behind the U.S.
statement of views. It was pointed out that this could best be handled by confirming on our
part the fears and concerns expressed by the military officers themselves. It was also noted
that a communication of our views informally today, following the arrival of the Bundy
party, would have a greater impact than similar statements made previously. Ambassador
Taylor suggested that early action be taken to contact the key military figures believed to be
receptive to our views in order to provide the necessary information on which to base
judgment as to whether he should request authority from Washington to invoke the nonrecognition threat if absolutely necessary. Ambassador Taylor emphasized that once a threat
was invoked he would have to make good on the threat. It was further noted that the U.S.
would be placed in an awkward position should Khanh succeed despite U.S. efforts.
Mr. Killen stated that the impression in Saigon and in the countryside is that Khanh is now
running the country regardless of the position he occupies. The Vietnamese people are
becoming more demoralized and discouraged. From his conversation with public spirited
citizens, both high and low, it is evident that Khanh is thoroughly distrusted. Mr. Killen
believes that regardless of the position Khanh holds he will, because of his power, be the
effective chief of the ship of state. If we take a longer look regarding the necessity of
reorganizing and revitalizing the government, in removing distrust of the government on the
part of the people and in getting on with the struggle, it is evident that Khanh must be
removed from positions of power. Mr. Killen believed that discussion of desirability of
Khanh as Chief of State was only formalistic one, since Khanh exercised effective power.
Mr. Bundy asked whether anyone around the table differed with the above estimates of
Khanh. Ambassador Taylor replied that no one from the U.S. Mission disagreed and in fact
our objective was not only to prevent Khanh's becoming Chief of State but to work toward a
better government.
Ambassador Johnson noted that if Khanh does not succeed in his ploy to become Chief of
State his days are probably numbered as Commander-in-Chief. Mr. Bundy asked whether it
would not be sufficient for Khanh's stock to go down dramatically if he fails in his ploy. Mr.
Manfull observed that in this event Khanh would merely begin again to maneuver to
assume power and would create further difficulties and instability in the future. Khanh will
never give up in his drive for power. Mr. de Silva noted that it is significant that recently
there has been a decided change of heart among the people who provide Khanh's base of
support--the military.
Mr. McNaughton inquired as to what evidence exists that Khanh would tend toward a
neutralist solution were he to assume power. It was noted that there was no hard evidence
but plenty of smoke, which could be adduced from his alliance with the Buddhists, and
activities of his brother-in-law Pham [Phan?] Quang Tuoc, and the fears of his colleagues.
In response to Mr. Cooper's query, Ambassador Taylor said that Khanh would try to exploit
publicly U.S. interference should he succeed in being appointed Chief of State and we in
turn withheld recognition.
Mr. Unger noted the possibility that Khanh might be driven faster along the road to a
neutralist solution if he becomes aware of U.S. action to block his path to Chief of State.
Ambassador Taylor replied that he always had a feeling that Khanh was prepared to
consider alternate solutions in any situation. General Westmoreland said that Khanh had
accomplished many improvements in the strictly military field (better care for dependents,
spot promotions, decorations for valor, etc.) but despite these actions his popularity with his
colleagues has continually eroded. In his view the only commander of troops who would
support Khanh in a pinch is the Commander of the Airborne Brigade, Dong. Dong was
currently taking great pains to avoid his American counterpart.
Ambassador Taylor then posed the proposition: Should we proceed with conveying the
"message" of last evening in the hopes of preventing Khanh from obtaining a vote of
confidence at the AFC meeting on Friday. Mr. Bundy noted that there was a lot of territory
between the statement conveyed yesterday and the flat statement that the U.S. would not
recognize a government led by Khanh. He believed there were many things we could say
but which would avoid a situation in which Khanh could say that Ambassador Taylor had
tried to unseat him. In this connection it was pointed out that in effect the U.S. emissaries
were merely associating the U.S. with the views these key military figures had already
voiced in opposition to or concern over Khanh's motivations and intentions. It was
recognized, however, that Khanh would undoubtedly become aware of our activities.
It was agreed to proceed with conveying the "message" of the previous evening to selected
military officers; namely, Generals Pham Van Dong, Thieu, Ky, Linh Quang Vien, Cao Van
Vien, Marine Commander Khang, Commodore Chung Tan Cang (through Ky) and General
Co./5/ It was further agreed that based on results of conversations with the above officers a
decision would be made at the end of the day regarding the necessity to request standby
authority from Washington concerning non-recognition of a regime led by Khanh.
/5/See Document 68.
66. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/
Saigon, February 4, 1965, 7:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File,
McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text bears the
handwritten notation: "Seen WP Bundy 2/5." Attached to the source text is another copy of
the telegram forwarded by McCone to the White House for Bromley Smith's attention. A
stamped date and time on this copy indicates that it was received at the White House at 4:07
p.m. on February 4.
Saig 1533. To Mr. McCone from McGeorge Bundy.
1. Thank you for your message./2/ Only an interim answer is possible overnight, but you
should know that the immediate problem does not appear to be more than the quiet
prevention of a total Khanh takeover which no one here believes would produce kind of
government the President wants.
/2/Document 62.
2. We have pressed throughout the day to see whether any member of Country Team
believes that we can prevent continued deterioration in the absence of a "reasonably
effective and stable government." The Country Team appears to share the President's
judgement that such a government is necessary on all counts. Getting it is something else
again.
3. In particular, I think you should tell the President that a day of inquiry reveals no present
prospect of a government acceptable to us which would also be acceptable to the leaders of
the Buddhist Institute. The current situation among non-Communists forces gives all the
appearances of a civil war within a civil war.
4. In this situation, the construction of a government of national unity may well require
sharp confrontation with Buddhists before, during, or after the construction job.
Forces Council for Chief of State, I do not see any present likelihood of requiring authority
mentioned in Ref A).
/2/Telegram 2391 is Document 59; telegram 1601 is Document 60. Regarding telegram
2389, see footnote 2, Document 60.
We should not be under any illusion about possibility of maintaining secrecy of these
contacts we have made or to believe that General Khanh will not perceive our action.
Except for Khanh's reaction, I would not anticipate any flare-up from other generals who,
during show-down with Khanh last August, were openly seeking US position with regard to
retention of Khanh. Fact that we supported him at that time was subject for open discussion
in their debates. Hence, I am not particularly concerned now over an excessively
conspicuous showing of US hand.
With regard to possible successors to Khanh, three leading candidates in our judgment
remain Co, Cong and Thieu. We would not rule out Ambassador Khiem but his absence
from scene makes him definitely dark horse.
In concentrating attention on possible selection of Khanh as de Gaulle-type Chief of State,
we have perhaps commented insufficiently on possibility that Khanh will prefer to keep Suu
and "Jack" Owen in office and continue to pull strings from behind. This situation will not
require sudden and dramatic action on our part but will present us with problem which
cannot be allowed drag indefinitely. I can well visualize necessity at some time of utilizing
full US leverage to include that mentioned in Ref B) to induce our Vietnamese friends to get
Khanh out of position of Commander-in-Chief (from which he pulls the strings) and to
install their very best governmental line-up.
In past slates, they have never used all their best people.
Taylor
To assess significant political forces and attitudes in South Vietnam, and to estimate the
prospects over the next month or so.
The Estimate
I. Political Dynamics
1. Significance of the Immediate Situation. Recent events in Saigon underline the fact that
apart from the Communists--and the US presence--the two primary political forces in South
Vietnam today are the military establishment and the political bonzes who direct the
"Buddhist movement." At present, US political leverage appears to be at a low point.
2. Neither the military nor the Buddhist leadership is homogeneous or monolithic; both
suffer from factionalism and personal rivalries. Dominant power obviously rests with the
military, but the Buddhists are strong enough to make unworkable any set of political
arrangements their leaders care to oppose. Whatever legal or constitutional form the
Government of Vietnam (GVN) takes in the near future, the military and the Buddhists will
almost certainly retain an effective veto power.
3. The removal of Huong on 27 January was the product of cooperation between the
Buddhists (under Tri Quang) and the military (more or less under Khanh). This cooperation
has produced at least a temporary stabilization, though the balance struck is delicate and
could easily be upset. There are rumblings within military and Buddhist ranks and in
various other quarters, e.g., the Catholics, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, and the students
and other political elements in Saigon and Hue. However the events of 27 January appear
thus far to have had almost no disturbing effect in the provinces. The course of political
developments will depend on what the Buddhists do and on the degree of military unity.
Either the Buddhists or the military or both may exploit anti-Americanism as a tactical
device. The explosiveness of this issue will depend on how it is handled by all parties
concerned, including the US. Notable Viet Cong military successes could also adversely
affect the course of events.
4. Basic Political Determinants. South Vietnam is in the midst of a social and political
revolution. In the political vacuum occasioned by the French departure, power was initially
assumed by an elite of French-educated and predominantly Catholic mandarin types, of
whom Ngo Dinh Diem was both symbol and archetype. Power is now passing to a much
more "Vietnamese," militantly nationalistic and potentially xenophobic group of which the
political bonzes, the students, and certain young generals are prime examples. This
revolution is a formless thing, uncontrolled, and in many ways genuinely spontaneous. The
Communists are obviously exploiting it. Nevertheless, it is something quite apart from the
VC-directed insurgency; indeed those who aspire to lead this revolution claim that unless it
is successful the Communist insurgency cannot be defeated. This shift in the alignment of
fundamental political forces is responsible for much of the turbulence we are witnessing-and will continue to witness--largely on the urban scene, particularly since this process
involves the striking of new power balances in the midst of a war and in a situation where
no parliamentary traditions or institutions can effectively channel political conflict.
5. Tri Quang and the "Buddhist Movement." Because of the historical context in which this
revolution has developed, contending factions tend to group under religious labels. The
issues involved, however, are ones of political power, not religious doctrine. The "Buddhist
movement" derives its political strength partly from the political acumen and demagogic
skill of its leaders, but primarily from the fact that "Buddhism" has become the rallying
point for emotionally charged though inchoate revolutionary aspirations. The bonzes who
lead this "Buddhist movement" have found the exercise of political power both heady and
habit forming. They do not appear to desire the responsibilities of office or direct
participation in government, but they are determined to prevent a revival of what they
consider Catholic dominance and to have a veto power over major GVN policies and
personnel. Furthermore, as in many protest movements, no contender for primacy within the
Buddhist leadership feels he can let a rival appear more "militant" than he.
6. Among these leaders, Tri Quang is the most influential and politically skillful. He seems
to have outmaneuvered all existing or potential rivals within the Buddhist movement and is
not likely to be deposed from within the movement itself. However, were Tri Quang to
leave the scene, the Buddhist movement would probably continue essentially unchanged.
Tri Quang is vain and hyper-nationalistic; thus he probably resents the extent of US
involvement in Vietnamese affairs. Although he recognizes the present need for US support,
he regards the US as incapable of understanding the political situation in South Vietnam
and, over the long run, would like to see the US out of the country.
7. Tri Quang's short-run intentions are harder to divine and may not be systematically or
consistently developed even in his own mind. He professes to be anti-Communist and at
times appears to recognize that his position and the movement he leads would get short
shrift under a Communist regime. Nevertheless, he has such a high opinion of his own
political abilities that he may come to feel that he can outwit the Communists and use them
for his own ends; indeed, he may have already reached this conclusion. The relevant
evidence is conflicting and precludes confident judgment. On balance we incline to the view
that he is probably not now deliberately working for a Communist victory or Communistdominated "neutralist" settlement. Regardless of his intent, however, disruptive actions such
as his thus far are serving these ends.
8. The Military Establishment. Through a combination of luck and political skill, Khanh has
managed to retain a paramount position within the military establishment, but he wears an
uneasy crown. During 1964 there emerged a group of officers labelled the Young Turks
who saved Khanh in September, but who suspect his motives and who, so long as they
maintain their solidarity, constitute a potent threat to his position. Below the Young Turks
(most of whom are now one-star generals) there is another unstructured but perhaps even
more restless and ambitious group of colonels and majors--unit commanders who during the
past year have borne the brunt of the fighting against the Viet Cong. Some of these officers
commanded the units which made possible the military pressure plays of the past year.
9. By and large the military leaders are intensely nationalistic. They have no intention of
abandoning the war, but are impatient and frustrated over the lack of progress. At the same
time, however, they are divided among themselves and deeply involved in politics, and
some have overriding personal ambitions. Many military officers do not trust Khanh and
not a few are resentful and suspicious of the Buddhists. Khanh remains in serious danger of
being ousted--particularly if he should make too obvious a bid for personal political power,
if he appears to become overly subservient to the Buddhists, or if his efforts should not soon
begin to produce some political stability or military progress.
10. The Communists. The military establishment and the Buddhist movement have long
been prime targets for Communist penetration. The present military leadership seems
resolutely anti-Communist even though the Viet Cong have almost certainly penetrated the
military establishment at least enough to acquire considerable capabilities for collecting
intelligence. The situation in the Buddhist movement is less clear, particularly since much
of the Buddhists' agitation lends itself so easily to Communist exploitation. There is no
evidence that the movement itself is Communist-directed or controlled, but there are strong
presumptive grounds for believing that Communist penetration is having some success. The
student movement seems to have been even more vulnerable to Communist penetration.
II. Present Power Relations
11. Khanh and Tri Quang. There is conclusive evidence that the dismissal of Huong on 27
January and the interim political solution then announced were based on an arrangement
between Khanh and Tri Quang; the circumstances lead us to infer that they had cooperated
for some time in preparing the crisis. This cooperation may have originated in the wake of
the December dissolution of the High National Council by Khanh and the Young Turks, a
move occasioned by pressures within the military establishment but which the US strongly
opposed.
12. Not long after, the Buddhists, who had intermittently engaged in demonstrations against
the government, renewed their campaign against Huong. They also emphasized antiAmericanism or, more precisely, opposition to the US Ambassador for his support of
Huong. This gave the Buddhists' anti-Huong campaign an emotionally inflammatory
ingredient it had hitherto lacked. It is extremely unlikely that the Buddhists would have
dared stress this anti-US note without at least some confidence that the military would not
interfere. In any case, this theme proved politically beneficial, and was probably personally
gratifying, to Khanh. Tri Quang's political position was helped by the ouster of Huong, to
which he was publicly committed. Khanh obtained at least temporary hold over the levers
of power, and in such a manner that his opponents could do little but acquiesce. All this has
so clearly been to the benefit of both Khanh and Tri Quang that it seems unlikely to have
been fortuitous.
13. Any alliance between Khanh and Tri Quang must be inherently unstable. Each strongly
distrusts the other. Tri Quang is not likely to abide by any commitments made; signs of this,
in fact, are already beginning to emerge. Unless he assumes the responsibilities of office,
which he is unlikely to do, Tri Quang's position as a militant leader of an emotionally
charged movement almost requires that he continue to criticize governmental policy. On
past form he is unlikely to be a constructive critic, though he will probably take some care
not to alienate the Young Turks. Khanh, for his part, cannot afford to alienate the
Buddhists--no Vietnamese politician can do this in present circumstances and survive in
power--but neither can he be too accommodating to them without running the risk of being
deposed by some of his military colleagues. Most politically influential Vietnamese, civilian
and military, have generally acquiesced in the 27 January "solution," though there is
apprehension in some quarters. Furthermore, there are influential officers who were not
happy with these arrangements and are probably determined to prevent Khanh from making
a personal bid for permanent political office and from giving in too far to the ever
demanding Buddhists.
III. Near-Term Prospects
14. The present political arrangements in Saigon are avowedly temporary, and there is at
least a faint chance that the scenario announced for the ensuing weeks may hold promise for
improved political stability in South Vietnam. However, in the present political context,
tolerable stability can only be achieved if there is a central government whose structure and
ranking personnel are acceptable to the majority of the important military and the majority
of important Buddhists--a contingency which cannot at present be judged likely. Nor is it
likely that a National Assembly, even if convened in March, will devise a more permanent
structure which meets Vietnamese desires and is adapted to current political power realities
in South Vietnam. Yet if both these contingencies were met, the spring and summer might
see the evolution of a stronger base for prosecuting the counterinsurgency effort than has
heretofore existed. The odds on such a fortunate outcome are considerably less than even.
15. The course of events in the near-term future will be materially influenced by the
ultimate effect of the extreme nationalist sentiments whipped up in recent weeks. Such
sentiments, because of their xenophobic and anti-US overtones, will obviously cause
considerable complications for the US effort. The regime is still aware of its need for US
support, but even in the short run we expect that nationalist sensitivities will set severe
limits on the degree to which the US can influence Vietnamese actions. The chances have
increased that nationalist sentiments, in combination with war weariness and frustrations,
will take a pro-neutralist turn which the Communists would certainly endeavor to fan and
exploit. On the other hand, however, a vigorous nationalism identified with an indigenously
devised government reflecting local political realities will be an essential ingredient for any
dynamic and successful counter-insurgency effort.
71. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith)
to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), at Saigon/1/
Washington, February 4, 1965, 3:31 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File,
McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I. Top Secret. Repeated to the CIA for McCone. The date
and time stamped on the source text indicate that it was received in Saigon on the morning
of February 5, although the hour is illegible.
CAP 65030. Saigon for McGeorge Bundy--deliver opening of business. For your
information, President reacted sharply to UPI report from Saigon/2/ saying Khanh appeared
to be snubbing you by turning down invitation to Friday/3/ reception for Vietnamese
military leaders at Westmoreland's home.
/2/The text of the UPI bulletin was quoted in telegram 1617 to Saigon, February 5.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Bundy)
/3/February 5.
The President told me that assuming this was true, we should start looking hard for
someone who could replace Khanh. He would like you to get full rundown on possible
replacements. (We did not then have Embtel 2400.)/4/ I listened and then explained how
you were handling postponement of call on Khanh (Embtel 2399)./5/
/4/Document 68.
/5/Document 67.
Subject did not come up in President's press conference./6/ State is cabling text of
President's comments on Vietnam and on your mission.
/6/For the transcript of the President's press conference on February 4 at 11:20 a.m. in the
White House, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1965, Book I, pp. 131-139.
will try to get a summary of our current thinking to you tomorrow because Sunday/4/ we
will be going back into the field and we should have as much of the picture as we would
like you to have in outline at least by that time. My current estimate is that we will not
return with urgent and immediate requirements for decision making meetings because of the
continuing fluidity of the local situation here. On the other hand we may, we will I think,
wish to have some development of alternatives, and I think therefore that the current pattern
in which the Secretary will be out of the town for two or three days is an acceptable one,
certainly for our purposes today. Have you got all that?
/4/February 7.
W. Bundy: I understand you perfectly. We will do nothing to change our schedule unless
you indicate otherwise in terms of what you might propose. I of course will be on hand
Sunday morning--and indeed tomorrow and Saturday--to get your messages. If you have
some indication, well and good, otherwise we will just sit tight and wait until you arrive.
M. Bundy: I missed your last transmission, would you say again?
W. Bundy: I said that we will do nothing to change Secretary Rusk's schedule unless you so
indicate in your message which we presume you will send tomorrow night.
M. Bundy: That makes good sense. I would like to shift to another subject and say that our
first bare impression is that the confrontation which was foreshadowed as a possibility in
one of the Ambassador's telegrams (Saigon 2391)/5/ is not immediately likely. It appears
that other local forces, military primarily, have indicated strong opposition to the
contingency which troubled us. There is no immediate likelihood that contingency will
happen. On the other hand, there is no indication either as to what a resolution of the present
interim status will be and there is no agreed opinion that I can solicit on our side as to what
the preferred solution is. We hope to direct attention to the development of preferences but
we do not expect during this business to engage in active indication of positive US
preferences. I would be glad of your comments on this.
/5/Document 59.
W. Bundy: I agree completely with your suggestion that you take no active role while you
are there. As you can see from our cables we are very concerned about any appearance of an
active US political role in any case, and we were concerned, as you have now cleared up,
that the issue stated in Saigon 2391 was not likely to be immediate and was somewhat more
black and white than any case that we would be likely to confront in the immediate future.
Your evaluation of the immediate situation does seem to confirm what we have been getting
principally from CAS reporting. I should think we had to see how the situation settled down
before any of us could be sure how we would like to use US influence and whether we
would want to take any risks of having our hands show very clearly. Those are just
preliminary reactions but I think they accord with your thinking.
M. Bundy: That is exactly the way we see it here. We have had a serious exchange of
messages with McCone/6/ and I think it would be worth your while to have a talk with him
directly and to say that I mentioned this exchange to you.
/6/See Documents 62 and 66.
W. Bundy: I understand that and I will be in touch with Mr. McCone. The message that he
sent after seeing the President was seen by Mr. Ball and myself and I have not seen your
reply but I will get in touch with him in the morning and will be brought abreast of that.
M. Bundy: There is no reason to view it tonight your time. Tomorrow is OK, I just wished
to be sure you were aware of his transmission and his view of thinking there.
W. Bundy: Yes, we were fully aware of that and I think we also saw the difficulty in
producing the results suggested immediately and I have not yet seen your response but I
will do so tomorrow morning the first thing.
M. Bundy: In essence what I said was precisely that. It was easier to make the prescriptions
than get the answers and in particular it was not so clear that we could have won for them a
working alliance that would be practical for us between the two parties specified in his
message, but you will be over to see my answer. This conversation has been exactly what
was needed for our guide. I am very grateful to you.
W. Bundy: All right I have nothing further at this end. If you have nothing further I guess
we can call it quits now.
M. Bundy: That is all I have. Thank you again. Over and out.
W. Bundy: Over and out.
President, USG, and American people to support SVN as long as necessary and in any way
necessary, Khanh asked what about going North. Bundy replied that USG was willing to
consider appropriate means for bringing pressure on North Vietnam, but this would be
feasible only if it involved frank and loyal partnership with a stable and reasonably popular
GVN. In discussing this, Khanh several times referred to U.S. assistance in "liberating the
North". Bundy set the record straight in a very deliberate manner. He explained that while it
was U.S. policy to assist SVN, it was not U.S. policy to liberate the North. Measures would
be taken against the North only insofar as they support the above-stated U.S. policy
objective of winning the war in the South.
Khanh's second question was whether USG would object if National Council designated a
military man as chief of government. Would USG insist on a civilian chief? Bundy avoided
a direct answer, indicating USG would be [looking?] only for quality and results and for
indications that the person chosen enjoyed sufficient popular support to stay in power for a
reasonably long time. Bundy reiterated, as he did on several other occasions as well, the
importance USG attaches to governmental stability in SVN.
Khanh's third question was to ask for an explanation of "U.S. strategy", by which he
appeared to mean our policy objectives. Bundy replied appropriately, emphasizing that we
are here to assist GVN maintain Vietnamese independence and freedom, but that we only
advise and assist; main burden inevitably falls on Vietnamese, who must learn to work
together more cohesively and effectively.
After meeting had gone on well beyond scheduled time and as we were about to leave,
Khanh announced that some twenty generals were in adjoining room and would like to meet
Mr. Bundy. Although this was hardly fair play toward an unwarned guest, the meeting
turned out to be a good thing, allowing Bundy on invitation from Khanh to make a few
graceful remarks to the generals. Bundy emphasized President's determination to continue
to assist Vietnam and his full support for his representatives out here. In praising
Vietnamese armed forces and generals present, Bundy avoided any reference to General
Khanh.
Taylor
Thich Thien Minh is ibid. The other four are in Washington National Records Center, RG
84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, ORG 7 Visits. Regarding Bundy's reaction to
these meetings, see Cooper, Lost Crusade, page 257.
76. Summary Notes of the 545th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, February 6, 1965, 7:45-9 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret;
Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The concluding time of the
meeting is from the president's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) For other records of this meeting, see
Document 77 and Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 124-125.
Reprisal Strikes in North Vietnam
(This is a partial record of the meeting because the writer was in and out of the Cabinet
Room talking by secure phone from the Situation Room to McGeorge Bundy in Saigon.)
The meeting opened with a discussion of how to react to the surprise attack by the Viet
Cong on the U.S. Army barracks at Pleiku in South Vietnam and other attacks on two South
Vietnamese airfields. A recommendation was made that U.S. planes attack three targets in
North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese, with U.S. air cover, attack a fourth target./2/
There was recognition that MIG's based near Hanoi might respond to the strikes.
/2/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 78.
General Wheeler: CINCPAC reports that if he receives an execute message by 10:00 p.m.
tonight, his planes could be over their targets in North Vietnam at 3:00 p.m. their time.
The President gave the following figures on the four recommended targets:
Target
Troops
Military Casualties
Civilians
6,000
3,600
40
150
90
1,200
720
30
Vu Con Barracks
----
No Good Estimates
----
General Wheeler: The attack on Pleiku came as a surprise. There were no South Vietnamese
casualties. Our forces were in a compound outside the town. The area has been quiet
recently. At one time it was General Khanh's headquarters and formerly was pacified.
Secretary McNamara: However, the Viet Cong had recently been building up in this area.
Under Secretary Ball: We are all in accord that action must be taken. We need to decide
how we shall handle the air strikes publicly. The Soviets may call for a conference. We
must make clear that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong are the same. We retaliate
against North Vietnam because Hanoi directs the Viet Cong, supplies arms, and infiltrates
men. We need to answer the question as to why we are striking North Vietnam when the
Americans were attacked by Viet Cong in South Vietnam.
Deputy Defense Secretary Vance: Arrangements should be made for a joint U.S.-South
Vietnamese announcement.
Under Secretary Ball: Should U.S. dependents in South Vietnam be withdrawn at once or
only later at a time when the North Vietnamese may be responding to our air attacks?
General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara: Get them out now.
Ambassador Thompson: Should the U.S. dependents be evacuated so quickly that it appears
we are running away?
The President: We cannot contemplate the loss of U.S. women and children in an attack by
the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong in Saigon or elsewhere. We have long sought to get
out the dependents and have been waiting only for the proper atmosphere.
In summary, we have decided to make the air strikes. Our strikes should be arranged so as
to hit in daylight hours. We need a recommendation from Saigon. One hundred and twenty
U.S. planes would attack three barracks in the south of North Vietnam and a fourth target
would be hit by South Vietnamese planes. A final decision is needed within the hour.
Deputy Secretary Vance: The four targets to be struck are those discussed earlier.
General Wheeler: A total of 132 U.S. planes will be involved, plus 22 South Vietnamese
planes for a total of 154. Estimates are that we will lose no planes and the South Vietnamese
will lose two planes.
There followed a discussion of several issues including the need for U.S. reinforcements
following the air strikes, and whether a Congressional resolution was needed to insure the
legal position of the Administration. Under Secretary Ball's position was that the quicker we
have a resolution, the better.
Senator Mansfield: The North Vietnamese attack has opened many eyes. We are not now in
a penny ante game. It appears that the local populace in South Vietnam is not behind us,
else the Viet Cong could not have carried out their surprise attack.
The President said the group would meet again at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow to decide what
additional forces should be moved into South Vietnam. The strike on the four targets was
authorized and the request was made that commercial transports be used to fly out
dependents. (Location of targets to be struck is marked on the attached map and target
list.)/3/
/3/Attached, but not printed.
Bromley Smith
asked him to call Ambassador Taylor in Saigon and to request Taylor's, General
Westmoreland's, and McGeorge Bundy's recommendations as to reprisal actions we should
undertake. At 1520 I departed for the White House.
At the White House, I attended a meeting on Arms for Jordan. That meeting adjourned at
1700 and I then gave to the President the latest Vietnamese reports.
The President asked me what actions I thought would be recommended and I told him that I
thought Option 1 would be recommended. I then discussed the targets included in Option 1.
The President then asked me, General Wheeler, Mr. Ball, and Mr. Bill Bundy if we would
agree with such recommendation. Each of us responded affirmatively. The President then
inquired whether we had sent a message to Saigon requesting the views of the officials
there. Mr. Bundy indicated that such a message had been sent an hour ago./2/ The meeting
closed with the President asking that we let him know when the Saigon recommendations
were received.
/2/Not found.
At 1830, I returned to the Pentagon and joined General Wheeler. There, we discussed the
forces to be alerted, the number of persons to be evacuated, and the possible assets to be
used for the evacuation. Additionally, we discussed the targets to be struck if Option 1 were
recommended, and those to be struck if both Options 1 and 2 were recommended. I asked
for a list of the forces available for use in the strikes and a list of those forces to be alerted-both to be used later in discussion with the President. During this discussion, General
Blanchard and Admiral Mustin joined us.
At this time, Secretary McNamara called to say that he felt it desirable to call Saigon on the
KY-9 secure phone and obtain Saigon's recommendations. I then called Ambassador Taylor
but could not reach him and talked instead to Alexis Johnson on a normal telephone in his
home. Using double talk, I asked if Washington's cable had been received and found that it
had been. I told Johnson that it was urgent that we receive Saigon's recommendations as
soon as possible and asked when this might be. Mr. Johnson replied that this would be
within 30 minutes or so and also said that we could probably guess what their
recommendations would be. In closing, I stressed again the urgency of early receipt of the
recommendations, asking that they be given over a secure telephone.
I reported the foregoing telephone conversation to both the President and Mr. McNamara.
The President was pleased and asked when we could expect to hear from Saigon. I
estimated that it would be within one and one half hours. At this point the President noted
the need to evacuate dependents and asked me what our capability was to do so. I responded
that this was being checked now. The President also emphasized that we should alert the
strike forces and I told him General Wheeler had done so at 1800. Finally, the President
asked about alerting other forces. To this, I responded that we were working on the problem
now and that I would call him again when I heard from Saigon.
At 1905 I received a call from McGeorge Bundy in Saigon over an open telephone. He said
that all in Saigon unanimously recommend a) that action be taken today; b) that targets 33,
36 and 39/3/ should be hit by Admiral Sharp's forces; c) that target 32/4/ should be
undertaken in a joint effort by local forces; and d) that an announcement concerning the
removal of dependents could be made immediately after any action. [Omission in the source
text.] for recommendations as to the time-frame for evacuation of dependents, pointing out
that the President felt strongly about it. Mr. Bundy replied that the evacuation should be
done promptly but in an orderly fashion. Bundy also stressed the need for prompt decision
by the highest authority on their recommendations because of the problems associated with
the joint effort on target 32.
/3/The Dong Hoi Barracks, the Vit Thu Lu Barracks, and the Chap Le Army Barracks,
respectively.
/4/The Vu Con Barracks.
I immediately called the President, told him that we had received Saigon's
recommendations, and asked when he wished to meet again. The President suggested that
we meet at 1945 and asked who should be there beyond the group that had met in the
afternoon, plus the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President. I suggested that the CIA
should be represented and the President asked me to call General Carter. At this point I
called Mr. McNamara, told him of the meeting, and said that my car would pick him up at
his home. I asked a member of General Wheeler's staff to notify General Carter.
Subsequently, I received a second call from McGeorge Bundy, this time over a secure
telephone. Bundy said that they wished to make a joint announcement in Saigon after the
strike prior to any announcement in Washington and reiterated the great importance of joint
participation in the proposed strike action. I noted that this posed timing problems and read
to him a proposed cable to Admiral Sharp. Bundy said that the cable as drafted put them in
a time bind and asked if it were a decision by the highest authority to proceed as specified in
our draft cable. I replied negatively but said that General Wheeler and I would so
recommend to the highest authority. Bundy stressed again the need for a rapid decision. I
expressed the hope that I could call a decision to him by 2015 and assured him I would call
him as soon as a decision was reached. At 1920, General Wheeler and I left again for the
White House.
The National Security Council convened at 1935. Those present included the President, Mr.
McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Senator Mansfield, Speaker McCormack, Mr. Ball, Mr.
Llewellyn Thompson, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Carl Rowan, General Wheeler, General
Carter, Mr. Colby, Mr. Reedy, Mr. Moyers, Mr. Bromley Smith and myself.
At the beginning of the meeting, I reported on the McGeorge Bundy conversation and the
recommendations made by Saigon. The President then asked me to describe the targets
proposed to be struck, the North Vietnamese forces at these targets, and to estimate North
Vietnamese casualties both military and civilian. In turn, he asked General Wheeler to
explain the details of the proposed operation and to give his views of anticipated North
Vietnamese responses. General Wheeler and I responded to these questions. The President
then queried Mr. Ball as to his views on the recommended course of action and the
difficulties involved. Subsequently, he asked for the views of everyone around the table as
to the desirability of proceeding with the recommended course of action.
After full discussion, the President, on the recommendation of the NSC, authorized the
execution of the proposed course of action provided that Vietnamese clearance was
obtained.
I then left the meeting to communicate this decision to McGeorge Bundy in Saigon. I
further told Mr. Bundy that the decision had been made to evacuate all dependents from
Vietnam as rapidly as possible following the strike, and that there could be no reclama of
this decision. Bundy said that we already had military clearance; political clearance would
be had shortly. I indicated that we would await word of political clearance and stressed the
need to have it as soon as possible.
After this conversation I returned to the NSC meeting where a proposed press release for
issuance Sunday morning was being discussed. It was agreed that the NSC would
reconvene at 0800, 7 February, to discuss actions to be taken on Sunday and the issuance of
a public release.
Soon thereafter I received a call from McGeorge Bundy saying that political clearance had
been obtained. I relayed this to General Wheeler and directed him to issue the order of
execution, which he did. I also reported these actions to the President and those others still
present in the NSC meeting. We then reworked the proposed press release to be issued after
the NSC meeting on Sunday morning as well as a release to be issued on the evacuation of
dependents. General Wheeler and I then left the White House to return to the Pentagon.
At the Pentagon I then cleared a proposed cable with respect to the alerting of additional
forces for possible movement./5/ I also authorized the use of ten additional aircraft for the
strike on target 33. And, finally, I authorized the removal of Farm Gate markings from U.S.manned aircraft for the strike on target 32 if this could be done without delaying the strike.
/5/Not further identified.
General Wheeler and I then talked to Ambassador Taylor and Mr. McNaughton on the
telephone. General Taylor asked that we delay the time over target for targets 33, 36, and 39
by one hour, making the new TOT 1600 Vietnam time. General Wheeler and I approved
this change dependent upon Admiral Sharp's agreement. Thereafter, Admiral Sharp said that
it was infeasible to make this change and Ambassador Taylor agreed to the original time
over target of 1500 H.
At 2330 I met with General Burchinal, his staff, Mr. Lennartson and Colonel Smith. At this
time I indicated the nature and content of the charts and maps which would be required for a
background press conference on Sunday morning and discussed the necessary back-up
materials. I then met with General Burchinal to review the status of our preparations, in
particular a requirement for military aircraft for the evacuation of dependents. At this time I
authorized General Burchinal to move MATS aircraft as far as Clark Field to be in position
to expedite a dependent evacuation. I also asked General Burchinal to prepare another list of
additional forces which might be required should the North Vietnamese and/or the
ChiComs take escalatory action.
We also discussed the possible ChiCom reactions and the ability of the U.S. to move ground
forces into the area if the ChiComs moved on the ground. General Burchinal said that he
was satisfied that our plans were in good shape and that we could respond promptly.
7 February
At 0105, I received the first report of aircraft airborne on their mission--eight A1H planes
had departed the Ranger on the way to target 36 with a predicted time over target of 0700Z
(0200 Washington time)./6/
/6/The President's Daily Diary indicates that he received telephone calls from Vance at
3:40, 4:10, 4:55, and 5:10 a.m. on February 7, apparently reporting on the results of the air
strikes. (Johnson Library)
80. Summary Notes of the 546th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, February 7, 1965, 8-9:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top
Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. For another record
of this meeting, see Document 81
Reprisal Strikes in North Vietnam
There was a discussion of the statement to be issued from the White House announcing the
reprisal air strikes in North Vietnam.
Senator Mansfield: Why cannot we handle this matter through the United Nations? Can't the
Geneva powers act?
The President: This cannot be done.
Secretary McNamara: The surprise attack on our base at Pleiku resulted in 7 U.S. deaths
and 109 wounded. Numerous U.S. planes were damaged.
In reprisal, four army barracks in North Vietnam were attacked. Three of the four targets
were weathered in. Either the attack planes did not take off or they went to the target but
could not see enough to drop their bombs. A total of 33 attack aircraft were involved, plus 8
planes providing aircap and 8 planes engaged in flak suppression.
As to our next move, Ambassador Taylor recommends we attack the three targets not hit
because of weather./2/ Notwithstanding his recommendation, no U.S. planes should take
part in a second attack. A South Vietnamese attack on their target is acceptable. We would
provide an aircap of 4 to 8 planes plus 4 to 8 flak suppression planes to assist the South
Vietnamese.
/2/This recommendation was made by Taylor in telegram 2419 from Saigon, 3 p.m. Saigon
time February 7, and received at the Department of State at 2:08 a.m. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Under Secretary Ball: The reprisal by the South Vietnamese would be for the Viet Cong
attack on a South Vietnam village. This is a different situation from the strikes authorized
yesterday. We need to avoid appearing to respond only when Americans are attacked.
Secretary McNamara is right in recommending that we should not hit today the three targets
not hit yesterday. If we do so, the Communists will get a wrong signal and think that we are
launching an offensive. Our officials in Saigon want a graduated response to the entire
North Vietnamese military effort rather than merely retaliatory strikes to attacks by the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.
General Wheeler: The Chiefs believe that ground action against the North Vietnamese effort
is adequate to reverse the situation. Air strikes on the three targets are not necessary from a
military point of view. However, a South Vietnamese attack on their target is acceptable.
Ambassador Thompson: We have completed our reprisal action for the North Vietnamese
surprise attack. Another attack cannot be called reprisal. The punishment should fit the
crime. No additional air strikes should be made now.
(The statement to be issued by the White House was approved and given to George Reedy
for release to the press./3/)
/3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 238-239.
Secretary Dillon: If we encourage an air strike by the South Vietnamese, everyone will
think it is a U.S. attack. Therefore, we should send along U.S. planes to ensure that the
South Vietnamese strike is successful.
Representative Ford: Why should we only hit one out of four targets? If the plan to strike
four was good, why should we not complete it?
Several Council members explained the nature of the decision to make a reprisal strike only.
The President: We need to know the extent of the damage caused by yesterday's strike. This
will have a bearing on future decisions. We should give consideration to Taylor's
recommendation but for the time being, we should approve a strike by the South
Vietnamese only. Bomb damage assessment flights by U.S. planes should be flown.
Secretary McNamara, turning to the question of withdrawing dependents, circulated a text
of a White House release covering the subject. It would announce the immediate withdrawal
of dependents or their withdrawal in a two-week period, as Ambassador Taylor prefers.
The President: For 15 months we have been trying to bring about the withdrawal of
dependents. Thus, a decision to do so within 15 days is acceptable. The number of days in
which they will be withdrawn can be worked out so long as it is absolutely certain that the
dependents are coming out.
Secretary McNamara: The Hawk Battalion will go ashore at Danang today. Some planes
which were diverted and went on to Saigon can be used for withdrawing dependents. As
many as 400 or 500 can be removed on these planes.
The President: Do we think that Saigon is going to be a target? If so, why should we make
any announcement about the withdrawal of dependents? We should hold the announcement
until we have talked to Ambassador Taylor by phone. The word "orderly" should be taken
out of the announcement.
The announcement as finally released is attached./4/
/4/Not attached, but see ibid., p. 239.
Also attached is the transcript of the Press Secretary's briefing at 10:00 a.m. February 7./5/
/5/Attached, but not printed.
Bromley Smith
2. Senator Mansfield suggested that the release give particular emphasis to the President's
resolution to avoid any wider war and that it indicate that we are prepared to bring this
incident to the UN or to a reconvened Geneva Conference. The President said that his
advisors had told him that it was hopeless to expect anything out of the UN, which Mr. Ball
confirmed from Ambassador Stevenson. With respect to the Geneva Conference, the
President said that he would be prepared to consider this somewhat later but not at this
moment. Mr. Ball emphasized that any Geneva Conference should only be entered from a
position of greater strength than we now have.
3. Mr. McNamara then gave a review of the situation. He brought out that Ambassador
Taylor had recommended that all additional targets not hit on the first run be undertaken on
the second day. However, Mr. McNamara said he and Mr. Ball were of the opinion that
additional U.S. strikes would not be appropriate but that a VNAF strike with U.S. support
was not only appropriate but quite essential, in order to demonstrate full Vietnamese
participation. Mr. McNamara and Mr. Ball based their recommendation on the desirability
that Hanoi and Moscow not be led to believe that the U.S. had begun a full-blown offensive
effort. They recommended that this be a matter of separate consideration and decision and
not to be the result of bad weather. Mr. William Bundy reported that Ambassador Taylor
will probably recommend such a steady increase in pressures but he also agreed that this
should be considered separately perhaps after Mr. McGeorge Bundy's return. General
Wheeler pointed out that the JCS believes that increased military pressures are needed but
that these are not needed immediately and he agreed with the recommendation. Ambassador
Thompson pointed out that another American strike could be construed as an American
campaign whereas a VNAF strike would be comparatively easy to explain. The latter also
left Kosygin some leeway. Senator Mansfield asked whether Kosygin would not consult
with Peking on his way back to Moscow. Ambassador Thompson said that he might consult
but that the leadership of the Soviet Union today is so much a collegial affair that no
decision could be arrived at before Kosygin returned to Moscow to consult.
4. It was brought out that the VNAF alone might not do much but Mr. McNamara said they
definitely should try. Mr. Dillon wondered at the possible bad effects of a VNAF failure.
General Wheeler commented that they should be able to accomplish something, especially
with full American assistance in navigation, flak suppression, etc. Senator Mansfield agreed
with the current action as did the Speaker. The President said that he would agree with this
step but wait for Mr. Bundy's return before making any decisions as to further courses of
action.
5. Representative Ford stated that he found it difficult to understand why a plan that was
considered appropriate last night was now stopped when only halfway completed. The
President pointed out that the decision was to make a "prompt and adequate" response, that
no one other than those present knew how many targets were contemplated and that the one
target hit was by far the biggest and had the most potential for damage. He also said that he
wished to have a chance to review the matter with Mr. Bundy on his return before making
any decisions as to going further than the present. He added that a prompt, adequate and
joint (with the GVN) reply was what was sought. Representative Ford indicated that he
would prefer the original plan and Ambassador Taylor's recommendation. (Comment:
Representative Ford's raising this was partly caused by his reading a CIA summary/4/ that
preliminary post-strike reporting indicated that "at least some damage" was done. The
President picked this up and asked whether CIA had any separate reports, which General
Carter indicated was not the case. Mr. Vance and General Wheeler indicated that the
reporting did indicate very substantial damage to the target area.)
/2/On February 9 Dobrynin, on instructions from his government, made a formal oral reply
to Thompson regarding the U.S. reprisals against North Vietnam. The Soviet Government
refused to accept U.S. justifications for the bombing. Thompson's memorandum of their
conversation, in which he quotes Dobrynin's oral statement, is ibid., Presidential
Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, 1965. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for
publication in volume XIV.
84. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
En route from Saigon to Washington, February 7, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File,
McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II. top Secret. Bundy met with the President from 10:48 to
11:25 p.m. on February 7. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) At a press briefing at the White
House the following day, Press Secretary George Reedy said that Bundy had met with the
President about 11 p.m. the previous evening, but "there were no substantive conversations,
he merely left with the President a few written notes, a few papers for night reading." (Ibid.,
National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon,
Vol. II) This memorandum and annex were presumably among the papers left with the
President.
RE
The Situation in Vietnam
This memorandum attempts to describe the situation, the stakes and the measures which I
think should now be taken.
I. Summary Conclusions
The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action defeat appears
inevitable--probably not in a matter of weeks or perhaps even months, but within the next
year or so. There is still time to turn it around, but not much.
The stakes in Vietnam are extremely high. The American investment is very large, and
American responsibility is a fact of life which is palpable in the atmosphere of Asia, and
even elsewhere. The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our
influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden on the
Vietnamese themselves, and there is no way of negotiating ourselves out of Vietnam which
offers any serious promise at present. It is possible that at some future time a neutral nonCommunist force may emerge, perhaps under Buddhist leadership, but no such force
currently exists, and any negotiated U.S. withdrawal today would mean surrender on the
installment plan.
The policy of graduated and continuing reprisal outlined in Annex A is the most promising
course available, in my judgment. That judgment is shared by all who accompanied me
from Washington, and I think by all members of the country team.
The events of the last twenty-four hours have produced a practicable point of departure for
this policy of reprisal, and for the removal of U.S. dependents. They may also have
catalyzed the formation of a new Vietnamese government. If so, the situation may be at a
turning point.
There is much that can and should be done to support and to supplement our present effort,
while adding sustained reprisals. But I want to stress one important general conclusion
which again is shared by all members of my party: the U.S. mission is composed of
outstanding men, and U.S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed. None of
the special solutions or criticisms put forward with zeal by individual reformers in
government or in the press is of major importance, and many of them are flatly wrong. No
man is perfect, and not every tactical step of recent months has been perfectly chosen, but
when you described the Americans in Vietnam as your first team, you were right.
II. The General Situation
For the last year--and perhaps for longer--the overall situation in Vietnam has been
deteriorating. The Communists have been gaining and the anti-Communist forces have been
losing. As a result there is now great uncertainty among Vietnamese as well as Americans
as to whether Communist victory can be prevented. There is nervousness about the
determination of the U.S. Government. There is recrimination and fear among Vietnamese
political leaders. There is an appearance of wariness among some military leaders. There is
a worrisome lassitude among the Vietnamese generally. There is a distressing absence of
positive commitment to any serious social or political purpose. Outside observers are ready
to write the patient off. All of this tends to bring latent anti-Americanism dangerously near
to the surface.
To be an American in Saigon today is to have a gnawing feeling that time is against us.
Junior officers in all services are able, zealous and effective within the limits of their means.
Their morale is sustained by the fact that they know that they are doing their jobs well and
that they will not have to accept the responsibility for defeat. But near the top, where
responsibility is heavy and accountability real, one can sense the inner doubts of men whose
outward behavior remains determined.
The situation is not all black. The overall military effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed
forces in open combat continues to grow. The month of January was one of outstanding and
genuine success in offensive military action, showing the highest gross count of Viet Cong
dead of any month of the war, and a very high ratio also of enemy to friendly losses. We
believe that General Westmoreland is right (and General Alsop wrong) when he says that
the Viet Cong do not now plan to expose themselves to large-scale military engagements in
which their losses on the average would be high and their gains low. (The operation at Binh
Gia/2/ is analyzed as a special case, representing the taking of a friendly Catholic village as
bait rather than a decision to force pitched battle--more such cases are expected and the
particular military problem posed is difficult.)
/2/See footnote 5, Document 14.
Moreover, the Vietnamese people, although war weary, are also remarkably tough and
resilient, and they do not find the prospect of Communist domination attractive. Their
readiness to quit is much lower than the discouraging events of recent months might lead
one to expect. It is probable that most Vietnamese think American withdrawal is more
likely than an early switch to neutralism or surrender by major elements within Vietnam.
Nevertheless the social and political fabric is stretched thin, and extremely unpleasant
surprises are increasingly possible--both political and military.
And it remains a stubborn fact that the percentage of the countryside which is dominated or
threatened by the Viet Cong continues to grow. Even in areas which are "cleared," the
follow-on pacification is stalled because of widespread belief that the Viet Cong are going
to win in the long run. The areas which can be regarded as truly cleared and pacified and
safe are few and shrinking. (An important exception to this is the area of Saigon and its
immediate surroundings. The Hop Tac program of pacification in this area has not been an
unqualified success, but it has not been a failure, and it has certainly prevented any
strangling siege of Saigon. We did not have a chance to form an independent judgment on
Hop Tac, but we did conclude that whatever its precise measure of success, it is of great
importance that this operation be pursued with full vigor. That is the current policy of the
mission.)
III. The Political Situation
Next only to the overall state of the struggle against the Viet Cong, the shape and structure
of the government is the most important element of the Saigon situation. We made it our
particular business to examine the question whether and to what degree a stable government
is a necessity for the successful prosecution of our policy in Vietnam. We reached a mixed
conclusion.
For immediate purposes--and especially for the initiation of reprisal policy, we believe that
the government need be no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of raw
power while a weak caretaker government goes through the motions. Such a government
can execute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US/GVN
policy. That is about all it can do.
In the longer run, it is necessary that a government be established which will in one way or
another be able to maintain its political authority against all challenges over a longer time
than the governments of the last year and a half.
The composition and direction of such a government is a most difficult problem, and we do
not wholly agree with the mission in our estimate of its nature.
The mood of the mission with respect to the prospect of obtaining such a government is one
of pessimism and frustration. This is only natural in terms of the events of the past many
weeks. Two dominant themes predominate: a government headed by Khanh will be difficult
if not impossible to deal with and, in any case, would be short lived; the Buddhists (or,
more specifically, the few politically activist bonzes) must be confronted and faced down
(by military means if necessary) lest they maintain their power to unseat any government
that does not bow to their every demand. We tend to differ with the mission on both counts.
Specifically, we believe that General Khanh, with all his faults, is by long odds the
outstanding military man currently in sight--and the most impressive personality generally.
We do not share the conclusion of Ambassador Taylor that he must somehow be removed
from the military and political scene.
There are strong reasons for the Ambassador's total lack of confidence in Khanh. At least
twice Khanh has acted in ways that directly spoiled Ambassador Taylor's high hopes for
December. When he abolished the High National Council he undercut the prospect of the
stable government needed for Phase II action against the North. In January he overthrew
Huong just when the latter, in the Embassy's view, was about to succeed in putting the
bonzes in their place.
Khanh is not an easy man to deal with. It is clear that he takes a highly tactical view of
truth, although General Westmoreland asserts that Khanh has never deceived him. He is
intensely ambitious and intent above all else on maintaining and advancing his own power.
He gravely lacks the confidence of many of his colleagues--military and civilian--and he
seems not to be personally popular with the public. He is correctly assessed as tricky. He
remains able, energetic, perceptive and resilient, and in our judgment he will pursue the
fight against the Communists as long as he can count on U.S. help. (If he should conclude
that the U.S. was violently against him personally, he might well seek a way to power by
some anti-American path, a path which would lead to disaster for both Vietnam and the
United States.)
But our principal reason for opposing any sharp break with Khanh is that we see no one else
in sight with anything like his ability to combine military authority with some sense of
politics.
We also differ from the Embassy in our estimate of the Buddhist leaders. The dominant
Embassy view is that "the Buddhists" are really just a handful of irresponsible and
designing clerics and that they must be curbed by firmness. We agree that they may well
have to be limited at some point, especially in their use of mobs, but we also think they
must be offered some accommodation.
We feel that the operative concept should be incorporation into the affairs of government
rather than confrontation. This is easier said than done, because the Buddhists have many of
the bad habits of men who have prospered by irresponsible opposition. Still there are signs
that both Buddhist laymen and bonzes are now taking a more positive stance. We feel that
the mission might do more in attempting to direct or channel the Buddhists into a more
useful and positive role--an active rather than a passive approach. The Buddhists now play a
key role in the balance of political forces, so that something more than "confrontation" must
be achieved if there is to be any active government at all.
Having registered these two immediate and important differences of emphasis, we should
add that in our judgment the mission has acted at about the right level of general
involvement in the problem of Vietnamese government-making. American advice is sought
by all elements, and all try to bend it to their own ends. The mission attempts to keep before
all elements the importance of stable government, and it quietly presses the value of those
who are known to be good, solid, able ministerial timber.
In a situation in which confidence is low and uncertainty great, strongly ambitious forces
like Khanh and the Buddhists might react very vigorously against an overt American
attempt to form or actively support a government against their liking. Anti-Americanism is
a theme that is potentially explosive, and therefore tempting to those who feel that we are
blocking their ambitions. This is one lesson, to us, of the outburst in Hue last month.
On the other hand, no power whose stake is as great and whose presence as clear as those of
the United States in Vietnam can afford to stand aside entirely, and such a passive posture
would not be understood or approved by the Vietnamese themselves.
It is important, therefore, that the mission maintain a constant and active concern with the
politics of government-making. This it is doing. While it is very difficult to second-guess
this effort, we do recommend a telegram of guidance which might take into account the
marginal differences from mission thinking which are suggested above. In the light of
further discussion, a message of this sort will be drafted for consideration.
IV. Strengthening the Pacification Program
If we suppose that new hopes are raised--at least temporarily--by a reprisal program, and if
we suppose further that a government somewhat better than the bare minimum is
established, the most urgent order of business will then be the improvement and broadening
of the pacification program, especially in its non-military elements.
The mission fully concurs in the importance of this effort. We believe, however, that
consideration should be given to important modifications in its organization for this
purpose. In particular we believe that there should be intensive effort to strengthen our
program at the margin between military advice and economic development--in the area
which implies civil government for the soldiers and police action for the aid mission. These
efforts, important as they are understood to be, are somehow at the edge of vision for both
parties. General Westmoreland and his people inevitably think first of military programs,
though they have been imaginative and understanding about the importance of other
aspects. Mr. Killen and the USOM people are centrally concerned with problems of aid and
of economic improvement, although they talk with conviction and energy about their
increasing police effort. It remains a fact that its own organization for helping to provide
real security for an area which has been "cleared" in crude military terms is unfinished
business for the U.S. mission. What is true of our side is doubly true of the Vietnamese.
We do not offer a definite solution to this problem. We are inclined to suggest, however,
that one important and unemployed asset is the Special Forces of the Defense Department.
Because of the predominant role of the U.S. military, and because of the generous spirit and
broad mind of General Westmoreland himself, we are inclined to believe that the easiest
growing edge for this work may be through the use of some of these versatile and flexible
units.
We would think it important, however, that an effort of this kind be coordinated at a high
level between the Defense Department and AID, and we believe that a joint mission which
would include either Director Bell or Mr. Gaud from AID is urgently needed for the
purpose of building this missing link into our program.
V. A Sense of Positive Hope
Vietnamese talk is full of the need for "revolution." Vietnamese practice is empty of action
to match the talk--so much so that the word "revolution" sometimes seems to have no real
meaning. Yet in fact there is plainly a deep and strong yearning among the young and the
unprivileged for a new and better social order. This is what the Buddhist leaders are groping
toward; this is what the students and young Turk generals are seeking. This yearning does
not find an adequate response in American policy as Vietnamese see it. This is one cause of
latent anti-American feeling. We only perceived this problem toward the end of our visit.
We think it needs urgent further attention. We make no present recommendations. We do
believe that over the long pull our military and political firmness must be matched by our
political and economic support for the hopes that are embodied to Vietnamese in the word
"revolution."
VI. The Basic U.S. Commitment
The prospect in Vietnam is grim. The energy and persistence of the Viet Cong are
astonishing. They can appear anywhere--and at almost any time. They have accepted
extraordinary losses and they come back for more. They show skill in their sneak attacks
and ferocity when cornered. Yet the weary country does not want them to win.
There are a host of things the Vietnamese need to do better and areas in which we need to
help them. The place where we can help most is in the clarity and firmness of our own
commitment to what is in fact as well as in rhetoric a common cause. There is one grave
weakness in our posture in Vietnam which is within our own power to fix--and that is a
widespread belief that we do not have the will and force and patience and determination to
high visibility such as the Pleiku incident. Later, we might retaliate against the assassination
of a province chief, but not necessarily the murder of a hamlet official; we might retaliate
against a grenade thrown into a crowded cafe in Saigon, but not necessarily to a shot fired
into a small shop in the countryside.
3. Once a program of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be necessary to connect
each specific act against North Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. It should be
possible, for example, to publish weekly lists of outrages in the South and to have it clearly
understood that these outrages are the cause of such action against the North as may be
occurring in the current period. Such a more generalized pattern of reprisal would remove
much of the difficulty involved in finding precisely matching targets in response to specific
atrocities. Even in such a more general pattern, however, it would be important to insure
that the general level of reprisal action remained in close correspondence with the level of
outrages in the South. We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world,
that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or
stopped--and that we are not attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam.
4. In the early stages of such a course, we should take the appropriate occasion to make
clear our firm intent to undertake reprisals on any further acts, major or minor, that appear
to us and the GVN as indicating Hanoi's support. We would announce that our two
governments have been patient and forbearing in the hope that Hanoi would come to its
senses without the necessity of our having to take further action; but the outrages continue
and now we must react against those who are responsible; we will not provoke; we will not
use our force indiscriminately; but we can no longer sit by in the face of repeated acts of
terror and violence for which the DRV is responsible.
5. Having once made this announcement, we should execute our reprisal policy with as low
a level of public noise as possible. It is to our interest that our acts should be seen--but we
do not wish to boast about them in ways that make it hard for Hanoi to shift its ground. We
should instead direct maximum attention to the continuing acts of violence which are the
cause of our continuing reprisals.
6. This reprisal policy should begin at a low level. Its level of force and pressure should be
increased only gradually--and as indicated above it should be decreased if VC terror visibly
decreases. The object would not be to "win" an air war against Hanoi, but rather to
influence the course of the struggle in the South.
7. At the same time it should be recognized that in order to maintain the power of reprisal
without risk of excessive loss, an "air war" may in fact be necessary. We should therefore
be ready to develop a separate justification for energetic flak suppression and if necessary
for the destruction of Communist air power. The essence of such an explanation should be
that these actions are intended solely to insure the effectiveness of a policy of reprisal, and
in no sense represent any intent to wage offensive war against the North. These distinctions
should not be difficult to develop.
8. It remains quite possible, however, that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the
level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning.
It may even get us beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peiping, if there is Communist
counter-action. We and the GVN should also be prepared for a spurt of VC terrorism,
especially in urban areas, that would dwarf anything yet experienced. These are the risks of
any action. They should be carefully reviewed--but we believe them to be acceptable.
9. We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a continuous operation.
Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to "spectacular" outrages would lack the
persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the
Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own
program. The Gulf of Tonkin affair produced a sharp upturn in morale in South Vietnam.
When it remained an isolated episode, however, there was a severe relapse. It is the great
merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of
their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort.
III. Expected Effect of Sustained Reprisal Policy
1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement
of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of
affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but
longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South--in the minds of
the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres.
2. Predictions of the effect of any given course of action upon the states of mind of people
are difficult. It seems very clear that if the United States and the Government of Vietnam
join in a policy of reprisal, there will be a sharp immediate increase in optimism in the
South, among nearly all articulate groups. The Mission believes--and our own conversations
confirm--that in all sectors of Vietnamese opinion there is a strong belief that the United
States could do much more if it would, and that they are suspicious of our failure to use
more of our obviously enormous power. At least in the short run, the reaction to reprisal
policy would be very favorable.
3. This favorable reaction should offer opportunity for increased American influence in
pressing for a more effective government--at least in the short run. Joint reprisals would
imply military planning in which the American role would necessarily be controlling, and
this new relation should add to our bargaining power in other military efforts--and
conceivably on a wider plane as well if a more stable government is formed. We have the
whip hand in reprisals as we do not in other fields.
4. The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese
factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government.
5. We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have
a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. This
is the strong opinion of CIA Saigon. It is based upon reliable reports of the initial Viet Cong
reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and also upon the solid general assessment that the
determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major
items in Viet Cong confidence.
6. The long-run effect of reprisals in the South is far less clear. It may be that like other
stimulants, the value of this one would decline over time. Indeed the risk of this result is
large enough so that we ourselves believe that a very major effort all along the line should
be made in South Vietnam to take full advantage of the immediate stimulus of reprisal
policy in its early stages. Our object should be to use this new policy to effect a visible
upward turn in pacification, in governmental effectiveness, in operations against the Viet
Cong, and in the whole U.S./GVN relationship. It is changes in these areas that can have
(7) We should plan quiet diplomatic communication of the precise meaning of what we are
and are not doing, to Hanoi, to Peking and to Moscow.
(8) We should be prepared to defend and to justify this new policy by concentrating
attention in every forum upon its cause--the aggression in the South.
(9) We should accept discussion on these terms in any forum, but we should not now accept
the idea of negotiations of any sort except on the basis of a stand down of Viet Cong
violence. A program of sustained reprisal, with its direct link to Hanoi's continuing
aggressive actions in the South, will not involve us in nearly the level of international
recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North program which was not so
connected. For this reason the international pressures for negotiation should be quite
manageable.
87. Summary Notes of the 547th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, February 8, 1965, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top
Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The meeting lasted until 11:35 a.m. (Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary) For another record of the same meeting, see Document 88.
The President asked Secretary McNamara to begin the meeting by reporting on the results
of the U.S. raid in North Vietnam which took place yesterday against the Dong Hoi
barracks.
Secretary McNamara said that bomb damage photographs indicated ten buildings were hit,
two damaged, others burning. He described the raid as being moderate to good. He also
reported on the air strike carried out by the South Vietnamese Air Force, with U.S.
assistance, against the Chap Le army barracks. He said there were very good results from
this strike based on reports received so far.
Acting Secretary Ball spoke of the effect of the North Vietnamese attack on Soviet Premier
Kosygin's visit to Hanoi. He said it may be that Soviet Union was not aware of plans for the
North Vietnamese attack. If so, they may have been mouse-trapped by Hanoi. If they had
known of the attack, the Russians might not have sent Kosygin to Hanoi. The North
Vietnamese action has put the Russians on the spot. We have talked to the Russians in an
effort to explain why we had to retaliate as we did. Our hope is that they will understand
why we acted as we did, at least to the extent of being annoyed by the North Vietnamese
action.
Mr. Ball informed the group that we had sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations
a letter/2/ stating our case. The purpose of this letter was to preempt any effort of a UN
member to call a UN Security Council Meeting to discuss the situation in Vietnam. We are
quite ready to explain our case to the Security Council but we wish to control the
circumstances of that discussion. He recalled when we had proceeded in a similar manner
The President then read a battle damage report of the attack on the Chap Le barracks and on
the Dong Hoi target. (The document from which he read is attached. Tab C.)/5/
/5/Attached, but not printed.
In response to the President's question, General Wheeler spoke of the difficulty of insuring
the security at the Pleiku base. He described the dropping of mortars and went into the
details with respect to what he described as a skillful sneak attack. He said the only real
security for an airfield is full combat control of the perimeter two miles out from the field.
In guerrilla warfare such as exists in Vietnam, there are no rear areas. He called attention to
the fact that we must rely on the Vietnamese to carry out the security task because our
forces are there as advisers and are insufficient in number to insure security of such an area
as the Pleiku airfield.
Further details of the Vietnamese attack were given by General Goodpaster who, as a
member of the Bundy group, had just returned from the area and had discussed the attack
with those who were engaged.
The President added that we were up against highly skilled guerrilla fighters. He said there
is no way to insure against such attacks as that which occurred at Pleiku short of sending a
very large number of U.S. troops to Vietnam.
Representative Ford asked whether McGeorge Bundy was now recommending the program
proposed last December./6/
/6/Ford was referring to the program of action that Ambassador Taylor apparently described
to members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 3, 1964; see vol. I, p.
974.
The President responded by saying that Mr. Bundy had brought back from Saigon the views
of our country team there. These views had been discussed with the President's advisers and
an agreed recommendation had been made to the President.
Representative Ford asked whether the program involved additional U.S. personnel and
additional financial assistance.
The President replied that our present needs are met. If the response to our action is larger
than we expect, we will then of course make a request for a larger amount of U.S. military
assistance and will need additional personnel.
McGeorge Bundy said that events had forced us to act as we have--that action had not been
based on his group's findings. A rolling consensus as to the proper course of action had
developed after he returned to Washington from Saigon.
Representative Ford asked whether all we intended to do was to react to Viet Cong
provocations.
The President replied that all Viet Cong actions did call for a response but we did not intend
to limit our actions to retaliating against Viet Cong attacks.
Senator Dirksen asked what effect on the morale of our forces in Vietnam and on South
Vietnamese government itself would result from our decision to move our dependents out
of Saigon.
Secretary McNamara replied that our action would be explained on the basis of our
intention to clear the decks for further action rather than as an indication of our intention to
retreat.
Senator Dirksen asked what the effect would be if the United States pulled out of South
Vietnam./7/
/7/In a February 8 memorandum to the President Carl Rowan noted, "When Senator
Dirksen today raised the question of what would happen if we decided to pull out of
Vietnam completely, I passed you a note indicating that a USIA study indicates that there
would be dismay in many parts of the world, especially in countries like India and Japan.
This note was based on a compilation of world opinion that I asked my Research Service to
do just a few days ago." Rowan said he was forwarding this compilation to the President "in
the event that you will find it useful in discussions with others who may be entertaining the
notion that we can turn tail and run out of Viet Nam without suffering drastic consequences
in other parts of the world." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, Vol. XXVII, Cables)
McGeorge Bundy replied that if we pulled out there would be a strong feeling in the nations
of Southeast Asia that we had failed to carry out our policy of assisting the Vietnamese to
continue as an independent state. The consequences in Southeast Asia of our pull-out would
be very large. In other parts of the world, the effect would also be very serious, even to the
extent of affecting the morale in Berlin.
Senator Dirksen asked Director McCone what the reaction of the Chinese Communists
would be.
Mr. McCone said we did not know as yet, but he recalled that Peking's reaction to the Gulf
of Tonkin incident had been minor.
The President said that the Congressional Resolution on Vietnam plus the legal power of
the Presidency made it possible for him to carry out at a manageable level an effort to deter,
destroy and diminish the strength of the North Vietnamese aggressors and to try to convince
them to leave South Vietnam alone. He said that the views of a few Senators could not
control his actions. He intended to use the Congressional Resolution carefully but
effectively. He repeated his view that we now have in Saigon the best possible people.
Ambassador Taylor had his pick of personnel throughout the world. It is true that we have
real trouble in Vietnam but we are not going to pull out.
Senator Dirksen asked what use could be made of the information which he had heard
during the meeting.
The President replied that he had instructed McGeorge Bundy to talk to the press, telling
them as much as he possibly could without affecting the national interest./8/ He referred to
the outstanding TV presentation made yesterday by Secretary McNamara and Acting
Secretary Ball./9/ He said there was very little information which the government had which
was not already in the public domain. We cannot say we are seeking to broaden the war, or
say that we are going to withdraw. We can say that if the Vietnamese will cease their
aggression, we will pull out. He asked those present not to discuss publicly our military
actions but he said they could say that our actions would be kept at a manageable level.
/8/A transcript of McGeorge Bundy's and George Reedy's White House Background
Briefing on February 8 is ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy-Saigon, Vol. I.
/9/For text of McNamara's opening statement at the news conference, see Department of
State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 239-240.
myself privately, recalled that I had warned him that some catastrophic event was bound to
happen and that he had to take positive actions against the North.)
/4/Apparently a reference to McCone's meeting with the President at 3:25 p.m. on February
3; see Document 61.
Bundy generally agreed, indicating that his use of the word reprisal inferred a continuing
series of actions, but that they would be "publicized as reprisals." He said he did not feel
that we should just sit back until another Pleiku incident occurred and then start another
reprisal. However, it was obvious that Bundy was shifting his ground somewhat as his
paper pretty definitely ties reprisals to specific acts of the VC. Bundy warned of the danger
of lifting the problem off the shoulders of the South Vietnamese and creating a North
Vietnamese-U.S. war situation.
Ball agreed with my concept. He seemed to argue for positive action. He thought that slow
action would be costly and quick action on our part and sustained action might very
possibly affect ChiCom and Soviet reactions which would be more favorable to our purpose
than otherwise.
Dillon stated that faster action may bring us to the conference table earlier than otherwise.
Bundy raised the question of whether we should go to the conference table.
Secretary McNamara then summarized the situation as follows:
1. There was no disagreement around the table that more military actions by the U.S.
against the NVN were indicated.
2. Actions against NVN would soon bring a confrontation with the MIG's and we must
expect that we would be obliged to take the MIG's out in 3 to 6 weeks.
After an extended discussion it was agreed that Bundy and McCone were in substantial
agreement that the action must be dynamic, must be positive, McNamara's statement that
we would be in confrontation with the MIG's between 3 to 6 weeks was probably correct
and that at that point we would have to take them out.
Thompson issued a word of caution. He thought that further strikes would cause the Soviets
to move. He reasoned we should not do anything until the Soviets come in with their
response and seemed to be implying that our whole South Vietnamese policy must be
governed by what the Soviets say. Thompson reviewed his talk with Dobrynin in which he
made the point that the North Vietnamese had mousetrapped the Soviets by conducting this
Pleiku raid during Kosygin's presence in an effort to force Kosygin to make greater
concessions to Hanoi. Thompson believed that the Soviets would invite a conference.
General Wheeler then spoke of the improving Air Defense of North Vietnam, the
installation of radar and ground control equipment, the MIG's at Phuc Yen and the
possibility of moving them south. Militarily, he said, the cheapest thing would be to take all
the MIG's out right now. However, he agreed that a more gradual approach would probably
be more feasible. McNamara then developed what he called the Y Theory, stating that we
were now on the lower leg of a Y and would have to decide at some future time which
branch we were to go on. Throughout this exchange there was considerable discussion as to
the degree of escalation. Ball continued with the position that time increases the risk of
outside involvement. Also Thompson entered into the discussion and urged that we not do
anything for a couple of days until we see what signals come out of Moscow.
There was considerable discussion of the political stability of South Vietnam. In the final
analysis it was Bundy's opinion and all seemed to agree that our actions could be used to
influence Saigon to "pull up their socks." Bundy reviewed his two meetings with Khanh.
The first, upon his arrival which was cold and distant, both kind of feeling their way. The
second, after the Pleiku incident at which he informed Khanh of our decision to react, which
was a warm, frank and entirely satisfactory meeting. Bundy has considerably more
confidence in Khanh than is held by Ambassador Taylor or our Mission. Thompson then
raised the question if we should exacerbate the situation in anticipation of the March 1st
meeting of the Communist Parties. Throughout the morning he seemed to be raising issues
designed to stop action rather than move.
Finally, McNamara stated positively that we should move forward and should keep going.
Bundy summarized the sense of the meeting that without dissent, all agreed to act, that we
should apply force against the North, that it should be done against targets out of range of
the MIG's, that we should use this decision to stimulate Saigon to form a government that
was viable, that we should be careful and not announce this decision prior to receiving the
signal from the Soviets and that the actions should stay at the low level, i.e., should be
directed towards targets in the south rather than Phuc Yen Base.
The President entered and heard Bundy's summary.
The President then raised the question of a stable government, stating that he was concerned
that in December we placed the establishment of a stable government as a first priority and
things had gone down hill since then, not up. For that reason many of the decisions made in
December were not carried out. Bundy confirmed that we had made contingency decisions,
that they were very fluid, but nothing was done because of the internal South Vietnam
political problem. Bundy then reviewed in some considerable detail the political
developments in Saigon in December and January. The President raised the question of how
to go about getting the best possible government in South Vietnam and the consensus
seemed to be that since Max Taylor's efforts had been futile probably dynamic action on our
part would help. Throughout the discussion Bundy indicated that in his discussions with
many people, including Buddhist, Bonzes, Catholics, Military, etc., there was a feeling that
perhaps the U.S. was going to pull out. Therefore, he reasoned that action on our part and a
restatement of our position would be useful in reestablishing a strong government.
The President then re-asserted his determination to get the best possible government. He
also re-asserted his determination to get the dependents out. He said that we were standing
on shaky ground and he wished to avoid a rapid escalation and therefore favored a gradual
approach. He summarized the choices as follows:/5/ Get out of the area through a
Conference. He stated that in his opinion this was not the time as we would be admitting
defeat; therefore hoped that by careful and sustained responses we would gain strength
essential to stay in South Vietnam or gain an appropriate position for a Conference. The
President recognized the problem of delaying until after Kosygin left Hanoi but he believed
that Kosygin was there to give the North Vietnamese substantial help. He then raised the
question of what specific instructions were to go to Taylor. Should it be the December
Phase II decision, or this decision plus some more. He asked whether we want to commit
regardless of what the Soviets say. All agreed to the course of action discussed above.
/5/There was apparently some confusion at this point in the dictation and transcription of
McCone's memorandum.
At this point I expressed very strong opinion that I felt that our actions would not be
positive enough, and would not be taken in a sustained and consistent manner. I urged that
we organize to strike every day or at least every second day and that we carry it on
regardless of what the Soviets say or what the Chinese Communists say or what anybody
else says. In other words, my differing with the proposals of Bundy was that I proposed a
more rapid cadence of the operation; furthermore I agreed that we should make a final effort
to improve the government.
In summary of this part of the meeting, it appeared to me that starting with the idea of
"reprisals" which would be taken against specific acts such as another Pleiku, the sense of
the meeting turned in the direction of sustained action which I advocated and others fell into
line although I am not sure from the discussions which ensued when the Leadership
appeared, that the President is fully committed to this course of action.
Then Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Ford and McCormack entered. All others remained
except Dillon, Gaud and 3 or 4 staff people. McNamara summarized the situation as
mentioned above.
Ball mentioned the political problems such as Kosygin's presence, belief that the North
Vietnamese mousetrapped Kosygin and stated that Stevenson had addressed a letter to the
Security Council. Thompson reviewed his meeting at his residence on Sunday morning with
Dobrynin, at which time he gave Dobrynin the estimate that Hanoi had acted to pressure
Kosygin during his visit.
The President then reviewed the studies made in November-December, the instructions
given to Taylor to (1) create a strong government, (2) remove dependents, and (3) to
proceed with the courses of action agreed to and approved last November.
Bundy then made a report on his trip, emphasizing that things have been going down hill;
that one of the serious problems was the doubt in the minds of a great many people
concerning the U.S. intentions. He emphasized disappointment in SVN that the Tonkin Gulf
incident, which gave a great lift, was not pursued further and this caused the SVN leaders to
look over their shoulders at what was really the U.S. intention and long-range purpose.
The President then questioned General Wheeler about the security of our bases. He asked
for an explanation of why better security could not be provided. Wheeler stated that security
was in the hands of the SVN; long-range mortars had about a 2-1/2 mile range and the
shorter range mortars about a mile or mile and a half range. He said the SVN had border
patrols, but that they had been successfully evaded. He wound up by stating that in a
guerrilla-type war it is impossible to protect an installation, particularly an airfield.
Action: I don't believe this is true. I think that the Clandestine Services might play a part
here. It seems to me that we could create a net of informants in the villages around each one
of the airfields and this might cost some money but would be so set up that we would be
advised. I have spoken to Helms about this and wish to see if it is at all possible to work out
a plan.
Dirksen then asked if the Vietnam troops were well trained. Goodpaster said, "Yes,
generally, although there are some variations." Ford asked if Bundy's recommendations
involved merely the carrying out of the operations agreed upon in December. All agreed.
Ford then asked if more money and men are required. McNamara said, "not in the initial
stages," but he reserved his position and stated that if any escalation beyond that expected
developed, a supplemental would be called for. The President supported him in that. Ford
then asked if our action was in response to North Vietnamese action. The President made it
clear that this was what the case was. Dirksen asked what was the effect of the removal of
the dependents on the morale. McNamara responded that he thought there would be some
deterioration but it would not be bad because of the method that was being employed.
Dirksen then asked about the results of a U.S. pullout from South Vietnam, indicating that
this would be hotly debated both in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and on the
Floor. Bundy outlined the consequences which were the standard argument.
The President then wound up the meeting by stating that it was incumbent upon him as
President to conduct our activities in South Vietnam in order to stop aggression and to
destroy the aggressor if necessary but in any event to take such actions as might be required
in support of the free peoples of South Vietnam.
89. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)
to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by
David H. Henry of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs.
Washington, February 8, 1965.
SUBJECT
Soviet Reaction to Attacks on North Vietnam--Information Memorandum
We are inclined to expect a hard Soviet reaction to the North Vietnam strikes, despite the
fact that Soviet propaganda has been rather mild thus far. (On important issues Soviet
propaganda tends to be moderate and imprecise until a governmental decision has been
taken.)
We believe that the Soviet Government will feel that it has received a direct insult and
challenge because of Kosygin's presence in Hanoi. The Soviets will probably feel that their
prestige has been seriously damaged and that they must take some positive action to save
face. Moreover they will be impelled in the same direction by their desire to wean North
Vietnam away from China, and by their need to prove to smaller Communist states that
Soviet commitments are valid and Soviet protection dependable. Finally, the USSR would
appreciably reduce its voice and influence in all of Southeast Asia by failure to respond to
what the Communists must consider a challenge. The USSR could scarcely save its prestige
if it failed to act, when Kosygin only the day before repeated the Soviet Government's
commitment: "We sternly declare that the Soviet Union will not remain indifferent to the
destiny of a brotherly socialist country and is ready to give the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam all necessary assistance if the aggressors dare to encroach upon the independence
and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."
The possibility that the Soviet Government will be angry with the North Vietnamese for
getting them into this uncomfortable position does not reduce the pressures for action
outlined above.
The Soviet reaction, we believe, will take two forms. First on the ground itself the Soviet
Government will probably grant extensive and impressive military assistance to North
Vietnam, particularly defensive and perhaps also offensive air armament. The USSR will
also find its arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute weakened and be compelled to adjust
itself, at least superficially, toward the Chinese viewpoint. This is not to suggest, however,
that the Soviet Government will increase its risk of its own forces' involvement in the Far
Eastern conflict.
Secondly, we believe U.S.-USSR bilateral relations will be affected adversely. The Soviet
leadership will undoubtedly consider as a personal challenge the fact that the U.S. chose the
moment of Kosygin's visit to attack North Vietnam, and will be little swayed by the
argument that provocation was given. It is difficult to estimate how serious and widespread
will be the damage to our bilateral relations. Obvious possibilities are the cooling off on the
exchange of high level visits, demonstrations against our Moscow Embassy, a slowing up of
cultural exchanges, or a recall of their Ambassador for consultation. Even increased
harassment in Berlin can not be excluded.
In order to reduce the impact of these developments on our bilateral relations we suggest
that we should attempt to be as forthcoming as possible on non-vital issues in those
relations during the next few weeks. For example, we might make an extra effort to obtain
ratification of the Consular Convention as soon as possible (if the temper of Congress is not
too adverse). Any action on our part which would enable the Soviet Government to point to
concrete gains for its "peaceful coexistence" policy would help to blunt the Soviet reaction
to the North Vietnam attacks.
Since the above was typed we have received the text of a Soviet Government statement/2/
which tends to reinforce some of the foregoing points. In speaking of the effect on U.S.USSR bilateral relations the statement says:
/2/Not found.
"This process is incompatible with aggressive manifestations in politics, capable of
cancelling out various steps undertaken in the interests of improving Soviet-American
relations."
The statement concludes:
"In the face of the above-mentioned U.S. actions, the Soviet Union will be forced together
with its allies and friends to take further measures to safeguard the security and strengthen
the defense capability of the DRV. No one should doubt that the Soviet Union will do this,
that the Soviet people will fulfill its international duty to the fraternal socialist country."
90. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/
Washington, February 8, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam (Misc) I. Top Secret;
Limit Distribution. The date is handwritten on the source text.
SUBJECT
Varying Estimates of Consequences for US Courses of Action in Vietnam
You may be interested in certain differences comparing the White House memorandum of
February 7, "The Situation in Vietnam"/2/ with the unanimously agreed interagency
intelligence assessments contained in DIA-CIA-State memorandum "Probable Communist
Reactions to US Option C or C-Prime Measures" of November 26, 1964,/3/ and SNIE 1065 "Communist Military Capabilities and Near-Term Intentions in Laos and South
Vietnam" of February 4, 1965./4/
/2/Document 84.
/3/Not found.
/4/SNIE 10-65 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume
XXVIII.
Incomprehensibly to me, the White House memorandum discusses the risks of sustained US
air strikes against North Vietnam without examining Chinese Communist responses.
However, the two intelligence community products estimate Chinese Communist air
intervention to be quite likely at some stage in this very process.
Again in a reversal of our hitherto conventional rationale on this subject, the White House
memorandum posits these strikes as primarily directed toward improving morale in South
Vietnam, and only secondarily and eventually affecting North Vietnam's support for the
war. The intelligence community estimate of November 26 anticipates an initial elation in
South Vietnam followed by a further let-down if the attacks against North Vietnam do not
lead quickly to successes over the Viet Cong. Finally, the White House memorandum tends
to minimize Free World reaction to US escalation whereas the November 26 estimate sees it
as overwhelmingly opposed to escalation once that threatens to engage Chinese Communist
forces.
A textual comparison of relevant excerpts follows:
What Are The Risks?
White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 2: "We should be ready...for energetic flak
suppression and if necessary for the destruction of Communist air power... It remains quite
possible that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity
contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get us
beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peiping, if there is Communist counter-action."
SNIE 10-65, page 2: "The addition of air strength to the already formidable ground strength
in the China/Indochina border area is also intended to strengthen Chinese/DRV defenses
against the contingency that the US might ignore Communist warnings and take the war to
North Vietnam and even to China."
Ibid., page 4: "They (China) would almost certainly attempt to use fighters against air
strikes on North Vietnam and would certainly do so in the case of an attack on China:"
DIA-CIA-State Memo, page 6: "At this point [attacks on the balance of the 94-List
targets]/5/ Chinese Communist aircraft operating from Chinese bases would probably assist
in defending North Vietnam against the US attacks."
/5/Brackets in the source text.
Ibid. page 5, INR footnote: "The increasingly severe US air strikes contemplated against
DRV targets north of the 19th parallel would probably evoke the employment over North
Vietnam of Chinese air from Chinese bases. The Chinese decision to construct the new
Ning Ming airstrip, carefully located just over the DRV border and operationally ready in
early 1965, already strongly suggests Chinese preparation to test US adherence to the
privileged sanctuary concept."
What Are The Gains?
White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 3: "Action against the North is usually urged as
a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an
important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South--in
the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres... The
Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions
themselves to join together in forming a more effective government. Effective and sustained
reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of
Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. The determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity
of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence."
DIA-CIA-State Memo, page 9: "Initial South Vietnamese elation and support would almost
certainly quickly wane if the war seemed to drag on despite the new US moves, and
especially if the Viet Cong were able to increase their military and terrorist pressures."
Ibid., page 7: "In the event Hanoi felt assured of Chinese Communist rescue, it would
probably fight on." INR footnote "believes that the Chinese Communists, despite their
reluctance to become involved in fighting the US, would feel it necessary to assure Hanoi of
its support and to come to Hanoi's assistance as the situation required."
How Will The Free World React?
White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 5: "A program of sustained reprisal, with its
direct link to Hanoi's continuing aggressive actions in the South, will not involve us in
nearly the level of international recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North
program which was not so connected. For this reason the international pressures for
report on the internal political situation in South Vietnam and the conduct of the war. In
responding to the instruction in paragraph 5 of this telegram, Taylor reported that, on
February 9, he and U. Alexis Johnson had tried to persuade Vien to accept the prime
ministership, which Vien had declined when it was offered to him. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
6. This brings my warmest good wishes to you and Mrs. Taylor, and my renewed thanks for
all that you are doing for your country.
Ball
movements; that they had recently completed an air-field infrastructure in North Vietnam
and that they had airfields and naval bases on the Island of Hainan, off the coast of the
northern part of North Vietnam and South China.
Whether or not the Chinese will intervene is a factor which only the future holds the answer
to, but an increase in at least indirect Chinese intervention is to be anticipated.
I pointed out also that South Vietnam has a very unstable government and that we could not
depend upon it or the great majority of the population therein. That is proved by news
stories from reliable American officials in today's press which state that there was plenty of
opportunity for advance warnings on the Pleiku attack but that the attack when it came was,
in effect, a complete surprise.
It is especially hard to understand why we were caught off-guard ourselves, in view of the
attack of November 1st on our force at Bien Hoa, 12 miles outside of Saigon. Our own
security arrangements were certainly lax there and despite the explanation given at our
meeting on Saturday night, it appears to me they were lax at Pleiku. It is my understanding
that the American base at Pleiku is situated on a high plain, dotted with brush here and there
but certainly not the kind of jungle area which surrounded Bien Hoa. While McNamara and
Wheeler said that it would be extremely difficult to provide security two miles out, this is,
nevertheless, a matter which should be looked into especially in view of the fact that aside
from the more distant mortar shelling of the base, rifle fire and hand grenades were used
right inside the American compound and explosives were placed against the barracks. This
makes it clear that the Viet Cong were in the compound as has been stated in the press and
proves that the security which was supposed to be furnished by both the United States
forces and the Vietnamese military was lax. It is my understanding that more than half of
the 23,000 U.S. personnel in South Vietnam are stationed in Saigon. Certainly some of
them could be used to guard U.S. compounds. The explanations given this morning by
General Goodpaster and others, in my opinion, were not convincing.
At the recent meeting, I also pointed out that General Giap had an army of 350,000 men,
well-trained, and that he was and is one of the best military tacticians in Asia.
It is disturbing to me, though understandable, that the retaliatory move was essentially
unilateral, initiated by us and then we had to wait until the South Vietnamese government
was informed in order that the protocol of the situation might be maintained at least on the
surface.
In other words we had decided on what our moves would be without any request from the
government of South Vietnam but only in anticipation of such a request.
I have grave doubts about the ability of General Khanh's government. I have no doubt but
that the great majority of the population of South Vietnam are tired of the war and will give
us no significant assistance. I have a full awareness of your feelings, which I share, because
of the attack on Pleiku. I appreciate, too, your repeated statements that it is not your desire
to spread the war. However, the prospect for enlargement now looms larger and I think it is
only fair that I give you my honest opinions, as I did on Saturday and Sunday, because to do
otherwise would be a disservice to you and to the Nation.
In this connection you will recall that I also stated at the meetings that before we make any
moves that we understand their full implications, in terms of the costs involved, and the
fact, as I see it, that if we went too far in North Vietnam we would be in a far worse position
than we were in Korea.
For, in a larger sense, not only can we not depend on the South Vietnamese population, but
we can also place very little reliability on the Laotians and the Thais and none whatever on
Cambodia. Moreover, beyond Indochina, we could well be squeezed in a nutcracker by
developing events throughout Southeast Asia over which the Chinese cast an ominous
shadow. Events in Malaysia could under certain circumstances bring into force the Anzus
Treaty which would call for our giving assistance to Australia and New Zealand.
Finally, as you know we have approximately 42 mutual security agreements of one kind or
another with countries or groups of countries scattered over the face of the globe. Short of
nuclear war, we have not got the resources or the power to honor those agreements if the
demand-payments on them multiply. We are stretched too thin as it is and even with total
mobilization there would be little hope of fulfilling simultaneously any large proportion of
these commitments.
What the answer to the situation is at the moment I do not know nor does anyone else. But I
am persuaded that the trend toward enlargement of the conflict and a continuous deepening
of our military commitment on the Asian mainland, despite your desire to the contrary, is
not going to provide one. I did suggest on Sunday, therefore, that the matter be referred to
the United Nations and I am glad that Ambassador Stevenson has brought it up at the
Security Council./3/ I did suggest further that the Geneva powers be convened again for the
purpose of seeing what if anything honorably could be done. I did suggest that any other
forum might be considered in a search for acceptable ways to contract and to end the
fighting in South Vietnam.
/3/For text of Ambassador Stevenson's letter of February 7 to the President of the U.N.
Security Council, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 240-241.
I further suggested that Ambassador Kohler in Moscow could carry any or all of the above
suggestions to Brezhnev in Moscow and that our Ambassador in Warsaw, who already has
had in excess of 125 conferences with his Chinese Communist counterpart, follow the same
procedure.
The purpose of this memorandum is to furnish you with a brief analysis of my views in
writing on this most difficult subject as I have expressed them in large part in the meetings
at the White House over the past three days.
Finally, you will recall that I stated to you that the burden of decision was yours but that,
regardless of my individual views, I would do whatever I could to support you in the
exercise of your grave responsibility.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis.
Repeated to the White House, DOD, CINCPAC for POLAD, Bangkok, and Vientiane.
2445. We appreciate prompt decisions from Washington for reprisal attacks yesterday and
today against selected military targets in the DRV. I consider this a significant forward step
in demonstrating US determination not to continue to submit to VC offenses against US and
Vietnamese personnel and installations without a suitable response on our part. The White
House statement of February 7/2/ emphasizes that we seek no wider war, in pinning the
responsibility on the DRV, and in carefully pointing out that our response was against
military targets supporting DRV aggression and not the North Vietnamese population. This
statement and our actions yesterday and today provide in my view a good foundation for
embarking on a graduated reprisal program to bring increasing pressure on the DRV to
cease its intervention in SVN, as discussed here at some length with Bundy and his party.
/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 238-239.
The general concept of such a program is that through a measured, controlled sequence of
actions against the DRV taken in reprisal for DRV-inspired actions in SVN, significant
pressures can be brought to bear on DRV to persuade it to stop its intervention in SVN. The
program would be carried out jointly with GVN and would be directed solely against DRV
military targets and infiltration routes, not against DRV population. While February 7 and 8
military actions were specifically tied to VC attacks in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, in the future we
could look to a situation in which US/GVN reprisals could be initiated based on a general
catalog or package of VC outrages, no one particularly grave itself, not necessarily to a
specific VC act in each case. For example, we might announce that VC acts against specific
targets (such as the railroad in SVN) will result in retaliation against similar targets in the
DRV, our graduated reprisals with the general level of VC outrages in SVN, or if we so
desired progressively raise the level of pressure on the DRV. Thus, it would be tantamount
to the so-called Phase II escalation but justified on basis of retaliation.
In carrying out such a program, we believe that we should limit US/GVN publicity to the
bare minimum necessary to balance Communist output. We would confirm our reprisal
actions only when necessary and then as being in accordance with an established policy of
reprisals.
Our current 34A operations (except any 34-A air strikes in the DRV) and the Yankee
Team/Barrel Roll operations in the Laos corridor would of course continue. Additionally,
we would progressively extend these operations into the DRV along infiltration routes.
Throughout the period of graduated reprisals we would convey clearly through appropriate
intermediaries or other means to Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi the limited nature of our
objectives and intentions, but at the same time our determination to achieve our objectives.
Similarly, we would have to expand our discussions with Thailand and initiate discussions
with the RLG and other friendly governments to bring them into the picture to the extent
desired.
With regard to the GVN I would envisage more detailed discussions at an early date to
develop firm arrangements for joint GVN actions and to begin a process of education by
which GVN would begin to formulate its war objectives and ultimately reach agreement
with US on the framework of demands to be made on the DRV as well as the general
negotiating procedures. Both General Khanh and Acting Prime Minister Oanh have stressed
the need for expanded discussions and of integrating the Vietnamese into a program against
DRV. I feel it is most important that we do this and that we maintain a sense of momentum
if we are to capitalize on the psychological factors which if exploited early could lead to a
greater sense of purpose and direction both in the government and the military and awaken
new hope for eventual victory on the part of the Vietnamese people. We should attempt to
avoid in the present situation a general letdown in morale and spirit which followed our
action in the Tonkin Gulf.
If the graduated reprisal program succeeds in mounting sufficient pressure on the DRV to
the point where the DRV leaders have serious doubts as to their chances for ultimate
success, we should have a general understanding of where we would like to come out. I
believe rationale of simply returning to observance of the spirit of the 1954 Geneva Accords
with respect to SVN and the 1962 accords re Laos as set forth in Embtel 235 (notal)/3/ is
still valid. This formula has the advantage of simplicity, of avoiding pitfalls of new
conferences, and avoiding negotiations. It is conceivable that cessation of DRV direction
and support of aggression against the South could be achieved more or less tacitly in first
instance and then confirmed through GVN/DRV negotiations at the military level. An
added advantage is that it keeps us removed from direct negotiations with DRV. A separate
telegram follows/4/ on how US/GVN terms for cessation of DRV support and direction of
aggression in SVN might be stated.
/3/The reference is in error and should be telegram 2235; see Document 32.
/4/See Document 104.
In sum, I believe a Phase II program based largely on graduated reprisals offers the best
available means of exerting increasing pressure on the DRV leaders to induce them to cease
their intervention in SVN while at the same time being more manageable in terms of
domestic and international opinion and with our friends. I recommend that we proceed
along this track.
Taylor
94. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to Senator Mike Mansfield/1/
Washington, February 9, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vietnam--Mansfield Memo
and Reply. Confidential.
Dear Mike:
The President has asked me to respond to your long and thoughtful memorandum of
February 8/2/ on the subject of Vietnam. The President feels that your careful questions
deserve a prompt reply, and as he himself is heavily occupied today with other matters, he
has asked me to answer in his behalf.
/2/Document 92.
Let me attempt to comment in order on the important points of your memorandum.
1. We agree that the episode at Pleiku and our response to it create pressures on Kosygin,
but in our judgment responsibility for this pressure rests with Hanoi and not with us, and we
believe that the Soviet Government will recognize this fact. Given the character of the
attack at Pleiku, we are unable to see what other course was open to the President than to
make an appropriate reply. We think that inactivity by the United States would have made it
even more tempting for the Soviets to enlarge on their support for North Vietnam.
2. Our intelligence estimators are clear in their judgment that it is most unlikely that these
events will have the effect of driving the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists closer
together. Our Embassy in Moscow points out that the Soviet statement contains at least two
elements which will be energetically disapproved by the Chinese Communists: it speaks of
the desire for good relations with the United States, and it specifically limits its offer of
assistance to defensive weapons.
3. In our efforts to defeat Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, we must recognize that
any U.S. action carries some risks of wider Chinese involvement, but we aim to keep the
risk of that involvement as low as possible. As your memorandum generously recognizes,
the President has always emphasized his own desire to avoid actions which would lead to
direct conflict with the Chinese. We are making it clear in every statement and by every
avenue that our central concern in Vietnam is to turn back the aggression in the South, and
that our limited actions against the North imply no intent whatever to "liberate" or conquer
North Vietnam.
4. We agree with you, of course, that there are important political problems of governmental
stability in South Vietnam, and that there is a problem also in the degree to which the
Communists have intimidated the local population and made it reluctant to report Viet Cong
movements. If we had a stable government and if there were no fear of the Viet Cong, we
would not have the problem that we do in Vietnam. Unfortunately stating the difficulties
does not solve them, and it remains our best judgment that the vast majority of the people of
South Vietnam do not wish to fall under Communist domination. The President has
repeatedly made it clear that we cannot ourselves solve all the problems of South Vietnam.
He has also insisted, however, that every possible step be taken to make our support for the
Vietnamese people more effective and efficient. My own understanding of your position is
that you agree with this course and do not wish to see us pull out of Vietnam or decrease
our present assistance to the Vietnamese.
5. The President certainly shares your view that military security should be as effective as
possible within the limits of our basic policy decision not to deploy large American combat
units for guard duty in Vietnam. Able American professionals are giving their full attention
to the problem of military security around installations such as Bien Hoa and Pleiku. The
President is satisfied that General Westmoreland is an outstanding officer, and I myself
observed the energy with which he followed up on the Pleiku incident. It remains true that
in a contest as fluid as this one, in which small units are able to move undetected through
large parts of the countryside, there can be no full guarantee against episodes of this kind.
As in all warfare, we learn as much by experience as by forethought, and it was my
observation that important lessons had been learned in the Bien Hoa incident. Undoubtedly
lessons will be learned from Pleiku as well. The hazard of guerrilla attack will nevertheless
continue until the course of the struggle has been turned strongly against the Viet Cong.
6. I can assure you that the decision to make a retaliatory response was in no sense
unilateral. I talked myself with General Khanh and I talked with Ambassador Taylor just
after his conversation with Prime Minister Oanh./3/ From these conversations and from
earlier talks with Vietnamese leaders, I know they warmly support a policy of response
against outrages like that at Pleiku. This general attitude was expressed to me by
Vietnamese leaders from many different groups, and indeed no different judgment was
expressed by any of the Vietnamese citizens with whom I talked during my visit.
/3/For a record of McGeorge Bundy's conversation with Khanh on February 5, see
Document 73. Bundy's conversation with Taylor and Taylor's conversation with Oanh have
not been further identified.
7. We recognize the danger of war weariness among the population of South Vietnam, but it
seems to me wrong to conclude that the great majority of the population will give us no
significant assistance. The fact is that while American losses come home with particular
force to Americans, it is the Vietnamese who are taking the bulk of the casualties. The
performance of Vietnamese armed units in recent months makes it clear that they are tough
and resilient fighters and that their morale remains high. Moreover, when energetic
programs of pacification are pursued, our junior officers report that the population is
invariably responsive. The problem is one of maintaining the necessary energy and
effectiveness, not just sporadically but on a constantly growing basis throughout the
country. This task is certainly difficult, but I met no American in Vietnam who thinks it
impossible.
8. You are certainly right to call attention to the wider environment of Southeast Asia, but
your judgment on some of the countries involved seems harsh. We have had strong support
from the Thais, for example, especially with respect to Laos, which is necessarily of most
direct concern to them. Moreover, our own sea and air forces make us a most formidable
opponent, as long as we are careful and measured and disciplined in our use of them.
9. More generally, it does not appear to me that the power of the United States around the
world is "stretched too thin." We have been able to keep our commitments around the world
for a quarter of a century and our country has never been richer or more at ease. While
every single American casualty gives the President personal sorrow, we cannot say that the
current level of American sacrifice in Southeast Asia is unduly heavy. We made a vastly
heavier sacrifice in Korea--and one which was fully justified--and yet the stakes there were
certainly not greater than those that are now on the table in Southeast Asia.
10. The President has considered your suggestion that we take the matter to the United
Nations. He regrets that previous discussions of the question in the United Nations have not
indicated any desire of the members of that body to take any action whatever. From the
Secretary General on down, we are unable to find any expert on the UN who sees any
prospect that it can act effectively in the present situation in Vietnam. Neither is the
President aware of any prospect that any other conference or forum would currently lead to
an agreement by the Communists to end the fighting on any terms other than those of
surrender. But the President asked me to say again how much he will value any further
suggestions you may have on this problem.
11. I think you know from our association in recent years how great is my personal respect
and regard for you, not only as the leader of the majority in the Senate but also as one of the
outstanding public servants of our time. I therefore regret that your judgment and that of the
Administration should be at variance on this most important issue, and I beg you to
understand that while I have tried to write directly and straightforwardly, I have done so
with a feeling of deep respect not only for you but for your deeply held convictions.
Sincerely,
McGeorge Bundy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
I have the impression that the President, so adept in the use of power in domestic politics,
has been considering carefully how to exercise it in international affairs, and has reached
certain conclusions that will be manifested in forthcoming decisions. He bitterly resents
indignities against our establishments and officials abroad, such as burning of libraries,
stoning of Embassies, and the rest. I think we may expect stern responses in the future to
such actions.
After some conversation about his badly needed and imaginative programme to "make
America beautiful," he reverted to Vietnam; he displayed a thorough familiarity with the
types and numbers of planes operated by both sides there, the strength of guerrillas, rangers,
partisans and regulars thus far engaged. During all our talk today, from time to time he
made calls through the telephone switchboard in front of his chair. Once it was to tell the
Pentagon to shift a squadron of aircraft nearer Vietnam, others to inform Senators Dirksen
and Mansfield what instructions he had lately sent to Saigon, another to State approving a
severe rebuke to the Kremlin regarding the attack on our Moscow Embassy,/3/ another to a
member of the House congratulating him on the management of a Bill, another to Treasury
relating to today's Balance of Payments message. At intervals he gave orders on other
subjects through two squawk boxes in the Oval Room.
/3/On February 9 a demonstration involving more than 2,000 persons, including Vietnamese
and Chinese Communist students, took place outside the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in
protest over the U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam. The demonstrators hurled stones
and other objects at the Embassy building, breaking more than 200 windows and badly
damaging the facade. For text of the White House statement issued on February 10
regarding the attack on the Embassy, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 170.
[Here follows an entry unrelated to Vietnam.]
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Vance
Asst. Secretary McNaughton
JCS
Admiral McDonald
Treasury
Secretary Dillon
CIA
Director McCone
USIA
Director Rowan
White House
McGeorge Bundy
Chester Cooper
Secretary McNamara raised several questions with respect to retaliation for the attack on the
enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nhon (Biet Cuong Hotel):
1. Should we retaliate?--McNamara thought we should with a joint US-GVN operation;
2. When should we retaliate?--McNamara felt strongly that this should be done at the first
daylight opportunity;
3. Against what targets?--McNamara recommended three targets: two just north of the 17th
parallel (barracks), and one 50 miles north (supply base).
4. What should be the rationale for retaliation?--McNamara felt we should point to the
recent terror against South Vietnamese civilians, including the blowing up of a railroad
bridge, and the blowing up of the barracks.
Much of the rest of the discussion centered on the timing and composition of the attack.
State (especially Ball and Thompson) and Vice President Humphrey felt that we should
hold up the attack until Kosygin had returned to Moscow, or, in any case, until after he left
Peiping following his visit to North Korea. The argument centered on the effect of an
immediate attack on Sino-Soviet relations and the degree of commitment the Soviets might
be forced to make. State felt that Kosygin's trip to North Korea was an affront to the
Chinese and that an immediate attack would submerge or paper-over the difficulties that the
Chinese and Russians would otherwise confront when Kosygin saw the Chinese on his way
back to Moscow.
If a retaliatory strike were to be launched immediately, State felt that it should be a GVN
rather than a U.S. effort. McNamara, and most of the others present, felt that the President
would be hard-pressed to explain to the American people why U.S. planes did not retaliate
immediately, especially in the light of our reprisal against the Pleiku incident.
While recognizing the merit of this, Ball emphasized that the biggest single question we
confronted was how to avoid a substantial Soviet commitment to North Vietnam. Such a
commitment might be postponed or minimized if we could delay our reprisal, or if the
VNAF alone made an immediate reprisal.
Most of the participants discounted the effectiveness of a VNAF attack. McNamara pointed
out that the VNAF attack had hit the wrong target the night before and, in any case, the
difference between a VNAF strike and one which would involve U.S. planes would not
make a significant difference in terms of the Soviet reaction. This phase of the meeting
ended with several people, including McGeorge Bundy and Thompson and the Vice
President, musing on the merits of delaying the retaliation for a few days, not only because
of the Sino-Soviet matter but because of the remaining dependents.
The President joined the group at approximately two o'clock, at which time the NSC
meeting began (to be reported on separately by Bromley Smith)./2/
/2/Document 98.
CLC
98. Summary Record of the 548th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, February 10, 1965, 2:07-4:04 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top
Secret. The drafter is not indicated, but it was apparently Bromley Smith. The time of the
meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The meeting was held in the
Cabinet Room.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
Note: Minutes of a meeting of these participants prior to the arrival of the President are
attached. (Tab A)/2/
/2/Document 97.
Secretary McNamara summarized for the President the latest information on the Viet Cong
bombing of the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nhon. As of that time, one U.S. soldier was
known to be dead, 20 injured, and 20 missing. Presumably, the missing soldiers are buried
under the rubble of the billet.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy summarized the discussion of the Council members prior to the
President's arrival. A response to the Qui Nhon incident by the U.S. in some form is agreed
by all present. However, there is a difference as to what the response should be. Some
believe we should not launch another raid while Kosygin is in the Far East. Some feel an
attack now might force the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union together.
Acting Secretary Ball reported that the Soviet reaction to the earlier attack on North
Vietnam had so far been mild. Mr. Kosygin is leaving for North Korea at 3:00 p.m. today
our time. He will probably try to enlist the support of the North Koreans for the holding of
the March 1 meeting of Communist Parties which the Soviets are planning despite Chinese
Communist opposition. Kosygin is expected to stay two days in North Korea. U.S. action
now puts heavy pressure on the Soviets. We should hold off any reprisal action until
Kosygin leaves the area. Ambassador Thompson added that our objective should be to
avoid any deeper Soviet commitment to the North Vietnamese. If the Chinese Communist
Air Force comes in response to our retaliatory attack, very heavy pressure is put on the
Soviets to come to the aid of the Vietnamese.
Secretary Dillon said he did not believe the Russians would make a major policy decision
based on the whereabouts of Kosygin.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy pointed out that we cannot put ourself in the position of giving the
Russians control over our actions by their moving Soviet diplomats from one place to
another. If we take no action, the Soviets may think we are in fact a paper tiger.
Director McCone said that to base our action on a possible Soviet reaction would be to lose
sight of our objective which is to help the South Vietnamese overcome aggression.
Secretary McNamara said that Ambassador Taylor, the Joint Chiefs and the Department of
Defense recommended a retaliatory strike today at daylight. He said we will soon be facing
the difficulty of taking Phase II actions even though there are no incidents created by the
Viet Cong. However, the Qui Nhon attack provides us an opportunity today to retaliate
immediately. He explained to the President the targets in North Vietnam which could be hit
today. They are: Target 14, the Thanh Hoa bridge, which he said he would discuss later;
Target 24, the Chanh Hoa army barracks, and Target No. 53, the Phu Vam supply depot, as
a weather alternative. In addition to these two U.S. targets, he recommended that Target No.
32, the Vu Con barracks, be struck by the Vietnamese Air Force, assisted by U.S. planes
with Target No. 39, the Chap Le barracks, as a weather alternative. (See attached target map
with descriptions.) (Tab B)/3/
/3/Attached, but not printed.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that at an appropriate time we could publicly announce that we
had turned a corner and changed our policy but that no mention should be made now of
such a decision.
The President stressed the importance of preventing any leaks to newspapers. He appealed
to the patriotism of those present and asked the Heads of Departments and Agencies present
to survey their departments to ensure that leaks were not coming from their subordinates.
In response to the President's question, the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
McDonald, said he agreed with Secretary McNamara's recommendation. From a military
point of view there is no reason to delay a strike.
The President asked what our team in Saigon recommended. Secretary McNamara read
parts of a message from General Westmoreland recommending (Tab C) immediate
reprisals. (Copy attached)/4/ Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that, having talked to Ambassador
Taylor recently, he could summarize his views as follows: Reprisals should be undertaken
at once, not only to improve morale in South Vietnam but also to give a clear signal to the
North Vietnamese. He would not think that Communist behavior would be basically
changed if we decided to delay a U.S. strike.
/4/Not found as an attachment to the source text.
Secretary McNamara said the United States has overwhelming air power in the Southeast
Asia area. The Joint Chiefs do not want to add more military power to that already in the
Western Pacific. However, he thought that we should move additional forces into the
Southeast Asia area for political reasons. He suggested that rather than announce the
movement of these forces into the area we could informally give the press the list of U.S.
forces which would have been placed on alert for short notice movement to the Western
Pacific.
In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said about 130 planes would
be used in the strike recommended for approval. He then said he would drop Target 14, the
Thanh Hoa bridge, which is much further north than any of the other targets. He suggested
that Target No. 53, the Phu Van Support Depot be put in the plan instead of the prestige
bridge recommended earlier. He felt that three targets were needed, two for the United
States and one for the Vietnamese Air Force to attack. In response to question, he said the
targets were not related to the railroad system because damage done to railroad tracks could
be easily repaired.
Secretary Ball suggested that today's retaliatory strike be limited to two targets.
The President interrupted to ask whether any casualties had been reported as a result of the
earlier strike. Mr. McGeorge Bundy replied that Hanoi had given no casualty figures but
merely admitted there had been a loss of life.
There followed a discussion as to whether the last raid by the South Vietnamese/5/ had been
successful. Secretary McNamara reported that after-battle information revealed that the
South Vietnamese planes had hit a target other than one they were supposed to hit.
/5/The raid on February 8 on the Chap Le Army Barracks. A report on the raid was
contained in a February 8 memorandum to the President from the White House Situation
Room. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVIII,
Cables)
The President asked whether all those present agreed we should launch a retaliatory strike.
In response to the President's direct question, the Vice President said he had some doubts as
to whether the strike should take place today or whether it should be delayed until Mr.
Kosygin left the area. He had mixed feelings about whether we should retaliate as Secretary
McNamara had recommended. He shared the State Department's view that Kosygin's
presence in Hanoi or in the Far East limited our freedom of action.
Acting Secretary Ball repeated his view that our action should be cautious. He said the
strike as now planned, i.e., deleting the Thanh Hoa Bridge, minimized the effect on a
possible Soviet reaction to the strike.
Ambassador Thompson recommended that the strike be delayed for a few days. He thought
we should first give warning that the North Vietnamese must stop their aggressive action
now or we would end the safe haven which they now have in North Vietnam. If they then
continue their activities we should launch Phase II of our December plan for graduated
military pressures.
McGeorge Bundy summarized briefly the latest U.S. intelligence estimate of Hanoi's
reaction to a new U.S. air strike. (A copy is attached.) (Tab D)/6/
/6/Not found attached.
The President suggested we discuss our position with the Soviet Ambassador, possibly
sending a message to the Soviet officials as to why we have to react the way we are.
McGeorge Bundy said Ambassador Dobrynin gave Ambassador Thompson yesterday a
"personal" message from the Soviet Government which had a governmental rather than a
personal tone./7/
/7/See footnote 2, Document 82.
The President asked whether we had any other channels of communication. He recalled the
Seaborn channel. He was reminded of the conversations which are apparently being carried
on informally by the French in Paris.
There followed a discussion of how much news should be made public following the air
attack. The consensus was that we should not spell out in detail exactly what we had
undertaken to do.
The President raised the question as to whether there should be Congressional consultation.
He also asked whether the time had come for him to make a TV speech. He indicated his
reluctance to state again what he had said many times previously.
The President then expressed an interest in any possible targets in South Vietnam. In
response, Secretary McNamara said there were no worthwhile targets they had been able to
find in South Vietnam.
Acting Secretary Ball said we must emphasize South Vietnam's participation in the air
attacks. Selecting only two targets, one for U.S. forces and one for South Vietnamese
forces, meant that the operation would be smaller than previously planned. The two targets
chosen were closer to the demarcation line and thus an attack on them would be less likely
to pull in the MIG airplanes based in North Vietnam.
The President said it had been proper and necessary for us to go into great detail publicly
about our first raid in order to reassure the press but he did not think it is necessary
following the proposed strike. Public statements should be limited to a generalized
description of the new strike.
The President received affirmative answers when he asked Director McCone, Secretary
Dillon, and Director Rowan whether they agreed with the recommended strike plan. Mr.
Moyers said he thought the strike should be made to meet domestic public opinion
requirements.
McGeorge Bundy summarized the consensus that news of the new strike should be released
Thursday/8/ in Saigon and that special emphasis should be given to the joint U.S.-South
Vietnamese character of the action.
/8/February 11.
Secretary McNamara then proposed that the strike be limited to two targets and that the
justification for the strike would be a public statement separate from a report of the action.
The President authorized execution of the strike plan as revised. (The execution order is
attached.) (Tab E)/9/
/9/Not found attached.
As the meeting broke up, the President reviewed a draft State Department telegram to
Saigon giving Ambassador Taylor guidance on the political situation in South Vietnam.
(Draft telegram attached.) (Tab F)/10/
/10/This was a draft of telegram 1677 to Saigon, February 10; see footnote 2, Document
105.
5. McNamara and Bundy exchanged views on whether we had turned the corner and had
moved in the direction of sustained and repeated strikes, rather than occasional retaliations.
McNamara took the view that retaliation was for all the actions of the NVN/VC in the South
and not for any single specific VC operation; therefore we should keep going.
6. The President asked [for] the field recommendations. McNamara read the latest cable
which supported his earlier recommendations. The President asked the JCS--Admiral
McDonald said there was unanimity that we should go right now.
7. Dillon, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Unger, Carl Rowan, all expressed support of
immediate action, with statements concerning how it should be kept in a low key,
announced out of Saigon, etc., etc.
8. Thompson then suggested that we might defer action for a few days but announce that we
were going to take retaliatory moves at a time of our choosing. This would permit Kosygin
to get out of the Far East. This idea was vetoed. Thompson then suggested we work out
communications to Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow concerning our purposes and see if they
were not prepared to modify their tactics. It was agreed that we should keep open channels,
which would probably be meaningless, as discussions would be on their terms, not ours.
9. The President then raised the question of VC targets in South Vietnam. He seemed to feel
that with all the Viet Cong and their irregulars, totaling in excess of 100,000, there should
be some lucrative camps as targets. McNamara explained that there weren't.
10. Ball than raised the question of what would happen when the MIG's came in. He
developed a scenario of MIG opposition, followed by the need to take out the MIG bases in
North Vietnam. This then would be followed by ChiComs introducing MIG's from bases
across the NVN border; then this would escalate into the necessity to take out those bases.
Hence, he could see we were starting on a course that would escalate into all-out conflict
with China.
11. The question of China participation was raised. I stated that there was a possibility of
Chinese volunteers coming in at any time and a capability to introduce them. They might do
so. However, we did not believe they would introduce organized units now. At this point I
said that the introduction of Chinese at this point was not considered a probable event,
however, it was very definitely a possibility and in the consideration of our actions, we had
to plan to take care of every single possibility, irrespective of how remote, and to be
prepared to commit the forces, the resources, the money, etc., to this end. The President was
in agreement with this point. Note: This was a repetition of what I had told him privately a
week ago./7/
/7/See Document 61.
12. The President then raised the question of how we can prove that the support and
direction of the VC was coming from Hanoi. McNamara and Ball quickly responded that
this could be proven in the most positive and undeniable way and that State, Defense and
CIA were working on papers which would convince even the most doubting people that this
was true./8/ (I did not enter into this discussion as I am not familiar with this effort, and I
am not sure that the case can be undeniably proven, although I am convinced that this whole
operation is directed out of Hanoi.) (Carter follow this up.)
armament for use by VC insurgents, but I did not expect any military action, nor did I
support the possibility of confrontation with us in other areas, i.e., Berlin and Cuba, etc.
18. Bundy then reviewed at some length his observations in South Vietnam, dealing with
the political situation.
19. The President then went around the room and there was no objection to the courses of
action decided upon. Mansfield, who was present, made no comment whatsoever. The
President pointedly avoided asking him for an opinion or for comment. The meeting
adjourned about 8:15.
20. Note: Throughout this discussion the emphasis was laid on retaliation and reprisal for
the events which had been described by McNamara. There was no intimation given that we
were engulfed on a program of sustained and continuing strikes against the north.
21. Following the meeting I had a brief private discussion with the President and told him I
was going to leave for the south and would be there for a few days to get over this cold,
would be available to call, would keep a plane standing by. The President agreed this should
be done, saw no immediate crisis requiring my staying on hand. I told him General Carter
would be acting.
to comment. He had a memo that was in his hand--I sat next to him, and I thought he would
comment off the memo, but he apparently decided at the last second not to bring the memo
into discussion at the meeting so he placed it in an envelope and gave it to Jack Valenti for
direct delivery to the President./3/ The President urged the group to avoid any discussion of
the meeting, and that if it was learned that a meeting took place, they would have to limit
themselves to simply saying it was an informal group of leaders gathered to hear a report
from McGeorge Bundy on his trip.
/2/Not further identified.
/3/See Document 101.
unlikely that any of the present United States installations outside of Saigon will be really
secure against the Viet Cong. If we are to minimize repetitions of the recent American
bloodlettings, therefore, the outposts will have to be vastly strengthened by American forces
or pulled into and consolidated in the Saigon area. The timing of any further retaliation
against the North, if that is the decision, should take cognizance of this factor.
The French government has indicated that it would participate in a conference of the 1954
Geneva conferees if it should be called by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the
sponsoring powers. We are not members of the 1954 Conference (although we were
represented there by an observer) and we should certainly interpose no objections to its
being called. Indeed if there is to be another retaliation against the North in response to this
latest incident, it may be well to try to make it serve the purpose of bringing about the
reconvening of such a Conference. If it is convened, our diplomacy should strive to see to it
that the first act of this Conference should be to call for a cease-fire throughout Viet Nam
and Indochina. We could then attend the Conference, if we chose, as observers or as
participants depending on an assessment of both the military and diplomatic situation at the
time.
102. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council
Staff to Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff/1/
Washington, February 10, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Reprisal
Program, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Some Queries on Our Proposed Reprisal Track
In reflecting on Mac's report and its Annex,/2/ I am troubled by some far-reaching
questions. Let me be clear that I am not questioning the need for a response to
"spectaculars" like Pleiku: my doubts focus on the suggested policy of systematic and
continuous reprisals against the North.
/2/Document 84.
1. Have we faced--and has the President faced--the full shape of the risk of Chinese
intervention?
As I read them, the estimates/3/ already point to the probability of a Chinese MIG response
to U.S. air attacks north of the 19th parallel. Under present DoD rules of engagement our
planes are authorized hot pursuit across the Chinese border to the jet bases in South China
and suppressive fire against these bases. (The estimates also deem as likely Chinese use of
these bases.) Such strikes in South China would very probably bring Chinese ground forces
into Southeast Asia. Needless to say, any strikes against Chinese nuclear centers--if
perchance such a side-benefit is lurking in anyone's mind--would unquestionably bring a
Chinese ground force response.
/3/See the section entitled "What Are The Risks?" in Document 90.
2. This raises a further question: Are we willing--and is the President willing--to face a
ground war in Southeast Asia against the combined armies of North Vietnam and China?
This is an old question I know, but it is one that must be faced anew in terms of the
systematic reprisal track. It would be folly for the sheer momentum of events (or of actions
taken to bolster the morale of our friends in Saigon) to lead us into a land war with China in
which our air and naval power would be relatively ineffective.
3. Perhaps more significantly, are the American people willing to face a ground war in
Vietnam--a conflict already fuzzed by national doubts far exceeding any that attached to the
relatively clear-cut Korean conflict (invasion and "UN" response)?
4. Finally, what has happened to the concept of "negotiation" so earnestly pursued by our
more thoughtful journalistic and Congressional critics, and previously pursued by many
thoughtful people here and at State? Are we ruling it out, as the Annex suggests? If so, for
how long?
In sum, I fear we must very soon face the fundamental question of whether the kind of
South Vietnam we would like to see emerge is really worth the high probability of a land
war with China, a war in which Soviet neutrality simply cannot be assumed.
I know that these are not new questions; but I would feel utterly negligent if I did not raise
them again at this time. It is instructive to remember that the bright promise of our
predecessor Administration was early removed by a combination of accumulated
momentum and events that led us into the first Cuban episode. I know that Cuba was not
worth that price at the time; and I seriously question the higher price we may be forced to
pay for Vietnam in Asia and in our relations with most of the rest of the world over the next
decade.
James C. Thomson, Jr./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
the British Ambassador, first on my own and then later at the President's direct insistence,
that such a visit would be untimely and unhelpful. Lord Harlech obviously agreed, but his
replies made it clear that the Prime Minister was insistent. I tried a further delay by
suggesting that the call be deferred until Thursday a.m.,/2/ but the Prime Minister continued
to insist that he needed to have a position before he faced his own Cabinet Thursday noon
London time. The President agreed to receive the call and, after considerable delay in a vain
effort to get the classified circuit going, I completed an open circuit with the Prime
Minister, and the President went on the line about 10:15 p.m. My notes cover only the
President's side of the conversation.
/2/February 11.
2. The Prime Minister evidently opened with his proposal, and apparently indicated that
there was a high level of concern in London, and that he would like to come to Washington
to put himself in a better position to deal with that concern.
3. The President said he thought it would be a very serious mistake for the Prime Minister
to come over; that he thought there was nothing to get upset about, any more than it would
be right for him to get upset about Malaysia; and that any visit would be misunderstood
here. The President said that our response had been very measured and very reasonable, and
that it was not going to be very different whether the Prime Minister came here or not--that
it would be a great mistake for us to jump up and down and fly the Atlantic every time there
was an issue of this sort. Next week we might be arguing about Sukarno, and another week
there might be a threat or two from some Communist. We have telephones and we can
always talk.
4. The President went on to make the point that he had tried to be helpful to the Prime
Minister on monetary matters and on Malaysia, and that he would be glad to send the Prime
Minister an account of the exact situation by classified cable so that he could tell his
colleagues just what the U.S. position was.
5. The Prime Minister then evidently said something about his problems in the House of
Commons. The President said he had plenty of problems with his own Congress, and he
thought it would be a mistake for the Prime Minister to try to use the President as an
instrument in the House of Commons, just as he would not wish to use the Prime Minister
as an instrument with the Congress. He had to deal with the Congress every day, but he did
not pull the Prime Minister into it. He thought the Prime Minister would have to decide
what side he was on. The Prime Minister evidently said something about the hazards of
escalation, and the President replied he was afraid of escalation, too, but he did not see what
was to be gained by flapping around the Atlantic with our coattails out. He thought that
such activity would make everybody even more concerned and, instead, he proposed again
that he should send the Prime Minister an exact account of the situation and he would be
glad to have the Prime Minister's comments as a true ally.
6. The President reminded the Prime Minister that the U.S. did not have the company of
many allies in Vietnam. He had spoken to the Prime Minister about the need for British
support there and the Prime Minister had told him about his troubles in other areas. The
President told the Prime Minister that he was with him in Malaysia with men, money,
marbles, and chalk, all the way. Now in Vietnam it looks a little dark and he didn't see what
help would come from talk. If the Prime Minister had any men to spare, he would be glad to
have them. The Prime Minister apparently returned to the charge, and the President asked
him bluntly, "Why don't you run Malaysia and let me run Vietnam?" Would the Prime
Minister think it would be good for the President to announce to the American press
tomorrow that he was going over to London to try to stop the British in Malaysia? The
Prime Minister apparently answered back in some fashion, and the President repeated his
comments about the British in Malaysia and our own role in Vietnam.
7. At this point the Prime Minister apparently gave way and reassured the President of his
own basic support for our policy in Vietnam. The President replied that that was all right
and fine--that we would stand on that--that we understood the British problem--the
monetary problem, and the MLF problem, too. [Here follows discussion of the multilateral
force.]
8. The conversation evidently moved back to Vietnam. The President said that Ambassador
Bruce was here, and that he had talked with him for two hours today/3/ and he would be
seeing him further. He would have Ambassador Bruce bring a detailed memorandum on the
exact situation to the Prime Minister./4/ The President repeated that he would be glad to
share all this information with the Prime Minister and if the Prime Minister had any troops
to spare, the President would be glad to have them.
/3/See Document 96.
/4/No copy of such a memorandum has been found, nor is there any indication in Bruce's
Diary that he was given such a memorandum for Prime Minister Wilson.
9. The President reaffirmed his basic position: Wherever they murder our people, we are
going to react promptly, adequately, and measuredly. The President knew the Prime
Minister was going to do the same thing--in Malaysia or anywhere else.
10. The Prime Minister then apparently spoke about the concerns of some other countries.
The President replied that he had never considered any of these countries great allies.
France was a problem to us, and India had never taken up arms for us. I passed the President
a note that our information was that the Indians wanted us to stand firm. The President
repeated this comment to the Prime Minister.
11. The Prime Minister then apparently gave further assurances. The President said that he
was glad to hear of them, and repeated his view that we ought not to run back and forth
across the Atlantic with our shirttails hanging out.
12. The Prime Minister then apparently said something about the difficulty he would have
in explaining what he was doing and not doing, and all that he would have to talk about was
a call in the middle of the night. The President replied with some sharpness that it was the
Prime Minister and not he who placed the call in the middle of the night. The President was
just answering it. The President then repeated that the U.S. position was not provocative,
not belligerent, not domineering, and that we were not throwing our weight around. But if
people came in and killed our men--20 or 30 or 40 of them--our response would be prompt,
adequate, and measured. And that's what the President would expect the Prime Minister to
do in similar circumstances, and he would have our full support.
13. At this point the Prime Minister apparently gave new assurances of his support and
friendship, and the President said that that was fine, and he appreciated it, and that was
armed insurgency. (With respect to Laos strictly observe the 1962 Accords, including the
withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces and personnel from Laos and recognize that the freedom
of movement granted therein in Laos under those Accords is not subject to veto or
interference by any of the parties in Laos.)
B. In return and subject in each instance to a judgement that DRV is complying faithfully
and effectively:
1. US will return to 1954 Accords with respect to military personnel in GVN and GVN
would be willing to enter into trade talks looking toward normalization of economic
relations between DRV and GVN.
2. Subject to faithful compliances by DRV with 1954 Accords, US and GVN would give
assurances that they would not use force or support the use of force by any other party to
upset the Accords with respect to the DRV.
3. Within the framework of the 1954 Accords, the GVN would permit VC desiring to do so
to return to the DRV without their arms and would grant amnesty to those peacefully laying
down their arms and desiring to remain in SVN.
C. If and when Hanoi indicates its acceptance of foregoing conditions, careful consideration
must be given to immediate subsequent procedures which will avoid danger of: (a)
becoming involved in a cease-fire vis--vis the DRV and/or the VC accompanied by strungout negotiations; (b) making conditions so stringent as to be unworkable from practical
point of view. Probably best procedure would be to have the GVN and DRV meet in the
DMZ at the military level under ICC auspices with US observers to reach agreement
mechanics of carrying out understanding while action against the VC and DRV continues,
at least in principle. RLG would have to be associated with these negotiations at some point.
We recognize that one of the most difficult aspects as we proceed with the graduated
reprisal program, if approved, will be how to establish communications with Hanoi and at
the same time not to become involved in direct negotiations with the DRV. One possible
formula might be for the US to talk with GVN while USSR talks with Hanoi and with the
US and the USSR talking together. Other possibilities will undoubtedly suggest themselves
to the Department. Another difficult problem should we reach the stage of GVN/DRV
negotiations will be how we can maintain the threat of continued reprisals in order to
prevent DRV stalling and achieving a de facto cease-fire and to permit us to verify that
DRV is acting in good faith and that VC have not merely gone underground only to arise
again. We have no sure fire formulae at the moment but wish to flag these problems for
intensive study./4/
/4/The Embassy offered further comments on a graduated reprisal program in telegram 2350
from Saigon, February 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor
/3/Not found.
In closing, we do not feel that this Embassy has ever tried "to shore up a govt besieged by
both military and Buddhists." We did support the Huong govt which, until Jan 26,
successfully resisted the Buddhists with the support of the armed forces. When, between Jan
25 and Jan 26, Khanh and company pulled the rug from under Huong, there was no shoring
up to be done since his govt or any other would necessarily fall with the withdrawal of
military support. The latter is indespensable for the continued existence of any govt in
South Vietnam; the support of the Institute leaders is not, as long as the military are willing
to stand up against them.
Thus we feel that our primary objective should be to encourage the formation of a govt
headed by a resolute PriMin, civilian or military, who has the full support of the armed
forces and the will to maintain order against all comers. Our efforts should be discrete and
invisible to the naked eye since no VN official will thrive long who can be accused of being
a U.S. puppet.
Taylor
107. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to Senator Mike Mansfield/1/
Washington, February 11, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vietnam--Mansfield Memo
and Reply. Confidential.
Dear Mike:
The President has asked me to acknowledge your memorandum of February 10,/2/ with its
considerations directed specifically at the second major Viet Cong attack. Let me once
again try to comment in order on your specific points.
/2/Document 101.
1. We of course are watching the Communist defenses against air attack with great care, and
all missions are designed in the light of the most up-to-date information we can get. You are
entirely right in believing that this question of Communist air defenses is of critical
importance.
2. It is not our current expectation that any single retaliation can be expected at this stage to
cool off the situation. It is clear that for the immediate future the Vietnamese Communists
will try as hard as they can to show that they have more determination than we. The choice
we are facing, however, is the choice between making a reply and not making one, and it is
in that framework that the President's decision was made. As he said last night,/3/ the action
taken today is designed to be prompt, adequate, and measured.
/3/Apparently a reference to remarks made by President Johnson at a meeting the previous
evening with Congressional leaders; see Document 100.
3. There is no question that Americans on the ground in Vietnam face the prospect of
harassment by the Viet Cong. The Pleiku incident makes it clear that they faced the prospect
before our current replies were begun, and as I said in my last letter,/4/ it is obviously of
high importance that our commanders out there should do everything they can to take all the
precautionary measures that they can against such harassment. Nevertheless, you are quite
right in pointing to this as a continuing problem.
/4/Document 94.
4. Only the future can tell what the long-term reaction of the South Vietnamese people may
be, but it seems to us much too soon to reach your pessimistic conclusion that the help from
the South Vietnamese will decrease if a tit-for-tat pattern develops. We shall certainly be
doing all that we can do to prevent such a result, and as the President remarked last night,
the most important single thing which we can do is to avoid an appearance that the
American people are looking for an easy way out in Vietnam.
5. The problem of possible international conferences is a most important and interesting
one, and so is the question of the terms which we set as a part of any possible future
discussions. I am not sure just what you mean by a "call for cease-fire." If the cease-fire
were to apply to all forces in South Vietnam, it would seem to me to be an effort to apply
equal standards to the cops and to the robbers; but if it is a matter of saying that any replies
we make in the North can be stopped the minute there is an end to the aggression in the
South, I can see great merit in it.
6. The President asked me to repeat again that he values your continuing counsel on this
very difficult problem.
Sincerely,
McGeorge Bundy/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
108. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 11, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. VIII. No classification.
SUBJECT
Cables from Max Taylor
I attach two cables from Max Taylor which have been referred to in our discussions but
which you will wish to read yourself. They are the basic recommendation for a reprisal
program (Tab A),/2/ and his weekly report (Tab B),/3/ which includes his acknowledgment
of our outgoing cable (Tab C)/4/ reporting your basic decision of Monday to reaffirm your
December plan on the basis of the evacuation of dependents and the best government we
can get in Saigon. These documents are the fundamental basis on which we are now making
plans for your further review. The only more important document will be your speech, of
which I expect to have the first draft by Saturday morning./5/
/2/Document 93.
/3/Telegram 2466, February 10, in which Taylor expressed his happiness at the decision to
move ahead into Phase II of the December plan. (Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S)
/4/Document 91.
/5/For Bundy's drafts of the speech, see Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of
McGeorge Bundy, Feb. 1965 Non-Speech on Vietnam. The proposed speech was never
given. See Document 124, paragraphs 5-7.
McG. B./6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
VC action and that tempo may hopefully be somewhat slower than some versions of Phase
II had envisaged.
In our analysis to date, latter point assumes great importance. Ideally, we would like to
lengthen the time before we reach a fork in the road at which negotiating pressures become
extreme, or dangers of sharp Communist response become substantial, or both, while at the
same time maintaining necessary pattern of response and pressure both to strengthen SVN
situation and eventually to affect Hanoi attitudes.
Timing and criteria for specific actions thus crucial. Hanoi may force our hand, as it did by
Qui Nhon and other actions, so that there is really no choice but to respond at once.
However, we remain anxious to keep our response actions controllable and optional to
maximum degree possible, and particularly to relate timing to any special factor outside
SVN. For example, Kosygin's continued presence in Far East gave us concern yesterday
although we concluded immediate action essential.
Thus, we will need to stay in closest touch assessing VC actions against threshold of further
response actions. Procedurally, we want to keep maximum discretion here and try to make
our own minds up before we become in any degree committed to GVN to specific actions.
There may be cases where provocations so extreme that failure to consult immediately with
GVN could be construed as hesitancy and have adverse effect on them; night of February
10 was probably such a case, and we accept your judgment. However, we should have
general practice of consultation with Washington prior to any GVN approaches which
inevitably tend to commit us and could tilt the scales wrongly on timing decisions.
An underlying basic point--and another factor pointing to controlled tempo--is that GVN
and South Vietnamese generally should not slide into believing we have taken over the war
and they can resume bickering and not go all out in the field. Would appreciate your
judgment how far such danger exists as we go along. Your present estimate would also be
helpful in next few days./2/
/2/See Document 112.
Ball
McGeorge Bundy forwarded SNIE 10-3-65 and SNIE 10-3/1-65 (Document 139) to
President Johnson on February 19 under cover of a memorandum stating that both estimates
"are important enough for you to read in full" and "seem careful and sober to me" and
"suggest the wisdom of your determination to act in a measured and fitting way." (Johnson
Library, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII)
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE US ACTIONS
The Problem
To estimate Communist reactions, particularly Soviet reactions, to a US course of sustained
air attacks on North Vietnam.
Scope Note
This US course is presumed to start with a public declaration outlining the new policy and
linking it to the entire range of Viet Cong guerrilla and terrorist activity in South Vietnam.
This declaration, we further presume, makes it clear that the US means to go beyond
specific reprisals for individual major Viet Cong actions and to continue air attacks until the
threat to South Vietnam has been reduced to levels which the US regards as tolerable. We
consider in this estimate present Communist attitudes and Communist reactions, particularly
Soviet reactions, in the period before and during continuing air attacks, and during any
period when these attacks are suspended.
The Estimate
The Present Situation
1. Reversing Khrushchev's policy of minimum involvement in Southeast Asia, the new
Soviet leaders have over the past several months begun to reassert the USSR's interest,
particularly in Vietnam. Kosygin's visit to Hanoi is the latest step in this process. We
believe that, in embarking on these tactics, the Soviet leaders hoped to work Hanoi back
toward a middle position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, to discourage the US from broadening
the war, and to participate in the Communist victory which they expected. To these ends,
the USSR probably planned to offer to strengthen North Vietnamese air defenses and to
provide equipment for use in insurgency and subversion.
2. The recent VC attacks and US/GVN reprisals probably cut across Soviet calculations.
The US course of action under consideration here would further undermine these
calculations and force the Soviets to reconsider; indeed, they are probably already doing so.
In the meantime, however, they have already reconfirmed their commitment to North
Vietnam, albeit in general terms, with a government statement promising "further measures
to safeguard the security and strengthen the defensive capability" of the DRV.
3. Soviet public statements after the attacks of last weekend had a cautionary flavor, and we
believe that Kosygin's private representatives to Hanoi were of a similar nature.
Nevertheless, Hanoi has evidently chosen to maintain a high level of VC pressures in South
Vietnam, including attacks against US facilities, perhaps in part to force the Soviets into a
stronger commitment. China for its part is almost certainly seeking to sharpen the Soviet
dilemma of a choice between support for the DRV, whatever the dangers of confrontation
with the US, or a withdrawal which Peiping could portray as confirmation of its case
against Moscow.
Key Uncertainties
4. At the outset, the Communists would have to determine how to interpret the new policy
declared by the US. We believe that they would understand that the US did in fact intend a
course of sustained pressure against North Vietnam. Even at the beginning, however, they
would see some chance that their own threats and international pressures could succeed in
averting air attacks or keeping them at a low level. Unless attacks continued regularly and
frequently thereafter and the US Government displayed a consistent determination to
persevere, the Communists would tend to doubt that the US would long sustain this course
of action.
5. Another important initial uncertainty relates to timing. In the course of reasserting their
interest in Vietnam, the Soviets may have extended specific commitments, including offers
of military aid, of which we are not yet aware. Or they may do so between now and the time
when the new US policy is announced. In either case, the USSR's freedom to disengage in
reaction to the new US program would be reduced, although not entirely eliminated.
Soviet Reactions
6. It is possible that, once the US has demonstrated the seriousness of its intentions, the
Soviets would revert to a policy of minimum involvement. But we think it unlikely that they
would do so; their commitment to date probably has already carried them past this point.
Although the Soviets would perceive military risks in more direct involvement, they would
expect to be able to keep these at a tolerable level and far removed from the Soviet
homeland. They would also expect difficulties in their relations with Washington, but the
new leaders have thus far shown themselves at least as concerned to win support of other
Communists and anti-Western radicals as to carry forward a dtente with the US.
7. We believe that the Soviet response to the US program of air attacks would consist both
of a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda effort to bring the US to the conference table and
the provision of military support to North Vietnam. The extent and nature of the latter are
difficult to predict. It would almost certainly include anti-aircraft artillery and radars. In
order to provide a more effective defense against US air attacks, however, North Vietnam
would almost certainly press for surface-to air missiles or even advanced jet fighters. These
systems would, at the present time, have to be installed and operated by Soviet personnel./2/
/2/In the case of the SA-2 missile system, the USSR would need two and more probably
about three weeks to provide a limited operational capability in North Vietnam after a
decision to do so. Advanced jet fighters could be provided more quickly. [Footnote in the
source text.]
8. In considering these advanced systems, the USSR would recognize that missile sites and
fighter bases in North Vietnam would be highly vulnerable to US attack. The Soviets would
appreciate that successful attacks on these targets would face them with a choice of
accepting the damage, substantially boosting their involvement in the defense of the DRV,
or becoming party to even more provocative escalation. It may be that, rather than open up
these dangers, the USSR would refrain from providing SAMs and fighters. Yet a refusal to
satisfy North Vietnamese requests for this kind of aid would be costly to the Soviet
position, the more so if such aid had previously been promised.
9. On balance, we think that the chances are about even that the Soviets would provide
some SA-2 defenses to North Vietnam. Such a move would run counter to the preferred
Soviet tactics of increasing their commitments only when the dangers of confrontation have
begun to recede. But the present degree of Soviet involvement, plus the political costs of
failing to provide support in the circumstances under consideration, might outweigh their
caution in the present case.
10. If the Soviets should provide SA-2s, we believe that they would do so in ways
calculated to minimize the initial risks to them. One likely way of doing this would be to
deploy some SA-2 defenses for the key Hanoi-Haiphong area, hoping that this degree of
involvement would serve to restrain the US and still not engage Soviet personnel in actual
fighting. SA-2s deployed in this area, however, probably would be used if attacking US
aircraft came within their range. By providing Soviet personnel in the guise of
"technicians," the USSR would preserve the option of ignoring any Soviet casualties.
11. This would be a fairly limited Soviet involvement, but it would represent a greater
commitment to North Vietnam than has obtained in the past. In this situation of increased
risks, we believe that the USSR would be seeking means to curb the conflict. This effort
would consist both of threats against the US and of attempts to mobilize international
pressures on the US to negotiate, probably in the Geneva forum.
12. If these efforts failed, however, the Soviets might in time advise Hanoi to damp down
operations in South Vietnam or even to entertain a political settlement on terms not
completely unacceptable to the US. This would be a delicate operation for the USSR; the
DRV would charge that what was needed was not less Viet Cong aggressiveness but more
effective Soviet assistance, and Peiping would almost certainly take the same line. We
cannot at this time predict whether the USSR would try this approach nor, if it did, what the
results would be.
13. Elsewhere in the world, general Soviet policy would harden against the US. This would
tend to preclude moves toward a relaxation of tensions and to increase the USSR's verbal
ugliness on other East-West issues. The new leaders, however, have in any event not been
inclined to date to move very far toward detente. Nonetheless, we think it highly unlikely
that they would react to the US course of action considered here by deliberately provoking a
major crisis in some other area of the world, e.g., Berlin or Cuba.
DRV Reactions
14. Initiation of the new US policy almost certainly would not lead Hanoi to restrain the
Viet Cong. Hanoi would probably elect to maintain the very intense levels of activity
evident in the past few days. Pressures might be stepped up in Laos at the same time. The
anger and emotion with which the US program would be received in Hanoi might affect its
calculations. In any case, the DRV would wish to avoid an impression of weakness at the
outset. Moreover, it would have some doubt about US staying power on its new course and
would hope that Sino-Soviet competition would maximize the support provided by both
allies. If the US persevered in the face of threats and international pressures, and as the
degree of damage inflicted on North Vietnam increased, the chances of a reduction in Viet
Vietnamese or Chinese bases. We think this unlikely because of the vulnerability of North
Vietnamese bases and China's reluctance to risk retaliation against its own territory.
A Possible Communist Tactic
19. If at some point the Communists had become persuaded of the durability of the new US
policy, they might adopt tactics designed to provide a respite. This might come about if US
attacks were inflicting severe damage and if, at the same time, the US had made clear an
intention to reduce or cease its attacks in return for a sharp reduction of Viet Cong activity
in South Vietnam. In these circumstances, the DRV might order such a reduction and use an
ensuing period of calm to press for a negotiated cease-fire and an international conference.
At the same time, it might use the respite for a major buildup, assisted by its allies. Such a
buildup might include extensive SA-2 deployments, additions to jet fighter strength in
North Vietnam and southern China, and large-scale deployments of DRV and Chinese
ground forces suitable for rapid invasions. The Communists might expect that they could
complete these preparations without US interference, and that thereafter the US would be
deterred from resuming its program of air attacks when Viet Cong activity was again
stepped up.
The Coordination of Communist Policy
20. It is obviously to Communist advantage to appear unified, and they will make great
efforts to convey this impression. Heightened military conflict would itself exert strong
pressures for effective unity. Nevertheless, we have at several points indicated our belief
that the USSR and China act as competitors in North Vietnamese affairs and that they
would continue to do so during a period of sustained US air attacks on North Vietnam. We
have also pointed to complex and conflicting interests which make for delicate relations-and difficult communications--between Hanoi and both its allies. We think it likely that
policy coordination among three Communist countries involved will be chronically
imperfect and occasionally quite erratic. Hence, Communist policies and reactions will at
times be faltering and uncertain and at others bold to the point of rashness. In any case,
since Communist policies will be constantly fashioned and refashioned to meet a constantly
changing situation, they will be difficult to foresee very far ahead.
/3/Document 93.
In review of the rationale for concept of graduated reprisals, we are of the opinion that, in
order of importance, it should have the following objectives: (A) the will of Hanoi leaders;
(B) GVN morale; and (C) physical damage to installations having some bearing on the
DRV ability to support VC. Of these three, first appears to us by far the most important,
since our effectiveness in influencing Hanoi leadership will, in the long run, determine the
success or failure of our efforts in both North and South Vietnam. Second objective, effect
on GVN morale, is also important and fortunately the requirements for building morale in
the South are roughly the same as those for impressing Hanoi leaders with the rising costs
of their support of the VC. In this case, what is bad for Hanoi is generally good for Saigon.
Effect of the physical destruction of material objects and infliction of casualties will not, in
our judgment, have a decisive bearing upon the ability of DRV to support VC. However,
degree of damage and number of casualties inflicted gauge the impact of our operations on
Hanoi leadership and hence are important as a measure of their discomfort.
If one accepts the foregoing rationale, one can then pass to a consideration of methods and
procedures appropriate to implementation of such a concept. We agree with the Dept that
we should keep our response actions controllable and optional to maximum degree possible
so that we can act or withhold action when and as we choose. This need for flexibility
argues strongly for vagueness in defining criteria for situations justifying retaliation and for
retention of freedom of action to make ad hoc decisions in light of our interests at the
moment. But in any case, complete flexibility will not be possible for at least two reasons.
First the GRV may perpetuate an untimely atrocity like Qui Nhon which we cannot ignore.
Second, we will probably receive from GVN more requests for retaliatory strikes in excess
of the optimum tempo which we wish to give the operations. To turn down the GVN too
often will work against factor of morale which we mentioned at the outset and sour relations
which we hope to sweeten. We shall have to take this point into account.
Assuming that we have achieved control and flexibility, we will then need to think of the
tempo which we wish to communicate to the retaliatory program, with primary
consideration given to effect of the program on Hanoi leadership. It seems clear to us that
there should be a gradual, orchestrated acceleration of tempo measured in terms of
frequency, size, number and/or geographical location of the reprisal strikes and of related
activities such as Barrel Roll and 34-A. An upward trend in any or all these forms of
intensity will convey signals which, in combination, should present to the DRV leaders a
vision of inevitable, ultimate destruction if they do not change their ways.
The exact rate of acceleration is a matter of judgment but we consider, roughly speaking,
that each successive week should include some new act on our part to increase pressure on
Hanoi. As indicated at the outset, we are working on a paper/4/ which will contain specific
suggestions along these lines.
/4/Not further identified.
We note your comment with regard to avoiding contact with GVN prior to consulting
Washington. We can see advantage of first getting the Washington reaction before that of
the GVN but would point out the difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining VNAF
participation in a strike during the daylight hours following a night atrocity without starting
the VNAF wheels turning as soon as retaliatory actions appear likely. This difficulty is not
an overriding objection because, in our view, there is an operational need henceforth to
stagger our attacks in DRV in order to avoid being trapped in an unchanging pattern of
reaction. The three strikes which we have executed thus far have all fallen between 1400
and 1600 of the first day following the atrocity. We are bound to increase the hazards to our
pilots if we do not vary our schedule.
We do not believe that our reprisal program will lead the GVN to believe that we have
taken over their war and that they can reduce their anti-VC activities. We hope that the
opposite will be the effect and the retaliatory actions in the North will give impulsion to the
defensive efforts in the South. However, the Dept's fear can certainly not be ruled out and
we shall watch closely the GVN reaction to the program as it unfolds.
Taylor
As we move--step by step--up the scales of military action you will certainly wish to
appraise the level of risk at each point--although admittedly your ability to control exposure
to risk is likely to diminish as the scale and intensity of military pressure increases.
Part II of the memorandum is a program of political action. Such a program is an essential
accompaniment to the military program. It is needed for several reasons:
a. To make clear to the world that our objectives are peace and freedom;
b. To minimize the danger of MIG engagement and Chinese and Soviet involvement, giving
the Soviets an alternative to support the Chinese militancy;
c. To pre-empt a probable peace offensive by the Communists;
d. To enable you to opt for a political settlement at any point where you determine that the
risks of further military pressure have become prohibitive in the light of our over-all
interests.
PART I
The Risks of Our Military Program
A. Nature and Objectives of the Proposed Military Program
The course of action we are now proposing to follow (subject to refinement by exchanges
with Saigon and further staff work here) envisages continued air attacks, on a joint United
States/South Vietnamese basis, against military targets directly related to North Vietnamese
infiltration. It also contemplates attacks on targets such as railroad lines, in response to Viet
Cong attacks on corresponding targets in the South.
We would continue to justify such air attacks as responses to Viet Cong action in the South.
Viet Cong attacks on United States personnel and installations would call for practically
automatic responses. Other Viet Cong activities would be assessed continuously, and the
criteria for response left as flexible as possible.
Since we would seek to justify our attacks as responses to Viet Cong actions we might not
be able fully to control their tempo. However, we would seek to keep as much flexibility as
possible.
We envisage that the attacks would slowly increase in scale.
We propose to mount strikes at roughly weekly intervals unless our hand is forced by
dramatic VC actions.
The fundamental objective of this program is to increase United States bargaining power,
vis-a-vis Hanoi and Peiping, to the point where a satisfactory political solution becomes
possible. Hopefully these attacks should also tend to improve morale and increase stability
in Saigon while impairing the infiltration efforts of the North Vietnamese.
B. Risks of War with Communist China
1. We cannot long continue air strikes against North Viet-Nam without facing the likelihood
of engagement with the 53 Chinese MIGs sent to Hanoi to defend North Viet-Nam. The
danger of encountering these MIGs will increase as we strike targets closer and closer to
Hanoi.
In our air strikes to date, we have hit targets up to sixty miles north of the 17th parallel. At
some point--if we close the remaining gap of 250 miles to Hanoi--engagement by United
States planes with the 53 MIGs sent to Hanoi will become inevitable. We recommend
delaying the chances of MIG involvement by continuing for the next eight weeks to confine
our strikes to targets below the 19th parallel. Such targets lie outside the effective range of
the ground control center of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
2. Once our planes have been engaged heavily by MIG aircraft, you will be compelled--in
order to prevent unacceptable losses--to face the decision to mount an air effort to eliminate
the major MIG base at Phuc Yen, near Hanoi. This base is heavily defended. Some parts of
the base are near populated areas. Any effective strike against it would require a massive air
effort.
2a. If we hit targets in or approaching the Hanoi-Haiphong area, it will be likely at some
point to trigger a DRV ground force move South. The DRV can support an invasion of
125,000 troops (20-50,000 through the DMZ; balance through Laos). There is no current
estimate of what US response would be needed to stop this action. It would clearly require
substantial increases of US ground, air and naval forces.
3. Last November, the United States intelligence community unanimously agreed that, if the
United States attacked above the 19th parallel, "Chinese Communist aircraft operating from
Chinese bases would probably assist in defending North Viet-Nam against the United States
attacks"./4/ Perhaps the involvement by Chinese air would first take the form of
"volunteers," but it might shortly be followed by direct engagement of Chinese planes
operating from the sanctuary of Chinese territory. There are now approximately 350
Chinese jet fighters deployed in the Hainan area of South China--within striking distance of
North Vietnam.
/4/The Feb. 11 estimate is that this "might" occur. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is
to Document 111, paragraph 17.]
4. Once Chinese aircraft entered the conflict you would be under considerable pressure to
order United States forces to knock out offending Chinese bases--and even to strike at
Chinese nuclear production installations.
5. If Chinese air bases were hit, some of our intelligence experts believe it likely that China
would move massive ground forces into North Viet-Nam, and subsequently into Laos,
South Viet-Nam, and possibly Thailand. Other experts assess the chances as being lower.
All agree that such a movement would be entirely possible.
6. If Chinese ground forces were to move into Southeast Asia, we would be compelled to
make a major effort to stop them. The only way that this could be done through
conventional means would be by introducing substantial United States ground combat
forces into South Viet-Nam. The magnitude of the required effort would almost certainly
mean that you would have to call up reserves.
7. It is estimated that the Chinese have the logistical capacity to support 14 Chinese
divisions and 8 North Vietnamese divisions in a movement into Laos, Thailand and South
Viet-Nam (without taking account of United States and Allied interdiction operations). In
order to counter this movement, we would be required to bring in 5 to 8 United States
divisions with a total troop strength (including supporting elements) of 300,000 men.
8. The confrontation of Chinese ground forces by American ground forces would induce
debate in the United States as to the need to use nuclear weapons--although DOD does not
believe there would be a military requirement for such weapons. Recalling the Korean
experience, some Americans would argue that United States ground forces should not be
asked to fight large numbers of Chinese troops without resort to nuclear weapons, in which
the United States has a clear advantage.
9. To use nuclear weapons against the Chinese would obviously raise the most profound
political problems. Not only would their use generate probably irresistible pressures for a
major Soviet involvement, but the United States would be vulnerable to the charge that it
was willing to use nuclear weapons against non-whites only.
10. Peiping's decision whether or not to intervene may well turn upon its estimate of the
extent to which it can expect Soviet support. Unless we provide the Soviets with a political
alternative they can support they will be in a weak position to bring pressure on the Chinese
Communists to move toward a settlement. Without such a political option they will also
find difficulty in resisting Chinese pressure to provide assistance in the event of a United
States-Chinese military conflict. Such a political option is suggested in Part II of this paper.
C. Chances of Conflict with the USSR
We cannot be certain at this time what the Soviets will do if we continue our air strikes
against North Viet-Nam--particularly if these strikes lead to direct conflict with the Chinese.
The Soviets may want the Chinese and us to bloody our noses, but we doubt they would be
in a position to exploit this desire. In the last analysis, the Soviet stake is the leadership of
the Communist Bloc. Competition for that leadership would probably force the USSR in the
direction of increasing its aid and involvement. On balance, we think it highly likely that--if
the war should continue and escalate--the Soviets would feel compelled to extend an
increasing amount of assistance to the North Vietnamese and Chinese.
1. Kosygin's trip has already resulted in a commitment by the Soviets to give increased
defense assistance to Hanoi. We do not know what form this increase will take. The United
States Intelligence Community thinks "the chances are about even" that ground-air missiles-probably with Soviet missile crews--will be included. The likelihood of increased aid
commitments will grow as our raids extend northward to Hanoi.
2. If we should become engaged directly with the Chinese, the Soviets would be faced with
a painful dilemma. Under the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty (which is fifteen years old on
February 14) the Soviets are obligated to come to China's assistance if China is attacked.
The Soviet Union could avoid this commitment only by claiming that China's actions had
caused the attack. Under existing circumstances, this would be tantamount to denouncing
the treaty.
3. Since China is rich in manpower, the Soviets would probably seek to limit their
contribution to advanced military equipment. But, again, the contribution to Soviet missile
and other personnel or volunteers could not be excluded.
4. Soviet harassment of United States interests elsewhere might well be another step in this
sequence of events. Ambassador Kohler pointed out on Thursday that "...the Soviets will be
intrigued with possibilities inherent [in the] somewhat less enthusiastic support of our
policy in Southeast Asia by [the] majority [of] Western European countries and may think
that by presenting them with [a] nasty flareup in central Europe and exerting pressure on us
to temper actions in Viet-Nam, they have [a] real opportunity of causing serious intraalliance friction."
5. At the very least, progress toward improvement of United States-Soviet relations would
be severely set back. Moreover, we could look forward to a substantial deterioration in the
evolution of the Bloc toward a reduction of tensions and the development of a system more
compatible with that of the West.
C [D]. Negotiating Pressures and World Reactions
1. In many major capitals there are already signs of deep concern at the present state of the
conflict and the dangers of escalation. U Thant, the French, and India have already called
for some form of negotiation. The British have advised us that they are under public
pressure to take a negotiating initiative. Labor back-benchers can be expected to increase
this pressure with any rise in the intensity of military operations. The Canadians have also
told us that they are considering proposals that would lead to negotiation, although both
they and the Indians do not propose an immediate conference.
2. More generally, Ambassador Stevenson has reported that there is substantial sentiment in
the United Nations favoring negotiation. This could conceivably lead to negotiating
initiatives.
3. Any escalation--even the repetition of air strikes at the present level of intensity--will
increase these pressures. If we found ourselves engaged with the MIGs and particularly if
we were compelled to strike Phuc Yen, the Soviets, Indians, Canadians, British, and others
would almost certainly bring strong pressure for immediate negotiations. Many would call
for an immediate conference with no preconditions--before we had built up sufficient
bargaining power.
4. Up to this point, we have the public support of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand,
Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. We have, at least, the understanding and
acceptance of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and our NATO allies
generally--except for France. On the other hand, we must recognize that even such an ally
as Japan has expressed its strong opposition to any systematic program of air strikes against
the North.
5. Even the continuance of military pressure against North Viet-Nam at the present level
would probably arouse sharp hostility among the Afro-Asian nations. Indonesia would be of
particular concern, since by stepping up its actions against Malaysia it could create a twofront conflict. The general attitudes of Afro-Asian and neutralist nations need not be a
serious drawback in themselves, but they would contribute to an over-all world atmosphere
highly critical of our position.
PART II
Outline of a Political Program
A. Our Objectives in South Viet-Nam
McNamara and Bundy differ from Ball and Thompson as to what the United States should
realistically expect to achieve in South Viet-Nam and the degree of risk we should assume.
McNamara-Bundy Position/5/
/5/McGeorge Bundy wrote in the left-hand margin of the source text next to this paragraph:
"not our view." Ball later recollected that before the February 13 meeting with the
President, Bundy called him to correct Ball's statement of the views attributed him. Bundy,
according to Ball, said he did not believe that the United States had to increase military
pressure "to the point where Hanoi is prepared to agree not only to stop infiltration from the
North, but effectively to call off the insurgency in the South and withdraw those elements
infiltrated in the past." (The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 504-505)
McNamara and Bundy believe that we must pursue a course of increasing military pressure
to the point where Hanoi is prepared to agree not only to stop infiltration from the North,
but effectively to call off the insurgency in the South and withdraw those elements
infiltrated in the past. To achieve this objective, they would accept the risks of substantial
escalation, including the acceptance of ground warfare with Red China--although they
believe it likely that we can achieve the desired objective without such a war. This view is
shared by Maxwell Taylor.
Ball-Thompson Position
Ball and Thompson believe that--short of a crushing military defeat--Hanoi would never
abandon the aggressive course it has pursued at great cost for ten years and give up all the
progress it has made in the Communization of South Viet-Nam. For North Viet-Nam to call
off the insurgency in South Viet-Nam, close the border, and withdraw the elements it had
infiltrated into that country would mean that it had accepted unconditional surrender.
Ball and Thompson believe that Red China would be extremely reluctant to permit Hanoi to
suffer such unconditional surrender since it would mean the collapse of the basic Chinese
ideological position which they have been disputing with the Soviets. Peiping would thus be
under great pressure to engage the United States on the ground as well as in the air.
Ball and Thompson believe that the Chinese decision to intervene on the ground would, in
the final analysis, probably depend largely on the extent to which Peiping felt assured of
Soviet support. There is no way that we can safely predict whether or not such support
would be forthcoming. They are convinced, however, that the risks of Chinese ground
intervention would be great and the costs of such intervention tremendous--particularly
since the very taking of this step by Peiping would presumably imply substantial Soviet
involvement, perhaps even to the point of a large-scale Soviet-US confrontation.
Ball and Thompson have supported the air strikes that have so far taken place and they
would support a program of gradually increasing military pressure. They believe that only
in this way can the United States achieve a bargaining position that can make possible an
international arrangement that will avoid a humiliating defeat to the United States. They do
not believe, however, that we can realistically hope for an international arrangement that
will effectively stop the insurrection in South Viet-Nam and deliver the entire country south
of the Seventeenth Parallel to the government in Saigon free and clear of insurgency. They
consider that the most we can realistically expect from any international arrangement are
measures to stop the infiltration so that we may be able, over time, to reduce our
commitments. Hopefully the military actions preceding such an arrangement would have
created a sufficient sense of unity in Saigon to make it possible for the South Vietnamese
Government--with diminishing United States help--to clean up an insurgency that had
become manageable by the shutting of the borders.
In all events, Ball and Thompson recommended that you must be prepared and alerted-whenever it appears that military conflict may have reached the level of intensity where
Chinese ground intervention seems likely--to accept a cease-fire under international
auspices short of the achievement of our total political objectives.
B. Elements of a Political Program
The political program we propose consists of four parts:
(a) The issuance of a joint US-South Viet-Nam statement of aims;
(b) Based on this statement, the submission of the South Vietnamese problem to the
Security Council and full discussion in the Security Council of all aspects of that problem;
(c) Negotiation of the conditions for a conference to be conducted among a group of
countries consisting of the United States, Great Britain, France, South Viet-Nam, North
Viet-Nam, Red China, and the Soviet Union; and
(d) Negotiations at the conference.
(a) Issuance of an Agreed US-South Viet-Nam Statement of Aims
Ideally, the United States and South Viet-Nam should jointly issue a statement of war aims
as a prelude to the submission of the South Viet-namese case to the Security Council.
Because of the action of U Thant in issuing a statement of his own, we may find it
necessary for the President to outline our objectives to the world over the weekend, without
waiting for a full South Vietnamese concurrence.
A joint US-South Vietnamese statement of aims would include these elements:
1. The two governments intend to continue to take all necessary military measures to stop
the Communist aggression against the Republic of South Viet-Nam.
2. Our joint and sole aim is to secure and maintain the political independence and territorial
integrity of South Viet-Nam so as to permit it to develop its institutions and live in peace
with its neighbors free from outside interference.
3. The independence of South Viet-Nam requires the cessation of the guerrilla activities in
South Viet-Nam directed and supplied from the North, the stopping of infiltration from the
North, and the withdrawal of Viet Cong cadres previously infiltrated into South Viet-Nam.
4. South Vietnamese independence, which is the birthright of every nation, large and small,
should be internationally guaranteed.
5. Such a guarantee must be reinforced on the ground by peace- keeping machinery with
enough strength and a sufficient mandate to assure that all parties to the agreement abide by
their promises.
6. This machinery can best be established under the aegis of the United Nations.
7. Once these arrangements are carried out, the United States is prepared to withdraw its
military forces from South Viet-Nam. [It must, of course, be made clear that any final
arrangement should include the right of South Viet-Nam to call in assistance at a moment's
notice if the United Nations' guarantee should prove inadequate.]
(b) Submission to Security Council
As soon as possible--and we do not think that this can be delayed at the most for more than
a week--the United States should bring the Viet-Nam issue to the United Nations Security
Council. Conditions at the moment are propitious since the Security Council has the most
favorable composition in years--the five permanent members, plus Bolivia, Uruguay, the
Netherlands, Malaysia, Jordan and the Ivory Coast.
1. In proceedings in the Security Council, the United States would:
(i) Present all available evidence to establish that the insurrection in South Viet-Nam is not
an indigenous revolt but an insurgency imposed, directed, supplied, and inspired from North
Viet-Nam. [The effective establishment of this proposition may require some compromise
of existing intelligence. We should be prepared to do this.]
(ii) Call for the establishment of peace in South Viet-Nam under conditions that will assure
its independence. These include the halting of infiltration and the stopping of the direction
and encouragement of the revolt from the North.
(iii) Call for a meeting with representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom,
France, USSR, Communist China, North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam to discuss
arrangements for a cease-fire, the cessation of infiltration, and the establishment of peace in
South Viet-Nam.
(iv) Suggest that the Hanoi regime as well as the Republic of Viet-Nam be invited to join in
the deliberations of the Council.
2. It is unlikely that Hanoi would send representatives to New York. Most probably both
Hanoi and Peiping would scornfully reject the Security Council proceedings--at lease in the
first instance. But taking the problem to the Security Council and calling for peace
negotiations--while stepping up our military efforts and our military buildup--would
increase the pressure on the Soviets to help put an end to the crisis by joining in a call for a
cease-fire and a conference.
392)
The President was cross about newspaper leaks. He said his decisions were announced in
the New York Times before he made them. He wanted his principal officers to enforce rules
against divulgences from their Departments, also to report to him the gist of conversations
they had with journalists on substantive matters.
He told us of his telephone conversation with Harold Wilson,/3/ in the course of which he
remarked "We've got no time to be flying back and forth across the Atlantic with our shirttails hanging out."
/3/See Document 103.
[Here follows a paragraph unrelated to Vietnam.]
After much exposition, the President agreed to the next steps of Vietnam policy. The three
salient provisions were: (1) Intensification of the pacification program; (2) Measured, but
effective, action below the 19th parallel, against military targets in North Vietnam--to be
reported to the United Nations Security Council. Action will cease when aggression stops;
(3) U.S. will press for talks to bring an end to aggression. Ambassador Stevenson will take
this up with the Security Council.
It was decided to instruct Max Taylor to secure the support of the South Vietnam
Government to the above. The President is to explain the policy in a speech next week,
probably on Thursday./4/
/4/The speech was not given; see Document 124, paragraphs 5-7.
[Here follows information unrelated to Vietnam.]
FYI. Our current expectation is that these attacks might come about once or twice a week
and involve two or three targets on each day of operation. End FYI.
3. We will announce this policy of measured action in general terms and, at the same time,
we will go to UN Security Council to make clear case that aggressor is Hanoi. We will also
make it plain that we are ready and eager for "talks" to bring aggression to an end.
4. We believe this 3-part program must be concerted with GVN, and we currently expect to
announce it by Presidential statement directly after next authorized air action. We believe
this action should take place as early as possible next week.
5. You are accordingly instructed to seek immediate GVN agreement on this program. You
are authorized to emphasize our conviction that announcement of readiness to talk is
stronger diplomatic position than awaiting inevitable summons to Security Council by third
parties. We would hope to have appropriate GVN concurrence by Monday/3/ if possible
here.
/3/February 15.
In presenting above to GVN, you should draw fully, as you see fit, on following arguments:
a. We are determined to continue with military actions regardless of Security Council
deliberations and any "talks" or negotiations that may ensue, unless and until Hanoi has
brought its aggression to an end. Our demand would be that they cease infiltration and all
forms of support and also the activity they are directing in the south.
b. We consider the UN Security Council initiative, following another strike, essential if we
are to avoid being faced with really damaging initiatives by the USSR or perhaps by such
powers as India, France or even the UK.
c. At an early point in the UN Security Council initiative, we would expect to see calls for
the DRV to appear in the UN. If they failed to appear, as in August, this will make doubly
clear that it is they who are refusing to desist, and our position in pursuing military actions
against the DRV would be strengthened. For same reason we would now hope GVN itself
would appear at UN and work closely with US.
d. With or without Hanoi, we have every expectation that any "talks" that may result from
our Security Council initiative would in fact go on for many weeks or perhaps months and
would above all focus consistently on the cessation of Hanoi's aggression as the
precondition to any cessation of military action against the DRV. We further anticipate that
any detailed discussions about any possible eventual form of agreement returning to the
essentials of the 1954 Accords would be postponed and would be subordinated to the
central issue.
For your private guidance, the following draft language is under consideration for
Presidential announcement:
"The aggression has continued. It has continued against the Vietnamese, and it has
continued against Americans. In support of the independence of Vietnam, in the service of
our nation, and in fulfillment of the solemn public obligation of our nation, and in our
individual and collective self-defense, the Government of the United States, with the
Government of Vietnam, has now decided that further action must be taken.
The actions we have agreed upon are three.
First and most important, we will continue and we will intensify still further our campaign
against terror and violence in South Vietnam itself. The establishment of civil peace and the
disarming of the Communist forces are the first order of business for both our Governments.
Our military and police actions will be increasingly energetic and effective. We will also
strengthen and enlarge our efforts to move forward with the peaceful development of a
society set free from fear. We will never make the mistake of assuming that there is any
substitute for victory against aggression where it shows its open face--inside the borders of
South Vietnam itself.
Second--and at the same time--we will carry out measured but effective actions against
military targets in North Vietnam. These actions will be reported to the United Nations
Security Council under the Provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter/4/--and
each such report will include a full account of the continuing acts of aggression which make
our actions necessary. These actions will stop when the aggression stops.
/4/Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reads as follows:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security." (Charles I. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United
States of America, 1776-1949, vol. III, p. 1165)
Third, we will press with urgency for talks designed to bring an end to the aggression and
its threat to peace. I have today instructed Ambassador Stevenson to seek such action
urgently, in the Security Council of the United Nations, and if that body should be
hamstrung by any veto, we shall then press for talks in another appropriate forum. We
believe that in any such talks the first object must be an end of aggression, and we believe
that the government in Hanoi must be brought to the conference room. Our common
purpose--and our only purpose--is to restore the peace and domestic tranquillity which
others have so savagely attacked."
Ball
There is just a chance that the vision of possible victory may decide Khanh to take over the
government at this juncture. Alternatively, it may create some measure of national unity
which will facilitate the task of Quat or of any other Prime Minister who succeeds in
forming a new government.
Our comments on the text of the proposed Presidential announcement and the tactics related
to it will follow by separate cable./4/
/4/Apparently before Taylor had time to send the cable promised here, the Department of
State provided further instructions to him; see Document 117.
Taylor
have decisive impact on Hanoi willingness accept our basic objectives. In effect, progress in
SVN is just as much part of total pressures on Hanoi, if not more, than proposed action
program.
Ball
Finally, I strongly believe that the Lao and the Thai should be brought on board before we
seem to be inviting reopening of a Geneva Conference. If we fail to do this, much of the
effect of our present course of action will be lost on them.
I recommend, therefore, elimination of any reference to willingness to talk in final
paragraph of proposed Presidential announcement/4/ or in initial presentation in UNSC and
that we preserve basic approach contained Embtel 2235,/5/ particularly paragraph 14 re how
we state our demands on DRV and nature of negotiations. Our willingness can well be
brought out in UNSC debate. While some form of negotiations is obviously our ultimate
objective and UNSC discussion could eventually lead to such negotiations, we should in my
judgment divert and focus these pressures for negotiation in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow
and maintain a posture of firmness and determination.
/4/In a February 15 memorandum to Rusk Harland Cleveland took issue with Taylor's
recommendation, proposing instead that the announcement "make a specific proposal for
preliminary talks based on specific pre-conditions of our own choosing." (Department of
State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, February 1965)
/5/Document 32.
I recommended following revision of final paragraph of Presidential announcement:
"I have today instructed Ambassador Stevenson to seek urgently a meeting of the Security
Council of the United Nations to explain the reasons leading to the joint decision of the
USG and GVN and to inform the UNSC members of the history of DRV aggression which
makes this course of action necessary. Our common purpose--and our only purpose--is to
restore the peace and domestic tranquility which others have so savagely attacked."
I also recommend the following additional changes in the announcement:
A) In the first paragraph, insert the following new sentence between the present third and
fourth sentences: "These actions will continue until lawless elements are either destroyed or
driven from the country."
B) At the end of the second "action" paragraph add "and not before."
Taylor
Khanh then asked what we meant by the phrase "selected military targets in the southern
part of the DRV"? I explained that it meant the area in which we had conducted our recent
strikes and would extend over, at least, as much of south DRV as could be reached with
safety by VNAF. I then made the point that, not covered by this proposed agreement, were
the US air operations in Laos, the 34-A program which should continue to be conducted as
at present, and any CINCPAC operations of the nature of the Tonkin Gulf affair. I explained
that the initial limitation of strikes to this southern part of the DRV would not necessarily be
permanent as, in the course, we would probably want to edge north to give signals to Hanoi
of increasing danger.
On the subject of point three, the approach to the UN, I explained the need for preemptive
action and for taking the initiative from those countries who might wish to call us before the
UN bar as the guilty party. It was most important to present the strongest possible case
against Hanoi and we must work closely together [to] this end. I emphasized that we
expected to continue air strikes throughout the duration of the discussions which might last
several months. I closed with a summary of our objectives which are to oblige Hanoi to
cease infiltration and all forms of support of VC and to collaborate in obtaining cessation of
VC insurgency.
Khanh and Oanh consulted briefly and Khanh indicated that they were completely in accord
with the three-point program. I indicated that I would report GVN concurrence to
Washington.
Before we broke up, Khanh expressed concern over the statements appearing in the world
press which suggested that our recent air strikes had been in retaliation solely for US losses
on US bases and indicated that this kind of talk caused him trouble in SVN. I told him that
we appreciated his difficulty and would also like to stress the mutuality of our defensive
actions. I reiterated, as I had in my meeting with Prime Minister Huong on January 23, that
retaliation should take place whether the victims were Vietnamese, US nationals or both.
Khanh's comment is a reminder to us that in all government statements we should recognize
the GVN partnership and the mutual responsibility to protect the nationals of both countries.
Later when I queried Khanh privately as to whether he has considered bringing Quat into
the meeting per our suggestion, Khanh replied that it would have been improper to include
Quat since he was not officially installed as Prime Minister. However, Khanh said he would
bring Quat up to date immediately following Quat's investiture. Earlier we had informed
Quat without mentioning subject of meeting that we would suggest to Oanh and Khanh that
he participate but of course decision rested with them.
Taylor
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
I told the Ambassador that I wished to talk to him a little further about the situation in VietNam, I said we were convinced and, in fact, had evidence that the Viet-Cong were
controlled from Hanoi and we were convinced that the recent escalation had been
deliberately triggered by Hanoi. I said we did not have evidence that Peking had ordered the
recent increase in activity and the outrages against our people, but since it was only Peking
that stood to gain, we could assume that they were involved.
Dobrynin asked if this was a message from the President, and I replied that the President
had asked me to speak to him but had not instructed me specifically what to say, but I
thought I was reflecting his thinking. When he asked whether this was a reply to the
message from his Government/2/ or whether there would be a separate communication, I
said I frankly did not know.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 82.
Dobrynin said he had no instructions from his Government and could only give me his
personal views. He said that not only he but the members of his staff had reacted very
strongly at our action in bombing North Viet-Nam, which they thought was deliberately
related to the Kosygin visit. He could assume that reactions in the Soviet Union were
similar.
I again assured him that when we had learned of the Kosygin visit, we had taken a number
of steps, including calling off a DeSoto patrol in order not to, in any way, embarrass Mr.
Kosygin. It was not we, but the other side that had started these new developments. When
Dobrynin said we could have taken some other action than the bombing of the country
which his Prime Minister was visiting, I asked him to put himself in our place. I said, for
example, that if the West Germans had been conducting operations in East Germany similar
to those which North Viet-Nam was conducting in South Viet-Nam and that during a visit
of President Johnson to West Germany a lot of Soviet personnel in East Germany had been
blown up in a sneak attack, what would they have done? He said I can assure you we would
not have bombed West Germany.
Dobrynin several times asked to know what the course we had embarked upon was leading
to and what our ultimate objectives were. I said our objective was to get out of South VietNam. I pointed out that we had reached a settlement of a similar problem in Laos and that
we had actually withdrawn our troops. His Government had complained about a few alleged
technical violations but the fact was that we had really carried out the agreement. The other
side had not and had prevented any international machinery from operating effectively. I
said we would like to see this agreement effectively implemented.
Dobrynin said he still did not understand what we were driving at. From the Soviet point of
view, we had intervened to put down an indigenous movement which was very strong and
the fact that even if one accepted our statements of some infiltrators from the North, the
South Vietnamese had some three hundred thousand men, in addition to the sizeable
American forces, engaged, and they were unable to put down the rebellion, which showed
that it was basically an indigenous movement. He said that simply for the sake of argument,
if one accepted our statements about the North Vietnamese role, what would happen if they
agreed to stop any intervention and did so? There would continue to be incidents and he
wondered what he would do then.
I said that we had firm evidence of the command and control of these operations by Hanoi
and said we could produce our evidence. I did not dispute that there was some indigenous
rebel activity but said that after the Geneva Accords the North Vietnamese had left
personnel in South Viet-Nam to carry on these operations and had brought in tens of
thousands from the North after the Accords. These people were highly trained and would go
into villages and force the villagers to supply them with personnel under threat of
destroying the village. If the village did not comply, they carried out their threats.
Dobrynin interjected that there was plenty of evidence of the South Vietnamese
Government using similar methods. I went on to say that if Hanoi stopped its intervention
and withdrew its people, we would know about this and in this event we were sure that the
situation could be stabilized. I said it was important to realize that North Viet-Nam was
trying to take over South Viet-Nam but we were not endeavoring to take over the North. I
said we considered our actions defensive.
Dobrynin pointed out that Shastri, de Gaulle, and U Thant had raised the subject of
negotiations/3/ but the State Department had said no. He said that I knew his country and
must know how they were reacting and the possibility that they would become involved. He
asked if it were true, as he had inferred from press articles, that there had been some
negotiations started indirectly between us and Hanoi. I replied that I had not heard of any.
/3/Regarding the Indian Government's public statement of February 8 calling for
negotiations, see footnote 5, Document 122. For text of U Thant's appeal on February 12 for
a dialog among the principal parties involved in Vietnam, see American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1965, pp. 832-833.
In discussing Soviet/American relations, Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government had
made several gestures toward the improvement of relations, not that they felt President
Johnson needed them, but they were genuine. He emphasized that contrary to press
statements, the Soviet Government was not in a position of having any need to improve
relations, although they thought this was in the mutual interest of both countries. He said it
was not a question of desiring to worsen them, but was simply one of fact that if our present
policy continued, our relations would be adversely affected. I said I could recognize this
fact but it seemed to me they were attempting to use the threat of worsening relations as a
deliberate move to affect the Vietnamese situation. I pointed out that after the Cuban affair
we had been able quickly to resume our progress in bettering our relations.
Dobrynin emphasized that he had been speaking personally and I again said that I was
simply trying, at the direction of the President, to give him some understanding of the way
we looked at the problem.
121. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 15, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, February 1965.
Secret.
SUBJECT
Some Thoughts on Southeast Asia
As you suggested after we talked on the phone Saturday,/2/ here are my three points in
writing.
/2/February 13.
1. The military weight of infiltration. In addition to documenting the fact of infiltration and
its illegality in terms of the commitments of 1954 and 1962, it is important to put into
perspective its straight military significance. All guerrilla wars are marked by a vast
disproportion between the number of guerrillas and the number of government troops
required to control or defeat them. This disproportion stems from the fact that the guerrillas'
job is to harass and to destroy; the government's job is to defend a living society. Although
the figures vary, the average proportion is ten to one (derived from data on Algeria, Naga,
the Irish Rebellion, the French war in Indochina, the present war in South Viet Nam,
Malaysia, and the Philippines). This means that by infiltrating (say) 500 to 1,000 men a
month the North Vietnamese are throwing into battle the equivalent of 5-10,000 per month
so far as the SVN government is concerned. This is an extremely heavy weight to bear for
the South Vietnamese. The VC are, in effect, crossing the border each month with a
division. In fact, none of the postwar guerrilla conflicts has been won with an open frontier.
The frontiers were closed, or virtually closed, in the Philippines and in Malaya. The Greek
civil war was won only after Tito closed the Yugoslav frontiers when he split with Stalin.
(This whole point is elaborated in more detail, including the critical morale role of an open
capacity for replacement? Why do they appear to be forcing our hand when the chances,
from our perspective, look good for so discouraging the South Vietnamese about their
prospects that the political leadership (including the army) might prefer some negotiation,
from a weak position, to the endless pursuit of a stalemated war?
I do not know the answers; but it may be that there are pressures working on them to make
the best deal they can in a negotiation fairly soon. These could arise because they are
hurting more than we think; because our relative position looks stronger to them than it does
to us; because there is a split in Hanoi related to the Sino-Soviet split; or to something else.
In any case, if they are driving towards the most advantageous position in a negotiation
fairly soon, they will be strongly tempted to play their asset (ground forces strength) just as
we are led to bring into negotiating play our asset (naval and air power).
I conclude, therefore, that we must be extremly alert to a land grab, perhaps in the Laos
corridor, from which they would negotiate from a position of increased relative strength;
and I would commend to us consideration of a preemptive ground force move in that area
and on the soil of South Viet Nam, which would also enhance our strength in a negotiating
situation. A ground force can sit quietly during a conference until it is negotiated out for
something substantive. It will be extremely difficult for us, during a negotiation, to make
effective use of our air and naval power because (except sea blockade of Haiphong) it is
sanguinary; although we may have to have the nerve and will to use air and naval strikes to
make them accept terms minimally compatible with our interests.
122. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 15, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 272, Vietnam (Misc.) I. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Course of Action
For your meeting at 5:30 today,/2/ I am setting down what I believe to be the serious
unresolved questions.
/2/Rusk met with the President at the White House at 5:25 p.m. on February 15, and at 6
p.m. they went to the Cabinet Room for a meeting with McGeorge Bundy, Ball, McNamara,
and Thompson. The meeting lasted until 7:15 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily
Diary) No record of the discussion at these meetings has been found, other than McGeorge
Bundy's very fragmentary handwritten notes. (Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge
Bundy)
1. Saigon 2588/3/ and Bangkok 1129/4/ both argue strenuously that any expressed
willingness to talk would raise serious problems in both countries, and could well cause
doubts about our firmness. At the very least, this would point to adequate time to consult
fully with both governments, and probably also with the Lao.
/3/Document 118.
/4/Not found.
On the other hand, the argument for declaring our willingness to talk remains very strong.
Once we have made our case in the Security Council, there is a terribly high probability that
some one will generate a resolution calling for discussion among the interested powers on
how to achieve cessation of what the Indian Declaration/5/ calls "provocative actions" on
both sides, i.e., DRV infiltration and activity in SVN, versus our own activity against the
north, probably with a cease-fire in the south and withdrawal of American personnel from
the south also thrown up as part of the agenda. There remains great merit in the idea that
getting into "preliminary discussions" on a seven-power basis would give us a strong
lightning rod against pressures for an immediate conference and would permit us to
continue our actions during the prolonged period that such preliminary discussions would
take.
/5/Apparently a reference to the Indian Government's public statement of February 8,
expressing its "grave concern" over the developments in Vietnam and calling for a
"Geneva-type conference." The Indian Ambassador had called on Acting Secretary of State
Ball on February 13 to inquire about the U.S. reaction to the February 8 statement and to
Prime Minister Shastri's follow-up letter to President Johnson of February 10.
(Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, February 10, and telegram 1652 to New
Delhi, February 13; both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
As I see it this is the key question. If we decide to continue with Saturday's script,/6/ we
must recognize that we have not in fact cleared this in Saigon--or Bangkok, or Vientiane-and that failure to understand our motives and purposes in these quarters could have very
serious implications. Saigon in particular is an absolute must, since we must have the
Vietnamese with us in the UN and not appear to be jumping ahead of them down what can
be construed as a negotiating track.
/6/Apparently a reference to the plan agreed on Saturday, February 13, at the working level
and then approved by the President on February 13. See Document 115.
2. Allied Consultation. If we envisage a sequence comprising an additional strike, a public
statement within 24-48 hours thereafter, and resort to the UN in another 2-3 days thereafter-(and foreshadowed by the statement), we must consider carefully just when and how fully
we talk to our allies. I divide the problem as follows.
a. SVN, Thailand, and Laos: full consultation and clearance.
b. UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada: full consultation, but with the difference that
clearance can be expected to be fairly automatic.
c. Japan, Philippines, India, and perhaps France: slightly less full consultation, designed to
keep Japan and the Philippines calm and to make India and France at least understand what
we are doing.
d. Soviet Union: This too is a special case, and it might be what we would wish to tell them
only at once after the next action and just before our public announcement.
e. U Thant: This too is a special case, and I assume you have talked to Ambassador
Stevenson and Mr. Cleveland about the possibility that U Thant, unless forewarned, may at
some time state publicly that he has been working on an avenue to Hanoi, that Hanoi has
agreed (I don't personally know what he means by this) and that we have declined to go
ahead./7/
/7/Regarding Stevenson's contacts with U Thant on Vietnam, see Document 145.
As to timing, I would myself be inclined to state that categories a and b above should be
fully covered before we make the strike, and that category c might also be considered for
such treatment; d and e might wait until the day between the strike and the announcement.
3. Nature and Timing of Operations. This has not been fully thought through, and I have the
feeling that the Pentagon still thinks in terms of larger single operations, and more
operations in any one strike, than may be wise, particularly during the time that we are
actually presenting our case to the world and in the Security Council.
4. UN Presentation.
a. The drafting up to this point establishing the case on DRV activity is in very good shape.
Our legal justification is also in strong shape, with a good memorandum from L./8/ On the
case against the DRV, we have a serious question whether to mention in general terms the
existence of the radio net; this came up with Ambassador Stevenson this morning,/9/ and
my own conclusion is that we could hold it out of the initial UN presentation, in order to
develop it later in the preliminary discussions as a prelude to radio silence as one form of
compliance.
/8/Apparently a reference to the paper prepared in the Office of the Legal Adviser, "Legal
Basis for United States Actions Against North Viet-Nam," which was attached to a
February 11 covering memorandum from Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker to Thompson.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/9/No record of this conversation has been found.
b. We do not yet have an exact formulation of the conditions we would set as essential to
the convening of a conference. My own view is that at the outset we should insist on a
cessation of infiltration and of activity in the south in which the DRV has a hand. However,
all of us can see that this would be a very difficult thing to verify for the first part, and
practically impossible for the second. We may find ourselves moving toward a trend that
would set the cessation of infiltration against the cessation of our attacks against the DRV,
and this needs careful weighing as we go along. A cease-fire is another thorny issue, since it
would not be advantageous in the south, as we now see it, unless we had freedom of GVN
armed forces movement throughout areas where there is still nominal GVN presence.
The complexity and difficulty of these issues argue strongly for not seeking to litigate them
in the UN, and this in turn points strongly in the direction of initiating, or accepting, a
proposal for early, "preliminary discussions" to work on these issues.
WPB.
over 500 Viet Cong were killed and about 130 captured, government forces lost over 1,000
weapons. Many of those losses occurred in Binh Dinh Province where the security situation
has been steadily deteriorating. The Viet Cong are consolidating their control in four
districts of the province while government control is limited to the immediate vicinity of
district capitals. The government has ordered reinforcements to the area and a major U.S.
advisory effort is under way. The basic cause for the retrogression is the low density of
available troops in a province which is both large and populous. We can hope to do little
more than stabilize in Binh Dinh until additional military, paramilitary and police forces
authorized for 1965 are in place.
Taylor
124. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol.
VIII. Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam decisions
I have been brooding about our discussion of yesterday,/2/ and I think I am beginning to
understand where the problem is.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 122.
1. I think that some of us--perhaps mostly me--have been confusing two questions. One is
the firmness of your own decision to order continuing action; the other is the wisdom of a
public declaration of that policy by you. Let me give you a little background and a
recommendation.
2. Rightly or wrongly, those of us who favor continuing military action against the North do
see it as a major watershed decision. However much it is based on continuing aggression in
the South (as it should be), it amounts to a U.S. decision to mount continuing pressure
against Hanoi by use of our air and naval superiority. This is not the same, in operational
terms, as what we did last August. And it is not the same as a policy of episodic retaliation
for particular attacks against large numbers of Americans. It is very different indeed, and
the difference is just what we are counting on as the one possible means of turning around a
desperate situation which has been heading toward a disastrous U.S. defeat.
3. Precisely because this program represents a major operational change and because we
have waited many months to put it into effect, there is a deep-seated need for assurance that
the decision has in fact been taken. When you were out of the room yesterday, Bob
McNamara repeatedly stated that he simply has to know what the policy is so that he can
make his military plans and give his military orders. This certainly is equally essential if we
are to get the necessary political effects in Saigon. If we limit ourselves to reprisals for
spectaculars like Pleiku and Qui Nhon, we leave the initiative in the hands of the
Communists and we can expect no good result.
4. Thus it seems essential to McNamara--and to me too--that there be an absolutely firm and
clear internal decision of the U.S. Government and that this decision be known and
understood by enough people to permit its orderly execution. That is one side of the
problem.
5. The other side of the problem, as I understand it, is that you do not want to give a loud
public signal of a major change in policy right now. This is a position which makes a lot of
sense on a lot of grounds. When I talked to Cabot Lodge yesterday, he told me that he had
taped a statement for Dave Garroway's "Today" show in which he stoutly and firmly
supported your decision not to make loud public statements. Lodge believes, as you know,
that action speaks louder than words in this field. Russ Wiggins of the Post has just called
me to try to make a luncheon date (I refused), and in the course of listening to him I learned
that he too thinks it is right to act against the North and equally right not to boast about it,
because such boasting only makes life harder for the Communists. Tommy Thompson also
argues the virtue of not rubbing the Communist nose in this mess, at least at your level.
6. So in terms of public statement, I fully understand the forces which were leading you
yesterday to suggest that any public comments might be best handled by the Secretary of
State and Ambassador Stevenson. Most of the need for public utterance which led Bill
Moyers and me to urge a Presidential speech last week can be met just as well by the
Secretary, and there is real gain in keeping you out of the immediate military aspect of the
matter at this stage.
7. Thus I think it is possible to reconcile the need for a clear decision within the
Government with a need to avoid excessive public noise--by a policy of Presidential
decision and Secretarial exposition.
8. That leaves us only one problem: which is communication with our Allies. What we tell
them is not likely to stay tightly secret, and yet I think it is crucial that they not feel left out
or uninformed. In different ways this is as important for London as for Saigon, for Ottawa
as for New Delhi, for Bonn as for Tokyo, for Paris as for Bangkok.
9. My solution to this problem would be to give a clear account of our private thinking, with
appropriate emphasis for each capital, but without any indication of the size and frequency
of planned actions, other than to say that they will be limited and fitting, and that any
further escalation will be the fault of the enemy.
10. For this purpose, Taylor's phrasing of the new policy which he gave to General
Khanh/3/ is just about right. He described it in the following language:
/3/See Document 119.
"A. Intensification by all available means of the program of pacification within SVN.
"B. Execution of a joint GVN/US program of measured and limited air action against
selected military targets in the southern part of DRV./4/ Air strikes under this program will
be jointly planned and agreed.
/4/The President crossed out "in the southern part of the DRV." and made a handwritten
interpolation to revise the sentence as follows: "We will respond to and deter aggression by
the execution of a joint GVN/US program of measured and limited air action against
selected military targets."
"C. Announcement of this policy of measured action in general terms and presentation to
the United Nations Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor,
accompanied by an indication of readiness to discuss ways of bringing the DRV aggression
to an end."
11. In summary, what I think we need is internal clarity about the importance and scope of
the decisions you are taking, and as much public calm and coolness as possible. For these
purposes, Rusk is the ideal spokesman for policy, and Stevenson the ideal defender and
explainer (which means, incidentally, that McNamara probably should not undertake a TV
program proving that Hanoi is the aggressor--this should be Adlai's job, though that is very
unfair because it is Bob who has had all the necessary spade-work done).
McG. B.
ibid.
3. More immediately, whether or not we get into the Security Council as such, any "political
track" requires us to be very clear in our own minds about:
a. How much of a stand-down by the DRV we would insist on as a pre-condition to talks
about the longer range problem? and
b. How much of a stand-down we would be prepared to live with ourselves as the quid pro
quo?
4. The following problems, among others, seem to be crucial. I hope that in the discussions
with Defense they can be clarified:
a. We presumably want a halt to the infiltration. But how will we know that the infiltration
is halted without some international inspectors on the ground? To discuss international
inspectors as part of a precondition for a peace conference would stall progress toward
peace talks. (If as things work out we want to stall talks for a while, this would be a credible
way to do it.)
b. Can we use, in the pre-condition phase, the concept of radio silence? In this case the
"inspection" would presumably be our national capabilities, rather than any international
arrangement. There is, however, precedent, in 1958 in Lebanon, for international (UN)
monitoring of a military radio system as part of a peacekeeping operation.
c. Do we want a cease-fire in South Vietnam? The answer presumably depends on the
definition of "cease-fire".
On the one hand, "cease-fire" could simply mean a stand-still while the talks go on. But if
such a stand-still enables the Liberation Front to consolidate its political control in the areas
effectively held by the Viet Cong, this would build into the peace talks an incentive for the
Communists to stall, since the cease-fire would be working to their advantage.
On the other hand, if "cease-fire" is taken to include the idea that the Saigon Government
could "pacify" the Viet Cong areas during the cease-fire, that would be taken by most
people as a frivolous proposal, since it would be a kind of "one-sided cease-fire". We
cannot, after all, expect to accomplish by political negotiation a great advance over what we
can accomplish by military means. If the South Vietnamese army with our American
advisers cannot pacify the country-side, it is unlikely that the State Department or our UN
delegation will succeed in doing so in a Security Council resolution or at the pre-conference
table.
The definition of "cease-fire" will therefore have to be somewhere in between a "one-sided
cease-fire" and a simple stand-still order equally applicable to both sides.
d. Under what conditions would we agree to stop bombing the North--or, without an
agreement, stop bombing de facto? Can we agree to stop the bombing only in return for a
stoppage of the infiltration, leaving the Viet Cong free to continue attacks (including attacks
on American installations) in South Viet-Nam?
5. These are all questions, and are not intended to imply the answers. But we clearly need to
know what we think the answers are before we get into public negotiations--in or out of the
UN--on the issue of how the shooting can be stopped and the talking begun.
6. One alternative we should certainly consider is to start the talking while the shooting (and
periodic bombing) continues. Unless we can get a very considerable stand-down by Hanoi
and the Viet Cong--perhaps including some actual withdrawal of North Vietnamese from
South Viet-Nam as an earnest of good intentions--there may be advantages to talking about
a cease-fire but not actually to arrive at one before the peace talks begin. Under these
conditions, the "pre-conference" stage (with a strictly limited number of countries involved)
would probably turn out to be 90 percent of the peace talks; a "Geneva Conference" could
be called merely to ratify more or less permanent arrangements that had already been agreed
to at the "pre-conference", spurred by continuation of sporadic fighting and bombing.
HC
126. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, February 1965.
Secret. Drafted by Green.
Having read the welter of telegrams that is the price of one day's absence in Washington, I
feel that one point needs stressing:
The DRV is not likely to "cave" out of fear of further US/SVN bombing of North VietNam. Tough old characters like Ho Chi Minh have great capacity to take punishment. In
this connection I stick to the conclusions we on the Red Team reached during the Sigma
exercises./2/
/2/Apparently a reference to the simulated Vietnam war game, Sigma II-64, organized by
the JCS Joint War Games Agency in September 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Agency File, JCS, War Games, Vol. 2)
What is most likely to cause Hanoi to falter would be mounting evidence that Peiping will
not provide Hanoi with the degree of specific support and assurances Hanoi will require if it
is to undergo the agony of our bombardment. There is already evidence that Peiping is
stepping back from giving the assurances of support that Hanoi seeks. Hanoi is
unquestionably troubled over this; and, although Hanoi will not thereby throw in the
sponge, Hanoi will obviously be rendered more willing to look for some compromise that
would be more acceptable from our viewpoint.
Meanwhile, Phase II operations will intensify international (and even US) pressures for
negotiations. As you often say, the trick is to keep these pressures under control. Hence, I
conclude:
1. Phase II operations must not be too intense or frequent; else negotiating pressures
become unmanageable and we find ourselves negotiating before Hanoi has fully sensed the
implications of its "lonely" position, that is, before Hanoi becomes fully aware of Peiping's
unwillingness to make the total commitment of support that Hanoi seeks.
2. Also, if we step up the attacks too far, we are more likely to drive North Viet-Nam into
widespread attacks against South Viet-Nam either with organized PAVN forces or, as is
more likely, by massive infiltration to the south.
3. We should not relieve the ChiComs of any fear they might already have that we will go
after their air bases, etc., in the event that their air force attacked ours or that they would
have any privileged sanctuary position in the event they became too involved in the
Vietnamese fighting. This would have to be done quietly. Public declarations on the subject
are out.
127. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
(Greenfield) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by
Greenfield. Rusk's handwritten initials appear at the top of page 1 of the source text.
SUBJECT
Viet Nam and the Public
The public problem on Viet-Nam currently breaks down into two problems: One, the need
for some public statement, either on a Presidential or Secretarial level, that reiterates the
United States stake in Viet-Nam and sets the tone for public discussion in this country.
Two, the more intricate, detailed and searching investigation by the press of future U.S.
aims and actions. These questions are both legitimate and pressing, but at the moment they
reflect journalistic rather than public pressure.
Within government the tendency so far is to brush aside the general public statement on the
excuse that it cannot include all the details demanded by the press. This argument is not
valid.
The Public Statement
A public statement, either Presidential or on a high State Department level, should spell out
some of the guidelines which will motivate our future actions in Viet-Nam. But this look
into the future need not form the bulk of such a statement.
Instead, the statement should be dominated by a simple, direct restatement of U.S. policy.
This restatement should outline the reasons why we are in South Viet-Nam, the nature of
guerrilla warfare, the importance of the Pacific area to the United States, the alternatives
that the U.S. faces and the consequences for both the U.S. and the free world that would
occur if the United States did not carry out its commitment in Asia.
To people dealing closely with the problem this is old-hat, even boring stuff. But it would
not be to the American public.
The argument that we have said all this before--and therefore should not repeat ourselves--is
equally invalid. The rationale for our actions during the past few weeks was almost entirely
dropped from most of the stories that appeared after the first day of bombings. In ninety
percent of the stories, the reasons for our actions fell victim to the more dramatic factual
news of bombings, Americans wounded, statements, threats and counter threats.
People, I am convinced, have lost sight of many of the past statements (and bits of
statements) made in the past on Viet-Nam by the President and the Secretary. Our own two
White House statements in the last ten days/2/ shifted emphasis without explanation.
Almost no one remembers what the accords of 1954 and 1962 were all about, the rationale
upon which they were based, or their applicability to the present situation.
/2/For the White House statements of February 7 and 11, see Department of State Bulletin,
pp. 238-239 and 290.
Someone, therefore, should take them back through the essentials of our policy--back
through the accords, back through our mounting involvement as this new kind of warfare
unfolded, back through our countless statements that we want no bases and no territory for
ourselves. We should remind the public that a free Viet-Nam is worth the risks, both
because of our obligations to the Vietnamese and to ourselves.
It is not enough simply to say that we are in Viet-Nam because Ike got us there or because
the Vietnamese have asked us in, although both facts should be recalled.
Such a statement should end up by a clear declaration that what we seek is peace and as
clear a statement as possible as to what we expect from the other side in order to gain that
peace.
Such a statement will reassure the country, give it a common starting point to judge future
U.S. actions.
The Questions of the Press
It will not, however, satisfy many of the questions being asked by the press such as those
listed below. Many of them are currently unanswerable.
1. What is our objective in bombing the North?
-- Is it unconditional surrender?
-- Is it to drive the Viet Cong out of South Viet-Nam?
-- Is it a cease-fire?
-- Is it negotiations: if so with whom, what conditions, how arranged?
2. Why do we think the Viet Cong will give up if we bomb the North?
(Granted they are supplied and directed from Hanoi, but we acknowledge they have a strong
local base and large measure of independence.)
3. Under what circumstances will we continue to bomb the North?
--only if major attacks on U.S. facilities continue? (i.e., tit-for-tat: theme of February 8
statement)
--at our discretion irrespective of specific attacks on U.S. personnel or installations? (White
House statement of February 11)
4. What are we doing to prevent situation from returning to wasting guerrilla war that we
haven't been able to win, with continuation of political instability in Saigon?
5. Any efforts going on to edge confrontation onto political track? What are circumstances
under which we would talk to Hanoi, to Peiking, to South Viet-Nam National Liberation
Front and/or Viet Cong leadership?
If we won't talk do we have any objective other than complete withdrawal of Viet Cong to
north of 17th Parallel?
Conclusion
Either the President or you should make a statement setting forth the fundamentals of our
position and relating recent events to those fundamentals. If you hold a press conference
you must be prepared to open with a full statement on Viet-Nam, since many of the
questions you will get are unanswerable--or better left unanswered.
RSM: No.
Difference between L.B.J. & R.S.M.
[LBJ]: Give some more thought to what is likely to flow? How many people are going to be
on board? Do you want to talk to predecessors? I'm going to talk to some folks outside? I
don't want it to be influential on anyone--sure it's not. We must be prepared 1) to grant any
request for $ and pacification, 2) possible targets in SVN, 3) make evident--if there is any
doubt--to Commies & to SVnese & to our own people. But we can strike measurably and
prudently in NVN.
I think that is much more necessary by desperate condition of Gov't. It may be in adversity
you can minimize their differences.
We have done it in less spectacular ways. Killing 16000, in less spectacular ways. But
bombers--I'm just hoping out of hope they'll draw people in Saigon together. But bombers
won't bring 'em to their knees--unless we do something we wouldn't do. We'll be called
warmongers--elsewhere & here in U.S. that'll be more pronounced--peacemakers'll be after
us.
Line-up forces: Who is with us? Lots of people against us. You can't then wire [?].
This decision we made, I think, in December. Once we do it, let's tell all the boys to take a P
beforehand.
Let's evaluate all their views--all the peacemakers. I'm not going to announce a new policy.
We'll have an NSC meeting tomorrow./3/
/3/The National Security Council met on February 18; see Document 140.
My policy with Press is not good. They hit our Barracks. Hit our Hotel & we hit theirs. But
Scotty/4/ has a different idea.
/4/Presumably a reference to James "Scotty" Reston's articles in The New York Times on
February 12 and 14, in which Reston called upon the President to "go before the country
and explain his objectives." This country was "in an undeclared and unexplained war in
Vietnam," stated Reston, but "we seem to be standing mute in Washington, paralyzed
before a great issue, and merely digging ourselves deeper into the accustomed military rut."
129. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVIII.
Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Per your request this afternoon,/2/ Ambassador Thompson and I have done the attached
summary of reactions by key countries to our actions in Viet-Nam./3/
/2/Presumably a reference to the meeting recorded in Document 128.
/3/A 13-page memorandum, also dated February 16; attached but not printed.
To summarize briefly, the score card reads:
With us pretty strongly
Thailand
Philippines
Australia
New Zealand
Taiwan
South Korea
Laos
Germany
Canada
India
With us tepidly
Japan
Malaysia
Pakistan
Mixed
Africa
We have left out the neutralist Afro-Asian countries, such as Indonesia, most of which are
opposed--some vehemently, but some also with an underlying appreciation of what we are
doing.
William P. Bundy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.
130. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United
Kingdom/1/
of aggression.
4. Concurrently with next military action, the US will inform major friendly governments as
well as the Soviet Government of our views as outlined above.
In presenting this position you should emphasize to the Prime Minister the very high degree
of secrecy attaching to this plan of action until final Presidential decision and orders have
put it into operation./5/
/5/In telegram 3961 from London, February 17, Bruce reported that he had talked with
Prime Minister Wilson about the U.S. Government's policy as outlined above. Wilson said
that his government would "solidly support" U.S. policy, but he was "deeply concerned,"
especially in view of domestic pressures and what he felt would be the reaction in many
other countries, regarding the second sentence under paragraph 2C. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
132. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 17, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965.
Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy, but the source text is neither initialed nor signed by
him.
SUBJECT
South Viet-Nam Course of Action
The key question remains whether to take a talking initiative in your press conference
statement./2/ I do not think we can well omit it from the press statement and then make it at
the UN; this would seem a weakening of our position, coming so close on the heels of the
statement, whereas it can be put all in one bite in the statement.
/2/Stating that he understood that the President had asked Rusk to hold a press conference
later that week, Cleveland offered suggestions as to what Rusk might say in a memorandum
to Rusk of February 16. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
I would rack up the arguments as follows:
If we do not take a talking initiative:
1. There will be moderate, but bearable, public criticism at home. Even without an
initiative, we can go far enough to hold this within bounds.
2. However, the real question is what others will then do.
a. Wilson is very restive and has specifically flagged this very point in his talk with
Bruce./3/
/3/See footnote 5, Document 131.
b. U Thant already has the idea of a group of major powers to work on a two-stage process.
c. The Indians have already proposed this on a "cessation of provocations" formula, and the
Canadians have expressed their sympathy. Latest word last night is that the two
governments are in close touch.
d. The Soviets have already called for an immediate conference, although Hanoi has not
taken this up. (This points to Hanoi not showing up in New York, and possibly not playing
at all, which would get us off the hook right then and there if we made an initiative.)
The sum total adds to a virtual certainty that either (a) some other power will call for a
preliminary meeting, or (b) there will be a move in the SC calling on North Viet-Nam to
cease its actions but calling, on an equal basis, for us to stop attacks in the north and
withdraw our forces over Geneva limits. In the former case, we would look unwilling to talk
even if we accepted, and we would lose much control of the terms of reference of the talks.
In the latter case, we would be put on an equal footing with the DRV and this would greatly
stimulate "both your houses" feeling all over.
3. The risks of military escalation will be very substantial.
If we take an initiative:
1. We will in any case run some risks of lowering morale in South Viet-Nam and in Laos
and Thailand. We must in any case clear exactly what we are doing with them, and this we
have not yet done.
2. We will have to fight off efforts in the Security Council itself to frame the terms of the
"cessation of provocations." We should not seek to litigate these in the Council, and should
if necessary accede to others adding our own actions, or a cease-fire in the south, to the
agenda, provided we get a formula that somehow puts the DRV actions in the forefront.
(This is another element arguing for an initiative by us, with maximum US control of
wording.)
3. We will have moved to "half a Geneva" before we have established any real pattern of
pressures on Hanoi, and would be in the somewhat novel position of continuing our military
actions while some form of talks was going on. But this is what we always thought we
would face in weeks or a very few months in any case.
4. We cannot totally control the grouping that would emerge. The present proposal calls for
US, UK, France, USSR, Communist China, and the two Viet-Nams. But I hardly see how
we can avoid Laos, unless we move separately to convene a Laos Conference on the Article
19 point. A two-ring circus is not without precedent--the 1954 Geneva Conference went for
some time with both Korea and Indochina on the agenda--but the merger would tend to
obscure the "preliminary" label we wish to retain for the Viet-Nam part.
5. The risks of military escalation will be reduced, perhaps to a major degree. If we feel
impelled to increase the pace of our actions, we may find ourselves under a shade more
pressure not to. But equally the Communist side might feel somewhat inhibited from drastic
responses.
6. Developments within South Viet-Nam will be crucial to whether a decent bargaining
position emerges. If the VC continues to gain, we still face the grim choice of hitting the
north really hard (most unlikely to do the job at that point) or of waking up one morning to
find the GVN has been at the Liberation Front or Hanoi behind our backs. (This too would
be in a Geneva patten, for the real deal was made outside the conference, in 1954, between
the French and the Viet Minh.) This would put us in a most ungraceful position--but my
own view is that the blow to our prestige would be worse than if we had not negotiated and
the same thing had happened.
On balance:
I would strongly favor an early initiative./4/
/4/Bundy further elaborated on possible developments in Vietnam and the consequences of
certain U.S. actions in an uncompleted draft memorandum dated February 18 and entitled
"Where Are We Heading?" (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron,
Jan-Mar. 1965) The memorandum is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III,
pp. 692-693.
own. It is necessary to stop infiltration, and the Vietnamese themselves must be the basis for
that effort. We can, however, play a major part in destroying the will of the enemy to
continue the war.
The next major point was that morale is the key factor. He stressed that he was referring to
morale in its broadest sense. To emphasize its importance, he quoted Napoleon as saying
that "in war morale is to the material element as three is to one"; his only disagreement is
that he would rate it as higher than three to one. The factor of morale applies in several
ways. First, our aim must be to destroy the enemy's morale; i.e., to destroy his will to
continue the war and attack the south. Second, we must do everything possible to raise the
morale of our own side. In his judgment, air strikes against the north cannot deny the ability
of the DRV to infiltrate. The strike can, however, discourage the north, and can make them
pay a cost for continuing their aggression. He thought that morale is more important in a
guerilla war than in a conventional war. In the latter case, the combat could be conducted
with elite forces, but in the former the participation, and hence the morale, of the entire
population is required.
He regarded it as of fundamental importance that the population of South Viet-Nam wants
to be friendly to us. He recognized that there are limits as to how far they can manifest such
friendliness to us. If security is lacking in the hamlets and in the countryside, the population
will be frightened and unable to cooperate. If they see that if they defend themselves against
the Communists their local leaders will be killed and their village destroyed, they will do
little. The question is how to build morale. His first point is that success and victory, even if
local and limited, begin to build morale effectively. He noted that morale in the south has
risen because of the strikes by U.S. and VNAF against the north. The strikes following the
Tonkin Gulf incident raised morale, which then suffered when there was no followup. He
also noted that the morale of the ARVN, despite the bitter fighting in which they have been
engaged, is high. We should ask ourselves what can be done to get the nation to feel the
same confidence in itself as the ARVN units feel.
He made a strong plea for proper support for the [U.S.] Information Service. He referred to
the lack of Congressional support for this activity in the past, and commented that he had
once been told that the Russians spend more on information activities in France alone than
the U.S. spends in the whole world. He related this need to the recent attacks on our
embassies. He thought too many of the people in the countries involved do not know the
probity of our aims. While the participation of Communists in such attacks is to be
expected, they could not continue without some public participation, or public tolerance. In
stressing the need for better information and propaganda, he said he thought the U.S. could
take a half billion dollars out of other governmental programs and put it into this with
greater advantage. There is too little understanding around the world of the record of the
U.S. through recent years, e.g., from 1920 onward. He thought the information activity
should fall into three categories. The first is official; everything done in this way should
stick strictly to the truth and be entirely objective, disseminating pure information
concerning the activities of our country. The second is such activities as Radio Free Europe,
which furnish opinion; these should be supported, and should have more latitude. The third
should be clandestine; in this field we should get other friends, governments and
organizations to do the actual job.
General Eisenhower than reverted to the needs in South Viet-Nam. There is a need in his
opinion for information and inspiration. Also, it is necessary to give security to the
population, and to train the local forces in particular for this purpose. He said he understood
frequently villagers are threatened and turn over their arms. Mr. McCone had told him that
the Viet Cong obtain a large percentage of their arms by capture from the ARVN. He felt
that people must want to be saved; otherwise nothing can be done. He added that he
believes that the people of South Viet-Nam do want to be saved, but they need a feeling of
protection for themselves and their families. They also need a promise of independence and
a better life. The French failed to recognize the importance of the desire for independence.
We should put great stress on more rice for the people, medical assistance, and local help of
many kinds.
Reverting to the question of the air strikes, he said that in his opinion these retaliation
actions have helped the situation a great deal. However, he felt it is now important to shift
to a campaign of pressure. Targets should be struck north of the border which have an
obvious connection with infiltration. He thought such strikes could be well justified before
the world.
He commented that he was out of touch with the local political situation there. The changes
of government have been bewildering, and it is hard to know whom to deal with. From his
experience in the Orient, however, he thought it was important to find someone who is
promising and try to bolster him. He commented that he had known Diem well. He
recognized the difficulties attending Diem, but recalled that, in the case of France, before
De Gaulle came to power, he was anxious to see him gain control. Even though he knew De
Gaulle would cause trouble in many areas, he thought De Gaulle was the best hope of
saving the situation in France, which was rapidly going to pieces. Diem also was a capable
man. Despite his nepotism, he would have been effective, and he felt that the removal of
Diem resulted in a great setback for our cause. He reiterated that we need someone to back.
He summarized the need for improving the morale of the government, of the population,
and of the armed services, particularly the local forces. If morale is up, and with the
resources we can make available, there will be progress. We have the basis for this since we
are supporting Vietnamese freedom, unlike the French, who would not commit themselves
to the freedom of Viet-Nam. He stressed strongly that the U.S. Government must tell our
own people just what we are doing in the area, i.e., what our policy is, and what course of
action we are following.
He next considered the question of Chinese Communist or Soviet intervention. He said that
if they threaten to intervene we should pass the word back to them to take care lest dire
results occur to them. He commented on how the armistice was brought about in Korea.
Following two years or more of inconclusive effort, shortly after he came to office, he had
three messages passed to the Koreans and Chinese, one through Nehru, one through Chiang
Kai-shek, and one through officials at lower level who were participating in armistice
discussions. The gist of the messages was that if a satisfactory armistice were not signed
promptly, we would remove the limits we were observing as to the area of combat and the
weapons employed. He thought we should let them know now what we are seeking to do in
South Viet-Nam, and that we would act against them if necessary. This should not be done
publicly, but rather very quietly. He recalled that at the time of the Suez incident, the
Soviets had threatened to use rockets against Britain and France. We had immediately
passed the word to the Soviets that, although we were in disagreement with Britain and
France, if any action were taken against them by the Soviets, we would respond in their
support with all means required.
General Eisenhower said he had a final point on tactics and the conduct of operations. He
strongly advised decentralization. The essential is to back a commander and trust him. This
requires that policies and missions be defined. The mission can be very broadly stated. He
recalled his own as a model--to enter the continent of Europe and bring about the
destruction of Germany's war power. He quoted an old adage, "Centralization is the refuge
of fear." Our representatives in the field are much more effective if we show that we have
confidence in them to do the job. As another tactical point, he said he would not destroy the
MIG's in the Hanoi area right away. He would work hard on pacification in South VietNam, and start the attacks in the southern region of North Viet-Nam, in order to begin to
charge a price to them for their continued aggression. He would let them and their
Communist supporters have no mistaken idea as to our purpose. He would make clear what
we are going to do in this regard.
At the President's request General Wheeler commented that the U.S. Government has
already started action with the objective of finding ways to strengthen the security of the
people of South Viet-Nam. In addition, on the military aspects of General Eisenhower's
comments, he stated that in a general way these suggestions have been the approach the
Administration has been taking.
The President, after thanking General Eisenhower for his comments, said he could best give
the thinking of the Administration by quoting from a message being sent to Ambassador
Bruce as a basis for discussion with Prime Minister Wilson of the U.K. The text he read was
as follows:
[Here follows the text of Document 131.]
The President made two comments. First, he was planning to meet with the National
Security Council later in the day, or the following day, and expected to make his decision at
that time./2/ Second, he commented that there had been a good deal of discussion regarding
the reference in paragraph 2. c. of the message to negotiations. Some of his advisers were
inclined to go further in the direction of indicating a readiness or desire for an early
conference. He invited General Eisenhower's comment on this point. General Eisenhower
cited President Lincoln's handling of the Emancipation Proclamation. He had had it ready
for issuance long before it was promulgated, and in fact had wanted to put it out. He felt,
however, that he had to wait for a success, since otherwise its issuance would be taken as an
act of weakness if not desperation. He therefore held it during the dreary months of military
reverses, but seized upon Lee's retreat from the Battle of Antietam (at which Lee's army
might well have been destroyed) as the occasion to issue it. With regard to negotiations,
General Eisenhower felt that negotiation from weakness is likely to lead only into deceit
and vulnerability, which could be disastrous to us. On the other hand, if we can show a fine
record of successes, or real and dramatic accomplishment, we would be in good position to
negotiate. He advised not to negotiate from a position of weakness. He commented that
Prime Minister Wilson of the U.K. had not had experience with this kind of problem. We,
however, have learned that Munichs win nothing; therefore, his answer to the British would
be "Not now boys."
/2/See Document 140.
The President read again the text of the messages/3/ concerning Ambassador Stevenson's
presentation of the case in the U.N.--it is to be cast in terms of DRV aggression from the
north. He read again that military action would continue while the aggression continues.
General Eisenhower thought the message was a good one. As to tactics, he would suggest
that we should have the VNAF ready so that, if the Viet Cong murder a governmental
official, within as little as two hours they could strike with six or eight planes against some
targets in the north. This should be done every time there is such an atrocity, and in this
case the action should be "blared out" publicly to create an immediate impact and let the
DRV know they will not be getting a free ride any longer.
/3/Presumably the February 7 letter printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 22,
1965, pp. 240-241.
The President then read from a message received from Ambassador Martin in Bangkok
reporting his meeting with the Thai Foreign Minister. The text he read was as follows:
"This morning in my first meeting with Thanat after my return, I found him in a rosy glow
over vast improvement in morale throughout Southeast Asia as a result of American and
SVN strikes at DRV. He was particularly pleased at the SVN participation. He said he
hoped that as result of release of details on extent of DRV infiltration we would realize we
had perfectly justifiable rationale to continue such joint strikes at DRV targets connected
with such infiltration. Thanat said future strikes need not, therefore, be limited to reprisals
for attacks on American installations or personnel.
"He went on to observe that it was quite possible that we had now seen the low point and
future progress should be steadily upward. He said the vastly increased hopefulness would
quite likely serve as a cement of sorts among SVN factions and said Quat seemed to have
best chance since 1954 to create more broadly based regime. He agreed with my
observation it quite likely Viet Cong would try more spectacular strikes but thought prompt
retaliatory action would soon prove this unprofitable tactic. He made it clear, in response to
my request for elaboration his thought 'low point' had been reached, that he well aware
struggle would take long time with sharp reverses from time to time but again expressed
conviction that psychological turn-around reached if we remained firm. Thanat said he had
only one worry. Referring to 15 Feb issue of Paris edition of NY Herald Tribune and NY
Times, carrying spate of stories on 'negotiations', he said he was certain Secretary
understood now was not the proper moment to indicate any desire to return to conference
table. When I pressed him on Thai reaction he said, after considerable pause for reflection,
he thought he could bring Thai government to new conference, but only when we had
continued pressure on north for sufficient period to make negotiations worthwhile to north
to obtain relief from such pressures. This, he said, obviously was quite a bit in the future
since Hanoi would undoubtedly need quite a bit of convincing. I said I thought the
Secretary had made this position very clear in his reiteration of the necessity for Hanoi to
begin observance of the commitments undertaken in 1954 before considering new
negotiations. Thanat agreed.
"In response to my question Thanat said he gathered from comments from officials Soviet
Embassy here that Kosygin taken completely by surprise at Pleiku attacks. He thought Sovs
would confine their reactions to 'noise' and a bit more ink on American Embassy walls
throughout the world. He thought Soviet hard-headed appraisal their self-interest almost
guaranteed no greater reaction. Similarly, he thought in absence direct threat to ChiCom
borders, there would be no Chinese reaction. He did think, however, that Thailand would be
subjected to increasing subversive pressures and hoped we could be helpful. I said my
consultations in Washington convinced me that specific Thai plans in this regard would find
helpful and forthcoming response from U.S. side."
General Eisenhower said this was a fine message, and expressed congratulations to the
their own course rather than be influenced by what we do. He said he would not fear such a
reaction. The President then asked what we might do if Chinese forces were to come south,
posing a requirement for eight to ten U.S. divisions in Southeast Asia. General Eisenhower
said he would hit them at once with air, picking out the key points along their support
routes. He said he would use any weapons required, adding that if we were to use tactical
nuclear weapons, such use would not in itself add to the chance of escalation. With regard
to starting a bigger war, he felt that the Chinese would not do this unless they had made the
decision on their own. He further stated that he believed they would not come in to the war,
but that, if they should, he would use some additional ground units against them, but would
essentially shift to use of different weapons. He commented that the U.S. must take extreme
care never to allow itself to get over-deployed. Our rule must always be to "hit the head of
the snake." (As an aside, he commented that in his opinion the U.S. is over-deployed in
Europe. The need of the Europeans for U.S. forces there has long since diminished. He
acknowledged that many people do not agree with him in this view.) He stated that if our
intelligence saw fifteen to twenty Chinese divisions coming into the war, we should hit their
LOC with the strongest possible attacks. General Wheeler commented that we have given
thought to the possibility of putting one U.S. division south of the DMZ, both to protect and
to deter while the strikes against the north go on. General Eisenhower said he would see
merit in action of this kind, but would not send in anything like a dozen U.S. divisions, and
start a big war of that kind. He would use whatever was needed to immobilize the attacking
forces and would secure the key areas in South Viet-Nam, for example, the three major
airfield areas which were outlined to him.
At this point members of The President's staff came into the Cabinet Room to ask what
might be said to the press, and whether pictures might be taken. The President thought it
might simply be pointed out that General Eisenhower was in the city having a monthly
physical checkup at Walter Reed, and that he had taken advantage of his presence to meet
with him to talk about Europe, Southeast Asia, and other world problems. He asked whether
General Eisenhower would care to meet the press, and General Eisenhower said he felt that
any statements made concerning meetings in the White House should be made by The
President or on his behalf, and that he would simply go out as he had come in, through the
south grounds.
General Eisenhower suggested that every one of our ambassadors should be given the
substance of the message sent to Ambassador Bruce, and they should be advised to say to
the government to which they are accredited that these governments also should take some
responsibility for what is being done in Southeast Asia in behalf of the freedom of South
Viet-Nam. To illustrate his point, he described how France and Britain had failed to tell
their people what stand our government was taking on the Suez matter prior to the invasion.
As a result, there was bitter feeling in those countries on the unjustified grounds that we had
not given notice we would oppose them.
The President said he would like to revert to the subject of negotiations. General
Eisenhower said there are two requirements in his view. First, the enemy must want to come
to us, which means that we must be in the position of strength. The second is that any
agreement reached must be self-enforcing, or we must be able to put our own people into
the area in order to verify performance. He asked in this regard what the Russians are doing
about their recent nuclear tests, which "vented" in violation of the treaty. Mr. Bundy
reviewed the exchange of notes with the Russians, and indicated that the dialogue is still
going on. He also indicated that the treaty is not precise on this score, and that if the
Russians take the view that very small amounts of debris should be disregarded, we may be
able to use such latitude ourselves in the future. General Eisenhower saw merit in such a
position.
The President next referred to the Resolution/5/ the Congress had passed following the
Tonkin Gulf incident, giving him authority to act. He asked General Eisenhower whether he
thought that Resolution was strong enough, and ample to fill the need. General Eisenhower
said that it had sounded to him very much like the Formosa Resolution which had left a
large area of discretion and flexibility to The President, and that he thought that this is the
way it should be. The President commented that the Formosa Resolution had been the
model for this one.
/5/See ibid., p. 664.
At The President's request Mr. Bundy reviewed very briefly the observations he had made
on his recent trip to South Viet-Nam. Two out-standing points were the lack of security for
the population in the countryside, and the little experience of government which South VietNam has had. The President commented that steps are being taken to try to strengthen the
government and to seek some rapprochement with Khanh. He said he is considering the
possibility of trying to get some good U.S. reporters and TV people to go out to the area for
a period of thirty to ninety days, in order to introduce greater responsibility in the handling
of the political reporting. Mr. Bundy made the point that the Buddhists have had no
experience in taking responsibility. Theirs has been an opposition role. Also he stated that
Khanh is very Asian and devious politically. He added that General Westmoreland had said
that, in the military matters on which he deals with Khanh, the latter had never deceived
him.
The President said he saw great importance in developing a sense of participation on the
part of the South Vietnamese. We should find targets they can really hit, and should work
the VNAF hard. General Wheeler reviewed the "MAROPS" program of unacknowledged
attacks from the sea conducted by the South Vietnamese. General Eisenhower said he
thought these operations were valuable. The President reiterated that we should get as many
South Vietnamese as possible in sea and patrol operations.
(At this point The President and General Eisenhower went into The President's office to
have pictures taken, and Mr. Bundy left the meeting.)
When the President and General Eisenhower returned, Mr. McNamara asked for further
comment on how General Eisenhower would advise responding to escalation, and what he
had in mind regarding tactical nuclear weapons. General Eisenhower said he would make
use of our carrier strength in the area for instant retaliation. For this purpose it should be
kept in constant readiness. He would pass warnings to the Chinese Communists. Pick out
the two or three key points in South Viet-Nam, such as Saigon and the air bases, and guard
these strongly. General Wheeler identified these as Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa.
General Eisenhower said tactical nuclear weapons should be used when the enemy comes in
large strength as organized formations. lf they have strong forces these will have depots
which can be struck. General Wheeler commented that there are bridges very important to
such a campaign over the Red River north of Hanoi. General Eisenhower commented that
this would be in effect a new war. We should be sure that the enemy does not lack an
appreciation of our stamina and determination to keep nations free by whatever means
required. He thought that if they find we are ready, they will not come in in great strength.
He referred to the Chinese in Korea. There was a gentlemen's agreement between us and
our allies after the very early days of the war--well known to the Chinese--that we would
not cross the Yalu or even strike the bridges on the Yalu, nor would we use nuclear
weapons. With regard to South Viet-Nam, we should let it be known that we are not bound
by such restrictions.
The President asked General Eisenhower what he could tell him about the course of events
in Korea. General Eisenhower said that in 1949 severe cuts were made in the U.S. military
budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time (with himself presiding as chairman at The
President's request) reached the view that in a global war Korea would not be important,
although it was important in a cold war situation. As a result of the cutback of the budget
and of the armed forces, it was necessary to withdraw our units from Korea. Secretary
Acheson made a public statement at that time that Korea lay outside our security perimeter.
Soon thereafter the Communists invaded the country. Mr. Truman initially attempted to
meet the attack, using only naval and air forces. General Eisenhower said once we had
committed ourselves to the war, he had advised Mr. Truman that we must use whatever
force was needed. He had told him that we must succeed, and that if ground forces were
required they should be put in. The President said he is concerned regarding the North
Vietnamese, and the possibility that war in Viet-Nam might follow the same course as the
war in Korea. General Eisenhower said the U.S. has put its prestige onto the proposition of
keeping Southeast Asia free. Indonesia is now failing. We cannot let the Indo-Chinese
peninsula go. He hoped it would not be necessary to use the six to eight divisions
mentioned, but if it should be necessary, so be it. He would warn the Chinese in advance
through many channels.
The President asked just what General Eisenhower had done in 1953 to bring the war in
Korea to a close. He said he had had the word passed through the three channels he had
previously mentioned, telling the Chinese that they must agree to an armistice quickly, since
he had decided to remove the restrictions of area and weapons if the war had to be
continued. General Eisenhower said that the greatest danger in his judgment in the present
situation is that the Chinese get the idea that we will go just so far and no further in terms of
the level of war we would conduct. That would be the beginning of the end, since they
would know all they had to do was go further than we do. The President asked how such
information might be gotten out, i. e., that we think the situation would be most dangerous
unless the Chinese understood that we will do whatever is required. He and General
Eisenhower discussed the possibility of approaching Ayub on this matter. They agreed he is
a very fine man with whom we are having some difficulties at the present time. The
President is considering what can be done to improve our ties with him. General
Eisenhower described this problem as one boil in the whole world system. We must look at
the effect of our actions on the whole world. When we say we will help other countries we
must then be staunch. It is, of course, necessary to work out our tactics, and we should not
be unnecessarily provocative.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
G.
Lt. General, U.S.A.
defined by the President, it is true that many key advisors in the Government are advocating
a policy markedly similar to the Republican policy as defined by Goldwater.
2. Consequences for other policies advocated by a Democratic Administration.
The Johnson Administration is associated both at home and abroad with a policy of
progress toward detente with the Soviet bloc, a policy of limited arms control, and a policy
of new initiatives for peace. A full-scale military attack on North Vietnam--with the
attendant risk of an open military clash with Communist China--would risk gravely
undermining other U.S. policies. It would eliminate for the time being any possible
exchange between the President and Soviet leaders; it would postpone any progress on arms
control; it would encourage the Soviet Union and China to end their rift; it would seriously
hamper our efforts to strengthen relations with our European allies; it would weaken our
position in the United Nations; it might require a call-up of reservists if we were to get
involved in a large-scale land war--and a consequent increase in defense expenditures; it
would tend to shift the Administration's emphasis from its Great Society oriented programs
to further military outlays; finally and most important it would damage the image of the
President of the United States--and that of the United States itself.
3. Involvement in a full scale war with North Vietnam would not make sense to the majority
of the American people.
American wars have to be politically understandable by the American public. There has to
be a cogent, convincing case if we are to have sustained public support. In World Wars I
and II we had this. In Korea we were moving under UN auspices to defend South Korea
against dramatic, across-the-border conventional aggression. Yet even with those
advantages, we could not sustain American political support for fighting the Chinese in
Korea in 1952.
Today in Vietnam we lack the very advantages we had in Korea. The public is worried and
confused. Our rationale for action has shifted away now even from the notion that we are
there as advisors on request of a free government--to the simple argument of our "national
interest." We have not succeeded in making this "national interest" interesting enough at
home or abroad to generate support.
4. From a political viewpoint, the American people find it hard to understand why we risk
World War III by enlarging a war under terms we found unacceptable 12 years ago in
Korea, particularly since the chances of success are slimmer.
Politically, people think of North Vietnam and North Korea. They recall all the "lessons" of
1950-53:
a. The limitations of air power.
b. The Chinese intervention.
c. The "never again club"--never again GI's fighting a land war against Asians in Asia.
d. The Eisenhower Administration's compromise which represented a frank recognition of
all these factors.
If a war with China was ruled out by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations alike in
1952-3, at a time when we alone had nuclear weapons, people find it hard to contemplate
such a war with China now. No one really believes the Soviet Union would allow us to
destroy Communist China with nuclear weapons, as Russia's status as a world power would
be undermined if she did.
5. Absence of confidence in the Government of South Vietnam.
Politically, people can't understand why we would run grave risks to support a country
which is totally unable to put its own house in order. The chronic instability in Saigon
directly undermines American political support for our policy.
6. Politically, it is hard to justify over a long period of time sustained, large-scale U.S. air
bombardments across a border as a response to camouflaged, often non-sensational, elusive,
small-scale terror which has been going on for 10 years in what looks like a civil war in the
South.
7. Politically, in Washington and across the country, the opposition is more Democratic
than Republican.
8. Politically, it is always hard to cut losses. But the Johnson Administration is in a stronger
position to do so than any Administration in this century. 1965 is the year of minimum
political risk for the Johnson Administration. Indeed it is the first year when we can face the
Vietnam problem without being preoccupied with the political repercussions from the
Republican right. As indicated earlier, the political problems are likely to come from new
and different sources if we pursue an enlarged military policy very long (Democratic
liberals, Independents, Labor, Church groups).
9. Politically, we now risk creating the impression that we are the prisoner of events in
Vietnam. This blurs the Administration's leadership role and has spill-over effects across the
board. It also helps erode confidence and credibility in our policies.
10. The President is personally identified with, and admired for, political ingenuity. He will
be expected to put all his great political sense to work now for international political
solutions. People will be counting upon him to use on the world scene his unrivalled talents
as a political leader.
They will be watching to see how he makes this transition. The best possible outcome a
year from now would be a Vietnam settlement which turns out to be better than was in the
cards because the President's political talents for the first time came to grips with a fateful
world crisis and so successfully. It goes without saying that the subsequent domestic
political benefits of such an outcome, and such a new dimension for the President, would be
enormous.
11. If on the other hand, we find ourselves leading from frustration to escalation, and end up
short of a war with China but embroiled deeper in fighting with Vietnam over the next few
months, political opposition will steadily mount. It will underwrite all the negativism and
disillusionment which we already have about foreign involvement generally--with direct
spill-over effects politically for all the Democratic internationalist programs to which we are
committed--AID, UN, disarmament, and activist world policies generally.
chairmanship role. The Foreign Secretary felt that the need for a clarification of U.S. policy
existed prior to Lapin's remark. Lapin's remarks added urgency to this.
The Secretary inquired whether HMG did not think it desirable to tie down the details of the
Hanoi attack. Lord Harlech said HMG agreed there was a need for such an explanation but
that it should be supplemented by an outline of U.S. policy. The Secretary then said that
apart from the necessity of gaining a common acceptance of the elementary facts of the
situation, we should be certain the Soviets are under no misunderstanding of the facts as we
see them. They need not, of course, be required to agree with our interpretation. In addition,
it would be useful to determine whether the Soviets were ascribing difficulties purely to
South Vietnam or whether they agreed that it was a problem of the North Vietnamese as
well.
The Secretary then explained the difficulties of making a public statement on our policy
towards Vietnam. If we were too precise about the problem, we could reduce our
maneuverability. For the Ambassador's private information, however, the Secretary stated
he was thinking of making a press statement this week.
Lord Harlech stressed the Foreign Secretary's feeling that we had moved into a new phase
on the Vietnam problem and that it was consequently essential to have a new statement of
U.S. policy. The UK would have an increasingly difficult time holding the line unless it
could point to a U.S. position which the British could support. Without such a guide, more
and more suggestions would be made as to how other people or organizations could solve
the problem. The problem would become particularly difficult for the UK if it continues in
its co-chairman role.
The Secretary noted that we would not consider negotiations unless we felt there was some
possibility of a meaningful conclusion to them. It was conceivable that if we made a formal
proposal to negotiate on such and such conditions that it would be rejected at the outset by
the other side. On the other hand, if we met without any reasonable prospects of success and
failed, where could we go from there? The Secretary said he would inform Lord Harlech
shortly of our reactions to the British Foreign Secretary's proposals./4/
/4/In telegram 1744 to Saigon, February 17, drafted by Rusk, the Secretary of State
informed Taylor of his conversation with the British Ambassador and remarked that
"assumption of 1954 co-chairmanship by two governments would imply that they might
themselves explore with interested governments possibilities of solution, which we would
encourage or otherwise as we see fit." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
136. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 18, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965.
Top Secret. The source text was attached to a brief covering note of February 18 to Rusk, in
which Bundy wrote that it attempted "to reflect the proposal discussed this morning at the
White House." Bundy said he was also sending copies to Ball, Thompson, McGeorge
Bundy, and, if Rusk wished, to Cleveland. The White House meeting was apparently that
held from 12:02 to 1:03 p.m. and attended by the President, William Bundy, McGeorge
Bundy, Ball, Thompson, and Marvin Watson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS
1. The Secretary to call in Lord Harlech, preferably this evening, and to inform him that we
have given thought to the British request that we indicate what we thought they might say to
the Soviets as to action by the Co-Chairmen, and that we had further given thought to the
British statement that a clear public exposition of our aims would be of great use. In the
light of these British views, our suggestion would be that the British approach the Soviets to
say that the most useful thing the Co-Chairmen could now do would be to call on other
interested governments for an expression of their views on the situation, so that the CoChairmen could consider what further action they might usefully take.
The Secretary would tell Lord Harlech that in response to such a request the US
Government would state its position fully in a note addressed to the UK and USSR,/2/ and
would further state that it would give careful and sympathetic consideration to any proposal
the Co-Chairmen might make for action to deal with the essentials of the situation as set
forth in our note.
/2/A draft "Note to UK and USSR as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and
1962," drafted by Rusk on February 17, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S.
2. We would expect the British to respond favorably to this suggestion, and to take it up at
once with the Soviets--as their initiative. If the British then reported that the Soviets agreed,
they would combine this with a request for our views, and we would immediately send
them the revised note.
3. Any press conference would be timed in relation to the completion of this sequence, since
the press conference would not be useful unless it could be the occasion for revealing our
note.
4. At whatever time we approach Lord Harlech with this suggestion, we would inform our
Embassies in Saigon, Bangkok, and Vientiane of what we were proposing to do, arming
them with the necessary arguments to explain it to their governments. Query whether we
should immediately have Saigon go to work with the GVN framing a similar GVN response
to go alongside our own. Query also whether the approaches to these three governments
could take place even before the British had hit the Soviets; I would think there would be
much merit to doing so at once, particularly as we might wish to explain to Saigon why we
would not wish to have another joint strike until the sequence had been completed. In this
respect, the firm tone of the President's statement of yesterday/3/ should serve, as read in
Saigon, to leave no doubt that we are going on with strikes, and this is the essential point.
/3/At the conclusion of his remarks to the National Industrial Conference Board on
February 17 in the Sheraton-Park Hotel in Washington, the President summarized U.S.
purposes and objectives in Vietnam. For text of his remarks, see Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 202-205.
5. Australia and New Zealand could be fully informed of our proposed sequence
immediately after we have told the British. They should also be told that we are going ahead
with joint strikes and approximately the desired pace and degree of severity.
6. Canada, India, and U Thant are special problems. Canada could be told exactly what we
are doing, but both India and, more severely, U Thant raise security problems in that they
might surface the sequence as a US-UK collusion, which we are anxious to avoid to the
degree possible,
7. We should hold off on the next strike until the British have gone to the Soviets and have
a response. If the Soviets should ask time to think it over, this might, however, cause undue
delay. Accordingly, we should consider whether we would then ask the British to seek our
views, and go ahead on the basis of this request only without waiting for the Soviets to join
in. However, this would somewhat weaken the key element in the sequence, which is to
bring the Soviets at least half way aboard in the Co-Chairman role right at the outset.
8. With respect to the UN Security Council, we would still plan to circulate the full printed
document of our case, after we had completed the sequence. We would also have the
possibility of an additional oral presentation either concurrently, or within a day or two after
the written version was sent to the President of the Security Council.
McN thought it better if we went into the Security Council because we know that China and
Hanoi are not going to come before the Security Council.
Ball said in the statement that was sent over this morning the first and last paragraphs would
be taken out. This was on the assumption that we would make an approach ourselves to the
co-chairmen. The central part is a statement of our position. It has been revised a little but it
is substantially the same.
Ball said it was possible the President would want to have a talk before the NSC./6/
/6/Ball, McNamara, and Rusk met with the President for about 20 minutes prior to the NSC
meeting, which began at 5:25 p.m. on February 18. No other record of this pre-meeting
discussion has been found. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was
outside his jurisdiction.
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE US COURSES OF
ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
The Problem
To estimate Communist reactions to a US course of sustained air attacks on North Vietnam.
Scope Note
This estimate is intended to supplement, not to supersede, SNIE 10-3-65/2/ on the same
subject, dated 11 February 1965. For example, the probable involvement of Communist air
forces is discussed in that paper, and not in this.
/2/Document 111.
The Estimate
1. The US air attacks on North Vietnam have added another ingredient to an already
intricate and complex situation. Hence Communist reactions to these attacks will not be the
product of the attacks alone, but will be governed by numerous factors: the state of relations
among the USSR, Communist China, and the DRV; the attitudes and conduct of various
free world powers--especially France; developments in the UN; the course of events in
South Vietnam; the manner and pace with which the US air attacks develop and the policy
of the US itself, not only as this policy may be enunciated by the administration, but also as
the Communists may read the influence upon it of newspaper and Congressional
declarations and other expressions of diverse views. We cannot estimate with confidence or
precision how these factors will interact in weeks to come.
Reactions to the Bombings of Early February or to a Few More of the Same Type, South of
the 19th Parallel
2. To establish Communist power in South Vietnam and to unify the country under the
Hanoi regime is the primary national objective of the DRV leaders. From the beginning of
the insurrection in the South, however, they have consistently admonished their followers to
be prepared for a long struggle. Only in the past few months have they occasionally talked
in terms of victory being near. This feeling may have been dampened somewhat by the past
week's tougher US action.
3. There are probably some among the DRV leadership who would prefer a cautious course.
They would urge that collapse of GVN resistance is inevitable in time despite any amount
of foreign support, and that it would be foolish to risk destruction of the DRV's laboriously
acquired modern economic sector merely to accelerate the pace of victory. However, in the
present moment of high emotion in Hanoi they probably hesitate to voice such thoughts.
4. To the militant majority, the recent US air attacks probably appear to be the actions of a
foe endeavoring to ward off defeat. These leaders probably reason that if the DRV/VC stand
firm or even increase their pressures in the South, they will have to ride out a few more such
US attacks, but that the US/GVN disposition to continue the struggle will decline. To these
leaders, any display of apparent weakness in the face of the bombing would signal to the US
that it had hit upon the way to get what it wants in the area.
5. We accordingly believe that the DRV/VC reaction to a few more air attacks like those of
early February would probably be to continue their pressures in the South more or less on
the scale of recent weeks--always with an eye upon factors like those mentioned in
paragraph 1. At the moment, the Communists cannot be sure whether US actions presage a
sustained course of air attack or a "tit-for-tat" program of limited reprisals to specific
provocations. It is possible that they would, for a week or two, refrain from direct attacks on
US installations, but we cannot estimate that such restraint is probable.
6. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly encourage the DRV in the more militant
course. We do not believe that they will intervene in Vietnam with substantial military force
during this stage. We see no evidence at present of preparations to do so, although we
cannot have full confidence in our ability to detect such preparations.
Reactions to a Declared and Sustained US Program of Bombing in the North
7. Over the past decade the DRV has invested much time, effort, and capital in the
development of industry, transportation, and relatively modern military facilities. They will
not lightly sacrifice these hard-won gains. Yet a threat by the US to mount sustained attacks
on these assets would probably be greeted in Hanoi with mixed feelings of trepidation and
skepticism. At the start, the Communists would not be convinced that the US intended
really to follow through with this program. They would almost certainly apply a range of
pressures in an endeavor to make the US desist. They would maintain strenuous diplomatic
and propaganda efforts to organize international influence against the US policy. They
would probably threaten dire consequences to US interests in the area. Chinese Communist
threats would be more insistent, and Chinese Communist forces would probably be
deployed in more threatening postures. Viet Cong attacks would probably continue, though
not necessarily at a steady pace.
8. If despite these pressures, the US vigorously continued in its attacks and damaged some
important economic or military assets, the DRV leaders would have to reach a decision.
They almost certainly believe that, while the US could destroy much in their country by air
attacks, these alone would not cause their regime to collapse or prevent them from
continuing to support the insurgency in the South. And they may believe that their
international political position would improve if they became the object of sustained air
attack from the US. Accordingly, they might decide to intensify the struggle, accepting the
destructive consequences in the North in the expectation of early victory in the South.
9. It seems to us somewhat more likely however that they would decide to make some effort
to secure a respite from US air attack, especially if the US had indicated that such a respite
would follow a sharp reduction of Viet Cong activity./3/ We do not know how far they
would go in concessions, whether the US would accept what might be offered, or what the
international situation might be at such a time. We think it extremely unlikely, however,
that Hanoi would concede so far to US demands that it would entail abandoning its support
of the insurgency in the South or giving up its intention of unifying Vietnam under
Communist control.
/3/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes this course of
action less likely than that described in paragraph 8. He considers that Hanoi would feel that
any benefits to be gained by such a respite would be more than offset by a loss of
momentum at a time when victory appeared near, by a loss of face with the VC, and by the
consequent bolstering of US/GVN morale. Hanoi would have in mind that concessions
under such circumstances might only invite the US to resume strikes upon any renewal of
Viet Cong military activity.
Moreover, the assumed vigorous US attacks on major targets could easily coincide with the
probable use over the DRV of Chinese air defense from Chinese bases. If so, US responses
would either have been to acknowledge the privileged sanctuary of Chinese bases or to
strike the bases in hot pursuit, thus inviting further Chinese military responses. Hanoi's
persistence would be reinforced either way. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. The Chinese Communists would almost certainly be willing to support the DRV in even
the more militant course of action outlined in paragraph 8. We have set forth in SNIE 10-365 (paragraphs 16-18, with State Department footnotes of dissent) the use the Chinese
would be likely to make of their own forces.
Possible, but Unlikely Reactions
11. Instead of temporarily easing off or intensifying present levels of pressure, the
Communist leaders might actually engage in actions which would change the scale and
nature of the war. These would be much more dangerous and aggressive courses and,
although they seem to us unlikely in the light of logic and prudence, they are possibilities
which cannot be ignored:
a. They might launch a large-scale DRV invasion of South Vietnam and/or Laos. We think
it unlikely that they would do this in response to bombings of North Vietnam. They would
feel that at best this drastic policy would only accelerate victories in Laos and Vietnam
which they are confident they will win before very long through less costly tactics. Such an
invasion would virtually require a greater involvement of the Chinese in Vietnam, which is
in itself distasteful to the North Vietnamese. The Communists would recognize that to
launch such an invasion would be to invite further major destruction upon the DRV and
perhaps upon China./4/
/4/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that paragraph
11a is applicable only in the initial stages of bombings in North Vietnam, well below the
Hanoi-Haiphong target complex. Once US attacks destroy major industrial and military
targets in this complex, however, Hanoi will have substantially lost its hostage and suffered
the maximum damage it could anticipate from the air. In this case the DRV, having suffered
the destruction of its major military facilities and the industrial sector of its economy, would
probably carry on the fight and proceed to send its own armed forces on a large scale to
Laos and South Vietnam. Hanoi might assume that the US would be unwilling to undertake
a major ground war, or that if it was, it could ultimately be defeated by the methods which
were successful against the French.
Furthermore, if the DRV should persist in this fashion, Peiping would probably introduce
limited numbers of Chinese Communist ground forces into the DRV as "volunteers," both
to prepare for further escalation and to make clear Peiping's commitment to assist the North
we must expect an increase in Viet Cong aggressive tactics and that we must recognize that
our own responses are likely to increase as well. He wants to make it clear that the U.S. is
going to continue its efforts to meet and stop this aggression. Our Mission in Saigon should
have no doubts whatsoever as to U.S. intent and objectives.
/2/The previous NSC meeting was on February 10 (see Document 98) rather than February
8 (see Document 87).
/3/See footnote 3, Document 136.
Secretary McNamara briefed the Council on the increasing tempo of the conflict. The
Saigon Mission and the GVN (Khanh) want to undertake attacks on certain targets in the
southern part of North Vietnam, and he agreed this should be done.
Secretary Rusk pointed out that there were daily evidences of an increase in Viet Cong
activity in the central and southern part of South Vietnam. He pointed to the Communist
"war vessel" that was brought into a South Vietnam port./4/ He said there may well be an
increase in North Vietnamese forces in the northern part of South Vietnam. He agreed that
strikes this weekend against the North should take place. Secretary Rusk went on to review
the international reaction to our strikes. He said that those Asian countries that had a great
stake in the security of the area (e.g., Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Australia, UK, Philippines)
are with us; some countries (e.g., France and Pakistan) are luke warm; some "unaligned"
countries are flatly opposed.
/4/A report of this event was transmitted in telegram 2462 from Saigon, February 18. In
telegram 2710 from Saigon, February 22, the event was described as the discovery off the
coast of South Vietnam on February 16 of "an armed ocean-going, steel ship carrying large
quantities of Communist bloc arms and ammunition." (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
The Secretary indicated his misgivings with respect to an approach to the UN at this time.
He doubted that a debate in the Security Council would be the best way to deal with the
situation. The USSR is the only Communist country represented there, and would have a
special responsibility to defend the DRV actions and thus might adopt a less forthcoming
stance than it might in another forum. The Secretary felt that we should make our White
Paper/5/ available as soon as possible. He felt the ICC may be able to play a useful role, but
we are still investigating how best to use the ICC machinery.
/5/This paper was released on February 27 and entitled "Aggression from the North: The
Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam"; see Document 171.
The Secretary felt that, in the course of the next week, it may be necessary to make another
strong statement on our aims and objectives, stating that we will move our troops as soon as
we know the aggression has stopped. He said there are many who think "negotiation" is a
magic word, but felt it would be a mistake to indicate prematurely our desire to enter into
negotiation; unless there was some prospect that negotiations would be meaningful, it
would be a very dangerous situation. A negotiation that failed would indicate that we had
taken the case to the higher court and it was unable to deal with it. This would be the worst
possible situation.
The Secretary indicated that "political antennae" all over the world are waiting for signals
that the Communists are ready to engage in meaningful negotiation. Thus far no significant
signals have been received. It is extremely important, in this respect, that the GVN itself is
ready to stand up against this aggression.
The President said that he would rather talk than fight, but nonetheless it was terribly
important that the GVN not get the wrong impression that the U.S is seeking negotiations
prematurely. Under these circumstances Saigon might begin its own negotiations very
quickly and without our knowledge or participation.
The President read the text of an outgoing message, from Secretary Rusk to Ambassador
Bruce, which spelled out our proposed policy./6/ He asked the members of the Council for
their reaction. All agreed.
/6/See Documents 131 and 149.
The meeting adjourned at 6:05.
CLC
/3/A further report, including a brief summary of Taylor's conversation that afternoon with
Prime Minister Quat, was sent in telegram 2657 and received in the Department of State at
4:27 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S)
Taylor
b. Emphasize that call for Armed Forces Council meeting is a sound approach to solving
difficulties. In the meantime, there should be a standstill on troop movements headed for
Saigon.
c. Deny that the U.S. was informed concerning the coup attempt but otherwise maintain a
neutral position insofar as the contending factions are concerned.
d. Stress that the coup attempt following on recent U.S./GVN joint air attacks on DRV is
most unfortunate in terms of its effect on U.S. and Free World opinion.
143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 19, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, McGeorge Bundy
Correspondence. Secret.
SUBJECT
Your meeting with Couve de Murville at 11:30 this morning
1. Obviously the dominant topic is Southeast Asia and especially South Vietnam. Couve
takes the immediate military disturbance calmly, although he obviously feels that it
reinforces his own conviction that there is not, and cannot be, any workable government in
a situation of "American occupation." He professes to think there is a possibility of such a
government after a political settlement and an American withdrawal, but he produces no
evidence whatever to support the notion that such a government would be anything but
Communist.
2. Couve told me that he thought we had decided on "escalation" and that he was very
fearful of the results. This is what he has told others and I think it is what he honestly
believes. I pointed out that no one had more experience of negotiation and of the settlement
of political differences than you, and that our current lack of interest in negotiation should
not be construed as willful insistence upon a violent solution. Couve readily admitted--and
indeed volunteered--the opinion that you are a very prudent man and that you have made no
mistakes since November 1963--"a remarkable achievement."
3. I pointed out to Couve that just a year ago today he had suggested to Bohlen in a private
talk that we might have to take further military action before we would be in a position to
negotiate. He did not deny that he had said this (the cable is at Tab A)./2/ He simply said
that he thought it was now too late for such measures. In his own view the dangers of action
beyond the 17th Parallel outweighed any possible return, and he thought we would do better
to limit our attention to the South. I told him that you more than any other man in the
government were insistent upon a maximum effort in the South, but that we also had to take
account of the very heavy role and responsibility of Hanoi and of the problem of morale
which is created when there is increasing violence against our people and the Vietnamese,
and no visible response.
Mr. Ball referred to his talk with General de Gaulle on June 5, 1964./5/ He thought that a
major difference between our two governments was in our respective assessment of the
intentions of Communist China. France thought that it was preoccupied with major internal
problems and thus looked inward on itself, whereas we think that the Chinese are aggressive
and land hungry.
/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 464-470.
Mr. Bundy said that another difference was that France seems to think that there can be no
solution to the problem of stable government in South Vietnam while the United States
remains there, while we think that there can be no solution if we leave.
The Foreign Minister said that government stability was impossible to achieve in a period
of hostilities, but that if a cease-fire could be achieved, then, with the US staying in South
Vietnam, internal conditions could be expected to change.
Ambassador Bohlen commented that another difference was that France thinks that
negotiations would last a very long time, whereas we thought that a conference would be
likely to break up.
The Foreign Minister said that in estimating the probable course which the Communist
Chinese government would take, it was useful to look at the Soviet example. He recalled
that the Soviet Union had stayed quiet until World War II and had only started its
expansionist policies at that time.
Mr. Ball said that Chinese expansionism had already been active in Africa. The Foreign
Minister said this was different: before the war there had been activity in other countries by
the Communist parties.
Ambassador Bohlen said that Communist China proclaimed its belief in militant support of
indigenous movements, and that this raised the question of how it could be expected to
retreat.
The Foreign Minister said that if the Chinese once agreed to come to the negotiating table, it
would then be harder for them to resume fighting.
The President asked what was the French evaluation of the Soviet thinking on these matters.
The Foreign Minister answered that the Russians had the same evaluation as the French,
and that they constituted a moderating element. The Russians didn't want to see the
Communist Chinese expand, and would support North Vietnam against China.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
In conclusion, the question of press guidance was discussed, and it was agreed that the
Foreign Minister would say that he had talked about various subjects with the President,
including South Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said that in reply to any further questions he
would refer the press to the White House.
The meeting ended at 12:30 p.m./6/
/6/A memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Couve de Murville on February 20, during
which they discussed several topics related to Southeast Asia, is in Department of State,
Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965.
146. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. VIII. Secret.
Washington, February 19, 1965.
SUBJECT
Answer to Adlai Stevenson's memo
I asked George Ball to answer Adlai's memorandum of February 17 (Tab A)/2/ and here is
my own suggestion as to what you might say to him if you wish to telephone him. In the
current situation, I do not think such a phone call is urgent.
/2/See Document 145.
1. Stevenson suggests an early Presidential statement. Your answer is that you believe in all
necessary statements of our policy and objectives--that you have stated them repeatedly-and that you have told the Secretary of State to hold a press conference or issue a statement
at any time in the next days or weeks that he may think it necessary. You yourself do not
wish to heat up the national or international atmosphere by making a very loud noise right
now, although you are free to change your mind if the situation requires it.
2. You do not wish to indicate our "readiness for exploratory talks" at this time. Our
position is not one in which we should now look as if we were hunting negotiations. Both
the Communists and our friends in Saigon would interpret such a proposal as a sign of
weakness and readiness to withdraw.
3. You share his view that we do not wish to get into the Security Council right now.
4. You do not think that we would now wish to organize a meeting of the US, UK, France,
China, the Soviet Union, and North and South Vietnam. Such a committee would be
weighted against us, and there is no reason today to offer the French the mediator role in
this conspicuous way.
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
had voted "no confidence" in General Khanh and that Khanh had left the meeting so that
Council members could speak freely. At about 1:15 a.m. EST Prime Minister Quat
confirmed to Ambassador Taylor that the Council had voted "no confidence" in Khanh and
had also decided that the insurgents should be tried and punished by the military.
Another Council decision, according to Quat, was to make General Nguyen Chanh Thi
Commander of the Capital Military District (Saigon) replacing General Pham van Dong.
General Dong however is still serving as a member of the Armed Forces Council.
Quat agreed to discuss with Ambassador Taylor the question of naming Khanh's
replacement as Commander in Chief, indicating that Phan Khac Suu's decree removing
Khanh still stands. The Ambassador is inclined to share General Westmoreland's view that
no successor as Commander in Chief is necessary and that it would be preferable to have
only a Minister of Defense and a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
Major General Nguyen van Thieu as Minister of the Armed Forces and Acting Commander
in Chief appears to be top figure in the Armed Forces Council in the absence of Khanh and
the most likely inheritor of leadership of the armed forces.
Rusk
Lord Harlech then reviewed Ambassador Trevelyan's conversation with Lapin, noting that
at the outset the latter had accepted the British formula about the status of the Co-Chairmen
with regard to the 1954 Accords on Viet-Nam. Lapin had also promised seriously to study
the British proposal even though Trevelyan surmised that there was some disappointment
that the British were not suggesting a conference. While Lapin mentioned that the Soviets
had already had submitted to them views from the French and North Vietnamese, they were
nevertheless ready to consider the British proposal for requesting views from the other
countries. Harlech said that his estimate was that there would be a reply from the Soviets in
two to three days. He also assured the Secretary that all of the US suggestions about the
approach to the Soviets, including the bringing in of the ICC countries, had been accepted
and acted on by the British.
Secretary Rusk then referred to the difficult question posed by Trevelyan's judgment
opposing any further strikes at this time. The Secretary observed that as long as the current
confusion in Saigon exists we would not be inclined to lay on a strike. On the other hand the
capture of the North Vietnamese arms ship almost begs for a response. He acknowledged
the pressure on the Russians which a strike would represent but emphasized that London
and Moscow must not believe that embarking on the Co-Chairman process would be
accompanied by a unilateral cease-fire by the US. When the British Ambassador said it was
the conviction of London and their Embassy in Moscow that another strike at this time
would doom the British initiative with the Soviets, the Secretary added that it was not his
expectation that a decision would be made today concerning a further strike and he
promised the British advance warning on this subject. He noted nevertheless that we do not
regard this connection between a strike and the British initiative in Moscow as a really
decisive element in our decision.
Ambassador Harlech said the British saw real value in getting a clear Russian reaction at
this time. It is most important to learn what we can of their purposes and get whatever
evidence we can of their readiness to play a mediating role and help avoid escalation. He
said that his Government urged the US strongly to hold its hand until the British have an
answer from the Soviets.
The Secretary pointed out that the Soviets may come back and state that the end of US
strikes is a precondition to their playing the Co-Chairman role as suggested by the British.
In this case the Secretary assumed that the British would make sure that into the ensuing
consideration there would also be the demand for North Viet-Nam to put an end to
infiltration. In this regard the Secretary referred to the British position in Malaysia which
would envisage reaction against Indonesia in response to rather less provocation and he
emphasized how the arms ship illustrates the nature of the North Vietnamese role. In
conclusion, however, he stated again there would be no strike today or tomorrow.
Lord Harlech acknowledged that the US cannot agree to a unilateral cease-fire and he also
referred, himself, to the arms ship as "straight aggression."
152. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House/1/
Washington, February 21, 1965, 4:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX.
Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Repeated to the Department of State, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the National Military Command Center. Received at the White House at 4:51
p.m.
CIA 86906. The following is CIA/OCI Situation Report for Vietnam as of 1600 hours EST,
21 February:
1. General Khanh is resisting his ouster as Commander-in-Chief, officially announced by
Saigon Radio today, and is attempting to rally behind him whatever forces he can muster.
Late Sunday night/2/ (Saigon time) some 15 tanks and two truckloads of rangers, apparently
acting on Khanh's behalf, occupied Saigon's airfield of Tan Son Nhut. The situation has
been characterized chiefly by maneuvering and confusion, and is still far from certain how
much actual support Khanh might secure in a showdown. Khanh is at his seaside command
post at Vung Tau, southeast of Saigon.
/2/February 21.
2. The Armed Forces Council has issued an ultimatum to Khanh to leave the country
immediately. General Thi, I Corps Commander, who is emerging as perhaps the most
powerful of the young Turks, has warned that any forces attempting to reinstate Khanh
would be subjected to air strikes.
3. A field appraisal of the loyalties of key military commanders shows an almost complete
lineup against Khanh. General Dong, Military Governor of Saigon and strongly anti-Khanh,
estimates that Khanh might at most be supported in the capital by three airborne and one
marine battalion. However, as in the case of the 19-20 February attempted coup, there
always exists some danger of split loyalties developing among individual field units.
4. Yesterday, the Armed Forces Council deputized General Co, II Corps Commander, to
find Khanh and tell him of its no-confidence vote. When Co finally caught up with Khanh
upcountry in Nha Trang, Khanh refused to accept the message. He claimed that the vote
was taken at a rump session of the Armed Forces Council, and he insisted on the right to
defend himself before the total membership.
5. On the afternoon of 21 February, the Armed Forces Council voted to name Major
General Tran Van (Little) Minh, erstwhile Chief of Staff, as temporary armed forces
commander. A formal decree to this effect was signed by Chief of State Suu and broadcast
Sunday night.
6. Of the key military figures, only Navy Commander Admiral Cang at latest word is
remaining with Khanh at Vung Tau, and Cang's intentions and loyalties are not clear.
General Quang, Special Forces Commander, earlier thought to be on Khanh's side, now
says he wants out and has asked for a plane to take him from Vung Tau. General Ky is
arranging transport. Thus, while the situation is still subject to sudden change, the trend
seems to be running against Khanh.
153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/
The use of Marines in mobile counter-VC operations has the attraction of giving them an
offensive mission and one of far greater appeal than that of mere static defense. However, it
would raise many serious problems which in past have appeared sufficiently formidable to
lead to rejection of use of US ground troops in a counter-guerrilla role. White-faced soldier
armed, equipped and trained as he is is not suitable guerrilla fighter for Asian forests and
jungles. French tried to adapt their forces to this mission and failed; I doubt that US forces
could do much better. Furthermore, we would have vastly complicating factor of not
running war and hence problem of arranging satisfactory command relationships with our
Vietnamese allies. Finally, there would be ever present question of how foreign soldier
would distinguish between a VC and friendly Vietnamese farmer. When I view this array of
difficulties, I am convinced that we should adhere to our past policy of keeping our ground
forces out of direct counterinsurgency role.
If there were any great likelihood of DRV forces crossing the demilitarized zone in
conventional attack, there would be no question of need for strong US ground force to assist
ARVN in defense of coastal plain. However, this situation would not arise suddenly and we
should have ample time to make our deployments before situation got out of hand.
In view of foregoing considerations, I conclude that only mission worth considering now
for additional Marines in Danang area is to contribute to defense of base against mortar fire
and ground attack. However, to defend against mortar fire would require at least full brigade
and I do not believe threat and possible consequences of mortar attack are so great as to
warrant pinning down so valuable force in static defensive mission. However, in view of
General Westmoreland's understandable concern for safety of this important base, I would
be willing to recommend placing in Danang Marine battalion landing team. Such force
would strengthen defense of base and, at same time, would be manageable force from point
of view of accommodating it on base and absorbing it into Danang community. Such force
with those Marines already present should remove any substantial danger of VC ground
attack and in conjunction with available ARVN forces provide an acceptable level of
security against attack by fire.
If Washington decision is to introduce additional Marines into Danang, it should, of course,
be made contingent upon getting concurrence of GVN. It would be useful and, I believe, not
difficult to get GVN to initiate request for additional forces to which USG could then
accede./3/
/3/In telegram MAC JOO 5515, February 22, General Westmoreland recommended that a
Marine expeditionary brigade "be deployed to Da Nang on a phased basis as soon as
political clearance is obtained." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor
2720. For the President./2/ This has been the most topsy-turvy week since I came to this
post: A new government installed, a coup attempted against the Commander-in-Chief, the
coup suppressed, the Commander-in-Chief deposed by those who had put down the coup.
The coup attempt itself was an ill-considered, ill-timed move against Khanh by a group of
officers and former officers, many of whom had already been discredited by their earlier
unsuccessful attempt against Khanh last September 13. One might have expected that
General Phat, the coup leader, would have done better on a second go but he again
misjudged the temper of the military commanders having effective military strength in the
Saigon area. Phat's unsuccessful effort did have the effect, however, of breaking Khanh's
spell over his colleagues in the Armed Forces Council and of bringing them to a decision to
unseat him. This action appears to have been successful and Khanh's appointment as
Ambassador-at-Large/3/ has just been announced. I understand that he will depart Saigon
for Hong Kong on 25 February: but one cannot exclude the possibility of his making
another last minute maneuver to save himself.
/2/In a telephone conversation with Rusk at 12:15 p.m. on February 23, Bromley Smith
indicated that he was sending this telegram to the President at his request. (Ibid., Rusk Files:
Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
/3/Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson's conversation with Quat on February 22 regarding
Khanh's future status was reported in telegram 2700 from Saigon, February 22. (Ibid.,
Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S)
With Khanh, the troublemaker, removed from the scene, we hope that the Quat government
can get under way with our joint programs. We believe that the government has
considerable potential but its basic strength will not be known until put to the test. That test
is likely to be a challenge by the Buddhist Institute where Thich Tam Chau is presently
making pro-Khanh anti-Suu noises. It is hard to see what objection the Institute can find in
the Quat government, the members of which were carefully chosen with a view to their
acceptability to the Buddhists.
The excitement over the coup tended to divert attention somewhat from the Viet Cong
munitions ship sunk off the coast of Phu Yen Province. The cargo of this ship furnishes by
far the most dramatic evidence of Hanoi involvement yet uncovered in the war. An
incomplete count of the cargo and nearby caches indicates that some 4,000 weapons, large
quantities of ammunition and some 500 pounds of medicines were captured. The weapons
and ammunitions were [from] the USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Communist
China; Hanoi packing slips were found in the medical containers, which include supplies
manufactured in North Vietnam, the USSR, Communist China, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Japan. This discovery is particularly timely in terms of
justifying the US/GVN air strikes against North Vietnamese military targets.
Viet Cong activity was down during the week but pacification conditions remain
unsatisfactory in many provinces, particularly in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. The deteriorating
security situation in this latter area has required a cut back in our economic programs, since
USOM representatives are generally unable to leave the principal towns. We can hardly
expect to reverse the situation in central Vietnam until the Quat government is able to
increase its operational military and paramilitary strength.
Taylor
156. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 23, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965.
Top Secret.
FRENCH DISCUSSIONS WITH HANOI AND PEIPING
1. Source of Information. On February 2, the French Foreign Office filled us in on French
contacts with Hanoi and Peiping, mostly in Paris, but on one occasion in Peiping. A similar
fill-in was given on February 17, just prior to Couve's departure for Washington, and this
covered Couve's talk with the ChiCom Ambassador on February 13, to which Couve
referred in his talk with the President on February 19th. The reporting cables are Paris 4295,
4390, 4445, and 4692,/2/ as supplemented by Couve's talk with the President./3/
/2/All four cables are ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
/3/See Document 144.
We have no information of any other French contacts with either Communist country in
recent months. Our supposition is that the French have informed us fully, although there are
significant differences in interpretation from one French talk with us to another. Notably,
Couve in his talk with the President was much more optimistic about ChiCom views than
the French Foreign Office source who reported to us separately on the same February 13
conversation.
2. Dates and Places of Contact. The French talked in Paris with the Hanoi economic
delegate, Bo, on December 22 and January 20. They have talked to the ChiComs in Paris on
December 17, January 15 and 25, and February 13, and the French Ambassador in Peiping
talked to ChiCom Foreign Minister Chen Yi on January 9.
3. French Talks with Hanoi. The French have put three questions:
a. Would Hanoi accept and join in guarantees for a neutral and completely independent
South Viet-Nam?
b. Would Hanoi agree to knock off political and military subversion in South Viet-Nam?
c. Would Hanoi accept some control mechanism more serious and with wider checks than
the present ICC?
The French have reported that Bo showed considerable interest in a and c but was evasive
on b.
As to a, Bo was quoted as saying that such a settlement would require bilateral negotiations
and the resumption of relations between the two Viet-Nams, as well as wider international
guarantees and a control mechanism.
As to b, Bo has refused to admit Hanoi's activities in South Viet-Nam, but has said that
"what was needed was an honorable compromise based on real forces present in Viet-Nam."
For some reason, the French interpret this statement--which would seem much more likely
to mean legalization of the Liberation Front--to indicate some sympathy with a bilateral
withdrawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam as the basis for settlement.
The Hanoi representative has at no time stated that he was speaking on instructions from
Hanoi. The French have pressed him for an official statement of Hanoi's position, but he has
not produced it. The French Foreign Office, in its last briefing to us, nonetheless believes
(for some unstated reason) that Hanoi in fact approved Bo's replies on points a (affirmative
but general) and c (affirmative but avoiding any specifics). The last French report on
February 17 indicated that the French Foreign Office "believes further clarification Hanoi
position required."
It is extremely hard to make anything of Bo's reported comments. The lack of Hanoi
express authority for his statements, plus the fact that there have been no reported contacts
since February 7 and 11, make the reading from these contacts extremely obscure at this
time. It certainly cannot be said that the contacts--which were apparently at French
initiative--have produced any serious indication of Hanoi's attitude or terms. Nonetheless,
because of their interpretation of Bo's statements, as indicated above, the French have told
us they think Hanoi's position is somewhat more forthcoming than Peiping's.
4. French Talks with Peiping. The French have stated that these were initiated by the
Chinese.
Initially, the ChiCom representative called for a unilateral withdrawal of the US from South
Viet-Nam as the only basis for settlement. They also attacked the position the US had taken
in the Warsaw Talks as purely propagandistic.
On January 15, the ChiCom representative, on instruction from Peiping, had asked whether
France would assume a more active role in Viet-Nam and would approach the US with a
view to discussing a negotiated settlement. In both of the first talks, the French put to the
ChiCom representative the same three questions they had addressed to the Hanoi
representative. The ChiComs had evaded any precise reply to these, and the conversation
since then has apparently revolved around whether there might be a reconvened conference
and whether any preconditions were required for this purpose.
On this point, in the January 15 conference the ChiComs allegedly did not reject the idea of
a conference but said that US bellicosity and desire to extend the war made it impossible to
propose a conference. (They also complained of the Korean troops going to SVN.)
On February 13, the ChiCom Ambassador--to Couve--pointed to the US attacks as showing
US bellicosity and contradicting the French assurance that the US did not wish to extend the
war.
Couve replied that the French still thought a conference should be convened without prior
conditions and that its first task should be a cease-fire. The ChiCom Ambassador allegedly
responded "positively" but went on to say that the US had now introduced a new element by
attacking North Viet-Nam and that a halt to this aggression constituted a new prior
condition for a conference.
The French believe that the ChiComs were thus moving away from their propaganda
position that there must be a total US withdrawal from SVN before negotiation. (This same
theme was apparently covered between the French Ambassador and Chen Yi on January 9,
in which Chen Yi had said that such a total US withdrawal was not a prior condition to
negotiation but might be a goal thereof.)
In summary there has been no Chinese response to the basic three points, and it is by no
means clear that the ChiComs are not insisting on a cessation of attacks on the DRV as a
precondition to any conference. In his talk with the President, Couve said that the ChiCom
Ambassador could hardly have been expected to agree verbally with the French position for
a conference without preconditions, and Couve seems to draw the conclusion that the
ChiComs would in fact now accept a conference. However, it seems absolutely clear that
their objective in such a conference would be, at a minimum, to obtain total US withdrawal
from SVN, and there is no indication in any of the French contacts with the ChiComs that
they even admit North Viet-Nam's role or would set up its cessation as an acceptable quid
pro quo for US withdrawal. The Chinese position, as stated to the French, seems to be that
we must stop attacking the DRV before there can be any negotiation, and that we must
agree, in any negotiation, to get out of SVN. This is hardly a very promising or forthcoming
position!
5. References to US Position. The French tell us that they have not purported to speak for
the US in any of these contacts. However, they have made clear to our Embassy that they
believe they understand the US position correctly, as being acceptable to a neutral SVN
with adequate assurances and solid guarantees. Prior to the two most recent Chicom
contacts, the French indicated that they had read with great care the reference to
negotiations in Mr. William Bundy's speech of January 23./4/ Since this may now be the
basis of French representation of US views, the relevant paragraph is as follows:
/4/See footnote 2, Document 48.
"As to the basic alternatives, so long as South Viet-Nam is ready to carry on the fight,
withdrawal is unthinkable. A negotiation that produced a return to the essentials of the 1954
Accords and thus an independent and secure South Viet-Nam would of course be an
answer, indeed the answer. But negotiation would hardly be promising that admitted
Communism to South Viet-Nam, that did not get Hanoi out, or that exposed South VietNam and perhaps other countries of the area to renewed Communist aggression at will, with
only nebulous or remote guarantees."
It seems desirable and timely for me to put down an outline of my own thinking about a
comprehensive approach to our effort to assure the security of South Viet Nam. I am
convinced that there is no single miracle-working approach which can get the job done. I
am convinced that it would be disastrous for the United States and the free world to permit
Southeast Asia to be overrun by the Communist North. I am also convinced that everything
possible should be done to throw back the Hanoi-Viet Cong aggression without a major war
if possible. We cannot accomplish this result without the risk of major escalation; but the
other side, too, must face and worry about the same risk.
I. Stable and Unified Government in South Viet Nam
The highest possible priority must be given by us and the South Vietnamese to the
establishment of a government and leadership which not only is stable but looks stable.
Without the elementary platform, other efforts in the military and political field are likely to
prove fruitless. Political confusion in Saigon (a) diverts military leaders away from their
main job of fighting the Viet Cong, (b) undermines the capacity of administration
throughout the country to take effective action in pacification and the non-military measures
required to organize the countryside, (c) undermines the morale and sense of purpose of the
American people, (d) frustrates our effort to obtain increasing help from other free world
countries to South Viet Nam, (e) most important of all, convinces Hanoi and its Communist
allies that if they persist in their present course of action, they have every prospect of
victory, and (f) finally, political confusion in Saigon makes it almost impossible to activate
political processes which have the prospect of resulting in the security of South Viet Nam.
It is not easy to prescribe from Washington what further steps the United States can take to
bring about greater unity and stability in the GVN. If General Khanh does in fact leave the
country, it would be timely for Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson and General
Westmoreland to interview all of the principal political and military leaders and to obtain
from them a pledge to demonstrate both publicly and in their actions that, at long last, they
are prepared to put aside personal rivalries and work together for the security of South Viet
Nam. Every effort should be made to obtain public declarations of support from any and all
of the existing non-governmental groups, including Buddhists, Catholics, labor, students,
business, or anyone else whose voice can add to a chorus of unified determination.
II. Increased Effort by the South Vietnamese
The gravity of the present situation in South Viet Nam, as well as the gravity of the
decisions with which the United States is faced, calls for maximum effort on the part of the
South Vietnamese. The slightest acceptance of a "business as usual" situation is not
consistent with the possibility of an explosion into larger hostilities nor with the experience
of other guerrilla actions in Greece, Malaysia and elsewhere. Apart from the governmental
question, discussed above, the South Vietnamese should undertake (a) additional measures
of mobilization, (b) the organization of the civilian population into a pacification effort,
with emphasis upon information and intelligence, (c) vigorous execution by the South
Vietnamese of agreed psychological warfare programs, on which the South Vietnamese
have been dilatory and ineffective, (d) sharply increased international diplomatic and
political effort, (e) intensified military and pacification effort on the basis of a 24-hour day
and 7-day week. It should be made clear that intensified South Vietnamese efforts should
not be limited by budgetary considerations or US financial and material support.
III. US Effort in South Viet Nam
We ourselves should consider whether there are additional steps which we ought to take in
South Viet Nam. Apart from the political results which increased efforts might achieve, we
should think of the importance of conveying a signal to Hanoi and Peiping that they
themselves cannot hope to succeed without a substantial escalation on their part, with all of
the risks which they would have to face. I would favor the immediate stationing in Da Nang
of a Marine battalion combat team, to be reinforced promptly to a brigade if the security
situation calls for it. I would also favor the use of US Naval forces, particularly destroyers,
to reinforce counter-junk operations and to ensure that there are no repetitions of seaborne
Viet Cong supply similar to the recent ship discovered in Vung Ro Bay. US destroyers
could assist GVN junks and other craft in systematic surveillance of those portions of the
seacoast not securely in government hands. They could act as command ships for flotillas of
smaller craft to intensify and tighten surveillance of junk traffic coming both from the North
and Cambodia. Our military authorities should be asked to be certain that every possible
step is being taken for the security of key installations, such as intensive patrolling and the
dispersal of the living quarters of American personnel. The military should be asked to look
again at the applicability of our most sophisticated conventional weapons, some of which
are still highly classified and have not been used. We should continue to permit US aircraft
of all types to engage in direct action against the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam./2/
/2/On February 24, the Embassy in Saigon issued a statement announcing a strike that day
by U.S. jet aircraft from Bien Hoa and Da Nang, at the request of the South Vietnamese
Government, against Viet Cong forces in the mountain pass between An Khe and Pleiku in
South Vietnam. (Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1965, pp. 371-372) In a February
25 memorandum to Reedy, Cooper provided background information on the use of the U.S.
jet aircraft, pointing out that this was the first time that U.S. jets had been used for
something other than reconnaissance in South Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Confidential File,
ND 19/CO 312)
IV. Strikes into North Viet Nam
For the present, strikes into North Viet Nam should be considered as serving the political
purpose of indicating to the North that they cannot expect to rely upon a sanctuary in the
face of their increased infiltration and operations in South Viet Nam.
In this respect, they play their part alongside of MAROPS and our air missions in Laos. The
more air strikes against North Viet Nam can be directly linked to specific events in South
Viet Nam, the better from a general political point of view. If, at a given moment, there are
political reasons for deferring a strike (such as political confusion in Saigon or a major
international political contact), we should not bind ourselves to a specific schedule. A strike
directly related to the full examination of the evidence of the ship at Vung Ro Bay would
involve smaller political difficulties than one not so related. To the extent that strikes can be
specifically related to events in South Viet Nam, the responsibility for major escalation will
continue to rest with the other side.
V. Political Possibilities
Obviously, the United States should be ready to take advantage of any political possibility
of bringing the fighting in Southeast Asia to an end consistent with the security of South
Viet Nam and of Laos. The international political objective should be to bring about a
cessation of infiltration and the repatriation of those previously infiltrated. This would
include, of course, assured compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos.
Negotiation as a cover for the abandonment of Southeast Asia to the Communist North
cannot be accepted. This is a weakness of President de Gaulle's attitude. A formal and
public negotiation at this time which would simply register the impossibility of a peaceful
settlement would add even greater dangers to the present situation. Our problem is to bring
about a combination of circumstances in which negotiations can achieve the abandonment
of aggression by Hanoi and Peiping. We have no reliable evidence that Hanoi and Peiping
are prepared for any such result. The attitude of the Soviet Union is somewhat more
equivocal and it should be a major effort on our part to keep the Soviet Union from
complete solidarity with Hanoi and Peiping about Southeast Asia. I will discuss orally the
various contacts and possibilities as they shape up at the present time.
VI. Reiteration of Policy
There is some danger that protracted periods of silence on our part can lead to an impression
either of indecision or of discouragement and nervousness. Although the essential elements
of our policy have been stated many times, reiteration is necessary to remind public opinion
here and abroad of the essentials as we see them. I would consider these essentials to be the
following:
(1) The right of the nations of Southeast Asia to be left alone by their neighbors to work out
their own national life and their own international policy without interference by others;
(2) The systematic and large-scale infiltration of trained personnel by North Viet Nam into
South Viet Nam contrary to the Geneva Agreements and international law;
(3) The large scale and illegal infiltration of arms by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam;
(4) The absence of any US desire for a national military presence in Southeast Asia,
whether in the form of bases or in the form of the continuing presence of American military
personnel;
(5) Our commitment to the settlements of 1954 and 1962;
(6) The absence of any desire on our part to destroy by military means the regimes in North
Viet Nam or Mainland China;
(7) Our receptivity to political action which would achieve a result consistent with these
essential elements./3/
/3/Rusk restated these points in greater detail at a news conference on February 25. For text
of his statement as well as a transcript of the question and answer period which followed,
some of which dealt with Vietnam, see Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1965, pp.
362-371.
D. Consultation must take place between the two zones looking toward eventual
reunification.
E. As of July 1964 Hanoi has included as a further condition an end to US "provocations"
against DRV territory.
5. The recent activities of North Vietnamese agents in Paris suggest Hanoi is seeking to
stimulate French pressure for a US withdrawal as the first step toward a negotiated
settlement of the "impasse" in Indochina. These maneuvers by the Communists appear
designed mainly to encourage opposition in France and elsewhere in the Free World to
continued prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong and to possible further US attacks
against the DRV.
6. Such motives were suggested by the North Vietnamese response to French initiatives
during the Paris conversations. Although there was no give in the position taken by the
DRV representative, he stressed an interest in continuing the discussions, doubtless with a
view to keeping French hopes for a negotiated settlement alive. Similar objectives probably
lie behind the recent propaganda from Hanoi, which has reported without comment the
substance of French and Cambodian calls for a new international conference on Indochina.
There is, however, no evidence available to us that the North Vietnamese are giving serious
consideration to a conference.
7. The Chinese have consistently backed Hanoi's hard line concerning negotiations and do
not appear interested, at this time, even in the kind of talks which might be exploited under
some circumstances to give Communist forces a breathing space.
8. The Chinese Communists are almost certainly optimistic concerning developments in
South Vietnam. The conversations initiated by the Chinese in Paris were apparently
designed to obtain a better reading on these questions, and at the same time to stimulate new
French pressure on the US to withdraw quietly from the "hopeless" impasse in Indochina. In
this endeavor Peiping is playing skillfully on French ambitions for a larger role in Southeast
Asia as mediators of the Sino-US conflict.
9. The remarks of the Chinese Charge in Paris, as reported by the French, make it clear that
Peiping--like Hanoi--has no desire for any agreement except on Communist terms. The
Chinese continue to insist that a unilateral US withdrawal is the only basis for settlement.
10. Peiping's latest public statement on the question of possible negotiations ridicules the
idea of talks. A key paragraph of the People's Daily editorial on 19 February claims that the
US is hoping to gain at the conference table what it cannot win on the battlefield and then
dismisses the notion as "too much wishful thinking." The Chinese go on to say that peace
can be had in Vietnam at any time but only after the "US aggressors have withdrawn" to
permit the people in Vietnam to "settle their own problems."
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Rusk.
1805. Subject to final execute instruction tomorrow, we believe next strike should take
place Feb 26/2/ and that you should seek political clearance Feb 25.
/2/This planned strike was designated Rolling Thunder IV.
We believe departure of Khanh essential before either clearance or strike and that Saigon
situation generally should appear to have settled down as completely as possible. In this
connection it would be a great help if generals and Quat, with other leaders if possible,
could join in statements of solidarity and resolve to prosecute war firmly. We are also
concerned over possibility Buddhist demonstrations or other action contributing to picture
of unsettled situation.
You will get through military channels suggestions to have operation consist of two naval
targets, one to be struck by VNAF and one by US./3/ This is to focus operation heavily on
boat incident although we agree with your excellent suggested draft release/4/ stressing
other VC operations also as warranting response. FYI: One object in stressing naval
rationale is to reduce risks serious flare-back on gambit described Deptel 1783,/5/ which
remains active. As you can see, this gambit continues to have great broad policy
importance. Secrecy on it remains essential, although stories today from London have given
us grave concern whether it can be preserved. End FYI.
/3/Not further identified.
/4/The Embassy's proposed text of a press release was transmitted in telegram 2710 from
Saigon, February 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/5/Document 150.
In response to concerns Embtel 2706/6/ (which we did not pass to other addressees as they
had not received our 1718 and 1724)/7/ you are correct that we have been reconsidering
sequence and forum of public statement and presentation of case against DRV. Not clear yet
just how these will work, and we hope for clearer picture by tomorrow. In any case,
developments do not yet warrant any new statement to Quat other than to say that we still
contemplate public statement our purposes and objectives and also presentation of case, but
timing on these not yet firm.
/6/In telegram 2706, February 23, Taylor reported that it appeared from recent Department
of State cables that the U.S. Government was considering modifying the procedures agreed
for the previously planned Rolling Thunder missions regarding the announcement of the
strikes and the raising of Hanoi's aggression in the U.N. Security Council. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S)
/7/Documents 115 and 117.
Let me take this opportunity to congratulate you, along with Alex, Westmoreland, and your
whole mission, on your expert handling of the recent semi-coup. It had all sorts of dangers
whether US hand might be charged, and Thao and his friends certainly did their best to
implicate us. But we seem to have come out relatively untouched, and perhaps the results
will be for the best./8/
/8/In telegram 1815 to Saigon, February 24, the Department of State instructed Taylor to
seek political clearance on February 25 for an air strike against North Vietnam on February
26. In telegram 5327 to London, February 24, the Department informed Ambassador Bruce
of this decision and also indicated that Ambassador Harlech had been informed of the
decision earlier that day. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S. Bad weather, however, forced further postponement of this first Rolling Thunder
mission.
Rusk
160. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency
(Rowan) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 24, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, CO 312. Confidential. Copy sent to
McGeorge Bundy.
Pursuant to our discussion Friday/2/ about our psychological program in Viet Nam and the
question of whether an outside observer like Frank Stanton should have a look at it , I wish
to cite a few points that may help you to decide your next step.
/2/On Friday, February 19, Rowan met alone with President Johnson from 6:05 to 6:44 p.m.
No other record of the discussion has been found. (Johnson Library, President's Daily
Diary)
1. First, let me say that we in the Agency would welcome a look at the situation by Stanton.
We believe that the program we have developed in the last year is quite impressive--still, we
welcome any fresh ideas as to how we might better do the job.
2. Having said this, let me emphasize quickly that efforts to develop among the South
Vietnamese people a sense of national unity and a determination to fight off Communist
aggression, have not progressed to my satisfaction. As you know so well, this kind of
psychological operation cannot be divorced from other problems there such as:
a. Shortcomings in the pacification program and the failure to give lasting physical
protection to the villagers we are urging to be brave;
b. The continuing political turmoil that leaves us uncertain as to whom we work with and
the Vietnamese people confused as to who constitutes the government we are asking them
to rally 'round;
c. Or the widespread notion, voiced even by U.S. congressmen, that we are waging a futile
effort in Viet Nam.
3. Despite these difficulties, we have made some psychological headway during the past
year, particularly in the Hop Tac areas. Given any degree of political stability in the next
year, and barring severe military defeats for our side, I believe our projected program is
such that we can anticipate a further significant increase in unity and will-to-win on the part
of the Vietnamese.
The Viet Nam Coordinating Committee has discussed thoroughly all the areas where U.S.GVN programs might be strengthened. It has decided that a working team, including a
USIA representative, should go to Viet Nam soon to effect whatever improvements are
possible.
4. I mentioned to you Friday such things as my having almost doubled my American staff
and reallocated an extra million dollars to the Viet Nam psychological program since I was
there 10 months ago. You may be interested in the following brief summary of what we
have built in the way of organization in that time:
Under the U.S. Mission Council in Viet Nam there is a Mission Psychological Operations
Committee which has representation from all U.S. agencies in Viet Nam and is chaired by
the USIS Country Public Affairs Officer, Barry Zorthian. A country-wide psychological
operations committee has existed for some time in the Vietnamese Government but has not
functioned with full effectiveness due to the continuing political turmoil. In some provinces,
however, we have built local structures for waging psychological warfare, and these can
now move ahead if there is a reasonable degree of political and military stability.
Under the U.S. Psychological Operations Committee is a Joint Field Services Center,
housed at USIS and composed of personnel of USIS, USOM and MACV. In the Field
Services Center are thirteen USIS Americans, two USOM employees, five MACV military
personnel and seventy Vietnamese employees of USIS (twenty-three of these Vietnamese
employees are stationed in provincial offices of the Vietnamese Information Service).
MACV has a total of approximately seventy American military personnel engaged directly
in psychological operations and civic action--working under general policy and strategy
developed by USIA. More than forty of the MACV Psychological Operations Civil Affairs
Officers are stationed full-time in the various provinces. Others serve at division, corps and
Saigon level.
In addition to the USIS personnel directly engaged in field operations, five USIS Americans
and 57 Vietnamese USIS employees are engaged in producing such products as films,
publications and leaflets designed for Vietnamese rural audiences.
Also, 51 third-country personnel, including Filipinos, Chinese and Australians, are engaged
in operations closely related to the aforementioned activities. Their work includes civic
action, political warfare and radio broadcasting.
One of the most significant developments in recent months has been the formation of
Provincial Psychological Operations Committees. Usually chaired by the provincial
governors themselves, these committees usually have USOM (AID), MACV and, where
wanted him to raise. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram
UNMIS 21, February 25, Yost reported on the conversation with U Thant (Document 164).
After Stevenson returned from Jamaica, the Department of State, in telegram 2114 to the
U.S. Mission, February 26, instructed him to raise with U Thant the following day the
matter of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. (Ibid.) A memorandum of Stevenson's
conversation with U Thant on February 27, with Yost and Bunche also attending, is in The
Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, volume VIII, pages 717-722. Stevenson's memorandum of
March 1, which was sent either to the President or the Secretary of State and in which he
recommended the beginning of negotiations in the near future "if they can be arranged
without unacceptable preconditions" is printed ibid., pages 722-724.
find out something, ok. Y said he would see him early tomorrow morning or will try
tonight.
(Y's office called back to say SYG had left for home and Y would see him first thing in the
morning, about 10 am.)
With this in mind I would like your views on the desirability of my taking several days on
my trip en route to Baguio/4/ to consult with you on pacification program. To facilitate our
discussion questions and proposals mentioned above are being pouched. Would it also be
useful if I were preceded by small interagency team to prepare ground for our discussions
and assure follow-up in each agency in Washington? Alternatively would you prefer to
defer visit such team and leave decision on this to be made during my visit?
/4/A Far East ambassadorial conference was scheduled to meet at Baguio in the Philippines
on March 9.
Rusk
164. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, February 25, 1965, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret.
UNMIS 21. For Cleveland only. From Yost. Ref: Deptel 2083./2/ At meeting this morning
at which only SYG, Bunche and Yost were present, latter read full text of instructions with
occasional appropriate comment, particularly emphasizing points made in paragraph one.
Thereafter, SYG launched into following lengthy explanation of his position.
/2/See Document 161.
He said he had been reading carefully and regularly since 1963 Hanoi broadcasts as
reported in USG publication. From these broadcasts he had become convinced that Hanoi
was ready to talk peace with US, that it was closer to Moscow than to Peking, and that,
indeed, though having to take account of geography, it was clearly not pro-Peking.
His first piece of advice to US had been after Diem ouster when he had suggested to
Stevenson that US encourage formation in South Vietnam of broad-based government
which would include certain Vietnamese leaders in exile, for the most part in Paris. He had
never had any reply to this suggestion and did not know whether US had endeavored to
follow it.
His second step had been taken last year when he had become convinced that the situation
was deteriorating seriously and that the longer it deteriorated the more likely it was that the
Communists would take over South Vietnam. At that time the Hanoi radio was still
indicating willingness to negotiate.
He had asked Hanoi through the Soviets whether they would negotiate directly and
privately with US. To his surprise, Hanoi had promptly replied in the affirmative. SYG had
communicated this fact to Stevenson, emphasizing his belief that we should explore means
of drawing Hanoi further away from Peking, taking advantage in this respect of
Moscow/Peking rift.
Stevenson had subsequently inquired at what place and at what level these contacts should
occur, if we should be disposed to pursue them. As to place, SYG had suggested various
alternatives, including Cambodia and Pakistan, but had recommended Rangoon, since both
US and DRV had diplomatic representation there. He had sounded out the Burmese Govt as
to whether it would offer necessary facilities and GOB had replied it would be happy to do
so. This he had passed to Stevenson in Dec./3/
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 427.
In January Stevenson had resumed conversation, pointing out great difficulty of US
negotiating with DRV without RVN participating. SYG had recognized cogency of this
objection but had nevertheless felt that some risks must be taken, that time is wasting and
that Hanoi might change its mind about negotiations at all. As alternative to bilateral
negotiation, and also to full-scale Geneva conference, they had discussed possibility of
meeting of five great powers plus two Vietnams. SYG himself thought this was an excellent
idea and suggested Geneva as appropriate locus. He had, however, had hitherto no reply
from Washington to this suggestion, and meanwhile, of course, Hanoi radio had become
much more militant./4/
/4/See Document 145.
Subsequently, he had through Lord Caradon sent message to Prime Minister Wilson
informing latter of his suggestion of bilateral, and later of 5-plus-2 negotiations, and asking
Wilson to use his good offices in Washington to bring about acceptance of this idea. He
presumed Wilson had raised problem in Washington though he did not know in what form.
SYG had also discussed question of negotiations with Couve de Murville during latter's
recent visit. Couve had advocated Geneva conference with original composition but SYG
said this was impossible and mentioned 5-plus-2 proposal. To this Couve did not comment.
(Seydoux subsequently confirmed to Yost that SYG had raised with Couve suggestion of
Geneva conference with smaller participation.) SYG added that Couve had expressed
opinion that more than half of the population of South Vietnam favors the Viet Cong. Yost
contested this vigorously, expressing view that if this were the case South Vietnam would
long since have been taken over.
Finally, SYG remarked that he had not mentioned 5-plus-2 idea to Soviets, though they
were of course aware of his original idea of bilateral contacts since they had at his request
sounded out Hanoi.
SYG concluded his exposition by emphasizing his continued conviction that, while it might
already be too late, it is still of utmost importance to find some means of coming to
negotiations, first of all because he believes that continuation and escalation of armed
conflict will force Moscow to rapprochement with Peking, which would be greatest possible
disaster, and second because of his conviction that, on account of highly unstable political
situation in South Vietnam, continuance of war will inevitably end in total Communist
takeover.
At this juncture Yost repeated several salient points of our assessment of the situation,
particularly the fact that we have seen absolutely no sign that Hanoi and Peking are
prepared to negotiate in such a way as to take account of security and interest of South
Vietnam on the same basis as their own security and interest, or that they have any
conception of negotiations other than as a means of facilitating total Communist takeover of
South Vietnam. At this point SYG suggested that US prepare proposals or agenda for
negotiation, for example, for 5-plus-2 conference, which might be submitted through
appropriate intermediary to Hanoi and which would smoke out basis on which they may be
prepared to negotiate. SYG said it would not be appropriate for him to put forward any such
proposals but implied he would be willing to transmit them as coming from us.
Reverting to SYG press conference, Yost made several efforts to determine what elements
of "truth" Thant feels are being withheld from the American public. It was obvious he was
embarrassed and unhappy at the reaction which this particular comment of his had
provoked. He emphasized he had not meant to accuse the US Govt of withholding info but
had merely meant to bring out that in a war situation many elements of truth are ignored or
forgotten, such as appeals of Shastri, Ayub, Ne Win and others for negotiations, and such as
markedly different way in which Asians and Americans regard many of the questions at
issue in this conflict. In other words, it appeared that what he had had in mind was not that
facts and background are being withheld from the US public but simply that factors which
he considers of utmost importance tend to be swamped and obscured in the volume of dayto-day war news. He admitted that the only "fact" which had not been revealed was Hanoi's
private indication to him of its willingness to negotiate bilaterally with US, and that this was
largely procedural point since everyone has been aware of their desire for a Geneva
conference (without the slightest indication in either case that they are prepared to negotiate
even-handed settlement). SYG was relaxed and cordial throughout conversation, obviously
firmly attached to basic conceptions on these issues which he has had for many years, but
still distressed and embarrassed that what he had said, particularly in regard to "facts" and
"truth", had given rise to such deep concern in Washington.
It would appear that SYG considers he has had provisional response to various suggestions
he has been making to US in recent months. However, he obviously expects US to continue
to consider urgently desirability of early negotiations in one form or another and to hope he
may be of service in this connection. The only concrete point on which he might expect
some early comment would be whether or not we saw any merit in his idea that we should
smoke out Hanoi's intentions by suggesting through him or another intermediary our idea of
agenda of meeting in case it should eventually take place.
Subsequently, at SC luncheon, Bunche told Yost that he and SYG had discussed the matter
further after Yost's departure and had come to the tentative conclusion that it would be
desirable to issue to the press this afternoon clarification of those of SYG's remarks which
had caused most concern in Washington. Yost said he thought this would be most helpful
and further indicated to Bunche his personal view that SYG's ill-considered public
comments on Vietnam risk undermining his and UN's possible usefulness in later stages of
this problem. Bunche fully agreed. He later drafted press clarification for SYG and accepted
several modifications which Yost proposed./5/
/5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memorandum of Meetings with the President.
Secret. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office.
SUBJECT
Discussion with President Johnson, Thursday evening, from 6:15 p.m. for about 10 minutes
1. I handed President Johnson and briefly discussed the following:
a. Memorandum dated February 25th concerning attitude of Hanoi and Peiping towards
negotiations./2/ I stated our opinion was that both Communist China and NVN would,
under current circumstances and conditions, enter negotiations only on their terms. Moscow
on the other hand seemed to have a more lenient approach, as reported by the French,
largely through the press.
/2/Apparently a reference to Document 158.
b. Watch Report of February 25th/3/ pointing out the numbered paragraphs concerning
indications of Communist movements southward in NVN, movement in Laos, high level of
communications, and other indicators. I stated there was a high probability that the NVN,
with the VC, were assembling sufficient military strength to cut off the four Northern
provinces of SVN. I stated that in June of 1962 Diem and Nhu told me that this was an
objective of Hanoi, and for that reason they maintained large forces in the Northern
provinces. However, these forces had since been removed because of deterioration in the
Delta and other areas of SVN. The President agreed that this seemed to be the objective of
the VC and the NVN.
c. Report of February 25th/3/ giving the background of military and political characters
remaining in SVN and the status of the various religious sects, political groups, etc. I
mentioned considerable suspicion and distrust in Generals Thi and Ky, noting that the
former participated in the 1960 coup, fled to Phnom Penh, lived there for three years in
close consultation with neutralists and possibly unfriendly forces and, as Commander of the
1st Corps, he was in a most strategic position to collaborate with the VC and NVN in
establishing an independent country composed of the four Northern provinces.
/3/Not found.
2. The President asked if Amb. Taylor was fully aware of all of this and I responded that in
all probability he was, but I questioned whether he held Ky and Thi in the same suspicion as
did I. He then said that it was too bad that Taylor could not "have his own man" running the
place.
Action: I would like consideration of a summary of all of the above transmitted to Saigon
station with instructions to discuss with Taylor, Johnson and the Country Team. Also, I
wish to call attention of McNamara, Vance and Wheeler to all of the above.
3. Prior to this meeting I met privately with Secretary Rusk who was waiting to see the
President/4/ and outlined all of the above to him. Rusk took no exception, noted the three
documents, and said that he would review them personally with his staff when he returned
to his office.
/4/Rusk met with the President at 6:25 p.m. for ten minutes. (Johnson Library, President's
Daily Diary)
Action: I should call McNamara, Vance and Wheeler concerning the above.
166. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Smith) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 26, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX. No
classification marking.
Mr. Bundy:
The President asked Henry Cabot Lodge to come in to see him on Friday (for press reasons,
Lodge has said he asked to see the President)./2/
/2/Lodge met with the President from 12:30 to 1:15 p.m. on Friday, February 26. (Ibid.,
President's Daily Diary) In a February 25 memorandum to the President, Smith noted that
Lodge had been an "advocate of our policy in Vietnam," supporting it recently in a speech
in Miami and in interviews in U.S. News & World Report and a French magazine. (Ibid.,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX)
During the conversation the President called me, and in Lodge's presence he said that he
wanted the proper officials to review with Lodge everything on Vietnam. The President said
that Lodge, as a friend and as a former public servant with experience in Vietnam, might
have some useful ideas for us to follow up. He suggested that Cooper review the current
situation with Ambassador Lodge, and that Lodge also see Mr. McCone, William Bundy,
and probably General Goodpaster in Defense. The President said that we should consider
him as a Consultant.
I talked to Ambassador Lodge and we have made the following arrangements. We will call
him a Presidential Consultant and will pay transportation, per diem, and our maximum
WAE of $75 per day. He will return to Washington Monday afternoon (March 1). We will
put him in Bob Komer's office so he will have a base of operations. Chet Cooper will lay
out his appointments.
Ambassador Lodge's view of his role is that of a person with some experience in Vietnam
who, after having read himself into the current situation, might prepare a paper containing
his conclusions and recommendations. This paper, if he decides to write one, would
conclude his immediate assignment, probably the same week it begins.
The State Department is anxious to have Ambassador Lodge hold General Khanh's hand
during the time Khanh is in the U.S. Lodge, an old friend, is anxious to do this and is
prepared to have Khanh visit him in Massachusetts for a weekend. He would be quite
prepared to do whatever we think would be useful in connection with keeping General
Khanh out of trouble during the time he is in the United States.
The attachments/3/ show how the press treated Lodge's conversation with the President.
/3/Not found.
BKS
[Commander] Pham Van Dong, closure of newspapers which had taken line hostile to them,
withdrawal of license of rival general Buddhist association) and whether they intend
proceed to develop "peace" campaign.
On Catholic side, there has been apprehension of growing UBA influence. Militant northern
refugees suspect Quat of being in UBA's pocket, and these fears are being fed by
concessions already made and would be accentuated by further concessions. Furthermore,
many Catholics fear themselves compromised by February 19 coup manque leadership of
which was heavily Catholic and which indicated nostalgia for Diem regime thus giving new
impetus to fears that Catholics will suffer from Buddhist reaction. Most important, should
Buddhists push "peace" theme, Catholic fears that Communist take-over being facilitated
might well become extreme. GVN has shown awareness of importance of quieting Catholic
fears that government may be hostile to them, but possibility remains real that if GVN
shows self too solicitous toward Buddhists, or if UBA continues to mount political
pressures, Catholics may go over into opposition.
Final major element in position to create great political problems for GVN is military.
Removal from scene of General Khanh has eliminated one major source of instability, but
other candidates for this role remain within AFC. Despite protestations of a desire to return
to fighting the war, we can expect further political turbulence from this quarter. AFC is still
clearly prime mover of government structure today (despite AFC's retention of provisional
charter), and has direct representation both in GVN (Thieu, Vien and Hong) and in new
legislative council. AFC appointed Suu as Chief of State and (contrary to charter) named
Quat as Prime Minister. Before Quat's government was officially announced, AFC had
issued policy declaration (Embtel 2620)./3/ Moreover, that declaration stated clearly that
AFC had watchdog role over government until latter could be based on popular choice.
Seems clear that Quat government will be plagued by AFC looking over its shoulder and
Quat group could even be discredited individually and collectively as puppets of military.
Although in wake February 19 coup attempt AFC has reaffirmed its support for Suu and
Quat primacy its position remains unimpaired.
/3/Dated February 16. (Ibid.)
On positive side of ledger, increased direct role of US air power in struggle will give both
GVN and population as whole psychological lift which will both provide momentum for
GVN to mount program and may also serve to damp down factional pressures.
In sum, we believe Quat government has potential, whether it will live up to that potential
or not cannot yet be judged. It appears to have ridden out successfully its first storm, thanks
largely to fact that coup plotters were widely unpopular within military establishment.
Taylor
170. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Washington, February 27, 1965, 4:52 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup #13. Top Secret. Also
sent to Westmoreland.
JCS 736-65. At highest level meeting held evening 26 February Washington time/2/ to
explore Vietnamese problem the following decisions were taken:
/2/The President discussed Vietnam in a meeting from 7:05 to 8:35 p.m. on February 26
with Rusk, Ball, McNamara, and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Thomas Mann. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting
has been found.
A. Phased deployment ashore at Da Nang of two BLT's and a helicopter squadron of 9th
MEB was approved. Deployment of 3d BLT and remainder of command and support
elements (including fixed-wing aircraft component) was deferred for future decision.
B. Medium level photo recce of the southern part of North Vietnam in conjunction with
Rolling Thunder IV was approved. Separate Blue Tree message refers./3/
/3/Not further identified.
C. Recognizing that Rolling Thunder probably could not be executed on 27 February for
weather reasons, execution on 28 February or as soon thereafter as weather permits was
favorably considered. You will, of course, be advised by separate messages of strike
approvals.
2. It was made clear that U.S. policy is as follows:
A. Do everything possible to maximize our military efforts to reverse present unfavorable
situation.
B. In accordance with A. above, increase substantially our military efforts in South
Vietnam. More on this in subsequent paragraphs. Increase tempo and effectiveness of our
strikes against DRV being careful to avoid pushing them to the extent of forcing ChiCom
intervention.
C. In view of lack of interest exhibited by Hanoi and Peking in negotiations at this time and
the weakness of the GVN/U.S. position at the Council table, refrain from early negotiations.
In this connection it was recognized that the preliminaries to any realistic negotiations
would require at least three to six months to produce results, making it even more necessary
for us to take positive action to reverse the unfavorable situation in South Vietnam by all
means available.
3. On the military side, the following items were discussed in an exploratory way centering
about the desire to determine what military actions can be increased or what new actions
can be taken to improve the over-all situation.
A. Provision of additional U.S. advisors at the fighting unit level.
B. Measures to improve intelligence so that VC installations and concentrations can be
detected and struck from the air.
informally as the Cooper Report. For Cooper's views on its preparation and release, see The
Lost Crusade, pages 264-266.
172. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency
(Rowan) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 27, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX.
Confidential.
Enclosed is a study describing some attitudes and views of the rural population of Viet
Nam./2/ The information is based on a series of interviews obtained by USIA field
personnel in Long An Province, an area thirty miles south of Saigon./3/ The province is
typical of much of rural Viet Nam in that large portions of the province are under Viet Cong
control, militarily and politically.
/2/Attached, but not printed. The study was entitled "Facts and Attitudes: Long An
Province" (R-10-65), and was issued by USIA in February 1965.
/3/The interviews were conducted during the first seven months of 1964. For an account by
one of the USIS officers involved in the survey, see Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An:
Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province.
The conclusions drawn from the study are not startlingly new and are what we have long
suspected--that the principal problems facing us in obtaining the support of the Vietnamese
population are inadequate security and ineffective Government. The report, however, is the
first of which I am aware, which places into such sharp clarity the key aspects of the overall
problem.
The USIA researchers conclude that the population is largely apathetic and is primarily
interested in ending the twenty years of war; they care less as to which side will win,
although there appears to be a substantial degree of approval of the Viet Cong.
Insecurity from Viet Cong harassment represents the principal obstacle to changing the
apathy to active support of the Saigon Government. In addition, the rural population desires
evidence that the Government intends to carry out realistic development programs, and has
the staff to direct these programs with honesty and efficiency.
In the eyes of the average rural Vietnamese, Saigon neither knows nor cares about his needs
and desires.
In contrast, the Viet Cong has exacerbated these shortcomings of the Saigon Government
through potent military insurgency, sabotage of governmental development programs, and
terror and assassination directed against the better and more energetic local Government
officials. Despite these tactics, the Viet Cong's rural presence has been characterized by a
careful regard for the peasant's attitude.
I believe you will find the marked passages of the report of particular interest./4/
/4/In a memorandum of February 26 transmitting the report to Ernest K. Lindley of the
Policy Planning Council, Director of INR Hughes called it a "highly discouraging account"
and noted that Rusk had seen it. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, Vietnam)
Carl T. Rowan
173. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 1, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
1. Welcome Home./2/
/2/McGeorge Bundy had been vacationing in Florida during the last week in February.
2. I have heard it said that you'll be off and running at the crack of dawn. I hope not. What
is needed now is more walking and less running. Perhaps a bit of just plain sitting would be
useful. I'll come back to this theme later but let me, first, bring you up to date.
3. On the Political front:
a. The Government seems to be settling down after the Khanh affair. Quat seems to be more
sure-footed than his predecessor. Relations (at least as they come through the cables)
between the Embassy and the Government seem to be less subjective, more businesslike.
Quat's statement that the "war must end"/3/ (quoted out of context by the press) aroused
some worry here, but subsequent words and actions indicate determination to press ahead
on all fronts.
/3/At the ceremony on February 25 at which General Nguyen Khanh turned over command
of the Vietnamese armed forces to General Tran Van Minh, Prime Minister Quat was
quoted as saying that South Vietnam was "suffering too much" and "we want to end the war
with honor."
b. The Buddhists, while giving at least tacit support to the Government, are causing troubles
by unhelpful statements on the part of key venerables in favor of negotiations and U.S.
withdrawal (it is not always clear which they want first). A "peace" group, with active
Buddhist support if not sponsorship, has been active in Saigon as well as in the Northern
provinces.
c. The Catholics are worried about increasing Buddhist influence and, while behaving
a. Advance ROK contingent (600 men) arrived and put in place without incident./11/
/11/Details regarding the arrival of the Korean contingent on February 25 were provided in
William Bundy's February 26 memorandum to Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
b. White Paper/12/ published after much anguish.
/12/See Document 171.
c. Ambassador Lodge, Presidential Consultant on Vietnam, in place (Komer's office)./13/
He has been read in and will get some briefings Tuesday prior to making his rounds. Will
be here for about a week.
/13/See Document 166.
10. The Home front:
a. So much for where we stand. The real question, though, is where are we going? We are in
a new phase of the war, both as regards the North (Rolling Thunder) and the South (U.S.
bombing of VC concentrations). The hope is that we will bang sense (or fear) into Hanoi,
and will significantly damage VC capabilities in the South. So far so good. But suppose
neither happens at present levels of activity? Do we step them up, or turn them off?
Presumably, the former. But there are three factors emerging within South Vietnam that
should be ground into the calculations. All of them have been alluded to in earlier
paragraphs: The fragile relationship among the generals, the "peace movement", the
faltering pacification program.
b. I am aware that we all agreed that our requirements for a central government should be
very modest, but this was on the assumption that we had a military chain of command.
What might emerge is an acceptable government, but discord among the military. This
cannot be shrugged off. One of the Rolling Thunders was cancelled last week because the
VNAF had not recovered from the aftermath of the coup.
c. The "peace movement" at the moment appears to be relatively insignificant. But I am not
confident that it will remain so. The Buddhist bonzes have been making strange noises
lately and are in a position, in the light of their following and the general war weariness, to
give it a good shove.
d. Unless we can get cracking fast (i.e., tomorrow), on reversing the trend in the pacification
program, our air activity will have bought us considerable risks, but not much else. And I
am a little worried that much of our energies here in Washington (and I suspect in Saigon as
well) are absorbed in targeting, scheduling, and press releases, rather than the grubby
business of clearing and holding.
e. This lugubrious rack-up could add up to a situation where the pressure for negotiations
has expanded--internationally (perhaps not very important), in the U.S. (important, but not
critical), and in South Vietnam (critical). Meanwhile we haven't gained much purchase for
our troubles.
11. Every military plan has (or is supposed to have) an alternative in the event matters do
not proceed as planned. For some reason, it is regarded as treasonable, defeatist--or at least
chicken-hearted--to do the same kind of "what if--?" planning in the case of a political
scenario. But we have a great stake in our present Vietnam policy (greater than ever before).
And for our policy to come off we must rely on several factors over which we have little or
no direct control. We cannot simply assume things will go as we plan or hope. We should
have some alternative course in mind, in the event that the march of events does not proceed
according to our plans and desires. Obviously, there are many imponderables, and it would
be footless [foolish] to try to out-guess chance or fate. But, and this is my plea, an effort
should be undertaken to develop options as we proceed down our present path. Such an
effort will not be exerted unless it is ordered on a priority basis by high authority. I know;
I've tried. Key people are too absorbed by today's flaps to have time for tomorrow's
problems.
12. Welcome back!
CLC
174. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the
Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message
Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Sharp.
JCS 739-65. Reference MAC 1061./2/
/2/In MAC 1061, March 1, addressed to Wheeler and Sharp, Westmoreland raised several
questions about the policies and procedures for combined reprisal strikes. (Ibid.)
1. In all honesty, I must admit that we here recognize the policy and procedural difficulties
imposed upon you, your staff, the GVN and VNAF by close control of Rolling Thunder
exercised by Washington. Hence, I will not address the several points which you logically
raise. Let me assure you that we here, both the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, are doing
our utmost to clear away the restrictions which hinder you in carrying out your mission.
However, you should understand that there are sizable and vexing domestic and
international political problems inherent in our military operations against the DRV.
Washington authorities are attempting to steer a careful course which maximizes the effect
of our operations both inside and outside South Vietnam, while minimizing the chance of
suddenly escalating military action to the point where the ChiComs would become
involved. Setting aside the weather problem, the recent visit of Mr. Kosygin to Hanoi and
the Communist conference now underway in Moscow have contributed to the political
problems being faced here and have had an impact upon contemplated military action.
2. You may ask what does the future hold? Recall that Yankee Team and Barrel Roll
missions were subject to the same type of restrictions when these operations were first
initiated. Over a period of time, restrictions here have been relaxed as people became used
to the idea of conducting recce and making strikes in Laos. We are working toward setting
up some such similar procedure for Rolling Thunder; i.e., agreeing upon a bank of targets to
be struck by VNAF and U.S. forces at times to be selected by field commanders in
accordance with the weather and other operational factors. In this connection, it is most
important to get off this next Rolling Thunder to break what seems to be a
psychological/political log jam.
3. In furtherance of my cable reporting on 26 February high-level meeting,/3/ we are putting
together here a list of possible actions in country which will improve the over-all situation.
On the list is the proposal by you to give field commanders full authority to utilize jet
aircraft in the area as required to support the war effort against the VC. Another is to do
away with the Farmgate concept as you also suggested. I cite these items only as evidence
that we understand and sympathize with your views, and we are doing our utmost to untie
your hands.
/3/Document 170.
4. As noted above, I have already received a number of ideas from addressees concerning
future helpful actions and programs to further our cause in Southeast Asia. If any others
occur to you, please let me have the benefit of your thinking.
A. General
1. Send General Johnson to Vietnam for as long as necessary to review thoroughly with
Westmoreland the present use of all DOD assets and to determine what additional forces
and techniques, if any, can be of value.
B. Air Strike Operations
2. Remove all restrictions on use within South Vietnam of any US land- or sea-based
aircraft, including the restrictions requiring Vietnamese personnel in Farmgate aircraft.
3. Organize large-scale air attacks on Viet Cong base areas, including night and day pattern
bombing in such areas as the VC Do Xa base area. B-52s based on Guam could be used to
supplement other aircraft.
4. Increase the frequency and effectiveness of Barrel Roll operations in Laos.
5. Increase night aerial activity over known infiltration routes in South Vietnam. Include use
of infra-red and night photos.
C. Ground Operations
6. Organize massive use of all surveillance-type aircraft on a grid basis to cover VC
movements in selected areas of Vietnam, with a capability to call for rapid ground and air
attacks.
7. Employ ranger-type ARVN and/or US Special Force-controlled CIDG units in extended
offensive guerrilla operations in VC-controlled areas.
8. Support ARVN with US mortar units to increase accuracy of mortar fire.
9. Use small patrols with long-range radios to report on VC movements and locations.
10. Use up to a division of Korean combat units.
D. Naval Operations
11. Immediately send out additional small Navy craft for operation by US and/or
Vietnamese crews for coastal patrol and other duties.
12. Implement promptly the recommendations of the Navy team now considering methods
of creating US-GVN sea and air patrols for coastal- and river-security as near watertight as
possible.
E. Tailored Incentives and Actions
13. To increase the numbers and to improve the morale of South Vietnamese forces, provide
a subsistence allowance "in kind" to the regular and irregular troops and to their dependents
in such a way as to provide a massive increase in compensation (for example, 50%).
along with the President's brief acknowledgment of receipt dated February 24 and Cooper's
March 1 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy commenting on Dodd's suggestion, are in the
Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXX.
Viet Cong activity was up somewhat and caused further deterioration in the security
situation in the northern portion of II Corps where there are strong indications of the
presence of new Viet Cong main force units. General Westmoreland's headquarters is
continuously reviewing the available intelligence and will probably raise the estimated in
country Viet Cong main force strength now at 34,000 to something over 40,000. One
consequence of this increased Viet Cong strength in II Corps has been to drive nearly
56,000 people into refugee centers in Binh Dinh province, thereby developing an acute
refugee problem.
As you know, we have recently made two important departures from former policy in
authorizing the use of U.S. aircraft under certain conditions to strike Viet Cong targets in
South Vietnam and in deciding to introduce Marine combat units for the defense of the
Danang airfield. While I accept the justification for these actions, I am concerned that we
not rush in and take over the conduct of the war from the Vietnamese. I think that it would
be a political and psychological mistake to change our past position that this is a
Vietnamese war in which we are helping in areas where the Vietnamese cannot help
themselves. While increased involvement of the U.S. directly in the war in South Vietnam
along with the strikes against the North will tend to solve some immediate problems arising
from eroding morale and from the shortage of available Vietnamese forces, in the long run
we will have the problem of avoiding any sense of the part of the Vietnamese that they thus
have less responsibility for maximizing their own war effort.
Taylor
178. Telegram From the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Embassy in
Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 2, 1965, 2:07 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Drafted and released by Vance. Printed in part in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition,
vol. III, p. 337.
DEF 6181. Exclusive for Ambassador Taylor signed McNamara. After meeting with the
President this morning,/2/ we believe it wise for General Johnson to go to Saigon to meet
with you and General Westmoreland. He proposes to leave at 2100 EST on 3 March, ETA
0830 Saigon time, 5 March. Purpose of trip is to examine with you and General
Westmoreland what more can be done within South Vietnam. He will bring with him a list
of additional actions which has been developed here for your consideration./3/ Would
appreciate your developing a similar list for discussion with him./4/ In developing list, you
may, of course, assume no limitation on funds, equipment or personnel. We will be
prepared to act immediately and favorably on any recommendations you and General
Johnson may make. The President is continuing to support such action against North as is
now in progress but does not consider such actions a substitute for additional action within
South Vietnam. The President wants us to examine all possible additional actions--political,
military, and economic--to see what more can be done in South Vietnam. Carl Rowan will
accompany General Johnson for urgent review of psychological warfare and information
programs./5/
/2/The President held an 8:25 a.m. breakfast meeting in the second floor dining room at the
White House with McNamara, Rusk, Vance, and General Harold Johnson. (Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found, but see
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 125.
/3/Apparently a reference to Document 176.
/4/No record of a similar Embassy list has been found.
/5/In telegram 418 to Saigon, March 2, Rowan informed Zorthian of the purpose of his visit
and with whom he wanted to meet. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon
Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, A/ORG 2-6) See also Document 160.
180. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the
Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
181. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 5, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by
Unger and cleared by Green. A note on the source text indicates that copies were sent to
Ball, Cooper, Thompson, and Ambassador Taylor.
SUBJECT
U.S. Conditions for a Dtente in Viet-Nam
The purpose of the present paper is to try to define how we might take the first political step
away from the present confrontation with North Viet-Nam. It concerns itself only with the
opening steps in any dtente and is not intended to discuss succeeding steps which might be
taken in more formal negotiations or an international conference.
If our present combination of political and military actions is successful we will in due
course begin to receive indications from North Viet-Nam that they are ready to talk
seriously about a dtente in Viet-Nam. It is impossible to define in advance what the nature
of these indications must be in order to persuade us that Hanoi is serious and to move us
from our present position that "the essential element", i.e. their interest in a resolution, is
still missing. Nevertheless we should at this time prepare for that moment by defining our
own position on conditions. We must also determine the extent to which those conditions-i.e. the corrective actions which must be taken by North Viet-Nam--are to be posed by us as
preconditions which must be fulfilled before we would be ready even to talk, directly or
through intermediaries.
It is assumed for purposes of this paper that the Communist demands will be first for a
cessation of US-SVN air attacks against NVN; they may pose this as a precondition for any
kind of talks. They will also press for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from SVN, if
not all, then all but a small advisory group, and for an end to U.S. arms supply to SVN.
They may well also pose as conditions the neutralization and non-alignment of SVN, its
pledge not to call on SEATO for help, and conceivably the inclusion in the Government of
SVN of representation from the Liberation Front.
It is recommended that our price for a cessation of air attacks be a cessation of NVN
support of the Viet Cong in men and materiel. This should not be a matter of preconditions
to talks since it will require talks to work out the manner in which we, the U.S., can be
satisfied that such support by NVN has ceased. Until we are satisfied, we should not agree
to call off the air attacks since once suspended in an atmosphere of anticipated dtente it
would be very difficult to resume them.
It will not be an easy matter to decide whether or not NVN has in fact stopped the flow of
men and materiel from north to south. Probably the most practicable way to achieve this
would be to charge the ICCs both in Laos and in Viet-Nam with carrying on a surveillance
over the land and sea infiltration routes and the supply depots and training camps in NVN
where the infiltration has its origin. In this process there is one key indicator of NVN
intentions: the willingness to instruct the Pathet Lao to permit free ICC circulation and
investigation in the PL-controlled areas in Laos. If this permission, which it has been
impossible for the ICC to secure since the Geneva Accords were signed in 1962, were to be
granted it would give reason to believe that NVN was more in earnest this time. While even
with the ICC performing this surveillance some personnel and arms could slip through,
North Vietnamese acceptance of surveillance, including on its own territory would probably
be an adequate price for cessation of air attacks.
Other means of checking on NVN's compliance in a cessation of infiltration are hard to
envisage, although one other possibility might be found in NVN's agreement to the free use
of unarmed U.S. aircraft to carry out day and night, land and sea reconnaissance anywhere
over NVN territory (or at least over the coast and the land area south of Vinh) and over the
Laos panhandle, perhaps combined with agreement that if suspicious activity is noted, the
ICC could be dispatched to investigate on the ground.
It might be that NVN would accept no such arrangements without exacting a higher price,
such as the withdrawal of the bulk of US forces from SVN. This might be acceptable to us,
since US forces could always be promptly deployed again in case of NVN non-compliance,
especially if our withdrawal could be staged to postpone any substantial outward movement
until a surveillance system in NVN and Laos was in reasonable operation. However, we
should not accept unilateral US withdrawal but should insist that it be accompanied by the
pulling back to North Viet-Nam of at least the NVN cadres who are leading and directing
and providing the technical skills for the Viet Cong effort.
If arrangements somewhat as outlined above could be worked out, we should have moved
into a state of dtente in Viet-Nam which would considerably ease present international
tensions. SVN would, of course, still face major tasks of pacification and internal
stabilization but these could be undertaken with our help with much more promise of
success than we see today. In working our way toward an effective compliance by NVN of
the 1954 and 1962 Accords and some further military disengagement of the U.S. in SVN,
fuller and more formal negotiations and perhaps a conference would perhaps be in order.
That would be the time to introduce in specific terms the proposals for Mekong Valley or
other types of economic development in Indochina, including NVN, which would have the
objective of gradually weakening that country's links with Communist China. Such
proposals, however, might well be foreshadowed in earlier general public statements.
(3) In III Corps, an apparent force equilibrium has been reached, the Hop Tac campaign
cannot move much further forward without substantial reinforcement. At the same time, the
general reserve, on which Hop Tac has heretofore depended for reaction forces and for
spoiling operations on the periphery, has been committed to other geographic areas. By
contrast, the VC has the capability of upsetting the equilibrium should they opt to commit
part or all of their reserves in the critical provinces surrounding Saigon.
(4) In IV Corps while the VC incident rate remains comparatively high, the intensity is low.
Only in the contiguous provinces of Dinh Tuong and Go Cong has the GVN made any
measurable pacification advances in recent months. There are indications that the VC are
regrouping main force elements into regimental formations and, although the GVN has
recently inflicted some sharp losses on the VC, they can raise the intensity of military action
at any time.
4. To make the forecast which you requested, I have taken the above estimates as a base and
have projected the trends we now discern without admitting new factors. I recognize that we
have already set in train new actions which can significantly affect the power equation.
Nonetheless, I have tried to answer the question, "If we continue the course of action we are
now following, what will be the situation six months hence?" I am unable to deal with this
subject in 60 day increments as suggested--given all the variables at play, such refinement is
just not possible. The forecast for the next six months, made under these limitations, is as
follows:
A. The VC, holding the initiative, will increase the tempo and intensity of their activities
throughout the RVN, but most particularly in the northern and central parts of the country.
At the same time they will be strengthening existing units, forming new ones, and
regrouping the main forces into larger formations while re-equipping them with
standardized armament. Concurrently, they will be making maximum efforts to consolidate
and strengthen their political organization in areas under their control, to extend population
control into contested areas, and to penetrate areas held by GVN forces.
B. The bulk of VC military operations will be directed toward driving GVN forces into
isolated strongholds--separated from the majority of the population--by denying lines of
communications, by encroaching on coastal areas; and by attacking GVN forces wherever
found in limited strength.
183. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 6, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. IX. Secret; Personal and Sensitive.
Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, and I spent 2-1/2 hours together last night on Vietnam./2/ The
following general conclusions emerged:
/2/Rusk met Bundy at 7:35 p.m. and McNamara at 7:40, and the three men then had dinner
3. There is one particularly tough issue on which we will get comment next week, both
from the Johnson mission and the Lodge report. That is the question of the organization and
management of the U.S. team in Saigon. McNamara and I, if the decision were ours to
make, would bring Taylor back and put Alex Johnson in charge, with a younger man
(conceivably John McNaughton) as Chief of Staff. Rusk, McNamara, and I have all learned
from separate channels that within the country team it is in fact Alexis who is looked to for
leadership and for coordination. Max has been gallant, determined, and honorable to a fault,
but he has also been rigid, remote and sometimes abrupt. We all recognize that Taylor has
served an enormously important purpose in keeping American opinion from division and
criticism, but our inclination would be to bring him back not later than the first of June for a
final round of consultation and discussion, and release him from his duties at the end of the
year for which he originally contracted. (He took the oath on July 2.)
4. We talked also about our international political position. We all agree that so far we have
followed the right course, but we continue to believe that it is important to defend and to
insist on our policy in every forum. That is why Dean has agreed with enthusiasm to your
proposal for briefings of Ambassadors, and that is also why he has taken on this heavy
schedule of public appearances in the immediate future.
5. There remains a real question in our minds as to how much we should open the door to a
readiness for "talks". This is a point on which both Dean, and Bob especially, are quite
concerned. They both feel, for somewhat different reasons, that it is important to show that
we are ready to talk about Vietnam--always on our own terms--in all appropriate
international channels. They point out that in one sense that is exactly what we are doing
now in our briefings of Ambassadors, and in our tough talk with Dobrynin, and in public
statements which constitute diplomatic actions. But Bob goes a lot further. He believes that
we should find a way to have real talks in an international meeting. (I think his motivation
is that we will need a conference table if things go worse, as he expects.) Dean and Bob
both feel that to hold some of our allies we may need to be a little less rigid about "talks"
than we have in the last ten days. The particular pressure which is visible today is from the
British, who have been made nervous by one sub-Cabinet resignation and a lot of
yammering from their own Churches and McGoverns. What the British want is to make
some explorations toward the possibility of talks, and to say that they have been in
consultation with us. This is not an urgent matter over the week end, if only because Wilson
is safely in Bonn. It will be up for judgment early next week.
My own opinion on the general diplomatic front is that we can always get to the conference
table when we need to, and that there is no great hurry about it right now. (Dean Rusk
agrees, though he wants to keep the British just happy enough to hold them aboard.) I think
there is a lot to be said for detailed and careful study of the bargaining problem in all the
various forms which it may develop. But for the moment it seems to me that we are exactly
right to stick on the line which you have set. The one thing we might add is that of course
we are willing to talk about ending the North Vietnamese aggression and that talks on that
subject in any forum would always be welcome. Dean's backgrounder yesterday/6/ went a
little way in this direction, and I think we would all be helped by knowing your own
reaction to the resulting stories by Roberts, Frankel, et al.
/6/Rusk left his office at 5:05 p.m. for the press background and returned at 5:45. (Johnson
Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
6. Bob and I pressed upon Dean our feelings that it is important to have contingency
planning on what we should do if in spite of our best efforts there is either escalation by the
enemy or continued sharp deterioration in South Vietnam. The military planning for
reactions to escalation is mostly done, but we do not feel confident that we know just what
our actual decisions should be and would be if there were North Vietnamese ground
movements over the demarcation line or large movements of Chinese forces into North
Vietnam, or both. We estimate both of these as unlikely for the moment, but we have to be
ready for them. The crucial question is, in a sense, whether and when you would authorize
landings of a number of U.S. divisions in South Vietnam.
A closely related question on escalation is whether it would be useful right now to get a
substantial allied ground force in place in the central and northern part of Vietnam. Max
Taylor is doubtful about this, but in the heat of discussion last night Rusk, McNamara and I
all thought it worth serious further exploration. A force which had Australians, Filipinos,
Thais, Koreans and conceivably even Pakistanis would also have a substantial braking
effect on any possible Communist escalation. We will be asking for your thoughts on this
one too.
7. Finally, on the subject of contingency thinking for sharp deterioration, we agreed, in spite
of Dean Rusk's reservations, that such thinking should be done--but very, very privately.
Rusk points out that when men even look as if they were planning for defeat, they make
defeat more likely, and he is right. So our current plan is that there should be no paper work
on this subject at all, but simply some intensive discussion limited completely to the three
of us and one subordinate each. There will be no papers, and this mission will not exist
anywhere except in this memorandum.
8. I need not tell you how helpful it will be to have your reactions to this discussion. There
is nothing in it that makes it urgent for you to respond today or tomorrow, but I will be right
here if you want to comment.
McG. B.
184. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to
Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-160-65
Washington, March 6, 1965.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin File: FRC 70 A
1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Farmgate Restrictions in the Republic of Vietnam (C)
1. Over the past several months, there has been a series of messages, letters, and discussions
regarding the status, markings, mission, and Vietnamese participation in the operation of the
two US Air Force air commando squadrons in South Vietnam. You are aware of the long
history which accounts for their mission, the VNAF markings on these aircraft and the
ground rule which requires VNAF observers on each mission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
have examined the restrictions placed upon air commando operations and believe that these
ground rules have been overcome by events.
2. The mission of the air commando squadrons clearly has changed. Originally, they were in
the RVN for a combination of combat and training purposes with the emphasis on training.
Because of operational necessity their combat contribution has increased until they are now
over 80 per cent combat committed. In this respect, their mission is US support of the
RVNAF in exactly the same way as US Army and Marine helicopters, US Air Force and
Army transport aircraft, and more recently US Air Force tactical fighter and light bomber
squadrons. The Government of Vietnam seeks this support and there should be no adverse
propaganda results since the Viet Cong have long been charging that the entire air war is
conducted by the United States.
3. Information from COMUSMACV reveals that difficulties are continually encountered in
locating VNAF personnel to fly in the A-1Es at critical times. A typical example occurred
on 27 February 1965 in which an air strike was requested in Kontum Province while the
VNAF was either committed or standing down in preparation for other operations. Four air
commando aircraft were alerted and prepared to meet the operational request, but no
Vietnamese observers or pilots could be located to accompany the aircraft. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff believe it is a matter of operational necessity to relax the requirement of VNAF
personnel to be aboard air commando aircraft.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe also that it is logical and proper to change the markings
on air commando aircraft to identify US units with our own insignia. COMUSMACV
reports that the Vietnamese prefer it. No adverse press reaction is anticipated when this is
evaluated against the background of US jet strikes both within the RVN and against targets
in the DRV. The press would find it difficult to believe that any important policy decision
was involved.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the training mission of the air commando
squadrons is clearly the lesser of its responsibilities. However, the training mission is
essential to the development of the VNAF 5th and 6th A-1H squadrons. Consequently, the
air commando training mission will be essential for at least another year. There is no reason
why this training cannot or should not be conducted with US Air Force markings.
6. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:
a. The task of the air commando squadrons include:
(1) Training as necessary in support of the VNAF.
(2) Combat operations in support of the RVNAF.
b. Air commando A-1Es be permanently marked with US Air Force insignia for both in and
out of country operations.
c. Air commando A-1Es be authorized to conduct combat operations without VNAF
personnel aboard.
d. The action proposed in the attached draft message/2/ be approved.
185. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Honolulu, March 6, 1965, 12:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV, Message
Files Top Secret. Repeated to COMUSMACV.
CINCPAC 062235Z. A. COMUSMACV MAC 1190 DTG 060500Z./2/ B. CINCPAC
050401Z./3/
/2/Document 182.
/3/Not found.
1. General Westmoreland's commander's estimate in Ref A is the best analysis of the
situation in Vietnam which I have seen. So far as the estimate itself is concerned, there is
nothing that I can add.
2. However, I should like to reemphasize certain of his observations in order to give even
stronger support to recommendations I have already made in Ref B as to:
A. The increased use of air in RVN.
B. The necessity for much tighter control over coastal shipping.
C. Requirement for use of U.S. forces in security missions within Vietnam.
D. The need for a U.S. logistic base within country.
3. In Westmoreland's estimation the war has moved out of the purely guerilla phase and into
a more formalized military conflict. It is essential, therefore, that we recognize this
transition and react immediately and with our best tactics and weapons. Obviously it is a
situation which should allow us to employ our airpower. Anything, therefore, which can be
done to bolster the tactical air control system must be accomplished as a matter of urgency
and I will support any new requirements in this area. Similarly I support with enthusiasm
the requirement stated for additional experts for the targets research and analysis center and
the allied equipment for DFing and IR recce. The target acquisition function is absolutely
vital to proper employment of air. You know my strong feelings as to the requirement for
the MEB(-) at Danang. In the light of Westmoreland's estimate I would put even a higher
priority on its employment. Aside from all the other considerations which would argue in
favor of this deployment we must give ourselves some insurance against a collapse of the
ARVN will or ability to resist in the critical area of Danang where we have so much already
execution have been constantly rotating. Thus, military successes when they have occurred
are frequently not exploited; areas cleared are not held; areas cleared and held are not
developed and VC infrastructure remains in villages and hamlets ready to emerge when
troops move on.
Throughout this period, counterinsurgency efforts have been plagued by popular apathy and
dwindling morale, consequences of long war with no end in sight. There is no sense of
dedication on our side comparable to that instilled into VC and no popular commitment to
suceeding governments which, because of their constantly changing character, have tended
to repel rather than to attract confidence and support.
Second primary cause of our lack of success, continuing growth of VC, I attributed to open
frontiers of SVN, land and sea, which it has been impossible to close to infiltration,
uninterrupted activities of DRV in reinforcing VC, and continued ability of VC to find
recruits in SVN. Frontier problem is result of nature; there are 2500 miles of land and sea
frontier to police and inadequate means to effect any thing like complete surveillance. Even
with vast increases of manpower, ships and other equipment for mission, frontiers can never
be hermetically sealed. Land and air incursions by GVN forces into Cambodia, Laos and
DRV could assist in limiting infiltration but there are valid political arguments which
impose restraints on such operations and there is a shortage of manpower which would limit
them even if political objections did not exist. These facts do not argue against trying to do
better job at closing frontiers but do suggest that there is an early point of diminishing
returns for such efforts.
The continued support of VC from DRV is heart of infiltration problem. If frontiers cannot
be closed from inside--and we are convinced that they cannot--then only way to stop
infiltration is to get Hanoi to order it to stop. Such is fundamental justification for Barrel
Roll and Rolling Thunder operations. In combination with 34-A activities, they constitute
our principal hope of ending infiltration--and end it we must if in-country pacification is to
succeed.
It is true that VC, even then, would be able to continue to recruit locally in SVN where lack
of security against terrorism and absence of commitment to Saigon govt have favored VC
recruiters. However, successful application of pressure on Hanoi offers hope of changing
many unfavorable conditions which have worked against us in past; one of which has been
this past willingness of many country boys to join VC. An improved national morale,
consequence of offensive action against Hanoi, may provide at least partial antidote.
Causes for our failure to establish and maintain an effective govt have been their roots in
historical and racial factors difficult to define in precise terms. SVN has never been nation
in spirit and, until recently, has never had govt which people could regard as their own.
Even now their instinct is to consider any govt as intrinsically their enemy. They have
always been divided by racial and religious differences, which over centuries their alien
rulers have sought to perpetuate. As result, there seems to be no cement to bind together
various elements of heterogeneous society, no instinctive herding together even under threat
of war. Since the fall of Diem and sudden removal of restraints imposed by his dictatorial
regime, natural tendency to disunity and factionalism has been allowed free play, both
among civilian politicians and among generals. Resulting field day has been marked by
series of demonstrations, bonze immolations and military coups which have produced
political turbulence of last 15 months.
189. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 8, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX,
Memos. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Cabot Lodge
1. Here are Cabot Lodge's views, carefully drawn in the shape of an informal memorandum
which has been handed to me and to no one else. He does want you to see them, and you
have his promise that there will be no written "Lodge report" of any sort.
2. I also told Lodge frankly that it might be troublesome in his and my Party if he were to be
seen ostentatiously discussing Vietnam with you again. He said nobody understood this
problem better than he, and of course he understood that he was not being consulted as a
Republican but simply as a former Ambassador with relevant experience. He will quite
understand it if you do not wish to see him tomorrow, but I believe it would be a graceful
gesture to give him a phone call at least. Depending on your own earlier understanding with
him, you might also wish to have him in to shake hands and to thank him for his work.
3. In any case, I will talk with him at length about his recommendations tomorrow before he
leaves, and I will also make sure that he is in touch with others around town informally.
4. I repeat that Lodge was most understanding on this matter and that you have a free hand
in whether you talk to him in any way tomorrow./2/
/2/On March 9 between 12:39 and 12:50 p.m., the President, McGeorge Bundy, and Henry
Cabot Lodge went for a walk on the South Grounds of the White House. (Ibid., President's
Daily Diary) No other record of their conversation has been found.
McG. B.
Attachment/3/
/3/Top Secret. A draft dated March 4 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX, Memos.
Memorandum by the Presidential Consultant on Vietnam (Lodge)
Washington, March 8, 1965.
SUBJECT
Recommendations Regarding Vietnam
The following would be in addition to the wise decisions and effective actions which have
already been taken:
A. Pacification
Communist subversion-terrorism is the great unsolved problem in South Vietnam. It is also
the greatest single foreign danger to the U.S. and the Free World, actually threatening a
Communist takeover of many underdeveloped countries. It is, in a sense, a bigger threat
than the nuclear, where we have superiority and a well understood procedure.
In South Vietnam our military, economic, social and informational programs are
individually good. But none of these tools accurately fits the puzzle of subversion-terrorism.
The political and executive "glue" to hold them together and bring them to sharp focus is
lacking. Until we do this, we cannot win--nor can we convince Hanoi that its aggression is
unprofitable.
The only overall executive or "generalist" in Vietnam for all these "special" American
programs is, as regards counter-subversion-terrorism, the Ambassador. This is not good
organization. In Malaya there were "generalists" at every level of government.
There is no time for further elaborate studies in the theory of subversion-terrorism. The
subject has already been over-analyzed and over-intellectualized. Workable methods are
well known. The need is for quick action.
Recommendation No. 1
Some one man in the U.S. Government should now be made responsible for subversionterrorism; given enough authority; rewarded if he gets results; and relieved if he fails. His
representative in Saigon would, under the Ambassador, pull our separate programs together
throughout the country to wipe out subversion and terrorism and train the Vietnamese to do
the same.
Instead of giving this new official a name connected with "counter-subversion-terrorism", a
positive note might be struck calling it the "Agency for Support of National Independence".
The head of the agency would recruit personnel--less than 50 persons--for whom counter-
subversion-terrorism would be a career, for whom it would be the primary interest, and on
the basis of which they would get promoted. This does not exist today.
This is not said in criticism of anyone; and individual agencies have done good work. But
the organization of the whole has obviously not produced the needed result. Neither we nor
the Vietnamese are organized so as to give counter-subversion-terrorism the unified thrust
which it needs.
Counter-subversion-terrorism in its first stage involves military, propaganda, police and
political personnel, who carry out: saturation of the popular mind; strict resources and
population control (including a curfew); national registration of everyone over 12; detention
of suspects; and search without warrant. (In the second stage, at utmost speed, come
economic and social measures.)
In addition to the existing military and propaganda programs, which are adequate in size,
and to the proposed political program, I make the following:
Recommendation No. 2
Maximum increase in police forces, which is the basic long-term answer to terrorism. (In
Malaya the police force was almost tripled.)
Recommendation No. 3
There should be a greater degree of decentralization of the U.S. political effort in Vietnam.
As an example, I suggest naming a politically-minded representative of the Ambassador
who would be in touch with the Cao Dai, a religious sect numbering some 3 million people
and another, who would keep in touch with the Hoa Haos, a religious sect numbering 2
million people. There might also be political advisers in the corps area headquarters. These
persons could also be "generalists" who would coordinate our present inadequately
organized effort locally.
The operative concepts should be flexibility and adaptation to local circumstances and
problems rather than national programs, centralized direction and control from the center.
Every region is different from every other. The program therefore should flow from the
bottom (i.e. the people) up, rather than from the top (i.e. Saigon) down.
The Vietnamese have no tradition of national government. They do not do it well. Until the
advent of Chinese Communist imperialism, it never seemed necessary to have a national
government. On the other hand, there is considerable vitality in regional, tribal and religious
groupings. These local people have shown that they know how to get the word around. We
should work more on them, and not hamper ourselves by the classic, diplomatic idea that
for us to deal with anything below the national level is interference in internal affairs.
The Vietnamese lack of a sense of nationhood (in spite of a real sense of peoplehood)
makes coups easy, including a "neutralist" pro-Communist coup, the winners of which
would ask us to leave--an invitation to be rejected out of hand as specious, spurious and not
representing the true interests or desire of the Vietnamese people. The reasons which
prompt us to be there now obviously prompt us to stay there until the Vietnamese can stand
participation by Buddhist leaders outside of Vietnam might one day be useful in connection
with possible future international aspects of the Vietnamese problem.
Recommendation No. 7
We should favor distribution of surplus foods through the Buddhist clergy, thus giving them
a responsible stake in the preservation of law and order. But this must not be done so as to
appear as a bribe. It must appear as a mark of friendship and regard.
By doing this, we should facilitate contacts between Americans and Buddhists, which
should in turn lead to further friendships.
The Communists are actively trying to infiltrate the Buddhist movement. If they succeed, it
will be disastrous, not only in Vietnam, but in Ceylon, India, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos and Japan. It is through friendship, respect and warm personal relations that we can
best work to prevent this.
Recommendation No. 8
There should also be support of Buddhist educational, cultural and religious activities, not
only by the Government, but also through foundations and religious groups, including funds
for hospitals and schools.
Recommendation No. 9
It would also be very constructive if the Ecumenical leaders meeting in Rome should strive
to bring Catholics and Buddhists together.
There is an outstanding priest in Japan, Rev. Riri Nakayama, with whom I am on excellent
and friendly terms; who considers that I did him a favor when I first met him in Japan en
route as Ambassador to Vietnam; who is highly respected and well known by the
Vietnamese Buddhist clergy; and who is well thought of at the Vatican because of his work
to protect the Catholic Church in Japan during World War II. Rev. Nakayama is devoting
his life to improving relations between Buddhists and Christians; and if you approve the
recommendation to help the Buddhist movement generally as regards surplus foods, schools
and hospitals, this decision could be tactfully communicated to Rev. Nakayama, which
would protect us from being accused of making an attempt to bribe the Vietnamese clergy.
Rev. Nakayama is also in a particularly good position to work for good Catholic-Buddhist
relations.
Recommendation No. 10
The Dalai Lama should be brought to Saigon as an object lesson of the dreadful things
Communism does to high ranking Buddhist clergy.
C. Plan for Development of Southeast Asia
Recommendation No. 11
There should be a Plan for the Development of Southeast Asia, comparable in scope to the
190. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency (Cline) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 8, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
1. Herewith my own capsule appreciation of the unfolding of the scenario in Vietnam so far.
It is in accord with the views of most of my Southeast Asia experts but is far too clear-cut a
statement to be coordinated easily as an official intelligence community view.
2. For your noting, not necessarily for reading, are two of my earlier memos/2/ on the
situation in Vietnam and what to do about it. You will see I am at least consistent. My only
fear now is that we may have waited too long to reduce the pressure on the political and
internal security fabric in South Vietnam. It is pretty threadbare, as you know. If it holds,
then I believe the course we are on will pay dividends as time goes on.
/2/Dated March 14 and November 27, 1964; attached, but not printed.
Ray S. Cline
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency (Cline)
SUBJECT
Status Report on Vietnam after Seven Days in March
It is too soon to tally up the returns from U.S. military pressure on North Vietnam of the
systematic kind implicit in the March air strikes. It is clear, however, at the end of this first
week that the reactions and results all around are running according to the scenario
envisaged beforehand in planning papers and intelligence estimates.
1. The first series of air strikes in North Vietnam (7, 8, 11 February and 2 March) inflicted
limited damage on military installations associated with infiltration but, of course, as
anticipated, constituted more of a political and psychological signal than a major military
interdiction of the North Vietnamese effort in the South.
2. The 2 March signal seemed to register in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow, causing perhaps
more noise and flutter than might have been expected from one raid. The unexpected
propaganda barrage was laid down by all three Communist governments condemning the
U.S. and trying to deter it from pursuing this campaign of military pressure.
3. Hanoi has reacted otherwise by sitting tight, activating the Viet Cong to try to win as
much of South Vietnam as possible, hopefully from their point of view all of it, by guerrilla
tactics and terror before it is too late. Gains thus won would, of course, be useful at the
bargaining table if Hanoi was later obliged to negotiate some sort of settlement. For the
present, though, North Vietnamese leaders are, as we estimated they would, decrying any
talk of negotiations prior to U.S. complete withdrawal from Vietnam as a way of snatching
the fruits of victory from Communist hands.
4. There are no signs of open military moves to change the character of the war through the
intervention of large-scale regular forces not now engaged, either North Vietnamese or
Chinese. Peking has talked very tough, and there are some Chinese Communist
precautionary movements and activities which could, of course, presage later military
intervention, but this was expected.
5. The Soviet Union seems to be about to re-enter the arena with military aid of some kind.
This was not specifically anticipated but so far seems to be a minimum military
commitment if it is one at all. On the whole, Moscow seems more worried about the
dangers of escalation and anxious to reassure itself of the limited character of U.S. military
action than to intervene in any way except purely defensive or political.
6. Most observers report that the U.S. air strikes have given a substantial boost to morale in
South Vietnam. Unfortunately, as yet there is no appreciable diminution of divisive sparring
among political cliques in Saigon. This fact is disappointing, although it should be
recognized that strengthening of the national political fabric in South Vietnam is a longterm task.
7. The truly discouraging phenomenon is the ability the Viet Cong now demonstrate to
dominate large areas of the country previously under Saigon's control and to mount
tremendous harassing campaigns against internal security almost everywhere. We are
seeing the results of long years of careful Communist preparation, and we estimated that an
aggressive, no-holds-barred guerrilla attack would be the Communist response at this stage.
8. The crucial question is whether the political and internal security fabric in South Vietnam
will hold together under this strain while military pressures on North Vietnam build up over
a long enough time to have some effect on Viet Cong instructions from Hanoi, will to fight,
or capabilities. This we cannot predict with any certainty so soon after all of the factors in
the situation have been stirred up as a result of the 2 March strikes. About all that can be
said is that for the first time in many months the U.S. has some initiative and the
Communist nations are watching Vietnam with some agitation and concern.
Ray S. Cline
191. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Green) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, March 9, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam (Misc. #2). Secret.
Drafted by Green. The source text was attached to a covering note of March 9 from Green
to Ball which reads: "This is in response to your suggestion that I put some of these
thoughts on paper. I would be glad to follow up with Len Unger and others if you so desire.
I would hope we could get men like Bob Johnson of S/P in to help out. I am not circulating
any copies, though you may want to show a copy to the Secretary or to McGeorge Bundy."
SUBJECT
Thoughts on Negotiations over Viet-Nam
I sometimes wonder how realistic we are with regard to the whole question of negotiations
over Viet-Nam. I hesitate to break into print on this subject, without having been in VietNam for many years. But I have watched it from Hong Kong and, then and subsequently,
through Peiping/Hanoi eyes as far as possible. Tentative conclusions come to mind:
1. How will the war end? Will it be by the Westernized form of negotiations in which a
bunch of people sit around a table and sign documents? Or will it be something that is
closer to the Oriental experience of negotiating by a series of actions unilaterally taken
which lead to tranquilization? I think the latter is more likely to happen--and I think it is
more likely to be successful. This, after all, is the way the Offshore Islands issue was settled
in 1958. Moreover, it involves relatively little loss of face--which a formal conference does.
Most importantly, it permits the process mentioned in paragraph 2, below, to take place:
namely, if the North Vietnamese, after enough Rolling Thunder persuasions, decide to
exfiltrate cadre leaders or curb infiltration or stop the terror, we could react by a unilateral
cessation of something we were doing at that time which was painful to them. Such a tacit
form of "negotiation" would take some time but might be accelerated by secret diplomatic
messages about what they and we were doing.
2. What will persuade Hanoi to call off the aggression? I believe it will be a combination of
elements such as (a) the penalties for continuing aggression (e.g., our bombing of NVN), (b)
Hanoi distress over Peiping's failure to give the kind of support Hanoi wants, (c) the
attractions for stopping the war (e.g., Soviet or other economic assistance), and (d) a
settlement process which involves minimum loss of face and indeed permits Hanoi to deal
with its own anti-peace elements be they in Peiping or Hanoi itself. I fear it is quite
unrealistic to expect that Hanoi will formally agree to withdraw its cadre leaders and stop
infiltration as a condition to negotiations. For Hanoi to agree to stop infiltration or to stop
terrorist actions in the south or to withdraw cadre leaders would be to admit the aggression
it has persistently denied. The only way Hanoi might actually call off the aggression would
be through a quiet unadmitted process. This we must permit if we are to get them to
withdraw and end infiltration.
3. I foresee the distinct possibility that the Vietnamese will become increasingly
"nationalistic" about how this war is resolved. They will resent what they regard as the
presumptuousness of outsiders like U Thant, the Indians, the French, the Russians and even
His Holiness the Pope to play the role of negotiators or of arbiters of the fate of the
Vietnamese people. This will be whipped up of course by Hanoi. Note the latest NLFSVN
position (FBIS, March 8) which states: "South Vietnamese affairs should be settled by the
South Vietnamese people them- selves.... The South Vietnamese have been and still are
resolutely opposed to the scheme of internationalizing the war in Indochina." As the
Americans get drawn into deeper and deeper involvement in South Viet-Nam, North VietNam will not only try to make out that this is a war between the Americans and the
Vietnamese, but it may succeed in establishing a common Vietnamese front (NLFSVN and
non-Communist elements) to urge the Americans to get out.
4. The real danger in any estimation is not that we will be forced prematurely into an
international conference on Viet-Nam but rather that the political sickness and war
weariness in South Viet-Nam will bring about direct talks between the Viet Cong and the
Government or Hanoi and Saigon or even a triangular talk between Saigon, Hanoi and the
Viet Cong (NLFSVN). I could even see a situation where the Vietnamese Government and
NLFSVN representatives in a particular area got together and signed a truce or effected
some settlement. This could spread like wildfire. Would the US and SVN forces try to
quash--and how? All of this makes it desirable to anticipate as far as possible this kind of
eventuality in order to avert or, if necessary, to cope with it. Mr. Unger has already done
some work on this subject.
The foregoing considerations do not argue against continuing the course on which we are
now embarked. Certainly it supports the President's silence on a negotiations approach as
well as emphasizing our willingness to return to the Geneva Accords and respect for NVN
territorial integrity. We can also expect and should tolerate non-U.S. Government talk about
negotiations. This is bound to occur and we should never seem to be opposed to peaceful
settlement, as indeed we are not.
192. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 9, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
Military Issues, Vietnam and Laos
1. Two decisions regarding the use of U.S. aircraft are up for immediate decision.
a. Restrictions on the Use of U.S. Aircraft. The JCS have requested that all restrictions be
lifted on the use of U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam. At the present time they can be used
only in emergency situations by special requests. CINCPAC and MACV have strongly
recommended this action./2/ If implemented, it should permit the development of tactics
which could greatly assist in defeating Viet Cong hit and run operations.
/2/In telegram MAC JOO 6127 to CINCPAC, February 27, Westmoreland requested that
"authority now be delegated to me to use U.S. aircraft to reinforce VNAF or to support
Vietnamese forces as I judge prudent." (Ibid., Westmoreland Papers, History Backup #13)
b. Restrictions on Farmgate Aircraft. Farmgate aircraft are A1H models which are used by
U.S. pilots for training Vietnamese pilots. They are marked with Vietnamese insignia and
can only be used if a Vietnamese pilot or observer is on board. The JCS recommend that
markings on these aircraft be changed to U.S. insignia, and MACV reports the Vietnamese
would prefer this. The JCS would also relax the requirement for VNAF personnel on these
aircraft. Training of the RNVAF would remain the primary mission, however. Farmgate
restrictions seem academic in the light of the present situation./3/
/3/See Document 184.
2. The Barrel Roll problem we discussed this morning has been resolved. DOD has agreed
to State's restrictions on the frequency of flights (no more than one every four days) and the
number and type of aircraft. I believe this will suit Sullivan and Souvanna.
3. Several issues are still pending, and you should be aware of them.
a. Rules of Engagement, SEA. The JCS have requested authorization for immediate pursuit
into Communist China in response to any ChiCom attack on U.S. forces./4/ This issue broke
into print this weekend as the result of an ISA press interview. The individual concerned
was trying not to release anything, but the reporter came up with an article stating that our
rules of engagement would not permit the sort of sanctuary for Chinese aircraft that was
available in the Korean war. ISA is pushing hard for this policy, but State has delayed
approval.
/4/This request was made in JCSM-118-65, February 19. (Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin File: FRC 70 A 1254, Vietnam 381)
b. Use of Napalm. The JCS have requested authority to use napalm against targets in North
Vietnam,/5/ and have provided the attached paper/6/ which shows the increased
effectiveness possible and reduced loss rate to be expected as a result of the low level attack
pattern. Loss rate might be further reduced as a result of greater effectiveness in flak
suppression. It is difficult to damage anti-aircraft weapons with high explosives, and the
crews of the gun position under attack are able to take cover while adjacent guns continue
firing. Napalm attacks would leave anti-aircraft guns in poor condition, and would follow
the gun crews into their foxholes. A new strike proposal which should be coming over soon
will probably call for use of napalm. While this seems desirable, it may be useful to append
a note of caution such as "great care should be taken to confine napalm patterns to military
areas".
/5/This request was made in JCSM-127-65, February 25. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos, Vol. I)
/6/Not attached.
c. 34A Air Strikes Against North Vietnam. The JCS propose to begin small scale VNAF air
strikes against the DRV under 34A operations. This issue should receive very serious
thought. If the North Vietnamese were subject to surprise air attack around the clock, they
would be placed under much the same sort of harassment as our troops in South Vietnam.
This should sap their zeal for the war by building anxiety and eliminating the world-wide
publicity that follows a large scale attack. In this program we could use single ship or two
ship sorties working at low level, thus guaranteeing surprise and few losses. They should
use sophisticated armament such as the AGM12B guided bomb in order to assure high
effectiveness. They should also take great care to avoid any damage to civilians. To achieve
this sort of effectiveness and control, however, it might be better to use U.S. aircraft instead
of the VNAF.
d. Hot Pursuit into Cambodia. In the case of Viet Cong forces employing hit and run tactics
operating across the Cambodian border, the JCS recommend authorization for (1) return
fire, (2) hot pursuit to recover prisoners, and (3) hot pursuit while actively engaged. Military
factors strongly support this recommendation, but, of course, the political effects will be a
critical consideration.
Chester L. Cooper/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
193. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs (McNaughton)/1/
Washington, March 10, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412, Project
Mayflower. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Unger,
McNamara, and Vance.
ACTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM
1. US aims:
70%--To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).
20%--To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.
10%--To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.
Also--To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.
Not--To "help a friend," although it would be hard to stay if asked out.
2. Deteriorating situation:
(a) Politically, 50% chance of coup within 3 weeks.
(b) Militarily, SVN has been cut in two with GVN control in north reduced to enclaves.
3. Prognosis:
(a) GVN officials will adjust their behavior to an eventual VC take-over.
(b) Defections of significant military forces will take place.
(c) Whole integrated regions of the country will be totally denied to GVN.
(d) Neutral and/or left-wing elements will enter the government.
(e) A popular-front regime will emerge which will invite the US out.
d. Stated terms:
(1) We do not seek to destroy DRV or to acquire a base,
(2) We will arrange rice-barter deal between DRV and SVN, and
(3) We will stop squeeze on DRV (not withdraw from SVN),
but (4) DRV must stop training and sending personnel to SVN/Laos,
(5) DRV must stop sending arms and supplies into SVN/Laos,
(6) DRV must stop directing military actions in SVN/Laos,
(7) DRV must order the VC/PL to stop their insurgencies,
(8) DRV must stop propaganda broadcasts to South Vietnam, and
(9) DRV must remove VM forces and cadres from SVN and Laos.
e. Other risks:
(1) Strikes north of 20# are likely to attract MIGs out of Phuc Yen (Hanoi). (Unless MIG
hazard becomes great, striking MIG base can be postponed until it fits our pressure
schedule.)
(2) China may introduce MIGs from Hainan, raising question of hot pursuit into China and
of taking out Chinese air bases.
(3) DRV (Chinese?) air may strike SVN bases or cities.
(4) Increased VC activities (take city, kill top leaders).
(5) DRV (China?) may launch ground forces into Laos and/or SVN.
(6) South Vietnamese may panic if threatened by land or air.
(7) GVN may disintegrate out from under us.
(8) World-wide revulsion against killing Vietnamese may develop.
f. Other Red moves:
(1) China/USSR may stir Laos, Thailand, Korea, Berlin, etc.
(2) More jets to NVN with NVN or ChiCom pilots.
(3) AAA and radar gear to NVN.
The realistic objective is not a DRV/VC backdown nor necessarily an explicit agreement.
Would we settle for a tacit piecemeal live-and-let-live Vietnamese deal including a "writing
off" of indefensible portions of SVN? The US should:
(a) Maintain present posture of refusing formal negotiations.
(b) Maintain position that we ask only that DRV leave SVN alone.
(c) Keep quiet channels (via UK? France?!) open for hopeful signs.
(d) Keep eye on South Vietnamese, who may be dealing under the table.
(e) Be ready to shift to formal negotiations as a "circuit-breaker" (para 6g) or to help
"downgrade the apparent stakes" (para 8d).
10. Evaluation:
It is essential--however badly SEA may go over the next 2-4 years--that US emerge as a
"good doctor." We must have kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and
hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect
judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the US will behave in
future cases of particular interest to those nations--regarding US policy, power, resolve and
competence to deal with their problems. The US should:
(a) Progressively squeeze North Vietnam (per para 6), without high confidence that it will
improve the situation in SVN, with some confidence that it will improve the US/GVN
bargaining position, and with confidence that it will demonstrate lengths to which US will
go to fulfill commitments.
(b) Be prepared to shunt to "circuit-breakers" (per para 6g), either to deploy large numbers
of US forces in South Vietnam or to Thailand and Laos.
(c) Pursue the negotiations track (per para 9).
(d) Have a contingency plan to downgrade the apparent stakes (per para 8) to be initiated
when/if necessary to confuse the issue and diffuse the blame.
194. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 10, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol XXX. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Revisited
A few quiet hours over the weekend and Ambassador Taylor's 2879, which came in on
Sunday,/2/ stimulated me to put down my own conception of what we are trying to do in
Vietnam, and how we might best do it. I had planned to pass this on to you early yesterday
morning, but decided to wait until after the session with McNaughton. I have made a few
modifications as a result of this session, and I share these private thoughts with you for
whatever they are worth.
/2/Document 186, received in the Department of State on March 7.
What are we trying to do?
Our short-term objective in Vietnam is to restore sufficient security and stability there
(whether by "victory" on the ground or by a favorable political outcome) so that we can
withdraw the major part of U.S. forces in the confidence that South Vietnam can handle the
problem pretty much on its own. At least as important is the need to demonstrate U.S.
determination and capacity to assist a hard-pressed ally meet the threat of Communist
subversion.
To accomplish these objectives, we are embarked on a three-pronged policy: (1) To assist
the GVN by political, economic and military means to pacify the country; (2) To engage in
a series of graduated strikes against North Vietnam to force it to stop its support and
direction of the insurgency and/or to provide us with greater leverage in any future
international negotiations; (3) To discourage any moves toward premature negotiations but,
at the same time, keeping open diplomatic channels for satisfactorily resolving the
Vietnamese problem.
Several assumptions underlie our present course. Among the most important are:
1. The regime in Hanoi, hopefully at some point short of massive bombing raids on
industrial and population targets, will agree to halt their direction and support of the VC
and/or will agree to reasonable negotiating terms. (Possible, but unlikely)
2. The effectiveness of the VC, when denied the support of Hanoi, will decrease to the point
where the insurgency will become "manageable" for the U.S. and the GVN and, in time, by
the GVN alone. (Probable)
3. During the course of our efforts, both against the North and in the South, we will manage
to avoid direct confrontation with either Peiping or Soviet forces. (Almost certainly in the
South, possibly in the North)
What are our prospects?
So far so good: our objectives are fairly realistic; our policy, given the situation, is probably
the best that can be devised; and our underlying assumptions have some validity. But
Ambassador Taylor has raised some fundamental questions at his recent meeting with the
Washington visitors (Saigon 2879 limdis). Taylor pointed out that "the basic unresolved
problem is provision of adequate security for the population.... Given security and
reasonable time, all of our other problems will fall into place.... Failure to provide security
results from three primary causes.... (1) Lack of satisfactory progress in destroying VC
insurgents in the countryside, (2) continuing capability of the VC to replace losses and
increase in strength, and (3) our inability to establish and maintain an effective
government."
Ambassador Taylor's presentation points up the basic dilemma we face in Vietnam:
1. By putting the emphasis on "destroying the VC" and by thinking in terms of a "10-20 to
1" ratio of counterinsurgency forces to insurgents, we virtually eliminate the prospects of a
solution. The fact is that we have killed 100,000 VC over the past few years. And the fact is
that we are most unlikely to achieve the desired 10-20 ratio. Clearly our success will depend
on something in addition to military factors.
2. We cannot count on eliminating the ability of the VC to replenish its manpower and
supplies. We might slow down this support, we might make it more costly, but if we
establish its elimination as a criterion for progress, we had better resign ourselves to defeat.
3. If, as a third criterion, we are going to insist on an "effective government", we also are in
deep trouble. I don't see anything ahead that is better than we have now--and, indeed, we
may have something worse.
What comes out of all of this? I have a queasy feeling that, whatever must be done, must be
done in spite of the unlikelihood of our getting a favorable manpower ratio, our eliminating
the support of Hanoi, our establishing and maintaining an effective government. These must
not be regarded as conditions necessary for success, unless we are now ready to accept
failure. This is not to say that we avoid recognizing impending disaster, if that is what we
face; it is to say, if that is what we confront, we should get cracking to minimize its
implications.
Some thoughts after Brooding.
This has been simple to write thus far. Now I must be wise, and this is a great deal more
difficult. Here are a few ideas--some new (I think), some variants. In no particular order:
1. I would continue the bombing against the North, but I would hug the 19th parallel and I
would concentrate on military, VC-associated targets. A critical point I would keep in mind
is the maintenance of maximum flexibility; by pressing north too hard, too fast, we can
quickly exhaust our options, we make it more difficult to turn the program off or slow it
down, we make it more difficult for the Chinese and the Russians not to become engaged.
We must avoid a situation in which the scale and weight of our attacks have vastly
complicated our problem (i.e., "widened the war") and/or have raised the pressure for
negotiations to an intolerable level (in the U.S. as well as abroad) before we have had time
to improve our position in the South. And, finally, I am convinced that, short of pulverizing
North Vietnam, Hanoi is not likely to call "uncle".
2. I would continue using U.S. air power against VC targets, but be constantly aware that
this cannot substitute for ARVN ground action or for the much more difficult, but much
more essential, matter of pacification.
3. I would introduce U.S. ground forces on the DMZ (1 Division), and seriously explore the
usefulness of 2 Divisions emplaced from the Laos Border south of the 17th parallel cutting
across Routes 9 and 12./3/
/3/Since writing this, I have learned that the JCS and State take a negative view toward
making this kind of disposition. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. I would forthwith decentralize our pacification efforts so that their success or failure does
not depend on how effective the government happens to be in Saigon. This obviously does
not mean that we can cope with constantly changing province chiefs. But it is to say that we
will be more free than we have been from the chaos and fecklessness of Saigon.
5. I would take an area like the Hop Tac (depending on the Johnson & Co. report on
progress there) and create an Ad Hoc Hop Tac Task Force (AHHTTF), comprising elements
of all the appropriate agencies under a Mr. Big who, in turn, would be responsible to a Mr.
Pacification in Saigon. I would give Mr. Big a considerable amount of authority and latitude
to move the programs necessary to secure and develop the area. (Incidentally, I've been
talking to a bright American businessman who has been building homes for private
ownership, for as little as $100 apiece, in all sorts of strange places. Maybe the Hop Tac
area is worth a pilot project?)
6. I would re-examine our own (i.e., the GVN and the U.S.) ability to wage guerrilla warfare
in the areas under tight VC control. Why can't we be the insurgents? Why can't we put the
VC in a position, in the many parts of the country they control, of having to mount a "10-20
to 1" ratio?
7. I would take some initiative on negotiations, or at least be less negative. In this
connection, I'd make a big production of Thich Quang Lien's proposal, made a day or two
ago (attached)./4/ We could live with this, and it would have the advantage of avoiding a
big international conference. While there are some compliance problems, and while Hanoi
would almost certainly refuse, I'd put the onus on the North for refusing to acknowledge
"the just aspirations of the Vietnamese people". (This needs more thought and is getting
it.)/5/
/4/Not attached.
/5/Cooper added the sentence in the parentheses by hand.
8. I would begin planning on how we can get the GVN to continue to fight during a period
of long drawn-out negotiations.
9. I would reactivate the Washington PsyWar Committee on a full-time basis to deal almost
exclusively with the Vietnam situation (I'm in contact with State now on this.). (It's now
moving.)/6/
/6/Cooper added the last sentence in parentheses by hand.
10. I would, shortly after the return of William Bundy and General Johnson, work up a
crash pacification program. It might not be as good a program as we could get by
continuing our studies, but a "B-" program that could get moving immediately is better than
an "A" program that would take a few months to start.
C
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXI. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
Communist Reactions to U.S. Air Attacks on North Vietnam
I have examined our recent Intelligence Community estimates on Communist reactions to
sustained U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam and find no reason in the events of the past ten
days to change the views therein. This judgment is supported by senior staff advisers/2/ and
the Board of National Estimates.
/2/For one view, see Document 190.
We said the initial Communist reaction would be to try to make the United States desist by
threats, propaganda, and diplomatic pressure, plus a continuation of Viet Cong attacks in
South Vietnam. This is what has happened so far.
We also considered how this reaction would change if vigorous sustained air attacks
damaged some important economic or military assets in North Vietnam, as would be likely
if the strikes increase in frequency and hit north of the 19th parallel. The majority of the
members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in my view that in these circumstances
the Communists might try to secure a respite from U.S. air attack by some political
negotiation and a reduction of Viet Cong activity. We concluded that this reaction was more
likely than a Communist decision to intensify the struggle, accepting the destructive
consequences in North Vietnam in the expectation of early victory in the South. The State
Department stated that the latter reaction seemed more likely than the first. I doubt that
these views would change if formally reviewed today.
I have only one reservation in this regard. If Viet Cong military strength and capabilities are
greater than we have supposed, as a review of the data now in process suggests, this factor
might alter the general situation.
Of course, the danger of more extreme Communist military reactions increases as more vital
parts of North Vietnam are damaged and as attacks come nearer to the border of Communist
China. Conversely, if air attacks reached past the 19th parallel but did not damage important
economic or military assets, the reaction would probably be the same as at present--neither
Communist concessions nor large-scale Communist military actions.
John A. McCone
distribute it without giving him (or me) a call." See Document 179 regarding the
background of the Johnson report.
I. Assessment.
Situation "has deteriorated rapidly and extensively in the past several months.... Time is
running out swiftly in Vietnam and temporizing or expedient measures will not suffice.
...The United States possesses capabilities which, if applied with speed, vigor and
imagination, can redress the present military imbalance without excessive risk of widening
the conflict."
II. Recommended Actions.
A. Measures to arrest the deterioration. To strengthen the RVNAF, to dampen infiltration,
to improve hamlet security, and to improve appeal of the pacification program.
1. Provide 3 additional Army helicopter companies to increase mobility of forces.
2. Provide more 0-1 aircraft to create a saturation surveillance capability.
3. Establish a Joint (US-RVNAF) Target Research and Analysis Center.
4. Evaluate payoff from MACV's use of jets in SVN. (Decide later if more needed.)
5. Increase the scope and tempo of US air strikes against DRV.
6. Remove restrictions on strikes against DRV (e.g., US-VNAF concurrency, denial of
alternate targets, ban on classified ammos, narrow geographical limits, requirement to get
Washington approval before striking alternates when weather bad).
7. Increase tempo and scope of SOG activities against the DRV. (This 34A operations.)
8. Increase air and naval reconnaissance and harassing operations against the DRV.
9. Re-orient Barrel Roll to increase military effectiveness against infiltration.
10. Use 7th Fleet to coastal patrol and to augment in-country recce and strike ability.
11. Give cash awards for capture of DRV junks.
12. Streamline procedures to give MACV quick release authority for construction funds.
13. Create a MACV-controlled stockpile of nearby construction materials and equipment.
14. Get Australia and New Zealand to run training-center phase of Reg. Forces' training.
15. Create US-GVN psychological operations organization.
16. Position the remaining subsector advisory teams to improve the Pop. & Reg. Forces.
17. Provide cash contingency fund to each subsector advisory group ($50-100 monthly limit
at first) to be distributed thru District Chief to civilians and Pop. Force soldiers as a reward
for exceptional performance or small civic action projects.
18. Permit subsector advisory groups to draw on USOM food and building stocks.
19. Dredge DaNang, QuiNhon and NhaTrang to permit berthing of ocean-going ships.
20. Provide 4 LSTs and 6 LSUs for logistic support missions.
21. Accelerate program for more jet-capable airfields and runways programmed by MACV.
B. Measures to free some ARVN forces for offensive operations. "[T]he GVN effort is now
stretched to the limit...the time has come to decide how much the United States is willing to
commit to the security of South Vietnam within South Vietnam."
either 1. Deploy US combat units (amounting to a tailored division force) to assume
responsibility for the security of Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Qui Non and Pleiku.
This would free 6 ARVN combat battalions and 25 existing Regional Force companies.
or 2. Deploy US combat units (amounting to a tailored division force) to assume
responsibility for defense of the provinces of Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac in Corps II. This
would free 11 ARVN combat battalions for Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Phu Bon.
C. Measures to contain infiltration by land. Deploy a 4-division ground force (US or
international under the SEATO treaty) south of the 17th Parallel across northern Quang Tri
province and the panhandle of Laos to the Mekong.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/5/Document 84.
2. In the course of my review of the various policy discussions in Washington, I stressed
that the President was particularly anxious to let our policy speak for itself and not to
speculate on its implications to the press. I told Alex frankly that we have been somewhat
concerned at the extent of backgrounding being done in Saigon in this direction. We also
discussed the Kleiman article;/6/ Alex and others had seen Kleiman, largely to attempt to
affect the Times line, but Alex made clear that his conversation bore no resemblance to the
article. Apparently Kleiman himself kept talking about "a political track" and I must say
that it remains possible that Kleiman was reflecting his own thinking in large part and
merely claiming to have got it from Administration sources. This of course still leaves the
mish-mash of specifics about "McNamara-Bundy" and "McNaughton" texts, and Alex quite
rightly pointed out that no such labels were even known in Saigon. The mystery is not
solved, but my own surmise is that Kleiman put together the burrowings of the last three
months and gave it an authoritative label to make a story out of it. Nonetheless, someone
certainly did talk to him a little too much.
/6/A front-page article in The New York Times on March 1 by Robert Kleiman describing in
detail the development of U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the previous several months
and indicating that according to the "highest American and South Vietnamese officials" in
Saigon, President Johnson had decided to begin a limited air war against North Vietnam as
leverage to reach a negotiated settlement. The Department of State's concern over the
Kleiman article and the "apparently increasing problem" of leaks to the press was expressed
in telegram 1849 to Saigon, March 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX)
3. Alex complained mildly about the hasty way in which General Johnson's trip had been
arranged and also queried its vast bulk and rank.
4. Commenting on Seaborn's report of his impressions in Hanoi,/7/ Alex particularly noted
Seaborn's impression that Hanoi thought we were in effect putting our allies up to
negotiating initiatives, and that our military actions were simply desperation measures and a
screen for seeking a way out. I asked whether Seaborn based this impression of Hanoi's
attitude on any specific evidence, but Alex seemed to think it was largely deduction and
atmospherics. (I have not read the full report of Seaborn's impressions.)
/7/The Canadian representative on the International Control Commission for Vietnam, Blair
Seaborn, visited Hanoi during the first week of March and, on behalf of the U.S.
Government, repeated to a DRV official on March 4 a statement made by Ambassador
Cabot in Warsaw on February 24 to PRC Ambassador Wang outlining U.S. objectives in
Vietnam. The text of Cabot's statement to Wang is in telegram 942 to Ottawa, February 27.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Seaborn reported on his trip in a
conversation with U. Alexis Johnson on March 6, which was described in telegram 2880
from Saigon, March 7 (see footnote 3, Document 187).
5. Alex was totally negative on MACV taking over the police advisory role, much less
USOM as a whole. He reported that Westy felt the same way.
6. Commenting further on General Johnson's mission, Alex expressed the general view that
what was needed was less a host of new tactics than giving Westmoreland what he had
asked for. He commented that there were a great many requests in the mill which had not
been met.
7. Alex said that both he and Ambassador Taylor had been really dubious about the marines
going into the north, but had finally been persuaded that the security situation at Da Nang
was critical.
8. Alex totally supported Jim Killen and said that Killen now was in full accord with others
on the need for continued and indeed increased decentralization. He was also making a
marked effort to improve relations between USOM and MACV, and Alex had a number of
reports that USOM morale is now better. He thought that Killen was generally doing a fine
job, while noting that he tends to take things into his own hands and is still not very good at
delegation.
9. Continuing on the theme of whether there should be more decentralization, Alex said he
was thoroughly familiar with Peer de Silva's thesis in this direction. He said everyone
agreed that the province chief was the key and should be up-graded and subjected to less
harassment from Saigon. Organizationally, he thought that the position of the Corps vis-vis the province chief was very hard to resolve on any general basis. Westy at one time had
favored the abolition of the division level, but did not now think it was practical politics.
One major step--which Killen had pushed through--was the arrangement now in force to
have funds go directly from the GVN Bureau of the Budget to the province chief, not
through the individual ministries.
10. Alex noted that both he and Ambassador Taylor were now trying to give a number of
small dinners for Vietnamese leaders. He said that the going was fairly sticky at these, but
that they should pay dividends in the long run. Alex made the interesting comment that, as
compared with his experience with Chinese, Japanese, and Thai, the Vietnamese were the
most difficult group he had ever encountered. They had very little openness and tended to
clam up in each other's presence, and the long strains of war had made them very cagey. He
noted that the people as a whole simply do not have the sense of humor and capacity to
laugh, even in adversity, that the other peoples have.
11. Alex noted that there was some continuing difficulty between MACV and CAS, with
the former suspicious that CAS wanted to resume control of the CIDG problem. He said
that de Silva was doing all he could to allay this suspicion.
12. Alex said that he himself had come to the central conclusion that, whatever the
importance of economic benefits, security was the crucial and necessarily dominant key to
the present situation. He felt this was particularly true in the central provinces, where the
deteriorating situation now verged on open conventional warfare.
13. Alex thought that the up-grading of the Popular Forces was extremely important, and
noted that MACV was now moving some of our Special Forces assets into this field. He
said that it was very difficult for the Vietnamese JGS and MACV to get away from their
basic feeling that the Popular Forces were simply a third-rate armed force, rather than
having an essentially different mission.
14. Alex said that both he and Ambassador Taylor were skeptical that US jets would really
have great impact on the situation. He noted that one early operation in Phuoc Tuy had been
a complete bust, and said that the fundamental point still applied that air was most useful
where GVN units were in definite contact with the VC and really good forward air control
was available. He said that Army-Air Force service rivalry continued to plague the whole
air problem, and that the dispute of fixed-wing aircraft versus armed helicopters just was
not resolved. In the same character, he had a little the feeling [felt slightly] that the
allocation of strikes against the north, as between Navy and Air Force, was affected by a
feeling that everyone had to get into the act. He wondered if we could not work out a
geographical division, with the Air Force taking on southern targets, perhaps up to the 19th
Parallel, and the Navy acting above that point. He said that the involved command chain
from CINCPAC caused real problems, particularly since the Second Air Division in any
case had to handle liaison with the VNAF on the VNAF strikes.
Alex had the impression that experience with the strikes was raising serious doubts whether
jets were more effective than A1H's, where the latter could reach the targets. The jets
seemed to be more vulnerable to ground fire, and their speed seemed to increase this
damaging effect of hits that hardly bothered an A1H.
15. Alex expressed the hope that authority for strikes against the north could be placed on a
"when weather permits" basis. He admitted that Washington might occasionally have to
take into account political factors, but hoped that this would henceforth enter in very rarely.
16. We concluded with a long discussion of possible negotiating sequences, which I will not
try to summarize in this memorandum, but will discuss at the Working Group meeting this
afternoon./8/
/8/No record of this meeting has been found.
William P. Bundy/9/
/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
200. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXI,
Memos. Top Secret; Sensitive.
MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION, TUESDAY,
MARCH 16, 1:00 P.M./2/
/2/The luncheon meeting included the President, McNamara, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy,
and lasted from 1:34 to 3 p.m., at which time everyone except McNamara went to the
President's private quarters. Rusk left at 3:15 and Bundy at 3:37. (Ibid., President's Daily
Diary) No other record of the luncheon meeting has been found.
Policy in Vietnam
a. Military actions
1. Rolling Thunder. DOD will present a proposed four-week program designed to increase
the effectiveness and visibility of air strikes. Essential changes in this program are its
increased flexibility to avoid weather delays and its delegation of operational control on a
week-by-week basis to the field (CINCPAC and MACV).
2. Barrel Roll. State and DOD are coordinating closely on a program which again is
intended to be more effective and more visible (at least to Hanoi). This program will imply
daily route reconnaissance and 3 or 4 operations for attacking or reseeding choke points
each week.
3. 21-step Johnson program/3/ is being reviewed and general approval is expected.
/3/See Document 197.
4. Major ground force development. Defense and State are both reviewing this question and
recommendation should be available for discussion next week. Preliminary analysis
suggests that such deployment may soon be necessary for both military and political
reasons.
b. Political and civil action in South Vietnam
At the President's direction, State, AID, and USIA, with the White House Staff, are framing
a program designed to match and even out-match the military efforts outlined above. This
program will be designed to present additional actions in such categories as the following
(the list is illustrative and not exhaustive): close control of the population; new programs to
encourage Viet Cong defection; land reform operations; new information and propaganda
programs; new incentives to university students; new programs of guerrilla action in Viet
Cong-controlled areas; intensified housing and agricultural programs; progressive U.S.
political announcements; increased contact at all levels with political and religious groups;
greatly increased decentralization of all U.S. efforts in the light of weakness and instability
of central government.
c. U.S. leadership in Saigon. General Taylor's return at the end of the month has been
announced, and the question of the timing of his replacement and the name of that
replacement is increasingly urgent. There should be preliminary discussion today, and a full
slate of candidates should be available for discussion next week.
d. The political and diplomatic position. We have largely accomplished the immediate
purpose of getting our new level of military action into operation without yielding to clamor
for "negotiations." We now need to examine both our public and our private view of the
conditions for a settlement.
1. Public position. There is a strong argument for a more detailed exposition of our
conditions for peace, and our view of the future in Southeast Asia. It may be wise to have a
draft prepared for consideration over the weekend and review on Tuesday,/4/ with no
commitment as to the level at which such a statement might be put out.
/4/March 23. No draft public statement antedating March 23 has been found. Regarding the
drafting of the address the President gave at Johns Hopkins University on April 7 and which
dealt with Vietnam, see Document 245.
2. Our private assessment of the bargaining problem. The existing situation in South
Vietnam is bad, and the basic condition of any political negotiation is that it should allow us
to continue to take actions which will in fact improve the anti-Communist position in South
Vietnam. This means that this can only be done by successful pacification, and therefore our
object must be to trade off our own trumps in return for enemy actions which will give us
advantage in the South. This will not be easy.
In essence, there appear to be three things that Hanoi can do: it can stop its infiltration; it
can withdraw forces and supplies under its control from the South; it can order its people
not to use force against the government in the South. None of these is likely at present, and
it is questionable whether any of them will be ordered under the pressure of our air
operations alone.
Nevertheless, we can and should consider at what point we would reduce our air operations
against the North in return for actions of this sort by Hanoi.
Preliminary analysis suggests that we might well wish to indicate privately that the weight
and locus of air attacks will be raised and lowered in direct relation to the amount of Viet
Cong force and/or infiltration we observe.
Of course it is not essential from our standpoint that we stop hitting the North before serious
bargaining begins. But it may be necessary that we have a public price for doing so, if only
to make it clear that our position remains careful, reasonable, and measured.
e. The shape of an eventual settlement. Only the broadest outline of this question can be
stated now, but there appear to be three general possibilities.
The first would be effective pacification of a wholly non-Communist South Vietnam. This
is desirable but hardly possible today. If this is our real target, it is doubtful that we want an
early settlement.
The second is a somewhat Laotian solution, in which a government of national unity would
have some members from the liberation front and in which de facto VC control in large
parts of the countryside would be accepted. This is what the French and the Lippmanns
have in mind, and our current estimate is that this solution would be acceptable only if some
significant U.S. presence remained, to sustain de facto non-Communist control in
substantial areas of the country, including especially Saigon and its surroundings.
The third is an explicit partition of SVN, leaving the clearly non-Communist government in
control of as large a territory as possible. This solution might permit a reasonably quick
reduction of U.S. forces if real pacification were achieved in the non-Communist territories
and if the ground given to the VC were sufficiently limited. But it is also probable that
continuing VC ambition would quickly lead to a situation in which we would have to
return.
It does not appear necessary today to decide among these three alternatives. What does
appear quite likely is that our eventual bargaining position with respect to all three
possibilities will be improved and not weakened if the United States presence on the ground
increases in coming weeks. This U.S. ground presence is likely to reinforce both
pacification efforts and Southern morale, while discouraging the VC from their current
expectation of early victory.
McG. B.
to you on which we have reported separately,/2/ an action indicating that he is not yet
prepared to drop his peace plans. Clearly, the Buddhist Institute is not wholly together on
the issue of peace activities and the serious Institute leaders are wrangling over them.
Hence, we are withholding comment for the moment on how to respond to Lien--if at all.
/2/Not further identified.
I spent Tuesday, March 16, visiting key points in the II Corps where we have been
particularly concerned over the declining military situation and the growing refugee
problem. I would say that the military situation is looking up somewhat but that the refugee
problem is very serious. General Co, commanding II Corps and his division commanders
are regaining confidence after a week which included a number of local military successes
over the Viet Cong. However, the Viet Cong pressure on the civil population of the I and II
Corps over recent months has caused some 160,000 men, women and children to leave their
homes in the hills and the piedmont to take refuge in the towns of the coastal plain. They
are living huddled in temporary camps, not hungry but unhappy in the squalid dullness of
their lives and the uncertainty of their future. The U.S. Mission and the government are
fully alive to the problem and are formulating specific actions and recommendations.
With the growing pressure on North Viet-Nam, the psychological atmosphere continues to
be favorable. What is still missing in this new atmosphere is the image of a Vietnamese
Government giving direction and purpose to its people. As noted above, Quat is begining to
pick up speed, but he can not yet be said to have established communication with the
Vietnamese people. However, it is too early to say that he may not with time. We will keep
pressing.
Taylor
203. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 17, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. IX. Secret.
Carl Rowan's report to you of his mission (Tab 2)/2/ is a good document and it is possible
that you will want to read it all the way through. But here is a summary:
/2/A copy of the attachment, Rowan's memorandum to President Johnson, March 16, 1965,
is ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Rowan Report.
1. We need unified control and direction of psychological warfare under USIA.
2. We need a substantially increased effort which can be supported largely by other
agencies, but will need additional money within USIA.
3. There will be a difficult and continuing problem of getting the Vietnamese to do their
allow a strengthening of military efforts in the I and II Corps areas where the situation is
deteriorating and would give a boost to GVN morale, military and civilian. Likewise, it
should end any talk of a possible U.S. withdrawal and convince Hanoi of the depth of our
resolve to see this thing through to a successful conclusion.
This statement of the purpose of introducing a U.S. division is, in effect, a tabulation of the
arguments in favor of so doing. However, there are counter arguments on the other side of
the case. The introduction of a U.S. division obviously increases U.S. involvement in the
counterinsurgency, exposes greater forces and invites greater losses. It will raise sensitive
command questions with our GVN allies and may encourage them to an attitude of "let the
United States do it." It will increase our vulnerability to Communist propaganda and third
country criticism as we appear to assume the old French role of alien colonizer and
conqueror. Finally, there is considerable doubt that the number of GVN forces which our
action would relieve would have any great significance in reducing the manpower gap.
It is impossible to reach a conclusion with regard to the overall merit of this action without
first examining in some detail the possible missions which could be assigned a U.S.
division. There are two obvious possibilities; the first, the assignment of the division to one
or more of the provinces of the high plateau where the climate is good, the terrain relatively
open, and the Montagnard population more readily distinguishable from the alien Viet
Cong. Here, our forces could utilize their mobility and firepower effectively and make an
important contribution in cutting off the growing infiltration into and through this area. For
the most part, the Montagnards are friendly to the U.S. and our forces would thus be
operating in a relatively friendly environment.
On the other hand, such a mission in the highlands would place our forces in an area with
highly exposed lines of communication leading to the coast. Their location in this area
would create serious logistic problems because of the difficulty of the movement of land
transport through areas infested by the Viet Cong. There would be problems both of
reinforcement and of withdrawal because of this precariousness of land communications.
Finally, the GVN may question the introduction of sizeable U.S. forces into the Montagnard
area where we have often been accused of favoring the Montagnards over the Vietnamese
and of encouraging Montagnard separatism.
The other role which has been suggested for U.S. ground forces is the occupation and
defense of key enclaves along the coast such as Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa and Nha
Trang. Such a disposition would have the advantage of placing our forces in areas of easy
access and egress with minimum logistic problems associated with supply and maintenance.
The presence of our troops would assure the defense of these important key areas and would
relieve some GVN forces for employment elsewhere. The troops would not be called upon
to engage in counterinsurgency operations except in their own local defense and hence
would be exposed to minimum losses.
On the other hand, they would be engaged in a rather inglorious static defensive mission
unappealing to them and unimpressive in the eyes of the Vietnamese. Operating in major
population areas would maximize the points of contact with Vietnamese and hence
maximize the possible points of friction. The division would be badly fragmented to the
extent that its command, control and supervision would be awkward.
The foregoing analysis leads me to the following tentative conclusions. First, it is desirable
to introduce a U.S. division into South Viet Nam unless there are clear and tangible
advantages outweighing the numerous disadvantages, many of which have been noted
above. One must make a definite determination of the numbers and types of GVN forces
relieved by the introduction of the U.S. unit and thus the effect of the increased U.S.
presence in closing the manpower gap of 1965. Obviously, our division would make some
contribution but it remains to be proved that it will be sufficient to reverse the downward
trend and give such a lift to the GVN forces that they would perform better by the
stimulation of the U.S. presence rather than worse in a mood of relaxation at passing the
Viet Cong burden to the U.S.
If the evidence of the probable effectiveness of this U.S. contribution is convincing, then the
matter of mission becomes the primary question. The inland mission in the highlands is
clearly the more ambitious and, if well done, will make a greater contribution during the
present critical period. On the other hand, it is the more exposed and even permits one to
entertain the possibility of a kind of Dien Bien Phu if the coastal provinces should collapse
and our forces were cut off from the coast except by air.
The coastal enclave mission is safer, simpler but less impressive and less productive than
the inland mission. The contrast of the pros and cons of the two suggests the desirability of
reexamining the question to see whether the advantages of the inland disposition could not
be combined in some way with the retention of a base coastal area, linked with a position
inland. In any case, considerable additional study is required before we are prepared to
make a recommendation either for the introduction of a division or for the assignment of its
mission. In the meantime, we should be giving much thought both in South Vietnam and in
Washington as to the right course of action if and when this issue becomes pressing--as it
shortly will.
Taylor
NVN military reaction improbable, at the same time it was definitely a possibility and we
must be always prepared to meet any possible enemy reaction. It is not enough merely to
plan on the probable. The Secretary seemed depressed over the outlook and not at all sure
the actions we were taking would bring about results. He expressed concern over the
fragility of the political situation, lack of leadership, high level of Viet Cong strength, etc.
He asked that we examine the weather situation over the next several months and its
possible effect on both the SVN and the VC.
/2/"Strength of VC Military Forces in SVN." (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXI)
Action: This study has been requested of Mr. Cline.
[Here follows material unrelated to Vietnam.]
Addendum.
9. Message from Archie Roosevelt,/3/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 6489
of 11 March, recounting a discussion between Rod MacLeish and Anatoliy Danilov of the
Soviet Embassy in London--in this referenced cable Danilov had suggested that we in the
United States ought to exchange intelligence information on this (meaning South Vietnam
and North Vietnam). I told Rusk we were giving consideration to opening a channel,
carefully cut out, and unattributable, to see if there was any pay dirt in this suggestion. Rusk
indicated interest but no confirmation or endorsement of the idea.
/3/Not found. A handwritten note in the margin indicates that the telegram was destroyed in
1972.
December, with the Viet Cong demonstrating an increasing capability and the South
Vietnam military weakening by comparison.
3. McNamara stated that so far he felt the strikes in the north had had little effect. I said that
results had been exactly as we had estimated, i.e., considerable propaganda and noise out of
Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow (but really less than we expected) and some step-up in VC
activities, but no overt moves by either Hanoi or Peiping and no attempt to topple the SVN
government.
With respect to more intensified strikes, I said that when they reached the point of
threatening the industrial base and hence the total economy of North Vietnam, the NVN
would probably tamp down their guerrilla operations in SVN and wait for a sunny day,
making some pretense at negotiations. This, I felt, was the most probable course of action
by the NVN but there was a possibility that they might put on a "burst operation" in South
Vietnam in an effort to defeat the SVN, topple the government, and force the removal of
Americans. I pointed out that State leaned in the direction of the latter possibility; the
balance of the intelligence community felt the former more probable.
4. I made reference to the March 17th CIA-DIA-State reappraisal of VC strength/2/ and, in
response to McNamara's question, stated that we felt there was a strong possibility that the
VC had 50,000 regulars and 100,000 irregulars and that this level had been reached because
VC strength was under-estimated 18 months or 2 years ago and the amount of augmentation
in recent months had been also under-estimated. This combination of circumstances led us
to the opinion that VC strength may be 50% greater than reported. I pointed to the
conservatism of MACV's estimates and the fact that information concerning new units did
not get through the combined SVN-MACV bureaucracy and therefore show in the official
estimates for almost 13 months after a prisoner or a document was captured.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 205.
McNamara expressed surprise at the figures and said if these were true, we were "simply
outmanned." He expressed concern over the effectiveness of bombing, distress over the fact
that many women and children would be killed, and the guerrilla wars could not be won
from the air.
5. McNamara stated that he felt that the internal situation would continue to degrade and
that it would not be long until we ran out of worthwhile targets in the north. Hence our
position would become increasingly difficult.
6. With respect to the 21 suggested proposals of General Johnson,/3/ McNamara stated they
were all being approved. A few of them are being coordinated with State because of AID's
participation. These did not involve approval of Johnson's proposals in B. and C., which
involve the deployment of divisions. McNamara seemed to feel we should make some
moves indicating an intention for more dramatic action such as the movement of forces,
possibility of call-up of reserves, etc. He thought these actions were useful in the Berlin
crisis even though none of the forces were used or even deployed.
/3/See Document 197.
7. On other subjects, McNamara thought his budget talks were going along very well;
expressed great concern over the military pay bill, which he felt was divisive, and seemed
highly critical of the Congressmen who are introducing it.
207. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 19, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Political Track Papers. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
Possible Sequence of Actions Toward a Settlement in South Viet-Nam
This memorandum attempts to lay out the major issues that would arise if Hanoi showed a
disposition to move toward a settlement. Although we cannot see very far down the road on
this at the present time, we obviously need to get our thoughts in order and to consider
whether we should, in some subtle way, revise or amplify our present formula that Hanoi
must simply cease its aggression. The British also tell us that Minister Stewart will want to
discuss this topic./2/
/2/A reference to the planned visit to Washington later in the month of British Foreign
Secretary Michael Stewart; see Document 211.
Incidentally, I spent an hour with Alex Johnson on the matter in Baguio,/3/ and he feels that
we should be consulting fairly soon with the GVN on our thinking.
/3/See Document 199.
I. Elements of the problem.
A. We assume that we are dealing with Hanoi, not with Peiping and not with the Liberation
Front. Our "dealing" could be direct, indirect through third parties, or might in the early
stages be through public signals and reciprocal actions only without any contact.
B. We can identify the principal bargaining elements as follows:
On the US side:
1. Cessation of our attacks against the DRV.
2. Cessation of overt US military action in some categories (e.g., air attacks) within South
Viet-Nam.
3. Withdrawal of any major US military units from South Viet-Nam.
4. Withdrawal of our military presence from South Viet-Nam, at least down to Geneva
levels.
On Hanoi's side:
5. Cessation of infiltration so that we are satisfied that it has stopped, or under a system of
reliable supervision and inspection.
6. Cessation of organized unit military action by the Viet Cong in the south.
7. Withdrawal and/or demilitarization of infiltrators within SVN.
On both sides:
8. Complete cease-fire and regroupment in the south.
9. Measures to determine the future political organization in the south.
C. Our objective remains to remove all DRV interference in the south, so that SVN can
determine its own future and so that its security will be assured. Since we cannot readily
expect Hanoi simply to call the whole thing off at once, we should be thinking in terms of a
sequence that would accomplish our objective but still leave them some "face" at each stage
and that will be plausible to the world and consistent with the stated basis of our action,
against aggression from the north. Such a graduated sequence also conforms to the practical
way the cards might play.
D. The issues really divide into four:
1. Possible preconditions for the cessation of our attacks on the DRV.
2. The future political structure of SVN.
3. The future international status of SVN.
4. Policing and supervising machinery for any of the above.
II. The immediate problem: Preconditions for the cessation of our attacks on the DRV.
We believe that we must include a cessation of infiltration, at least to the point where we are
satisfied that it has stopped or dwindled to a trickle, but that we cannot stop there. Whereas
we might have thought nine months ago that, without further infiltration, the VC could be
fairly readily handled over a period of time, VC strength is now such that, from a military
standpoint alone, they might still be in a position to make dangerous gains.
Thus, we would have to insist, both for practical reasons and in logic, on a second condition
concerning the degree of VC continued action in the south. Alex Johnson thought that we
should insist that Hanoi direct the complete cessation of all VC activity. However, most of
us think this is too much to expect, and that it would suffice to insist on a cessation of
organized unit action of any significant size.
These two preconditions would in effect thus be reduced to practical and recognizable
terms. We would not be insisting that adequate supervising machinery be in place on the
infiltration issue--this would require major deployments by some international grouping,
and simply could not be arranged readily. We would not be insisting on a complete "ceasefire". We would be establishing a practical and indeed somewhat elastic standard and saying
in effect: "We will know if you go on with the infiltration and we will know if there are
significant VC actions. If either of these happens, we are reserving the right to resume our
attacks on any scale required."
The result could well be a sort of twilight zone period in which we might in fact be
continuing occasional attacks, but in which the situation might be settling down at least to
the point where more formal discussions could be held.
III. The next phase: Determining the future political structure of the south.
Here our basic position could well be that we favor an appropriate determination of the will
of the people of SVN, provided that all external interference is removed. Once that
interference is gone, we for our part would be prepared to withdraw our forces.
In practice, this position would almost certainly lead to a very long drawn-out process.
Perhaps the first crucial question would be the freedom of action of GVN forces. If they
moved into areas now controlled by the VC, there would almost certainly be clashes which
we would find it hard to justify as a basis for resuming attacks on the DRV. We need to
explore just what the exact limits of nominal "government control" are and to see if a
practical guideline would be freedom of GVN forces to operate in these areas.
But even this would leave enclaves of VC control scattered throughout the country. In
theory, we could meet these by some procedure for regroupment and for repatriation to the
north of those who had come from there. In practice, this would be a very difficult
procedure to carry out. We might make an amnesty proposal, with the GVN then free to
move into areas where the amnesty offer had been extended. But we almost certainly could
not accept a hardening of somewhat legalized VC control over a period of time.
On the political side, Hanoi would almost certainly demand a legalized role for the
Liberation Front. This we should resist, insisting on the removal of external interference or
its equivalent, the disarming of the VC.
What is clear is that we cannot let the VC dig in, in the fashion of the Pathet Lao provinces
of Laos, and that any explicit partitions of SVN, even if it were possible without looking
like a case of measles, would likewise invite a resurrection of VC activity. We have to insist
on the gradual elimination of VC control, but we may probably have to accept that this
would have to be done in such a way that there could be a genuine determination of the will
of the people.
For this reason alone, it is very difficult to see this stage taking place without there having
been created a fairly substantial international machinery. And this in turn virtually requires
a major multilateral negotiating process. In short, once we had obtained the preconditions
for the cessation of our attacks on the DRV, we should not only not reject, but should
positively welcome and seek a conference situation.
A second possible function for international machinery would be to verify and insure the
permanent cessation of infiltration. In this connection, we could consider whether it would
be wise to be prepared to withdraw our organized combat units in return for such
machinery. This would have the rationale that these units had been the necessary insurance
against a recurrence of infiltration.
In general, we should recognize that the presence of additional US organized combat units
could become a valuable negotiating card either in this or some other way, and that such
forces would in any event greatly help to stabilize the situation that might exist after the
preconditions were satisfied but while major VC units were still in place within SVN.
In sum, a rough sequence in this phase might be:
1. A consolidation of government control in all areas even more or less now under
government control, but leaving the VC unmolested in their areas.
2. A regroupment or amnesty progressively applied to the VC areas, under international
supervision.
3. International supervision of the infiltration routes.
4. Withdrawal of US organized combat units.
5. Some procedure for "determining the will" of the people of South Vietnam. This again
would appear to require international supervision, and might conceivably be done on the
basis of layers of local elections (as in Pakistan), leading to a national convention. Any
popular referendum would appear extraordinarily difficult to carry out, especially in terms
of framing the propositions to be put.
IV. Future International Status of SVN, and of SEA Generally.
This point appears to be under much better control than any of the others, in that we have
repeatedly indicated (as has Hanoi verbally) our support of the 1954 provisions--no
adherence to an alliance, no military bases, limited external military personnel for training
only.
We could also argue strongly that until a political structure was established within SVN, it
was premature to seek any modification of the 1954 status, since the will of the new SVN
Government itself should have great weight.
By the same token, any issues on the future status of the Indochina successor states as a
whole, much less the rest of mainland Southeast Asia, could and should be deferred. Again,
we already have a clear position--the 1962 Accords for Laos and neutrality for
Cambodia.We certainly do not want to raise any question of Thailand's status, and we could
well stick to the fundamental proposition that the nations of the area should determine their
own future status, either on an individual basis or in some collective framework as they see
fit.
V. Actions in the Near Future.
Here we have two questions--whether to amend our public posture, and what to discuss with
the GVN.
On the first point, it is obvious that the cessation of infiltration (to our satisfaction) and the
cessation of VC organized unit actions are not by any means a cessation of the whole
aggression as we have been using the term. Hence, to announce this modification in our
position publicly would almost certainly be regarded as a retreat, and a suggestion that we
might retreat still further--e.g., to the early Canadian suggestion (to the Soviets and without
our consent) that we might cease our attacks on the DRV merely in return for some
reduction in the scale of VC activity.
This leaves the tactical question of when and to whom we should indicate our
preconditions. They could certainly be discussed with the British without leaking, but
equally without any chance of their reaching Hanoi. The Canadians could convey them to
Hanoi more or less directly, but this too may be more eager than we now wish to appear.
On balance, we are inclined to think that the first hint of possible give in Hanoi's position
will probably come to us through the Soviets on a private basis. This would then probably
be the best time to indicate our position.
As to the GVN, we are inclined to think that we could safely discuss with them the whole of
our thinking under II and the broad outlines of our positions under III and IV. Our position
under II is sufficiently favorable so that we do not believe the GVN would see in it any
signs of weakening. They could probably be persuaded also that any early true "cease-fire"
might run into the question of GVN freedom of action, and is thus much less desirable than
the sequence here discussed.
WPB
been a marked deterioration in the military situation in Vietnam in relation to that of the
preceding period. In the period immediately following the removal of Diem, there were
serious political problems in Saigon, but the armed forces remained relatively unaffected,
and capable of substantial military accomplishments. The principal problems were political:
how to achieve governmental stability, avoid disruptive coups, and extend governmental
control throughout the provinces. More recently a major military problem has arisen. The
Viet Cong have grown substantially stronger, and have achieved increasing military
successes. Moreover, RVN military effectiveness appears to have declined as a result of the
political involvements and maneuverings of key military figures. It is the view of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that the military situation has become critical, and that, if present trends are
not reversed, the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam will be lost. Also, it is their
view that such a loss would be a US defeat, which we cannot afford and which would be
recognized world-wide as such.
3. The needs of the military situation have become primary, and direct US military action
appears to be imperative if defeat is to be avoided. The type of military action envisaged
will open a new phase of combat and will require substantial shifts in the methods of
conducting the war, including a change in the form and scope of US operations, and
modifications to US policies and programs which have provided the basis for US support of
the RVN.
4. Certain recommendations toward arresting the present trend have already been submitted
to you, and further proposals in addition to those in this memorandum are being prepared on
an urgent basis. They have included and will include proposed actions both within and
outside the country. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that more forceful application
of military pressures against both the Viet Cong and the DRV is necessary, including the
deployment of forces to deter ChiCom aggression and to provide the capability to increase
the intensity and severity of air attacks against the DRV. The recommendations herein for
actions within the RVN are considered an essential component of the broader program.
5. It has become apparent that the RVN urgently needs substantial increases in effective
combat forces in order to withstand the Viet Cong. The requirement is not simply to
withstand the Viet Cong, however, but to gain effective operational superiority and assume
the offensive. To turn the tide of the war requires an objective of destroying the Viet Cong,
not merely trying to keep pace with them, or slow down the rate of their advance. Although
measures are being taken which will ultimately result in the provision of increased RVN
forces, the time required does not permit reliance upon these measures alone. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff consider that US land forces should be introduced in a combatant role, in
such strengths as to achieve an effective margin of combat power, and provide a clear
indication that the United States intends to support SouthVietnam and intends to achieve its
objectives. Participation by forces of the Republic of Korea, and of other allies if
subsequently offered, would provide valuable force increases in addition to a favorable
psychological effect. Outline concepts for force introductions, including strengths and
command arrangements, are set forth in the Annex/2/ to this memorandum. The forces thus
provided would conduct active operations against the Viet Cong, provide security for
important installations, free ARVN forces for offensive operations, and assist in containing
infiltration.
/2/Attached, but not printed.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that US and allied forces be deployed for
combat missions in South Vietnam as indicated (Additional details of concepts and force
requirements are in the Annex.)
a. Expand mission of Marine elements at Da Nang to include counterinsurgency combat
operations. Deploy remainder of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to the Da Nang area as
requested by CINCPAC, with the same mission.
b. Deploy, as soon as proper logistic support is ensured, a US Army division with necessary
supporting forces from the continental United States for employment in the central plateau,
centered on the Pleiku area, for counterinsurgency combat operations.
c. Deploy, as soon as practicable, a Republic of Korea Army division force to South
Vietnam for counterinsurgency and base security operations.
d. Deploy, as requested by CINCPAC, four of the nine Air Force squadrons previously
recommended in JCSM-149-65./3/
/3/Not found.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
209. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 22, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. IX. Secret.
SUBJECT
Your meeting with Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart of Great Britain, Tuesday, March 23,
11:30 a.m./2/
/2/See Document 211.
1. Stewart's conversations with Dean Rusk so far have produced only one serious question-the political problem of the Wilson Government in holding to its present support for us in
Vietnam. Dean is planning to talk some more with the British before Stewart comes in, and
this memo may be outdated by tomorrow, though I doubt it.
2. The British tell us--and David Bruce agrees--that their present position is not tenable
without some slight help from us. As David Bruce puts it, the Prime Minister is being
strongly criticized, not only by his Left but by his Center. He is accused of uncritical
support for a U.S. position about which he is uninformed. It is asserted that he has deserted
his principles to curry favor with the President, who in return has allowed it to be known
that the Prime Minister will be an unwelcome visitor in April. The cooler men in the Labor
Party, as distinct from the Left Wing wild men, are said to be losing their patience.
3. All this of course is a wild misstatement of the existing situation. None of it takes account
of the very great damage which Wilson did to himself by his outrageous phone call to you-a phone call which has never been publicized. But Bruce impresses it on me that the
existing situation in the Labor Party is real.
4. In this situation one course might be to let the [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] Labor Party struggle with its own political problems, on the ground that
Wilson's troubles are of his own making, not ours. The difficulty with this course is that
since Wilson prefers his own survival to solidarity with us, he would be mortally tempted to
begin to make critical noises about us, thus appealing both to his own party and to the
natural nationalism of many independent Englishmen. This would not be helpful to Wilson
in the long run, but it would not be helpful to us either, as the history of Dienfenbaker
proves. (Wilson and Diefenbaker have about the same amount of internal sweetness.) When
we fall out with Prime Ministers, it's usually painted as our fault.
5. The alternative is to see what is the least we can offer the British in return for continued
solidarity in support of the essentials of our policy in Vietnam. David Bruce thinks this
necessary minimum is simply that we should join them in saying publicly that there is a full
and continuous exchange of views and of information at all levels between our two
Governments on this important issue. Then we can put on some parsley about how glad we
are to have Mr. Stewart and how much we look forward to the Prime Minister's visit. In
return, the British should undertake not to advocate negotiations and not to go back on their
existing announced approval of our present course of action. They should limit themselves
to expressions of hope that a path to a peaceful settlement will come, plus expressions of
alertness, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, to any opportunities for peaceful
settlement which may develop in the future. Bruce thinks that this position will not be easy
for Wilson, but that he will find it distinctly preferable to a split with us at this time.
6. David and I have been up and down this problem for an hour this afternoon, and this is
our joint recommendation. I will telephone and ask for your views in the morning, and on
the basis of what you tell me, I will then do a one-page paper for your use with Stewart./3/
Bruce and I believe that you can be most candid and effective with him if you see him
entirely alone, but the meeting can be of any size that you choose. It need not take more
than 20 minutes, and the smaller it is the shorter it can be. Our talking paper will cover the
stupid fuss over gas, which should not have occurred, as well as press reports of a far-out
statement on "escalation without limit" by Max Taylor.
/3/Not found.
McG. B.
210. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 23, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. IX. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
What we now know on gas (leaving aside the loose end on nausea gas)/2/
/2/On March 22 an Associated Press dispatch from Saigon charged that gas was being used
against the Viet Cong. The factual basis for the charge was discussed by Rusk in telephone
conversations with William Bundy at 12:55 p.m. and McGeorge Bundy at 5:11 p.m. on
March 22. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) A sampling of
the highly critical response in various countries of the world to the charge was included in
Rowan's March 23 memorandum to the President. (Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Vietnam 000.7)
1. The riot-control gases used in Vietnam are standard issue for all U.S. troops with riotcontrol missions, and authority to use them has been delegated to subordinate commanders
for many years.
2. These gases are also standard issue under Military Assistance Programs to friendly troops
with riot-control missions.
3. These gases are non-lethal and their effects are temporary. They are totally different from
the poison gases against which international conventions and humanitarian feeling are
directed.
4. There are three known uses of these riot-control gases in Vietnam (two cases were in
efforts by Vietnamese troops to rescue U.S. advisors--this is a good point at home, but not
abroad).
5. There has been absolutely no NSC discussion of this problem precisely because riotcontrol gases are standard equipment. There has been no proposal at any time for the use of
poison gas in this theater or elsewhere.
6. Finally, these gases are precisely analogous to those used by police forces all over the
world.
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
President should receive Stewart the following day. (Ibid.) For Stewart's recollection of the
visit to Washington, see his Life and Labour: An Autobiography, pp. 152-153.
Meeting with the British delegation this morning./2/ Mac Bundy had seen the President
earlier, and it was arranged that LBJ would receive the Foreign Secretary alone at 11:30. I
rode over to the White House with the two Michael Stewarts. On our side, Bill Tyler, Tom
Judd, Harry Shullaw and Lloyd Hand, Chief of Protocol, were present. We waited in the
Cabinet Room with the British Minister. Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary talked to Mac
Bundy, before being closeted with the President. To our surprise, after about fifteen minutes
of this duet, we were all summoned into the oval office, where we were joined by Hadow
(Foreign Office Press representative) and Bundy. Marvin Watson wandered in and out,
trying to preserve the President's appointments schedule, whilst the British were concerned
lest Stewart miss his engagement to lunch and speak at the National Press Club. This did
not divert LBJ, who was in talkative form. It was great theatre; he fed us oratorical
sandwiches, with layers of gravity and levity. At one time, after he had enumerated the
variety of criticisms to which he was daily subjected over Vietnam, he remarked
"Sometimes I just get all hunkered up like a jackass in a hailstorm."
/2/Rusk, Ball, and Bruce met with Stewart and other members of the British delegation at
10:30 a.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) The meeting apparently dealt
exclusively with Southeast Asia and was described in two separate memoranda of
conversation. One memorandum is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-10 VIET
S. The other is ibid., POL 27 ASIA SE.
Stewart kept reverting to the uproar in Britain over the use of non-lethal gas by the South
Vietnamese air force. The cable lines are hot with protests, petitions are pouring forth from
MP's, Americans are being denounced for resorting to barbarous and horrible weapons. I
thought the President dealt well with the attack, explaining that the gas was one in common
use by our own police forces, was frequently employed for quelling riots, and was stocked
by many countries. The chief trouble, I believe, is that no warning was given in advance
from Saigon of its prospective utilization, nor until yesterday, did our top men in
Washington seem to know anything about the occurrences. From a public relations
viewpoint, the Saigon authorities, and secondarily our own, have behaved idiotically. "Gas"
is widely regarded as a dirty word, and everywhere evokes images of World War I
brutalities. The affair is further complicated by the allegation that supplies of this type were
left behind by the French army, when they evacuated Indo-China, and that some of it was
manufactured in the UK. We are now explaining that on the occasions it has been used in
Vietnam, it was largely ineffective.
LBJ discoursed for more than an hour, explaining his objectives, hopes and fears. He is
power sublimated, like Niagara Falls. He read us a long letter/3/ from an American soldier
in Vietnam to his "Mom", strongly supporting American policy. I think he impressed his
audience by his grasp of the issues involved, and his own mastery over decisions, but must
have puzzled the British by the alternations of his manner. He told Stewart he had no
objections whatever to negotiations if any one could offer a reasonable prospect of their
succeeding.
/3/Not further identified.
There was a brief session for photography; the cameramen made their onslaught in two
waves. Then the Foreign Minister was released, after ninety minutes of an experience he is
between Saigon and the provincial administrations. Also, Quat is spending two days in
central Vietnam this week on a personal inspection of the refugee situation there and
establishing political contact in Hue and Danang, the traditional center of political
turbulence in South Vietnam. I expect to join him in Danang Wednesday/2/ for a visit to the
aircraft carrier Coral Sea off the coast and to our Marines in Danang.
/2/Apparently March 24.
The Armed Forces Council met over the weekend to consider changes in the high
command. Although Quat has told me that no decisions have been taken, the press and our
informants have it that the Council confirmed General "Little" Minh as commander-in-chief
(he holds this post now on an "acting" basis), selected General Huynh Van Cao as Chief of
the Joint General Staff and is about to recommend several other changes. If these
appointments materialize, they place Catholic generals in the three top military positions
(the third being General Thieu, Deputy Prime Minister and Armed Forces Minister). This
could stimulate a reaction from the Buddhist Institute, and we have reports that the Armed
Forces Council have sent representatives to discuss the matter with Institute leaders. Except
for Cao whose ability to fill the job of chief of staff is questionable, we would take no issue
with the reported changes.
Despite the apparently improved Catholic position within the military establishment, we
have begun to receive some indications that the militant northern refugee Catholics are
becoming more and more restless at what they consider to be the growing alliance between
the Buddhist Institute and Generals Thi and Ky, I Corps and Air Force commanders
respectively. We will take more soundings among these Catholic groups in order to monitor
their feelings and intentions as closely as we can.
If the Catholics are getting increasingly restless, it is perhaps understandable that the
Buddhist Institute continues to be relatively tranquil. The Institute had a national conference
last week and, as far as we can determine from talking to key leaders, they agreed that
Quang Lien should cease his involvement in the peace movement he initiated (although
Quang Lien reportedly believes the conference did not take such a hard and fast decision).
Institute leaders also decided that they should concentrate on internal Buddhist
organizational and program matters, avoiding politics unless "directly threatened." They
seem reasonably satisfied with Quat for the time being and may be willing to stick to
propagating the dharma. Time will tell.
I look forward to seeing you soon and going over the situation which has shifted
significantly since I was home in December.
Taylor
215. Letter From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 24, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX ND 19/CO 312, filed under
April 12. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. President:
Over the years, I have submitted both to your predecessor and to you a series of
memorandums on the situation in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia./2/ Sometimes suggestions
have been requested of me and sometimes they have been volunteered. In either case, they
have been motivated solely by a desire to give such help as I might in the burdens of the
decisions of the Presidency.
/2/For earlier memoranda from Mansfield to President Johnson, see Documents 92 and 101;
Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 691-692; and Foreign Relations, 1963-1968,
vol. I, Document 2.
The main lines of thought in these memorandums over the years, as you may recall, are the
following:
1. That the United States does not have interests on the Southeast Asian mainland to justify
the costs in American lives and resources which would be required if we were to attempt to
exercise, in effect, primacy over what transpires in that region; and that, insofar as South
Viet Nam is concerned, we are there, not to take primary responsibility, but to provide
whatever assistance is wanted and can be used effectively by the Vietnamese themselves.
2. That our national interest lies in reducing, rather than in increasing, the unilateral role
which we have played in recent years, through the foreign aid program and excessive
involvement of various United States agencies in the internal affairs of the weak nations of
that region.
3. That our national security interests are best served in Southeast Asia by severely limiting
our military involvement and, confining ourselves at most, to a very judicious use of air and
sea power.
4. That the best prospects for a tolerable long-range situation in Southeast Asia lie in
encouraging, through astute diplomacy and limited and preferably multilateral economic
assistance, the emergence of truly independent governments with firm roots in their own
people, which are as free as possible from great power involvement in their internal affairs.
This situation, as I have noted, time and again, has prevailed in Cambodia at least until very
recently when, in my judgment, a combination of years of inept diplomacy and the events in
Viet Nam finally conspired to push this small and ably-led nation sharply towards China. It
has prevailed to some extent in Burma and at one time, there was hope for it in South Viet
Nam under the late Ngo Dinh Diem.
I am aware that the principles of policy outlined in the four points above are subject to the
charge of "a return to isolationism." It should be noted, however, that there is no automatic
virtue in an ubiquitous and indiscriminate internationalism, particularly when it leads to the
kind of isolated internationalism in which we presently find ourselves in Viet Nam.
I think it is correct to say that the trend of our policies over the past few years has been in a
direction opposite to the main lines of thought which are contained in my memorandums
over the past few years. I say this, as you know, without rancor or criticism. I know that my
thoughts have received your careful attention. I know that your assistants and the
bureaucracy have studied them and occasionally even have concurred in an idea expressed
in them.
Nevertheless, it is still a fact that present policy is on a course which contains the following
diametric opposites of the suggestions which I have advanced over the years. Present
policy, so far as I can determine, requires:
(1) That we make whatever expenditure of American lives and resources, on an ascending
scale, is necessary in order for us to exercise, in effect, a primacy over what transpires in
South Viet Nam. If this involves going into North Viet Nam and beyond, that, too, will be
done.
(2) That in the absence of unconditional capitulation of the Viet Cong, our military
involvement must continue and be increased as necessary (there is discussion even now of a
Joint Command which can only be the prelude to United States command in fact if not in
word).
(3) That our military involvement will not be restricted to a most judicious use of air and
sea power, as evidenced by instructions to strike at "targets of convenience", but rather that
it be extended, even to the infusion of a steadily increasing number of American combat
forces on the ground.
(4) That we will not try to encourage, through sustained diplomatic efforts, the emergence
of the kind of situations which exist in Burma and Cambodia, but rather, so far as I can see,
that we will stress those situations which can be maintained only by continuous infusions of
American aid (i.e., Laos and Thailand, not to speak of South Viet Nam itself).
Those are the facts of our policy as it is being carried out, as I see it. It is possible that this
direction may not be precisely the one you seek, a possibility suggested by your calling to
my attention this morning your unawareness in advance of the usage of gas in Viet Nam./3/
It may be that you were also unaware in advance, understandably, of the usage of napalm
and of the concept of "targets of convenience" which are likely to do at least as much
damage to non-combatants as combatants in a situation such as Viet Nam or the countless
other decisions which deepen our involvement and responsibility. May I say in connection
with the gas that it is beyond my comprehension how any American in an office of
responsibility would not realize the vast significance, beyond immediate military
considerations, of this act and, therefore, seek the highest political authority before taking
such a step.
/3/President Johnson phoned Mansfield at 9:12 a.m. on March 24. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary)
It is this possibility, that actions of the bureaucracy may have taken us in more deeply than
desired, which leads me to write you once again, and most respectfully suggest certain
changes at this time which may move us from the present direction of policy as it is
expressed in action. In all frankness, I believe that the present direction is at variance with
the extent and nature of our national interests on the Southeast Asian mainland and in the
world. In the end, I fear that this course, at best, will win us only more widespread
difficulties which will play havoc with the domestic program of the Administration, with
the balance of payments situation, and with our interests and constructive influence
elsewhere in the world.
I have no great hope that, at this late date, these suggestions will be useful to you. But for
For text of Rusk's remarks concerning the gas warfare charge at his news conference on
March 24, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 845-846.
217. Summary Notes of the 550th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, March 26, 1965, 1:15-2:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top
Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Helms also prepared a
record of the discussion. (Memorandum for the record, March 26; Central Intelligence
Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Memos for the Record, 1 Mar-28 Apr 65)
Vietnam/2/
/2/In a March 26 memorandum to the President, Bundy had recommended that the NSC
meeting be devoted to Vietnam. "It would be helpful at this point for all present to take a
deep breath and listen to each other for about a half hour in a review of the situation as it
now stands." (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX)
CIA Director McCone summarized the Vietnam situation including reactions abroad to U.S.
air strikes on North Vietnam:
a. In South Vietnam, the U.S. attacks greatly improved military morale and stabilized the
government situation in Saigon.
b. Hanoi stated its determination to stand up to the air attacks. It has given no hint that it is
ready to accept negotiations.
c. Communist China urged Hanoi to stand firm. Peking continues to provide military
assistance to Hanoi. The Chinese Communists are not yet ready to get into the fight.
d. The Soviets have no choice but to support Hanoi. The Vietnam war has the effect of
intensifying the Sino-Soviet split.
The intelligence community estimates that Hanoi remains unconvinced that they cannot win
out militarily. They are not yet ready to negotiate. Sustained U.S. air attacks on North
Vietnam may prompt Hanoi to offer negotiations on the condition that the air attacks are
called off. The State intelligence representative thinks that the Chinese Communists will
respond by sending combat troops before Hanoi reaches the point of being forced to accept
negotiations. The rest of the intelligence community believes that the Chinese Communists
will probably not attack U.S. planes or ships or send in their ground army.
There is no hard evidence that the Chinese Communists are blocking Soviet efforts to send
aid to North Vietnam. There are some indications that this is being done, such as the refusal
of overflight clearances for Soviet planes flying materiel to North Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk: Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called at his request at noon.
The President: How did this whole gas incident happen? Was it a Communist plot?
USIA Director Rowan: Peter Arnett of the Associated Press didn't write his story out of the
blue. We should find out about his background.
Secretary McNamara gave his account of how the gas story got started and, in reply to the
President's question, explained our public information system in SouthVietnam.
Mr. Rowan: The public information situation was bad two years ago but improved when we
increased our military activity. We now have new problems with over 200 reporters based
in Saigon. New press guidelines are being sent to Saigon. New press criticism is increasing.
Secretary Rusk raised the question of briefing Senators. They should be briefed as soon as
we have something new to say. The Senators are getting nervous. Weekly briefings in
executive sessions of the appropriate Senate committees should be considered.
The President: We must think out this problem. We are spending most of our time
defending our actions in Vietnam. What about the Stennis report on no equipment
failures?/6/ Should not this report have gone first to the President and then to the press?
Senators other than those on the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees
should be called on and given briefings. Separate gatherings should be arranged which
would be addressed by only Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. All questions raised
at these sessions should be answered. We should then offer to go up to the Hill to testify on
Vietnam every two weeks.
/6/Not further identified.
Bromley Smith
/2/Document 204.
In addition to these mounting requirements, there is a more significant one taking form
which is discussed in Embtel 3003. It is quite clear that the existing operational units of the
armed forces of Vietnam are insufficient to cope effectively with the internal Viet Cong
threat. In recent weeks, we have seen a serious deterioration in the I and II Corps which has
required the transfer of most of the RVNAF general reserve units to that area. Although
there is an intensified build-up of ARVN forces in process, the full effect of this expanded
mobilization will not be felt in terms of available operational units until toward the end of
calendar 1965. Thus, we are faced with an immediate shortage of trained military and
paramilitary units to offset the mounting strength of the Viet Cong. The basic question is
whether we can accept this manpower shortage over the coming months and await the
readiness of the new ARVN units, or whether some way must be found at once to
compensate for the shortage during the intervening period.
Before attempting to answer this question, it is first necessary to decide what kind of
strategy should be pursued during calendar year 1965. Strategy A might be to accept the
present unsatisfactory progress in defeating the Viet Cong and base our hopes on the effect
of the pressure of the current air attacks on Hanoi. Even if we make little progress in
pacification during the coming months or even accept further retardation, this delay will be
inconsequential if, in the end, Hanoi throws in the sponge and agrees to cease aid to the Viet
Cong and to cooperate in their liquidation.
Strategy B might be to take the position that it is essential to reverse the downward trend in
certain critical provinces, not only to avoid the danger of a debacle in these areas but also,
through in-country successes, to give added weight to the effectiveness of the air campaign
on the will of Hanoi. If the latter is losing both in SVN and suffering from repeated air
attacks in NVN, this condition should accelerate the decision of the North Vietnamese
leaders to mend their ways.
Strategy C might be to take the position that we must do everything possible to speed up the
in-country campaign against the Viet Cong to prevent a possible collapse of national morale
and to shorten the period of international tension which will exist throughout the duration of
our military pressures on Hanoi. This means go for broke to win rapidly. To accept such a
strategy is to support the need for the injection of all possible military strength into SVN
which can be supported and be used effectively.
Without choosing between these three strategies at this point, let us assume that we are
headed along the course of either Strategy B or C. Furthermore, let us make the assumption
which I believe is correct that no introduction of US forces less than about 9-12 battalions
will have any significant effect on the military situation in this country in the short term. So
the immediate question is how to employ such a force if the decision is taken to introduce it.
In extension of the discussion on the same subject in Embtel 3003, I would say that such a
US force could be used in three ways: (1) in a defensive or offensive enclave, (2) in
territorial clear-and-hold operations or (3) as mobile reaction reserves. The defensive
enclave is typified by the present employment of the two battalions of Marines in defense of
the Danang airbase. They secure the immediate airbase but do not engage in military
operations outside the defensive perimeter. This disposition could be changed into an
offensive enclave if the Marines were allowed to sally forth and engage in operations either
initiated by themselves or in support of operations conducted by ARVN. In any case, they
There are no particular disadvantages to the mobile reaction concept except the hard fact
that we will take losses whenever our troops are plunged into the midst of an engagement in
progress. Also they will necessarily be closely associated in action with ARVN and hence
will have to work out appropriate command relationships for each operation.
It should be noted that there is nothing incompatible between a combination of the first and
third concepts, that is, of placing US units in mobile reserve for reaction which would
operate out of offensive enclaves. One could establish perhaps three such enclaves on or
near the coast, each garrisoned by a brigade of three battalions. Under normal conditions, at
least two of these battalions could be used on reaction operations leaving the third on the
security mission. If the third battalion were required outside the enclave, it would be
possible to reinforce the enclave either from another enclave or from a Marine or airborne
unit brought in from the Fleet or from Okinawa. A first step toward effecting this
disposition could be to organize the Marines in the Danang area into the first of these
offensive enclaves. Thereafter, we could bring two Army brigades into areas such as Qui
Nhon, Nha Trang and Vung Tau-Bien Hoa. This could be an initial disposition capable of
expansion after acquiring experience and gaining evidence as to the effectiveness of US
forces in this new role. This conservative beginning would give us insight into the political
and psychological effect of US combat participation on the GVN, on the armed forces of
Vietnam and on the people.
With regard to the popular reaction, it is far from clear what the attitude of the GVN and the
Vietnamese people would be toward the introduction of these forces. It could be that
Vietnamese morale would be raised and their will to fight enhanced by the presence of US
forces and their participation in combat on the ground. It is equally possible that the
presence of these additional Americans would tend to sap the already flaccid purpose of the
Vietnamese and would promote an attitude of "let the US do it". In any case, before
introducing further US reinforcements into SVN it is essential to be sure that they will be
enthusiastically welcomed by the government, by the armed forces and by the people.
Thus, we need an answer to the following questions before proceeding farther. (A) What
strategy does the US propose to follow calendar year 1965? (B) To carry out that strategy, is
it necessary to bring in additional US ground forces? (C) What will be the reaction of the
Government and people of Vietnam to this proposal? If the answers to these proposals
support the introduction of additional US ground forces, I would then favor their
employment, initially at least, in accordance with the offensive enclave-mobile reaction
concept.
Taylor
219. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 28, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXI,
Memos. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to McNamara and McGeorge Bundy.
SUBJECT
Major Issues During Ambassador Taylor's Visit/2/
/2/Taylor left Saigon on March 27 and arrived in Washington the following day. Other
members of his party included General De Puy and Lieutenant Colonel Montague of
MACV, Leroy S. Wehrle of USOM, and H. Freeman Matthews, Jr., of the Embassy's
Political Section. A proposed program for Taylor's visit, March 28-April 3, was attached to
Unger's March 25 memorandum to William Bundy and others. (Ibid.)
I have gone over the principal papers that Ambassador Taylor has brought with him./3/
They raise a number of matters that can be dealt with, at least in the first instance, by his
appointments in State, DoD, AID, and USIA. However, I thought it would be useful for you
to have a preliminary indication of the major issues and the positions that have been
recommended to the Ambassador by the Mission elements.
/3/Presumably a reference to some of the nearly 40 briefing papers prepared in Saigon in
response to Mission Council Action Memorandum No. 80, March 22, to which was
attached a list of the subjects to be covered in the briefing papers. (Department of State, FE
Files: Lot 69 D 74, EA)
1. Need for US Forces. MACV has not included third country forces, such as a ROK
division, in its analysis. It has prepared a detailed "Commander's Estimate"/4/ which will be
briefed to the DoD/JCS session Monday/5/ and which recommends the introduction of a US
division and the filling out of the Marine units, for a total of approximately 33,000 combat
personnel. I am not clear whether this includes all the supporting and logistics personnel
incident to this additional deployment.
/4/"Commander's Estimate of the Situation in South Vietnam," March 26. (Center of
Military History, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup) >/5/March 29.
This combat deployment would be over and above recommended increases of
approximately 18,000 in assorted units and logistics personnel separate from the combat
deployment. The 18,000 figure breaks down into approximately 6,000 of increments to
existing units, and 12,000 of new units, with the main element in the latter about 7,000 for
the "logistics command."
Our present strength in SVN is given as 28,669 so that we are dealing with
recommendations that would bring it to the level of 80,000 or higher under both headings.
2. "Negotiating" Policy and Tactics. The Embassy has supplied excellent papers on this
subject, which we will have copied and distributed Monday. They focus on much the same
issues that we are touching on in the present draft pronouncement,/6/ and that are analyzed
in more detail in my memorandum of March 19./7/ I will inform the Ambassador Monday
morning of the status of the pronouncement and give him a copy of our own analysis of
March 19.
/6/Presumably a reference to the draft of the speech the President gave at Johns Hopkins
University on April 7; see Document 245.
/7/Document 207.
3. Tempo of Operations against the DRV. The Embassy staff is recommending an increase
in tempo, including additional strikes above the 20th parallel. They are also recommending
immediate introduction of a leaflet operation as part of the program.
The Mission has also supplied useful papers on the question of blockade or aerial mining of
the ports. The staff conclusion is that these steps should be further studied, but not carried
out for the time being.
4. Non-military Measures. A very lengthy Mission cable has already given preliminary
responses to the list of 41 points,/8/ and we will break out these and isolate the key issuses
with Ambassador Taylor in our first State meeting Monday morning./9/
William P. Bundy/10/
/8/Telegram 3114 from Saigon, March 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
/9/No record of Taylor's meeting at the Department of State on March 29 has been found.
Blouin's memorandum for the record of Taylor's meeting at the Department of State at
10:30 a.m. on March 30 with representatives from various agencies to discuss non-military
programs in South Vietnam is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA
Files: FRC 75-163, VN Chron.
/10Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
location unspecified. The Chairman, JCS emphasized the urgent necessity to deploy a
logistical command and the forward deployment of tactical fighter squadrons as well as the
earliest possible construction of the airfield at Chu Lai and a runway at Da Nang.
b. Ambassador Taylor indicated that 3 divisions seemed high; that Quat was not persuaded
that more troops were necessary; that anti-American sentiment lies just under the surface
and that finally there are two very real limitations on the number and rate of introduction of
US or 3rd country forces. First is the absorptive capacity of the country and second
logistical limitations.
c. The Chairman, JCS outlined the importance of establishing a goal against which logistics
planning could proceed.
d. The Secretary of Defense indicated that further US deployments must be accompanied by
deployment of Koreans for reasons of domestic reaction.
e. After an exchange of views on the missions and operating methods of US forces the
Secretary of Defense stated that he was impressed with the adverse force ratios and favored
deployment of US forces conditioned by:
(1) political (psychological) absorption capacity
(2) logistical absorption capacity
(3) operational absorption--(that is operational requirements).
f. For consideration later in the week OSD and JCS are laying out the various force
increases, force ratio implications, and deployment schedules.
3. Rolling Thunder
a. Strikes against lines of communication will be stepped up starting next week including
the Thanh Hoa bridge. Subsequently and in due course the rail lines leading northeast and
northwest of Hanoi will be struck. The limitations now being considered are to avoid the
Haiphong area and the GCI range of MIGs around Hanoi.
b. The necessity for low level recce is recognized. A policy statement (formula) is being
drafted to provide within over-all sortie limitations unescorted low level recce as required
anywhere in NVN as long as it serves the purpose of building up a bank of required
targeting information. The Haiphong area and MIG range of Hanoi would be excluded.
4. It was agreed to reexamine the question of aerial mining of the port of Haiphong as a
more effective, less expensive equivalent of blockade. It was thought that this action might
become necessary in the period 4 to 12 weeks out ahead.
5. Lastly Ambassador Taylor pointed up some equipment problems associated with the
Popular Forces. At a cost of $28 per man a poncho, blanket, mosquito bar and ruck sack
could be provided. The Secretary of Defense directed immediate funding for up to 200,000
Popular Forces.
Rusk
viability of the government, to promote cohesion within the South Vietnamese military
structure, and to encourage South Vietnamese people to support their government and to
participate more actively in the defense of their country.
/2/See Document 217.
Some of the proposed actions are not dissimilar to current undertakings of the U.S. Mission.
However it is my belief that additional effort in the proposed areas, performed by men who
have had long backgrounds of experience in South Vietnam, would be very useful.
Respectfully yours,
John A. McCone
Attachment/3/
Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Helms) to Director of Central
Intelligence McCone
Washington, March 31, 1965.
/3/Secret. A copy was sent to the Deputy Director for Intelligence.
SUBJECT
CIA Proposals for Limited Covert Civilian Political Action in Vietnam
Outlined below are twelve key points that we believe should be intensified or initiated in the
general field of covert political action. Some of these actions are covert in the traditional
sense of secrecy and non-attributable sponsorship. Others are on the overt side, but are
properly undertaken by CIA because of our flexibility and capability to move into situations
quickly, bypassing cumbersome governmental mechanisms on both the U.S. and South
Vietnamese sides. All of these actions are, of course, essentially complementary to the
large, overt activities of the U.S. mission in its large-scale collaboration with the South
Vietnamese government. Based on our experience in Vietnam, however, we believe that the
listed actions should and could be undertaken by CIA with proper approval and authority.
We realize that the obstacles to success are substantial, but feel that the effort should be
made, and promptly.
1. Extension of covert support to key Buddhist leaders, especially in the social, cultural and
anti-communist political fields. Both Buddhist lay and religious leaders have requested help
in the organization and training of cadre to work in the countryside on various anticommunist projects.
2. Covert subsidy of a political party in support of Quat. The training and placement of
political organizers to evoke positive popular reactions to Quat's programs could contribute
to the stability of his government.
3. Expansion of covert contacts at all levels of the military structure to influence them
toward cohesion and collaboration with the Quat government. Considerable personal and
non-official involvement with these personalities is necessary to provide a means through
Third country personnel having necessary expertise should be utilized in the above
programs. Beyond this value, they tend to dilute the sense of overwhelming American
inspiration of these programs and encourage additional participation and commitment of
their governments to the successful outcome of the Vietnam war.
rh
223. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 31, 1965.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Memos
for the Record, 1 Mar-28 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed
in his office.
SUBJECT
Discussion with Ambassador Taylor--31 March 1965
1. In response to Taylor's request I summarized the current estimates of South Vietnamese,
NVN, ChiCom and Russian reactions to the bombing, reporting along the lines of my report
to the NSC on March 26th./2/
/2/See Document 217.
2. Advised Taylor of concern over paucity of photographic reconnaissance of South China.
Advised him that if ChiNats would not agree to fly, I intended to send a special
representative to see Chiang Ching Kuo, and in all probability request authority to fly
American pilots over South China in U-2 planes.
3. Advised Amb. Taylor of the analysis of communications indicating that the NVN 325th
Division Headquarters, now located in SVN, was in communication with 11 components in
the area and also in direct communication with Hanoi and we thought this was probably
associated with a plan for a concerted action against some point in the northern part of
South Vietnam.
4. In answer to the Ambassador's questions, I stated that we could not interpret the low level
of VC current activity to necessarily be attributable to the air operations or orders from
Hanoi. It might be explained as a cyclical situation similar to those we have observed
before. The Ambassador observed that the period of low level of activity was somewhat
longer than experienced before and this apparently is true. I stated that there is no question
but what the bombing in the north has interrupted, but not stopped, the flow of cadres and
materiel into SVN. Likewise, the tighter coastal patrol and the successful interdiction of
several supply ships has had its effect.
5. Then told the Ambassador we felt more must be done to encourage the people of SVN to
support the government and its purposes. Taylor countered by saying that this could only be
brought about by a successful military effort and as long as there was discouragement on
the part of the people, they would either be apathetic or disinclined to actively support the
government. I did not fully agree, and then explained that the President had asked me for
recommendations as to what more we could do in South Vietnam to help the U.S. cause. I
had Taylor read the attached March 31st memorandum to the President and DDP's
memorandum to me./3/ Taylor said that he could not take exception to any of the points that
we made. He felt all had possibilities but naturally wished any particular action to be spelled
out in detail prior to his approval. He asked that we expand on one or all of the proposed
actions, transmit the ideas to Peter de Silva (whom Taylor holds in the highest regard), and
he then would consider any recommendations de Silva made.
/3/Document 222.
6. With respect to Item 7, Taylor said he had authorized substantial expansion of the
program, mentioned 200 teams of 40 men for a total of 8,000 personnel to be trained and
equipped and directed in this operation. Taylor said he was afraid that quality might erode
away as the numbers grew and of course this is a possibility. He did not mention
"regularizing" this activity by placing it under USOM, AID or MACV.
Action: I concurred that we would forward specifies to de Silva.
7. Throughout the discussion I said that CIA felt there was a need for a very considerable
amount of covert political and civic action and work with organizations such as religious
groups, labor groups, farm groups, etc., which would parallel the more overt and formal
actions of the regular agencies. I expressed the opinion that CIA had very good civilian
resources which were not being used and that the United States cause in South Vietnam was
suffering on this account. At this point I said that the loss of Montagnard support, which
was an outgrowth of Operation Switchback and MACV's handling of this entire area, was in
my opinion unfortunate. Taylor countered by saying that the Generals, most particularly
Khanh, were very suspicious and resentful of the training of the Montagnards. He felt they
were traditional enemies of the South Vietnamese, were considered totally unreliable, and
would turn on the government or the SVN people at any moment. For this reason the
Montagnard program was abandoned at the insistence of the SVN government.
224. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 31, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. IX. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Your meeting with Max Taylor at 5:15 this afternoon/2/
/2/The President met with Taylor at the White House at 5:34 p.m. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary) No other record of their conversation has been found.
1. Max Taylor's visit this afternoon is the first of two. Today he comes privately. Tomorrow
all the recommendations growing out of his visit will be available for formal presentation to
you in the presence of the heads of the departments concerned. This will be quite a
substantial meeting in numbers, but it is being kept off the record--and if it leaks it will be
billed simply as one more effort to make sure that we are doing everything we can to make
our program more efficient and effective.
2. The three problems on Max's mind are these:
(1) The timing and direction of attack on the North;
(2) The timing, size, and mission of any U.S. combat deployments to Vietnam; and
(3) The terms and conditions of a political resolution of the problem.
He has done more thinking on (1) and (2) than on (3)--and so have we.
3. I think that on (1) he is in reasonable agreement with our outline plans for the next 2 or 3
weeks. But he is prepared to go toward Hanoi faster than McNamara. You may wish to
probe him on this because I sense that you are leaning a little ahead of Bob on this one.
4. On U.S. deployments, I think Taylor and McNamara are very close together in the notion
of a coastal deployment of the remaining battalions of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade
and the effort to get a Korean Battle Group (Ambassador Brown warns from Seoul that he is
very wary of this proposal and that the ground would have to be very carefully laid).
5. Max's work is still continuing on the proposed actions to beef up our work inside South
Vietnam. Max is somewhat resistant to our pressures on this since he feels that his own time
and energy should go into the absolutely top priority problems. What he puts at the head of
the list is overall troop strength in SouthVietnam--and I think he is probably right, at that.
But the other matters also count, and that is one more reason for my conviction that in the
long pull we need a McNaughton-type in Saigon. John does see this point.
6. Finally, you and Taylor will certainly wish to talk over the guidelines for his meetings
with Congressional Committees tomorrow and any backgrounding he may do with the
press.
McG. B.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Political Track Papers. Top
Secret.
In constructing our political track leading to the ending of hostilities, we should first remind
ourselves of the terminal situation which we wish to create. We would like to be assured
that the DRV has ceased its support of the VC insurgency, that the main force VC units and
all VC personnel so desiring, move back into North Viet-Nam, that the former VC
remaining in South Viet-Nam are prepared to become law-abiding citizens, that the
Communist commnications network between North and South Viet-Nam is dismantled and
that some form of international inspection exists to verify the consummation of these
actions. Likewise, there should be some arrangement subject to verification that Laotian
territory will no longer be used as a channel of infiltration into South Viet-Nam.
To attain these objectives, we have three blue chips to offer Hanoi: cessation of our
bombing attacks, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam and political and
economic assistance for North Viet-Nam. The question is how best to play these chips in
order to get in return the objectives indicated above.
In exchange for the cessation of bombing we would like to get the cessation of DRV
support for the VC and the withdrawal of main force VC units. While this demand might be
our initial position, it seems highly unlikely that both of these concessions could be
obtained. In lieu of the requirement to withdraw main force units, an acceptable
modification might be an agreement that the major VC forces would "surface", identify
themselves to the ICC and remain in place pending an arrangement for their evacuation to
the North. Implicit in this procedure is the prior presence in South Viet-Nam of a strong
ICC type mission capable of monitoring this entire procedure.
Also, we must be prepared to resume bombing if negotiations break down or if the DRV
does not live up to its agreements.
Thus, under the foregoing concept, the first phase would consist of our cessation of
bombing in exchange for the termination of aid and direction by Hanoi to the VC (to
include the requirement that all Communist radio traffic be in the clear) and for the
surfacing, identification, and immobilization of the main VC units in South Viet-Nam. VC
incidents would have to cease and government forces would circulate freely except in the
immediate vicinity of the areas occupied by the identified VC units. The second phase
might consist of the actions necessary for the withdrawal of all main force units and
supporting VC guerrillas to the North in exchange for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
South Viet-Nam. Such a withdrawal could be increments, possibly based on percentages of
total strength. The VC units could depart honorably with their arms and colors flying.
Upon the completion of phase 2, there would be the pay-off whereby the United States
would engage itself to provide political and economic support for both North and South
Viet-Nam to assure the viability of both countries as independent, recognized states.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, SE Asia
Regional Development. Secret. The source text was attached to Harriman's covering
memorandum of April 1 to McGeorge Bundy, in which he explained that the draft paper
contained suggestions for clearing up the confusion regarding U.S. policy toward Vietnam
that Harriman believed existed abroad and in the United States.
I think it is important that the President make one or more statements amplifying Point V of
his March 25 statement/2/ to capture world opinion as well as to give the enemy a political
and economic carrot. Ambassador Taylor's return might be a suitable occasion.
/2/Point V of the President's statement of March 25 dealt with the need for further
cooperative ventures by the United States and Southeast Asian nations in the economic and
social realms. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1965, Book I, p. 319)
The statement should be couched in terms that would not disturb but strengthen the morale
of SVN.
Its objective would be to make an impact on the following groups:
1. The people and governments of friendly countries, as well as groups in the US that are
concerned over where we are going in Viet-Nam.
The statement should show that the President is thinking in terms of peace and the future
welfare of the people of Indochina.
2. The leaders of North Viet-Nam.
The statement should imply that NVN could have a political and economic future free from
fear of Chinese domination. It would also imply that NVN would be recognized as a state
and would share in the development of the area, and specifically have a source of supply
other than China for rice and other essential products.
3. The Soviet Government.
Statement should propose a non-aligned area for Indochina with its security guaranteed by
the US, USSR, Red China, etc. This would assure the Soviets against ChiCom advance to
the south.
4. Peiping.
By the non-aligned set-up, Peiping could have the security of a comfortable buffer area.
They might be ready to accept such a buffer, as long as they were sure that there would be
no attempt to make it a Western bastion. The ChiCom leadership is patient and it might be
willing to put off for the time being its expansionist hopes.
To achieve these purposes, the statement should propose close economic relationship
among the four Indochinese countries, with the opportunity for Thailand, Burma, Malaysia,
and perhaps others to join if desired.
228. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 1, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. IX. Top Secret. Printed in part in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III,
pp. 346-347. The source text was attached to a brief memorandum of April 1 from
McGeorge Bundy to the President, in which Bundy wrote:
"If you have a chance to read this memorandum before our meeting today, I think it will
save time. I have deliberately put the political problems up near the front because they are
the harder ones. The military and non-military action programs summarized in later parts of
the memo do not seem as controversial or difficult today.
When he was doing research in his files at the Department of State in the early 1970s,
William Bundy typed a note to the effect that this memorandum was essentially the same as
his March 31 memorandum entitled "Key Elements in Strategy for South Vietnam." This
memorandum and Bundy's later note are in Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D
240. WPB Chron.
KEY ELEMENTS FOR DISCUSSION
THURSDAY, APRIL 1, at 5:30 PM
1. The Situation
Morale has improved in South Vietnam. The government has not really settled down, but
seems to be hopeful both in its capacity and in its sense of political forces. The armed forces
continue in reasonably good shape, though top leadership is not really effective and the ratio
of armed forces to the VC buildup is not good enough.
The situation in many areas of the countryside continues to go in favor of the VC, although
there is now a temporary lull. The threat is particularly serious in the central provinces, and
the VC forces may be regrouping for major efforts there in the near future.
Hanoi has shown no signs of give, and Peiping has stiffened its position within the last
week. We still believe that attacks near Hanoi might substantially raise the odds of Peiping
coming in with air. Meanwhile, we expect Hanoi to continue and step up its infiltration both
by land through Laos and by sea. There are clear indications of different viewpoints in
Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow (and even in the so-called Liberation Front), and continued
sharp friction between Moscow and Peiping. However, neither such frictions nor the
pressure of our present slowly ascending pace of air attack on North Vietnam can be
expected to produce a real change in Hanoi's position for some time, probably 2-3 months,
at best.
A key question for Hanoi is whether they continue to make real headway in the south, or
whether the conflict there starts to move against them or at least appear increasingly tough.
If the former, even a major step-up in our air attacks would probably not cause them to
become much more reasonable; if the latter, the situation might begin to move on a political
track--but again in not less than 2-3 months, in our present judgment.
2. Immediate International Moves
There are two initiatives from third parties which require US decisions. U Thant has
proposed a three-month period in which there would be "a temporary cessation of all hostile
military activity, whether overt or covert, across the 17th parallel in Vietnam." The 17
"neutrals" which met in Belgrade have proposed negotiations "without preconditions."/2/
/2/For text of the appeal adopted at a meeting of 17 non-aligned nations meeting in
Belgrade March 13-15, see Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1965, pp. 611-612. The
appeal was given to Rusk on April 1 by a delegation of the Ambassadors of Afghanistan,
Ethiopia, Ghana, and Yugoslavia. A memorandum of the conversation on this occasion is in
Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Secretary's Memcons: FRC 83-0057, April
1965.
We think the U Thant proposal should be turned off. (Bunche tells us U Thant will not float
it publicly if we reject it privately.) It is not clear that the trade-off would be to our
advantage, even if it could be arranged, and in any case, we prefer to use U Thant for
private feelers rather than public proposals. We can tell U Thant that we have no objection
on his sounding out Hanoi on this same point, however, and that if he gets a response, we
would be glad to comment on it.
The 17-nation proposal is more attractive. We are inclined to propose to Quat that both
South Vietnam and the US should accept it with a covering statement of our good, firm,
clear objectives in any such negotiation. The President has already made it clear that he will
go anywhere to talk with anyone, and we think the 17-nation proposal is one to which we
can make a pretty clear response. Tactically, it will probably not lead to an early conference,
because the position of Hanoi and Peking will be that they will not attend any meeting until
our bombings stop. The Secretary of State will elaborate on these propositions.
3. More General Political Posture
The more general political question, which still needs refinement, is the order and content of
the eventual tradeoff. We have three cards of some value: our bombing of North Vietnam,
our military presence in South Vietnam, and the political and economic carrots that can be
offered to Hanoi. We want to trade these cards for just as much as possible of the following:
an end to infiltration of men and supplies, an end of Hanoi's direction, control, and
encouragement of the Viet Cong, a removal of cadres under direct Hanoi control, and a
dissolution of the organized Viet Cong military and political forces. We do not need to
decide today just how we wish to mesh our high cards against Communist concessions. But
we will need to be in such a position soon, if only to exchange views with Quat. On this
more general point, we believe more exploratory conversation with the President is needed
today.
4. Actions within South Vietnam
It remains crucial that the South Vietnamese and we put every possible useful resource into
the effort in the South. Specifically, the promising elements of the following programs
should be carried out energetically in accordance with appropriate priorities:
a. The 41-point program of non-military measures. (A separate first status report/3/ on these
measures has been prepared.) The Mission, as well as all agencies in Washington, should
develop additional points, and a major US program for the supply and distribution of food
should be urgently considered. Mr. McCone's twelve suggestions for covert and other
actions/4/ should be explored urgently.
/3/The 41-point program of non-military measures was transmitted to the President under
cover of a memorandum of March 31 from Taylor. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Point Program) A status report on the program was sent to
Rusk as an attachment to a memorandum of April 2 from Unger. (Department of State, S/S
Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 328)
/4/See the attachment to Document 222.
b. The Rowan recommendations,/5/ with USIA in charge.
/5/See Document 203.
c. The 21-point Johnson program of military actions,/6/ expanded to include every possible
measure and effective use of US resources against sea infiltration.
/6/See Document 197.
d. An 18,000-20,000-man increase in US military support forces to fill out existing units
and supply needed logistic personnel.
e. The GVN manpower increase programs, using increased pay scales or any other
inducement regardless of monetary cost.
5. US and Third Country Combat Forces in South Vietnam
In view of the inadequate ratio of government forces to the likely pace of VC buildup
during 1965, consideration has been given to (and the JCS would recommend) the addition
of 2 or 3 division forces to take on limited missions, to release government forces for wider
use, and to deter large-scale DRV attacks on South Vietnam. Deployment of the forces
would proceed in a series of steps, the first of which would require sixty days and would
involve the deployment of 2 additional Marine battalions, one Marine air squadron, and the
logistical forces referred to in d above.
Because the reaction of the GVN and the South Vietnamese people to any major US combat
deployment is uncertain, as is the likely net effectiveness of US and third country combat
forces in the Vietnamese environment, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
recommend that action at this time be limited to approval of the first step. The second and
remaining steps could be reviewed approximately 60 days from now.
Major third country participation would be a big asset to the program. We may get some
small Australian and New Zealand participation, with staff talks going on this week.
However, major forces could come only from South Korea. The Secretary of Defense thinks
we should seek deployment of Korean "offensive enclave/mobile combat reserve" forces (in
the form of a 3500-man regimental combat team) concurrently with deployment of
additional US Marines. The Secretary of State points out that the political situation in Korea
is touchy, but he believes that we can quietly explore with the Korean Government the
possibility of bringing in Korean combat troops on a quiet basis to reinforce and support the
2,000 Koreans now in South Vietnam.
We should defer any decision on any larger-scale program. However, detailed plans should
be made for the logistics to support the possible later introduction of the remainder of the
Marine Expeditionary Force (30,000 additional Marines), a US Army Division (30,000
men, including logistics), a possible Korean force bringing their total to a division, and at
least one Commonwealth Brigade.
6. Actions Against North Vietnam and in Laos
We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder
operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or
conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC action slacked off sharply for what
appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.
The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should
continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the
near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks, to attacks on the rail lines north and
northeast of Hanoi.
Leaflet operations with warning and propaganda themes should be initiated to add to the
psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.
Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be
considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in
relation to the Soviets and certain third countries, but also offers many advantages.
Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should
be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.
7. A Regional Economic Initiative
If there is time, Mr. McGeorge Bundy will present briefly the current results of further steps
P[resident]. If we can first get our feet on their neck. Rural electrification--Brotherhood
Operation .
President full of determination--we have set our hand to wheel. Get plenty more targets-damn many planes trying to find 'em. Hold out promised land.
Payin' enough money--payin' enough information--we got to find em & kill em. Saturday
report.
Wheeler: 12 week program keeps away from MIGs. Para 5,/4/ JCS do not agree. We are
losing the war out there. JCS want one Marine division, one Army division, one ROK
division. Lots of problems--foreign mainly white troops.
/4/Apparently a reference to paragraph 5 of Document 228.
LBJ: Have we exhausted all the possibilities with foreign/5/ Filipino forces?
/5/The word "foreign" is written above "Filipino."
Wheeler: 1 div[ision] ROKs--1 Bn Aussies--1 RCT Fil[ipino]s--Thais no. (helping in Laos)-no combat troops w/o U.S. combat troops.
We got a commitment there./6/
Are we liable to get Chinese? DRV?/6/
/6/The notes do not indicate who was speaking.
1. Effective margin. 2. proof of purpose. 3. deterrent to escalate. 4. power base if deterrent
fails. 5. important negotiating point.
Wheeler asks tentative decision.
3 divi[sion]s--logistical, political & oper probs solved.
Decision--need and, be to prepare.
Reserves
--You do not need them for 3 div[ision] move./7/
/7/Presumably a reference to the three divisions requested by Wheeler.
--You do need them for strategic reserve.
McNamara--no decision today.
Rusk--no decision today.
b. Plus the three divisions, U.S. and/or third country (recognizing this decision has not been
made however). Also I would like an opinion from our experts as to the reaction of the SVN
public, political leadership and the military leadership to the doubling of American presence
in SVN.
Also I would like the views of our experts on the reaction of NVN and the ChiComs to the
change in Mission from one of static defense to one of actual engagement in
counterinsurgency operations in SVN.
231. Summary Notes of the 551st Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, April 2, 1965, 2:05-3:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top
Secret. Prepared by Cooper on April 5. The time of the meeting is taken from the
President's Daily Diary at the Johnson Library. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
Secretary Rusk briefed the Council on the diplomatic and political aspects of the Vietnam
situation. He noted that a group of 17 unaligned nations presented an appeal to the U.S. and
other governments to undertake early negotiations without pre-conditions./2/ He
recommended that our reply be serious, restrained and positive. If the other side makes a
shrill and unyielding response we will achieve a major propaganda advantage; if they react
in a positive way, we will get some clues as to what they may have in mind with respect to
possible negotiations.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 228.
Mr. Rusk noted that the House of Commons debate on Vietnam went well and that the
"gas" issue was overshadowed by the evidence that the UK had used it frequently in the
Middle East.
The Secretary concluded by pointing out that the Government in Saigon appears to be stable
and effective and that Washington agencies and our Embassy in Saigon were developing
some proposals for non-military actions in Vietnam.
Secretary Vance reported that VC actions during the past week declined somewhat--except
for the dramatic bombing of the Embassy. The Department of Defense is in process of
following through on General Johnson's "21 points."/3/ In particular, early action is being
taken in connection with additional helicopter companies, recce aircraft, more military
support personnel, and more Marines.
/3/For a summary, see Document 197.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy referred to the pending Presidential speech/4/ and discussed the
proposed plan for a Southeast Asia Development Association./5/ Mr. Gaud (AID) and Mr.
Rusk both indicated their approval of the plan and their desire to move ahead in that
direction.
The Press was then admitted to question both the President and Ambassador Taylor./8/
/8/No transcript of this session with the press has been found.
Following the Press Conference, Mr. Rusk, Mr. McCone and Mr. Vance expressed their
appreciation of Mr. Vinson's services and contributions to peace and national security./9/
/9/Carl Vinson, former member (D.-Georgia) of the House of Representatives. Earlier in the
day, with Vinson in attendance, the President had dedicated the Carl Vinson Hearing Room
in the Rayburn House Office Building.
The President expressed his appreciation and pride to Ambassador Taylor for his leadership
and performance in South Vietnam. He also commended Ambassador Johnson for the
manner in which he handled the crisis in Ambassador Taylor's absence, as well as all the
other U.S. personnel who serve in Vietnam.
Ambassador Taylor noted his own appreciation and admiration in the members of the U.S.
team.
The meeting adjourned at 3:15.
Chester L. Cooper
/4/See Documents 229 and 242. Wheeler informed Sharp and Westmoreland of the
decisions in JCS telegram 1181-65, April 3. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland
Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)
In response to a request by the President for a comment from me, I stated that I could add
nothing to the evaluation given last Friday; however, I wished to point out that the air
strikes have not brought an indication that the DRV are softening in their attitude--if
anything they have hardened their position. I stated that I felt we must consider this
carefully in view of yesterday's decision to change the mission of the ground forces. (I feel
the President did not "hoist this point aboard" and I, therefore, asked McBundy to place a
copy of my letter to Secretary of State, et al. in the President's reading file tonight. This
Bundy agreed to do.)
The meeting was held up by an exchange between the President and Ambassador Taylor in
which Taylor said he had everything he wanted, complete cooperation, and was going home
satisfied with his week here. The President was most complimentary of Taylor.
Following the meeting I told Taylor that of the twelve points we proposed,/5/ I thought it
was essential to initiate a covert program of political action to strengthen Quat and also a
covert program among the generals to promote cohesion. I said that DDP would have
specifics of their plans either in his hands before he left on Saturday or by the time he
reached Saigon. He said that he would be very glad to entertain our proposals.
/5/See the attachment to Document 222.
233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, April 2, 1965, 10:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis.
Drafted by Cleveland, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk.
2380. Subject: U Thant and Vietnam. For Stevenson. U Thant has proposed through you
that he might take public initiative to seek a three-month cessation of "all hostile military
activity, whether overt or covert, across 17th parallel in Vietnam."
At same time 17 "neutrals" have launched an appeal to all parties concerned, asking for
peace talks without preconditions./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 228.
These two initiatives are not mutually exclusive. But public appeal by 17 nations does
accomplish one part of what SYG would have accomplished by public appeal to NVN,
SVN, and US. It creates need for each of three countries militarily engaged (and other
addressees as well) to respond publicly and reveal their present attitudes about moving
toward a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.
Now that the 17 nations have made this appeal, this makes unnecessary a public initiative
by SYG at this particular stage./3/ Indeed, at the level of public discourse 17-nation appeal
is preferable to SYG action since SYG appeal might draw from Hanoi a statement denying
UN's jurisdiction in the matter, thus making it difficult for SYG to conduct private
explorations and play mediatory role at level of quiet diplomacy.
/3/For McGeorge Bundy's recommendation to President Johnson on this issue, see
Document 228.
We believe that explorations by SYG with Hanoi may be important element in search for
ways of defusing war in Vietnam. But we would suggest his delaying action, and even
suspending judgment on exact form and content of his explorations, until Hanoi has
answered 17-nation proposal, and he (and we) can judge from that reply whether there is
any possible basis for fruitful talks.
For our part, we expect to make a quite forthcoming reply to the 17, and would hope that
Saigon will do likewise. We will try to schedule our reply to 17 in such a way that we can
make it available as a courtesy to SYG prior to its public release.
On the substance of SYG's proposal, he should be aware that we would want to see
substantial changes in the arrangements proposed in his draft, before we would be able to
agree with it. You have already mentioned to him two of the points that create difficulties
here: the need to cover infiltration through Laos, and the need for some kind of enforcement
or inspection machinery to make sure Hanoi would keep to its part of any deal, our part
being self-enforcing. But beyond this, we see a more fundamental difficulty in trading a
stoppage of the bombing in North Vietnam for a stoppage of the infiltration as such. For
Hanoi to "leave its neighbor alone" means to call off organized Viet Cong activity in South
Vietnam. Complexities this matter make it difficult, and inadvisable, to try to spell out at
this stage with U Thant just what kind of mutual cessation of military activity might be
acceptable. The main point to make to SYG at this stage is our judgment that military
activity in South Vietnam must be somehow bracketed with stoppage of infiltration as price
for diminution of our own military activity in support of Saigon.
In sum:
(a) We want to preserve SYG as useful channel for quiet diplomacy as this situation
develops.
(b) 17-nation appeal provides basis for reformulation each of nations involved in Vietnam
war, of their attitudes toward moving in direction of peaceful settlement.
(c) We strongly urge that SYG await replies to 17-nation appeal, especially from Hanoi, and
then consult further about nature, content and timing of private explorations he might then
undertake.
Rusk
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXII.
Top Secret. The last paragraph of McCone's letter indicates that it was sent to President
Johnson sometime after April 2.
Dear Mr. President:
I remain concerned, as I have said before to you, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara,
over the limited scale of air action against North Vietnam which we envision for the next
few months.
Specifically I feel that we must conduct our bombing attacks in a manner that will begin to
hurt North Vietnam badly enough to cause the Hanoi regime to seek a political way out
through negotiation rather than expose their economy to increasingly serious levels of
destruction. By limiting our attacks to targets like bridges, military installations and lines of
communication, in effect we signal to the Communists that our determination to win is
significantly modified by our fear of widening the war.
In these circumstances the Communists are likely to feel they can afford to accept a
considerable amount of bomb damage while they improve their air defenses and step up
their insurgency in South Vietnam. If they take this line of action, in the next few months
they can present us with an ever-increasing guerrilla war against the reinforced Viet Cong in
terrain and circumstances favorable to the Communists.
If this situation develops and lasts several months or more, I feel world opinion will turn
against us, Communist propaganda will become increasingly effective, and indeed domestic
support of our policy may erode.
I therefore urge that as we deploy additional troops, which I believe necessary, we
concurrently hit the north harder and inflict greater damage. In my opinion, we should strike
their petroleum supplies, electric power installations, and air defense installations (including
the SAM sites which are now being built). I do not think we have to fear taking on the
MIG's, which after all the ChiNats defeated in 1958 with F-86's and Sidewinders.
I am not talking about bombing centers of population or killing innocent people, though
there will of course be some casualties. I am proposing to "tighten the tourniquet" on North
Vietnam so as to make the Communists pause to weigh the losses they are taking against
their prospects for gains. We should make it hard for the Viet Cong to win in the south and
simultaneously hard for Hanoi to endure our attacks in the north.
I believe this course of action holds out the greatest promise we can hope for in our effort to
attain our ultimate objective of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem. This
view follows logically, it seems to me, from our National Intelligence Estimate of 18
February 1965,/2/ which concludes that the Hanoi regime would be more likely than not to
make an effort to "secure a respite" by some political move when and if, but not before, a
sustained U.S. program of air attacks is damaging important economic or military assets in
North Vietnam.
/2/Document 139.
I attach a copy of my memorandum of April 2nd, which may not have come to your
attention, since it argues this case in a little more detail.
Respectfully yours,
John
Attachment/3/
Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of State
Rusk
Washington, April 2, 1965.
/3/Also addressed to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Taylor, and also printed in
Pentagon Papers: The New York Times Edition, pp. 440-441.
I have been giving thought to the paper/4/ that we discussed in yesterday's meeting, which
unfortunately I had little time to study, and also to the decision made to change the mission
of our ground forces in South Vietnam from one of advice and static defense to one of
active combat operations against the Viet Cong guerrillas.
/4/Apparently a reference to Document 228.
I feel that the latter decision is correct only if our air strikes against the North are
sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese. The paper we
examined yesterday does not anticipate the type of air operation against the North necessary
to force the NVN to reappraise their policy. On the contrary, it states, "We should continue
roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations--," and later, in
outlining the types of targets, states "The target systems should continue to avoid the
effective GCI range of MIG's," and these conditions indicate restraints which will not be
persuasive to the NVN and would probably be read as evidence of a U.S. desire to
temporize.
I have reported/5/ that the strikes to date have not caused a change in the North Vietnamese
policy of directing Viet Cong insurgency, infiltrating cadres and supplying material. If
anything, the strikes to date have hardened their attitude.
/5/See Document 196.
I have now had a chance to examine the 12-week program/6/ referred to by General
Wheeler and it is my personal opinion that this program is not sufficiently severe or
damaging to the North Vietnamese to cause them to compromise their present policy.
/6/The 12-week program of air strikes against North Vietnam was described in Wheeler's
memorandum JCSM-221-65 to McNamara, March 27. (Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381)
On the other hand, we must look with care to our position under a program of slowly
ascending tempo of air strikes. With the passage of each day and each week, we can expect
increasing pressure to stop the bombing. This will come from various elements of the
American public, from the press, the United Nations and world opinion. Therefore time will
run against us in this operation and I think the North Vietnamese are counting on this.
Therefore I think what we are doing is starting on a track which involves ground force
operations which, in all probability, will have limited effectiveness against guerrillas,
although admittedly will restrain some VC advances. However, we can expect requirements
for an ever-increasing commitment of U.S. personnel without materially improving the
chances of victory. I support and agree with this decision but I must point out that in my
judgment, forcing submission of the VC can only be brought about by a decision in Hanoi.
Since the contemplated actions against the North are modest in scale, they will not impose
unacceptable damage on it, nor will they threaten the DRV's vital interests. Hence, they will
not present them with a situation with which they cannot live, though such actions will
cause the DRV pain and inconvenience.
I believe our proposed track offers great danger of simply encouraging Chinese Communist
and Soviet support of the DRV and VC cause if for no other reason than the risk for both
will be minimal. I envision that the reaction of the NVN and Chinese Communists will be to
deliberately, carefully, and probably gradually, build up the Viet Cong capabilities by
covert infiltration of North Vietnamese and, possibly, Chinese cadres and thus bring an
ever-increasing pressure on our forces. In effect, we will find ourselves mired down in
combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have
extreme difficulty in extracting ourselves.
Therefore it is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces, we
must also change the ground rules of the strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them
harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage. Instead of avoiding the MIG's, we must
go in and take them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their air
fields, their petroleum resources, power stations and their military compounds. This, in my
opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint.
If we are unwilling to take this kind of a decision now, we must not take the actions
concerning the mission of our ground forces for the reasons I have mentioned above.
John A. McCone/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
235. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (MacArthur)/1/
Washington, April 3, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Confidential.
Drafted by William Bundy. Copies were sent to Unger and Green.
I spoke to the Secretary Friday night/2/ about the question of Senate concern on our sending
300,000 men, or 3-4 divisions, to South Viet-Nam under the Congressional Resolution. He
tried to reach Bill Fulbright and Cliff Case without success, and finally got through only to
Frank Church./3/ He told Church that no such operation was at all in contemplation and that
we would naturally consult with appropriate Senate leaders before we seriously considered
any such step.
/2/April 2.
/3/Rusk called Senator Church at 6:52 p.m. on April 2. According to a memorandum of the
conversation prepared by Rusk's Personal Assistant, Carolyn J. Proctor:
"Sec said he was a little concerned that the Committee this morning got into with Taylor as
an Ambassador questions of constitutional problems that the President and Sec should
handle. Sec said if there was concern re fear of lack of prior consultation with Congress by
President, he would be glad to talk to them about it. C said he was not concerned; it was the
Chairman who raised it. Sec and C agreed it was not a question for that witness. Sec said
there was no point of issue between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue on that point;
there would be the fullest consultation with Congress. C said he appreciated the Sec's
call." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
Since Church is a pretty weak reed, I think you should follow this up Monday either by
asking George Ball to call Fulbright and others or by yourself calling them to convey an
authoritative message to this effect, perhaps referring to the Secretary's personal attention to
it.
William P. Bundy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
236. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the
Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/
Washington, April 3, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret.
Drafted by William Bundy. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton, Green,
and Unger. April 3 was the last day of Taylor's Washington visit.
SUBJECT
Status of Political Track Discussions
I have prepared the attached compilation of the recent papers on this subject, including the
excellent memorandum you brought from Saigon,/2/ my own memorandum of March 19,/3/
your paper of April 1,/4/ the short paper I did as a result of discussions during the week,/5/
and the exchange of cables with Saigon consisting of the March 19 memorandum and Alex'
reply comments and criticisms./6/
/2/Reference is to an undated paper entitled "Settlement" prepared by the U.S. Embassy in
Vietnam. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 69 D 74, EA)
/3/Document 207.
/4/Document 226.
/5/Regarding William Bundy's March 31 memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 228.
/6/Document 225 and footnote 2 thereto.
Between them, I think these papers at least highlight the status of thinking at the present
time and the difficulties we face. I think we should be working on a more comprehensive
revision of the March 19 memorandum, and Mr. Green and Mr. Unger will work on this as
time permits during the week. I will come back at it after that.
As I see it, your opening discussions with Quat would be exploratory in nature and would
be designed to bring out the stages of our present thinking and to elicit his comments
particularly on the content of the early stages. The stages appear to be:
1. Conditions for cessation of attacks on the DRV.
On this point, papers 3 and 4 are really not far apart, that our asking price might include
withdrawal of units from the South, but that we might settle for cessation of infiltration (de
facto) plus a major reduction in VC activity in the South, plus a surfacing and groupment of
the major forces in the South, together with a commitment to move rapidly to a stage of
withdrawal/demilitarization. If Hanoi did not in fact move to this stage, we would reserve
the right to resume attacks on the DRV.
2. Withdrawal/demilitarization stage.
We all agree that, whatever conditions we get for the cessation of attacks on the DRV, we
cannot accept a condition in which the VC units were simply left intact in the South. My
memorandum argued that the withdrawal/demilitarization phase required a lot of
international supervision, and that we would have to move to some kind of multilateral
discussion in order to get this. We need to do some more work on whether the multilateral
method would have to be a reconvened Geneva Conference, or whether the effort might be
made to bring in the UN at this stage.
3. Determination of the political structure within South Viet-Nam.
Alex' 3177/7/ takes this up at length. I certainly agree that we do not want to concede any
DRV voice on this, and I think we all agree that we must stand firm against any legalized
role for the Liberation Front. In so doing, however, we probably will want to say that South
Viet-Nam should in due course find a way of expressing the popular will to "determine its
own future" (the President's phrase of last week),/8/ and this forms a pretty good line of
defense against legalizing the Liberation Front. I don't think this is singling out South VietNam or need be phrased in any way that would undermine the standing of the GVN as of
that time, points which Alex made. However, we don't cross this bridge for the time being
in any case, and I don't think we need to be at all specific on it with Quat or the present
GVN.
/7/Document 225.
/8/For text of the President's statement of March 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 319.
4. International status of South Viet-Nam.
As stated in the March 19 memorandum, I think this is not too difficult.
5. Relations between North and South Viet-Nam.
Here we have one immediate question, whether we might foreshadow recognition of North
Viet-Nam, as Tran Van Do has suggested./9/ We might also consider whether we should
foreshadow the possibility of peaceful trade between the two Viet-Nams. My own feeling is
that we could do both of these, and conceivably in a broad form as early as the reply to the
17 nations. It is in the present draft to be discussed.
/9/See footnote 3, Document 225.
The really tough problem is the question of eventual unification and "free elections" in all
Viet-Nam. This is the main sticking point in our adhering to past formulations about "the
essential elements of the 1954 agreement." I know that the Secretary is troubled about this
problem; my own personal view is that we would not be badly off if we stuck to the old
position that we were always prepared, in the case of divided countries, to see the will of the
people determined by free elections under UN or other international supervision. We would
have to worry about taking the position in Viet-Nam different from the strong positions we
have taken in Germany and Korea. As a practical matter, I myself think that this
formulation would move the issue so far down the road that we would not have to worry
about it, although I would wholly agree that we should not accept the setting of a definite
date for future elections in any reaffirmed Geneva Agreement, as the setting of such a date,
in itself, would have a disruptive effect in the South. This too is an issue that I do not see us
facing in the early stages of discussion, and I should think we could go on trying to play the
card pretty close to our chest for the time being.
In a sense, all of this--but particularly point 1 and perhaps point 5--relate to the contents of
the reply to the 17 nations. We will be discussing this today and perhaps cabling the draft to
Alex,/10/ and you will be carrying it with you.
/10/Regarding the drafting of the U.S. Government's reply to the 17-nation appeal, see
Document 245.
William P. Bundy/11/
/11/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
drafter is not indicated, but apparently Matthews drafted it on April 6. The meeting was
held in the Secretary of State's office.
PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Dean Rusk
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Ambassador Taylor
Assistant Secretary Bundy
Ambassador Unger
Mr. H.F. Matthews, Jr.
Secretary Rusk began by saying he thought Ambassador Taylor would now have an
impression of the problem facing the political leadership in the United States on policy
toward Viet-Nam. The President felt that he must not force the pace too fast or the Congress
and public opinion, which had been held in line up to now through the President's strenuous
efforts, would no longer support our actions in Viet-Nam. Ambassador Taylor agreed that
he understood the situation in the United States. Secretary Rusk said he hoped Ambassador
Taylor would therefore not be too specific in relating the Washington decisions to Prime
Minister Quat and that he would inform the Vietnamese of specific events, such as the 21point Johnson program, only just before they were about to take place.
Ambassador Taylor then showed Secretary Rusk the paper entitled "Subjects for Discussion
with GVN" dated April 3 (attached). Ambassador Taylor said the additional Marine
deployments would require clearance from Quat. There was discussion of the revised
Marine mission, as summarized in the memorandum of April 3 prepared by Ambassador
Unger./2/ Ambassador Taylor said an instruction to the Marines was necessary to encourage
them to patrol deeply, in cooperation with ARVN units. There was agreement that the
Marines should be used in 1) local counterinsurgency in a mobile posture and in 2) strike
reaction, and that they should have an "active and aggressive posture". Secretary Rusk said
later in the discussion that he did not yet want to give up the ability to describe their mission
as defensive.
/2/Document 238.
Secretary Rusk said the Ambassador could mention the reinforcements (points A 2 and A 3)
to Quat, but said the President has not yet cleared the idea of further offensive enclaves, so
any discussions with the Vietnamese should be ambiguous and emphasize the logistic
aspects of point A 5. The remaining points under overall heading A presented no particular
problems, but implementing messages from Washington will be required for some of them.
The discussion then turned to the draft reply/3/ to the 17-nation proposal and the Secretary
said the replies of the United States and the GVN should be consistent but different. The
Vietnamese could be more shrill in their response. Various changes were made by the
participants in the draft reply.
/3/See Document 245.
With regard to points B and C under overall point B, the Secretary said our and the GVN's
actions toward the DRV concerning negotiations should be parallel and consistent; we
should consult together but our responses need not be identical and we should not get
tongue-tied.
The Secretary digressed to say he wanted Ambassador Taylor to make clear to Quat in the
course of consultations about future actions that we realized that the war in SVN was one in
which the GVN's responsibilities were paramount and in which they were taking the heavy
casualties; however, the United States would bear 100% of the responsibility and
repercussions in case the war "escalated". The Secretary emphasized that the GVN should
understand this point clearly.
Ambassador Taylor asked whether the GVN should be the mouthpiece in any discussions
with the DRV (point C) and the Secretary said not necessarily except perhaps with the NLF.
In this connection, the Secretary said, and he returned once again later to this point, that we
should explore with Quat whether there was any possibility of the GVN's talking to Front
leaders and persuading a couple of them to defect. Such defectors, who would say publicly
the whole Front was a fraud and a sham, would be worth a great deal--perhaps several
mission [million?] dollars in Switzerland.
As to point D, it was agreed that it was not yet possible to determine how we would play
our high cards in any negotiations and what we hoped to get for each card.
The discussion turned to the draft NSAM,/4/ which was accordingly revised. Ambassador
Taylor reminded the group that clearance of the GVN was required on a number of the
items included in it. Mr. McGeorge Bundy emphasized the need for very tight public
information controls on these matters.
/4/Apparently a draft of NSAM 328, Document 242.
Attachment/5/
Paper Prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Unger)
Washington, April 3, 1965.
/5/Top Secret. Drafted by Unger.
SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH GVN
Upon his return to Saigon, Ambassador Taylor should initiate discussions with the GVN for
the following purposes:
A. To explain recent USG decisions and obtain GVN concurrence and cooperation as
required.
(A) Military Decisions
1. 21-point Johnson program
2. 18-20,000 U.S. personnel increase
3. Additional Marine deployments (2 battalions, 1 squadron)
4. Revised Marine Mission
Secretary Rusk also emphasized that in discussing with Prime Minister Quat the logistic
development of certain coastal enclaves, this should be treated in very low key and stated in
very general terms with nothing that would lead the Vietnamese to begin to think in terms
of the deployment of U.S. divisions. He agreed with Ambassador Taylor's suggestion that
we could discuss with the Vietnamese the actions we considered necessary in terms of
normal repairs and improvements for current operations and to meet possible contingency
needs.
Washington talks had unfortunately not really focused on the opposing viewpoints. Admiral
Sharp said he did not agree with Mr. McCone's view. Ambassador Taylor said Secretary
McNamara expressed interest in an economic blockage and in the idea of mining NVN
harbors and destroying railway bridges. Admiral Sharp said if we are going to do that, we
should do it before the Soviet ships which are en route arrive, warning them in advance that
we are doing so.
4) Ambassador Taylor then turned to the list of items emerging from his Washington
consultations for discussion with Prime Minister Quat. He said he had already discussed
with him in general terms the 21-point Johnson program. He said that Secretary McNamara
was willing to see an increase in logistics and preparation of logistic enclaves to be ready
for the introduction of combat forces. However, neither he nor any other civilian leaders,
from the President down, were convinced of the need for divisions. There was fear that
American troops might be trapped inland and would have to fight their way out to the sea
through mutinous South Vietnamese troops in a civil war situation.
5) To sum up his Washington talks, the Ambassador said he had gone there hoping to
clarify three chief problems: (1) the tempo of Rolling Thunder, (2) the introduction of U.S.
combat forces to close the manpower gap, and (3) the Political Track or how do we end the
war. On the first two, the Ambassador felt he had obtained relatively clear guidance; on the
third, it was evident our thinking had not been refined. We had two top cards to play: 1)
stop bombing the North and 2) withdraw our forces from the South. With them, we wanted
to obtain 1) a cessation of infiltration of arms, men and direction from NVN; and 2) the end
of VC attacks in the South and withdrawal or surfacing under amnesty of VC units in the
South. There was some inclination to play the two cards separately in isolation against the
Communist cards, but the Ambassador did not agree with this idea and thought the
President also did not, from remarks he had made. We had also thought of ways to permit
the Communists a way out without abject surrender; and we had considered such matters as
political (recognition, admission to the UN, assurance of security) and economic (trade,
SEA development programs) carrots.
6) Finally, there was brief discussion of command organizations. Ambassador Taylor said
he thought there were two contingencies involved: (1) the counterinsurgency effort in its
larger dimensions in VN and (2) general war with China. While we should be thinking
about and prepared for the latter, we should not let our plans for such an eventuality hamper
our best efforts in organizing ourselves to deal with the former. Admiral Sharp agreed.
241. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to
Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
CM-534-65
Washington, April 6, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos,
Vol. I. Top Secret. The source text bears the following handwritten marginal note: "Retd
from President 4/9/65."
SUBJECT
Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam 7 February 1965 to 4 April
1965/2/
/2/In an April 3 memorandum to Wheeler, McNamara wrote that the President wanted to
receive by noon April 6 an appraisal of the current bombing program against North
Vietnam, including "comments on the effects of the strikes on North Vietnam's military
capability and its economy, and indications of the degree to which the attacks have affected
the attitudes of the people and their political authorities." (Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Vietnam 381)
1. Since 7 February United States forces have conducted 34 air strikes and South
Vietnamese forces have conducted 10 air strikes in North Vietnam. These strikes used
conventional weapons including napalm with the heaviest bomb being 1000 pounds. The
targets included one naval base, two army supply depots, three ammunition depots, two
army barracks areas, one airfield, nine radar sites, and three highway/railroad bridges and
associated routes.
2. Until 3 April when a MIG damaged a U.S. aircraft, and 4 April, when two North
Vietnamese MIGs shot down two U.S. planes, enemy reaction had been limited to
antiaircraft fire from weapons up to 57-mm caliber. The South Vietnamese have lost six
planes with one pilot believed killed, and two missing. U.S. losses have been 25 planes with
one pilot killed, two pilots captured, and nine missing.
3. The air strikes have not reduced in any major way the over-all military capabilities of the
DRV. Damage inflicted on the Army supply depots and ammunition depots has, of course,
reduced available supplies of certain military items, but these losses should not be critical to
North Vietnamese military operations. Damage to the naval base, army barracks, the air
fields and radar sites was not such as to hamper in a serious way DRV capabilities. We have
no estimate of NVN casualties. I believe that the destruction of the railroad/highway bridges
at Thanh Hoa and Dong Phuong and the Dong Hoi highway bridge is the most damaging
military blow delivered to date. The loss of these bridges will slow down logistical support
to the southern portion of the DRV. If we follow up as planned with additional strikes
against railroad and highway bridges, railroad rolling stock trapped south of Thanh Hoa,
and armed reconnaissance missions along the key highways south of the 20th parallel, we
should be able to apply a serious stricture to DRV logistical support to the south, including
that to Laos and to the VC in South Vietnam.
4. Prior to the recent strikes on the bridges, the economic effects of our attacks were
minimal. No doubt the fishing industry has been harassed by maritime operations and
armed reconnaissance flights along the coast. The line of communications strikes referred to
above should apply increasing economic pressures as well as military logistic problems.
5. The air strikes have caused a build-up of AAA defenses and, coupled with the shore
defenses including beach watcher units established by the North Vietnamese Government
because of maritime operations, have the effect of increasing the number of regular military
and para-military forces. In other words, manpower resources devoted to military activities
have been increased at the expense of those available to the economy.
6. Any assessment of the impact of our air strikes on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese
Government and people must be deduced from the small evidence available to the outside
world from a closed Communist society. I believe that the following estimates are
reasonable conclusions in the light of the evidence we have:
a. The military are keenly aware of the destructive potential of our forces. They are
attempting to establish ground defenses to make us pay a good price for every target struck.
The DRV Air Force exhibited considerable daring in its two clashes with our aircraft. The
DRV Navy has dispersed and has issued instructions to its vessels not to open fire on hostile
aircraft unless the aircraft actually initiate an attack against them.
b. There are indications that the North Vietnamese people are apprehensive of the future.
One report highlights the difference in public attitude in Haiphong in January--described as
"exultant"--and that in March described as "depressed and fearful."
c. Outwardly, the North Vietnamese Government appears to be uninfluenced by our air
strikes. The degree to which this official attitude is based upon a desire to reassure its own
people, to influence world attitudes against the United States and to discourage us from
continuing offensive actions is imponderable. Moreover, the North Vietnamese Government
may believe that, with the support of Communist China and the USSR, VC successes in
South Vietnam and world opinion will eventually give them the victory. In other words,
they are willing to pay a price for South Vietnam. On the other hand, intercepted messages
reveal that certain population centers have been partially evacuated, air raid shelters have
been prepared and air raid drills conducted, and the government has increased military
defenses.
7. In summary, I think it fair to state that our strikes to date, while damaging, have not
curtailed DRV military capabilities in any major way. The same is true as regards the North
Vietnamese economy. The North Vietnamese people exhibit an understandable degree of
apprehension for the future. The Hanoi Government continues to maintain, at least publicly,
stoical determination.
8. At tabs A through F are more detailed discussions of specific areas./3/
/3/None printed.
Earle G. Wheeler
actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31./5/
/5/See the attachment to Document 222.
4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions
submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14/6/ and re-emphasized his
desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.
/6/See Document 197.
5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill
out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.
6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one
Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.
7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to
Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by
the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.
8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian,/7/ and New
Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat
elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment
approved in paragraph 6.
/7/The possibility of Australia sending combat troops to Vietnam was discussed by Rusk
with Australian Ambassador Waller on April 2 and April 13. A memorandum of the former
conversation is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files:
FRC 68 A 5612, POL VIET. A memorandum of the latter conversation is in Department of
State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron.
9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of
continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:
We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder
operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or
conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared
to be more than a temporary operational lull.
The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should
continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the
near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and
northeast of Hanoi.
Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect
on the North Vietnamese population.
Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be
considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in
relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.
Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should
be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.
10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese
Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in
the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately
reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should
take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.
11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7,
premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should
be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of
sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made
only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary
of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood
as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.
McGeorge Bundy
E) An announcement that Quat will reserve Thursday afternoons to meet with members of
the public.
Another interesting development, but one on which we still have only tentative and
fragmentary information, has been the emergence of signs of Buddhist protests against Viet
Cong depredations against Buddhist monks and pagodas. We understand that the Buddhist
Institute has instructed pagodas to pray for a Buddhist monk in Binh Dinh Province who
reportedly burned himself to death in protest against such Viet Cong actions. The Buddhist
Institute also held a memorial service for the American and Vietnamese victims of the
Embassy bombing. These are heartening, if still isolated, signs of an improved attitude in
Buddhist ranks.
In the military field, the Viet Cong continued to lie low, their activities reaching a level
even lower than that recorded during the lunar festival period of early February. In spite of
their inertia, they took heavy losses in engagements with the government forces in which
the friendly total killed in action amounted to 189 against 795 Viet Cong dead. The enemy
also lost 80 captured and over 200 weapons. While this is good news, we still have the
uneasy feeling that the Viet Cong may be preparing unpleasant surprises for us. During the
week, we acquired reasonably clear evidence that elements of the North Vietnamese 325th
division have been in South Viet-Nam since February. The presence of one battalion is
confirmed and it is possible all three regiments are operating in the central provinces. We
are pressing all intelligence agencies to determine what the Viet Cong are up to.
Reports of improved morale are now coming in from the provinces, indicating that the rise
in confidence noted in urban centers is beginning to spread to the countryside. While more
indications will be needed to establish the extent of the trend, this is the first time in months
that we have had such encouraging reports on provincial morale.
Taylor
strength maintains present upward trend and GVN accomplished presently projected force
goals, ratio of strength will be even less favorable at end of year. I then outlined
Washington discussions and decisions including 21 point General Johnson program to
improve effectiveness of existing programs, the proposed additional Marine battalions, and
the RB-66 task force./2/ I also mentioned the possibility of additional third country
contributions, such as from Australia, New Zealand and Korea. I tied proposed Marine
deployments to Quat's previous remarks to Alex Johnson on desirability of enlarging
Danang perimeter./3/ I also referred to increased Navy surveillance program and the
additional equipment for popular forces which has been approved.
/2/The RB-66 was a B-66 turbojet light bomber modified for reconnaissance.
/3/Quat's suggestion to Johnson was reported in telegram 3154 from Saigon, March 31.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
With respect to manpower gap, Quat said that he has asked Thieu urgently to study this
problem with senior officers, particularly with respect to more effective "political
mobilization" throughout country. In passing, he said that he felt that the regional and
popular force figures on those present for duty were padded and he very much felt this
needed looking into. He also felt that a more aggressive spirit was much needed among
many of the ARVN officers and that morale in the Army could be improved by better
administration of present provisions for troop welfare, veterans' benefits, etc. I gather that
he has been discussing all these matters with Thieu.
He was entirely receptive to the addition of Marine deployments in the Danang area but
wanted to discuss matter with Thieu and Minh before giving us a final answer or
authorizing Westmoreland to undertake discussions at military level. With respect to these
forces, as well as possible addition third country forces, he said that he was receptive and
entirely understood and accepted our rationale but that he has a political problem of public
presentation which required careful handling. He indicated that this involves what he
termed a strongly nationalistic minority who could be expected to oppose introduction of
foreign combat forces.
In discussing naval surveillance in the Gulf of Siam, he said he was anxious to find some
way of improving relations with Cambodia and referred to a proposal that he had made
when FonMin in Khanh's govt for the establishment of a "no man's land" or "free zone"
some five kilometers in depth on the Vietnamese side of the border from which all friendly
Vietnamese population would be removed. He said the numbers would not be very large. In
the zone all civilians could be assumed to be hostile and subject to military or police action.
I also referred in broad terms to our plans for the construction of a new chancery, the "41
points", and the Rowan program on public information. On the "41 points", I sought to
obtain from him the designation of a contact point within the govt. After some "thinking
aloud" on the role of Tuyen, he finally came around to say that at this stage he wanted to
handle it himself and that Killen and I should bring the matter to him.
In referring to our needs for office space here, particularly that of MACV, he said that he
was considering the formation of some sort of a govt enterprise which would build space to
our specifications, just as a private contractor or landlord, so that at such time as [US] no
longer had need of the space, the govt would be in possession of some better buildings. I
among others, dealt with the wording of the reply and clearing it with the South Vietnamese
Government. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) A revised draft of the
reply was sent by McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson at Camp David under cover of a
message of April 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Draft
Appeal on Vietnam) Ambassador Taylor accepted a last-minute change in the wording in a
telephone conversation on April 8 with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Unger, a
memorandum of which is in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69.
On April 8 North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, in an address before the United
National Assembly in Hanoi, set forth his government's policy in the following four points:
"1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence,
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S.
Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel and
weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its 'military alliance'
with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam.
According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war
against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily
divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam
must be strictly respected; the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance
with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military
personnel in their respective territory.
"3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people
themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Vietnam National Front for
Liberation, without any foreign interference.
"4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both
zones, without any foreign interference." (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1965, page 852) For an analysis of this statement, see Document 255.
Rowan in his report dated March 16/2/ for intensified and expanded psychological activities
in the Vietnamese conflict. It is the President's decision that USIA is to re-program funds to
the extent possible in order to carry out this larger program; in addition, he has directed all
agencies and departments to provide funds and resources as available to the Director of
USIA. Where appropriate, provisions of funds and other resources will be subject to
procedures and amounts as determined in consultation with the Bureau of the Budget.
/2/For a summary, see Document 203.
2. The President has designated the Director of the U.S. Information Agency to execute and
coordinate these expanded and intensified activities in keeping with USIA's official
responsibilities abroad, subject to political guidance from the Secretary of State.
3. The Director, USIA, will continue to advise the President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and others as appropriate on
psychological and foreign public opinion aspects of the Vietnamese situation. Action
addressees will continue to consult with the Director, USIA, regarding actions and public
statements concerning Vietnam which may have psychological implications in Vietnam or
elsewhere abroad.
4. The Director, USIA, will report on progress through the National Security Council or
directly to the President, as appropriate.
5. The responsibility of the Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs, Saigon, for all
psychological and informational programs in South Vietnam under the direction of the U.S.
Ambassador is here reaffirmed.
McGeorge Bundy
247. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 10, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 328. Top Secret;
Exdis. Also addressed to the Secretary of Defense. A handwritten note on the source text
indicates that copies were sent to FE, U, and G and one other component in the Department
of State whose acronym is illegible, and that a copy was shown to Greenfield.
The President has directed me to emphasize again his continuing concern for more careful
control of military information on operations in Vietnam. The President continues to believe
that it is very unhelpful to have detailed accounts of the size and strength of air operations
against North Vietnam, and does not understand why it is not possible to avoid giving out
accurate information on numbers of aircraft and the weight of bombs dropped.
The President is also dissatisfied with the rapidity of release of information respecting
further troop reinforcements to/2/ Vietnam and does not understand why there should have
been an announcement on this subject from Saigon./3/ This announcement seems to him
inconsistent with the decisions reached on April 1 and reported in paragraph 11 of National
Security Action Memorandum No. 328 dated April 6./4/
/2/The word "North" in the source text at this point was crossed out and "per White House"
was handwritten in the margin.
/3/Not further identified.
/4/Document 242.
The President requests that the Department of State and the Department of Defense take
further energetic action to improve our performance in these respects./5/
/5/A memorandum by Greenfield, in response to this memorandum, was sent to McGeorge
Bundy under cover of an April 21 memorandum from Read. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S) No response by the Department of Defense has been found.
McGeorge Bundy
actions in North Vietnam are caused by the actions of the North Vietnamese and not by any
aggressive purpose on our side, in any way, shape, or form.
I do not think that I have ever spoken of "unconditional capitulation" of anyone. The exact
shape of a settlement that would allow the South Vietnamese to work out their own destiny
is a matter which cannot be decided at this stage, but I do not think your second paragraph
is a precisely accurate description of the terms and conditions set forth in my speech and in
our answer to the 17-Nation declaration.
I think that the implied criticism of "targets of convenience" in your third paragraph is
somewhat unfair. This military phrase is not a perfect one, but all that it means is that along
certain carefully defined communication routes, pilots are authorized to attack whatever
military targets they encounter.
Contrary to what is suggested in your fourth paragraph, we are not opposed to the kind of
situation which exists in Burma and Cambodia. Our position is rather that the decision on
alignment or non-alignment is one which individual countries should be free to make in the
light of their own interests and needs.
Finally, I do not agree with the suggestion that the military authorities in Vietnam should
have sought my personal approval before making the limited, specific use of riot-control
gases which they authorized in an effort to save lives. These episodes have been blown up
out of all proportion by critics who do not seem to be troubled by the killing of civilians in
city streets by terrorist bombs.
You will agree that I should be careful in responding to your specific proposals for future
action, simply because of my obligation to maintain freedom of choice as the situation
develops. But I want you to know that I am fully alert to the importance of maintaining
effective access to American troops in Vietnam, and that by my direction the terms and
conditions for discussions leading toward an eventual settlement are under careful and
continuous review.
For the rest, I will stand on what I said last Wednesday, and I thank you again for your
prompt and effective support for that statement.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
government side. Binh Dinh Province which was considered to be in critical condition two
months ago has now been restored to what might be called normalcy; that is to say, the fear
of the loss of major towns appears to be past although a large part of the province remains
under Viet Cong control. The success in Binh Dinh is attributable to three factors: a new
and aggressive division commander, the commitment of five general reserve battalions to
the province, and the improved morale generated by the air actions in the North.
We still have the feeling that the Viet Cong are regrouping in the provinces in the northern
half of the country and are probably preparing some kind of offensive action. However,
there are a few indications that suggest that Viet Cong morale may be dropping. They have
given up four major arms caches during the month without a sustained fight and the number
of defectors during the week (129 Viet Cong military personnel and 23 political cadre) is
the highest defection figure since weekly statistics were initiated in January, 1964.
On the manpower side, unaudited figures indicate that government military and paramilitary
forces increased by some 10,000 during the month of March of whom two-thirds were
volunteers. This rate exceeds the target of 8,000 accessions per month which we had
considered the best the government could do with a maximum effort.
Quat continued his program of provincial visits, making a tour of the Delta area from which
he returned full of new ideas and bubbling with enthusiasm. He was quite impressed with
the senior officers whom he met in the IV Corps and, as always, enjoyed talking to the
country people who assembled to greet him.
His principal concern remains the unruly generals and the continued evidence of lack of
unity in the senior officers corps. You have probably noted the case of insubordination in
the Navy wherein several senior naval officers petitioned the removal of Admiral Cang, the
Chief of Naval Operations. Quat is handling this matter routinely by a board of inquiry but
is disturbed by this new evidence of lack of discipline in the armed forces. In his campaign
to bring the generals under some kind of control, he is about to take the step of abolishing
the position of commander-in-chief, while increasing the functions of the Minister of
National Defense. This is a move in the right direction but his troubles will not end as long
as the military command structure is clouded by the presence of the Armed Forces Council.
Quat is fully aware of this problem and intends to resolve it, but slowly and cautiously.
Your Johns Hopkins speech and the reply to the 17-nation overture/2/ attracted much
attention in Saigon where the reaction was generally very favorable. As one might expect,
the phrase "unconditional discussion" brought forth considerable editorial comment, but the
conclusion was that the term suggested no real difference in aims between the Vietnamese
and the United States Government. On two occasions, I have urged Quat to sit down with
Alex Johnson and me to discuss various alternative courses of international political action
which may require consideration during the coming weeks and months. He has not
responded affirmatively to this suggestion apparently because his own thoughts are not yet
in order.
/2/See Document 245.
The mission has been very busy since my return with all agencies reviewing their programs
to see that they are aligned with the recent decisions taken in Washington. USOM Director
Killen has discussed the 41 point non-military program with Quat who has expressed
250. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 13, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling
Thunder Memos 1965. Secret. Drafted by Unger.
SUBJECT
Military Program in Viet-Nam
For more than two months there has been a steady growth in our military presence in South
Viet-Nam and in our joint action against North Viet-Nam. These programs are now
reaching critical points at which decisions are required about the rate and intensity of our
actions in the future, i.e. should these increase, level off at least for a time, or diminish.
Pertinent to these decisions are the openings given for discussion by President Johnson's
speech on April 7 and our April 8 reply to the 17 nation appeal/2/ and some apparent
slowing down of Viet Cong initiatives in South Viet-Nam over the last three or four weeks.
On the other hand there are the uniformly negative reactions of Hanoi, Peking and Moscow
to those openings.
/2/See Document 245.
There are set forth below some of the questions which have come or are coming to the fore
with regard to our future military actions and which should be reviewed on the basis of
political as well as military considerations:
(1) In the present period how far North should strikes and air recce take place in North VietNam?
Strikes on the Thanh Hoa and Dong Phuong (the latter at latitude 19# 58) Bridge involved
us in our first MIG engagement and it may be assumed that strikes further north would
increase the likelihood of additional engagements. If strikes proceeded to within about 20
miles of SAM sites (once these are in operation) there could be serious, sharp losses in US
aircraft and lives.
(2) Should our target lists be expanded to go beyond the strictly military?
With the exception of the Thanh Hoa power plant we have confined ourselves to military
targets thus far.
(3) How close should US aircraft fly to Hainan Island and other ChiCom territory?
It was the diversionary flight over the Gulf of Tomkin just off Hainan Island last week
which resulted in an engagement with Chinese MIGS, the probable penetration of Chinese
air space and, thus, the risk of serious escalation.
(4) Should support forces be deployed now to South Viet-Nam beyond the 18-20,000
increase specified in NASM 328?/3/
/3/Document 242.
Ambassador Taylor in a telegram received April 11/4/ refers to a proposal of MACV to
increase forces in this category now by approximately 5000 over that agreed ceiling figure.
/4/Not further identified.
We have by our military action over the past two months certainly made clear to North and
South Viet-Nam and the rest of the world our determination to stay the course. We have
also given the North Vietnamese pause by demonstrating our ability almost at will to
overfly their territory and destroy their facilities and installations. We have heartened the
South Vietnamese and seen a modest stabilization of affairs there and some slight
improvement in the military situation. Furthermore, since the President's April 7th speech,
we have taken enough strong military action to make it clear that the stick will continue in
action, even though the carrot has been offered, until there is some real indication of a
desire for a satisfactory settlement on Hanoi's part.
Having accomplished the foregoing and bearing in mind that our intention has never been to
bring unlimited destruction to North Viet-Nam, it seems to me we now should weigh
carefully the choices for the future. Should there be a continuation of military operations by
and large at their present level, a continued gradual intensification or a diminution?
Our prime objectives remain, I presume, to separate Peking and Hanoi, to avoid pressing the
Soviets into significant military support of North Viet-Nam, to persuade Hanoi to open
meaningful discussions and meanwhile to prevent any further deteriorating, at least, in the
South. With these points in mind I would recommend a leveling off of military action for
the present. Rolling Thunder II (for period April 16-22) incidentally, corresponds fairly
closely with this concept.
Security Affairs Bundy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary)
No memorandum of discussion at the luncheon meeting has been found. One of the
decisions reached at the meeting, however, was to deploy immediately the 173d Airborne
Brigade to the Bien Hoa-Vung Tau area for security and counterinsurgency combat
operations, of which the Joint Chiefs notified CINCPAC in telegram 9012, April 13. In
telegram 3373 from Saigon, April 14, Taylor expressed surprise at this decision in view of
the understanding reached during his visit to Washington that "we would experiment with
the Marines in a counterinsurgency role before bringing in other U.S. contingents." He
recommended that the deployment be delayed until all matters relating to it could be sorted
out. Both these messages are in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 51, Deployment-State Messages.
On April 14 the Department of Defense drafted a telegram to Taylor summarizing the
decisions reached at a luncheon meeting the previous day. According to a telephone
conversation between Rusk and McNamara the morning of April 14:
"Sec wondered after he left the luncheon yesterday if it had become clear that all these
things were execute orders; he asked if M had seen Max's telegrams. M said he thought that
particular cable referred to related to actions before yesterday; it was not clear what the
decisions were; they were execute orders subject to clearance with South Viet Nam Govt.
Sec said we have some real consultation to do on the Hill, haven't we? M said he thought so
but first we should get the clearances with the South Vietnamese Govt so it does not leak
from here. M said he would try to pull the pieces together this morning." (Department of
State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
The cable referred to by McNamara was apparently telegram 3373 from Saigon. Rusk may
also have been referring to telegram 3384 (Document 252) which, along with telegram
3373, was received in Washington early in the morning of April 14.
Later the morning of April 14, in a telephone conversation between Rusk and McGeorge
Bundy:
"Sec asked as to what the decisions were yesterday. B said the JCS had confused matters by
sending out their own cable. B said the document of serious consideration will be a cable to
Max which Sec and President would review; the draft cable should be over by 2 pm. B
hoped then that Sec and Bob and he could see President for a moment before the 6 pm. Sec
said there was a serious question of consultation with the Leadership on this." (Department
of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
The 6 p.m. meeting referred to was apparently a briefing for certain Senators at the White
House that began at 6:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) As recorded in a
telephone conversation between McNamara and Rusk at 4:55 p.m. on April 14:
"M said he had tried to put in the form of a cable the decisions the President made; it was
sent to Bill Bundy; maybe Sec could look at it and we could get Sec's views tonight and M
would see if the President is of the same mind. M said there was nothing we could get
agreement on back here but M had put them on an experimental basis. Sec asked if we had
left room for a full consultation with Max. M said no; it is directed to Max; he will not be in
favor; a lot of people were not. Sec thought the President should be aware of that, that Max
will not be in favor. M said someone has to make a decision. M said we are not doing
enough here for them to give up the direction of the war." (Department of State, Rusk Files:
Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
For text of the Defense Department telegram as sent to Taylor, see Document 256.
Taylor
253. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 14, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. IX. Top Secret.
Bob McNamara may bring over a cable to Taylor this evening which will rack up a number
of instructions to the field to carry out some of the things that were discussed at lunch
yesterday. (The current draft is at Tab A.)/2/ My own judgment is that direct orders of this
sort to Taylor would be very explosive right now because he will not agree with many of
them and he will feel that he has not been consulted. He heard about the airborne brigade by
a premature JCS message of yesterday and has already come in questioning it./3/
/2/At Tab A was a draft of Document 256.
/3/See Document 251.
At Tab B is another cable from Taylor in which he gravely questions the usefulness of
immediate additional ground deployments:/4/
/4/At Tab B was a copy of Document 252.
I am sure we can turn him around if we give him just a little time to come aboard, but I am
not sure that you yourself currently wish to make a firm decision to put another 10,00015,000 combat troops in Vietnam today. As Taylor says, we were planning when he left to
use the Marines already on the scene in combat roles and see how that worked. It is not
clear that we now need all these additional forces.
Your own desire for mixing our Marines with theirs is quite a different matter, and I think
that should be pressed sharply.
The net of this is that I would strongly recommend that you hold up on Bob's telegram
tonight and take time to talk it over with Rusk, McNamara and me either after the meeting
with the Senators or tomorrow morning./5/
/5/Bundy wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "I have made an appointment for us with
you at 11:30--subject to your OK." No such meeting was held at 11:30 a.m. on April 15, but
President Johnson did meet with McNamara and Rusk at 12:25 p.m. on April 15 for 4
minutes. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
McG. B.
The recent flurry of North Vietnamese policy reflects a change in Hanoi's position on
negotiations by allowing that talks are possible after certain principles have been
"recognized" as the basis for a settlement. Actually the conditions for settlement enunciated
are not new, but heretofore Hanoi has not conceded the possibility of a conference at any
remotely reasonable point. For the most part, North Vietnamese spokesmen had simply
ignored the subject. This change probably is primarily a reflection of North Vietnamese
concern that their intransigence harmed their political position abroad, particularly after
President Johnson offered "unconditional discussions." However, we cannot rule out that
the North Vietnamese desired to test Washington's response in order to establish if there is
any basis for negotiations in light of the President's speech. In commenting on that speech,
Hanoi has not attacked negotiations per se or in fact directly turned down the offer for
"unconditional discussion," suggesting anew that while the North Vietnamese are not
anxious for talks they do not want to preclude possible talks in the future.
Recent Statements. On April 12 and 13 the Vietnamese News Agency (VNA) released the
text of an address reportedly made on April 8 by Premier Pham Van Dong to the National
Assembly. The final portions of this text contained an analysis of President Johnson's April
7 address and a formulation of North Vietnamese conditions which Dong said must be
"recognized" before a Geneva-type conference could be considered./2/ (There is evidence to
suggest that these portions were added later, perhaps on April 10, providing more time for
study of the President's address.) Later on April 13, VNA released the text of a resolution of
the Assembly formally approving Dong's formulation. Earlier, on April 9, VNA had
released and the Hanoi press had front-paged the text of an April 5 interview given by Ho
Chi Minh to the Japanese Communist Party organ, Akahata, in which Ho appeared to lay
down more rigid preconditions for negotiations than did Dong three days later. And on
April 12 Hanoi released the text of Ho's address on April 10 to the Assembly; it contained
no mention of negotiations but rather basic conditions for a "solution," which though briefer
were like Dong's points. This flurry of activity is confusing and contradictory but the more
careful and authoritative formulations seem to us to be those of Dong and the Assembly,
rather than that of Ho. The net effect seems to us to be to put Hanoi's stance on negotiations
more clearly on record than ever before.
/2/See Document 245.
Terms for Settlement. Dong laid down his terms under four headings. The first heading
includes both US withdrawal and cessation of the air attacks "in strict conformity with the
Geneva Agreements" and calls for recognizing the unity of Vietnam; the second asks
respect for the "military provisions" of the Geneva Agreements (which are defined only as
no military alliances, foreign bases, troops, nor personnel); the third demands settlement of
the affairs of South Vietnam "by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance
with the program of the Front"; and the fourth requires "peaceful reunification without
foreign intervention." All of these terms for settlement have been set forth by Hanoi in
recent years.
Terms for Negotiations. The new element in Dong's proposals is the acknowledgement that
negotiations might be held once these principles were "recognized" as the basis for a
settlement. There is no indication of what is meant by "recognized," of who must
"recognize" them or of how rigidly Hanoi might insist on recognition in the form laid down.
Though admitting that the two "zones" may remain separate for some time, Hanoi
adamantly opposes any suggestion that the Geneva Agreement provided for an independent
South Vietnam. It is unclear whether adherence to the military provisions of the 1954
accord is meant to be limited to the provisions mentioned. The military agreement also
provided for a cease-fire and regroupment of forces (undoubtedly subsumed by Hanoi under
"internal" South Vietnamese affairs) and for international supervision. On the latter point
there may be more flexibility, and a few North Vietnamese spokesmen in the past have
hinted strongly that a stronger control group might be considered.
Hanoi must be aware that at least one condition, acceptance of the program of the Front
entailing establishment of a Front-approved coalition regime, would be quite impossible for
any US or GVN negotiator. The North Vietnamese may feel, however, that in some other
form, e.g. Front presence at the negotiating table or the acknowledgement of the possibility
of a coalition government, it might eventually be acceptable to Washington and Saigon. The
remaining three conditions, while couched in offensive language, are not so different from
some US objectives in the area, and Hanoi probably does not feel that it is making it
impossible for Washington to come to the conference table.
Objective: A More "Reasonable" Stance. We believe that Hanoi has been moved by the
current flurry of diplomatic activity and particularly the President's speech and its favorable
international reception. North Vietnam's leaders apparently felt compelled to appear more
forthcoming toward negotiations.
Previously North Vietnamese spokesmen publicly had either ignored or had indicated
opposition to talk about negotiations; privately, particularly after the sustained air strikes
began, they showed sensitivity to the possibility that interest might be interpreted as a sign
of weakness. Hanoi permitted and even encouraged the erroneous impression that it insisted
that no negotiations could begin before US withdrawal had been completed. In fact, in an
interview released just after the President's address, Ho Chi Minh came very close to
making withdrawal a precondition for talks. He laid down terms which if "carried out"
would create conditions for a conference, but he did not state that negotiations were
possible "only" if these terms were met.
Dong's speech and the National Assembly resolution represent a shift from Ho's stance and
strongly suggest that Hanoi now feels that the 17-nation proposal,/3/ President Johnson's
speech, and the world reaction have placed them on the defensive. They realize that if world
and US domestic opinion is to exert any serious pressure on the US Government to halt the
bombings, they must be more forthcoming on negotiations. Whether they will rely entirely
on such pressure or would be willing to supplement it by private indications of greater
flexibility cannot be determined from these public moves.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 228.
Hanoi Reaction to Other Proposals. Hanoi has not publicized nor apparently replied
formally to other proposals which have been communicated to its officials. In most cases,
such as with the 17-nation proposal, the North Vietnamese gave the bearers the standard
lecture on US perfidy and then promised to study the plan and reply later. However, in one
case, which fits in with the shift in Hanoi's public posture, the Foreign Ministry called in the
British Consul-General on April 12 to soften the April 6 refusal to see the former British
Foreign Secretary, making sure that the British understood that the door was open for future
consultations.
Peiping Reaction. Peiping, in a People's Daily article, has picked up Hanoi's "terms for a
experts, techniques, and procedures. Westmoreland will work out with the South
Vietnamese new recruiting goals and detailed plans for accomplishing them.
5. An experimental program providing expanded medical services to the countryside
utilizing mobile dispensaries. The Surgeon General of the Army is being directed to work
with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan to accomplish this objective.
6. An experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US
Army Civil Affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel) to assist in the
establishment of stable government in the provinces and to initiate and direct the necessary
political, economic and security programs. Initially teams should be introduced into 1 or 2
provinces. General Peers is being sent to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed
plan to accomplish this objective.
7. An experimental plan for distribution of food directly to regular and paramilitary
personnel and/or their families. General Timmes is being sent to work with COMUSMACV
to develop a detailed plan for this purpose.
Ambassador Taylor should discuss above program urgently with Quat, and assuming
favorable reaction, State and Defense will inform Congressional leaders of proposed actions
before they are undertaken. Westmoreland should be prepared to discuss his plans for items
1, 2 and 3 with General Wheeler during their discussions in Honolulu next week.
final execution, and we regret any contrary impression given by our messages in recent
days.
Rusk
April 15. Received Deptel 2314/7/ directing that Embassy Saigon discuss with GVN
introduction of ROK regimental combat team and suggest GVN request such a force ASAP.
Because of Quat's absence from Saigon, I have not been able to raise matter. As matter of
fact, it should not be raised until we have a clear concept of employment.
/7/Dated April 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
April 16. I have just seen State-Defense message DOD 152339 cited above which indicates
a favorable attitude toward several possible uses of US combat forces beyond the NSC
decisions of April 2. I am told to discuss these and certain other non-military matters
urgently with Quat. The substance of this cable will be addressed in a separate message./8/ I
can not raise these matters with Quat without further guidance.
/8/See Document 260.
Faced with this rapidly changing picture of Washington desires and intentions with regard
to the introduction of third country (as well as US) combat forces, I badly need a
clarification of our purposes and objectives. Before I can present our case to GVN, I have to
know what that case is and why. It is not going to be easy to get ready concurrence for the
large scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit.
Let me suggest the kind of instruction to the Amb which it would be most helpful to receive
for use in presenting to GVN what I take to be a new policy of third country participation in
ground combat.
"The USG has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and
international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent
weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of
the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the
VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat govt. However, it is becoming increasingly
clear that, in all probability, the primary objective of the GVN and the USG of changing the
will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency can not be attained in an acceptable time
frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be
supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the rough [South] before we can hope
to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.
"The JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end
of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible
mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful
campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If
the ground war is not to drag into 1966 and even beyond, they consider it necessary to
reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 battalion equivalents in addition to the forces
now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements can not be raised by the GVN, they
must inevitably come from third country sources.
"The USC accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and offers its assistance to the
GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an
end in the shortest possible time. We are prepared to bring in additional US ground forces
provided we can get a reasonable degree of participation from other third countries. If the
GVN will make urgent representations to them, we believe it entirely possible to obtain the
following contributions: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry
battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. If forces
of the foregoing magnitude are forthcoming, the USG is prepared to provide the remainder
of the combat reinforcements as well as the necessary logistic personnel to support the third
country contingents. Also it will use its good offices as desired in assisting the GVN
approach to these govts.
"You (the Ambassador) will seek the concurrence of the GVN to the foregoing program,
recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of
employment and disposition of forces must be worked out subsequently."
Armed with an instruction such as the foregoing, I would feel adequately equipped to
initiate what may be a sharp debate with the GVN. I need something like this before taking
up the pending troop matters with Quat.
Taylor
the Council has grave doubts about the individual encadrement proposal raised in paragraph
1, reftel. There are both military and political objections which appear overwhelming, not
the least of which is the likely repugnance of the proposal to GVN. However, we will
reserve final comment until Gen Westmoreland prepares a specific plan. The other
suggestion in paragraph 1--that US and GVN combat battalions be brigaded for combat
operations--may have merit and has been under intensive study by MACV in the context of
an international force.
With regard to the military measures of paragraphs 2 and 3, assuming that it is the decision
of the USG that it is necessary to take a major part in the ground combat, the Council
concurs in the experiments suggested, provided GVN acquiesces and after MACV has
organized the necessary logistical support.
The Vietnam recruiting program is going well as result of months of effort expended on it.
Accessions in March amounted to about 10,000, exceeding the goal of 8,000 which we had
believed to be the highest feasible figure the GVN could attain. All the necessary recruiting
goals have been worked out as well as plans for accomplishing them. US experts have
collaborated in developing them. No further assistance is needed at the moment.
The Council favors any practical program of expanded medical services and welcomes the
collaboration of the Surgeon General of the Army in its development. In this connection,
USOM several weeks ago enthusiastically accepted informal nomination Brigadier General
Humphrey of USAF as Chief, USOM Public Health Division. In view priority assigned
health effort, we request earliest arrival Humphrey.
We do not understand the proposal contained in para 6. We have in every province teams of
US military and civilians who are the best qualified people the USG has been able to send
and who are deeply engaged in "the establishment of stable govt in the provinces and the
initiation and direction of necessary political, economic and security programs". This
quoted language describes the pacification mission which is the main business of entire US
Mission. The Council sees no need for a large Dept of the Army planning team to work
with COMUSMACV, particularly since other agencies of the mission have important parts
of this problem and our current plans are being [garble] to be adequate.
As to para 7, we are not aware of any special problem in the feeding of regular and
paramilitary personnel; as a matter of fact, the sole program for distribution of subsistence
in kind to dependents has recently been abandoned since it was administratively
unmanageable and a monetary supplement substituted therefore. Hence, there is no
requirement for sending General Timmes on a planning mission.
In general, the Council feels that there is no deficiency in our mission planning. The
weakness is in field of execution which will never be better than the level of performance of
GVN. New programs will not of necessity raise that level; unless carefully selected, they
may have the opposite effect.
Council is deeply concerned that combination of measures proposed reftel will be regarded
by Vietnamese as a sharp change in policy and basis for our joint effort with Vietnamese as
indeed it appears to us. If we are to build a viable independent nation here, we must
continue to press and pro [prod?] Vietnamese on all fronts but realize that in final analysis it
is Vietnamese who must run their own affairs. Council foresees many adverse political and
population could badly back-fire on US and give rise to cries by Buddhists (who are now
moving in very favorable direction) and others to "throw out foreigners" and "return
Vietnam to Vietnamese".
In next few weeks Marines deployed in Da Nang area will be testing degree to which nonVietnamese forces can be successful in:
(1) Acting as reaction force in situations where ARVN has already identified enemy and
developed an engagement.
(2) Patrolling in thinly populated VC held areas and developing engagements against an
enemy who has always shown great skill in avoiding engagements except on his own terms.
In spite of urgency of situation I very deeply feel that we should not seek to deploy
additional non-Vietnamese combat forces into Vietnam until both we and Vietnamese have
an opportunity to observe, digest, and evaluate results which Marines are able to achieve. If
Marines are able to achieve substantial results in offensive operations (as opposed to their
static security missions which there is no doubt they can perform well) there should be
climate here respective [receptive?] to further non-Vietnamese forces which will be able to
apply lessons that undoubtedly will be learned from Marine experience. If Marine
experience is not favorable presumably other forces will be equally unsuccessful and we
may find ourselves caught in a situation in which we have taken on price and problems
(both in SVN and elsewhere) of large non-Vietnamese combat force without achieving an
offsetting gain. On other hand, if we wait reasonable period of time, say 60 days, until we
see how Marines make out we should not lose greatly and may gain much.
With respect to para 6 of DOD 152339Z it is difficult to conceive of anything more
counterproductive than setting up anything in provinces smacking of US Military Govt. If
anything, Province Chief is already smothered with American Advisors and rather than
increasing, we should probably in some cases be decreasing their number. However, to
reduce and better to coordinate demands by American personnel and agencies on Province
Chief and to prevent any suggestions of competition between them, there may be merit in
considering appointment from personnel already in Provinces of single Senior American
Rep as channel for all American relations with Province Chief. In some cases this might be
military officer, and in other cases civilian official. It certainly should not be US military
civil affairs officer imposed on top of present American structure in Provinces.
Taylor
he has directed that all actions and visits be suspended until after McNamara's meetings
with Westmoreland in Honolulu.
We hope you will give Westie fullest account of your thinking and when McNamara returns
here, the President will review situation again and consult once more with you.
My own belief is your views and ours can be brought very close together if we work at it.
You can be sure that we will try to respect your heavy responsibilities for the large-scale
programs you already have entrain./2/
/2/Taylor was called by Rusk on April 17, apparently before McGeorge Bundy's message
was sent, and "was ordered to proceed to Honolulu on Sunday, April 18, to consult with
McNamara and party." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Diaries, T-272-69)
I left Saigon on Sunday, April 18, for Honolulu and returned to Saigon on Thursday, April
22. Purpose of the trip was to discuss with McNamara and party DOD 152339Z, copy
attached./2/ The main business was done in two executive sessions on Tuesday, April 20.
The following attended:
/2/Document 256.
McNamara
McNaughton
Wheeler
Sharp
William Bundy
Taylor
Westmoreland
We first considered the question of the introduction of additional U.S. and third country
combat forces. There was no disagreement in estimating the situation. We all considered
that since we could not hope to break the will of Hanoi by bombing alone, we must do
better in the campaign against the Viet Cong in SVN.
While conceding that bombing would not do the trick alone, we also did not believe that
any combination of pressures could end the situation quickly, certainly not within six
months. All favored mounting pressure against the North but no one advocated attacking
Hanoi. All believed that the present target system, extended to include northern targets out
of MIG range, dikes and dams, electric power plants and restrikes on old targets would keep
our aviation busy for an almost indefinite period. I stressed that repetition of the same level
of attack was in itself a form of escalation.
With regard to the need for additional U.S. combat troops, in view of the inadequacy of
ARVN units presently operational or to become operational in 1965, we agreed on a Phase I
which would call for the introduction into SVN of nine U.S. battalions and four third
country battalions between now and the end of summer.
With the present in-country strength of about 33,000, this reinforcement would bring the
U.S. personnel to about 82,000, with something over 7,000 third country troops in addition.
We recognized that it might be necessary to follow with a Phase II and III which would
include a U.S. division, a ROK division minus and the remainder of the Marine
Expeditionary Force. Final totals in that case would be 123,000 U.S. and about 22,000 third
country combat forces.
We agreed to a new text of instructions for me as Ambassador conforming pretty generally
to my previous recommendation.
We were generally opposed to the encadrement of U.S. soldiers in ARVN units and to the
extensive use of USA civil affairs personnel in the provinces. We supported the concept of
an international force, the extended use of mobile dispensaries and a three province test of a
new U.S pacification organization.
Principal attitudes of interest were (a) desire by certain Chiefs of Staff for a dramatically
heightened escalation of bombing (Wheeler disagreeing); (b) JCS emphasis on need to
introduce troops for possible contingencies rather than for primary use in curbing the Viet
Cong.
It was understood that McNamara would carry back our agreed recommendation and
endeavor to secure authority without delay.
deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 US troops already in-country
(including the 4 Marine battalions at Danang-Hue):
1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Bien
Hoa/Vung Tau
Total: US 13 btns
82,000
7,250
/2/Document 256.
7. It is therefore recommended that you approve:
a. A program of strikes against the North according to the principles stated in paragraph 2
above.
b. The deployments listed in paragraph 4 above.
c. The approaches to the governments of Korea and Australia implicit in those listed
deployments.
d. Instructions to Ambassador Taylor (see Appendix II),/3/ relating to his discussions of the
proposed deployments with the GVN.
/3/Not printed here, but for the instructions as sent to Taylor on April 22, see Document
271.
e. Informing the Congressional leadership of:
1) The contemplated deployments.
2) The change in mission of US forces in Vietnam.
3) The creation of an International Mobile Security Task Force, as mentioned in Appendix
I.
Robert S. McNamara/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Appendix I/5/
/5/Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
ACTIONS RELATING TO THE 7 POINTS OF DEF 9164
A. Points 1, 2, & 3
The cable proposed the deployment to SVN of approximately 9 additional US battalions
and suggested the possible encadrement, on an experimental basis, of a limited number of
ARVN units.
At Honolulu, it was agreed that 9 US battalions should be deployed to SVN (see paragraph
4 above) but General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units is
neither required nor feasible. He does plan, however, to assign Vietnamese liaison
personnel to each independent US platoon and to "brigade" US forces with ARVN troops in
counter-insurgency actions. Furthermore he proposes a plan for an International Mobile
Security Task Force which will contain third country elements as well as ARVN and US
forces. Westmoreland will submit a written statement describing the command relationships
which will pertain when US ground forces are engaged in offensive combat operations,
alone or with Vietnamese or other forces.
B. Point 4
The cable suggested the use of US recruiting personnel and techniques to accelerate the
expansion of the Vietnamese forces.
Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland stated the mission needs no additional
expertise in this area, that the bottlenecks were not in obtaining recruits but rather in
training facilities, trainers and leadership. These problems are being surmounted. They
expect the strength of the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces, including police, to
increase by 127,000 men in the next 12 months.
C. Point 5
The cable suggested an experimental program to provide expanded medical services to the
countryside, utilizing the assistance of the Surgeon General of the Army.
Ambassador Taylor welcomes this proposal. The representative of the Surgeon General will
be sent to Saigon immediately to work with COMUSMACV and USOM to develop a
detailed program.
D. Point 6
The cable suggested an experimental introduction into the provincial government structure
of a team of US Army civil affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel).
At Honolulu, it was agreed that it would be wise to experiment in three provinces with full
and carefully selected US teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military
initiative and advice. It was suggested that in these three provinces the US effort would be
put under one person, and that in at least one of the three provinces the person would be a
civilian. It is understood that the Ambassador may call on the Defense Department for
whatever specialized personnel are required for these three provinces.
E. Point 7
The cable proposed an experimental program of food distribution direct to the families of
military personnel.
Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland said that there is no evidence that the
regular and paramilitary forces or their families are short of food. They said that an earlier
food-distribution plan was abandoned because of corruption and difficulties in
administration. It was agreed, however, that the mission would undertake a study to
improve the fringe benefits for the forces and their families.
views and mine was in the level of effort against the north, and that he felt that strikes
against the north should be limited in the manner outlined in paragraph 2 of his
memorandum. Rusk agreed./8/
/8/According to McGeorge Bundy's notes, McNamara said that the "situation in South is
place for a signal[;] situation in North might bring Chinese in." The President then asked,
"Are we pulling away from our theory that Bombing will turn 'em off?" McNamara
responded, "That wasn't our theory. We wanted to lift morale; we wanted to push them
toward negotiation--we've done that."
The President raised the question of the Quat government. McNamara quoted Amb. Taylor
as stating that Quat is more confident than he has been, he feels morale is better, he
recognizes dissension within the military but feels there is no coalition of dissident forces
which will threaten his government. Rusk warned that we are setting a bad example for the
Quat government by problems within our own camp and he indicated that the several U.S.
organizations in SVN are not working together and, as a result, the Vietnamese are
confused. McNamara felt that a great deal has been done to straighten out recent problems,
details of which were not discussed.
The President raised the question of the kind of support we can expect from the U.S. public,
the press, friendly countries, world opinion, etc. on the protracted program. He noted the
amount of propaganda being directed against us and asked how serious it was. Secretary
Ball stated that we were losing the propaganda war. McNamara contradicted this view by
stating that he thought we were winning public opinion and that criticism appearing here
and there did not amount to much. The President insisted that we must improve our
propaganda and must do everything necessary to get our message over. He felt that his
Baltimore speech/9/ and later statements had had little effect. Both McNamara and Rusk
disagreed with him.
/9/See Document 245.
The President questioned whether there is an organized effort within the United States and
elsewhere to discredit U.S. efforts in Vietnam and, if so, how would this develop under the
proposed plan. He also questioned the effect on our normal friends of continuing the
operations plus those which are now planned.
The President urged that all take the initiative in the propaganda war to put the Communists
on the defensive. He urged that we emphasize the good things that we are doing in every
area such as medical, supplies, education, construction, aid, etc., and likewise to emphasize
the villainous and cruel things being done by the Communists.
It was agreed to meet again on Thursday at 11:00 o'clock/10/ to consider the estimate./11/
No action was taken on the McNamara recommendations although Secretary Rusk
recommended that they be accepted. The President, however, was non-committal.
/10/See Document 269.
/11/Document 268. In telegram 2379 to Saigon, April 21, Rusk informed Taylor that
McNamara had summarized the results of the Honolulu conference at a "highest level
meeting" that day but that a final decision had been deferred at least a day to allow time to
267. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 21, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Political Track
Papers. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
The Attached Memorandum
I am enclosing the memorandum regarding a possible approach to Vietnamese settlement
which we discussed this morning./2/ I have dictated it hurriedly this afternoon in order to
meet the schedule we agreed upon. For that reason, there are loose ends.
/2/Regarding this meeting, see Document 266.
The memorandum suggests some moves that we might make to take advantage of what may
well be a diplomatic opening provided by the North Vietnamese. I believe that Hanoi, in its
answer to the 17 nation declaration,/3/ has put out a feeler--in its peculiar Oriental way--that
we should not ignore.
/3/North Vietnam formally rejected the 17-nation proposal in a statement issued on April
19. For text, see Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote a Negotiated
Settlement of the Conflict in Vietnam, Cmnd. 2756 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1956), pp. 63-65.
I believe further that, if we are to settle this matter short of a major war, we must be
prepared for a settlement that falls somewhere short of the goals we have publicly stated,
but that still meets our basic objectives.
I would like to see us move on this promptly--certainly before any final decision for a 150
percent increase in our troop deployment in South Viet-Nam that would multiply our
dangers and responsibilities while limiting your freedom of maneuver.
George W. Ball
Attachment/4/
Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson
/4/Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but Ball describes his
drafting of the memorandum in The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 393.
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
Should We Try to Move Toward a Vietnamese Settlement Now?
I
The proposed program for increasing our force deployments in South Viet-Nam to over
80,000 requires an important decision of policy. This would be a quantum jump of 150
percent. It could not help but have major consequences.
A. It would materially change the scale and character of United States involvement in the
eyes of both Moscow and Peiping. (Whether it would compel them to increase their
involvement is presently being considered by our intelligence community.)
B. It would transform the character of the war in world opinion. Our friends--as well as the
non-aligned countries--would tend more and more to regard this as a war in which the
United States was directly engaging North Viet-Nam.
C. It would substantially increase United States' casualties. (Secretary McNamara has made
clear that our own casualties will go up at a rate almost directly proportionate to the
numbers deployed in South Viet-Nam.)
D. It would probably induce Hanoi substantially to step up the rate of infiltration. (This was
the view expressed by Mr. McCone this morning.)
I recommend that you postpone the decision for a few days while we consider the
possibilities of trying to move toward a settlement within the near future.
If we should decide to test the diplomatic water, you may still wish to commit the additional
forces only provisionally--with the understanding that deployments might be changed at any
time prior to actual landings in South Viet-Nam or that they might be stretched out over a
longer time span.
II
Where We Are Now
We have now been bombing the North Vietnamese for ten weeks. We have mounted more
than 2,800 sorties--increasing in intensity from 122 per week (February 7-13) to 604 per
week (April 16-22). Our estimates show that we have damaged or destroyed 32 targets in
Viet-Nam, including all the bridges on Route 1.
Deployment of additional United States personnel to date, and announcements of further
deployments to follow, have amply shown our determination to assist Saigon.
There is evidence
--that these actions have improved morale and increased stability in Saigon.
--that the heavy air attacks in the South and air strikes against the North have--at least for
the time being--somewhat impaired morale among the Viet Cong and decreased their
efficiency.
There is no hard evidence that our air strikes have yet halted or slowed down the infiltration
efforts of the North Vietnamese.
We are on the threshold of a new military situation. From mid-May to mid-September is the
rainy season in South Viet-Nam. During that time our air operations against the Viet Cong
will be impaired. The free movement of our forces in the interior of the country--whether by
air or road transport--will be restricted.
Experience shows that this will benefit the Viet Cong, who are far less dependent than the
United States and South Viet-Nam on motorized ground and air transport. For example,
during the rainy season last July, Viet Cong activity reached record intensity (21 battalionsized attacks).
There is evidence that substantial Viet Cong strength is being concentrated in South VietNam so that it can be used during the rainy season against towns, airfields, etc.
III
Time to Reappraise Our Situation
Now is the time to take a hard look at where we are going. Specifically we should ask
ourselves: should we try to set in train a possible diplomatic solution before the rainy season
or should we wait until fall?
There are arguments each way.
On Hanoi's side, the argument for waiting is that, before seriously facing negotiations, they
may wish to see whether they can exploit their tactical advantage during the rainy season to
achieve a Dien Bien Phu. If they should succeed in a spectacular way in attacking an
isolated point of prominence in the interior (such as Pleiku or Kontum for example) their
bargaining position would be substantially improved.
On our side the argument for waiting is that, if we can get by the rainy season without
permitting the Viet Cong a substantial victory, Hanoi may grow discouraged and be more
Hanoi Position
Hanoi has advised the non-aligned nations that it will consider an international conference
"in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam" provided its four-point
proposal is recognized as "the basis for the soundest political settlement..." These four
points are:
"1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence,
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the
United States Government must withdraw from South Viet-Nam all United States troops,
military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all United States military bases
there, and cancel its military alliance with South Viet-Nam. It must end its policy of
intervention and aggression in South Viet-Nam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the
United States Government must stop its acts of war against North Viet-Nam, completely
cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.
"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam, while Viet-Nam is still temporarily
divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1959 Geneva Agreements on VietNam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military
alliance with foreign countries; there must be no foreign military bases, troops, and military
personnel in their respective territory.
"3. The internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people
themselves, in accordance with the NFLSV Program, without any foreign interference.
"4. The peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both
zones, without any foreign interference."
V
Do the Hanoi Points Provide a Starting Point for Further Exchanges?
Hanoi has set forth these four points for the purpose of staking out a beginning bargaining
position just as we have staked out our objective of a completely independent South VietNam.
We cannot realistically expect Hanoi and the other Communist governments to accept our
formally stated objective as a pre-condition to beginning negotiations. They consider it
instead as the result we would like to achieve through the negotiating process.
By the same token Hanoi obviously does not expect us to accept its four points as a precondition to negotiation.
The present posture is thus that each side has stated an objective that would represent total
capitulation by the other side.
If we are to move off dead center we must define for ourselves what we really can accept.
In other words, we must separate what we publicly state as our objectives from a realistic
definition of the achievable and acceptable.
The best approach, it seems to me, is to try to find some common ground that would save
face for Hanoi and permit it to pull back even though that action were only tactical and
Hanoi hoped to prevail at some later date. In my view such a tactical withdrawal is probably
the most we can realistically try to achieve short of totally destroying North Viet-Nam.
VI
Common Ground in Hanoi's Four Points
There is, in fact, much in Hanoi's four points that we could accept. I think it possible that
these four points were deliberately drawn to test the possibility of beginning a dialogue--and
we would do well to examine them in that light.
Analysis of the Four Points
Point One
Except for "unity", we can certainly agree to recognize "the basic initial rights of the
Vietnamese people--peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity." We
cannot, of course, accept "unity" as a basic right--except as it may be brought about by the
free act of a South Vietnamese Government once the independence of South Viet-Nam is
secure.
We have already stated that we will be prepared to withdraw our forces and return to the
conditions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements--but only after Hanoi and the Viet Cong have
stopped infiltration and aggression.
Point Two
We can certainly agree to return to the military provisions of the 1954 Agreements pending
the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam. (We must insist, of course, that reunification can be
achieved only by the free act of an independent South Vietnamese Government.)
But North Viet-Nam must abide by the same military provisions.
We have already made clear that we would not expect South Viet-Nam to enter into any
military alliances or to maintain any foreign military bases.
Point Three
We can certainly agree that the internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must "be settled by the
South Vietnamese people" themselves.
But where Point Three sharply diverges from our position is by providing that the political
settlement must be "in accordance with the program of the NFLSV" or that it must be
achieved without United States assistance.
The NFLSV program, published in 1961,/5/
/5/For text of the manifesto issued by the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front at the
time of its establishment in December 1960, see Gareth Porter, ed., Vietnam: The Definitive
Documentation of Human Decisions, vol. II, pp. 86-89.
(a) calls for the establishment of a national coalition government after the overthrow of the
government of South Viet-Nam. Elections are to be held only after this coalition is
established.
(b) provides that, once the coalition is created, the present constitution of South Viet-Nam
would be abolished. A new National Assembly would then be elected through universal
suffrage.
Point Four
We can certainly agree that "the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is to be settled by the
Vietnamese people in both zones", provided it is understood that reunification can come
about only by the freely expressed decision of an independent and secure Viet-Nam.
VII
What are the Common Objectives?
From this analysis, it is possible to distill the following common objectives on which we
should be able to reach at least verbal agreement with North Viet-Nam:
a. Peace
b. Independence
c. Sovereignty
d. Territorial integrity
e. Withdrawal at later stage
f. Mutual return to military provisions of 1954 Agreements
g. No military alliance or bases
h. South Viet-Nam control of internal affairs
i. Reunification under appropriate conditions of self-determination.
VIII
What are the Irreducible Differences?
In considering the basic differences between our objectives and those of Hanoi we must
face up to a fundamental question that could furnish the key to a possible solution:
Would we be prepared under proper conditions to accept the continued presence in South
Viet-Nam of native-born Viet Cong and accept their participation in the political processes
of the country?
Obviously, we would not accept a coalition government of the Russian type. But should we
reject an arrangement under which the Front would be given the opportunity--along with all
other political parties--to campaign freely but without the use of terror or intimidation for
political support among the South Vietnamese people?
In my judgment we will ultimately have to settle for something like this unless we are
prepared to fight a very big war. I do not believe that we can ever compel the North
Vietnamese to agree to the withdrawal of South Vietnamese-born Viet Cong unless we are
prepared to go through with the total destruction of North Viet-Nam. Nor do I believe that
we can realistically expect to exterminate the Viet Cong in the South without prolonging the
struggle over a time span that would be unacceptable to the American people and the rest of
the world.
What might possibly be achieved within the fairly near future is something substantially
less but nevertheless good enough--an agreement by Hanoi to what it regards as a tactical
pull-back. By this I mean that the North Vietnamese might be prepared to stop the
infiltration and the fighting if they could be assured of the continual existence of a Viet
Cong party in the South--which, in their view, could ultimately prevail.
We could not, of course, agree to any arrangement worked out on these terms without
insisting that the Viet Cong units in the South be broken up and that the Viet Cong be
absorbed into the national life of the country.
I do not think we should assume a priori that an arrangement of this kind would be
impossible to achieve.
Those who know much more about South Viet-Nam than I advise me that if a free election
could be conducted in South Viet-Nam today the non-Communists would win. If that is not
the case then clearly our moral position is not what we claim it to be. Under those
circumstances we could not honestly say that we were trying to help the majority of the
South Vietnamese achieve their heart's desire but merely that we were trying to stop the
Communists.
But, if I am correct in believing that we could win an election under fair and free conditions,
then certainly the United States could improve its posture by making clear to the world that
we would--under proper safeguards--accept a democratic test of strength.
IX
Outline of a Possible Settlement
The kind of settlement that we may have reason to hope for at the end of the road could
contain the following elements:
1. All hostilities would be terminated. Hanoi would stop infiltrating men and equipment and
the Viet Cong would stop their guerrilla activities.
The United States would halt its bombing and both the South Vietnamese and the United
States would stop attacking the Viet Cong.
2. The Saigon Government would declare a general amnesty--subject to the faithful carrying
out of paragraph 1 by Hanoi and the Viet Cong. As part of the amnesty all Viet Cong
wishing to return to the North would be permitted to do so. Transportation would be
provided and a regrouping encouraged--but not required--along the lines of that arranged in
1954.
government would have all the attributes of sovereignty--including the right to opt to join
the North at some future point.)
6. These questions would be raised with the North Vietnamese on the ostensible authority of
the intermediary nation which would make clear that the questions had not yet been raised
with the United States but that the intermediary would be prepared to talk with the United
States if Hanoi's answers were at all encouraging.
These are obviously preliminary suggestions that have not had the benefit of staff work. I
have not tried to deal in this paper with the refinements of any diplomatic approach that
might be made or with the problems of clearance and agreement with the Government in
Saigon.
The purpose of this paper is simply to raise a warning signal that we may be passing up an
opportunity for getting negotiations under way. I think it important that we examine our
position carefully before a decision is made that will greatly increase the American
commitment in South Viet-Nam with all the dangers and responsibilities that entails.
George W. Ball/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
also assume that, within the next few months, additional US military forces are introduced
into South Vietnam to bring the total US military presence there to approximately 80,000
and that these forces will have, as part of their mission, ground combat against Viet Cong
troops. We also assume that approximately 5,250 Allied non-US combat forces are
introduced.
Discussion
I. Introduction
1. The Present Situation. At present it appears that the DRV, with strong Chinese
encouragement, is determined for the present to ride out the US bombardment. The Viet
Cong, the DRV, and Communist China have hardened their attitudes toward negotiations,
without categorically excluding the possibility under all conditions. They still consider that
the tide is running in favor of the VC, despite the bombings in the South. They apparently
calculate that the DRV can afford further punishment and that, in the meantime, US
determination to persist will weaken because of the pressure of international and US
domestic opinion, the threat of a broader conflict, and increasing DRV air defense
capabilities.
2. The Soviets have exhibited increased concern about the trend of events, and Moscow has
indicated a greater interest in negotiations than the other Communists involved.
Nevertheless, the others have thus far rejected Moscow's efforts in this direction. In these
circumstances the Soviets have been taking a series of steps, each of which increases their
involvement and commitment, in an effort to vie with the Chinese as supporters of North
Vietnam and the VC's "national liberation struggle." Soviet SAMs are almost certainly on
the way, and the recent Soviet-DRV communiqu suggests that agreement has been reached
on other forms of military assistance as well.
3. Non-Communist opinions are influenced primarily by two factors: fears that the war will
spread beyond Vietnam, and judgments as to the relative chances of the two sides. On the
first point, fears of a larger war are presently not high, but they lie fairly near the surface
and work largely against the US. On the second, most world opinion judges that political
weakness in Saigon, the success of Viet Cong guerrilla tactics, and the ground
predominance of China will eventually lead to Communist victory. Another factor, one
which works in the US favor, is the priority which some governments, notably the UK and
Australia, attach to maintaining solidarity with the US in Southeast Asia.
Reactions to A Continuation of Present Courses of Action
4. If present US policies continue without the introduction of large additional forces or
increased US air effort, the Communists are likely to hold to their existing policy of seeking
victory in the local military struggle in South Vietnam. They will try to intensify that
struggle, supporting it with additional men and equipment. At the same time, DRV air
defenses will be strengthened through Soviet and perhaps Chinese aid. So long as the trend
in South Vietnam appears to the Communists to be favorable, however, we doubt that they
will open new fronts in Indochina, launch an overt invasion of South Vietnam, or challenge
the US in the air in the southern part of the DRV.
5. As to the course of the struggle in South Vietnam itself, in these circumstances we think
it unlikely that the Viet Cong and its supporters will come to believe that they can no longer
support the war and must make concessions extending beyond the superficial in order to
end it. They are more likely to believe that they are prevailing or at least holding their own.
6. If these estimates are correct, then some changes in world opinion are likely over the next
six to twelve months we are here considering. Fears of a larger war would probably decline,
but the conviction of ultimate Communist victory would be strengthened with the passage
of time. Under these circumstances, therefore, the outlook is for a decline in support for the
US, although the change might not be very great.
II. Reactions to the Assumed Greater US Involvement
7. The assumed US course of action would require the Communists to re-examine their
estimates of US intentions. As the buildup of US and other foreign forces became clear,
both Communist and non-Communist opinion would probably conclude that the US had
taken a firm decision not to accept a military defeat in South Vietnam. Most of those who
believed that US policy sought merely to create the minimal conditions for a face-saving
withdrawal would abandon this belief. Many people, and in particular the Chinese, might
believe that this US decision could be undone at a later stage, but all would perceive at least
a temporary reaffirmation and strengthening of the US commitment. However, as it became
apparent that US operations against the DRV were still being conducted on a limited basis,
without maximum use of air and naval power, the Communists would be likely to conclude
that US determination to prevail had not yet overcome its concern to prevent a widening of
the war.
Initial Communist Reactions
8. In the circumstances thus created, the Communists might reason that military victory
would now become very difficult or perhaps even unattainable. They might think this, not
because they expected the new enemy forces rapidly to reverse the tide of battle, but
because they feared they would be unable to continue a series of successful local operations
and thereby to maintain the morale of the Viet Cong in a prolonged struggle. Additionally,
they might infer from the increased US commitment that, if a stalemate persisted, the
chances of a subsequent US resort to more aggressive actions were greater.
9. Alternatively, the Communists might reason that the new enemy forces would serve only
to postpone the ultimate Communist victory. In this, they would be counting on such factors
as the capabilities of the Viet Cong, the known aversion to "getting bogged down" in a land
war in Asia, the political vulnerability of the Saigon Government, the pressures of world
and domestic US opinion, and the evident unwillingness, at least thus far, of the US to
expand the conflict by bombing northern North Vietnam.
10. Although there would be differences among them in general we believe that the Viet
Cong, North Vietnam, and China would initially respond along the second of these lines of
reasoning. Accordingly, they would probably try to offset the new enemy strength by
stepping up the insurgency, reinforcing the Viet Cong as necessary with the men and
equipment necessary. They would likely count on time being on their side and try to force
the piecemeal engagement of US troops under conditions which might bog them down in
jungle warfare, hoping to present the US with a de facto partition of the country. The Soviet
Union would be more inclined to the first line of reasoning but, unless unforseen events had
in the meantime produced a major change in post-Khrushchev policy, the USSR would
almost certainly acquiesce in a decision by Hanoi to intensify the struggle.
11. There is a third possibility: that Hanoi and Peiping would choose the arrival of major
new US forces as the moment for a general showdown. This could involve a large-scale
invasion of South Vietnam by DRV troops, movements of Chinese forces into the DRV,
and movements of DRV and/or Chinese troops into northern Laos or beyond. We do not
believe, however, that they would react in this fashion, at least until they had had a chance
to observe how the US intervention had affected the course of the war.
Communist Reactions at a Later Stage
12. Subsequent Communist reactions would depend upon the subsequent course of the
struggle in South Vietnam. We cannot estimate how that struggle would evolve after new
anti-Communist forces had arrived and the Viet Cong had in turn received new support. In
general, however, we believe that the Viet Cong, the DRV, and China all rate the staying
power of their side as inherently superior to that of their enemies. But the critical factor will
be whether these beliefs are proved in combat validated in terms of the tides of battle, the
casualties, and other indicators with US and SVN forces over another six to twelve months
of fighting.
13. If the Communists concluded that the Viet Cong's military prospects had seriously
worsened in spite of the reinforcements noted in paragraph 10 as a result of the US
intervention and military successes then they would face a choice between taking steps to
interrupt the conflict or shifting to a large-scale ground offensive along the lines of
paragraph 11. In weighing these alternatives, we think they would recognize that by
committing ground forces to offensive operations the US had acquired a greater stake in the
war. Moreover, they would probably also recognize that the chances of overrunning South
Vietnam in overt military operations had receded, and that if they tried to do this against
large US forces, the US probably would not accept defeat without expanding the war to the
DRV and China, perhaps using nuclear weapons. Thus, we think that, if and when this point
is reached, the chances are somewhat better than even that the DRV and China would resort
to political moves would seek at least a temporary political solution for a time rather than
launch a major ground invasion.
14. The USSR is less concerned than the other Communist states to defeat the US in South
Vietnam. Its chief motive is to prevent such a defeat from redounding to Chinese credit and
its own discredit, to uphold its claims to leadership of the "socialist camp" and the "national
liberation movement." These concerns provide Hanoi with considerable leverage over
Moscow, and the USSR would probably provide general support and specialized military
assistance to the DRV in any of the various levels of conflict here envisaged. But we note
that the present level of Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia is a recent policy departure
which reverses Khrushchev's tendency toward disengagement, and it is therefore possible
that a sharp increase in risk might cause the USSR to revert to a more aloof posture.
Initial and Subsequent Non-Communist Reactions
15. Perhaps the most important non-Communist reactions would be those of the South
Vietnamese. These reactions would probably be somewhat ambivalent, that is, On the one
hand they would be considerably encouraged on the one hand but tending by the increased
US support; on the other, there would be some tendency, with the passage of time, to relax
efforts on the other because someone else would now do the fighting. The introduction of
large numbers of US troops might lend credence to charges that the US had colonialist
ambitions in Vietnam and cause a rise in popular support for the VC. The key determinant,
however, would be the effectiveness of the total US effort. If this produced a slackening of
VC pressures, US-South Vietnamese working relations would be fairly smooth. If, on the
contrary, the war looked as if it would drag on with no particular respite from DRV/VC
pressures, South Vietnamese war weariness and anti-Americanism would probably begin to
threaten the US political base in South Vietnam.
16. There would be wide variations, ranging from very positive to very negative, in the
reactions of the other non-Communist nations to the US course of action assumed here.
However, their declarations and moves would, for the most part, tend to be unimportant,
since only a few can have, or even hope to have, any noticeable influence on the countries
most directly involved in Vietnam. The ultimate effect of developments in Vietnam on US
relations with the bulk of these countries would continue to be determined by the eventual
success or failure of US policy there and by the degree to which any individual country
found itself becoming more deeply embroiled in the conflict.
17. Major NATO allies, such as Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, and Italy, which
have heretofore largely supported US actions, would be almost certain initially to continue
this posture. However, their concern at this further evidence of US willingness to enlarge its
commitment, and at the implications for further escalation later on, would enhance existing
desires for a negotiated settlement. While Rome and Bonn would be likely to remain
passive, London and Ottawa would probably press Washington privately to show greater
willingness to start talks with the Communists, while avoiding additional escalating actions,
and also devise schemes for a de facto cease-fire or ultimate settlement. Nevertheless, both
countries would go very far to avoid an open break with the US and to maintain their lines
of communication to US policymakers.
18. Such allies as France and Pakistan, which are already negatively oriented to US policies
in Vietnam, would deplore the assumed course of action, predict its failure, and step up their
moves to mobilize world pressure, primarily on the US, but also on the Communists, to
move to the conference table. India's reaction would be similar, though perhaps even more
vocally hostile to the US. India and France might also seek to work out joint positions or
even new initiatives with the USSR, but Pakistan may be more wary of such actions in view
of Ayub's recent rebuff in Moscow and of the vulnerability of newly-established ties
between Peiping and Karachi.
SUBJECT
Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee/2/--22 Apr 65
/2/The term "NSC Executive Committee" is McCone's and was not a formal designation of
the group.
ATTENDING
The President, Secty Rusk, Secty Ball, William Bundy, Secty McNamara, Secty Vance,
Gen. Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, Admiral Raborn and Mr. McCone/3/
/3/McNaughton also attended. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
I briefed the group on the April 21st estimate on the probable Communist and world
reactions to the proposed U.S. courses of action in Vietnam./4/ In my briefing I followed
the exact wording of the sections of the briefing that are underscored and adjacent to the
numbers that appear in the margin of the attached,/5/ modifying the wording as appears in
ink. With reference to the statement that "We believe the Communists think time and tide is
running in their favor," the President asked whether that was also our own estimate. I
responded in the affirmative.
/4/Document 268.
/5/Not attached.
Secretary Rusk took some exceptions to my statements concerning world opinion,
indicating that he believed that the intransigence of the Communists and their refusal to
engage in negotiations would be understood and absorbed by world opinion and therefore
world opinion would lean in our direction.
McNamara stated he agreed with the estimate, particularly the appraisal of the present
situation in paragraph 1 and the appraisal of the probable ultimate reaction in paragraph 13.
He said these two estimates defined our areas of maneuver. I immediately pointed out the
implications and the importance of paragraph 10 in the paper and stated that in my opinion
the Viet Cong build-up in South Vietnam initiated by the VC, NVN and Chinese
Communists would probably be slow and deliberate and it would be progressive and would
always confront us with an increasing demand for men, increasingly serious problems, and
increasing casualties. I therefore, urged the group not to overlook the implications in
paragraph 10.
McGeorge Bundy stated that Lodge had had satisfactory talks with the Australians and they
are willing to provide the brigade indicated in the McNamara paper. His talks with
Macapagal had been satisfactory but there had been no commitment, and the position of
Korea had not as yet been determined. General Wheeler then stated that the JCS
unanimously supported the April 21st paper./6/ He said it was necessary to deploy the
additional men and to make preparations for still more men. He made no comment on the
tempo of the bombing. He made no appeal for authority to bomb industrial targets, POL,
power stations, etc. He expressed no concern over the idea that bombing would be carried
on over a long period of time and, indeed, the operation itself would go on for a protracted
period. He stated there was a need for more air power in South Vietnam because their air
power was getting used up.
/6/Document 265.
Note (a): His position was diametrically opposite from that taken by Admiral Mustin,
Director of Planning for the Joint Chiefs, in his briefing to me 10 days ago. In that briefing
the Admiral said that we were using less than 5% of our air power and he strongly
advocated bombing the targets which are excluded above.
Note (b): I did not at this point raise the differences as it was obvious that Wheeler's
position had changed as a result of the Honolulu meeting.
The President asked for Quat's reaction. McNamara stated that we cannot tell. We assume
that he will go along. Some work has to be done with the South Vietnamese military leaders
to insure their enthusiastic acceptance of large U.S. and third country forces; that the
command structure has to be worked out carefully, but he said no problems. I raised the
question of South Vietnam public reaction pointing out that the Vietnamese might feel that
the war was being taken off their shoulders and fought by others and therefore they would
relax. Also, I pointed out that the lift in morale, if it came about, might be quickly offset by
an adverse reaction if the war intensified. Rusk elaborated on my statements, confirming
them and supporting the estimate in this regard. Wheeler stated that this did not happen with
air and when U.S. air went into action, South Vietnam air stepped up their effort. He also
said that General Thi finds no problem with the military brigades now in the first Corps
area.
The President then made brief reference to the alternative proposal of promoted negotiations
and the memorandum prepared by Secretary Ball/7/ (which has been seen by only Mac
Bundy, McNamara and Rusk and no others), and expressed the desire to discuss this subject
only with those directly concerned, i.e., State and McNamara.
/7/Document 267.
The President then discussed at great length the public reaction and the reaction on the Hill.
He complained that no supporting speeches were being made and he felt that our
Congressional support was very uncertain and wobbly and we could lose it rapidly. He felt
that speeches by Morse, Gruening, Clark, and the statement by Fulbright would have their
effect and he exhorted everyone to carry on an intense personal campaign with sympathetic
senators and get them on their feet. He also thought that McNamara and Rusk should take
every opportunity to make speeches, go on television, etc., and point out the reasonableness
of U.S. policy and the ridiculousness of the suggestion that we stop bombing while the VC
continue bombing of a type that has been carried on. The President in his remarks, which
were extended and quite bitter and directed toward McNamara and Rusk, to me represented
a feeling on the President's part that his chief lieutenants had failed to carry Congressional
opinion and public opinion with us. He said his mail was running about 50 to 1 against our
policy. All in all he seemed very dissatisfied with the public relations effort. He made some
passing reference to my working on certain senators but I made no comment nor did I make
a commitment. Admiral Raborn suggested that I make a nation-wide television speech. The
President did not respond.
The meeting adjourned without action on the McNamara paper. It was obvious that the
President wished to give the subject further thought. He wished to get the reaction from
South Vietnam. He also wished to explore the diplomatic track prior to making a
commitment./8/
/8/Following this meeting in the Cabinet Room, President Johnson met in his "little lounge"
from 2:50 to 3:40 p.m. with Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found, but see Document 272.
I informed him of Ambassador Lodge's visit on 28-29 April,/3/ mentioning that it was
confidential for the moment. He expressed pleasure and anticipation at prospect of seeing
Lodge soon.
/3/Regarding Lodge's visit, as the President's Special Representative, to Seoul, Tokyo,
Manila, Taipei, Canberra, Auckland, Saigon, and New Delhi, with a stopover in Rome on
the return to Washington, April 19-May 1, see Lodge's memorandum to President Johnson,
May 4, scheduled for publication in volume XXVI.
In response to a query, he indicated that he had no additional word on General Khanh but
promised to clarify his future for us soon./4/
/4/In telegram, 3496 from Saigon, April 23, Taylor indicated that he had given Quat a
general report on the Honolulu Conference, as described in telegram 3491 from Saigon, and
warned the President there might be "serious difficulties" in obtaining Quat's approval of
some of the projects under consideration. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
Taylor
Upon completion of these deployments, the U.S. forces would include 13 battalions and
would have a total strength approximating 82,000 men, and the Korean and Australian
forces would include 4 battalions with a total strength of 7,250 men.
For your wholly private information, and subject to private Congressional consultation, the
President is inclined to favor McNamara's recommendations, but before making a decision
on them he wishes to obtain the opinion of the GVN. We believe the best way to pursue
matter with Quat at this stage would be for you to make an exposition of the situation as a
matter of your own judgment and recommendation, in essentially the following terms:
Instructions to Ambassador Taylor.
"The Embassy has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national
and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in
recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the
result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field
against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat government. However, it is
becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objectives of the GVN and
the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency cannot be attained
in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the
North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the South before we can
hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.
Meanwhile the JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by
the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible
mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful
campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If
the ground war is not to drag indefinitely, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN
ground forces with about 20 or more battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now
being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must
inevitably come from US and third country sources.
The Embassy accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and subject to your views, I
am prepared to recommend to the President that:
(1) The US assist the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the
272. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 23, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX CO 312. No classification
marking. Marked with an indication that the President saw it.
The following suggestions emerged from our conversations yesterday:/2/
/2/See Document 269 and footnote 8 thereto.
1. That we should accept the Cambodia Conference/3/ and transmit to Hanoi privately the
word that we come prepared to discuss larger issues. The latter, of course, should not be
said publicly. We do feel it important to let Hanoi know we are serious. Some key
intelligence people believe your Easter statement/4/ flatly rejected the possibility of talks.
/3/See Document 263.
/4/Apparently a reference to the statement read by the President to news correspondents at
the LBJ Ranch on April 17. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 857859)
2. At the same time, and after clearance with Saigon, we should slow down our bombing.
We should do this without announcing it simply by suspending raids for two or three days a
week in some sort of pattern. We should also let Hanoi know that we are doing this in order
to improve the atmosphere for talks.
3. We should then prepare for talks in Geneva--which should begin as soon as possible-with a detailed negotiating strategy. The beginning of this is in the George Ball paper./5/
/5/Document 267.
The basic assumption is that we want to get the war to the Conference table. We do not
know if Hanoi is willing to negotiate, but we want to make it as easy for them to do so as
possible.
By slowing down the bombing you are allowing them to talk without looking as if they are
being bombed into submission. By not making a public announcement of the bombing let
up, you do not get into the position of having to admit the failure of a peace effort if you
resume raids. Hanoi will get the message anyway. If it fails we can always leak stories that
we tried it and it didn't work.
We also agree that the present steady escalation, in the North, will get less and less result
for more and more noise. The best way to stop it is to slow down for a while. Then you can
buildup again, and have considerable impact without going above the present level.
After all, our political message--that we are going to stay--is pretty well understood.
Therefore the real purpose of a continuing buildup would be to smash North Vietnam into
submission. This kind of an approach will bring with it a substantial chance of Chinese
intervention. Even Ho Chi Minh will probably prefer Chinese intervention to surrender.
We should also make a real peace effort before putting in many more ground troops. It is a
lot easier to disengage planes than ground troops.
It is possible they don't want to negotiate. It may even be probable. But we should give this
a try, and in a direct and low key way.
21 to the President. (Document 265) It also noted an additional substantive point made in
McNaughton's minutes of the meeting, namely that it was agreed that "tasks within South
Vietnam should have first call on air assets in the area and that, if at any time there are not
enough assets in the area to perform all necessary tasks, more air should be brought
in." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Minutes of April 30,
1965 Honolulu Meeting)
A. II, paragraph 1. "This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or
more from Viet Cong failure in the south as from DRV pain in the north and that it will take
more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate Viet Cong failure in the
South."
Comment: This statement suggests that it may take a year or two to break the will of Hanoi
to continue their present course even if we continue our bombing and introduce substantial
U.S. forces. My view is that a favorable settlement should be possible from a combination
of continued air attacks and by the introduction of sufficient U.S. and third country forces to
demonstrate to Hanoi that the Viet Cong have no ultimate chance of success. This process
will probably take months; how many is impossible to estimate.
B. II, paragraph 2. "All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months,
perhaps a year or two, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period."
Comment: I subscribe to this statement less the phase "perhaps a year or two."
Taylor
3552. From Ambassador Taylor. Although Quat had not summoned us to resume the
discussions reported in reference telegram,/2/ Alex Johnson and I went to see him this
afternoon to find out the current status of his thinking on the introduction of international
forces. We found that he was full of the subject, having discussed many aspects of the
military manpower shortage with Generals Thieu and Minh over the weekend.
/2/Telegram 3511 from Saigon, April 24. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol.
IIA)
He is particularly impressed with the need and possibility of increasing the national effort
beyond the present program of 31 additional ARVN battalions between July 1965 and
March 1966 (the so-called second alternative). He sees numerous possibilities of utilizing
certain specially trained regional force soldiers, ex-non-coms dismissed by Diem in the late
1950's, and officers presently assigned to civilian ministries. He also considers that the
Nungs and Hoa Hao are capable of producing many more soliders and units than at present.
He has charged General Minh with looking into these possibilities and of formulating a new
program to superimpose on the second alternative. Knowing something of the problem of
raising additional forces, I have doubts as to the feasibility of most of Quat's ideas, but his
enthusiasm is certainly laudable.
With regard to additional US forces, we agreed that General Westmoreland should contact
Generals Thieu and Minh and work out plans for the following movements: (a) three
battalion equivalents to move into Bien Hoa-Vung Tau in early May; (b) three battalion
equivalents, followed by three air squadrons, to move into Chu Lai early May; (c) three
battalion equivalents to move into Qui Nhon-Nhatrang in mid-June. It is understood that in
addition to these US combat forces, there will be substantial numbers of logistic troops
brought in to add to the logistic support presently in-country, to provide support for the
additional combat forces, and to improve the logistic facilities in the three areas mentioned
above.
With regard to publicity, it was agreed that, as combat units are about to enter the country,
as in the case of the Marines, there will be a simple announcement made, indicating that the
additional forces come at the invitation of the Government of Vietnam.
We then passed to a discussion of third country forces. Quat made a fuzzy introduction
which led me to believe for a moment that he was going to raise obstacles to non-US
foreign troops. However, in a circumlocution which was difficult to follow, he concluded
that since it was the position of his Government that the cause of South Vietnam is really
the cause of the Free World, it would be entirely consistent for him to accept third country
units. He noted in passing that he was aware of our US domestic problem and that the
presence of other flags would be of assistance to us.
I told him that I felt sure the Australians were prepared to offer a battalion and that
Ambassador Anderson would no doubt be seeking an appointment with him shortly. He
replied that Anderson was already on his list for callers for tomorrow. He showed some
interest in the possibility of a Korean reinforcement but was markedly cool to the thought of
additional Philippine forces. We left both matters open with the agreement to obtain
Ambassador Lodge's impressions of his visits to Seoul and Manila when Lodge calls
tomorrow./3/ Also, Quat authorized Alex Johnson to discuss the matter of these foreign
contingents with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do who we find is abreast of these matters.
/4/As reported in telegram 3556 from Saigon, April 27. (Department of State, Central Files,
DEF 6 VIET S)
On last Friday, I received authority from Washington/5/ to sound out Quat with regard to
the introduction of the additional forces recommended by the conference in Honolulu. Alex
Johnson and I presented the matter to him the following day/6/ under somewhat
disadvantageous conditions as he was being pressed at the time by the need to develop a
government position on the Cambodian conference. In spite of earlier indications of
reluctance to request additional foreign forces, Quat received our presentation quite calmly
and indicated almost at once his personal concurrence in principle. Our understanding when
we broke up was that he would discuss this matter cautiously with his principal military
advisors and call us back for a second conference earlier this week.
/5/See Document 271, which Taylor received on Friday, April 23.
/6/Taylor described this meeting in telegram 3511 from Saigon, April 24. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. IIA)
Having failed to receive this call, Alex Johnson and I sought an appointment the afternoon
of April 27 in which Quat gave his complete concurrence to the introduction of the U.S. and
third country forces recommended in Honolulu. We agreed that Generals Westmoreland,
Thieu and Minh would initiate planning at once and I have requested Washington for final
approval for the phased introduction of the US troops./7/
/7/See Document 276.
Insofar as Viet Cong activity during the week was concerned, the lull in activity which has
lasted for several weeks continued. The Viet Cong main force units are still avoiding
contact with ARVN units and react only when the ARVN proceed against their controlled
areas. While we always try to push the ARVN to take advantage of such a lull to harass and
destroy the Viet Cong in their own bases, results in terms of casualties inflicted on the Viet
Cong during the week have not been impressive.
You may have noticed from previous reports that the term "pacification" has fallen into
disrepute as being negative and ill-descriptive of the liberation of the country from the Viet
Cong and that "rural reconstruction" has been substituted for it. Regardless of the change of
name, progress in this field remains as undramatic as in the past. However, a great deal of
work is being expended on the numerous actions programs which were discussed with you
during my consultations in Washington earlier this month. Whenever security conditions
permit, most of these programs are moving quite well but, unfortunately, reconstruction is
hampered by security considerations in many provinces.
We may have to seek your help in the matter of the new chancery project which has run into
trouble before Congress. You will recall your quick reaction to the bombing of the Embassy
in urging and obtaining House authorization for the construction of a new chancery which
would be both "permanent" and "dignified". It has been almost a month since the public
announcement of the intention to initiate this construction/8/ but the legislation has, I
understand, encountered obstacles in the Senate. Because of the political and psychological
effect here in South Viet-Nam (apart from our urgent need for an efficient and reasonably
secure Embassy), it will be most unfortunate if Congressional delays are allowed to blur the
I remain concerned, as I have said before to you, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara,
over the limited scale of air action against North Vietnam which we envision for the next
few months.
Specifically I feel that we must conduct our bombing attacks in a manner that will begin to
hurt North Vietnam badly enough to cause the Hanoi regime to seek a political way out
through negotiation rather than expose their economy to increasingly serious levels of
destruction. By limiting our attacks to targets like bridges, military installations and lines of
communication, in effect we signal to the Communists that our determination to win is
significantly modified by our fear of widening the war.
In these circumstances the Communists are likely to feel they can afford to accept a
considerable amount of bomb damage while they improve their air defenses and step up
their insurgency in South Vietnam. If they take this line of action, in the next few months
they can present us with an ever-increasing guerrilla war against the reinforced Viet Cong in
terrain and circumstances favorable to the Communists.
If this situation develops and lasts several months or more, I feel world opinion will turn
against us, Communist propaganda will become increasingly effective, and indeed domestic
support of our policy may erode.
I therefore urge that as we deploy additional troops, which I believe necessary, we
concurrently hit the north harder and inflict greater damage. In my opinion, we should strike
their petroleum supplies, electric power installations, and air defense installations (including
the SAM sites which are now being built). I do not think we have to fear taking on the
MIG's, which after all the ChiNats defeated in 1958 with F-86's and Sidewinders.
I am not talking about bombing centers of population or killing innocent people, though
there will of course be some casualties. I am proposing to "tighten the tourniquet" on North
Vietnam so as to make the Communists pause to weigh the losses they are taking against
their prospects for gains. We should make it hard for the Viet Cong to win in the south and
simultaneously hard for Hanoi to endure our attacks in the north.
I believe this course of action holds out the greatest promise we can hope for in our effort to
attain our ultimate objective of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem. This
view follows logically, it seems to me, from our National Intelligence Estimate of 18
February 1965,/2/ which concludes that the Hanoi regime would be more likely than not to
make an effort to "secure a respite" by some political move when and if, but not before, a
sustained U.S. program of air attacks is damaging important economic or military assets in
North Vietnam.
/2/Document 139.
I attach a copy of my memorandum of April 2nd,/3/ which may not have come to your
attention, since it argues this case in a little more detail.
/3/See the attachment to Document 234.
Respectfully yours,
John A. McCone/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
281. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 1, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. X. No classification marking.
In the attached cable/2/ Max Taylor reports that he has relayed to Quat our basic decisions
on the May deployments to Vietnam. His current plan is that there will be a joint
announcement from Saigon on Monday,/3/ very early in the morning, our time. This timing
may slip somewhat if the planned schedule is not met. The text of the announcement is at
the second page in the marked paragraph./4/
/2/Telegram 3606 from Saigon, May 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
/3/May 3.
/4/The text of the announcement reads as follows: "As a continuation of the GVN's efforts
to assure security of key installations and to press the war effort against the Viet Cong more
vigorously, the GVN has requested and the United States Government has agreed to furnish
three battalions of United States airborne forces for deployment in South Viet-Nam. This
contingent of United States forces will augment the security forces assigned to the vital
Bien Hoa-Vung Tau military base complex. An advance party arrived on 3 May and the
movement will be completed within the next few days."
McG. B.
/2/For text of a May 6 message from Rusk to the Cambodian Foreign Minister regarding the
severance of relations between the two countries, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1965, pp. 716-717.
The major events of the military week were the arrival of the advance party of the 173rd
Airborne Brigade and the announcement that Australia will send a battalion of combat
troops to Vietnam. Both announcements were received with enthusiasm and, for the
moment, constitute a lift to the local morale. What the eventual effect will be of the
presence of so many foreign troops is still unpredictable.
There are many sensitivities in this country of which we foreigners are unperfectly aware.
Recently, the local press picked up a report that a joint US/GVN command was being
considered which has triggered many adverse comments both in public and in private. A
joint command to the Vietnamese means one dominated by the US and such a subordination
would be offensive to most Vietnamese. General Westmoreland is thoroughly aware of this
sensitivity and will proceed cautiously in suggesting such changes of relationship as may be
required by the presence of US ground forces in action.
I hope that your attention has been called to the highly successful anti-Viet Cong operation
in Kien Hoa Province where the seventh division has just executed an extremely well
planned operation. It resulted in the discovery of a large arms and supply cache and the
capture of important documents giving considerable information on seaborne infiltration. It
may well be that this discovery will be more valuable than the ship we sank at Vung Ro
Bay in early March.
We enjoyed very much Cabot Lodge's visit last Wednesday and Thursday. He said the right
thing to the right people and left much good feeling behind him. Many thanks for having
him call on us.
Taylor
285. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council
Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, May 7, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIV,
Memos (B). Secret.
SUBJECT
The Radhakrishnan Plan for Vietnam/2/
/2/Indian President Radhakrishnan publicly put forward the plan outlined in this
memorandum on May 24. (The New York Times, May 25)
You asked for our thoughts on the usefulness of the Radhakrishnan plan for a Vietnam
solution.
The Plan: Originally Radhakrishnan's personal inspiration (proposed rather casually last
month on receiving a newly accredited diplomat), this plan now has the full support of the
Indian Government and should be taken seriously, if for that reason alone.
Essentially, the proposals are for (a) cessation of hostilities by both sides in Vietnam; (b)
policing of the boundary between North and South Vietnam by an Afro-Asian force; and (c)
maintenance of the present boundaries so long as the people concerned desire it. In more
recent discussions, the Indians have indicated that (a) "cessation of hostilities" would not
interfere with the GVN's right and obligation to preserve peace within its borders; (b) the
proposal for Afro-Asian troops in the area did not imply a request for concurrent evacuation
of U.S. forces (the Indians assume that U.S. forces would "pull back" into camps but would
remain in South Vietnam); and (c) the Afro-Asian force would patrol the 17th parallel and
also the Cambodian and Lao borders.
Status of the Plan: The Indians have now solicited support for this plan in most capitals of
Europe, Africa and Asia, with the exception of Karachi, Djakarta, and Peking. They report
favorable responses from Nkrumah, Nasser, Tito and Souvanna Phouma; they say that the
Soviets find the proposal "interesting" and are ready to "use their influence with Hanoi".
Peking has denounced the plan. The Indians are currently working on the command,
recruitment, and financial aspects of the proposed Afro-Asian force; it is envisioned that
such troops would come mainly from Japan, Nigeria and the U.A.R. (India is also ready to
contribute, but its role has to be worked out so as not to prejudice its position on the ICC.)
The U.S. Response: Bowles and the Department have privately told the Indians of our
interest in the Radhakrishnan initiative. We are not under pressure for an immediate public
response, since the Indians themselves believe that the U.S. should refrain from public
endorsement until Moscow and Hanoi have made their position clear. However, Bowles
argues that a public statement that we are considering this plan would further demonstrate
our reasonableness and flexibility, would help to build up Indian influence vis--vis China
before the Algiers conference, would increase India's good will towards us at a critical
juncture, and would test Hanoi's and Moscow's desire to end the fighting on honorable
terms.
Embassy Saigon's Reaction: Embassy Saigon has just reported its views (Saigon's 3682)/3/
that the Radhakrishnan plan has attractive features and that we should encourage the Indians
to develop it. Saigon also suggests that we refrain from public endorsement of the plan to
avoid giving it the kiss of death in Hanoi. The GVN Foreign Minister is currently in New
Delhi, and something further may come out of his talks with the Indians.
/3/Dated May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Conclusion: This plan has considerable merit. At the very least, it provides yet another
means to show our peaceful intentions and to test the other side; conceivably it might serve
as the basis for a negotiated solution.
For the time being, we seem to be playing this one just about right; but we should be ready
to move with some speed toward public endorsement if either Moscow or Hanoi makes
such a move.
Jim
could be of critical importance, particularly in light of the fact that there have been some
indications of differing views between Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. For example, it would
probably be advantageous to expand bombings after, not before, some major new VC move
(e.g. obvious concentration for imminent attack on Da Nang or Kontum) and after, not
before, any current possibilities of serious negotiations have been fully tested. And such
bombings should not be so regular as to leave no interval for the Communists to make
concessions with some grace. Indeed, we should keep in mind the possibility of a pause at
some appropriate time, which could serve to test the Communist intentions and to exploit
any differences on their side.
We must not of course get overly preoccupied with military action and lose sight of the
basically political aspect of the war. In the final analysis, it can only be won at the SVN
hamlet level.
This will thus entail certain measures over and above greater military commitment and
expanded punishment of the DRV. The most imperative of these are:
a. Creating effective administrative, police, and local defense instrumentalities at the hamlet
level.
b. Making US and GVN military measures support a growth of indigenous civilian political
authority and serve legitimate local and national aspirations.
c. Expanding such political, economic, and sociological efforts as will close the gap
between Saigon governments and the South Vietnamese population.
The expanded air attacks on North Vietnam, judiciously exercised, are not expected to
result in large-scale Chinese Communist intervention by ground forces in Vietnam or
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, as long as the Chinese do not believe their vital security
interest is threatened by US actions. In other words, the chances of such actions are less
than even, but should not be wholly excluded./6/
/6/A note on the source text indicates that there were three attachments to the letter. Annex
A is the McCone letter cited in footnote 2 above; Annex B is printed below; and Annex C is
described as a recent intelligence rsum, but is not further identified and was not found.
WF Raborn
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Annex B/7/
/7/Top Secret.
DATA TO SUPPORT VIEWS CONTAINED IN DCI'S LETTER TO
THE PRESIDENT DATED 8 MAY 1965
I. The current programs for our air strikes against North Vietnam, as I understand them,
limit the targets to such objectives as bridges, military installations, and lines of
communication, avoiding targets in populated areas or within the "effective GCI range" of
MIG jet fighters.
A. I do not believe that an air strike program operating under these restrictions is going to
hurt the North Vietnamese enough to persuade Hanoi to end its support of the guerrillas in
South Vietnam, or even to negotiate.
1. We have some recent evidence that the intensification of our air strikes is disrupting the
economy and the every-day life of the North Vietnamese, but the strikes to date have not
caused any change in the North Vietnamese policy of directing the Viet Cong insurgency,
infiltrating cadres, and supplying materiel.
2. If anything, the strikes to date appear to have hardened Hanoi's attitude. By now the
North Vietnamese may well have discerned for themselves the restraints under which the
Rolling Thunder operations are conducted. They are likely to read this as evidence of a U.S.
desire to temporize.
3. In these circumstances, the Communists will probably feel that they can afford to accept
a considerable amount of bomb damage while they improve their air defenses and intensify
the insurgency in South Vietnam. If they do this, we face the prospect over the next few
months of an ever-increasing war against a reinforced Viet Cong, in terrain and under
circumstances favorable to the Communists.
4. Another hazard that must be kept in mind when we speak in terms of a "slowly ascending
tempo" for Rolling Thunder is that with the passage of each day and each week, we can
expect increasing pressure to stop the bombing. This pressure will come from various
elements of the American public, from the press, from the United Nations, and from world
opinion. Under these restraints, time is running against us. The Communists not only know
this and count on it, but are doing what they can to further the pressure.
B. We are changing the mission of our ground forces in South Vietnam from one of advice
and static defense to one of active combat operations against the Viet Cong guerrillas, and
to do this we are deploying additional troops.
1. I think what we are doing is starting on a track involving ground force operations, which
is necessary, and which will restrain some Viet Cong advances, but a track which--in all
probability--will have limited effectiveness against guerrillas.
2. We can expect requirements for an ever-increasing commitment of U.S. personnel, but
we cannot reasonably predict that this will materially improve the chances for victory. In
the final analysis, the submission of the Viet Cong can only be brought about by forcing
Hanoi to the necessary decision.
3. As long as our actions against North Vietnam do not impose unacceptable damage nor
threaten the vital interests of North Vietnam, I believe that the new ground operations in the
South carry the risk of simply encouraging Moscow and Peiping to support Hanoi. They are
likely to conclude that the risk to them is minimal.
4. As I see it, the reaction of the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists will be to
build up the capabilities of the Viet Cong deliberately, carefully, and probably gradually, by
the covert infiltration of North Vietnamese and possibly Chinese reinforcements. We will,
in effect, find ourselves pressing the fight on the ground, in the jungle, where our
capabilities have the least comparative advantage. We may become bogged down in a
military effort which we cannot win, and from which we cannot easily extricate ourselves.
II. It is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces, we must also
change the rules for the air strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder and
more frequently, and inflict greater damage. If we are not willing to do this, I question
seriously whether it is wise to become more deeply involved in the ground operations.
A. Specifically, I feel that we must carry on the air strike in a manner that will begin to hurt
North Vietnam badly enough so that Hanoi will prefer negotiation, in search for a political
way out, rather than exposure of its economy to increasingly severe levels of destruction.
B. I feel we must hit their petroleum supplies and their electric power installations. We
should knock out their air defense installations, including any surface-to-air missile sites we
can find under construction or completed. We should not avoid their MIG fighters, but go
after them. I do not think we need to fear taking on MIG's which, after all, the Chinese
Nationalists defeated badly in 1958 with F-86's.
C. I am not talking about bombing centers of population per se, and killing civilians who
are not involved. There will, of course, be some casualties, but what I am proposing is to
"tighten the tourniquet" on North Vietnam, to multiply the damage to the military and
economic fabric of their society so that they will have to measure the actual loss against the
long-term prospect for gains.
1. There is probably room for some leeway in the timing of this expanded air strike
program. For example, it would probably be advantageous to launch it after, rather than
before some major new Viet Cong move, such as obvious concentration for an attack on Da
Nang or Kontum.
2. I feel it might also be wise if the pace of the expanded air strikes were irregular enough
so that there would be intervals from time to time when the Communists could move toward
the negotiating tables without total loss of face--not out of any consideration for their
sensitivities, but because this is, after all, what we desire.
3. I do feel, however, that this new program--including the "timing" element--must be taken
promptly. If it is implemented too gradually, then we will not only face the increasing
pressures of domestic, allied and world opinion which I mentioned before, but there is also
some danger that the Communists will be slow to get the message.
III. I believe this course of action holds out the greatest hope there is for our ultimate
objective of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem. If we only make it hard for
the enemy in the South, we are not bringing effective pressure to bear on his commander in
the North. Hanoi, in my view, is not likely to engage in meaningful discussions at any time
in coming months, if U.S. air attacks have not yet begun to damage or destroy its principal
economic and military targets, which are overwhelmingly in the northern portion of North
Vietnam, beyond the scope of our present strikes.
A. The Intelligence Community, less the Department of State, is in agreement, however,
that the Hanoi regime would be more likely than not to seek a respite by some political
move when and if--but not before--a sustained program of U.S. air strikes is damaging
important economic and military assets in North Vietnam.
B. I think we have got to proceed forthwith to fulfill this condition, and hit the North
Vietnamese where it really hurts.
all possible in political terms for Quat. I assume we could undertake to enlist the
Archbishop and the Nuncio in calming the Catholics.
/3/Telegram 3699, May 8, reported that Thich Tinh Khiet's Buddha birthday message
carried no appeal for a cease-fire. Taylor added that on May 1 he had asked Prime Minister
Quat whether he saw any merit in the suggestion that there be a pause in air attacks during
the celebration of Buddha's birthday. Quat responded that Buddha's birthday was not a
national holiday akin to Tet, and he did not see any merit in such a suggestion. (Department
of State, Central Files, SOC 12 VIET S)
/4/In telegram 3706, May 10, the Embassy reported that it had received from Tri Quang a
copy of an appeal being made by Khiet calling for a cessation of hostilities on Buddha's
birthday. Tri Quang said that the birthday message reported in telegram 3699 had not been
Khiet's authorized holiday appeal. He added that should the United States heed such an
appeal, its stock would go up significantly with the Vietnamese people. (Ibid., POL 27
VIET S)
You should understand that my purpose in this plan is to begin to clear a path either toward
restoration of peace or toward increased military action, depending upon the reaction of the
Communists. We have amply demonstrated our determination and our commitment in the
last two months, and I now wish to gain some flexibility.
I know that this is a hard assignment on short notice, but there is no one who can bring it off
better.
I have kept this plan in the tightest possible circle here and wish you to inform no one but
Alexis Johnson. After I have your report of Quat's reaction I will make a final decision and
it will be communicated promptly to senior officers concerned.
Rusk
given to pause of several days duration in air attacks against DRV which, it seemed to us,
would offer several advantages. Such action would be viewed favorably by world opinion
as an indication of our reluctance to proceed too rapidly in applying military pressures. It
would also provide an opportunity to observe reaction of Hanoi leaders who are unlikely to
respond other than with defiance while attacks are in process. Finally, we could anticipate
some psychological effect deriving from quiet of several days of suspended action followed,
if required, by resumption of attacks.
After pointing out advantages, we noted danger of misinterpretation and need for plausible
reason for timing of our action. We said that observance of Buddha's birthday offered
convenient peg upon which to hang our proposed action. We knew that from previous
discussions Quat had not favored anything resembling cease-fire related to this period but
we were raising matter again in an entirely different context.
Quat did not take issue with arguments in favor of pause of limited duration. He did
suggest, however, that pause be introduced progressively, one day of air activity followed
by another of quiet. I objected that this kind of pattern would not fully meet any of three
purposes which we considered to justify suspension of air activity. He abandoned argument
without much reluctance and indicated general agreement with pause concept (four or five
days only) except for linkage with Buddha's birthday. He feels strongly that we should not
publicly advance this occasion as reason for our action. To do so would cause him difficulty
with local Catholics and would be embarrassing in other respects since his govt has
declined to give official recognition and support to birthday period. Finally, he pointed out
that Ambassador Lodge was alleged to have pursued pro-Buddhist policy and that he felt
Americans would give support to this allegation if we justified pause on Buddha's birthday.
Without such pretext, we asked him how we could respond to inevitable press queries as to
reason for lack of air activity. He said that this would cause him no difficulty as he and his
spokesmen would simply respond that this matter of strategy about which they would make
no comment.
While I did not mention plan to call suspension of air activities privately to attention of
Moscow and Hanoi, I did comment on need of clear understanding of our motives on part of
Communists and mentioned that it may be necessary to enter into some kind of
communication with them on subject. Quat accepted this remark without comment.
In summary, Quat concurs in concept of pause from four to not more than five days
provided there is no public linking of this action with Buddha's birthday. If speculation
assumes this linkage, he would not try to dispel impression but would give no verification.
Johnson and I recommend that we respect his objections and adjust our plans in consonance
with them.
Part II
If decision is made to proceed with pause, we shall need additional guidance with regard to
our public relations attitude. The following are some of factors which will have to be taken
into account. (Some do not apply if we follow Quat's views with regard to Buddha's
birthday.)
1. As pattern of daily announcements and briefings on air actions against North now
established here and elsewhere, absence of announcement will immediately be noted and
queries made as to reason.
2. Bonze Khiet's request for "cessation of attacks" is only for period 0000 hours to 2400
hours May 15. If we use birthday as pretext for pause of several days, we appear more
Buddhist than venerable.
3. Quat will have to give some reasons for pause to his generals and something as to true
motives can be expected to leak fairly promptly to press.
4. Press can be expected to probe hard to learn whether initiative for pause came from GVN
or USG and, if latter, whether from Saigon or Washington.
Initially, press can be expected to perceive connection between pause and Buddha's birthday
but to extent that pause extends beyond May 15 speculation as to other reasons can be
expected to become intense both in local and international press, and correspondents will
hound every possible source. Our refusal to answer questions here and well-known fact that
Washington issues instructions on strikes can be expected to divert much of press pressure
to Washington. We hope that as situation develops we can be kept fully informed on how
matter being handled Washington, including all backgrounders, so that we and GVN can
keep in step.
Taylor
291. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 11, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. X. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to McNamara, Raborn, and William
Bundy.
Up to this moment, the knowledge of the President's plan for a trial pause has been
restricted to the President himself and to those addressed in this memorandum.
The President now approves the extension of this circle to include in the State Department
Under Secretary Ball, Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Unger; in the Defense
Department Deputy Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; and in the White House Mr. Bromley Smith. The President has further approved
most private transmission of the existence of his plan to Prime Minister Wilson, Prime
Minister Pearson, and Prime Minister Menzies, with explicit caution to each of these Heads
of Government against revealing the substance of the President's plan at this time to anyone
but his Foreign Minister. The President has himself informed Ambassador Taylor and
Ambassador Johnson in Saigon, and he now authorizes a message to Ambassador Taylor
instructing him to inform General Westmoreland./2/
/2/See Documents 288 and 292.
The President has consulted fully with Prime Minister Quat, who has expressed his
understanding of the President's plan./3/
/3/See Document 289.
The President has authorized the Secretary of State to convey appropriate messages with
respect to this plan to the Government of the Soviet Union/4/ and the Government of North
Vietnam./5/
/4/See Document 293.
/5/See Document 298.
The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense to carry out the military aspects of
this plan.
Beyond this point, the President has given no authorization whatever for any discussion or
disclosure of this plan by anyone at any time with anyone inside or outside the Government.
The President has directed me to emphasize the importance of complete discretion among
those who are authorized to be informed, and he asks me to impress upon the Secretary of
Defense and upon Mr. William Bundy, in Secretary Rusk's absence, the importance of
insuring complete discretion in the State and Defense Departments. Needless to say, he has
given me a similar caution with respect to the White House, and he omits this warning in
the case of Admiral Raborn simply because he expects that no other office of the CIA will
be informed at this time.
This operation needs a code word and the best that I can think of is Holiday.
McGeorge Bundy/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by the
Secretary.
2557. Strictly eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Deptel 2553; Embtel 3731./2/
Congratulations on your excellent presentation as well as your analysis of factors affecting
proposal.
/2/Documents 288 and 289.
We have decided here to go ahead commencing on Thursday/3/ for period of approximately
5-7 days. Orders through military channels will place stand-down on basis "in order to
observe reaction of DRV rail and road transportation systems" and will order increase in
photo recce of DRV and bombing within SVN./4/ You should tell Westmoreland true basis
for his personal use only so that you and he and Alex Johnson remain the only three
Americans in Saigon aboard. We have informed Dobrynin tonight and are instructing
Kohler to convey message to Hanoi through DRV Ambassador in Moscow. I will also be
telling British and Canadian Foreign Ministers personally tomorrow and we will convey
message to Menzies through Embassy here. However, each of these being informed only at
highest levels and their Saigon representatives will not be witting.
/3/May 13.
/4/Orders to this effect were conveyed from Secretary McNamara to Ambassador Taylor
and Admiral Sharp in telegram DEF 1900 to Saigon and CINCPAC, May 11. (Department
of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
You should take following actions:
1. Inform Quat we are going ahead. You should not specify period but let us know if he
raises question or still insists on as short a period as 4-5 days. Tell him we will definitely
refrain at all times from associating action with Buddha's birthday and that our initial plan
will be to refer all press queries to Washington and to hold as long as possible simply to
operational factors as explanation. You should raise with him question of what he will tell
generals urging in strongest terms that he tell them only what we are saying through
military channel and preferably delay even this until question arises. If Quat raises question
of what we are saying to Communist side, you will have copies tonight's talk with Dobrynin
and instructions to Kohler by septels/5/ and may draw generally on these for his personal
use only./6/
/5/Documents 293 and 294.
/6/In telegram 3737 from Saigon, May 11, Taylor reported that he had called on Quat to
convey this information. Quat agreed with the plan as outlined, without any specific
reference to the duration of the pause, but Taylor felt that Quat and his colleagues would
become uneasy if it extended beyond 5 days. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
2. To deal with any possibility adverse Catholic reaction you should inform Archbishop
and/or Nuncio very privately that any variation in actions in forthcoming period will be
USG decisions not related in any way to Buddha's birthday or any appeal or issue connected
with it. You may of course also reiterate that any such variations have no effect whatever on
our determination as clearly shown in recent months. We leave timing this approach to you
but believe it should be done earliest before any speculation arises./7/
/7/Taylor responded that he and Johnson felt that it was unnecessary to approach
Archbishop Binh or the Nuncio at that time. (Ibid.)
3. At appropriate time you should instruct Zorthian to report simply that no operations other
than reconnaissance were conducted on each day and to refer press queries, preferably by
indirection, to Washington.
Rusk
293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, May 11, 1965, 8:19 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by the
Secretary. Repeated to Saigon. The text of the message conveyed in the source text is also
printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 868-869.
3103. Strictly eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Highest levels have determined
that we should undertake short trial cessation of bombing against DRV in order to test
Communist reactions. I have seen Dobrynin tonight as reported septel./2/
/2/Document 294.
You should make earliest possible arrangement see DRV Ambassador Moscow to convey
parallel message as set forth below. We are using you as channel to avoid using Soviets as
intermediaries and also to insure that message is accurately and directly delivered. We leave
appropriate method of arranging contact to you and are not concerned if Soviets should
become aware you are making such contact. You should of course make maximum effort
avoid any attention by any third party.
Message you should deliver should be oral but confirmed by written piece of paper which
you should hand to Ambassador with request he deliver message to Hanoi. Message is as
follows:
Begin text. The highest authority in this Government has asked me to inform Hanoi that
there will be no air attacks on North Viet-Nam for a period beginning at noon, Washington
time, Wednesday, May 12, and running into next week.
In this decision the United States Government has taken account of repeated suggestions
from various quarters, including public statements by Hanoi representatives, that there can
be no progress toward peace while there are air attacks on North Viet-Nam. The United
States Government remains convinced that the underlying cause of trouble in Southeast
Asia is armed action against the people and Government of South Vietnam by forces whose
actions can be decisively affected from North Vietnam. The United States will be very
watchful to see whether in this period of pause there are significant reductions in such
armed actions by such forces. The United States must emphasize that the road toward the
end of armed attacks against the people and Government of Vietnam is the only road which
will permit the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States to bring a
permanent end to their air attacks on North Vietnam.
In taking this action the United States is well aware of the risk that a temporary suspension
of these air attacks may be misunderstood as an indication of weakness, and it is therefore
necessary for me to point out that if this pause should be misunderstood in this fashion, by
any party, it would be necessary to demonstrate more clearly than ever, after the pause
ended, that the United States is determined not to accept aggression without reply in
Vietnam. Moreover, the United States must point out that the decision to end air attacks for
this limited trial period is one which it must be free to reverse if at any time in the coming
days there should be actions by the other side in Vietnam which required immediate reply.
But my Government is very hopeful that there will be no such misunderstanding and that
this first pause in the air attacks may meet with a response which will permit further and
more extended suspension of this form of military action in the expectation of equally
constructive actions by the other side in the future. End text.
Rusk
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, May 11, 1965, 8:22 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by the
Secretary. Repeated to Saigon.
3104. Strictly eyes only for Ambassadors from Secretary. I saw Dobrynin tonight and made
oral statement confirmed by piece of paper/2/ following exactly same format on substance
as message to DRV contained septel./3/ Only changes concerned first paragraph and first
sentence of second paragraph with appropriate substitutions of Soviets and calling attention
to Soviet specific mention of factors cited first sentence second paragraph.
/2/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODISMAYFLOWER)
/3/Document 293.
I explained we were not indicating any precise number of days, that we retained freedom of
action, and that we would convey similar message to Hanoi. I also said we would make no
announcement although we expected press pressures, and made clear our action related only
to strikes of any sort and not to continued reconnaissance. (Paper itself makes clear action
confined to DRV and does not include Laos or SVN.)
I also said we did not know what to expect but that Hanoi knows what it is doing and can
find a way to make its response clear.
Dobrynin noted we were merely informing Soviets and was clearly relieved we not asking
them to act as intermediary. Asked about my trip to Vienna/4/ and indicated there might be
further conversations there Saturday with Gromyko. Asked basically whether action
represented any change in fundamental US position.
/4/Rusk traveled to London on May 11 for the NATO Ministerial meeting, May 11-12, and
then to Austria for the 10th anniversary celebration of the signing of the Austrian State
Treaty.
I replied that it did not and that this should be no surprise.
I reviewed recent indications that Cambodia conference blocked by Peiping despite
favorable mention in DRV-Moscow communiqu/5/ and that three-party talks on Laos
likewise in abeyance apparently following Peiping and perhaps Hanoi pressure. President
on April 7 had tried open up discourse but thus far channels blocked. If attacks on DRV
were part of problem, Communist response to present action might open up channels.
/5/For excerpts of the joint communiqu issued at Moscow on April 17, see American
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 855-856.
Dobrynin said he thought we would get some answer but could not predict what.
I underscored importance action not be misunderstood in Hanoi. Hanoi appears to have
impression they may succeed, but US will not get tired or be affected by very small
domestic opposition or by international pressures. Hanoi cannot rely on Saigon instability.
They may have wrong ideas on these points and important they not misunderstand our
action.
Dobrynin responded he saw no danger of misunderstanding but problem was to find way.
Rusk
295. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff/1/
Honolulu, May 11, 1965, 5:14 p.m.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265,
Vietnam 381. Top Secret; Limdis.
55813. Rolling Thunder Program.
1. With the completion of our fourteenth week of Rolling Thunder it appears appropriate to
assess briefly what we have done and to suggest our future course. Any such assessment
when related to the fundamental purpose of the air campaign must be inconclusive at this
time. The possibility remains, however, that we are in more danger of minimizing the
effects of Rolling Thunder than we are of exaggerating them. These air attacks have
disrupted road and rail movements in North Vietnam. They have, in a few short weeks,
completely changed the pattern of logistic support into Laos and it may be here that we first
see concrete military results of our air attacks, because the Laotian Communists are more
directly dependent on DRV support than are the VC. The cumulative effects of our
interdiction campaign will be realized as the rainy season adds to the effects of our air
interdiction.
2. Some doubt has been expressed as to whether or not much remains to be done south of 20
degrees N. Destruction of the DRV military and logistic support facilities and LOC's south
of 20 degrees has just begun. Within four of the major barracks complexes attacked,
roughly two thirds of the 674 known buildings remain undamaged. Of three major ammo
stowage depot complexes attacked, 40 percent of the 46 known ammo stowage and 56
percent of the 93 known depot support buildings have been destroyed/damaged. Similarly,
within two major support depot complexes attacked, 46 percent of the 90 known buildings
have yet to be hit. The surface has barely been scratched on striking DRV shipping and port
facilities. And, in spite of the success of our bridge attacks, the major portion of the bridge
and ferry system remains intact. Newly developed, dispersed staging, rest and refueling are
yet to be attacked.
3. In the development of a sustained air campaign, we must carefully weigh the capabilities
and limitations of US air power operating within current political parameters and the
vulnerabilities of the DRV within this framework. It is certain that we cannot expect
interdiction, even when we attain a maximum feasible damage level, to stop completely
supplies flowing to the VC through southern DRV and Laos routes. Further, we cannot
predict how successful the VC will be in procuring weapons and ammunition through other
sources and channels.
Although the immediate military objective is to reduce the movement of personnel and
supplies to support the VC and PL/VM, in our effort to accomplish this we must develop
and drive home to the DRV leadership the idea that our staying power is greater than theirs.
To do this we should raise their direct costs in terms of manpower and military, logistic and
support facilities and in indirect economic effects. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly,
the characteristics of the air campaign should be such as to generate pessimism and a
feeling of helplessness among the military and general frustration, anxiety, and fear among
the people. Lastly, we should present the government and military with an ever growing
management problem. The cumulative effect of these internal problems should serve to turn
DRV attention inward rather than outward. The total impact would be realized in
degradation of supervision, military training, cadre replacement and build up for Laos and
RVN as well as in reduction of supplies. The concept of making it as difficult and costly as
possible for the DRV to support insurrection in Laos and RVN should embrace the totality
of these effects. Its success will be realized when the DRV is convinced that the cost of
aggression is too high.
4. The concept we propose calls for an ubiquitous demonstration of U.S. airpower carrying
out an around the clock program of immobilization, attrition, and harassment. Specific types
of missions would be as follows:
A. Carry out extensive day armed recce of land and inland waterway routes south of 20
degrees, and night blockade tactics.
quarrel with the people and they should be warned to avoid all military installations. We
should hammer home the main themes of our intent to destroy their military capacity and
our determination to continue until the military leave their cousins in peace. Overt
propaganda, on a world-wide basis, should echo the same themes; releases on mission
accomplishments should stress our objectives as we highlight accomplishments.
8. Target and "Strike Zones" are as follows:
A. Initially, strikes should continue to be limited to the area from the DMZ to 20 degrees.
All military facilities and LOC targets listed in the current AIF/PACOM CPFL-NVN
should be considered for attack by small flights. We hold AIF/CPFL data on more than 225
military/LOC targets in the following categories: RR/highway bridges, ferries, RR yards,
port facilities, warehouse areas, POL storage, naval bases, airfields, military
headquarters/barracks, military schools/training areas/camps and military
ammo/supply/depots. About 100 of these targets appear on the JCS numbered target system,
but most of them qualify for attack under the concept expressed herein.
b. Northwestward from the 20th parallel, the following nine major military supply/ammo
depots and barracks warrant large strikes:
(1) Target 29--Quang Suoi Bks NE (73 Bks/storage bldgs).
(2) Target 43--Qui Hau ammo depot w (23 ammo storage bldgs).
(3) Target 61--Xom Chang supply depot (17 storage bldgs with 10 Bks/7 support bldgs).
(4) Target 28--Ban Xom Lom Bks (Div HQ--363 Bldgs including 191 storage and 30
ammo).
(5) Target 46--Ban Phung How ammo depot (10 semi-revetted ammo storage, 5 prob ammo
storage and 8 supply bldgs).
(6) Target 25--Son La Bks (complex is large military supply/Bks concentration containing
367 Bks/warehouse bldgs, of which over 100 are supply storage).
(7) Target 56--Son La Army supply depot (co-located with target 25).
(8) Target 63--Thuan Chau Bks/depot (571 bldgs).
(9) Target 25--Dien Bien Phu Bks (142 Bldgs). Dien Bien Phu complex includes airfield,
radar, radio and HQ 316 div. As the large strikes progress towards Dien Bien Phu, we
should extend the armed recce and small strike zone accordingly.
9. In summary, armed recce would operate as continuously as weather permits and with a
high degree of flexibility. Ordnance loads would provide for surveillance and attack of
fleeting targets on specified route sectors after attacking pre-briefed fixed targets with
optimum munitions. On call strikes would be ready for unusual targets of opportunity.
Random routing would be developed to avoid set patterns. Around the clock surveillance
would be maintained over LOC funnels. Weather alternates would be standard.
10. I recommend that this concept be accepted and that concurrently numerical limits be
lifted on armed reconnaissance and that these small controlled air operations be limited only
by our capability to execute them.
296. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 12, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. X. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Your conversation with Governor Stevenson
1. You are considering a decision to suspend air attacks on North Vietnam for several days.
You would not announce this decision in any way, but you would call attention to this pause
privately with Moscow and Hanoi. While this pause would not be a long one, it would
indicate our own ability to move either way, depending upon the actions of the enemy. This
pause would not be extended or repeated merely in return for a conference, but only if there
were major reductions in the level of armed action in South Vietnam.
2. You would like to have this decision known to U Thant, but only if he could be told in a
way that would protect us entirely against leaks. Does Governor Stevenson think he could
tell U Thant on an entirely personal basis, so that Governor Stevenson and U Thant would
be the only two people in the whole United Nations to know about this matter until the
President was ready to discuss it publicly?
3. If Governor Stevenson can give you this kind of assurance, you are strongly inclined to
go ahead with this pause. If he cannot give you this assurance, you may have to reconsider
the whole matter.
Stevenson sees U Thant around noon and this phone call should be placed as quickly as
possible./2/
/2/Johnson's phone call to Stevenson was placed at 10:57 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily
Diary)
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODISMAYFLOWER. Top Secret. The source text was transmitted to the White House on May
12 under cover of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Read to McGeorge Bundy,
which noted that Stevenson had dictated the report of his conversation with U Thant to the
Department by classified telephone.
PARTICIPANTS
Governor Adlai E. Stevenson
Secretary-General U Thant
1. Vietnam
In my conversation with the Secretary General on Wednesday, May 12th, from 12:00 noon
to 1:00 p.m., I informed him about the "pause" after his assurance that the information
would go no further. His comments follow:
Hanoi is now more responsive to the USSR than to China, and the new Foreign Minister is
more pro-Moscow than pro-Peking.
Last September, when he made his first sounding about private peace talks,/2/ Ho Chi Minh
was ready to talk with the United States and South Vietnam alone, but a new element has
now been introduced. While originally only Peking insisted that in any peace talks South
Vietnam should be represented exclusively by the Viet Cong, Hanoi has now taken this
position too.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 427.
In early March U Thant asked Algeria to inform the Viet Cong and Hanoi representatives in
Algiers that it was unrealistic to insist on the Viet Cong as the exclusive representative of
South Vietnam in any talks with the United States. So far he has had no reply. U Thant
thinks that if the United States excludes any Viet Cong representation in any peace or ceasefire discussions, there will be no discussions. But he also believes a compromise possible,
i.e. assuming there were six seated at the table, North Vietnam would be represented by
two, the United States by two, and South Vietnam by two--one from the Viet Cong and one
from Saigon. He cites the recommendation of the three factions in the Laos negotiations as
pertinent.
If any such discussion relates only to hostilities over the frontiers, then in his view the
representation should be just the United States and Hanoi, thus avoiding the Viet Cong
problem. However, he doubts that Hanoi would talk on this basis.
While he doubts that there will be any response, as a result of the "pause" from Hanoi
satisfactory to us, if the question of the Viet Cong representation could be worked out
privately in advance he thinks there is a good chance of discussions starting. When it
appears that the United States is being more than reasonable, he suspects Hanoi with Soviet
encouragement will overrule Peking.
He would clearly consider with us making a public (or private) appeal for a cease-fire or for
discussions of conditions for the cessation of hostilities, either during or after the "pause".
He thinks it certain that Peking would oppose but assumes that the USSR and France would
go along. He would welcome our views both as to language and timing of any such appeal.
And when I suggested that it might include something as follows, he did not dissent:
"The United States has offered to discuss peaceful settlement in Vietnam, without
preconditions. The United States has suspended its bombing temporarily. It is time the
belligerents opened discussions of conditions for the total cessation of hostilities
preliminary to discussions of peaceful settlement."
He seemed eager to cooperate in any way, and if we have any suggestions as to Viet Cong
representation, he would clearly explore the possibilities (through the Soviet Union)
privately, without in any way committing us in advance.
On the basis of previous experience with explorations in Hanoi, he thinks it might take ten
days to two weeks to get a reply.
In view of the "pause" he did not press me for an answer on his proposal for a cease-fire
appeal at this time.
2. Indian Proposal
I also discussed with him the Indian three-point proposal/3/ with which he was not very
familiar. He proposes to discuss it with the Indian Ambassador and give him such
encouragement as he can.
/3/See Document 285.
3. Cambodian Conference
U Thant sees little hope of doing anything through Cambodia and reported that he had
asked Sihanouk to receive Narasimhan before his departure a fortnight ago. The reply was
that no useful purpose would be served by such a meeting, that Sihanouk's position was
well known--that the United States troops should get out of South Vietnam.
Narasimhan is on his way back; moreover he is confident that he would not have been
received in Hanoi at this time.
U Thant's report was that in his soundings with Federenko about Vietnam he has always
been brushed off, and he saw no hope of ever doing anything with him in New York.
298. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, May 13, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Repeated to London. No time of transmission is on the source text, but it was
received in the Department of State at 10:35 p.m. on May 12.
3391. Ref Deptel 3105./2/ London for Secretary eyes only./3/ On receipt reftel (1905 local)
I sought urgent appointment with Kuznetsov but when informed by MFA he not available I
accepted appointment with Deputy ForMin Firyubin at 2100.
/2/Not found.
/3/Rusk was in London to attend the NAC meeting, May 12-14.
I informed Firyubin that as he must know from report of Dobrynin's conversation with
Secretary US Govt has made decision which we hoped would be both understood and not
misunderstood. I had been informed by several high Soviet sources that decision we had
taken was precisely what was called for but none had been in position to predict reaction.
Our purpose in reaching this significant decision was to attempt to ascertain if a way could
be found to peaceful solution of current crisis in Southeast Asia. We had hoped we would
be able to deliver oral communication conveying this decision to DRV authorities and I had
attempted to do so today through DRV Ambassador. Unfortunately Amb let it be known
that he did not wish to receive me personally and when his Emb was informed that the
message I sought to deliver was of extreme importance it was suggested that we transmit
the message through the Soviet Govt in its capacity as Geneva co-chairman. It was because
of these circumstances that I had found it necessary to disturb Mr. Firyubin tonight. I
pointed out that although DRV Amb had refused to receive me Emb had succeeded in
delivering a copy of oral communication to employee of DRV Emb earlier this evening
(2015 local) who agreed to bring it to attention of Amb. (Communication as set forth in
Deptel 3103/4/ then translated in full for Firyubin with sole interruption being Firyubin's
inquiry if cessation attacks applied only to those from air--which I confirmed.)
/4/Document 293.
After receiving confirmation from me that communication was of oral nature, Firyubin said
he viewed communication as based on old erroneous conception on which US has
proceeded, a conception which precludes US recognizing that the South Vietnamese people
are fighting for their freedom and are struggling against aggression and control by Saigon
puppets. Furthermore it indicated to Firyubin that we continued to view the picture
incorrectly when we referred again to the struggle in South Vietnam as being organized and
directed by the DRV. The absurdity of this view, he said, is obvious and naturally the Soviet
Govt cannot agree with it as it has made clear in numerous statements. Firyubin could only
view the communication as repetition of the threat against the DRV--now a threat of
renewed and expanded aggression. This was the only way he could interpret the reference to
the risk that a suspension of attacks involved. Obviously we are suffering from a gross
misunderstanding if we think that such aggression will go unpunished, without response.
The only constructive approach to a peaceful settlement of the situation in South Vietnam
was to end the aggression, recall troops from South Vietnam and give the Vietnamese
people the right to choose their own form of govt--a choice which can be made freely only
if the so-called specialists should be withdrawn and their opportunity of exercising
influence on the Vietnamese thus removed. Firyubin said that he well acquainted with the
countries and peoples of Southeast Asia; he therefore was aware and could understand the
feelings caused by our actions there as well as the reaction in many other parts of the world.
I told Firyubin I had asked to see him to put a very simple question to him. Does the Soviet
Govt agree to transmit the oral communication to the DRV? I said this was the whole
purpose of my visit.
Firyubin said the DRV Emb had not put such a request to the Sov Govt. I must agree that
for Sovs to act as intermediary between US and DRV is very unusual. Naturally he would
report my request to his govt and if the DRV should request this service he would not
exclude the possibility of transmitting the communication to the DRV Govt. Meanwhile he
would be interested in knowing just how the DRV Emb had responded to our approach.
I again described for Firyubin our efforts to deliver the message to the DRV through its
Emb in Moscow and told him that the end result was a suggestion by the Emb that we
transmit the message through the Sov Govt in its capacity as Geneva co-chairman. Firyubin
repeated his promise to report my request to his govt and to inform me of the results.
(At this point Firyubin passed a note to Kornienko who attended him and latter left the
room, not to return until just before the conversation was concluded.)
I thanked Firyubin and then said I wished comment briefly on his remarks. I was well
acquainted with the Sov view of the situation in Vietnam and since I had on several
occasions expressed my govt's view to numerous Sov officials I was sure he was aware of
the way we looked at the situation. We did not consider resistance to aggression as
aggression. We could discuss our differences of view for hours but my purpose in calling on
him tonight was not to enter into such a discussion but simply to ask the Soviet Govt to pass
an important message to the DRV. We had noted the reported Soviet indications that if air
strikes should be discontinued the situation might improve with respect to finding a way to
peaceful settlement. Secondly we had read with great care the Sov Govt appeal several days
ago in which the govt came out for peaceful solution of all questions in dispute. Finally we
had noted and the President had responded positively to the appeal by the 17 unaligned
nations,/5/ although so far as I was aware the other governments chiefly concerned--the
Sovs, DRV and China--had not yet officially replied. I stressed that my govt considers the
communication which we were asking the Sovs to pass to the DRV a genuine concession on
our part toward finding the path to peaceful settlement about which the Sov Govt itself had
expressed its view in its appeal several days ago. I hoped that this initiative would be
correctly understood and taken in this light by the Soviet Govt.
/5/See Document 245.
Firyubin said he wished reaffirm his govt's support for peaceful solutions of all questions in
dispute. However peaceful solutions are out of question when negotiations must take place
under the gun. They cannot take place under pressure or when one side operates from a
position of strength. He wished inform me again there had been no request from the DRV
Emb that Sov Govt act as intermediary and he felt therefore that it would be more
convenient for US to find another way "bypassing us."
I told Firyubin that I saw no purpose in continuing discuss substantive questions which
should probably be the subject of conference if there should be one. I would merely point
out that with regard to his remarks on "position of strength" that shooting and bombing are
being carried on by two sides, not just one. I then said he should know that I had told him of
our efforts to approach the DRV Emb simply as a matter of information. I did not believe
the attitude of DRV had any bearing on the request I had put to Firyubin. I was asking
Firyubin in the name of the Govt of United States to pass important communication to
DRV. (During translation these remarks, Kornienko reappeared and handed note to Firyubin
which latter read carefully.)
Firyubin then said flatly Sov Govt would not do this. The DRV Emb has not requested this
service. He said there were number of ways of passing the message to DRV and it was our
responsibility to find the most convenient way.
I said I wished to understand him correctly. Was he rejecting my request to transmit the
communication to the DRV?
He said this was a correct understanding of the Sov Govt position. We must ourselves find
the way.
I said that what I was seeking was the cooperation of the Sov Govt and Firyubin's remarks
indicated clearly that the Sov Govt was refusing this. Firyubin said "I am not a postman"
and again said we could find our own ways of transmitting messages.
I pointed out to Firyubin that the cooperation I had requested is a well-known and not
unprecented process in international diplomacy. I had great difficulty in reconciling Sov
Govt refusal to cooperate with its declaration in support of peaceful settlement of disputed
questions.
Kornienko chimed in that he had recalled statement by both the President and Secretary of
State on several occasions that the US Govt has channels for transmitting messages direct to
Hanoi. On this the conversation ended but it should be noted that Firyubin made no effort to
return to me the text of the oral communication which I had handed him at the outset of the
conversation.
Kohler
299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 13, 1965, 12:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODISMAYFLOWER. No classification marking.
The attached cable/2/ from Kohler gives an interesting account of his talk with Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin on the pause.
/2/Document 298.
Kohler had a tough time getting his message to the North Vietnamese Ambassador. The
North Vietnamese Embassy refused to receive the message on the ground that we did not
have diplomatic relations and suggested that Kohler deliver it through the Soviet
Government, as a Co-Chairman./3/ The Soviets refused to play this role, and Kohler
eventually got the message delivered by having it handed to an employee at the North
Vietnamese Embassy who accepted it.
/3/Reported in telegram 3378 from Moscow, May 12. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
Kohler also gave a copy to the Soviets who refused to pass it on, but did not pass it back.
This cable makes it obvious that the whole Soviet Government is embarrassed by the notion
of admitting that it has any middle-man's role with respect to Hanoi.
Yet there is evidence on other channels of real Soviet interest in a pro-Russian and antiChinese settlement in Vietnam (see Tab B)./4/
/4/There is an indication on another copy of this memorandum that CIA telegram CSDB
312/01196-65, May 12, was attached at Tab B. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X) Tab B was not found attached to either
copy of the memorandum and was not found.
All this is very preliminary evidence of the impact of the pause. We are reviewing all our
political plans and should have comment for you by the end of the day on Saturday./5/
Meanwhile, everyone's orders are to avoid comment on the absence of bombing. So far we
have gotten through one day more than I expected, but I expect the noise to begin very
soon.
McG.B.
/5/May 15.
not lose interest. The history of other former colonial nations in the post-war period has
shown that, given the resources and opportunity to evolve their own political institutions,
they will be likely to steer a non-Communist course.
B. Attractions for North Viet-Nam
Analyzing the plan in terms of their own doctrinal convictions, the North Vietnamese could
also conclude that it offered them an adequate chance to achieve their long-range objectives.
Ho Chi Minh demonstrated in 1954 that he was not in a hurry. The Vietnamese
Communists have repeatedly shown their willingness to work within long time spans. While
they would be prepared to absorb enormous punishment before abandoning the purpose
they have sought for four decades, they might well be prepared to wait a few years longer to
achieve that purpose--sustained by the conviction that the United States would lose interest
in South Viet-Nam, that they could subvert any government that could be established in that
country, and that over the long pull Communist success was inevitable.
It might take ten years or more to determine which judgment was right, but ten years is a
long time in the present-day world. Within the next decades new elements could enter the
equation that would fundamentally change the whole situation.
III.
Purposes of Plan
Briefly stated, the purposes of the plan are-A. To enable us to probe for a less dangerous means than military force alone--at present or
higher levels--for preserving an independent, non-Communist South Viet-Nam.
b. To supplement the continuing military effort by offering the prospect of political and
economic progress for the South Vietnamese people.
c. To provide a program having substantial positive propaganda value both in South VietNam and throughout the world.
IV.
Advantages of Plan
The major advantages of the Plan are these-a. It offers the chance to halt offensive military operations by both sides. Yet it at all times
reserves to us the option of resuming full military operations if the plan is not achieving its
purpose.
b. It does not require the Government of South Viet-Nam to enter into "negotiations" with
the North Vietnamese Government or the National Liberation Front, but it would not
preclude formal negotiations at other levels. We could and should maintain our posture of
willingness to hold discussions with any "government concerned" and to participate in a
formal negotiating conference if one should be called under suitable conditions.
c. It avoids any implication that the United States lacks confidence in the South Vietnamese
The Prime Minister of South Viet-Nam would make a speech or issue a proclamation that
would-1. Review the history of the Viet Cong insurgency emphasizing its instigation and direction
by the North.
2. Describe recent military actions taken by the South Vietnamese and United States forces
and their success.
3. State the Government's fundamental objectives--to achieve peace and reconciliation
under a government free of foreign control, representing the Vietnamese people and capable
of meeting their needs.
4. Outline the Program for the Social and Political Reconstruction of South Viet-Nam (as
described in section VI).
5. Announce a limited pause in certain military operations in order to assure serious
attention (as described in section VII).
6. Announce--in general terms--that once civil insurrection had ended, the Government
would expect to establish trade and other forms of peaceful intercourse with the North and
to examine other matters of common interest.
Comment: First announcement must be made by the head of the South Viet-Nam
Government, rather than by any United States official. As soon as the announcement is
made, the United States could express its full support, including concurrence in the military
pause, and its willingness to withdraw forces on a phased basis (assuming proper response
on the other side) and to furnish assistance for the economic and social aspects of the
Government's program.
The initial formal announcement should be followed by a saturation information effort
employing radio broadcasts, speaker planes, leaflets, etc., to ensure wide dissemination of
the South Vietnamese Government's program even in Viet Cong-held areas. Furthermore,
there must be a continuing saturation campaign--keyed to local areas--advising of the
success of the program and, especially, fixing the blame squarely on the Viet Cong in any
areas where the program fails or cannot be put into effect.
VI.
Key Elements of the Program for the Social and
Political Reconstruction of South Viet-Nam
A. First Element: An offer of amnesty to all Viet Cong adherents who cease fighting
This offer (which could be portrayed as an expansion of the current Chieu Hoi Program)
would be addressed to the Viet Cong members in the South rather than to its Northern
commanders. This would permit the Government in Saigon to maintain the posture that it
was not "negotiating" with the North or with the National Liberation Front.
The offer might appeal, most of all, to the Viet Cong local and district forces and
sympathizers and to those provincial or main-force elements whose military position may
be precarious.
Amnesty would imply the delivery of arms. But very few of the Viet Cong would be likely
to come in and lay down their arms since that would involve their public admission of Viet
Cong activities.
Since many of the Viet Cong adherents cannot be identified, amnesty in practice might
consist merely of a halt in individual military participation and a return to civilian life by
peasants who would never concede their past Viet Cong association.
B. Second Element: A phased schedule for establishing a Constitutional Government based
on an electoral process in which all peaceful citizens, including peaceful Viet Cong
adherents, would take part
Village council elections are already scheduled for May 30 in secure areas. The Program
would provide for similar elections at later dates throughout the country. The Premier would
promise--as soon as local elections had been held in areas containing a substantial majority
of the population--to call together a constitutional assembly to draft and adopt a new
constitution for South Viet-Nam.
Former Viet Cong adherents who had qualified for amnesty would be eligible to participate
as voters and candidates. They would participate in the political life of the country as would
the representatives of any political party that did not advocate the overthrow of the
Government by force.
Comment: The 1956 Diem Constitution was modified in an authoritarian direction in 1962
and nullified in 1965. A "Provisional Charter" has since been drafted by the High National
Council appointed by General "Big" Minh in the fall of 1964, but it has never been put into
full effect. It is essential to this Plan that a constitution be approved by some representative
body in which peaceful elements of the Viet Cong may participate.
C. Third Element: Pending the local elections, the Government would seek to establish its
presence with a minimum of disruption to local administrative arrangements currently
acceptable to the local populace
In Viet Cong base areas, this would involve leaving local administration more or less in
present hands, but on the explicit condition that these administrators did not resist the right
of Central Government officials to move freely and carry out limited functions within their
areas.
In marginal or contested areas a delicate balance would have to be struck on a case-by-case
basis. In areas where Viet Cong local administrations were operating by stealth and terror,
the process of redress would proceed gradually as the power of the Government presence
increased and inspired public confidence.
Where the actual authority is now exercised by Viet Cong adherents and there is no
government authority, incumbents would not be disturbed until after village council
elections. Future local administrative arrangements would depend on the results of the
elections.
3) that offensive military measures would immediately be resumed wherever the Program
was resisted by Viet Cong forces; and
4) that, if resistance was wide-spread, military pressure on the North would also be
resumed.
C. Public Announcement of the Pause
On balance we believe there are advantages in announcing the pause publicly rather that in
communicating it privately:
1) Its announcement in connection with the Program for Social and Political Reconstruction
would help draw the attention of Viet Cong adherents to a future political path that would
include a role for them.
2) It would avoid any inference of weakness that might be drawn from a secret proposal for
a military pause by the South Viet-Nam Government to the North.
3) It would relieve the North of the embarrassment implicit in responding to such a secret
proposal, and thus demonstrating to the world that it controls the Viet Cong.
D. Communist Response
Obviously, there would be difficulties in determining the Viet Cong response. Statistical
analysis may not give reliable quantitative or qualitative measurements to show significant
increases or decreases in the scale of Viet Cong operations. We must also decide whether
our willingness to continue the pause should (1) be made dependent on no increase above
the present level of Viet Cong activity, or (2) upon some further decrease below the present
level.
Any public statement concerning the pause would probably have to list--as one of the
expected responses--a halt of infiltration from the North. But we must recognize that such
infiltration is not readily measurable in the short term. It is also--in a sense--irrelevant,
since, if the Plan is succeeding, that itself implies North Vietnamese acquiescence--and thus
presumably an end to infiltration. If we should detect substantial infiltration while the pause
continues and other elements of the Plan are proceeding, we can consider responding by
military reinforcements of our own.
VIII.
Conclusion
The recent improvements in South Vietnamese military and political performance furnish
our first opportunity to probe deeply for the return of the contest of wills in Viet-Nam
primarily to the political forum. If this opportunity is seized, great hazards may be avoided
and lives saved in achieving our ends. Even if it fails--and the contest continues as primarily
a military one--the Government of South Viet-Nam will have strengthened its political base,
and confidence in the leadership of the United States in this cause will be greatly enhanced.
301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, May 13, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Project Mayflower. Secret;
Nodis; Repeated to London. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it
was received in the Department of State at 2:05 p.m.
3395. London--eyes only for Secretary. Pierre Salinger who is here on private movie
production deal, has been in touch with Mike Sagetallyan, former TASS Bureau Chief
Washington, now in headquarters Moscow. At dinner and evening at his apartment Tuesday
May 11 Sagatellyan probed Salinger hard as to whether he was on some kind of covert
mission and seemed unconvinced despite latter's reiterated denials. In any case, Sagatellyan,
protesting he was speaking personally, talked at length about Viet-Nam. He wanted
Salinger's opinion on hypothetical formula for solution approximately on following lines:
1. US would announce publicly temporary suspension of bombing DRV;
2. DRV or USSR or both would make statement hailing suspension as step toward
reasonable solution;
3. Soviet Union would intercede with Viet Cong to curtail military activities;
4. De facto cease-fire would thus be accomplished.
5. Conference would be called on related subject (not specifically Viet-Nam). Viet Cong
would not be participant but have some kind of observer or corridor status (this followed
Salinger's expression of opinion US Govt would never accept Viet Cong as participant in
any conference).
6. New agreement would be worked out on Viet-Nam providing for broader based SVN
Govt not including direct Viet Cong participation but including elements friendly to Viet
Cong.
Salinger refused express opinion on substance foregoing but in reply Sagatellyan's direct
question said he would of course be willing carry any message back to Washington.
Sagetellyan, repeating these his personal ideas, said he would talk with government circles
and be in touch with Salinger later. He has in fact invited Salinger to dinner again tonight
and latter will report results to me tomorrow.
During conversation Sagetellyan several times repeated Sovs could not control situation in
Viet-Nam but implied that if they seemed responsible for bringing about cessation of
bombardments influence with DRV and Viet Cong would be enhanced. Salinger felt
Sagetellyan reflecting official Soviet feeling both Soviet Union and US enmeshed in
Vietnamese situation to benefit ChiComs.
Kohler
302. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, May 15, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Project Mayflower. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Vienna. No time of transmission is indicated on the source
text, but it was received in the Department of State on May 14.
3424. Vienna eyes only Secretary./2/ Embtel 3416./3/ Salinger had further four hour lunch
conversation today with Sagetellyan and "Vassily" who identified himself as "Sergeev",
latter dominated entire conversation, and told Salinger he was speaking this time officially
and not as "an individual".
/2/Rusk was in Vienna for anniversary ceremonies for the Austrian State Treaty.
/3/Telegram 3416 from Moscow, May 14, reported on a dinner conversation on May 13
among Salinger, Sagetellyan, and Vassily Sergeyevitch, who was identified as a Foreign
Office representative. In the course of a 4-hour conversation, the Soviet official confirmed
the general nature of the proposal put to Salinger initially by Sagetellyan. Sergeyevitch told
Salinger that the Soviet Union was prepared to convey such a proposal from the United
States to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but would do so informally through
Sagetellyan, so as to be in a position to disavow the contact if news of it leaked.
(Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 142, Project Mayflower)
"Sergeev" said that after further discussion of idea put to Salinger in previous conversations
and after additional clearances it had been decided that proposal as originally formulated
was not feasible. He made it clear that the Sovs could not afford to be middleman in scheme
and if US Govt should be interested in pursuing contact in private channels, middleman
would have to be some Eastern European Socialist country and not Sovs. "Sergeev" was
unwilling specify which Eastern European country would be suitable channel but when
Salinger indicated that he had good contacts with Yugoslavs, he said Yugoslavia was not
Kohler
Thompson and I both have the impression that Gromyko's attitude clearly means that the
Salinger talk was of little substance and that we should now merely consider what kind of
signal we wish to get back by way of Salinger as a part of the closing out process.
I do not believe that we should assume from Gromyko's remarks that we ourselves should
not put to Moscow our own most serious views of the situation, whether they are willing to
discuss them or not. It is quite clear, however, that Gromyko wanted me to believe that they
are not prepared to work toward a settlement in Hanoi and Peiping and that, indeed, unless
we abandon our effort in South Viet-Nam there will be very serious consequences ahead.
Rusk
Rusk: Gromyko is interested in the Cambodian Conference. Sihanouk is pulling back on his
original insistence that Viet Cong be represented at the conference. French and British have
talked to Russians and urged them to move forward on Cambodian meeting.
I think we ought to get telegram to Taylor to get his reaction to the Acheson-Ball plan. It
will take at least three weeks to get plan launched.
Tonight we don't need any decisions--except when we start bombing and what we say about
the resumption.
The President: If there was going to be any interest on part of Hanoi, we ought to have the
reaction by now. You gave them notice on Tuesday. Monday will be six days. If you want
to start the bombing on Tuesday, that's okay.
We can tell the Congressional leadership--that we had some adjustments out there. To me
it's a pure question of what happens in this country. If we hold off this bombing longer,
people are going to say "What in the world is happening." We can inform Mansfield, the NY
Times, but we will never satisfy the Times.
Now, if this is what you all want, we'll go on Tuesday evening our time, but I would go
Monday.
McNamara: What do we say to the press?
The President: We don't need to disclose every piece of strategy to the press. I would say to
Mansfield, Kennedy, Fulbright that we notified the other people--and for six days we have
held off bombing. Nothing happened. We had no illusions that anything would happen. But
we were willing to be surprised.
We are anxious to pursue every diplomatic adventure to get peace. But we can't throw our
gun away. We have laid off them for six days--meanwhile we have lost planes at Bien Hoa.
No one has even thanked us for the pause.
McNamara: We ought to give this out on background. Mansfield ought to know Hanoi spit
on our face.
The President: I'm afraid if we play along with this group, we will wind up with no one on
our side. We tried out their notion and got no results.
My judgement is the public has never wanted us to stop the bombing. We have stopped in
deference to Mansfield and Fulbright, but we don't want to do it too long else we lose our
base of support.
The President: We will go Tuesday to satisfy you here tonight. I'd go Monday night myself.
However, if you have good reasons, we'll go when you say.
We ought to talk to the leadership and tell them what we did. We can tell them we used the
time for reconnaissance--and in deference to Buddha's birthday. We gave them all week.
We told Dobrynin and we told Gromyko.
I'd call them in and tell them we are starting Monday night. And then you'll be requested to
delay again--by the NY Times.
McNamara: Let's talk to the leaders on Monday and tell them we are starting again to bomb
on Monday night.
The President: Rusk, do you buy that?
McNamara: Target #29/4/ is military barracks 10 miles further north than we have ever
gone. I urge to leave this target in. Our own military will say we have gone soft if we take it
out again. Also it can be our message to Hanoi and Peking.
/4/See Document 295.
The President: What do you think about the threats from Russia about coming in?
Rusk: There is a flash point in the Hanoi area in how far you can go without bringing the
Russians in. Gromyko said he was going to help North Viet Nam and help them decisively.
The President: What about the SAM sites?/5/ Question is whether we let the clock tick or
whether we take them out now.
/5/Reference is to a series of surface-to-air missile sites being established by Soviet
technicians as an integrated anti-aircraft system in North Vietnam.
McNamara: We can't go after the SAM sites unless you go after the MIG airfields. We don't
think we are at that point now. Most you would lose would be 3 or 4 crews. They don't have
one SAM operational right now.
We have to go after MIG airfields first. First.
B-52's to plaster the airfields at night. There may be civilians involved since all bombs
won't hit target. Then fighter bombers go in. And then we take out the SAM's
This is a major operation from the Hanoi point of view.
Fair to say not more than one SAM site will be operational in 4 weeks./6/
/6/McNamara and Rusk agreed, in a telephone conversation on May 17, that it would be "a
great mistake" to attack the SAM missile sites. Rusk felt that such an attack would
guarantee a rapid escalation of the conflict. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Calls)
(At this point meeting interrupted by call from Bundy)
The President: Now, Rusk will talk to Fulbright and Mansfield--talk about your visit with
Gromyko.
I think you ought to show the leaders we are open and receptive to ideas--but nothing
happened on this particular idea.
For six days we didn't touch them and we told them we weren't going to touch them. And
yet Gromyko was tougher than he has been in his talks with you, Dean.
Acheson: Important thing is you haven't bombed in six days and now you are going to
bomb again. This is good thing for people to know.
Rusk: I hope we can keep the barracks target off the first day's bombing--perhaps put it on
the third or fourth day.
McNamara: Yes, we will.
The President: Ball is going to say our bombing will be keyed to their aggression.
Acheson: Actually the plan is a series of pauses--in which we interpret the results each time.
Acheson: First, we put into effect a plan to strengthen the Viet Nam government. They
announce the plan. We give the other side two weeks to think it over. For two weeks we
will take no offensive action. We defend ourselves, but no offensive action. Government
will send troops and officials into all provinces. Perhaps nothing will happen in one
province and something will happen in another. But we will find out the temper of the other
side. For if this works, the rebellion is over. We will have a practical plan to test the
response.
The President: We want Taylor's reaction to this--also I think we ought to put extra money
into the USIA. Eisenhower thought we ought to spend much more than we are/7/--we have
to give these people a will to fight and a will to win.
/7/At President Johnson's request, General Goodpaster briefed President Eisenhower on
May 12 at his home in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on the bombing pause in Vietnam.
Eisenhower thought the plan was a good one and put the onus on the North Vietnamese to
respond. If they failed to respond positively, Eisenhower felt that the United States should
return to the bombing campaign, and use "everything that can fly." (Memorandum from
General Goodpaster to President Johnson, May 13; Johnson Library, National Security File,
Name File, President Eisenhower)
306. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to
Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
CM-616-65
Washington, May 17, 1965.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265,
Vietnam 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text reads: "Sec Def has seen."
SUBJECT
Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam, 7 February 1965 through 30 April
1965
1. Between 7 February and 30 April 1965, US/RVN forces attacked sixty specific JCSdesignated targets in North Vietnam. Of these, 43 targets were struck by US aircraft and 17
by VNAF aircraft. In addition, 86 armed reconnaissance missions were flown against lines
of communication, targets of opportunity, and coastal ships.
2. The only two occasions when enemy aircraft interfered with our strikes were on 3 April
when a MIG damaged a US aircraft, and on 4 April when two North Vietnamese MIGs shot
down two US planes. In addition, one US aircraft on air patrol over the Gulf of Tonkin on 9
April was lost during an intercept with Hainan Island-based MIGs. Otherwise, enemy
reaction has been limited to antiaircraft fire from weapons up to 57mm in size. The South
Vietnamese have lost six planes and four pilots killed, missing and captured. US losses have
been 30 planes and 17 personnel killed, missing and captured.
3. Our air strikes have not reduced in any major way the capability of the DRV armed
forces to perform their mission of defense of the homeland, to train their own and
infiltration forces for South Vietnam and Laos, and to provide logistic support at present
levels of activity. The interdiction of lines of communication, however, has magnified DRV
problems in providing logistic support to the southern portion of North Vietnam. Moreover,
although supplies sufficient for their current military needs can still reach the area near the
17th Parallel, reduction of route capacities has degraded DRV ability to support any major
offensive beyond its own borders into Laos or South Vietnam.
4. Although over-all economic effects are considered to be minor, the accumulating damage
being inflicted on rolling stock and fixed facilities is forcing the DRV to expend greater
effort to maintain distribution of essential supplies in the southern region of North Vietnam.
The destruction of the Thanh Hoa electric power plant has reduced electric power available
to the Thanh Hoa area by 60 per cent. The operation of phosphate and superphosphate
plants and rice processing plants are the industries which will be most affected by the power
shortage. Additionally, defense preparations both north and south of the 20th Parallel are
believed to have diverted considerable resources from normal economic activities--a
diversion the regime can ill-afford in view of its bare subsistence level economy.
5. Assessment of the impact of our air strikes on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese
Government and people must continue to be deduced from the relatively small number of
reports received by Free World sources and from statements made by DRV officials and
citizens. Analysis of available evidence leads to the following conclusions:
a. The local population in North Vietnam is becoming increasingly aware of our air strikes
and a sense of uncertainty has been generated among the populace. Western observers,
however, see no signs that the people are pressing the regime for a settlement of the
conflict. Rather, the popular reaction to the strikes seems to be that of "grim determination
to continue the fight." In general, the populace appears to be responding favorably to the
increased political and military controls imposed by the regime.
b. Early in April, Western diplomatic observers described the atmosphere in Hanoi as
"fairly relaxed," although a suggestion of greater anxiety in official statements and in the
press was noted. North Vietnam's propaganda output vigorously stresses the theme that the
"army and the people" are stirred to profound hatred and are responding positively "to
defeat the US aggressors." The tone of statements emanating from Hanoi gives no inkling
that the DRV has weakened in its determination to continue supporting the Viet Cong while
persevering in their resistance to US air actions against North Vietnam. Emphasis in DRV
public statements, however, on the growing opposition within the US to the "aggressive
war" being waged by the US may be an indication that the regime's leaders are hoping that
the appearance of grim determination on their part and flagging resolve on our part will still
permit them to achieve their objectives in South Vietnam.
6. In summary, our air strikes to date, while magnifying DRV logistic support problems in
southern North Vietnam and reducing their current ability to support overt aggression
outside their borders, have not reduced their over-all military capabilities in any major
sense. Neither have we seriously hurt the North Vietnamese economy. The North
Vietnamese regime, with no apparent opposition from its populace, gives every impression
of being determined to continue on its present course.
7. At Tabs A through E are more detailed discussions of specific aspects./2/
/2/None printed.
Earle G. Wheeler
309. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) and the Deputy
Ambassador to Vietnam (Johnson)/1/
Saigon, May 20, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret. For
background information on this paper, see Document 287.
FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS IN A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. As a guide to present and future discussions of possible ways to settle the Vietnam
question, it may be useful to list a few of the fundamental factors controlling the attitudes of
the principal parties concerned.
a. DRV/VC
(1) The DRV/VC objective is to unite the two Vietnams under a Communist regime. They
will not give up this objective until it becomes clearly unattainable in the foreseeable future.
Even then, they will defer their efforts, not abandon them.
(2) The DRV/VC strategy is now based on accomplishing their objective in three stages
stretched over a period of years--first a negotiation between the NLF and some Government
in Saigon for a coalition government; secondly, a take-over of that Government by the NLF;
and lastly, an integration with the Hanoi regime. They believe they can attain their objective
following this track. They cannot be talked or negotiated out of it until they are convinced it
is a losing game, particularly since they feel that at Geneva in 1954 they were tricked out of
accomplishing this objective which was then within their grasp. They are thus especially
wary of "negotiating tricks".
(3) The DRV/VC expect that war-weariness, government instability, U.S. sensitivity to
domestic and international pressures, and Vietnamese xenophobia will lead to a situation
which will shortly permit them to accomplish the first stage, i.e., a coalition government.
(4) No amount of bombing of the North is in itself going to persuade the DRV/VC to
abandon their strategy. They can be persuaded to abandon it only if they are convinced that
the trend of events in the South is against them and the factors cited above are not panning
out. They are not yet convinced that this is the case.
(5) The VC will never really disband their armed forces in South Vietnam until they are
fully in control of the government. They might as a ruse "play dead" without giving up their
310. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) and the Deputy
Ambassador to Vietnam (Johnson)/1/
Saigon, May 20, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret. For
background information on this paper, see Document 287.
QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS RELATING TO "A PLAN FOR A
Comment: Paragraph VI. C. seems to indicate that we would accept the status quo insofar as
government control or lack of control of population and territory is concerned. On the other
hand, in Paragraph VI. E. one contemplates at some point attaining a situation where "the
government has effectively extended its authority throughout the country". As a practical
matter, the Viet Cong will never allow government officials to operate in their areas of
authority nor is it likely that we will find many government officials willing to try to enter
Viet Cong bailiwicks unless amply supported by ARVN bayonets. Thus, if the thought is
that government officials could at a minimum effect the registration of voters country-wide,
we consider the possibility highly unlikely.
9. When, if ever, would there be a cease-fire and how would it come about?
Comment: By the time elections are taking place, presumably the shooting will have died
down. We are not sure how this will have come about, whether by tacit agreement or by
some more formal understanding. We do not see how we could have much confidence in
the duration of a cease-fire if the Viet Cong have not been disarmed.
10. Under this plan, how do we ever assure the ending of infiltration from North Viet-Nam
and the dismantling of the Viet Cong military apparatus within South Viet-Nam?
Comment: As for infiltration under this plan, we see no reason why North Viet-Nam could
not continue the clandestine infiltration of men and equipment as has been done in the past.
Similarly, we do not see how the plan disposes of the hundred thousand odd armed Viet
Cong who constitute at present the principal threat to security in South Viet-Nam. In the
absence of reasonable assurances on these two points, it is equally unclear how the United
States government can ever free itself of its present obligations in South Viet-Nam.
11. Can this plan be sold to the GVN?
Comment: We can see little if anything in this plan which would appeal to the GVN. Local
leaders will be quick to see the danger of a coalition government and of the failure to assure
the end of infiltration and to liquidate the Viet Cong military thread within South Viet-Nam.
If we mention U.S. withdrawal, they will shy even more. In its present form, it is highly
unlikely that the GVN would accept the plan without a great deal of unpleasant armtwisting on the part of the Americans--perhaps not then. Such pressure tactics could only be
applied at a very substantial sacrifice of the present good relations existing between GVN
and USG. If the GVN yielded to this pressure, it is entirely possible that a military-Catholic
coalition would overturn the government.
312. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 20, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Rostow Papers, Southeast Asia. Secret. Copies were sent to
Ball, Harriman, Thompson, William Bundy, Unger, and circulated to interested members of
the S/P staff.
SUBJECT
Victory and Defeat in Guerrilla Wars: The Case of South Viet-Nam
In the press, at least, there is a certain fuzziness about the possibility of clear-cut victory in
South Viet-Nam; and the President's statement that a military victory is impossible/2/ is
open to misinterpretation.
/2/An apparent reference to the President's address to members of the Association of
American Editorial Cartoonists at the White House on May 13. For text of the address, see
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp.
522-526.
1. Historically, guerrilla wars have generally been lost or won cleanly: Greece, China
mainland, North Viet-Nam, Malaya, Philippines. Laos in 1954 was an exception, with two
provinces granted the Communists and a de facto split imposed on the country.
2. In all the cases won by Free World forces, there was a phase when the guerrillas
commanded a good part of the countryside and, indeed, placed Athens, Kuala Lumpur, and
Manila under something close to siege. They failed to win because all the possible routes to
guerrilla victory were closed and, in failing to win, they lost. They finally gave up in
discouragement. The routes to victory are:
a) Mao Stage Three: going to all-out conventional war and winning as in China in 1947-49;
b) Political collapse and takeover: North Viet-Nam;
c) Political collapse and a coalition government in which the Communists get control over
the security machinery; that is, army and/or police. This has been an evident Viet Cong
objective in this war; but the nearest precedents are Eastern European takeovers after 1945,
rather than guerrilla war cases.
d) Converting the bargaining pressure generated by the guerrilla forces into a partial victory
by splitting the country: Laos. Also, in a sense, North Viet-Nam in 1954 and the Irish
Rebellion after the First World War.
3. If we succeed in blocking these four routes to victory, discouraging the Communist force
in the South, and making the continuance of the war sufficiently costly to the North there is
no reason we cannot win as clear a victory in South Viet-Nam as in Greece, Malaya, and the
Philippines. Unless political morale in Saigon collapses and the ARVN tends to break up,
case c), the most realistic hope of the VC, should be avoidable. This danger argues for more
rather than less pressure on the North, while conducting the battle in the South in such a
from "declaration" which followed. Four points constituted "best base" from which to find
"most just" solution. Recognition these "principles" would create favorable conditions for
solution problem and would "open" possibility of convocation conference like Geneva
1954./4/
/4/A marginal note on the source text at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: "differs from
6582."
3. When asked if Hanoi recognized that realization of its proposed "principle of withdrawal"
of American forces would depend upon the "conclusions of a negotiation," Bo responded
"exactly" and indicated that if there were agreement on the "bases", the "ways and means"
of application of "principles" would be found and in peaceful manner; possibilities were
many; a way out (porte de sortie) should be found for US; "our suggestion humiliates no
one (sic)."
Quai officials seemed convinced that DRVN delegation head had been instructed by his
government to make the foregoing approach as a matter of urgency during the cessation of
US bomb attacks./5/ Lucet had no comment on discrepancy between Hanoi May 18
communiqu denouncing "so-called cessation bombings"/6/ and foregoing dmarche except
to indicate that former was for public consumption.
/5/In Washington the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research differed
with the CIA over the intent underlying the North Vietnamese approach. The CIA felt that
the dmarche was intended to probe the U.S. position on a settlement, but did not see it as a
response to the bombing pause. (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 1765/65, May
27; Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Mai Van Bo 1965) Allen S. Whiting
of INR felt that the French were correct in assessing the dmarche as a response to the
bombing pause. Like the CIA analysts, Whiting was prepared to accept the approach as
genuine, and authorized by Hanoi, but, where the CIA saw a probe for flexibility on the part
of the United States, Whiting saw a somewhat more serious effort to establish a basis for
negotiations. (Memorandum from Whiting to Hughes, June 1; ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 72 D
272, Vietnam Misc #IV)
/6/For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp.
870-871.
Lucet expressed interest in Indian mediatory role in this matter and expressed intention seek
details from Indian Charge.
Comment: Any information on this subject which Emb could pass on to Quai would help
ensure continued flow from French sources.
Bohlen
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No
time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department at
10:24 a.m., and passed to the White House and to the Department of Defense, exclusive for
McNamara.
3878. For the President. Abortive coup of May 20-21/2/ has been principal topic of
conversation in Saigon this week. In this case, Quat and his senior officials acted promptly
on info, part of which we contributed, to arrest about 40 military and civilian officials who
were plotting overthrow of his govt. Since round-up, we have been trying to evaluate
pattern and political motivation of those involved. Some of plotters had been connected
with earlier attempted coup of February 19/3/ and had already been convicted in absentia.
Others have Catholic or Northern connections but, on whole, there seems to be no ground
for describing movement as being Catholic or regional in its character. Our overall
impression is that conspirators are hodge-podge of individuals and small group disaffected
for differing reasons but all responsive to string-pulling of perennial troublemaker, Lt. Col.
Pham Ngoc Thao. We had warned Quat previously about danger of allowing Thao to
remain at large to plot. Now I believe for first time police are sincerely trying to catch him.
/2/In telegram 3838 from Saigon, May 21, the Embassy reported Quat's account of the coup
attempt. (Ibid.) The Embassy had received prior warning of an impending coup from
General Don on May 17. (Airgram A-857 from Saigon, May 18; ibid., POL 23-9 VIET S)
/3/See Documents 141 and 142.
This morning (Tuesday, 25 May), Quat finally carried out cabinet changes at which he has
been working for several weeks./4/ His difficulties in doing so have illustrated delicate
balance of relationships holding his govt in place. He may not yet be out of woods as he is
still encountering opposition from Chief of State Suu, who up to last minute has been
expressing unhappiness at what he feels is Quat's failure to observe required legal niceties
in changing his ministers. New members of cabinet include several southerners who, while
not well known, should give greater regional balance to govt and will probably bring greater
competence to their several ministries than that of weak officials whom they replace.
/4/The new cabinet appointments announced by Quat on May 25 included Nguyen Trung
Trinh, Minister of Economy; Tran Van Thoan, Minister of Interior; Tran Thanh Hiep,
Minister of Labor; Dinh Trinh Chinh, Minister of Information; and Lam Van Tri, Minister
of Agricultural Reform.
Generals added to Quat's last minute difficulties by repeating past objections to General
"Little" Minh even in his reduced role of Chief of Joint General Staff. Quat evidently felt
that he is still not strong enough to challenge any important grouping of generals and agreed
to sacrifice Minh. His replacement, General Co, is good man but we are likely to miss Minh
who was competent professional staff officer of kind not overly abundant in Vietnam.
Viet Cong, while not notably active during week, conducted two successful ambushes of
convoys and appeared to be concentrating attention on lines of communication around
Saigon. They interrupted road traffic to Dalat, source of much of fruits and vegetables on
Saigon market, and sabotaged several towers on transmission line carrying large part of
Saigon's electricity from Danhim hydroelectric complex in Tuyen Duc Province. They can
cause us serious trouble if they continue to attack power lines which pass through wild and
difficult areas where defense, repair and maintenance of lines are very difficult. If we are
looking for reason for retaliatory action against North Vietnamese power plants, we have
one in this situation.
After several unsuccessful efforts, we have finally got Quat to agree to sit down with us to
discuss factors in eventual political settlement. We are initiating this discussion with him
tomorrow along with his FonMin. It may be significant that, in his speech today to
Legislative Council, Quat emphasized that GVN must be master of its house in conduct of
war and in eventual negotiation of political settlement. While it may be that Quat wished
merely to offset anticipated criticism on this score, there is no doubt that he and his
ministers are very sensitive to recurring charge that Americans are in control and that
Washington is calling shots.
Taylor
315. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 25, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIV.
Top Secret.
SUBJECT
A Diplomatic-Political Track for Vietnam
This memorandum was prepared for you at Mr. Moyers' request. It deals with certain
diplomatic and political steps the U.S. might take over the next several weeks largely, but
not entirely, in response to recent initiatives from Hanoi. This paper has been seen by
Ambassador Unger, but has not otherwise been reviewed by either State or Defense.
The Background
On April 13, DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong put forward four points as "the basis for
the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem". The points were incorporated in
the Soviet-DRV communique of 17 April/2/ and can thus be assumed to have Moscow's
blessing. Peiping, in its own treatment, made the four points appear to be negotiating
preconditions--a position which went beyond Hanoi's original exposition. [A memorandum
to Mr. Bundy exploring these four points from our own point of view is attached as Tab
A.]/3/
/2/See footnote 5, Document 294.
/3/Dated April 24. All brackets are in the source text.
On May 19 Ambassador Bohlen reported that, according to the French, just prior to the end
of the bombing pause, Mai Van Bo, Hanoi's representative in Paris, had made a "fairly
pressing approach". In essence, Bo stressed that Pham Van Dong's four points were not to
Rangoon, May 24; telegram 636 from Rangoon, May 25; telegram 6690 from Paris, May
25; and telegram 1924 from Vientiane, May 26. (All ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Schedule another "pause".
Inform Hanoi and Moscow privately of our intent. This to be done 48 hours prior to the
beginning of our suspension of bombing.
Inform Hanoi (and possibly Moscow) that we are aware of Mai Van Bo's approach to the
French, and are prepared to engage in quiet, bilateral exploratory discussion with
representatives of Hanoi without preconditions. We accept that Pham Van Dong's four
points, as modified and interpreted by Bo, would form part of the basis for discussion as
would certain points we have put forward. We await Hanoi's response.
Select a small U.S. delegation which should be prepared to engage in preliminary or even
definitive discussions.
If, after 3-4 days of pause (which, in effect, will have given Hanoi 5-6 days to consider our
proposal), we get no response, resume our bombing attacks.
Note--it is assumed that the GVN and our key allies will be informed of our initiative. The
approval of the GVN (but not necessarily of our other allies) should be obtained.
The question of whether or not bombing should continue during discussions with Hanoi
requires further study.
Consequences of Undertaking This Approach
At best, we might be able to isolate Hanoi from Peiping and, with judicious application of
carrots, sticks and general bargaining techniques, induce Hanoi to disengage militarily from
SVN and cease its support and direction of the VC and (hopefully) bring an end to largescale offensive action by the VC in the South, in exchange for our suspension of bombing.
This could be tied to a second phase of negotiations involving the GVN and the VC, which,
especially if the Acheson proposals/7/ had taken effect, might lead to a satisfactory political
resolution within South Vietnam. The final phase of this process could be a relatively
simple one: the ratification of the agreements by the Co-Chairmen of the 1954 Accords.
/7/See Document 287.
At worst, negotiations might be undertaken and be broken off in bitterness and hostility.
This might make subsequent attempts at a diplomatic resolution more difficult, but this is a
risk attendant on any attempt to negotiate. Of less grave import, would be Hanoi's ignoring
or turning down our initiative. In this case, we would leak or publicize our approach and the
fact that we undertook such a serious and constructive step would buttress the
Administration's image domestically and abroad. Finally, even if negotiations are carried
out, there is the possibility that we might find, some time after our bombing has ceased,
Hanoi was not keeping its part of the bargain and that our bombing would have to be
resumed with all the attendant political problems this would raise.
Further Considerations
If the Acheson plan meets with approval at the highest level, steps should be taken to delay
the initiation of direct talks with Hanoi until the plan has been set in motion by Quat. Since
the essence of the Acheson scheme is to establish the authority of the GVN throughout
South Vietnam and to offer the Viet Cong a political exit from their insurgency, it is
important that this be in train prior to any negotiations with Hanoi.
A small group should be established to manage all aspects of our diplomatic-political
approach as a full-time highest priority task. This group should be selected with a view that
it will provide the nucleus for the US negotiating team. Immediate study should be given to
the preparation of a US negotiating track taking into account Hanoi's four points as recently
put forward as well as our own position and objectives.
The visit by the Canadian ICC representative to Hanoi on 31 May offers an opportunity to
explore the possibility of direct talks, to inform Hanoi of an impending "pause", or to seek
further clarification of Bo's initiative.
C L Cooper
316. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, May 25, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam Negotiations,
Seaborn. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Possible Messages to Hanoi via the Seaborn Channel
The Canadians told us Monday that Seaborn would be going on a normal visit to Hanoi on
May 31 (Sunday evening our time) and would be staying about a week. This will be his first
visit since early March,/2/ when he conveyed on our behalf a message (Tab A attached)/3/
simply restating what we had told the Chinese Communists at Warsaw. He saw only the
liaison officer to the ICC--who is however quite politically sophisticated--and the same was
true in his December visit,/4/ when we instructed him only to ask what Hanoi's reactions
were to the longer messages we had conveyed in June and August./5/
/2/See footnote 7, Document 199.
/3/Telegram 942 to Ottawa, February 27, was attached at Tab A. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 436.
/5/See ibid., Documents 222 and 304.
We might in any event be considering a general message for Seaborn to have in the event he
has any substantive conversations. However, there is the further possibility that we should
use this channel for either or both of the following purposes: (a) to reiterate the substance of
our pause message (Tab B attached),/6/ or (b) to indicate our awareness of the Bo message
to the French that Pham Van Dong's four points are not to be considered preconditions but
rather "working principles" (Tab C attached)./7/
/6/Printed as Document 293.
/7/Printed as Document 308.
The first possibility, reiterating our pause message, would entail no difficulty and seems
desirable in any event, particularly the last paragraph suggesting the possibility of further
pauses in the future. We have little doubt that Hanoi actually got this message, but the
reiteration of the last paragraph after our resumption would have some weight and might
become useful in the Acheson/8/ or any other context in the future.
/8/Regarding the Acheson-Cutler Plan, see Document 287. For text of the plan as circulated
on May 13, see Document 300.
The second possibility raises somewhat greater difficulties. Bo's message to the French does
state that the four points are not "prior conditions" but equally it appears to call for
recognition of these "principles" as the essential bases for discussion. We certainly do not
wish to get into the position of accepting the four points as a basis, but there would be some
merit in language to the following effect:
"At the time of the resumption of bombing attacks on North Vietnamese territory, the USG
noted indications received through third parties that certain conditions previously stated by
Hanoi as the basis for negotiations were not to be considered prior conditions. The USG had
previously been unable to determine this point and would be interested in whether Hanoi is
now prepared for discussions without any conditions whatever, as has been proposed by
President Johnson."
In other words, we could pitch the inquiry on the basis of "unconditional discussions" in the
full sense and not on the question of discussions on the basis of the four points. This would
not be a change in our basic position, although we should have to weigh whether the inquiry
alone would tend to indicate to Hanoi that we were looking for a bilateral forum and a way
out. Needless to say, any actual bilateral discussions would have to be weighed very
carefully by us, and we would have to consider particularly whether the GVN would accept
them or react unfavorably if they came to light. Although we have acted on the Bo message
to the extent of exploring what the possible venue of bilateral discussions might be (Paris,
through clandestine channels, Rangoon, and Vientiane are possibilities), we had been
inclined against any initiative toward such discussions at the present moment (largely
because we think an action/reaction sequence is more likely to be fruitful).
On the other hand, to remain silent in the face of the Bo message could be misconstrued. It
is notable that Hanoi, in the Bo message, did use a wholly secret channel. It was probably
trying to establish a credible position with the French and it may also have been saying
indirectly to us that, if they ever did decide to talk, they would wish to use the French
channel and not the Soviets or the British (through whom we had sent the pause message).
On balance, I am inclined to think that we should include in Seaborn's kit a paragraph along
Cambodia,/4/ and that it has been negative toward the recent Indian proposal/5/ even as a
basis for discussions.
/4/See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 716.
/5/See Document 285.
4. In addition, the USG informed Hanoi on May 12/6/ that it was undertaking a temporary
suspension of bombing attacks for a period of several days. The USG regrets that this action
met with no response from Hanoi neither directly nor in the form of any significant
reductions of armed actions in South Viet-Nam by forces whose actions, in the view of the
USG, can be decisively affected from North Viet-Nam. Accordingly, the USG, in
coordination with the Republic of Viet-Nam, was obliged to resume bombing attacks.
Nonetheless, the USG continues to consider the possibility of working toward a solution by
mutual example.
/6/See Document 293.
5. In making these points, the USG again must make it clear that in the absence of action or
discussions leading to a political solution it must and will take whatever actions may be
necessary to meet and to counter the offensive actions being carried out by North Viet-Nam
against South Viet-Nam and against American forces acting to assist the Republic of VietNam.
6. If but only if senior DRV representative gets on to Pham Van Dong four points of April
8,/7/ Seaborn would reply that he has no message from USG on this subject. However, his
study of four points would indicate that some might be acceptable to USG but that others
would clearly be unacceptable. It has also not been clear whether DRV statements should be
taken to mean that the recognition of these points was required as, in effect, a condition for
any discussions. He would say that the USG appears to have made its position clear, that it
would accept unconditional discussions in the full sense, with either side free to bring up
any matter, and that he would be personally interested in whether the DRV representative
wished to clarify the question of whether their recognition is regarded by the DRV as a
condition to any discussions. End proposed text.
/7/See Document 245.
In presenting these instructions to the Canadians, we would explain that paragraph 4
represents a reiteration of the message conveyed to Hanoi at the time of the pause, and that
paragraph 6 is an attempt to elicit clarification on the repeated DRV formulation of the four
points. At the same time, we have not wished to appear to be taking any real new initiative
for discussion. You will note also that the formulation, as well as the explanation to the
Canadians, makes no reference to the recent Bo approach in Paris,/8/ on which we have not
informed the Canadians and which we would not wish to seem to be picking up as such. At
the same time, part of the reason for paragraph 6 is that we have some concern that the Bo
approach might have been designed to have the French pass the word in diplomatic
channels that Hanoi is actually ready for discussions without prior conditions, which might
invite some unhelpful initiative by the French or perhaps by U Thant or others. If Seaborn
should in fact use paragraph 6 and the DRV representative should respond that acceptance
of the four points is a necessary precondition, we would have learned something; equally, it
would indicate what might be a significant change if Hanoi should take a different position.
We suppose that the former would be the result, based on our over-all reading of Hanoi's
position at this time, but at least the point would be somewhat better nailed down.
/8/See Document 313.
Request your comments on this whole approach. If you concur, we should be going ahead
with the Canadians tomorrow if possible so that instructions could reach Seaborn in time./9/
/9/In telegram 3927 from Saigon, May 28, the Embassy endorsed the proposed channel and
message, with suggestions for minor revisions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S) In telegram 2732 to Saigon, May 28, the Department informed the Embassy that
the Canadian Government was being requested to instruct Seaborn along the lines indicated
in telegram 2718. (Ibid.) On May 30 the Embassy cabled the Department that Seaborn had
received instructions that stipulated that he should ask for an appointment with the North
Vietnamese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister and take the initiative in raising the
question of Pham Van Dong's Four Points as a basis for negotiations. The Embassy felt that
this was contrary to the message outlined in telegram 2718 and asked Seaborn to wait for
confirmation. (Telegram 3956 from Saigon; ibid.) The Department responded in telegram
2754 to Saigon, May 30, that the Canadian Embassy had confirmed that new instructions
were being sent to Seaborn to bring his mission to Hanoi back into line with the intent
outlined in telegram 2718. (Ibid.)
Rusk
the proposed attacks might prompt a response from air bases in mainland China. (Ibid.,
INR-NIE Files) The Department of State had indicated a similar concern on May 27 when
Rusk called McNamara to discuss the rules of engagement governing immediate pursuit in
connection with the Rolling Thunder bombing operations. Rusk asked that McNamara
make it clear that pursuit operations against North Vietnamese aircraft include a caution
against attacking air bases or other ground targets that were not on the designated target list.
(Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) McNamara returned the call on May 28
and indicated that instructions had been issued that no North Vietnamese SAM sites or air
bases were to be attacked by U.S. aircraft. (Ibid.)
On June 2 McNamara sent a memorandum to the President in which he indicated that three
senior U.S. military and diplomatic officials in Europe recommended against attacks on the
IL-28 bomber base in North Vietnam (Document 325).
At outset they stated broad GVN political objectives were restoration of peace with liberty,
full sovereignty and independence of SVN. They noted reunification impossible at present
and necessary accept division at 17th parallel until international situation permits further
consideration reunification. They were firm that National Liberation Front (NLF) merely
creature of Hanoi and SVN cannot accept NLF as element in GVN administration; that is,
as a bloc or political force or organization. However, they acknowledged provision would
have to be made for integration returnees into national life as individuals. Agreed that major
steps need be taken to revitalize and expand Chieu Hoi program and to promote defections.
We responded with statement general political objectives as set forth in answer to question
1, Embtel 3678, noting these interrelated and that "security guarantee" is theme running
through all objectives and raises basic questions as to whether GVN/US should seek
restoration status quo ante or seek new international framework. This promoted lengthy
discussion of: (A) suitability of Geneva Accords as basis for eventual settlement; and (B)
importance and nature of security guarantees. Regarding (A) initial GVN reaction strongly
negative with their citing problem of elections, ineffectiveness of ICC, prohibition of
alliances, and their desire interpret Accords as armistice between French and VC but not as
political document governing future SVN. They saw advantage of Accords in designation of
17th parallel as boundary and possibly with respect to eventual regroupment and
repatriation of VC. However, in the ensuing discussion they came around considerably and
agreed that elections really presented little difficulty, that ICC problem secondary one, and
problem of prohibition of alliances presented greatest difficulty but not impossible of
solution. Question was raised whether a security guarantee by US need be considered an
alliance. Quat himself suggested further consideration of formula using Geneva Accords as
acceptable basis for settlement providing certain provisions of Accords are modified or
reinterpreted to bring them in line with current realities. We will return to this in later
discussions.
With respect to security guarantees they drew parallel between "guaranteed or armed peace"
under NATO after World War II and situation in SEA where no muscle provided to
guarantee peace postulated under Geneva Accords. They felt SEATO ineffective to date and
felt something strong essential. While they dwelt on multilateral guarantees, it was clear
that they were primarily interested in obtaining bilateral security guarantee from the United
States. They indicated this might take form of bilateral arrangements under which US would
intervene at request of GVN in the event SVN security were threatened. We pointed out that
problem of SEATO unanimity was dealt with in Rusk-Thanat communiqu of 1962./6/
Without commitment, we undertook to examine with Washington whether that
interpretation of the SEATO treaty could be made applicable to SVN as a protocol state.
/6/For text of this communiqu, issued on March 6, 1962, see American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1091-1093.
Under question 2 we had meeting of minds on estimate of situation and necessity of pushing
on all fronts to convince Hanoi that everything of value in DRV will be destroyed and trend
of military and political events in South is running against them thus leading Hanoi to
conclusion negotiations are necessary. GVN representatives emphasized sensitivity of the
political climate in SVN to such developments as recent moratorium on air attacks, RuskGromyko talks, proposed Cambodian conference--all of which are exploited by Vietnamese
press and opposition groups as indications that basic decisions concerning SVN being made
without GVN being a party. Extreme sensitivity also displayed over when and how US
troops might be withdrawn.
Extended discussion involved modalities reaching eventual settlement either through tacit
arrangement or through more formal discussions or negotiations of an official character.
They saw distinct advantages in tacit arrangement but acknowledged difficulties in
predicting how confrontation of viewpoints with DRV could be arranged, as indicated
Embtel 3914,/7/ they felt it was in many ways desirable for US initiate contacts with DRV.
Here again they expressed concern because of sensitivity of Vietnamese political situation
and public opinion. With respect to more open official contacts the following were
discussed briefly: (A) Direct negotiations between GVN and DRV; (B) direct negotiations
between GVN and DRV with GVN accompanied by US and DRV by USSR or Communist
China; and (C) a larger formal conference of Geneva type. While recognizing that ultimate
choice of means would depend on situation as it evolves, GVN would prefer the order as
listed above. The larger conference was considered least desirable since question NLF
representation would prove most difficult to handle under this formula. However, GVN
representatives indicated they could live with NLF representatives as an integral part of
DRV delegation.
/7/Dated May 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Considerable discussion revolved around question 3 A on what we should trade for
cessation of US/GVN bombing and eventual reduction US forces. While it agreed that
GVN/US basically desired cessation of infiltration and VC activities in SVN and
destruction VC infrastructure, problem was how and what we offered on our side in
exchange in view of difficulties in verifying DRV performance. Agreed we should not trade
GVN/US air attacks against DRV for mere statement from DRV that it would behave.
Discussion inconclusive and marked again by sensitivity that US would at some stage
expect to withdraw troops.
Discussion of question 3 B confirmed judgment that in general it desirable to probe DRV
attitudes and intentions and perhaps easier for us to do this. Agreed that such contacts
should proceed from solid, agreed US/GVN position. Radhakhrishnan proposals discussed
under this heading which reported separately (Embtel 3903)./8/
/8/Not found.
Regarding question 3 C GVN reps expressed general preference for matching specific offers
to DRV to evidence of good DRV behavior, although GVN could say publicly that it is
prepared to study at proper time general types of exchanges (commercial, cultural,
individuals, etc.) with DRV. They noted difficulty speaking out on this subject at early stage
since Quat's opponents likely to label speakers as "neutralists". GVN confirmed it could
accept principle of reunification but stated that reunification would have to await more
favorable international political climate. GVN can accept co-existence with DRV but not
co-habitation.
Questions 3 D, 3 E, and 3 F were explored during above discussions but no specific
conclusions were reached.
Under question 3 G importance of Afro-Asian conference stressed. Agreed that additional
measures which GVN could take would be to dramatically increase its diplomatic and
public information efforts abroad. In general believed that continued display our
determination and firm adherence to our course of action against DRV and within SVN
looking into possible application Rusk-Thanat communiqu to SVN and will let you know
results.
3. Ref to "pushing on all fronts to convince Hanoi that everything of value in DRV will be
destroyed" not clear. Is it meant to refer to importance of credibility of threat as influence
on Hanoi's readiness turn to negotiations or does it relate to judgment about how military
action against North should develop in future, with regard to intensity as well as location
and character of targets?
4. Believe you can adequately reassure GVN on question US troop withdrawal since this is
an action which we would not be taking without full consultation with GVN and not until
we are satisfied that northern aggression no longer a threat and GVN capable handling
security problem in South. In any case we envisage phased withdrawal capable being timed
or even reversed in response developments.
5. Re modalities for reaching settlement we can envisage, if tacit arrangement being
pursued, situations in which it might at no point be necessary to have confrontation of
viewpoints with DRV even though some formal meeting to put international stamp of
approval on settlement might be required.
6. With reference question 3G agree that actions will certainly speak louder than words with
DRV. However, their own statements make it quite clear that Viet Cong and Peking and
almost surely Hanoi as well are counting on governmental pressure (abroad) and private
protest (at home) against US policies and actions to deter us from pursuing our objectives as
fully and vigorously as may be necessary. More effective GVN efforts around the world, if
such did not too seriously tax personal resources needed at home, could make significant
contribution to our joint efforts. As you are aware, GVN Embassy Washington virtually a
cipher and we are contemplating measures to bring about improvement. In considering
public relations problem either here or in Saigon we are reminded again of Dang Duc Khoi
and wonder if GVN prepared put him back to work.
Rusk
the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI) On June 5 Bundy also sent the President an
assessment of the message prepared in the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research. (Ibid.)
In a June 4 memorandum to the President, McGeorge Bundy proposed a meeting on
Saturday, June 5, to discuss developments in Vietnam and "the appropriate shape of an
answer to the Chinese." Bundy suggested that, in addition to the President and himself,
participation in the meeting be limited to Rusk, Ball, McNamara, and possibly Raborn.
(Ibid.) According to the log maintained in the White House, such a meeting took place on
June 5 at the Department of State over lunch. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No other
record of that meeting has been found. In a memorandum to Rusk on June 5, however,
William Bundy noted that he had informed the British Embassy that Hopson should be
authorized to reply to the Chinese that the United States had received the message. (Ibid.,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV)
/5/The text of the provisional charter was transmitted in telegram 1204 from Saigon,
October 20, 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol.
XX, Cables)
Because of this situation, I felt obliged to postpone my return to Washington until it can be
resolved--how long or how short this delay will be is hard to say. We have been meeting
with the principal contenders daily to urge that the crisis be solved quickly and to impress
on all concerned the over-riding importance of political stability at this time of increasing
U.S. commitment and support.
The impasse has been another reminder of the basic lack of cohesion among the Vietnamese
and of the irresponsibility of many of their leaders.
The impatience of the military with this state of affairs was made clear by Air Force
Commander General Ky in an after-dinner speech made in the presence of Quat and other
civilian leaders; in effect, Ky warned that the generals would feel forced to resume political
power if the civilians did not soon resolve their differences. The danger of military
intervention will grow the longer the confrontation drags on.
A hopeful sign in this otherwise darkened political scene was the generally successful
carrying out of municipal and provincial elections on Sunday. Although results from the
provinces are not yet all in, it looks as though about 70 per cent of those registered
exercised their vote. I visited some of the polling places in Saigon and while there was no
air of great excitement, the voting was orderly and seemed well conducted. Present plans
call for an electoral law to be promulgated by the end of June for elections to a national
assembly to be held in October. Reports from Sunday's elections seem to show that voting
in populated areas is feasible and that the Viet Cong are not a serious obstacle to balloting.
The upward trend in military activity which began last month continued during the early
part of the week and peaked sharply at its end. There was a general increase of attacks,
ambushes and sabotage of roads and bridges. Most of the increased activity occurred in the I
and II Corps areas and reached a climax two days ago in the combat near Ba Gia, not far
from Quang Ngai city. This was a sharp fight in which govt forces came out second best
with two ARVN battalions decimated. There were disturbing indications of failures of
leadership on the part of a number of key officers in the second division from which the
troops came. General Westmoreland is having a close analysis made of this action to learn
all possible from it. It may prove to be the opening engagement of the offensive which we
have suspected the VC to be preparing during recent quiet weeks.
Taylor
conference remarks on June 1, relating to the request for the additional appropriation,
President Johnson noted that his personal representative, former World Bank President
Eugene R. Black, had begun extensive negotiations to lay the international groundwork for
a long-range development program for Southeast Asia. (Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pages 610-611) The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1965, which appropriated the additional funds requested on June 1, was
signed into law on September 6 by President Johnson. (79 Stat. 653)
/2/Reference is to telegram 3768 from Saigon, May 15, in which the Embassy reported that
Buddhist leader Tri Quang had told Embassy officers that he believed that the psychological
lift achieved by the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and the landing of U.S. troops in South
Vietnam was wearing off. (Ibid.)
If on the other hand, we accept the logic of the second proposal, we should presumably be
prepared to assume greater risks of Chinese and Soviet involvement in an effort to persuade
Hanoi to stop. This means that we might logically proceed, within the relatively near future,
to bomb the military installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Such an action would seek to
achieve the ultimate US objective without the need to depend on victory in the South which
would make the risks of a greater Moscow-Peiping involvement worth assuming.
The relevance of all this to the present situation is obvious. Action against NVN by USGVN forces has now reached a critical point. We must decide whether to proceed on one of
the three following courses:
The first is to continue progressively to move northward in our air attacks, recognizing that
any further movement nearer the Hanoi-Haiphong area poses grave danger of a serious
encounter with MIGs that could draw us into attacks on MIG bases and SAM sites and the
attendant possibility of greater Chinese and Russian involvement. In fact, the Rolling
Thunder operations, for several weeks, have been in areas where the MIGs might easily
have engaged. Their failure to do so (except once) may well be because they are waiting for
the early activation of the SAM sites. Attacks on Haiphong and Hanoi could be expected to
offer the same dangers as strikes on the MIG bases.
A second possibility is to move northward but keep far enough west of the Hanoi-Haiphong
area to avoid the range of the SAMs. This would be on the assumption--not yet proven--that
this course would offer less danger of escalation. We would like your comments on the
validity of this assumption. Would the Chinese permit us to approach nearer their territory
without reacting?
A third possibility is to expand the present rules to include industrial and other non-military
targets that would not entail high civilian casualty rates. This course would permit a
continuation of bombing south of the 20th Parallel without providing reactions appreciably
different from attacks on the present target systems.
In order to make these decisions we need your answers to the following questions:
1. Do you believe that our best hope is to seek to win the war in the South while employing
air attacks in the North for the ancillary purposes outlined in assumption I above
maintaining approximately the same level and geographical scope of bombing as Rolling
Thunder programs to date?
2. Do you now believe that, in view of the military and political difficulties in SVN we
should begin to shape our air effort against the North more in the direction of assumption II
above?
3. Do you believe that we would have a reasonable chance of persuading Hanoi to quit by
increasing the destructiveness of our air attacks so long as the Viet Cong were winning or at
least holding their own in the South? If so, do you believe that such pressure could be
mounted without unacceptable risks to the United States from an enlarged Soviet/Chinese
involvement?
4. Taking into account your answers to the above questions, how do you apply these
answers to the requested authorization for Rolling Thunder 17 tomorrow morning?/3/ RT
17 includes suggested strikes on target 43, Qui Hau Ammo Depot, which is 12 NM farther
north than target 47.11 in RT 16 program,/4/ 3 NM closer to Phuc Yen (47 NM) and same
distance (40 NM) from Hanoi; target 82.11 Ben Thuy Thermal Power Plant; and target
71/18.17 Ben Thuy Port and Ferry with estimated civilian casualty loss of 59 persons.
/3/In JCS telegram 3263 to CINCPAC, June 2, the JCS detailed the target list and intent of
Rolling Thunder Seventeen and authorized CINCPAC to implement the bombing program.
(Ibid.)
/4/Target 47.11, authorized as a bombing target in the execute message for the Rolling
Thunder Sixteen program, was the Hoai An ammunition depot, located 26 nautical miles
north of the 20th parallel. (JCS telegram 2672 to CINCPAC, May 22; ibid.)
Finally let us know how you feel about the method in which authorized strikes are carried
out. Do you learn about targets sufficiently in advance? Do you favor existing authority to
permit repeated restrikes of given target until given damage level achieved? Should strikes
against North be run daily or intermittently?
Question of IL-28s is being given separate study here.
Rusk
the South Vietnamese, we would find it necessary to respond with great force. He
emphasized the absolute necessity of "prior consultation" with the British in the event we do
carry out a strike on Phuc Yen.
General Lemnitzer: So long as there are no more than a small number of IL28's in North
Vietnam (I reported to him that at present we estimate there are approximately 9 aircraft at
Phuc Yen), he would be inclined to defer a strike against them. When the number becomes
large and militarily significant General Lemnitzer would strike to destroy them. In his
opinion, the Soviets would not respond to a U.S. strike against Phuc Yen with overt military
action in Western Europe--they might harass the corridors to Berlin, and in that event
General Lemnitzer would suggest we harass their seaborne commerce.
Ambassador Bohlen: He does not believe the Soviets will allow the bombers to be used
initially against Saigon or other civilian targets in South Vietnam. For this and other
reasons, he recommends against attacking the IL28's until they move south of the 17th
parallel. If and when they do so, we should hit back hard. He said it would be a tossup as to
how the Soviets would react if we strike the IL28's before they move south of the
demarcation line. He pointed out the Soviets are in a bad spot: They do not want to become
involved in the war in Southeast Asia, but they do have to protect their position in the
Communist world, and the current regime does not have the stability of Khrushchev's. In
the event we did strike first, he doubts that the Soviets would start any military action in
Europe because they would recognize that to do so "would be committing suicide for fear of
death." And he does not believe they would go to war in the Far East because they would
think such action would lead to war in Europe. Their military reaction would probably be
slight, but the international reaction to our move would be very bad, e.g., we would
probably lose the support of the British. He made exactly the same suggestion as
Ambassador Bruce, i.e., couldn't we get word to the Soviets that if the IL28's are used
against us or against the South Vietnamese, "we will blast you."
Robert S. McNamara
For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Moyers, and Bromley Smith
For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
9. At 1810, Messrs. Mann, Bunker, and Vaughn departed the meeting and the discussion
turned to Vietnam. Mr. McNamara presented the strikes plan under Rolling Thunder XVII.
The President instructed Mr. McNamara to be sure that there was adequate CAP aircraft on
each strike. Target 43 came in for much discussion after which it was decided to take it out
of the Rolling Thunder XVII plan. Mr. Ball gave a detailed presentation of his concerns
over the policy which was guiding the bombing in the North. He said he had sent a telegram
to Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson, asking them to reply to certain basic questions./2/ He
presented a case for the fact that the thrust of the bombings from this time onward ran every
risk of escalating the war and pleaded for a hard look to be taken at the purpose of the
bombings and a pattern which would be pursued. Admiral Raborn informed the meeting
that our estimate on this general question would be available within the next forty-eight
hours./3/ The meeting adjourned with the understanding that this question of the bombings
would be the principal topic of conversation when Ambassador Taylor arrives for
consultation.
/2/Document 324.
/3/SNIE 10-6-65, dated June 2, and SNIE 10-6/1-65 and SNIE 10-7-65, both dated June 4,
all dealt with issues involved in U.S. air strikes in North and South Vietnam. (Department
of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99) Regarding SNIE 10-6-65, see Document 318.
Richard Helms/4/
Deputy Director
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
for a week, at least, because he wants to wait until Taylor gets back and get his
recommendations, and also because he fears this would bring China into the struggle. He
said that this would create, almost literally, a Cuba for China and I agreed with him.
He said that there are no indications of any feelers from the other side, that the Russians are
shipping a lot of stuff, some of which is getting through to North Viet Nam but the Chinese
are holding up a good deal of the material. He said we haven't got many more targets left to
bomb, that, in fact, they got most of them on the first strike and that the difficult period was
now beginning with the monsoons.
Senator Long spoke up and said we have to face up to the $64.00 question and bomb China.
I said as emphatically as I could, "I disagree with you completely and absolutely."
The President then turned to another subject.
After watching the blast-off and a discussion of a few legislative matters, I started to leave
and the President said, "When Taylor gets back I want to talk to you about that area." I said
I would be delighted and left./2/
/2/An additional sentence is handwritten at the bottom of the page: "He also mentioned the
possibility of sending up another Resolution--along lines of Javits' suggestion--if the
decision was to go ahead."
that increased bombing will compensate for losses on the military and political fronts in the
South. On the other hand, we would not cease to apply the kind of mounting pressure
described in paragraph 2 above. While we should do everything possible to win on both
fronts, North and South, we should not let up in the North because things are not going well
in the South.
(C) Question No. 3--As we have indicated above, the chance of persuading Hanoi to lay off
while the Viet Cong are winning or holding their own in the South is obviously not good.
However, we repeat that this fact is no reason to limit the bombing effort in the North. It
simply means that we must try harder in the South while bearing down on the North. It is
impossible to say whether added pressure would create unacceptable risks of an enlarged
Soviet-Chinese involvement except in terms of specific targets. Obviously, any extension of
the present target system should be examined closely for [from] this point of view.
(D) Question No. 4--In consideration of our views expressed above, we have recommended
the approval of Rolling Thunder 17 (Embtel 4004)./4/
/4/Dated June 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. With respect to the method of carrying out authorized strikes, the present pattern is
generally satisfactory to us. We need approximately 48 hours, from receipt of the execution
order to bombs on target, for me to clear with the Prime Minister and General
Westmoreland the Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the RVNAF. A twoweek program is preferable to a one-week program. Desirably, operating units should
receive the warning order one week prior to execution in order to permit adequate planning.
A two-week program with execution delegated to the operation level would provide
flexibility in coping with the vagaries of the weather and other factors, including in-country
competition for sorties. Whether strikes are made daily or intermittently would not seem to
be significant, but experience suggests that more frequent strikes by fewer aircraft reduces
losses. Additionally, varied and repeated strikes serve to complicate the problem for the
DRV defenses.
6. In addition to answering your questions, we would like to make some specific comments
on targeting, derived from the three courses of action discussed in reftel. As we understand
these three courses of action, the first involves a progressive movement northward without
consideration for the sensitivity of the Hanoi/Haiphong area; the second moves northward
but sideslips to the west, and perhaps to the east, to avoid the SAM's; and the third confines
our efforts south of the 20th parallel but includes industrial or non-military targets.
7. In consonance with the concept earlier expressed, it is important that we constantly add to
the pressure on the DRV. If we continue to concentrate on lines of communications as in the
past, the very repetition of our actions designed to disrupt and maintain the disruption of
these communications is in itself a form of escalation. In addition, while maintaining this
interdiction program, we would like to introduce variety by occasionally striking a target on
a random basis outside of the LOONC [LOC?] pattern, such as a power plant, military
installation, dam site, supply area, industrial complex. By so doing, we complicate the DRV
defense problem and make it clear that we are limited to no single target plan. Thus, nothing
other than populated areas is immune to attack.
8. Under this concept, we would avoid the sensitive area of Hanoi/Haiphong except for an
occasional well selected target within the area struck to show that we can penetrate and that
there is no sure sanctuary. We do not feel that an occasional selective intrusion into this area
is likely to invoke a Chinese reaction even though we tangle with MIG's.
9. The number of industrial and other significant non-military targets below the 20th
parallel are few and far between. In fact there are very few such targets outside of the
Hanoi/Haiphong complex. We agree that non-military targets should be struck as a variation
from the LOC pattern, but only occasionally and selectively, both North and South of the
20th parallel.
10. In summary we recommend a basic pattern of LOC targets varied occasionally by other
kinds of targets both South and North of the 20th parallel to include the Hanoi/Haiphong
area. Upon this pattern, we would superimpose a program of full fledged psywar operations
as an integral part of Rolling Thunder. This would require only a slight increase in air effort.
Leaflet drops should precede and sometimes accompany strikes, having the primary purpose
of explaining the cause and nature of Rolling Thunder and of magnifying popular anxiety.
11. We appreciate this opportunity to present our views on these important subjects.
Taylor
where they palavered for most of the day. Quat himself left the meeting at about 19:00
whereas some of the participants were still hanging about two hours later.
Quat summarized the accomplishments of the meetings as follows. It was agreed that Suu
would put out an appeal to the population in the name of the government, the Generals, and
the Legislative Council for the purpose of urging greater national unity in these critical
times. It is my understanding that this appeal has been made by radio, although I have not
yet been able to verify the fact.
Vice Premier Tuyen has undertaken to settle the matter of the two reluctant ministers who
do not wish to resign. Quat is strangely vague as to what he expects Tuyen will do.
However, Bui Diem seems sure that Tuyen is basically on Quat's side.
In view of the lack of enthusiasm of the Legislative Council to come to grips with the
constitutional issue, Quat seems to consider it to have been satisfactorily arranged to let this
matter drag on unsettled.
In order to satisfy the Generals who were very vocal in criticizing the civilians (and
particularly but obliquely Suu) for their political bickering while the troops are dying on the
battlefield, Quat has undertaken to formulate a statement of stronger policy which will
guarantee a more energetic conduct of the war. He obviously did not know what kind of
specific measures he might propose: his vagueness suggests that this will probably be more
of a literary exercise than a change of behavior.
As Quat finished this summary of the outcome of today's session, Bui Diem came in, having
lingered behind at Gia Long Palace. In response to Quat's question as to what had happened
since Quat's departure from the meeting, Bui Diem announced that Suu wanted a meeting at
15:00 tomorrow with the Prime Minister and General Chieu of the Legislative Council to
discuss the current crisis. This surprised us as we assumed that Quat's resume represented
the consensus of action required to meet the crisis. Quat said that he thought Suu had
primarily in mind discussing the Catholic issue and the possibility that the military will
return to power if the civilians do not perform better. Quat said that General Thi in
particular had become very emotional over the ineffectiveness of the civilian government
and had left the meeting early in a rage.
Johnson and I then started asking questions designed to bring out the unsatisfactory nature
of the day's events. I pointed out that there was a contradiction in striving for a stronger
policy and a more effective conduct of the war with a decision to stall off a resolution of the
constitutional powers of the Prime Minister. The latter could hardly be expected to do better
in the conduct of the war with his powers clouded by the present controversy.
We asked why there had been no follow-up on the gambit started yesterday when Quat
wrote his letter to the Chief of State, asking for agreement in the dismissal of the Ministers
of National Economy and Interior (Embtel 4003). Bui Diem said that this partially
completed action had been overtaken by events, but when we pressed him, he conceded that
there was considerable merit in trying to carry it through as an easy, face-saving way of
resolving the constitutional issue./3/
/3/According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between Ambassador Johnson
in Saigon and Leonard Unger in Washington, June 3, Suu did not act on Quat's letter,
despite his earlier assurance. Johnson estimated at that point that the Quat government had
only a 50-50 chance of emerging from the constitutional crisis with its position and
authority intact. (Ibid.)
In spite of the general inconclusiveness of today's conferrings, there is a new, important
factor emerging in the form of the reappearance of the Generals on the political scene. They
appear to have shown themselves genuinely reluctant to take sides in the Quat-Suu
controversy, although their sympathies seem to have been on the Prime Minister's side. One
of them has indicated that they would have declared for Quat had he directly requested it,
but no such request was made. While being sharply critical of the civilian politicians, the
Generals limited themselves to offering to serve as arbitrators between the contending
elements if they were requested. In answer to our question as to what would be arbitrated,
Bui Diem replied that it would be the whole question of the nature and content of the
constitution and of the government. We agreed that it would be disastrous to bring the
Generals back from the battlefield to fulfill such a broad and far ranging mandate.
Quat and Bui Diem seemed tired tonight and to lack incisiveness and self-confidence./4/
Just as former Prime Minister Huong could not keep off the subject of the menace of the
Buddhists, Quat has become similarly fascinated by the dangers represented by the
Catholics. He has heard a rumor that Archbishop Binh is now supporting Pere Quynh and
his factious priests. He is happy with the fact that in the course of Tuyen's audience with the
Pope, the latter undertook to write Papal Delegate Palmas a letter on the subject of Catholic
avoidance of involvement in politics.
/4/On the evening of June 4 Bui Diem called Manfull to say that "the constitutional crisis
was solved." Manfull called on Quat for details and found him in good spirits, confident that
he had weathered the crisis. He had met with Suu and worked out an agreement on the
constitutional questions at issue. The agreement would be embodied in a communiqu, and
Quat said that he would send a decree on June 5 to Suu for his signature confirming the
dismissal of the Ministers of Economy and Interior. (Telegram 4056 from Saigon, June 4;
ibid.)
Taylor
330. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 3, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. XI. A handwritten "L" in the margin of the source text indicates the President
saw this memorandum.
The British and Vietnam
On a number of occasions you have showed your skepticism when one or another of us has
remarked that the British have been very solid and helpful on Vietnam. And of course you
have recollections, which the rest of us only have at second hand, of Harold Wilson's effort
to telephone his way into a fancy trip to the White House at just the wrong moment./2/
Moreover, you feel the wounds of what Home said about busses and what Michael Stewart
said about gas, although everyone else has long since forgotten those particular episodes.
/2/See Document 103.
It remains a fact that every experienced observer from David Bruce on down has been
astonished by the overall strength and skill of Wilson's defense of our policy in Vietnam
and his mastery of his own left wing in the process. The support of the UK has been of real
value internationally--and perhaps of even more value in limiting the howls of our own
liberals. It is quite true, of course, that we would get this kind of backing more or less
automatically from a Conservative government, but support from Labour is not only harder
to get but somewhat more valuable in international terms.
The only price we have paid for this support is the price of keeping them reasonably well
informed and fending off one ill-advised plan for travel. This is not a very great cost.
Moreover, we have had no leaks from the British, and no public expression of worry about
the length of the pause. It is true that Gordon Walker has been making some moderately
foolish noises lately, but he is not a member of the government.
My own feeling is that it is well worth our while to keep the British on board as long as it
can be done simply by keeping them fully informed and giving them the feeling that they
are in the know as we go ahead. To put it another way, I see no advantage at all in putting
them at arms length and thus increasing the risk that they will be tempted to criticize./3/
You have taught us all a great deal about the advantages of Congressional consultation in
the last year and a half--I myself believe that the same rules apply in diplomatic
consultation. After all, we are dealing with human beings in both cases.
/3/On June 3 Prime Minister Wilson sent a message to President Johnson in which he
warned against air raids on petroleum storage areas in North Vietnam, and argued for a
limited concept of warfare in Vietnam. He reiterated, however, his continuing support for
U.S. policy in Vietnam. (Pentagon Papers: New York Times Edition, pp. 448-449)
I attach Bruce's latest cable on this subject./4/
/4/Reference is to telegram 5835 from London, June 3, in which Ambassador Bruce
commented on a statement made in the House of Commons on June 3 by Foreign Secretary
Michael Stewart. The statement dealt with Vietnam and was in line with the generally
supportive position that the Wilson government had taken on the issue, despite an
increasingly restive left wing within the Labor Party and growing uneasiness among the
British public. Bruce noted, however, that, in order to manage their own party and the
public, the Wilson government depended heavily on an undertaking from the United States
to consult with them on any major changes in the policy or conduct of the war in Vietnam.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
McG. B.
Sudiste groups (Le Van Thu, Hoang Ho, Tran Van Van, etc.) responsible for his election as
Chief of State. He is undoubtedly being used by this group. The more readily since he
foresees for himself a more exalted and powerful role than that which he now enjoys as
Chief of State with nominal powers. These ambitions are reflected in the projected draft
constitution providing for a strong Chief of State along de Gaulle lines, which Suu has
announced that he wishes to submit for referendum to the people, and by his call for early
national elections. In the immediate situation he has been a willing tool of the opposition in
raising constitutional and procedural questions in their confrontation with Quat.
The position of the military has been to withdraw progressively from the active political
scene and to devote their efforts to fighting the war and putting their own house in order.
The military appeared content with civilian rule so long as the government gave evidence
that it could effectively maintain a degree of political stability and direct the affairs of state.
Having withdrawn from the political scene under strong urging from Quat, the military have
been loath to intervene actively in the current crisis. They much prefer to remain aloof in
the current situation unless their intervention is officially requested or should prove
necessary as they view the situation. However, the military leaders are upset and
increasingly impatient at the apparent inability of the civilian elements to solve the current
impasse. They desire above all a strong effective government and if prospects for this
appear dim, they will undoubtedly move to assume power.
Prime Minister Quat's performance in the current crisis has not been reassuring. He has not
projected an image either as a forceful leader or as an astute politician. In advancing his
proposed cabinet reshuffle, he did not prepare the ground either with the Chief of State, the
NLC, or the ministers concerned. When faced with the "constitutional issue,", Quat did not
seize the initiative nor utilize his strong assets. Had he done so, at the outset he could have
forced the pace and probably achieved his objectives before the opposition was strongly
organized. His failure to act decisively has fed the opposition and allowed them valuable
time to develop their campaign. His chief asset has been support from the military. Quite
understandably, he did not wish to inject the military into the picture during the early stages
of the confrontation; however, he has not played this card effectively when events appeared
to be running against him. In short, when faced with his first real challenge, Quat has been
found to be indecisive--an almost fatal posture in the arena of jugular-vein politics in
Saigon. Having said this, any realistic assessment must admit that Quat and his close
associates constitute perhaps the best group on the scene at present. No single leader stands
out as a clear alternative and no group exists which shows promise of handling the affairs of
state much better.
Until late on 4 June, Quat faced two general orders of problems: (1) the constitutional
challenge posed by Suu to his right to dismiss cabinet ministers, and (2) the vocal
opposition to his government articulated by the Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Sudiste
politicians. Although the second order of problem was brought to a focus by the [garble],
the fact of public opposition remains, even though the constitutional problem appears to be
on the way to settlement.
The Chief of State has been asked to intercede with the religious groups on Quat's behalf,
but it is not yet clear whether he will in fact do so, or if he does, whether he will pursue the
task with energy and with the Prime Minister's interests in mind. Nor is it clear how
receptive the respective opposition groups will be to his approaches and those of Quat. The
Catholics, for example, have up to the present given every evidence of implacable hostility
to Quat, with indication that this disaffection exists to a degree within the Catholic
hierarchy itself. The southern Catholics seem to be united with northern Catholics on this
issue.
In considering our own options, it will be important to determine the depth and extent of the
opposition to Quat now that the constitutional deadlock has been broken and after
soundings have been taken with these groups by Suu and the GVN to determine whether
their grievances can be satisfied. In the interim period, our course of action should be to
urge on all sides (the GVN and the religions) the importance of arriving at an amicable
accommodation. We will also have to bear in mind the interests of such groups as the
United Buddhist Association, who will not be direct parties, to be sure that they are not
given a cause for grievance.
If such an accommodation--imperfect and vulnerable though it be--can be reached, the
immediate obstacle will have been surmounted and we can perhaps look forward to this
government surviving for some time more. If, on the other hand, the opposing interests
prove irreconcilable, or the military situation continues seriously to deteriorate, we will
have to assess the situation in the light of the facts as they emerge and consider various
alternatives, of which a more active military involvement in the political situation may be
best from both political and military points of view.
Military Situation
After a two-month relative lull, evidently spent in regrouping, re-equipping and training, the
Viet Cong have quickened the tempo of the fighting. Since early May, main force units
have returned to the battlefield in increasing numbers, engaging in a number of attacks and
ambushes with forces up to regimental size. While the months of March and April were
relatively favorable for the government forces in terms of casualty and weapons loss ratios,
the trend in May became less favorable as Viet Cong pressure mounted.
Captured documents indicate the Viet Cong have embarked on a new military campaign
which will probably extend through the summer. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front
broadcasts have heralded this new campaign as a demonstration of the Communists' will
and determination to continue to press the war despite increased U.S. involvement in both
North and South Vietnam. The apparent aims of this campaign are to alter the balance of
military forces in favor of the Viet Cong by inflicting maximum attrition on the government
forces, including specifically the piecemeal destruction of regular ARVN ground combat
units where possible, and to extend Viet Cong control in rural areas by constricting GVN
forces to the principal towns and cities. The pattern of Viet Cong operations to date
indicates the campaign will be pressed vigorously in all military regions, the major attacks
and ambushes will be accompanied by intensified, small-scale guerrilla activity, particularly
sabotage and harassment of lines of communication, and that the Viet Cong intend to
consolidate their rural gains through intensified subversion and political action. Increased
terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and installations in urban areas are also likely.
So far, the enemy has not employed his full capabilities in this campaign. Only two of the
nine Viet Cong regiments have been heavily engaged (one in Phuoc Long and one in Quang
Ngai), and probably only a similar proportion of their separate battalions has been
committed. In most engagements, their main force units have displayed improved training
and discipline, heavier firepower, and a willingness to take heavy losses if necessary to
achieve their objectives. Their healthy respect for the effectiveness of U.S. and GVN
tactical air support is reflected, however, in their reliance on ambush tactics instead of open
assaults.
In pressing their campaign, the Viet Cong are capable of mounting regimental-size
operations in all four ARVN Corps areas, and at least battalion-sized attacks in virtually any
province. The larger attacks can be supported by a limited number of 70-mm or 75-mm
artillery pieces. Known dispositions indicate major actions are likely in the near future in
the Binh Duong-Phuoc Thanh-Phuoc Long area north of Saigon, in the Quang Ngai-Quang
Tin area in central Vietnam, and in Kontum Province. Major attacks could occur also in
other areas, since the Viet Cong have shown that they are capable of concentrating in
regimental strength without giving significant warning.
While the Viet Cong remain numerically inferior in over-all strength, they can achieve
temporary local superiority at times and places of their selection. Their ability to do this is
facilitated by the commitment of a large portion of the RVNAF infantry-type battalions to
relatively static missions, while the Viet Cong main force and local battalions are employed
only in an offensive role. During periods of intensive activity, the Viet Cong thus enjoy the
initiative in that they can choose the time, conditions, and place of engagement; significant
contacts rarely occur, even when RVNAF units are engaged in aggressive operations, unless
the Viet Cong elect to engage. By posing simultaneous or successive threats in widely
separated areas, the Viet Cong have demonstated an ability to offset [to] some extent
ARVN's superior transportation resources.
Despite severe losses on occasion, Viet Cong forces have shown a remarkable recuperative
ability. This has been facilitated by a systematic recruiting effort and an evidently effective
replacement system, supplemented by the infiltration of northern draftees who have been
integrated into Viet Cong units in the northern provinces. Access for recruiting purposes to
the major portion of the population has enabled the Viet Cong not only to replace their
losses but to continue to form new units. In addition to elements of the PAVN 325th
Division already identified in the South, other units of this division and the PAVN 304th
Division may already have entered or are stationed in the Laos border area. These elements
represent a significant reinforcement capability for Viet Cong units in the I and II Corps
areas.
Although GVN forces generally have responded well to the increased Viet Cong pressure,
there have been several disturbing instances of poor performance in critical situations. Some
units have broken under pressure and fled from the battlefield. These manifestations,
coupled with the continuing high desertion rate in many units, reflect a generally marginal
state of morale. The morale and confidence of the Officer Corps were buoyed up by the
more direct involvement of U.S. forces since February. This improved spirit was enhanced
by the period of relative inactivity of the Viet Cong main force units. The growing
realization, however, that the increased U.S. commitment would not produce an immediate
end to the war, together with ARVN's apparent inability to cope decisively as yet with the
renewed Viet Cong offensive, apparently has caused morale to sag again. Unless the
anticipated Viet Cong major attacks are effectively countered, morale will deteriorate
further. Indeed, the cumulative psychological impact of a series of significant ARVN
defeats could lead to a collapse in ARVN's will to continue to fight, despite the presence in
South Vietnam of U.S. forces. To ward against the possibility of such a collapse, it will
probably be necessary to commit US ground forces to action.
Conclusions:
1. The Communist leadership in Hanoi has not yet been shaken in its determination to
continue the war. It apparently has elected to respond to the growing commitment of U.S.
military resources in Vietnam by employing their principal weapon--the Viet Cong ground
force reinforced by PAVN--in intensified operations in the South.
2. Having resumed major offensive actions in South Vietnam, the enemy is capable of
continuing the recent pace of attacks and ambushes over the next several months, although
there will probably be local cyclical fluctuations in the level activity. While the Viet Cong
have suffered heavy losses, they have generally achieved their objectives in actions to date.
3. RVNAF general reserves have been barely adequate to deal with any one major thrust
and are inadequate to counter simultaneous or successive thrusts in widely separated areas.
Taking advantage of terrain and weather conditions, the Viet Cong appear likely to achieve
further successes. To meet the shortage of ARVN reserves, it will probably be necessary to
commit U.S. ground forces to action.
4. Further military reverses, coupled with the economic disruption caused by the harassment
and blocking of lines of communication, will have a serious adverse impact on popular
confidence and morale, exacerbating political instability in Sagion.
5. The political situation remains essentially unstable. Although the constitutional impasse
appears to have been resolved, the Quat government continues to be faced with the difficult
task of reaching an accommodation with strong opposition groups seeking its ouster and its
life line is of uncertain length. The military and political situations are closely interrelated,
and reverses in either area will have an adverse reaction in the other.
Taylor
333. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 5, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV,
Memos (B). Top Secret. The source text indicates that the President saw it.
SUBJECT
George Ball's cable to Taylor
1. Here is George's outgoing of June 1, and the answer from Taylor and Johnson./2/ What
they say in essence is that they would like to maintain and increase pressure by air attacks
as well as by efforts in the South. They would avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area except for an
occasional selected target--and they believe a little more than we do that pain in the North
will help bring a change of heart in Hanoi.
/2/Documents 324 and 328.
2. I share Bob McNamara's view that we can readily frame a specific program over the next
month that will be acceptable to the Embassy without unacceptable risks of escalation. I
myself am more attracted than Rusk and McNamara by the notion of an occasional limited
attack inside the Hanoi perimeter--probably in the Haiphong port area.
McG. B.
335. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, June 1965. Top
Secret.
Washington, June 5, 1965.
SUBJECT
Negotiating Developments re South Viet-Nam
1. Bo Message and Seaborn Approach.
The Bo message of May 18 to the French/2/ still leaves the ambiguity whether recognition
of the four points is a condition to any talks. The wording slightly shades the public
formulations, but on its face does not change the sense of what Hanoi appeared to be saying,
originally on April 8/3/ and later in April when it used the four points as its statement on the
appeal of the 17./4/
/2/See Document 308.
/3/See Document 245.
/4/An authorized statement in English rejecting the 17 Non-Aligned Nation Appeal was
broadcast over Hanoi radio on April 19.
We have given Seaborn a message designed to smoke this out./5/ He returns today or
tomorrow, we believe, but we have no report yet on whether he was received by any senior
person, which was a prerequisite to his delivering the message.
/5/See Document 317.
Meanwhile, the French have reported the approach to the British, who in turn have told the
Australians. We ourselves told the GVN, and the Canadians know of it through our
intelligence publications/6/ (as perhaps do the New Zealanders through the same channel,
which was a technical mistake). Thus, there is a leak danger from these facts alone, and
Senator Pell's mention of the subject at your hearing the other day/7/ strongly suggests that
Alphand is at work peddling the line that the message did indicate Hanoi was ready for talks
without preconditions, and also implying that we lost a chance by resuming so soon. Saigon
4062,/8/ in today, flags the leak problem and raises the question of what we should be
prepared to say. I am drafting a reply, attached as Tab A./9/
/6/Not further identified.
/7/Rusk appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 3. (Johnson
Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
/8/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/9/Not printed.
More basically, Hanoi propaganda is now going all out to play up the four points, while
Peking has flatly stated their acceptance is a precondition to talks. I am more than ever sure
in retrospect that Hanoi was playing just for the French gloss they appear to be getting,
while not in fact committing itself, and of course denouncing the pause in their public
statements.
2. The Chen Yi Conversation with theBritish/10/
/10/See Document 321.
This took place on May 31, and was obviously meant to be conveyed to us. I told the British
yesterday they could tell Chen Yi we had received the message. Hopson is seeing Chen Yi
again soon.
On substance, Tab B is Lindsey Grant's analysis,/11/ with which I agree. Chen Yi was
apparently being (a) tough about DRV resolve; (b) mild in the sense that he appeared to be
saying China would not come in unless China itself were attacked; (c) tough as to China
going all the way if it did come in.
/11/Dated June 3.
Perhaps the most interesting thing is that Peiping was so forthcoming to Hopson on his first
call. While the substance was nothing new, the repetition of a specific message, allegedly
sent once through Ayub though not clearly conveyed to us through that channel, plus the
length of the discussion, does indicate Peiping wants a channel and has perhaps chosen this
one at least for the time being.
Knowledge of the Chen Yi approach is confined to the UKG and USG among allies. It was
held very close when first received but [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Thus, it
is more widely known within the USG than it should be, but I hope we do not have a leak
problem.
3. Indian Proposal and Letter to Shastri
The long draft letter to Shastri, by the President, was rejected as a single letter by the
President, and has been revised into a shorter letter, with a long memorandum conveying
what was taken out of the letter. We hope the President will approve this morning./12/ A
major purpose of course is to encourage Shastri to keep the Indian proposal alive; latest
word from New Delhi is that the Indians are shaken by negative Communist responses and
might not really press it at Algiers, which is where it could play a real role.
/12/The letter and accompanying memorandum were transmitted to New Delhi for delivery
to Shastri in telegram 2540, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 INDIA)
Meanwhile, Hanoi is blasting away at the Indian proposal almost daily, usually pairing this
with its play-up of the four points (The Bo message also contained a more measured
rejection, with reasons.) The purpose is obviously to move the Algiers nations to adopt the
four points.
4. U Thant Status
On Monday, I gave Stevenson the full pause story, including the Bo approach and our
Seaborn plans, and he saw U Thant Tuesday. Our short report/13/ does not specifically say
what Stevenson conveyed, but I assume it was the works, together with urging U Thant to
help the Indian proposal privately. U Thant thought the Indian proposal had little hope, but
said he would talk further with Stevenson next week. He is apparently not very itchy, but
might at any time revive his idea of a "cease-fire across the 17th";/14/ Stevenson has
already tried to talk him in the direction--if he does anything at all--of a call for discussions
of a broader cessation of hostilities, which we could buy.
/13/Not further identified.
/14/See Document 233.
5. Consultations with GVN
Ambassador Taylor did have his first talk with Quat and Do, and they were not far apart on
ultimate conditions./15/ We have had a further exchange with the Embassy on our ideas for
a wider GVN initiative, but of course this has not been broached to the GVN./16/
/15/See Document 319.
/16/See Document 320.
Meanwhile, Sullivan has a good short cable in,/13/ highlighting the need for a GVN
statement to match the four points, the sooner the better. I think we would all agree, and
perhaps we should be working to get the GVN onto a short general statement (a) using the
sequence of our reply to the 17--cessation of aggression, end of "supporting
actions" (bombing of the north, perhaps more), SVN to determine its future without external
interference, US withdrawal, finally determination of relations between south and north by
peaceable means; (b) going as far as possible about GVN willingness to determine the
popular will as soon as possible, stressing local elections already held, perhaps implying exVC could participate in some formula: (c) saying frankly that the reunification issue could
be faced eventually on the basis of a determination of free popular will (Michael Stewart
said roughly this Thursday), perhaps even stating free elections right out. Points (b) and (c)
would have particular appeal to the world, since Pham Van Dong's four points would
simply put the Liberation Front in at once without elections, and the fourth point on
reunification likewise makes no reference to elections.
If you approve, I could put this suggestion to Saigon today for their thoughts. However, if
the Ambassador comes back over the weekend, we probably want to await his return.
Moreover, we have the imponderable that part of the fire on Quat has been for alleged peace
tendencies, and he may be particularly edgy right now. However, they will be in a bad way
at Algiers if we do not have a summary statement by the middle of the month, to compete
with the four points.
6. Cambodian Conference
The British again pressed the Soviets on June 2, without response. Meanwhile, you have
probably seen Sihanouk's interesting letter to the Times yesterday, which repeats publicly
that he will allow any SVN representation the great powers agree on, but is also remarkably
frank that he would be swallowed by China if it got power in the area. (We have sent this
out to posts, particularly for New Delhi use, in their soft approach to Nong Kimny.) The
letter has an air of genuineness, almost of despair; maybe he is now hoping for mercy from
the DRV, but he could be extending a wispy branch towards us.
7. Liberation Front Status
One interesting feature of Hanoi's latest propaganda/17/ is that it groups the four points with
the Liberation Front statement of March 22 (which is harder on its face). This could be an
attempt to build up the Front more--again with an eye to Algiers. One of the shoes that
could drop at any time would be a formal declaration by the Front of government status
(which Michael Stewart alluded to the absence of); I have always thought they might be
waiting to capture a provincial capital to do this (Pleiku or Kontum might be best for their
geographical reasons).
/17/Not further identified.
William P. Bundy/18/
/18/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
/2/In telegram 4084 from Saigon, June 6, Taylor added that when Seaborn discussed his trip
with Johnson, they had agreed that, in the absence of an initiative on the part of North
Vietnam, further efforts through the Seaborn channel would not be useful and could be
counterproductive. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET) On June 8 the
Canadian Embassy passed to the Department a copy of Seaborn's June 4 telegram reporting
on his trip to Hanoi. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor
and discipline, heavier firepower from the new family of weapons with which most main
force units have been equipped, and a willingness to take heavy losses in order to achieve
objectives.
5. In pressing their campaign, the Viet Cong are capable of mounting regimental-size
operations in all four ARVN Corps areas, and at least battalion-sized attacks in virtually all
provinces. Known dispositions indicate major actions are likely in the near future in the
Binh Duong-Phuoc Thanh-Phuoc Long area north of Saigon, in the Quang Ngai-Quang Tin
area in Central Vietnam, and in Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon and Binh Dinh Provinces. Major
attacks could occur also in other areas; the Viet Cong have shown that they are capable of
concentrating in regimental strength with little or no warning. Whether or not the 304th Div
is in, or moving toward SVN, the DRV has a "doorstep" capability to reinforce the VC with
sizable forces.
6. ARVN forces on the other hand are already experiencing difficulty in coping with this
increased VC capability. Desertion rates are inordinately high. Battle losses have been
higher than expected; in fact, four ARVN battalions have been rendered ineffective by VC
action in the I and II Corps zones. Therefore, effective fighting strength of many infantry
and ranger battalions is unacceptably low. As a result, ARVN troops are beginning to show
signs of reluctance to assume the offensive and in some cases their steadfastness under fire
is coming into doubt. In order to bring existing battalions up to acceptable battlefield
strength, it will be necessary to declare at least a temporary moratorium on the activation of
new battalions. Thus, the GVN VC force ratios upon which we based our estimate of the
situation in March have taken an adverse trend. You will recall that I recommended the
deployment of a U.S. division in II Corps to cover the period of the RVNAF buildup and to
weigh the force ratios in that important area. We assumed at that time that the ARVN
battalions would be brought to full strength by now and that the force buildup would
proceed on schedule. Neither of these assumptions has materialized.
7. The problem of low battlefield strength in ARVN has forced us to plan the use of
personnel now training in 11 new battalions as fillers for old battalions. In effect, these 11
battalions will be deferred and during the period from mid-July to early November no new
ARVN battalions will become available. Thus the gap to be filled is both deeper and wider.
8. In summary, the force ratios continue to change in favor of the VC. I believe that the
DRV will commit whatever forces it deems necessary to tip the balance and that the GVN
cannot stand up successfully to this kind of pressure without reinforcement. Even if DRV
VC intentions are debatable, their capabilities must be acknowledged and faced.
Additionally, it is prudent to consider possible enemy air action, leading to significant
escalation and a broadening of the arena of conflict. We must be prepared to face such a
contingency./3/
/3/In telegram 2873 to Saigon, June 11, the Department of State noted that INR and CIA
had assessed the military appraisal of the situation in South Vietnam provided in telegram
19118. While agreeing that it was serious, the intelligence analysts questioned the
implication that there was a serious danger of complete military collapse within a relatively
short period of time. This impression, the Department noted, was not supported by reporting
from Saigon, and telegram 19118 did not reinforce the impression with reference to a
dramatic or unexpected development in the military situation. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S)
9. In order to cope with the situation outlined above, I see no course of action open to us
except to reinforce our efforts in SVN with additional U.S. or third country forces as rapidly
as is practical during the critical weeks ahead. Additionally, studies must continue and plans
developed to deploy even greater forces, if and when required, to attain our objectives or
counter enemy initiatives. Ground forces deployed to selected areas along the coast and
inland will be used both offensively and defensively. U.S. ground troops are gaining
experience and thus far have performed well. Although they have not yet engaged the
enemy in strength, I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and
firepower can successfully take the fight to the VC. The basic purpose of the additional
deployments recommended below is to give us a substantial and hard hitting offensive
capability on the ground to convince the VC that they cannot win.
10. In sub-paragraph "A" below, deployments and actions are recommended on which
decisions should be made now. In subpara "B" we have identified further actions on which
planning should start and on which separate recommendations will be forthcoming:
A. Actions recommended:
(1) Deploy at once to I CTZ the remaining two BLTs of the 3d Mar Div and appropriate
supporting division and air elements (approximately 8,000 personnel). Reconstitute the SLF
as a floating reserve.
(2) Deploy balance of increment 1 and all of increment 2 (as defined in Ref C) of army
logistic and other support units in accordance with schedule set out in Ref D.
(Approximately 8,000 personnel.)
(3) Deploy the US Army Air Mobile Division (and logistic increment 3) through Qui Nhon
to An Ke, Pleiku and Kontum (approximately 21,000 personnel). Qui Nhon will be ready to
receive the division approximately 1 August, upon the closure of increment 2 forces.
(4) Concurrently with the Air Mobile Division, deploy I Corps Headquarters
(approximately 1,500 personnel).
(5) Deploy the ROK Marine RCT to Cam Ranh Bay as soon after 1 July as the unit can be
readied for movement (approximately 4,000 personnel). Deploy balance of the ROK
Division force (approximately 14,500 personnel) plus US logistic increment 4 (1,500
personnel), starting 15 September to the general area of Qui Nhon. (This answers Ref E in
part--separate message on F86F will follow.)/4/
/4/Not found.
(6) Deploy additional tactical fighter squadrons to Cam Ranh Bay when expeditionary
landing field complete at that location. Also provide naval aircraft carrier support of incountry operations as required; we believe this latter will engage one carrier full time.
(7) Hold the 173d Airborne Brigade in-country until the Air Mobile Division has deployed
and is ready for operations.
(8) Continue air attacks against the DRV. (Ref F applies.)
B. Additional deployment that may be required and on which planning should begin:
(1) Three U.S. Army Hawk battalions to TN Bien Hoa, Qui Nhon and Cam
Ranh in that priority.
(2) The remainder of the 1st Infantry Division or the 101st Airborne Division
begining 1 October.
(3) One additional MAB to reinforce the III MAF.
(4) Tactical air units for support of increased U.S. force (additional airfields in
SVN and Thailand may be required).
(5) Required combat and logistic support forces to include helicopter units to
support the foregoing.
11. Message has been discussed with Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson. Ambassador
Taylor is prepared to comment thereon during current visit to Washington./5/
/5/Admiral Sharp added his comments on these proposals in CINCPAC telegrams 072325Z
to JCS, June 7, and 112210Z to JCS, June 11. Sharp concurred in Westmoreland's
assessment of the deteriorating military situation in Vietnam and agreed on the necessity of
expanded deployment of U.S. forces to meet the threat. He expressed apprehension,
however, over the proposed deployment of the U.S. Air Mobile Division to the central
highlands. Sharp argued that limited U.S. combat forces should be used to secure the more
populous coastal areas of South Vietnam. (CINCPAC telegram 072325Z is in Department
of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; CINCPAC telegram 112210Z is in Washington
National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 12305)
"This is to confirm your understanding that COMUSMACV has the authority to authorize
commitment US ground forces to action in combat support on the basis of operational
coordination and cooperation with RVNAF." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
On June 9 The Washington Post ran a lead story, based upon McCloskey's statement, which
observed that a new phase in the Vietnamese war had been signaled with the announcement
that United States ground forces could be used in a combat role in South Vietnam.
The White House issued a statement on June 9 that indicated that there had been no change
in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam:
"The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military
installations like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of active
patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded. If help is requested by
appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmoreland also has authority within the
assigned mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with
aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his
judgement, the general military situation urgently requires it." (American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1965, page 872)
The text of the statement was conveyed to Saigon in circular telegram 2470, June 9.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Secretary of State Rusk, interviewed
on the NBC "Today" program on June 9, said that, while United States forces had been sent
to Vietnam to defend certain installations, "obviously, we do not expect these men to sit
there like hypnotized rabbits waiting for the Viet Cong to strike." (The Washington Post,
June 10, 1965)
General Taylor indicated that if the present government were to fall, the next one would
doubtless be a military dictatorship.
5. Mr. McNamara received approval for Rolling Thunder XVIII. One question was raised as
to whether this should include Target 43 or Target 28. It was decided to go for Target 28.
Otherwise, there was no disagreement on targets.
6. Mr. Rusk asked if there was any evidence of substantial military movements in either
Communist China or North Korea. I answered in the negative. (I have asked Mr. Jack Smith
to report regularly on this query.)
7. The President asked General Taylor, upon his return to Saigon, to get the South Vietnam
Government "on the record" as being opposed to any negotiation between it and the Viet
Cong. In response to a question as to what the bombing in the North has achieved aside
from giving the South Vietnamese Government some stability for the last ninety days,
General Wheeler pointed out that there has been a sizable military benefit in the form of the
difficulties which the North Vietnamese have had in moving men and supplies into the
South. He said he was convinced that it had thrown a distinct block into the time-table of
Viet Cong attacks.
8. The President asked that all options be reviewed, that our objectives in Vietnam be
specified, and that recommendations be made later in the week as to how we should proceed
with the Vietnamese war.
Richard Helms/5/
Deputy Director
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates that Helms signed the original.
going to stay there? The question will be asked increasingly at home no less than abroad.
And it is the crucial question because the answer to it should control the extent and nature
of our military involvement in Viet Nam. As I see it, at this point, we can mean one of three
things when we say we are going to stay in South Viet Nam. I am no military expert but, on
the basis of our past experience elsewhere and developments in Viet Nam since the first of
the year, it seems to me that the military costs of each of these three alternatives would look
something like this:
1. Do we mean that we are going to stay in Viet Nam until we or our Vietnamese military
allies prevail everywhere south of the 17th parallel down to the smallest hamlet? If that is
what we mean, we are talking in terms of years or decades, and upwards of a million
American soldiers on the ground in South Viet Nam, assuming that the Chinese do not
become involved with men.
2. Or are we talking about holding the military situation about where it is now? So far as I
can judge, from second hand reports, this would mean that our side must retain the
provincial capitals, the larger towns in the interior, Saigon, and the coastal cities and we
must be able to maintain at least tenuous lines of communication on the ground in between.
If that is what we are talking about when we say we are going to stay in Viet Nam, then the
300,000 McNamara estimate is probably too low but something in the range of 500,000
might do it, at least if Giap's army does not move in full and open force across the 17th
parallel.
3. Or are we talking about staying in Viet Nam in order to hold a bargaining position for
negotiations which might be expected to permit some reasonable choice--selfdetermination--on the part of the South Vietnamese people as to their political future, some
protection for Vietnamese who have been on our side and some prospect of a bona fide
peace based on eventual withdrawal of all foreign forces. If that is what we are talking
about, then it would appear to me that instead of committing United States combat forces to
the difficult-to-defend Vietnamese outpost cities and towns scattered in the interior, we
ought to be drawing the Vietnamese garrisons in those towns into the coastal bases and into
Saigon where they would add to our strength, rather than the reverse. And at the same time,
we should stop waiting for signals but rather launch a powerful diplomatic peace-offensive
to try to get to a conference table. Unless the situation is already totally hopeless, this kind
of holding of South Viet Nam may be feasible--at least for a year or so with something on
the order of 100,000 or less United States combat forces on the ground backed by powerful
naval and air units.
Moreover, if a sustained peace offensive, simultaneously, succeeds in bringing about a
conference during the next six months, new elements will inevitably be introduced into the
situation and it is conceivable that they could begin to point the way to a resolution of the
problem.
The absence of a decision as to which of the above approaches really serves our national
interests, seems to me to be the crux of the difficulty which has confronted us all along. I
think you know my personal view as to which course is preferable in the national interest.
But as things are now going, it is apparent that you are being advised to continue to take at
least the second course. The rate of commitment is accelerating and it is quite likely that it
will lead rapidly to pressure to follow the first course, if not to go beyond it to all-out war
with China. That may not be the way it looks now but a course once set in motion, as you
know, often develops its own momentum and rationale whatever the initial intentions.
As for the question of Taylor's replacement, as I told you, Lodge's name may set off an
immediate and hostile debate of the whole situation in the Senate. You have got U. Alexis
Johnson out there already. He has played a major role and has had a major responsibility in
this situation for years. It would seem to me that if we are going to continue on the course
of getting in deeper he is the logical man to continue with it.
With respect to another Congressional resolution on the situation, I cannot see the value of
it at this point whether it originates here or with you. The Senate cannot direct you in the
conduct of foreign relations even if it wanted to and I think you know that there is no
substantial group in the Senate which is going to take the initiative in urging you to put
more American ground forces into South Viet Nam. I think you know too, that what has
been done to date in the way of resolutions, however one-sided the votes, has been done
with grave doubts and much trepidation on the part of many Senators. It has been done
largely on faith, out of loyalty to you and on the basis of the general view that when the
President has the responsibility and when he requests legislative support in a crisis, he
should have it.
But if you make another request, at this time, in connection specifically with the use of
ground forces, I am concerned at the possible reaction. It is not nearly as predictable as in
the past when the requests have been for support of policy in general terms or for funds. A
request at this time could set off a wave of criticism and of demands for inquiries which, in
the end, even though a resolution were overwhelmingly approved, would not in any way
strengthen your hand, render your task easier or make your burden of responsibility
lighter./3/
/3/McGeorge Bundy responded on June 27 to this and two other Mansfield memoranda
concerning Vietnam. See footnote 3, Document 334.
and even possibly air strikes would be considered by Hanoi, but intelligence community
does not believe DRV would react by overt invasion of SVN although it might step up VC
support and increase DRV line units in SVN.
Estimate is that ChiComs would furnish additional support, which DRV would probably
request, including additional fighter aircraft. Majority believe ChiComs would not engage
in air combat over DRV from ChiCom bases but minority thinks this probable. Sovs would
be put on major spot but would probably react initially by replacing most of destroyed
equipment, though perhaps not IL-28's themselves at once. Sovs would probably reach
general conclusion they had little choice but to increase aid to DRV.
On other hand, intelligence community estimates that not attacking these targets might lead
to Communist conclusion US, at least for time being, has accepted certain limitations and
ground rules in bombing of DRV. Sovs might take somewhat more rigid position though
still hoping for negotiated settlement and Hanoi might conclude it could press war in South
at no greater risk to key DRV areas. Intelligence community does not believe Sovs would
necessarily increase build-up of offensive weapons, although they might do so. Also
conclude that it is unlikely DRV now intends to use IL-28's in offensive operations with or
without attack, although special circumstances might arise or Hanoi might conceivably try
an individual raid with them.
Your comments should cover your general reaction and any comment you may have on
above intelligence community estimates. I personally am not of course necessarily in
agreement with the estimates but they are part of the material I must use in reaching my
personal judgment. Request reply to reach here morning June 10 if possible./2/
/2/Ambassador Johnson responded with telegram 4134 from Saigon, June 10, sent as a
personal message to the Secretary. Johnson noted that he considered the IL-28s and SAMs
to be differing problems, in that the bomber was an offensive weapon and the missiles had a
strictly defensive capability. On balance, taking into account the danger of involving
Chinese forces in the conflict, Johnson concluded that the purpose of demonstrating U.S.
resolve without broadening the war could be achieved by limited, selective attacks on SAM
missile sites. He noted that Westmoreland concurred in this recommendation. Johnson
added: "This is going to be a long war and there are no shortcuts yet in sight. We should not
let our natural frustrations and impatience mislead us into ill considered efforts to find
shortcuts." (Ibid.)
Rusk
The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary.
William Bundy also took notes at the meeting and used them several years later to prepare a
5-page summary of the discussion, which is cited in several footnotes below. (Johnson
Library, Papers of William Bundy, chap. 26, pp. 10-15)
Problem of Public Information--People feel we are withholding information. President to
tell 1) numbers 2) Mission--We ought to draft a speech. What are we trying to accomplish-how do we go about it. Russell joins us at 10:40 a.m. McN reviews Westmoreland
recommendation--Points out the area of disagreement with--instead of 32 B[attalio]ns, 18.
Would have cut out 14 Bns. to avoid too large an escalation &/2/
/2/According to William Bundy, "McNamara led off with his own view--the 95,000 level,
or half Westmoreland's first add-on, and nothing at all on his second. Rusk concurred, and
Taylor made the case that this appeared to be about right to prevent serious losses of
territory and lead in the direction of a stalemate in the South."
Max [Taylor]: We should get in rapidly the forces that can be effective in Monsoon season.
RSM[cNamara]: A plan to cover us to end of year.
Johnson/3/ favors Westy-Sharp questions division.
/3/Presumably a reference to Harold Johnson, Army Chief of Staff.
MDT[aylor]: distinguishes between territorial clear-and-hold as against strategic strike.
LBJ: Why must we do it.
MDT: If we don't, we may lose some territory. Don't you think it will be read as "land war
in Asia." We have to explain this is not that--not a Korean War.
LBJ: reviews needs & what we have.
RSM: not so much territory as military losses.
LBJ: How many are fighting people & how many supporting people.
DR: 35,000 fighters--55,000 non-fighters
President wants to know what GVN is doing.
LBJ: Is there any question about our authority.
DR[usk]: None: powers of C-in-C., SEATO, SEA Res./4/--the
/4/Southeast Asia Resolution; see footnote 2, Document 347.
LBJ: Have we kept 'em informed?
George Ball: We need to be careful not to regard this decision as defining or pre-deciding
what we do after we see what happens in monsoon.
LBJ: McGB[undy]: What relation to bombing.
MDT: Two complementary programs.
LBJ: The Phuc Yen complex?
RSM argues against need for crash attack on it.
LBJ reviews parts of Saigon 4134./12/
/12/Telegram 3134, June 10, from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk discussed the pros and cons
of air strikes against SAM sites and IL-28 bombers in North Vietnam. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
LBJ: What are we doing this summer then with 95,000!
RSM: Not too much--general need-LBJ: How fast?
RSM: Aim at 1 August--no commitment.
Raborn: We believe in build-up--faster the better.
Senator Russell: How to get us out and save face? Little knowledge I have, I'd send division
in &/13/
/13/According to William Bundy, Russell "spoke only briefly and drily. Driblets were not
the answer; if a division in the highlands would help, or bombing the SAM sites, these
things should be done. He would like a way out, but did not see one that would keep our
word."
Jack McCloy for India?/14/
/14/This and the following line are apparently notes Bundy made to himself.
Quat content
How effective our people are in combat--this is a really serious matter./15/
/15/It is not clear from the notes who said this or whether it is a note Bundy made to
himself.
DR on danger of full-fledged debate--the Commies would use their whole apparatus to stir
up trouble which might have serious international results.
LBJ: Fulbright & Stennis say we [illegible]./16/
/16/According to William Bundy, the meeting concluded with a "discussion of how the
situation and new programs should be put to Congress," with the President debating "out
loud the pros and cons of a new Congressional Resolution."
We owe P[resident] a draft of argument./17/
/17/Apparently a note Bundy made to himself.
enemy. The DRV would continue to reinforce the VC, and we doubt that US/ARVN forces
could soon produce any decisive improvement in the military situation. The most likely
results would be heavy US casualties, an over-emphasis on the military aspects of the
conflict to the detriment of the political, and bogging-down of the war at higher levels of
commitment and intensity, and, perhaps ultimately, a petering out of GVN/ARVN
determination and intensity.
Option B
5. Course of Action: To continue to increase US forces to the extent necessary to defeat the
Viet Cong, to increase sharply our weight of attack on the DRV, bombing virtually all
targets; to impose a naval quarantine; to accept further difficulties with the USSR and the
possibility of major hostilities with Communist China.
6. Objectives: Raised from those of a/3/ above, to compel the DRV to cease and desist in
the South; to coerce Communist China into acquiescing in such a DRV decision lest it incur
attacks on its own territory, perhaps including destruction of its nascent advanced weapons
capability.
/3/Reference in the source text is unclear.
7. Consequences: This would risk convincing the Communists that the US intended to
destroy the DRV regime and thus bring us close to the "flash-point" of Chinese Communist
intervention. If they judged that the Hanoi regime was losing control of the country, they
would probably enter the DRV unilaterally and might engage US air forces with their own.
Option C
8. Course of Action: To cease bombing in the North, to hold on in the South, and to seek to
negotiate as good a Vietnam settlement as we can get.
9. Objectives: To settle for a Laos-type "neutralist" solution--guaranteed by other powers
and by a continuing, but markedly lessened, US presence in South Vietnam--on the grounds
that we cannot, at an acceptable cost, "win" militarily or impose our will on Hanoi.
10. Consequences: US overtures for negotiation would probably be rejected and, the enemy,
scenting a weakening in US determination, would probably fight on, while raising his
terms. Also, a sudden US turning in this direction, without punishing the DRV above
present levels, would have a seriously dispiriting effect upon non-Communists in Southeast
Asia.
Option D
11. Course of Action: To increase our weight of attack on the DRV; to increase US forces
up to the 70,000 man strength already authorized; and, most importantly, to place major
stress on a program of political, social, and economic action in South Vietnam.
12. Objectives: To prevent a collapse in South Vietnamese morale and military capabilities
during the next few months; to accomplish certain improvements basic to the creation of a
viable non-Communist state in the South, and, meanwhile, to keep open the preceding
options.
13. Consequences: Though Option D also has its drawbacks, it has the following relative
merits:
a. Heightened US pressure on North Vietnam would increase the difficulty of supporting
the Viet Cong and make Hanoi pay an ever heavier price for continuing that support.
Furthermore, it would demonstrate our willingness to accept heightened political risks.
b. It would involve the deployment of substantial US ground forces in the South--a prime
requirement for the immediate future. Further, it would not convey to the GVN/ARVN the
notion that the US was taking over the war.
c. It would give the US time and opportunity to increase the civic action, political,
paramilitary, local defense, and administrative improvements which are needed to create a
viable non-Communist state in the South.
d. The net effect of the foregoing would have some chance of persuading the DRV that time
was no longer running their way and that they should move to negotiate.
e. The US would avoid the negative reactions abroad and at home which would be produced
by all-out bombings of the DRV and ever-increasing US troop commitments.
consent of the government of South Vietnam and would be limited to the territory of that
country.
It is my view that, as a matter of law, further Congressional approval at this time is not
necessary.
I
Under the Constitution the President has authority, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces (Article II, section 2), and as the sole organ of the United States in the field of foreign
relations (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)), to deploy and
use the armed forces abroad. This authority has generally been broadly interpreted, and the
armed forces have been used without legislative authority on scores of occasions including
those involving "acts of war."
In the absence of some action by Congress, the only legal limitation on the power of the
President to commit the armed forces arises by implication from Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution, under which only Congress is authorized to "declare war." I believe it is a fair,
although not uncontroversial, summary of nearly two centuries of history to say that the
power to "declare war" is the power to confer substantially unlimited authority to use the
armed forces to conquer and, if necessary, subdue a foreign nation. Unless such unlimited
authority is exercised by the President, his legal position in using the armed forces is
sustainable. It has been argued that the President may, without Congressional approval, take
only urgent defensive measures, or that he may take only minor police measures that are not
likely to commit the United States to full scale war. However, the action taken by President
Truman in Korea, which is not widely regarded as having been illegal, shows how extensive
the powers of the President may be. The same illustration also shows how inextricably tied
together the legal and policy issues involved in such a situation necessarily are.
On many occasions the President has asked for Congressional approval of his action. When
Congress responds to such a request the strictly legal effects of its action, if short of a
declaration of war, are likely to be to limit rather than extend his authority. In the absence of
Congressional action, the President's legal position is sustainable so long as it is consistent
with the Constitution, i.e., so long as his action does not amount to an infringement of the
power of Congress to declare all-out war. There is authority, however, indicating that in
areas where both Executive and Congressional powers are operative, the Executive must
observe the limits of any Congressional authorization that may be enacted even though, in
the absence of any authorization, his Executive powers under the Constitution would clearly
go beyond the Congressional grant. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637, 661-662 (Justices Jackson and Clark); Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 177-178
(Chief Justice Marshall). The Congressional authorization obviously can serve
indispensable political purposes and it may serve to allay the legal doubts of narrow
constructionists. These advantages must be weighed, however, against the legal limitations
that may be effectively imposed by a Congressional authorization and its legislative history.
It is my view that as President you would have the authority, in the absence of any action by
Congress, to use the armed forces in the manner now proposed. The commitment involved
is certainly far less than all-out war, and the likelihood of involving the United States in allout war as a result of the proposed moves, assuming that to be a relevant consideration, is
relatively slight in view of the limitations on both the size of the force committed and the
nature of the mission. It should be noted also that none of the acts proposed is an act of war
against a foreign nation; that is to say, the activity involved would take place solely within
the territory of South Vietnam and at the invitation of its government, and would be
directed against forces claiming to be insurgents rather than the forces of a foreign nation.
I also believe it is clear that you have the legal authority to take the proposed measures
under the terms and legislative history of the Vietnam Resolution of August 10, 1964 (P.L.
88-408, 78 Stat. 384),/2/ and the appropriation of May 7, 1965 (P.L. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109). It
was repeatedly stated in connection with those enactments that the military measures
previously taken, including the bombing of targets in North Vietnam, were being approved
by Congress. In my judgment the steps now proposed, being confined to South Vietnamese
territory, are of a kind with the steps already approved. There is some legislative history to
the effect that the Congressional approval did not extend to involvement in large-scale land
war in Asia. In this regard, however, there were repeated references to war in "division
strength." These limitations--if they exist--are not infringed by the limited measures now
contemplated.
/2/This Resolution provides:
"The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in
Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further aggression.
"Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the
maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the
Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance
with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States
is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the
use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
"Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and
security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the
United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent
resolution of the Congress." [Footnote in the source text.]
I therefore conclude that, from a legal standpoint, there is no need to seek further
Congressional approval at this time.
Nicholas deB Katzenbach
COMUSMACV views regarding the enemy and friendly situation in Southeast Asia.
5. In this unstable military situation, appropriate countermeasures are required. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff consider that the ground forces situation requires a substantial further buildup of US and Allied forces in the RVN, at the most rapid rate feasible on an orderly basis.
The Appendix hereto/4/ summarizes US and Allied forces required now for this build-up,
designed to provide a substantial and necessary increase in offensive capability. The
recommended deployments were discussed with Ambassador Taylor on 9 June 1965/5/ and
he foresees no political problems with the Government of Vietnam in the introduction of
these forces. Lists in the appendix may be further refined by recommendations from
CINCPAC and the Services.
/4/Not printed.
/5/No record of the discussion cited here has been found.
6. In addition to the above deployments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that air action
against North Vietnam should be intensified to include increased armed reconnaissance of
LOCs and strikes against militarily important targets. Such action is necessary to reduce
DRV capabilities to support the VC and the PAVN, further punish the DRV, and further
establish US intent to prevent a communist seizure of SVN.
7. In addition to the actions recommended in JCSM-415-65, JCSM-442-65, and paragraph
6, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the deployments shown in the Appendix
be approved now for implementation.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
347. Summary Notes of the 552d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, June 11, 1965, 12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret;
Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. A list of participants at the
meeting is ibid.
Vietnam--Taylor Report
The President opened the meeting by discussing the Administration's authority to act in
Vietnam which is now based on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution./2/ The debate now going on
in the Senate was referred to.
/2/Reference is to the Joint Resolution To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace
and Security in Southeast Asia, August 10, 1964, P.L. 88-408. See footnote 2, Document
345.
The President: We have a treaty obligation and we intend to keep our commitment. Some
say we should get out of Vietnam while others say we should do more. We should seek
ways of holding the situation so that we can carry out what we are committed to do.
General Taylor: It has been two months since my last personal report to you. General Quat
is still in power. He managed to handle the South Vietnamese generals in such a way as to
get General Khanh ousted and to end the Military Council. Political life is still determined
by three groups--the generals, the southerners, and the Catholics. Minor or even major
changes are possible because the political impasse still continues. Elections last Sunday/3/
turned out well, with a large number of voters registering. There was no effective VC
opposition.
/3/June 6.
As to the military situation, the recent tranquility was due to retraining and re-equipping.
Ten days ago, the monsoon campaign began. Its intensity will be greater than in years past.
The South Vietnamese manpower shortage in their military forces is serious. Their problem
is to raise the total military force and substantially decrease desertions. The superiority of
South Vietnamese military forces over the Viet Cong has dropped from 5.4 : 1 to 3.9 : 1.
This lower ratio is the justification for the introduction of additional U.S. forces. There are
about 50,000 U.S. forces which will soon go to 70,000.
The present VC campaign will be terminated without serious losses. With more U.S.
combat troops and more U.S. air power, the hope is that we will be able to push Hanoi into
negotiations.
General Wheeler: U.S. force levels are now: 12,000 ground combat men; 7,000 attached to
air combat; and 30,000 supporting including advisers, communication forces and logistic
support for the GVN.
General Taylor: We estimate the Viet Cong forces at 42-50,000.
Secretary McNamara: Our estimate of the future Viet Cong strength is 64,000--a huge
increase over last year.
General Taylor: The increase in the Viet Cong forces came before our bombing. North
Vietnam infiltration has been slowed down by our bombing.
General Wheeler: Our bombing has slowed down the entire North Vietnamese
transportation system.
Secretary Rusk: We have listed 13 channels which have been used to probe enemy
intentions. There are now few tracks open or operating. A Geneva type conference proposal
is still alive. One thought would be to have the seventeen-nations/4/ issue invitations to a
conference of governments for talks without preconditions. The other side will turn down
such a proposal, awaiting the outcome of the monsoon campaign.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 228.
Today we see no possibility of talks. Although we are alert to all tracks, none appear
promising. We should not be too timid about the present U.S. position on North Vietnam.
We have more support than the Communists say we have. (Summary of the peace probes/5/
was handed by Secretary Rusk to several Council members, including the President.)
/5/A copy of this summary was sent to Bromley Smith at the White House on June 11 by
John P. Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV)
The President: We should get out the contents of this summary to the public by means of
speeches and TV appearances. We should show what we have tried to do.
Ambassador Stevenson: The UN Secretary General should be asked to call for a cease-fire
during negotiations. The Secretary General's proposal would probably be turned down by
Hanoi. Even so, taking this initiative would prove that we have tried everything.
The President: This proposal should be explored with Secretary Rusk. When we tried a
bombing pause, I didn't believe it would work, and it didn't. It did relieve the pressure of
public opinion.
Secretary McNamara: General Westmoreland has sent up a proposal for the deployment of
additional U.S. forces in Vietnam./6/ He recommends that the 13 battalions--70,000 man
level now authorized be increased to 23 battalions--123,000 men. The Chiefs are opposed to
the deployment of U.S. forces in the highlands of South Vietnam and want the new forces
to be used as a mobile reserve near the coast./7/
/6/Document 337.
/7/Document 346.
General Wheeler: The ARVN forces did not do as well as we expected. The Chiefs are
impressed by General Westmoreland's presentation of the need for more U.S. forces. The
ratio between friendly plus U.S. forces as opposed to Viet Cong forces is now unfavorable.
The Defense Department's proposal calls for deploying fewer troops now than either
General Westmoreland or the Joint Chiefs recommend. The Chiefs favor taking a decision
now on sending the number of troops recommended by General Westmoreland. The
McNamara plan/8/ would send fewer forces now and keep our option open to send
additional forces later.
/8/See Document 343 and footnote 2 thereto.
Under Secretary [Attorney General] Katzenbach: There is no doubt of our legal position to
increase force deployments in Vietnam. It is doubtful that we should go back to Congress to
get additional authority every time we take a new action. The President already has, under
the Constitution, all the power he needs to deploy additional forces abroad./9/
/9/Legal opinions supporting this conclusion were submitted to the President by the
Attorney General (Document 345) and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense
on June 10, and by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State on June 11. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 7 B, Legality Considerations) A
June 14 memorandum to the President from James Thomson of the National Security
Council Staff on the question of the need for further consultation with Congress concerning
an increased military commitment in Vietnam is ibid.
The President: We must delay and deter the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong as much as
we can, and as simply as we can, without going all out. When we grant General
Westmoreland's request, it means that we get in deeper and it is harder to get out. They
think they are winning and we think they are. We must determine which course gives us the
maximum protection at the least cost.
Bromley Smith
Explosive developments of this sort would not be in the interest of the Catholic community
or of Viet-Nam as a whole. This kind of bitter division among free citizens of Viet-Nam can
only serve the purpose of the Communists who are seeking to take over the whole country.
It is our belief that this general situation is very well and clearly understood by Archbishop
Palmas, the Apostolic Delegate. He is a strong man, and he understands the situation
clearly. We believe it would be greatly in the interest of the Catholic community in VietNam if the authorities in Rome were able to give Archbishop Palmas unusually wide
discretion and authority in his relations with local Catholic leaders at this critical time.
We repeat that we understand clearly the sensitivity of this problem. These comments are
forwarded only because of our deep conviction that the true interests of Catholics and the
interests of the United States in Viet-Nam are the same. End Text.
FYI. White House arranging privately for deliver same message to Apostolic Delegate
here./2/ You may indicate White House interest in making your presentation. End FYI.
/2/On June 11 Jack Valenti met with the Apostolic Delegate in Washington to convey the
same message. Valenti emphasized that the President considered the survival of the Quat
government to be essential to the effort to combat Communist efforts to control Vietnam.
He added that unless a viable government became a reality in South Vietnam both the
United States and the Vatican would be losers. (Memorandum of record, prepared by
Valenti; Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File)
Rusk
expected that the Embassy would be informed and consulted before any far-reaching
decisions were made. (Telegram 4156 from Saigon; Department of State, Central Files,
POL 15 VIET S)
1. A statement will be issued tomorrow morning in the name of all of the above elements
announcing that power has been returned to the military and that Chief of State, Prime
Minister and Cabinet will serve in a caretaker capacity (Legislative Council disappears).
Statement will also appeal to all population remain calm etc./4/
/4/The text of this statement, broadcast by Radio Saigon on the morning of June 12, was
transmitted to Washington in telegram 4158 from Saigon, June 12. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV)
2. Gens Thieu and Ky working jointly with Quat will: (A) discuss principal policy lines of
government, (B) future governmental structure and (C) personnel to be incorporated in
government. (They said Armed Forces Council would not be reestablished.)
They accepted my suggestion that Do call in diplomatic corps here to give them information
and explain action before announcement made public tomorrow. It was also agreed Bui
Diem will hold press backgrounder.
I strongly emphasized that in this move and future plans they keep strongly in mind
international aspects, particularly in view upcoming Afro-Asian conference. Stressed that
international aspects were of great importance and proper interest to USG and thus hoped to
be consulted as they moved ahead with their work. They all agreed.
In response to my queries on their estimate of opposition, especially Catholic, attitudes
toward move they took very relaxed attitude.
Both privately and in presence of generals, Quat stressed to me that discussions between
himself, government and generals had been entirely frank and cordial and he was very
satisfied with the attitude of the generals. (Incidentally all four corps commanders are
returning to their commands early tomorrow morning.)
Johnson
The attached was prepared to assist me in pulling together some of my thoughts on the
situation in Vietnam. It was also designed to serve me as a resume of intelligence
community views which have been set forth in the recent National Intelligence Estimates.
Because every effort was made to keep the present document to minimum length,
departures from the full texts--as agreed--were unavoidable. Even though there are
numerous estimates on the subject, they do not cover all of the major points presently under
discussion. Accordingly, my staff has supplemented community findings with judgments
very generally agreed to within the Central Intelligence Agency.
I myself have found the document useful and forward it to you for your information,
emphasizing again that you should consider it a special-purpose briefing note and in no
sense an agreed pronouncement of the United States Intelligence Board.
Respectfully yours,
W Raborn
Attachment/2/
/2/Top Secret; Sensitive.
Briefing Paper Prepared by the Office of National Estimates
Washington, June 11, 1965.
NIE's and SNIE's on South Vietnam
Since June 1964 there have been 12 NIE's or SNIE's on South Vietnamese problems. Only
one of these, issued 4 February 1965, "Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam,"/3/ was in
any sense a general assessment of the situation. Eight were on "Communist Reactions to
Certain Possible Courses of US Action"--these US courses of action were specifically given
to us by policy-makers requesting the respective Estimates.
/3/Document 69.
Accordingly there are no agreed USIB documents which are currently valid and which
provide a general view of the situation in all its aspects, or which deal with all contingencies
which might arise.
In Part I, following, we attempt to present estimative judgments on the most immediate
issues. Column 1 poses the questions, or puts the propositions. Column 2 contains what
NIE's or SNIE's have said on the matter. You will realize that this presentation omits
supporting arguments and most qualifications. It may serve as a basis for briefing.
Part II is a list of USIB-approved Estimates specifically related to the Vietnam situation,
issued during the past 12 months./4/ It includes a very brief note on each Estimates.
/4/Attached, but not printed.
PART I
/6/Document 337.
II. As long as the Communists think
they are winning in South Vietnam,
bombing of North Vietnam is
unlikely to lead them to make
conciliatory gestures.
/7/Document 139.
(d) indiscriminate and complete.
/9/Document 111.
(c) Chinese Communist attack on
the offshore islands, Taiwan, or
South Korea.
FINAL NOTE
One Estimate--that on reactions to US bombing of China--deals in its final section with a
situation of general war in the Far East--perhaps in the world. We note that except for this,
all the Estimates deal with situations of moderate or limited escalation (or no escalation).
The general proposition is that the Communists will try to restrain further expansion of
military conflict--if only because they are doing well in conflict on the present scale.
combat troops to their tactical areas of responsibility which are associated directly with the
defense of the installations near which they are located.
/3/See Document 339.
3. The fact is, we have moved some distance down the road toward the active commitment
of US combat forces and we have done so hand-in-hand with our Vietnamese ally. They
now expect and anticipate this kind of participation. They and we recognize that the time
has come when such support is essential to the survival of any government of South
Vietnam and the integrity of the RVNAF.
4. Therefore, we recommend that the concept for employment and the letters of instruction
be modified as follows and approved as a matter of urgency:
A. The tactical areas of responsibility around air bases and base areas where US troops are
located will be extended or expanded into all adjacent VC concentrations or base areas
which threaten the installations in question. This will permit offensive operations, combined
or unilateral, in direct relation to the defensive mission. This seems to us fully compatible
with para 1 of State Department Circular 2483 of 10 June/4/ in which the Secretary of State
is quoted as follows: "Now obviously we don't expect these men to sit there like hypnotized
rabbits waiting for the VC to strike. They are now in the surrounding countryside to be sure
that the VC are kept off balance and a strong striking force is not organized in the
neighborhood to strike these installations."
/4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
B. We will organize and plan with the Vietnamese for the commitment of US reserve
reaction forces to be called upon by the Vietnamese when in their opinion and ours the
general reserve of RVNAF has been committed or is not immediately available. This we
regard as entirely compatible with the statement issued from the White House on 9 June
which says: "General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to
employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attacks when
other effective reserves are not available and when in his judgment the general military
situation urgently requires it."
5. We have reached a point in Vietnam where we cannot avoid the commitment to combat
of US ground troops. Our objective is to maintain intact the Government of South Vietnam
and its armed forces. They can no longer cope alone with the increased VC DRV threat.
They (the Vietnamese) are fully aware of this fact and need and expect US support. We see
no difficulty in explaining the actions described above in accordance with the terms set
forth in the White House and the State Department messages.
6. Ambassador Johnson has read and concurs./5/
/5/On June 13 Admiral Sharp admonished Westmoreland not to press for explicit authority
defining the combat role of the ground forces under his command. Sharp noted that the
mission of those forces had been carefully defined in March to include "counterinsurgency
combat operations." (See Document 208.) This flexible directive was "deliberately designed
to authorize you to conduct operations necessary to achieve our objectives." Sharp added
that "it seems inevitable that further definition may serve to clarify the legal language in
your combat directive, but only at the risk of imposing new restrictions which neither of us
would have desired." (CINCPAC telegram 130025Z to COMUSMACV, June 13; Johnson
Library, Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Messages)