Xvietnam War White House CIA Foia 07lbjvol3

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume III

Vietnam
June-December 1965
Department of State
Washington, DC
Editors
David C. Humphrey
Edward C. Keefer
Louis J. Smith
General Editor
Glenn W. LaFantasie
United States Government Printing Office

Washington
1996
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 10261
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Contents
Preface
Selection and Editorial Policies
Sources
Abbreviations and Terms
Persons
Chapters:
Assessment of the U.S. role and the decision to expand the U.S. commitment, June 13July 28 (Documents 1-97)
Discussion on ending the war and deployment of additional U.S. forces, July 29November 26 (Documents 98-207)
The bombing pause and the diplomatic peace initiative, November 27-December 31
(Documents 208-278)

Vietnam
June-December 1965
Department of State
Washington, DC
Preface
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary
historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of
the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed
to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to
the policy positions ultimately adopted.
The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the
preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian,
Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series.
This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of
historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection
and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank
B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the
series through 1991.
A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law
102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which
was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138
added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC
4351, et seq.).
The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable
record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States
diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to
provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of
the United States Government, including facts that contributed to the formulation of
policies and records that provided supporting and alternative views to the policy positions
ultimately adopted.
The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign
Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records
should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a
deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major
importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of
concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be
published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.
The statute also requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include
all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy
decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government
agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the
Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent
to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.
In preparing each volume of the Foreign Relations series, the editors are guided by some
general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the
General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be
documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also
made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in
editorial or bibliographical notes.
The editors of this volume, which was originally compiled in 1984 and 1985 and revised
and updated in 1993 and 1994, are convinced that it meets all regulatory, statutory, and
scholarly standards of selection and editing.
An explanation of the selection policy for the series and of this particular volume and a
detailed description of the sources available to the editors of the series as well as a list of
specific files consulted for this volume follow this preface.
Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series
This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that
documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the 5 years (1964-1968) of
the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. In planning and preparing the 1964-1968
subseries, the editors chose to present the official record of U.S. foreign policy with
respect to Vietnam in seven volumes. Volume III (presented here) documents U.S. policy
toward Vietnam during the period from June 13, 1965, through December 31, 1965.
Volumes I, II, and IV through VII document U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the
following periods: I, 1964; II, January 1, 1965, through June 12, 1965; IV, 1966; V, 1967;
and VI and VII, 1968.
These seven volumes focus on Vietnam. They do not record activities in the rest of
mainland Southeast Asia except as they may relate immediately to the conduct of the war
in Vietnam. U.S. relations with Laos are documented in Volume XXVIII.. U.S. relations
with Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and SEATO are documented in Volume XXVII.
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the
Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations
concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall
compilation and editorial process of the series and assists with any access and/or clearance
problems that arise. Time constraints prevent the Advisory Committee from reviewing all
volumes in the series.
This volume has not been reviewed by the Advisory Committee.
Declassification Review
The declassification review of this volume resulted in the decision to withhold .05 percent
of the documentation originally selected; no documents were withheld in their entirety.
The documentation provides an accurate account of the main lines of U.S. policy toward
Vietnam during the June 13-December 31, 1965 period.
The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information,
Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State,
conducted the Department of State declassification review of the documents published in
this volume. The Declassification Coordination Division of the Historian's Office
coordinated the interagency and foreign government declassification review. The review
was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on
National Security Information and applicable laws.
Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following
categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
the national security, requires classification:
1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to
the national security;
3) foreign government information;
4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
8) cryptology; or
9) a confidential source.
The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to
the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed
concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of
State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign
governments regarding specific documents of those governments.
Acknowledgments
The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Lyndon B. Johnson
Library, in particular Regina Greenwell and Charlaine Burgess; the Department of
Defense, in particular Sandra Meagher; the National Defense University, in particular
Susan Lemke; the Minnesota Historical Society, in particular Dallas Lindgren; the
University of Montana; the Library of Congress; and officials at other specialized

repositories who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume. The editors also
wish to thank senior Foreign Service officer William H. Marsh for reading the manuscript
and for his comments and suggestions.
Edward C. Keefer and Louis J. Smith originally compiled this volume, and David C.
Humphrey contributed to the collection, selection, and substantive editing of the material
presented in this volume. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps
in the editorial and publication process. Student intern Shelby Hunt assisted in the
preparation of the lists of sources, abbreviations, and persons. The Declassification
Coordination Division, David H. Herschler, David C. Geyer, Kerry E. Hite, and Donna C.
Hung, coordinated the declassification review. Editors Rita M. Baker and Vicki E.
Futscher prepared the book manuscript for publication and performed the editorial review,
and Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division oversaw the production of
the volume. Breffni Whelan prepared the index.
William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
October 1995

Vietnam
June-December 1965
Department of State
Washington, DC
Selection and Editorial Policies

Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series
In preparing each volume of the Foreign Relations series, the editors are guided by some
general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the
General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be
documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also
made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in
editorial or bibliographical notes.
The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the Foreign
Relations series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the
particular issues and the available documentation. The compiler-editors also tend to apply
these selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally
accepted standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors
gave priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records
(which are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes).
Selection Criteria (in general order of priority):
1. Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to other
governments, including those that define or identify the principal foreign affairs interests
of the United States;
2. Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities, whether or not
major decisions were made, and including dissenting or alternative opinions to the process
ultimately adopted;
3. The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as the official
constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy;
4. The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and special
Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought before these bodies or
their individual members;
5. The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and the most
important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or policies;
6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges

between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that demonstrate the main
lines of policy implementation on major issues;
7. Important elements of information that attended Presidential decisions and policy
recommendations of the Secretary of State;
8. Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken on behalf of
the United States by government officials and representatives in other agencies in the
foreign affairs community or other branches of government made without the involvement
(or even knowledge) of the White House or the Department of State;
9. The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major aspects of U.S.
foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key information in the
formulation of major U.S. policies;
10. The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular foreign policies
or foreign affairs actions;
11. Economic aspects of foreign policy;
12. The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as other types
of assistance;
13. The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the military
establishment and major regional military commands as they bear upon the formulation or
execution of major U.S. foreign policies;
14. Documentation that illuminates special decisionmaking processes that accomplished
the policies recorded in particular volumes;
15. Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy changes.
Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for Foreign Relations, 19641968, Volume III
The editors developed the following six areas of focus for research and the selection of
documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) formulation of policy in Washington, with
particular emphasis on the decision to commit major ground forces to Vietnam and its
consequences for policy makers; 2) the advisory process, including recommendations
from key advisers in Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam,
and reporting and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon; 3) efforts to negotiate a settlement
to the Vietnam conflict, other key diplomatic contacts, and the issue of bombing pauses;
4) military planning and strategy and non-military programs in Vietnam; 5) the
relationship between the United States Government and the South Vietnamese
Government, including the issue of political instability in South Vietnam; and 6) the
implementation of policy in South Vietnam.
Editorial Methodology
The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the
case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S.
Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other
receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are
placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the
memorandum was drafted.
Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows
Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief
technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia
or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed
according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the
limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each
document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as
found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected.
Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a
correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in
the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as
found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each
volume.
Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated
subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic
type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of
lines or pages of source text that were omitted. The amount of material omitted from this
volume because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been
delineated. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by
footnotes.
The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original
classification, distribution, and drafting information. This footnote also provides the
background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his
major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a
document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the
source footnote.
Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the
volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to
important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide
summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed
documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been
used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Vietnam
June-December 1965
Department of State
Washington, DC
Sources
The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations
series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major
foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that
government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate
with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records
pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected
records. The editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in
accordance with the standards and mandates of this statute, although access to some
records was restricted, as noted below.
The editors have had complete access to all the retired records and papers of the
Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files
("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the
Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international
conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the
President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President
and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts.
Intelligence-related files maintained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research became
available to the Department historians only after this volume was compiled. Arrangements
have been made for Department historians to have access to these records for future
volumes; if any documentation relevant to this volume is found, it may be included in a
subsequent volume.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President
Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained
and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign
affairs-related documentation from other federal agencies including the National Security
Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the National Security Agency, and the United States Information Agency. All of
this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks
to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives
and Records Administration.
The Department of State has arranged for access to the audiotapes of President Johnson's
telephone conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. The first audiotapes became
available to the editors in late 1994, with most audiotapes, including those for the year
1965, to follow during 1995 and 1996. The editors decided not to delay publication of this
volume, but if relevant records are found among these telephone conversations, they may
be included in a later Foreign Relations volume.
Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense,
particularly the records of the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants and the
records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The editors of this volume also had access to the
Papers of General William Westmoreland at the U.S. Army Center of Military History
and the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, the Papers of General Maxwell Taylor at the National
Defense University, the Papers of General Harold Johnson at the U.S. Military History
Institute, and the Files of Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton at the
Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
Since 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanded access to Department
historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records still in the custody of
that Agency. Department of State historians' access is arranged by the History Staff of the
Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992
memorandum of understanding. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work
out the procedural and scholarly aspects of the access, and the variety of documentation
made available and selected for publication in the volumes has expanded. The editors of
this volume made particular use of the files of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Richard Helms.
The following are the particular files and collections consulted and cited in this volume.
Unpublished Sources
Department of State
Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files. In February 1963, the Department of State
changed its decimal central files to a subject-numeric central file system. The subjectnumeric system was divided into broad categories: Administration, Consular, Culture and
Information, Economic, Political and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these
divisions were subject subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contained four
subtopics: POL (Politics), DEF (Defense), CSM (Communism), and INT (Intelligence).
Numerical subdivisions further defined them.
The following were the most important files used in this volume:
EP 6-1 Hue, emergency and evacuation policy and plans
POL UK-US, political relations, U.S.-United Kingdom
POL 1 US-USSR, general policy, U.S.-Soviet Union
POL 1 VIET S, general policy, Vietnam
POL 1-1 VIET S, contingency planning and coordination re Vietnam
POL 12 VIET S, Vietnamese political parties
POL 15 VIET S, government of Vietnam

POL 15-1 VIET S, Vietnamese head of state/Executive Branch
POL 15-1 US/Johnson, Executive Branch, President Johnson
POL 23-9 VIET S, rebellions and coups in Vietnam
POL 27 VIET S, military operations in Vietnam
POL 27 VIET S/PINTA, peace negotiations during 37-day bombing pause
POL 27-7 VIET, prisoners of war
POL 27-14 VIET S, truce, cease-fire, and armistice
POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ, negotiations through Mai Van Bo
Lot Files. Documents from the Central Files have been supplemented by materials from
decentralized office files, the lot files of the Department of State. A list of the major lot
files used or consulted follows:
Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272 Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961-1966.
Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379 Files of Ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen, 1961-1968
Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327 Diaries of David K.E. Bruce while Ambassador to the United
Kingdom, 1961-1969
Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240 Files of William P. Bundy as Assistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs, 1964-1969.
EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiation Files: Lots 69 D 277 and 69 D 412 Files on Vietnam
peace negotiations, including material on the positions and efforts of Communist and nonCommunist countries and groups, international organizations, and individuals, 1964-1968.
EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219 Files of the interagency Vietnam
Working Group, 1964-1967.
INR Files: Lot 81 D 343 Consolidated files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including
texts of speeches, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence,
chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations.
S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139 Country Files of the Policy Planning Council and memoranda to
the Secretary from the Chairman, 1965-1968.
S/S Files: Lot 66 D 150 Record copies of policy briefing books and reports, including
material on the President's Panel of Foreign Affairs Consultants, 1965.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda
(NSAMs) for the years 1961-1968, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson
National Security File
Country File, Vietnam
Files of McGeorge Bundy
International Meetings and Travel File
Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy
Name File
National Intelligence Estimates
National Security Action Memoranda
National Security Council Histories
Diaries and Appointment Logs
President's Appointment File (Diary Backup)
President's Daily Diary
John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President
Meeting Notes File
Office Files of the White House Aides
Horace Busby, Jr.
White House Central Files
Subject File
Confidential File
George Ball Papers
Notes on telephone conversations, 1963-1966
McGeorge Bundy Papers
Notes of meetings, 1963-1966
William P. Bundy Papers
Unpublished manuscript on U.S. policy in Vietnam, 1961-1965
Walt W. Rostow Papers
Southeast Asia file
Dean Rusk Papers
Appointment Books, 1961-1969
Paul C. Warnke Papers
Files of John T. McNaughton, 1964-1967

William C. Westmoreland Papers
History File, History Backup, and COMUSMACV Message Files, 1964-1968
Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia
DCI (McCone) Files
Files of John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-1965.
DCI (Helms) Files
Files of Richard Helms as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1965-1966.
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland
Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the United States
Saigon Embassy's Coordinator Files: FRC 68 A 5612
Classified sensitive captioned files of the Coordinator, Embassy in Saigon, 1964-1965.
Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470
Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1961-1968.
OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, 70 A 1266, 71 A 6489
Subject files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1965
OSD/General Counsel Files: FRC 75 A 0062
Files on the Pentagon Papers
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
Averell Harriman Papers
National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
Maxwell Taylor Papers
U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
William C. Westmoreland Papers
History File, History Backup, and COMUSMACV Message Files, 1964-1968.
U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Harold Johnson Papers
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
James C. Thomson Papers

Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota
Hubert H. Humphrey Papers
Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana
Mike Mansfield Papers
Published Sources
Documentary Collections
The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog and microfiche. Woodbridge,
Connecticut, 1975 onwards.
Herring, George, ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating
Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin, Texas, 1983.
Johnson, Walter, ed. The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson. Boston, 1972.
The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of United States
Decisionmaking on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel Edition. 4 vols. Boston, 1971.
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: Study Prepared by the Department of
Defense. Washington, 1971.
U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965.
Washington, 1969.
--------. Department of State Bulletin, 1965. Washington, 1966.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965. Washington, 1968.
Memoirs
The Department takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these memoirs nor endorses
their interpretation of the events.
Ball, George. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. New York, 1982.
Bui Diem, with David Chanoff. In the Jaws of History. Boston, 1987.
Colby, William. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year
Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago, 1989.
Cooper, Chester. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York, 1970.
Humphrey, Hubert. Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics. Garden City, N.Y.,
1976.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969.
New York, 1971.
The Johnson Years: A Vietnam Roundtable. Edited by Ted Gittinger. Austin, Texas,
1993.
Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York, 1976.
Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province.
Berkeley, California, 1972.
Rostow, W.W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York, 1972.
Rusk, Dean, as told to Richard Rusk. As I Saw It. New York, 1990.
Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant. Strategy for Defeat. San Raphael, California, 1978.
Stewart, Michael. Life and Labour: An Autobiography. London, 1980.
Taylor, Maxwell. Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir. New York, 1972.
Thant, U. View from the UN. Garden City, New York, 1978.
Valenti, Jack. A Very Human President. New York, 1975.
Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, New York, 1976.
Wilson, Harold. The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record. London, 1971

Vietnam
June-December 1965
Department of State
Washington, DC
Abbreviations and Terms

AA, anti-aircraft
AAA, anti-aircraft artillery
ADA, Americans for Democratic Action
AFC, Armed Forces Council
AFSC, American Friends Service Committee
AID, Agency for International Development
AIF, Automated Intelligence File
A-1H, Skyraider, single-engine attack aircraft
AKA, attack cargo ship
ammo, ammunition
AP, Associated Press
Arc Light, code name for U.S. B-52 bombing strikes in Southeast Asia
ARVN, Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASAP, as soon as possible
Barrel Roll, U.S. air operations over northern Laos
BDA, bomb damage assessment
Bks, barracks
bldgs, buildings
BLT, battalion landing team

Blue Springs, code name for U.S. photoreconnaissance drone operations over North
Vietnam
Blue Tree, code name for U.S. photoreconnaissance operations over North Vietnam
Bn, battalion
BOQ, Bachelor Officers' Quarters
BTL, battalion
C, Confidential
CAP, series indicator for outgoing White House telegrams
CAS, controlled American source
CBU, cluster bomb unit
CG FMFPAC, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
ChiCom, Chinese Communist
CIDG, Civilian Irregular Defense Group
Chieu Hoi, Government of South Vietnam's repatriation program for the Viet Cong
CINC; C-in-C, Commander in Chief
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, United States Air Force, Pacific
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCRVNAF, Commander in Chief, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
CIP, Commercial Import Program
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM, Chairman's memorandum
COMUSKOREA, Commander, United States Forces, Korea

COMUSMACV, Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
conf, conference
CPFL, Contingency Planning Facilities List
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
CTZ, corps tactical zone
CVT, Confederation of Vietnamese Trade
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDP, Deputy Director of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
DEF, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of Defense
Dept, Department
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DeSoto, code name for U.S. Navy destroyer patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin
DF, direction finding
DGNP, Director-General, National Police
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
dissem, dissemination
div, division
DJSM, Director of the Joint Staff memorandum
DMZ, Demilitarized Zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DRV, Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam
DSC, Distinguished Service Cross
DTG, date-time-group
Emb, Embassy
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ELINT, electronic intelligence
EST, Eastern Standard Time
ETA, estimated time of arrival
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/GER, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, exclusive distribution
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Flaming Dart, code name for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam in February
1965
FNL, Front National de Liberation (National Liberation Front)
ForMin, Foreign Minister
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
GOB, Government of Burma
govt, government
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
H-H, Hanoi and Haiphong
HK, Hong Kong
HMG, Her Majesty's Government
HNC, High National Council
Hop Tac, Government of Vietnam program for pacification of Saigon and surrounding
provinces
HQ, headquarters
ICC, International Control Commission

ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IL-28, Soviet-made light bomber based in North Vietnam
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IR, infrared
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
JGS, Joint General Staff, Vietnamese Armed Forces
KIA, killed in action
KY-9, secure telephone line
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LBJ, Lyndon Baines Johnson
Limdis, limited distribution
LOC, line of communication
log, logistic
LOR, distribution indicator for closely held exchange of telegrams between the President
and Ambassador Taylor
LSD, dock landing ship
LSM, landing craft, mechanized
Lucky Dragon, code name for high altitude U.S. reconnaissance operations over Southeast
Asia
MAB, Marine Amphibious Battalion; Mobile Air Brigade
MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF, Marine Amphibious Force
MAROPS, Maritime Operations

MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MCC, Military-Civilian Council
MEB, Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MiG, Soviet-built fighter aircraft
MLF, Multilateral Force
MM, millimeter
MP, Military Police; Member of Parliament
MTU 79.3.5, U.S. Marine unit at Danang as of January 1, 1965
Natl Cap, national capacity
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Corporation
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NLC, National Leadership Council
NLF, National Liberation Front
NM, nautical mile
NMCC, National Military Command Center
Nodis, no distribution
Noforn, no foreign dissemination
NOTAL, indication that a reference telegram was not sent to all addressees
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NVN, North Vietnam
OCI, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency

OPLAN, operation plan
OPLAN 34A, operation plan for covert operations against North Vietnam
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM, Pacific Command
PAO, Public Affairs Officer
para, paragraph
PAVN, People's Army of North Vietnam
Pinta, code name for U.S. peace negotiations during the 37-day bombing pause
PIO, Public Information Officer
PL, Pathet Lao; Public Law
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants
POLAD, Political Adviser
PolAffs, Political Affairs
PNG, persona non grata
Pres, President
PriMin, Prime Minister
PsyWar, psychological warfare
PT, patrol
PW, prisoners of war
RCT, Regimental Combat Team
recce, reconnaissance
ref, reference
reftel, reference telegram
Rep, Representative
ret, retired
RG, Record Group
RKG, Royal Khmer Government
RLAF, Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG, Royal Laotian Government
ROK, Republic of Korea
Rolling Thunder, code name for long-running program of U.S. air operations in North
Vietnam
RR, railroad
RRU, Radio Research Unit
RT, Rolling Thunder
Rupert, code name for Mai Van Bo
RVN, Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S, Office of the Secretary of State
SA-2, Soviet-made surface-to-air missile
SAC, Strategic Air Command
S/AL, Office of the Ambassador at Large
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAR, search and rescue
SC, United Nations Security Council
SE, Southeast
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEACOORD, Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecGen, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from
Washington
septel, separate telegram
SLF, Special Landing Force
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOG, Studies and Observation Group
Sov, Soviet
sqdns, squadrons
S/P, Policy Planning Council or Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Steel Tiger, code name for air strikes against the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos
SVN, South Vietnam
SYG, United Nations Secretary-General
TASS, tactical air support squadron; Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskovo Soyuza
(Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union)
Thich, Venerable (title for Buddhist monk)
TOT, Time Over Target
U, Unclassified; Office of the Under Secretary of State
UAR, United Arab Republic
UBA, Unified Buddhist Association
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNMIS, United States Mission to the United Nations
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSYG, United Nations Secretary-General
UPI, United Press International

USAF, United States Air Force
USASCV, U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USIS, United States Information Service
USN, United States Navy
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
VC, Viet Cong
VM, Viet Minh
VN, Vietnam
VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force
Westy, General William C. Westmoreland
WH, White House
WNRC, Washington National Records Center
XYZ, code name for unofficial U.S. contacts with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
through Mai Van Bo
Z, Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time)

Vietnam
June-December 1965
Department of State
Washington, DC
Persons
Acheson, Dean, Secretary of State from 1949 until 1953
Aka, Moise, Ivory Coast Representative to the United Nations General Assembly
Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States until October 1965
Arends, Leslie C., Republican Representative from Illinois, Republican Whip
Arkas-Duntov, Urah, intermediary in U.S. contacts with Mao Van Bo
Ayub Khan, Field Marshal Muhammad, President of Pakistan
Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State
Bell, David E., Administrator of the Agency for International Development
Black, Eugene R., Special Adviser to the President for Southeast Asia after April 9, 1965
Boggs, Hale, Democratic Representative from Louisiana
Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France
Bowles, Chester A., Ambassador to India
Bowman, Colonel Richard C., Member of the National Security Council Staff
Brezhnev, Leonid I., First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
Brown, Harold, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense,
until October 1, 1965; thereafter Secretary of the Air Force
Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Buffum, William B., Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of
State, until September 11, 1965; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Organization Affairs
Bui Diem, Vietnamese Chief of Staff in the Quat government until June 1965; Special
Assistant for Planning and Foreign Aid in the Thieu-Ky government from June 1965
Bunce, W. Kenneth, Assistant Director (Far East), United States Information Agency
Bunche, Ralph J., United Nations Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs
Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Burchinal, Lieutenant General David A., USAF, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Busby, Horace, Special Assistant to the President until October 1, 1965
Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to Burma
Califano, Joseph A., Special Assistant to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of
Defense until July 1965; thereafter Special Assistant to the President
Cang, see Chung Tan Cang
Cao, see Huynh Van Cao
Cao Van Vien, General, ARVN, Commander of III Corps; Chief of the Vietnamese Joint
General Staff from September 1965
Carroll, Lieutenant General Joseph F., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until
April 28, 1965; thereafter Director of the National Security Agency
Carver, George A., Jr., Member of Vietnamese Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency
Cater, S. Douglass, Special Assistant to the President
Chiang Kai-Shek, Generalissimo, President of the Republic of China
Chancellor, John, Assistant Director of the United States Information Agency after
August 27, 1965
Ch'en Yi, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China
Chieu, see Pham Xuan Chieu
Chou En-lai, Premier of the People's Republic of China
Chung Tan Cang, Admiral, Vietnamese Navy Commander and Member of the Armed
Forces Council until April 1965
Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

until September 8, 1965; thereafter Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Clifford, Clark, unofficial adviser to President Johnson
Cline, Ray, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
Co, see Nguyen Huu Co
Colbert, Evelyn S., Chief, Southeast Asia Division, Office of Research and Analysis for
Far East, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Colby, William E., Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency
Cooper, Chester L., Member of the National Security Council Staff
Corcoran, Thomas J., Director, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, until July 1965; thereafter First Secretary of the Embassy in Vietnam
Cousins, Norman, President and Editor, Saturday Review
Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister
Cutler, Lloyd N., Washington lawyer
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France
De Silva, Peer, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon; thereafter
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency
Dean, David, Mainland China Affairs Officer and then Deputy Director, Office of Asian
Communist Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States after April 13, 1965
Denney, George C., Jr., Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
DePuy, Major General William E., Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations), U.S.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; thereafter Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency
Devillers, Philippe, French historian and journalist
Diem, see Ngo Dinh Diem
Dillon, Douglas C., Secretary of the Treasury until April 1, 1965
Dirkson, Everett M., Republican Senator from Illinois; Senate Minority Leader
Do, see Tran Van Do
Dong, see Pham Van Dong
Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh"), General, ARVN, former Vietnamese Chief of State
Ehrlich, Thomas, Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State Ball
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States from 1953 until 1961
Erhard, Ludwig, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Foreign Minister after March 5, 1965; President, Twentieth
Regular Session, United Nations General Assembly
Fedorenko, Nikolai, Soviet Representative to the United Nations
Firyubin, Nikolai, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Flott, Frederick W., First Secretary at the Embassy in Vietnam
Ford, Gerald R., Republican Representative from Michigan; House Minority Leader
Forster, Oliver G., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States
Fortas, Abe, unofficial adviser to President Johnson; Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court after October 4, 1965
Fowler, Henry H., Under Secretary of the Treasury until April 1, 1965; thereafter
Secretary of the Treasury
Fulbright, J. William., Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee
Galbraith, John Kenneth, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Gard, Richard A., Consul at Hong Kong
Garroway, Dave, television and radio personality and commentator
Gaud, William S., Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development
Giap, see Vo Nguyen Giap
Givan, Walker, Officer in Charge, Italian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs,
Department of State
Goldberg, Arthur J., Representative to the United Nations after July 28, 1965
Gomulka, Wladyslaw, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party
Goodell, Charles E., Republican Representative from New York
Goodpaster, Lieutenant General Andrew J., USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Green, Marshall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until June
1965; Ambassador to Indonesia after July 26, 1965
Greene, General Wallace M., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps
Greenfield, James L., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister
Gronouski, John A., Ambassador to Poland after December 7, 1965
Gullion, Edmund S., unofficial U.S. envoy ("X") in the XYZ negotiations with Mai Van
Bo
Hammarskjold, Dag, former Secretary-General of the United Nations
Hand, Lloyd, Chief of Protocol, Department of State, after January 21, 1965
Hannah, Norman B., Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Harlech, see Ormsby Gore, Sir David
Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 1965;
thereafter Ambassador at Large
Helms, Richard N., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until April
28, 1965; thereafter Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Herfurt, Jack A., Counselor for Administration at the Embassy in Vietnam
Hertz, Gustav C., Public Administration Adviser, Agency for International Development
Mission in Vietnam; captured by the Viet Cong in 1964
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Republican Senator from Iowa
Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietam
Ho Giac, Buddhist leader
Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States after January 20, 1965
Huong, see Tran Van Huong
Huynh Van Cao, General, ARVN, Secretary to the Armed Forces Council
Huynh Van Ton, Colonel, ARVN, participant in anti-Khanh coup attempt, February 1920, 1965
Javits, Jacob K., Republican Senator from New York
Johnson, General Harold, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army
Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States
Johnson, Robert H., Member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam until September 1965; Deputy Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs after November 1, 1965
Jorgensen, Gordon L., Chief of Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon after Peer
De Silva
Katzenbach, Nicolas deB., Attorney General of the United States
Kent, Sherman, Director, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
Khang, see Le Nguyen Khang
Khanh, see Nguyen Khanh
Khiem, see Tran Thien Khiem
Killen, James S., Director, Agency for International Development Mission in Vietnam;
Senior Evaluation Officer, Office of Administration, Agency for International
Development, after October 10, 1965
Klaus, Josef, Chancellor of Austria
Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Kosygin, Alexei N, Soviet Premier
Kraft, Joseph, j ournalist and syndicated columnist
Kuchel, Thomas H., Republican Senator from California
Ky, see Nguyen Cao Ky

Laird, Melvin R., Republican Representative from Wisconsin
Lam Van Phat, General, ARVN, leader in the anti-Khanh coup attempt of February 19-20,
1965
Lansdale, Edward G., Special Assistant to Ambassador Lodge after August 16, 1965
Lapin, Sergei G., Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Le Nguyen Khang, General, Vietnamese Marine Corps Commander
Le Van Hoach, Member of the Quat Cabinet from mid-February 1965
Leddy, John M., Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development until June 15, 1965; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs
Lippmann, Walter S., journalist and author
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Ambassador to Vietnam after August 25, 1965
Long, Russell B., Democratic Senator from Louisiana; Senate Majority Whip
Lucet, Charles E., Director of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry; French
Ambassador to the United States after December 15, 1965
Macapagal, Disodado, President of the Philippines
MacArthur, Douglas II, Ambassador to Belgium until February 11, 1965; Assistant
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations after March 14, 1965
MacDonald, Malcolm, Leader of British Delegation and Co-Chairman, International
Conference on Laos, 1961-1962
Mai Van Bo (code named "Rupert"), Commercial Representative in Paris of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Manac'h, Etienne, Director of Asian Affairs, French Foreign Ministry
Manfull, Melvin L., Counselor for Political Affairs at the Embassy in Vietnam
Mann, Thomas C., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until March 17,
1965; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana; Senate Majority Leader
Marks, Leonard H., Director of the United States Information Agency after September 1,
1965
Martin, Graham A., Ambassador to Thailand
McBride, Robert H., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in France
McCloskey, Robert J., Director, Office of News, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State
McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence until April 28, 1965
McConnell, General John P., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force after February 1, 1965
McCormack, John W., Democratic Representative from Massachusetts; Speaker of the
House
McDonald, Admiral David L., USN, Chief of Naval Operations
McLendon, Gordon, Chairman, McLendon Corporation in Texas
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense
McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Adviser, Department of State, after May 18, 1965
Meloy, Francis E., Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Italy
Menzies, Sir Robert Gordon, Prime Minister of Australia
Michalowski, Jerzy, Director-General, Polish Foreign Ministry
Minh ("Big Minh"), see Duong Van Minh
Minh ("Little Minh"), see Tran Van Minh
Morse, Wayne, Democratic Senator from Oregon
Moyers, Bill D., Special Assistant to the President; Press Secretary to the President after
July 8, 1965
Narasimhan, C.V., United Nations Under Secretary for General Assembly Affairs and
Chef de Cabinet of the United Nations
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, President of the United Arab Republic
Nehru, Jawaharlal, former Indian Prime Minister
Ngo Dinh Diem, former Vietnamese President
Nguyen Cao Ky, Air Vice Marshal, VNAF, Air Force Commander and Member of the
Armed Forces Council; Vietnamese Premier after June 19, 1965
Nguyen Chanh Thi, General, ARVN, Vietnamese Commander of I Corps; Member of the
National Leadership Committee
Nguyen Duc Thang, General, ARVN, Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations); Minister
of Rural Construction after October 1965
Nguyen Duy Trinh, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Huu Co, General, ARVN, Commander of II Corps; Chief of the Vietnamese Joint
General Staff from May until September 1965; Defense Minister after June 19, 1965;
Defense Minister and Vice-Premier after October 1, 1965
Nguyen Khanh, General, ARVN, Chairman of the Armed Forces Council until February
21, 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large
Nguyen Van Thieu, General, ARVN, Member of the Armed Forces Council; Member of
Quat Cabinet after February 16, 1965; Chairman of the National Leadership Committee
and Chief of State from mid-June 1965
Nguyen Xuan Oanh, Vietnamese Deputy Premier until January 27, 1965; Acting Premier
from January 28 to mid-February 1965
Nitze, Paul H., Secretary of the Navy
Nkrumah, Kwame, President of Ghana
Norodom Sihanouk, Prince, Cambodian Head of State
Oanh, see Nguyen Xuan Oanh
O'Brien, Lawrence F., Special Assistant to the President
Ormsby Gore, David (Lord Harlech), British Ambassador to the United States until April
1965
Paul VI, Pope of the Roman Catholic Church
Peter, Janos, Hungarian Foreign Minister
Pham Ngoc Thao, Colonel, participant in coup attempts against Khanh in February 1965
and Quat in May 1965
Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Pham Van Dong, General, ARVN, Commander of the Capital Military District and
Member of the Armed Forces Council in early 1965

Pham Xuan Chieu, General, ARVN, Member and Chairman of the National Legislative
Council; Member of the National Leadership Committee
Phan Huy Quat, Vietnamese Premier from February 16 until June 11, 1965
Phan Khac Suu, Vietnamese Chief of State until June 11, 1965
Phap Tri, Buddhist leader
Plimpton, Francis T.P., Deputy Representative to the United Nations
Porter, William J., Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam after September 13, 1965
Procter, Carolyn J., Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State
Quaison-Sackey, Alex, Ghanaian Representative to the United Nations; President,
Nineteenth Session, United Nations General Assembly
Quang Lien, Buddhist leader
Quat, see Phan Huy Quat
Raborn, William F., Jr., Director of Central Intelligence after April 28, 1965
Radhakrishnan, Sir Sarvepalli, President of India
Radvanyi, Janos, Charge d'Affaires at the Hungarian Legation in Washington
Ramani, Radhakrishna, Malaysian Representative to the United Nations Security Council
Rapacki, Adam, Polish Foreign Minister
Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of
the Department
Reedy, George, Press Secretary to the President until July 8, 1965
Resor, Stanley R., Under Secretary of the Army from April 5 until July 5, 1965; thereafter
Secretary of the Army
Reston, James B., Associate Editor, New York Times
Ribeiro, Miguel A., Ghanaian Ambassador to the United States
Rifa'i, Abdul Monem, Jordanian Representative to the United Nations Security Council
Rogers, Colonel Jack A., USA, Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs

Rolz-Bennett, Jose, United Nations Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs
Rosenthal, James D., Political Officer at the Embassy in Vietnam
Rostow, Walt, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of
State
Rowan, Carl, Director of the United States Information Agency until July 10, 1965
Rowen, Henry S., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget
Rupert, see Mai Van Bo
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State
Rusk, Howard, physician, founder of the American Southeast Asia Foundation
Salinger, Pierre, Press Secretary to President Kennedy
Schwartz, Abba P., Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department
of State
Scott-Murga, Guillermo, Bolivian Representative to the United Nations Security Council
Seaborn, J. Blair, Canadian Delegate to the International Control Commission
Sevareid, Eric, author and correspondent, Columbia Broadcasting System
Sharp, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Indian Prime Minister
Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs after
September 10, 1965
Smathers, George A., Democratic Senator from Florida
Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Sparkman, John J., Democratic Senator from Alabama
Splitt, Orville S., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs
Springsteen, George S., Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State
Stanton, Frank, President, Columbia Broadcasting System
Stevenson, Adlai E., Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965
Stewart, Michael, British Foreign Secretary after January 22, 1965
Stewart, Michael N.F., Minister of the British Embassy in Washington
Stoneman, Walter G., Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Far East, Agency for
International Development
Sturm, Paul, unofficial U.S. envoy ("Y") in the XYZ negotiations with Mai Van Bo
Sullivan, William H., Ambassador to Laos
Suu, see Phan Khac Suu
Sylvester, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Talbot, Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
until September 1, 1965; Ambassador to Greece after October 11, 1965
Tam Chau, Buddhist leader and head of Vien Hoa Dao, the Institute for the Propagation of
the Faith (Buddhist Institute)
Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, Ret., Ambassador to Vietnam until July 30, 1965;
President's Special Consultant after September 17, 1965
Thang, see Nguyen Duc Thang
Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Thi, see Nguyen Chanh Thi
Thien Khiet, Buddhist leader
Thien Minh, Buddhist leader
Thieu, see Nguyen Van Thieu
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., Ambassador at Large
Thomsen, Samuel B., Principal Officer at the Consulate in Hue
Thomson, James C., Jr., Member of the National Security Council Staff
Tito, Marshal, President of Yugoslavia
Ton, see Huynh Van Ton
Tran Thien Khiem, General, ARVN, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States
Tran Van Do, Vietnamese Foreign Minister

Tran Van Don, General, former Vietnamese Defense Minister
Tran Van Huong, Vietnamese Premier until January 27, 1965
Tran Van Minh ("Little Minh"), General, ARVN, Chief of the Joint General Staff until
May 1965; Acting Commander in Chief of Vietnamese Armed Forces after February 21,
1965
Tran Van Tuyen, Deputy Premier in the Quat government
Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Trinh, see Nguyen Duy Trinh
Tri Quang, Buddhist political leader and Secretary General of the High Council of the
United Buddhist Association
Tuyen, see Tran Van Tuyen
Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 18, 1965;
Ambassador to the Netherlands after June 23, 1965
Ufford, Leopold Quarles van, Netherlands Representative to the United Nations Security
Council
Unger, Leonard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and
Chairman of the Vietnam Coordinating Committee
Valenti, Jack, Special Assistant to the President until May 15, 1965
Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense
Vaughn, Jack Hood, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Afairs after March
22, 1965
Velazquez, Carlos Maria, Uruguayan Representative to the United Nations Security
Council
Vien, see Cao Van Vien
Vo Nguyen Giap, General, PAVN, Minister of National Defense, Democratic Republic of
Vietnam
Watson, W. Marvin, Special Assistant to the President after February 1, 1965
Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Commander, United States Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam
Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Whiting, Allen S., Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Far East, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Wiggins, James Russell, Editor and Executive Vice President, Washington Post
Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency
Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister
Winiewicz, Josef, Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
X, see Gullion, Edmund
Y, see Sturm, Paul
Yost, Charles W., Deputy Representative to the United Nations
Zorthian, Barry, Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs at the Embassy in Vietnam;
Minister-Counselor for Information at the Embassy after September 1965
Zuckert, Eugene M., Secretary of the Air Force until September 30, 1965

Vietnam June-December 1965
Department of State
Washington, DC
Vietnam, June - December 1965

ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. ROLE AND THE DECISION TO EXPAND THE U.S.
COMMITMENT, JUNE 13 - JULY 28
1. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Saigon, June 13, 1965, 7:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV,
Cables (B). Top Secret; Immediate. Repeated to JCS.
MACJOO 20055. Subj: Concept of operations--force requirements and deployments,
SVN. Ref: A. MACV 070335Z. B. CINCPAC 112210Z./2/
/2/Reference A is telegram MACJOO 19118, vol. II, Document 337. Regarding Reference
B, see footnote 5 thereto.
1. There has been an extended exchange of messages regarding the VC/DRV threat, the
requirement for US forces, the concept of their employment and the details of their
deployment. MACV proposes to treat each of these matters in an effort to bring the
picture into closer focus.
2. The threat. State message 2873, 11 June 1965,/3/ raises questions about MACV's
current estimate of the seriousness of the situation in SVN. This message will be answered
separately by Embtel reflecting MACV views. Suffice it to say that ARVN has lost five
infantry battalions on the battlefield in the last three weeks while rising casualties and
high desertion rates have caused a moratorium to be proposed in connection with the
formation of new battalions. Thus, ARVN battlefield strength is declining in the face of
DRV reinforcements and a VC offensive. It is MACV's considered opinion that RVNAF
cannot stand up to this pressure without substantial US combat support on the ground.
/3/See ibid., Document 337, footnote 3.
3. Force requirements. MACV has asked for added forces in ref A. These consist of two
battalions to round out the 3d Marine Division, a ROK division, an airmobile division, the
retention of the 173d Airborne Brigade, tactical fighters and a corps headquarters plus
combat and logistic support forces. We have also flagged the possibility of additional
forces.
4. Concept of employment.
A. CINCPAC analysis of the situation and concept of operations is properly focussed
upon the population--that is, upon the people. There is no doubt whatsoever that the
insurgency in South Vietnam must eventually be defeated among the people in the
hamlets and towns. However, in order to defeat the insurgency among the people, they
must be provided security of two kinds:
(1) Security of the country as a whole from large well organized and equipped forces
including those which may come from outside their country.
(2) Security from the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist and the informer.
B. MACV is convinced that US troops can contribute heavily in the first category of
security as in paragraph 4A(1) above, but that only the Vietnamese can make real progress
and succeed in respect to the problem in paragraph 4A(2) above. Unfortunately, the
ARVN is being drawn away from the people and their security in order to meet the
challenge of the main force VC/DRV offensive. The best illustration of this point is the
fact that the II Corps Commander has removed most of the troops from the province of
Binh Dinh with its nearly one million people in order to defend the relatively less
important province capitals of Kontum and Pleiku. Therefore, the MACV concept is
basically to employ US forces together with Vietnamese airborne and marine battalions of
the general reserve against the hardcore DRV/VC forces in reaction and search and
destroy operations, and thus permit the concentration of Vietnamese troops in the heavily
populated areas along the coast, around Saigon and in the Delta.
C. We have tailored logistic support forces to provide for some tactical flexibility so that
forces may be shifted in accordance with the strength and movement of the VC.
Continuous adjustments and redistributions undoubtedly will be necessary. It is likely that
the war will continue to become more fluid and more mobile. We believe that the major
bases at Da Nang, Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh and Saigon-Bien Hoa provide the
backbone support on which mobile forces can be supported and from which they can
maneuver.
D. It is not our concept that the US would take exclusive control of responsibility for any
entire province although, in practice, only token GVN forces might remain. Thus
generally, we must match our forces with the territorial organization of the GVN. We
must strengthen and support the RVNAF structure to keep it alive and operative. We
should generally concentrate US forces away from major population centers and
whenever possible do the bulk of our fighting in more remote areas.
5. Deployments.
A. MACV recognizes that the in-country location of ground combat forces has a bearing
upon the size, nature and location of logistic support forces, ports, airfields and related
facilities. For this reason, MACV has indicated from time to time the proposed initial
location of the combat forces for which requirements have developed. However, as the
number of combat forces requested and required increases and the number of
combinations and permutations regarding location correspondingly increases, we rapidly
approach a point where everyone will be confused and no useful purpose will be served.
B. The VC are now maneuvering large forces up to reinforce regiments equipped with
heavy weapons. Thus, we are approaching the kind of warfare faced by the French in the
latter stages of their efforts here. It is entirely possible that the DRV can and will deploy
three or more divisions into South Vietnam by infiltration. It is highly likely that one is
already here. Therefore, it will be necessary to react to the introduction of DRV forces and
to the shift and tactical play of the VC. Thus, tactical dispositions will change and only
the major bases will be fixed. In short, we will be conducting mobile warfare from fixed
and defended bases. Some of these bases will be major logistics centers at ports and
airfields such as Chu Lai and Cam Ranh. Others will be tactical bases such as An Khe or
Pleiku, the tactical bases will move as necessary and that may be with some frequency as
the battle develops.
C. With these thoughts in mind, a MACV review of the tactical situation corps-by-corps
will indicate the probable deployment of required US forces:
(1) I Corps. This corps is highly vulnerable to the introduction of DRV forces. It has
virtually no reserve and is barely able to hold the major population centers, province and
district towns. We believe that the 3d Marine Division augmented by two battalions as
recommended can provide adequate reserve reaction forces for I Corps at the present level
of VC activity. With a full division, the equivalent of one BLT will be available for
employment throughout the corps in a reaction role away from the base area.
(2) II Corps. This corps has a hopelessly large area to cover with the meager forces
available. Additionally, the Vietnamese have a fixation on the importance of Kontum and
Pleiku, probably derived from the history of the Viet Minh war. Recently, the corps
commander has denuded Binh Dinh Province (with nearly a million inhabitants) in order
to reinforce Kontum with two marine battalions. The VC control Phu Yen Province
except for Tuy Hoa itself and, as reported earlier, the 325th Division may be deployed in
Kontum, Pleiku and Phu Bon. The 23d Division is scattered so widely that it cannot react
in strength to VC attacks against isolated province capitals and district towns. We are
greatly concerned that such towns as Ham Tan in Binh Tuy and Gia Nghia in Quang Duc
and even Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan may be attacked. Corps commanders without
adequate reserves have shown conclusive evidence that they will move timidly and too
late in a piecemeal manner upon the event of a VC heavy attack. This is resulting in the
loss of ARVN battalions faster than they can be organized, trained and equipped. II Corps
requires heavy reinforcements. We have asked for an infantry brigade, an airmobile
division and a ROK division. We would generally employ these forces as follows:
(A) The ROKs appear to be sensitive to the possibility of heavy casualties and would be
pleased, we believe, to take over the security mission at the major logistic bases of Cam
Ranh and Qui Nhon. Although two RCTs are not required for the defense of Qui Nhon,
they can profitably be used there to extend the secure area and reinforce the ARVN in that
populous and important province. If only one ROK RCT becomes available, we would
employ it to relieve the 1st Division Brigade at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh.
(B) Having been relieved by the ROKs of the security of Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh, we
visualize the employment of the 1st Division Brigade in the general area of Highway 19
west of Qui Nhon toward An Khe. The security of Route 19 is important not only in the
event of the deployment of major US forces on the high plateau, but is equally essential
for the support of the population in that area and for the delivery of POL for current
combat operations. The fact is that Highway 19 must be kept open. There is no feasible
way into the high plateau from north or south. If the plateau is abandoned, it will form the
first significant territory of the NFLSVN and will be recognized and supported by China
through Cambodia.
(C) We believe that Route 19 and the Pleiku-Kontum area present a challenge which must
be met. We do not believe that the RVNAF can do the job. If the VC elect to fight a major
campaign for Route 19 with DRV or VC forces, this is as good terrain as any, and better
than most, on which such a battle should take place. It is vastly preferable to the populated
lowlands. The problem in Vietnam has always been one of finding, fixing and fighting
successfully the elusive VC. If Route [garble--19] becomes a magnet, it tends to solve
several of these problems. With the mobility, communication and firepower of the air
assault division supported by tactical air, we believe the battle of the road will be won and
that the road can be used by the division. The division can be supported over the road for
the bulk of its requirements, and can be backed up as necessary by a C-130 squadron on a
contingency basis, augmented by C-123 and Caribou, as well as Chinook helicopters
which are organic to the division. The air assault division consumes POL, ammunition,
food and miscellaneous supplies at a rate which varies from 600 tons at the maximum to
100 tons or less at the minimum. When all aircraft are flying at the maximum rate and
ammunition expenditures are the highest conceivable in this kind of war, the division
might hit the 600 ton requirement. If on the other hand it is necessary to pull in the belt-defend the hard bases, curtail both flying and shooting--then the consumption comes
down dramatically. In short, the division can subsist easily on air resupply while relatively
inactive and yet defend itself. We would have a corps force with one US and one ROK
division operating in the northern half of II Corps. This would permit the regrouping of
the 22d and 23d Divisions so that more ample coverage could be provided in the south
and would provide the kind of reaction force required to meet and defeat major VC
attacks. The foregoing deployment relates to the situation as we know it now. If that
situation changes or additional forces are introduced by the DRV, these forces will be
shifted correspondingly.
(3) III Corps. This corps is extremely weak on its northern and eastern flanks and has
inadequate reserves to react to heavy VC attacks particularly in isolated areas. The VC
attacks in Phuoc Long Province on 10 and 12 June illustrated the dire consequences of a
piecemeal commitment of small battalions against a VC regiment in an intelligence
vacuum. There are no prospects of additional ARVN forces in the near future. Thus, we
foresee the eventual requirement for a full US division northeast of Saigon to meet the VC
threat as it is now constituted. In the meanwhile, we wish to retain the 173d Airborne
Brigade after the arrival of the brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. If for some reason
the airmobile division is not deployed, we would station one of the airborne brigades at
Pleiku.
(4) IV Corps. At the moment, this corps is standing on its own two feet. The terrain in IV
Corps lends itself to the full use of air mobility and the absence of cover compounds the
difficulty of the VC. The units of the 7th and 21st Divisions have attained a high state of
morale and certain units have achieved an outstanding record against the VC. We consider
that, although the margin is favorable, it is certainly thin. Whether or not US forces will
be required in this area cannot now be forecast.
6. The VC are destroying battalions faster than they can be reconstituted and faster than
they were planned to be organized under the buildup program. The RVNAF commanders
do not believe that they can survive without the active commitment of US ground combat
forces. The only possible US response is the aggressive employment of US troops
together with Vietnamese general reserve forces to react against strong VC/DRV attacks.
To meet this challenge successfully, troops must be maneuvered freely, deployed and
redeployed if necessary, and the challenge of Highway 19 and the high plateau must be
met.
2. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 13, 1965, 10:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, Hue, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White
House, DOD, and CIA.
4173. Part I.
Curious calm has settled over Saigon in wake of military's return to power. No one
(including military) appears to have clear idea what form new govt will take, and for the
moment, Suu, Quat and his Ministers rest in place in caretaker capacity. Key civilian and
military leaders did not meet on either Saturday or Sunday/2/ to discuss policies,
governmental structure or personnel thus there have been no significant developments
since Friday night. Quat, Do and Tuyen all gave impression they feel they are still very
much in picture and in position strongly to influence final outcome. (A very definite
element in our ability to obtain information is what Bui Diem frankly expressed to me the
other day as the real sense of shame from Quat on down that they have not been able to
make a go of civilian government.)
/2/June 12 or 13.
Civilian politicians are beginning to stir somewhat and their activity should increase
sharply within next few days as they attempt to sell themselves or their favorites to
Generals committee (in first instance Thieu and Ky) as ministerial material.
Within military group there does appear to be some ferment. Some of younger officers
apparently feel that Quat's invitation presents them with opportunity to bring about "real"
revolution which they feel has been denied people ever since November 2, 1963. This
group seems to include VNAF Commander General Nguyen Cao Ky, DGNP Lt. Colonel
Pham Van Lieu and perhaps I Corps Commander Nguyen Chanh Thi. They may be
reinforced in their thinking by such civilians as Dinh Trinh Chinh (Info Minister), Tran
Quang Thuan, Bui Tuong Huan and possibly Bui Diem.
As yet it is not possible to know precisely what form of govt will satisfy needs of "real"
revolution, but as outlined roughly to EmbOffs by [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] Tran Quang Thuan, it will be lean, simplified and authoritarian, led by
younger men with prime purpose of gearing nation for war. Noteworthy to us that such
govt appears to have appeal to such disparate types as [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] on one hand and Tri Quang on other (see Hue tel 215 rptd Dept 4162)./3/
/3/Telegram 4162 from Saigon, June 12, repeated telegram 215 from Hue to Saigon, June
11, which reported on a conversation with Tri Quang on June 11. Tri Quang indicated that
if Quat could not survive the political crisis without making concessions to the opposition,
he felt that the military should take over again. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV)
While it remains too early to assess with any precision the extent to which this ferment is
widely shared among key individuals, there are certain characteristics to the attitude
which might be noted: (a) its proponents are younger men who tend to be from the center
or north and to share an intellectual affinity with Thich Tri Quang; (b) the attitude is
strongly nationalistic with overtones of xenophobia; (c) it has a sense of disillusion with
what is regarded as recent experiment with more democratic way of life, it desires to see
concrete results rapidly taken through decisive governmental action; (d) it is, therefore,
authoritarian; (e) it tends to oversimplify difficulty of complex questions and ability of
antiquated bureaucracy to perform.
In short, this attitude is, as it claims, both revolutionary and ultranationalistic, holding
belief common in underdeveloped world that decisive action must be taken by
governmental decision without undue concern for counter considerations. Such
government likely be hard on local ethnic Chinese and French interests. It would be hard
on "Sudistes" particularly French educated "bourgeois". Catholic attitudes in turn likely be
shaped by degree government able effectively prosecute war plus indications of govt
attitude towards them. It would probably present some difficulties in its relations with
USG and from standpoint US public opinion.
It remains to be seen, however, whether attitude is really dominant, if it is, whether it can
remain so, whether it can successfully handle opposition it will tend to create, and
whether it can produce results it demands. Most likely prospect is that strong
revolutionary flavor will be watered down when government attempts frame realistic
goals and policies and galvanize torpid administrative apparatus.
Part II.
Embassy inclined to feel that "revolutionary" label might be useful device for new govt to
adopt to help it overcome apathy which many of populace might feel at yet another
governmental change. If govt can successfully sell itself as "revolutionary" and get off the
mark with a specific program, it might well be in position to move somewhat more
effectively toward solving many of nagging problems (e.g., conscription, rice deliveries,
irresponsible press situation) which have plagued its predecessors. However, it in turn will
continue to be plagued by the deep seated inefficiencies of the administrative structure. To
be in position to do this, govt would need some new faces and probably a new chief
executive. But it is hard to see who they might be. Although Quat might be retained in
some capacity, if revolutionary label is to have currency at all, someone new must head
the ticket, but the person has not yet emerged. Possible he does not exist.
As for governmental structure, it seems likely, based on current fragmentary information,
that revolutionary govt will have some things in common with Minh-Tho govt that held
power from Nov 1963 to Jan 30, 1964. Differences are essentially that this time military
committee superimposed over govt will be smaller, presumably more wieldy body, and
that govt, on basis experience other govts since Nov 2, 1963, will not be as diffident as
Tho govt of technicians. It essential that executive under military committee act without
bucking every question to military for decision. For efficiency executive should be single
individual rather than executive committee as some have proposed.
As adjunct to this govt, we believe that religious council should be established. (Quat had
intended to form such body with representation drawn from all major religious groups.)
This consultative body would not act as a legislative body, but would be brought in to
handle any incidents of religious friction and would have an advisory voice in the drafting
of legislation affecting the religions.
Hopefully it could to some degree develop as a forum in which inter-religious fears and
suspicions could have some airing.
(For the moment Catholics and Sudistes can be expected to scrutinize emerging
government with wary eye. Catholics will be most unhappy if Thi-Ky-Lieu [Thieu]
combination appears clearly to be dominant and consolidating their position, particularly
in the security services, and if efforts are not made to appease their suspicions that antiCatholic actions are in works. Southerners will tend to interpret developments as
consolidation of north-center political control, unless there is reasonable regional/religious
balance in eventual Cabinet. Same attitudes likely prevail among Cao Dai and Hoa Hao,
although these groups will remain split in prevailing factions. In short, groupings
opposition to Quat will remain potential opposition, depending on their assessment of
strength of Generals' intentions, steps may be taken to appease their interests, and possible
momentum shown by new government in prosecuting the war.)
As for any type of legislative body, we feel that decision on this should be deferred. If,
after its establishment, govt draws heavy critical fire from "out" politicians, it might prove
useful to provide them with forum such as Council of Notables in which they can talk
without being able to do much harm. For the future, we feel that govt should go on record
promising elections to a constituent assembly in about one year's time in order channel
energies of peripatetic politicians.
Unless Dept has some reservations on any of foregoing points in Part II, we would
propose to bring what influence we can bring to bear in bringing them about./4/
/4/In telegram 2899 to Saigon, June 14, the Department of State agreed with this line:
"We have for long time felt need for some forward, progressive look in SVN
Govt." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
Johnson
3. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the

Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, June 14, 1965, 8:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Vietnam I. No classification marking.

Drafted in Ball's office.
Pres. asked that somebody summarize the paper on the 12 or 13 diplomatic channels we
had./2/ Mac Bundy had mentioned earlier in the day we were going to ask Bruce to talk to
Wilson and bring them up to date. It might be wise to ask Bruce to have a breakfast
meeting or some kind of meeting with Menzies to go over it with him. If they want us to
get out of Viet-Nam we can get out and they'll be in a fix. Bill had told the President of
the lunch today. It is essential we survive the monsoon; we're in a very precarious
position.
/2/Presumably a reference to the paper prepared by the Department of State on June 10
and entitled "Recent History of United States Negotiating Efforts in Southeast
Asia." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV)
Ball told the President he would have a memorandum for him in the morning along the
lines of his talk with Moyers./3/ Bill Bundy had suggested on the thirteen points rather
than give them out as a release, or to use as one paper against another, we might
incorporate them in a speech during the week. Perhaps the Secretary could do it--a speech
that will set forth what we have tried to do in context to have an impact. President
mentioned that the Secretary was getting him together a speech for Monday/4/ but he
hasn't got it yet. McNamara wanted to do one, but President told him it should come from
either the President or the State Department. Ball mentioned his speech in Pittsburgh at
this point. President asked that he be given a draft; if he can make it he will, or . . .
President said he particularly liked what Ball has been doing--raising the red flag and
saying we ought to give thought to different approaches, etc. Initiatives are necessary.
Anything we can get together, they will be rewarded and not criticized. He mentioned
having talked with Fulbright. Ball told him he was seeing Fulbright tomorrow. President
asked that he get all of his views. He will talk to him before he sees Dobrynin (the
Secretary) and tell him Fulbright's views. Fulbright thinks we should say to the Russians
what can you live with? He thinks it will be Tito. He believes if they will call a meeting
with the British there is a chance. We should tell him what we would like to do--"The Ball
Plan"/5/--we will stop bombing if they will stop; we will be willing to meet and work out
supervised elections through the UN and let the people have a choice. Fulbright is
hypnotized by them now. There will be trouble if we don't take him with us. Ball said he
would talk with him. President advised Ball get his plan ahead of time. Tell Mac to send
the Tito memorandum of four or five weeks ago./6/ President didn't know how we could
sell something like this in this country. Dick Russell will back us up, although he is afraid
of the ground troop thing. Mansfield is unhappy. President told him he wanted a united
front; he does not want to be a dictator. If they will write the policy the President will try
to execute it; he will consider their thoughts. They could put in a resolution or whatever
they want. If they get the Committee Members together we are willing to explain
everything and provide them all the debate they want. President advised Ball to put it to
Fulbright hard; he thinks he is ready to go with us; he just wants to have something after
the monsoon. President told Ball to get anybody he wanted, either in the Government or
outside. Pick up the phone and tell him you will send a plane and get him down here for a
talk.
/3/Apparently a reference to Document 7.
/4/June 21. Presumably Johnson is referring to a draft of the speech he delivered in San
Francisco on June 25; see footnote 3, Document 19.
/5/See vol. II, Document 287.
/6/Not further identified.
President said he wanted to get off the San Francisco hook./7/ He doesn't want to go out
there. He doesn't have enough to say to them in this frustrated period. He wants somebody
to find a reason why he doesn't have to go. Mentioned again he had asked the Secretary to
have a speech for him but he hasn't got it yet. He asked that Ball get this in his teeth and
have some recommendations for him tomorrow.
/7/See footnote 3, Document 19.
4. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Exdis.
CAP 65331. For Ambassador Bruce from McGeorge Bundy. The following message has
been passed to Derek Mitchell for the Prime Minister:
1. The President is keenly interested in the Prime Minister's imaginative proposal for a
mission of Prime Ministers,/2/ and has just asked me to make sure the Prime Minister has
full information on the President's own thinking about Vietnam at this stage. It is obvious
that it is of the highest importance for our two governments to mesh their decisions and
statements with great care in order to get the full advantage of our respective actions.
/2/See Document 6.
2. I think Bruce has already told you we cannot move up the proposed special bombing
operation in South Vietnam without weakening the plans for a prompt follow-up on the
ground. A postponement would be manageable, but does not seem to help the Prime
Minister. Accordingly, we think it best to proceed on schedule, but we will quite
understand if the Prime Minister thinks it wise to conduct his discussions with other Prime
Ministers in such a way as to leave them in no doubt of his belief that the Americans are
determined to make increasing use of appropriate conventional weapons against
concentrations of Viet Cong armed forces. We will also make it clear that this operation
and the London proposal are wholly separate and unrelated in their origins.
3. I think Ambassador Dean also knows in a general way of our thinking about additional
ground force deployments. McNamara will today be explaining our existing decisions to
enlarge our number of ground force battalions to 13, with supporting air and logistic
strength such that the overall force strength in South Vietnam will be about 70,000. He
will also explain that while no further decisions have been taken, we expect to do what is
necessary in South Vietnam. Within the next week or so the President is likely to face
decisions which may lead to further deployments which would bring total U.S. forces
there to a level between 90 and 100,000. (This last figure is for the Prime Minister's
private guidance only; it is obviously extraordinarily sensitive and could easily be
changed upward or downward after further analysis here.)
These deployments again are in response to the overall increase in Viet Cong numbers
and activity which has been developing over many months.
4. It is also probable that as the monsoon season continues, General Westmoreland will
find it necessary to use his discretionary authority to commit U.S. ground forces to
supporting combat action. Such a commitment very nearly occurred in recent days in the
area of Dong Xoai and might occur at any time from now onward.
5. The President continues to reject the proposals which are urged by some in this country
for radical extension of the bombing operations against North Vietnam. In particular, the
operations are still carefully limited to military targets in which danger to civilians is
minimized. The President has never believed that bombing would bring Hanoi to the
conference table on the run. He believes rather that the real contest is in the south and the
purpose of the bombing has been to interfere with supply and support from the north, and
to give clear evidence to both sides in the south of American determination and strength.
These limited objectives are being met and no unlimited objectives are being substituted
for them.
6. The President equally rejects the notion of withdrawal and abandonment. This is not a
point which needs to be argued to the Prime Minister.
7. A third course of action is simply to allow the increasing efforts of the Viet Cong in the
south to go without effective reply. This course has also been rejected. The increased
efforts which we will be making will, however, remain within the framework of our
determination to support and assist the Vietnamese themselves.
8. We have made repeated efforts to get this dangerous business into a conference room.
The record of intransigence in Hanoi and Peking is clear, and our own judgment is that no
different answer can be expected until after the monsoon fighting. Nevertheless, the
President welcomes the readiness of the Prime Minister to make another try. The
President fully agrees with the view of the Prime Minister and of Sir Robert Menzies that
even if the mission fails in its immediate purpose, it should succeed in showing just where
the responsibility lies.
9. So far, I have spoken of the President's own thinking. Let me, in closing, report that I
talked with Oliver Wright about the cease-fire question which was discussed between the
Prime Minister and Bruce. I have not yet had a chance to discuss this with the President,
but my guess is that he would strongly prefer to have any explicit discussion in this area
start from here. The great difficulty about a cease-fire is that the U.S. can easily stop what
it is doing by a single order and the results can be seen immediately. Terror and
subversion and infiltration are not so easily monitored. We keep a continuing review of
the possibility of actions and proposals in this field, however, and we fully understand the
importance which might attach to this question in the light of other events scheduled for
June.

Saigon, June 17, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No
time of transmission is indicated on the source text; the telegram was received at 10:01
a.m. and passed to the White House. On a copy of this telegram, which was retyped for
the President's reading file, there is an indication in the margin that the President saw it.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. II
(A))
4220. For the President. My first action upon returning from Washington was to seek out
Prime Minister Quat, General Thieu and General Ky to find out the meaning of the action
of the Quat government in returning political power to the military. I presume that you
have seen the result of this interview reported in Embtel 4190./2/ In essence, a ten-man
National Leadership Council initially composed entirely of Generals will oversee the
affairs of the government. The chairman and head of state will be General Thieu, who was
formerly Minister of Defense, and General Ky, former Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force, will become Prime Minister with the long-handled title of "Commissioner in
Charge of Directing the Executive Branch". Ky as de facto Prime Minister will form a
Cabinet largely of civilians and present it for approval to the National Leadership Council.
/2/Dated June 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 VIET S)
While there are some favorable aspects in this situation, I am disturbed by the selection of
General Ky as Prime Minister. While he is a well-motivated, courageous, and patriotic
officer who has matured considerably over the past two years, he is completely without
the background and experience necessary for an assignment as difficult as this one. The
American General officer closest to him describes him as "a proud man and a fine military
commander, although a naive, inexperienced politician and civil affairs administrator. I
believe he will do his absolute best to succeed in his new position, but he will require a lot
of technical assistance, moral support and a normal amount of conscientious
understanding." We will do our best to provide these missing ingredients./3/
/3/In his diary entry for June 21-27, Ambassador Taylor wrote:
"General Ky seems to be serious about fulfilling his campaign promises to stir up the
country and get it on a war footing. Impetuous as some of his actions have been, they
seem to have the honest intent of energizing an apathetic people and creating an
atmosphere of urgency where day-to-day routine has been the rule. With his hip-shooting
tendencies, Ky is likely to continue to take ill-advised actions from time to time such as
his breach of relations with France but it is just possible that he will be able to create a
new outlook favorable to getting things done." (National Defense University, Taylor
Papers, Box 52, T-272-69)
Second only to the importance of the political situation is the military. As you know, the
Viet Cong monsoon offensive is clearly on, marked by another large battle (as
Vietnamese battles go) at the district town of Dong Xoai. As in the engagement near
Quang Ngai on May 29, the Viet Cong here sought to destroy regular GVN forces and
were willing to take heavy losses to accomplish this objective. They succeeded to the
extent of about two battalion equivalents of GVN casualties. The performance of the
Vietnamese troops in this very hot engagement appears to have been first rate.
It is clear that the primary objective of the Viet Cong is to chew up the regular forces of
South Viet-Nam and to cause their attrition to a point where major geographic objectives
can be taken and held for considerable periods of time. They are counting upon the
habitual reaction of the GVN to come to the aid of remote posts attacked in areas
favorable to Viet Cong ambushes. Since GVN forces come by helicopter with limited
cargo lift, inevitably they arrive piecemeal on the battlefield and too often suffer heavy
casualties upon landing.
As a result, over the past three weeks, the number of GVN ineffective units has risen from
two regiments and three battalions to four regiments and nine battalions. Ineffectiveness is
caused largely by under-strength conditions resulting from battle losses.
General Westmoreland is thoroughly aware of the problem and is studying new tactics to
cope with the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, they are presenting us with two alternatives, both
unattractive, either to intervene piecemeal as in the past and take the casualties, or to
concede the loss of remote towns difficult to defend. While these towns are not important
in terms of population, the effect of abandoning them can have a serious effect on national
morale.
It is unfortunate that the present political instability and the Viet Cong offensive coincide
with preparations for the Algiers conference which begins on June 29./4/ In anticipation
of this meeting, there is no doubt that the Viet Cong will take every action possible to
undermine GVN prestige and to bolster the appearance of strength and legitimacy of the
Liberation Front.
/4/The second Afro-Asian conference, originally scheduled for March 1965, after having
been postponed several times, was scheduled to meet in Algeria on June 29, but it was
ultimately postponed; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 636643.
Taylor
6. Editorial Note
On June 17, 1965, the Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth, meeting in London,
issued a statement indicating that a four-member mission, consisting of the Prime
Ministers of the United Kingdom, Ghana, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago, would make
contact with the governments principally concerned with the problem of Vietnam in an
attempt to establish the basis for a conference leading to a negotiated settlement in
Vietnam. (Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts To Promote a Negotiated Settlement of
the Conflict in Viet Nam, Cmd. 2756, page 90)
Ambassador to the United Kingdom David Bruce was informed by Prime Minister Wilson
of the impending initiative on June 16. Wilson assured Bruce that he would not be a party
to any arrangement that was not satisfactory to the United States. (Telegram 6012 from
London, June 16; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET) The White House
responded on June 16 with a personal cable from McGeorge Bundy to Bruce (Document
4).
The Commonwealth proposal was directed to Saigon, Hanoi, Moscow, Peking, and
Washington. On June 22, the United States and the Republic of Vietnam welcomed the
proposal for a visit by the Commonwealth mission. (Cmd. 2756, pages 99-100) The
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China rejected the proposal, however, on June
23 and June 25, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also rejected it on June 28.
(Ibid., pages 92-95, 101, 103-104) In the face of these negative responses, the proposal
was ultimately dropped. Documentation on the proposal and the U.S. response to it is in
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
7. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 18, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV,
Memos (D). Top Secret. For President Johnson's reactions to this memorandum, see
Document 11.
SUBJECT
Keeping the Power of Decision in the South Viet-Nam Crisis
I.
The Need To Keep Control
Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote: "Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind."
Your most difficult continuing problem in South Viet-Nam is to prevent "things" from
getting into the saddle--or, in other words, to keep control of policy and prevent the
momentum of events from taking command.
The best formula for maintaining freedom of decision is (a) to limit our commitments in
time and magnitude and (b) to establish specific time schedules for the selection of
optional courses of action on the basis of pre-established criteria.
II.
Outline of Specific Proposals
The North Vietnamese are apparently using the monsoon season as a test period to
determine whether they can impose enough local defeats to demoralize the South
Vietnamese and discourage the United States.
I propose that we also treat the monsoon season as a test period since we do not yet have
enough experience with the direct employment of American combat forces to appraise our
chances for military success in the South.
But in launching a vigorous effort to halt the Viet Cong offensive during the monsoon
period you should at the same time make it clear to your key advisers that, at the
conclusion of that period, we will take a serious look at our accumulated experience and
decide whatever long-range course of policy or action is indicated.
For the fact is--and we can no longer avoid it--that, in spite of our intentions to the
contrary, we are drifting toward a major war--that nobody wants.
I recommend, therefore, the following program:
1. Decide now to authorize an increase of American forces in South Viet-Nam to an
aggregate level of 100,000--but no more--additional forces. These should be deployed as
rapidly as possible in order to deal with the Viet Cong offensive during the rainy season.
2. Instruct your top advisers--limited in this case, for security reasons, to the Secretaries of
State and Defense (and possibly also the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs):
(a) that you are not committing US forces on an open-ended basis to an all-out land war in
South Viet-Nam;
(b) that instead you are making a controlled commitment for a trial period of three
months;
(c) that on the basis of our experience during that trial period we will then appraise the
costs and possibilities of waging a successful land war in South Viet-Nam and chart a
clear course of action accordingly;
(d) that, during the test period, in publicly stating American aims and purposes, American
spokesmen should emphasize our willingness to stay in South Viet-Nam so long as we are
wanted (a qualification that has tended to become submerged in recent months); and
(e) that, in carrying out this limited decision, your advisers should--during the threemonths period--press the war on the ground in South Viet-Nam as vigorously as possible,
while seeking quietly and effectively to avoid those longer-term actions and commitments
that would reduce your freedom of decision at the end of the period.
3. Direct your top advisers to prepare the following plans:
(a) A plan for continuing the land war in South Viet-Nam on a stepped-up basis;
(b) A plan for conducting a vigorous diplomatic offensive designed to bring about a
political settlement; and
(c) Plans for bringing about a military or political solution--short of the ultimate US
objectives--that can be attained without the substantial further commitment of US forces.
These last should be regarded as plans for cutting losses and eventually disengaging from
an untenable situation.
The reasoning underlying these proposals and the manner in which they might be carried
out are elaborated in the balance of this memorandum.
III.
Where We Are Now--On the Threshold of a New War
In raising our commitment from 50,000 to 100,000 or more men and deploying most of
the increment in combat roles we are beginning a new war--the United States directly
against the Viet Cong.
Perhaps the large-scale introduction of American forces with their concentrated fire power
will force Hanoi and the Viet Cong to the decision we are seeking. On the other hand, we
may not be able to fight the war successfully enough--even with 500,000 Americans in
South Viet-Nam--to achieve this purpose.
Before we commit an endless flow of forces to South Viet-Nam we must have more
evidence than we now have that our troops will not bog down in the jungles and rice
paddies--while we slowly blow the country to pieces.
A review of the French experience more than a decade ago may be helpful.
The French fought a war in Viet-Nam, and were finally defeated--after seven years of
bloody struggle and when they still had 250,000 combat-hardened veterans in the field,
supported by an army of 205,000 South Vietnamese.
To be sure, the French were fighting a colonial war while we are fighting to stop
aggression. But when we have put enough Americans on the ground in South Viet-Nam to
give the appearance of a white man's war, the distinction as to our ultimate purpose will
have less and less practical effect.
Nor is our position in Viet-Nam without its historical ambiguities. From 1948-1954 we
identified ourselves with the French by providing almost $4 billions of United States aid
to help the French in Indochina wage war against the Viet Minh. As soon as our aid
contributions began to mount, Ho Chi Minh denounced American "imperialism".
This campaign of denunciation was continued over the radio and through other
propaganda media after the French withdrew and we began to help President Diem.
Today no one can say for certain how many Vietnamese are for us or against us. We have
trouble collecting intelligence because few Vietnamese are willing to risk their necks to
aid the American effort. And our popularity will diminish even further as we are forced to
indulge in more and more area bombing, crop burning, etc.
Ever since 1961--the beginning of our deep involvement in South Viet-Nam--we have met
successive disappointments. We have tended to underestimate the strength and stayingpower of the enemy. We have tended to overestimate the effectiveness of our
sophisticated weapons under jungle conditions. We have watched the progressive loss of
territory to Viet Cong control. We have been unable to bring about the creation of a stable
political base in Saigon.
This is no one's fault. It is in the nature of the struggle.
The French had much the same experience.
They quoted the same kind of statistics that guide our opinions--statistics as to the number
of Viet Minh killed, the number of enemy defectors, the rate of enemy desertions, etc.
They fully believed that the Vietnamese people were on their side, and their hopes
received intermittent shots of adrenaline from a succession of projects for winning the
war--the De Lattre de Tassigny Plan, the Salan Plan, the Navarre Plan, etc.
This does not mean that we cannot succeed where the French did not; we have things
running for us that the French did not have. But we cannot yet be sure--and that is the
reason for the trial period.
For we have not so far seen enough evidence to be sure that the South Vietnamese forces
will stand up under the heightening pressure--or, in fact, that the Vietnamese people really
have a strong will to fight after twenty years of struggle. We cannot be sure how far the
cancer has infected the whole body politic of South Viet-Nam and whether we can do
more than administer a cobalt treatment to a terminal case.
Yet the more forces we deploy in South Viet-Nam--particularly in combat roles--the
harder we shall find it to extricate ourselves without unacceptable costs if the war goes
badly.
With large forces committed, the failure to turn the tide will generate pressures to
escalate. There will be mounting domestic demands that we expand our air attacks on the
North so as to destroy Hanoi and Haiphong. Yet if our air attacks threaten the total
destruction of the North Vietnamese economy, Red China can hardly help but react. And
our best Soviet experts do not believe that the Soviet Union could stand down in the event
that we became involved directly with the Chinese.
IV.
Courses of Action To Be Followed Dependingon Results of Test Period
A. Actions if the Fight Goes Well.
If--on a careful appraisal of all the evidence accumulated during the test period--you are
satisfied that United States military power can stop and throw back the Viet Cong without
unacceptable United States losses, you are then in position to decide on a longer-term
aggressive strategy, of which the elements would be:
(a) to commit whatever force is needed to do the job in South Viet-Nam as quickly and
cheaply as possible;
(b) to continue our air attacks on North Viet-Nam but avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong
complex and keeping well south of the Chinese border;
(c) to renew your assurances to the South Vietnamese and the world of our intention to
stay the course; and
(d) to initiate the Acheson plan and increase our diplomatic probes through third parties
and a judicious use of pauses--while encouraging efforts of friendly countries to bring the
North Vietnamese to the conference table.
All of this is, of course, contingent on the continued maintenance of a minimum level of
political stability in Saigon.
B. Actions if the Fight Goes Badly.
If the evidence accumulated during the test period provides no reasonable assurance that
the United States can conduct a successful land war in South Viet-Nam without a vast
protracted effort, you should seek means of limiting the American commitment and
finding a political solution at a level below the total achievement of our declared
objectives.
There are several ways of achieving this--none fully satisfactory. But a good general picks
his own terrain and is prepared to execute tactical redeployments when events require it.
Similarly, it is a part of good statesmanship to cut losses when the pursuit of particular
courses of action threaten (a) to lead to a costly and indeterminate result; or (b) to produce
an escalation of violence that could result in a major war.
The technique of cutting our losses requires intensive study. No one has yet looked at the
problem carefully since we have been unwilling to think in those terms. I would suggest,
however, that there are several alternative possibilities which should be carefully
examined.
(a) Reducing Our Military Commitment
The first is to devise a plan for limiting the defense perimeter within South Viet-Nam to
the cities and major towns--particularly those having access to the sea. This would deny to
the Viet Cong the administrative, commercial and industrial heart of the country.
(b) Letting Nature Take Its Course
A second approach is subtly to withdraw moral and political support from the
Government in Saigon. In this way the non-Communist and neutralist forces might be
encouraged to work out some sort of compromise with the Viet Cong.
Such an operation would require great finesse. However, the Saigon Government is
becoming more and more a fiction--in real terms South Viet-Nam has an army but no
government.
While putting in train any operation of disengagement we should, of course,
simultaneously take steps to strengthen our position in Thailand and to create a diplomatic
atmosphere around the world that would minimize the costs of US withdrawal. To do this,
we would rely heavily on the qualified nature of our commitment--to help defend the
South Vietnamese so long--but only so long--as they wished our help.
(c) Other Possibilities

As a third possibility, we might consider variant means by which there might emerge a
South Vietnamese determination to go it alone. One approach might be to encourage our
friends to call for elections in South Viet-Nam in order to permit self-determination by a
people engaged in civil war. Another might be to let our friends crank up a fourteennation conference.
During the past weeks we have concentrated on seeking a political solution that would
fully meet our stated objectives in South Viet-Nam. Such a solution will not be feasible so
long as the Viet Cong are winning or believe they are winning. Since we cannot yet be
sure that we will be able to beat the Viet Cong without unacceptable costs, we would be
prudent to undertake an additional study of the political means to achieve less than a
satisfactory solution--or, in other words, a solution involving concessions on our side as
well as the Viet Cong.
The above suggestions are of the most preliminary kind. I am sure that other possibilities
could be developed.
George W. Ball
8. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the source text
indicates that the President saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Pros and Cons of a June Pause
The Case for Such a Move
1. It will dramatize the good faith of our quest for a peaceful solution.
2. It will further shift the onus for continued hostilities to Hanoi and Peking, if they fail to
respond with action.
3. It may allow the USSR increased leverage in pressing Hanoi towards negotiations, if
any such inclination exists within the Soviet leadership. (Very doubtful, on the evidence
of May.)
4. It will permit a more careful testing of Hanoi's interest in negotiations, if any such
inclination exists.
5. It will meet one persistent demand of our domestic critics and waverers.
6. It will ease the mounting domestic pressures on our allies (primarily the British and the
Japanese, but also the Australians and Canadians) to stop their support of our Vietnam
policy.
7. It will meet some persistent objections of unaligned nations and leaders (primarily the
Indians and U Thant).
8. It will somewhat de-fuse the Algerian meeting by strengthening our supporters and
putting the heat on our adversaries.
The Case Against Such a Move
1. It may cause deep apprehension of US determination in the already weakened Saigon
Government.
2. It may allow Hanoi to catch its breath, repair damaged communications, and increase
its assistance to the Viet Cong.
3. It may appear to the Communist side to be an admission of the ineffectiveness of the
bombings and an indication of US desperation for "negotiations now."
4. It will arouse strong criticism among domestic hardliners--particularly among
Republicans who are looking for a way to make capital out of any signs of our softness in
Vietnam.
5. It might make a return to air-strikes difficult in the context of inevitable international
pressure to make the suspension permanent.
If US forces were to get hurt during a pause, we would be giving a dangerous opening for
Mel Laird;/2/ people just wouldn't understand it.
/2/Melvin R. Laird, Republican Representative from Wisconsin.
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

Saigon, June 21, 1965, 7:36 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Received
at 8:35 a.m. and repeated to Algiers, Bangkok, Bonn, Canberra, Djakarta, Hong Kong,
Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, New Delhi, Paris, Rangoon, Rome, Seoul, Tokyo,
Vientiane, Wellington, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Hue. Passed to the White House,
DOD, and CIA.
4312. Prospects for new GVN.

1. The new GVN which was launched on June 19 has made a fresh start with regard to the
organization of political institutions, but it faces the same basic divisions of Vietnamese
society which have proved the undoing of four previous governments. This message
presents the Mission Council views of the assets and liabilities of the new government as
well as its immediate prospects.
On the positive side, the GVN begins its tenure with the following assets:
(A) In breaking with past, GVN has eliminated not only older political institutions, but
also the pressure groups which had grown up around them have been cut adrift, at least for
the moment. Conspicuous example of this advantage is removal from scene of Phan Khac
Suu and his entourage from a strong position of influence.
(B) Military has accepted full responsibility for government although not excluding
civilians from sizeable participation. Army represents country's principal base of power,
and its engagement in political control and responsibility responds to reality of situation.
Despite numerous changes of membership, organization of top Generals--as an entity--has
maintained a high degree of unity and has been body of ultimate decision in Vietnam,
providing country with its most important single institution of national cohesion since
downfall of Diem regime. At least for the present, top Generals appear to retain this
communal unity. Strength which this brings to government will make it somewhat more
difficult for opposition groups to successfully attack government.
(C) Desire for "revolutionary" government has been widely expressed especially among
younger Generals and junior officers, bureaucrats and university youth. The program of
action which GVN has announced should initially elicit support from such individuals and
groups. Whether this support is retained will depend upon performance. As noted in
septel,/2/ however, program of action strikes at interests of many powerful special groups,
majority of whom will not view happily the prospect of being organized for greater
service.
/2/Presumably a reference to telegram 4311 from Saigon, June 21, in which Taylor
analyzed the government's new 26-point program. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
(D) Cabinet is composed for most part of competent technicians, for the most part young,
and in many cases dynamic. For example, the economic wing is in our judgment the most
capable, experienced and highly motivated group to have served since November 1963
coup. Southerners are more widely represented in this cabinet than they were in the
Huong and Quat governments, which may relieve some of sudiste sense of grievance.
(E) Apostolic Delegate Palmas appears ready to play more active role in working to
prevent Catholic involvement in civil disorders. This could make major contribution to
easing political life for new government.
(F) The new government has indicated its intention to act strongly and this no-nonsense
attitude may also smooth its political way. If fears of military dictatorship do not rise
above threshold point, reluctance of discontented individuals and groups to tangle with
determined military leadership will be factor working to dissuade public disturbances.
3. On negative side, government starts with following liabilities:

(A) A potential opposition grouping lies in the recent temporary alliance of Catholics with
southern regionalists. This coalition might tend to regard present GVN as being in a sense
Quat's spiritual heirs. One of major roots of Catholic enmity towards Quat had been belief
that he was in league with leaders of central faction of UBA (Tri Quang-Thien Minh) and
was consolidating his power through backing of coalition of Generals and police officials
whose hostility towards Catholics they believed was clear. If it now appears to them that
after Quat's removal, coalition behind him has moved to forefront of government, their
discontent will continue. Some priests have in fact already made this interpretation. As
yet, however, there are points that remain unclear about the new GVN, such for example
as the precise position and conduct of Police Director Pham Van Lieu, whom Catholics
regarded as important member of Thi-Ky coalition and whom they regarded as especially
hostile to themselves. Furthermore, more active role by Apostolic Delegate as well as
reluctance of such leaders as Father Hoang Quynh to see his people engage in
confrontation with army itself are important moderating factors. Nevertheless, state of
feeling against Ky personally and against new military government in general is high
amongst Catholic extremists at this point.
Attitude of sudistes not yet so clear. They are more prominently represented in present
government than they were under Quat, including such key posts as Defense and Interior.
This may remove some of edge from their feeling, although many will undoubtedly
continue to resent large number of "carpetbaggers" who remain in positions of great
power over them. However, still true that sudistes remain poorly organized and lack
means (such as Phan Khac Suu as Chief of State) for bringing pressures to focus, although
many of "politicians" among them would of course serve to swell ranks of opposition, if
leadership were provided from somewhere else (for example, by Catholics). Furthermore
political scene is clouded by extent to which Saigon intellectuals continue to enjoy
conspicuous--and unmerited--influence. For these men as class, opposition politics is
traditional--unless they should happen to find selves on inside of government--and
political intrigue and maneuver are more important to them than war.
To existing nucleus of opposition, new GVN may add other key groups if it presses its
program of action vigorously. Such groups might include businessmen, some students and
other youth, the wealthy, and possibly higher-level civil servants (see septel).
(B) Organization of government especially at echelon involving senior Generals may well
bog down in a structure of interlocking committees resulting in a diffusion of authority
and responsibility.
(C) If attempt is made to press 26-point program of action vigorously, not only will key
groups be alienated, but there is real danger of serious administrative and economic
dislocations. There is a finite limit on the number of programs which can be implemented
simultaneously.
(D) Although they have possessed the ultimate power of decision in Vietnam since
downfall of Diem regime, senior military men have not proven their capacity to govern
more effectively than civilians. In facing immediate problems of country, skill and finesse
in governing will be at premium.
(E) Abilities of Nguyen Cao Ky at this juncture are in question. He has created image of
brash, courageous young officer, who has led squadrons on attack missions and who was
apparently willing to employ air force against city of Saigon if necessary to break coup
attempts. He will have difficult task in changing this image, which he will have to do if he
is to acquire stature which Vietnamese people as whole will desire to see in their national
leader. He clearly lacks experience in art of government, and until now has had no
opportunity to demonstrate whether or not he possesses the qualities needed to make a
good Prime Minister. His rise in the military does suggest that he possesses decisiveness
and leadership abilities, both of which qualities are among the pre-requisites for being an
effective PM. However, he was considered by his principal MACV advisor as a poor
administrator. Furthermore, it should be noted that Ky's role, while obviously very
important can still be overstated since it appears likely that Generals will continue to
watch and moderate his actions as needed. This control may safeguard but it also may
retard, depending on how it is applied.
(F) By very fact of engaging itself so directly in responsibility of government, club of top
Generals adds to divisive pressures playing upon it. As noted earlier, unity of this group
as an entity has been a major factor in preserving unity of nation. Adding another element
to centrifugal forces at work, is fact that grouping of central Buddhists has begun to zero
in on General Thieu. Tri Quang as well as Thien Minh apparently intend to hold their fire,
at least temporarily, probably because they do not wish to add to problems of government
with which they are in sympathy. However, if things should go badly for Ky government,
there is excellent chance that they would flex their muscles in center to make clear that
they remain force to be reckoned with.
(G) In addition to whole range of other problems, GVN must at same time face major
military threat represented by VC monsoon offensive, perhaps supported by PAVN
elements.
4. Prospects for new GVN. The range of problems confronting this government are
formidable in number as well as in depth and complexity. Most important single factor in
its success or failure will be degree of administrative and political skill which new
government brings to bear in managing these problems. It is as yet too early to assess this
element.
The problems themselves are formidable. Opposition to previous governments has often
been based less on what these governments have actually done than on fears (usually illfounded) of religious and regional groupings as to what that government might do in
future. These basic religious and regional antagonisms and divisions remain unchanged
and constitute facts of life for this GVN as for any other. At present, as noted in
foregoing, this government starts with Catholics predisposed against, UBA in favor
(though opposed to Thieu); Sudistes probably against anything but pure Sudiste
government, Centristes (following Tri Quang) in favor; Saigon politicians against (as they
are against any government that excludes them from power). Because there are numerous
uncertainties to present situation, there will probably be at least some period of time
during which a wait-and-see attitude is adopted and during which certain of these
predispositions may be hardened or possibly modified. If prosecution of war proceeds
vigorously and effectively, this would mollify Catholic attitude, and would impress
Buddhists also.
Nonetheless, despite the inherent hazards that confront all governments in South Vietnam,
and the strengths and weaknesses of this particular government, both of which have just
been enumerated above, the present government is likely to be as good as can be
reasonably expected at this juncture. At a time of increasing Viet Cong pressures, it also
appears probable to us that the Generals are less likely than any purely civilian
government to panic and abandon the war effort in favor of negotiations and neutralism.
Accordingly, it will serve our best interests to strengthen, support and endorse this
government.
Summary: Four factors stand out as probably of determining importance to future of Ky
government, apart of course from military operations. These are (1) extent to which the
military remain unified and in support of Ky and his Cabinet and policies, (2) whether Ky
can erase present image of bravado and shallowness and develop as leader of stature, (3)
degree to which GVN can implement selected program having real importance to people,
and (4) extent to which government succeeds in handling opposition groupings.
Taylor

Department of State
Washington, DC
Washington, June 21, 1965, 10 a.m.
Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification marking. Attached is a note, dated June 21, which
indicates that the President instructed his secretary to put Senator Wayne Morse's
memorandum on his desk the next day, because "I've got to read that memorandum
tomorrow."
I think Morse's memorandum is tightly argued and complex,/2/ and if we answer it point
by point at this stage, we will be almost sure to trip over ourselves as we make tactical
decisions in the coming months. So it seems to me better to give him the soft answer
which is suggested in the attached draft./3/
/2/Attached and printed below.
/3/Attached but not printed. The draft response, which an attached note indicates Johnson
approved, contains the assurance that "if, at any time, we think there is a real prospect of
progress through the United Nations, we will be the first to move."
And just because his paper is so well argued, I am sending a copy to Harlan Cleveland so
that in anything we do we can take account of the possibility of flanking fire from Morse.
McG. B.
Attachment/4/
/4/No classification marking.
SECTION I
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON
UNITED STATES POLICIES IN VIETNAM
1. United States policies toward Vietnam should encompass at least the following
essentials:
(a) They should command widespread support and respect throughout the world and
throughout the United States. This is not presently the case.

(b) They must contemplate the cost of "victory" as well as defeat. The cost is already high
and we have no sign of victory.
(c) The United States will make a profound error if we do no more than prosecute the war.
The longer it continues, the more likely it will escalate, and we cannot escalate it
ourselves without China and Russia escalating their participation, too.
It would be a very serious mistake to think the American people would support a
stalemated ground war in Vietnam for a period long enough to force the Communists into
negotiating. They refused to support that kind of war in Korea. It became a choice
between going all out to win, or ending it on almost any terms.
We alone cannot stop the war in Vietnam. But the United Nations could. The United
States has more to gain from a U.N.-imposed peace than from a continuation of the
fighting, leading we know not where.
It is frequently alleged that the United States has three possible courses of action in
Vietnam: to escalate, to get out, or to stalemate the issue until the other side gets tired.
But there is another course of action which is positive in a world framework, even if the
short range effects in Vietnam may be difficult, embarrassing, and involve loss of face.
This course is for the United States to call on the United Nations to make the Vietnamese
war its business. More is involved than suggesting that the Secretary General visit Hanoi
and Peking. What is required is a specific application of U.N. procedures.
2. If we have a desire and determination to use the United Nations as prescribed in the
Charter, there are many ways in which it can be done. If we desire only to make a gesture
to the U.N., there are many ways in which we can make sure our gesture is rejected.
On the record, our unilateral action has served to spread both the war and the degree of
Communist control in South Vietnam. It is a real question whether the United Nations
could do more poorly than we have done, if it is our objective to keep the peace and to
forestall Communism.
3. Because North Vietnam--a non-member of the U.N.--said U.N. action was
"inappropriate" in no way affects the jurisdiction of the Security Council or the General
Assembly over any situation that threatens the peace.
To give a veto to North Vietnam over this matter is a travesty on the power of the United
Nations.
Those of us who were here when President Truman rallied the United Nations in 1950 to
throw back aggression in Korea remember that even the opposition of the Soviet Union
did not stop us. She walked out of the Security Council and in her absence it took up the
breach of the peace in Korea. When Russia came back and used her veto on the
implementation of the decision to intervene, the issue was taken to the General Assembly,
and it acted.
North Korea was not invited to take part in the discussions, and she did not ask to take
part; that did not deter the U.N. from acting. Like North Vietnam, North Korea was not a
U.N. member.
North Vietnam, mainland China, and South Vietnam are not members of the United
Nations. None should be accorded a veto over prospective United Nations action in
Southeast Asia, either by declining to take part in its discussions or by opposing what is
proposed.
4. We could request the Vietcong to join us, South Vietnam, and possibly North Vietnam
in negotiations. The use of acceptable mediators and conciliators could be discussed.
The terms of the Charter provide certain steps to be taken when breaches of the peace
occur. The first is Article 33:
"1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
"2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle
their dispute by such means."
Our offers to negotiate with North Vietnam and with China have not been accepted.
However, the Vietcong is a principal party to the dispute in South Vietnam, and until we
offer to negotiate with them or undertake with them any of the other means of settlement
above, we have not really explored the possibilities of this Article. Moreover, China could
be left out of arrangements under this Article since she is not a party to the dispute.
5. Article 34 describes the jurisdiction of the Security Council:
"The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security."
Obviously, the war in Vietnam qualifies for at least "investigation" by the Security
Council.
Article 35 continues:
"1. Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the
nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General
Assembly.
"2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the
General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the
purposes of the dispute, the obligations to pacific settlement provided in the present
Charter.
"3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention
under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12."
There is a considerable movement afoot among members of the British Labor Party to
induce the British Government to act under this Article to put the Vietnam war before the
Security Council. Article 99 of the Charter also empowers the Secretary General to bring
before the Security Council a dispute he regards as a potential threat to peace. Since
members, non-members, and the Secretary General all have the right to do it, the United
States would be in the best position if it acts to seek U.N. jurisdiction before someone else
does it and, in effect, makes the United States a defendant in the matter.
6. If we fail to get discussions, we should invite the Vietcong, North and South Vietnam
to join us in laying the dispute before the Security Council.
Article 37 is a clear statement of American obligation if we fail to settle the Vietnam
problem by peaceful means of our own choosing:
"1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by
the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
"2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute in fact is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security it shall decide whether to
take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider
appropriate."
Very likely the Vietcong and North Vietnam will never join us in referring the war to the
Security Council. But they are not U.N. members, and we are. They do not claim to stand
for the rule of law in the world, and we do. They could not muster anything like the
support in the U.N. that we could.
Like North Korea, they probably would not appear at all. But it is their objective to take
control of territory they do not now control; and it is our objective to keep them out. A
peace-keeping mission of the U.N. could very likely do more to achieve our stated
objective than we are doing.
7. Public notice should next be served that we intend to lay the Vietnam war before the
Security Council under Articles 35 and 37. Then we should engage in some realistic
private talks with the Russians over what kind of U.N. action they would support, making
it clear that if we fail to get Security Council action, we will go to the General Assembly.
8. As with many legislative matters, this is one of whether we want "an issue or a bill." If
we want a "bill," in the form of U.N. action, we would have to deal with the other
powerful U.N. members--chiefly Russia and France--to work out a United Nations
program which they at least would not veto. After all, the Soviet Union did not veto the
Cyprus peace force.
And there is every reason to think Russia is anxious to see the Vietnam war brought under
control so she will not continue being forced to come to the support of a sister Communist
state. It is worth a great deal to us to find out whether Russia is interested in a U.N.
jurisdiction over the war in the form of a peace mission that would stop it, or more
interested in her rivalry with China over who does more to aid wars of liberation.
Some say that bringing it up in the U.N. would force Russia to take China's part and drive
them closer together. That is an excuse, not a reason. The longer the war continues, the
more involved Russia must become simply because of her rivalry with China.
9. If we do find that Russia prefers the war to continue, or if France or Nationalist China
poses some insurmountable obstacle, we can still go to the General Assembly. We have
done it before, both with Korea and the Congo.
10. There is nothing in such a policy that would be inconsistent with our commitment of
support to South Vietnam. Article 51 of the Charter affirms the right of individual or
collective self-defense-"until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security."
We can help South Vietnam until the U.N. acts to restore peace. Moreover, our 1954
commitment was from an American president to a South Vietnamese president. It is not a
treaty; but the American commitment to the U.N. Charter is a treaty.
Our commitment to South Vietnam called for U.S. aid, meaning foreign aid, and we
extended it "provided your government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards
of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied."
The Government of South Vietnam was unable to fulfill its obligations. Yet we went
infinitely beyond our obligation, into co-belligerency. By so doing, we have become
involved in a situation that brings us under those provisions of the United Nations Charter
to which I have referred.
SECTION II
SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE WHITE HOUSE POLICY
STATEMENT ON VIETNAM
At the risk of being presumptuous, I respectfully submit the following language for the
President to consider using in his address in San Francisco./5/
"I stand here today to rededicate the United States of America to the principles and
purposes of the United Nations. I propose to do this not by word, but by deed.
"Today there rages in Indochina an undeclared war. Some call it a civil war. Others call it
a war of aggression. Others call it a war of liberation.
"I care not what it is called. It is war. It can spread and destroy all man has built. Men and
women and children are dying. Passions are rising, uncontrolled.
"The United States is involved in this war. Let there be no mistake, the United States can
win it. We believe great and fundamental issues are involved that may affect the future of
mankind and the direction in which he grows. We believe that the independence of all
small states is involved in Vietnam.
"But we are ready to be judged by the conscience of mankind as represented in the United
Nations.
"I am, therefore, calling on the Security Council of the United Nations (Articles 34, 35
and 37) to vest itself of the situation in Vietnam as a 'dispute or situation . . . likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security . . .'
"I also take this occasion to state that my government will abide by such decision as may
be taken by the Security Council. I go further and say that if the Security Council should
not be able to resolve the war in Vietnam, my government will call for a Special Session
of the General Assembly of the United Nations and place the situation before that body of
world conscience. We will abide by its recommendations.
"Finally, I have ordered the military forces of the United States to suspend all air and
naval attacks north of the 17th parallel for a period of one month while the United Nations
considers the threat to the peace implicit in the situation in Vietnam."
11. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State

(Ball) and the President's Special Assistant (Moyers)/1/
Transcribed by Jacquelyn Taylor in Ball's office.
Moyers said the Pres had read the V-N memo/2/ over the weekend at Camp David and
they had talked about it at lunch today. The Pres agrees in substance with most of the
memo--one or two slight changes possibly.
/2/Document 7.
Following are notes taken by Moyers as stated by the Pres: "I don't think I should go over
100,000 but think I should go to that number and explain it. I want George to work for the
next 90 days--to work up what is going to happen after the monsoon season. I am not
worried about riding off in the wrong direction. I agree that it might build-up bit by bit. I
told McNamara that I would not make a decision on this and not to assume that I am
willing to go overboard on this--I ain't. If there is no alternative, the fellow here with the
program is the way I will probably go."
Ball asked Moyers if he had mentioned to the President about his request for a legal
memo re V-N./3/ Moyers had forgotten to ask the President about it but said he would this
afternoon.
/3/See Document 24.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at
10:51 a.m.
4336. For the President. The new Ky government is now in office following the
promulgation of a new charter on June 19,/2/ which states that, until a permanent
Constitution can be established, the sovereignty of Viet-Nam is temporarily vested in its
armed forces. On the same day, General Ky announced his Cabinet and an ambitious and
"revolutionary" 26-point program of action./3/
/2/For text of this charter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp.
880-883.
/3/The Embassy analyzed the new 26-point program in telegram 4311 from Saigon, June
21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
On the whole, the new Cabinet seems a very good one by Vietnamese standards and
potentiality. There are seven holdovers from Quat's team and a better regional balance of
Ministers than Quat had, particularly in relation to the number of southerners. There is no
particular religious complexion to the Cabinet which is outstanding for its number of
young, competent technicians, many of whom in the past have hesitated to serve in a
Cabinet. The main question mark remains General Ky himself, who thus far has been very
cooperative and approachable in the limited dealings which I have had with him in the
past few days. He has a rather disarming way of alluding to his inexperience and need for
assistance in an unfamiliar role.
The chief danger appears to be that of trying to go too far and too fast with an extreme
reform program. While Ky's motives are of the best, the program of action which he has
outlined could easily generate heavy opposition if he goes about it in a heavy-handed
manner. I am afraid that he is likely to ignore the administrative weakness of his
government and clog the machinery by injecting too many projects at one time.
The charter which has been promulgated is an imperfect, hastily written document
obviously designed to keep Ky under the control of his military peers. There is nothing of
importance which he can do as Prime Minister without the approval of the directory of ten
officers (of which he is a member) presided over by General Thieu. It looks as if this new
government will be far more of an oligarchy than an autocracy.
The intensity of military operations dropped off very considerably from the high level of
previous weeks. There are a number of factors which could explain this decline. Several
of the Viet Cong regiments have suffered heavy losses and are probably licking their
wounds while others, not yet committed, are probably awaiting the word to pass to the
offensive. On the GVN side, the losses of preceding weeks have caused commanders to
prefer to stay on the defensive rather than initiate engagements which may cause
additional losses. Little progress has been made in restoring the combat edge of the four
regiments and nine battalions (roughly two division equivalents) which I mentioned in my
last week's message/4/ as being ineffective from lack of strength.
/4/Document 5.
The use of B-52s of the Strategic Air Command from Guam in a bombing operation on a
Viet Cong base 35 miles northwest of Saigon has aroused much interest and considerable
discussion of the effectiveness of zonal bombing. Inevitably the effectiveness of such
bombing depends upon the accuracy of intelligence, and good intelligence of conditions
deep within a Viet Cong war zone is hard to come by. In this case, while the bombs
themselves did little damage, they fell close enough to Viet Cong installations to shake
their occupants and to facilitate the penetration of ground patrols which accomplished
some damage. In future operations of this sort, I would hope that the exploitation by
ground forces could be on a scale large enough to guarantee the destruction of Viet Cong
personnel and installations which have escaped the effects of the bombing.
We have been watching with interest the development of the Commonwealth proposal/5/
for finding ways and means of settling the situation here. I have been somewhat
concerned over the readiness of our friends to talk of a cease-fire in connection with these
activities. A cease-fire under the conditions existing here would be a very tricky affair
requiring very careful definition to avoid the many possible pitfalls. We are sending a
cable shortly on this subject which I hope will be called to your attention./6/
/5/See Document 6.
Taylor
13. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the
Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message
Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.
JCS 2331-65. 1. I urgently need your personal views for upcoming discussions of courses
of action available to us in Vietnam. The problem can be phrased as follows. What
additional military actions can we take in South Vietnam and in the DRV, short of
destroying North Vietnamese economic and population targets, which will apply
additional pressures on the VC and on the DRV?
2. Please note the word "additional" because it is key to the problem I must address. In
other words, I require your assessment of need for additional U.S. forces, their locations
and missions, and an assessment of what they could accomplish in South Vietnam. As to
actions against the DRV, I require your views as to targets, modes of delivery (B-52's as
opposed to fighter bombers) and collateral actions such as mining Haiphong harbor.
3. The subject is regarded here as one of great sensitivity; therefore, I solicit your personal
views and not a staff study. In particular, no one other than U.S. military should be
consulted or apprised of my request.
4. As additional background you should know that thought here in some areas is to the
effect that introduction of U.S. troop units over 10,000 (some 20,000 fewer than already
requested) will convert the war into a second Vietnamese/French war in which we would
play the role of the French. That is, Communist propaganda and the inherent xenophobic
tendencies of the Vietnamese would surely convert the VNAF and loyal South
Vietnamese into our enemies rather than the fact that the VNAF leaders have their necks
on the chopping block. In sum, regardless of what happens the United States will survive;
South Vietnam and its leaders will not. However, I would like your assessment of this
point.
5. As stated earlier I need your views urgently. In the interest of speed you may have to
omit rationale, but provide me as much as you can./2/ Regards.
/2/For Westmoreland's response, see Document 17.
14. Agenda Prepared by the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, undated.
Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret. Bundy sent this annotated agenda to the President at 4:15 p.m.,
under cover of a brief memorandum describing it.
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
Wednesday, June 23, 1965, 5:30 PM
1. VIETNAM
(1) Rolling Thunder 20
(2) Saigon's planned break of relations with France
(3) Future use of B-52's
(4) Soviet attitudes and what we should do about them
(5) Prospects of Prime Minister Wilson's mission
(6) Report on political programs of the Ky government
Present:
State Department
Secretary Rusk
Under Secy. Ball
Amb. Thompson
Asst. Secy. Bundy
Defense Department
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secy. Vance
Asst. Secy. McNaughton
White House
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Busby
Mr. Cater
Central Intelligence Agency
Admiral Raborn
Mr. Richard Helms
[Here follow agenda items dealing with Berlin and the Dominican Republic.]
Tab 1
VIETNAM
1. Rolling Thunder 20
Bob McNamara will have a chart and I think he and Dean Rusk will have an agreed
position. You probably will not wish to discuss targets in detail, even with such a select
group as this. Bob needs one good solid target, and I think he will have settled it with
Dean before you come in. He already has my proxy.
2. Saigon's Breach of Relations with France
The new military government has apparently decided to break relations with Paris. We all
think this is a mistake because of the French power of retaliation. There remains a slight
difference of opinion as to whether we should say out loud it is a mistake. You will want
to hear Rusk on this point.
3. Future Use of B-52s
Bob McNamara wants to go right on with the B-52s, and in principle, most of us agree.
The real problem is not in the military decision but in the public relations handling. I have
asked Doug Cater to study this one and he may have ideas.
4. Soviet Attitudes and What We Should Do About Them
This is not an action matter, but I think it would be helpful for us all to hear Tommy
Thompson's current thinking. The Soviets have just turned down the Wilson Peace
Mission and in rather tough language. At the same time they are floating the notions that
Tony Lewis picked up in the Times this morning--even hinting that we can do anything
we want as long as we do it in South Vietnam. It is worth a moment's discussion.
5. Prospects of Prime Minister Wilson's Mission
My brother Bill will have the latest on this one. We expect the British to move right ahead
even though no Communists give them the time of day.
6. Political Progress of the Ky Government
I have put this one in to keep everybody's attention focussed on the fact that our problem
is indeed as much political as military. My brother will be ready to comment.
[Here follow Bundy's comments on the agenda items dealing with Berlin (at Tab 2) and
the Dominican Republic (at Tab 3).]
15. Memorandum for the Record/1/

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Chrono as
DDP and DDCI, 1 Jan-31 Dec 65. Secret. Prepared by Helms on June 24.
SUBJECT
Meeting in the Cabinet Room on Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, 1730, 23 June
1965/2/
/2/The meeting actually began at 5:50 p.m. and ended at 8 p.m. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary) For another record of this discussion, see Document 16.
1. Attendance at this meeting is set forth in the attached agenda./3/ Item No. 2, Berlin, was
not discussed.
/3/Not attached, but see Document 14. Attending were the President, Rusk, McNamara,
Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Vance, William Bundy, McNaughton, Wheeler, Raborn, Helms,
Thompson, Busby, Cater, Jack Vaughn, and U. Alexis Johnson. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary)
2. That part of the meeting devoted to Vietnam was opened by Mr. Bundy who presented
to the President a copy of the Javits resolution, herewith attached./4/ The President
directed that it be permitted to run its normal course in the Congress.
/4/Not printed.
3. Rolling Thunder 20 was approved, Target 43 being chosen instead of 51.12/82.15.

4. Regarding the anticipated South Vietnamese break in diplomatic relations with France,
it was agreed that the United States would tell the French Government that we regretted
this section on the part of General Ky and that we were not party to the basic decision.
5. There ensued considerable discussion of the B-52 strike which is scheduled for Sunday,
27 June. The President emphasized that the press releases on this strike should be handled
in such a way as to convey the straight story to the public. He authorized briefing the
press fully both in Washington and Saigon on the reasons for such raids and agreed that
on this occasion the news of a raid should first be released in Saigon. There was general
agreement that there should be a significant tightening up of security on the planning and
execution of such raids.
6. Ambassador Thompson briefed on Soviet attitudes toward Vietnam and emphasized
that these attitudes were hardening not only toward the United States but also toward
Communist China.
7. There was some discussion of a proposal to place an international force across the 17th
parallel in order to put an end to North Vietnamese infiltration of South Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara indicated that such a proposal was unrealistic and could not be
implemented without a vast military force. He pointed out that sea patrols of the
Vietnamese coast were not turning up significant amounts of equipment proceeding by
sea.
8. The President expressed considerable concern about the Wilson mission and said that
he saw no point in having the Prime Minister come to Washington if Washington and
Saigon were the only capitals which would receive him. He expressed the view that a
Wilson visit could be counterproductive, would achieve little in the interest of peace, and
might turn out to be a further embarrassment to the United States foreign policy.
9. The remainder of the discussion on Vietnam is excluded from this Memorandum for the
Record since the President made it clear he did not want it talked about outside the
compass of the meeting.
[Here follows brief discussion of the Dominican Republic.]
Richard Helms/5/
Deputy Director
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
16. Editorial Note

On June 23, 1965, President Johnson met in the White House at 5:50 p.m. with his senior
advisers to discuss Vietnam. See Document 15 for a record of the discussion during the
first part of the meeting. According to William Bundy's recollections, based on notes he
took at the meeting, the discussion then turned to the question of the policy alternatives
that would be open to the administration at the end of the summer. The general feeling,
Bundy recorded, was that more forces would be needed. "Alexis Johnson, back from
Saigon on consultation, was skeptical: 15 American battalions was a good level-off point,
and we must accept that this would be a long war, without shortcuts and with only the
grinding proof to the Viet Cong that they could not win. Ball at once chimed in, giving the
gist of his argument that we should stop at 100,000 and then think hard--even about plans
for cutting our losses and shifting our focus of action in Southeast Asia to Thailand. Rusk
and McNamara objected to the last idea: Thailand, they thought, could not be held if SVN
had given up. Rather, Rusk said, we would end up with the only secure areas Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, and NATO, with even India falling to the Communist
Chinese. It was an extreme statement, and my notes show an exclamation point in the
margin--and a note to myself to get an estimate of the consequences of withdrawal from
SVN.
"After this exchange, McNamara moved in the opposite direction from Ball. His proposal
was a combination of a lot more force, in the South and possibly selectively in the North
as well, and a much more intensive negotiating effort than he felt had yet been made. At
least, he said, let us show the President what might be done on these two lines,
coordinated with each other. He had the ideas on additional forces, and Ball had the ideas
on moves toward a settlement; perhaps the two meshed with each other, and were less
contradictory than some might suppose.
"The result was at least agreement on the next steps. The President, who had for the most
part let the discussion rage around him without injecting his own views, directed
McNamara and Ball, with one or two staff men each, to produce studies covering military
and political moves over the next three months and beyond. These were to come back in a
week, although there was of course no assurance that the issue would then be
decided." (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Chapter 26, pages 22-23)

(Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, June 24, 1965, 8:20 p.m.
MAC 3240. Ref: A. JCS 2331-65 230144Z. B. MACJOO 070335Z./2/
/2/Reference A is Document 13. Reference B is telegram MACJOO 19118; see Foreign
Relations, 1961-1963, vol. II, Document 337.
1. Per your request in reference I have following views. Some items are based on studies;
others are not.
2. By way of introduction, the premise behind whatever further actions we may undertake,
either in SVN or DRV, must be that we are in for the long pull. The struggle has become a
war of attrition. Short of decision to introduce nuclear weapons against sources and
channels of enemy power, I see no likelihood of achieving a quick, favorable end to the
war. The fabric of GVN civil functions and services has been rendered so ineffective and
listless by successive coups and changes, and the military arm is in such need of
revitalization that we can come to no other conclusion. In this context the following is
submitted for your consideration.
3. I am becoming more convinced every day that US forces in appropriate numbers must
be deployed to permit the Vietnamese with our help to carry the war to the enemy.
Objectives would be to neutralize enemy power, give heart to the war weary ARVN and
provide adequate maneuverable fire power to attack the enemy formations wherever they
can be found and fixed. With regard to your comment that some in Washington consider
that more than a 10,000 man US combat force will invoke visions of the French, I can
only comment that force of that number will not give us a chance of winning or assure
avoidance of defeat. Although the hazard exists, there is absolutely no logical reason to
conclude that we will be cast in the role of the French. It's up to the US leadership in SVN
to insure that we do not fall into such a role, by means of indoctrination, discipline,
morale, positioning the masses of US combat forces away from population centers and
administrative controls, all of which we now stress. I am confident that this one is
manageable.
4. As a refinement and supplement to the forces which may be required as set forth in
paragraph 10B, Ref B, I believe the following will also be required, sooner or later.
A. A minimum of 7 more army helicopter companies than presently deployed or
approved, and two more USMC helo squadrons in I Corps. Ratio is 2 companies (sqdns)
per separate US brigade, 1 company per 3d country brigade.
B. The 101st Abn Div Brigade and 173d Abn Brigade retained in country and both
positioned in Bien Hoa area under a task force HQ to provide the heavy mobile punch to
gain the initiative.
C. Possibly at least another US infantry or airborne division to provide an offensive punch
and get ARVN troops in the III Corps area on the offensive. VC order of battle in III
Corps area, plus other mobile VC units nearby, are approaching the potential for sustained
if not successful attack on communication centers.
5. The foregoing are big orders. However, believe it is time all concerned face up to fact
that we must be prepared for a long war which will probably involve increasing numbers
of US troops. If the Communists have the determination to make it such, they certainly
have the capabilities and we have no choice but to match them, with an increment left
over in our favor.
6. Actions which we may take against the DRV include several which I think will increase
pressure on Hanoi and support our effort in SVN, but which do not involve unacceptable
risk of provoking an escalation to the extent of ChiCom involvement.
A. Use B-52's on isolated military targets remote from civilian populations. Several ammo
and supply depots fit this description. A study could turn up more. B-52's could put
massive fire power on such area targets with much more effectiveness and less risk than
the equivalent in fighter bombers.
B. Interdict the trans Nanning-Hanoi-Kunming Railroad. There are 5 key bridges whose
destruction would be devastating. 10 percent of total import tonnages use this railroad to
Hanoi; but we suspect the tonnages have a much higher qualitative value.
C. Interdict Haiphong Harbor with repetitive mining.
D. Accelerate leaflet operations targeted on the DRV population centers.
E. Continue our air interdiction programs of LOC's. It takes a long time for cumulative
results to produce a telling effect on primitive DRV LOC system. This is another aspect of
the war of attrition which we must be prepared to prosecute in full measure despite
mounting costs.
7. To conclude, I will emphasize some general thoughts which seem pertinent.
A. It is difficult, if not impossible for me to imagine how we can commit and sustain US
forces, air, surface and naval, without backing them up for the long pull by mobilization
of manpower, industrial and training resources at least to a limited degree. I face the very
practical problem of maintaining morale of people on their second combat tours, with
many, many more to come, I suspect, when all the forces we require are committed. I
understand almost the entire complement of aviators in the 1st Cav will be on their 2d tour
by the time it gets here, while the average US citizen enjoys his butter at no
inconvenience.
B. It would seem that we should prepare US and world opinion for the rigors ahead by
airing an objective, complete analysis of the problem we face and what we must do about
it. The news couldn't be worse overall than it is now made out to be in piece-meal fashion
by irresponsible or uninformed reporting and editorializing today. This could well be the
most salutary thing we might do. The government would then be in a position to
counterattack, in good faith, the distorted reporting of the crepe hangers.
Washington, June 24, 1965, 9:40 a.m.
Bundy, Vol. XI. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Senator Morse, Vietnam, and the UN
1. The Morse memorandum/2/ makes the tightest case I have seen for taking Vietnam to
the UN. He recognizes that the Soviet Union might block action in the Security Council,
and in that event he would press on into the General Assembly. He would "abide by" a
majority vote in the General Assembly.
/2/See Document 10.
2. What he does not say is what kind of resolution he would press for either in the
Security Council or in the General Assembly. It is on this point that I think he should be
pressed. Does he want the UN to vote ways and means of getting the North Vietnamese
out of South Vietnam? Or does he want the General Assembly to validate a Communist
takeover? Or does he simply want it to "observe", as it is doing in the Dominican
Republic? The last is about all we could really hope to get, and while it might be worth it,
it would certainly not bring peace, in and of itself.
3. As you know, I myself think that we can and should take further initiatives to see what
the UN can do about Vietnam. I think this is primarily a tactical matter, designed to show
that the Soviet Union is not prepared to desert other "socialist" countries on this issue. The
trouble with this tactical approach, of course, is that a man who holds Morse's basic view
is likely to denounce it as a fraud unless we take it all the way through and actively work
for a resolution which would get us out of there. And if we are going to get out of
Vietnam, I do not think it serves any good purpose to blacken the reputation of the UN by
trying unsuccessfully to unload this responsibility on it. No one would be fooled, and both
the UN and the US would be damaged.
4. So I think the underlying difference between us and Morse is not whether we should
take the case to the UN, but what we take it there for. I would take it there to pin the rose
of aggression on the Communists. I think Senator Morse would take it there in order to
cover a withdrawal and a Communist takeover. But I am not sure, and this is what a talk
with him may uncover./3/
/3/At 12:20 p.m. on June 24, McGeorge Bundy telephoned Secretary Rusk and said that
President Johnson wanted a draft paragraph prepared for the speech he was going to
deliver in San Francisco the following day that would indicate the President intended to
instruct Adlai Stevenson to take up the question of Vietnam in the U.N. Security Council.
Bundy said the President asked him to find out more of what Rusk and Stevenson thought
of raising the issue in the Security Council. Rusk said that he would try to contact
Stevenson. He added that it might be possible to raise the issue in the context of a general
report on the problem "without ginning up too much expectation that the Security Council
will be able to act." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Rusk
Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
McG. B./4/
Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification marking.
I have talked with my brother Bill and with Dean Rusk/2/ and at their suggestion, also
with George Ball. The Secretary is the least negative and Bill the most so.
The basic arguments against going to the Security Council now are three:
a. that it would be unsettling in Saigon. This can be controlled, but not prevented.
b. that it would require Moscow to take a harsh public line against us at a time when we
still have some hope to engage them more usefully in negotiation.
c. there is a danger that Hanoi would read this appeal as weakness.
Given these difficulties, I am inclined now to back away from this one. I think it would be
wiser to take the position that if there should ever be a prospect of effective action in the
UN, we would be the first to work for it. Language which might do that sort of thing
follows and could be fitted in to the present draft quite easily, I believe./3/
/3/In his address to the 20th anniversary commemorative session of the United Nations in
San Francisco on June 25, President Johnson reviewed the Vietnam problem, noted that
resort to the Security Council had been rejected by North Vietnam, and stated that the
United States would support any effective action by the United Nations to promote a
negotiated settlement of the conflict. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 703-706) While in San Francisco, Johnson
met on June 25 with U Thant and discussed Vietnam. No record of that conversation has
been found except for U Thant's memoirs, View From the UN, pp. 67-69.
If at any time there is a prospect of effective action for peace in Vietnam, through any of
the agencies of the United Nations, the United States will be the first to work for UN
action.
McG. B.

Department of State
Washington, DC
20. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/
Washington, June 26, 1965, 11:58 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVI.
Top Secret; Exdis. A note on the source text indicates that the telegram was received at
the LBJ Ranch at 11:25 a.m. and that the President saw it.
CAP 65363. The following message from Max Taylor recommends reprisal action for the
execution of Bennett and the restaurant atrocity./2/ Rusk, McNamara, and I all disagree
with this recommendation. We do not believe that important escalation should be attached
to a single episode at this stage. McNamara and I do think, however, that if terror and
executions continue, we should substantially increase weight of Rolling Thunder attacks,
probably including oil supplies in Haiphong area. Rusk is less certain.
/2/On June 24, the Viet Cong executed Sergeant Harold G. Bennett, and on June 25, a
Viet Cong bomb exploded in the My Canh floating restaurant in Saigon, killing 44
persons, including 13 U.S. citizens.
We are considering usefulness of leaflet drops on Hanoi-Haiphong area which would say
that if these outrages continue, necessary further action will be taken.
Meanwhile you should know of Taylor's recommendation in case you wish to take his
judgment and overrule Washington doves.
Taylor's message follows:
From: Embassy Saigon No. 4402/3/
/3/Dated June 26. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol.
XXXVI)
This is a US Mission message.
Viet Cong execution of Sergeant Bennett closely followed by My Canh restaurant atrocity
brings into sharp focus blackmail potential VC and Hanoi possess in numbers of US
hostages in their hands and the usefulness of this blackmail to support a stepped-up
terrorist campaign. Since they well aware we place higher value on human life than do
they, Hanoi/VC prepared use this weapon to own advantage. They have evidently decided
that execution of US prisoners will be very sensitive issue for USG, and their experience
with Hertz case in which they undoubtedly aware that we have caused GVN to delay
execution of Hai, may have led them to believe that we will pay very high price to prevent
execution of our personnel. They thus hope to cause political problems between US and
GVN, to stir up US public opinion against Viet-Nam policy, to damage US troop morale,
and also raise morale their terrorist cadre by showing their ability to retaliate for GVN
executions and by possibility of delaying or halting further GVN executions. (We
understand 5 or 6 convicted VC terrorists now awaiting carrying out of death sentence.)
Text of announcement, which first made over Radio Hanoi, a fact we should emphasize as
evidence of origin of this outrage, makes clear that Hanoi and VC are holding USG
responsible for GVN action in executing three named terrorists. In our response to this
outrage we should make clear we likewise hold Hanoi responsible. Announcement also
makes clear that Sergeant Bennett was executed on orders of Hanoi cloaked as "orders of
the NLFSV Central Committee" by the command of the South Viet-Nam Liberation
Front, apparently without any pretext of a trial. Announcement also twice mentions policy
of NLFSV toward "prisoners of war" as "humane and lenient" and as "correct and
humane". It mentions prisoners of war in three contexts: executed terrorists are referred to
as prisoners of war and are equated with US detainees; "rebel soldiers" (RVNAF) are
referred to as prisoners of war and in obvious appeal to Vietnamese opinion, offer is made
to release those who have "repented"; US detainees are called US "war prisoners" but
their lives are said to be dependent on actions of US "aggressors". This is first use of term
"prisoners of war" in any of these three contexts to our knowledge.
We cannot permit ourselves to be placed in position of paying blackmail for lives of US
prisoners in form of preventing GVN from executing terrorists who are tried and
convicted of violating Vietnamese civil law. If not sternly repressed, terrorism is likely to
become a VC tactic of increasing proportions. Even if we were willing to pay blackmail
regardless of difficulties which it would cause internally for GVN and for our relations
with GVN, we would soon find the price raised to some other even less acceptable level.
The US Mission takes the general position that (a) convicted VC terrorists must be
punished in accordance with GVN law regardless of possible reprisal actions against US
prisoners in VC hands; (b) must hold Hanoi responsible both for terrorism and for
reprisals against our prisoners; and (c) we should obtain maximum propaganda effect in
condemning the Bennett and My Canh incidents in combination as international murder
(the toll of dead so far--27 Vietnamese, 13 US, 2 French, 1 Swiss, 1 Filipino; wounded-62 Vietnamese, 16 US, 1 Swiss, 2 Germans).
We therefore recommend
(1) The immediate execution of a bombing attack in the Hanoi-Haiphong area with an
appropriate statement of the reason for the departure from the Rolling Thunder pattern.
This attack to be accompanied by major leaflet drops in NVN and by maximum
exploitation by VOA and other media.
(2) A Presidential statement voicing sense of outrage of American people at these wanton
acts of murder and announcing that target in preceding paragraph was accordingly being
attacked to show USG would not stand for blatant violation of all standards of humanity
and international conduct.
(3) A GVN statement similarly denouncing the My Canh atrocity and the wanton murder
of Sergeant Bennett, contrasting latter with due process of law followed in trial of Tran
Van Dang, who was caught redhanded preparing to blow up building in city of Saigon,
charged, tried by competent court, and convicted under accepted standards of justice.
(4) GVN protest to ICC.
We believe and intend that above steps would lead to heavy public denunciation of VC
terrorism and execution of US prisoner. If handled properly this should have opposite
effect to that intended by VC of stirring American public opinion in support of US policy
in Viet-Nam.
We feel that the publicity campaign should get underway at once and the overall USG
position should be established in the next few hours. We have asked GVN to make no
statement for time being, but we will have difficulty keeping GVN quiet if matter drags.
Taylor.
21. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State
(Ball)/1/
Bundy said President agrees with Maxwell Taylor./2/ Ball said this was a dreadful
decision. Bundy said it was not actually a decision--the President wants to hear the
arguments. Ball said we have to recognize the fact that there will be incidents and we are
either in a war or we are not--we should work out rational course of action to meet
accidental or incidental events. Ball said we have not been prepared to make a decision to
drop bombs on Hanoi-Haiphong up to now and he does not know why we make this
decision on this basis. Bundy said he had said all of this and that he would like to have a
meeting at 4:30./3/ Bundy said he has called Secretary but has not reached him yet
because he is enroute from the office to his home. Bundy said meeting could be held at
State Department and they could then give President their recommendations and choice.
Bundy said he had to tell Ball, however, that the President feels strongly about this.
Bundy said he thinks what is on the President's mind is that we did react after Pleiku and
here is something bigger. President thinks country will feel strongly about this. Bundy
asked Ball if he had seen AP 93, which is direct threat to Taylor and South Vietnamese
leaders--they will be marked for death. Bundy said his personal judgment runs with Ball's.
/2/See Document 20.
/3/See Document 22.

Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the telegram was received at the LBJ
Ranch at 5:22 p.m. and shown to the President.
CAP 65366. 1. Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Wheeler, Bill Bundy, and I have just met for an
hour to review all aspects of possible reprisal for restaurant and Bennett outrages.
2. We concluded that if reprisal is ordered, best target is either power plant or POL depot
in Hanoi-Haiphong area. No target outside this area is sufficiently important to be a
noticeable departure from present Rolling Thunder pattern.
3. In order to strike a target in the Hanoi-Haiphong area with minimum international
backlash, we all agree that we must consult major friendly nations. Attack without such
consultation could easily drive Wilson and others clear off the reservation, and while they
are not as much help to us as they think, we would not look smart if a single act of reprisal
gave them an excuse to jump ship.
4. This consultation would probably lead to fairly heavy argument against attack in
reprisal form. Allies could point out that repeated executions of prisoners by Nazis in
World War II were not used to justify specific reprisals. They could point out also that
once we moved to measured air operations in North Vietnam after Pleiku we avoided
specific acts of reprisals as in the case of the Embassy bombing.
5. We believe nevertheless that by a strenuous diplomatic effort we could probably keep
most allies with us, although not happy. But one condition of this effort would be that we
emphasize military need for attacks on these targets and downgrade reprisal aspect. But if
we are to use straight military argument with allies, we should use it with our own people
too.
6. And that leads to the main argument which seems important to all of us--namely, that
major new acts against the north should be undertaken in terms of our whole policy in
Vietnam, and not in response to particular outrages. We don't all agree as to when and
how it will be necessary to hit targets in Hanoi-Haiphong area. We do all agree that this is
a major decision which should be made in a wider context than these atrocities.
7. Secretary Rusk also feels strongly that Gromyko/Kohler conversation forwarded
separately/2/ shows at least a hint of Soviet readiness to work toward serious negotiations.
Attack in Hanoi-Haiphong area right after this conversation might easily be
misunderstood in Moscow.
/2/See Document 23.
8. You should also know that Alexis Johnson is reported by George Ball to oppose
reprisal action.
9. Finally, we believe that both public and private statements and messages can be used to
make clear to Hanoi that American people are bound to react with great force to continued
atrocities. We can and will make this point to allies as well, so that further outrages of this
sort can be used to lay a base for such additional military actions as you may wish to
authorize on overall grounds./3/
/3/In telegram 37 to Saigon, July 3, drafted by Ball, the Department of State informed
Taylor that a "high level decision" had been made not to launch the retaliatory strike
against the Hanoi-Haiphong area recommended by Taylor. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S)
10. Next following message contains text of statement as issued by Department of State:
The regime in Hanoi and their puppet liberation front in South Viet-Nam have
acknowledged their responsibility for the execution of Sgt. Bennett and for the bombing
of the My Canh restaurant in Saigon, in which 44 persons, Vietnamese, American,
French, Swiss, Filipino were killed and many more persons injured. They have
compounded their brutal conduct by publicly bragging about their action and making
threats to carry out even more outrageous acts. We in America and people around the
world cannot help but be appalled and revolted by this show of wanton inhumanity. These
Communist threats to intimidate, of course, will not succeed. Our determination to help
the embattled people of South Viet-Nam to avoid their falling under a regime which is
capable of such brutality will only be strengthened.
Hanoi's recent statements have surely also made it clear to anyone who may have had any
doubt that it is the power directing the policies and actions of the VC, its instrument in
South Viet-Nam, and must bear full responsibility for these acts./4/
/4/The text of this statement was issued by Department of State Spokesman McCloskey
on June 26. It is printed also in Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1965, p. 55.
Confidential. A note on the source text indicates this telegram was sent to the LBJ Ranch
at 6:41 p.m.
CAP 65365. The following message is relevant to Taylor's suggestion,/2/ which we are
reviewing at your request, because of what it shows of possible change in the weather in
Moscow:
/2/Apparently a reference to Taylor's message in Document 20.
Message from Ambassador Kohler follows:
From Embassy Moscow No. 3863
Foreign Minister Gromyko accompanied by Smirnovsky came to Spaso today for lunch in
honor of George Kennan. Stoessel and Toon were only other guests present. I had
originally invited Keldysh, MGU Rector Petrovsky and several other historians and
academicians but all for various reasons declined. On behalf Gromyko, Foreign Office
had initially expressed doubts that Foreign Minister would be able to attend but
subsequently called Embassy to advise that after rechecking his calendar Gromyko had
found it possible to accept. I suspect that when Gromyko reached this decision word was
passed to other invitees they should decline in order permit Foreign Minister engage in
private, frank conversation which in fact took place. Conversation ranged over wide
spectrum and throughout Gromyko was affable and gave impression of genuine desire to
resume dialogue on basic issues which initiated in post-Cuba period. Following are
significant points in exchange relating to Vietnam and U.S.-Sov relations.
After general discussion and frank exchange of views with Kennan on national liberation
movement thesis--in which Kennan proved to be able and effective advocate our position,
Gromyko turned to me and said he wished to convey two basic points. In first place, he
said, Soviets are not authorized and cannot negotiate on behalf of North Vietnam.
Vietnamese situation must be discussed with DRV. He would point out that so far as
Soviet position is concerned, 4-point statement by DRV would be reasonable basis for
negotiations. As he had told Secretary Rusk in Vienna, Gromyko would caution the U.S.
that no progress could be made if any future approach to DRV should be cast in
"insulting" terms as it had been previously. For us to announce suspension of hostile
action against DRV and simultaneously to inform DRV that unless it behaved according
to our prescription the punishment would be resumed was bound to lead us nowhere.
Secondly, Gromyko stressed that it has been and continues to be fundamental Soviet
policy to seek improvement in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. He was compelled to
observe, however, that Soviet Government had been disappointed by drastic change in
U.S. policy since elections, and Soviets could not avoid feeling that policy now pursued
by President Johnson in most instances paralleled that endorsed by Goldwater in electoral
campaign.
I made following comments on Gromyko's remarks. I said U.S. Government fully
recognized difficulties faced by Soviet Government in dealing with Vietnamese situation;
obviously Soviet maneuverability was restricted by attitude of Hanoi and to certain extent
Peking. On other hand we had hoped that Soviet Government would be prepared to bring
its influence to bear on Hanoi in effort to bring about peaceful settlement of Vietnamese
problem which neither of us, I felt, wished to see escalated to a dangerous degree.
Meanwhile, I thought Gromyko should recognize that current U.S. policy of support for
South Vietnam was laid down 10 years ago and had been followed consistently by three
administrations. Recently, of course, degree of U.S. support had increased but this had
only been in response to step-up in hostile and terroristic activities of forces controlled by
North Vietnam rather than change in our basic policy. Equally, there had been no change
in U.S. policy with regard to our bilateral relations with Soviet Union. We have
consistently taken position that despite current difficulties, particularly in Vietnam, we
desire continuing improvement in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations on which such significant
start had been made in 1963. It was our impression from public statements of Soviet
leadership and Soviet press comment that it was Soviet attitude that in this respect had
undergone a basic change. They had in fact flatly stated both privately to me and then
publicly, that U.S. activities in Vietnam were incompatible with continued improvement
U.S.-Soviet relations. It was therefore reassuring to me personally to have Gromyko

restate in positive terms his government's position in favor of improvement of U.S.-Soviet
bilateral relations. I could assure him that we would do our part toward this end.
Comment: It is entirely possible of course that reason for Gromyko's appearance at Spaso
was simply to satisfy his curiosity about Kennan whom he had met only briefly shortly
after the war to make appropriate official gesture following 1952 persona non grata
action, and to attempt to influence views of a prominent representative of American
academic community. However, it became obvious that Gromyko had come specifically
prepared to make to me statement summarized above. It is obvious from this account that
Gromyko was not prepared or authorized go much beyond officially stated Sov position,
particularly on Vietnam. I had impression, however, particularly from his positive
comment on U.S.-Sov relationship (which does, of course, differ from official position),
his affable mood, and his almost wistful recall of 1963 atmosphere that there is perhaps
some new flexibility in Sov posture. It seemed to me that he was trying to suggest that
Soviet Government finds itself in extremely awkward position, that it genuinely desires to
see the heat taken out of Vietnamese situation, that this can be done only by direct
approach to Hanoi accompanied by cessation of bombing. He seemed to imply some hope
that if this should be done Hanoi's response would be positive and the Sov Gov would
then find it possible and desirable to resume the dialogue with U.S. and restore the
hopeful relationship which existed in 1963. Kohler.
Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret.
SUBJECT
George Ball's paper on US Commitments Regarding the Defense of South Vietnam
1. The attached paper from George Ball was prepared for your use last Wednesday,/2/ but
we did not get it to you before your departure Thursday. George asked me to say that he
himself does not think the legal arguments about support for Vietnam are decisive. The
commitment is primarily political and any decision to enlarge or reduce it will be political.
/2/June 23.
2. My own further view is that if and when we wish to shift our course and cut our losses
in Vietnam we should do so because of a finding that the Vietnamese themselves are not
meeting their obligations to themselves or to us. This is the course we started on with
Diem, and if we got a wholly ineffective or anti-American government we could do the
same thing again. With a "neutralist" government it would be quite possible to move in
this direction.
McG. B.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/3/
/3/Secret.
SUBJECT
United States Commitments Regarding the Defense of South Viet-Nam
I.
The Nature of Our Legal Commitment
1. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, when read together with its protocol,
provides that in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack" against South VietNam each party will "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes."
2. The United States has determined/4/ that there has been such aggression against South
Viet-Nam, which has brought this Treaty obligation into operation. Although other
SEATO powers are providing assistance to South Viet-Nam, the United States, to the best
of our knowledge, is the only one that has made this determination. There has been no
decision by the SEATO members to act collectively "to meet the common danger" in
Viet-Nam.
/4/The determination that North Viet-Nam was committing "aggression by armed attack"
was explicitly stated in the so-called "White Paper" entitled "Aggression from the North"
issued by the Department of State in February 1965. [Footnote in the source text; see
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 171.]
3. Since South Viet-Nam is not a party to the Southeast Asia Treaty, our obligation under
the Treaty does not run directly to South Viet-Nam. Authorities on international law
generally agree that only parties (and not "third-party beneficiaries") acquire rights under
a treaty. However, since the United States has determined that there has been "aggression"
against South Viet-Nam within the meaning of the Treaty, our assistance to the South
Vietnamese Government to meet that aggression is in discharge of our treaty obligation.
4. Our provision of military assistance to South Viet-Nam is consistent with the United
Nations Charter. Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense--although it does not impose an obligation of collective defense on
UN Members.
5. In addition to its treaty responsibilities with respect to South Viet-Nam, the United
States has repeatedly promised the Government of South Viet-Nam to assist it in its
struggle against aggression. These promises have been embodied in a series of messages
and statements, beginning in October 1954 when President Eisenhower promised to aid
"the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state,
capable of resisting attempted subversion and aggression through military means."/5/ The
implied--and frequently expressed--conditions to the provision of United States assistance
have been (a) the continuing request of the South Vietnamese Government for such
assistance and (b) its will and ability to use that assistance effectively.
/5/See ibid., 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, p. 2167.
II.
Consequences of Withdrawal
1. The consequences of an abrupt withdrawal of our assistance from South Viet-Nam
should be judged not in juridical terms but in terms of its effect on the credibility of our
commitments throughout the world. The relevant questions would be:
a. To what extent would such withdrawal impair the confidence of other small nations on
the periphery of Communist power that the United States had the will and resources to
help them prevent a Communist takeover?
b. To what extent would such withdrawal shake the faith of our partners in other security
treaties--whether in Latin America, Europe, the Far East or elsewhere--that we would and
could meet our treaty obligations?
c. To what extent would such withdrawal reduce the prestige of the United States and
hence diminish its power and effectiveness in its dealings with other governments?
2. The answers to these questions would not depend on the differences or similarities in
the nature of our legal commitments. Our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, for
example, are quite different from our responsibilities for Viet-Nam under SEATO, since
we have obligations running directly to each of our NATO partners to take action,
including the use of armed force, in the event of an armed attack on any NATO power.
Our obligations to West Berlin are covered not only by Articles 5 and 6 of the North
Atlantic Treaty but by our status as an occupying power pursuant to the unconditional
surrender of Germany at the end of World War II.
We are obliged directly to the other American republics under the Rio Treaty of 1947 to
come to their assistance in the event of armed attack.
3. In the longer term, we must judge a decision to withdraw assistance from South VietNam primarily in terms of its effect on the ability of the United States to maintain its role
of world leadership. That role is not an easy one. France could withdraw from Indochina
or Algeria without wide-ranging consequences since it was not a great power and other
nations did not depend on France for their own security. The United States must, however,
always act with the consciousness that if it fails to discharge its role of leadership there is
no other free world power capable of taking its place.
George W. Ball
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Point
Program in Non-Military Sphere in SVN. Secret.
SUBJECT
The Status of Non-Military Actions in Vietnam
Several months ago you asked that programs for Vietnam be reviewed to insure that all
practical measures were being taken in the non-military sector. This led to numerous new
proposals which you approved./2/ The Mission Council in Saigon then assigned a scale of
priorities to these projects. This is a report on those actions as they relate to broader,
overall Mission programming in major areas of activity.
/2/See vol. II, Documents 173, 200, 228, 229, and 242.
INTERNAL SECURITY
Population and Resources Control
The Viet Cong's continuing ability to move freely among the population led to increased
emphasis on police training and counter-subversion operations. A substantial amount of
additional instruction has been added to police training and increased emphasis has been
placed on control operations. This has shown marked success particularly in the Hop Tac
area.
Informant Intelligence Operations
The Special Branch of the National Police has the key responsibility for general
information on Viet Cong political activities. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Bounties for Apprehending Viet Cong Leaders
In April the Mission approved a bounty program aimed at apprehending selected Viet
Cong leaders. The program calls for a two-month preparatory period, followed by a fourmonth operational phase, after which the program will be evaluated to determine future
actions.
Arrest and Detention Law
A draft law was prepared last April with U.S. assistance and approved by the Ministry of
Interior. In May Quat asked for minor changes to be made, but there is no indication that
he signed the law before his government fell.
PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS
The brittle administrative structure of the National Government in Saigon has made it
necessary to buttress the authority and responsibility of the province chiefs, while still
improving their communications and ties with the Saigon authorities.
Provincial Government
A system of integrated provincial budgets was initiated in April. The position of the
Province Chief has been strengthened by according him greater authority for technical
services as well as for military and civilian administration. On May 30, provincial and
municipal councils were elected to function as links between the people and provincial
authorities. At the Mission's urging, Quat and various government ministers began
frequent visits to the provinces to demonstrate Saigon's interest in the problems of local
governments.
Operations Against the Viet Cong
CIA has considerably expanded its recruitment and training of local teams engaged in
Viet Cong harassment, counter-terror and intelligence operations. By the end of this year
there is scheduled to be almost 3,000 teams engaged in one or another of these activities.
Improvement of Popular Forces
MACV undertook to improve the equipment, morale and indoctrination of the provincial
Popular Forces and to increase their medical support. The GVN has approved a
substantial program for the construction and improvement of Popular Forces training
centers.
INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Political instability has continued in the absence of a cohesive political infrastructure
which could contain and channel the energies of such pressure elements as the students,
Montagnards, Buddhists and Catholics. Several of the actions you approved were
designed to minimize possibilities of conflict among these groups.
Youth and Students
Vietnamese youth and students remain volatile and restless and are quite capable of
making political trouble. To minimize this prospect and to direct their energies along
more constructive lines, the Mission has supported a summer youth program designed to
place several thousand urban youth into rural areas to participate in small-scale civic
action activities. The program has been well received by various political and religious
groups. CIA has initiated a supplementary program among student organizations.
Montagnard Grievances
In late April a Montagnard agricultural conference was held at Dalat attended by 100
Montagnard officials and a Saigon delegation. The Minister of Agriculture announced that
the Montagnards would be given title to the lands they now farm and be permitted to cut
timber from government forests. In May an Office of Ethnic Minority Affairs was
established directly subordinate to the Prime Minister to deal with Montagnard and other
ethnic minority grievances. CIA gave special attention to the Montagnards in expanding
their local Viet Cong harassment and counter-terror teams.
Buddhists and Catholics
You approved an action calling for a revitalization of the Inter-Religious Council, where
religious grievances could be aired and adjudicated without resort to political action.
Mission contacts with principal religious leaders were expanded and efforts were made to
exploit these contacts for the revitalization of the religious council. While the more
moderate religious leaders supported this initiative, extreme militants among both
Buddhists and Catholics were not forthcoming and the tension between them persists. An
initiative with the Holy See in Rome has further encouraged the moderating influence of
the Apostolic Delegate in Saigon. The new government is considering the formation of a
"National Consultative Council" to include representatives of the religious sects and other
important political factions.
Labor
The labor sector is a prime target for Viet Cong subversion. The Vietnamese Workers
Confederation (CTV) embraces most unions and generally has a non-Communist
orientation. However, its strength and support in aggressive anti-Communist actions have
heretofore never been fully committed to any Vietnamese government. AID dispatched
two teams of labor consultants to Vietnam and urged the AFL-CIO to directly assist the
CTV. A permanent AFL-CIO representative is now in Vietnam. [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] move the CTV into more aggressive anti-Communist action. We
believe the CTV is now on the verge of fully committing its organizational strength to the
GVN.
INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Implementation of Land Reform
The Mission, with Washington encouragement, has repeatedly urged the GVN to develop
a comprehensive program for land reform. An initial, positive result was the establishment
of a Secretariat of Land Reform (sub-ministerial but independent) in the Cabinet reshuffle
that led to Quat's downfall. Its continuation under the new government is apparently
undecided. We have pressed for vigorous action.
Refugees
Severe floods together with increased Viet Cong activity have created an emergency
refugee and disaster relief problem involving more than 200,000 Vietnamese. A program
was initiated by the GVN with strong AID and voluntary agency assistance, and the
problem is now under control. The International Rescue Committee, a registered
American voluntary agency, will assume a sizeable part of the refugee relief burden in a
private, non-governmental program.
Emergency Quick-Fix Brigades
To cope with other emergencies as they arise in the provinces, the Mission has begun to
organize action teams composed of the province chief, the MACV sector advisor and the
AID provincial representative, backstopped by their respective Saigon organizations.
Flexible procedures will minimize bureaucratic impediments and enable the provincial
teams to act immediately with local resources and, if necessary, obtain on a priority basis
from Saigon personnel, commodities and funds.
Coastal Water and Other Transportation
Viet Cong interdiction of communications and transportation lines has created severe
problems for the movement of foodstuffs, supplies and other commodities. Agreement
was reached early in June between the GVN and AID for the urgent development of a
national logistics system, with emphasis on expanding port and harbor facilities.
Rural Electrification
A survey team is preparing feasibility reports on three pilot electrification projects. The
AID electric power project envisions providing 80 rural locations with small generating
units in 1965.
Urban Programs
A recently completed AID study provides for a five-year $150 million low-cost housing
and slum clearance project for the Saigon/Cholon area. The need for similar low-cost
housing in other urban areas is being determined. A program to improve water supply
facilities for 65 cities and towns is being accelerated.
GVN PRESS AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS
A high priority has been given to encouraging the GVN to assume greater responsibility
for press briefings in Vietnam and to carry out a more aggressive external information
program in order to underscore the predominant role of the GVN in the war against the
Viet Cong. The installation for a GVN press center has been ready for use since mid-May,
but despite continuous urgings, the GVN has yet to make use of this facility. Nor has the
GVN responded to the critical need for an effective external information program.
McGeorge Bundy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
26. Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 48, Memos to the President on VN
Feb. 1965-Apr. 1966. Top Secret. Sent to Rusk and to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy,
William Bundy, McNaughton, and Unger under a June 28 covering memorandum from
Ball, which explained that an expanded version of the paper would be circulated to the
group prior to the meeting scheduled to discuss the paper on June 29. The text of the
expanded paper is ibid. The text printed here, which was prepared in response to President
Johnson's June 23 instruction, was drafted by Ball, with support from his staff, William
Bundy, and several INR staff members. The final analysis and drafting was done by Ball.
(Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 26, p. 23)
William Bundy recalls that when Ball's paper was discussed in the Department of State on
June 29 by the group to which it was circulated, it was the summary that was the focus of
the discussion, and it was criticized as outlining "the worst way to lose if it came to that."
The group felt that it was "absurd to insist on a new perfection just as the going was at its
worst; to Asian eyes, it would have been the most cynical exit method possible." (Ibid.,
Ch. 27, p. 6) In light of this criticism, Ball modified his proposal in the paper he sent to
the President on July 1; see Document 40.
CUTTING OUR LOSSES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM
Summary
This paper, written on the premise that we are losing the war in Viet-Nam, advances and
supports the following propositions:
1. We cannot achieve our political objectives by expanding the bombing of North VietNam. On the contrary, extending the geographical scope of our bombing will pose grave
dangers of involving both Red China and the Soviet Union while isolating the United
States from its friends and allies.
2. There is no assurance that we can achieve our objectives by substantially expanding
American forces in South Viet-Nam and committing them to direct combat. On the
contrary, we would run grave risks of bogging down an indeterminate number of
American troops in a protracted and bloody conflict of uncertain outcome. This risk is so
great, in fact, that those who advocate this course must sustain the burden of proof that
commitment of American forces to combat will assure our objectives at an acceptable
cost.
3. Combining expanded air attacks in the North with increased troop commitments in the
South will not achieve the desired objective. The whole is not greater than the sum of its
parts.
4. Since the measures discussed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above offer no assurance that we
can win the war by substantially greater US commitments, we should undertake either to
extricate ourselves or to reduce our defense perimeters in South Viet-Nam to accord with
the capabilities of a limited US deployment.
5. This is our last clear chance to make this decision. If we go forward with Phase III
combat, even at the present level of troop deployment, a substantial number of Americans
will be killed. This will make it much harder and more costly to extricate ourselves or
reduce our commitments. We should, therefore, revise current orders to return to Phase II
and we should maintain our present levels of deployment while we seek to get out of the
quagmire and cut our losses.
6. By pursuing a systematic and careful plan for cutting our losses we should be able to
create the conditions under which we can get out of a dangerous situation without
excessive loss of American prestige and influence.
How To Think About the Problem
To determine a proper course of action we must balance the risks and costs of a war
fought by United States forces against the risks and costs of a carefully organized tactical
withdrawal of the United States from South Viet-Nam or a systematic reduction of our
territorial commitment to accord with the capabilities of a limited US deployment.
Obviously, if a curtailment of our commitment in South Viet-Nam would place the United
States in imminent peril, we would be justified in taking long chances in pouring troops
and equipment into that beleaguered country and in running large risks of escalation.
On the other hand, if we could accomplish such curtailment in a manner that would
minimize the costs and dangers to the United States, the indicated formula would be quite
different.
The ultimate decision, therefore, involves a hard-nosed judgment as to the relative costs
and dangers to America--both short-term and long-term--of these two courses of action.
Plan for Cutting Our Losses
Against the background of these propositions, we propose a plan that should either create
the conditions for a systematic US extrication or--less likely--establish a sound basis for
our continued involvement at present levels of commitment.
This plan consists of the following elements:
Step 1
The President should make the firm decision that he will not commit United States land
forces to combat in South Viet-Nam.
Step 2
We should use every occasion to re-emphasize what has been clear ever since the first
Eisenhower letter/2/ but has not been recently stated--that our assistance is being provided
on two explicit conditions:
/2/Sent to President Diem on October 1, 1954. For text, see Foreign Relations, 19521954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 2166-2167.
(a) that there is a government genuinely representing the people of South Viet-Nam which
continues to ask for our support; and
(b) that such government maintains an adequate standard of performance, both in the
conduct of the war and the making of necessary political, economic and social reforms.
Step 3
1. Since Americans are dying in South Viet-Nam, the United States has both the right and
duty to demand of Saigon that it fashion a stable Government of National Union. We
should, therefore, make the following demarche not only on General Ky but on the leaders
of all principal groups in Saigon--the Catholics, the Buddhists, the Cao Dai, the military,
the Dai Viet:
(a) unless, within a month's time, those leaders are able to put together a Government of
National Union under civilian leadership, the United States will have to reconsider the
extent of its commitment until such a Government is formed;
(b) a Government of National Union must have authentic representation of all key ethnic,
religious, and regional groups with a commitment to national elections as soon as
hostilities cease;
(c) such a Government must announce and begin to implement a broad program of
political, social and economic reforms, including a cancellation of all peasant debts, land
reform, seed and fertilizer programs, etc.
(d) the Government must announce the essentials of the Acheson Plan/3/--including a
major amnesty effort--in order to attract and protect defectors from the Viet Cong so as to
provide a sound intelligence base for our military operations and a transition to a posthostility reconstruction of South Viet-Nam as a national entity.
The ability of the Saigon Government to accomplish these objectives is not dependent on
the course of the war. If there is to be genuine unity, it can come about regardless of
whether the ARVN is winning or merely holding its own during the rainy season. In fact,
the worse the war, the greater the crisis that should instill a willingness to abandon
internecine strife and unite against the common enemy. If no such willingness prevails in
Saigon, we cannot take over the war ourselves.
Step 4
If the leaders of the various factions in Saigon prove unwilling or unable to put aside petty
factional jealousies and comply with the US demarche we must be prepared to follow
through. We must be prepared to advise the Ky Government--or whatever government
may then be in power--that we cannot maintain even the present level of our assistance.
It is more than likely that a notice of this kind from the United States Government would
have the effect of either
(a) inducing the Ky Government to adopt an extreme nationalist position and announce it
would go it alone without United States help; or
(b) bring about the fall of the Ky Government in favor of a government prepared to try to
find a political solution with the Viet Cong.
In either event, we would not expect that American forces would leave quickly. Rather we
would expect a protracted discussion between US representatives and representatives of
the various Vietnamese factions.
Should Ky or his successor demand the immediate removal of US forces from South VietNam, he would almost certainly be ousted by more moderate elements. Even if those
elements were neutralist, they would still tend to regard our presence for a period of time
as essential to prolonged bargaining with the Viet Cong and Hanoi. Our willingness to
cooperate in this negotiating phase could permit us to remain in South Viet-Nam for a
considerable period and thus avoid any public appearance of a precipitate and undignified
withdrawal.
We could use this interval profitably to establish the justice and wisdom of our position
with our friends and allies. We could also undertake the necessary diplomatic and
economic actions in Thailand and Laos designed to offset so far as possible the immediate
shock of the developments in South Viet-Nam.
Defensive and Affirmative Actions
In our anxiety to build up support for the struggle in South Viet-Nam, we have tended to
exaggerate the consequences for US power and prestige of a tactical withdrawal from
South Viet-Nam. Admittedly, such a withdrawal would create short-term problems,
especially in Thailand, but by taking prompt and effective defensive and affirmative
measures we should be able to avoid any serious long-term consequences. By and large,
the world knows that the government in Saigon is a joke, and if our withdrawal resulted
from an effort to face this problem squarely, friendly nations would not interpret it as a
US failure to keep its commitments. More likely most nations would consider that we had
more than kept our commitments to Viet-Nam--and that our decision to force the issue of
stability was a mark of prudence and maturity.
The following memorandum/4/ contains a discussion of some of the measures which
should be taken to avoid damage to our position in specific countries and areas.
/4/Presumably a reference to the expanded version of this paper cited in footnote 1 above.
Renvoi
The position taken in this memorandum does not suggest that the United States should
abdicate leadership in the cold war. But any prudent military commander carefully selects
the terrain on which to stand and fight, and no great captain has ever been blamed for a
successful tactical withdrawal.
From our point of view, the terrain in South Viet-Nam could not be worse. Jungles and
rice paddies are not designed for modern arms and, from a military point of view, this is
clearly what General de Gaulle described to me as a "rotten country".
Politically, South Viet-Nam is a lost cause. The country is bled white from twenty years
of war and the people are sick of it. The Viet Cong--as is shown by the Rand Corporation
Motivation and Morale Study/5/--are deeply committed.
/5/See Document 27.

Hanoi has a Government and a purpose and a discipline. The "government" in Saigon is a
travesty. In a very real sense, South Viet-Nam is a country with an army and no
government.
In my view, a deep commitment of United States forces in a land war in South Viet-Nam
would be a catastrophic error. If ever there was an occasion for a tactical withdrawal, this
is it.
Bundy, Vol. XI. Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the
President saw it on June 28.
SUBJECT
RAND Studies of Viet Cong Motivation and Morale
The RAND Corporation has recently completed studies of Viet Cong motivation and
morale based on interviews with Viet Cong PWs and defectors. The studies indicate that
while older, hard-core VC have a deep commitment to Communist objectives, the
younger, newer recruits have a much more shallow sense of commitment. Morale of the
VC armed units has been significantly affected by air attacks within South Vietnam.
Indeed, preliminary and unpublished findings based on recent interviews indicate that
morale has fallen significantly over the past few months as a result of our air harassment.
MOTIVATION AND MORALE
The Viet Cong movement embraces a mass of Vietnamese, ranging from the casual
peasant supporter who occasionally buys supplies for the Viet Cong on a trip to the local
market, to the most deeply dedicated cadre in the main forces. The main forces fall into
two generations of recruits: the hard-core Viet Cong cadre and Party member who usually
is a Southern Vietnamese "returnee" from North Vietnam where he received, after 1954,
five to ten years of systematic training and indoctrination; and the younger generation
comprising those recruited mainly after 1958.
The Hard Core Cadre
This group fought as Viet Minh against the French. Many of them were regrouped in the
North, but some remained underground in the South. These men form the backbone of the
revolutionary effort in the South, which they regard as a continuation of the war of
independence against the French. The regroupees were bitter at the United States and the
GVN for the cancellation of 1956 reunification elections and the consequent prolonged
separation from their homes in the South. Although many were antagonized by the
harshness of the DRV land reform of that period, they nonetheless appear to have
maintained their faith in the wisdom of the leadership in Hanoi.
The Younger Generation
Whereas the older group joined the Viet Cong mainly for nationalist reasons, the younger
generation joined for a variety of motives: protest against social injustice at the village
level, lack of opportunities on the GVN side for education and employment, avoidance of
the GVN draft, fun and games. Intertwined with these as a result of Viet Cong political
indoctrination is a desire to protect Vietnam from "the American imperialists and their
lackey, the GVN." Although coercion is used in recruitment by the VC, it is usually
combined with persuasion and patriotic appeals.
Both Generations
The Viet Cong claim that they "live splendidly and die gloriously," even though their
living conditions are in fact miserable. Most of those interviewed believed that the war
would last a long time and would end as a result of a gradual exhaustion of the enemy,
rather than through a dramatic VC victory.
Defections from the Viet Cong have resulted mainly from personal rather than ideological
factors. While defectors and some PWs did criticize the Viet Cong, they more frequently
expressed embarrassment or guilt over their own inability to stand the rigors of guerrilla
life.
The second generation of Viet Cong has a shallower comprehension of Communist
doctrine and cites the revolution's goals as simply "peace, independence, democracy and
neutralism."
Both generations regard the revolution as an indigenous Southern movement, albeit with
some welcome assistance from Hanoi. The nationalistic idealism of the movement is
stressed rather than Socialism or Communism. Many Southerners appear uninformed on
the extent of Hanoi's role in the war.
RAND (and we) are convinced that the flow of defectors could be markedly increased by
improved GVN treatment of its PWs. The Viet Cong is now able to convince its men that
surrender to or capture by the GVN will only bring torture or execution. (As indeed it too
often does.) We have a special mission out on this one now.
EFFECT OF US-GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS ON VC BEHAVIOR
On the basis of its interviews of Viet Cong captives and defectors, RAND suggests that
air harassment should be a major objective of our operations in Vietnam. The Viet Cong
are especially fearful of detection and attack from the air, and intensified and continuous
air surveillance and harassing activities by day and night are likely to have a major
disruptive effect on Viet Cong living conditions, morale, movement, and operations. Air
envelopment operations, because of surprise, have a major effect on Viet Cong morale
and inflict heavy losses. Recent interviews, not yet published, indicate a growing belief
that the VC can no longer win the war militarily.
Artillery fire is feared by the Viet Cong. Because of good Viet Cong intelligence,
however, there seems to be a need for more ARVN artillery and frequent changes in the
location of the pieces and concentrations.
The interviews suggest that intensified ground patrolling has had a significant disruptive
effect on Viet Cong operations, and that protracted ground sweeps should be assessed
primarily in terms of their harassing impact rather than the casualties they inflict on the
Viet Cong.
RAND CONCLUSIONS
"Although the interviews indicate that certain weapons, tactics and operations have a
significant effect on the Viet Cong, their impact will depend not only on their scale and
intensity, but also on the way they are integrated into and supported by a range of
political, psychological, economic, and social programs designed to exploit fully their
effects on the Viet Cong. For example, Viet Cong morale may significantly decline as a
result of intensified aerial surveillance and harassment, but the rate of Viet Cong
defections will continue to depend largely on the treatment the GVN accords to its Viet
Cong captives and defectors.
Similarly, aerial harassment and attacks may directly lower the scale, intensity and
effectiveness of Viet Cong activities, but in the end only the ground forces can transform
the Viet Cong from hunters into hunted, defeat them decisively, and establish complete
control and security over the population."
McG. B.
28. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the
Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
JCS 2400-65. References: A. MAC 3275./2/ B. MAC 3283./3/
/2/In this telegram to Wheeler, June 26, Westmoreland discussed the disposition of U.S.
and South Vietnamese forces in Vietnam and stated that the United States should not
make any major change in its policy of supporting the RVNAF. "It is a Vietnamese war,"
and "they are the only ones that can win it." (Ibid.)
/3/In this telegram to Wheeler, June 27, Westmoreland discussed plans for augmenting
U.S. military forces in Vietnam. (Ibid.)
1. As you know from my earlier cables we are considering urgently expanded military
actions both in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. Our objective in South Vietnam is to
prove to the VC/DRV that they cannot win in South Vietnam. To do this we propose to
increase U.S./GVN military strength to the level required to counter current and likely VC
ground strength. In North Vietnam our objective is further to curtail by airstrikes their
capability and will to continue support to the VC.
2. At the present time you have in-country seven Marine battalions, two Army battalions
and one Australian battalion. We have en route to you six U.S. Army battalions and two
additional Marine BLTs with support including an F4B squadron and other elements
totaling 8,000 Marine personnel. This will provide you by 28 July a total of seventeen
U.S. and one Australian battalions. There seems to be good reason to believe that Korea
will provide one division; however, the timing is unclear.
3. We are considering deploying to South Vietnam the air mobile division of eight
battalions, the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division with six battalions and one MAB of
three BLTs, a VFMA squadron and necessary support for a further Marine augmentation
of 8,000 personnel. Additionally, we propose to deploy two 105-mm howitzer battalions,
one 175-mm artillery battalion and thirteen companies plus two platoons of helicopters
(initially five Army and eight Marine Corps), eight platoons of Chinook helicopters and
three Hawk battalions. With a field force headquarters, four additional attack fighter
squadrons, and additional logistic support, the total U.S. deployment will approximate
175,000 men. The force would comprise thirty-four U.S. maneuver battalions and ten
third-country maneuver battalions.
4. In your judgment, is this proposed augmentation of U.S./GVN strength sufficient to
give us reasonable assurance of achieving the objective set forth in paragraph 1, assuming
the VC strength continues to be of the magnitude of your present estimates? Obviously, if
the VC sizably augment their forces the situation will be changed. In other words, do you
need now or foresee the need for more forces than those cited in above references and
summarized (I hope correctly) in preceding paragraphs.
5. Once more I must ask you to give me your reply ASAP. I must have a paper on the JCS
agenda on Wednesday which reflects your views. FYI: In another cable/4/ the JCS is
querying you regarding the need for additional airfields of aluminum matting which
would provide you greater in-country fixed-wing air support.

Saigon, June 29, 1965, 9:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Limdis. Received at 10:18 p.m. on June 28 and repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the
White House, the Department of Defense, and CIA.
4422. When I called on General Ky afternoon June 28 to take up several minor matters, I
found him with Generals Thieu, Chieu and Co, the latter having just reported to Saigon as
new MinDef. They were all sober-faced and depressed, probably in wake of discussion by
Co of military situation in II Corps.
Ky went straight to his principal point, need for additional US ground combat forces. He
is sensing for first time difficulty which we have anticipated for some time of fielding
sufficient combat-ready ARVN units to cope with growing number of VC units during
next few months. He is impressed with need for injection of additional US (or other third
country) forces to tide over monsoon offensive period and to take off VC pressure while
mobilization measures are being taken and, to use his expression, "while rear is being
cleaned up". By latter term, he appears to mean actions needed to stimulate pacification,
to energize public opinion, and to establish better security measures against VC terrorists.
(With regard to latter, he indulged in some reflections on need for reprisal executions of
VC prisoners in retaliation for atrocities like the My Canh bombing.)/2/
I told him that on US side we have long been conscious of growing shortage of trained
military manpower. We had justified to our govt introduction of US combat forces as
means to assist in alleviation of shortage. I reminded him of our announced intention to
bring in six additional battalions which, I thought, represented our maximum effort
between now and August.
What we might consider doing thereafter would depend upon requirements of situation as
we might evaluate them. It appeared timely to me for General Co and General
Westmoreland to undertake comprehensive review of military manpower requirements
between now and end of calendar year, to establish goals for period in terms of year-end
position to be sought and of means, particularly of personnel, required to reach it. In
general terms, it seemed to me that our objective for period should be to hold population
and territory presently under govt control, to blunt and bloody VC monsoon offensive and
to make preparations for passage to offensive in early 1966.
Generals agreed to this thumbnail estimate of situation and agreed that Co and
Westmoreland should undertake analysis required.
General Ky mentioned that press had questioned him with regard to command
relationships in joint US/GVN ground operations. He had answered to effect that we have
been accustomed to operating on basis of combat support with US helicopters and
aviation and see no particular reason for drastic change. In any specific tactical situation,
command would be worked out in accordance with good sense and sound military
principles. He is obviously most anxious to play down issue, recognizing it is sensitive to
both parties.
I took advantage of discussion of US ground forces to obtain his concurrence for landing
of one Marine company at Qui Nhon to add to US defensive strength in this area pending
arrival of US brigade next month. This approach was made at General Westmoreland's
request.
With regard to current issues facing his govt, Ky said that he had just had satisfactory
meeting with newspaper publishers whom he had threatened with closing on July 1. They
have agreed to attempt to reduce their number to 20 by consolidations to be worked out
among themselves. Those who cooperate will be allowed to continue to publish but
recalcitrants will be put out of business. Ky has also given them pep talk on subject of
loyalty to govt and its policies. Ky does not propose to apply censorship but those who do
not show "self-control" can expect trouble from him.

From subject of press, we passed to that of better communications between govt and
people. Ky says he is aware of inefficiency of govt radio operations and agrees to make
new efforts to improve them. I told him that we on our side were prepared to talk
television if his people can show improvement in radio field. I mentioned that Barry
Zorthian is our contact point for TV discussions.
Since Chieu Hoi program is form of communication, I took occasion to plug for better
attention to this activity. Ky indicated that it is being temporarily run out of Ministry for
Psychological Warfare but eventually will be absorbed into Secretariat for Rural
Reconstruction.
With regard to visit to Seventh Fleet carrier, Ky indicated he would like to make trip on
Thursday, July 1, following trip to Hue-Danang on Wednesday. Because of involvements
with Eugene Black visit on that date,/3/ I have arranged for General Westmoreland to
accompany him to carrier and thereafter bring him back to Saigon in time to meet with
Mr. Black and his party.
/3/Documentation on Black's visit to Saigon is in Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S.
Taylor

Department of State
Washington, DC
30. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper and James C. Thomson of the National
Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV.
Secret.
Recognizing that there are already several cooks preparing the soup, but confident that the
chef is tolerant, we offer the following.
Notes on a Vietnam Political Track
In this proposal we suggest a three-fold initiative to be undertaken in the next two weeks.
It is an initiative designed to probe the intentions of the other side more fully than has
previously been attempted, to do so in such a way as to demonstrate our peaceful intent,
but yet without undermining our military and political position in Vietnam.
Despite the present unpromising outlook for political discussions, certain factors make the
current context more favorable than future conditions might permit. The NLF remains
internationally weaker than it will be once it is formally constituted as a government; the
US and the USSR have not yet collided militarily in Vietnam--but by design or accident,
such a collision will become increasingly likely--and dispassionate Soviet-American
discussions less possible--as the conflict escalates; our room for diplomatic maneuver will
become narrower as each Viet Cong outrage increases the pressure from the domestic
right to retaliate against Hanoi/Haiphong and even Red China.
At worst, the three-fold initiative suggested below will simply further prove the
unwillingness of the other side to consider peace terms while their hopes for monsoon
victories remain high. As a more favorable result, we may obtain useful new information
about the views and calculations of Moscow, Hanoi, and Peking. At best, we might begin
the slow process of moving the conflict to a conference table.
The Proposal
We suggest that three separate actions be taken, in a neutral capital (perhaps Algiers or
Cairo), in Moscow, and in Washington, within the next fourteen days. The three actions
are related, but need not be simultaneous; their timing should be dictated by certain other
variables.
1. Neutral Capital Initiative.

Prior to a rescheduled Algiers Conference, the U.S. should make an approach, at the
highest level, to three friendly African governments of good international standing (e.g.,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Guinea). We should ask these nations to join together in conveying,
on our behalf, a private message to both the DRV and NLF representatives in Algiers or
elsewhere.
This message should include:
a. a statement of U.S. acceptance of Pham Van Dong's four points as one basis for further
discussions;
b. a statement of U.S. acceptance of Tran Van Do's peace proposals as another basis for
further discussions;
c. an offer to send U.S. officials to meet with DRV representatives secretly at any place of
their choosing for informal discussions of both sets of proposals as possible bases for
more formal negotiations;
d. a proposal for a de facto cease-fire to be observed by both sides once these discussions
are underway;
e. a proposal that if these discussions show any promise, they should be enlarged to
include representatives from the GVN and the NLF;
f. a hope that agreement might be reached that would permit the convening of a Genevatype conference.
2. Moscow Initiative.
A high-level U.S. official--ideally Averell Harriman--should be sent to Moscow, either
without publicity or on some other pretext, in order to talk directly with Kosygin and
others about Vietnam./2/ (Although the Gromyko channel has not proved promising, our
efforts should not stop with him.)
/2/We recognize that this is already under consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]
Our emissary should clearly state (a) our determination to do whatever is necessary,
regardless of the consequences, to keep South Vietnam from going Communist; (b) our
view that our national prestige is inextricably tied to a non-Communist outcome in the
South; (c) our concern that the actions of the VC, the DRV, and Peking may permanently
damage our relations with the USSR and seriously threaten world peace; (d) our
awareness of the considerable stakes that all parties, including the USSR, have in the
conflict; (e) our willingness to consider face-saving compromises for a peaceful solution
as long as the compromises left South Vietnam intact as a non-Communist state; (f) our
interest in seeing the USSR play a peace-maker role--and get the credit--if necessary.
The emissary should tell the Soviets of our initiative with the neutral states. He should ask
for Kosygin's personal views on an urgent basis, to be transmitted back to the President.
3. Washington Initiative.
On the basis of the outcome of the Moscow conversation, or perhaps in conjunction with
both the Moscow and Neutral initiative, the President should authorize a 7-10 day pause
in our air strikes against North Vietnam.
The fact of this pause should be communicated to both the Soviets and the Neutrals.
Public announcement by the White House should probably be avoided, however, so that
we can retaliate if necessary against unusual spectaculars--and reinstitute the air strikes
routinely if the initiatives produce no results.
C
JT

(Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, June 30, 1965, 11:30 a.m.
MAC 3320. Ref: A. JCS 2400-65, 290035Z. B. Saigon 4422 to State, 29 June./2/
/2/Documents 28 and 29.
1. We have no evidence, to date, that the DRV and/or the Viet Cong have any inclination
to modify their objectives with respect to SVN, or their basic methods for attainment of
these objectives. While we can only conjecture as to the extent to which US air action
against DRV will be expanded, or what international initiatives may be taken over the
next few months, we do not believe that developments in either field will significantly
alter DRV/VC intentions over the next 6 months.
2. The foregoing said, the direct answer to your basic question is "no." In other words, a
force of 34 US maneuver battalions and 10 3d country maneuver battalions together with
appropriate tactical air and balanced ground combat and logistic support will not provide
reasonable assurance of attaining the objective you postulate (convincing the DRV/VC
they cannot win). The DRV/VC are too deeply committed to be influenced by anything
but application of overpowering force. Consequently, while infusion of US/3d country
combat strength on the scale contemplated should reestablish the military balance by the
end of December, it will not per se cause the enemy to back off.
3. As you fully appreciate, the build up from the 17 maneuver battalions, in position on 1
August, to 40 plus battalions will extend throughout the remainder of the calendar year.
Thus, over the next few months, the enemy will retain the capability of overrunning
isolated district capitals; of severely interdicting land routes of communications; and of
consolidating the rural areas he now dominates. As of January, and providing that the
RVNAF has held its own in strength and combat effectiveness, we should be in a position
to begin to wrest the military initiative, in selected areas, from the VC/PAVN forces
estimated to be in SVN. At that juncture (or before), the enemy may elect to further
augment his strength.
4. With the foregoing considerations in mind, I adhere to the 44 battalion package as the
proper and necessary scope of deployment authority at this time. (Parenthetically, all
should understand that the ROK division is a firm part of the military requirement during
the next several months. If the ROK division does not materialize, a US division must be
committed in its place in the same time frame.) There are very practical limitations locally
in the logistics areas, quite apart from those which will predictably confront the services.
We will be hard pressed to receive, and commit to combat forces of the magnitude
contemplated over the next 6 months.
5. We cannot now state what additional forces may be required in 1966 to gain and
maintain the military initiative. Obviously, many variables are involved--the most
important of which is resources DRV may elect to commit. Instinctively, we believe that
there may be substantial additional US force requirements. Analytic study of this whole
subject is essential, and this we have initiated. We hope to have a fairly solid estimate by
early August of the range of additional forces we may require. In this connection,
following the Ambassador's conversation with AVM Ky as reported Ref B, I met with
General Co yesterday and arranged for follow-on discussions between Depuy and JGS J-3
(Thang) on a closely held basis. Through Thang--and without commitment--we will seek
JGS views of the future course of the war, analysis of overall force requirements and
estimate of what additional forces, regular and regional, it will be within GVN capability
to provide. These inputs will be of considerable value to our essentially unilateral study.
6. As seen from here, the requirement for some form of limited mobilization seems clear
and pressing. Parenthetically, the impact of national decision to mobilize, albeit in limited
degree, might well have more impact on Hanoi/Peking than the deployment of an army
corps.

The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:16
a.m. and passed to the White House. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to the
President on June 30 with a covering memorandum in which he noted that the important
aspects of the message were the "hard military and economic questions" outlined by
Taylor. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV,
Memos (C))
4434. For the President. Whatever one may think of General Ky, he seems to be serious
about fulfilling his campaign promises to stir up the country and get it on a war footing.
Impetuous as some of his actions have been, they seem to have the honest intent of
energizing an apathetic people and creating an atmosphere of urgency where day-to-day
routine has been the rule. With his hip-shooting tendencies, Ky is likely to continue to
take ill-advised actions from time to time such as his breach of relations with France but it
is just possible that he will be able to create a new outlook favorable to getting things
done.
The unhappy event of the week was, of course, the execution of Sergeant Bennett on June
24 and the bombing of the My Canh restaurant on the following day. In combination,
these two events constitute the bloodiest Viet Cong atrocity which we have suffered and
forecast a new technique of further brutalities with the perpetrators shielded by threats of
reprisals against U.S. prisoners. It was this prospect which led the U.S. Mission to
recommend that Hanoi be held responsible and be made to pay a price for this incident. It
seemed to us that the enemy had escalated and by the rules of the game we should
respond--otherwise we would seem to accept this kind of thing as an inevitable new way
of life. I have not yet received an indication of the countervailing reasons which led to the
contrary decision in Washington but hope to receive them in due course.
Military activities picked up during the week with renewed indications of Viet Cong
offensive intentions in Kontum Province. Commanders in that area are being faced with
the difficult decision of abandoning minor towns under attack or of sending relief forces
into areas favoring the ambushes of the enemy. While the former decision is most
distasteful to a military commander, there will be cases, I am sure, when the shortage of
ARVN units will angle [argue?] strongly for it.
While the number and intensity of Viet Cong incidents were increasing, Viet Cong
harassment of communications routes continued to the point that all major routes leading
into II Corps are now closed. As a result, we will be obliged to use airlift to assure the
delivery of essential military and civilian supplies.
Up to now, General Ky has only been aware of the air war and is now learning the hard
facts of the ground campaign. As I reported in Embtel 4422,/2/ he has appealed to me for
additional U.S. ground forces to tide over the monsoon offensive period. I have agreed to
have General Westmoreland and the Vietnamese High Command make an estimate to
determine where we want to be militarily at the end of the calendar year and what forces
will be required to get us there. This should be a useful planning exercise requiring the
Vietnamese to face hard facts which they have sometimes preferred to ignore.
/2/Document 29.
As suggested above, the economic situation is becoming difficult in the face of Viet Cong
interference with road and river transport. This situation, added to the hoarding activities
of rice merchants, has presented the new government with a threat of a serious rice
shortage. It appears to have won a short-term victory by threatening the profiteers with
shooting and at the same time offering modest price increases, a deal which has obtained
the promise of delivery of 50,000 tons for the government stockpile. This action meets the
immediate problem but Mr. Killen will wish to discuss the longer term aspects during his
consultations in Washington next week.
While the economic outlook for the government is far from clear, we are impressed by the
competence and motivation of the economic members of the new Cabinet. If they are kept
in place a few months, we think we can make progress with them.
Taylor
Bundy, Vol. XI. Confidential.
SUBJECT
France in Vietnam, 1954, and the U.S. in Vietnam, 1965--A Useful Analogy?
It has been suggested in some quarters that the United States today finds itself in a
position in Vietnam similar to that of the French in 1954. One implication is that we must
expect an outcome to our present policy similar to that which befell the French in their
defeat and withdrawal of that year.
The actual content and applicability of this analogy are discussed in the paragraphs that
follow.
1. Vietnam in 1954
A. The Political Scene
The central fact of French involvement in Vietnam was the persistent seven-year effort to
re-establish French colonial rule. French forces were pitted against a Communist-led
revolution for national independence; at no point did France offer Vietnam the alternative
of non-Communist independence.
The former Emperor Bao Dai served as the political facade for France's effort to maintain
control through a Mandarin elite. Saigon cabinets came and went, while vested interests
among Vietnamese and Frenchmen jockeyed for power; but little progress was made
toward forming a government capable of rallying Vietnamese nationalist allegiance.
B. The Military Scene
By early 1953, Viet Minh forces comprised seven regular infantry divisions, with
independent regiments equal in strength to two additional divisions--a total of nine
divisions. In numbers, the Viet Minh had about 125,000 regulars, 75,000 full-time
regional and provincial troops, and 150,000 part-time guerrillas--a total of 350,000 men.
To combat these forces, the French had committed 175,000 regulars (54,000 of whom
were native Frenchmen, the rest Legionnaires, Africans, etc.) and 55,000 auxiliaries, plus
a naval contingent of 5,000, an Air Force contingent of 10,000 and 225,000 local forces of
the three Indo-China states--a total of 470,000 men.
By 1952, eight percent of France's national budget was annually allocated to the
Indochina war; in 1952-53 nearly 6,000 French and Legionnaire troops were killed, as
well as 7,730 of their Vietnamese allies.
These impressive statistics imply heavy conventional engagements. In early 1950 the Viet
Minh had shifted from guerrilla to conventional warfare, and for the next four years largescale assaults--ranging upward to 14-battalion strikes--were not uncommon. In 1952 a
three-division assault in one province forced the withdrawal of over 20,000 French troops.
By 1953 the French were generally engaged in a holding action; the brunt of their forces
were tied to defensive duties, and the prospects for a military victory were nil. They had
largely retreated to the Red River Delta in the North, some key towns in the Center, and
the region around Saigon in the South. Only the equivalent of three divisions were
actually available for offensive operations.
By 1954 the war's unpopularity at home had brought mounting pressure for negotiation.
The Geneva Conference was already under way by the time of France's spectacular
tactical defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954.
2. Vietnam in 1965
A. The Political Scene
The two central facts of the South Vietnam situation today are the Viet Cong/Viet Minh
struggle for control and the process of non-Communist social and political revolution.
U.S. forces are present in rapidly growing numbers to help resist the Communists at the
request of successive Saigon governments.
Since Diem's fall, power in the urban South has been passing from the predominantly
Catholic and French-educated elite to a more "Vietnamese," militantly nationalistic and
potentially xenophobic group of which the political bonzes, students, and certain young
generals are prime examples. While the Communists are seeking to exploit this
revolutionary ferment, it remains something quite apart from the Viet Cong insurgency.
Those who aspire to lead the revolution claim that, unless it is successful, the Viet Cong
insurgency cannot be defeated.
This shift in the alignment of fundamental forces is responsible for much of the political
turbulence of the urban scene. It is a process that involves the striking of new power
balances in the midst of a war and in the absence of parliamentary traditions or institutions
for the channeling of political conflict. Despite their deep antagonisms, neither the
Buddhists nor Catholics have acquired political dominance, with the result that each can
check but not cancel the power of the other. The same is true of the myriad of other
political factions pressing their own interests.
While frequent changes in governments have had a debilitating effect on political and
administrative stability, as well as on government efforts to create a national
consciousness for support of the war effort, there remains an impressive resiliency among
the Vietnamese people and their traditional way of life which is little affected by the
cabinet changes in Saigon.
Nevertheless, the most significant element of stability and strength, insofar as the struggle
against Communist insurgency is concerned, remains the external factor of U.S. military,
economic and political support. Without it, the country would quickly succumb to
Communist domination.
B. The Military Scene
The Viet Cong probably controls somewhat more than 3 million Vietnamese in half the
total rural area of the country. The GVN continues to control rural areas inhabited by an
estimated 4.4 million. The remaining rural inhabitants, some 5.4 million, are subject to
various stages of governmental pacification, or else not controlled by either side.
Viet Cong regulars, now estimated at 64,600, are full-time, professional soldiers
organized in identified units of up to regimental strength. They are for the most part well
trained and equipped. The regulars are distinct from an estimated 80,000 to 100,000
irregular Viet Cong who operate as guerrillas and self-defense militia troops. Another
30,000 armed political personnel staff the Viet Cong's party and administrative apparatus.
The military activist figure may therefore be as high as 194,000.
The Viet Cong regular force has the capability of mounting large-scale actions well above
present levels of activity. Such actions could theoretically involve as many as nine
simultaneous attacks in regimental strength; even a series of coordinated, widespread
attacks of lesser magnitude could seriously tax South Vietnamese ability to respond with
the limited general reserve battalions available.
But the Viet Cong regular battalions vary widely in their combat effectiveness. Some are
battle-tested veterans, while others are known to include relatively poorly trained young
recruits or recently infiltrated North Vietnamese draftees with minimal training and little
or no combat experience.
It is not clear whether the Viet Cong will sustain their currently stepped-up pace, whether
present activity is the forerunner of a major offensive, or whether Viet Cong plans have
been set back by increased U.S. air activity and troop support. The concentration of Viet
Cong forces in northern South Vietnam suggests Kontum, Pleiku or other GVN interior
strongholds as their likely targets for a major victory, possibly accompanied by an attempt
to drive to the coast from their own inland strongholds, thereby cutting South Vietnam in
two.
Arrayed against the Viet Cong is the South Vietnamese Army, numbering approximately
220,000 out of the total armed forces of roughly 250,000 men.
The ARVN is capable of maintaining internal security in the major population centers, in
some outlying areas, and along selected lines of communications. While its combat
capabilities are affected by frequent command changes at top echelons, insufficient
numbers of aggressive leaders and poor but improving logistics, the ARVN is well
supplied with U.S. arms and equipment and has become gradually more effective in
guerrilla operations. The ARVN, with continuing U.S. military support, has the capacity
to prevent a Viet Cong military victory.
In alliance with the ARVN are the U.S. forces in Vietnam which now approach 70,000--a
combined US/GVN total of 320,000.
Remaining in the background throughout the present conflict is the seasoned regular army
of North Vietnam, numbering over 300,000 men.
3. France in 1954
Two key aspects of France's relation to the Indochina war in 1954 were the war's acute
unpopularity and French political instability.
France was never united or consistent in her prosecution of the war in Indochina. The war
was not popular in France itself, was actively opposed by many on the left, and was
cynically used by others for domestic political ends.
The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement
from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi
Minh's political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period, in fact, were heavily
influenced by his belief that the Communists would soon come to power in France.)
For a long time, Paris tried to pretend that the war was not a war but a "police action." Not
until July 1952 was the legal status of "veteran" given to Frenchmen who had served in
Indochina, and the National Assembly never did permit conscripts to be posted to the
Indochina theater.
The ambiguous legal status of the conflict enabled French Communists to carry their
opposition to the point of sabotage without incurring the legal charge of treason.
Successive French governments had to contend with concerted and organized domestic
opposition; resolutions favoring negotiation and early withdrawal were frequently
proposed and occasionally passed by non-Communist parties. Leak and counter leak was
an accepted domestic political tactic, and, as a result, even highly classified reports or
orders pertaining to the war were often published verbatim in the pages of political
journals.
Pressures for negotiation and settlement mounted steadily in 1953, with a number of
prominent politicians--especially Pierre Mendes-France--pushing such themes with vigor.
The January 1954 Berlin conference gave new impetus to this pressure, and by February
18 it was decided that a conference should be held in Geneva in April to consider both
Korea and Indochina.
Dien Bien Phu fell on the day before the opening of the Indochina phase of the Geneva
Conference. Had Paris had the will to continue the fight, replacements for that battle's
losses could have been sent from France, and the Indochina war might have continued for
months if not years.
Paris lacked the will, however, and the defeat at Dien Bien Phu made the French
Government anxious to disengage as soon as possible. The fall of the Laniel cabinet on
June 12 and the advent of Mendes-France as Premier on June 18 hastened the conclusion
of a settlement.
4. The United States in 1965
The central themes of U.S. opinion regarding Vietnam appear to be considerable concern
(over U.S. casualties, U.S. involvement, Saigon's political instability, the risks of general
war, the use of air strikes and napalm, etc.) but general support for the Administration.
In general, the public appears unenthusiastic but reconciled to our role in this conflict.
While there is widespread questioning and uneasiness about the way in which we may be
playing that role, the public as a whole seems to realize that the role must be played.
Furthermore, open skepticism as to our tactics subsides at times of sharp crisis in the
situation.
The most articulate critics of our present policy in Vietnam have been elements within the
academic community and church organizations. Although usually a minority within their
own groups, they have stimulated extensive worry and inquiry in the nation as a whole.
With the end of the academic year, this protest movement has temporarily subsided.
Meanwhile, the Government's negotiatory posture since April 7th, and the apparent
intransigence of the Communists, has made it more difficult to advocate persuasive
alternatives to Washington's current track. Criticism continues to be focused on the air
strikes, however, and on the U.S. Government's apparent refusal to consider negotiations
with the NLF.
The latest Harris Poll (June 28) shows that 62% of the public expresses overall approval
of the President's handling of the Vietnam crisis. Well over 70% of the people believe that
Southeast Asia will go Communist if we do not stand firm in Vietnam, and they approve
the President's call for unconditional negotiations. Twenty-three percent are not sure about
bombings in the North or the sending of more troops during the monsoon season.
However, of those with an opinion, almost 80 percent approve of the bombing and over
60 percent believe we should send more troops. Skepticism as to the future of the conflict
and our right to be involved in it are expressed by the fact that 35 percent of the people
believe that China has the right to ask us out of an area so close to her borders and 32
percent believe we might get involved in a land war we can't win.
The latest Gallup Poll (June 9) showed that the percentage of people who believed that we
should continue our present course of action climbed from 13 to 20 percent in the last
month. Those who believe that we should increase military action dropped from 23 to 21
percent and those who believed we should stop military action stayed virtually the same
with only a one point rise to 26 percent. The number of those expressing no opinion
dropped from 35 to 28 percent.
With some exceptions, most editorialists and columnists support the President in his
determination to keep Vietnam independent. This support for the broad objective is
tempered by a noticeable strain of criticism over a "lack of frankness" on the part of the
Administration in discussing the depth of our commitment. Such criticism was most
discernible after the seeming contradiction between the Department of State and the
White House over the combat role of U.S. troops and after the Government's handling of
the B-52 affair.
Those who oppose the Government in the press also seem to be presently concentrating
on the demand that the U.S. negotiate directly with the Viet Cong and, to a lesser extent,
that the bombings should be stopped again. In general, however, most newspapers appear
convinced that the Administration is sincere in its desire to settle the conflict by
negotiations and that the intransigence is on the Communists' side.

The most vocal current comment on the Vietnam situation is coming from the Congress.
Senators Morse and Gruening remain convinced that we must pull out. There is another
group, somewhat larger, which could be termed "reluctant realists" whose viscera says get
out but whose heads tell them the present policy is unavoidable. Senators Mansfield,
Church and Fulbright seem to fall in this category. Once again, the problem is one of
offering a plausible alternative that would assure the existence of a non-Communist South
Vietnam.
The most recent Congressional development is the attack spearheaded by Representative
Melvin Laird who states that unless we go for total victory we shouldn't commit U.S.
ground troops. He threatens withdrawal of Republican support in the House. It is too early
to judge the appeal of this maneuver.
Despite obvious Congressional disquiet, Congressional support has been demonstrated in
the 512-2 vote last August on the Southeast Asia Resolution and in the votes approving
the President's request for a supplemental Vietnam appropriation (408-7 and 88-3).
5. Conclusion
It would seem clear from the foregoing analysis that despite superficial similarities, the
situation faced by France in Vietnam in 1954 is not fundamentally analogous to that faced
by the U.S. in Vietnam in 1965.
France in 1954 was a colonial power seeking to reimpose its overseas rule, out of tune
with Vietnamese nationalism, deeply divided in terms of French domestic opinion,
politically unstable at home, the victim of seven years of warfare--the last four of them
marked by military engagements on a scale far greater than anything yet encountered by
the U.S. and the GVN.
The U.S. in 1965 is responding to the call of a people under Communist assault, a people
undergoing a non-Communist national revolution; neither our power nor that of our
adversaries has been fully engaged as yet. At home we remain politically strong and, in
general, politically united. Options, both military and political, remain to us that were no
longer available to the French.
McGeorge Bundy/2/
34. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A
3470, 7/65 SVN Trip and Memos--Misc. Papers. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent to
McNamara by Raborn, under cover of a memorandum indicating that the comments were
in response to McNamara's request.

SUBJECT
Comments on the Secretary of Defense's 26 June 1965 Memorandum, "Program of
Expanded Military and Political Moves with Respect to Vietnam"/2/
/2/McNamara circulated a June 26 draft of his memorandum, prepared by McNaughton,
to several senior Presidential advisers for comment. For text of the memorandum, as
revised by McNamara and sent to the President on July 1, see Document 38.
(Comments are keyed to the numbered sections in the subject memorandum)
1. We are in general accord with the main thesis of the basic paper that something like his
"Course 3" is necessary if US objectives in Indochina are to be achieved or, indeed, if the
US and its South Vietnamese allies are to avoid the real risk of a major political-military
defeat in the next several months. We have reservations about some of the assumptions on
which the argument of the memorandum seems to be based, as well as about certain
specific actions advocated therein.
2. (Introduction) US objective as stated in the first sentence of the basic paper
Introduction is very limited--"to force the DRV to the conference table." On its face, this
seems to fall far short of US objectives since the holding of a conference itself gives no
indication of the settlement that might come out of the conference. We wonder whether it
was intended actually to narrow previously stated US objectives, or whether the
formulation is simply a foreshortened statement. It is our understanding that US policy in
Vietnam has had the three-fold end of (1) inducing, or forcing, the DRV to reduce the
level of Hanoi-instigated, supported and directed insurgency in South Vietnam (this will
require a combination of suasion, punitive pressure on North Vietnam itself and inflicting
defeats on its insurgent forces in the field in the South) and, (2) building up the political
and military strength of a non-Communist government in South Vietnam so that, (3) the
US can eventually curtail its extraordinary commitment to and involvement in Vietnamese
affairs but, when it withdraws, can leave behind a regime capable of coping with the level
of politico-military pressures and problems likely to be prevailing at that time. At some
point a conference may be a useful step in this process, but it is not an end, in itself, and
probably negotiations when and if they take place will only ratify an equilibrium
established by military and political power.
We agree the VC may now be winning. They clearly believe they are. We doubt if it will
be possible to demonstrate "to the DRV/VC that the odds are against their winning"
unless and until they are in fact losing--which, as the memorandum rightly notes, is not
now the case. We cannot realistically hope "to prove to the VC that they cannot win in
SVN and therefore to turn the tide of the war" except by actually beginning to turn the
tide against the VC. Obviously we cannot do this if US/GVN forces sustain a series of
shattering setbacks during the next few weeks. To have any hope of turning the tide we
must, at a minimum, avoid defeat and, under present conditions, some actions along the
lines recommended in the memorandum are patently essential if defeat is to be avoided. If
we succeed in not losing the war during this monsoon season (through October, say), what
we will have won is a chance to settle down to a protracted struggle to contain Communist
pressures from the North and help build a stable, viable independent South Vietnam.
3. (I-A) It appears obviously essential to provide a breathing spell in South Vietnam while
the government of South Vietnam and its armed forces can prepare themselves to once
again apply the political and military counter-insurgency measures necessary to put the
VC on the defensive. It follows, therefore, that the augmentation and deployment of US
forces in South Vietnam must be adequate beyond question to prevent an ARVN collapse
this year.
The total in-country military effect of this added US force commitment would of course
depend largely on the effective use of the 49 ARVN battalions freed for other duties as
well as on the use of the additional US and other foreign battalions. If foreign troops are
given extensive pacification duties in heavily populated areas, the military results will
probably be negligible and the political results adverse. If these troops are used to provide
basic strategic defense (hence reassurance against total defeat), to assault fixed and certain
concentrations of Communist regulars, and to bail out Vietnamese troops in difficulty, the
results should be good. The more directly and effectively US forces can be used in combat
against major concentrations and base areas of the Viet Cong, the sooner can it be
demonstrated that VC/DRV efforts to win a decisive victory this year are fruitless. It
should not be expected, however, that the Viet Cong will necessarily stand and fight
against superior forces. Rather they may drop backward a step to smaller-scale harassment
and hit-and-run raids in which they do not encounter superior US combat units. Not until
they themselves are being hounded, harassed and hurt in many areas without prospect of
relief will there be a likelihood of the VC/DRV seeking a respite via the conference table
or by any other device.
We would not normally presume to comment on the exact level and composition of forces
required but we are inclined to side with MACV's views on the undesirability of tying too
many US forces to the static defense of base installations. The added forces proposed
would be of obvious value in giving the thinly stretched ARVN a strategic reserve it does
not now have, screening the DMZ, and generally boosting Vietnamese morale,
capabilities, effectiveness and fighting spirits. The net effect of the proposed B-52 sorties
could, in our opinion, have a significant influence if promptly and thoroughly followed up
on the ground in the areas attacked.
4. (I-B) The proposed expansion of aerial attacks on North Vietnam is probably broader
than necessary, in view of our conviction that the issue must ultimately be settled in the
South, and in view of some of the risks involved. The economic effects of mining the
approaches to northern ports, in particular, are not in our view sufficient and in any case
not likely to be quickly enough felt to warrant the awkward international political
complications such action would entail. There is a better argument for choosing targets
whose destruction would immediately put domestic political pressure on the Hanoi
regime, e.g., dock facilities and harbor dredges, power plants and industrial targets, as
well as do economic damage to Hanoi's military effort. Destroying the Haiphong harbor
dredges alone would, in a short time, have a constricting effect on operation of the port,
and in about six months make it virtually unusable because of silting. Moreover, if we
increase the pressure on NVN as visualized, one of the quickest ways to signal our serious
intent as well as protect our attacking forces would be to destroy the SAM sites and major
airfields. While a major Chinese and/or Soviet response cannot be totally ruled out, the
risk will not necessarily be increased by pressing our limited-objective attacks on NVN.
5. (II-A) While we approve of political gestures indicating our willingness to make a
reasonable settlement in Vietnam, most of the initiatives mentioned have been tried to no
avail. A serious, official high-level approach to the Soviets would almost certainly be
rebuffed since it would expose them to such severe Chinese Communist criticism. This
kind of approach could not be successful until we have demonstrated we can stop and turn
back the VC/DRV attack and are able to face down Chinese Communist threats.
Whenever this has been done and the Communist side has had enough in Vietnam, it will
find a variety of doors open to a conference room and the Soviets may then assist them to
pass through. We stand to gain by keeping the doors open, as we have, but not by overstressing our anxiety to confer.
6. (II-B) The need for this type of initiative within South Vietnam is well established. The
two proposals suggested are good starters but of themselves hardly scratch the surface.
We feel far more attention must be devoted to the kind of civil and political programs
which will be required not only to bring the insurgency under permanent control (even
assuming military success), but also to permit South Vietnam to stand successfully against
the Communists in the event that a negotiated settlement could be reached and the bulk of
US forces withdrawn. It is certain that, in the wake of any such settlement, the
Communists would continue their efforts against the Saigon government, either by
political means or through outright violation of agreements. There is little point in
spending US lives and treasure to obtain a conference or settlement which, in the absence
of a viable non-Communist state, must lead either to US re-intervention or a subsequent
Communist takeover.
7. (III) Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic
strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until
two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a situation in the war in the South
which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can
simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly
damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of
an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and
accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not
hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern
struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be
brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its
basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.
It might do so in several ways. Going for a conference as a political way of gaining a
respite from attack would be one. Alternatively Hanoi might reduce the level of insurgent
activity in the hopes that this would force the US to stop its punishment of the North but
not prevent the US and GVN from remaining subject to wearying harassment in the
South. Or, Hanoi might order the VC to suspend operations in the hopes that in a period
of temporary tranquillity, domestic and international opinion would force the US to
disengage without destroying the VC apparatus or the roots of VC strength. Finally,
Hanoi might decide that the US/GVN will to fight could still be broken and the tide of war
turned back again in favor of the VC by launching a massive PAVN assault on the South.
This is a less likely option in the circumstances we have posited, but still a contingency
for which the US must be prepared.
Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
3470, 7/65 SVN Trip and Memos--Misc. Papers. Top Secret.
This memorandum is designed to raise questions and not to answer them, and I am afraid
it may sound unhelpful.
The draft memorandum to the President of June 26/2/ seems to me to have grave
limitations.
1. It proposes a doubling of our presently planned strength in South Vietnam, a tripling of
air effort in the north, and a new and very important program of naval quarantine. It
proposes this new land commitment at a time when our troops are entirely untested in the
kind of warfare projected. It proposes greatly extended air action when the value of the air
action we have taken is sharply disputed. It proposes naval quarantine by mining at a time
when nearly everyone agrees the real question is not in Hanoi, but in South Vietnam. My
first reaction is that this program is rash to the point of folly.
2. The memorandum itself points out that the test of the success of any program in the
near future will be in South Vietnam. I agree with this view. But I think it far from clear
that these drastic changes will have commensurate significance in this decisive field. In
particular, I see no reason to suppose that the Viet Cong will accommodate us by fighting
the kind of war we desire. Fragmentary evidence so far suggests that they intend to avoid
direct contact with major US forces and concentrate their efforts against the Vietnamese
Army. I think the odds are that if we put in 40-50 battalions with the missions here
proposed, we shall find them only lightly engaged and ineffective in hot pursuit.
3. The paper does not discuss the question of agreements with the Vietnamese
Government before we move to a 200 thousand-man level. The apparent basis for doing
this is simply the increasing weakness of Vietnamese forces. But this is a slippery slope
toward total US responsibility and corresponding fecklessness on the Vietnamese side.
4. The paper also omits examination of the upper limit of US liability. If we need 200
thousand men now for these quite limited missions, may we not need 400 thousand later?
Is this a rational course of action? Is there any real prospect that US regular forces can
conduct the anti-guerrilla operations which would probably remain the central problem in
South Vietnam?
5. The suggestion of a naval quarantine is particularly drastic and highly important. I think
it should be separated from the rest of the paper. A blockade by mining would have both
greater risks and much greater impact. It needs a kind of study it has not had (as far as I
know) before it is seriously proposed.
6. This paper omits certain additional possibilities that should be considered before a
specific program of pressure is adopted:

(1) It is within our power to give much more drastic warnings to Hanoi than any we have
yet given. If General Eisenhower is right in his belief that it was the prospect of nuclear
attack which brought an armistice in Korea, we should at least consider what realistic
threat of larger action is available to us for communication to Hanoi. A full interdiction of
supplies to North Vietnam by air and sea is a possible candidate for such an ultimatum.
These are weapons which may be more useful to us if we do not have to use them.
(2) The paper passes by the possibility that stronger interdiction of north-south traffic
might be possible by combining land, sea, and air action. I am not persuaded by what I
have heard in casual comments of the impossibility of tightening these pressures by
combined action. Is there no prospect that special forces could hold critical strong points
in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail? Is it impossible to tighten controls along the DMZ?
Have we really done all we can in naval patrol?
7. The timing of an expanded effort needs examination. It is not at all clear that we should
make these kinds of decisions early in July with the very fragmentary evidence available
to us now on a number of critical points: the tactics of the VC, the prospects of the Ky
Government, and the effectiveness of US forces in these new roles.
8. Any expanded program needs to have a clear sense of its own internal momentum. The
paper does not face this problem. If US casualties go up sharply, what further actions do
we propose to take or not to take? More broadly still, what is the real object of the
exercise? If it is to get to the conference table, what results do we seek there? Still more
brutally, do we want to invest 200 thousand men to cover an eventual retreat? Can we not
do that just as well where we are?
McG. B.
Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret.
RE
Contingency Planning on Vietnam
We have had two long meetings on the planning of the political and military alternatives
that grew out of our meeting with you last week./2/ Jack Valenti has given us time at
11:30 on Friday for a meeting with you, and your night reading for tomorrow will have
the papers for Friday's discussion./3/ Meanwhile, I have one further thought that you may
wish to be turning over in your mind between now and then.
/2/The meeting "last week" was presumably the meeting held at 5:50 p.m. on June 23; see
Documents 15 and 16. The two "long meetings" have not been identified with certainty,
but one may have been a meeting held at 3:10 p.m. on June 29 in the Department of State,
which is described in Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book as "with Sec. McNamara et al.
(re Ball-McNamara paper)." (Johnson Library)
/3/See Documents 43 and 44.
During this week I have had a review made of the economic and informational situation in
Vietnam and around the world. It is extraordinarily clear that any further action turns on
what we can get the Ky government to do.
In this situation, the quality and energy of our team in Saigon becomes decisive. Max
Taylor is heavily preoccupied with the military situation, and the rest of his team is not
geared to a full-steam operation with the new cabinet.
So I begin to wonder if it would not be wise to settle hard on the plan for a LodgeSullivan team, and plan to get them out there together as soon as Lodge is briefed and
Sullivan's successor is chosen. I have already told my brother Bill that Sullivan is the
generally preferred choice for this job, and that he should accordingly find the right man
quickly for Vientiane. But the decision on the timing of the Taylor-Lodge change is
obviously one which only you can make. The more I think about it, the more I think the
time of Lodge's takeover should be nearer 1 August than 1 September.
McG. B.
37. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) to Prime Minister Ky/1/
Saigon, July 1, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 VIET S. Secret. Transmitted to the
Department of State as Enclosure 1 of airgram A-6 from Saigon, July 2.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
We of the United States Mission were very much impressed with the spirit and substance
of your twenty-six point statement promulgated on June 19,/2/ which we assume is to
serve as the overall guideline for impending actions by your government. Because we
have been involved in many of the past plans and programs of the government which bear
upon the objectives stated in this proclamation, I have asked the chiefs of United States
agencies to review the twenty-six point statement and indicate their judgment as to which
of the on-going plans and programs should be given top priority to accelerate the
attainment of the objectives which you seek. This letter records some of their views and
my own as to what needs to be done first to get decisive results fastest.
As I see it, the basic problem facing your government in the coming months is to increase
the military effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces in relation to that of the Viet
Cong while building the national economy and the national morale. We are deeply
impressed that security is the first essential for the political, social and economic progress
of your country and that the most praiseworthy efforts to achieve progress in these fields
are of marginal utility unless a minimum level of security is established. Hence, we would
say that in establishing priorities, number one should go to those measures which will
increase the relative military effectiveness in the next few months.
If this point of view is accepted, we would then place at the top of our list measures to
remedy the critical lack of trained combat ready units in the RVNAF, particularly in the
Army. The objective of the monsoon Viet Cong offensive is clearly to destroy as many
ARVN units as possible; the countermeasures should be to punish the Viet Cong, to create
new ARVN units and to rehabilitate those depleted in battle as rapidly as possible. Of the
latter, there are presently 4 regiments and 9 battalions which are combat ineffective by
reason of severe understrength which is the result of a high desertion rate as well as of
enemy action. Hence, the great importance of the plans under way to increase the
attractiveness of the military service and to bring down the desertion rate. The plans as we
know them are well conceived, but the effect will depend upon carefully checked
implementation. If the intake of manpower can be increased and desertion losses reduced,
it may be possible, as General Thieu thinks, to increase the manpower goals for early
1966.
To one of your military training, I need hardly comment upon the importance of good
leadership as a prerequisite to improve military effectiveness. Somehow we need to learn
better how to identify and reward the competent leader and identify and replace the
incompetent. With regard to the latter, I have heard with regret of instances of officer
failure in the presence of the enemy during recent battles. It would seem to me consistent
with the state of war which the government has announced to take drastic disciplinary
action against the officers who misbehave on the battlefield. The punishment of a few
flagrant cases should have a salutary effect throughout the Army.
It is important not only to find competent leadership but to keep it in place when found so
that the presence of a strong leader may achieve a lasting effect on the unit which he
commands, or on the post which he occupies. Since the fall of the Diem government,
there has been a constant turnover of personnel both military and civilian which has had a
most adverse effect upon the war effort. I would hope that your government would
recognize the self-defeating nature of this practice and resolve to keep competent persons
in place.
In closing these comments on increased military effectiveness, let me say that my
government will in the future as in the past continue to help with air, advisory and logistic
support, with military equipment and with United States combat forces, the latter to assist
in meeting the manpower shortage during this coming period.
While recognizing the prime importance, in the short run, of increased military
effectiveness, the correlated problems on the economic front bear heavily on both the
short- and longer-term prospects for Vietnamese success in the present struggle. Like
most countries in time of war, the South Vietnamese government is obliged to face a
mounting budgetary deficit. Your experts and ours are in constant contact on this subject
and have always worked effectively together. Thus far, they have protected the country
from the potentially disastrous results of serious inflation, but I know that they are
constantly concerned over its possibilities and will need your support in carrying out the
anti-inflation measures which they may recommend from time to time.
As has been illustrated in the recent threatened shortage of rice, there is a serious and
growing problem in the distribution of commodities within South Viet-Nam. This
difficulty arises both from the operations of the Viet Cong in interrupting land and river
communications, and also from the hoarding and profiteering operations which you have
vigorously condemned. Thus, the problem requires attention on two fronts; first, in the
improvement of sea communications out of reach by the Viet Cong, and second, in the
form of legal and police measures to discourage and eventually to break up hoarding and
black market practices. The rice procurement and distribution agency which you have in
mind is an important measure of such a program which should also include the further
development of port capacities as another essential element.
We are of the opinion that a great deal can be done to improve the tax collection system
by bringing about a more effective collection of existing taxes and instituting certain
additional taxes and customs levies. Such measures would be exactly in line with your
announced intention of imposing an austere wartime regime upon the country.
I believe the political value of longer-term economic and social development objectives
which your government could espouse and support can be very great indeed. The key
people in your economic and social ministries are well aware of the need for realistic but
imaginative planning in these fields. Our people would welcome the opportunity to
collaborate and assist in all possible ways. The timing of our efforts is most important
because we should not attempt too much too fast to the detriment of the immediate war
effort. But we should be ready to take action at the appropriate time on such an important
matter as land tenure which could provide the theme for a most important reform
program. I have been impressed with the complexity of this problem and the requirement
for adequate time and careful preparation before embarking upon extensive measures.
While most authorities seem to be in agreement that many improvements are possible and
necessary, I believe they would also recommend against the diversion of the necessary
administrative effort in a nation-wide reform program at this time. However, it is entirely
possible to initiate certain pilot operations in a few selected provinces from which much
experience could be drawn for future use. Such limited actions appear worthy of inclusion
in your priority list in order to keep this idea alive.
Now may I say a few words about the need to maintain the national morale in these
critical times? Military and economic successes are not likely to occur or be sufficient in
themselves if the national morale should begin to fail. While no one would argue this
truism, it is not easy to decide what specific measures should be taken in first priority to
maintain morale. Personally, I would be inclined to recommend focussing attention on the
public relations field at the start. Most American observers would say that there has long
been a basic problem of how to effect better communication between the government on
the one hand and the people, the international world and the Viet Cong on the other.
Better communication in turn is divisible into two parts, the technical and the substantial.
On the technical side, we have and are continued to be prepared to assist in improving the
equipment and organization in the radio and press fields. Also, when the time is
propitious, we are ready to work with you at the problems incidental to the introduction of
television. However, these technical improvements are of little avail unless you find
persuasive spokesmen for your government able to communicate persuasive themes
effectively to the three audiences which I have mentioned above.

In communicating with the international world, your government has long been suffering
from a dearth of official representation. At the present time, I am told that you have only
seven Ambassadors in place in overseas posts. Certainly this reduced representation
obliges Viet-Nam to labor under serious disadvantages in defending its case before the
outside world. I have several times discussed this matter with Foreign Minister Tran Van
Do and am sure that he shares my views of the importance of recruiting and placing able
Ambassadors as soon as possible.
In speaking to the Viet Cong, a revitalized Chieu Hoi program might accomplish
significant results in detaching the increasing number who are becoming uncertain of the
outcome of the struggle. The month of May was the most successful in the history of
Chieu Hoi, when over 1,000 rallies came over to our side. It is important to act quickly to
take advantage of this trend and also to offset any impression that the importance of Chieu
Hoi has been downgraded in losing its ministerial status.
Apart from this matter of better communication with the people, there are a number of
other areas which you have mentioned in your twenty-six points which will bear
importantly on national morale. A nation-wide anti-corruption program is not only
possible but most important for purposes of morale. We have some very practical ideas on
ways of raising the ethics and conduct of the public service particularly with regard to
corruption which we would be happy to put at your disposition.
You have shown a keen awareness of the need to help the war veterans, widows and
orphans, a concern which all of us applaud. Justice toward these sufferers of the war will
not only raise morale but will also supplement the programs for increasing the Armed
Forces and controlling desertion.
The last morale-building act which I should like to mention is one which I have raised
before. It is the simple matter of cleaning up Saigon and other principal cities. Cleanliness
is a mark of pride and self-respect, qualities which normally go with good morale. Could
we not demonstrate these two qualities in a practical way by cleaning up the streets and
the alleys of this beautiful capital and of the other principal towns of Viet-Nam?
This has been an overly long letter, Mr. Prime Minister, but I wanted to convey to you
some of our serious thoughts on the priorities which are required in the present emergency
to meet the goals you have set for your government. We have resources available to
support most of the measures suggested herein and are most anxious to be of help in any
respect. Please let me know if there is any action which you would like from me or other
members of the United States Mission.
Sincerely yours,
Maxwell D. Taylor/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.
38. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 1, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII,
Memos (C). Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was
drafted on June 26 and revised on July 1. A covering note on a copy circulated to the Joint
Chiefs on July 1 by General Wheeler indicates that the memorandum was drafted by
McNaughton. (U.S. Military History Institute, Johnson Papers, Miscellaneous)
SUBJECT
Program of expanded military and political moves with respect to Vietnam
Introduction. Our objective is to create conditions for a favorable settlement by
demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. Under present
conditions, however, the chances of achieving this objective are small--and the VC are
winning now--largely because the ratio of guerrilla to anti-guerrilla forces is unfavorable
to the government. With this in mind, we must choose among three courses of action with
respect to South Vietnam: (1) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that
can be arranged; (2) continue at about the present level, with US forces limited to, say,
75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks while recognizing that our position will
probably grow weaker; or (3) expand substantially the US military pressure against the
Viet Cong in the South and the North Vietnamese in the North and at the same time
launch a vigorous effort on the political side to get negotiations started. An outline of the
third of these approaches follows.
I. Expanded military moves.
The following military moves should be taken together with the political initiatives in Part
II below.
A. Inside South Vietnam. Increase US/GVN military strength in SVN enough to prove to
the VC that they cannot win and thus to turn the tide of the war.
1. Increase combined US/GVN ground strength to the level required effectively to counter
the current and likely VC ground strength./2/ On the assumption that GVN strength holds
its own, a decision should be made now to bring the US/3d-country deployments to 44
battalions within the next few months. Their mission would include hounding, harassing
and hurting the VC should they elect not to stand and fight. General Westmoreland says
that infusion of such forces with such missions on the schedule proposed "should reestablish the military balance by the end of December."/3/ He continues that "it will not
per se cause the enemy to back off."/4/ General Westmoreland's recommendations are
shown below:
/2/Discuss with Ky his view of the military outlook, his plan for improving the situation
and his appraisal of the extent to which an increase in US presence along these lines (a)
would arrest the deterioration and/or (b) would have a net counter-productive "French
colonial" effect. If he suggests the latter, ask how he can offset the VC strength advantage
without using additional US forces. [Footnote in the source text.]

/3/See Document 31.
/4/Westmoreland reports that he "cannot now state what additional forces may be required
in 1966 to gain and maintain the military initiative." He says that "instinctively, we
believe that there may be substantial US force requirements." He has a study under way,
with a fairly solid estimate due soon. [Footnote in the source text.]
MACV RECOMMENDED FOR 1965
III MAF
9 bn (2 due 7/5)
173d Abn Bde
2 bn
1st Inf Div
9 bn (3 due 7/15; 6 could arrive 9/1)
101st Abn Div
3 bn (due 7/28)
Air Mob Div
8 bn (due 9/1)
I MAF
3 bn (1 due 7/1; 2 could arrive in 12 days)

Total
US
34 bn (175,000)
A/NZ
1 bn
ROK (or US?)
9 bn (could arrive approx. 10/15)
Total
44 bn
2. Deploy 13 additional US helicopter companies and 5 additional Chinook platoons to

increase effectiveness of US/GVN forces.
3. Deploy additional US artillery batteries and engineers to reinforce ARVN divisions and
corps.
4. Carry out 800 B-52 sorties a month in strikes against VC havens (followed promptly by
entry of ground-forces into the struck areas).
B. Against North Vietnam./5/ While avoiding striking population and industrial targets
not closely related to the DRV's supply of war material to the VC, we should announce to
Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow into and
out of North Vietnam.
/5/Because of the short lead-times involved in all of these actions, no decision with
respect to them is needed now. Actions to quarantine the ports or to intensify the strike
program against the North can on short notice be made a part of an increasing-pressures
program. [Footnote in the source text.]
1. Quarantine the movement of war supplies into North Vietnam--by sea, rail and road.
a. Mine the DRV harbors. Seaborne traffic accounts for 80% of the DRV foreign trade,
including practically all POL, the single import most vital to the DRV (the DRV armed
forces consume 40% of the POL and transportation most of the remainder). Sixty per cent
of the bottoms are Free World under charter mainly to China, but almost all POL is
carried by Communist tankers. Practically all of the seaborne traffic moves through four
ports. Mining of those ports could be launched on 72 hours notice, and delayed fusing
(three days) could be employed to permit ships time to exit after the fields were laid. A
full mining effort to plant all fields would require 97 sorties; the fields could be sustained
with 38 sorties per month.
b. Destroy rail and highway bridges leading from China to Hanoi. There are 15 highway,
5 railroad and 8 railroad/highway bridges north and east of Hanoi. The railroads now
carry between 1600 and 1900 short tons per day. Roads to Hanoi from China can support
considerable truck traffic. It would take approximately 1000 sorties to carry out strikes on
the 28 bridges, with 85% probability of dropping one span in each case.
c. Conduct intensive armed reconnaissance of the LOCs from China.
2. Destroy the war-making supplies and facilities of North Vietnam wherever they may be
located. There are 56 unstruck targets in this category--1 explosive plant, 1 airfield, 5
supply and ordnance depots, 7 ammunition depots, 9 POL storage, 12 military
barracks/headquarters, 2 communications facilities, 6 naval base/port facilities, and 13
power plants. Approximately 1650 strike sorties would be required to attack all of these
targets. About half of them would be suitable for B-52 attack. Only three are likely to lead
to more than 100 civilian casualties under daylight alert conditions.
3. Interdict movement of war supplies within and out of North Vietnam by an expanded
strike and armed reconnaissance program against LOCs west and south of Hanoi.
a. Expand strike program against bridges, ferries, railroads and roads. Other than 6 locksand-dams targets, only 4 bridges and 4 railroad shops and yards remain unstruck in this
category. These eight targets would require approximately 266 sorties. Two of them--both
railroad yards in Hanoi--would probably result in more than 100 civilian casualties. Three
of them--the two Hanoi railroad yards and the Yen Vien railroad yard--would be suitable
for B-52 strike.
b. Expand armed reconnaissance against LOCs. These LOCs south and west of Hanoi,
together with the LOCs north and east of Hanoi referred to in para 1c above, should be
struck by 1000 sorties a week. This would increase the total strike-plus-armed recce
sorties against North Vietnam from 1800 to 5000 a month. (Efforts should be continued in
Laos to interdict the "trail" there, and at sea preventing infiltration by water.)
4. Be prepared to destroy airfields and SAM sites as necessary to accomplish the
objectives of sub-paras 1-3 above.

C. In the United States. Even if US deployments to Vietnam are no more than 100,000
men, we should:
1. Call up selected reserve forces (approximately 100,000 men).
2. Extend tours of duty in all Services.
II. Expanded political moves.
Together with the above military moves, we should take the following political initiatives
in order (a) to open a dialogue with Hanoi, Peking, and the VC looking toward a
settlement in Vietnam, (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military
involvement and support of North Vietnam until the time when settlement can be
achieved, and (c) to cement the support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends,
and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. While our approaches may be
rebuffed until the tide begins to turn, they nevertheless should be made.
A. Political Initiatives.
1. Moscow. Place a high level US representative in contact with Moscow to discuss
frankly and fully with Soviet leaders our intentions and our desire to find common ground
to work with them rather than come into conflict. We would reiterate that US objectives
are limited but at the same time we have a firm determination to achieve them. We would
stress the dangers we see to both of us in Chinese expansion, and we would recognize the
Soviet need to follow a course which does not destroy its leadership in the Communist
world. We would press the Soviets to avoid any deeper involvement. We would
emphasize that continuation of the military phase can only be harmful to the Communist
cause and urge the Soviets to step in (perhaps with British Co-Chairman) to move the
situation away from war and toward a peaceful settlement.
2. United Nations. As a prelude to expansion of the military effort, we should consider
once more putting before the UN the Vietnam question for discussion with the Chicoms
and North Vietnamese present. They will almost surely refuse to attend and will provide
us with a better position for expanding military action; but if they accept we will have the
prospect of negotiations without having stopped our bombing.
3. Other international forums. In all international forums and contacts, public and private,
continue to demonstrate to the world who is responsible for the trouble in Vietnam and
persuade them that our course of supporting the South, including bombings, must be
accepted and if possible supported. Whenever we can provide further demonstrations of
Communist intransigence and refusal to treat reasonably on this question, this will
strengthen our case.
4. Geneva Conference. US should propose a Geneva Conference of all world powers
(including France) with the subject, "Peace in Southeast Asia."
5. NLF and DRV. GVN--and US after consultation with the GVN--should initiate
contacts with the Liberation Front and North Vietnam, making clear a readiness to discuss
ways and means of achieving settlement in Vietnam.

6. Chicoms. If there is any sign of Chinese willingness to begin discussions, US should
contact the Chinese to set forth US position including our limited objective and the
dangers to China of continuation of the war, and should press the Chinese to bring the
aggression against the South to an end.
7. UK, Canada, India, France, U Thant. Consult individually with the British, Canadians,
U Thant, Indians, French and possibly other neutrals to enlist them in taking peace
initiatives bilaterally, multilaterally or through international organizations however best
calculated to bring about the participation of Communist Governments.
8. Other initiatives. In connection with paras 1-7 above, US and GVN would make it clear
they stand ready to take any reasonable action which does not endanger their military
posture which might improve the chances of success of any peace initiatives. This could
include a bombing "pause." It could include an explicit restatement of US intention of
withdrawing from South Vietnam at the appropriate time, a South Vietnamese
announcement of responsible treatment of NLF-VC personnel who remain in the South,
emphasis on implementation of President's April 7 offer for economic development in
South East Asia,/6/ etc.
B. Initiatives inside South Vietnam. Take steps to induce VC defections and to increase
support for the Ky government--among other steps, these:
1. Economic program. Sharply expand program of economic aid in South Vietnam-including a major construction program, junk building, increased rice and pig output,
improved distribution and marketing procedures.
2. Chieu Hoi program. Improve and expand Chieu Hoi program--with a good man in
charge on the US side, and bounties, amnesties, work and educational opportunities, and
other inducements.
III. Evaluation of the above program.
A. Domestic US reaction. Even though casualties will increase and the war will continue
for some time, the United States public will support this course of action because it is a
combined military-political program designed and likely to bring about a favorable
solution to the Vietnam problem.
B. Communist reaction to the expanded programs.
1. Soviet. The Soviets can be expected to continue to contribute materiel and advisors to
the North Vietnamese. Increased US bombing of Vietnam, including targets in Hanoi and
Haiphong, SAM sites and airfields, and mining of North Vietnamese harbors, might
oblige the Soviet Union to enter the contest more actively with volunteers and aircraft.
This might result in minor encounters between US and Soviet personnel.
2. China. So long as no US or GVN troops invade North Vietnam and so long as no US or
GVN aircraft attack Chinese territory, the Chinese probably will not send regular ground
forces or aircraft into the war. However, the possibility of a more active Soviet
involvement in North Vietnam might precipitate a Chinese introduction of land forces,
probably dubbed volunteers, to preclude the Soviets' taking a pre-eminent position in
North Vietnam.
3. North Vietnam. North Vietnam will not move towards the negotiating table until the
tide begins to turn in the south. When that happens, they may seek to counter it by
sending large numbers of men into South Vietnam.
4. Viet Cong. The VC, especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to
depend increasingly upon the PAVN forces as the war moves into a more conventional
phase; but they may find ways of continuing almost indefinitely their present intensive
military, guerrilla and terror activities, particularly if reinforced with some regular PAVN
units. A key question on the military side is whether POL, ammunition and cadres can be
cut off and if they are cut off whether this really renders the Viet Cong impotent. A key
question on the political side is whether any arrangement acceptable to us would be
acceptable to the VC.
C. Estimate of success.
1. Militarily. The success of the above program from a military point of view turns on
whether the increased effort stems the tide in the South; that in turn depends on two
things--on whether the South Vietnamese hold their own in terms of numbers and fighting
spirit, and on whether the US forces can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a
role in which they have not been tested. The number of US troops is too small to make a
significant difference in the traditional 10-1 government-guerrilla formula, but it is not too
small to make a significant difference in the kind of war which seems to be evolving in
Vietnam--a "Third Stage" or conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate and
attack the enemy. (South Vietnam has 141 battalions as compared with an estimated
equivalent number of VC battalions. The 44 US/3d country battalions mentioned above
are the equivalent of 100 South Vietnamese battalions.)
2. Politically. It is frequently alleged that such a large expansion of US military personnel,
their expanded military role (which would put them in close contact and offer some
degree of control over South Vietnamese citizens), and the inevitable expansion of US
voice in the operation of the GVN economy and facilities, command and government
services will be unpopular; it is said that they could lead to the rejection of the
government which supported this American presence, to an irresistible pressure for
expulsion of the Americans, and to the greatly increased saleability of Communist
propaganda. Whether these allegations are true, we do not know.
The political initiatives are likely to be successful in the early stages only to demonstrate
US good faith; they will pay off toward an actual settlement only after the tide begins to
turn (unless we lower our sights substantially). The tide almost certainly cannot begin to
turn in less than a few months, and may not for a year or more; the war is one of attrition
and will be a long one. Since troops once committed as a practical matter cannot be
removed, since US casualties will rise, since we should take call-up actions to support the
additional forces in Vietnam, the test of endurance may be as much in the United States as
in Vietnam.
3. Generally (CIA estimate). Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely
to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting
insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a
situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no
grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under
continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think
they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe
that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if
North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to
carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions
outlined above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a
period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.
Hanoi might do so in several ways. Going for a conference as a political way of gaining a
respite from attack would be one. Alternatively it might reduce the level of insurgent
activity in the hopes that this would force the US to stop its punishment of the North but
not prevent the US and GVN from remaining subject to wearying harassment in the
South. Or, Hanoi might order the VC to suspend operations in the hopes that in a period
of temporary tranquility, domestic and international opinion would force the US to
disengage without destroying the VC apparatus or the roots of VC strength. Finally,
Hanoi might decide that the US/GVN will to fight could still be broken and the tide of war
turned back again in favor of the VC by launching a massive PAVN assault on the South.
This is a less likely option in the circumstances we have posited, but still a contingency
for which the US must be prepared.
Robert S. McNamara
39. Paper by Secretary of State Rusk/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII.
Top Secret. According to William Bundy, Rusk did not circulate this paper before
submitting it to the President. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p.
11)
VIET-NAM
1. U.S. Objective
The central objective of the United States in South Viet-Nam must be to insure that North
Viet-Nam not succeed in taking over or determining the future of South Viet-Nam by
force. We must accomplish this objective without a general war if possible.
The "war aim" of the United States is not concerned with what the South Vietnamese
would do if they were left alone. There are many problems in the country which only the
South Vietnamese can solve. U.S. forces are present in South Viet-Nam only because of
the aggression of Hanoi in sending men and arms into the South. If this aggression were
removed, U.S. forces could be withdrawn. We would not use U.S. forces to settle issues in
South Viet-Nam among the Buddhists, Catholics, the sects, the local Chinese and
Cambodian communities, the Montagnards, and the genuinely "indigenous" Viet Cong.
The sole basis for employing U.S. forces is the aggression from the North.
2. U.S. Commitments
There can be no serious debate about the fact that we have a commitment to assist the
South Vietnamese to resist aggression from the North. If the South Vietnamese were to
ask us to withdraw our help, we would have to do so. There is no present likelihood that
they will do so.
The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world.
If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions
that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the
South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without
disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world.
3. Comment on the present situation
There is no question but that the situation in South Viet-Nam is critical. It is said that we
are "losing"; this means that we are not making headway, but rather falling behind, in the
effort to stop the infiltration and to pacify the country. But that does not mean that the
Viet Cong are "winning"; they have the power to disrupt, but they are not capable of
occupying and organizing the country or any major part of it. The Viet Cong can be
denied a victory, even if complete pacification will be a long and tortuous prospect.
4. The Risks
There are obvious risks in any engagement between free and communist countries,
especially where large communist countries are contiguous to the area of conflict. But
these risks are present for the communists as well. If they discover that we are less
resolved than they, the prospect for the future is exceedingly dark. Moscow and Peiping
do not wish a general war with us over Southeast Asia. Our problem, therefore, is to deny
to Hanoi success in South Viet-Nam without taking action on our side which would force
the other side to move to higher levels of conflict. If they decide to move to a larger war
rather than fail to absorb South Viet-Nam, we could not shrink from that eventuality; but
such a decision on their part does not appear likely. It is least likely in relation to what we
do in South Viet-Nam.
5. Main Courses of Action
a. Maximum South Vietnamese effort.
We must use the leverage of U.S. presence and assistance to insist that South Vietnamese
leaders declare a moratorium on their bickering and knuckle down to the increased effort
needed to defeat the Viet Cong. They must be told bluntly that they cannot take us for
granted but must earn our help by their own performance.
b. A level of U.S. effort in South Viet-Nam, as a supplement to the best the South
Vietnamese can do, to deny a Viet Cong success.

Even present levels of U.S. forces are not yet reflected in corresponding damage to the
Viet Cong. Reinforcements now in course should open the way to a war plan to engage
concentrations of Viet Cong with punishing effect.
c. Maintenance of present character of air action against North Viet-Nam, both for its
practical effects and to establish that there is no sanctuary for participants in the war.
The elimination of the sanctuary is the principal brake upon direct Chinese participation.
We should not, for the present, attack targets in the immediate Hanoi-Haiphong area.
Priority should be given to any need for air strikes on targets in South Viet-Nam.
d. Intensify the mobilization of "other flags" in support of South Viet-Nam.
e. Pursue our readiness to seek a peaceful solution through any available channel.
f. Initiate as soon as possible the "Acheson Plan" in South Viet-Nam; if not for the entire
country, perhaps in the III and IV Corps, or in selected provinces around Saigon.

Department of State
Washington, DC
40. Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Memos (C). Top Secret. Sent by Ball to McGeorge Bundy on July 1, with a covering note
indicating that the paper was "for inclusion in your book for the President." Also printed
in The Pentagon Papers: New York Times Edition, pp. 449-454.
A COMPROMISE SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM
1. A Losing War: The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can
assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on
our terms no matter how many hundred thousand white foreign (US) troops we deploy.
No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla
war--which is at the same time a civil war between Asians--in jungle terrain in the midst
of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN) and thus
provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly
illustrate this point:
(a) The sneak attack on the Danang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense
perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. This raid was possible only because of the
cooperation of the local inhabitants.
(b) The B-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off.
(c) The search-and-destroy mission of the 173rd Airborne Brigade which spent three days
looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy
who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment.
2. The Question to Decide: Should we limit our liabilities in South Viet-Nam and try to
find a way out with minimal long-term costs?
The alternative--no matter what we may wish it to be--is almost certainly a protracted war
involving an open-ended commitment of US forces, mounting US casualties, no assurance
of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.
3. Need for a Decision Now: So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting
the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once
we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the
United States and a large part of the population of South Viet-Nam, organized and
directed from North Viet-Nam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.
The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of US troops are
committed to direct combat they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are illequipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.
Once we suffer large casualties we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our
involvement will be so great that we cannot--without national humiliation--stop short of
achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be
more likely than the achievement of our objectives--even after we had paid terrible costs.
4. A Compromise Solution: Should we commit US manpower and prestige to a terrain so
unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy--or should we seek a
compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our
losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so?
5. Costs of Compromise Solution: The answer involves a judgment as to the costs to the
United States of such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries
in the area of South Viet-Nam, the credibility of our commitments and our prestige around
the world. In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial US forces to combat in
South Viet-Nam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a
long-term catastrophe. I believe we have tended greatly to exaggerate the costs involved
in a compromise settlement. An appreciation of probable costs is contained in the attached
memorandum. (Tab A)
6. With these considerations in mind, I strongly urge the following program:
A. Military Program
(1) Complete all deployments already announced (15 battalions) but decide not to go
beyond the total of 72,000 men represented by this figure.
(2) Restrict the combat role of American forces to the June 9 announcement,/2/ making it
clear to General Westmoreland that this announcement is to be strictly construed.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 339.
(3) Continue bombing in the North but avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area and any targets
nearer to the Chinese border than those already struck.
B. Political Program
(1) In any political approaches so far, we have been the prisoners of whatever South
Vietnamese Government was momentarily in power. If we are ever to move toward a
settlement it will probably be because the South Vietnamese Government pulls the rug out
from under us and makes its own deal or because we go forward quietly without advance
pre-arrangement with Saigon.
(2) So far we have not given the other side a reason to believe that there is any flexibility
in our negotiating approach. And the other side has been unwilling to accept what in their
terms is complete capitulation.
(3) Now is the time to start some serious diplomatic feelers, looking towards a solution
based on some application of the self-determination principle.
(4) I would recommend approaching Hanoi rather than any of the other probable parties
(the National Liberation Front, Moscow or Peiping). Hanoi is the only one that has given
any signs of interest in discussion. Peiping has been rigidly opposed. Moscow has
recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi. The National Liberation Front has been
silent.
(5) There are several channels to the North Vietnamese but I think the best one is through
their representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. Initial feelers with Bo should be directed
toward a discussion both of the four points we have put forward and the four points put
forward by Hanoi as a basis for negotiation. We can accept all but one of Hanoi's four
points and hopefully we should be able to agree on some ground rules for serious
negotiation--including no pre-conditions.
(6) If the initial feelers lead to further secret exploratory talks we can inject the concept of
self-determination that would permit the Viet Cong some hope of achieving some of their
political objectives through local elections or some other device.
(7) The contact on our side should be handled through a non-governmental cutout
(possibly a reliable newspaperman who can be repudiated.)
(8) If progress can be made at this level the basis can be laid for a multi-national
conference. At some point obviously the government of South Viet-Nam will have to be
brought on board but I would postpone this step until after a substantial feeling out of
Hanoi.
(9) Before moving to any formal conference we should be prepared to agree that once the
conference is started (a) the United States will stand down its bombing of the North, (b)
the South Vietnamese will initiate no offensive operations in the South, and (c) the DRV
will stop terrorism and other aggressive acts in the South.
(10) Negotiations at the conference should aim at incorporating our understanding with
Hanoi in the form of a multi-national agreement guaranteed by the United States, the
Soviet Union and possibly other parties, and providing for an international mechanism to
supervise its execution.
George W. Ball
Attachment A/3/
/3/Top Secret.
PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE CUTTING OF

OUR LOSSES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM
We have tended to exaggerate the losses involved in a compromise settlement in South
Viet-Nam. There are three aspects of the problem which should be considered:
First, the local effect of our action on nations in or near Southeast Asia.
Second, the effect of our action on the credibility of our commitments around the world.
Third, the effect on our position of world leadership.
A. Effect on Nations in or Near Southeast Asia
Free Asian reactions to a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam would be highly
parochial, with each country interpreting the event primarily in terms of (a) its own
immediate interest, (b) its sense of vulnerability to Communist invasion or insurgency,
and (c) its confidence in the integrity of our commitment to its own security based on
evidence other than that provided by our actions in SVN.
Within this framework, the following groupings emerge:
1. The Republic of China and Thailand, staunch allies whose preference for extreme U.S.
actions, including a risk of war with Communist China, sets them apart from all other
Asian nations;
2. The Republic of Korea and the Philippines, equally staunch allies whose support for
strong U.S. actions short of a war with Communist China would make post-settlement
reassurance a pressing U.S. need;
3. Japan, an ally that would prefer wisdom to valor in an area remote from its own
interests where escalation could involve its Chinese or Russian neighbors, or both;
4. Laos, a friendly neutral dependent on a strong Thai-US guarantee of support in the face
of increased Vietnamese-Pathet Lao pressures;
5. Burma and Cambodia, suspicious neutrals whose fear of antagonizing Communist
China would increase their leaning toward Peking in a conviction that the US presence is
not long for Southeast Asia; and
6. Indonesia, whose opportunistic marriage of convenience with both Hanoi and Peking
would carry it further in its covert aggression against Malaysia, convinced that "foreign
imperialism" is a fast fading entity in the region.
Of these varied reactions, the critical importance of Japan and Thailand calls for more
detailed examination.
Japan
According to our Embassy, Japanese public opinion is largely unreceptive to our

interpretation of the situation in Viet-Nam. Many if not most Japanese consider that the
US is endeavoring to prop up a tottering government that lacks adequate indigenous
support. Public media stress the civil war aspects of the struggle, portray Hanoi's
resistance as determined and justified, and question our judgment as to the dangers of an
eventual war with Communist China.
The government as such supports our strong posture in Viet-Nam but stops short at the
idea of a war between the US and China. Governmental leadership can--to a considerable
extent--influence the public reaction in Japan. Government cooperation would, therefore,
be essential in making the following points to the Japanese people: (1) US support was
given in full measure, as shown by our casualties, our expenditures, and our risk-taking;
and (2) the US record in Korea shows the credibility of our commitment so far as Japan is
concerned.
Thailand
Thai commitments to the struggles in Laos and South Viet-Nam are based upon a careful
evaluation of the regional threat to Thailand's security. The Thais are confident that they
can contain any threats from Indochina alone. They know, however, that they cannot
withstand the massive power of Communist China without foreign assistance.
Unfortunately, the Thai view of the war has seriously erred in fundamental respects. They
believe American power can do anything, both militarily and in terms of shoring up a
Saigon regime. They now assume that we really could take over in Saigon and win the
war if we felt we had to. If we should fail to do so the Thais would initially see it as a
failure of US will.
Yet time is on our side, provided we employ it effectively. Thailand is an independent
nation with a long national history and--unlike South Viet-Nam--an acute national
consciousness. It has few domestic Communists and none of the instability that plagues its
neighbors, Burma and Malaysia. Its one danger area, in the Northeast, is well in hand so
far as preventive measures against insurgency are concerned. Securing the Mekong Valley
will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos, with Thai-US
forces occupying the western half, or by some cover arrangement. Provided we are willing
to make the effort, Thailand can be a foundation of rock and not a bed of sand on which to
base our political-military commitment to Southeast Asia.
South Korea
As for the rest of the Far East, the only serious point of concern might be South Korea.
But if we stop pressing the Koreans for more troops to Viet-Nam (the Vietnamese show
no desire for additional Asian forces since it affronts their sense of pride) we may be able
to cushion Korean reactions to a compromise in South Viet-Nam by the provision of
greater military and economic assistance. In this regard, Japan can play a pivotal role now
that it has achieved normal relations with South Korea.
B. Effect on the Credibility of Our Commitments Around the World
With the exception of the nations in the Southeast Asian area, a compromise settlement in
South Viet-Nam should not have a major impact on the credibility of our commitments
around the world. Quite possibly President de Gaulle will make propaganda about
perfidious Washington, but even he will be inhibited by his much-heralded disapproval of
our activities in South Viet-Nam.
Chancellor Erhard has told us privately that the people of Berlin would be concerned by a
compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam. But this was hardly an original thought and I
suspect he was telling us what he believed we would like to hear. After all, the confidence
of the West Berliners will depend more on what they see on the spot than on news of
events half way around the world. They have much to gain by the prevention of a
confrontation between East and West elsewhere and by the gradual developments of a
spirit of entente that might pave the way for ultimate reunification.
In my observation, the principal anxiety of our NATO allies is that we have become too
preoccupied with an area which seems to them an irrelevance and may be tempted to
neglect our NATO responsibilities. Moreover, they have a vested interest in an easier
relationship between Washington and Moscow.
By and large, therefore, they would be inclined to regard a compromise solution in South
Viet-Nam more as new evidence of American maturity and judgment than of American
loss of face.
These would be the larger and longer-term reactions of the Europeans. In the short run, of
course, we could expect some cat-calls from the sidelines and some vindictive pleasure on
the part of Europeans jealous of American power. But that would, in my view, be a
transient phenomenon with which we could live without sustained anguish.
Elsewhere around the world, I would see few unhappy implications for the credibility of
our commitments. No doubt the Communists will try to gain propaganda value in Africa,
but I cannot seriously believe that the Africans care too much about what happens in
Southeast Asia.
Australia and New Zealand are, of course, special cases since they feel lonely in the far
reaches of the Pacific. Yet even their concern is far greater with Malaysia than with South
Viet-Nam, and the degree of their anxiety would be conditioned largely by expressions of
our support for Malaysia.
C. Effect on Our Position of World Leadership
On balance I believe we would more seriously undermine the effectiveness of our world
leadership by continuing the war and deepening our involvement than by pursuing a
carefully plotted course toward a compromise solution. In spite of the number of powers
that have--in response to our pleading--given verbal support from feelings of loyalty and
dependence, we cannot ignore the fact that the war is vastly unpopular and that our role in
it is perceptibly eroding the respect and confidence with which other nations regard us.
We have not persuaded either our friends or allies that our further involvement is essential
to the defense of freedom in the Cold War. Moreover, the more men we deploy in the
jungles of South Viet-Nam, the more we contribute to the growing world anxiety and
mistrust.
41. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
Memos (C). Top Secret. Included in memoranda sent to the President by McGeorge
Bundy on July 1; see Document 43. William Bundy later recalled that this memorandum
was sent to the President at the latter's request. Bundy drafted it after helping Ball prepare
his June 28 paper (Document 26) advocating U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Bundy could
not agree with that conclusion, and was influenced by U. Alexis Johnson, who believed
that military reports from Vietnam were too bleak and that the introduction of more than
15 U.S. battalions would cause serious problems for the South Vietnamese Government.
Accordingly, Bundy concluded that "there must be a presentation to the President of a
military operation looking not to early compromise on the most crucial issue, but to a
genuine trial period to see if the South Vietnamese were tough and American forces
effective." The memorandum printed here was a summary of a longer memorandum,
dated June 29, entitled "Holding On in South Vietnam," which was discussed on June 30
by the senior review group that earlier had discussed Ball's June 28 paper. (Johnson
Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 26, p. 26 and Ch. 27, p. 7) Bundy's June 29
memorandum is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV.
A "MIDDLE WAY" COURSE OF ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
This memorandum advocates the following military decisions as the basis for US action
during the next two months:
a. Complete the deployment of the balance of the Marine force at Da Nang (early July),
and of the additional six battalions from the 1st and 101st Divisions (July 15 and July 28).
This would bring combat strength to 18 battalions, and overall US strength to about
85,000.
b. Revise the current decision on the Air Mobile Division so that this division is alerted
and could be sent to South Vietnam three weeks after decision at any time, but not decide
now that it will in fact be sent.
c. Start now to weed out and prepare for deployment as many combat units as possible to
meet the possible military need for 44 combat battalions by the end of the year, but defer
any decision on deploying these units and on calling up major reserve units. (DOD should
supply the time factors and indicate whether and to what extent such deferral would
prevent our meeting the possible force needs if we later decided to do so.)
d. Continue to avoid the urban areas of Hanoi and Haiphong in our bombing of the DRV,
being prepared to attack SAM sites and airfields if but only if they are used to inflict
militarily significant losses on us. Hitting these cities would not now lead Hanoi to give in
but might on the contrary toughen it. It would almost certainly lose us the support of such
key governments as the UK and Japan. Above all, it would inevitably intensify the Soviet
commitment and probably remove the chance of the Soviets exerting restraint in the fall.
e. Defer decision on mining North Vietnamese harbors and/or cutting the rail and road
lines from China to North Vietnam. The harbor operation would tend to throw North
Vietnam into the arms of Communist China and diminish Soviet influence. The rail and
road operation could be useful added pressure but should be held in reserve; it would have
much more effect if it came after a summer stalemate, and it cannot affect DRV
capabilities in the short term or perhaps to any major degree.
f. Maximum air action in the South, including B-52's.
This military program would be accompanied by every effort to galvanize the political
and economic programs of the Ky Government, in the direction of "maximum revolution
and reform, but minimum repression." We would be preparing the way for a really major
reform and amnesty program to be launched in the fall if the monsoon offensive is blunted
so that such action would not have a note of weakness.
The program also involves the possibility of discreet contacts with Hanoi, and cut-out
contacts (not identified with the US) with the Liberation Front. These would not be with
any serious negotiating expectations, but to open channels and to soften both up by
playing on Hanoi's fear of Peiping and the possible Liberation Front fear of being totally
under Hanoi's domination.
In essence, this is a program to hold on for the next two months, and to test the military
effectiveness of US combat forces and the reaction of the Vietnamese army and people to
the increasing US role. Basic to the program is that US combat forces would be employed
on a fairly strict interpretation of the June 9 White House statement, used in combat as
reserves where a battle has been or can be joined and US military advantages are greatest,
not in general countryside operations.
The program rejects withdrawal or negotiating concessions in any form, and equally
rejects a present decision to raise our force level above about 85,000. The latter appears
unwise because:
a. We have not tested whether our forces can really find and hit the VC. This program
gives us enough reserves to give a fair test.
b. We simply do not know, and probably cannot now know, whether raising the US force
level and combat involvement to the point where we take over much of the combat load
would (1) cause the Vietnamese government and especially the army to let up; (2) create
adverse popular reactions to our whole presence, on "white men" and "like the French"
grounds. So far things have been all right while we were sticking to secure areas and were
not in combat; we just don't know what will happen when we start fighting and are in
contact with the people in disputed areas. At some point, we could be playing into VC
hands, and negating immediate military results, thus getting into a truly disastrous
situation. Again, what we need now is to test; perhaps, these fears will be groundless, but
we lose little by waiting, compared to the risks. And these risks are affected by pace and
timing; we might be readily accepted if we moved gradually, but arouse the world fears
and adverse reactions if we moved fast.
c. While military effectiveness is the basic reason for holding at about 85,000, we must
also reckon the Congressional and public opinion problems of embarking now on what
might appear clearly to be an open-ended ground commitment. The present rationale of

meeting the monsoon offensive and balancing DRV regulars has put us on a solid and
sober footing for 85,000; any major increases would require a much broader base and
explanation.
Washington, July 1, 1965, 5:50 p.m.
Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret.
SUBJECT
Meeting Friday Morning on Vietnam
I have just come from another long session in the State Department on the draft papers/2/
for discussion tomorrow. These papers will offer two main alternatives: George Ball's
preference for a negotiated withdrawal, and Bob McNamara's recommendation of a
substantial increase of military strength, with a call-up of reserves during this summer.
/2/Documents 38-41.
I find that both Rusk and McNamara feel strongly that the George Ball paper should not
be argued with you in front of any audience larger than yourself, Rusk, McNamara, Ball,
and me. They feel that it is exceedingly dangerous to have this possibility reported in a
wider circle. Moreover, both of them feel great reticence about expressing their own
innermost thoughts to you in front of any larger group. So they both would prefer a
meeting limited to the five of us in the morning.
The disadvantage of this is that it cuts you off from a chance to talk freely with some
other men who have expert opinions--like Thompson and General Wheeler and Lodge
(whom I can easily take care of in another way by having him read the papers and get
ready to report separately to you at another time).
In the light of Bob's and Dean's feeling, however, I now recommend we keep this meeting
small. After you have had a chance to get your own thinking clear on the broad outlines of
the problem, we can bring in Raborn, Wheeler, Thompson, and others in a later meeting
for more intense discussion of a specific set of recommendations. My personal, private
opinion is that both Rusk and McNamara are too diffident and that it would help you to
have a few more people in the meeting. But it is a fact that they feel as they do, and this
feeling will govern their effectiveness in a meeting./3/
/3/Two options were typed below Bundy's initials: "OK, Keep the meeting small" and
"Speak to me." The President checked the first.
McG. B.
Bundy, Vol. XII. Top Secret.
I attach four documents which are for consideration at the 11:00 o'clock meeting
tomorrow./2/
/2/Documents 38-41.
At Tab 1 is Dean Rusk's four-page statement of the basic issues.
At Tab 2 is George Ball's paper on a compromise solution.
At Tab 3 is Bob McNamara's recommendation for expanded military action.
At Tab 4 is my brother Bill's program offering a middle course for the next two months.
The positions within the government are roughly as follows: McNamara and Ball honestly
believe in their own recommendations, though Bob would readily accept advice to tone
down those of his recommendations which move rapidly against Hanoi by bombing and
blockade.
Dean Rusk leans toward the McNamara program, adjusted downward in this same way.
The second-level men in both State and Defense are not optimistic about the future
prospects in Vietnam and are therefore very reluctant to see us move to a 44 battalion
force with a call-up of reserves. So they would tend to cluster around the middle course
suggested by my brother. They would like to see what happens this summer before getting
much deeper in.
The Joint Chiefs are strongly in favor of going in even further than McNamara.
Specifically they want now to take out the SAM site, the IL-28s, and the MIGs in the
Hanoi area.
My hunch is that you will want to listen hard to George Ball and then reject his proposal.
Discussion could then move to the narrower choice between my brother's course and
McNamara's. The decision between them should be made in about ten days, which is the
point at which McNamara would like a final go-ahead on the air mobile division. I think
you may want to have pretty tight and hard analyses of some disputed questions like the
following:
1. What are the chances of our getting into a white man's war with all the brown men
against us or apathetic?
2. How much of the McNamara planning would be on a contingency basis with no

decision until August or September?
3. What would a really full political and public relations campaign look like in both the
Bundy option and the McNamara option?
4. What is the upper limit of our liability if we now go to 44 battalions?
5. Can we frame this program in such a way as to keep very clear our own determination
to keep the war limited? (This is another way of stating question 4.)
6. Can we get a cold, hard look at the question whether the current economic and military
situation in Vietnam is so very bad that it may come apart even before this program gets
into action? (I don't believe that it is that bad, but no one seems to be really sure of the
facts today.)
Friday's meeting/3/ is not, repeat not, for decisions, but for sharpening of the issues that
you want studied.
/3/July 2; see Document 44.
McG. B.
44. Editorial Note

At 11 a.m. on July 2, 1965, President Johnson met in the Cabinet Room of the White
House with Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, George Ball, and McGeorge Bundy to discuss
the four papers submitted to the President the day before dealing with Vietnam policy
(Documents 38-41). The meeting lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary) No other contemporary record of the meeting has been found, but
William Bundy recalled the decisions made by the President during the meeting:
"Like a Judge, the President expected to mull over the pleadings, and gave no direct
indication what his final decision would be. Instead, he plucked ideas from each of the
papers, and set them in motion. Averell Harriman should travel at once to Europe and set
up the faint 'cover' of visiting Moscow on a sightseeing trip. McNamara should go to
Saigon in mid-July with General Wheeler and with Cabot Lodge, now picked as Taylor's
successor, to look over the situation and evaluate the military plans which Westmoreland
was already working to project into 1966. Ball should work intensively to refine the
negotiating possibilities, with a particular eye to his latest proposal of direct contact with
the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, and a secondary look at how contact with
NLF representatives, through private Americans, might be arranged and to what
end." (Ibid., Papers of William P. Bundy, Chapter 27, page 13)
45. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80 B 01285A, Chrono as
DDP and DDCI, 1 Jan-31 Dec 65. Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Possible Contact with the National Liberation Front
1. In response to your memorandum of 1 July,/2/ we agree that it would be wise to
inventory various modes and methods by which contact could be made with or messages
discreetly passed to the National Liberation Front (NLF) should we want to decide, now
or later, to take any such action. Our suggestions on this score are set forth in the attached
annex./3/ The matter of passing the particular message proposed in your 1 July
memorandum is a bit more complex.
/2/Document 41.
/3/Entitled "Review of CIA's Capabilities To Contact NLF"; attached but not printed.
2. As we understand it, that memorandum suggests a contact or contacts designed to do
two things:
a. Elicit information about the strength of "southern" sentiment in the NLF and "southern"
concern over growing Hanoi (i.e., "northern") domination as the war in the south expands;
b. Execute what we would call a covert action operation to plant a seed (or seeds) of
concern over the future fate of southerners in the NLF movement if the war continues and
"Hanoi moves in absolutely to the driver's seat".
3. There would certainly be no harm in trying to exert this kind of covert psychological
pressure, but we doubt if the particular operation suggested would be very fruitful. Hanoi-i.e., the leadership of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party--has been
absolutely in the "driver's seat" ever since it directed the NLF's creation in 1960. It is
highly unlikely that anyone has been posted abroad as an NLF representative who does
not know this and who is not quite willing to accept the fact of Lao Dong control.
4. As for the information elicitation, at best our cut-out(s) would be unlikely to learn much
more than the private sentiments of the particular NLF representative(s) contacted. Such
information would be interesting, but not necessarily representative. The views of NLF
agents abroad could easily be far out of phase with the sentiments of the cadre actually
waging war in South Vietnam. Furthermore, the chances of a casual contact's achieving
even this much are quite slight; for in selecting the NLF's foreign representatives, the
Communist leadership would certainly make every effort to screen out the kind of
individual who would harbor dissident sentiments or be prone to bare his innermost
political feelings to casual contacts. This information, of course, could best be obtained in
South Vietnam itself, either through agent assets or through a manipulated contact.
5. A further point to bear in mind, and an absolutely crucial one, is the extreme delicacy
of any such operation. We would, of course, be operating through third country cut-outs
not themselves identifiable as acting on behalf of the United States Government. If
security broke down in any phase of this operation, however, the results could be
damaging. If the Communists become aware of United States sponsorship of these
overtures, they themselves could use this fact to our political detriment. If we sounded out
the GVN in advance about making any such overtures, the reaction of the GVN's new
leadership would almost certainly be adverse and our very suggestions would raise grave
doubts in their minds about United States constancy and reliability. If we made such an
approach without advising the GVN beforehand and the Communists should learn that
these approaches were United States sponsored, the Communists could do us serious
political damage with our Vietnamese allies in Saigon by ensuring that the latter were
made aware of the fact that the United States was dealing with the NLF behind the GVN's
back. At a minimum, if the Communists realized that such overtures were of United States
instigation, they would probably discount these overtures' immediate substantive content
and construe the fact of the United States initiative in mounting them as a sign that the
United States was so anxious to disengage in Vietnam that it was willing to soften its
adamant stand on the NLF. This, in our opinion, would be more likely to encourage Hanoi
with regard to the wisdom and eventual profit of its present obdurate course than to induce
any matching gestures of conciliatory reasonableness.
6. In sum, though we certainly second the idea of canvassing our assets now to determine
how we might best be able to arrange discreet contact with the NLF should it ever become
desirable to do so, we do not believe that the likely advantages of the particular approach
outlined in your 1 July memorandum would be worth the political risks they would
unavoidably entail.
Richard Helms/4/
46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Unger and approved by Ball.
41. It may be that in coming weeks we will wish to establish some indirect contacts,
probably through cutouts, with NLF in order to get better reading than provided by
present random reports of Front's state of mind and intentions. We have in mind
particularly recurring suggestions that in Front there is significant element of Sudiste
thinking which, if properly nurtured, might draw at least part of NLF/VC away from
Hanoi domination toward some accommodation with GVN on terms which not too
unacceptable.
Realize such contact, no matter how carefully managed and covered, may be leaked in
such a way as to reach ears of GVN and raise with them acute worries about our
intentions. While we presume there are numbers of avenues by which certain GVN
officials themselves maintain more or less clandestine contact with Front, if it was learned
that US maintaining such contact there would be immediate assumption we were looking
for way out and intended to impose at least coalition government on SVN if not scuttle
GVN outright in favor of NLF. Therefore if leaks occur we would deny categorically to
GVN officials and also publicly if necessary that we have been in contact and contacts
will of course have to be managed in such manner that our denial credible.
Depending on what these contacts reveal and how over-all political situation develops we
may later conclude it advisable to bring GVN into picture to some degree. In that case we
will first wish to examine with you whether and how this can be done so as to avoid
precipitating sharp and perhaps decisive loss in GVN confidence in our intentions.
In order get dialogue underway with NLF and establish basis for efforts to alienate them
from Hanoi we would contemplate approaching indirectly those individuals who are
accessible and considered less enthusiastic about dependence on Hanoi and receptive to
Sudiste appeal. We envisage approach taking following line, being conducted, of course,
by someone who disclaims any official connection and whose reference to official US
views would be in terms of his impression of thinking in Washington, to which he would
claim to have some access:
(1) You (NLF/VC) after years of fighting and privation are still getting nowhere and
widening daily the gulf between yourselves and your brothers in the South.
(2) Since Hanoi persists in pressing always harder in its effort to take over the South,
using you in the process, and rejects all reasonable efforts which US, GVN, many neutrals
and Afro-Asians and others have made to come to some peaceful settlement, you face
dismal prospect.
(3) Wonder to what extent we all find ourselves in this situation because there may be real
misunderstanding of why US in South Viet-Nam and what it is seeking, or because we
may not fully understand your true objectives.
(4) Contact welcomed to see if misunderstanding can be reduced or removed for mutual
benefit both our countries.
(5) Central aim US is simple: a neutral Viet-Nam which is dominated by no outside
power, whether from the North or elsewhere, and which can choose its own government
and policies through consultation with all of its people.
(6) US seeks no alliances or bases in South Viet-Nam. Persuaded US means to withdraw
its forces the moment it becomes clear that efforts of North Viet-Nam to dominate and
dictate to the South are at an end.
(7) Do not believe you any more than we wish or consider it in your interest to make
South Viet-Nam more of a bloody battleground than it already is or to be further used by
the Northerners against your brothers in the South who also seek peace for your country.
Hope therefore our contact can promote fruitful discussion.
Your comments on foregoing plan for approach to NLF urgently requested.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Unger, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Paris.
42. Deptel 41./2/ In coming weeks or months, in circumstances where it would not signal
weakness, we may wish to make quiet effort to establish contact also with DRV in order
explore more actively possibilities of some kind of negotiated settlement Vietnam
situation. In spite of several rebuffs we and others have received to more formal, official
overtures there have been indications that DRV might welcome opportunity to talk. This
might be worked out through official but quiet and confidential lower level contact such
as Mai Van Bo in Paris. It is possible though far from certain that North Vietnamese
might wish and be able in this way to discuss position independent of Chinese. There may
also be honest misapprehension on DRV part as to what is precisely our position on
certain questions and direct dialogue might serve to dispel such.
/2/Document 46.
We would not be prepared to pay price of formal recognition of DRV which Hanoi may
very well demand. This might, however, be a price we would be willing to pay for an
acceptable resolution of overall problem of Vietnam, but this would be a possibility to be
acknowledged only much later should it ever be possible to get fruitful discussions
underway.
As in case our possible contact with NLF, we recognize GVN would be immediately
suspicious and most uneasy if it becomes aware of our contact with DRV. Nevertheless
we presume that, as Quat once hinted to us, contact with DRV not really so great political
problem and we have after all long since declared ourselves prepared to enter into
discussions with any government.
Therefore we believe that we should keep GVN informed if any contact established,
reassuring them that this being undertaken for purpose of making sure no avenue to
settlement left untried and that possibility of settlement not being obstructed by
misunderstanding which could be corrected; at same time we have no intention
negotiating behind their back any arrangements they could not accept and we will keep in
constant consultation with them. Furthermore, they might wish to consider themselves
possible utility of their making contact independent of ours, in which case we would of
course also expect be kept informed.
For contact with DRV we envisage some appropriate US official, depending upon
locality, who could conduct conversations inconspicuously. On initial contact we would
envisage he would follow line something like following:
1. US has been deeply disappointed at negative responses from Hanoi to numerous efforts
made in recent months to explore peaceful means of settling unhappy Vietnam situation.
2. US position remains unchanged in that we are determined to help South Vietnam as

long as this is necessary preserve that country's independence. At same time we are ready
without preconditions to discuss ways of moving toward a peaceful settlement and
bringing military activity to an end.
3. We have said and we mean without qualification that we seek no bases in South
Vietnam and are prepared to withdraw our forces from that country as soon as its
continuing independent existence is assured. We favor a neutral Vietnam. We have no
designs whatsoever on North Vietnam and no intention of trying to change its kind of
government. We believe the question of unification of the two parts of Vietnam is a
matter for the North and South to decide when each is in a position to make a free
decision; otherwise we take no position on whether Vietnam should be unified or remain
at least for some time divided.
4. We have noted the four points put forward by Premier Pham Van Dong on April 8/3/
and frequently pressed since that time. We have also noted the four points put forward by
the Government of South Vietnam on June 22./4/
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245.
/4/The GVN's four points were announced in an address by Foreign Minister Tran Van Do
on July 22; for text of his address, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1965, p. 883.
We regard all of these and other statements of objectives put forward from other sources
as worthy of our attention and suitable subjects for discussion. Naturally we would not
enter into discussion on any understanding that the resulting conclusion would be fixed in
advance and would presume this would also be the DRV position.
5. There are many elements in Premier Pham Van Dong's four points which appear to be
acceptable, assuming that further discussion would confirm our understanding of what is
intended. There are others which, if we correctly interpret their purport, would in our view
jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and therefore not be acceptable.
6. Thus we return again to our initial thought that free and open discussion without
preconditions might prove to be useful and we hope that the DRV would agree to
undertake these.
Your early comments requested on proposal for approach to DRV on lines set forth above.
Rusk
Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret; Exdis. There is an indication on the source text that the President
saw the memorandum.
Since one of the critical variables in Vietnam is the attitude of the Vietnamese toward
U.S. troops, we have asked the Embassy in Saigon for a careful review of the evidence on
this point to date. That review is coming next week, but in the meantime the mission has
sent us a quick assessment/2/ whose summary judgment is interesting, as follows:
1. U.S. forces have drawn a variety of local reactions which, overall, are moderate in tone
and mildly favorable in content. Criticism expressed so far deals with specific localized
incidents rather than broader questions of sovereignty.
2. There is general recognition of the military need for U.S. forces and respect for their
effectiveness and fire power. There is some psychological letdown because U.S. forces
have not quickly ended the war, and on the other hand where U.S. forces are solidly
emplaced, the residents appear to be pleased with their improved physical security. There
have been local episodes of friction, but there have also been reports of village opinion
that U.S. troop behavior is better than that of Vietnamese. Intensive Viet Cong
propaganda against U.S. presence has not been effective in secure areas, nor has there
been any incident of a situation which constitutes a significant hazard to U.S.-Vietnamese
cooperation or to effective prosecution of U.S. force missions.
3. The respect of one service for another probably makes this summary slightly optimistic,
but it remains important and encouraging.
McG. B.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR,
Vol. II(B). Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only.
CAP 65391. Following two telegrams, to and from Max Taylor, show that we are over the
hump on the Lodge transition except for details. Taylor accepts both Lodge appointment
and McNamara/Lodge visit in good cheer and his preference for a short turn-around
period is in accordance with ours. I think this means that the McNamara trip should be
announced Tuesday/2/ and the Lodge appointment later in the week. We will be sending
draft announcements to Taylor with the notation that they are subject to your review and
approval after his comment.
/2/July 6.
To Saigon number 39, July 3, 1965/3/
/3/The Department of State copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only
During this past week the President and his principal advisers have been wrestling hard
with the extent to which we should augment ground combat forces between now and the
end of the year. Understand Westmoreland is filling you in on his exchanges with
Wheeler, which indicate the program under consideration. We are especially concerned
with the question whether a 44 battalion force would mean taking over the war to the
extent that would diminish GVN and ARVN performance and perhaps at some point
stimulate further Vietnamese popular opposition. No attempt was made this week to
resolve the issue and we would welcome comment from you and Alex that would help us
with our thinking next week.
In view of far reaching decisions the President believes that it would be useful to us all if
McNamara could visit Saigon starting about July 15 for five or six days. Wheeler and
someone from Department would accompany.
As you know, President is deeply grateful for your willingness to stay on for short period
beyond your original commitment of last year but he also feels a personal obligation to
that commitment. He plans to name Cabot Lodge as your successor and he could be in
position to report for duty about August 15. President is very eager that Lodge should
accompany McNamara in order to get fully and locally briefed before meeting Senate
committee for confirmation and to take part in decisions which he must largely carry out.
If Lodge should accompany McNamara this again raises question of when public
announcement of your retirement and his nomination should be made. In order to avoid
slightest speculation that McNamara visit led somehow to your replacement there could
be advantage in announcing change in Ambassadorship when party leaves Washington for
Saigon.
As you know, President has unlimited regard for the job you have done and the sacrifices
it has entailed on your part. I am quite sure that he would wish to have your own reactions
to the handling of the changeover before pushing any buttons. Viet Nam situation is
sufficiently special to set aside normal practice in which one Ambassador in no way
appears until his predecessor has departed. But we also realize that handling of South
Vietnamese situation between public announcement and your departure is of considerable
importance. Please let me have your comments soonest. Rusk.
From Saigon nr. 38, July 4, 1965/4/
/4/Also ibid.
Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only
Party most welcome July 15 or sooner since time is pressing for decisions on
deployments. Please let us have desires of party with regard to program members wish
arranged. We will update US Mission estimate of situation and forward it prior to
departure of party.
Agree with desirability of Lodge coming with Secretary McNamara and of Washington
announcement of plan for Ambassadorial succession at time of departure from
Washington. However, I would not want to stay on for month as "lame duck"
Ambassador, and would like to depart Saigon shortly after departure of visiting group.
Suggest announcement of McNamara visit without mention of Lodge soonest since
preparatory measures for visit will soon become visible and leak is likely. Lodge
announcement would then be made on departure from Washington./5/
/5/In telegram 61 to Saigon, July 6, the Secretary indicated that the feeling in Washington
was that it would be best to combine the announcement of the McNamara visit and the
Lodge appointment. (Ibid.) The White House announced the visit and the appointment on
July 8. (The New York Times, July 9, 1965) In his July 8 letter to Taylor accepting his
resignation, President Johnson stated that he did so "only because I am bound to honor the
understanding we had at the time of your initial appointment." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (A))
I would appreciate opportunity to comment on draft text of both announcements. Taylor.

Department of State
Washington, DC

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority;
Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 12:39 a.m. on July 5.
41. Deptels 41 and 42./2/ The following are Alex Johnson's and my comments on plans
for approach to NLF and DRV contained in reftels.
In a sentence, we are vigorously opposed to these proposed approaches because (1) they
are premature now or in any short term future; (2) they are highly dangerous because of
the effect on the GVN of a leak, either fortuitous or deliberate on the part of Communists;
and (3) by our overeagerness to negotiate, they will nullify our past and present efforts to
convince the VC/DRV that we have the will and determination to turn the tide against
them sooner or later--so that they had better come to terms sooner rather than later.
We are convinced that we are on a sound course now and should stay on it without letting
ourselves be diverted to untimely actions on either the political or the military front. We
are now engaged in the early phases of the ascending military confrontation of the
monsoon season. We are taking losses and will take more; the same goes for the VC. At
the end of this season, it should be our purpose to have so blunted and bloodied the
monsoon offensive and to have so punished the approved targets of our bombing in NVN
that the VC/DRV can no longer hope for a military victory and must admit it to
themselves. If we can create that picture and in addition one of readiness for a counteroffensive in 1966, we would then think Hanoi might be ready for useful contacts. But it
appears highly risky to seek shortcuts such as the reftels propose, as they will encourage
and stiffen the resistance of the enemy and, if known, will be disastrous to our relations
with the GVN. Apart from all the foregoing considerations, this evidence of
overeagerness to negotiate will tend to defeat our purpose of leading Hanoi to the
conference table if only because the Communist leaders must necessarily oppose anything
that we are seeking.
With regard to specifics within the two proposals, we have further comments which we
would like to make if, in spite of the reasons set forth above, it is decided to pursue one or
both of these proposals.
Taylor

a.m.
58. For the President. This has been a relatively quiet week of orientation and
organization for the new government of Generals Thieu and Ky. We had our first
substantive session with its principal members at the joint US/GVN Council meeting on
Friday where we had a useful exchange of ideas on such subjects as desertion control, the
mobilization of paramilitary forces and the rice situation.
With regard to the latter, the GVN has established a central supply committee with full
powers to deal with the urgent logistical problems relating to the distribution of rice and
other commodities to population centers, generally to the north of Saigon where shortages
exist. In collaboration with our representatives, the committee is developing requirements
for commodity transport and then arranging for the most efficient combination of coastal
shipping, airlift and escorted truck convoys. The distribution problem is becoming
increasingly difficult as the Viet Cong exert mounting pressure on communications by
road and inland waterways as a part of the monsoon offensive.
In the course of this offensive, military action moved on at a slightly increased tempo over
last week with a high level of losses on both sides. During the week ending July 3, our
side lost 264 killed in action as against 881 Viet Cong killed. It is hard to believe that the
Viet Cong can stand indefinitely the effect of such losses which, on our side, have made
combat ineffective roughly the equivalent of two divisions. Government units in the II
Corps have been particularly chewed up and are going to need an injection of new vitality
which can only come from U.S. sources. I would expect General Westmoreland to seek
early employment of our troops in a strike role now that both the Marines and Airborne
Brigade have had time for acclimatization and experience in patrol contacts with the Viet
Cong. We shall watch very closely the effect of U.S. forces committed to these first
actions, expecting these early experiences to help us form some judgment as to their
effectiveness and hence the extent of the requirement for additional U.S. ground forces.
We had a short but pleasant visit from Eugene Black and his party. Although the timing
was not ideal because of the newness of the government, nevertheless it allowed him and
his colleagues to form some impression of the Viet-Nam situation.
Needless to say, we are looking forward to Bob McNamara's visit and the opportunity to
discuss directly with him the important problems which lie ahead.
Taylor
52. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Secret.
SUBJECT
Senator Morse's Proposals for UN Action on Viet-Nam
The papers Senator Morse has given you/2/ raise two basic questions:
/2/Presumably reference is to the Attachment to Document 10 and to Morse's June 29
memorandum to President Johnson in which Morse proposed that the United States ask U
Thant for a Security Council meeting on Vietnam. (Ibid., Confidential File, ND 19/CO
312)
(a) Whether it makes sense to use the UN to help bring about a conference on Viet-Nam;
and
(b) Whether an effort should be made to get a UN peace force into Viet-Nam.
With regard to (b), there has not been, and there is not now, a remote possibility to get a
UN peacekeeping force into Viet-Nam except as a part of a settlement with the
communists.
With regard to (a), I personally have discussed this further with Senator Morse,
Ambassador Dobrynin and Ambassador Stevenson.
Senator Morse seemed personally relaxed during my conversations with him/3/ and also
was unaware of the information which I could give him about the influences which we
thought the Russians were trying to exert to bring about some sort of negotiation or
discussion of Viet-Nam. He indicated that, at a recent dinner meeting with Drew Pearson
and Ambassador Dobrynin, the Ambassador had been asked point-blank what the Soviet
Union's attitude would be toward a Security Council call for a conference of the Geneva
powers to take up the question of Southeast Asia. He reported that Dobrynin had
answered that the Soviet attitude would depend upon prior talks between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. as well as on the manner of presentation to the Security Council. Senator Morse
seemed to think that this left some opening.
/3/Rusk met alone with Morse at 9:25 a.m. on July 2 for approximately 25 minutes. (Ibid.,
Rusk Appointment Book)
As you know from my memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin, I explored this with
Dobrynin last Saturday./4/ He flatly denied having made any such statement and reiterated
that the Soviet Union did not think that the Security Council was the proper forum to take
up any such proposal. We must anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Union would not only
oppose such a Security Council resolution but would be cast in the position of a harsh
advocate of the Hanoi position. There is obvious disadvantage in our forcing the Soviet
Union into an even more extreme position than they have taken, since we know there is
still some flexibility in the Soviet view of negotiation.

/4/Rusk met with Dobrynin at 11 a.m. on July 3. A memorandum of the conversation,
together with McGeorge Bundy's memorandum forwarding it to President Johnson on
July 4, is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol.
XII.
Today I discussed further UN action with Ambassador Stevenson./5/ He has the same
reservations which we in the Department have about the value of an all-out vindictive
debate in the Security Council at this time. However, we agreed to recommend for you the
following steps involving the UN:
/5/Rusk had a luncheon meeting with Stevenson on July 6. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment
Book)
(a) Stevenson will consult with U Thant about the desirability of a Security Council
resolution calling for a conference of the Geneva powers; U Thant could then sound out
the Soviet Delegation and ascertain directly whether there is any possibility of a Soviet
abstention rather than a veto.
(b) We might well now present in writing to the members of the Security Council a
periodic report on events since February (the date of our last report)./6/ In this way we
could recapitulate the various efforts which have been made to seek a peaceful settlement,
their rejection by the other side, and a summary of the situation as we see it. There could
be some value in a document of this sort which would be circulated to all the members of
the UN.
/6/For text of this report, dated February 7, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22,
1965, pp. 240-241.
(c) We would say to U Thant that if he wished himself, as Secretary General, to call for a
meeting of the Geneva powers, at which meeting the question of a cessation of hostilities
would be the first order of business, we would indicate our readiness for such a
conference. This would be entirely consistent with our basic view that we are prepared for
discussions without conditions.
(d) We would also say to U Thant that we could see some advantage in his undertaking
any private exploration which he could make with Hanoi, Peiping or Moscow to ascertain
whether there are any openings for a peaceful settlement. Such explorations might at least
indicate that he had been a possible channel if any of the parties had anything of interest
to say./7/
/7/In telegram 41 to Geneva, July 7, Rusk informed Stevenson (who was in Geneva for
the meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council) that he had sent these four
recommendations to the President for approval. (Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S) During a telephone conversation on July 7, Stevenson told Rusk that he had
talked that morning to U Thant, who said that the Soviet Union was "out of the Viet Cong
business" and Federenko had instructions not to discuss the matter with him. Thant said
that any suggestion for negotiation hinged initially on U.S. acceptance of Viet Cong
representation. Thant indicated that he would transmit a message to Hanoi proposing
negotiations. Rusk responded to Stevenson that the United States would not support such
an initiative. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
On July 8, Stevenson reported, in telegram 31 from Geneva, that in view of U.S.
opposition, U Thant would not put forward a negotiating formula that included the Viet
Cong as a separate party. In response to the possibilities outlined in telegram 41, Thant
said that he would talk with the Soviet delegation concerning a Security Council
resolution calling for a conference of the Geneva powers, but he anticipated that the
Soviets would insist on including the Viet Cong or would veto the resolution. (Ibid.,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
If you approve, we will proceed on points (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. I would recommend
that I give the gist of the above to Senator Morse orally,/8/ unless you believe that he
should be provided a written reply to his informal memorandum (Tab A)./9/
/8/My preference. [Footnote in the source text handwritten by Rusk.]
/9/Not printed.
Dean Rusk
Washington, July 7, 1965, 11 a.m.
SUBJECT
Telegrams on Negotiations with Viet Cong and Hanoi
1. I attach outgoing and incoming telegrams to Saigon/2/ on the subject of negotiations
with the Viet Cong and with Hanoi. The sum of their meaning is that Taylor and Johnson
vigorously oppose any informal approach to either the Viet Cong or Hanoi at this time.
They believe that such approaches are premature because of the tough summer ahead.
They think they are dangerous because of the effect of a leak on the Saigon government.
They think that overeagerness to negotiate "will nullify our past and present efforts to
convince the Communists that we have the will and determination to turn the tide against
them sooner or later."
/2/Attached were telegrams 41 and 42 to Saigon (Documents 46 and 47) and telegram 41
from Saigon (Document 50).
2. This reaction was largely predictable, but its strength is somewhat surprising.
Moreover, conversations with Lodge indicate to me that he has exactly the same view.
3. But the very same day we have a further message from Saigon reporting a contact made
by a southern Catholic [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./3/ [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] asserts that there is a whole wing of the Liberation Front
that is against Hanoi and in favor of some compromise solution. Since he is an influential
and respected Catholic, the Embassy takes his view more seriously than other earlier
reports of division in the Viet Cong. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is
exploring these divisions on his own, and the Embassy appears to be quite willing to keep
in touch with him. This may mark the bare beginning of contacts among Vietnamese in
the South that could be helpful.
/3/Telegram 44 from Saigon, July 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
McG. B.
54. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR,
Vol. II(A). Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McNamara. Repeated to CINCPAC
with instructions to pass to General Westmoreland, who was visiting CINCPAC
headquarters. The source text contains handwritten revisions by McNamara; see footnotes
2-4 below.
DEF 5319. Exclusive for Ambassador Taylor. From SecDef signed McNamara. The main
purpose of our visit will be to receive from you your recommendations for the number of
US combat battalions, artillery battalions, engineering battalions, helicopter companies,
tactical aircraft, and total military personnel to be assigned to South Vietnam between
now and the end of this year; the time schedule on which such forces are required; the
results which we can expect to achieve with such force levels compared to those of
alternative programs; the probable requirements for additional forces next year; and the
program of political contacts which you propose as a complement to your military
actions--we will wish to discuss possible additional political initiatives of our own, third
party initiatives, our dealings with the Soviets, and the possibility of some form of contact
with DRV and/or NLF./2/
/2/Before it was revised by McNamara, the latter part of this sentence read as follows: "we
will wish to discuss measures, including possible additional initiatives of our own, third
party initiatives, our dealings with the Soviets, and possibility of some form of contact
with DRV and/or NLF for psychological warfare and other purposes."
The two most basic questions we will ask in relation to your recommendations for
expanding US forces will be:
A. Assuming your proposals are fully accepted, what assurance do we have that with the
resulting force level we can/3/ prove to the Viet Cong they cannot win, and thereby force
them to a settlement on our terms?
/3/At this point, McNamara deleted the phrase "in a reasonable time."
B. Will large increases in the number and involvement of US combat units and military
personnel in South Vietnam cause the Vietnamese Government, and especially the Army,
to let up; will it create adverse popular reactions to our presence in the country?
Subsidiary questions will include:
1. How did you determine the number of US and ARVN battalions required to effectively
counter the current or prospective Viet Cong forces?
2. Where do you propose to station US combat units and where and how will they be
used; what casualties do you expect?
3. How long do you think it will take with your recommended forces (a) to seize the
initiative, (b) to prove to the Viet Cong that they cannot win, and (c) thereby to force them
to a settlement on our terms?
4./4/ Would it be wise to withdraw GVN military and paramilitary forces from certain
outlying or exposed positions in order to concentrate in positions of strength and to reduce
the penalties of the serious shortage of Government troops?
/4/McNamara deleted the original paragraph 4 and renumbered the subsequent
paragraphs. The original paragraph 4 read as follows: "4. How good and timely is our
intelligence as to VC locations and activities in SVN and in the corridor, and how can it
be improved?"
5. What reaction to the expansion of US and third-country forces do you expect from the
VC and the DRV?
6. Is the currently approved construction program adequate for the expanded force?
7. Is the current MAP program adequate?
8. What command arrangements do you propose for the expanded US force when engaged
in combat?
9. What program of military pressure (bombing, mining, etc.) against North Vietnam, in
terms of the types of targets, level of effort, etc., do you propose for the next six months
as a complement to your plan of action in the South?
10. How effective has been the bombing of the Laotian infiltration routes; what Laotian
bombing program do you recommend for the future in terms of specific targets and level
of effort?
11. How effective have been the B-52 strikes; assuming 800 B-52 sorties are available
each month, what bombing program do you recommend for the future in terms of specific
targets and level of effort?
12. Exclusive of B-52 sorties, how many strike sorties and how many reconnaissance
sorties per month do you recommend against targets in South Vietnam during the next six
months; are all of your current requirements being met; if not, why not; should we be
planning on additional airfields for South Vietnam and if so, by what date are they
required and where should they be placed?
13. What has been the trend of each of the major indicators (population control, area
control, desertions, weapons losses, terror incidents, price level, etc.) of the success or
failure of the counterinsurgency campaign over the past year?
14. How does the freedom of movement today over the railroads and the major highways
and waterways compare with that of a year ago?
15. What measures do we have of the success or failure of our efforts to prevent
infiltration of men and equipment by sea; has the recently expanded program reduced
such infiltration; if not, why not; are additional forces required?
16. Outline and appraise the effectiveness of alternative plans (including a barrier across
the 17th Parallel) for the use of US troops in Laos for the purpose of preventing
infiltration of men and equipment through that country into South Vietnam.
17. If you think it is possible militarily to cut off or very substantially cut down the
infiltration of North Vietnamese personnel and materiel from the North to the South,
when do you believe it will begin to have an important effect on VC activities and how
decisive will that effect be?
18. Has the Hop Tac Program/5/ succeeded; if, as it appears to us, it has not, review the
program in detail to throw light on the causes of its failure?
/5/Reference is to a plan developed by General Khanh in 1964 to concentrate military
resources in the Saigon area and progressively clear areas radiating outward from the
capital.
19. Outline the original plan for the expansion of the GVN military, paramilitary and
police forces; the progress to date against that plan; and changes, if any, which you
propose for the future.
20. Do you concur in the conclusions of the recent RAND study of the morale of VC
forces?x
/6/See Document 27.
21. How important is the monsoon to military operations and to the military balance, and
how should we expect military prospects to change when the monsoon ends?
22. Would it be possible to implement the Acheson Plan/7/ in the near future, starting in
the 4th Corps; is it feasible to initiate such a plan in a particular area before it has been
proven to the Viet Cong that they cannot win?
23. After the deployment of the recommended US forces, how would the GVN react to an
extended pause (six or eight weeks) in the bombing of the DRV?
24. Should we consider the imposition of press censorship after the expansion of US
forces?
25. What contacts do the South Vietnamese now have with the NLF and the DRV; what
additional contacts would you recommend that they or the US have with those parties or
the Soviets; how should such US contacts be initiated and with what notice to the GVN?
Assuming our party remains in Vietnam 4 or 5 days, certain members of the party,
including myself, probably should visit an aircraft carrier, the major US bases at Bien
Hoa, Da Nang, Phu Bai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Chu Lai, and Cam Ranh Bay, the 2d
Corps Headquarters in the highlands; and the Hop Tac area.
We hope it will be possible for us to avoid large ceremonial dinners. Instead, we should
like to dine with small numbers of Vietnamese, US or third-country nationals in an
atmosphere so informal that they will feel free to provide us their personal comments on
the Vietnamese scene.
Upon our return, we expect that important policy decisions will be made. These may well
require major legislative and executive action (including possibly the declaration of a
national emergency, the calling up of reserve forces, large additions to the Budget, etc.)
for which we wish to be fully prepared.
55. Notes of Meeting/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 150, Meeting of Foreign Affairs
Consultants. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy on July 10.
VIETNAM PANEL/2/
/2/The Vietnam panel was a sub-panel of the President's Panel on Foreign Affairs, a
senior advisory group of former military leaders and statesmen selected during the 1964
Presidential campaign. The group met for the first time, at the President's request, on July
8 at 11 a.m. in the Department of State to consider a variety of problems confronting the
administration. The group was divided for discussion purposes into panels on Vietnam,
Europe, and Latin America. The Vietnam panel consisted of General Omar N. Bradley,
John J. McCloy, Roswell Gilpatric, Arthur Larson, and Dr. George Kistiakowsky.
According to William Bundy, the idea of convening the advisory panel developed in early
June, and the President approved the suggestion at the beginning of July. The group
received extensive briefing materials on July 7, met in separate panels on the morning of
July 8, and met again for a joint discussion after lunch. President Johnson met in the
White House at 6:15 p.m. on July 8 with Dean Acheson, Arthur Dean, and Robert Lovett
of the Europe panel; John Cowles of the Latin America panel; and General Bradley and
McCloy of the Vietnam panel, and received the group's recommendations. (Johnson
Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 15)
This group consisted of Messrs. Bradley, Gilpatric, Kistiakowsky, Larson, and McCloy. It
met with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Thompson, and Mr. William
Bundy. The following are highlights:
1. Stakes and Objectives in South Vietnam.
The group, with the possible exception of Mr. Larson, felt that the stakes were very high
indeed. They concurred in the Administration judgment that Thailand could not be held if
South Vietnam were taken over, and they thought that the effects in Japan and India could
be most serious. They particularly felt that the effect in Europe might also be most
serious, and that de Gaulle would find many takers for his argument that the US could not
now be counted on to defend Europe.
They also felt that South Vietnam was a crucial test of the ability of the free world and of
the US to counter the Communist tactic of "wars of national liberation," and that a US
defeat would necessarily lead to worldwide questioning whether US commitments could
be relied on.
It was the feeling of the group that these consequences would be accentuated if the US by
its own decision withdrew from South Vietnam, of if the US suffered a military defeat
there. On the other hand, the group felt that the consequences would not be much reduced
if a Communist takeover took place as a result of a change in government in Saigon, as a
result of which the US was asked to leave.
Mr. Larson appeared to dissent from this assessment, in line with his over-all view that we
should be seeking UN action or serious negotiations (see para 4 below).
2. Increase of Combat Forces in South Vietnam
In line with their view of the grave stakes, the group generally felt that there should be no
question of making whatever combat force increases were required. Several members of
the group thought that our actions to date had perhaps been too restrained, and had been
misconstrued by Hanoi that we were less than wholly determined.
The group urged that, in connection with any decisions for further increases, there should
be a full spelling out of the military situation and the facts making the increases necessary.
One or two members of the group asked whether it was possible to undertake the closing
of the South Vietnamese border as a military operation. They appeared, however, to
accept Secretary McNamara's statement that this would be a very fast, major operation of
uncertain effect, and that the job had to be done within South Vietnam, including the
possibility of major forces in the plateau area--although this currently did not seem wise
because of the fact that the main operation route (Route 19) was cut in several places and
would have to be fully defended before forces could be sustained in the plateau other than
by air supply.
3. The Policy on Bombing of the DRV
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, and Ambassador Thompson, laid out the
various factors--particularly the question of Soviet reaction--that had led us not to hit
Hanoi and Haiphong. The consultants appeared to accept these points, and none pressed
for any early change in this policy. However, General Bradley did raise the question
whether we might not conduct individual raids on Hanoi and Haiphong in reprisal for
specific outrages in the South. It was noted that this should not be done for outrages
confined to Americans--but noted equally that most outrages were not likely to be of this
character.
4. Negotiating and International Actions
There was much discussion whether it would be useful to take the South Vietnam issue to
the UN. Mr. Larson argued at length for this course, but much of his discussion related to
whether it should have been done in 1961 before we went into the advisory build-up. At
the present time, Mr. Larson said that his soundings indicated that there would be much
support in the United Nations for a simple call for the convening of a Geneva Conference.
Others doubted whether there would not be hookers such as a demand for the cessation of
bombing. Mr. Larson himself did not see much use in convening the Geneva Conference,
and appeared to have in mind that the UN itself might act to introduce forces or police a
cease-fire. Others doubted very strongly that either of these was either practical or useful,
and Mr. Acheson and Mr. Dean were vehement on the subject in the later plenary session.
(Mr. Dean said that this was no time to "turn over our Far East policy to the UN.")
Mr. Larson's basic underlying view appeared to be grave doubt that we would get a truly
viable and democratic Vietnam even by causing Hanoi to pull out, and he repeatedly
queried whether what we might get as a "success" would be that much better than what
we might get now. Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that the real difficulty might be the
difference between a South Vietnam in which individuals now in the Viet Cong were free
to engage in political activity--which would certainly have its difficulties--and a South
Vietnam in which the Communist Viet Cong had become a part of a coalition government
and were highly likely to take over. The matter was not really developed in detail, but it
was clear that the group thought we needed to look hard at just what we did expect to
come out in South Vietnam--and equally clear that none of the other members of the
group were prepared to buy Mr. Larson's basic thesis.
As to going to the UN, it should be noted that several members of the group, while clearly
opposing Mr. Larson's line, thought that it might be useful at some time--perhaps in the
context of increased military commitments--to do this, in order to make clear again that
we were ready for negotiations. But the general feeling was that such a move at the
present time would not be useful and would be a dangerous sign of weakness. (General
Bradley particularly stressed this point.)
In the plenary session, Mr. Hoffman (who, like Mr. Larson, had apparently been having
extensive personal contacts in the UN corridors) more or less backed Mr. Larson's thesis
in favor of an early move in the UN. He thought it was essential to persuade the AfroAsian countries we were not acting as imperialists, and that many of them did have this
view. He specifically suggested a UN call for talks which would include the two
Vietnams, the US/USSR/UK/France/Communist China, but also the Liberation Front. The
plenary session did not pursue the question of dealing with the Liberation Front, but the
matter had been raised in the Panel, and the Panel members appeared to accept Secretary
Rusk's statement of the many strong reasons why this would be unwise and unproductive
in terms of real negotiations, and seriously damaging to the whole view of the war on
which our actions were based.
5. Prognosis of the Situation

Mr. McCloy spoke at some length--both in the Panel and in the later plenary session--on
the degree to which he had been impressed during the discussion with the toughness of the
situation. He thought that it was most unlikely that merely blunting the monsoon offensive
would bring Hanoi to a negotiating mood, and that the situation would probably remain
critical for a long time. He was particularly concerned that the Soviets might be brought
increasingly to what he called an "annealing" of the Sino-Soviet relationship, i.e., the
Soviets competing with the ChiComs and acting on parallel lines, although with no
necessary resolution of the basic policy differences between them.
While others did not express themselves at length on this question, it seemed clear that
Mr. McCloy's views had many takers both in the Panel and in the plenary session.
In the plenary session, Mr. Dean said that he thought there was a great deal of sentiment
in the country for doing whatever it took, if we were going to go on at all. Mr. Lovett
made the point that it was not useful to talk about "victory", that what was really involved
was preventing the expansion of Communism by force; in a sense, avoiding defeat. This
view seemed to be generally shared.
6. Specific Suggestions
The importance of local intelligence was particularly stressed by General Bradley,
including the importance of Americans throughout the countryside.
Mr. McCloy and others stressed the great importance of the closest possible contact with
our allies, and wondered if more could not be done particularly with the British, and, he
thought, the Germans.
Mr. Larson thought that it would be useful for the government, particularly as it took
further decisions, to spell out a number of points that had been bothering the public. He
specifically mentioned the legal justification for bombing in the North.
Mr. Cowles thought that government sources had consistently painted too rosy a picture
of the situation, and Mr. Lovett joined in this view.
Mr. Cowles thought that one highly popular move in South Vietnam might be for the
government to abolish taxes, with the US making up the deficit through increased
economic aid.

Saigon, July 13, 1965, 3:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated
to CINCPAC for POLAD.
123. Crop destruction. Following is evaluation of past crop destruction missions and
recommendations for new guidelines.

1. Evaluation. Rand Corporation has prepared preliminary report (being pouched)/2/ of
impressions of interviews with 33 VC captives and defectors who had experienced or
observed effects of defoliation and crop destruction. Report states that spray operations
have successfully destroyed crops grown by VC production units, further reducing already
scarce food supply for VC combat units and forcing VC to seek food elsewhere. On the
other hand, report states that spraying of crops belonging to civilians and popular belief
that sprays are harmful to humans have had "significant adverse effect" on population's
attitude toward GVN and US.
/2/Not found.
MACV, however, points out that Rand findings are based on comparatively small
sampling and that other intelligence sources do not support conclusion that adverse effect
of chemical crop destruction has been sufficiently extensive to be described as significant.
MACV also points out that Rand findings do not reflect procedures instituted recently to
assure that psywar operations planned in connection with herbicide operations are in fact
carried out.
MACV has drafted evaluation of crop destruction in three major VC areas since July
1964, which will be pouched as soon as staffing completed. According to MACV
evaluation, Binh Thuan operation (summer 1964) destroyed 80 percent of VC crops in
area, forcing VC into open to steal or purchase food. Psywar program drew 252 people
out of an area in which previous psywar efforts had been singularly unsuccessful. Psywar
teams successfully demonstrated to population that VC had failed to live up to their
promises of protection.
Phuoc Long and Phuoc Thanh operation (October 1964) destroyed 3085 hectares of VC
crops. There was confusion and lowering of morale among VC and supporters following
spraying, and reduction in VC ability to conduct operations. Fact that only three hundred
people were resettled from a much larger number of potential refugees attributed to lack
of more aggressive psywar program.
Binh Dinh operation (April-May 1965) destroyed 3145 hectares of VC crops. Three
hundred sixty people have been resettled, and many more are dissatisfied but forcibly
detained by VC, creating definite anti-VC feeling in area. This is substantiated by reported
murder of two VC cadre by villagers.
Available information, which thus far continues to be scanty, indicates following:
1. Chemical crop destruction has caused hardship to VC.
2. VC have attempted with limited success to turn peasant fear of unknown chemicals and
loss of food against GVN. But Rand report found no evidence population has joined VC
because of herbicide operations.
3. When VC experience food shortage, initial reaction is to make greater food demands on
population, who therefore frequently bear brunt of loss. But even if VC succeed in this
objective, it necessitates (a) creating ill will among peasant population through seizing
and taxing methods; (b) diversion of increased percentage of VC manpower from military
activity to food production; (c) in some cases movement of VC units into open area in
search of food, making them more vulnerable to GVN action and decreasing VC offensive
capability. Rand and MACV estimate one-third to one-half of VC manpower devoted to
food production.
Mission has come to recommendations below based on these findings and following
considerations:
1. Conditions of war are hardening. Areas tightly controlled by VC pose dilemma for
GVN forces which are faced with alternatives of (a) abandoning area and its population;
(b) striking with aerial bombardment and strafing; (c) undertaking ground operations
supported by air strikes and artillery; or (d) destroying food and thus starving VC and
population out. Viewed in this context, Mission considers chemical crop destruction poses
comparatively less risk to civilian population in area.
2. To be truly effective, operations must destroy all food in fairly extensive area.
3. Most effective areas for crop destruction are now northern and central highlands, which
are among most critical areas of expected VC summer offensive.
4. There will undoubtedly be some resentment on part of population whose crops are
destroyed. It is therefore crucial that this resentment be directed against VC rather than
GVN. Rand evidence indicates need still exists for increased psywar/civil affairs program.
MACV is actively pursuing this issue. Future operations will be approved here unless
increased emphasis on psywar support is planned in each operation.
Mission therefore recommends:
1. Extension of crop destruction operations sufficiently to result in major VC food denial.
2. That Department's guidelines (Deptel 1055, May 7, 1963)/3/ be amended to permit
operations in less remote and more populated areas, provided they are strongly VC
dominated and provided each operation offers significant military gain.
Taylor
/3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. III, pp. 274-275.
57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to
Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
CM-750-65
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A
1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam through 30 June 1965 (U)
1. (TS) US/RVN air activity against North Vietnam during June 1965 increased by
approximately one-third over that performed during May. During June, 86 strikes were
made against JCS-designated and special targets. Of these, 78 strikes were flown by US
aircraft and eight jointly flow by US/VNAF aircraft. In addition, 69 armed reconnaissance
missions were flown against LOCs, targets of opportunity, and coastal shipping.
2. (TS) During the reporting period, DRV MIGs reacted to the presence of our aircraft
over North Vietnam on two occasions, both actions resulting in air combat engagements.
The first engagement occurred about 45 nm south of Hanoi on 17 June between two Navy
F4B Phantom II jet fighters on barrier cap patrol over Thanh Hoa Bridge and Yen Phu
Barracks and four MIGs in loose trail formation. The release of a Sparrow AAM from
each F4B exploded two of the four MIGs. VHF intercept indicates a third MIG may have
been destroyed. Available data indicates the MIGs were engaged in routine training at
time of encounter, however, when visual contact was made the MIGs changed heading to
collision course with the US fighters. The fourth MIG was observed making direct
landing approach to Phuc Yen. In contrast, the second occurrence on 20 June, supported
by sequence of events, indicates a deliberate enemy interception effort by two MIG17/FRESCOs against four A1H Navy aircraft while providing air cover on SAR operation
for a downed USAF F4C earlier involved in air attack against Son La Barracks 100 nm
west northwest of Hanoi. During an approximate five minute engagement, the MIGs fired
unguided rockets at extreme range which burned out before reaching the A1Hs. One MIG
was hit and exploded upon crashing. In other activity, enemy reaction has been limited to
frequent, intense antiaircraft fire. US losses for the month were 14 aircraft. No VNAF
aircraft were lost in June. As of 30 June 1965, 55 US aircraft were lost in air actions
against North Vietnam.
3. (TS/NFD) Our air strikes have increased the time required for traffic movements from
Hanoi south and have reduced the capacity and flexibility of the national transport system.
Motor transportation and coastal shipping requirements have greatly increased. There are
some indications that concentration on internal needs has reduced the level of logistic
support to the Pathet Lao. The DRV has demonstrated the capability to infiltrate supplies
to SVN from the Haiphong area by sea. Movement of military supplies overland and
across water obstacles, especially Route 1A, with the advent of the monsoon season will
become increasingly difficult and may block routes into Laos. However, it is felt that the
capability of the PAVN to perform its mission of (1) defense of homeland, (2) to provide
training for its own forces and for infiltration forces for SVN and Laos, and (3) to provide
logistic support for its own forces and the Communist forces of SVN and Laos at the
present level of activity has not been effected to any appreciable degree. The reduction of
road capacity due to attacks of LOC targets in the southern part of the country has
however limited the ability of DRV to support any major offensive beyond its own
borders into Laos or SVN.
4. (S) The economic effects of the air strikes have been minor in relation to total economic
activity of North Vietnam. The combined effects of transportation difficulties, loss of
electric power, and disruption caused by actual or anticipated air strikes have probably
reduced the rate of total output of the GNP by only a few percentage points. The volume
of freight carried on the Thanh Hoa-Vinh rail lines was on the order of 440 short tons each
way per day, or less than five percent of the total tonnage carried by the entire railroad
system of North Vietnam. Three electric power plants, comprising about nine percent of
total national generating capacity, have been rendered inoperable and will probably
require at least 12-18 months for restoration. Viewed from the outside, the economic
effects of the air strikes do not seem to amount to much. However, Hanoi probably has a
different view. The damaged and destroyed bridges and power plants represent years of
construction work which was made possible only with foreign assistance. Costs of
reconstruction of the bridges, power plants, and POL storage facilities will represent about
four percent of total annual investment. However, the country is barely self-sufficient in
food, industrial output is small, and there are ambitious plans for economic expansion.
There are strains in all elements of the economy and any disruptions add to the serious
problems faced by the regime.
5. (S/LD/NFD) Assessment of the effect of our air activity on the attitudes of the North
Vietnamese Government and people is based on reports received by Free World sources
and from statements made by DRV officials and citizens. From an analysis of available
evidence there is nothing to indicate definitely that the bombings have caused either
physical damage or lowered morale to an extent that would compel the DRV to negotiate.
The bombings may be factors in some reports that the North Vietnamese Government is
perhaps slightly more willing to discuss a settlement. It might be conjectured, however,
that a concern for preventing escalation of hostilities is another factor--and a strong one in
the case of the Soviet Bloc pressure that is manifested in reported conversations in various
parts of the world. Postal intercepts indicate that despite some economic upset,
destruction, and suffering, there is a spirit of resistance to the air strikes.
6. (TS/NFD) In summary, the DRV still seems ready to endure further air strikes. DRV
logistic support problems in southern North Vietnam have increased and further reduction
of an ability to support external overt aggression has taken place. However, the strikes
have not yet reduced DRV over-all military capabilities to train and support covert
infiltration to South Vietnam. Preoccupation with their own internal defense, however,
has affected the level of their logistic support to the Pathet Lao. Similarly, expanded civil
defense duties, if prolonged, may prevent achievement of agricultural production goals--a
problem of chronic concern in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, the regime at this point
appears determined to persevere in its present course of action.
7. (U) At Tabs A through D are more detailed discussion of specific aspects./2/
/2/None printed.
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
58. Special Memorandum/1/

No. 18-65
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions &
Initiatives--Soviet. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of National
Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency. Forwarded to William Bundy by Sherman Kent
under a July 15 covering memorandum.
SUBJECT
Soviet Tactics Concerning Vietnam
SUMMARY
The new Soviet-DRV economic and military aid agreement implies a stepup in Soviet
arms shipments and will have the effect of deepening the Soviet commitment in Vietnam.
Partly in order to contain the risks of this commitment, the USSR has of late intensified
private approaches to the US, indicating continued interest in a negotiated settlement. At
the same time, it has threatened in low key to make trouble in Berlin if the US remains
unyielding in Vietnam. We believe that this combination of tactics is intended to deter
further US escalation in Vietnam. It is also meant to prepare for the time when
negotiations might become feasible, and the USSR can play a larger role in Vietnam.
[Here follows the 6-page estimate.]
59. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Moscow, July 15, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR. Secret; Exdis.
Transmitted as enclosure 1 of airgram A-120 from Moscow, July 22. The meeting was
held in Premier Kosygin's office in the Kremlin. Harriman sent a summary of this
conversation to the President and Secretary Rusk in telegram 138 from Moscow, July 15.
McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to the President on July 15, under cover of a
memorandum in which he noted that what was striking about the conversation was the
routine character of Kosygin's comments, including a standard exchange on Vietnam. A
notation on Bundy's covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII)
PARTICIPANTS
USSR
Premier Kosygin
M.N. Smirnovsky, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry
V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Foreign Ministry
US
Governor Averell Harriman
Ambassador Foy D. Kohler
Marshall Brement, Second Secretary
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
Premier Kosygin asked whether the U.S. seriously believed, "speaking in human terms
between ourselves," that there is a real legal government in South Vietnam. He said he
could not conceive of this. "You just can't believe this," he said. "Yet the U.S., for this socalled government, sheds the blood of its own soldiers and kills defenseless Vietnamese."
Governor Harriman reported that he did not want to dodge that question but that he
wished at that point to put another question on the table. Does the Soviet Union really
believe, he asked, that without the support and direction of the North Vietnamese there
would be a serious situation today in South Vietnam?
Kosygin stated that he would answer Governor Harriman's question. He said he was
thoroughly familiar with Vietnam and knew that the South Vietnamese would fight with
bamboo sticks, if necessary, against the current regime there. A rotten regime cannot last,
he said, and he offered to cite many examples from Russian history to prove his point.
This happened in 1905 and 1917 in Russia and is about to happen in Vietnam, he said.
Governor Harriman noted that the Vietnam situation was, of course, a major difference
between the USSR and U.S. which see this problem differently. He noted that agreement
had been reached on Laos between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev during
their Vienna meeting. He stated that he came here twice in 1963 to try and persuade the
Soviet Government that the North Vietnamese were violating the 1962 Geneva
Agreement by sending people and arms to Laos. Khrushchev, however, did not want to
talk about this and only stated that the Soviets were adhering to the Agreement and that
the USSR did not have any other responsibility in the matter. We are regretful, the
Governor stated, that the Soviet Union, as co-chairman, did not take a hand in stopping
this violation of the Agreement. In Vietnam we are absolutely certain that the NLF is
aided, abetted and directed by Hanoi, he said. There is no evidence whatsoever that the
NLF movement is really an indigenous uprising, or that the people of South Vietnam want
to be taken over by North Vietnam. We have an expression in English, "voting with your
feet." One million people left North Vietnam to go to South Vietnam in 1954, the
Governor said. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese have left their
homes in Viet Cong-dominated areas. It is true that it has been difficult to obtain political
agreement in South Vietnam because of internal frictions, largely between the Catholics
and the Buddhists. (As this last phrase was being translated into Russian Kosygin laughed
and said "this cannot be serious".) However, the Governor stated, not one of the rival
groups in South Vietnam stands for surrender to the North. We believe firmly that the
majority of people in South Vietnam want to remain independent and do not wish to be
taken over by the Ho Chi Minh clique. The President has stated that we are in favor of
elections there once the war is over. The very fact that there have been so many changes
of government in Saigon is evidence that we are not imposing our will on the Vietnamese
people. It is the people of Vietnam who must decide the future of their own government.
At this point Kosygin laughed again and said directly to Governor Harriman, "You don't
believe what you are saying."
Governor Harriman quickly replied that Premier Kosygin had hit on exactly the reason for
his presence in Moscow and that the Premier's reaction had been expressed so naturally
that Governor Harriman had to believe that it was a sincere reaction. Governor Harriman
stressed that what he had just been saying is the real belief of the President, his advisors,
Congress, and the American people. The Eisenhower Administration, he said, had made a
commitment to Vietnam in 1954 and all successive U.S. administrations had carried
through this commitment. What the U.S. is doing is in response to escalation from North
Vietnam. We believe, Governor Harriman said, in strict adherence to the 1954 Geneva
Agreement and we had adhered to it scrupulously. But starting in 1959 and 1960 terrorism
organized by the North Vietnamese had disrupted a country which had been making great
strides forward economically. This terrorist action and guerrilla warfare were in
accordance with the theories of Mao Tse-tung. Governor Harriman stated that it is
important for Kosygin to understand that we are not mistaken in our assessment of the
situation in South Vietnam. During the past 3-1/2 years we have captured many prisoners
and interrogated them. The weight of the evidence is overwhelming that on the orders of
Hanoi the terrorism in South Vietnam has been started, dormant Communist cells had
been reactivated and more and more people had been sent to the South from North
Vietnam. Now, regular units of the North Vietnamese army had been dispatched to the
South. The North Vietnamese seem to believe that they can win by force. However,
President Johnson has stated that the honor of the U.S. is involved in this struggle. We
deeply believe that we have proof beyond question that the NLF is not a spontaneous
liberation movement and that it would collapse if it were not supported by Hanoi. If the
Soviet Union is so sure that we are wrong, the Governor stated, then why not accept
President Johnson's proposal and discuss the situation. We could discuss the possibility
for future elections in Vietnam, he said. While this was not a proposal, it would certainly
be a topic which could be discussed at some possible future conference.
Kosygin stated that he was not authorized to negotiate on the question of Vietnam.
However, he said, since Governor Harriman had touched upon this matter, he would
speak his mind frankly. He said that he was profoundly convinced that Governor
Harriman did not believe what he had just said. The information presented was
completely at variance with reality. The U.S. knows that there is no duly constituted
government in South Vietnam, he said. There is only a clique of military men paid by the
U.S. which kills Catholics and Buddhists alike. Kosygin then cited desertions from the
South Vietnamese army as perhaps another example of "voting with one's feet." Our
information is good, he said. If the Vietnamese people were given a real chance to vote,
the Saigon clique would be thrown out. He had been to Vietnam, he said, and talked to
people there he trusted 100% and he believed them. How can the U.S. say that it is
helping the South Vietnamese? he asked. "This is a monstrous statement. You are killing
South Vietnamese. History will never forgive the U.S. for this crime. This will always be
a blot on the U.S."
Kosygin stated that he would like to offer for consideration one aspect of the Vietnam
situation which he had been thinking about. He stated that, as the U.S. knew, differences
exist in the international communist movement on questions of war and peace between the
Chinese and the Soviets. The U.S. was now doing all it could to prove the Chinese right
and the Soviets wrong on this question. "You follow pro-Chinese policies," he said. You
are responsible for tensions in the area and the peoples of the East are turning against you.
You only have your puppets there and by your actions and resistance to national liberation
movements you only prove the Chinese point that war is inevitable. This is my personal
view, he cautioned, and not for the press. He went on to state that the U.S. was trying to
prove that war is inevitable whenever national liberation movements arise. You are
thereby, he said, taking the view of those you profess to fight. You are taking a proChinese stand.
Governor Harriman stated that although the Premier's words were harsh, he appreciated
his speaking what was on his mind. Governor Harriman said that we have to speak frankly
and openly in order to move forward in solving the problems which confront us.
Kosygin replied that he had never said this to anyone else and he hoped Governor
Harriman would communicate his thoughts to President Johnson.
Governor Harriman stated that without sincerity we cannot solve the problems that face us
and he assured Premier Kosygin that he was utterly convinced that what he had told him
was the truth.
Premier Kosygin stated that if he had the time he was sure that he could convince
Governor Harriman that his own assessment of the Vietnam situation was the correct one.
You may be convinced of what you say, he said. "If so, your convictions are completely
erroneous, 100% erroneous. There are many disparate forces in South Vietnam, but by
your own cruelty, by your barbarism you are uniting the people of Vietnam against you. If
I were a Vietnamese, I myself would grab a stick and start to fight against you. By your
actions, he said, you are helping those who favor war in the world." Indicating another
engagement, he then stated he would like to bring the talk to a conclusion and asked
Governor Harriman whether he could offer any new hypothesis or proposal (1) to reduce
tensions in the world, or (2) to improve relations between the U.S. and USSR. "Or do you
have nothing to offer?" he asked.
Governor Harriman stated that Chairman Kosygin had put him in a difficult position by
asserting that the President is wrong. Chairman Kosygin had to acknowledge first of all,
he stated, that the President is sincere. You say you have been in Vietnam and know the
situation there, but you have been deceived, the Governor said. You must accept the
President's sincerity, he said, adding that he did not question Chairman Kosygin's
sincerity even though he knew him to be wrong.
Kosygin replied that he had not been deceived by anyone. "That is impossible." There are
other sources of information than the U.S. is aware of. Your crude (gruby) actions have
not only united the Vietnamese against you but will cause events in Vietnam to be
repeated throughout Southeast Asia. Talks such as this, he said, will not solve the
question. It will be solved, sooner or later by the people of Vietnam themselves. You
cannot win by buying governments. He stated he could buy "these puppets of yours"
tomorrow for one million dollars. And it is for these marionettes that you sacrifice the
people of Vietnam and your own people as well, Kosygin said.
Governor Harriman stated that he had come here in good faith and not to be abused. He
recalled that when he was Ambassador here during the war, Marshal Stalin once told him
that he accepted his sincerity because Governor Harriman had come to the Soviet Union
in the 20's in order to help the Soviet people. Governor Harriman reminded Chairman
Kosygin that he had had long experience with the leaders of the Soviet Union over the
years and that nobody until now had questioned his good faith. He stated that he himself
was not important. However, he vigorously stated that Kosygin must believe that the
President is completely sincere and has no intention of allowing Ho Chi Minh, supported
by the Chinese, to take over South Vietnam. We had faced a similar situation in Korea,
the Governor stated, and did not flinch there. Our actions in Vietnam are based on what
we believe to be incontrovertible evidence. The President is also absolutely sincere, he
said, in wanting to go to the conference table. This, however, should not be interpreted as
weakness. We must perhaps wait for Hanoi to realize that it cannot succeed in its efforts.
Once Hanoi realizes this, the Governor said, perhaps we can then have a conference and
come to some arrangement whereby the problem could be settled. In view of the Soviet
dispute with Peiping, he said, he would have thought that the USSR would not favor the
use of force as a means for the settlement of problems in the Far East. He assured Kosygin
that the U.S. will not stand by and see country after country fall under Peiping's heel. He
denied that those who supported the U.S. position in the Far East are "puppets", and
asserted that many peoples in the Far East sincerely support us. The U.S. fought a bloody
war with Japan in order to stop that country from taking over that area and it will not
stand by and let China accomplish what Japan could not. Governor Harriman pointed out
that we have great experience in the area and are well acquainted with the forces which
are at work there. The way to reduce tension between the U.S. and USSR he said, was
perhaps exemplified by India where both countries worked together to strengthen India's
capacity to resist Peiping's aggression. But the first step in reducing tension is for the
Soviet leaders to accept the sincerity and determination of the President, he said. Without
that, there is little left to talk about.
Premier Kosygin said that Governor Harriman was asking him to support President
Johnson but that this completely contradicts the Soviet view of the problem and would be
impossible for any humanist. Such an action could not be justified, he said. He stated that
the Soviet people approve the actions which the Soviet Government has taken to support
the Vietnamese and he was convinced that many American people do not support U.S.
Government policy in Vietnam. He said that the U.S. pilots who destroy defenseless
villages could not be considered heroes. No one could believe this, he said. "It would go
against the grain of any humanist, any communist."
Kosygin stated that when he had expounded his views, Governor Harriman had
interpreted them as somewhat insulting. He said that Governor Harriman had referred to
the fact that Stalin had valued his personal integrity. He stated that he had given Governor
Harriman no cause for personal pique and had not meant to impugn his integrity. He
added that he had been Deputy Premier during the war and knew how sharply Stalin could
speak. The Soviet Union stands firmly for peaceful coexistence, he said. This view is
shared by all Soviet leaders. The Soviets will continue this policy and will not embark on
any military adventures. It was for this reason, he stated, that he had asked Governor
Harriman whether the U.S. could offer any hypothesis to improve bilateral relations or to
settle the Vietnam problem.
Governor Harriman pointed out that discussions of the Vietnam situation were one
possibility. Since the Soviet Union was co-chairman, he said, it should be thinking of
finding ways to bring about negotiations. He emphatically stressed that President Johnson
had the support of his advisors, of Congress and of the American people in pursuing his
Vietnam policy. According to the latest public opinion polls in the U.S., 70% of the
people supported the President. He added that he had never suggested that the USSR was
in any way responsible for the acts of Hanoi and certainly not for those of Peiping.
Kosygin said that the U.S. should not think that a peaceful initiative in Vietnam would be
regarded as weakness. The French settlement of the Algerian war had been a sign of
strength. Kosygin added that the U.S. would be making a mistake in equating Peking and
Hanoi. He himself, he said, had talked to the Vietnamese leaders and knew that they do
not rule out a possible political settlement. "You must find a way, an approach, to bring
this about." He said that he had known Ho Chi Minh for more than thirty years and he
could assure Governor Harriman that Ho is a heroic representative of the Vietnamese
people, who love and admire him. The only way out in Vietnam is for the U.S. to start
talks with the Vietnamese themselves and find a solution for this affair. What else is
there? Fighting in Vietnam for many years to come will not help that country. He
reiterated that a peaceful initiative in Vietnam would never be considered by the Soviet
Union to be a sign of weakness and that the prestige of the U.S. would not sink if peaceful
initiatives were undertaken.
Governor Harriman replied that President Johnson is ready and anxious for talks but that
thus far Hanoi had shown no interest in them. If this was Kosygin's suggestion, he said,
then the U.S. will certainly follow it.
Kosygin replied that "waiting is all right, but people with the noise of bombs in their ears
are not anxious to negotiate."
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

Department of State
Washington, DC

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Drafted on
July 24 by Manfull. Transmitted as enclosure 1 of airgram A-66 from Saigon, July 27.
The meeting was held in the Prime Minister's office. The McNamara party arrived in
Saigon on the morning of July 16 and returned to Washington on the afternoon of July 20.
Members of the party included McNamara, Lodge, Wheeler, Goodpaster, McNaughton,
Sylvester, Unger, Cooper, and Colby. Unger replaced William Bundy, who withdrew
from the trip because of illness.
PARTICIPANTS
GVN:
General Thieu
General Ky
General Chieu
General Co
General Khang
General Thang
Tran Van Do
Truong Tai Ton
Bui Diem
US:
Secretary McNamara
Ambassador Taylor
Ambassador-designate Lodge
General Wheeler
General Westmoreland
General Goodpaster
Ambassador Johnson
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Sylvester
Mr. Unger
Mr. Cooper
Mr. Zorthian
Mr. Herfurt
Mr. Manfull
SUBJECT
Meeting with GVN
Opening Remarks:
General Thieu welcomed Secretary McNamara and his party. Thieu said after three weeks
of its existence the GVN has perhaps not succeeded in producing spectacular results;
however, by the firm stand the GVN has taken, the religious and political groups appear to
endorse the GVN program and are quiescent./2/ The GVN had first sought to make clear
to the people that the new government would be resolute in prosecuting the war, in
winning ultimate victory over the VC, and in bringing peace with freedom to South VietNam. Secondly, the new government is attempting to push forward vigorously with the
war effort in the countryside and to organize the people in the rear. In order to generate
popular support emphasis has been placed on bringing to the people a greater measure of
social justice. The GVN has attempted to do this by "cleaning up" the organization and
administration in Saigon and the countryside, by applying an austerity program, and by
focusing attention on corruption and taking measures to eliminate corruption. Further, the
GVN believes that "it is time to think of North Viet-Nam and to creating a psychological
situation there so that the Vietnamese people in the DRV can help themselves to fight
communism."
/2/In telegram 164 from Saigon, July 16, the Embassy reported that Buddhist leader Tri
Quang had informed the Embassy that he could not support the Ky government and was
considering what course of action to take. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S) The Department
responded, in telegram 166 to Saigon, July 17, with concern that Quang's attitude might
presage renewed Buddhist unrest, and instructed the Embassy to call on Quang and
inform him that additional political turmoil in Saigon could only serve to aid the Viet
Cong and undermine the will of the South Vietnamese to resist the Communists. (Ibid.)
General Thieu noted that Secretary McNamara and other representatives of the U.S.
Government would have an opportunity for fact-finding. For its part, the GVN would like
to hear from Secretary McNamara and others an expression of U.S. policies so that the
GVN and U.S. could coordinate their policies to better effect and win the war. General
Thieu observed that up to now the GVN had tended to present its own point of view and
had perhaps not sought an adequate degree of coordination with the Americans. He felt it
was necessary to achieve better coordination in the future. To that end in the discussion to
follow the GVN spokesman would try to be as honest as possible in presenting the GVN
point of view.
General Thieu then called on Truong Tai Ton, Minister of Economy and Finance, to
present a review of the economic situation and proposals concerning U.S. aid to VietNam.
Economic:
Mr. Ton made the following presentation:
General Considerations.
1. We are in a total war. The Government of Vietnam endeavors to safeguard a sound and
viable economy along with the ever-growing military efforts. It is essential that exertions
in the military field do not impede economic stability. Galloping inflation could be as
catastrophic as a military disaster.
Our objective is twofold: to win the war and not to lose peace.
2. The Government of Vietnam has already started to implement a series of measures
designed to re-establish the national economy and put it on a war-basis: Organization of
supply, rice marketing, formation of safety stocks, reorganization of the market,
intensification of the tax efforts, budgetary thrift, etc.
Those efforts are nevertheless far from sufficient in view of the increasing burdens we
have to face. A substantial increase of American economic aid is therefore necessary to
the simultaneous carrying out of the war effort and the maintenance of economic stability.
3. According to reiterated statements of U.S. leaders, American economic aid to Vietnam
is unlimited and unconditional.
From the Government of Vietnam point of view this aid must have the following
characteristics:
a) It has to be proportional to the intensification of the military efforts, that is to
approximately match the increase of our budgetary expenditures (from 1960 to 1965, this
increase is only due to military burdens).
So our budget has more than trebled between 1960 and 1965, going from 15 to 47 billion
whereas commercial aid (CIP-PL 480) has stood at the same level. Consequently, in spite
of efforts aimed at increasing our own revenues, our budget which was still in equilibrium
in 1961/62 has shown a deficit of 12 billion in 1964 and 23 billion in 1965.
b) It must enable us not only to continue the war somehow or other but also to keep
ourselves in a fairly good position to face peace.
As far as we are concerned the war effort must be total. It should not, however, bleed the
country dry of all its financial resources so that we are completely unprepared to face the
hour of peace.
But the tremendous deficit of our budget, the continuous decrease of our reserves in gold
and foreign exchange (U.S. dollars 175 million in January 1964, US dollars 100 million in
July 1965) plus difficulties of all sorts generated by the war, are about to jeopardize our
economic security. This trend is on the increase and will inevitably lead us to an economic
crisis, unless American aid adequately supplements our own efforts.
Proposals.
4. CIP 1965/1966.
a) The Commercial Import Program (CIP) for FY June 1965-June 1966 should be brought
up to a minimum of US dollars 200 million. To make its absorption possible, more
flexibility and greater eligibility are necessary (to be negotiated between the Ministry of
National Economy and USOM).

b) The CIP is primarily aimed at securing piasters for our budget support. One million
U.S. dollars generate roughly 80 million VN piasters. Ten billion piasters are needed to
compensate entirely for the increase of military expenditures between 1964 and 1965
(from 17 to 27 billion). This would require an additional amount of 125 million US
dollars, that is a total CIP of 125-135 (1964/1965 level) = 260 million in FY 1966.
c) The increase of CIP amount will also permit us to establish necessary safety stocks.
5. PL 480.
It is requested a total programmed at about 60 million US dollars, with the permission to
buy between 100,000 and 150,000 tons of rice in order to establish a permanent safety
stock in Saigon to supply the capital and central provinces with rice.
6. Direct Aid.
We entirely support the policy consisting of buying in-country all goods which can be
produced locally. However, in terms of direct aid, we don't agree with the in-country
purchase of imported goods under the CIP program because such purchases will decrease
the CIP amount.
7. Balance of Payments.
Our export situation has deteriorated because of security conditions. Export earnings
decreased from 80 million US dollars in 1963 to 35 million in 1965 due to the suspension
of rice exports and the lessening of other exportable surpluses. At the same time we had to
spend our own foreign exchange stock in order to get piasters for the budget and not to
disturb the market.
The amount of our reserves has lowered in an alarming way (100 million of gold and
foreign exchange compared to 175 million in January 1964). At this conjuncture of
intensive military effort as well as economic and political tension, a more accentuated
decrease will run the risk of destroying confidence in our currency and creating a panic.
This will, in a short time, be prejudicial to all military political and economic gains thus
far obtained with so much struggle.
It is, therefore, suggested that American aid take emergency steps, put US dollars at our
disposal to enable us to restore our reserves to the level of 150 million, a sum which we
deem minimal to the protection of our currency.
8. Exchange of US Dollars.
The rush of US military men and their expenditures in US dollars have seriously disturbed
our economy. The black market flourishes. Dollars introduced in the black market then
feed illegal transactions (illicit trading of foreign exchange, smuggling, flight of assets,
and, undoubtedly, even VC financial operations). The value and sovereignty of our
currency are at stake.
On the other hand, those expenditures in US dollars are harmful to the American soldiers
themselves: due to the absence of coins, they have to pay at the minimum price one US
dollar for a glass of beer, a haircut or a taxi drive whereas the real price is only between
VN piasters 10 and 30.
American authorities should help us stem the black market of dollars, make the exchange
of dollars with piasters at the free market rate and not at the black market rate./3/ This
could be viewed as an increased contribution of the United States to the war effort and the
strengthening of the Vietnamese economy.
/3/In a later meeting between McNamara and Ky on July 16, Ky singled out the black
market currency question and the supply of rice as the two most important economic
problems that his government faced. (Telegram 167 from Saigon, July 17; ibid., FN 17
VIET S) In telegram 168 to Saigon, July 17, a joint
State/AID/Treasury/DOD/Agriculture/BOB message, instructions were sent to the
Embassy concerning exchange rate negotiations designed to bring the black market
problem under control. (Ibid., FN 10 VIET S) After lengthy negotiations, the Embassy
reported on August 18, in telegram 521 from Saigon, that tentative agreement had been
reached with the South Vietnamese Government on diverting dollars out of the black
market into legal channels. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon
Embassy Coordinator Files: FRC 68 A 5612, FN 17)
9. The Presence of US Military Men and Economic Activities.
The presence of an important number of US military men has brought about a vertiginous
rise in the cost of labor (100%) and the prices of some products. It is suggested that a
joint-committee strive to study economic problems generated by the above US presence
and that US officials agree with the Government of Vietnam about their wage-policy.
Military:
General Co said that the military briefing would be in three parts: (1) Additional GVN
force requirements for the remaining months of 1965 and early 1966; (2) a few
considerations and recommendations concerning future strategy and conduct of the war;
and, (3) a concept for organization of the "home guard" forces. General Co then turned the
briefing responsibility to General Thang, who spelled out additional force requirements as
follows:
For the ground forces-3 additional airborne battalions
4 additional Marine battalions
7 Ranger task force headquarters elements
For the Air Force-1 squadron of jet aircraft
1 squadron of A1H's
For the Navy--
1 AKA
5 LSD's
5 LSM's
In explaining the background of this additional request, General Thang noted that the
present general reserve consists of 11 battalions, of which 6 are airborne and 5 are Marine
battalions. Six of the 11 have been deployed in I Corps and II Corps to meet the step-up in
VC activity in the highlands; 1 airborne battalion suffered over 50 percent casualties in
the Dong Xoai battle and is not combat ready. Therefore, only four battalions can be said
to be available in the general reserve. In order to meet this critical situation U.S. support
for formation of additional battalions as indicated above is urgently requested. The GVN
realizes that this additional request is not part of the 85,000 increase previously agreed
upon. General Thang believed the additional battalions could be recruited without running
into the manpower problem because: (a) operational losses (casualties) are relatively
lower with these types of units than in the regular ARVN battalions; (b) the desertion rate
is lower; and, (c) recruitment to activate the additional battalions in Saigon and the other
urban areas is generally easier for these units and should not prove too difficult. General
Thang observed that there has been an evolution in regard to the Rangers, beginning with
the formation of Ranger companies, then Ranger battalions, then a reinforcement of the
Ranger battalions with heavy weapons, and now there is a need to operate the Rangers as
2-3 battalion task forces. This will require augmentation of the Ranger battalion
headquarters elements.
With regard to present and future strategy, General Thang said that the situation in I Corps
and IV Corps is relatively good. In IV Corps initiative rests with the GVN because of the
aggressive spirit of the troops and a terrain adapted to helicopter and M-113 operations. In
I Corps the situation was relatively good and could be improved if the U.S. Marines were
committed more actively to search and destroy operations. II Corps he considered as
critical because of the introduction of the entirety of the 325th PAVN Division. Thang
said that the JGS had now confirmed all regiments of the 325th Division were now in
South Vietnam. He therefore requested that the U.S. dispatch a U.S. Assault Division to
help meet this critical situation. Thang noted that the situation in III Corps was not good.
The 5th Division is low both in morale and effective strength because of the recent series
of battles with the VC. The GVN would like to have the 1st U.S. Infantry Division
assigned to this area after the U.S. Assault Division is in place in the highlands. Thang
foresaw a series of large engagements and VC attacks in the immediate weeks ahead.
General Thang said that in the GVN's view Hanoi had two general courses open to it:
(1) To make major effort during the monsoon season but eventually to realize that the VC
victory was impossible and to sue for a cease-fire; and
(2) To increase their infiltration and recruitment and make an all-out effort to cut off the
highlands from the rest of South Vietnam.
Thang believed that general objectives should be to (a) stop and destroy units coming
from DRV into South Vietnam; (b) destroy all major VC main force units in the highlands
and Central Vietnam; and (c) protect the Vietnamese manpower in South Vietnam to
inhibit VC recruitment and exploitation of the manpower pool. Therefore, the GVN/US
should continue bombing attacks against targets in the DRV and increase the tempo and
intensity of the air strikes. With respect to (b) above the U.S. should commit an Assault
Division to the highlands and other combat troops from third countries should be
deployed there. With regard to (c) above GVN/US should think seriously concerning
intensified pacification program to protect the manpower resources. The GVN should
commit ARVN primarily to this task and deploy Vietnamese units along the coastal
lowlands and in the Delta. Under this concept, there would be two general areas--one area,
the populous areas where GVN would devote its primary efforts; the other, the relatively
unpopulated areas where the US/allied forces would concentrate their efforts, it being
understood in the latter case that administration for the large cities and district towns
would remain with the GVN. The primary missions of the US/allied forces would be
search and destroy operations and the protection of important bases. The primary mission
of ARVN would be to engage in pacification programs and to protect the population.
If this concept were approved the GVN would suggest that a US Air Assault Division be
deployed to an area comprising Kontum, Pleiku and Phu Bon; another Division to operate
against Zones C and D. This would require an additional Division for the BanmethuotPhuoc Thanh area.
With regard to the organization of a home guard, Thang observed that all were agreed that
the war cannot be won by military means alone, and that all Vietnamese must take part in
the war. This implies that Vietnamese not on active military service be organized into
groups. Thang alluded to efforts under the Diem regime to organize the Republican Youth
and Combat Youth and under General Nguyen Khanh to create civil defense organization.
The proposed home guard is conceived to be comparable effort and GVN intends to
mobilize all males between ages 15-48 and all females between 18-30. Thang said that the
chain of command for the home guard would be incorporated in that for the Regional
Forces/Popular Forces down to the hamlet level. It is anticipated that the home guard
would have special uniforms and insignia and that selected members would be armed.
Thang requested the U.S. to assist the GVN in developing a realistic plan for the home
guard and the necessary support to get it launched.
Questions:
General Thieu requested the U.S. representatives to study the GVN proposals and
inquired whether there were any questions. Secretary McNamara inquired as to the
approximate number of U.S. personnel which the GVN desired to have in South Vietnam.
Thieu replied that the GVN proposal involved the 44 additional U.S. battalions previously
requested plus one more infantry division. Secretary McNamara observed that we have
approximately 75,000 U.S. personnel in South Vietnam at present and the GVN request
would bring this figure to approximately 200,000 U.S. personnel in-country. Secretary
McNamara inquired whether the Vietnamese people would readily accept an American
presence of this magnitude. General Ky said he anticipated no real problems and General
Thieu added that it would be necessary to explain carefully to the Vietnamese people that
U.S. personnel were in South Vietnam only to help fight the war. Thieu believed that most
Vietnamese did not consider the U.S. as having any colonialist aspirations but he thought
the GVN should embark on an extensive propaganda program to explain U.S. presence.
Thieu continued that if U.S. forces were concentrated in separate military zones away
from the major population centers and areas of dense population that the impact of
American presence could be minimized. He said that this consideration was fundamental
in suggesting that U.S. forces operate in the highlands and against Zone C and D. Further,
the terrain in these areas is difficult and U.S. availability of helicopter lift and mobility
would be additional assets. Thieu observed that up to now the GVN had never had
necessary military strength nor the time to conduct a really effective pacification effort in
the populated areas. He believed that a concentration of GVN attention to this effort made
good sense.
Secretary McNamara said that many Americans asked him whether, if the U.S. were to
send up to 200,000 troops, we could count on a stable government in South Vietnam.
General Thieu replied that in the past there were two general reasons for political
instability: (a) previous governments did not have a clear policy and were not strong
enough to carry out their announced policies; and (b) previous governments found that
after 3-4 months they have been unable to sustain VC attacks and at the same time to
bring social justice to the people. He believed that if U.S. troops were to relieve ARVN to
work actively on a pacification program, the current government could demonstrate to the
people that it is capable and qualified to govern. He added that he would intend under the
new home guard organization to train good political and pacification cadres for the
pacification program.
Secretary McNamara inquired as to possible VC actions particularly whether the VC
might increase their strength substantially and what the GVN and U.S. should do in this
event. General Thieu responded that he felt it was more difficult for the VC to increase its
strength now than in the past. While VC ranks can be increased through infiltration, we
can inhibit this through stepped up bombing of infiltration routes. However, at the present
time, at least half of the manpower of South Vietnam is controlled by the VC. It is
therefore essential that the GVN take steps to bring this manpower pool under GVN
control.
Secretary McNamara noted his surprise at the elimination of the Chieu Hoi ministry in the
current government and inquired whether the GVN had a program comparable to the
Chieu Hoi program. Thieu replied that the Chieu Hoi program continues but that the
Directory believed that it belonged more properly under the PsyWar Ministry than as a
separate ministry. By bringing Chieu Hoi within the PsyWar Ministry, the GVN had not
intended in any way to denigrate its importance. General Ky underlined these remarks,
stating that all agree on the importance of Chieu Hoi and the need to put more emphasis
on this program. However, he believed it was more important to have the Chieu Hoi
program as part of a more general program to bring the people back under GVN control.
With regard to governmental stability, General Ky stated that the Vietnamese also long
for a strong, stable government. He said that the current government would do its best to
maintain stability. The GVN desired more U.S. troops not because the Vietnamese were
unwilling to continue the fight but that it would relieve ARVN for important pacification
tasks. He added that the GVN did not like to lose terrain to the VC, therefore it was
suggested that the US/allied forces help hold terrain while the GVN "reorganized the
rear". General Ky said the reason for government instability in the past has been primarily
the lack of social justice. At present corruption exists everywhere, the rich get richer while
the mass of the poor Vietnamese see little hope for improvement. The mass of Vietnamese
are therefore very vulnerable to VC propaganda. In his view previous governments had
based their support primarily on the promises of support from minority groups, such as
the religious sects and groups of politicians. In contrast, the current government intends to
emphasize support of the mass of the Vietnamese, particularly of the poor Vietnamese,
and to give them a sense of hope and confidence in the future. Ky said the GVN would
ask for more sacrifices from the people and the members of the government were
prepared to make their individual sacrifices. The GVN considers the political and
religious groups as being merely individual Vietnamese citizens and not as groups which
could validly claim a controlling voice in government policies. It was necessary for the
Vietnamese to unite on one road to victory. In this connection none of the Ministers in his
government represented any particular group or faction and they were deliberately chosen
for this reason. Ky said the GVN hoped to satisfy U.S. public opinion concerning
governmental stability by making the government strong and stable enough to carry out
this announced policy.
In conclusion Secretary McNamara thanked the GVN participants for their frankness. He
said that the discussion had been most helpful and that he looked forward to further
discussions in the succeeding days.
61. Telegram From Acting Secretary of Defense Vance to Secretary of Defense

McNamara, in Vietnam/1/
/1/Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/General Counsel Files: FRC 75 A
62, Box 55, Binder 35, SecDef Cable Files. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only. Sent to
MACV headquarters in Saigon with an instruction to the Duty Officer to deliver it
personally to McNamara only. The source text has a stamped indication that Secretary
McNamara saw it.
172042Z. Yesterday I met three times with Highest Authority on actions associated with
34 battalion plan. In summary, he stated:
1. It is his current intention to proceed with 34 battalion plan.
2. It is impossible for him to submit supplementary budget request of more than $300-400
million to the Congress before next January.
3. If a larger request is made to the Congress, he believes this will kill domestic legislative
program.
4. We should be prepared to explain to the Congress that we have adequate authority and
funds, by use of deficit financing, $700 million supplemental and possible small current
supplemental, to finance recommended operations until next January, when we will be
able to come up with clear and precise figures as to what is required.
I asked Highest Authority whether request for legislation authorizing call-up of reserves
and extension of tours of duty would be acceptable in the light of his comments
concerning domestic program, and he stated that it would.
I pointed out that we would have great difficulties with Senator Stennis concerning this
course of action. He said that he recognized that we would but we would just have to bull
it through. He requested that I talk to Senator Russell on Monday,/2/ and I will do so.
/2/July 19.
I have talked to Charlie Hitch and Paul Ignatius about this, and the three of us will
determine whether we can achieve what Highest Authority desires. I have also talked to
McGeorge Bundy but do not plan to mention it to anyone else.
In meantime, planning exercise is proceeding according to schedule and we expect to
have plans completed for your review upon return. Also expect to send you draft
Presidential message and draft speech by back channel cable/3/ this weekend. Signed
Vance.
/3/Not found.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
a.m.
182. For Bundies from Cooper and Unger. Summary state of play at the half follows:
Re military situation--briefing on GVN plan for utilization US military forces and
disposition provided by General Thieu and ARVN J-3. Briefly, GVN contemplates US
force of 200,000 with 3 US divisions to take over responsibility for highlands in II Corps
and defense of major US bases and installations throughout country. ARVN would
concentrate on pacification primarily in populous sections throughout country. GVN also
unveiled Home Guard plan with sketchiest explanation.
MACV and visiting team disinclined to accept GVN concept. MACV concept will be
reflected in McNamara team and US Mission recommendations now in preparation.
Team given intensive briefings on MACV strategic and tactical situation and logistic
requirements. Biggest bottlenecks appear to be in sea interdiction. McNamara is
formulating recommendations to break this and other binds. Thus far little opportunity
discuss pacification/rural reconstruction with either GVN or MACV.
Re economic situation--excellent briefings by acting USOM Chief and GVN Minister of
Economic Affairs point up danger of incipient inflation, shortages of key commodities
(e.g., rice, building materials) labor scarcities, black market and transportation
bottlenecks. Recommendations to deal with these and some major policy proposals to
cope with over-all GVN weakness will be incorporated in team report (some suggestions
will be forwarded to Washington prior to team's departure).
Re political situation--Meeting with Thieu, Ky et al., subsequent informal conversations at
dinner, additional sessions yet to come, and intensive series of Unger-Cooper meetings
with cross-section political types in and out of government should provide reasonably
good feel of political scene. Initial, tentative impressions: Thieu and Ky appear to take
pains to present collective front. Both make the right noises about solidarity, stability,
revolution, Chieu Hoi, etc. Both convey sense of sincerity and determination, although
both (especially Ky) seem to be concentrating on the daily quick-fix and neither seems to
have yet harnessed the resources (if indeed they exist) to work out fundamental, solid
plans for the longer term. Possibly excluding Co, other members of GVN's first team,
especially Econ Minister seem quite impressive.
Visitors have pressed GVN hard for their estimate of reaction to large US forces (no basic
problem, but same underlying worries re black market etc.), Chieu Hoi (they say the right
things, but see below), government stability (Ky and Thieu stress reliance on support of
mass of citizens rather than individual groupings--neat trick if they can do it) and
representation abroad (they are working on it, but no immediate progress seems in sight).
In short, we want to probe more before coming to any firm conclusions.
Re Chieu Hoi--Ky claims he has given this program increased importance by combining it
with rural reconstruction. He also claims that statistics of increased numbers of ralliers
have been either inflated by provincial Chieu Hoi officials or are meaningless because the
VC itself has used Chieu Hoi centers as "rest camps".
In session with Chieu Hoi investigation team (Col. Jacobson et al.) Unger and Cooper got
impression that program not doing too badly despite apparent massive indifference on part
of GVN. Jacobson is preparing tentative conclusions and recommendations for
incorporation in McNamara team report (final report of survey will not be available for a
month).
Miscellany--Lodge and Cooper went to Cam Ranh Bay this morning and both extremely
impressed with pace and scale of construction of logistics base. Unger to Hue to get
provincial impressions. Embassy morale high, even inspiring. Hertz case cooking. CAS
more optimistic of release (perhaps this week) than any time since February.
Taylor
Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking. The President put a line through the entire
memorandum, crossed out the third point, and wrote at the bottom, "Rewrite eliminating
3." Bundy submitted the rewritten memorandum to President Johnson on July 23 under a
covering memorandum stating: "This is a revised version of an earlier paper, but it may
clearly be out-of-date." The revised version was identical to the memorandum printed
here except for the omission of the third point. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
The Reasons for Avoiding a Billion Dollar Appropriation in Vietnam
1. It would be a belligerent challenge to the Soviets at a time when it is important to do

only the things which we have to do (like calling reserves).
2. It would stir talk about controls over the economy and inflation--at a time when
controls are not needed and inflation is not that kind of a problem.
3. It would create the false impression that we have to have guns, not butter--and would
help the enemies of the President's domestic legislative program.
4. It would play into the hands of the Soviets at Geneva, because they could argue that it
was a flagrant breach of the policy of "mutual example" on defense budgets.
5. It is not needed--because there are other ways of financing our full effort in Vietnam for
the rest of the calendar year, at least.
McG. B.
Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Planning at Close of Business, July 19
We currently expect Bob McNamara back at 8 a.m. Wednesday./2/ We assume you will
want to see him that morning--or possibly that afternoon after he has had time to take a
reading with Rusk and Vance. The attached cable from Cooper and Unger (Tab A)/3/
shows where they are at half time in Saigon.
/2/July 21.
/3/Document 62.
Meanwhile, Vance has gone ahead with planning for the reserve call-up, the extension of
tours, and the increased draft calls which are foreshadowed in the military planning. A
first draft exists of a Presidential message and of the necessary legislation./4/ The planned
reserve call-up will be one Marine Division and six Army Reserve Brigades (a total of 27
battalions). Beyond this, there would be temporary additions to the active forces of 27
battalions (nine Marine and 18 Army), plus a permanent addition of nine more Army
battalions. This makes a total addition of 63 battalions. (At Tab B is a one-page statement
of current planning which Cy Vance regards as very tentative and which Bob McNamara
has not had a chance to approve.)
In addition, my brother has drawn up an action checklist for Congressional and diplomatic
steps./5/ We will have appropriate messages for all foreign leaders. Some should go early
in the game, as soon as you know your own mind. Others should wait until after public
announcement of your plans--presumably in a message to the Congress.
/5/Checklist of Actions, July 17. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History,
Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam)
Indeed the timing of the message to the Congress is really the D-Day for the whole
operation. If McNamara reports to you Wednesday, you probably do not wish to give an
appearance of great haste in reaching a decision, and for that reason I would recommend
against going to the Hill before the first of the week. But a delay beyond Monday would
seem to me to create too wide a gap between McNamara's return and the point of
decision. If you agree, we might tentatively plan that you would see McNamara
Wednesday, see him again with a view to decision Friday, and talk with the Congressional
Leadership either Friday or Saturday to get ready for a formal message on Monday.
At the same time, it is increasingly urgent that we get ahead with planning for public
support. Doug Cater is ready to go ahead with plans to provide speech materials to
friendly Senators and Congressmen, and everyone is ready to go ahead with the Citizens
Committee as soon as you give the signal. I continue to think that Arthur Dean would be
an excellent choice for us, but he is by no means the only possibility.
I have suggested to Jack Valenti that Rusk and Vance and I have lunch with you
tomorrow, or come in at any other time at your convenience to review the bidding on all
these matters. You have just agreed to this, and I have told Marvin./6/
/6/The final sentence initially read: "I will call in the morning to learn your pleasure." It
was revised in Bundy's hand after his conversation with the President. The Marvin to
whom he refers is Marvin Watson, a Special Assistant to the President.
McG. B.
Tab B/7/
/7/Top Secret. The source text bears the date "7/19/65" in the top right corner.
PROPOSED 63 BATTALION PLAN
1. Purpose
A. Reconstitute ASAP by calling up reserves substantially all elements of US ground
combat forces introduced into SVN under 34 + 10 Bn Plan.
B. Make certain temporary and permanent additions to active ground combat forces (by
draft increases, volunteers and tour extensions).
2. Combat Ground Forces Involved:
A. Call-up of reserves (27 Bns):

4th Marine Div, including air elements (9 Bns): combat ready in 60 days
6 Army reserve brigades (18 Bns): combat ready in 8-12 weeks
B. Temporary additions to the active forces (27 bns):
3 Marine Brigades, w/out air elements (9 Bns): combat ready in 4-6 mos.
3 Army Brigades (9 Bns): combat ready in 6-8 months
1 Army Division (9 Bns): combat ready in 8-10 months
C. Permanent additions to the Army (9 bns):
3 Brigades (9 Bns): combat ready at end of 3d, 4th, and 5th months respectively
3. Options provided:
At end of one year, retain all, part or none of Army and/or Marine reserves on active duty,
thereby reducing 63 Bns not at all or by up to 27 Bns (18 Army plus 9 Marine Bns).
4. Service end strength increases:
A. Personnel:
If Reserves deactivated
If Reserves retained
Army
250,000
350,000
Navy
56,000
56,000
Marines
86,000
131,000
Air Force
*102,000
*102,000
Total
494,000
639,000
*Includes 16,000 civilians for MATS augmentation.

B. Units:
Army--Shown above.
Navy--17 Destroyers plus 24 combat support/supply vessels (plus undetermined number

of private charters).
Marines--Shown above.
Air Force--9 TFS (F-100); 6 Recce Sqdn (RF-84).
Note: Above figures and units are tentative and will be reviewed in light of actual
decisions reached following Mr. McNamara's report. In addition, these figures have not
been scrubbed and are merely rough planning estimates at this time.

a.m. and passed to the White House.
205. For the President. The only report worth your reading this week is the one which Bob
McNamara is carrying back on his plane to you tonight./2/ We have had a very fruitful
five-day period together and the important recommendations which he will present to you
have the full concurrence of Johnson, Westmoreland and me.
/2/Document 67.
Two events below the level of importance of the Secretary's report are still worth
mentioning. The first is the capture and death of Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, the inveterate
and skillful intriguer whose hand was behind abortive coup attempts of February 19 and
May 20 of this year. Since the latter, he has been lying low in the vicinity of Saigon
eluding apprehension by the police and thus avoiding the execution of the death sentence
leveled on him in absentia by a military court. Although Thao was close to the extremists
within the northern Catholic refugee bloc, leading clerics such as Papal Delegate Palmas
have been openly expressing the hope that Thao could be removed from the country and
his troublemaking activities suppressed. Although his death, presumably from wounds
received at the time of his apprehension, may stir resentment in lower Catholic circles, it
is doubtful that it will generate any emotional reaction among the substantial members of
the church.
The Viet Cong monsoon offensive dropped off rather sharply during the week in which
the guerrillas initiated only one battalion size attack. ARVN, on the other hand, executed
successfully one of their most complex military operations of the war in opening the road
from Qui Nhon to Pleiku for the movement of essential civilian and military cargo.
Participants included 12 ARVN battalions and the B-52 SAC bombers from Guam which
engaged in a close air support mission to assist Vietnamese Marines. The operation seems
to have taken the Viet Cong by surprise who thus far have made no reaction, and convoys
are rolling freely back and forth. They were badly needed to relieve the shortage of
commodities in the highland area resulting from Viet Cong interdiction of routes.
The main question of the public mind is, "What will the U.S. do next as a result of the
McNamara visit?"
Taylor
66. Memorandum From the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Lodge) to President

Johnson/1/
Memos (B). Top Secret. Lodge apparently wrote this memorandum in Saigon and sent it
to the White House upon his return from Vietnam.
Following are my present views concerning our future course as regards Viet-Nam:
1. I concur in the specific recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of Secretary
McNamara's Report./2/
/2/Document 67.
2. Continue all activities against North Viet-Nam.
3. Make strong points of the great seaports, notably Danang, Cam Ranh, and Saigon and,
possibly, some places in the interior which can be readily maintained.
4. From these strong points the Vietnamese, with our advice and help, should conduct
their program of pacification by means of a true Revolution for a New Life, on which a
start has been attempted in the Hop Tac area. With the ARVN and police providing
security, this should be an affirmative, highly political oil spot procedure, never striving
for flashy and misleading statistics, always seeking solid and durable gains, however
small, however slowly achieved. My intended program of stationing a few carefully
selected political coordinators in a few provinces, working directly under the Embassy,
attempts to create such a procedure. Once we and the South Vietnamese learn how to do
this, the oil spots will connect with each other and the Viet Cong military manpower pool
will inevitably shrink. Neither bombing nor conventional ground warfare will reach the
terrorist working as an individual and in small groups--and they are the backbone of Viet
Cong recruiting.
5. If the opportunity offers, U.S. troops can fight the pitched battle with large units of the
Viet Cong--as they attack our strong points, and possibly, in other places where they can
be identified and where the circumstances are such that the outlook for destroying them is
propitious. There may be good chances to open and secure roads. But U.S. troops should
not be committed to prolonged "search sweeps" in the jungle or to being permanently
stationed in the jungle.
6. No one can establish schedules or make predictions. As President Johnson has often
well said of the American pioneers--from Plymouth Rock to the Far West--we must
endure and, as we endure, we will learn and opportunities will come.

7. But our grandchildren will not live to see the day that a united China does not probe in
Southeast Asia.

Bundy, Vol. XII. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. A list of
comments on the memorandum, prepared by Lodge in Saigon on July 19, indicates that it
was drafted by McNaughton on July 18. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330,
McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Box 2) U. Alexis Johnson sent his comments on the
July 18 draft to McNaughton on July 19. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Recommendations of additional deployments to Vietnam
1. Introduction. Our object in Vietnam is to create conditions for a favorable outcome by
demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. We want to create
these conditions, if possible, without causing the war to expand into one with China or the
Soviet Union and in a way which preserves support of the American people and,
hopefully, of our allies and friends. The following assessments, made following my trip to
Vietnam with Ambassador-designate Lodge and General Wheeler, are my own and are
addressed to the achievement of that object. My specific recommendations appear in
paragraph 5; they are concurred in by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador-designate Lodge,
Ambassador Johnson, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland. I
have neither asked for nor obtained their concurrence in other portions of the paper./2/
/2/William Bundy discussed the memorandum with the other members of the group that
accompanied McNamara to Vietnam, and found that "to a man they shared his estimate."
After reading the report, Bundy noted that he also was forced to agree, "even though it
meant accepting the chance that the war would be increasingly Americanized." (Johnson
Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 26)
2. Favorable outcome. In my view, a "favorable outcome" for purposes of these
assessments and recommendations has nine fundamental elements:
(a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.
(b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our
obtaining confirmation of this fact.
(c) US/GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.
(d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral).
(e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.
(f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.
(g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not
regroupees) from South Vietnam.
(h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization.
(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.
A favorable outcome could include also arrangements regarding elections, relations
between North and South Vietnam, participation in peace-keeping by international forces,
membership for North and South Vietnam in the UN, and so on. The nine fundamental
elements can evolve with or without an express agreement and, except for what might be
negotiated incidental to a cease-fire, are more likely to evolve without an express
agreement than with one. We do not need now to address the question whether ultimately
we would settle for something less than the nine fundamentals; because deployment of the
forces recommended in paragraph 5 is prerequisite to the achievement of any acceptable
settlement, and a decision can be made later, when bargaining becomes a reality, whether
to compromise in any particular.
3. Estimate of the situation. The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago
(when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of
the war has quickened. A hard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul
the army. The VC main and local forces, reinforced by militia and guerrillas, have the
initiative and, with large attacks (some in regimental strength), are hurting ARVN forces
badly. The main VC efforts have been in southern I Corps, northern and central II Corps
and north of Saigon. The central highlands could well be lost to the National Liberation
Front during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six
district capitals; only one has been retaken. US combat troop deployments and US/VNAF
strikes against the North have put to rest most South Vietnamese fears that the United
States will foresake them, and US/VNAF air strikes in-country have probably shaken VC
morale somewhat. Yet the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer
people in less and less territory as terrorism increases. Cities and towns are being isolated
as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are usable and power and communications lines
are cut.
The economy is deteriorating--the war is disrupting rubber production, rice distribution,
Dalat vegetable production and the coastal fishing industry, causing the loss of jobs and
income, displacement of people and frequent breakdown or suspension of vital means of
transportation and communication; foreign exchange earnings have fallen; and severe
inflation is threatened.
The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is
"executive agent" for a directorate of generals. His government is youthful and
inexperienced, but dedicated to a "revolutionary" program. His tenure depends upon unity
of the armed forces behind him. If the directorate holds together and the downward trend
of the war is halted, the religious and regional factions will probably remain quiescent;
otherwise there will be political turbulence and possibly uncoordinated efforts to negotiate
settlement with the DRV. The Buddhists, Catholics, out-politicians and business
community are "wait-and-seeing;" the VC, while unable alone to generate effective unrest
in the cities, can "piggy-back" on any anti-government demonstration or cause.
Rural reconstruction (pacification) even in the Hop Tac area around Saigon is making
little progress. Gains in IV Corps are being held, but in I and II Corps and adjacent III
Corps areas it has lost ground fast since the start of the VC monsoon offensive (300,000
people have been lost to the VC, and tens of thousands of refugees have poured out of
these areas).
The Government-to-VC ratio over-all is now only a little better than 3-to-1, and in combat
battalions little better than 1.5-to-1. Some ARVN units have been mauled; many are
understrength and therefore "conservative." Desertions are at a high rate, and the force
build-up has slipped badly. The VC, who are undoubtedly suffering badly too (their losses
are very high), now control a South Vietnamese manpower pool of 500,000 to 1 million
fighting-age men and reportedly are trying to double their combat strength, largely by
forced draft (down to 15-year-olds) in the increasing areas they control. They seem to be
able more than to replace their losses.
There are no signs that we have throttled the inflow of supplies for the VC or can throttle
the flow while their materiel needs are as low as they are; indeed more and better weapons
have been observed in VC hands, and it is probable that there has been further build-up of
North Vietnamese regular units in the I and II Corps areas, with at least three full
regiments (all of the 325th Division) there. Nor have our air attacks in North Vietnam
produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference
table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that South Vietnam is on the
run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than a complete take-over.
4. Options open to us. We must choose among three courses of action with respect to
Vietnam all of which involve different probabilities, outcomes and costs:
(a) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that can be arranged--almost
certainly conditions humiliating the United States and very damaging to our future
effectiveness on the world scene.
(b) Continue at about the present level, with the US forces limited to say 75,000, holding
on and playing for the breaks--a course of action which, because our position would grow
weaker, almost certainly would confront us later with a choice between withdrawal and an
emergency expansion of forces, perhaps too late to do any good.
(c) Expand promptly and substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in
the South and maintain the military pressure against the North Vietnamese in the North
while launching a vigorous effort on the political side/3/ to lay the groundwork for a
favorable outcome by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of
communication. This alternative would stave off defeat in the short run and offer a good
chance of producing a favorable settlement in the longer run; at the same time it would
imply a commitment to see a fighting war clear through at considerable cost in casualties
and materiel and would make any later decision to withdraw even more difficult and even
more costly than would be the case today.
/3/Ambassador Lodge states "any further initiative by us now [before we are strong]
would simply harden the Communist resolve not to stop fighting." Ambassadors Taylor
and Johnson would maintain discreet contacts with the Soviets, but otherwise agree with
Ambassador Lodge. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
My recommendations in paragraph 5 below are based on the choice of the third alternative
(Option c) as the course of action involving the best odds of the best outcome with the
most acceptable cost to the United States.
5. Military recommendations. There are now 15 US (and 1 Australian) combat battalions
in Vietnam; they, together with other combat personnel and non-combat personnel, bring
the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 75,000.
a. I recommend that the deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by
October to 34 maneuver battalions (or, if the Koreans fail to provide the expected 9
battalions promptly, to 43 battalions). The battalions--together with increases in helicopter
lift, air squadrons, naval units, air defense, combat support and miscellaneous log support
and advisory personnel which I also recommend--would bring the total US personnel in
Vietnam to approximately 175,000 (200,000 if we must make up for the Korean failure).
It should be understood that the deployment of more men (an additional perhaps 100,000)
may be necessary in early 1966, and that the deployment of additional forces thereafter is
possible but will depend on developments.
b. I recommend that Congress be requested to authorize the call-up of approximately
235,000 men in the Reserve and National Guard. This number--approximately 125,000
Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 10,000 Navy--would provide approximately
36 maneuver battalions by the end of this year. The call-up would be for a two-year
period; but the intention would be to release them after one year, by which time they
could be relieved by regular forces if conditions permitted.
c. I recommend that the regular armed forces be increased by approximately 375,000 men
(approximately 250,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 25,000 Navy). This
would provide approximately 27 additional maneuver battalions by the middle of 1966.
The increase would be accomplished by increasing recruitment, increasing the draft and
extending tours of duty of men already in the service.
d. I recommend that a supplemental appropriation of approximately $X for FY 1966 be
sought from the Congress to cover the first part of the added costs attributable to the
build-up in and for the war in Vietnam. A further supplemental appropriation might be
required later in the fiscal year.
It should be noted that in mid-1966 the United States would, as a consequence of the
above method of handling the build-up, have approximately 600,000 additional men
(approximately 63 additional maneuver battalions) as protection against contingencies.
6. Use of forces. The forces will be used however they can be brought to bear most
effectively. The US/third-country ground forces will operate in coordination with South
Vietnamese forces. They will defend their own bases; they will assist in providing
security in neighboring areas; they will augment Vietnamese forces, assuring retention of
key logistic areas and population centers. Also, in the initial phase they will maintain a
small reserve-reaction force, conducting nuisance raids and spoiling attacks, and opening
and securing selected lines of communication; as in-country ground strength increases to a
level permitting extended US and third-country offensive action, the forces will be
available for more active combat missions when the Vietnamese Government and General
Westmoreland agree that such active missions are needed. The strategy for winning this
stage of the war will be to take the offensive--to take and hold the initiative. The concept
of tactical operations will be to exploit the offensive, with the objects of putting the
VC/DRV battalion forces out of operation and of destroying their morale. The South
Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, by aggressive exploitation of superior military
forces, are to gain and hold the initiative--keeping the enemy at a disadvantage,
maintaining a tempo such as to deny them time to recuperate or regain their balance, and
pressing the fight against VC/DRV main force units in South Vietnam to run them to
ground and destroy them. The operations should combine to compel the VC/DRV to fight
at a higher and more sustained intensity with resulting higher logistical consumption and,
at the same time, to limit his capability to resupply forces in combat at that scale by
attacking his LOC. The concept assumes vigorous prosecution of the air and sea antiinfiltration campaign and includes increased use of air in-country, including B-52s, night
and day to harass VC in their havens. Following destruction of the VC main force units,
the South Vietnamese must reinstitute the Program of Rural Reconstruction as an antidote
to the continuing VC campaign of terror and subversion.
7. Actions against North Vietnam. We should continue the program of bombing military
targets in North Vietnam. While avoiding striking population and industrial targets not
closely related to the DRV's supply of war materiel to the VC, we should announce to
Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow. The
number of strike sorties against North Vietnam--against fixed targets and for armed
reconnaissance--should increase slowly from the present level of 2,500 a month to 4,000
or more a month. We should be prepared at any time to carry out a severe reprisal should
the VC or DRV commit a particularly damaging or horrendous act (e.g., VC interdiction
of the Saigon river could call for a quarantine of DRV harbors, or VC assassination of a
high-ranking US official could call for destruction of all of the major power plants in
North Vietnam); the chances of our reprisal action leading to escalation is not large in
such an instance. After the 44 US/third-country battalions have been deployed and after
some strong action has been taken in the program of bombing the North (e.g., after the
key railroad bridges north of Hanoi have been dropped), we could, as part of a diplomatic
initiative, consider introducing a 6-8 week pause in the program of bombing the North.
8. Other actions in South Vietnam. The military program cannot do the job alone. Among
others, the following actions should also be taken in South Vietnam.
a. Continue doggedly to "strengthen the rear" by pressing forward with the rural
reconstruction (pacification) program, realizing both that the program has little chance of
meaningful success unless and until security can be provided, and that the program is
fundamental to full success once security is provided.
b. Keep working with the government in Saigon to make it more stable. Consider using
the deployment of the US troops as the occasion to lay down some terms--e.g., regarding
the presence and use of a US-controlled rice reserve, an effective US veto on major GVN
military commanders, statements about invading North Vietnam, and so on.
c. Take steps to meet the economic shortages and disruptions. Especially, the recurring
threat of rice inflation should be countered by the provision of an in-country UScontrolled rice reserve.
d. Take informational actions to undermine VC morale by reference to VC defeats, to
GVN/US weapon superiority, to air attacks on their bases, etc., and by encouraging VC to
defect either to the government or "back home." In this connection, the Chieu Hoi
program (to induce VC defections) must be revitalized immediately.
9. Expanded political moves./4/ Together with the above military moves, we should take
political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork for a favorable political settlement by
clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communications. At the same time
as we are taking steps to turn the tide in South Vietnam, we should make quiet moves
through diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps
the VC, looking first toward disabusing them of any misconceptions as to our goals and
second toward laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe; (b) to keep
the Soviet Union from deepening its military involvement and support of North Vietnam
and from generating crises elsewhere in the world until the time when settlement can be
achieved; and (c) to cement support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends,
and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts may be
unproductive until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should be made.
/4/Note footnote to paragraph 4 (c). [Footnote in the source text.]
10. South Vietnamese reaction to expansion of US forces. Three factors dominate the
psychological situation in South Vietnam: (a) the military situation (i.e., the security
problem), (b) the effectiveness of the government as a vehicle for dynamic leadership, and
(c) the implications of the growing American presence. The deployments recommended in
paragraph 5 run some risk of causing the Vietnamese to "turn the war over to us" and of
generating an "anti-colonial" type resentment toward us. The GVN has requested the
additional US forces urgently (indeed, they want 9 battalions more than the 44
recommended here). When Ky was asked about the popular reaction, he said, "We will
explain it to our people." Thieu agreed saying, "They know that you are not here to make
us a colony." Former Prime Minister Quat told me, "The only way to save Vietnam is to
send a large number of troops." He added, "The people of South Vietnam will not object."
The spectres of widespread adverse public reaction have been raised each time we
deployed personnel in the past, and, while no deployment has been so massive as this one,
no such reaction appeared. Furthermore, the key requirement for continued viability of the
Vietnamese spirit in the short run is evidence that RVNAF/US/third-country forces can
contain the VC/DRV monsoon offensive and reopen communications; in the longer run
the requirement will be evidence of bringing the war to a satisfactory close.
11. Communist reaction to the expanded program. The Soviets can be expected to
continue material assistance to North Vietnam and to lodge verbal complaints, but not to
intervene otherwise. The Chinese--at least so long as we do not invade North Vietnam, do
not sink a Chinese ship and, most important, do not strike China--will probably not send
regular ground forces or aircraft into the war. The DRV, on the other hand, may well send
up to several divisions of regular forces in South Vietnam to assist the VC if they see the
tide turning and victory, once so near, being snatched away. This possible DRV action is
the most ominous one, since it would lead to increased pressures on us to "counter-
invade" North Vietnam and to extend air strikes to population targets in the North;
acceding to these pressures could bring the Soviets and the Chinese in. The Viet Cong,
especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to depend increasingly
upon the PAVN forces as the war moves into a more conventional phase; but they may
find ways to continue almost indefinitely their present intensive military, guerrilla and
terror activities, particularly if reinforced by some regular PAVN units. A key question on
the military side is whether POL, ammunition, and cadres can be cut off and, if they are
cut off, whether this really renders the Viet Cong impotent.
12. Evaluation. ARVN overall is not capable of successfully resisting the VC initiatives
without more active assistance from more US/third-country ground forces than those thus
far committed. Without further outside help, the ARVN is faced with successive tactical
reverses, loss of key communication and population centers particularly inn the highlands, piecemeal destruction of ARVN units, attrition of RVNAF will to fight, and loss of
civilian confidence. Early commitment of additional US/third-country forces in sufficient
quantity, in general reserve and offensive roles, should stave off GVN defeat.
The success of the program from the military point of view turns on whether the
Vietnamese hold their own in terms of numbers and fighting spirit, and on whether the US
forces can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a role in which they are only now
being tested. The number of US troops is too small to make a significant difference in the
traditional 10-1 government-guerrilla formula, but it is not too small to make a significant
difference in the kind of war which seems to be evolving in Vietnam--a "Third Stage" or
conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate and attack the enemy.
The plan is such that the risk of escalation into war with China or the Soviet Union can be
kept small. US and South Vietnamese casualties will increase--just how much cannot be
predicted with confidence, but the US killed-in-action might be in the vicinity of 500 a
month by the end of the year. The South Vietnamese under one government or another
will probably see the thing through/5/ and the United States public will support the course
of action because it is a sensible and courageous military-political program designed and
likely to bring about a success in Vietnam.
/5/Ambassador Lodge points out that we may face a neutralist government at some time in
the future and that in those circumstances the US should be prepared to carry on alone.
[Footnote in the source text.]
It should be recognized, however, that success against the larger, more conventional
VC/PAVN forces could merely drive the VC back into the trees and back to their 1960-64
pattern--a pattern against which US troops and aircraft would be of limited value but with
which the GVN, with our help, could cope. The questions here would be whether the VC
could maintain morale after such a set-back, and whether the South Vietnamese would
have the will to hang on through another cycle. It should be recognized also that, even in
"success," it is not obvious how we will be able to disengage our forces from Vietnam. It
is unlikely that a formal agreement good enough for the purpose could possibly be
negotiated--because the arrangement can reflect little more than the power situation. A
fairly large number of US (or perhaps "international") forces may be required to stay in
Vietnam.
The overall evaluation is that the course of action recommended in this memorandum--if
the military and political moves are properly integrated and executed with continuing
vigor and visible determination--stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome
within a reasonable time in Vietnam.
Robert S. McNamara
68. Editorial Note

On July 21, 1965, Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman met with Soviet Premier
Kosygin for a second time during his visit to Moscow. (For a report of Harriman's initial
conversation with Kosygin on July 15, see Document 59.) The discussion again covered
the full range of major issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations, and Kosygin stressed that a
settlement of the Vietnam conflict was essential to progress on other issues. Harriman
noted that President Johnson had authorized him to state that U.S. military action in
Vietnam would be limited to whatever was necessary to stop the aggression directed from
Hanoi, and the President felt that the Vietnam conflict should not interfere with U.S.Soviet relations. Harriman added that the United States agreed that it was important to
move the Vietnam issue to the conference table as soon as possible, and welcomed any
Soviet suggestions to that end.
Kosygin responded that the Soviet Union was not authorized to negotiate concerning
Vietnam, but noted that the "Vietnamese comrades would not exclude political settlement,
bypassing the Chinese." He advised the United States to study Pham Van Dong's four
points and make counterproposals directly to the North Vietnamese. He added that he felt
that such a political settlement would be based on the retention of the 17th parallel as the
dividing line between North and South Vietnam. (Telegram 216 from Moscow, July 21;
Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 277, USSR Exdis 1965)
On July 23, Harriman stopped in Bonn and cabled his impressions of his conversations
with Kosygin to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk. On Vietnam, Harriman reported:
"I got nowhere in persuading him that N.L.F. was not the voice of the people, and that
Saigon spoke for the majority who don't want communist take-over. It was interesting,
however, that he mentioned the retention of the 17th parallel. His biggest concern is the
embarrassing position the Soviets are caught in. And he wants a settlement. I doubt that he
personally cares too much on what basis, though he will obviously have to support North
Vietnam demands at any conference. He would make no suggestion for settlement except
that we get together with North Vietnam, and he implied that we should disregard
Peiping." (Telegram 241 from Bonn, July 23; ibid.)
On the morning of July 22, Rusk telephoned McGeorge Bundy and asked if he had seen
Harriman's report. Rusk thought the President would be interested. Bundy noted that he
had seen it and passed it on to the President. Rusk said that he had called McNamara and
told him that the administration should think hard about the possibility of dealing with the
problem of South Vietnam in a low key. He felt that Harriman's message suggested a
more critical examination of the number of U.S. troops to be committed to Vietnam, and
of the rate at which they would be used. Bundy responded that the problem had become so
large that it would be difficult to play it in a lower key. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Conversations)
Rusk telephoned William Bundy on the evening of July 22 and instructed him to begin to
think hard about establishing contact with Hanoi in connection with Kosygin's remarks to
Harriman. Rusk added that Kosygin's suggestion could turn out to be very significant. He
had talked to the President and they agreed that it was important to consider "very hard
and very fast" whether the United States could find some way to take account of what
Kosygin said. Rusk felt that the North Vietnamese four points were subject to "dickering."
Bundy said that he would work on it. (Ibid.)
69. Memorandum From Richard C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff
to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Goodpaster Study on Vietnam
The attached study was prepared at the direction of the Chairman by a small group
working under General Goodpaster. It has no endorsement at the moment, and, therefore,
should be treated as a non-study. However, some of the contents could be useful to you as
background for the coming discussions on Vietnam.
The study advocates a two-fold approach:
(1) Stepped-up air offensive against transportation and military targets in NVN with later
extension to industrial targets as necessary (but no attacks on population).
(2) Use of U.S. and third country forces to eliminate the Viet Cong regular battalions (the
44 battalion force previously recommended was considered probably sufficient).
In furthering the interdiction of supply routes, the study recommends that the route nine
type barrier be established as "experience is gained and capability is developed."
This looks like an excellent military concept, but the other half of the equation is equally
important--an intense program to win over the peasant population and the Viet Cong
irregulars, themselves.
Dick
Attachment/2/
/2/Top Secret. The full report is 128 pages long. For information on the background of the
report and reactions to it, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam
War, Part III: January-July 1965 (Princeton, N.J., 1989), pp. 359-365.
INTENSIFICATION OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM: CONCEPT
AND APPRAISAL--REPORT OF AN AD HOC STUDY GROUP
[Here follows a table of contents.]
Directive
This study was prepared in response to an oral directive of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on 2 July 1965, to prepare for his use an assessment of the assurance the US can
have of winning in SVN if we do "everything we can."
The study was prepared by an ad hoc staff group under the direction of the Office of the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with representation from that office and the Chairman's
Special Studies Group, the Defense Intelligence Agency, J-3, and the Joint War Games
Agency.
Summary Report
1. As directed, a study group has assessed the assurance the US can have of winning in
SVN if we do "everything we can."
2. The limitations of the resulting assessment require specific note. It is not final nor is it
complete in detail. For operations within SVN, the assessment does not address explicitly
the task of providing territorial security, but rather is focused upon operations against
VC/DRV battalion-size units. Even for such operations, the military judgment involved in
arriving at expected results is as difficult and complex as it is important. Exact, certain
solutions cannot be achieved. Time has not permitted discussions with COMUSMACV or
CINCPAC. Such should immediately be undertaken, and further work in detail then
addressed to the key issues, particularly the results we can expect from offensive
ground/air action against VC/DRV battalion-size units in SVN.
3. Nevertheless, a responsive over-all appraisal addressed to the central question can
already be given. It amounts to a conditional affirmative, as follows: Within the bounds of
reasonable assumptions (particularly as set out below) there appears to be no reason we
cannot win if such is our will--and if that will is manifested in strategy and tactical
operations.
4. While there are important uncertainties and unknowns, there is little probability that
they could invalidate this judgment, providing the assumptions hold true. The key
question appears to resolve itself into a matter of means and willingness to use the means.
Neither the means visualized, nor the use of these means, appears to go beyond the
bounds of reason, realism or prudence. It is possible to outline them with a fair degree of
definition.
5. Before doing so, specific note should be taken of the major assumptions which limit the
scope of the study and condition the over-all conclusion stated above. They are, in
summary, as follows:
a. China and Russia will not intervene with armed forces, overtly or covertly, so long as
there is no US/SVN land invasion of NVN.
b. Restrictions on US/SVN use of force do not exceed the following:
(1) No land invasion of NVN by US/SVN forces.
(2) No use of nuclear weapons or chemical weapons.
(3) No mass bombing of population per se.
c. Once the concept envisaged in this study is approved by higher authority, operations
within the scope of the proposed strategy will not be subject to restriction, delay, or
planning uncertainties. This implies that the GVN will cooperate as necessary to this end.
d. Operational coordination between US and SVN forces meets minimum acceptable
professional standards of effectiveness.
e. Neither the government nor the population of SVN turns against the US and demands
withdrawal.
6. "Winning" in SVN, as referred to above, involves achieving an outcome somewhere
between, as a maximum, an end to insurgency by DRV/VC decision and as an acceptable
minimum, containment of the insurgency, except for minor areas and minor acts of
violence, with an end to the need for the presence of substantial US forces. This outcome,
the assessment indicates, can be achieved. Hopefully, the VC/DRV will become
convinced that they cannot win in SVN, that continued efforts will be extremely costly,
and that time is on the side of the Free World. But even if they fight on, it should be
possible to attain the minimum cited above. (Outcomes such as complete loss of the area,
further erosion, "losing slowly," and "begging down" in a series of beleaguered coastal
enclaves or in inconclusive jungle combat are judged to represent failing rather than
winning in the area, and are rejected.)
7. To achieve a "winning" outcome in the above sense requires a substantial step-up in the
scope and effectiveness of US/SVN operations in the area. Sources for this step-up
include the following, all of which are required:
a. Additional forces.
b. Removal of restrictions, restraints and sources of delay and planning uncertainty.
c. Adoption of a strategy for winning the war; such a strategy must be based upon taking
the offensive, and gaining and holding the initiative.
d. Adoption of a concept of tactical operations in SVN which exploits the offensive, with
the object of putting the VC/DRV battalion forces out of operation.
8. Of these, strategy sets the framework. The strategy contained in the study and outlined
below envisages establishing in Southeast Asia a heavy preponderance of US/SVN

military power over the VC/DRV, provides a concept for the employment of these forces
in the next six to eight months, sets forth objectives and weight of attack for an integrated,
interrelated effort involving operations against North Vietnam and operations in South
Vietnam, together with action against infiltration in Laos and elsewhere, and indicates
broad factors of timing, priority, and coordination between these principal courses of
action. This strategy, which is considered feasible and well-calculated to give high
assurance of winning in SVN, is set forth in essential outline below. It presupposes the
removal of restrictions, delays and planning uncertainties, as well as the completion of
preparatory coordinating arrangements at governmental and military level with the South
Vietnamese and, to the extent required, with the Thais and Laotians.
9. The basic concept is that allied forces (US, SVN and third country), by aggressive
exploitation of superior military force, gain and keep the initiative both in SVN and
against NVN, keeping the DRV and VC at a disadvantage, keeping the tempo such as to
deny them time to recuperate or regain their balance, progressively destroying the warsupporting power of North Vietnam, and pressing the fight against VC/DRV main force
units in SVN to run them to ground and destroy them. The object is to cause them to stop
the war, or to render them ineffective if they seek to pursue it. The operations combine to
compel the VC/DRV to fight at higher and more sustained intensity with resulting greater
logistical consumption and concurrently attack his LOC to limit his capability to resupply
forces in combat at this scale.
a. Operations against North Vietnam. The object is two-fold--to bring about a DRV
decision to stop the war or, failing this, at a minimum, to cut down and limit sharply the
support by the DRV of VC/DRV forces in SVN at the same time being prepared to limit
the introduction of additional DRV forces into SVN, if attempted, in order to permit
containment of the insurgency in the south. By sustained air action the following main
categories of targets should be attacked, with timing as indicated:
(1) Prior to the initiation of large-scale offensive operations by US forces in South
Vietnam, transportation throughout the DRV should be attacked in all its components, to
include attack on LOC (including locks) and vehicles, attack on POL, and mining of
harbors. In addition, attacks should be conducted on military supplies and equipment, to
include attacks on depots, arsenals, barracks and service installations, together with
attacks on electric power facilities.
(2) If the DRV and VC continue the war in South Vietnam after the foregoing attacks
have been accomplished, the attack should be extended to include industrial facilities and,
to the extent feasible, agricultural resources.
(3) At any time required to prevent interference or threatened interference with the above,
US/SVN forces should attack the DRV counterair capability, to include radars, AAA,
SAMs, MIGs, and IL-28s. (In this connection, it should be noted that strong factors even
now weigh in favor of such strikes.)
b. Action against infiltration routes. With the object of cutting down the numbers of men
and quantities of supplies moving into SVN, the following major operations should be
conducted:
(1) The present surveillance operation should be intensified and increased surveillance of
waterborne traffic from Cambodia should be instituted.
(2) Air attack should be intensified against land infiltration routes in Laos and border
areas of SVN, to include attacks on lines of communication (roads and bridges, depots,
truck parks, bivouacs and rest areas), attack of vehicles and of troop units in movement or
deployed for security of the LOC. Intelligence efforts should be intensified and
restrictions removed (e.g., defoliation should be experimented with), with the object of
determining route locations and gaining timely information on vehicle and troop
movements.
(3) Ground action should be undertaken against land infiltration in Laos and SVN,
expanding operations toward an effective barrier as experience is gained and capability is
developed. As feasible, blocking positions should be established, supplies seized or
destroyed, and DRV/VC route security forces harassed or destroyed.
c. Military operations in South Vietnam. The object is to put VC/DRV battalion forces out
of operation, i.e., to destroy them or cause their disintegration as fighting forces capable
of interfering with SVN pacification (territorial security) operations. Basing action
primarily on offensive land and air operations of US, RVNAF and third-country forces,
the concept is to locate and destroy VC/DRV forces, bases and war-supporting
organizations in SVN. For the present, the area of such operations will be the zones of the
I Corps and the II Corps, and the northern portion of the III Corps zone, with initial
priority of effort to those areas most critical to the success of the offensive.
Concentrations of VC forces should be aggressively sought out and attacked by mobile
land forces employed in coordination with air forces utilized for close support operations
or for general preparatory attack. Maximum effort will be made to avoid piecemeal
reaction to VC attacks, thus exposing forces to ambush, and instead to place primary
emphasis on launching coordinated attacks to destroy VC units. Maximum effort should
be applied to monitoring VC activities, employing all intelligence techniques, to include
indigenous sources as well as more sophisticated surveillance techniques, including largescale, light-plane spotter activity.
10. The concept of tactical operations for the offensive within SVN is, at the present time,
the heart of this problem, and the uncertainties that exist must be squarely recognized and
acknowledged. With limited and local exceptions, the course of the war to date in SVN
does not provide experience directly approximating what is now visualized. Lacking such
operations, we cannot assert with certainty that tactics can be devised and operations
conducted that will, in fact, put the DRV/VC battalions out of operation and keep them so.
Nevertheless, several avenues of operation which are available permit a high order of
confidence that such can be achieved:
a. Operations to locate and attack VC/DRV units to destroy them or render them
ineffective as fighting units.
b. Operations to clear and occupy the base areas from which VC/DRV units operate and
are supported.
c. Operations to establish major areas of strength, for example, in the central highlands or
other major infiltration avenues, to interdict DRV support for the VC.
11. Closely connected with the foregoing concepts is a further assumption not previously
stated: recognizing that it is necessary both to put the VC/DRV battalion-size units out of
operation, and to provide security to the territory and the people of SVN if we are to win,
it is assumed that if the US, SVN and third countries succeed in accomplishing the former,
the SVN with no more than advisory assistance and limited support from the US can
achieve and maintain the latter. These assumptions appear reasonable, but they warrant
closer study by our top commanders and officials in SVN.
12. The heavy preponderance of force required for this strategy can only be achieved with
substantial additional US and third-country ground forces. Forces adequate to initiate such
a strategy can be provided from SVN forces plus the 44 battalions of US and ROK forces
under consideration for deployment within the next few months. These should be able to
establish superiority and turn the tide of battle in favor of the US/SVN. Whether they will
be enough to sustain the offensive to achieve the "winning outcome," or whether such a
result will require the commitment of further US and third-country forces, is a question
that cannot be answered at this time. It is dependent in part on whether the DRV
introduces added forces into SVN, upon the evolving total requirement as the number of
surviving VC/DRV battalions declines, and upon the ability of the SVN to shift added
forces to this role as such a decline occurs. Rough estimates suggest, however, that
additional forces amounting to 7-35 further battalions could prove to be required,
depending upon whether the US/SVN operation can be limited to a zone such as that of
the I, II, and III Corps, or must be extended to cover the delta region as well.
13. A parallel increase in tactical air forces is also required. Several months will be
required to deploy the added ground forces and commit them to combat, and it is
appropriate to phase in the tactical air for close air support on a comparable schedule, thus
permitting earlier concentration on the air campaign against NVN--as is tactically
desirable in any event. On this basis, a requirement is foreseen for the 4 additional
squadrons now planned as soon as bases are available, for 6 to 9 additional squadrons
within the remainder of this year, and for a substantial increase in the B-52 force available
in the Western Pacific for conventional operations. Analysis of capabilities for rapid
building of additional air fields, employing aluminum matting, indicates that additional
bases adequate for at least 9 of these 10 to 13 squadrons can be made operationally ready
by the end of this year.
14. The end results that can be expected to be achieved in NVN, along the infiltration
routes, and in SVN through taking action along the lines presented in this study are
estimated to be as follows:
a. Air operations against NVN. The stepped-up program of air strikes should reduce in
major degree the ability of the NVN to support the insurgency in SVN. The SAMs, MIGs,
and IL-28s can be effectively eliminated. By attacks against the planned target system,
particularly POL and railroads, roads, and waterways, together with mining of harbors,
the DRV will be sharply limited in their ability to support VC/DRV forces in SVN at the
intensified level of combat envisaged, and will in particular be limited in their capability
to reinforce the VC with effective units of division size.
b. Attack against infiltration routes. When the intensity of combat operations in SVN is
raised to the extent envisaged and the logistical requirements for VC/DRV forces have
been correspondingly increased, the combination of more effective surveillance of sea
routes, together with air and ground action against the routes through Laos, should
materially limit the ability of VC/DRV forces to move personnel and supplies to SVN,
and to withstand the pressure of attacks within SVN. One effect will be the delay of overt
introduction of DRV forces into SVN by requiring such movement to be conducted at
reduced march rates over long distances.
c. Military operations in SVN. Presently organized and planned GVN forces, except for
reserve battalions (possibly including a limited number of ranger and infantry battalions),
would retain control over areas now held, extend pacification operations and area control
where permitted by the progress of major offensive operations, defend critical
installations and areas against VC attack and seek out and eliminate VC militia units. US,
SVN, and third-country forces, by offensive land and air action, would locate and destroy
VC/DRV forces, bases and major war-supporting organizations in SVN. The cumulative
effect of sustained, aggressive conduct of offensive operations, coupled with the
interdiction of DRV efforts to provide the higher level of support required in such a
combat environment, should lead to progressive destruction of the VC/DRV main force
battalions.
[Here follows the full report.]

Department of State
Washington, DC
Washington, July 21, 1965, 10:20 a.m.
SUBJECT
Your 11:30 meeting
1. The main business of the general 11:30 meeting will be McNamara's report./2/ From
10:30 on the rest of us will be in the Cabinet Room, and my guess is that we will be ready
for you earlier if you want to join us.
/2/Document 67.
2. The people present will be those you checked last night,/3/ with the exception of
Goodpaster and Yarmolinsky. I removed them because Bob McNamara expressed very
strong feeling that there would be resentment among the JCS if junior officers were
brought over while they were not. This does no immediate damage. I understand that
Goodpaster has very interesting views of his own, and I will try to have a private talk with
him in the next 24 hours.
/3/On July 20, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum to the President asking him to select
from a list of possible participants those whom he wanted to attend the meeting scheduled
for 11:30 a.m. on July 21 to discuss Vietnam. Johnson selected McGeorge Bundy,
Moyers, Valenti, Cooper, Rusk, Ball, William Bundy, Unger, Lodge, McNamara, Vance,
Wheeler, McNaughton, Raborn, Helms, Rowan, and Marks. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII)
3. The military recommendations, as usual, are in pretty good order. On the political side,
we have hard problems, also as usual. Lodge and McNamara have a disagreement on how
far we should have a "peace offensive." This difference may turn out to be more apparent
than real.
4. There is also a major political problem of U.S. leadership in Saigon below the level of
the Ambassador. My own view is that the solution is to get not one but two outstanding
deputies--Bill Sullivan and Frank Meloy. Meloy can run the ordinary Embassy work, and
I think Sullivan can coordinate the pacification activities in a way in which no one else in
government can. Lodge is no administrator--a fact which both McNamara and Chet
Cooper report as fully confirmed from this trip.
To give him two deputies is abnormal--but Vietnam is not normal. A little heat from you
on the State Department would help, although my brother Bill is already sympathetic.
Lodge's confirmation hearing has been put over until Tuesday. Both McNamara and I
think it would be wise to keep him out of the immediate argumentation on your program,
and Lodge himself wants a last few days of rest.
I will know more after the 10:30 meeting.
McG.B.

Washington, July 21, 1965, 10:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes were originally
handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. They are quoted extensively in Valenti, A
Very Human President, pp. 319-40. For another account of this meeting, see Document
72; more information on attendance is in footnote 1 thereto. For other first-hand accounts
of the White House meetings on Vietnam on July 21 and July 22, see Johnson, Vantage
Point, pp. 147-148; and Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 399-403. William Bundy
also wrote an account of the meetings. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch.
27, pp. 30-33)
SUBJECT
Viet Nam
PRESENT
McNamara
Rusk
Vance
Mac Bundy
Gen. Wheeler
Geo. Ball
Bill Bundy
Len Unger
Helms
Raborn
Lodge
Rowan
McNaughton
Moyers
Valenti
(McNamara passed Top Secret paper/2/ to all in room to read. The paper was returned to
McNamara.)
/2/Document 67.
McNamara made it clear that the paper was his own view of the situation--his specific
recommendations had been concurred in by Lodge, Sharp, Taylor, Johnson,
Westmoreland but the rest of the paper had not--he did not seek or receive their
concurrence.
Lodge: If I thought a diplomatic move would be successful, I would be for it. Now, it
would harden the enemy. This is not the time to do it. Clarifying objectives is good for the
world public, but not necessary for governments. They understand it.
McNamara: Seems to me our call-up and increase in budget is evidence that we are not
taking over North Vietnam.
M. Bundy: Our public utterances will make it clear that we are not trying to take over
North Vietnam.
McNamara: Our public actions must do this. We must show that we are not in with Ky's
objective to invade NVN. We are building such a force that NVN might think that is what
we are trying to do.
Lodge: Remember this "on to NVN" movement is part of a propaganda move and nothing
more.
M. Bundy: Isn't it true that most of the diplomatic moves come from other nations rather
than the U.S. (in rebuttal to Lodge's hard position).
McNamara: This is exactly what I am talking about.
Lodge: The President has done a remarkable job of forming public opinion so far. Very
skillful.
M. Bundy: Are there divergences between GVN and US in troop use?
McNamara: GVN wants us to use troops in the highlands. This is unacceptable to us.
While GVN originally recommended this, they are now in agreement with us.
Rusk: What is the capability of GVN to mobilize their own forces?
McNamara: They are trying to increase by 10,000 per month. Our country team is
optimistic. I am not. Desertion rate is high. They say it is lessening, but I do not agree. We
did not find any thread of discontent among our troops. U.S. morale is of the highest
order. Proud of their dedication and devotion. It reflects the belief they are doing
something worthwhile.
Wheeler: Agree. Advisors are pleased with Vietnamese. They speak very highly of
Vietnamese common soldier. Officer corps very different. Some officers are not of
highest quality. Not total however. Weakness in VN's forces are lack of adequate officer
corps--in their training and attitude--but they are getting better.
Rusk: Any summary of enemy troubles?
McNamara: No, nothing more than we already know. They are suffering heavy losses.
They are well supplied with ammunition. I suspect much of inflow of supplies is waterborne. Only part of our action that is unsatisfactory is our patrol of the seashore. But even
if we did have tight control, it should make little difference in the next six to nine months.
Rusk: What is the timing on how we should proceed?
McNamara: There ought to be a statement to the American people no later than a week.
Bundy: It is quite possible the message to Congress will be a message to the public.
Rusk: We ought to get civilians in the Congressional testimony to abuse [disabuse] the
feeling that the military is making the decisions.
Bundy: Perhaps Rusk should follow up the President's speech with statement of total
unanimity.
Ball: It is one thing to ready the country for this decision and another to face the realities
of the decision. We can't allow the country to wake up one morning and find heavy
casualties. We need to be damn serious with the American public.
McNamara: We discussed the command arrangements--they are to be left as they are-parallel commands.
The President entered the meeting at 11:30 am
McNamara: To support an additional 200,000 troops in VN by first of the year the
reserves in the US should be reconstituted by like amount. I recommend calling up
235,000 a year from now, replace the reserves with regulars.
In mid-1966 we would have approximately 600,000 additional men.
President: What has happened in recent past that requires this decision on my part? What
are the alternatives? Also, I want more discussions on what we expect to flow from this
decision. Discuss in detail.
Have we wrung every single soldier out of every country we can? Who else can help? Are
we the sole defenders of freedom in the world? Have we done all we can in this direction?
The reasons for the call up? The results we can expect? What are the alternatives? We
must make no snap judgments. We must consider carefully all our options.
We know we can tell SVN "we're coming home." Is that the option we should take? What
flows from that.
The negotiations, the pause, all the other approaches--have all been explored. It makes us
look weak--with cup in hand. We have tried.
Let's look at all our options so that every man at this table understands fully the total
picture.
McNamara: This is our position a year ago (shows President a map/3/ of the country with
legends). Estimated by country team that VC controls 25%--SVN 50%--rest in white area,
VC in red areas.
VC tactics are terror, and sniping.
President: Looks dangerous to put US forces in those red areas.
McNamara: You're right. We're placing our people with their backs to the sea--for
protection. Our mission would be to seek out the VC in large scale units.
Wheeler: Big problem in Vietnam is good combat intelligence. The VC is a creature of
habit. By continuing to probe we think we can make headway.
Ball: Isn't it possible that the VC will do what they did against the French--stay away from
confrontation and not accommodate us?
Wheeler: Yes, but by constantly harassing them, they will have to fight somewhere.
McNamara: If VC doesn't fight in large units, it will give ARVN a chance to re-secure
hostile areas.
We don't know what VC tactics will be when VC is confronted by 175,000 Americans.
Raborn: We agree--by 1965, we expect NVN will increase their forces. They will attempt
to gain a substantial victory before our build-up is complete.
President: Is anyone of the opinion we should not do what the memo says--If so, I'd like to
hear from them.
Ball: I can foresee a perilous voyage--very dangerous--great apprehensions that we can
win under these conditions. But, let me be clear, if the decision is to go ahead, I'm
committed.
President: But is there another course in the national interest that is better than the
McNamara course? We know it's dangerous and perilous. But can it be avoided?
Ball: There is no course that will allow us to cut our losses. If we get bogged down, our
cost might be substantially greater. The pressures to create a larger war would be
irresistible. Qualifications I have are not due to the fact that I think we are in a bad moral
position.
President: What other road can I go?

Ball: Take what precautions we can--take losses--let their government fall apart-negotiate--probable take over by Communists. This is disagreeable, I know.
President: Can we make a case for this--discuss it fully?
Ball: We have discussed it. I have had my day in court.
President: I don't think we have made a full commitment. You have pointed out the
danger, but you haven't proposed an alternative course. We haven't always been right. We
have no mortgage on victory.
I feel we have very little alternative to what we are doing.
I want another meeting before we take this action. We should look at all other courses
carefully. Right now I feel it would be more dangerous for us to lose this now, than
endanger a greater number of troops.
Rusk: What we have done since 1954-61 has not been good enough. We should have
probably committed ourselves heavier in 1961.
Rowan: What bothers me most is the weakness of the Ky government. Unless we put the
screws on the Ky government, 175,000 men will do us no good.
Lodge: There is no tradition of a national government in Saigon. There are no roots in the
country. Not until there is tranquility can you have any stability. I don't think we ought to
take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what
we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does.
As we move ahead on a new phase--it gives us the right and duty to do certain things with
or without the government's approval.
President: George, do you think we have another course?
Ball: I would not recommend that you follow McNamara's course.
President: Are you able to outline your doubts--and offer another course of action? I think
it is desirable to hear you out--and determine if your suggestions are sound and ready to
be followed.
Ball: Yes. I think I can present to you the least bad of two courses. What I would present
is a course that is costly, but can be limited to short term costs.
President: Then, let's meet at 2:30 this afternoon to discuss Ball's proposals. Now let Bob
tell us why we need to risk those 600,000 lives.
(McNamara and Wheeler outlined the reasons for more troops.) 75,000 now just enough
to protect bases--it will let us lose slowly instead of rapidly. The extra men will stabilize
the situation and improve it. It will give ARVN breathing room. We limit it to another
100,000 because VN can't absorb any more. There is no major risk of catastrophe.
President: But you will lose greater number of men.
Wheeler: The more men we have the greater the likelihood of smaller losses.
President: What makes you think if we put in 100,000 men Ho Chi Minh won't put in
another 100,000?
Wheeler: This means greater bodies of men--which will allow us to cream them.
President: What are the chances of more NVN men coming?
Wheeler: 50-50 chance. He would be foolhardy to put 1/4 of his forces in SVN. It would
expose him too greatly in NVN.
President: (to Raborn) Do you have people in NVN?
Raborn: Not enough. We think it is reliable.
President: Can't we improve intelligence in NVN?
Raborn: We have a task force working on this.
1:00 pm--Meeting adjourned until 2:30 pm./4/
/4/William Bundy later recalled that the President had a private meeting with McNamara
and Rusk before the second full meeting convened at 2:30. (Johnson Library, Papers of
William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 31) No other record of this meeting has been found.
Resume same meeting at 2:45 pm
Ball: We can't win. Long protracted. The most we can hope for is messy conclusion.
There remains a great danger of intrusion by Chicoms.
Problem of long war in US:
1. Korean experience was galling one. Correlation between Korean casualties and public
opinion (Ball showed Pres. a chart)/5/ showed support stabilized at 50%. As casualties
increase, pressure to strike at jugular of the NVN will become very great.
2. World opinion. If we could win in a year's time--win decisively--world opinion would
be alright. However, if long and protracted we will suffer because a great power cannot
beat guerrillas.
3. National politics. Every great captain in history is not afraid to make a tactical
withdrawal if conditions are unfavorable to him. The enemy cannot even be seen; he is
indigenous to the country.
Have serious doubt if an army of westerners can fight orientals in Asian jungle and
succeed.
President: This is important--can westerners, in absence of intelligence, successfully fight
orientals in jungle rice-paddies? I want McNamara and Wheeler to seriously ponder this
question.
Ball: I think we have all underestimated the seriousness of this situation. Like giving
cobalt treatment to a terminal cancer case. I think a long protracted war will disclose our
weakness, not our strength.
The least harmful way to cut losses in SVN is to let the government decide it doesn't want
us to stay there. Therefore, put such proposals to SVN government that they can't accept,
then it would move into a neutralist position--and I have no illusions that after we were
asked to leave, SVN would be under Hanoi control.
What about Thailand? It would be our main problem. Thailand has proven a good ally so
far--though history shows it has never been a staunch ally. If we wanted to make a stand
in Thailand, we might be able to make it.
Another problem would be South Korea. We have two divisions there now. There would
be a problem with Taiwan, but as long as Generalissimo is there, they have no place to go.
Indonesia is a problem--insofar as Malaysia. There we might have to help the British in
military way. Japan thinks we are propping up a lifeless government and are on a sticky
wicket. Between long war and cutting our losses, the Japanese would go for the latter (all
this on Japan according to Reischauer).
President: Wouldn't all those countries say Uncle Sam is a paper tiger--wouldn't we lose
credibility breaking the word of three presidents--if we set it up as you proposed. It would
seem to be an irreparable blow. But, I gather you don't think so.
Ball: The worse blow would be that the mightiest power in the world is unable to defeat
guerrillas.
President: Then you are not basically troubled by what the world would say about pulling
out?
Ball: If we were actively helping a country with a stable, viable government, it would be a
vastly different story. Western Europeans look at us as if we got ourselves into an
imprudent fashion [situation].
President: But I believe that these people are trying to fight. They're like Republicans who
try to stay in power, but don't stay there long.
(aside--amid laughter--"excuse me, Cabot")
Ball: Thieu spoke the other day and said the Communists would win the election.
President: I don't believe that. Does anyone believe that?

(There was no agreement from anyone--McNamara, Lodge, B. Bundy, Unger--all said
they didn't believe it.)
McNamara: Ky will fall soon. He is weak. We can't have elections until there is physical
security, and even then there will be no elections because as Cabot said, there is no
democratic tradition. (Wheeler agreed about Ky--but said Thieu impressed him)
President: Two basic troublings:
1. That Westerners can ever win in Asia.
2. Don't see how you can fight a war under direction of other people whose government
changes every month.
Now go ahead, George, and make your other points.
Ball: The cost, as well as our Western European allies, is not relevant to their situation.
What they are concerned about is their own security--troops in Berlin have real meaning,
none in VN.
President: Are you saying pulling out of Korea would be akin to pulling out of Vietnam?
Bundy: It is not analogous. We had a status quo in Korea. It would not be that way in
Vietnam.
Ball: We will pay a higher cost in Vietnam.
This is a decision one makes against an alternative.
On one hand--long protracted war, costly, NVN is digging in for long term. This is their
life and driving force. Chinese are taking long term view--ordering blood plasma from
Japan.
On the other hand--short-term losses. On balance, come out ahead of McNamara plan.
Distasteful on either hand.
Bundy: Two important questions to be raised--I agree with the main thrust of McNamara.
It is the function of my staff to argue both sides.
To Ball's argument: The difficulty in adopting it now would be a radical switch without
evidence that it should be done. It goes in the face of all we have said and done.
His whole analytical argument gives no weight to loss suffered by other side. A great
many elements in his argument are correct.
We need to make clear this is a somber matter--that it will not be quick--no single action
will bring quick victory.
I think it is clear that we are not going to be thrown out.

Ball: My problem is not that we don't get thrown out, but that we get bogged down and
don't win.
Bundy: I would sum up: The world, the country, and the VN would have alarming
reactions if we got out.
Rusk: If the Communist world finds out we will not pursue our commitment to the end, I
don't know where they will stay their hand.
I am more optimistic than some of my colleagues. I don't believe the VC have made large
advances among the VN people.
We can't worry about massive casualties when we say we can't find the enemy. I don't see
great casualties unless the Chinese come in.
Lodge: There is a greater threat to World War III if we don't go in. Similarity to our
indolence at Munich.
I can't be as pessimistic as Ball. We have great seaports in Vietnam. We don't need to
fight on roads. We have the sea. Visualize our meeting VC on our own terms. We don't
have to spend all our time in the jungles.
If we can secure their bases, the VN can secure, in time, a political movement to (1)
apprehend the terrorist and (2) give intelligence to the government.
The procedures for this are known.
I agree that the Japanese agitators don't like what we are doing but Sato is totally in
agreement with our actions.
The VN have been dealt more casualties than, per capita, we suffered in the Civil War.
The VN soldier is an uncomplaining soldier. He has ideas he will die for.
Unger: I agree this is what we have to do. We have spotted some things we want to pay
attention to.
President: How can we get everybody to compete with McNamara in the press? We are
trying to do so many other things with our economic and health projects. Constantly
remind the people that we are doing other things besides bombing.
Unger: Took this question up with Zorthian and press people.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2 E, 1965
Troop Decision. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Cooper on July 22. Valenti's notes of
the July 21 meeting do not list Cooper among those present; see Document 71. An
attendance list attached to Cooper's record of the meetings indicates that, in addition to
those listed by Valenti, Cooper and Busby of the White House staff and Marks of USIA
were present for the morning and afternoon meetings. Clark Clifford was invited and
attended the afternoon meeting.
SUBJECT
Meetings on Vietnam, July 21, 1965
This is a summary of the discussion of Secretary McNamara's report and
recommendations held in the Cabinet Room on Wednesday, July 21. There were three
sessions: a preparatory meeting without the President at 10:30, a meeting with the
President from 11:30 until 1:00, another meeting with the President from 2:30 until 5:30.
A list of those present is attached at annex./2/
/2/Attached but not printed.
Preparatory Meeting--10:30
Secretary McNamara noted that the only Section of his report which contained specific
action recommendations and the only one fully coordinated with the principals
(Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson, General Westmoreland, General Wheeler,
and Ambassador Lodge) was paragraph 5. The four key recommendations follow:
1. The deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by October to 34
maneuver battalions (or, if the Koreans fail to provide the expected 9 battalions promptly,
to 43 battalions). The battalions--together with increases in other units, would bring the
total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 175,000 (200,000 if we must make up for
the Korean failure).
2. Congress be requested to authorize the call-up of approximately 235,000 men in the
Reserve and National Guard. This number would provide approximately 36 maneuver
battalions by the end of this year.
3. The regular armed forces be increased by approximately 375,000 men (approximately
250,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 25,000 Navy). This would provide
approximately 27 additional maneuver battalions by the middle of 1966.
4. A supplemental appropriation of approximately $X for FY 1966 be sought from the
Congress to cover the first part of the added costs attributable to the buildup in and for the
war in Vietnam. A further supplemental appropriation might be required later in the Fiscal
Year.
Although no attempt was made to coordinate the remainder of the paper, the comments of
other members of the group were solicited. No attempt was made to resolve certain shades
of difference, but Ambassador Lodge's concerns about early political moves to obtain a
negotiated settlement (paragraphs 4c and 9) were recorded in footnotes.
Ambassador Lodge emphasized that his concern with respect to political moves was
basically on the matter of timing. He also felt that channels of communication with the
VC and DRV already exist.
McGeorge Bundy noted that such questions of the "liberation" of North Vietnam could be
handled in our public utterances. As far as "negotiations" were concerned, third countries
could be relied on to keep initiatives going. Secretary McNamara observed that the
contemplated size of our forces and bases in South Vietnam could well give Hanoi the
impression that we had the intention of "marching North." Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow
should be made aware that this was not our intent.
In a response to a series of questions from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara doubted
that the GVN could raise the necessary forces to counter increasing VC capabilities (the
country team was more optimistic, but we would be prudent to take a pessimistic and
skeptical view of the abilities of the GVN--"a non-government"--to push forward with any
major program); morale of US forces was excellent (General Wheeler heartily agreed);
the monsoon offensive was under way and "there was more to come;" the VC lacked the
capability to seize any of the major US bases, or Saigon.
In connection with VC logistics, Secretary McNamara indicated that, although there was
little information available, VC supplies appeared to be adequate. Both he and General
Wheeler felt that much of the VC supplies were coming in by sea. Our capability to
interdict sea supply was inadequate. This, and the lack of tactical intelligence ("POW
interrogations must be tightened up") were the two most important operational problems
we faced.
The seeking out of VC main force units was generally regarded as a high priority matter.
To a considerable extent this reflected the gaps in intelligence. General Wheeler pointed
out that small US-ARVN "foraging teams" operating primarily in the Delta, attempt to
locate VC units.
Secretary Rusk stated that, if the McNamara report was accepted, a scenario for
Congressional and public actions would be desirable. There was a general feeling that the
President would have to move ahead on statements to Congress and the public early in the
week of July 26. Although there was already a widespread expectation that we would be
expanding our forces in Vietnam, the key question involved calling up reserves.
Secretary Rusk felt that it was important that the new military proposals have civilian (i.e.,
State Department) endorsement. He thought he should participate in the Congressional
testimony. Mr. Bundy suggested that the Congressional presentation should be a DOD
responsibility and that Mr. Rusk should participate in the follow-up presentation to the
public. Mr. Ball pointed out the need to paint "a sombre picture" and to dispel any idea
that the post-monsoon period would see us over the hump. Secretary McNamara felt that
we should make it clear to the public that American troops were already in combat.
Meeting with the President--11:30
Mr. Bundy suggested an agenda for the discussion to follow:
1. The Action Recommendations (para. 5 of McNamara report)
2. The political situation and prospects in Vietnam

3. The basic diplomatic position
4. A scenario of action
The President stressed the need for utmost care to avoid any leaks or speculation on the
subjects under discussion.
Secretary McNamara summarized his recommendations.
The President indicated that, when the time came to call up the reserves, he wanted a full
statement of the situation in Vietnam which required additional US troops. What
consequences are likely to flow from a call-up? (The McNamara paper gives no sense of
victory, but rather of continuing stalemate.) Why can't we get more third country troops?
What are the alternatives available to us? We could tell the GVN that we are leaving, but
is this an option we wish to pursue at this time? If we pull out of Vietnam now, will we
have to call up more troops and suffer more casualties at some later date? We have
explored all initiatives for a peaceful settlement, to an extent, perhaps, that we might
already look weak. In short, what are our present options, why do we select the
recommended number of troops rather than more or fewer? What will this increased force
accomplish?
Mr. McNamara discussed the deterioration in the situation: The VC has greatly expanded
its control of the country, populous areas are now isolated, both the VC and ARVN have
been suffering heavy casualties. Unless the US steps in with additional forces, the VC will
push the GVN into small enclaves and become increasingly ineffective. The VC now
controls about 25 percent of the population (CIA Director Raborn estimated that the VC
controlled about 25 percent of the population during the day and about 50 percent at
night). A year ago, the VC controlled less than 20 percent.
The President felt that our mission should be as limited as we dare make it.
General Wheeler agreed, but felt that we should engage in offensive operations to seek out
and fight VC main force units. Although this is difficult because of the lack of tactical
intelligence, we know where these base areas are.
Director Raborn reported the CIA's estimate that the VC will avoid major confrontations
with US forces and concentrate on destroying our LOCs and on guerrilla warfare,
generally.
General Wheeler felt that the VC will have to "come out and fight" and that this will
probably take place in the highlands where they will probably attempt to establish a
government seat. Mr. Ball thought, however, that the VC might not "accommodate" us by
moving in "Phase III" operations. Mr. McNamara felt that if the VC did not choose to
fight in large units, the ARVN could proceed with pacification activities and consolidate
its oil spots. We don't know what the VC will do when confronted with 175,000 US
forces, but they probably will contrive to use their main force units in large concentrations
until they get badly mauled (probably by the first part of 1966). At the moment, terrorism
is low in terms of VC capabilities. US forces can engage guerrillas as well as the main
force units.
Admiral Raborn believed that the VC/PAVN will attempt to achieve a decisive victory in
the next six months. In response to the President's query as to the likelihood of this, Mr.
McNamara stated that this was highly improbable.
The President asked if there were any dissents from the McNamara recommendations. Mr.
Ball felt that we were engaged on "a very perilous voyage." He had grave apprehensions
about our ability to beat the VC because of the nature of the terrain, the softness of the
political situation and other factors. However, he would go along with the McNamara
report. The President indicated that he was aware of the dangers, but wondered about
other courses open to us.
Mr. Ball stated that he could not offer a course that would permit us to "cut our losses"
easily. But we should weigh the costs of cutting our losses now as opposed to later. The
pressures to move toward a larger war would be "almost irresistible." He based his views
not on a "moral" position but on a "cold-blooded calculation." We will have to take the
risk of Southeast Asia becoming Communist. However, he believed that the losses would
be of a short-term nature.
The President felt that Mr. Ball clearly identified the dangers before us, but did not get the
impression that Mr. Ball opposes the McNamara course. The President wanted to
minimize the dangers of this enterprise but felt that he had no other choice. He would
seriously like to explore other alternatives, now or as we proceed.
Mr. Rusk agreed that alternative options should be explored. He felt, however, that if we
had met the challenge posed in 1961 by sending "50,000 men" to South Vietnam, Hanoi
may have hesitated to proceed with its actions against the South.
Mr. Rowan indicated he would go along with the McNamara proposal, but was worried
about the prospects for GVN stability (page 3 of the report). Unless we can achieve
stability, our forces will be severely handicapped.
Mr. Lodge pointed out that we cannot count on stability in South Vietnam. Saigon has no
roots in the countryside and needs peace to rule the country. In any case, if there were a
strong stable government there wouldn't be a war. "We shouldn't take the Government too
seriously." If the area is important to us, we must do what is necessary regardless of the
Government.
The President asked Mr. Ball to present his alternative proposal in detail at a meeting in
the afternoon.
Mr. McNamara proceeded to develop his option: In essence the VC now had the
capability to push ARVN out of positions they now control with a consequent inevitable
takeover of the Government. He would not recommend that we hold our forces at the
present level. We should increase our forces or get out. General Wheeler pointed out that
the ARVN strength had sharply declined because of casualties and desertions. With
increased US forces we will have proportionately less casualties. He could not assure the
President, however, that an additional 100,000 men would be sufficient.
In response to the President's query why Hanoi couldn't match US man for man, General
Wheeler indicated that large-scale PAVN forces would be a favorable development for us.
He felt that the PAVN would be unlikely to put more than 25 percent of its own forces
into South Vietnam (Note: the PAVN consists of approximately 250,000 troops). Admiral
Raborn stated that CIA's estimate was that Hanoi would send 20-25,000 PAVN troops
into South Vietnam by the end of the year.
The President urged the DCI to increase CIA's capabilities for intelligence collection in
the North. Anything that was needed to accomplish this would be made available. Mr.
McNamara stressed the need to increase combat intelligence as well (CIA and MACV J-2
were working on this problem).
The President indicated his deep concern about press stories from Saigon that US forces
were bombing innocent civilians. These followed a general discussion on the overall press
situation with the President urging State Department officials to work on the matter.
The President closed this session with a request to Messrs. Ball and McGeorge Bundy
constantly to explore alternatives to proposed policies. The session adjourned at 1:00 p.m.
Afternoon Session--2:30
Mr. Ball developed the details of his policy alternative. He was basically skeptical of the
ability of Westerners successfully to wage war on the terrain and in the political
atmosphere of Vietnam. If the war could be won in a year with reasonable casualties, he
would not be so concerned. But he feels that it will take at least two years and the fact that
we will have put in so much US manpower with no early definitive results, would be a
sign of US weakness in the eyes of the world. The fact that our tactical intelligence is so
poor indicates the unfavorable political atmosphere in Vietnam. We have underestimated
the seriousness of the problem since we started there. And we are still underestimating the
seriousness of the situation. "It is like giving cobalt treatment to a terminal cancer case."
The least harmful way to cut our losses is to let the GVN decide it doesn't want us. He has
no illusions about the consequences of this in Vietnam or in Southeast Asia. He reviewed
these consequences in detail, but felt that in the long run they would be less serious than
they might appear at first.
The President agreed that the situation is serious. He regretted that we were embroiled in
Vietnam. But we are there. He believes the Vietnamese people want us there, despite the
frequent changes of government. In response to the President's query, Mr. McNamara
indicated his poor impression of General Ky, and his belief that the present GVN would
be removed by the end of the year. General Wheeler stated that he had a good impression
of General Thieu. He felt that the stability of the present government would depend on our
support.
The President stressed his concern about the GVN's instability. He noted two basic
problems:
1. Can Westerners engage in a war in Vietnam?
2. How can we fight a war under a government that changes so frequently?
Mr. Bundy agreed with the McNamara proposals. He felt that no government which could
hold power is likely to be one that will invite us to leave. The basic lesson of Mr. Ball's
view is that:
1. The post-monsoon season will not see us in the clear.

2. No single speech will be sufficient to reassure the American people.
We will have to face up to the serious, ominous implications of our new policy. This is
not a continuation of our present approach. "We are asking Americans to bet more to
achieve less." We will have to engage in a much more massive political and economic
effort. New organizational changes may be necessary in our mission in Saigon and in our
governmental structure in Washington. There are no early victories in store, although
early casualties are likely to be heavy.
Mr. Bundy did not believe that Mr. Ball's "cancer analogy" was a good one. Immaturity
and weakness, yes. A non-Communist society is struggling to be born. Before we take our
decision to the American people, Ambassador Taylor should go back to the GVN and get
greater, more positive assurances. There will be time to decide our policy won't work after
we have given it a good try. (Mr. Ball disagreed here, feeling that the larger our
commitment, the more difficult would be the decision to get out. "We won't get out; we'll
double our bet and get lost in the rice paddies.")
Mr. Bundy felt that the kind of shift in US policy suggested by Mr. Ball would be
"disastrous". He would rather maintain our present commitment and "waffle through" than
withdraw. The country is in the mood to accept grim news.
Secretary Rusk emphasized that the nature and integrity of the US commitment was
fundamental. It makes the US stance with the USSR creditable. It would be dangerous if
the Communist leadership became convinced that we will not see this through. It is more
important to convince the Communist leadership of this than to worry about the opinion
of non-Communist countries. He is more optimistic about the outcome of the war than
some. The effects of our force increment will be to force the VC into guerrilla activity, to
remove the capability of the other side to use major forces against the GVN. The VC must
now be faced with difficult decisions. An increased US commitment does not change the
nature of the war--we have already gone a long way in the air and on the ground without
escalating. Consequently, he wondered whether we should be too dramatic about the
increase in US forces. (Mr. Bundy pointed out here that calling up the reserves will
require a certain amount of "drama".)
Mr. McNamara felt that Mr. Ball understated the cost of cutting our losses. He agreed
with Mr. Rusk on the international effect of such an action at this time. Mr. Ball also
overstates the cost of his (McNamara's) proposal. He agreed that it would take at least two
years to pacify the country and we must be prepared to increase our forces by another
100,000.
General Wheeler said that it was unreasonable to expect to "win" in a year regardless of
the number of US troops involved. We might start to reverse the unfavorable trend in a
year and make definite progress in three years.
The President wondered whether we could win without using nuclear weapons if China
entered the war.
General Wheeler felt we could in "Southeast Asia." He believes US forces can operate in
the terrain of Southeast Asia. This is the first "war of National Liberation"; if we walk out
of this one, we will just have to face others.

The President asked why, when we have been undertaking military efforts for 20 months,
this new effort will be successful. General Wheeler felt that our additional forces will
stave off a deteriorating situation.
Ambassador Lodge disagreed with Mr. Ball's approach. He felt, however, that it was
essential to get a political/civil program going.
Ambassador Unger agreed with McNamara proposal. He found no unfavorable reactions
in South Vietnam to an increase in US forces.
The President raised again the problem of getting more economic/political information
into the press. State Department representatives promised to give this increased attention.
The President stressed his desire to get more third country troops into South Vietnam. He
also raised the possibility of a Vietnam Task Force which would meet daily.
The meeting adjourned at 5:30.
CLC
73. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
No classification marking.
The President invited alternatives to the McNamara proposal./2/ What follows, however,
is not an alternative but rather an ancillary approach.
/2/Document 67.
This morning's discussion/3/ noted two possible military outcomes resulting from a
substantial increase in US forces:
a. The VC main forces will be forced by US forces into reverting to guerrilla warfare.
b. The VC main forces will choose not to confront our units head-on and voluntarily
revert to guerrilla actions.
Either way, it would appear that we and the GVN will be faced with the problem of
guerrilla rather than positional warfare. The fact that this may mean that the VC cannot
achieve a military victory offers small comfort; neither we nor the GVN have as yet
demonstrated that we can win this kind of war. The idea of leaving "pacification" duties to
the ARVN (while we defend our bases and come to the relief of besieged ARVN units)
will not, in itself, do the trick. In effect, the VC will be doing what it is best at. What is
needed, if we are successfully to cope with the VC under the circumstances of widespread
guerrilla warfare, is a political-economic-psychwar program as carefully developed and as
massive in its way as the military effort envisaged in the McNamara proposal. In fact, it
may well be that many of the US forces would be redundant under these circumstances
and our hopes for "a favorable outcome" will be dependent on the success of our nonmilitary efforts.
In brief, I would recommend that if the McNamara proposals are accepted, there be
developed simultaneously a major non-military program to deal with the guerrilla phase
of the war. In fact, I do not see how the McNamara approach can succeed without such
accompanying non-military planning.
C
Washington, July 21, 1965, 8 p.m.
SUBJECT
Timing of Decision and Actions in Vietnam
Bill Moyers tells me we got through Wednesday/2/ with the White House press well
enough, but I think the probability is that we will have rising pressure in the coming days.
For this reason, I myself continue to think that the right time for your message--or a
fireside chat--or both at once, is Monday./3/ We really cannot get an orderly and wellconsidered decision made before that, but I doubt if we can hold the fort any longer.
/2/July 21.
/3/July 26.
I myself feel very strongly that we should not dribble out bits and pieces of this to the
Press or to publishers before you make your final decision and announcement. The Press
people we need most on this particular issue are the regular reporters, and the best thing
we can do for them is to be sure they get the news straight, and from you, and on-therecord. If you didn't scare the meeting into silence today, I will be greatly surprised, and I
think it makes good sense for your Government to deliberate for three days on an issue of
this magnitude. On this basis, it seems to me that on Friday, or Saturday morning, we
might announce that you are calling the Leadership to a meeting Sunday afternoon or
Monday morning, and expect to go to Congress Monday noon or Monday evening.
I have an additional reason for proposing this schedule. Dean Rusk is going to the
Bohemian Grove to give a speech on Saturday, and he has been hoping to take a day of
rest in the bargain. He would like to leave Friday morning and return Sunday afternoon.
Yet he should clearly be very much on hand when we meet the Leadership. The schedule I
have suggested meets both objectives.
I have discussed this matter only with Bob McNamara, and I find that he concurs in this
recommendation.
On a separate matter--Bob is carrying out your orders to plan this whole job with only
$300-$400 million in immediate new funds. But I think you will want to know that he
thinks our posture of candor and responsibility would be better if we ask for $2 billion to
take us through the end of the calendar year, on the understanding that we will come back
for more, if necessary. Bob is afraid we simply cannot get away with the idea that a callup of the planned magnitude can be paid for by anything so small as another few hundred
million. Cy Vance told me the other day that the overall cost is likely to be on the order of
$8 billion in the coming year and I can understand Bob's worry that in the nature of
things, these projected costs will be sure to come out pretty quickly, especially if he looks
as if he was trying to pull a fast one.
I have not told Bob that I am reporting his worry to you; don't give me away.
McG.B.
75. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Busby) to President

Johnson/1/
Washington, July 21, 1965, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Horace Busby, Vietnam, Box 3. Secret.
SUBJECT
Impressions, Vietnam Discussion
The following are some impressions--and personal reactions--to the Vietnam
discussions/2/ which may be pertinent and useful:
Personal Impressions:
--Lodge: Strikingly more impressive, far more involved and committed than on any past
occasion where I have seen him close-up. His year of reflection seems to me to have
enhanced his vision--and value to you.
--Rusk: Given only a degree or two more of warmth and heat, he would be imposingly
persuasive as a public leader. He is too deferential, self-effacing. But his logic and
impromptu articulation is devastatingly effective and clear-cut. He assesses the stakes in
Vietnam more precisely and convincingly than anyone else I have heard.
--Wheeler: A fortunate choice for his present post. I do wish other Joint Chiefs could hear
more of these sessions.
As for the views of Secretary Ball, These are my reactions--and suggestions. Given his
point of view, Ball is impressively clear-headed and well-organized in his argument. He is
conscientious, not a critic. Obviously, his thinking is influenced by two factors of a
decade ago: (1) concern--held-over from the Stevenson 1952 campaign--for adverse U.S.
reaction to efforts to keep any Asian war limited, and (2) his other strong personal
involvement, i.e., with the French during their fiasco in Indo-China. Anyone emotionally
involved in those two experiences would be cautious, as Ball is cautious. Significantly, his
argument is not the argument of the academic intellectuals--it is much more sane and
sound, and merits respect as such.
Out of the discussions these thoughts occur:
1. Someone mentioned the Viet Cong are "creatures of habit." So are we. Your advisers
have "the habit" of down-playing our role in Vietnam. Hence, a tendency is present to
insist that whatever is done is, actually, only an extension of all we have been doing. This
may be self-deceptive.
2. What we are considering is not whether we continue a war--but whether we start (or
have started) a new war. The 1954-64 premises, principles and pretexts no longer apply.
This is no longer South Vietnam's war. We are no longer advisers. The stakes are no
longer South Vietnam's. The war is ours. We are participants. The stakes are ours--and the
West's.
3. The two great needs are self-assessment--and clearer definition of objectives.
a. On Self-assessment: It seems dangerous to insist, passively or vocally that the U.S. has
not made mistaken judgments since 1961. We must have done so. It would be
constructive to insist upon critical self-analysis to determine at least the pattern of our
errors.
b. Objectives: Clearly, the acceptable objectives in Vietnam--acceptable in proportion to
U.S. sacrifice required--are world-size, not country-size. It is hard to define an acceptable
objective in Vietnam: To seek one there leads inevitably to Ball's conclusion and thesis.
The objectives--the acceptable objectives--must be in terms of Southeast Asia, the Pacific
or even the broad East-West relationship. Rusk sees it in this dimension--and his logic
prevails over Ball's. We do need, I believe, to equate our purposes in Southeast Asia with
objectives broader and greater than the one country itself. Only that will justify what lies
ahead.
4. On troop support from other nations: We may be thinking too narrowly on this. For
many reasons, such support will not be forthcoming. One reason is that our oldest ally
already is more involved--relative to strength--than we: i.e., Great Britain. If we can
broaden the Nation's perspective and information by defining regional rather than onecountry objectives, it would be helpful. Our efforts in Vietnam and Britain's efforts in
Malaysia should be packaged together for public consumption. The more relevant line of
action among allies would be to stop their trade with North Vietnam rather than pester
them for troops.
5. Clearly, the fixation about working with the Vietnam government is a holdover from
the ten-year effort to down-play our role there. Basically, we are there not solely because
of Vietnam's invitation, but because of our obligations under SEATO. Our fidelity to a
Treaty--not to a changeable government--deserves more emphasis abroad and at home. It
also offers a predicate for the U.S. to run its own effort rather than stand by seeking
permission from a government-that-is-not-a-government.
6. Overall, your initiative in insisting that everyone "think" is very satisfying, useful and
stimulating. Defense, as well as State, should be encouraged to re-examine its own
premises and past performance--or so it seems to me.
Horace Busby/3/

Washington, July 22, 1965, noon-2:15 p.m.
handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. They are quoted extensively in Valenti, A
Very Human President, pp. 340-352. Valenti recalled that before this meeting, President
Johnson told him: "All these recommendations seem to be built on a pretty soft bottom.
Everything blurs when you get almost to the gate." (Ibid., p. 341)
PRESENT
President
McNamara
Vance
Gen. Wheeler
Gen. Johnson
Secy. Resor
Gen. McConnell
Gen. Greene
Adm. McDonald
Clifford/2/
Secy. Nitze
Secy. Zuckert
Secy. Brown
Bundy
/2/Clark Clifford was invited to this meeting at the President's request. (Ibid., p. 340)
President: I asked McNamara to invite you here to counsel with you on these problems
and the ways to meet them.

Hear from the Chiefs the alternatives open to you and then recommendations on those
alternatives from a military point.
Options open to us
1. Leave the country--with as little loss as possible--the "bugging
out" approach.
2. Maintain present force and lose slowly.
3. Add 100,000 men--recognizing that may not be enough--and
adding more next year.
Disadvantages of #3--risk of escalation, casualties will be high--may be a long war
without victory.
President: I would like you to start out by stating our present position and where we can
go.
Adm. McDonald: Sending Marines has improved situation. I agree with McNamara that
we are committed to extent that we can't move out. If we continue the way we are it will
be a slow, sure victory for the other side. By putting more men in it will turn the tide and
let us know what further we need to do. I wish we had done this long before.
President: But you don't know if 100,000 will be enough. What makes you conclude that
if you don't know where we are going--and what will happen--we shouldn't pause and find
this out?
McDonald: Sooner or later we'll force them to the conference table. We [They?] can't win
an all out war.
President: If we put in 100,000 won't they put in an equal number?
McDonald: No. If we step up our bombing-President: Is this a chance we want to take?
McDonald: Yes, when I view the alternatives. Get out now or pour in more men.
President: Is that all?
McDonald: I think our allies will lose faith in us.
President: We have few allies really helping us.
McDonald: Thailand, for example. If we walk out of Vietnam, the whole world will
question our word. We don't have much choice.
President: Paul, what is your view?
Nitze: In that area not occupied by US forces, it is worse, as I observed on my trip out
there.
We have two alternatives--support VN all over this country--or fall out from secure
position we do have. Make it clear to populace that we are on their side. Gradually turn
the tide of losses by aiding VN at certain points.
If we just maintained what we have--more the Pres. problem than ours--to acknowledge
that we couldn't beat the VC, the shape of the world will change.
President: What are our chances of success?
Nitze: If we want to turn the tide, by putting in more men, it would be about 60/40.
President: If we gave Westmoreland all he asked for what are our chances? I don't agree
that NVN and China won't come in.
Nitze: Expand the area we could maintain. In the Philippines and Greece it was shown
that guerrillas lost.
President: Would you send in more forces than Westmoreland requests?
Nitze: Yes. Depends on how quickly they-President: How many? 200 instead of 100?
Nitze: Need another 100 in January.
President: Can you do that?
Nitze: Yes.
McNamara: The current plan is to introduce 100,000--with possibility of a second
100,000 by first of the year.
President: What reaction is this going to produce?
Wheeler: Since we are not proposing an invasion of NVN, Soviets will step up material
and propaganda--same with Chicoms. Might have NVN introduce more regular troops.
President: Why wouldn't NVN pour in more men? Also, call on volunteers from China
and Russia.
Wheeler: First, they may decide they can't win by putting in forces they can't afford. At
most would put in two more divisions. Beyond that they strip their country and invite a
counter move on our part.
Secondly, on volunteers--the one thing all NVN fear is Chinese. For them to invite
Chinese volunteers is to invite China's taking over NVN.
Weight of judgment is that NVN may re-inforce their forces, they can't match us on a
build-up.
From military view, we can handle, if we are determined to do so, China and NVN.
President: Anticipate retaliation by Soviets in Berlin area?
Wheeler: You may have some flare-up but lines are so tightly drawn in Berlin that it
raises risks of escalation too quickly. Lemnitzer thinks no flare-up in Berlin. In Korea, if
Soviets undertook operations, it would be dangerous.
President: Admiral, would you summarize what you think we ought to do?
McDonald: 1. Supply forces Westmoreland has asked for.
2. Prepare to furnish more (100,000) in 1966.
3. Commensurate building in air and naval forces, step up of air attacks on NVN.
4. Bring in needed reserves and draft calls.
President: Any ideas on cost of what this would be?
McNamara: Yes--$12 billion--1966.
President: Any idea what effect this will have on our economy?
McNamara: It would not require wage and price controls in my judgment. Price index
ought not go up more than one point or two.
McConnell: If you put in these requested forces and increase air and sea effort--we can at
least turn the tide where we are not losing anymore. We need to be sure we get the best
we can out of SVN--need to bomb all military targets available to us in NVN. As to
whether we can come to satisfactory solution with these forces, I don't know. With these
forces properly employed, and cutting off their supplies, we can do better than we're
doing.
President: Have results of bombing actions been as fruitful and productive as we
anticipated?
McConnell: No sir, they haven't been. Productive in SVN, but not as productive in NVN
because we are not striking the targets that hurt them.
President: Are you seriously concerned when we change targets we escalate the war?
They might send more fighters down. Can't be certain if it will escalate their efforts on the
ground.
Would it hurt our chances at a conference if we started killing civilians?
McConnell: We need to minimize civilian killings.

President: Would you go beyond Westmoreland's recommendations?
McConnell: No sir.
President: How many planes lost?
McConnell: 106 all types--small percentage of total.
President: How many out there?
McConnell: 146 combat. We have lost 54 combat.
President: How many Navy planes?
McConnell: In the 30's--about 125 combat.
Zuckert: It's worth taking a major step to avoid long run consequences of walking away
from it.
President: Doesn't it really mean if we follow Westmoreland's requests we are in a new
war--this is going off the diving board.
McNamara: This is a major change in US policy. We have relied on SVN to carry the
brunt. Now we would be responsible for satisfactory military outcome.
President: Are we in agreement we would rather be out of there and make our stand
somewhere else?
Johnson: Least desirable alternative is getting out. Second least is doing what we are
doing. Best is to get in and get the job done.
President: But I don't know how we are going to get that job done. There are millions of
Chinese. I think they are going to put their stack in. Is this the best place to do this? We
don't have the allies we had in Korea. Can we get our allies to cut off supplying the NVN?
McNamara: No, we can't prevent Japan, Britain, etc. to charter ships to Haifong.
President: Have we done anything to get them to stop?
McNamara: We haven't put the pressure on them as we did in Cuba but even if we did, it
wouldn't stop the shipping.
Brown: It seems that all of our alternatives are dark. I find myself in agreement with the
others.
President: Is there anything to the argument this government is likely to fail, and we will
be asked to leave? If we try to match the enemy, we will be bogged down in protracted
war and have the government ask us to leave.

Brown: Our lines of communication are long.
President: How long?
Brown: 7000 miles from the West Coast, but not too much greater than China's. Biggest
weakness of political base is lack of security they can offer their people.
President: Are we starting something that in 2-3 years we can't finish?
Brown: It is costly to us to strangle slowly, but chances of losing are less if we move in.
President: Suppose we told Ky of requirements we need--he turns them down--and we
have to get out and make our stand in Thailand.
Brown: The Thais will go with the winner.
President: If we didn't stop in Thailand where would we stop?
McNamara: Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, surely affect Malaysia. In 2-3 years
Communist domination would stop there, but ripple effect would be great--Japan, India.
We would have to give up some bases. Ayub would move closer to China. Greece,
Turkey would move to neutralist position. Communist agitation would increase in Africa.
Greene: Situation is as tough as when it started. But not as bad as it could be. Marines in
1st Corps area is example of benefits.
Stakes:
1. National security stake. Matter of time before we go in some
place else.
2. Pledge we made.
3. Prestige before the rest of the world.
If you accept these stakes, there are two courses of action:
1. Get out
2. Stay in and win.
How to win:
1. South-2. North
The enclave concept will work. Would like to introduce enough Marines to do this. Two
Marine divisions and one air wing. Extend.
28,000 there now--additional 72,000.
McNamara: Greene suggests these men over and above the Westmoreland request.
President: Then you will need 80,000 more Marines to carry this out.
Greene: Yes. I am convinced we are making progress with the SVN--in food and
construction. We are getting evidence of intelligence from SVN.
In the North--we haven't been hitting the right targets. We should hit POL storage-essential to their transportation. Also airfields destroyed, MIGs and IL28's. As soon as
SAM installations are operable.
President: What would they do?
Greene: Nothing. We can test it by attacking POL storage.
Then we should attack industrial complex in NVN. Also, they can be told by pamphlet
drop why we are doing this. Then we ought to blockade Cambodia--and stop supplies
from coming down.
How long will it take? 5 years--plus 500,000 troops. I think the US people will back you.
President: How would you tell the American people what the stakes are?
Greene: The place where they will stick by you is the national security stake.
Johnson: We are in a face-down. The solution, unfortunately, is long-term. Once the
military solution is solved, the problem of political solution will be more difficult.
President: If we come in with hundreds of thousands of men and billions of dollars, won't
this cause them to come in (China and Russia)?
Johnson: No. I don't think they will.
President: MacArthur didn't think they would come in either.
Johnson: Yes, but this is not comparable to Korea. Same situation--China bases and
communications-President: But China has plenty of divisions to move in, don't they?
Johnson: Yes, they do.
President: Then what would we do?
Johnson: (long silence) If so, we have another ball game.
President: But I have to take into account they will.
Johnson: I would increase the build-up near NVN--and increase action in Korea.
President: If they move in 31 divisions, what does it take on our part?

McNamara: Under favorable conditions they could sustain 31 divisions and assuming
Thais contributed forces, it would take 300,000 plus what we need to combat VC.
Resor: I'm a newcomer--(interrupted by President)
President: But remember they're going to write stories about this like they did the Bay of
Pigs--and about my advisors. That's why I want you to think very carefully about
alternatives and plans.
Looking back on the Dominican Republic would you have done anything any differently,
General?
Johnson: I would have cleaned out part of the city and gone in--and with same numbers.
President: Are you concerned about Chinese forces moving into NVN?
Johnson: There is no evidence of forces--only teams involved in logistics. Could be
investigating areas which they could control later.
President: What is your reaction to Ho's statement he is ready to fight for 20 years?
Johnson: I believe it.
President: What are Ho's problems?
Johnson: His biggest problem is doubt about what our next move will be. He's walking a
tightrope between the Reds & Chicoms. Also, he's worrying about the loss of caches of
arms in SVN.
President: Are we killing civilians along with VC?
Wheeler: Certain civilians accompanying the VC are being killed. It can't be helped.
President: The VC dead is running at a rate of 25,000 a year. At least 15,000 have been
killed by air--half of these are not a part of what we call VC. Since 1961 a total of 89,000
have been killed. SVN are being killed at a rate of 12,000 per year.
Resor: Of the three courses the one we should follow is the McNamara plan. We can't go
back on our commitment. Our allies are watching carefully.
President: Do all of you think the Congress and the people will go along with 600,000
people and billions of dollars 10,000 miles away?
Resor: Gallup Poll shows people are basically behind our commitment.
President: But if you make a commitment to jump off a building, and you find out how
high it is, you may withdraw the commitment.
President: I judge though that the big problem is one of national security. Is that right?
(murmured assent)
President: What about our intelligence? How do they know what we are doing before we
do it? What about the B-52 raid--weren't they gone before we got there?
McNamara: They get it from infiltration in SVN forces.
President: Are we getting good intelligence out of NVN?
McNamara: Only reconnaissance and technical soundings. None from combat
intelligence.
President: Some Congressmen and Senators think we are going to be the most discredited
people in the world. What Bundy will now tell you is not his opinion nor mine (I haven't
taken a position yet) but what we hear.
Bundy: Argument we will face:
For 10 years every step we have taken has been based on a previous failure. All we have
done has failed and caused us to take another step which failed. As we get further into the
bag, we get deeply bruised. Also, we have made excessive claims we haven't been able to
realize.
Also, after 20 years of warnings about war in Asia, we are now doing what MacArthur
and others have warned against.
We are about to fight a war we can't fight and win, as the country we are trying to help is
quitting.
The failure on our own to fully realize what guerrilla war is like. We are sending
conventional troops to do an unconventional job.
How long--how much. Can we take casualties over five years--aren't we talking about a
military solution when the solution is political. Why can't we interdict better--why are our
bombings so fruitless--why can't we blockade the coast--why can't we improve our
intelligence--why can't we find the VC?
President: Gerald Ford has demanded the President testify before the Congress and tell
why we are compelled to up the reserves. Indications are that he will oppose calling up the
reserves.
McNamara: I think we can answer most of the questions posed.
Clifford: If the military plan is carried out, what is the ultimate result if it is successful?
Wheeler: Political objective is to maintain SVN as free and independent. If we follow the
course of action, we can carry out this objective.
Wheeler: Probably after success, we would withdraw most of our forces; [some?]
international or otherwise, would have to stay on.
If we can secure the military situation, it seems likely that we can get some kind of stable
government.
Meeting adjourned at 2:15 pm
77. Meeting Agenda/1/

Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking. The source text bears no drafting
information, but the agenda was apparently drafted by McGeorge Bundy between the
noon and 3 p.m. meetings; see Documents 76 and 78.
Possible Items for Discussion
July 22, 2:30 P.M.
1. How big a change in policy is this and how do we explain it--in political and military
terms?
2. How do we inhibit Chinese and North Vietnamese response by both carrot and stick?
3. How do we combine a peace offensive with stepped-up military action?
4. Is this policy justified in terms of Vietnam, Asia or U.S. national interests--or all three?
5. How do we get a political and social effort within Vietnam that is equal in strength to
the military effort?
6. What are our war aims? What is the answer to Walter Lippmann's question on this
point?/2/
/2/Walter Lippmann's question is not further identified.

Washington, July 22, 1965, 3-4:20 p.m.
notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. The meeting was held
in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
PRESENT
President
McNamara
Rusk
Ball
Busby
Clifford
Gen. Wheeler
Cy Vance
Moyers
Valenti
Bundy
Cater
John McCloy
Arthur Dean
President: I don't think that calling up the reserves in itself is a change of policy. There is
a [no?] question though that we are going into a new kind of activity in VN. Basic
objective is to preserve the independence and freedom of VN. This is not necessarily tied
in with calling up reserves.
Rusk: The essence of policy is why we are there and what our war aims are. Moving from
75,000 to 185,000 men is a change of policy. Much is to be said for playing this low key.
President: That one point needs to be stressed with Congressional leadership--also to
explain with candor what we are doing to the American people. But when we do, we help
the NVN get their requests fulfilled by China and Russia.
McNamara: We can stay away from "change of policy" but it is a change in risk and
commitment. We need to explain why it is in our interest to do it.
Services have submitted budget request by [of?] $12 billion. We can cut this down by half
or more.
Moyers: I don't think the press thinks we are going to change basic policy, but the
requirements to meet that policy.
President: That's right and we ought to say it.
Ball: I hope we can avoid a debate on whether it is a change. We always lose on this. We
are becoming co-defendants with SVN.
McCloy: The country is looking to getting on with the war.
President: There are three alternatives:
1. Sit and lose slowly
2. Get out
3. Put in what needs to go in.
Rusk: If we bring out our message of decision while the Bucharest meeting/2/ is going on-it might bring them closer together. What we do in SVN is not of great concern to China.
But a progressive step-up in bombing increases risk of China intrusion.
/2/The ninth congress of the Romanian Communist Party, held in Bucharest July 19-24,
was also attended by delegations of over 50 other Communist Parties, including a Chinese
delegation and a Soviet delegation led by Brezhnev.
President: But the Chiefs say what we are doing in the North is not enough, only pin
pricking them, just goosing them.
Rusk: But it is contradictory to do this when we can't find anybody in the South.
Both China and the Soviets have pressure on them. A commitment in SVN is one thing,
but a commitment to preserve another socialist state is quite another. This is a distinction
we must bear in mind.
We have a 1 in 5 chance of Russia's staying out if we make our commitment and if we
bomb Hanoi. A commitment of large forces by us will lead to pressures on us to destroy
Hanoi. This is the key point.
McCloy: Do you think they will let go if they still have sanctuary?
Rusk: Their only sanctuary is 1/5 of the country.
A. Dean: What do you do if the war drags on--with mounting casualties--where do we go?
The people say if we are not doing what is necessary to end it, why don't we do what is
necessary?
McNamara: We are begging the questions. If we bomb Haifong, would this end the war?
and the answer is "No." We have only destroyed so far about 20% of the ammunitions
capacity and a lesser percentage of barracks capacity.
Dean: If this carries on for some years, we'll get in the same fix we were in Korea and the
Yalu.
Rusk: We were under no pressures to make it a larger war until the war was practically
over.
McCloy: If we could define our objectives specifically, what are our objectives in a
discussion? What do we have to negotiate?
Rusk: 1. Infiltration from the North must stop.
2. We have no interests in a permanent military base there.
3. 1954-1962 agreements ought to be solved by peaceful means and not . . .
McCloy: When do the troops get withdrawn?
Rusk: When proof of infiltration--stopping.

Bundy: If we really were the ones for free elections, it would be good. It is difficult for
Saigon to sign on.
McCloy: Would we be willing to take a Tito government or a VC victory?
Bundy: That's where our plan begins to unravel.
Now--how to keep a reasonable peace offensive going-President: We have got to keep peace proposals going. It's like a prizefight. Our right is
our military power, but our left must be our peace proposals. Every time you move troops
forward, you move diplomats forward. I want this done. The generals want more and
more--and go farther and farther. But State has to supply me with some, too.
We need Ernie Pyle out there interviewing soldiers who can tell how proud they are to do
their duty.
Rusk: Thinking of Bucharest meeting, I suggest you meet with the leadership on
Tuesday/3/ and make a statement on Wednesday.
/3/July 27.
Ball: We have big problem of disarmament meeting on Tuesday in Geneva.
McNamara: We can't delay this from the public.
President: Congress ought to be briefed on Saturday or Sunday and go up Monday to
Congress. We ought to decide what our decision is, write it, brief Ambassadors and then
tell the people.
Is the message a personal talk to the Congress or a normal message? Possibly a normal
message.
Meeting adjourned at 4:20 p.m.
79. Memorandum From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Johnson/1/

Cambridge, Massachusetts, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. Confidential. Sent to
President Johnson by Galbraith under a covering memorandum dated July 22, which
states: "This is meant as a sympathetic suggestion on a problem that I know is worrying
you." The covering memorandum is marked with an indication that the President saw
Galbraith's memorandum.
How to Take Ninety Percent of the Political Heat out of Vietnam

I assume the following to be true, much official crap to the contrary.
(1) Vietnam is of no great intrinsic importance. Had it gone Communist after World War
II we would be just as strong as now and we would never waste a thought on it.
(2) No question of high principle is involved. It is their rascals or ours. Both sides would
lose in free elections!
(3) The basic issue is that we must show that we can't be thrown out--that we don't give up
under fire. This would also be bad here at home.
(4) It is right to consider the politics of the problem. A great many people who make
policy do not have to take the political heat. Rusk ran the Korean War and his career was
made by it. Stevenson ran for office during the war and was destroyed. The same would
have happened to Harry Truman had he been up.
(5) Political questions are partly what we make them. Despite all of their efforts the
Republicans could not make mileage last autumn out of Cuba. That was because nothing
was happening there; it wasn't in the news and people couldn't be aroused.
I urge we:
(1) Instruct officials and spokesmen to stop saying the future of mankind, the United
States and human liberty is being decided in Vietnam. It isn't; this merely builds up a
difficult problem out of all proportion. It is also terrible politics. It directs maximum
attention to where difficulties are bound to be greatest.
(2) Stop saying that we are going to reconquer the whole country. We are not going to
pacify Chicago or Harlem. The easiest way to have a failure is to set one up for ourselves
by promising to do what can't be done.
(3) Let us apply a policy of political patience in the area. That is a technique you
understand. It means quietly marking out areas (including of course Saigon) which we can
hold, protect and feed if necessary for years. Then we hold these and worry very little
about the rest. This proves our main point which is that we can't be thrown out. There is a
safe haven for Catholics and anti-communists.
(4) The Viet Cong will not attack these areas frontally. Casualties will be low. High level
trips and other contrived publicity should be kept to the minimum.
(5) Stop or gradually suspend the bombing north and south. This has slight military value,
alarms our people and other countries and, above all, keeps the place at the top of the
news with maximum attention there and minimum attention where it belongs. (I think it
may harden resistance to negotiation also--but on this no one can be sure and I am
confining myself here to facts.)
(6) Keep open the offer of negotiations. But we should not count on this policy forcing
them to the table anytime soon. But someday they will come.
Results:
(1) Unless they attack head on, which we can rule out, we will prove our staying power.
We won't be playing their game by sending our forces out into the jungle where ambush
works.
(2) The whole place will go on the back burner. Public attention will come back to areas
of sound achievement of the Administration where it belongs.
(3) The Republicans will bleat as Keating did about Cuba. That will hurt them more than
us.
(4) It will take the Russians off the hook and enable us to make progress there.
Final Observations:
I would think it worth running some risk of criticism to avoid calling up reserves. This
will add to the publicity and wrong emphasis on Vietnam. I hope searching questions are
asked on the need for these men. (Why not some from the divisions in Korea?) But after
the initial flurry of publicity, this is still the right policy after a call-up.
In the past there were two difficulties with this program. It would have undermined the
South Vietnamese government and required the commitment of our troops. Now there
isn't any Vietnamese government worth worrying about and our forces are committed.
The great problem is our own eager beavers who do not consider the mood of our own
people come the next election, and whose political teat is not in the wringer.
J.K. Galbraith/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The covering memorandum is
signed "Ken."

Department of State
Washington, DC
80. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Rowen)
Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking. McGeorge Bundy forwarded this
memorandum to President Johnson at 7:45 p.m. on July 22, noting in his covering
memorandum that it was the "quick and dirty report" on calling up the reserves that he
had mentioned on the telephone.
SUBJECT
Alternative methods of call-up of Reserve forces
Legally the Reserves may be called up either by Executive Order or through legislative
action. Regarding Executive Order action, 10 U.S.C. 673 authorizes the calling up of up to
one million Reserves. However, the President must first declare a new national
emergency. 10 U.S.C. 673 does not permit the extension of enlistments except for the
Navy and Marine Corps.
The Reserves may also be called up by the Service Secretaries "in time of war or of
national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law . . ." (10
U.S.C. 672). This was the route used in 1961 during the Berlin crisis when Congress
passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to "order any unit, and any member
not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an Armed
Force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months." This law also limited
the number of Ready Reservists on active duty (other than for training) without their
consent under this section at any one time. The law also authorized the involuntary
extension of enlistments or other obligated service for not more than twelve months. The
Resolution was followed by an Executive Order/2/ delegating to the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretaries of the military departments the authority conferred by the Joint
Resolution.
/2/Executive Order 10957, August 10, 1961.
This method of calling up Reserves seems far and away the best. It assures Congressional
participation and support and avoids the problems involved in declaring a new national
emergency.
Finally, in light of experience we should think about including limitations on the
maximum number of Reservists to be called up and the duration of active service under a
Congressional Joint Resolution.
Harry
81. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 10-9-65
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates File.
Top Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the
intelligence organizations of AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense
participated in the preparation of this estimate. The estimate was submitted by the
Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the members of the U.S. Intelligence
Board, except for the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds
that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
A draft of SNIE 10-9-65 was submitted by CIA to President Johnson on July 20 with a
covering memorandum stating: "This estimate is being given to you tonight in preparation
for the meeting tomorrow morning. Admiral Raborn concurs in this estimate although the
USIB has not formally considered it." (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII) The
draft estimate, which is marked with an indication that the President saw it, varies in
wording in several places from the final estimate and does not include paragraphs 4, 5, 6,
14, the annex, or the substitute language provided in footnote 3 by the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, USAF.
COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO A POSSIBLE
US COURSE OF ACTION
The Problem
To estimate foreign reactions, particularly those of the Communist powers, to a specified
US course of action with respect to Vietnam.
Assumptions
For purposes of this estimate, we assume that the US decides to increase its forces in
South Vietnam to about 175,000 by 1 November. We further assume related decisions to
call up about 225,000 reserves, to extend tours of duty at the rate of 20,000 a month, to
increase the regular strength of the armed services by 400,000 over the next year, and to
double draft calls.
We further assume (a) that the increase in forces would be accompanied by statements
reiterating our objectives and our readiness for unconditional discussions, (b) that US
forces would be deployed so that no major grouping threatened or appeared to threaten the
17th Parallel, and (c) that we might either continue present policy with regard to air
strikes or extend these strikes in North Vietnam to include attacks on land (but not sea)
lines of communication from South China/2/ and military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong
area.
/2/See Annex for a discussion and map of both land and current sea routes from China to
North Vietnam. [Footnote in the source text. The Annex is not printed.]
The Estimate
1. Communists and non-Communists alike would see in the increased US military
involvement in Vietnam a strong indication that the US saw little hope of early
negotiations. This would be particularly true if, at the same time, the US extended its air
operations in North Vietnam.
I. Viet Cong and DRV Reactions
2. At present the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (DRV) leaders appear confident
that their course in South Vietnam promises ultimate and possibly early success without
important concessions on their part. They seem to believe that they can achieve a series of
local military successes which, sooner or later, will bring victory through a combination
of a deteriorating South Vietnamese army (ARVN) morale and effectiveness, a collapse of
anti-Communist government in Saigon, and an exhaustion of the US will to persist.
3. We do not believe that inauguration of the US actions here assumed would basically
alter these expectations. The VC and the DRV probably have come to expect increased
US commitments, and they probably believe that the VC, with increased North
Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset the effect of larger US forces. Nor do we
think that the extension of air attacks to military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area
would significantly injure the VC ability to persevere in the South or persuade the Hanoi
Government that the price of persisting was unacceptably high./3/
/3/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with the judgment made in
this paragraph and would substitute the following: "3. We believe that inauguration of the
US actions here assumed, which emphasize US willingness and determination to become
more deeply involved in combat operations in the South and eliminate the concept of an
area 'sanctuary' in North Vietnam, has a reasonable chance of basically altering the
Communists' short-term expectations. While the VC and the DRV probably have come to
expect some additional US commitments, and they probably believe that the VC, with
increased North Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset the effect of larger US
forces, such confidence could be quite quickly undermined by effectively expanded US
combat operations. Extension of air attacks to military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong
area would pose the added threat that urban/industrial targets might be next. The selective
and limited nature of US bombing target selections to date may have led Hanoi seriously
to underestimate the extent of US determination to exert the power necessary to force
discontinuance of DRV support for the VC. US military actions resulting from the
assumed program could well persuade the Hanoi Government that the price of persisting
was becoming unacceptably high." [Footnote in the source text.]
4. If the extension of air attacks were to include sustained interdiction of land lines of
communication leading from South China, these actions would obviously make the
delivery of Soviet and Chinese aid more difficult and costly, and would have a serious
impact on the limited industrial sector of the DRV general economy. It would still not
have a critical impact on the Communist determination to persevere and would not, at
least for the short term, seriously impair VC capabilities in South Vietnam.
5. If, in addition, POL targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area were destroyed by air attacks,
the DRV's ability to provide transportation for the general economy would be severely
reduced. It would also complicate their military logistics. If additional PAVN forces were
employed in South Vietnam on a scale sufficient to counter increased US troop strength,
this would substantially increase the amount of supplies needed in the South. The VC also
depend on supplies from the North to maintain their present level of large-scale
operations. The accumulated strains of a prolonged curtailment of supplies received from
North Vietnam would obviously have an impact on the Communist effort in the South.
They would certainly inhibit and might even prevent an increase in large-scale VC
military activity, though they would probably not force any significant reduction in VC
terrorist tactics of harassment and sabotage. These strains, particularly if they produced a
serious check in the development of VC capabilities for large-scale (multi-battalion)
operations might lead the DRV to consider negotiations./4/ But the final decision on
whether to seek negotiations would depend to a great extent on political developments in
the Indochina area and elsewhere, and on the actual course of combat in South Vietnam.
/4/The Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State, and the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believe that in spite of
greater damage and harassment caused by sustained air attack on lines of communication
(LOC) and other targets, the capacities of DRV and Laos LOC are sufficient to permit
support of the war in South Vietnam at the scale envisaged in this estimate. Other
significant factors supporting this position are the impossibility of doing irreparable
damage to LOC capacity; demonstrated Communist logistic resourcefulness and ability to
move large amounts of war material long distances over difficult terrain by primitive
means; and the difficulty of detecting, let alone stopping, sea infiltration. [Footnote in the
source text.]
6. In response to the US program, the Communists would almost certainly undertake
measures to increase their own strength in South Vietnam for a higher level of struggle.
They are already augmenting VC units and dispatching additional PAVN forces to South
Vietnam; the assumed US actions would probably result in a speeding up of this process.
By the end of 1965, the total of PAVN regulars in organized units in South Vietnam could
reach 20,000 to 30,000 men. Although the Communists are aware of the dangers of
concentrating their troops in large numbers, they might, during the next few months,
attempt major assaults against GVN forces and positions, seeking to shatter ARVN before
the increased weight of US strength could be brought to bear.
7. In coping with larger US forces employed in a more aggressive fashion, we believe that
the Viet Cong would seek to avoid the kind of engagements which risked a serious
Communist defect. Instead, they would probably concentrate on harassments intended to
bleed and humiliate US forces, trapping and destroying isolated units where possible. At a
minimum, the Communists would almost certainly continue present efforts to cut land
communication lines and would step up the dispatch of small, expendable teams on
sabotage and assassination missions designed to make the US look impotent or foolish.
The Communists might also seek to increase their activities in Laos.
8. Over the longer run, the Communists' strategy will depend upon the actual course of
combat and their estimates of South Vietnamese stability and US will to persist. They are
predisposed to attach great weight to signs of disintegration in Saigon and to
manifestations of domestic US opposition to Administration policies. These boost popular
morale on the Communist side and reinforce the leadership's conviction that Communist
staying power is inherently superior.
9. Should future military and political developments bring this conviction into serious
doubt, the DRV might express increased interest in negotiations. However, they would
endeavor to preserve their own freedom of action while laying inhibitions on US/GVN
military operations, hoping to promote disarray in Saigon and encourage US opinion in
favor of withdrawal.
10. Faced with the buildup outlined in our assumptions, the DRV would probably request
more air defense equipment from the USSR, including SAMs, fighters, technicians, and
perhaps pilots, particularly if US air attacks were expanded. From the Chinese, Hanoi
would probably request more radar equipment, anti-aircraft artillery, and technicians in
addition to a further increase in shipments of infantry arms and ammunition. Hanoi might
also request China (and, perhaps, North Korea) to furnish aircraft and pilots. In general,
however, we believe that Hanoi would wish to maintain some limits on, and a rough
balance between, Soviet and Chinese personnel.
11. Deployments on the scale here assumed would cause the DRV some concern about
US invasion. This would be true even if US forces took up positions which were not
suggestive of an invasion. We believe, however, that the DRV would not react to this
concern by requesting the introduction of Chinese combat forces. It probably would make
such a request only if actual invasion seemed clearly imminent.
II. Chinese Communist Reactions
12. The Chinese are probably even more convinced than the Vietnamese Communists that
if the DRV/VC remain firm, in the end the US will be wholly defeated in Vietnam.
Renewed US determination, evidenced by the buildup assumed in this estimate, would
give the Chinese some pause but, in our view, not much. They would believe that the US
measures were sufficient only to postpone defeat while magnifying its eventual effect.
13. We do not believe that the Chinese would react to the assumed US moves including
the present level of air attacks, by overtly intervening in the military struggle with combat
forces. They are already stepping up their military assistance, including the introduction
of some rear service elements into North Vietnam, and would give more aid if requested
by the DRV. Moreover, they would try to increase alarm among non-Communists,
especially the US public, by intensifying their propaganda and reiterating their willingness
to accept hostilities if attacked by the US. They would probably continue to strengthen
their forces in South China and might take some further overt steps toward mobilization.
14. If air strikes were extended to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and particularly to lines of
communication from South China, the chances of Chinese Communist air intervention
from Chinese bases would increase. This would particularly be true if the air strikes were
effective in cutting the main roads and rail lines over which the principal supplies are
moving. While we believe the Chinese would be reluctant to engage the US in an air war
or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military installations, we consider the chances are
about even that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US over North Vietnam
from bases within China. We do not believe, however, that this would lead to greatly
increased Chinese Communist participation in the conflict. In any case, if large numbers
of US aircraft were operating close to the frontiers of China the likelihood of hostile
encounters would be high./5/
/5/The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army; Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence); Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Director of NSA, do not agree with the
judgment expressed in this paragraph. They believe that it should read as follows: "If air
strikes were extended to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and particularly to lines of
communication from South China, the chances of Chinese Communist air intervention
from Chinese bases would increase. Nevertheless, we believe the Chinese would be
reluctant to engage the US in an air war or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military
installations. We therefore consider it unlikely that Chinese aircraft would deliberately
engage the US over North Vietnam from bases within China."
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the chances
are better than even that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US under these
circumstances. Even if air engagements were accidental they would have extremely
dangerous repercussions and if they were deliberate they could not fail to lead to a wider
war. [Footnote in the source text.]
15. If, in the circumstances described in paragraph 9, the Viet Cong and the DRV at some
point wished to move toward negotiations, an important divergence might open up
between Hanoi and Peiping. The Chinese are themselves not suffering direct military
damage and they fear that negotiations would give the USSR a chance to increase its role
in Vietnam. Thus they would exert strong pressures to dissuade the DRV from entering
into negotiations.
III. Soviet Reactions
16. The USSR hopes for an eventual Communist victory in South Vietnam, but it is more
conscious than Peiping and Hanoi of the larger military risks. Moreover, the USSR wants
to maintain or improve its influence over the DRV and in the world Communist
movement generally; it does not wish the kind of Communist victory which would
magnify the prestige and power of China. Unlike Peiping and Hanoi, Moscow is
concerned with minimizing damage to East-West relations. In this situation, the USSR
prefers a course of negotiations, but it cannot afford to appear laggard in supporting the
DRV, and it is deepening its commitment to Hanoi's cause.
17. In the circumstances outlined in our assumptions, we believe that the USSR would see
no alternative to continued support of the DRV and further expansion of its military aid. It
would thus be likely to grant a DRV request for additional air defense equipment and
personnel. It would probably feel compelled to comply promptly with DRV requests to
replace air defense equipment destroyed by US attacks in the Hanoi area. The Soviet aid
program might be hampered by Chinese restrictions on transit rights.
18. The USSR would probably indicate that, if the US remains unyielding in Vietnam, it
faces trouble elsewhere in the world, as, for example, in Berlin. We do not think,
however, that Moscow would confront us with a major challenge. Nor do we believe that
the Soviets would wish to foreclose the possibility of negotiations at some future stage;
indeed, they would probably work to keep this possibility alive on both sides.
19. We believe that the US decisions considered here would produce important reactions
in general Soviet policy. Moscow would almost certainly harden its general stance toward
the US. For example, although the Soviets have agreed to renewed disarmament talks,
partly in order to check the deterioration in East-West relations, the assumed US course in
Vietnam would probably lead them to devote the talks entirely to attacks on the US or
even to break them off.
20. The assumed moves would carry total US military manpower above the 2.8-2.9
million total which we estimate for the USSR; they would also imply a reversal of the
downward trend in US military spending which Kosygin cited in justifying the 1965
reduction in the overt Soviet military budget. We believe that the USSR's declared policy
of restraining or even reducing military expenditures has been under attack by military
spokesmen in recent months and is the subject of debate within the collective leadership.
It is likely that the US moves, plus the worsening of general Soviet-US relations, would
strengthen the position of those arguing for additional military appropriations. In those
circumstances, the USSR probably would respond with an overt increase in its own
military spending.
IV. Non-Communist Reactions
21. Most non-Communist nations have already realized that the US, already heavily
engaged in South Vietnam, is likely to increase its commitment if necessary. The
measures here considered would nevertheless cause rising alarm because, in combination
with Communist statements in response, they would revive and fortify fears of increased
cold-war tensions and even of a much larger war. This might make some governments
more reluctant to give public support to US policy, particularly governments in political
difficulty, e.g., the UK, Canada, and Norway. Significant extension of bombing in North
Vietnam would increase apprehension in these countries. Over the longer run, however,
the more important reactions will depend on the subsequent course of the conflict.
22. In non-Communist Asia, Japan offers the most serious problem. We believe the Sato
government would maintain its policy of supporting US policy in spite of howls from the
press and opposition forces. Sato's position would be made much more difficult, however,
if Okinawa or especially Japan were to become a greatly expanded conduit for support of
US forces in Vietnam, or if it appeared that China was about to become involved in the
fighting. India would deplore increased bombing of the DRV but would otherwise
continue its position of public questioning and private acquiescence in US actions in
South Vietnam. Pakistan, hoping to continue to receive American aid while remaining on
good terms with China, would reaffirm its neutrality and its noninvolvement in Vietnam.
V. Reactions to the Mode of Announcement
23. If the announcements were made in piecemeal fashion and with no more high level
emphasis than necessary, the development of a crisis atmosphere might be mitigated. It is
also possible that private assurances to the USSR that the US increase in overall military
strength was directed solely toward the situation in Vietnam, and not meant to improve
the US position vis-a-vis the Soviets, might soften the tone of the Soviet response. This
avoidance of strident recriminations might in turn decrease somewhat the negative
reaction of non-Communist countries. We believe, however, that the reactions of the
Communist powers, particularly in the military field, would not be basically changed by
the method of announcement. We also believe that there would still be increased
apprehension among non-Communist countries.
82. Memorandum From Justice Arthur J. Goldberg to President Johnson/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. No classification marking.
Attached to a note by President Johnson's secretary, dated August 17, that reads: "Fr. his
[Johnson's] pocket, he has had it since Camp David, the weekend of July 23, 1965."
Goldberg had agreed by the time he wrote this memorandum to become U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, a position to which he was appointed on July 26.
SUBJECT
Viet Nam
In my view, we should take the Viet Nam issue to the UN Security Council concurrently
with the announcement about increases in U.S. military efforts there.
I would recommend that we should propose and seek support for a simple Security
Council resolution calling for unconditional talks. I would not recommend that the
resolution go beyond this into the more controversial areas of cease fire and UN
observers.
The virtue of this is that it would emphasize that the President is pursuing a political
solution at the same time that he is manifesting his determination that we will not be
dislodged by military force.
The judgment of Harlan Cleveland has been that we have the votes to pass the suggested
resolution. This would have to be verified by consultations in New York to confirm the
accuracy of Mr. Cleveland's conclusion in light of present and proposed developments.
The arguments pro and con undoubtedly have already been adequately presented to you
by Secretary Rusk. I have four pro arguments to add:
1. In my experience, I have never found that renewed expressions of the desire to seek a
peaceful settlement through unconditional discussions undermine the firm position of the
proponent not to settle by force rather than agreement. On the other hand, such
expressions reinforce the support of the rank and file and even critical leaders for a firm
policy. This was proved by your Baltimore proposal./2/ And the other side will judge us
by what we do rather than what we say.
/2/Reference is to the President's speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7; see
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245.

2. Placing the matter before the Security Council may afford the Soviet Union an
opportunity to blow off steam rather than to respond more drastically.
3. It is at least likely as a result of the developments next week that we will be in the dock
of the Security Council on this subject as a defendant. There are obvious advantages in
being the plaintiff rather than in a defensive role.
4. The UN desperately needs a concrete expression of renewed faith on your part that it
can perform a vital role in keeping the peace.
Draft Resolution on Viet-Nam/3/
/3/Drafted by Goldberg in hand on the reverse side of the second page of his
memorandum.
The Security Council
Having considered the question of Viet Nam;
Concerned at the potential threat to world peace involved in a continuation of the present
situation;
Believing that every effort should be made to resolve the problem through peaceful
means;
1. Calls on all parties concerned to engage in immediate unconditional discussions
looking toward a solution of the problem;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices in facilitating the conduct of
such discussions.
Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret.
Mr. President:
I enclose two memoranda. One is from Joe Sisco,/2/ and the other is a paper on the history
of troop recommendations which you instructed me to prepare in our meeting yesterday.
/2/Not attached and not found.
I also had a talk with Sisco, and my own belief is that with further effort we can find a
way, showing our readiness to go to the UN without exposing ourselves to much danger
in the Security Council. We did it successfully at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin, and I
think we can do it again. I believe that the public advantage of showing readiness to speak
our peace [piece] in the Security Council outweighs the disadvantage of the Soviet
response, and I also think that with appropriate pressures, we can keep at least 8 members
of the Security Council on our side in keeping the focus sharply on the need for
discussions. The members of the Security Council, for your information, are:
US, UK, France, Nationalist China, and the Soviet Union--Permanent Members
The Netherlands, Uruguay, Bolivia, Jordan, Ivory Coast, and Malaysia--Temporary
Members
Sisco himself says we can get the US, the UK, the ChiNats, the Dutch, and the two Latin
Americans. I believe that strong diplomacy would give us Jordan, the Ivory Coast, and
Malaysia as well--all three of them owe us a lot in different ways.
McG.B./3/
Enclosure/4/
/4/Secret.
SUBJECT
The History of Recommendations for Increased US Forces in Vietnam
This story relates almost entirely to 1965. When you became President, US forces in
Vietnam totaled 16,000. On 31 December 1964, they totaled 23,000. Today they are
between 75 and 80,000, and you are considering increases of another 100,000 between
now and November.
In December and January, our attention did not focus upon increased ground forces. We
were trying to get the Huong Government to pull up its socks, and we were preparing to
authorize air strikes at the right moment. We had no recommendations from the military
for major ground force deployments.
At the end of January, after Bob and I discussed with you our growing doubts, you sent
me to Vietnam. During that trip, the attack on Pleiku occurred and in February, you put
into effect the program of limited air strikes against North Vietnam,/5/ and unlimited air
action in South Vietnam. It is in this connection that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended, and you approved, the deployment of Marines to Danang. Two battalion
landing teams were approved for such deployment on February 25./6/
/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Documents 131 and 149.
/6/See ibid., Document 170.

The bombing did not reverse the situation and we did not expect it would. In the first
week of March, you sent General Harold Johnson to Vietnam. He returned with three
basic recommendations:/7/
/7/See ibid., Documents 179 and 197.
First, a 21-Point program of small actions which was promptly approved;
Second, a deployment of a tailored division force either to the highlands or to certain
bases; and
Third, a four division ground force to contain infiltration by land.
The last two recommendations were tentative in form and were not pressed to a decision.
General Taylor, in an important dispatch on March 16 (Saigon 3003) weighed the pros
and cons of a single US division and recommended that judgment be reserved./8/
/8/Ibid., Document 204. Telegram 3003 was received on March 17.
At the end of March, General Taylor visited Washington and there was discussion of a
possible three-division force, as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Taylor himself
was skeptical and reported a similar skepticism in Prime Minister Quat./9/ The Secretaries
of State and Defense recommended that the decision be deferred and that instead we
should approve deployment of two additional Marine battalions and an 18-20,000 man
increase in other US support forces. This recommendation was accepted in the first days
of April./10/
The study of ground-force deployment continued in April, and on Tuesday, April 20,
McNamara, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharp, Westmoreland, McNaughton, and William Bundy
met in Honolulu./11/ At that point there were 2,000 Koreans and 33,000 US troops in the
country, and an additional 18,000 were already approved. After the Honolulu discussions,
McNamara recommended additional deployments leading to a total strength of 82,000-including 13 combat battalions. Part of this recommendation was given formal approval
on April 21;/12/ and other parts on May 15. This set of recommendations was the most
important between January and the present, and I attach McNamara's memorandum of
April 21./13/
/12/See ibid., Documents 266, 269, and 271.
/13/Ibid., Document 265.
Early in May, you requested $700 million for Vietnam,/14/ and our defense of this request
and related statements made it clear that additional forces were being sent. On June 16,
McNamara gave a full public exposition, announcing the planned deployment of 15
battalions, with a total military strength of 70-75,000./15/
/15/A transcript of McNamara's news conference is in the Johnson Library, Public
Statements of Secretary of Defense McNamara, 1965, vol. 5, pp. 1791-1803.
Meanwhile, on June 11, after discussions with MACV and Ambassador Taylor, the Joint
Chiefs recommended additional deployments to a total of 116,000./16/ The most
important element in this recommendation was the air-mobile division. On June 19 you
gave approval to the necessary preparatory steps for these deployments, without deciding
on the deployment itself.
On July 2, the Joint Chiefs produced a further recommendation for a total troop strength
of 179,000, again in coordination with MACV and Ambassador Taylor. Before approving
this recommendation, you sent McNamara to Vietnam./17/ With marginal modifications,
it is this recommendation which is now before you for decision.
/17/See Document 49.
The essence of this history, I think, is that initially we all had grave objections to major
US ground force deployments. Even those in favor (like my brother Bill), wanted to try
other things first, and none of us was prepared to urge on Westmoreland things he was not
urging on us.
Then when we got major bases of our own, largely for air action, we moved quite
promptly to protect them. These deployments did not give us bad reactions, and it became
easier for Westmoreland to propose, and for us to accept, additional deployments. Thus,
between the end of March and the beginning of July--a period of only three months--we
moved from recommended force levels of 33,000 to recommended force levels of
180,000. We also moved from the mission of base security to the mission of active
combat in whatever way seems wise to General Westmoreland.
I have found this review instructive. It suggests to me that McNamara's Plan 3 is better
than his other two plans. I think we should now approve the recommended deployments
through November. I think that at the same time we should explicitly and plainly reserve
decision about further major deployments. After all, we have not yet had even a companylevel engagement with Viet Cong forces which choose to stand their ground and fight.
McG.B./18/
Saigon, July 24, 1965, 7:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
Repeated to Bangkok eyes only for Ambassador Johnson. Received at 8:21 a.m. on July
25 and passed to the White House.
266. Deptel 218./2/ In approaching the matter of obtaining additional commitments from
GVN in advance of U.S. statement of expanded military effort, we would divide the
matter into two parts; those commitments which we might seek privately and those which
we might get GVN to state publicly or allow us to use publicly in U.S.
/2/In telegram 218 to Saigon, July 24, the Department of State indicated that it expected
an announcement soon of the expanded U.S. military effort in Vietnam and that an
essential accompaniment was a clear understanding with the South Vietnamese
Government that it would take every possible step to put the country on a war footing.
(Ibid.)
In private, there would be some advantage in informing the senior GVN officials that
prior to undertaking to provide additional military aid we would like to verify following
understandings:
A. Our joint war aims are expressed in general terms in the four points announced by FM
Do on June 22./3/ We will work together privately in refining and amplifying these
general terms, meanwhile will avoid giving any public impression of divergence of views.
/3/Not found.
B. We will continue as agreed previously to keep each other informed of policy decisions
of mutual interest in advance of public information.
C. We will cooperate together to control inflation and to end the currency black market. In
this regard we agree that there will be no increase in GVN budget or wage increases
without prior consultation.
D. We will always exchange views frankly on the subject of incompetent U.S. or GVN
officials who are not performing adequately and will undertake to replace those who are
found to be unsatisfactory to the joint effort.
E. U.S. military forces will be employed as determined by General Westmoreland who
will be guided by the White House statement of June 9 (Depcirtel 2470, June 9)./4/
/4/The statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1965, p. 1041.
F. GVN will take timely action to provide real estate required by U.S. forces.
G. We will continue to place emphasis on population and resources control.
In presenting this list to Generals Thieu and Ky, we would avoid giving impression of
asking for new agreements or imposing conditions for our increased aid commitments but
would do so in context of seeking reaffirmation of understandings already explicitly or
tacitly reached.
As to a public statement, we believe that one could be prepared which would be
acceptable to the GVN, making the following points:
a. Determination of GVN to put country on a war footing and to control inflation.
b. Plans to increase forces and reduce desertion.
c. Recognition of importance of Chieu Hoi.
d. Reaffirmation of Do's four points.
To attempt to go beyond the foregoing modest program would probably be unproductive.
We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be rejected or to require prolonged
debate. The private assurances will be no better than subsequent performance which is
likely to be spotty. The public statement will be viewed as government propaganda by
most observers. We would recommend our taking up the matter in the foregoing terms at
our meeting with Ky scheduled for July 27. Meantime we will send the Dept. a draft of
the proposed public statement which we will give Ky as a suggested public release.
Taylor

Camp David, Maryland, July 25, 1965, 5 p.m.
notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. The meeting was held
in Aspen Lodge.
PRESENT
President
Goldberg
McNamara
Clifford
Busby
Valenti
Clifford: 1. Do not think it advisable to go to UN with resolution now. Don't need this to
re-inforce peaceful intentions. Inconsistent with going in with additional troops.
2. Stop talking about Vietnam--on part of President, Rusk, Harriman, etc. No talking
about where and why we are there. Don't think they are going to be forced to table by any
UN proposal. Underplay Vietnam until January.
3. Both above based on this one: Don't believe we can win in SVN. If we send in 100,000
more, the NVN will meet us. If the NVN run out of men, the Chinese will send in
volunteers. Russia and China don't intend for us to win the war. If we don't win, it is a
catastrophe. If we lose 50,000+ it will ruin us. Five years, billions of dollars, 50,000 men,
it is not for us.
At end of monsoon, quietly probe and search out with other countries--by moderating our
position--to allow us to get out. Can't see anything but catastrophe for my country. A
resolution in the UN with dramatic debate is bad for us.
President: (reading from letter)/2/ VN is not of intrinsic value--If
/2/Document 79.
There is no high principle involved.
Basic issue is not to get thrown out under fire.
Political questions are what we make them.
1. Instruct officials to stop saying all humankind is at stake.
2. Stop saying we are going to pacify the country.
3. Patience--pressure--quietly marking areas we can hold. Hold these for years if need be.
Make a safe haven.
4. Vietcong cannot attack these places frontally.
5. Gradually stop bombings north and south. Maximum attention to it which is wrong.
6. Keep offer of negotiations open.
86. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam and the UN
Here is some information which you may not have.
1. Bill Buffum tells me that, over the weekend, the President talked to Joe Sisco a couple
times about the desirability of asking for a Security Council session on Vietnam to
accompany the forthcoming Vietnam announcements.
2. Joe, expounding the State Department view, thought that it would not be a good thing
to have a Security Council session at this time; there would inevitably be a debate which
would lead to such things as recommendations for a cessation of bombing and
recommendations for including the Viet Cong in any negotiations as an equal negotiating
party. Joe went on to suggest that we hold off on a Security Council meeting and possibly
have one at a later date.
3. As I understand it, the President bought the State Department view.
GC

Washington, July 26, 1965, 12:30-3:15 p.m.
handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. An hour before the meeting, McGeorge
Bundy sent the President an agenda that included: the SAM site, taking Vietnam to the
United Nations, a general plan for Congressional consultation and a public announcement
of the build-up, and further consultation with the South Vietnamese Government. In a
covering memorandum, Bundy noted that an additional item on covert negotiations was
not listed on the agenda. Only he, Rusk, Ball, and McNamara were aware of it, and all felt
that no one else should be informed. Bundy suggested that the President might want to
have a small follow-up meeting in his office on the matter. (Ibid., National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII) No record of such a meeting has
been found.
PRESENT
President
Vice President
McNamara
Rusk
Goldberg
Bundy
Lodge
Gen. Wheeler
Ball
Valenti
Busby
Moyers
Clifford, Helms, Raborn joined the group 30 minutes later
President: Please, Bob, give us your findings and recommendations on SAM sites.
Wheeler: SAM site that shot down the F4C is probably a mobile site, #6./2/
/2/On July 24, a U.S. F-4 aircraft was shot down by a surface-to-air missile launched from
a mobile missile site believed to be approximately 30 miles northwest of Hanoi, the first
aircraft lost to the SAM missiles deployed by Soviet technicians. Air reconnaissance
located two mobile SAM sites in the area of the attack, identified as mobile sites 6 and 7
in the series of SAM sites established near Hanoi. In telegram 265 from Saigon, July 25,
Taylor recommended an air attack against the sites "to show Hanoi how seriously we view
this incident and to prepare political opinion for our subsequent anti-missile campaign." A
copy of this telegram was sent to the President and there is an indication that he saw it.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Cables)
On July 26, however, Harriman advised against attacking the sites, since this would be
seen abroad as an escalation and would prejudice efforts to bring Hanoi to the negotiating
table. Harriman also felt that Soviet leaders would interpret the attacks as a direct
challenge, requiring some sort of retaliation. (Telegram 164 from Belgrade; Department
of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
(President and McNamara look at map showing where plane was shot down)
President: Any indication that there are more than five sites?
Wheeler: Yes, on Friday night we determined there are two more, #6 and #7. Site #4 is
possibility, but 6 and 7 are better possibilities--more probably a mobile site.
(President asked technical questions about sites and their shoot down capabilities)
Wheeler: Chiefs recommendation:
We don't know if any of these sites have equipment. We should attack all sites. At the
minimum, we should take out 4, 6, 7.
McNamara: Good, but I would take out only 6 and 7.
President: Where does your intelligence tell you Russians are operating?
Wheeler: In 6 and 7.
President: Are you sure they are Russians?
Wheeler: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--that is the weight of our
evidence.
Rusk: I would not hit one of the sites close in to Hanoi. Only reason to hit 6 and 7 is to
give warning to NVN. Very important if we strike that nothing be said about Russians
being there. Political effect of hitting 6 and 7 is a warning to not move sites farther out
from Hanoi.
Not at all sure we'll hit anything--they may have moved them out from there.
Intensify reconnaissance to see if we can pick up anything.
President: Are we photoing regularly?
McNamara: Yes, but we are careful over Hanoi. We are using drones more.
President: What are you getting out of this?
McNamara: No reports of radar activity at these sites.
Wheeler: This is the first time we have heard their radar.
President: How much personnel?
Wheeler: About 1/2.
President: How provocative will this be?
Wheeler: When they sent up the missiles, they expected something.
President: What would be our reaction to the Russians bombing our sites?
Rusk: Various indications that if Russians and US collide, it would be dangerous. Killing
the first Russians--[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
(Here President admonished the group NOT to speak to anyone about this. "This is a war-and the stakes are high".)
President: You think, Dean, we should take out the sites even though the Russians are
there?
Rusk: I think it would be a warning.
President: (I want the Secretary of State to draw up a document saying that if anyone
wants to write article for Life he cannot participate.)
Ball: This is a very hard decision. But our intelligence is not very hard at this time.
There is no way to keep from identifying the casualties as Russians.
Before we make this decision I'd like to know if we take out 6 and 7 there is something
there to take out.
Can we make some efforts to find out what is there. We don't have to take them the next
day. If they are building an outer perimeter, then we have to take them out.
Wheeler: We have already identified this site. Discussed low level rekky--staff advised
against it because they will get out after rekky.
President: The assumption is in your favor, but we don't know exactly where the missiles
came from.
McNamara: I don't see the logic to Ball's argument--If we strike and they are not there.
President: Get bad story if we roam around and find nothing

Bundy: We haven't addressed the question of turning [possible omission in the source
text]. See advantage of not crossing this bridge until after making Presidential Statement.
President: Let's not assume I am to make a speech. No one has decided that.
Bundy: Rapidity of action in Pleiku gave Russians a talking point. Is our position
affecting these sites better later than now--then take them out on our way to munitions
plant. Can see advantage if we punish SAM sites quickly. Also reports are saying we
shouldn't have let them go this long.
Don't see the merit of waiting. The target is on authorized list--current Rolling Thunder
list.
McNamara: Record shows there is military purpose for going over these targets now.
Ball: If we move promptly it will be a decision to step up war. In present heated tension of
this decision making, this step will be viewed as a decision break-through--this will be a
world impression.
Am sympathetic with view of Bundy--of taking out SAM site with purpose of taking out
military target--SAM only incidental.
Also, if we wait we allow Goldberg to present his credentials./3/ We ought to disassociate
the SAMs from the present heat.
/3/Arthur Goldberg presented his credentials as U.S. Representative to the United Nations
on July 28.
Rusk: Harold Wilson pleads we let him know in advance if we take 6 and 7. He needs to
keep his people in line. (Bundy shares this view.)/4/
/4/On the evening of July 26, McGeorge Bundy sent a message through the British
Embassy to Prime Minister Wilson informing him of the decision taken (see Document
90) concerning the SAM missile sites. (Telegram 462 to London, July 27; Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
President: What do you think about this, Cabot?
Lodge: 6 and 7 are 40 mi. away--the rest are 10 mi away.
Would go ahead on the two that are 40 mi. away. But don't think it is of pressing urgency.
Wheeler: If they announce that there are Russians in the site, it would make your decision
more anxious.
President: If we leave 6 and 7 for awhile, what would it do to Rolling Thunder?
Wheeler: Would cut targets in half. Will cut down on armed rekky.
Ball: It's going to make it difficult for us domestically if we don't take out these SAMs
right now.
We ought not let domestic politics guide us in making a small war larger.
McNamara: It hasn't been necessary to take out SAM in order to get to a military target.
President: Helms, do you have any intelligence on this? Are we sure they came from 6
and 7? Wasn't there a possibility it could have come from 4?
Wheeler: Our pilots' intelligence--and depending on navigation--there is possibility it
came from 4 or mobile site.
President: How liberally is it mobile?
Wheeler: According to Russian terminology this is semi-mobile site.
Rusk: We have knocked a key bridge connecting China with NVN. We could expect the
Russians to set up sites there.
President: One of the great dangers is conveying wrong message by letting enemy
miscalculate our motives. What will be reaction of enemy if he can knock down US
planes and we do nothing about it? The sites are put there to destroy us. Are we going to
sit and sit and let them knock down our planes? Are we going to let them move first?
Bundy: Let's see if the sites impede Rolling Thunder.
(Wheeler went over map to point out targets)
Goldberg: It is difficult for the public to distinguish between 6 and 7 and the rest. What
will be Russians reaction to this? This is what they have given to NVN. Where will they
go for future?
May be a specific reaction to pinpointing the target. Do we know enough out of this
episode--is it worthwhile to know how these sites are to be utilized? Is this their policy--or
is it a gesture? Is it definitely their policy or is it a trigger happy officer?
Public reaction would be--this is Hanoi area.
Bundy: I don't think we are facing a confrontation with the Russians that Amb. Goldberg
suggests. I am attracted by the notion of waiting until we have to go. Real risk if we seem
to be diverted by this episode--too much of our plans are operationally known by our
military.
President: Why do we ferret out ammo dumps, etc. and lose men--and fail to take out
something that is more dangerous like SAM site. How do you justify this. You bring
bombing to a standstill. If you are to continue bombing these targets, how can we not take
out SAMs.
Rusk: You cannot order pilots to bomb without helping them get back. We don't know
enough about sites.
President: Then we ought to cancel targets--we can't send pilots over the missile sites.
V. Pres: We ought to face up to Russian involvement. What impact this will have on
Russian relations, I don't know. All the press knows the Russians are in the site business.
Wheeler says if we delay it will aggravate situation. They have to be taken out. If I were
forced to decide, then if targets are to be kept, take out sites. If targets can be altered, 2 or
3 days later is not a matter of significance.
We can't leave ourselves without response. But I think we can allow ourselves a little
time.
McNamara: We simply have to change targets--we can't keep target schedules with sites
in. We are not going to learn anything more in the next 2 or 3 days.
Raborn: Information on these sites was obtained on July 20. First read-out did not read out
sites. Finally disclosed on Saturday morning, July 24. Will take coordinated intelligence
effort to sort out where these sites are. This effort is underway--using all kinds of
intelligence information to come up with answer.
Until the effort is completed, I would recommend not going in. We know 6 and 7 are
manned.
McNamara: If striking 6 and 7 properly, at low altitude, we will be protected from 8, 9,
10.
There are two problems: Should we take out 6 and 7 now--or wait.
My decision on taking out 6 and 7 depends on taking out Rolling Thunder targets--as well
as telling the Russians we won't allow them to conclude--we won't do anything.
We don't want to send planes to Rolling Thunder targets if they must be shot down.
Raborn: Study will be completed this afternoon. Suggest Thompson and CIA Russian
expert tell us of Russian intentions.
President: Next question is US position at United Nations.
Do we want to make a proposal at UN at this time. Goldberg has shown me and Rusk a
memo with his views./5/ What instructions do we want to give him? My thinking would
be if we agree on Westmoreland requests on men, equipment, etc.--playing all our
decisions low key, and not telling the Russians we intend to break our policy on economy
and nuclear production cutback.
/5/Document 82.
Generally, want Goldberg to talk to every delegate including Secy. Gen. to tell them we
are ready to talk unconditionally.
Goldberg: My view is that when you do anything forceful, must say our objective is
peace. How best can assurance of peace be done.
1) Laying before Security Council a resolution echoing Balt./6/ and confined to single
topic--to endorse talks on VN with help of UN. People don't understand sophisticated
complexities of UN politics. They do understand their President asking for unconditional
talks. Sometimes the public exhibition of an attitude can start us on the way. I would hope
we would do the necessary exploration to get the votes--by consulting with our friends.
Some dangers may turn out to be virtues--such as Viet Cong. I think there is great
advantage in President's saying simply we want to talk.
President: I said that in San Francisco.
Goldberg: Even though I don't expect Russians to say in advance "Yes", but it doesn't
mean they won't come around to this view.
I think we need a new initiative--the effects of President's Baltimore speech have worn
off. What would be the worst that could happen to us in the Security Council? Are we so
lacking in friends that we won't be applauded? There must be equity in the final
agreement.
If I thought the war could go on quietly--then I would acquiesce--but I don't think the war
can go on quietly. As we send in more troops--knock out SAMs--something must happen
in UN and I want us to be the plaintiff, not the defendant.
Rusk: UN is an organization to which we have a treaty commitment. We have an
obligation to use the UN as effectively as we know. But Hanoi and Peking are not parties
to this organization.
Advantages: Help placate our critics.
Disadvantages: Can't see how they would help. Maximum benefit is to reconvene
conference.
Very negative if we asked for meeting and didn't get it. International recognition of VC
would undermine the Saigon government. We have to assume that a resolution that would
meet our approval would draw Soviet veto. Might make it difficult for Soviets to push
quietly for talks. Might draw amendments that would be inimical to us. If we didn't get at
least 7 votes, it would appear that the UN had repudiated us.
Recommend Goldberg talk with U Thant to sound out Soviets as to character and form of
resolution and for us not to insist on resolution at this time.
Lodge: Am in disagreement with Goldberg on resolution but there are things he can do-Can do it by a speech--UN couldn't possibly undertake our mission in Vietnam--it hasn't
the money nor the muscle.
We mustn't overlook the effect on SVN, Russia and China. Everytime we talk about
negotiations, you lower the value of the ARVN. You don't impress China except when
you've got blood in your eye.
President: I'm tired of words. I've been giving words for 20 months. I told the UN in San
Francisco that I would back any effort by the UN to bring this to the conference table.
Lodge: We had to show the UN that what we are doing is entirely consistent with the UN
charter.
Clifford: Goldberg makes a persuasive case. But I am unalterably opposed to a resolution
in the UN. But we are in a paradox. On one hand, we are ready to meet commitments, but
we are really ready to get out. We can almost guarantee that a resolution would fail. The
Soviets must stand by the NVN. I see them using the resolution as a propaganda asset-using bombing and white-vs.-Asians. Talking at this time publicly will not accomplish
anything. If it is underplayed, we have a chance to justify our views.
Lodge: How do you send young men there in great numbers without telling why?
Clifford: We have already explained why we are there. We cannot win the war in SVN.
China and Russia don't intend for us to win the war. They will match us in manpower. No
matter how many men we send, they will match us.
The great danger is that additional troops are not [sic] a notice to the world that we intend
to make it a land war.
We should get through the monsoon season and quietly see if we can work out an
adjustment. I don't believe we will suffer prestige if we can't sustain.
(Moyers wanted to know if he can release names of those present--President against it
because of press hounding the people for information)
President: (to Rusk) Try to determine what would go into Goldberg's statement to the UN-desirability of writing letter signed by me to Secy. General--generally along lines of San
Francisco speech--after talking to allies Goldberg can buttress his arguments for
resolution.
Any objections to that?
(No one expressed dissent)
Meeting adjourned at 3:15 pm.

Exdis. Drafted by Unger, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, and approved
by Unger.
236. Saigon's 266./2/ Agree with your proposal to divide task of obtaining additional
commitments into private and public expressions, and you are authorized take matter up
with Ky in those terms at your July 27 meeting, subject to following modifications:
/2/Document 84.
1. In private consultation we must have some better understanding that we are not now
and do not expect to be engaged in efforts to change the regime in North Viet-Nam. While
we recognize there may be some internal political problem for GVN we have impression
that General Thieu's comments and GVN statement July 20 are gratuitous revival of issue
which should be left dormant. Argumentation recorded Embtel 140/3/ seems appropriate
and would hope it would be effective with GVN officials.
/3/Dated July 14. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol.
XXXVII)
2. It must also be understood with GVN that we do not reject 1954 Geneva Accords.
While question remains open what role Accords will play in any eventual negotiation,
they should not be rejected and Embassy will note our occasional references to our
agreement with the essential purposes of the Accords.
3. Believe would be useful for Ky to include in public statement a reference to request for
augmentation US forces in So. Vietnam made to McNamara group./4/ This should be in
quite general terms and mention only approximate magnitudes.
/4/See Document 60.
4. Suggest rewording Point A public statement to eliminate implication which could have
unfortunate repercussions here that GVN even now not on war footing, in spite of real
fighting and terror going on for several years now.
5. Public statement should also include some reference to economic and social measures
to increase solidarity of people and their government. This could include some reference
to General Ky's 26 points/5/ as well as program for financial technical assistance to aid
rural economy, including measures to meet tenure problems.
/5/Taylor discussed Ky's 26-point program in detail in telegram 4311 from Saigon, June
21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
For your guidance there is quoted below possible text of statement to be issued at high
level. This text, although subject to change and not to be seen in US Mission except by
Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson, will provide indication of framework to which GVN
undertakings will have to conform.
Very tentative text follows:

"Like every action the US has taken in Vietnam, these new deployments are ordered at the
request of the Government of Vietnam and in support of the efforts of the Vietnamese
people themselves. It is fully agreed and understood between that Government and the US
that the main effort in South Vietnam must still be made by the Vietnamese themselves.
Amb. Taylor has been assured that as US efforts are increased the Vietnamese
Government itself is reenforcing its own measures to build up its armed forces and to
meet the economic pressures caused by war. That Government is reaffirming its
determination and announcing its own programs of increasing action at home, including
certain measures in the economic and social fields to enhance the solidarity of the
Vietnamese people and their government in their critical efforts."
Septel/6/ contains rough first draft of possible US positions to be stated at a high level.
You should show this draft to General Ky in your July 27 meeting and secure his
concurrence, especially on US policy toward a settlement, which we construe as
consistent with GVN position as stated by Tran Van Do in June.
/6/Document 89.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis.
Drafted by Unger, cleared in substance by William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy, and
approved by Unger.
237. Saigon's 266 and Deptel 236./2/ There follows rough first draft of possible US
position to be stated at a high level concerning augmentation US forces South Viet-Nam.
You should show this draft to General Ky in your July 27 meeting and secure his
concurrence, as noted final para ref Deptel. In discussion with Ky you should not refer to
other related actions (e.g. calling reserves) which may be taken in connection with these
deployments but on which final decisions not yet made.
"In this last week the situation in Viet-Nam and the actions it requires have again been
reviewed. This has been the most careful and sustained review that has been made at any
time since President Johnson took office. The President has discussed the problem with
members of the Cabinet--Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Goldberg.
He has discussed it with distinguished Americans in private life who have earned the
thanks of their country by earlier service, like Mr. Arthur Dean and Mr. John McCloy. He
has had the advice of two great Ambassadors, Maxwell Taylor and Henry Cabot Lodge.
He has talked at length with the leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
By personal messages and diplomatic discussions the problem has been reviewed with
friends and allies in foreign countries. Out of these deliberations have come three
important decisions-The first is that US policy and purpose in Viet-Nam are sound and right.
The second is that the US must now take important additional military measures in
support of that policy and purpose.
The third is that the US should continue and intensify its diplomatic search for peace.
The US purpose and policy in Viet-Nam are right. The US is there to keep a promise. That
promise was and is to help the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to help
themselves against attack supported from outside. This American commitment must and
will be kept--both for its own sake and for its meaning to world peace. For the peace of
the world cannot be kept if there is not respect for the given word of the United States of
America.
But there is more to it than that. South Viet-Nam is not the only small state which is
threatened by external pressure and ambition. It is not the only country menaced by
subversion and infiltration and terror. If South Viet-Nam is lost, then others are weakened.
And finally, the US is there because it has a deep and enduring national interest in
preventing the Communist conquest of Asia. It seeks nothing in Asia for itself, but the
independence of the peoples of Asia is essential to the peace of the world and to American
security itself.
In pursuit of these great purposes, the US has supported and sustained its friends in Asia
for a quarter of a century, in war and in peace. It has respected their choice of neutrality or
alignment. It has respected their right to determine their own political and social systems.
It has helped them to resist aggression--whether by open attack as in Korea, or by
bombardment and threat as in the Formosa Straits, or by the more complex and
destructive methods now in use against Viet-Nam. This course of action has been right,
and it is right today.
And now it is necessary that the US increase its effort in Viet-Nam. The battles of the
spring and early summer have brought heavy losses to both sides. It is clear that over a
period of many months there has been a growth in the infiltration of Communist forces
from North Viet-Nam. The armed forces of South Viet-Nam continue to fight with great
courage and with growing skill. But they need more help, and they will get it.
Authorization has been given today for the movement to South Viet-Nam of additional
forces which will bring US total troop strength in that country to 175,000 men by
November. These enlarged forces will provide 34 combat battalions, 24 air squadrons, and
31 helicopter companies. Under the command of General Westmoreland--an officer who
has earned the confidence of all his countrymen--these forces will be used where they are
needed. And they will fight.
Like every action the US has taken in Viet-Nam, these new deployments are ordered at
the request of the Government of Viet-Nam and in support of the efforts of the
Vietnamese people themselves. It is fully agreed and understood between that
Government and the US that the main effort in South Viet-Nam must still be made by the
Vietnamese themselves. Ambassador Taylor has been assured that as US efforts are
increased the Vietnamese Government itself is reenforcing its own measures to build up
its armed forces and to meet the economic pressures caused by war. That Government is
reaffirming its determination and announcing its own programs of increasing action at
home, including certain measures in the economic and social fields to enhance the
solidarity of the Vietnamese people and their government in their critical efforts.
The decisions announced today are decisions to do what is necessary--and only what is
necessary. This has been US policy; it is US policy still. These new and increased actions
are made necessary by the growing battlefield action of others.
The ever closer partnership of the US with the people and Government of Viet-Nam is the
inevitable answer which the US gives, with them, to the increasing efforts of the attackers.
Yet the purpose remains unchanged. And it is a purpose of peace.
While the US does all that is necessary to turn back the attackers in South Viet-Nam, it
will do all that is possible to open the path to peaceful settlement. Again and again it has
said that it is ready for unconditional discussion. The US and others have made fifteen
efforts to get discussion started. These efforts have all been rejected out of hand. But the
US will not be discouraged.
In these last days, messages have been sent to all the more than 30 countries that have
given concrete evidence of their concern for the people of South Viet-Nam. It has been
emphasized again that just as there is need for wider effort to resist aggression, there is
equal need for further effort to open doors to peace. America's friends in these countries
know that all their efforts to this end are welcome to the United States.
And the US will do more. Today Ambassador Goldberg has been instructed to consult
most urgently with the Secretary General of the United Nations to see if there is not some
way in which the good offices of the United Nations can be engaged for peace in VietNam./3/ The earlier efforts of the Secretary General have met with rebuff, but no
possibility of progress must be overlooked. Ambassador Goldberg will make it entirely
plain that the United States continues to hope that a way can be found to bring the United
Nations into action in Viet-Nam. The Ambassador will submit a full report on US actions
there and its purpose of peace, both formally to the Security Council and informally to all
the Delegates who seek to know the US stand. If it proves possible to engage the United
Nations in Viet-Nam, the United States will actively support that engagement.
/3/See Document 99.
At the same time that the US seeks by every means to start the discussions that can bring
peace, it and its friends in South Viet-Nam are making it plain that they are ready for the
kind of peace that will be fair and honorable for all. Already in June, the Foreign Minister
of Viet-Nam and the Secretary of State of the United States have stated for all to hear the
fundamental principles of such a peace:
An end to aggression and subversion.
Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape its own destiny by democratic
principles and without foreign interference.

An end of the military measures now made necessary by aggression, and the removal of
foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam.
And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South VietNam.
Beyond these principles, it has been made clear that the US looks forward to the day when
relations between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful
means--including a free decision by the peoples of all Viet-Nam on the matter of
reunification. These principles imply and include the use of free election under
international supervision, just as soon as the end of aggression permits.
These purposes in essence are the purposes of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The
failure of the 1954 Agreements was not in purpose but in practice--not in the quality of
the objectives, but in the effectiveness of the instruments. When there is a new settlement
in Southeast Asia, it must be based on stronger and more lasting guarantees than those of
1954.
But the purpose of peace remains as the US has stated it. The program of peace remains
the same. And the program meets the interests of all who have a stake in Southeast Asia.
For the people of South Viet-Nam--on both sides of the current contest--it will bring
opportunity for an active and honorable part in the peaceful life of a freely growing
society.
For the people and Government of North Viet-Nam it will bring relief from the burdens of
war and a prospect of new and peaceful relations with the people to the south.
For the smaller neighbors of Viet-Nam it will mean an end to the danger of nearby
warfare and a widened prospect of peaceful development for the whole area.
For the people and Government on the Mainland of China, this plan of peace contains no
threat and no danger.
And on a still wider plane, a peace so clearly fair and reasonable for all can remove a clear
obstacle to understanding between all of these who call themselves Communists and all of
those who don't.
For the real future of Southeast Asia is a future of peaceful progress, not a future of
contest and conquest. While the US resists aggression--and probes for peace--it is
planning for progress. Already there has been an encouraging response to the proposals
put forward in April. The prospects for Asian development are good, and US readiness to
help has been made plain.
So today America appeals once again to those who have chosen the path of battle. Let
them turn from terror to talk, and from subversion to settlement. Let all interested
governments go to the conference table and let them bring with them any other parties that
they choose. The US will come with its proposals--let them come with theirs. And let
diplomacy replace destruction. The first business of such a conference must be to work
out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business must be peace. The
Government of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States are ready.
This readiness comes not from weakness but from strength--not from weariness but from
resolution. Until there is a settlement and an end of aggression, America's efforts will go
on and they will grow.
The deployments ordered today will be carried out. The Americans who go to Viet-Nam
will do their duty. The forces of the United States will carry out the order to resist and to
punish aggression. The US is ready for honorable peace, but it will persevere in the hard
task of battle until others are ready, too."
Rusk

Department of State
Washington, DC

Washington, July 26, 1965, 6:10-6:55 p.m.
handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed.
PRESENT
President
McNamara
Vice President
Rusk
Wheeler
Ball
Clifford
Thompson
Lodge
Goldberg
Raborn
Helms
Marks
Rowan
Busby
Bundy
Valenti
McNamara: Nothing has developed in our intelligence to show us any new data on missile
sites.
Thompson: As long as it looks as if the sites are all not Hanoi we are going after, I think
their reaction will be mild. We should not say they are manned by Soviets--need to fuzz
that up. It would be good if we can tie it in with something else.
President: Would you take out ammunition dumps and sites simultaneously?
McNamara: Take them out separately.
Wheeler: Chiefs would take out all 7 sites at one time. If not, take out 4, 6, 7. There is the
possibility that #4 was mixed up in this shoot-down.
President: Why against #4, Bob?

McNamara: #4 is a part of the Hanoi-Haiphong package. It would vex the Soviets. It is
not directly associated with Lao Chi and ammunition dump. There is no operational need
to take it out. It is too close to the Migs and would increase the number of aircraft in the
air. We have never hit a SAM site and there is no need to make a difficult target more
difficult. The chances of success are not perfect. They are about 50-50.
President: If you find them, can you destroy them?
McNamara: Yes, if we find them. However, we have narrow field of vision at 500 mph.
President: If you go in, lose planes and fail to get them, how will we look in the eyes of
the world?
McNamara: I foresee no problem there.
President: Is SAM like Hawk?
Wheeler: It is a big van, high mass of radar--missiles like Nike-Hercules.
Rusk: Would the cap come in only if Migs react?
Wheeler: Yes.
McNamara: Possibly, because of lack of friend-or-foe identification, they may shoot our
planes if they are present.
President: How far away are the Migs?
McNamara: The Migs are 25-40 miles away.
President: What protection do we have against Migs?
Wheeler: Our cap--F4C--8 F104. Two levels of defense.
President: Please summarize the pros and cons of going in to take out SAMs.
McNamara: (Brought situation up to date chronologically)
We think we should take out 6 and 7 because they lie athwart targets on our authorized
list. If we don't, we will give an incorrect reading to Soviets that we are willing to omit
targets because of SAMs. It is hard to explain to Congress and the people that we will take
out ammo depots but not SAM sites.
Rusk: While these sites are under attack, will radar be on them?
McNamara: Yes. We have changed authorized routes.
President: What about terrain or low level?

McNamara: It is relatively flat in that area.
Rusk: I see some advantage to striking other targets. However, it is unlikely we'll find
anything to hit. They will have moved. I wouldn't rely on clearing out a path for the
future. In terms of signals to the other side, would strike them and other targets quickly.
McNamara: I would not complicate matters by hitting targets simultaneously. That's very
difficult mission.
Lodge: (In response to question from President) I would be in favor of hitting 6 and 7 and
hitting ammo targets as soon as practical.
President: Any objections to McNamara's recommendation to hit?
Ball: No objection to recommendation, but let's have no illusions that it will not cause
tremors of tension around the world. Raise question of whether to take out all sites then
troop deployment, etc.
McNamara: If Migs came out to attack us, we must destroy them.
President: Would you pursue in case of fight?
McNamara: No. Right now the orders are to fight only in the air.
Goldberg: In light of danger of Soviet involvement; intelligence is not sure #4 is not
involved; not sure SAM is not mobile; I think we ought to know they are there and #6 and
#7 are the responsible ones before making this attack.
I would send another memo to attack the target to make sure if they are knocked down
that the SAM site is active.
President: You don't mean sending boys over that SAM site?
Goldberg: Yes.
Raborn: We support Amb. Thompson 100%. Our Soviet experts tell us they are expecting
us to come in.
President: If we don't take them out, I want targets off list. If we do take them out, we can
go on to better targets. I don't want to send boys over those sites where we know they will
be shot down. We may be mis-leading Russians again. Kennedy called up reserves and
put nation on war footing after Vienna and Soviets understood that. In missile crisis they
understood that.
For 20 months we have been restrained--and I don't want them to misunderstand us. Only
pressure we can have is our bombing. We have nothing else to bargain.
Can we find the targets--sites?

Rusk: What happens if we incur additional losses from Migs? We should not make any
decisions now to go into Hanoi-Haiphong area. If we do, we will be moving into
something by mistake. I would think hard about going into Hanoi to kill Migs.
President: This is not the subject of this meeting. Before we do that, you'll be heard.
Clifford: We are not going to be pushed out of SVN. We show enemy our determination
by taking out #6 and #7.
Bargaining: Most valuable asset NVN has is the industrial complex they have laboriously
built. If they think SAMs can protect their industry, they have won an important element.
We have no bargaining point if their industry is safe.
If Soviets put their men and material into a situation that knocks down American planes,
they must expect retaliation.
Thompson: On balance, I support the recommendation.
Bundy: We ought to examine the way we'll discuss this decision.
Rowan: We ought to understand that this will increase the "crisis atmosphere". Every
European newspaper takes it for granted that Russians shot down our plane. I say that
even though I support the recommendation to knock them out.
The press reaction in Europe is bound to make the Soviets feel they have lost prestige if
we knock out the sites.
V. Pres: I'm much impressed with what Clifford said about long term prospects. If these
targets are valuable, we have to do something about what blocks us. I am concerned that
we have changed emphasis--that we do indeed have mobile units to face.
McNamara: We are over-emphasizing the mobility of these units. They are semi-mobile.
They haven't been mobile in the 99% cases we have examined.
President: How long would it take to go?
Wheeler: If we gave "go" in the next few minutes, we could "go" at about 1 or 2 in the
morning our time.
V. Pres: SAM sites #6 and #7 ought to be taken out. Caution: China is not Russia.
Bundy: The conference in Geneva/2/ is primarily nuclear-proliferation oriented.
/2/Reference is to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meetings in Geneva.
Valenti: This could be a piece of definitive action that would signal our determination.
President: TAKE THEM OUT./3/ (Given at 6:55 pm)

/3/A situation report prepared in the White House for the President at 11:15 p.m. on July
26 stated that, in response to the President's order, 44 Air Force strike aircraft were
scheduled to attack SAM missile sites 6 and 7 that night. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (B)) A subsequent situation
report for the President, prepared at 6:40 a.m., July 27, indicated that the SAM sites and
their associated barracks had been struck, and the pilots reported the destruction of site 6.
The results of the attack on site 7 were not clear. Six F-105 aircraft were reported lost in
the attack. (Ibid.) Both reports have indications that the President saw them. On August 3,
R.C. Bowman sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy in which he noted that the attacks
on the SAM sites "may have been a DRV trap." Site 6, he noted, was evidently a dummy
site, and there was probably no equipment at site 7. He added that General Wheeler had
proposed to McNamara that strike aircraft be given authority to attack mobile SAM sites
wherever they were discovered outside the Hanoi area. (Ibid.)

Saigon, July 27, 1965, 9:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis.
Received at 9:45 a.m.
284. Deptel 237./2/ Johnson, Manfull and I had very satisfactory meeting with Ky, Thieu
and Co (Quang of IV Corps was also present but did not substantively participate) and
after considerable discussion noted below obtained their full agreement to draft contained
reftel. Also obtained Ky's agreement that he will seek make major address to nation,
keyed to and immediately following USG statement.
/2/Document 89.
(He promised submit text to us for comment thus we will not propose statement on this
subject to Dept.) Therefore would be greatest assistance if we could let him know as far in
advance as possible the timing of our statement and final text./3/
/3/At 7:57 p.m. on July 27, the Department of State instructed the Embassy, in telegram
251 to Saigon, to inform the South Vietnamese Government that the President intended to
make a public statement on July 28 along the lines of the draft agreed upon in telegram
237 to Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Discussion primarily revolved around (1) paragraph on reference to UN, (2) paragraph on
NVN and SVN working out relations by peaceful means, including especially last
sentence on elections and (3) paragraph on Geneva agreements.
With respect to first point, they accepted our explanation that, although it was not likely
constructive UN role could be found, it was important we demonstrate that we have
exhausted every possibility to that end.
It was notable that Thieu, as well as others, accepted second point. On question of
elections, they accepted fact that Communists never have accepted international
supervision of elections and can be expected to oppose in future. However they were
somewhat bothered by inclusion of last phrase "just as soon as the end of aggression
permits" and it seems to us that sentence is just as strong with omission of this phrase.
Longest discussion revolved around Geneva agreements with Thieu making spirited
exposition to effect that their "honor and political situation" did not permit them to
recognize binding effect of document which French sought to impose upon them by
signature of French General. We pointed out basic incompatibility of seeking to invoke
Geneva Accords against the DRV on one hand while on other hand denying their validity.
Thieu said they could accept the "factual situation" created in 1954 by the Geneva
Accords but GVN could not change what had been consistent and basic position of all
GVN's since 1954. However Ky said that GVN could take position that, while GVN had
not signed accords, they had always and would continue to respect their principles. Thieu
concurred and suggested that there be added to any such public position by GVN that
GVN had not and would not seek reunification of country by military means. We
concurred that this was sound and defensible position for GVN. During course of
discussion Ky and Thieu, as well as Co, concurred that best possible outcome of present
struggle might be that the war would passively "fade away", that is, there would be a
return to the de facto 1954 situation and thus that "stronger and more lasting guarantees of
1954" which could presumably be obtained only through general conference were also not
necessarily best outcome. We thus suggest consideration to deleting modifying sentence
in which that phrase appears.
Although Vietnamese did not catch or raise point, we question next to last two sentences
of third paragraph from end, that is, sentence reading, "The first business of such a
conference must be to work out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business
must be peace." Thus it seems to us these sentences unnecessarily raise spectre of "cease
fire" without effective agreement from other side.
During course of discussion we also obtained Ky's, Thieu's and Co's affirmation on points
of public and private understanding essentially as contained in Embtel 266 as modified by
Deptel 236./4/
Additionally, we obtained Ky's agreement that in his public address he will make specific
reference to the Chieu Hoi program.
Throughout our discussion we strongly emphasized sensitivity of draft statement
contained Deptel 237 and fact that it was still in draft stage.
Taylor

SUBJECT
Progress on Vietnamese diplomatic front
You will want to know, before you meet the Leadership, that Taylor and Johnson had a
very good meeting with Ky, Thieu, and Co on strengthening our international political
position at the same time that we move forward with the planned U.S. reinforcements in
Saigon./2/ Taylor and Johnson tried out on Ky and Thieu the political language which we
drafted over the weekend./3/ They did not call it a Presidential statement, but simply a
draft U.S. position which might be stated at some point by a high U.S. official. Ky and
Thieu accepted the entire position, and that now allows us to use language equivalent to
the paragraphs at Tab A./4/ This language takes us a long way forward and gives us a
good political punch to go with our military decisions. The attached paragraphs can be
shortened and tightened into whatever form of statement we make from here, and they can
be expanded and elaborated in any following presentation by Secretary Rusk. What is new
in these paragraphs is the following:
/2/See Document 91.
/3/See Document 89.
(1) An explicit affirmation that we are in favor of using the UN if we can get it into the
act.
(2) An explicit affirmation that we are in favor of free elections under international
supervision.
(3) Definite and clear-cut support for the purposes (but not the weak machinery) of the '54
agreements.
(4) An offer of hope for the Viet Cong if they will turn from war to peace.
(5) A concrete offer to discuss both their proposals and ours--this will be read as
movement toward a negotiation in which their points and our points would both be on the
table.
All these are important from the point of view of men like Mansfield and Fulbright. A
couple of them--like the offer to consider their proposals and the offer of hope for the Viet
Cong after a peaceful settlement--may have real impact in Communist circles as well. Yet
there is no weakness in them. And I repeat that Taylor has obtained Saigon's approval for
them.
McG.B.
93. Summary Notes of the 553d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, July 27, 1965, 5:40 p.m.-6:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top
Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. According to an
attached list, the following attended the meeting: President Johnson, McNamara, Wheeler,
McNaughton, Raborn, Helms, Rusk, Ball, Thompson, William Bundy, Lodge, Fowler,
Rowan, Marks, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, Busby, Goodwin, Moyers, Cater, Smith, and
Katzenbach. Valenti and McGeorge Bundy also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid.,
Meeting Notes File, Box 1)
SUBJECT
Deployment of Additional U.S. Troops to Vietnam
The President: Before formalizing decisions on the deployment of additional U.S. forces
to Vietnam, he wished to review the present situation with Council members present.
Secretary Rusk will deal with the political situation and Secretary McNamara will
describe the military situation.
Secretary Rusk:
a. The Chinese Communists are most adamant against any negotiations between the North
Vietnamese and the U.S./South Vietnamese. The clash between the Chinese Communists
and the Russians continues.
b. According to the Yugoslav Ambassador, Tito got the impression during his visit to
Moscow that "things would happen" if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We
have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing.
We have heard nothing to date in reply.
c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other side--in Hanoi as well as in
Moscow. Our purpose is to keep our contacts open with the other side in the event that
they have a new position to give us.
d. The U.S. actions we are taking should be presented publicly in a low key but in such a
way as to convey accurately that we are determined to prevent South Vietnam from being
taken over by Hanoi. At the same time, we seek to avoid a confrontation with either the
Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union.
Secretary McNamara: Summarized the military situation in Vietnam:
a. The number of Viet Cong forces has increased and the percentage of these forces
committed to battle has increased.
b. The geographic area of South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong has increased.
c. The Viet Cong have isolated the cities and disrupted the economy of South Vietnam.
The cities are separated from the countryside.

d. Increased desertions from the South Vietnamese Army have prevented an increase in
the total number of South Vietnamese troops available for combat.
e. About half of all U.S. Army helicopters are now in South Vietnam in addition to over
500 U.S. planes.
The military requirements are:
a. More combat battalions from the U.S. are necessary. A total of 13 additional battalions
need to be sent now. On June 15, we announced a total of 75,000 men, or 15 battalions.
b. A total of 28 battalions is now necessary.
c. Over the next 15 months, 350,000 men would be added to regular U.S. forces.
d. In January, we would go to Congress for a supplementary appropriation to pay the costs
of the Vietnam war. We would ask now for a billion, in addition to the existing 1966
budget. (Draft plan is attached as Tab A.)/2/
/2/Not attached and not found.
The attack on the SAM sites in North Vietnam was necessary to protect our planes.
Attacks on other priority targets in North Vietnam are required.
Ambassador Lodge: Asked whether the ratio of government to guerrilla ground forces had
to be 10:1. During his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had
been asked this question. Comment had been made about the astronomical size of U.S.
forces required if this traditional 10:1 ratio was valid.
General Wheeler: The mobility and fire power of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces has
put an imponderable element into the traditional ratio of 10:1. Perhaps 4:1 is the right
ratio.
With the additional forces to be sent to South Vietnam, General Westmoreland believes
we can hold our present position and possibly move back into areas now contested. The
one exception would be in the Fourth Corps.
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara expressed differences of view concerning a map
brought to the meeting by Secretary McNamara which purported to show the amount of
territory in South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong. Secretary Rusk thought the map
overstated the size of Viet Cong controlled areas. Secretary McNamara said it understated
the area they control. At least 26% of the population of South Vietnam is controlled by
Viet Cong, according to Secretary McNamara's figures.
(The meeting was interrupted briefly to permit the photographers to take pictures.)
The President: The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating. Even though we now have 80 to
90,000 men there, the situation is not very safe. We have these choices:
a. Use our massive power, including SAC, to bring the enemy to his knees. Less than 10%
of our people urge this course of action.
b. We could get out on the grounds that we don't belong there. Not very many people feel
this way about Vietnam. Most feel that our national honor is at stake and that we must
keep our commitments there./3/
/3/According to Valenti's notes of the meeting, Johnson also said at this point: "Ike,
Kennedy and I have given commitment."
c. We could keep our forces at the present level, approximately 80,000 men, but suffer the
consequences of losing additional territory and of accepting increased casualties./4/ We
could "hunker up". No one is recommending this course.
/4/Valenti's notes indicate the President said at this point: "You wouldn't want your boy to
be out there and crying for help and not get it."
d. We could ask for everything we might desire from Congress--money, authority to call
up the reserves, acceptance of the deployment of more combat battalions. This dramatic
course of action would involve declaring a state of emergency and a request for several
billion dollars. Many favor this course. However, if we do go all out in this fashion, Hanoi
would be able to ask the Chinese Communists and the Soviets to increase aid and add to
their existing commitments.
e. We have chosen to do what is necessary to meet the present situation, but not to be
unnecessarily provocative to either the Russians or the Communist Chinese. We will give
the commanders the men they say they need and, out of existing materiel in the U.S., we
will give them the materiel they say they need. We will get the necessary money in the
new budget and will use our transfer authority until January. We will neither brag about
what we are doing nor thunder at the Chinese Communists and the Russians./5/
/5/Valenti notes that Johnson added at this point that the United States should say to
Thieu: "You and your military help us there and make what gains we can. Meanwhile, we
will explore ways to find peace."
This course of action will keep us there during the critical monsoon season and possibly
result in some gains. Meanwhile, we will push on the diplomatic side. This means that we
will use up our manpower reserves. We will not deplete them, but there will be a
substantial reduction. Quietly, we will push up the level of our reserve force./6/ We will
let Congress push us but, if necessary, we will call the legislators back.
/6/Valenti notes that Johnson added that the United States could not draw down its
reserves for long if challenged on another front.
We will hold until January. The alternatives are to put in our big stack now or hold back
until Ambassadors Lodge and Goldberg and the diplomats can work./7/
/7/According to Valenti's notes, Johnson said that the decision narrowed down in his mind
to the options he outlined in paragraphs d and e.
Secretary Fowler: Do we ask for standby authority now to call the reserves but not
actually call them?
The President: Under the approved plan, we would not ask for such authority now./8/
/8/Valenti notes that Johnson added: "If Russia, England, etc. wouldn't get all excited
about calling up reserves, I would do it right now."
There was no response when the President asked whether anyone in the room opposed the
course of action decided upon./9/
/9/In his memorandum of the meeting, prepared on November 2, 1968, from his
handwritten notes dated July 27, 1965, McGeorge Bundy included the following
statement: "The notes also record my own feeling that while the President was placing his
preference for alternative five [e.], as against alternative four [d.], on international
grounds, his unspoken object was to protect his legislative program--or at least this had
appeared to be his object in his informal talk as late as Thursday and Friday of the
preceding week--July 22, and July 23."
Bromley Smith
94. Memorandum of Meeting With the Joint Congressional Leadership/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking.
Prepared by McGeorge Bundy in December 1968 based on handwritten notes he took on
July 27, 1965. According to a note by Bundy at the top of the source text: "Nothing not
clearly stated in the notes is included." The parenthetical observations in the
memorandum are Bundy's, added in 1968 when he transcribed the notes. The original
handwritten notes are ibid., Papers of McGeorge Bundy. Valenti also prepared notes of
the meeting. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File)
Present were the President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Wheeler, Admiral
Raborn, Ambassador Lodge, Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Hickenlooper, Smathers,
Kuchel, and Long; Speaker McCormack, Representatives Ford, Arends, Boggs, and
Albert, and from the White House--Richard Goodwin, Moyers, Busby, Valenti, O'Brien,
Cater, Califano and Bundy.
The President began by outlining the five possible choices: first, to blow them up--not
much thought had been given to that.
Second, that we ought to get out. Some people felt that way but did not really come out
and say what they thought until you pursued them.
Third, we could leave things just as they are with 80,000 to 90,000 men there today and
get Lodge out there and see if he can pull a rabbit out of the hat.
Fourth, we could declare an emergency, call in the reserves, thousands of men and billions
of dollars--tell the country that our best guess was Y billion dollars and X thousand men,
and ask for it. That course had a good deal of appeal to the President because we should
do what is needed, but there is an argument against it in the possible reaction of Hanoi.
We did not want to have things get more violent just as we have a new man going to the
U.N. We have hints from the Russians what we should take account of. The President did
not want to make this any more provocative than necessary. He had reasons for not
overstating the case. He did not himself believe that you can simply get in an airplane and
settle this thing.
The fifth choice would be to supply Westmoreland with the men and materials he had
requested, increase draft calls (the notes say 17-20, 24-28-35), extend enlistment of sailors
and marines, and go into the Senate for an additional appropriation of $1 or $2 billion and
defer a full presentation of requirements until January, 1966. By then we would be
through the monsoon. In the meantime, the Congress would keep its power to call itself
back into session. Maybe by then we would be past the monsoon and the Communists
would have further thoughts. If the Russians did not come in and if China was not
gambling we might be able to say "Cut out your foolishness and come to the conference
table." The President didn't think there was much chance of an early settlement but others
kept saying we've got to try even though we have tried fifteen times. Before the President
went into the districts of the Congressmen and Senators he would have done what Westy
and Wheeler want done. Meanwhile he would lay plans for more reserves. The President
also reported that the British pound was in great danger.
In summary the President said the choice was between course four and course five. Either
way he would give General Westmoreland what he wants. One course would be to go the
full Congressional route now and the other way is to give the Congressional leadership the
story now and the bill later. Concluding his presentation, the President said that he was
prepared to stay in the meeting just as long as members of the Leadership wanted.
The President was followed by the Secretary of State who gave a political analysis. He
pointed out that there was no real reason for a basic difference between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. on Vietnam, but that Moscow had no real influence on the ground. Furthermore,
Moscow had a dilemma because of other Communist pressures. At the other end of the
spectrum was Peking which was adamant against negotiations--bitter and harsh.
(At this point Bundy was out of the meeting getting certain "Ike papers" for the President.
When he returned the notes pick up again.)
Secretary McNamara was discussing the SAM-site problem.
The President then called on Ambassador Lodge who knocked down choices one, two and
three--alternative one would not solve the problem, alternative two was worse than a
victory for the Kaiser or Hitler in the two World Wars. Alternative three was no
alternative at all since you needed a bigger perimeter and you also needed Camranh Bay.
Congressman Albert then said that he agreed with the President's proposal.
Senator Smathers said that we did not want to get into World War III but we did want to
stay there. Was there any change in this policy?
The President answered that there was no change in policy but that as their effort
increased, ours must.
Congressman Boggs asked if there was any major defection of GVN forces. Secretary
McNamara replied in the negative. Congressman Boggs asked about the government and
Secretary McNamara said it was a weak government and would be while the VC were
free to attack it district by district. About this point the President told the Leadership why
he did not call the Leadership earlier (the notes say that this statement was "per my memo
to him on Lodge")./2/
Congressman Boggs asked why we needed a ten-to-one ratio. General Wheeler took that
question and said that perhaps four-to-one was a right ratio, but that ten-to-one was not
necessary because the helicopter had provided a new mobility and that this was why the
ARVN had been so successful until recently.
The President remarked that we all know that it is a bad situation and we wish we were
ten years back or even ten months back.
Senator Long said that Ho Chi Minh talks of a twenty-year war but that he thought that it
might be a hundred years long. We should look at the stakes and look at the fact that we
have been touched up. Should we put in more men or take a whipping? We'd better go in.
The Speaker said that he did not see any alternatives. Dedicated military leaders have
asked for more help. He was impressed by the analogy to Hitler. The road to appeasement
was a road to war. We have warned them. We do the things we should, hard as they are.
(The notes here remark that "The Leadership seems mighty hawky so far.") The Russians
had problems and weaknesses of their own.
The President read parts of a message from General Eisenhower to Prime Minister
Churchill at a time of crisis in Vietnam in 1954. The passage the President was reading
came from "Mandate for Change."/3/
/3/An apparent reference to the April 4, 1954, letter from Eisenhower to Churchill, which
is quoted in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, 1953-1956 (New York, 1963),
pp. 346-347. It is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 1, pp.
1238-1241.
Congressman Ford asked for clarification of choices four and five. The answer (the
speaker is not clearly defined by the notes) was that in either case Westmoreland would
get what he wants. The question was rather how you would go about the process--under
four you would ask funds from the Congress now and under five you would come back in
January and ask for them. The President said that we would ask for the money in any
event. We can either guess about larger figures or go for a limited sum in the Senate now.
He thought there were good reasons for not calling the reserves; if you call them now you
really won't be ready.
In January you would have it better worked out. Under alternative five he might tell the
Leadership three times that he was sending an additional 30,000 or so, without saying X
billion and 100,000 men if he could avoid it.

Representative Ford said that under alternative five you would double draft calls--and
how much of a burden would that place on training forces? The President said that the
difference between four and five was that one was more dramatic and blunter and more
powerful--if that is what you wanted.
Secretary McNamara said that the draft calls under option five would be about the same as
under option four--since when we called the reserves we would still have to double the
draft calls. Secretary McNamara also pointed out that Sections 512A and C of the
Appropriation Act gave authority to spend money and then get a deficiency appropriation.
The President said again that under alternative four he would have to get a new bill and a
great big reserve plan and go through a big process. Under five we would simply put $1.8
billion or whatever into the appropriation bills on the Senate side and then get in order for
January.
The Secretary of Defense said that the war was very difficult to predict, that under four we
would be asking for a blank check because we did not know what would happen, while
under five we would ask for what we see clearly between now and January. Congressman
Arends asked what General Westmoreland's needs were. Secretary McNamara answered
that he had an immediate requirement of thirteen battalions and 50,000 men. Beyond that
there would be a need for further forces before January 1. The Secretary also said that we
could supply forces faster than General Westmoreland could receive them. The Secretary
of State remarked that while there were sharp engagements, the fighting had not reached
the stage of Giap's phase three. The President referred to a speech by the Vice President
and said that we were running the danger of saying to Ho what he wants to hear. He also
said that he did not want Russia and China in it if he could help it.
Senator Dirksen quoted President Woodrow Wilson to the effect that "the business at
hand is undramatic." But the President was going to have to tell the country that we are in
a very serious business. There was then an exchange with Secretary McNamara, about
which the notes are unclear--McNamara's comment was that "there was more baloney on
that than any other subject," but the notes do not show what he was talking about.
Senator Dirksen apparently also asked about any possible diversion (?) of anticipated
shipments. The President's comment is that every man who leaves will be announced.
Senator Dirksen noted that he was receiving many questioning calls, and the President
said he was going to tell the country just as soon as he got through telling the Leadership.
Senator Dirksen said that he was not going to be like the Committee on the Conduct of the
War. The President said that in the morning he was going to get to General Eisenhower.
Senator Dirksen said that from now to January was five months and you could not wait
that long if you need it. "If you need it you ought to ask for it." The President said that we
would get what we needed. There would be a sizable supplementary in January--a few
billion dollars. Senator Dirksen said we should make the country realize that this is
dangerous, serious business. The President said he thought the country did realize it.
Senator Mansfield asked the President's indulgence and read a statement/4/ in which there
appeared remarks about apathy, disquiet, and apprehension. He thought that nothing
should be put out from the meeting except by the President. He said he would support the
President's position as a Senator and as Majority Leader.

/4/Not found.
Senator Hickenlooper asked if we were getting low on helicopters and whether we were
increasing our orders. Secretary McNamara said we had built up our helicopters
enormously. The loss rate was only one in 10,000 sorties and helicopters did not wear out.
Up to now there was no basis for concern about numbers of helicopters. Nevertheless we
were increasing production.
Senator Hickenlooper said that alternatives one, two and three were out. That anything
short of a result that would make a reliable buffer against Communism would be
disastrous. A negotiated so-called peace that did not do this would merely compound the
felony. He did not know just which way it should be done--and he remarked that over the
years mistakes had been made. He differentiated between approval and support. He
thought his decision now would be to support it but not approve it. The President
remarked that he was in the same position as Senator Hickenlooper. He had supported the
decisions of 1954 without approving them. Now there were 80,000 to 90,000 men out
there asking for help and his answer was yes.
Senator Kuchel asked what Westmoreland's orders were. Must he clean up all the red
spots? The notes do not show what answer he got.
Congressman Boggs said that alternative five was the logical way out. The President said
that his object was to get the government together, to get the Allies together and to get the
country together. And he would make his decision tomorrow. He spelled out three phases
in the future and thought that by 1 November we would double our forces.
Congressman Arends asked Secretary Rusk if the Allies could help us on limiting
shipping to the DRV. Secretary Rusk answered about help in South Vietnam from Korea,
Australia, and New Zealand. Arends persisted on shipping. The Secretary of State said
that there had been some improvement and that through various devices we could get a
cutback in shipments to Hanoi which might make us feel better but would not really
change the situation.
Senator Hickenlooper said that we were treating symptoms; there was a great danger of a
negotiated stalemate, and we needed a reliable settlement. The President said that Senator
Hickenlooper should talk to Mike Mansfield and Bill Fulbright and see what the three
could agree on. Right now settlement was not a practicable problem, because the
Communists thought they were winning. The question of settlement was a good long way
away. Senator Hickenlooper said the big question was what we were going to do. The
President said that we are going to try to bring about a situation where the government of
South Vietnam will be able to defend itself against foreign ideology. "Westmoreland
wants help--I'm going to give it--the question is how."
The Speaker closed the meeting by saying that the President would have united support.
This was a historic meeting. The President would have the support of all true Americans.
After the meeting with the Leadership, the President held a small meeting in his office.
Present were the President--the two Secretaries, Goodwin, Moyers, Busby, and Bundy.
The President remarked that we were prolonging the agony for 90 days and that he wanted
a statement of 700 words, the essence of which would be that he was giving
Westmoreland what he needed. Secretary McNamara repeated the thirteen battalion,
50,000 men figure, and expressed his confidence on the handling of the matter.
95. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Deployment of Major
U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965. Secret.
SUBJECT
Response to Presidential Messages on Vietnam
In accordance with your instructions, messages were delivered Monday to approximately
29 countries which are contributing assistance in Vietnam./2/ France was omitted for
political reasons and Laos, Ecuador, and Guatemala for political reasons or because their
contributions have in fact been insignificant.
/2/Circular telegrams 127 and 128, July 25, conveyed instructions to deliver on Monday,
July 26, a personal letter from President Johnson to the head of government outlining the
necessity to increase the number of U.S. troops involved in South Vietnam, and asking for
support and increased assistance in the struggle in Vietnam. The telegrams were sent to
Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Bonn, Tehran, Dublin, Rome, The Hague, Madrid, Tel
Aviv, Bern, London, Ankara, Canberra, Rio de Janeiro, Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul, Kuala
Lumpur, New Delhi, Wellington, Manila, Bangkok, Athens, and Karachi. (Department of
To date, we have received reports from 23 Embassies, which have presented the
Presidential message on Vietnam to the heads of government or highest government
official of the host country. These reports show sympathy of our principles of action-resistance to aggression while working for peace--but yield little tangible evidence of
prospects of substantially increased assistance.
Some countries--notably Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Philippines--express
a willingness to consider an additional effort urgently, but our Ambassador in Ottawa
cautions against over optimism while our Ambassador in Manila advises against
encouraging the Philippines to diffuse its effort.
In several cases no comment was offered by the foreign government at the time of receipt
of the message but comment may be forthcoming later. Thus, Ayub/3/ has promised a
reply in two days.
/3/President Ayub Khan of Pakistan.
There was general appreciation of advance notification of our plans.
Details of replies received to date are given in the attached memorandum./4/

William P. Bundy/5/
96. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A
1266, #14. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Meeting on Viet Nam
Subsequent to our telephone conversation, I met with the following Senators in my office
at 3:30 this afternoon:
Russell
Fulbright
Sparkman
Aiken
Cooper
I opened the meeting by reporting fully on the Leadership discussion of Viet Nam this
morning. There was a general sense of reassurance that your objective was not to get in
deeply and that you intended to do only what was essential in the military line until
January, while Rusk and Goldberg were concentrating on attempting to get us out. A
general desire to support you in this course was expressed. It was felt that one of the best
ways this could be done would be by communicating the feelings of some of the senior
Members of the Senate to you in this fashion.
Among the major points which were raised by various of the Senators in attendance
during the discussions were the following:
1. The estimate of 100,000 men by the end of the year was probably short, that the more
likely figure would be 150,000.
2. The Russians feel that they have an obligation to aid the North Vietnamese not unlike
ours towards a Western European country which might be attacked and if we expect them
to help in getting negotiations started before this situation gets out of hand we have to
provide them with some basis for helping.
3. The United Nations may be an important link in a way out of the situation but this
possibility is clouded by the issue of Article 19; it may not be opportune to insist upon
enforcement of the Article at this time; but heat is already being generated on the issue in
the House and some prompt Presidential initiative on the point in public may be desirable.
4. Bridges to Eastern Europe need to be kept open and continued encouragement of the
evolution of these nations (Yugoslavia, in particular) towards full independence, political
and economic, under their own unique forms of organization is of the greatest importance.
5. The Russians are deeply concerned that we are abandoning the policy of peaceful coexistence; some tangible reassurance that we are not, perhaps through the consular
convention, is desirable.
6. The country is backing the President on Viet Nam primarily because he is President,
not necessarily out of any understanding or sympathy with policies on Viet Nam; beneath
the support, there is deep concern and a great deal of confusion which could explode at
any time; in addition racial factors at home could become involved.
7. The main perplexity in the Vietnamese situation is that even if you win, totally, you
still do not come out well. What have you achieved? It is by no means a "vital" area of
U.S. concern as it was described by Lodge at a hearing this morning.
8. There is reason for concern and irritation at Cao Ky's statement that we should fight on
the perimeter while the Vietnamese military is organizing the rear.
9. The President was ill-advised to begin the bombing of North Viet Nam in the first place
and the error was then compounded by the limited character of the bombing.
10. In clarification of what would follow a failure of the Goldberg-Rusk effort between
now and January, it was pointed out that it would mean that we would probably have to
add very substantially to manpower at that time.
11. The military concept of a greatly extended bombing in Viet Nam is sound.
12. Another cessation of bombing of longer duration than the previous one might be
desirable as a means of getting discussions underway.
13. Underground contact might be sought not only with the Russians but with the Chinese
as well; it could be particularly useful in bringing about talks in the event another pause in
the bombing is attempted.
14. France, who has the best contacts in Indochina, has been virtually ignored as a
possible avenue of approach to negotiations.
15. The situation at Pleiku is highly dangerous; if the U.S. garrison is attacked it could be
another Dien Bien Phu and it could mean increased pressure for our deeper involvement.
16. The French parliament, at no time, permitted conscripts to be used in Indochina.
17. The Viet Cong are highly skilled and formidable fighters; the South Vietnamese
forces are of dubious quality and larger and larger desertions can be anticipated.
18. The important thing in a situation like this which is clearly detrimental to us is to
concentrate on finding a way out; a possibility might exist in a combination of the coastal
enclave strategy, a cessation of aerial bombardment and the use of all possible contacts to
get negotiations underway.
19. McNamara has been a disappointment in his handling of this situation, probably
because he is being used in a way in which he ought not to be used.
It should be noted that there was obviously not a unanimity among the Members present
on all of the points listed. But there was a very substantial agreement on many of them.
Moreover, there was full agreement that insofar as Viet Nam is concerned we are deeply
enmeshed in a place where we ought not to be; that the situation is rapidly going out of
control; and that every effort should be made to extricate ourselves./2/
/2/At the President's request, McNamara prepared a memorandum commenting on
Mansfield's first 18 points, which the President forwarded to Mansfield on July 28 under a
covering letter that reads: "With respect to the 19th point, as I have often said, I consider
Bob McNamara to be the best Secretary of Defense in the history of this
nation." (University of Montana, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 102, Folder 13)
97. Editorial Note

On July 28, 1965, President Johnson opened a mid-day press conference at the White
House with a statement in which he explained that U.S. involvement in the conflict in
Vietnam would be expanded. He stated that the United States intended "to convince the
Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power." He said
that General Westmoreland had outlined the forces needed to meet the "mounting
aggression" in South Vietnam, and he added: "We will meet his needs." He had therefore
ordered U.S. forces in Vietnam increased from 75,000 to 125,000, and he noted that
additional forces would be dispatched as they were requested. To meet the necessary
increase in active forces, the draft call would be raised over a period of time from 17,000
to 35,000 per month. The President reiterated that the United States was ready at any time
for unconditional discussions to move the conflict from the battlefield to the conference
table. The transcript is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pages 794-796.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff began implementation of the President's decision on July 28 by
approving the deployment of the Air Mobile Division and the Marine Amphibious
Brigade to South Vietnam. (Telegram 263 to Saigon, July 28; Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Embassies throughout the world were instructed to convey
the substance of the President's announcement to their host governments. (Circular
telegram 141, July 27; ibid.) In Vietnam, the U.S. Information Agency released the text of
the Presidential announcement to the local press and via radio, distributed some 200,000
illustrated pamphlets, and prepared 1 million leaflets with excerpts from the
announcement for airdrop into North Vietnam. (Telegram 361 from Saigon, August 3;
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos
(B))
On August 2, Bromley Smith reported to the President that 30 countries had reacted
favorably to the announcement, 5 were apprehensive, and Ghana and all of the
Communist states, except Yugoslavia and Romania, were critical. (Memorandum to the
President; ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII)

Department of State
Washington, DC
Discussion on Ending the War and Deployment of Additional U.S. Forces,

July 29 - November 26, 1965
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Mai Van Bo 1965. Top
Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Dean and Bundy. Copies were sent to the Department of
Defense for McNaughton and to CIA for Colby.
SUBJECT
Mai Van Bo Conversation with Urah Arkas-Duntov
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Urah Arkas-Duntov, Dreyfus Fund, New York
Under Secretary of State Ball
Mr. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. David Dean, Deputy Director for Asian Communist Affairs
Mr. Allen Whiting, Director, INR/RFE
Background:
Mr. Duntov was interested in ascertaining the North Vietnamese attitudes and position
because of the effect the Vietnamese situation has on Dreyfus' investments, and through
M. Parisot, Foreign Editor of "France Soir," arranged to see Nguyen Van Chi in Paris in
early May. Dissatisfied with the lack of substance in this contact, however, he asked M.
Parisot to get him an interview with Mai Van Bo. This interview was arranged with little
less than a week's notice.
Mr. Duntov stated that he had had a two-hour conversation with Mai Van Bo in Paris on
the evening of July 16, 1965. Also present were M. Parisot and Elli Maissi, the UPI
diplomatic correspondent in Paris. Mai Van Bo explicitly asked that the conversation be
regarded as confidential, but he assented when Mr. Duntov asked if he might pass the
substance of the conversation to friends in Washington.
Duntov gave Mai Van Bo an explanation of the Dreyfus Fund and of the necessity for
keeping abreast of political and economic developments.
Conversation almost immediately focused on the Viet-Nam situation. The following
points were raised and discussed:

1. Hanoi's Attitude toward Negotiations. Duntov asked why Hanoi would not negotiate.
Bo responded that Hanoi did want to negotiate, and that there were ample contacts in
which negotiations might take place. However, there must first be a basis for negotiations.
Bo first said that the proper basis would be the Geneva Accords of 1954. He then added
that these accords are often misinterpreted and misquoted, and that the true interpretation
is found in the Four Points laid out by Pham Van Dong. Thus these formed the proper
basis for negotiations.
2. Unification of Viet-Nam. Bo stressed very strongly that Viet-Nam is one country and
cannot be divided. When asked whether the US had not made clear its willingness to
negotiate unconditionally, Bo replied that the President's Baltimore speech of April 7 was
a trap, and that the President was really laying down conditions by his insistence on the
necessity of an independent South Viet-Nam and guarantees for such a South Viet-Nam.
One of the participants asked Bo whether his position was not in conflict with statements
by the National Liberation Front to the effect that the Front favored an independent South
Viet-Nam. Bo seemed somewhat taken aback by this question, but recovered and said that
this would be all right, since an "independent" government in South Viet-Nam would in
fact decide to join the north.
3. Internal Solution in South Viet-Nam. Bo insisted, somewhat emotionally, that there was
one basic premise, self-determination by the South Vietnamese people, and that if this was
accepted, a solution was possible. He referred at different times to the phrase, "selfdetermination," and to the Liberation Front program for the South (insistence on which, of
course, is the third of Pham Van Dong's Four Points). In referring to "self-determination,"
Bo explained that, if this principle was recognized, an independent government could be
formed. However, he went on to say that no "traitor" could be included, apparently
meaning by this that at least the present South Vietnamese military leaders would be
excluded.
4. Withdrawal of US Forces. Bo was asked what time schedule would be required--in the
event of an agreement for an independent South Viet-Nam--on the withdrawal of US
forces. Bo replied that this was no problem and that it was a technical detail that could be
worked out as it had been with the French in 1954. The withdrawal could be discussed
and could take place over a two- or three-year period. Bo related US withdrawal clearly,
however, to acceptance of the principles he had laid down for "independence" and "selfdetermination" in South Viet-Nam.
5. Cease-fire or Cessation in Bombings. Bo mentioned the bombings of the North only in
passing and with mild reproof. He gave no indication that a cessation of bombing was
required before there could be discussions.
Comment
1. The position taken by Bo in this conversation appears to be consistent with the latest
statements from Hanoi, notably an article on July 16./2/ Bo appeared to be quite firm that
there must be an agreed basis for discussions, and that this must be the Four Points.
Although he persisted in using the phrase "self-determination" to describe the solution
within South Viet-Nam, his parallel references to the Liberation Front program seemed to
state that Hanoi would still insist that we accept in advance the principle that the
Liberation Front be admitted to a coalition government (the core of the Front "program").
His reference to the exclusion of "traitors" also seems to point to a government that would
be weighted in favor of the Liberation Front.
/2/Reference is apparently to the "White Paper" on "US Aggression and Intervention in
Vietnam" released by North Vietnam in English on July 16. For text, see United StatesVietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part VI, B, 2, pp. 146-151.
2. In clearly not insisting on prior withdrawal of US forces before any discussions, and in
avoiding mention of a cessation of bombings as a pre-condition, Bo was also consistent
with the Hanoi July 16 statement.
3. Bo's great stress on the necessity for a unified Viet-Nam, and his failure to note the US
reference to this subject in Secretary Rusk's speech of June 23,/3/ suggest that as of the
date of the conversation Hanoi was not yet clear what the US position was on
reunification. The President's July 28 statement,/4/ referring specifically to the possibility
of "free elections . . . throughout Viet-Nam under international supervision," should make
clear to Hanoi what our position is on this point. However, it is clear that Hanoi, in the
wording of the Four Points and in Bo's stress on Viet-Nam being one nation, wishes an
agreement that would effectively assume early reunification, and presumably without any
holding of elections in the two Viet-Nams to see if the people wanted it. In other words,
there remains a difference of substance between us on this point, but it seems doubtful
that the US position could now be misunderstood in Hanoi./5/
/3/In an address to the American Foreign Service Association, Rusk called for a "free
decision by the peoples of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification." For
text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1965, pp. 52-55.
/4/See Document 97.
/5/In a July 30 memorandum to William Bundy, Dean noted that Mai Van Bo appeared to
be confused about the U.S. position on the Geneva Accords, unification, and selfdetermination. He suggested that "we clarify these points to Mai, and in turn give him a
list of specific questions about Hanoi's position." Dean added that he felt that such a direct
approach was necessary to get a firm reading of Hanoi's position. He felt that the danger
of public disclosure of such an approach by a U.S. businessman was slight, in that Mai
Van Bo had been discreet in the past. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412,
Mai Van Bo 1965)
4. The American source, Duntov, impressed us all as giving an honest and factual account
of the conversation. He said that throughout the conversation he asked only clarifying
questions and tried to make it clear that he had no message and no standing with the US
Government. We were inclined to believe that Bo accepted this although Duntov's closing
request to convey the substance to "friends in Washington" must mean that Bo will know
that his views got through to us.
5. If we were to consider using Duntov for future contacts with Bo, we would be wise to
have a security investigation, and we would also have to take account, despite Duntov's
apparent personal discretion, of the fact that he apparently has wide newspaper and other
associations who might learn of his approach, even if he did not tell them the substance of
his conversation.
99. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, July 29, 1965, 2:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
191. Subject: Vietnam. Reference: Deptel 138./2/ Subsequent to presentation credentials
Goldberg accompanied by Plimpton and Yost spent hour yesterday afternoon with SYG
accompanied by Bunche, Narasimhan and Rolz-Bennett./3/
/2/In telegram 138 to USUN, July 27, the Department of State reviewed previous
exchanges with Thant on the question of Vietnam, and outlined the points that Goldberg
should make with Thant in their first talk. Goldberg was instructed to explain the
defensive character of the anticipated U.S. troop build-up in South Vietnam, and to
suggest that it might be useful at some point for Thant to issue a personal appeal for a
Geneva conference to establish conditions for the cessation of hostilities. The Department
added that it remained interested in the question of whether the Security Council might
play a useful role in connection with Vietnam. (Ibid.)
/3/Francis T.P. Plimpton and Charles W. Yost, Deputy U.S. Representatives at the United
Nations. C.V. Narasimhan, Under Secretary for General Assembly Affairs and Chef de
Cabinet of the United Nations, and Ralph J. Bunche and Jose Rolz-Bennett, Under
Secretaries for Special Political Affairs.
On Vietnam, Goldberg covered fully points made reftel and talking paper,/4/ including
Harriman-Kosygin conversation./5/ Goldberg emphasized that we were suggesting SYG
explore three possible steps: (1) an SC mtg concluding with simple res calling for negots;
(2) a direct appeal by U Thant for negots; (3) North and South membership in UN. SYG
comments on these and other points were as follows.
/5/See Document 68.
SYG inquired whether Kosygin in conversation with Harriman had indicated receptivity
to SC mtg. Goldberg replied that he had not but that he had during conversation, as
evidenced by points Goldberg had just reported, shown degree of flexibility which seemed
to warrant further exploration by SYG. Goldberg mentioned that Kosygin had referred to
Vietnam as "small problem," though pointing out that he might have meant only that it is
small in relation to such broader issues as disarmament and over-all US-Sov relations.
SYG replied there had been no indication of flexibility concerning UN involvement in
Vietnam on part of Sov reps in NY. They had been reluctant to talk about problem at all
and had in particular been very negative about any SC mtg. French had also been opposed
to SC mtg though less categorically.

Thant mentioned that Stevenson had sounded him out in Geneva in early July on this
same point/6/ and he had replied that he would explore possibility but was not hopeful.
Subsequently in Paris he had sounded out Couve, who had been negative because he did
not think Peking, Hanoi or Saigon would be willing to attend SC mtg. Thant also
mentioned that Ben Bella, during their exchange concerning SYG's attendance at AfroAsian mtg, had argued Hanoi would not agree to any UN involvement in Vietnam
question because of absence from UN of ChiComs. Thant himself fears that in any SC
mtg Sovs would have to take strong line against UN involvement and to veto any res. He
is doubtful, therefore, as he told Secy at their mtg July 19, that there is any advantage in
pursuing idea of SC mtg with Sovs and French./7/
/7/Rusk and Thant met at 4:30 p.m. on July 19 at the United Nations in New York.
(Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
As to SYG himself issuing some sort of appeal, Thant mentioned that he had some time
ago been asked by Washington to delay cease-fire appeal and had done so. Goldberg
expressed appreciation for his having delayed such an appeal and pointed out problem that
would be created for us by unpoliced cease-fire. Thant suggested that desirability and
character of appeal by him should be more fully explored next time he and Goldberg
meet.
SYG expressed disagreement with indication in Harriman report that Hanoi is moving
away from Peking. It has been his impression that they are drawing closer to Peking,
certainly closer than they were last autumn when Hanoi through Moscow, without
clearing with Peking, agreed to meet with us.
As to membership North VN and South VN in UN, Thant posed certain questions. Would
Hanoi apply for membership? If it did, would Nationalist China veto admission? It is
Thant's belief that Peking would oppose DRV membership and would tell Hanoi not to
apply. However, SYG welcomed US "green light" on this point and said he would explore
possibilities.
SYG then made several comments on possible Geneva conf. He said it is matter of
indifference to him whether conf precedes or follows cease-fire. In former case he
concurred that cease-fire should be first item on agenda. However, it is essential that
Peking should participate and, while he has had no contact with Peking since becoming
SYG, he sees two possible impediments to their participation.
First impediment would be problem of South Vietnamese representation. Peking would
claim only Viet Cong should represent SVN. This of course is unrealistic and
unacceptable. However, in SYG's view, it would also be unrealistic that only Saigon
should represent SVN. Government of SVN changes from month to month and it would
not be realistic to claim that Ky and Thieu, or whoever will be in their place at time conf
convenes, are competent to represent S Vietnamese people. SYG recommends that SVN
be represented at such conf by two delegations, Saigon and Viet Cong, having equal
status. He mentioned incidentally that Hanoi would certainly reject Viet Cong appearing
only as part of DRV deleg. SYG said he had sounded out both UK and France concerning
his suggested dual SVN deleg, but both had said they preferred to await US reaction
before commenting.
Second possible impediment to Peking participation in Geneva conf is fact that Peking has
insisted publicly, though not recently, that 1954 Geneva Accords must be reaffirmed and
implemented by any new conf. Such implementation would of course include withdrawal
foreign forces and bases, as well as elections. SYG noted however that Hanoi has
apparently not insisted on withdrawal US forces before new conf.
This subject was closed with agreement that SYG would consider suggestions we had
presented and would explore them with Sovs and others where he considered appropriate
and that conversations would be resumed upon Goldberg's return to NY./8/
/8/Goldberg also gave U Thant a personal letter from President Johnson, dated July 28, at
this meeting. In the letter, Johnson indicated that he had instructed Goldberg to maintain
contact with Thant on developments in Vietnam, and he welcomed Thant's efforts to
move the conflict to the conference table. Thant responded on July 29 in a letter to
Johnson in which he expressed his determination to pursue a negotiated settlement of the
Vietnam conflict with all the means at his disposal. On July 30, Goldberg sent a letter to
the President of the Security Council in which he stated that the United States was
prepared to work unconditionally with the members of the Security Council in search for
an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to Southeast Asia. All three letters are
printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 892-894.
Goldberg

Memos (B). Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Evaluation of the Program of Bombing North Vietnam
Summarized below, as you requested, is an evaluation of the program of bombing North
Vietnam.
1. Rationale for bombing the North. The program of bombing NVN began in an
atmosphere of reprisal. We had had the August Tonkin Gulf episode; we had absorbed the
November 1 attack on Bien Hoa Airfield and the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks
Hotel in Saigon. The attacks at U.S. installations at Pleiku on February 7 and Qui Nhon
on February 10 were the immediate causes of the first strikes against North Vietnam. The
strike following Pleiku was announced as a "response"--a "reprisal"; our strike following
Qui Nhon was called a response to more generalized VC terrorism. The major purposes of
the bombing program, however, were:
a. To promote a settlement. The program was designed (1) to influence the DRV to
negotiate (explicitly or otherwise), and (2) to provide us with a bargaining counter within
negotiations.
b. To interdict infiltration. The program was calculated to reduce the flow of men and
supplies from the North to the South--at least, to put a ceiling on the size of war that the
enemy could wage in the South.
Supplemental purposes of the program were (c) to demonstrate to South Vietnam, North
Vietnam and the world the U.S. commitment to see this thing through, (d) to raise morale
in South Vietnam by punishing North Vietnam, the source of the suffering in the South,
and (e) to reduce criticism of the Administration from advocates of a bombing program.
2. Achievement of major purposes. The potential targets, targets struck and per cent of
destruction are shown at Tab A. In terms of the purposes of the program, its results have
been as follows:
a. To promote a settlement. Obviously, this objective has not yet been attained. We
recognized at the start of the program, as we do now, that the influence of the bombing on
a settlement would not be great until the North Vietnamese had been disappointed in their
hopes for a quick military success in the South. There is no doubt that the bombing
program has become an important counter in the current tacit and explicit bargaining
process and will be an important counter in any future bargaining.
b. To interdict infiltration. It is believed that regular North Vietnamese units now in South
Vietnam (estimated to be one division) require about 4 tons of supplies daily for the
"current" level of combat but would require 67 tons of supplies daily for "light" combat.
("Current" levels are operations conducted largely in small units; "light" combat would
involve larger elements in action on the average of every third day, with expenditures of
one-third of each unit's basic load of ammunition on each action.) It is believed that
regular North Vietnamese units and Pathet Lao forces in the Laos Panhandle require about
21 and 51 tons daily respectively for the two levels of combat. Viet Cong arms,
ammunition and other supply requirements are estimated at 8 tons daily for "current"
combat and 115 tons for "light" combat. The effect of the interdiction program on the
movement of supplies is summarized below:
The 440-ton per day rail traffic from Hanoi south to Vinh has been cut off at Ninh Binh
(40 miles south of Hanoi). Supplies still move by sea and over the parallel highway
system. The latter has been badly damaged and is subject to armed reconnaissance; sea
traffic into SVN is under surveillance. At a minimum, supply is slower and less regular
and delivered at increased cost in resources and energy expended. Roads into Laos have
been subjected to similar interdiction and armed recce. Only limited interdiction has been
imposed on the key rail and road net northwest of Hanoi, and none on the railway net
northeast of Hanoi; and port destruction has been minimal. Thus, substantially
uninterrupted supply continues from China by rail into Hanoi and by sea into Haiphong to
meet major North Vietnamese military, industrial and civilian needs.
The effect of the bombing on military operations is estimated to have been as follows:
(1) For regular North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces. The interdiction program has
caused North Vietnam increasing difficulty in supplying their units in Laos and South
Vietnam. How severe this difficulty is or how stretched North Vietnam's supply
capabilities are cannot be estimated precisely. Our interdiction efforts may have either
prevented or deterred the North from sending more troops than they already have. The
interdiction programs in North Vietnam and Laos also may have influenced a Communist
decision to forego a 1965 offensive in Laos.
(2) For Viet Cong forces. Because the VC require significantly less infiltrated arms and
ammunition and other supplies than do the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces, the
interdiction program probably has had less of an adverse effect on their operations. By
raising VC fears concerning adequacy of supplies, however, the program may have
caused the VC summer offensive to be less intense, aggressive and unrelenting than it
would otherwise have been. It should be noted that the program has not been a "strategic"
bombing program; it has been limited to selected targets of fairly direct military
relevance. Populations and targets such as dikes and basic industries have not been struck.
Furthermore, the immediate vicinities of Hanoi and Haiphong have been avoided, partly
because the targets there are primarily of the "strategic" type and partly because strikes
there would involve even more serious risks of confrontations with the Soviet Union and
China.
3. Other effects of the program.
a. Deterrence of VC terrorism. There is no evidence that strikes against North Vietnam
have affected one way or another the level or kind of VC incidents of terror in South
Vietnam.
b. Morale in South Vietnam. Morale in South Vietnam was raised by the initiation of the
bombing program (as, later, by the deployment of additional troops). Now--with the
bombing programs having become commonplace and with the failure of the situation to
improve--morale in South Vietnam is not discernibly better than it was before the
bombing program began. In a sense, South Vietnam is now "addicted" to the program; a
permanent abandonment of the program would have a distinct depressing effect on morale
in South Vietnam.
c. Reduction of criticism of the Administration. Some critics, who advocated bombing,
were silenced; others are now as vocal or more vocal because the program has been too
limited for their taste. The program has generated a new school of criticism among
liberals and "peace" groups, whose activities have been reflected especially in teach-ins
and newspaper criticisms.
d. Damage to peaceful image of the US. The price paid for improving our image as a
guarantor has been damage to our image as a country which eschews armed attacks on
other nations. The hue and cry correlates with the kind of weapons (e.g., bombs vs.
napalm), the kind of targets (e.g., bridges vs. people), the location of targets (e.g., south
vs. north), and not least the extent to which the critic feels threatened by Asian
communism (e.g., Thailand vs. the UK). Furthermore, for a given level of bombing, the
hue and cry is less now than it was earlier, perhaps to some extent helped by Communist
intransigence toward discussions. The objection to our "warlike" image and the approval
of our fulfilling our commitments competes in the minds of many nations (and
individuals) in the world, producing a schizophrenia. Within such allied countries as UK
and Japan, popular antagonism to the bombings per se, fear of escalation and belief that
the bombings are the main obstacle to negotiation, have created political problems for the
governments in their support of US policy.
e. Pressures to settle. More countries are now, as a consequence of the bombing program,
more interested in taking steps to help bring the war to an end.
f. Impact on US-Soviet detente. The bombing program--because it appears to reject the
policy of "peaceful co-existence," because it involves an attack on a "fellow socialist
country," because the Soviet people have vivid horrible memories of air bombing, because
it challenges the USSR as she competes with China for leadership of the Communist
world, and because US and Soviet arms are now striking each other in North Vietnam-has strained the US-Soviet detente, making constructive arms-control and other
cooperative programs more difficult. How serious this effect will be and whether the
detente can be revived depend on how far we carry our military actions against the North
and how long the campaign continues. At the same time, the bombing program offers the
Soviet Union an opportunity to play a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, by gaining credit
for persuading us to terminate the program. There is a chance that the scenario could spin
out this way; if so, the effect of the entire experience on the US-Soviet detente could be a
net plus.
g. Risk of escalation. The bombing program--especially as strikes move toward Hanoi and
toward China and as encounters with Soviet/Chinese SAMs/MIGs occur--may increase
the risk of escalation into a broader war.
4. The future of the program. Even with hindsight, I believe the decision to bomb the
DRV was wise and I believe the program should be continued. The future program
should:
a. Emphasize the threat. It should be structured to capitalize on fear of future attacks. At
any time, "pressure" on the DRV depends not upon the current level of bombing but
rather upon the credible threat of future destruction which can be avoided by agreeing to
negotiate or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations.
b. Minimize the loss of DRV "face." The program should be designed to make it politically
easy for the DRV to enter negotiations and to make concessions during negotiations. It
may be politically easier for North Vietnam to accept negotiations and/or to make
concessions at a time when bombing of their territory is not currently taking place.
c. Optimize interdiction vs. political costs. Interdiction should be carried out so as to
maximize effectiveness and to minimize the political repercussions from the methods
used. Physically, it makes no difference whether a rifle is interdicted on its way into North
Vietnam, on its way out of North Vietnam, in Laos or in South Vietnam. But different
amounts of effort and different political prices may be paid depending on how and where
it is done. The critical variables in this regard are (1) the type of targets struck (e.g., port
facilities involving civilian casualties vs. isolated bridges), (2) type of aircraft (e.g., B-52s
vs. F-105s), (3) kind of weapons (e.g., napalm vs. ordinary bombs), (4) location of target
(e.g., in Hanoi vs. Laotian border area), and (5) the accompanying declaratory policy (e.g.,
unlimited vs. a defined interdiction zone).
d. Coordinate with other influences on the DRV. So long as full victory in the South
appears likely, the effect of the bombing program in promoting negotiations or a
settlement will probably be small. The bombing program now and later should be
designed for its influence on the DRV at that unknown time when the DRV becomes more
optimistic about what they can achieve in a settlement acceptable to us than about what
they can achieve by continuation of the war.
e. Avoid undue risks and costs. The program should avoid bombing which runs a high risk
of escalation into war with the Soviets or China and which is likely to appall allies and
friends.
Robert S. McNamara
Tab A
ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM'S MILITARY EFFECTS
Fixed Targets
Type
National Capacity
No. of
Targets in
Country
No. of
Targets
Struck
% of
National
Capacity
Destroyed
Barracks
443,000 men
46
35
5.0
Ammo Depots
103,600 metric
tons
16
10
26.9
POL Storage
192,000 metric
tons
12
18.3
Supply Depots
0.6 million square

feet
11
5.0
Maritime Ports
7,800 short
tons/day
4.2
RR Yards
21,000 short
tons/day
1.8
Power Plants
176,000 kilowatts
17
9.0
1000 metric
tons/year (100%
Natl Cap)
7.5
Industrials:
Ammo Plant
Steel/Iron Plant
500,000 metric
tons/year* (100%
Natl Cap)
Machine Tool
Plant
1000 units/year
(83% Natl Cap)
Chemical
Plants
Yearly output ?
(100% Natl Cap)
Airfields
22 (9 hard-surface
fields targeted)
4.0**
Naval Bases
5 (excluding minor
operating bases)
12.5
Bridges
475 (57 most

significant
targeted)
57
27
32.8**
Ferries
34 (286 tons/trip
for 13 targeted)
13
11
6.5**
Commo Facil
22 (4 key installations targeted)
25.0**
Radar Sites
29 sites containing
42 radar sets
27
10
17.5
Locks & Dams
91 (11 targeted as
critical)
11
SAM Sites
20***
* Only partly operational: 1/3 to 1/2 capacity

** Of targeted capacity
*** Preliminary BDA
On Armed Recce
Targets
Type
DRV Holdings
Destroyed/
Damaged
% Holdings
Destroyed
Vessels (naval,
merchant to include
junks)
Unknown
185/357
Unknown
Vehicles
Unknown
168/223
Unknown
RR Rolling Stock
1920 (120
engines)
102/314
5.3
101. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

(Ackley) to President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Ex ND 19/CO 312. No
classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that Johnson saw the
memorandum.
SUBJECT
Economic Aspects of Vietnam
Summary
The implications of the Vietnam situation for the economy appear to be these:
It has affected, and may continue to influence, speculative commodity and financial
markets.
There are not likely to be significant effects on over-all prices, output, or employment in
the next few months.
If expenditures follow the path that Bob McNamara now visualizes as likely, they could
provide a significant stimulus to economic activity during the first half of next year.
We will need to intensify our concern about prices and wages.
Budgetary and tax planning for fiscal 1967 will be affected.
Analysis
1. Our economy has lots of room to absorb a defense step-up.
There is still a $15-$20 billion margin of idle industrial capacity and excessive
unemployment.
Our productive capacity is growing by $25-$30 billion a year (apart from any price
increases), making room for both more butter and, if needed, more guns.
Apart from the defense effort, market demand would not be likely to grow as fast as
productive capacity during the course of FY 1966, and unemployment would probably be
creeping up.
2. The stock market is anxious about Vietnam news, because the financial community
--generally hates uncertainties which could cloud the business outlook; and
--specifically fears that a major escalation could bring on increased taxes and wage and
price controls.
3. Vietnam news has had an important influence on the stock market.
A 12 point drop in the Dow-Jones Index on July 20 is generally attributed to the
Administration's appraisal of the war as "deteriorating."
Since your statement Wednesday noon,/2/ the market has been strong, with a gain of 14
points to today's close. On learning that no drastic measures were planned, "Wall Street
heaved a sigh of relief," said the Times.
/2/July 28. Reference is to the President's statement at his news conference; see Document
97.
4. As the stock market rebounded on reassuring Vietnam news, speculative commodity
markets retreated.
On Wednesday, copper futures fell sharply. In the previous 2 weeks, they had risen more
than 10%.
Fortunately, many other commodity markets had topped out before the latest round of
Vietnam news, and prices were not poised to leap ahead.
5. These markets will continue to reflect the ups-and-downs of military action and
speculation. But there is no good reason for major flurries in the near future. Nobody can
seriously expect that the kind of program you outlined is going to overheat the economy,
strain industrial capacity, or generate a consumer buying boom. But speculative
excitement inflames easily in the commodity markets, and we should be careful what we
say and do.
6. The thought of direct controls on prices and wages is what frightens business most. The
worry on this score is way out of proportion to the facts.
Here are two examples on opposite sides in recent press comment. U.S. News reported-before your press conference--"If the Vietnam war continues to escalate . . . rising toward
the scale of the Korean war, wage and price controls will return, many materials will be
allocated, and an excess profits tax will again become a real possibility." But a
knowledgeable broker argued in the Times, "Even if we assume the Vietnam war gets as
big as the Korean war, this doesn't mean we would have to have excess profits taxes or
commodity controls as we had then." Your Wednesday press conference should have been
reassuring.
We can say--and perhaps should emphasize publicly--that direct controls are simply not
live possibilities.
Only in the remote event that the Defense step-up for the near future got into the $10
billion range would we have to give serious thought to higher taxes, selective commodity
allocations, or (last of all) to direct controls on wages and prices.
7. The analogy with Korea simply does not hold water.
We started the Korean war with defense purchases running at a $12 billion rate; we
doubled them in 9 months and tripled them in 15. Our defense capability is incomparably
greater today.
Even so, the real reason for the surge in prices in late 1950 and early 1951 was not the
pressure of defense orders or outlays. Many businesses made frantic efforts to pile up
inventories, and consumers went on a buying spree. Consumer spending jumped 7-1/2%
in the third quarter of 1950 and took another 5-1/2% jump in the first quarter of 1951;
consumers virtually stopped saving. Fresh memories of wartime rationing and shortages
drove households into a hoarding binge. The consumer has been living in a world of
plentiful supplies and well-stocked shelves for a dozen years now. He is not about to
panic.
8. The current thinking in DOD, as relayed to me by Bob McNamara on a superconfidential basis, points to a gradual and moderate build-up of expenditures and
manpower.
In the closing months of 1965, when the reduction of steel inventories will be holding
down our economic advance, the defense step-up will be small and any influence it has
will be in the right direction.
In the first half of 1966, the impact on output and employment will be more significant.
But it means extra insurance against slowdown or recession during the period (when
payroll taxes will jump)--not a threat of overheating.
9. We are certainly not saying that a Vietnam crisis is just what the doctor ordered for the
American economy in the next 12 months. But, on a coldly objective analysis, the over-all
effects are most likely to be favorable to our prosperity.
10. We were probably heading into a period of a slightly faster creep of wages and
industrial prices without Vietnam. The new uncertainties will probably strengthen that
tendency.
This underscores the importance of Government-wide emphasis on the guideposts.
It also means we should go slow on measures that will raise business costs--like higher
minimum wages.
And we may need to have larger stockpile releases, if commodity markets start to
misbehave.
11. Vietnam will pose fiscal problems in our budget planning for FY 1967.
Added defense outlays will take a chunk of the $7 billion normal year-to-year growth of
tax revenues that we have to use in order to avoid a fiscal drag. The bigger the defense
chunk has to be, the less room for domestic civilian programs or tax cuts.
The uncertainties about defense needs, private demand, and Federal civilian programs
prevent any conclusions as yet. It is now less likely that you will want to recommend a tax
cut next year. But it remains a possibility that shouldn't be ruled out.
Gardner Ackley
102. Editorial Note

On August 1, 1965, Yugoslav President Tito and Indian Prime Minister Shastri issued a
joint communique calling for a suspension of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, while a
conference of interested parties attempted to resolve the Vietnam conflict on the basis of
the 1954 Geneva Agreements. (The New York Times, August 2, 1965) Ambassador
Harriman had met with President Tito at his summer retreat on the island of Vanga on
July 31 and discussed this proposal. Tito indicated that he believed that North Vietnam
was prepared to negotiate, and added that he and Shastri would be consulting with other
non-aligned countries concerning the initiative. Tito felt that with a return to the 1954
Geneva Agreements, South Vietnam could emerge as an independent, democratic republic
which would serve as a buffer against Chinese expansion in the area. (Telegram 479 from
London, August 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam,
Harriman Talks on Vietnam, July and August 1965)
103. Memorandum From the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Lodge) to

President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 3, 1965.
Bundy, Vol. XIII. No classification marking. McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to
the President on August 3, under cover of a memorandum in which he observed:
"Lansdale appears quite ready to take over MACV--and yet he's not all wrong. Can we
afford some creative tension?"
Following is an excerpt from a memorandum to me from Edward Lansdale/2/ in response
to a paper of mine to him on "Solving the 'politico' part of the 'Politico-Military' Vietnam
problem."/3/ It contains ideas of which, I believe, you should be aware:
/2/Lodge selected Lansdale to accompany him to Vietnam to establish a special operating
staff in the Embassy to work on political action programs with the South Vietnamese
Government. Lansdale arrived in Vietnam on August 29 with a hand-picked group of 10
counter-subversion specialists. He was designated as an assistant to Ambassador Lodge
and appointed the U.S. liaison representative on the Central Rural Construction Council,
created on July 30.
/3/Not found.
"'Politico'. Your paper states sound conclusions when it speaks of the need for an
affirmative answer to the threat of Communist-Subversion/Terrorism", the need for good
practical politics in Vietnam, the fact that our other programs even though excellent are no
substitute for a real political program, and the need for underscoring the truth of promises
through actual performance. Personally, I don't see how the Communists can be defeated
without these positive steps. The military can suppress the Communist forces, even keep
them suppressed by continued military action, but cannot defeat them short of genocide
unless our side puts the war on a political footing in Viet Nam.
"The enemy in Vietnam understands thoroughly the political nature of the war he is
waging. The enemy sees his every act as a political act, and uses psychological, military,
and socio-economic weapons to gain his political goals. This is a strict rule the enemy
borrowed from Clausewitz. Lenin, Mao, Ho, and Giap have been clear and firm on this
basic rule. The Viet Cong have obeyed it amazingly well. Our side has broken this rule
over and over again. It is being broken daily right now.
"Thus, when you ask my help to get a Counter-Subversion/Terrorism program moving,
you really are asking me to help you to get our side to start obeying and applying the
prime rule of the war in Vietnam. It isn't separate from the other programs. It is the basis
upon which the war in Vietnam will be won or lost. The psychological, military, and
socio-economic programs are its instruments, not ends in themselves. Political bankruptcy
in Vietnam and the direct use of U.S. combat forces complicate your task vastly. (A U.S.
commander, tasked to attack a suspected enemy position, is going to clobber it first by
bombing or artillery to cut his own U.S. casualties to a minimum when they attack;
casualties of Vietnamese non-combatants must be secondary to his responsibility to his
own command and mission.) I point this out to underscore the fact that something brand
new, perhaps of considerable difference from anything previous, will have to be worked
out in Vietnam to put the war on the essential political footing. It might require heroic
measures, such as moving non-combatants out of Central Vietnam into the far South, to
permit the military threat to be resolved conclusively in Central Vietnam by military
means while non-combatant refugees get a real chance at a new life. Again, this could be
a wrong move. You are going to need some exceptionally expert help to solve this vital
problem; for many reasons, it's your biggest."

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower.
Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Goodpaster.
SUBJECT
Meeting with General Eisenhower, 3 August 1965
1. I met with General Eisenhower for an hour and a half in his office at Gettysburg this
morning. I had arranged the visit with him previously by phone for the purpose of
bringing him up-to-date on the situation and program actions relating to South Viet-Nam.
2. Before I began my remarks he expressed concern over one important aspect of recent
actions. Citing Clausewitz, he pointed out that to every action we take, we must expect the
enemy to take counter-action. It is important to avoid acting by "driblets." If we want to
win, we should not base our action on minimum needs, but should swamp the enemy with
overwhelming force. He recalled that he had previously pointed out that if the enemy has
a battalion on a position and we use two battalions against him, we may take the position
but losses can be high. If instead we use as much as a division we will take the objective
and our losses will be much lower.
3. He said he thought we should avoid using specific numbers in announcing our buildup.
Specifically, he was troubled about the announced figure of 50,000. Instead, he thought
the statement/2/ should have been "sufficient to win."
/2/Reference is to the statement President Johnson made at his July 28 press conference;
see Document 97.
4. I brought out that the figure of 50,000 had been coupled with the kind of statement he
proposed--"additional forces will be needed later and they will be sent," and that in fact
planning and preparatory work is going forward to provide all that General Westmoreland
has asked for at a very rapid rate. He reiterated his view that we do better to avoid specific
numbers which tend to suggest to our enemies that we are limited in our determination.
He would think it better simply to say that SVN within the past year or two has become an
open battle ground of freedom against Communism, and that we will do whatever is
needed to defeat Communism there.
5. He thought that the call for more draftees struck a good note because it showed our
seriousness of purpose. He commented that he had been asked by many people while he
was in Wisconsin, particularly by young people, just what we are going to do about VietNam. He said his answer was that we must win there--we must stop the infiltration, stop
the Communists from cutting South Viet-Nam to pieces, and give the South Vietnamese a
chance to build a free society. He returned to his original point with a statement that this is
no time for "piddling" steps, and that such--in the present situation, in which there has
been an appeal to force--would be our greatest weakness.
6. At this point I reviewed in terms of major units the planned deployments to Viet-Nam
in response to General Westmoreland's request.
7. I next discussed the concept for the employment of the U.S. forces as they close in the
area. Secure bases will be provided at each of the key points selected. There will be an
ample security force (a brigade or more), and normally a major logistics installation, and
major tactical air base capable of general operations. As forces are built up further, they
will be used for reaction operations, to fix and destroy Viet Cong units of battalion or
greater size when they form for attack, and as a general reserve to locate, pin down and
destroy Viet Cong main force units through offensive action, and to attack the Viet Cong
base areas. As forces increase, the emphasis will shift toward offensive action on a
sustained basis to carry the fight without letup to the Viet Cong. Maximum use will be
made of air support, as well as artillery support, in these operations. General Eisenhower
indicated he thought well of this concept of operations. I added that the Vietnamese will
be expected to join in the foregoing operations to a limited degree (commensurate with
their strength), but will particularly be responsible for locating and destroying pockets of
Viet Cong smaller units and for establishing security in the countryside through wider
areas. General Eisenhower thought these operations were of very great importance. He
emphasized that propaganda activities should be intensified, and suggested that we be in
position to extend to any village taken over from the Viet Cong immediate assistance in
the form of food, medicines and the like. Such assistance, to be most effective, should be
given at once.
8. In the course of this discussion I reviewed the general situation in South Viet-Nam,
contrasting the situation observed in the Delta on my recent trip (where a highly capable
corps commander has his troops on the offensive, carrying the fight to the Viet Cong with
considerable effectiveness) with other areas where the Viet Cong encroachment continues,
together with disruption of roads, railroads and all forms of communication.
9. I next commented on operations against North Viet-Nam. I told him consideration is
being given at this moment to the question of expansion of the scope of attack operations
to include attacks on POL, remaining LOC, and possible mining of major harbors. He said
he considered that the selection of targets (speaking of military targets) amounts at this
stage to deciding tactical matters. He thought that this is a matter for the field commander.
It is important to comprehend what war is, and make sure we don't lose effect through
detailed control away from the scene of conflict. He thought it was essential to go after the
POL and the lines of communication, and would mine the harbors without delay, telling
the world to keep shipping out of the area and making clear that there is to be no
sanctuary. If this is not done, we will pay in U.S. casualties in South Viet-Nam. He
emphasized that the way to keep international pressures down, and to save lives is to win
the struggle as quickly as possible.
10. Referring to the surface-to-air missiles, he said that in his judgment we should have hit
them before they became operational. He added that he had understood that we were
going to do this. He said he would urge that we get the SAM's destroyed before they can
be used. He said that, in fact, we should strike quickly whenever we see a new kind of
danger building up, and not wait until it is in use. He commented that, operationally, there
seems to him to be too much of a brake on everything we do. If the North Vietnamese use
their SAM's and anti-aircraft in combination, as they are skillful enough to do, our air
operations will become much more difficult and costly.
11. I then outlined the program for force expansion which the President had approved. I
mentioned that the question whether to rely upon the draft or call up reserves had received
the most searching analysis and careful consideration, culminating in a decision to rely
upon the draft, extend terms of service where permitted, and bring selected reserves to a
higher state of readiness. The net resulting difference between the two methods will not be
large; there might be some limited additional delay in readiness of forces under the
scheme adopted. This would be of significance in case a contingency should occur in
Europe. General Eisenhower said he was not concerned over this point. If we were to
become involved in war in Europe of any substantial proportions, he would not be for
sending large forces into the area, but would be for using every bomb we have.
[Here follows brief discussion of the Dominican Republic.]
13. General Eisenhower's principal suggestion was to recognize that we are at war in VietNam, and not base our action on "minimum needs" or a weak strike program against the
North, but to "swamp them."
G.
Lt. General, U.S.A.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Public Affairs
Policy Committee. Confidential. Prepared by Gordon Chase of the NSC Staff on August
4.
SUBJECT
August 3 Dinner Meeting on the Information Problem
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Cater, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Califano, Mr. Marks, Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Greenfield, Mr.
Jorden, Mr. Leibman, Mr. Cooper, and Mr. Chase
At Mr. Cater's invitation, the group met for dinner at the White House Staff Mess to
discuss the Government's information program in the field of foreign affairs, and
primarily as it pertains to the domestic audience. The discussion generally covered (a) the
nature of the information problem and (b) general and specific ideas and agencies for
meeting the information problem.
1. The Nature of the Information Problem
(a) Mr. Cater said that, with respect to public information, we lack many of the strengths
we once had. We don't seem to have independent validators of policy any more--the
Vandenbergs and the Connollys. We don't seem to have elder statesmen any more-Eisenhower is the exception. We don't seem to have the newscasting we once had--the Ed
Murrows and the Elmer Davises, to quieten us and to give us perspective; instead, the
nature of T.V. is such that we always seem to get our news on a fragmentary basis.
Finally, with the exception of the President, the Government does not seem to have the
spokesmen it once had. Mr. Cater went on to say that our public posture is fragile; we rely
too much on the President and too much on specific facts. There seems to be no basic
understanding of the broader aspects on the part of the American people. And with this
situation, we are extremely vulnerable to rumor, gossip, and quick reverses.
(b) Mr. Greenfield, with specific reference to Vietnam, outlined a number of dimensions
that he sees as part of the information problem. First, we are always meeting the crisis of
the moment. In practice, there is little time to think about the long term or the
philosophical. We only plug holes and run as fast as we can to stay even. Second, we
seem to be obsessed by Vietnam. Foreigners especially believe that the President thinks of
nothing else but Vietnam. This is not a healthy image.
Third, we do not always keep the arithmetic in mind. There are almost 300 accredited
correspondents in Vietnam and we must recognize that we are going to have to live with
some unfortunate stories--e.g., brutality by Americans. Fourth, while our credibility with
the press is improving, we are still not credible enough. We suffer substantial losses when
we are not accurate, and there are plenty of inaccuracies. (Mr. Califano seconded this
point.) Fifth, we do not have the highest quality military spokesmen in Vietnam; they
should be improved. Sixth, we are involved in too many cliches. Some of them are all
right but others may not be; we should re-examine them. For example, we should look
again at "Our country's honor is at stake"; one day we may be sorry that we are tied too
closely to this stand. Another cliche we ought to examine is "Our friends won't trust us if
we desert the Vietnamese"; this one gives us trouble when foreigners say publicly that
they want us out of Vietnam--in effect, pulling the rug out from under us. (Mr. Bundy and
Mr. Cooper differed with Mr. Greenfield at this point; both agreed, however, that we
should make more of foreign statements which support our argument--e.g., Willy Brandt's
reference to the conflict as "our war.")
Seventh, we should probably try to do something about this curious business involving
newsmen who say "the American people don't know what's going on." When asked what
they want, these newsmen say that they want more specific facts (e.g., how many tons of
bombs were dropped); at the same time, they agree, when pressed, that the answer does
not really bear at all on the essence of the Vietnam situation. Maybe this curious
questioning relates to the proposition that the Vietnam war is different from anything
we've seen and that we are all groping for ways to understand it. Mr. Cooper agreed that
part of the information problem does relate to the fact that Vietnam represents a difficult
and brand new type of warfare. While correspondents may not think it is important when
B-52's hit a rice dump, it really is important. In short, we may not know how to fight the
war in Vietnam but the correspondents don't know how to report it either.
(c) Mr. Jorden said that an essential element in our Vietnam information problem is that
the South Vietnamese don't say anything. They don't say why they are fighting or where
they are going. We must get them to state their own case--that what they are doing is
good, just, etc. It would not only help with their own people but with the outside world as
well.
Picking up on this thought, Mr. Cooper said that unfortunately the GVN is shadowy-there is not even a GVN ambassador here. As a matter of fact, for some time we have
been trying in vain to get the GVN to do three relatively simple things--appoint an
ambassador to the U.S.; appoint an information officer to the U.S.; and hire an American
public relations firm to represent the GVN in the U.S. Partly as a result of the GVN's
ineffectual and mushy public information program, the American people do not think we
are really associated with anyone in Vietnam. Mr. Marks seconded this point and noted
that the American people do not really understand that the South Vietnamese have
committed 500,000 people to the struggle.
(d) Mr. Chancellor said that this is indeed a remarkable situation; we are faced with an
entirely different kind of war and there is no participation in the public information field
by the people one would expect to hear from the most--e.g., South Vietnam, North
Vietnam, and the Viet Cong. (Some members of the group noted that the Viet Cong was
indeed very active in the field.) In essence, perhaps we have, for the first time in our
experience, a non-packageable commodity. Perhaps, therefore, we should try to emulate
the 19th century British and try to get a sort of general commitment and support by the
American people rather than a specific commitment and support for Vietnam. The "This is
a long-term proposition--we are a world power and are stuck with this sort of thing"
psychology may in fact bring greater comfort to the American people than the definition
of the struggle as one of sharp confrontation. Mr. Bundy recognized the force in Mr.
Chancellor's argument but added, among other things, that we could never hope for
enough support, in the general sense, to do the job. We must get involved in the specifics
as well. We are faced with a situation of instant transmission of village episodes. The
Communists know this dimension and deal with it effectively; we, too, must cope with
this dimension.
(e) Mr. Leibman said that the American people do not yet really understand how we got
into Vietnam in the first place; they have received only generalities and they need
specifics. Mr. Bundy agreed that there is a problem here, but thought that this particular
piece of exposition might simply not be manageable. Our best posture may be to say
simply that somehow we are there and that we have to stay.
(f) The group noted that the nature of the information problem in Vietnam is changing in
some respects. Mr. Leibman said that the problem will be intensified immeasurably when
the effects of the doubling of the draft are felt. Mr. Chancellor said that the press is just
beginning to get active in Vietnam. With increased staffs, we are going to get fewer
people doing general interpretive work and we are going to get more of the poignant,
Ernie Pyle-type stories. This may help our effort in getting support from the American
people as the war starts to hit them locally. In this regard, Mr. Leibman noted that it may
be useful to consider building local heroes rather than national heroes.
(g) The group discussed the similarities and differences between the Korean War and the
Vietnamese war. Mr. Bundy said that the American people may have more patience than
they did during Korea; twelve years have passed. He noted that people have been saying
for the past several years that the American people would explode if nothing decisive
happened in Vietnam; yet, there has been no explosion. Mr. Cater noted the anomaly of
Korea which, in fact, was a real success story but was never understood as such by the
American people. The job is even tougher in Vietnam.
(h) Mr. Greenfield raised two questions which were largely left unanswered by the group:
What reaction would we like to get from the American people and from foreigners? Why
do people seem to understand that it is necessary to fight over Berlin but not over
Vietnam?
2. Meeting the Information Problem
(a) Mr. Cooper ticked off some of the specific projects that are now under way. First,
there are the "American Friends of Vietnam." While they still have a long way to go, they
have done some good work; they work with students, publish a journal, run a speakers'
bureau and have an elaborate mailing list. While the Government has been helping and
advising this group, we can't get too involved; if it becomes too closely identified with the
U.S. Government, its credibility will be badly affected. Second, we have sent 30 students
to Vietnam. Our follow-up will, of course, be crucial. Third, we have brought some
Vietnamese intellectuals over here. Fourth, we have been providing kits to certain
speakers. There are other projects too.
(b) Mr. Leibman said that the key elements that had been raised are the complexity and
built-in contradiction of policy and the need for perspective and continuity. With regard to
continuity, we should use more effectively the President's experience. Remember that "he
was there" for 30 years. Mr. Leibman went on to say that part of the answer lies in using
the private sector effectively. The private sector is anxious to be used.
Mr. Leibman then went on to describe a number of possible projects that might be
explored. First, perhaps the private sector could brief journalists and editors. There are
plenty of institutions and schools that would be willing and anxious to do the job. Second,
we could put into effect the "That Was the Week That Was" concept to get across the idea
of perspective and "the whole chessboard." Third, we could make use of the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces graduates. Fourth, with respect to high school teachers, there
are three different types of programs that could be used--(a) special summer institutes on
appropriate political subjects; (b) special programs for all teacher attendees at summer
school; (c) year-round programs for teachers as part of in-service training. Fifth, we could
use trade association forums. Mr. Leibman added that these ideas are only illustrative. The
point is that there is a vacuum. If we don't fill it, then it will be filled against us. He went
on to emphasize that the teach-in problem is almost here again and that we should be
ready.
(c) Mr. Greenfield noted that the only thing that makes our present posture swing is that
the people have confidence in the President. Mr. Leibman added that this is one reason
why the President must always be absolutely credible. Mr. Cater interjected that this is
evidence of how fragile our posture is and went on to say that the President should not
have to bear the whole burden of explanation.
(d) Mr. Califano made the point that there was great merit in repetition. The President and
other spokesmen in the Administration should keep repeating the same facts again and
again.
(e) Mr. Cooper noted Mr. Chancellor's point that there will be an increase in coverage of
Vietnam. He went on to suggest that we give serious consideration to educating the
editors so that they know which stories are significant and fit to print.
(f) Mr. Greenfield said that we can only use the private sector effectively if there are
effective Government spokesmen to support. And there are only four people who can give
the Government position effectively--the President, Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy. Mr.
Chancellor said that Bundy is probably not good for the housewife in the back yard;
unfortunately, Bundy appeals to the sophisticated and the sophisticated are already rigid in
their confusion or in their position pro or con the Administration in Vietnam. Only the
other three can do the job that is needed--and, for that matter, McNamara probably less
than Rusk.
(g) The group talked at some length about the problem of coordination of the information
effort. Mr. Leibman, while recognizing the dangers of too much coordination, noted that it
seemed to him that all sorts of people were involved but that no one was clearly carrying
the ball or coordinating the effort. Mr. Califano said that there is a real need for
orchestration on the Government side. Moreover, the only one who can really do the
coordinating job effectively and get the right response from the major players is Bundy or
Moyers. Mr. Cater said that what is needed is a sort of Tsar on the outside--a man with
great prestige, preferably from New York, who could pull together and coordinate on the
private side. Mr. Bundy agreed that there is a coordination problem as well as the everpresent problem of "finding the right man." He went on to say, however, that the private
sector would probably not sit still for a ringmaster. He also suggested that perhaps we do
not want to get so heavily organized either in the Government or in the private sector in
the area of public information./2/
/2/A follow-up meeting was held on August 4. (Memorandum for the record by Chase,
August 4; ibid.) See also Document 117.
GC
Washington, August 4, 1965, 9:30 a.m.
Bundy, Vol. XIII. Confidential.
SUBJECT
British reaction to Goldberg's letter to U Thant
1. You should know that the British have followed up very briskly on Goldberg's letter of
last week to U Thant./2/ Foreign Minister Stewart has sent word to Dean Rusk that the
British, as Chairman of the Security Council this month, feel that they would be seeming
to question our sincerity if they did not press very hard to find ways of having an early
meeting of the Security Council on Vietnam. In presenting this view, the British have also
presented a resolution which would match an end of our bombing against an unpoliced
North Vietnamese undertaking to send no more forces into the South--a notion which is
plainly unacceptable to us./3/
/3/Rusk and British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean met on August 2. The draft resolution
cited here is attached to the memorandum of conversation. (Washington National Records
Center, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: FRC 83 A 57, August 1965)
2. Dean Rusk has given the British a very skillful answer, stressing the need for intense
private consultation before there is any Security Council meeting, and pointing out the
defects in the UK draft resolution. Meanwhile, Yost talked yesterday to U Thant in New
York and found him still adamantly opposed to a Security Council meeting./4/ The
Russians have told him they would have to use such a meeting for violent denunciation of
the U.S. U Thant has said the same thing to the British, and it may be that Stewart will be
cooled off.
/4/Thant said that such a meeting would be "disastrous." (Telegram 236 from USUN,
August 3; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. It is obviously going to be hard for State and Goldberg to keep the right balance
between good sense and a forthcoming posture at the UN, but so far they are doing very
well. It remains to be seen whether Foreign Minister Stewart is really as unhelpful as this
particular demarche suggests. Up till now, he has been our best defender in the UK, but
there is a fishy smell to this one.
McG.B.
107. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol.
XXXVIII, Memos (B), 8/1-12/65. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Another Pause
A New Element
Last night's attack on the POL facility at Danang has introduced a new factor into the
considerations of a pause.
If a pause is to have the desired propaganda and political effect, it must be abundantly
clear that we have voluntarily held back our vast power. While the attack on our POL
storage facilities in Danang will, in fact, have no effect on our capabilities to bomb the
North, the Communists can make a good case that any early pause was merely making a
virtue of necessity. (You will recall that the VC and Hanoi proclaimed that our earlier
pause was dictated by a lack of fuel and the need to repair our planes.) Thus, this
overnight development might detract somewhat from the propaganda effect of an early
pause. But the political signal we will be sending will not necessarily be muted; Moscow,
Hanoi, Peiping and even the VC know that our logistic capabilities in the Far East cannot
be significantly reduced by the destruction of a few POL tanks, and they know that we
have sufficient capability within the 7th Fleet alone to destroy everything of value in
North Vietnam. If they are waiting for a signal, they can still read this one loud and clear.
In any case, a few news stories about our large POL reserves in the area and our
impressive resupply capability, a continuation of our bombings on the North until the
pause, and a heavy bombing program in the South might jointly remove much of the air
from the propaganda balloon.
Timing and Announcement

If we decide on a pause (pros and cons are discussed below), I think we should implement
it soon enough so that it appears to be part of the President's package of July 28,/2/ i.e.,
within a week or so. There are other advantages to doing it sooner rather than later:
/2/See Document 98.
Ambassador Lodge will still be here, and it will be easier to deal with any Communist
responses and U.S. counter-moves on the political/diplomatic front when he is in
Washington. Of lesser importance, but still worth noting, is that a pause prior to
Nkrumah's trip to Hanoi (if, indeed, he decides to go) would give us propaganda points in
Africa; a pause prior to Sukarno's 17th of August speech/3/ might tone him down a little;
a pause at this stage of the disarmament conference might also help the atmosphere at
Geneva.
/3/Sukarno addressed the 20th Anniversary Celebration of Indonesian Independence
August 17 in Djakarta; his address is printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1965, pp. 757-758.
My own view would be to stop the bombing without a prior public announcement, but
with prior confidential discussion with key allies and the USSR. If possible, the DRV and
VC (but not the Chinese--let's keep them stewing on the outside) should be informed
through trusted intermediaries. Obviously, a day or two without bombing will arouse great
curiosity. In answer to queries, we can state that we are testing the atmosphere, following
up on the President's statement, giving Nkrumah a leg up, etc., etc. We should make no
commitments in public or private about the duration of our suspension.
The Pros and Cons
The Case for a Pause:
1. It will continue the momentum toward settlement created by the conciliatory portions
of the President's press conference statement; the fact that a pause is taking place in an
interval of military build-up and after additional sizeable military appropriations should
minimize a possible interpretation of "weakness".
2. It will create, specifically, the most favorable possible climate for Nkrumah's
exploratory trip and should increase the pressure on Hanoi for a more conciliatory
response to Nkrumah.
3. It will ease the mounting domestic pressures on our allies (above all, the Japanese,
whose difficulties are becoming severe, but also the British, Canadians, and Australians).
4. It will meet the persistent objections of friendly unaligned nations and leaders
(primarily U Thant, the Indians, and the Yugoslavs).
5. Even if a pause produces no response, it can increase our own room for maneuver
within our military track by establishing early an understandable pattern of strikes and
pauses; in this regard, each week that passes without a second pause compounds the
significance--and the controversial nature, in the U.S. Government and general public--of
the pause concept itself. We need to de-fuse this issue in order to free our hands.
6. It will improve the atmospherics, although having no effect on the substance, of the
Geneva disarmament talks.
7. It will meet one persistent demand of our domestic critics and waverers.
8. It will further dramatize the good faith of our quest for a negotiated solution.
9. It will permit a more careful testing of Hanoi's interest in negotiations, if any such
inclination exists.
10. It may allow Moscow increased leverage in pressing Hanoi toward negotiations, if any
such inclination is present within the Soviet leadership. At the same time it may develop
strains between Hanoi and Peiping and develop yet additional strains between Moscow
and Peiping.
The Case Against a Pause:
1. It may cause deep apprehensions regarding U.S. determination within the alreadyweakened GVN.
2. An extended pause will permit the DRV to catch its breath, repair damaged
communications, and increase its assistance to the Viet Cong.
3. It will appear to the Communist side an admission of the ineffectiveness of the
bombings and an indication of U.S. desperation for "negotiations now".
4. It will arouse strong criticism among domestic proponents of toughness--particularly
among Republicans who are looking for a way to make capital out of any signs of
Administration softness in Vietnam.
5. It might make a return to air strikes difficult in the context of predictable international
pressures to keep the suspension permanent (although resumption of bombings after the
last pause was not that difficult).
6. It is a move to which such intermediaries as the Yugoslavs wistfully refer, but not with
fierce conviction; it is not a move that the Soviets are pushing with vigor.
On Balance
I favor a pause starting in the next week or so. However, I also think we should give some
urgent attention to what sort of signal from Hanoi or the VC we would regard as
significant. (Surely we don't really expect the DRV to withdraw its Division from South
Vietnam during the period of cessation. On the other hand, we should expect something
meaningful in terms of a drop in the scale of VC military activity or a clarification or
modification of Communist talking terms.) We should also give thought now to the
problem of communication with the other side after the initiation of a pause. None of the
would-be intermediaries (the French, the Algerians, etc.) are entirely trustworthy or
satisfactory for such a serious and delicate task. This raises the inevitable question of
direct U.S. access to the DRV and the VC. We should now identify the best sites and
channels for such direct conversations (this problem will be the subject of a subsequent
memorandum).
C
108. Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Washington, August 5, 1965, 2:45 p.m.
Bundy, Vol. XIII. Secret.
Agenda for the 5:45 Meeting
You have said that the main item on your mind is the Goldberg suggestion of a pause,/2/
but before you come to it, you may wish to have brief reports from Dean Rusk and Bob
McNamara on their testimony and Congressional reaction this week./3/ You may also
want to have a report from General Taylor, as we said yesterday we would. So I suggest
an order somewhat like this:
/3/The texts of Rusk's statement on August 3 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
and McNamara's statement on August 4 before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee were released in Why Vietnam (The White House, 1965).
1. Brief report by Dean Rusk.
2. Brief report by Bob McNamara.
3. Final report by Max Taylor.
4. Discussion led by the President on the possibility of a bombing pause. In this
discussion, the following would be important commentators:
Goldberg--(pro) Arthur can make his own case better than anyone else, if not more
briefly. It is surely important that everyone understand the fact that it is the bombing
which is now the target of international pressure. Some, but not all, of this pressure is
orchestrated from Moscow. Interestingly enough, the bombing is not the centerpiece of
propaganda from Hanoi or Peiping, nor is there any indication from either of these Asian
capitals that a pause in the bombing would have any effect whatever.
McNamara--(con for now) While Bob believes strongly that at some point a substantial
pause may be an important diplomatic card, he would not play the card at a time when it
might be thought to come from weakness. He would prefer a sustained pause at a
somewhat later stage, after we have shown that we can hold our own, and perhaps even
make some money in the South.
Marks--I think Leonard should be asked for comment on the world opinion aspect of this
matter. I do not know his current judgment.
Wheeler--if you call on him--will surely go very hard on the military advantages of
continuous bombing. Even if he does not make the argument explicitly, he will remind
those present that many Americans will find it odd to pause in the bombing that is
supposed to restrict aggression just at the time when we are sending ground forces to take
casualties in resisting that same aggression.
Rusk--(pretty much con) Dean is inclined to think that we ought not to have a pause until
there is some clear signal that it would be matched in some way by the other side. You
may wish to ask him what specific matching action we would find acceptable. We need to
have a more solid opinion on this point than we have now. (My own judgment is that it
will be hard to find a realistic short-term matching action, because such action needs to be
visible and provable in order to be acceptable to us, and the only visible actions are in
South Vietnam, where the people in Hanoi have to maintain that they have no influence.
This is one reason why a long pause at a time of relative U.S. strength seems to me more
sensible than a short one now. From a position of strength, we would not have to insist
upon public and prompt matching action; we could simply let matters develop for a while
with the diplomatic pressure on the other side.)
Just as a checklist, I list the following set of pros and cons:
Pro
1. Pause will sustain peaceful momentum of press conference.
2. Pause will help our allies deal with domestic pressure, especially Japanese.
3. Pause will reassert our flexibility and give us leeway to move up and down in the
future.
4. Pause will please domestic peacemakers.
5. Pause may put some diplomatic pressure on Hanoi, during Nkrumah visit.
Con
1. Pause may arouse apprehension in South Vietnam.
2. Pause will give real military advantage to Hanoi.
3. Pause may seem sign of weakness to the Communists--or even a reward for propaganda
pressure.
4. Pause may be sharply criticized by Republicans and other hardliners.
5. Pause will do no real good diplomatically.

I am afraid this memorandum is not as evenly balanced as I would like, but that defect at
least shows you where I myself come out.
McG.B.

Department of State
Washington, DC
XXXVIII, Memos (B), 8/1-12/65. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Contact with the NLF
This is not an argument for or against contacts with the NLF (although I can't resist the
opportunity to cast an affirmative vote). Rather it is an attempt to explore how best to
make such contacts, on the assumption that a decision is taken to do so.
There are four key questions:
Where should the contact be maintained?
Whom should the USG rely on to undertake such contacts?
How and to what extent should the GVN be cut in?
How can we insure that the contact is legitimate rather than a Communist propaganda
ploy?
The Front Abroad
The Front maintains representatives in Cuba, the UAR, Algeria, Czechoslovakia,
Indonesia, East Germany, China and the USSR. In addition, there appears to be a floating
delegation of uncertain stature in France and some slightly irregular and clandestine
representation in Cambodia. None of the places where the Front maintains an office seems
ideal for discreet contacts, and some of them are patently undesirable. To complicate the
matter further, we know very little about the calibre, status and personality of any of the
individuals in place. It is likely, however, that once we decide on a locus of contact and
once the Front is convinced we are ready for serious talk, the NLF will see to it that their
man is suitable at least from their point of view.
There are several reasons why Algiers, at this moment at least, seems to be the best place
for contact:
The NLF man now in place, Huynh Van Tam, is personally known to some Americans
(see the attached account of Gottlieb's recent conversation with him)./2/
Of all the places where the Front now has representation, Algiers is probably the
"loosest".
Willy, nilly, we may find ourselves (hopefully unofficially) in contact with Their Man in
Algiers. We are still awaiting some word on how (or even if) the VC and the Algerians
want to deliver Hertz. It is clear from my talks with the Algerian Ambassador that
whatever the precise details may be, the essence of the plan will be to exploit the
exchange for at least a propaganda U.S.-VC contact and hopefully for a more substantive
relationship.
The Means of Contact
I assume that whatever direct contact we may wish to maintain should be unofficial, very
low key, and deniable. This obviously eliminates our Embassy and, in my view, the press.
It still leaves three kinds of people: Academic types, Responsible Professional Peaceniks,
and just plain Private Citizens. I will, if you desire, shake up some possible candidates in
the first two categories (Lucien Pye comes immediately to mind in the Academic field,
possibly Gottlieb in the Peacenik area). But I have an inspiration within the 3rd category:
Burke Hertz--who, if we can deliver his brother, on the Algiers track, will have ostensibly
good reasons for an occasional chat; he is an able bright lawyer, a liberal Democrat, and
by now fairly sophisticated in the care and feeding of the Viet Cong. He will need an
interpreter since he doesn't speak French, but I think Bill Colby can find one.
Obviously, whoever is chosen, he will have to be someone who the VC thinks has an
official ear, if not an official voice.
The GVN Problem
It would be prudent to cut the GVN, at least the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, in
on the fact that some American is talking to a Front man (the consequences of it being
leaked to them would be more difficult and delicate to handle than a frank admission at
the outset). We have a tricky path ahead in our relations with Saigon, and we should tie
them to us as we take each step. This is not to say that we have to admit much official
interest or direction to the contacts.
The Propaganda Trap
This is the most difficult aspect of the problem. As far as the Front is concerned, its
purposes may be well served by publicizing the fact of the contact and distorting the
substance of the talks. Perhaps our only protection here is to insure that we can make a
credible case for denying any official sanction or character to the talks. This means that
both the instrument and his channel to U.S. policy makers will have to be ready to be the
patsies.
Chester L. Cooper/3/
110. Summary Notes of the 554th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, August 5, 1965, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top
Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith.
Vietnam
Secretary Rusk: Reported to the President on his recent meeting with the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. For the present, there is good support in the committee.
Secretary McNamara: In both the Senate and the House Committees, there is broad
support, but this support is thin. There is a feeling of uneasiness and frustration. There is
criticism of our allies for not helping more in Vietnam. A minority of committee members
believes we are not bombing targets of value. The Republicans are making political
capital by overstating the effect on the U.S. economy of the cost of the Vietnam war.
General Taylor: The increase in U.S. forces gave a lift to the South Vietnamese. We do
agree with Vietnam on war aims, even though General Ky may state, for domestic
consumption, that he wants to invade the North. The Saigon Government accepts the
principles of the Geneva Accords and is not going to march North. Viet Cong attacks are
slowing down. Saigon does not object to our contacts with the other side, but it would
worry if we stopped our military pressure on Hanoi during any talks.
General Ky is a young man, but he is better than one would imagine. He may mature.
General Thieu is a stabilizing force. He prefers to sit in the background, consequently, he
will not take the post of Prime Minister. The present Saigon Government framework is
solid but the members of the new government are not yet well-known to us. General Ky is
no administrator but he has a strong social conscience.
The present military situation is serious but not desperate. No one knows how much Viet
Cong resilience is still left. The arrival of additional U.S. forces must have convinced
Hanoi that their chance of winning the war is lessening.
No problem has yet arisen as to the U.S.-South Vietnamese command structure. We are
not raising the issue, but are dealing with it on a case-by-case basis.
By the end of 1965, the North Vietnamese offensive will be bloodied and defeated
without having achieved major gains. Hanoi may then decide to change its policy. 1966
could be a decisive year. We should seek to increase the South Vietnamese military forces
and limit the size of U.S. forces.
Political fragility continues in South Vietnam. We hope that the political situation is at
last settling down. Based on recent local elections, a national election held now would not
go to Ho Chi Minh.
The military side of the war in South Vietnam is not overstressed as some allege. Security
must come before a satisfactory political situation can develop.
At the time our combat forces arrived, the morale in South Vietnam was uncertain but
their confidence grew when we began our bombing. This bombing is effective in that it
reminds Hanoi of the increasing cost of the war to them. As to the effect of the bombing
pause, on balance it was neutral--not all good and not all bad.
As to the press, thanks to the press attache, Barry Zorthian, relations with the
correspondents are much better than two years ago. There continue to be a few
irresponsible correspondents who cause trouble and have a desire to express things in the
negative.
The President: We are getting only bad things from the press.
Mr. Zorthian: A minority of the correspondents cause trouble. Unfortunately, they get
more coverage because they work for some of the wire services and some TV networks.
Many foreigners represent U.S. press agencies in Saigon. There is a certain amount of
advocacy and many of the young correspondents have chips on their shoulders. We
should demand that news editors in the United States present a balanced picture in their
news reports. AP reporter Arnett is extremely critical of the entire war effort.
Ambassador Harriman: reported on his recent conversations with Kosygin and Tito:
Mr. Kosygin, who speaks for his government, does not want to get the UN involved in the
Vietnam problem. He says U.S. bombing will not succeed. As to Soviet influence on
Hanoi, he says the Viet Cong are as independent as they say they are.
The Soviets are anxious to avoid war. Their real battle is with the Chinese. They want to
maintain the status quo in Europe and in their relations with us.
Tito believes the Chinese are the danger--not because they are Communists but because
they are nationalists and imperialists. On Vietnam, he offered no proposals as to how to
end the war.
Bromley Smith

Washington, August 6, 1965, 4:45-5 p.m.
Bundy, Vol. XIII. Confidential. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy on August 11.
PRESENT
The President, Foreign Minister Quaison-Sackey, the Ambassador of Ghana, Mr. Bill
Moyers, Mr. McGeorge Bundy
1. The President greeted the Foreign Minister warmly, and took him and the Ambassador
into his small office. He opened the conversation by a friendly reference to the
Ambassador's recent trip to Lake Jackson in Texas. The Ambassador reported that he had
enjoyed the trip very much and that he looked forward to an opportunity to show this
same work on desalinization to the Minister of his Government mainly concerned with
these matters. The President told the Foreign Minister that the Ambassador was going to
be regarded as a citizen of Texas, and then turned to the Foreign Minister attentively and
expectantly.
2. The Foreign Minister said that he brought the President the very warm greetings of
President Nkrumah, and a letter./2/ He handed the letter to the President. The President
joked about the large number of red seals on the letter, produced a pocketknife, opened it
carefully, and read it aloud.
/2/In this August 4 letter, Nkrumah stated that Ho Chi Minh had informed him that he
would not be able to guarantee Nkrumah's safety if he visited Hanoi because of U.S.
bombing of North Vietnam. Nkrumah asked for a pause in the bombing to enable him to
travel to Hanoi to pursue "this fine opportunity directed towards the achievement of a
peaceful settlement in Vietnam." (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 277,
Ghanaian Mission 1965)
3. As soon as he had finished reading the letter, the President gave the Foreign Minister a
categorical assurance that no U.S. military operations would interfere with any visit to
Hanoi by President Nkrumah. The President said (1) we are not bombing Hanoi, (2) we
have not intensified our bombing of North Vietnam, (3) the President will be in no danger,
and (4) who is he kidding? (probably referring to Ho, not Nkrumah). The President
continued that a peaceful settlement would never be blocked because of any action of the
United States. If the aggression ceases, our resistance ceases. Nobody wanted peace more
than the United States, and if the efforts of Ghana could get the aggressors to stop, we
would stop resistance to the aggression. The President repeated that no one needed to be
worried about getting hurt in Hanoi--there was no danger in a visit to Hanoi in search of
peace.
4. The President told the Ghanaians that they knew what he thought--that he thought all
nations should be happy together--that the world should look forward to a time of peace
and progress. The President noted that this had been a great day for progress in the United
States, with the signing of the voting rights bill, and his guests enthusiastically agreed,
saying that they had seen the ceremony on television and been greatly moved by it.
5. The Foreign Minister said that the reason for the letter was the report of the Ghanaian
mission to Hanoi which had experienced some difficulties. It had been given military
escort from Peking to Hanoi in a flight which gave rise to some concern. It had heard the
sounds of guns on many occasions in Hanoi, and it had advised President Nkrumah not to
go to Hanoi at this time. But President Nkrumah wanted very much to go, and he
therefore asked whether bombings could not cease for three or four days. Then perhaps he
could work for a cessation of all hostilities during peace talks. President Nkrumah felt that
he must do all he could for a cease-fire, and this was the explanation for what the Foreign
Minister had come to call "the fever-heat diplomacy" of his sudden visit to Washington.
6. The President replied that he was happy to see the Foreign Minister and repeated that
the Foreign Minister should return to his President and say (1) that we have not bombed
Hanoi and that he need not be frightened, and (2) that if he can get the aggression stopped,
there will be peace overnight.
7. The President repeated again that no one wanted peace more than the United States, but
he said that no one would be allowed to gobble up little countries. We would stay there
and ensure the right of self-determination. We would not run out of there. But the
President said once again that President Nkrumah need not be concerned by the bombs
that had never fallen on Hanoi.
8. The Foreign Minister raised very gently the question whether the President would wish
to receive President Nkrumah either before or after his visit to Hanoi. The President said
he thought we should wait until after President Nkrumah got back from Hanoi, and then
we would see. So far, visitors in Hanoi had produced no hope from the other side. This
matter was left entirely open, but it was made quite plain by omission that the President
did not expect to see President Nkrumah before his visit to Hanoi.
9. The President, in closing, made it very clear that he himself thought the North
Vietnamese suggestion that President Nkrumah would be in danger was a fraud, and the
friendly chuckles of his guests made it appear that they personally did not disagree. It was
agreed that the meeting would not be discussed in detail, but that the Press Secretary
would give a brief summary of the contents of President Nkrumah's message and of the
oral reply which the President had given. The President would send a written reply
promptly,/3/ and it was tentatively agreed that the two letters would be released after the
Foreign Minister had carried the reply back and delivered it to President Nkrumah.
/3/On August 6, Johnson sent a letter to Nkrumah, through the Ghanaian Embassy, which
summarized the points he had made in his conversation with Quaison-Sackey. (Ibid.)
10. With exchanges of further best wishes and expressions of regard and satisfaction, the
meeting ended. The two visitors had clearly been both impressed and pleased by their
reception./4/
/4/On August 12, Nkrumah sent another letter to Johnson in which he explained that his
Foreign Minister had not been privy to all the information that he had received from
Hanoi. The information had encouraged him to feel that there was a good possibility that
he could broker a negotiated settlement of the conflict. He reviewed the North Vietnamese
position, as he understood it, and suggested that he come to Washington to discuss it with
Johnson. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. XIII) Johnson replied on August 13 in a letter in which he encouraged
Nkrumah again to undertake his mission to Hanoi. He stated, however, that he felt a
meeting in Washington was unnecessary until it developed that a firm basis for
negotiations had been established. (Ibid.)
McG.B./5/
112. Editorial Note

On August 6, 1965, the United States established direct contact with North Vietnam
through the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. In response to
suggestions from Mai Van Bo, passed through the French Government in May (see
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume II, Document 313) and through Urah ArkasDuntov of the Dreyfus Fund in July (see Document 98), an authorized but unofficial U.S.
representative was dispatched to Paris to explore with Bo the possibility of negotiations
with North Vietnam. The U.S. representative was retired Ambassador Edmund Gullion,
former Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon. The decision to pursue the negotiating track
was very tightly held, and for reasons of security Gullion was referred to in documents
relating to the Paris contacts as X, and Mai Van Bo was referred to as Rupert. For records
of the four meetings between Gullion and Mai Van Bo, which took place between August
6 and September 1, see Documents 113, 120, 122, and 133. Summaries of this and other
documentation on the Paris contacts are in the unpublished portion of United StatesVietnam Relations, 1945-1967 and are printed in George C. Herring (ed.), The Secret
Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers, pages
77-107.
Initial talking points and overall objectives, as summarized in United States-Vietnam
Relations, were outlined for Gullion before he established contact with Mai Van Bo:
"Initial talking points for X:
"1. These were to be simple and vague, but to set limits in which talks can safely take
place.
"2. X was to show desire for peace, and a free, independent, and unified Vietnam.
"3. X was to say that the prolongation of conflict is bound to lead to progressively larger
US pressures and long-term China control in NVN.
"4. X was to insist that nothing can force the US out. Indeed, X was to say that pressures
in the US to a wider war were growing and that it would be increasingly harder to exercise
restraint.
"5. If R[upert] does not seem receptive to a second meeting, then proceed as follows:
"Theme: US is flexible to some degree. See, for example, the President's press conference
of 28 July.
"a. US ready to discuss the four points.
"b. People of SVN have a right to peace and to determine their own destiny in free
elections in SVN or throughout Vietnam under international supervision.
"c. The four points, in some measure, parallel our own. Are we right in assuming these
points are not stated as the only basis for starting talks and that other points can be
discussed?
"d. The four points mention withdrawal of forces. The US says it will do so once SVN 'is
secure from outside aggression.'
"e. We did not ask SVN to be our ally or to keep US bases there -- although a 'sovereign
government should have the right to call for help if necessary in its own self-defense.'
"f. US is not opposed to unification 'at some future time under democratic processes.'
"Purpose of X's mission:
"Primary--To ascertain whether any serious purpose to negotiate exists and, if so, on what
basis? Secondary--R as possible contact? Third--clarify the four points (prerequisite or
best basis, timing on unification and elections, a settlement in accord with NLF program,
timing on withdrawal). Fourth--Collateral intelligence (DRV attitude on the Indian
proposal, UN, China, NLF, and the possible use of Laos and Cambodia as a gambit for
talks)." (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, page 97)
Regarding the President's press conference of July 28, see Document 98. For text of the
four points outlined on April 8 by Pham Van Dong as a basis for a peace settlement, see
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume II, Document 245; excerpts from his address
before the United National Assembly, during which he set forth the four points, are
printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 852-853. The
Indian and Yugoslav initiative calling for an international conference to resolve the
conflict in Vietnam was advanced in a joint communique on August 1; see Document 102.
113. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, August 6, 1965, 8:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; XYZ. Drafted by Gullion and cleared by Bohlen. See Document 112 for
background information on the "XYZ" contacts.
718. Literally eyes only for Ball from Ambassador. X made contact with Rupert/2/
without intermediaries and had two hour preliminary conversation with him this afternoon
with no others present. Following are principal points:
/2/"X" refers to Edmund Gullion and "Rupert" to Mai Van Bo.
1. Rupert took line similar to that he has used with previous interlocutors. This interesting
to degree that he was aware on basis Rupert's introduction that report would probably go
straight to official quarters. X believes that Rupert's comments to him were made on
instructions.
2. X adhered to script, points 1 through 15,/3/ at which point Rupert obviously ready to
say little until other shoe dropped. Confirmed that situation was as X described it but
problem was what to do about it. His country wanted only peace, had been obliged to
fight against foreign domination for twenty years and had maintained its independence for
thousands of years with only slight interruptions. He did not agree or disagree with X's
direr predictions but appeared depressed by prospects.
/3/Presumably a reference to Gullion's instructions; see Document 112.
3. Before continuing per script and discussing conceivable variants Dong's four points X
asked whether Hanoi ready to consider discussions or negotiations touching not only on
these but also on other points; whether withdrawal of forces was pre-condition of
negotiations or discussions (in which case X judged no chance); what modalities Rupert
could envisage for re-unification; whether and when the UN could be accepted as
"interlocuteur valable"; and if not who would be acceptable. X noted that the "four points"
referred several times to the "zones" of Vietnam, seeming to envisage separation for
longer or shorter time. X also claimed that Peking originally broadcast four points without
the conjoint declaration and always gave Hanoi's position a harder line aspect than Hanoi
did. X did not raise question of representation of Liberation Front.
4. Rupert seemed to see this as getting down to cases, appeared slightly agitated, went to
his office and brought back notes from which he spoke (from instructions?). Re troop
withdrawal he stressed that any "solution" must of course include it, but confirmed that
there would be "modalities" including staging and timing. Even convening of discussions
should stipulate withdrawal as one of objects.
5. As to UN, Rupert said Conference of Geneva was "a valid international instance" and
the accords "a valid base". The Geneva mechanism brought together the interested
countries, which was absolutely necessary to a settlement. Rupert said categorically that
his country rejected any intervention of the UN despite X's suggestion that U Thant or
member states might limit their activities to good offices.
6. With respect to unification Rupert said Geneva Accords themselves provided for
"zones" but accords also recognized Vietnam as constituted by a single people. Rupert
contemplated short or considerably longer interval before reunification but stressed latter
could only be on basis of free decision and consultation between Vietnamese people;
charged that Ngo Dinh Diem backed by U.S. had blocked elections. This couldn't be
allowed to happen again, said Rupert, but he gave no sign that elections had to occur soon.
Pending reunification Rupert said they wanted freer movement between zones, more
trade, etc. (X infers that there are differences possibly existing between north and south
which might influence attitude of north, which would not however drop its insistence on
long term unification and would be confident of achieving it.)
7. Rupert raised question of representation of national front, declared it solely qualified to
represent the south. X merely cited public statements this point by Secretary and
President.
8. Re Pham Van Dong's four points, Rupert betrayed interest in X's allegations concerning
Chinese treatment of them. (Documentation on this would be useful; Rupert also nodded
head once or twice in response to references by X to China in his opening discourse.) He
was, however, much less clear on relation of four points as a package to convening of a
possible conference than he was on other points cited above. (X believes there may be
semantic confusion in Rupert's mind or between Paris and Hanoi, or perhaps more
substantive disagreement between factions of Hanoi Government on this point.) Rupert
said that principles incorporated in the four points "must be recognized as creating the
possibilities for a solution." However, he also called them the only "right base for a
correct solution". X pointed out that Rupert had referred to Geneva Accords and Geneva
Conference as "a" possible machinery or basis, but that he seemed to be stipulating
acceptance of the four points as "the" (i.e., exclusive) base. Rupert finally said there was a
difference between what was required for a discussion (or negotiation) and what was
required for a settlement. There couldn't be a settlement without recognition of the
principles within the four points.
9. Re "interlocuteur valable", Rupert refused to pick up references to either Ghana or
France; or the Commonwealth; he referred solely to Geneva machinery; he also claimed
to be confused by President Johnson's total of fifteen efforts to negotiate and the interest
of some "forty" countries in a settlement./4/ X took occasion review many of these orally.
He observed that Rupert seemed slightly discomfited by particular reference to abortive
Cambodian and Laotian conferences.
/4/In his July 28 press conference, President Johnson stated: "Fifteen efforts have been
made to start these discussions with the help of 40 nations throughout the world, but there
has been no answer." See Document 98.
10. At this point, and speaking from a handwritten text,/5/ Rupert said he wished to ask X,
"who seemed to be in position to know U.S. Government thinking", what its reaction
would be to whole series of questions. X judged best to reply by citing possible variation
on four points which he said had been written only by him but on basis his appreciation of
what might be in minds of his friends in Department; he again stressed this not official but
might help to clarify. Rupert took note of many of these points but X left no text./6/
/6/For text of Sturm's version of the four points, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the
Vietnam War, p. 97.
12. In conclusion, Rupert said his views were those of "Vietnamese Government" taking
occasion to point out X's not necessarily those of U.S. Government. Rupert said his policy
to try to insure understanding his government's views and indicated contacts with X
"could" be continued. When X replied he going out of town Rupert asked when he would
return and suggested Wednesday or Thursday/7/ for possible next contact. He advised
meeting be arranged by leaving note rather than through telephone or intermediaries.
/7/August 11 or 12.
13. General impression: Rupert is serious and appears professionally reliable contact. He
aware that follow-up might be pursued by persons other than X. Latter believes
discussions could be moved or would be moved to negotiating level, if that is desired, in
degree that variations on four points are introduced with increasing degree of official
standing.
14. Time of next meeting with Rupert could be advanced but it will probably take him
several days to hear from his principals./8/
/8/The source text bears no signature. See Document 120 for the record of the next
meeting.
114. Telegram From the National Security Council Executive Secretary (Smith) to
President Johnson, at Camp David, Maryland/1/
XXXVIII, Cables. Secret. Received at 3:55 p.m. There is an indication on the source text
that the President saw the telegram.
CAP 65479. Goldberg's report on his talk in New York yesterday with U.N. Security
Council members:
Goldberg, Plimpton and Yost met for one hour this afternoon with non-permanent
Security Council members Ramani (Malaysia), Velazquez (Uruguay), Aka (Ivory Coast),
Quarles (Netherlands), Scott-Murga (Bolivia), Rifai (Jordan).
Ramani opened meeting by stating US letter to Security Council/2/ placed obligation for
action on members. Vietnam is new subject not on Security Council agenda and letter
cannot simply be filed. Those present therefore would appreciate clarification as to US
intentions and objectives.
Goldberg explained at some length rationale for President's letter to Secretary-General2
and his letter to Security Council, emphasizing our central objective is to bring issue out
of battlefield to negotiating table, welcoming any initiatives by Security Council
members, collectively or individually, but expressing agreement with Secretary-General's
view that Security Council meeting at this time would not be productive. He also stressed
that our letter was seriously meant, was in no sense intended as propaganda maneuver,
was in fulfillment our Charter obligation to keep Security Council informed, was certainly
not designed to put Security Council members on the spot but rather to elicit from them
any initiatives or assistance which may lead to negotiations.
We welcome all efforts, he said, to find way to negotiations and honorable settlement,
including those by Quaison-Sackey, Tito, Shastri, Nasser and other Africans. Most of all
we count on Secretary-General and hope Security Council members will assist him, as
well as taking any independent steps toward mediation and conciliation they may feel
would be constructive.
Rifai was only non-permanent member who commented at some length. He recognized
sincerity of US appeal to Security Council and welcomed it, pointing out he had favored
bringing question to Security Council in April but had gotten no positive reaction then. He
mentioned he is meeting with Secretary-General today. He would not fear polemical
debate in Security Council if something constructive came out of it. He would not,
however, wish to go into Security Council meeting without prior understanding where we
would come out. There is, moreover, no point in Security Council adopting decision if
that decision would not be accepted by interested parties not present in Security Council.
If these parties would not come to Security Council, he believed effort should be made to
obtain their prior acquiescence to action Security Council would take. He hoped to have
further discussion among those present and with others as to what should come out of a
Security Council meeting, such as conditions of settlement, organ that carries out
settlement, etc. Without disregarding outside efforts he would much prefer that the UN,
and in particular, the Security Council find solution in order to strengthen future
peacekeeping. He was aware US appeal to Security Council had aroused interest not only
of this group but of other Security Council and UN members. He closed by saying he
would like to discuss more details later.
Both Velazquez and Quarles asked, if no Security Council meeting were held, what other
action could Security Council take.
Goldberg replied that there is nothing in Charter which limits Security Council action to
meeting and voting. Conciliation and mediation are not excluded from Security Council
jurisdiction. In commenting on Rifai's statement Goldberg said US would of course
welcome Security Council playing important role in solution and that is why appeal to it
had been made.
Velazquez inquired whether US, having in mind Security Council should not meet on this
issue, intends to bring it before General Assembly. Goldberg replied that we still have
some time before General Assembly meets in which to consider that possibility but that,
since Security Council is organ primarily dealing with peace and security it should not be
downgraded by having matter prematurely taken out of its hands.
Aka agreed with Goldberg that it is most desirable to give Secretary-General time and
help in finding solution before resorting to Security Council meeting.
Ramani closed meeting by saying he wished later to discuss other aspects of problem with
Goldberg, having in mind special Malaysian interests because of geographic proximity.
All members expressed appreciation for meeting and for Goldberg's frankness.
It is our impression that these expressions were genuine and that meeting was very useful
even though no concrete proposals emerged.
115. Editorial Note

On August 9, 1965, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum to President Johnson outlining
strategy for Gullion's (X) next meeting in Paris with Mai Van Bo (R), which was
scheduled for August 15. The memorandum, which has not been located in the holdings
of the Johnson Library, is summarized in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967:
"Talking points for next X meeting with R:
"1. Let R do the talking this time and see if there is any give in his position.
"2. Make clear U.S. interest in 'unconditional Geneva Conference.'

"3. Instructions:
"a. Purpose--set stage for formal negotiations if possible.
"b. Seek a no preconditions Geneva Conference and timing thereof.
"c. On NLF--Throw ball in R's court. What would he suggest, recognizing the U.S. view
on negotiations between governments?
"d. Stress that the sole reason for the U.S. presence in SVN is North Vietnamese
infiltration of men and supplies. If infiltration stops, the U.S. will go home. This is a
matter for Hanoi and no one else. Withdrawal of all forces must be the product of
negotiations, not the preliminary.
"e. If R brings up bombing, say that U.S. must view 'suspension or cessation in the
context of adequate reciprocal actions.'
"f. Would R want conference on Vietnam alone, or Vietnam plus Laos and Cambodia?
How would he want the conference convened--by invitation from the co-chairmen,
privately, publicly, or by direct US-Vietnamese means?
"g. U.S. envisages no NLF role as a right in SVN. Is this really a precondition of the
DRV?
"h. Pick up R's suggestion about greater contacts between the zones." (Herring, Secret
Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, page 98)
116. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to

New York, August 9, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIII,
Cables. Secret. Goldberg sent this memorandum to the President on August 9, under cover
of a letter in which he represented it as describing "how I believe a pause in the bombing
of North Vietnam might be utilized in support of a mediation effort to determine whether
we can get Hanoi to start unconditional discussions." He noted that he had also sent copies
of the memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, and he offered to discuss it with the
President at his convenience. (Ibid.)
PAUSE IN U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
The question of another, more extended suspension of US aerial attacks against North
Vietnam deserves urgent consideration. The drawbacks are obvious but the advantages
have perhaps not been fully explored.
If, contrary to present indications, Hanoi should, in response to some of the mediation
efforts now getting under way, indicate a general interest in beginning negotiations in the
near future, another temporary suspension of US bombing might greatly facilitate the
effort to get negotiations started by arming one of the many possible mediators at hand
with convincing proof that the US desire for negotiations is sincere.
The best course would probably be a decision by the United States, in conjunction with a
meaningful mediation effort, along the following lines:
To pause in further air attacks against targets in North Vietnam for the reasonable limited
period of time required to support a reasonable mediation effort to determine whether the
North Vietnamese authorities are prepared to enter into unconditional negotiations for a
peaceful settlement. If there were no appreciable progress within a limited time, we would
resume bombing. We would, of course, exclude an open-ended commitment to halt
bombing indefinitely, as long as negotiations continued; we must avoid repeating our
experience in Korea in this regard.
1. Action in Response to an Appeal. We could make a declaration of this character in
response to an appeal by one of the world leaders now considering Viet Nam initiatives
(e.g., the Secretary General, Tito, Shastri or, less desirably, Nasser or Nkrumah). The
action taken would be separate and distinct from a possible briefer pause in bombing
during a four-day visit to Hanoi by Nkrumah; Quaison-Sackey mentioned the four-day
period to me on Saturday morning./2/
/2/August 7.
If we are to share the credit with anyone (i.e., by responding to an appeal), the best choice
would be the Secretary General. He has urged on us previously an appeal for a cessation
of hostilities; by responding to an appeal from him, we would thereby reaffirm our
support of the UN and tend to keep it in the picture. It would be a logical follow up to
your letter of July 28 asking the SYG to play a role./3/ It would arm him with the means
to probe the other side. This would facilitate a subsequent move on our part to involve the
UN in the role of supervising or policing a negotiated settlement. Rejection by Hanoi of
an appeal from the Secretary General would do more damage to the Communists'
international position than would their rejection of a unilateral US declaration.
2. Private Message. An alternative to responding to an outside appeal would be a private
message to Hanoi indicating that we would stop bombing for a reasonable period if it is
prepared to enter into unconditional negotiations for a peaceful settlement. While a private
message would deprive us at the outset of public credit for an important peace initiative,
our initiative would ultimately become public knowledge, whether or not it had
succeeded. Hanoi might find it easier to respond affirmatively to such a private message
than to an appeal from, say, the Secretary General. It would not require Hanoi to respond
publicly--and any public response would entail Hanoi's eating a certain amount of crow in
the eyes of its domestic and foreign audiences; rather, it could respond through private,
concrete actions which would demonstrate its desire to move toward negotiations.
Whether it is decided to implement a limited pause in air strikes through a third-party
intermediary or a direct private message to Hanoi, it will be necessary to emphasize the

following points:
That the pause is a genuine effort to facilitate negotiations and reduce the dangers of
escalation;
That a response must come from Hanoi within a reasonable time;
That we are ready to discuss a general cease-fire involving mutual concessions as a first
item in the negotiations;
But that we are serious in our intention to resume the aerial attacks if there is no
forthcoming response from Hanoi.

Washington, August 10, 1965, 5:30-6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Public Affairs
Policy Committee. Confidential. The meeting was held in Moyers' office. The source text
bears no drafting information.
PARTICIPANTS
White House-Bill Moyers
Chester Cooper
Defense-Arthur Sylvester
Orville Splitt
USIA-John Chancellor
Barry Zorthian
State-James L. Greenfield
William J. Jorden
Abba Schwartz
Leonard Meeker
Frank Sieverts
Mr. Moyers opened the discussion by reviewing previous meetings on Viet-Nam
information problems./2/ He said the President gives this subject very high priority and
wants to do what is right. He noted that Barry Zorthian will be given a new position in the
Embassy with responsibility for press and information matters, thus removing USIA from
the direct line of authority over military news in Viet-Nam./3/ He was looking for ideas of
other specific, practical things that could be done to improve public understanding of
events in Southeast Asia.
/3/In a telephone conversation with Rusk on August 9, Califano indicated that the
President wanted to make Zorthian the Ambassador's Special Assistant for Public Affairs,
and bring under him anyone dealing with public affairs in Vietnam. The President's idea
was to have Zorthian put out all the news. He felt that this would increase Zorthian's
prestige with the public and the press, and make him the Bill Moyers of Saigon.
(Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
Mr. Greenfield said that the news reports of U.S. soldiers setting fire to Vietnamese
villages and related incidents are causing very serious problems here and abroad. We have
to recognize that there exists a double standard, that such incidents are considered more
serious if Americans, rather than South Vietnamese, are responsible. In view of the
extensive press and media coverage in Viet-Nam stories and pictures like these will
continue to appear as long as the incidents occur. Alleged maltreatment of Vietnamese
civilians and civilian facilities is a moral and humanitarian concern for many Americans.
We must recognize this as a serious, long-run problem.
Mr. Chancellor referred to previous meetings in which the importance of making the
American people aware of the changing character of war was stressed. The new kind of
"twilight" war we are fighting in Viet-Nam requires more maturity, sophistication, and
patience from the American people than previous wars. He said we need to find ways to
build the necessary understanding of our involvement in Viet-Nam, an involvement that
may well be repeated elsewhere in the years to come. Simple aggressive patriotism wasn't
enough. You can't just "kill Japs" in a war like this one. We should work on editors and
other opinion-influencers to show them that the habits of mind left over from World War
II and Korea are not adequate for understanding this war.
Mr. Sylvester stressed the problem of unfriendly correspondents in Viet-Nam, particularly
foreigners, including some who work for U.S. news agencies and media. Some of these
individuals are known to be less than fully sympathetic with our efforts and appear to miss
no chance to embarrass us. The present concern about the village burned near Da Nang
arose largely out of a CBS-TV film made and narrated by Morley Safer, a Canadian
subject. The incident depicted in the film was not typical, so even if it was not staged (a
possibility he did not rule out) it was a distortion since it conveyed an inaccurate
impression. He noted that some reporters fail to tell the full story when they depict U.S.
forces in action. They don't give equal time to the facts of Viet Cong atrocities, and they
fail to point out that villages burned are Viet Cong strongholds, and that "civilians" who
appear to be maltreated are Viet Cong personnel who may have killed U.S. or GVN
forces.
Mr. Sylvester also said he thought it was important to take steps to inform our personnel
of the press problem stemming from such pictures and stories, so that they don't lend
themselves to this kind of coverage in the course of carrying out their missions. He said
there was a need to provide better information officers in Viet-Nam. As one step in that
direction he was considering sending his Special Assistant for Viet-Nam Col. Rodger
Bankson as over-all coordinator of military information, with rank of Brigadier General.
Mr. Greenfield said we couldn't pull a curtain on the problem. There were too many
reporters covering this war. It isn't just a problem of a few bad apples. We have to get
used to fighting in the open. This is a new kind of war, a war in which the basic goal is
people, not territory. You can't win the people in Viet-Nam by burning their villages. This
may have worked at Iwo Jima, but it won't work in Viet-Nam. We have to take steps to
prevent these things from happening, not just to make sure reporters don't see them.
Mr. Meeker said the International Committee of the Red Cross was about to enter the
picture. The Secretary of State and the Vietnamese Government were about to send letters
indicating that the United States and South Viet-Nam would cooperate with the ICRC.
The ICRC will want to take an active role in Viet-Nam. Therefore we should:
1. Instruct our troops in the field to conduct themselves in conformity with the Geneva
convention and accepted standards of warfare (without hampering their efforts to
prosecute the war); and
2. Publicly demonstrate our concern that the rules of war be observed in Viet-Nam. This
should be accomplished by publicizing our willingness to cooperate with the Red Cross,
and the Viet Cong-North Viet-Nam unwillingness to do likewise. We should call on the
other side to mark their hospitals, permit inspection of prison camps, etc. We should also
publicize directives and guidelines given to our troops in the field.
Mr. Cooper said we were dealing with a deeply important problem that goes beyond
public relations. At issue here is how the war should be fought. We should examine
carefully the usefulness of such actions as bombing raids by the VNAF and our own
planes against Vietnamese villages. Our object is not so much to destroy an enemy as to
win a people. We must make sure our military operations are in fact productive. If burning
a village provides the VC with a hundred additional recruits then that action is
counterproductive in basic military terms. He agreed that this is a difficult war to fight,
but that is no reason not to deal with these incidents as a problem in and of themselves.
Mr. Cooper also asked about the Vietnamese interpreters who assist U.S. and foreign
correspondents. Is there any way of checking to make sure they aren't slanting their advice
in favor of the Viet Cong. Could the Ministry of Information run careful checks on these
interpreters?
Mr. Zorthian said the interpreters were accredited by MACV after a check by the GVN,
but such procedures don't mean much in Saigon.
Mr. Moyers said he was considering meeting with the heads of the major wire services, to
discuss the nature of the war and ask for a balanced view of it. We would suggest that
they assign better, more mature reporters, preferably U.S. nationals. Such an approach had
obvious risks but was worth considering. It might also be worth approaching editors and
columnists in a similar vein. He hoped the series of backgrounders for editors and top
media people Ambassador Taylor was undertaking in major cities at the President's
request would help.
Mr. Zorthian said better military information personnel were essential. He hoped the
marines would get a good one not just someone who saw his job as promoting the
leatherneck image. As for the village burning problem, it might be best to have orders
issued that no villages should be attacked except under very exceptional circumstances.
Also, better Vietnamese liaison personnel should be attached to U.S. units in the field.
Mr. Zorthian raised the question of censorship. The present system of voluntary
cooperation is working fairly well. But some high officials favor full field censorship.
Mr. Greenfield pointed out that no system of censorship would prevent stories like the
village burning or the CBS-TV film. Censorship dealt with questions of military security,
not public relations. He suspected some of those who favor censorship saw it as a way to
prevent these inconvenient stories. But it would not work that way.
Mr. Moyers asked that memoranda be prepared for the President setting forth what should
be done in Saigon and in Washington that we are not now doing to deal with these
problems. They should be completed by COB Friday.
118. Memorandum From the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Lodge) to

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower.
Confidential. There is an indication on the source text that Johnson saw the memorandum.
1. Spent one-half hour with General Eisenhower as you requested.
2. He opposes "dribbling" forces into Viet Nam little by little and favors using adequate
forces at once to do the job. He opposes American troops "living in the jungle" saying
"we don't know how to live there". He approves development of strong points along the
coast. He wants no formal announcements of total U.S. troop strength. Such
announcements give the Viet Cong a pretext to raise their demands on Hanoi, Peking and
Moscow. I understand all the above has been conveyed to you already by General
Goodpaster./2/
3. He stressed the overriding importance of Viet Nam wanting to be free. We should do
everything to inculcate such a desire. They must have "heart" or, after we have achieved a
successful outcome, they will slump right back. It would be tragic if a successful outcome
were followed by an election in which the people voted for the Viet Cong. I told him our
plans regarding Lansdale were aimed precisely at such a contingency. He suggested a
scheme whereby there would be immediate delivery, "using old C-47's", to small
communities of rice, fish, medicines, or other morale boosting goods to be flown in
promptly for distribution by local chiefs. I told him we had this in mind and that I
believed AID was set to make such local distribution./3/
/3/Goodpaster briefed Eisenhower again on August 20, at President Johnson's request.
Goodpaster reviewed military developments in Vietnam and stressed the continuity of
Vietnam policy from the Eisenhower to Johnson administration. (Memorandum for the
record, August 20; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam,
Eisenhower Briefing)
H.C. Lodge
119. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, August 12, 1965, 5:22 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis.
342. For the Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg. Vietnam. I believe we should respond
in a forthcoming and constructive way to the SYG's proposals contained in memo on
Vietnam he handed me today./2/
/2/The text of this memorandum, which was also conveyed to the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, France, Canada, India, Poland, China, North Vietnam, and South
Vietnam, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 340 from USUN, August
12. (Ibid.)
Memo states objective as a settlement based on a "return to the essentials of the 1954
Geneva Agreements". Within this framework SYG suggests two propositions as a basis
for settlement: (1) military neutralization of Vietnam involving withdrawal of all foreign
troops; and (2) elections under international supervision as established in the Geneva
Agreements (we assume this means ICC machinery which would hardly be an effective
instrumentality) as a basis for possible reunification at a later stage.
SYG suggests we conduct private explorations "on his personal responsibility" (this is the
same distinction Hammarskjold made between his position as SYG and he as a person
when he undertook his trip to Peking to free the American fliers)/3/ in order to probe
detailed positions of respective parties. He envisages these private dialogues as a
preliminary step toward convening a Geneva conf, at which point Saigon and reps of the
NLF would participate.
/3/For documentation on Hammarskjold's mission to Peking, January 5-10, 1955, see
Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. II, Dag
Hammarskjold, 1953-1956, pp. 415-459.
He also proposes a cessation of all military operations by all sides, as an undertaking prior
to the formal convening of the Geneva conf. He suggests that either a public appeal by
himself or private probes by himself or others might be a way to determine whether a
cease-fire could be achieved.
While SYG's memo will have to be studied in Dept with great care, it offers us
opportunity to respond positively, consistent with the Pres's call for unconditional
discussion, and to encourage SYG to continue his informal explorations./4/ It will be
further evidence of our willingness to seriously engage the UN in the Vietnam matter.
While Hanoi and Peking may continue to react negatively to the SYG's involvement,
memo might at least provide handle for Sovs to become more active in dialogue with us
through the SYG as well as with Hanoi and Peking.
/4/Goldberg telephoned Rusk at 1:34 p.m. on August 12. He summarized Thant's
memorandum and told Rusk that U.S. allies at the United Nations felt that the U.S. appeal
for Security Council action held out better prospects for success. He added that he was
returning to Washington that evening and would brief Rusk at greater length on the
initiative on the following day. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Conversations)
I hope therefore Dept can arm me with short letter or memo to give to SYG promptly
which makes whatever limited reservations we feel we need to make on certain
substantive points, but placing primary emphasis on getting SYG to press informally for
clarification from the other side on what the component elements of the de facto cease-fire
would include./5/
/5/In telegram 250 to USUN, August 13, 10:53 p.m., Rusk sent a copy of a message sent
to the President at the LBJ Ranch summarizing Thant's initiative. In the message to the
President, the Department proposed returning a generally encouraging reply to the
Secretary-General and stating that "we believe it would be highly desirable for you to
send a personal message to the Secretary-General--purely procedural in nature-encouraging him to continue his private explorations and assuring him of US
cooperation." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Goldberg

Department of State
Washington, DC

Paris, August 13, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Nodis;
XYZ. The source text is a copy that was enclosed in a letter from Springsteen to McBride,
November 3, together with copies of telegrams reporting on Gullion's ("X") meetings with
Mai Van Bo ("Rupert") on August 18 and September 1. The copies do not include
telegram numbers or times of transmission or receipt. Springsteen transmitted these copies
and other documents to McBride at the request of Sturm ("Y") so that they would be
available to Sturm in Paris. In United States-Vietnam Relations, the meeting described in
this telegram is incorrectly dated August 15. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam
War, p. 100)
Literally eyes only for Ball. In one and one-half hour conversation with X this afternoon
Rupert was rigid, even retrograde, in comparison with first meeting. This possibly tactics
and possibly connected with appearance Ho Chi Minh interview. X considers it useful to
hold third talk if only for purposes of record and to allow for any changes of position
which may yet occur in interval. However, if more flexibility is not then manifested X
believes his mission should be suspended.
1. X began by reading from Paris papers/2/ and Reston's recent columns certain references
to growing pressures upon President for drastic and conclusive military action. Rupert
replied mildly that his government understood "lobbies and pressure groups" in America
but it was not these which would decide the issue of war.
2. X asked if Rupert had developed any thoughts since last meeting, particularly with
respect to X's version of four points/3/ which were undoubtedly pretty close to position of
U.S. Government leaders. Rupert had indeed reflected and wished to know "what U.S.
thought of Pham van Dong's four points". X said he thought this had been covered but he
reviewed position, as per earlier report. Rupert then stated that X's version did not
constitute the basis for a correct solution.
/3/See Document 113. For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97.
3. At this point (and at least three times thereafter) X tried to pin Rupert down on whether
Hanoi's points had to be accepted in toto before conference could be convened. Rupert
was more negative than at previous meeting. He assured X that his principals understood
point U.S. trying to clarify but that Hanoi's four points had to be taken as "base." Despite
this statement Rupert could not be brought to say categorically one thing or the other with
respect to whether or to what extent substance of Hanoi's points had to be stipulated or
accepted in advance of the meeting.
4. Rupert said his government believed a "conference of the Geneva type" should be held;
whether it should be convened sooner or later depended upon the Americans. X replied
that his friends also thought a conference of the Geneva type was desirable if it could be
held without pre-conditions. Such a conference he said might deal with Vietnam or with a
general examination of conditions under the Geneva and subsequent accords, or with
Laos, or with Cambodia. Impression in U.S. was that Cambodian conference project/4/
aborted because of Hanoi/Peking insistence on FNL as representative of South Vietnam.
Rupert asserted Hanoi had not taken this position but had merely gone along with Prince
Sihanouk's insistence on FNL. X urged Rupert to check record and said his recollection
was that Sihanouk had altered his attitude ending with willingness to see SVN represented
by Saigon or by FNL or both and in a variety of combinations. Anyway, X continued, if
the Cambodian setting created difficulty conference could be related to other subjects.
Rupert had no reply to this but switched to question of FNL.
/4/Reference is to the March 15 Cambodian proposal to reconvene the Geneva Conference
of 1954 to consider the question of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. See
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 715-716.
5. Hanoi had noted President Johnson's reference to some formula for meeting with
FNL/5/ but it was up to U.S. to give concrete details. FNL, Rupert said, bore brunt of
struggle, controlled four-fifths of the territory, was suffering "massacres and destruction"
while whole world knew Saigon Government represented nothing. X observed that Saigon
also had carried on fight for twenty years, its soldiers now fighting and dying, and
hundred of thousands of refugees were fleeing Hanoi-controlled regions. Discussion on
this point, however, said X, was sterile. Rupert and he should set themselves task of
exploring possibility of convening useful meeting. What for example, were obstacles
which Rupert saw to such a meeting?
/5/In his July 28 press conference, President Johnson stated that the Viet Cong "would
have no difficulty being represented" in negotiations "if Hanoi for a moment decides she
wants to cease aggression." See Document 97.
6. Rupert again signally failed to cite U.S. bombing as an obstacle; he did say that U.S.
must leave Vietnam alone to work out its destiny without interference; claimed that
President Johnson recently said U.S. must remain in Vietnam and could never leave it,
which X vigorously denied. In response Rupert's query what U.S. objectives in Vietnam
were, X emphasized again that they were those stipulated in Geneva Accords. He also
cited his version of Hanoi's four points, particularly numbers three and four, to stress U.S.
desire to see self-determination and unification of Vietnam; he emphasized that if there
were no North Vietnamese troops or arms in Hanoi U.S. ready to put its policies to the test
(i.e., self-determination by Vietnamese and possible non-alignment), and would be ready
to begin withdrawals. He said these would have to be phased and balanced with pullback
of North Vietnamese. Rupert indicated agreement with idea of balance and verification.
He asked if this was what X had meant by "redeploiement" in his version of four points.
He then claimed that "these accusations" of North Vietnamese activity in Vietnam were
only recent whereas U.S. had begun to sabotage the situation as far back as '54 with the
Ngo Dinh Diem operation and sending advisers. X replied that there were other forms of
interference, including intimidation, subversion, terrorism, Chinese influence. To latter
Rupert countered that Vietnam had defended its independence for thousands of years and
X need not worry.
7. At this point X remarked discussion so far provided little prospect for constructive
work. He reviewed his understanding of Rupert's position, which he said was apparently
more negative than previously. He reiterated that his friends in U.S. would be ready for
Geneva-type conference which would certainly take Pham van Dong's program as point of
departure; provided this conference were without pre-condition or ultimata. After all we
were not in position of French after Dien Bien Phu and in fact possessed fantastic strength
we hoped not to use. Hanoi surely could not expect U.S. to accept a conference which
stipulated prior acceptance of its points, or which was to be preceded by U.S. troop
withdrawals or which obliged us to desert our allies by setting up FNL as sole negotiator.
X thought his version of four points if picked up by U.S., as it well might be, represented
a very forthcoming effort. He asked again whether Rupert had carefully noted these and
whether they had been under study (mis a l'etude). Rupert confirmed that they had.
8. At this point Rupert meaningfully asked whether X had seen declaration by Ho Chi
Minh in today's Le Monde in response to written questions from Philippe Devillers./6/ (X
had not and it would have been hardly possible for him to have done so since paper was
only just reaching subscribers at time of interview. It is possibly significant that X had
seen Devillers shortly before leaving U.S.) Ho Chi Minh's declaration, said Rupert,
represented his government's position and my answer to X. (Timing and Rupert's manner
implied possible connection between release of Ho Chi Minh's statement at this time and
conversations between Rupert and X.)
/6/Ho Chi Minh's responses to Devillers' questions appeared in an issue of Le Monde
apparently distributed on the afternoon of August 13. In its August 14 issue, The New
York Times carried an article datelined Paris, August 13, stating that the interview was
published "today in Le Monde." The text of the interview was broadcast in English over
Hanoi radio on August 15. Ho Chi Minh stated that the "U.S. Government must give
tangible proofs that it accepts the four-point stand of the Government of the DRV." For
text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 99.
9. X asked if it might not be possible for Rupert and him to come to grips with semantics
and problem of agenda by envisioning terms in which an initiative on conference might be
announced, e.g., ". . . in order to secure and preserve fundamental right of Vietnamese
people, etc., as affirmed in Geneva Accords a meeting of Geneva conferees to be held
which would take up Pham van Dong's four points and other propositions." Rupert
nodded agreement to first part of phrase, disagreement to its ending.
10. Finally, X professed himself discouraged and puzzled at Rupert's greater rigidity. He
hoped history would not record that he and Rupert had failed in their duty to seize present
opportunity. Said he was not offering any threats but begged Rupert to reflect on
devastation which might be unleashed if war escalated. No one who had not seen U.S.
power could imagine its full potential. To avert this his friends in U.S. earnestly desired to
move the confrontation from the battlefield to the diplomatic table.
11. X said he must now begin to doubt utility of continuing conversations but probably
should be one more contact before he obliged to return home. In one of very few positive
developments Rupert was eager to have a further meeting in case he said there should be
"some change in the points of confrontation". X said he must return home Tuesday or
Wednesday./7/ Rupert is moving out of his flat but said he would inform X where next
meeting should be held.
/7/August 17 or 18.
12. General impressions and recommendations:
(a) Despite negative atmosphere, it could be that stiffening of Rupert's attitude was the
obvious thing for him to do tactically. Also whole meeting was held under shadow of Ho
Chi Minh's declaration.
(b) X believes he went about as far as it is possible to go, without giving impression of
U.S. weakness, in exhibiting U.S. readiness to negotiate under various formulae and in
various combinations. He established beyond doubt that the alternate version of Hanoi's
four points had been studied and rejected by Hanoi. It is still too early to say, however,
that this rejection is final.
(c) Points on which there seem to be some flexibility on part of Hanoi are with respect to
troop withdrawals and FNL representation. (X believes Rupert himself would envision
ancillary negotiating role for FNL; he inquired how U.S. had dealt with Red China at
international conferences.) Less flexibility than before shown on agenda for conference
but this may reflect impact of Ho Chi Minh's declaration.
(d) Before next meeting may be desirable to have: (1) statement of X's friends' position on
Ho's declaration, especially in relation to Rupert talks; (2) any further version of four
points; (3) a brief formulation X might use as his suggestion along lines of 9 above. This
would have virtue of eliminating semantic confusion as source of division, smoking out
Viets and making the record of U.S. attitude unmistakable./8/
/8/The source text bears no signature.

Saigon, August 17, 1965.
a.m.
505. For the President.
1. Probably the most important political development of the week was an interview with
Buddhist bonze, Tri Quang, in a Hong Kong paper denouncing the Directory government
in general and General Thieu in particular. On the military front, the most notable
development was that the MACV estimate of VC losses (1,330 killed in action) was the
highest since the war began here.
2. The Hong Kong Far Eastern Economic Review interview with Tri Quang quoted him as
having said "the people" were against the government and he was also against the
government, as well as saying that he hoped the war could be stopped as soon as possible
by a cease fire or "by any negotiations which would have the peoples' support". He was
also quoted as saying that a small country like Vietnam could rely only on itself and
"certainly on no outsider". Tri Quang may claim to have been misquoted as he did
following an earlier interview with the same correspondent, but the sentiments attributed
to him with respect to the government are consistent with what he has recently been
telling Embassy officers. It is harder to interpret his enigmatic remarks with respect to the
war. Not many weeks ago, he was privately telling visitors that we should pursue the war
more vigorously, bombing the north harder and even taking on the Chinese Communists.
Thus, I do not think that we should conclude that he is swinging toward "neutralism", that
is, negotiations with the Liberation Front for a coalition government. It is also too early to
say what form his opposition to the government may take. A few days ago, he told us that
he had discouraged the forming of demonstrations in Hue having anti-government
character.
3. Ky and his party took off for Taipei early Sunday morning,/2/ will be going directly
from there to Bangkok, and returning here next Saturday or Sunday. I had a good talk
with him before he left, both on his trip and some other matters including the "Chieu Hoi"
program, treatment of prisoners taken in combat and land reform. I do not feel that the
substance of what he does in Taipei will cause us any problem but, given his propensity
for flamboyant statements, I will not make the same prediction for what he says publicly.
/2/August 15.
4. Our people in the field feel that there has been some improvement in popular attitudes
as a result of the recent military successes and that popular aversion to the VC continues
somewhat to increase although this does not necessarily translate itself into active
commitment to or support for the GVN.
5. On the military side, not only were the VC losses highest ever but the ratio to friendly
troops killed (214) was a little better than six to one. The other indicators were also good
with more VC and VC weapons captured than government troops missing in action and
government weapons lost. The VC also continued to avoid initiating any actions by major
units although they kept up their heavy harassment of villages and outposts. The
government made a little progress in clearing lines of communication.
6. On the economic side, negotiations with the government on the US currency "black
mart" problem made good progress, and we hope that we can have this tied up in the next
few days. The rice imports from Thailand appear to have met our immediate needs and
should hold the situation until the arrival of additional PL-480 rice./3/
/3/On a copy of this telegram retyped for President Johnson, the President wrote: "Mc-Let's rush him plenty of rice now." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, Vol. XXXIX, Memos)
Johnson

Paris, August 18, 1965.
XYZ. The source text is a copy that does not bear a telegram number or a time of
transmission or receipt. For additional information, see the source note, Document 120.
Literally eyes only for Ball. Today's two hour session with Rupert most positive so far. In
principal developments Rupert (a) revealed possible Viet fall back positions from recent
Ho Chi Minh declaration;/2/ (b) pinpointed halt of U.S. bombing as principal "tangible
evidence" of acceptance in principle of Hanoi's four points; (c) queried meaning (i.e.,
chiefly editorial and translation) of X's four points,/3/ indication serious consideration; (d)
stressed desirability further meeting. X believes necessary he return at this time to
inventory talks in relation to developments and other indices Hanoi attitudes and discuss
next steps.
/3/See Document 113. For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97.
1. Rupert telephoned yesterday to fix today's meeting. At previous session he had
indicated utility of talks and said that even if X were to leave now but "should pass again
through Paris" it would be useful to consult.
2. He opened by asking whether X had studied Ho Chi Minh's declaration. X desired
clarification on number of points. First was date of Ho/Devillers interview which he
assumed was on basis written questions. Rupert confirmed and said date was to be taken
as that of appearance in Le Monde (i.e., August 14) and that answers "had only arrived
from Hanoi evening before". (X believes his friends correct in assuming interview was
planted answer to him, which also implies indeterminate amount of French help in stage
managing.) X said he discouraged by negative tone of statements and Rupert jested that X
always seemed discouraged.
3. X noted that neither questions nor replies had made any reference to statement
accompanying original four points re "most correct basis for political solution"./4/ With
uneasiness Rupert asserted Hanoi position still the same. He then linked "recognition of
this basis" to "tangible proofs" required by Ho Chi Minh in latest declaration. These, he
said, included in the first instance a suspension of bombing but he also referred to
withdrawal of troops and halting U.S. "aggression". (Re latter term X indicated that it
would be better in these discussions if terms like "enemy", "aggression", etc., were
abjured.) Rupert expatiated at some length on the bombing and worldwide condemnation
of it. (X got some impression VC and DRV being hurt.) Promising to return to this point,
X/5/ proceeded to review Ho declaration from beginning.
/4/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 852-853.
/5/On the source text the word "Rupert" is crossed out and "X" written above it.
4. Re point number one, Rupert was less categoric than Ho. He claimed that "realistically"
only FLN, which was carrying on fight, was suited to speak for South. Whole world knew
it was representative but Saigon was not. X disagreed and said it was "not realistic" to
expect the most powerful nation in the world to go into negotiations at price of
abandoning allies, accepting Hanoi fiat on agenda, and pulling all its troops out. In
subsequent discussion X got strong impression Rupert and even Hanoi ready to accept
some other formula for SVN representation but wishes to prod U.S. into putting it
forward. Rupert alleged France had finally been obliged to accept FLN as sole negotiating
agent in Algeria. He did not knock down idea that agreement on formula for
representation could be accepted if other obstacles were removed. He did ask just what
formula U.S. would imagine. Rupert referred to previous statements of U.S. Government
leaders.
5. Re second question of Ho declaration, X judges significant Rupert's confirmation that
unification could wait quite some time. X insisted this depended on will of the people and
asked what Ho meant by mention of program of front in this connection. Rupert said FLN
recognized that unification would come "by stages" and on basis of popular consultation.
Hanoi agreed. Rupert insisted on word "stages". He even said that "there might be people
in the south" (or just people) "who might not want unification" and in this case "Hanoi
prepared to wait" until they did! Re mechanism for controlling elections, supervision, etc.,
Rupert made no substantive objection to hypothetical projections made by X.
6. Re point three, X asked what Rupert considered "proofs" to be. When latter again came
forth with cessation of bombing Rupert/6/ replied in preconceived terms that such a
gesture had been made once before with no result or counterpart. It was conceivable that
such a gesture might be repeated but it was not conceivable that it could be unilateral.
Surely Rupert could not expect the U.S. in Saigon or the Saigon Government to negotiate
under terrorism and while 325th Division roamed the country. Terrorist acts only
weakened Hanoi's case with those who might be disposed to sympathize. Since X said he
and Rupert agreed to place their discussions under "sign of realism" it surely was
"unrealistic" to pretend that Hanoi did not have units in the country. (Whereat Rupert
laughed heartily.) Rupert then became very serious, appeared on the point of making a
reply but decided to withhold it. It was entirely obvious that suspension of bombing has
now re-emerged as key objective of Viets (as also confirmed in Para 10 infra). Rupert
showed X an extract with a Washington byline from a French press digest7 to effect that
Department of State spokesman had said that contacts with Hanoi had turned up nothing
significant and then referring to an Aide-Memoire Department was supposed to have
circulated to a number of governments explaining terms on which U.S. would again
suspend bombing./7/ Rupert asked if X knew of such a memorandum. X said he had heard
something along lines of first part of release but not informed of any memo. Hazarded
guess that if indeed it existed, which he questioned, it might be along lines he, X, had
employed.
/6/"?X" is written in hand before "Rupert."
7. X asked whether it was correct to understand that Ho was calling for prior withdrawal
of U.S. troops in same time scale as suspension of bombing and as prerequisite to

discussions. Rupert again laughed, said that was not "realistic" and that of course he
recognized that withdrawals would have to be phased. It should, however, be stipulated
that final settlement should see withdrawals completed. X indicated that they should also
be balanced, i.e., against pullback of DRV troops (whose presence in South Vietnam
Rupert no longer denies). Rupert insisted in his interpretation of Hanoi policy despite fact
X pointed out it seemed at variance with Ho interview.
8. X took occasion presented by Rupert's insistence on "poor show" by South Vietnamese
troops again to stress futility of Hanoi's hope to force a decision; he remarked on
differences between French military posture and that of U.S., said all DRV might achieve
would be escalation of war, which could only be to its disadvantage, involving foreign
influence in north and south, devastation of North Vietnam, and undesirable hatred
between Americans and Vietnamese. Rupert said that in war it was necessary to envision
the worst and that the consequences of escalation, including external intervention, had
been foreseen and prepared for. (X's purpose was to draw out Rupert on possible
evolution of conflict and again to impress him that U.S. not speaking from weakness.)
9. X asked Rupert what he preferred or suggested as channel of contact with Hanoi.
Rupert said all the same provided responsible people speak, whether it was in "Paris,
Peking, Moscow, or Hanoi". Then said that since X had obtained clarification Hanoi
position he now wished clarifications from X. Latter recalled that in Rupert's own words
Rupert represented his government, X only the opinion of some of his friends in
government.
10. Rupert then took up X's earlier suggested four points with striking total recall (?) of
verbal presentation. His most important observation was on point one: The basic rights of
Vietnamese people to peace, etc., are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords, etc.
Rupert verified French translation of this sentence and then said that point now was to
give "tangible proof" that these rights were recognized. Such proof he said might be a
cessation of bombardments.
11. Some other points of translation raised were: Line four (X's text, not given to Rupert),
"compliance" to which Rupert preferred "acceptance" and "execution" to
"acquiescement". Line nine, what was "quasi-military" and did it apply to personnel or
weapons or both? X assumed this meant persons carrying out military functions,
suppletifs and partisans, not necessarily regulars. Presumably a truck or aircraft could also
be quasi-military. Line 13, "regrouping and redeployment". X said these almost the same
thing, one word perhaps more static than the other. Separation of combatants at some
stage should be envisaged. In reply Rupert's question re "indigenous" and "foreign
personnel", X assumed indigenous would mean all types of Vietnamese forces. This might
include tribal groups as well as Vietnamese. What then was meant by "foreign
personnel"? Just what it said, replied X. Of course if DRV had performed miracles in
training indigenous forces to operate missiles they might not be involved in pullback.
Rupert thought this a great joke and said "you mean if they were Soviets they should
leave"? Yes, said X, and Chinese, etc.
X convinced foregoing had sufficient substance and implication to warrant further
contacts. He convinced, however, he should at this point return home to touch base, make
sure he does not get out of line, assess possible follow-up, and to discuss means of
improving security, contacts, communications, etc. Also desirable to let Rupert marinate.
X told Rupert he leaving over weekend and would give him date of departure. Also
exchanged addresses, telephone numbers, and means of contact. X set up possibility of
return in case he had to "confer further concerning his university connection in Geneva".
New address of Rupert is: 3 Square de Trocadero, Paris 16e., Telephone 727-38-74./8/
123. Memorandum of Meeting/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Johnson. Confidential.
Drafted by William Bundy on August 26.
SUBJECT
Points Discussed in the President's Luncheon with the Secretary and Senior State
Department Officers, Thursday, August 19, 1965/2/
/2/The senior Departmental officials included Rusk, Ball, Harriman, Goldberg, William
Bundy, Thomas Mann, Jack Vaughn, G. Mennen Williams, Joseph Sisco, Harlan
Cleveland, Phillips Talbot, and John Leddy. Lloyd Hand and Jack Valenti of the White
House staff were also present. The meeting lasted from 1:48 to 4:05 p.m. (Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary)
1. The President laid great stress on the importance of intelligence in South Viet-Nam.
Mr. Bundy commented that this was in part a matter of specific actions, but also heavily
related to the general improvement in popular morale and cohesion which was the
objective of Ambassador Lodge and of the Lansdale group.
2. The President commented at some length on the state of public opinion in the United
States concerning the Viet-Nam problem. He hoped that all officers of the Department
could be as active as possible in getting the Administration point of view fully expressed
in public forums, and also in dealing with critical segments of the press such as the New
York Times and, occasionally, the "Kennedy columnists." The President expressed the
general view that public support for Administration policies was generally satisfactory at
present, but that this would become more doubtful if the conflict were prolonged another
year or more. For this reason, but above all for the overriding reason of its own
importance he stressed over and over again that the Department was the agency
responsible for finding a proper way to peace. He had several exchanges with the
Secretary and with Ambassador Goldberg on the UN and other efforts in progress, and
made abundantly clear his whole-hearted support for these efforts.
3. In connection with the Viet-Nam problem, but also more broadly, the President also
laid great stress on the importance of relationships with Congress. He particularly
underlined the vital necessity of advance consultation with Congressional leaders and
interested committees on all actions being contemplated by the Department.

Repeated to USUN. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram
was received at 2:23 a.m. Ambassador Lodge arrived in Saigon on August 20 and
presented his credentials on August 25.
581. Reference: Department telegram 509, repeated USUN 289./2/ Following are some
comments on the general subject of diplomatic negotiations:
/2/Telegram 509 to Saigon, August 21, transmitted a copy of the draft reply to U Thant's
initiative on August 12, and asked for Embassy comments. (Ibid.) The reply, which
incorporated changes in response to Lodge's comments, was approved and sent to Thant
on August 27; see Document 129.
1. Although the U Thant proposal is as unfair as one would expect, there is advantage in
handling it very carefully--not because it will lead to an end to the aggression in Vietnam,
but because news of it will leak and the U.S. Government must appear in a good light in
the minds of those who think that peace can be promoted in this manner.
2. Convincing these people that the U.S. Government is leaving no stone unturned has
undoubtedly been a big factor in the remarkable education of U.S. opinion in the last six
months under the President's leadership. Today, practically every American of good will
understands why Vietnam is important and therefore why we must be here.
3. This is of the greatest importance in our effort to ward off the aggression here. In fact, a
unified and determined U.S. opinion is the decisive ingredient. It also creates favorable
opinion abroad.
4. But there is another aspect which gives me pause. I believe we are approaching the
point when further public eagerness by US for "negotiations" will harden Hanoi and
Peking's resolve and convince them that we are weak internally (however strong we may
be at Chu Lai) thus making things harder for our soldiers, tending to prolong the conflict,
and sapping the will to win of the GVN and RVNAF.
5. The President's bombing decision stopped the argument in Saigon as to whether to
continue the war and it started the discussion on how best to win it. The President's
decision on troops has brought a conviction that the U.S. is not clock-watching and is
determined to see this thing through. In Vietnamese minds, this makes a successful
outcome inevitable. These are precious assets which must be conserved and cherished and
certainly not diluted or destroyed.
6. The above in no way means that we should not work hard for peace, but what is needed
for peace at this moment is a conviction in the minds of the enemy that its aggression is
doomed to failure.
7. It would be helpful here and would have a constructive effect on U.S. and foreign
opinion, and ultimately in the UN, if we gave great prominence to the fact that our effort
in Vietnam is being undertaken in the letter and spirit of UN Charter which states in
Article I that the member states shall "take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for suppression of acts of aggression. .
. ." This is precisely what we are doing. Our effort is thus noble, respectable and legal in
the highest sense. It should be made to appear so and not look like a unilateral American
adventure. I have only seen one excellent statement by the President at a press conference
concerning the aggression aspect. Could not more be done along this line?
8. It is for this reason that I question the wisdom of paragraph 8 of the proposed aidememoire (reftel). To talk about "a cessation of all hostile military activity by all
concerned" implies that we and the South Vietnamese on the one hand are in the same
moral position as Hanoi and Peking on the other. This is not the case. Hanoi and Peking
wish to dominate South Vietnam. South Vietnam and the U.S. do not wish to dominate
North Vietnam. Hanoi and Peking are the aggressors. South Vietnam is the aggrieved
party. We must not give the impression that it is "six of one and a half-dozen of the
other".
9. I also fear the effect when paragraph 9 becomes public.
10. And the words "cease fire" make many hairs stand on end in Saigon and could give
rise to widespread feeling that the "Americans are negotiating behind our backs and
therefore why should we fight any more?"
11. I recognize the difficulty of these decisions and that there is much to be said for a
sympathetic attitude toward U Thant's proposals. I also recognize the commitment which
we have already made for the record. But there are other factors and a constructive
contribution could be made to public thinking by reminding members of the UN and
public opinion generally of Article I of the Charter.
Lodge
125. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff/1/
Honolulu, August 23, 1965, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. The
source text is a copy sent to the Department of State.
2400302Z. Increasing pressure against DRV (C). A. CINCPAC 220043Z./2/
/2/Not found.
1. We believe a main element of Communist strength in North and South Vietnam has
been their complete confidence in ultimate victory according to their strategic plan. VC
morale in SVN depends in large measure upon things going as planned. Superiority of the
VC over the RVNAF and sure victory is the backbone of troop indoctrination.
2. Indications are that when Hanoi saw in early 1964 that the U.S. had decided to step up
assistance to SVN, decision was made to move more rapidly toward victory through
increased organized military action in SVN. With SVN political system in disarray, the
RVNAF remained the hard core upon which the U.S. could build. Disintegration of the
armed forces through multiple large-scale assaults could remove the last stumbling block
to decisive control of the country. The rapid build up of the VC with organized PAVN
units and augmentation of support activities and political cadres began.
3. Hanoi has received two strategic surprises since initiating what was intended as the
final phase. First, the U.S. has introduced, and is continuing to build up, air and ground
forces in SVN on a scale that Hanoi must never have anticipated. The second surprise was
the air campaign against NVN.
4. The impact of U.S. forces in SVN has upset VC timing. Obvious intentions to embark
upon a campaign of large scale attacks materialized in Feb. In their efforts to make 1965 a
year of decision, the VC have made some limited gains but at a high price. Since March
1965 they have suffered heavy losses in virtually all of their major military efforts. This
trend has been particularly pronounced since May when Viet Cong initiated large-scale
operations such as those fought at Song Be, Dong Xoai, and Duc Co which cost the VC
very heavy and probably unanticipated casualties. The introduction of expanded U.S. air
and ground forces and naval support have further compounded the Viet Cong problem as
illustrated by the dramatic U.S. operation on the Van Tuong peninsula, south of Chu Lai,
where U.S. Marines destroyed the 1st VC regiment. Employment of U.S. forces in the
highlands hear Pleiku can and will disrupt VC plans for seizure and control of that
strategic area. Following Chu Lai more ground forces will be introduced when the 1st
Cavalry Division lands. Hanoi knows that the ROK division and other U.S. forces will
soon be introduced. Employment of B-52's and scheduled deployment of additional U.S.
air squadrons will further emphasize U.S. intent. More prisoners are being taken now.
More defections are occurring. These rates will rise when augmented U.S. air and ground
forces are brought more fully to bear in harassment, attrition, and search and destroy
missions.
5. The evidence is now overwhelming that the Communist forces in both Vietnams are all
under the command of Hanoi, and the battlefield in North Vietnam can be regarded as the
support area or zone of interior. After the first surprise of air attack in NVN, against what
must have been regarded as a sanctuary, Hanoi probably expected world opinion to cause
the U.S. to limit operations to sporadic, punitive attacks if not stop them completely. We
have just reviewed our program, Ref A, we are now at a point where we can move toward
the effective disruption of the current RT area. This will make it extremely difficult for
Hanoi to continue support to forces in Laos and SVN. But the important thing now is to
keep the Communists psychologically off balance. We believe the process is well
underway in the SVN portion of the battlefield. In the north we must concentrate upon the
same objective. Communist belief in victory must be destroyed. They are now taking
comfort from greater air defense capability and there are some indications that use of the
IL-28's and MIG's may be contemplated. We may expect some dramatic effort as their
need for a morale boost grows. We must not allow their developing capabilities to
generate hope of turning the tide.
6. Recommend that hard on the heels of the landing of the 1st elements of the 1st Cavalry
Division in SVN that we attack the POL at Hanoi (JCS 49) and at Haiphong (JCS 48). A
large percentage of the population in the delta area would see the fires and all would know
of the attacks. Grossly exaggerated Hanoi air defense propaganda would begin to ring
hollow. These two actions would have a tremendous psychological impact upon NVN.
Washington, August 24, 1965, 8 p.m.
Bundy, Vol. XIII. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
The Republican "White Paper"/2/
/2/On August 24, the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives issued a 33page report on Vietnam, styled a "White Paper," which charged President Johnson with
confusing public opinion and inviting Communist miscalculations. The report was
prepared by the House Republican Committee on Planning and Research, under the
direction of Representatives Gerald R. Ford, Charles E. Goodell, and Melvin R. Laird.
(Washington Post, August 25, 1965)
1. I have read the White Paper and discussed it with McNamara, Ball, Moyers, and my
brother Bill. I also got some free advice from Phil Potter, who called on another subject.
Our unanimous view is that it is a pretty feeble effort and that it does not deserve top-level
reply. So I would be inclined to go right past it in the press conference tomorrow and to
say simply that we maintain the closest touch with Republican leaders like President
Eisenhower/3/ and Senator Dirksen (who has dissociated himself from the report already),
and that there has never been a Republican or Democratic policy toward Southeast Asia in
the last 15 years./4/
/4/Johnson dismissed the Republican report as misleading during a press conference on
August 25. He said that the Vietnamese Communists should not entertain the illusion that
the people of the United States were are not united behind the Vietnamese Government.
(Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II,
pp. 922-923)
2. If you want to hit harder, it is interesting that this report omits the name of Ambassador
Lodge in its discussion of the last months of Diem. It misstates your own position on
Southeast Asia in 1961, in that your farsighted report/5/ specifically warned that we might
need to make a commitment of troops if circumstances should change. The document also
conveys a false impression of your views on Laos. In Bob McNamara's judgment, it
totally distorts his own record on Vietnam.
/5/See United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 159-166, and Foreign
Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, pp. 149-151.
3. In sum, this document imports into the discussion of foreign affairs the very spirit of
narrow partisanship which you have been trying to exclude. We are confident that the
American people prefer the attitudes of Republicans like Eisenhower, Dirksen, Lodge,
and McNamara, just as it has traditionally expected a spirit that rises above party from
Democratic leadership both in Congress and in the White House.
4. I attach a copy of a memorandum done by my brother Bill/6/ which gives a still more
detailed and comprehensive set of criticisms which could be made if one wanted to make
them.
McG.B.

Saigon, August 26, 1965, 12:41 p.m.
to CINCPAC.
624. 1. There is given below the text of an "Estimate of Viet Cong Situation" drafted by
the Mission Intelligence Committee and concurred in by Ambassador Johnson and
General Westmoreland which I have found of value and believe will be of interest to
concerned Washington agencies:
2. Hanoi appears to have made the decision last year to intensify the war in South
Vietnam. Whether the Communists actually expected to gain complete victory this year,
or merely to accelerate the transition to their vaunted general counter-offensive, they had
reason to hope that an early victory was possible. The build-up of Viet Cong main force
and guerrilla units had made substantial progress, and the insurgents had evolved tactics
for meeting the improving RVNAF air and ground capabilities. Viet Cong successes in
countering the GVN's pacification program had given the Communists control over wide
areas which had previously been dominated by the GVN; their food situation had
improved, and they had access to a substantial manpower base. Infiltration of both men
and material from the north was essentially unchecked. RVNAF morale clearly was
sagging, and its desertion rate mounting. Political instability in Saigon appeared to be
heightened with each change of government, and further violent clashes involving
Catholic, Buddhist and student elements seemed likely.
3. Given these conditions, it must have appeared to Hanoi that a modest escalation of Viet
Cong military capabilities might permit the insurgents to end the war relatively quickly.
They may have calculated that a successful military campaign would cause RVNAF and
civilian morale to collapse, produce an impression of the inevitability of Communist
victory, exacerbate political instability in Saigon, and create conditions favorable for a
general uprising through which the Communists could seize power. Since the overthrow
of the Diem government, Hanoi and the Liberation Front had increasingly put such an
uprising forward as a feasible, quick alternative to the traditional protracted resistance
struggle. Even if their broader hopes were not realized, the Communists probably believed
that a successful offensive campaign by the reinforced Viet Cong would permit them to
attain the initiative and pave the way for even greater offensive operations later this year.
The Communists may have calculated that they would have a reasonable chance of
achieving their aims without provoking increased U.S. intervention because of the
seeming reluctance--last fall--of the U.S. to commit its military forces to operations in
Vietnam. Even if the U.S. were to react, the Communists may have felt they could attain
their objectives before U.S. intervention became effective.
4. To assure success, Hanoi evidently concluded that the military capabilities of both the
Viet Cong and DRV would have to be further strengthened. Although the Viet Cong
build-up was progressing favorably, their forces were clearly incapable of mounting an
offensive of the scale desired. Hence, one of the goals established for 1964 was the
accelerated expansion of Viet Cong forces to the extent required to establish that
equilibrium with the GVN's forces which is deemed essential by the Communists for the
shift to a general counteroffensive. Toward this end, the Viet Cong intensified their
recruiting and conscription programs, creating a number of new main force battalions in
the southern delta, some of which were transferred to the area north of Saigon. The flow
of weapons and equipment from the DRV was stepped up last fall to permit the rearming
of some existing units with more modern and effective small arms, and heavy weapons,
and to so equip some newly formed units. To add further to Viet Cong capabilities, Hanoi
took the calculated risk of escalation by infiltrating regular units of the North Vietnamese
Army (PAVN). All three infantry regiments of the PAVN 325th Division evidently have
been deployed to South Vietnam, and it is possible that other units have been deployed
without identification. To strengthen the DRV's capabilities against the contingency of
U.S. air attacks, Hanoi arranged with the Soviets in February for a reinforcement of its air
defense resources, to include the introduction of surface-to-air missiles and the
augmentation of the nascent DRV air force.
5. The military campaign planned by the Communists appears to be centered on the
highlands. While the Viet Cong regard the densely populated and rice-rich Mekong Delta
as the prize in South Vietnam, they consider the highlands as the major battleground,
since the difficult terrain, dense vegetation, and limited lines of communication tend to
minimize RVNAF ground and air superiorities. Their concept of operations envisaged a
series of major (regimental-size) attacks against isolated outposts, aimed at destroying
ARVN garrisons and drawing ARVN general reserve units into ambushes under
conditions favoring Viet Cong success. These larger actions were to be supported by
intensified, widespread guerrilla activity in order to consolidate their hold on the people.
The principal objectives of the campaign were to destroy RVNAF units, enlarge the
liberated zones, and constrict GVN control to isolated district towns and provincial
capitals. In the highlands, it appears that they hope to eliminate the GVN strongpoints
north of Kontum and create a large liberated area extending over most of Kontum, Pleiku,
Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. This area, adjoining the Laos infiltration corridor
and offering motorable line of communications with North Vietnam, could be developed
into an extensive redoubt area from which subsequent major operations could be mounted
against the coastal plain or into the southern highlands. In the area northeast of Saigon, the
Viet Cong concept was similar, based in this instance on the enlargement of Zone D by
extending the liberated area into Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy and Lam Dong
Provinces. From this redoubt, the Viet Cong would be in position to mount operations to
link up with the northern highlands redoubt, westward to join Zone D with Zone C in
northern Tay Ninh, or southwestward against Saigon itself.
6. Although they enjoyed some initial successes, the Viet Cong campaign has been
frustrated by a series of fortuitous RVNAF tactical moves coupled with the effective use
of increased US-GVN air support. In the prelude to their offensive, the Viet Cong
inflicted heavy losses on ARVN units at Binh Gia (Phuoc Tuy Province) in December
1964 and in Binh Dinh Province in February 1965. They suffered a setback in their attack
on Song Be, the Phuoc Long Province capital, in early May, but scored their most
significant success at Ba Gia in Quang Ngai Province later that month. On 1 June, after
overrunning Le Thanh district headquarters in western Pleiku, the Viet Cong placed the
CIDG camp at Duc Co in a state of siege, which was to last over two months. The Viet
Cong suffered a setback in their attack on the district town of Dong Xoai in Phuoc Long
Province; although they inflicted heavy losses on ARVN forces, they were unsuccessful in
their attempt to occupy the town and suffered estimated losses in excess of 700 KIA. In
Phu Bon Province, the Viet Cong have effectively blocked Route 7 and made gains in
outlying areas, but they failed in their attempt to destroy the garrison at Thuan Man (Phu
Bon Province) and suffered heavily in an engagement with ARVN airborne units. The
"Geneva armistice" anniversary attack on the CIDG post Bu Dop (Phuoc Long Province)
was a costly failure, although the Viet Cong profited indirectly when another camp was
abandoned to permit reinforcement of the Bu Dop garrison. In the area north of Kontum,
their first major gain was the district town of Tuomoroung which fell on 25 July 1965. In
mid-August, the Viet Cong intensified their efforts to dislodge the garrison at Duc Co
(Pleiku Province) and suffered heavy losses when a joint ARVN/US operation broke the
68-day siege. On 18 August the Viet Cong furthered their gains in the area north of
Kontum when they successfully attacked and overran the district town and CIDG post at
Dak Sut. They have not yet dislodged or destroyed the GVN garrison at Tan Canh, near
Dak To, and Dak Pek near the Laos border, although they have the capability to do so at
any time. The Viet Cong have suffered a series of setbacks in fighting along Route 19,
and have been unable to deny to RVNAF the use of any road when the latter made a
determined effort to use them.
7. Thus, the Viet Cong have made some significant territorial gains during their summer
offensive. They also put six RVNAF battalions out of action in the early stages of our
campaign, but they were unable to sustain their pattern of success when ARVN altered its
normal reaction pattern and, in several instances, spoiled Viet Cong preparations by
mounting anticipatory operations. The Viet Cong did succeed in disrupting lines of
communication, effectively isolating the highlands from the coast, and interdicting
communications between most of the coastal provincial capitals. In the Mekong Delta
area, aggressive operations by ARVN's IV Corps appear to have frustrated Viet Cong
plans for some major operations and have kept their main force units off balance. RVNAF
morale has not collapsed, and may have recovered somewhat from its initial sag last
spring. The political situation in Saigon, although still precarious, is not as unstable as the
Communists hoped, and conditions are not ripe for a general uprising. Effective police
action in the cities, a by-product of draft enforcement activities, and in part a result of
improved counter-terror measures, has resulted in the apprehension of a number of Viet
Cong cadres and probably has kept their subversive apparatus off-balance. Resources
control operations in the Hop Tac area have also resulted in the seizure of explosives
destined for Viet Cong terrorists in Saigon.

8. Not only has their campaign failed to achieve the optimum results envisaged by Hanoi,
but since its inception the strategic balance has altered unfavorably for them. Preparations
for the Viet Cong campaign were underway before the U.S. began its air attacks on North
Vietnam and deployed its ground forces to South Vietnam--the bulk of the PAVN 325th
Division had entered the south by February. Although US ground forces have not yet
played a major role on the main battlefields, the Viet Cong are almost certainly becoming
aware of the potential deriving from their presence. Sounder minds in Hanoi must
appreciate that the opportunity for an early military victory has passed, and that the forces
now available to the Viet Cong are incapable of dislodging the US forces from South
Vietnam. Hanoi is therefore faced with the need to reappraise the situation and reassess its
alternatives.
9. Courses of action open to Hanoi include the following:
A. Massive reinforcement of the Viet Cong, in the form of an overt invasion, in an attempt
to regain their offensive momentum and perhaps defeat US forces before they are firmly
established.
B. Limited covert reinforcement by infiltrating one or two additional PAVN divisions in
order to restore the balance which has now swung in favor of the US-GVN forces and
permit the continuation of recent levels of offensive activity.
C. Modest retrenchment of activity, reducing the number of major attacks and placing
greater emphasis on local guerrilla activity and on consolidating their political base in
preparation for a protracted guerrilla struggle.
D. Substantial reduction of activity aimed at creating the impression of a collapsing
insurgency to lull the US into relaxing pressure on both the north and the south.
E. In combination with any of the above, initiating diplomatic moves designed to bring
about negotiations for a settlement.
10. Massive reinforcement, either by PAVN alone or with Chinese Communist
participation, would require assurance of logistic support on a scale which is probably
beyond the capacity of the disrupted lines of communication in the southern DRV.
Moreover, both Hanoi and Peking probably would estimate that such action might
provoke more extensive US air strikes against the DRV and possibly even Communist
China if the latter were directly involved. The same limitations would apply to the use of
massive numbers of bloc volunteers. This course of action cannot be ruled out entirely as
an irrational, desperation move to prevent the defeat of the Viet Cong or to provide a
temporary strengthening of the Communist position as a prelude to negotiations. Because
of the risks involved, however, the Communists probably would be inclined initially to
pursue more limited aims which would be attained with limited means. The Chinese are
also capable of participating in the defense of North Vietnam against air attacks, but have
thus far shown an inclination to avoid involvement except when US aircraft approach the
Chinese border.
11. Limited covert reinforcement, on the order of one or two PAVN divisions committed
in the same fashion as the 325th, is more within their capabilities. Such a move would
permit the Communists to restore some semblance of a balance of forces without serious
risk of escalation beyond North Vietnam. The principal disadvantage of this course would
be the uncertainty of adequate logistical support pending the development of a motorable
supply route through the Laos panhandle. Any substantial increase in the number of
troops in the highlands area would also further strain the already difficult food situation
confronting Viet Cong forces in that region. The Communists cannot be sure that they will
be able to deliver sufficient quantities of ammunition by sea in view of increasing US
efforts to interdict this line of supply. Some reinforcement is obviously necessary to
prevent the Viet Cong from losing the initiative to the expanding US-GVN forces, but, if
the movement of the 325th Division is any gauge, the deployment of further
reinforcements would require two to four months from the date of decision. Both Hanoi
and Liberation Front radio broadcasts appear to be laying the groundwork for some
reinforcement through their reference to organizing the "regrouped southerners" in
preparation for their return to the south. On the other hand, it must now be apparent to
Hanoi that growing US-GVN air and ground capabilities pose serious risks to large
concentrations of insurgent forces, thereby placing a premium on smaller scale guerrilla
actions of a type for which the capabilities of "foreign" PAVN units are not best suited.
12. A modest retrenchment of activity, similar to that which occurred in 1962 after the
initial US intervention, would permit the Viet Cong to conserve the offensive potential of
their main force units while studying the impact of current US deployments and
operations and evolving a new strategic approach. Widespread guerrilla activity would be
continued to counter GVN pacification operations while consolidating the Communist
hold on "liberated areas" and developing the Viet Cong subversive apparatus in areas
largely under GVN influence. Hanoi could continue the infiltration of key cadre elements
and weapons and ammunition to permit the expansion of local guerrilla forces. A major
portion of the Viet Cong main force units could be dispersed to support the guerrilla
campaign. The principal disadvantage of this course of action would be its adverse impact
on Viet Cong morale. Political cadres would face a difficult task in re-educating even the
main forces in terms of a prolongation of the struggle. Conscription in Communist areas
brought a substantial number of relatively unindoctrinated youths into Viet Cong units of
all types, even into the main forces. These inexperienced youngsters have already shown
symptoms of an unwillingness to fight, as reflected in the rising numbers of defectors and
ralliers from the Viet Cong. If US and GVN forces succeed in inflicting a number of
significant defeats on the Viet Cong and continue air actions at the current level, this
morale problem will mount despite Viet Cong indoctrination efforts. Although a
temporary retrenchment would not decisively impair Viet Cong morale, a prolonged
retrenchment might pose insurmountable problems.
13. A substantial reduction of activity, coupled with a voluntary curtailment of support
from the DRV, might be attempted in an effort to lull the US into relaxing its pressure.
This course would, in effect, produce a limited disengagement. By giving the appearance
of a collapsing insurgency and avoiding major actions, the Viet Cong might hope that the
US would be inclined to reduce its forces and discontinue its bombing attacks on the
DRV. The disadvantages of this course are similar to those enumerated in the preceding
paragraph. The adverse psychological impact on the Viet Cong would be even greater,
however, since the absence of support from the north would tend to discourage even some
hard-core insurgents. If it were explained as a ruse, the Viet Cong could not be assured
that word of this would not reach US and GVN authorities, thereby negating the
effectiveness of this course. Hanoi might be tempted to adopt this course however, taking
the calculated risk that enough of the Communist structure could be held together to
permit a renewal of insurgent activity when conditions were more favorable.
14. The Communists could, at any time, embark on diplomatic moves aimed at bringing
about negotiations for a settlement. They are not likely to undertake this course until
convinced that they cannot achieve success by violent means in the south. DRV leaders
continue to give the impression of confidence in the ultimate success of the insurgency,
and so far have conveyed no hint that they are prepared to relax their conditions for the
initiation of negotiations or for a settlement. Should the Communists agree to
negotiations, they will probably first attempt some form of major military action designed
to strengthen their position. They can be expected also to demand concessions on our part
which would relax US military pressure during the period of negotiations.
15. There are indications that the Communists have already laid down the guidelines for
their autumn-winter campaign. Agent reports suggest these are similar--for the Delta area-to those of the summer campaign. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front broadcasts reflect
continued determination to press the war, and indicate preparations are underway for the
introduction of additional troops from the north. On the other hand, they now speak in
terms of a prolongation of the struggle for up to twenty to twenty-five years, suggesting
that they see scant prospect for the short-cut solution they were touting as possible only a
few months ago. Appeals to the urban populace to prepare for the violent overthrow of the
government have similarly lost their urgency. There are no indications that the
Communists are preparing for a massive reinsurgement. Continuation of the insurgency at
the present level or retrenchment of activity poses serious problems with respect to
surrendering the initiative to the reinforced US-GVN forces and sustaining Viet Cong
morale. Only limited overt reinforcement--provided the logistical problem is overcome-offers some prospects for negating the impact of the US build-up and sustaining the
morale of the Viet Cong.
16. In conclusion, lack of complete success of their summer campaign has frustrated Viet
Cong aims for 1965. If they have not done so thus far, the Communists must soon
acknowledge their inability either to achieve an early victory or to dislodge the growing
military strength of the US forces in the south. Massive intervention is probably beyond
their capability to support, and would carry with it the risk of a substantial widening of the
war. While retrenchment might permit them to conserve their capabilities, it would pose
serious morale problems, and would surrender the initiative to the US and GVN forces,
which would gradually be able to resume pacification programs and regain control over
populated areas recently acquired by the Communists. Only limited reinforcement offers
prospects for sustaining the insurgency on a scale and at a level that provides reasonable
expectation of successfully testing and perhaps eroding US determination to continue the
war. Diplomatic moves to open negotiations would appear unlikely until the Communists
are convinced that US determination to continue the war cannot be eroded and that defeat
of the Viet Cong is probable.
Lodge
128. Memorandum for President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIX,
Memos. Secret; Limdis. There is no drafting information on the source text, which
indicates that the President saw the memorandum.
Following is the text of a cable from Ambassador Lodge (Saigon 626):/2/
/2/Telegram 626 from Saigon, transmitted at 3:25 p.m., was received at 8:04 a.m.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
1. I had a meeting yesterday afternoon alone with General Ky which lasted almost an
hour, with him doing almost all the talking in deliberate, grammatical English, sometimes
interspersed with French. I began by saying that I wished to help in every possible way
and that he could count on me to respect a confidence.
2. Ky covered many subjects, but his chief contention was that the people insisted on a
revolution, that it was impossible to compete with the Communists without treating the
peasant, the poor man, the laborer, and the soldier properly. Neither Minh, Khanh nor
Quat had really understood what a revolution is all about.
3. It was impossible for a civilian government to carry out a revolution with the military
standing on the sidelines complaining. The military had the power in Vietnam and they
had to meet their responsibility.
4. For the future, he wanted the Americans to hold the "strategic points" so that the
Vietnamese could concentrate on pacification operations. He was disgusted with the
Chieu Hoi program and the way it had been run and said that much American money had
been wasted. There were 30,000 cadres in various government departments which he was
going to regroup and retrain, and send them to the 235 districts in the country. He would
have a paper on this for me to read very soon.
5. I agreed that a Communist offer of a revolution, even though it was in brutality and
slavery, could only be beaten by an offer of a revolution for a new life in freedom. We
Americans agreed completely and stood ready to help. There were some things which we
could not do, but there were many which we could do. If he and his associates could stay
in power for a reasonable period of time, then it could be done. But another coup would
really be bad. Could we be helpful in this regard.
6. Ky smiled at this, and it seemed to me that he didn't take the possibility of a coup very
seriously. He said he had been at Dalat for the last two days and had met with all division
and corps commanders, and that they had all been in agreement. He said there had been
discussion about my arrival signifying that something new was being brought into the
Vietnamese problems. They did not know whether this was true, but they all agreed that I
was against Communism.
7. Comment: If this is true, it is good that I am not taken for granted. My main hope at the
meeting with Ky was not to settle any specific problem, but to develop a good
atmosphere. I feel that this was done to some extent. He was rather tense when I arrived
but he had a big smile on his face and was much more relaxed when I left.
8. Other remarks by Ky were as follows:

A. The Communists gave the peasant what in effect is a license to kill the landlord and
then take the land themselves. "We can do better than that," said Ky. I assured him of our
desire to help, having in mind the report that landlords are heavily represented among
generals.
B. Ky said he was aware of the importance of having able Ambassadors and that he would
make a number of appointments soon. Lodge.
129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and David H. Popper of IO on August 26 and cleared
by Sisco of IO and Ruth Bacon of FE. Repeated to Saigon, London, Ottawa, Canberra,
and Bangkok. At 2:55 p.m. on August 27, McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this cable to
the President, noting in a covering memorandum that the response to Thant had been
coordinated with the South Vietnamese Government by Ambassador Lodge, and had been
prepared in close collaboration with Goldberg. Bundy added: "Dean Rusk and I consider
that this entire paper represents no modification of our position, but only a careful and
diplomatically skillful statement of it for U Thant's eyes." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII)
313. Following is text of US aide-memoire for SYG on Viet Nam. Deliver at earliest
opportunity on receipt final authorization.
Begin Text.
AIDE-MEMOIRE
1. The United States believes that your memorandum of August 12/2/ contains a number
of highly constructive suggestions. It is our earnest hope that the memorandum will be
useful in initiating discussions which can provide a basis for the settlement of the Viet
Nam conflict. The views expressed below are designed to contribute to this important
objective.
2. We agree with your observation that the objective of a Viet Nam settlement should be
"a return to the essentials of the 1954 Geneva Agreements."
3. We concur in the principle you have set forth that neither zone in Viet Nam should
adhere to a military alliance or furnish military bases to others, and that foreign troops
should be withdrawn from both zones. You have already cited President Johnson's
statement of April 7/3/ to this effect on military alliances and military bases. On troop
withdrawal, the United States stated on April 8 in reply to the 17-nation declaration on
Viet Nam ". . . when conditions have been created in which the people of South Viet Nam
can determine their own future free from external interference, the United States will be
ready and eager to withdraw its forces from South Viet Nam."/4/
/4/For complete text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1965, pp. 853-854.
4. Equally basic is the principle of the Geneva Agreements that neither zone of Viet Nam
should interfere in the affairs of the other zone. This principle was incorporated in
numerous provisions of the Agreements, including Articles 19 and 24 of the Agreement
on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam/5/ and in the provision of Article 5 of the
Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference,/6/ providing that the respective zones
"shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive
policy." It is the violation of this principle by the DRV which has led to the conflict in
Viet Nam and to the presence of American forces in the Republic of Viet Nam. These
forces, like the forces of other states assisting the Republic of Viet Nam, have as their sole
purpose its protection against aggression, consistent with the provisions of the United
Nations Charter.
/5/For text of the agreement, signed on July 20, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954,
vol. XVI, pp. 1505-1520.
/6/For text of the declaration, signed on July 21, 1954, see ibid., pp. 1540-1542.
5. It is therefore essential that provisions be made in any settlement of the problem of Viet
Nam for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the troops and cadres infiltrated from
North Viet Nam into the South. The modalities and timing of withdrawal of American and
other forces assisting the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam can, of course, only be
worked out in the light of similar dispositions regarding the tens of thousands of
regrouped Southerners and Northerners infiltrated by North Viet Nam into South Viet
Nam over the past several years.
6. A third basic principle of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 was to ensure that the people
of Viet Nam have the right of free choice. That purpose still guides our actions in two
fundamental respects related to the Geneva Agreements:
a. We maintain that the people of South Viet Nam should have the right to shape their
own destiny by peaceful, democratic means and without interference from an aggressive
neighbor to the north.
b. We believe that the people of both South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam should have
the right of free choice regarding the reunification of Viet Nam. As called for in the
Geneva Agreements, any elections held for this purpose should be truly free and secret,
with effective international supervision. It was in this sense that President Johnson on July
28 referred to "free elections . . . throughout all Viet Nam under international
supervision."/7/
/7/See Document 97.
7. With respect to the political problems of South Viet Nam, we do not consider that the
provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 are directly applicable to the resolution of
the internal problems of either North or South Viet Nam separately, pending procedures
for reunification as discussed above. In this connection, the United States Government
notes that the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Viet Nam, on June 22, made clear the
view of the Republic of Viet Nam that South Viet Nam should be free to shape its own
destiny "in conformity with established democratic processes without any intervention of
whatever form and whatever source."/8/ As Secretary Rusk noted on June 23, the United
States Government fully supports this principle,/9/ and it was in this sense also that
President Johnson referred on July 28 to "free elections in the South." North Viet Nam
appears to have expressed a different point of view. We would welcome any appropriate
efforts by the Secretary-General to determine whether these divergencies are in fact as
profound as they now appear.
/8/For an excerpt from Foreign Minister Tran Van Do's address, see American Foreign
Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 883.
/9/For text of Rusk's remarks, see ibid., pp. 884-886.
8. We concur in the Secretary-General's suggestion that a cessation of military activity
might be subject to a variety of formulae, and that it might initially be a matter for de
facto action--by both sides--rather than for a more formal arrangement. In any
unconditional discussions, or in a conference, conditions for the cessation of hostilities
might well be the first order of business.
9. Finally, with respect to the role of the so-called National Liberation Front, we agree
that issues of this type need not and should not obstruct the way to a settlement. On July
28 President Johnson referred to negotiation taking place with governments (for example,
if there should be a Geneva Conference, those governments which participated in the
Geneva Conference of 1954), and indicated that the Viet Cong would have no difficulty
being represented and having their views represented if Hanoi desired a peaceful
settlement. This should not be an insurmountable problem and could be worked out. This
position does not, of course, prejudice the United States Government's view that the socalled National Liberation Front is not in fact an independent party inasmuch as it has
been established and is controlled by Hanoi.
10. We remain prepared to engage in unconditional discussions looking toward a peaceful
settlement whenever the other side is ready. This can be done, for example, through
reconvening the 1954 Geneva Conference or by other means, including discussions
through your good offices. We shall give serious consideration to any proposals of this
character. End Text.
Prior to delivery, inform GVN observer, pursuant to last para Deptel 310 (sent to Saigon
as 564)./10/
/10/Telegram 310 to USUN, August 26, dealt with coordination of a reply to U Thant's
initiative. The final paragraph reads: "We now plan to give our reply to UN SYG some
time early next week, and shall consult re timing in advance." (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 541 from USUN, August 27, Goldberg
reported that he had delivered the aide-memoire to Thant that evening. In reply to a
question from Goldberg, Thant said that he did not know yet whether the Chinese, North
Vietnamese, or Viet Cong had accepted the copies of the proposal, which he had sent to
them through a "second channel." (Ibid.)
Rusk

Department of State
Washington, DC
130. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense

McNamara/1/
JCSM-652-65
1265, Viet 381. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Concept for Vietnam (U)
1. (S) In the light of the introduction of major US combat units into Southeast Asia, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that we further formalize our concept for the
future conduct of the war. Recognizing this need, they have developed a concept as set
forth in the Appendix. This concept, in which the views of CINCPAC have been
considered, envisions the military actions that are part of the over-all US strategy for
Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. The
correlated military actions to carry out this strategy will be conducted in concert with US
major political, economic, and social programs for Southeast Asia. They also will include
measures for dealing with the ChiCom threat.
2. (TS) In summary:
a. The objective in Vietnam, as stated by NSAM-288, dated 17 March 1964,/2/ is a stable
and independent noncommunist government.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 87.
b. The major problems to be dealt with in the conduct of the war are:
(1) The continued direction and support of Viet Cong operations by the DRV, infiltration
from the north, and the apparent attendant Viet Cong capability to provide materiel
support and to replace heavy personnel losses.
(2) The continued existence of a major Viet Cong infrastructure, both political and
military, in the RVN.
(3) The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength as compared to that of the South
Vietnamese ground forces.

(4) The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, and population to Viet Cong
control.
(5) The lack of a viable politico/economic structure in the RVN.
(6) The threat of ChiCom intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in
the Western Pacific.
c. The basic military tasks, of equal priority, are:
(1) To cause the DRV to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency.
(2) To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control over all of the RVN.
(3) To deter Communist China from direct intervention and to defeat such intervention if
it occurs.
d. The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above tasks should be: to intensify military
pressure on the DRV by air and naval power; to destroy significant DRV military targets,
including the base of supplies; to interdict supporting LOCs in the DRV; to interdict the
infiltration and supply routes into the RVN; to improve the combat effectiveness of the
RVNAF; to build and protect bases; to reduce enemy reinforcements; to defeat the Viet
Cong, in concert with RVN and third country forces; and to maintain adequate forces in
the Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter and to deal with ChiCom
aggression. By aggressive and sustained exploitation of superior military force, the United
States/Government of Vietnam would seize and hold the initiative in both the DRV and
RVN, keeping the DRV, the Viet Cong, and the PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively
destroying the DRV war-supporting power and defeating the Viet Cong. The physical
capability of the DRV to move men and supplies through the Lao Corridor, down the
coastline, across the DMZ, and through Cambodia must be reduced to the maximum
practical extent by land, naval, and air actions in these areas and against infiltrationconnected targets. Finally, included within the basic US military strategy must be a
buildup in Thailand to ensure attainment of the proper US-Thai posture to deter ChiCom
aggression and to facilitate placing US forces in an advantageous logistic position if such
aggression occurs.
3. (S) The over-all strategic concept for Vietnam, as set forth in the Appendix hereto,
provides a basis for terminating the war in Vietnam under conditions which are
satisfactory to the United States and the GVN.
4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the attached concept be approved as the
basis for subsequent development of courses of action, forces, and other requirements to
include the phasing of operations. Recommendations based thereon, including a current
evaluation of the capabilities of approved force deployments to achieve the objectives of
the concept, will be provided you at the earliest practicable date.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Appendix
OVER-ALL US CONCEPT FOR VIETNAM (U)
Introduction
1. (S) The RVN is a politico/military keystone in Southeast Asia and is symbolic of US
determination in Asia--as Berlin is in Europe--to prevent communist expansion. The
United States is committed to the defense of the RVN in order to assist a free people to
remain free. In addition to the freedom of the RVN, US national prestige, credibility, and
honor with respect to world-wide pledges, and declared national policy are at stake.
Further, it is incumbent upon the United States at this stage to invalidate the communist
concept of "wars of national liberation."
2. (S) The military operations envisioned in this concept paper must:
a. Conform to the over-all US strategy and guidelines for Southeast Asia as a whole,
including the RVN, DRV, Laos, and Thailand.
b. Be conducted in concert with appropriate US/GVN political, economic, and social
programs in order to guide and to expedite the correlated achievement of US objectives.
c. Be conceived and evaluated in terms of how much and how well they will contribute to
the above.
Factors Bearing on the Development of a US Military Strategy for Vietnam
3. (S) The Viet Cong are directed, controlled, and supported (including heavy military
support and encadrement) by their sponsor, the DRV. Viet Cong activities in the RVN are
characterized by persuasion through propaganda, intimidation, and terror. Whenever
possible, through armed assault and coercion, the Viet Cong destroy the capability of
GVN authority to govern, thus progressively reducing the ability of the GVN to bring the
population and resources base to bear on the problem. Having assumed control over an
area, the Viet Cong install their own political organization and infrastructure. Then, using
local manpower and logistics, the Viet Cong organize, equip, and train military units to
resist GVN attempts to establish its authority and to expand Viet Cong control and
influence into other areas.
4. (S) For the most part, the Viet Cong have sought to avoid a large-scale sustained battle
with US/GVN forces. Instead, their tactics have been to maximize the advantages of
initiative and surprise and to strike at weakness with overwhelming strength, "fading
away" when the combat strength ratio is unfavorable to them. Currently, one of their
major objectives appears to be the destruction, through both attrition and demoralization,
of the RVNAF.
5. (TS) At present, the Viet Cong and DRV leaders appear confident that their course in
the RVN promises ultimate and possibly early success without important concessions on
their part. This apparent confidence may have been fostered in part by the current quest
for some negotiating arrangement. They seem to believe that they can achieve a series of
local military successes which, sooner or later, will bring victory through a combination
of a deteriorating South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) morale and effectiveness, a collapse
of anti-communist government in Saigon, and an exhaustion of the United States will to
persist.
6. (TS) In coping with larger US forces employed in a more aggressive fashion, the Viet
Cong would seek to avoid the kind of engagements which risked a serious communist
defeat. Instead, they would probably concentrate on harassments intended to bleed and
humiliate US forces, attempting to trap and destroy isolated units where possible. At a
minimum, the Viet Cong would almost certainly continue present efforts to cut land
communications lines and would step up the dispatch of small, expendable teams on
sabotage and assassination missions designed to gain propaganda advantages. The
communists might also seek to increase their activities in Laos.
7. (TS) Additionally, there is the possibility of ChiCom overt commitment of major
combat forces in Southeast Asia and other areas in the Western Pacific. With the greater
US involvement in the war in Vietnam, US military posture must be so oriented as to
deter ChiCom intervention and defeat this intervention should it occur.
8. (S) The war in Vietnam is the single most critical international problem facing the
United States today, and it portends the most serious immediate threat to continued US
world leadership and national security. The development of a US strategy for Vietnam is
necessarily influenced in varying degrees by the desirability to maintain amicable
relations with certain other nations; by the desirability to receive from third countries a
degree of support for US policy; by US objectives and alliances elsewhere; by the fact of
the sovereignty of the GVN; and, by the necessity to provide an effective Free World
counter or answer to "wars of national liberation."
9. (S) The situation in the RVN has deteriorated to the point where US national objectives
are endangered and may not be achieved unless GVN forces are bolstered, adequate
security for the South Vietnamese people is provided, and the DRV is persuaded that the
risks of further involvement on their part outweigh the gains.
10. (TS) Our strategy for Vietnam should not allow the communists to keep pace with or
more than match our military efforts. A program of slowly rising intensity with both sides
in step carries with it the danger that it will lead to less flexibility of choice, creeping
intervention by the Soviets and Chinese, first with materiel and later with troops, and the
eventual engulfing of both camps unwillingly into an expanded war.
11. (TS) Briefly, the major problems to be dealt with in the conduct of the war are:
a. The continued direction and support of Viet Cong operations by the DRV, including
infiltration from the North, and the apparent attendant Viet Cong capability to provide
materiel support and to replace heavy personnel losses.
b. The continued existence of a major Viet Cong infrastructure, both political and
military, in the RVN.

c. The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength as compared to that of the South
Vietnamese ground forces.
d. The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, and population to Viet Cong
control.
e. The lack of a viable politico/economic structure in the RVN.
f. The threat of ChiCom intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the
Western Pacific.
US Objectives, Tasks, and Basic Strategy
12. (TS) US national policy/3/ includes as an objective in the RVN a stable and
independent noncommunist government. Implicit in this objective is the containment of
Communist China insofar as expansion into Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the Western
Pacific is concerned. Basic military tasks, of equal priority, in support of this objective
are:
/3/NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964. [Footnote in the source text.]
a. To cause the DRV to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency.
b. To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control over all of the RVN.
c. To deter Communist China from direct intervention and to defeat such intervention if it
occurs.
13. (TS) Friendly control of population and resources is essential to success in countering
guerrilla warfare. In this regard, the RVN areas of major military significance are: the
Saigon area and the Mekong Delta; the coastal plain; and the central highlands. It is
imperative that the US/GVN have the support of the people and the control of resources in
those areas. Elimination of the Viet Cong from these areas must be vigorously undertaken
in order to provide adequate security for the people. Of particular importance is the need
for friendly control of the main food-producing areas in order that the GVN may gain
control of rice, feed the people under its control, enable exports of rice to bolster the
economy, and cause the Viet Cong to import or to fight for food. A paramount
requirement under this concept is the building and maintaining of a series of secure bases
and secure supporting LOCs at key localities along the sea coast, and elsewhere as
necessary, from which offensive operations can be launched and sustained, with the
subsequent enlargement and expansion of the secure areas.
14. (TS) The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above tasks should be: to intensify
military pressure on the DRV by air and naval power; to destroy significant DRV military
targets, including the base of supplies; to interdict supporting LOCs in the DRV; to
interdict the infiltration and supply routes into the RVN; to improve the combat
effectiveness of the RVNAF; to build and protect bases; to reduce enemy reinforcements;
to defeat the Viet Cong in concert with RVN and third country forces; and, to maintain
adequate forces in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter and to deal with
ChiCom aggression. By aggressive and sustained exploitation of superior military force,
the United States/GVN would seize and hold the initiative in both the DRV and the RVN,
keeping the DRV, the Viet Cong, and the PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively
destroying the DRV war-supporting power and defeating the Viet Cong. The physical
capability of the DRV to move men and supplies through the Lao Corridor, down the
coastline, across the DMZ, and through Cambodia, must be reduced to the maximum
practical extent by land, naval, and air actions in these areas and against infiltrationconnected targets. Finally, included within the basic US military strategy must be a buildup in Thailand to ensure attainment of the proper US-Thai posture to deter ChiCom
aggression and to facilitate placing US forces in an advantageous logistic position if such
aggression occurs.
Principal Measures for Executing the Basic Strategy
and for Achieving US Objectives
15. (TS) In order to gain the offensive and to seize and hold the initiative in the RVN, a
major effort must be made not only in terms of direct combat action to expand the areas
under US/GVN control but also to support the GVN in its rural reconstruction program
and to assist that government in the creation of new military units and the rehabilitation of
its depleted units as rapidly as possible. A psychological climate must be created that will
foster RVN rural reconstruction progress. It will be noted in paragraph 13 above that,
along with the Saigon area, the Mekong Delta is considered of primary importance. While
no US land operations are currently envisaged in the Mekong Delta (IV Corps Tactical
Zone) because of the comparatively inactive enemy situation now existing there,
increased Viet Cong activity could later necessitate US/Third Country operations in that
important area.
16. (TS) The intensification of military pressures on the DRV, PL/VM, and the Viet
Cong, the destruction of military stocks, supporting facilities, and the interdiction of
communist infiltration and supply routes into the RVN will necessarily require:
a. An immediate acceleration and increase in the scale, scope, and intensity of air and
naval actions against the DRV. These actions should be directed against key military and
economic targets, the destruction of which should dissuade the DRV from supporting the
Viet Cong insurgency; this would include mining of DRV ports. Targets would include
these main groupings: POL, LOCs, mines (including coal), military installations, port
facilities, and power stations. Attacks against population centers as such would continue
to be avoided.
b. Intensified land, naval, and air actions to reduce infiltration into the RVN. Such actions
would include a stepped-up land, sea, and air campaign against infiltration routes,
designed to minimize the flow into the RVN of personnel and materiel.
17. (TS) During the build-up phase US/Third Country and GVN forces should strengthen
military and civilian control in present areas of the RVN while intensifying air and naval
attacks against the DRV and communist infiltration and supply routes into the RVN. As
the force build-up is achieved, a principal offensive effort within the RVN of US/Third
Country forces should be to participate with the RVNAF in search and destroy operations
while assisting the RVNAF in clearing and securing operations in support of the rural
reconstruction effort. US/Third Country air and ground operations should be conducted on
a sustained basis; attack and destruction of base areas should be directed at applying
continuous pressure on the VC to keep them off balance.
18. (TS) To deter ChiCom direct intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere in the Western Pacific, and to deal with such intervention or aggression if it
occurs would, in addition to the measures above, require:
a. A credible strategic force posture in Southeast Asia and elsewhere to meet the ChiCom
threat.
b. A suitable build-up in Thailand to enable the expeditious deployment there of major US
forces. This build-up would include logistic support bases, new airfields, improvement of
existing airbases to increase their capacity, improvements to LOCs, and measures to
increase the readiness of the Thai armed forces.
Execution
19. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, as a matter of principle, CINCPAC
should be given as wide latitude as possible under the circumstances in executing the
above measures in consonance with the forces, support, and general policy guidance
provided to CINCPAC by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
131. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Lodge Letters
to the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Received in the White House and delivered to the
President on September 2. (Telegram 614 to Saigon, September 2; ibid.)
Dear Mr. President:
Herewith are some of my innermost preoccupations, which I have sent to no one else, and
which I send to you in the hope that they may prevent reverses in the future. I will, of
course, be glad to have this letter go to Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara and MacBundy--and
anyone else whom you may choose.
I am concerned about the current U.S. stress on a "settlement" and on "negotiations" to the
neglect of the concept of a satisfactory "outcome" or "result".
I believe that with great and sustained effort we can get a satisfactory "outcome", but it is
hard for me to visualize a satisfactory "settlement". In other words, we can succeed in
warding off the communist aggression, but we will not get them to admit it. If we do get a
satisfactory "outcome", it will be a real achievement in which we will all be able to take
pride.
You should probably make an announcement about it. It must look like the true success
which it most certainly would be, and it must not look like a failure because we have not
achieved a "settlement"--or because General de Gaulle doesn't enthuse.
We should therefore stress the need for warding off the aggression, for getting a
satisfactory "outcome", and not lay so much stress on diplomatic settlements which we
probably are not going to be able to get. The attempt to do so would probably make Ho
Chi Minh lose face, thus causing him to fight harder, thus lengthening the war and
increasing the bloodshed.
If I am wrong, and we do get a neat diplomatic document in which the communists admit
that they have been beaten, then we have lost nothing by following my advice--although it
is hard to understand the value of such a document given the worthlessness of such a
communist commitment.
Let me give two illustrations:
Illustration No. 1
The heartland of Viet-Nam, as is shown on a population map which I recently sent to Mac
Bundy, consists of the coastal plain plus the Delta (of which I class Saigon as a part).
About 65 per cent of the population is in those areas.
Suppose that we and the Vietnamese:
--really control the coastal plain (as we appear to be on the way to doing);
--eliminate the Viet Cong from the Saigon-Delta area (which we have not done, but which
could be done); and
--continue to hold the 43 provincial capitals which we now hold as well as the 240-odd
district towns; and
Then suppose that:
we are strong enough in all these places so that with our air, sea and ground power we can
force the Viet Cong to stay back in the hills--or the Camau peninsula--with the snakes and
the tigers because they get such a bloody nose every time they try to attack.
If all these things happen, we will be in a very strong position indeed and everything else
after that will be mopping up. We will be in control of areas with a total population of
about 11 million out of a national total of about 15 million. (Source: Statistics BranchUSOM Public Administration Division)
Neither in the Philippines nor in Malaya was every last communist guerrilla apprehended.
Some of them became farmers and some of them went into the hills where they still are-and where they do no harm.
Illustration No. 2
Another possibility is that the Viet Cong suddenly decides to stop fighting and that a
silence falls. This has happened in other oriental countries.

We would consider either of the above illustrations as a satisfactory outcome, and you
would be entitled to put it out to the public as an effective warding off of the aggression-something in which all Americans could take pride.
But if you make a "settlement" and diplomatic "negotiations" as a symbol of success, you
are really reaching for the moon. The communists do not like to sign papers in which they
admit that they were defeated. They prefer always to leave these situations hanging, with
the implication that a few years later they may be back. The fact that they don't come back
forcefully (as they didn't in the Philippines and in Malaya) doesn't alter the fact that they
don't like to look as though they have given up.
I understand fully the inestimable value of making it clear to public opinion at home that
you are willing to go anywhere and try anything for the sake of peace. It is your
willingness to do this which has been a major factor in the extremely skillful job which
you have done in unifying American public opinion behind U.S. policy in Viet-Nam--a
remarkable performance in every way. But I hope that you can keep U.S. opinion united
without at the same time getting yourself into a position where you can't get credit for a
satisfactory outcome once it is achieved.
It is surely possible, as we have done so far, to handle U Thant carefully without overpraising him. Surely the aggression can be successfully warded off without at the same
time stipulating a re-affirmation of the Geneva agreement, a guarantee of free elections,
and undertakings concerning reunification of North and South Viet-Nam--which are not
worth much when signed.
With warm and respectful regards,
Faithfully yours,
Cabot L.

Washington, September 1, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietrnam, Vol. XI,
Memos (A). Top Secret.
General Westmoreland has requested and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the
movement of an additional increment of forces to Vietnam./2/ This increment would be in
addition to the 28 combat battalions, associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces-totalling 125,000--announced by you on 28 July./3/ The request is for six additional
combat battalions (making a total of 34), associated air squadrons, and logistic support
forces--totaling 85,000 additional United States personnel.
/2/At the instruction of the JCS, representatives of the Joint Staff, the Military Services,
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), CINCPAC,
COMUSMACV, and COMUSKOREA conferred at Honolulu August 3-6 on the details of
Phase I deployment of U.S. forces to Vietnam. (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part II, ch. 22, p. 8) On August 23, the JCS approved and forwarded
to McNamara the program for deployment of U.S. troops in Phase I worked out at the
Honolulu conference. The program provided for 34 battalions and 210,000 U.S. personnel
for South Vietnam and 41,000 U.S. personnel stationed in other Pacific and Southeast
Asian areas outside Vietnam. (JCSM 643-65 to Secretary of Defense, August 23;
Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265,
Vietnam 381)
/3/See Document 97.
I recommend that these additional forces be authorized for movement.
I further recommend that no announcement be made at this time of the decision to deploy
additional forces, but that announcements be made only as forces arrive in the theater.
Robert S. McNamara

Paris, September 1, 1965.
XYZ. The source text is a copy that does not bear a telegram number or a time of
transmission or receipt. For additional information, see the source note, Document 120. In
United States-Vietnam Relations, the meeting described in this telegram is incorrectly
dated September 3. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 106-107)
Today's long and fumbling session with Rupert produced a very few elements useful in a
diagnosis of the Hanoi position but hardly anything that would advance negotiations.
Although Rupert insists he has been consistent throughout discussions he seems to
fluctuate in phase with Hanoi's pronouncements and this evening he took a stiff line in an
obvious effort to parallel that taken by Pham van Dong in declaration/2/ published in
today's Le Monde. Principal points to emerge were:
/2/Pham Van Dong's National Day report on August 31 was broadcast in English over
Hanoi Radio on September 1. For excerpts from the text, see ibid., pp. 103-106.
(a) According to Rupert, any "final solution would have to include a withdrawal of U.S.
troops (Pham van Dong appears to call for their withdrawal now), and in any case troops
would have to have left before elections could take place. This was first time Rupert had
made this link.
(b) U.S. bombing, especially its intensification north and south in the last fifteen days,
could only be interpreted as attempt to force Hanoi to negotiate. Also, U.S. insistence on
"counterpart" concessions by Hanoi was psychological warfare and unacceptable. Still,
according to Rupert, bombing was unilaterally undertaken; it must be stopped unilaterally

immediately, totally, and definitively; then and then only would there be a different
atmosphere and a possibility for negotiations. There could be no question, he said, of
accepting conditions laid down by U.S. ahead of time as price of suspension of bombing.
1. X opened by remarking that his conversations with Rupert had aroused a lively interest
among his friends in Washington, of which Rupert would find evidence in TV interview
of Secretary Rusk (August 23)./3/ Rupert would find some familiar expressions in this
discourse and he would also find confirmation that U.S. policy was the same as that
expressed in the four points which X had proposed to Rupert.
/3/For a transcript of the interview, in which Goldberg and McGeorge Bundy also
participated, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, pp. 431-444.
2. X read extensively from the interview and left the text with Rupert. He noticed that the
latter showed particular interest in Rusk's expression of confidence in elections in the
south which Rupert seemed to find fantastic. He derided the Saigon Government as U.S.
creatures and jeered at its instability and said that practically all Vietnamese, especially
since Diem's oppression of nationalist elements, utterly rejected it. X observed he could
not of course accept this evaluation and said whatever it was southern population wanted
he and Rupert both knew that they didn't want Hanoi imposed on them. Whatever
procession governments in Saigon indicated it clearly showed U.S. was not imposing a
regime. Rupert retorted with the Vietnamese proverb to the effect a sorcerer can raise
phantoms but after a while they control the sorcerer.
Rupert indicated that that might be but Hanoi had no intention of imposing a regime in the
south.
3. Discussion of bombing followed X's quotation of Rusk TV remarks on subject and was
intermittent throughout the rambling discussion. X recalled Rupert's inquiry about U.S.
Aide-Memoire/4/ and read excerpts from the Memoire. Also left with Rupert handwritten
rough translation of pertinent paragraphs on bombing. Also referred to British White
Paper/5/ and the phrase "appropriate and commensurate" in connection with desired type
of response from Hanoi.
/5/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, pp. 444-447.
4. Rupert's temperature here rose to something approaching heat. He denounced U.S.
proposal as psychological warfare, as an effort to impress world opinion, etc. He said that
the intensification of military activity in the south and bombing north and south,
particularly in the last two weeks, showed U.S. trying to compel Hanoi to the conference
table. In these conditions there could be no question of Hanoi's yielding. It was left with
no alternative but to continue the war. He insisted that U.S. requirement of a counterpart
was unrealistic; that U.S. began the bombing unilaterally and should stop it unilaterally
and stop its "aggression" as well. He claimed to believe U.S. demanding as counterparts
concessions tantamount to abandoning Hanoi's entire military position (X cannot recall
just what particulars Rupert cited).
5. Rupert again resorted to phrase about "allegations" re activity of 325th North Viet
Division. Later when X said--you apparently now deny 325th Division in the south,
Rupert said he did not deny it. He claimed, however, that the 325th not now engaged in
military operations.
6. X suggested that he preferred Secretary's word "signal" to Rupert's word "counterpart".
U.S. not asking Hanoi to abandon all its military leverage but wanted at least a token that
U.S. gesture in stopping bombing was understood as move toward peaceful settlement. He
quoted the U.S. Aide-Memoire to suggest other possibilities for a response by Hanoi, such
as stopping infiltration and reducing level of incidents. On latter point X also referred to
Algerian precedent when French found it easier to come to conference table when
incidents dropped below certain level. X said U.S. could not be expected to halt bombing
under circumstances which made it look as though it had found the going too rough and
too rude and was accepting military reverse.
7. Rupert at no time rose to bait on stopping infiltration or reduction of incidents. All he
would say (and repeatedly) was that if the U.S. stopped the bombing unilaterally there
would be a new atmosphere and a new deal.
8. X then went so far as to ask Rupert to comment on handling the problem of a Hanoi
response through device of parallel but ostensibly unlinked courses of action, i.e., U.S. to
halt bombing while there would be simultaneous actions by Hanoi possibly synchronized
by "third party" unspecified.
9. Rupert appeared interested but would say only in effect that if U.S. so acted one would
see. However, he then repeatedly revived other Hanoi conditions, including acceptance of
the program of the "Front", halting of U.S. "aggression", etc.
10. X again insisted he and Rupert losing time using words like "aggression". Rupert said
he willing to substitute "war". X's reply to charge that U.S. aggressively interested
[intensified?] bombing was that Hanoi had been unilaterally making war on the south for
four years previously, to which answer Rupert sharply interjected accusation about Diem's
activities.
11. According to X his friends in U.S. wanted some sign Hanoi understood what halt in
bombing meant. Rupert should be aware restraint in U.S. bombing policy. Although it
could easily do so, U.S. not interfering directly with harvest, had not destroyed Haiphong,
was not at the present time breaking up industry. Of course there was a rising curve in
military actions, especially as military machines on both sides took hold and passions
were aroused, but this is what he and Rupert had the opportunity to prevent.
12. Rupert quite excitedly said X was wrong, that thousands were being killed, that he had
the figures to show it. It was more obvious than ever before that Hanoi and VC, both north
and south, are being grievously hurt. For present, however, Rupert would only say that
these bombings more than ever made it inevitable that Hanoi would continue the war for
as many years as might be necessary.
13. X rehearsed his earlier arguments, that Hanoi could not obtain a decision, U.S. could
not be forced out, escalation could only mean stepping up foreign activity (U.S. and
Chinese), north and south, and could threaten continuance of U.S. policy of restraint in
bombing.
14. X then undertook to begin review of positions reached by him and Rupert in current
talks. Said although we wide apart there seemed to be somewhat less difference of opinion
re withdrawal of troops and unification. In reply Rupert made point, new in these
discussions, that U.S. troops would have to be withdrawn before elections could take
place. On being pressed to state his own understanding of what he and X discussed he
affirmed that "any final solution would have to include (comporter) withdrawal of U.S.
troops", but this time added that such withdrawal would have to precede elections. He
claimed it was X who had introduced the idea of "stages" in conversation. (X supplied the
word but Rupert if anything was ahead of him in endorsing the idea.)
15. X did not say whether this timing was acceptable to his friends but did repeat that U.S.
wanted fundamental rights of Vietnam as presented in Geneva Accords agreed. U.S.
wanted independent, unified, possibly non-aligned Vietnam, and were willing to put our
policy to the test, including free elections without outside intervention. If U.S. troops
withdrawn it could not be under conditions which left other outside forces, i.e., Hanoi,
free to influence results.
X observed that Rupert had not previously made this point on withdrawals, and took
occasion to observe that while Pham van Dong and Rusk interviews demonstrated
awareness X/Rupert conversations, Pham van Dong had taken a harder line while press
widely commented on Rusk's determination to seek peace and had even used phrase "deescalation".
16. As to reunification and X's claim that he and Rupert seemed not too far apart, i.e., with
respect to international decision by free consultation, north and south, timing and
supervision, Rupert said Hanoi was not imposing any decision on the south (meaning the
"Front"). Therefore the timetable would be as the south and north should agree. (X again
referred to fact that most South Vietnamese probably did not want unification on Hanoi
terms.)
17. X asked Rupert to try to resume where he and X stood. Rupert reviewed the positions
he had just taken on bombing, reunification, and claimed these represented no change in
his prior position. He confirmed that he had noticed in French press account taken by
Secretary Rusk and others of these discussions. With reference to internal regime he again
insisted on program of the "Front". X again said it was unrealistic to expect strongest
power in the world to accept adversary fiat on agenda, withdraw all its troops prior to
negotiation, and accept a priori installation of "Front" as sole negotiating agent and
government in south. Latter would certainly find a role to play in national life and
reconstruction and could also be included in North Vietnamese delegation. (Rupert
sneered at latter idea.) If, as Rupert claimed, Front represented everybody in south X said
they would be triumphantly returned by elections. However, X doubted it.
18. Early in interview X had indicated desirability of meeting next week and Rupert
agreed to Tuesday,/6/ at which time X promised refined French text of pertinent parts of
U.S. Aide-Memoire to other governments, as well as of parts of TV interview.
/6/September 7. Mai Van Bo did not show up for the meeting on September 7. DRV
officials indicated that he was "sick." Gullion and Mai Van Bo held no further meetings.
Paul Sturm ("Y"), who replaced Gullion, had an unproductive meeting with Mai Van Bo
on November 18. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 107-109)
At close of meeting X said he would "retain" particularly two of Rupert's points, i.e.,
position that cessation of bombing could not be conditioned on prior promise or
performance by Hanoi of counterpart undertaking, and point that withdrawal of foreign
troops must be completed before elections. He expressed obvious reservations, but said he
would reflect and consult on these points, and confirmed meeting for Tuesday.
Rupert said a further meeting might be worthwhile if there were anything new, but said
discussions thus far had produced little that was new or useful. X said he thought talks
had taken a "zig-zag" course and that last previous meeting had seemed "constructive".
This clearly worried Rupert who demanded confirmation that he had always taken a
consistent line.
General impressions:
X had stronger impression than previously that Rupert fearful of getting out of line with
Hanoi. Rupert obviously worried at implication that in current talks he had ever veered.
Indeed, he may already have done so in appearing on earlier occasion to be too relaxed
about timing of U.S. troop withdrawals. X suspects some of Rupert's waverings reflect
difference within Hanoi Government, pulling and hauling with Front, Chinese, etc.
Although on surface Rupert position on halting bombing and on withdrawal U.S. troops
seems notably unfruitful, Washington may wish to consider whether a third party might
not be enlisted (not French) to receive from Hanoi assurances that if bombing suspended
there might be some action on the part of Hanoi; also what would be time relation
between withdrawal U.S. troops and: (a) popular consultation with respect to unification,
and (b) with respect to voting on internal regime of South Vietnam, (c) convening of a
conference, (d) putting Geneva Accords into effect; also relation of these measures to
international control? Should we ask Rupert these questions?
X's general impression is that talks very unfruitful at this point and unless something gives
difficult to see beyond next one or two sessions. He thinks Hanoi does not want to talk at
this point. In a month's time it may be different./7/

Saigon, September 4, 1965.
to CINCPAC for POLAD. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the
telegram was received at 2:51 a.m.
474. Reference: Department telegram 610 rptd CINCPAC unn./2/
/2/In telegram 610 to Saigon, September 1, the Department of State noted with concern
the Embassy's report that General Thi believed that events in South Vietnam favored his
eventual ascension to power. The Department agreed entirely with Lodge's plan to
discourage Thi since it feared that the effects of further political instability in South
Vietnam would have serious consequences on U.S. and international public opinion and
could only disrupt the war effort against the Viet Cong. The Department asked for the
Embassy's assessment of Thi's chances and methods of a possible takeover. (Ibid.)
1. Prospect of fresh political instability in Saigon which Gen. Thi's ambition may
represent is merely most recent manifestation of long-term, well-known problem. It is, of
course, not related simply to Thi or any other individual. Since early 1963 political
instability has been a fact of life here. It does not arise or disappear because of failures or
successes against Viet Cong, but it is affected by the way the war goes and changes form
accordingly. Were the war to end under acceptable circumstances the problem would not
disappear. As the Viet Cong find themselves increasingly frustrated and as Hanoi sees the
path to military victory blocked, they may even come to regard the possibility of political
chaos and ineffective govt as their best hope for ultimate success and increase their efforts
in this sphere accordingly. However, if we were to find ourselves on the threshold of or
involved in negotiations with the DRV, they would hope to gain in such negotiations by
virtue of political weakness in the south what they could not gain because of combined
US-GVN military strength.
2. The Directorate govt has so far taken the line that there must be a moratorium on
political activity until the Communist threat has been dealt with. Such a policy is
unrealistic by itself, but when complicated by the possible fragility of the unity of the
Directorate, it becomes even more probable that we face the danger of sudden
opportunistic political moves and unpredictable political change. It is in this context that
the evidence of Thi's ambition or the maneuvering of Tri Quang must be examined.
3. Political instability has tended to fluctuate in intensity. Two weeks ago the political pot
began to bubble in Hue with mild anti-mobilization demonstrations which developed an
anti-government theme./3/ But now, due to a variety of factors, the intensity of opposition
to the government and the maneuverings of ambitious individuals seem for the moment to
have been checked. Moreover, the government's decision to establish a civilian advisory
council (Embtel 737)/4/ could take some of the political heat off the govt for the
immediate future.
/3/In telegram 724 from Saigon, September 2, the Embassy reported on anti-government
student demonstrations in Hue. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
/4/Dated September 3. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)
4. The Directorate has been operating in something resembling a political vacuum when it
comes to domestic politics, non-military power groupings, and individual ambitions. One
of Nguyen Khanh's essential weaknesses was his failure to deal effectively with nonmilitary political elements and eventually they brought him down. The new advisory
council seems able [garble] on part present GVN to cope with such elements.
5. With these introductory remarks in the broader context the more specific comments
requested in reftel can be provided.
6. Given the personality of I Corps Commander, Brigadier General Nguyen Chanh Thi, it
is extremely difficult to predict with precision just how he might try to make his move or
even whether he will try. By common consent, among those who have known him well,
Thi is an extremely complex individual. Low-born, he has always been quite aware of the
poverty of his antecedents. He has had little formal training outside the army. He is
acutely sensitive to this lack. His role in the coup manque of November 11, 1960 has been
cast into doubt by those who contend that he was a "late starter" who threw in his lot with
coup when they seemed on the verge of victory and broke violently with them in exile in
Phnom Penh, berating them for involving him in a lost cause. Exile cost him dearly in
terms of pride because he was forced to accept handouts and menial jobs from those he
considered inferior merely to live. During this period his wife, in Viet-Nam, took up with
another officer and left him.
7. When Thi returned to Viet-Nam following coup of November 1, 1963, he felt that
Military Revolutionary Council owed him something in the way of promotion and reward
in view of his association with attempt of November 11, 1960 and his long exile. But he
was given his old rank and shipped off to I Corps. There he associated himself with
Nguyen Khanh who had himself been "late starter" in coup of Nov. 1, 1963. Through his
old connections with the airborne brigade, Thi helped Khanh organize the coup of January
30.
8. In wake of January 30 coup, Thi found himself back in I Corps despite promises by
Khanh that he was to be his "right hand man" in Saigon. He was First Division
Commander and much later he rose to become Corps Commander.
9. At various times during past year Thi has played controversial political role in I Corps.
One has only to recall embarrassment Khanh suffered at hands of hostile crowd in Hue the
day that a Ngo Dinh Can henchman, Phan Quang Dong, was executed. Such an incident
could not have transpired without sure foreknowledge permissive attitude Thi's part.
There was also Thi's "hands off" attitude on Hue demonstrations that led to downfall of
Huong. Embarrassment of Thieu during course visit to Hue just after Directorate formed
is another case in point.
10. There is no doubt that Thi has often thought of himself as a potential saviour of his
country. These thoughts have probably also been accompanied by grave doubt about his
real ability to govern the land. He seems genuinely convinced of his own honesty and his
determination to cope with corruption and bad government (according to his own lights).
11. There seems little doubt Tri Quang and his adherents have felt for some time that Thi
was sympathetic and usable. There was a certain identity of interest between them, but at
the same time there was also a certain condescension on the part of Tri Quang and
company. Probably some of the Hue group of intellectuals around Tri Quang began
talking about how Thi could be used. Whatever the means by which he learned of it, Thi
appears fully aware of an effort to transform him into a deus ex machina and he resents it.
12. Articles 10 and 15 of Constitutional Charter promulgated June 19/5/ contain
provisions for replacement of President of Directorate and Prime Minister respectively.
These articles are concerned with death or incapacity, however, and not orderly
succession for other reasons. Either could, of course, be used to cover case where either
Thieu or Ky resigned and withdrew. By-laws of Congress of Armed Forces (reported in
FVS-11,922)/6/ are more specific and deal with such subjects as reprimands, noconfidence and replacement by Directorate members. Thus legal machinery does exist for
orderly and peaceful transfer of power to Thi assuming all parties are agreeable.
Nevertheless it is not a question of legal procedures but more a problem of power groups
and power plays that will determine the end result.
/5/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 880-883.
/6/Not found.
13. In his conversations with Mission officer regarding his destiny, Thi has come down on
side of a peaceful and orderly transfer if he is to take power. He has said on one occasion
that he would hope that Ky, on becoming aware of his incapacity to lead, would turn to
him and say, "I tried, now it's your turn," and quietly return to his air force. Such remarks
by Thi must be weighed carefully, because they were meant for American consumption
with full knowledge of our anxiety that governmental stability be maintained. Given Thi's
mercurial nature, one must conclude that the circumstances of the moment would
determine whether he made his play within or outside the framework of the existing
government. In any event, were he to assume either Thieu's position or Ky's one would
have to expect many changes in personnel (Thi has always wanted his own men around
him), programs and probably even in fundamental GVN policy.
14. It is our judgment that Thi would be seriously deficient in either military backing or
popular support were he to try and assume power. One can imagine a situation developing
within the Directorate itself through which he might be named either Chairman or Prime
Minister, but he would face virtually insurmountable difficulties from outset in attempting
to allay any broad base support. Your judgment is accurate that there would be sharp
reaction within the northern Catholic refugee bloc. In addition, the southern mass would
probably find this impossible to stomach. His only assets would probably be in the center
and even these are uncertain if he were unwilling to accept guidance from Tri Quang. (Thi
and Quang are possessed of personalities which are not dissimilar and potentially
antipathetic.)
15. In view of foregoing, we will continue taking line proposed in Embtel 671/7/ with Thi
and would hope that we can convince him that he can best serve the nation in present role
as I Corps Commander and by lending his support to the principle of continued unity
within the Directorate. Defense Minister Co has told us that he was sent to Da Nang while
Hue protests were going on for the purpose of reaffirming Thi's support for the
government about which certain members of the Directorate were worried. Co claims to
have gained Thi's understanding and that Thi continues to support status quo.
/7/Telegram 671 from Saigon, August 28, contains the report of Thi's statement to an
Embassy official that he would eventually replace the corrupt and inefficient Thieu/Ky
government. Lodge suggested, according to the cable, "that continuing exposure to
Americans all voicing the same line of the need for stability and unity among the
members of the Directorate will eventually convince him that he is not our man on the
white horse." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
Lodge
135. Memorandum From the President's Consultant on Vietnam (Taylor) to

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL,
Memos. Secret. Regarding Taylor's role as a part-time consultant to the President, see
Swords and Plowshares, pp. 358-366.
SUBJECT
A Cease-fire in South Viet Nam
In seeking possible ways of ending the insurgency in South Viet Nam, I have noted with
some concern that some of our best friends often consider that at some early point in the
procedure it would be desirable or even essential to declare a "cease-fire". Senator
Mansfield in his recent speech/2/ bore down heavily on the need for a cease-fire and a
stand-fast which, he indicated, might start at the outset of negotiations.
/2/The text of Mansfield's September 1 speech to the Senate is in The Congressional
Record--Senate, September 1, 1965, pp. 22560-22562.
If the users of this word, cease-fire, mean it in the sense of a cessation of all use of
firearms, it is no more reasonable to talk of a cease-fire in South Viet Nam than of one
between police and criminals in a crime-wave. The hostile acts of the Viet Cong which
must be brought under control--terrorism, sabotage, oppression of the rural population,
recruiting and infiltration--do not depend on the use of weapons. The prevention of these
acts by the government does. Hence, a cease-fire without something else would give the
Viet Cong the opportunity to continue to harass the population, impress recruits, expand
their areas of control and prepare for greater depredations.
The "something else" which would have to be added to make the situation tolerable from
our point of view must include provisions for the continued maintenance of law and order
by government forces, at least outside of those areas which might be conceded to be
normally under Viet Cong control. The government could offer to cease bombings and
clearing operations in these Red areas and, in exchange, the Viet Cong/Hanoi would
undertake to cease all incidents anywhere in South Viet Nam and all infiltration from
outside South Viet Nam. Our side should retain the right of unarmed air reconnaissance of
infiltration routes in North Viet Nam and Laos.
In summary, instead of talking of a mutual cease-fire we should talk of a cease-fire on our
side in exchange for a cease-aggression on theirs. A fair offer would be for our side to
cease all bombing in North and South Viet Nam, and all new clearing operations in Viet
Cong held territory, but to retain the right to use force to maintain law and order outside
of specified Viet Cong-controlled areas. Additionally, we might agree to freeze foreign
force levels but should retain the right of unarmed air reconnaissance of infiltration routes
in North Viet Nam and Laos. Their side would cease all incidents in South Viet Nam and
infiltration of men and equipment in South Viet Nam. Both sides should have the right on
short notice to denounce the agreement for cause.
I believe that the foregoing discussion suggests how involved a cessation of hostilities is
in a guerrilla situation such as we have in South Viet Nam. In many ways, the
requirements are as demanding as for the negotiating of a final peace settlement. Even, if
achieved, the agreement would be susceptible to breach without warning either by a
deliberate decision of the Communist leaders or by an act of indiscipline or carelessness
by any of the hundreds of thousands of armed men on either side. All of these points need
careful consideration before we allow ourselves to become involved in a so-called ceasefire which can be a trap.
Maxwell D. Taylor
136. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
I-36114/65
SUBJECT
Concept for Vietnam (U)
In JCSM 652-65 (Tab A),/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff outline a concept for the future
conduct of the conflict in Vietnam. In the proposed concept, the Joint Chiefs outline
factors bearing on the development of a US military strategy, discuss US objectives, tasks,
and basic strategy, and recommend principal measures necessary for executing the basic
strategy and for achieving US objectives. The concept includes certain generalized
courses of action about which there would be little or no dispute and a number of other
courses that are clearly controversial and raise far-reaching policy issues (e.g., blockade
and mining of DRV, US build-up in Thailand, intensified RT).
/2/Document 130.
The JCS state that they will submit specific recommendations to implement the concept at
an early date. They recommend that the concept be approved as the basis for subsequent
development of courses of action, forces and other requirements, to include the phasing of
operations.
In my judgment, an over-all approval of the concept proposed by the JCS is not required
at this time and would not significantly increase US capabilities and planning in dealing
with the situation in SEA in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, I recommend that the
concept proposed not be specifically approved at this time. Instead I recommend that you
indicate to the Chairman, JCS, that you have studied the referenced JCSM and agree to
the use of the proposed concept in the formulation of specific recommendations for future
operations in SEA./3/
/3/On September 11, McNamara informed the JCS that he had considered JCSM 652-65
and agreed that the recommendations for future operations in Southeast Asia should be
formulated and considered individually as they were developed. McNamara noted that he
had sent JCSM 652-65 to the Department of State and White House for use in future
deliberations. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC
70 A 1265, Vietnam 381)
Copies of the referenced JCSM have been provided to Bill Bundy and to McGeorge
Bundy.
John T. McNaughton
137. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling
Thunder Memos, 1965. Secret. Copies were sent to Unger and McGeorge Bundy. The
source text is Unger's unsigned copy; McGeorge Bundy's signed copy is in the Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Cables.
SUBJECT
Systematic Bombing in North Viet Nam
On my return from leave I found that not much progress had been made with respect to
bombing policy in North Viet Nam. It may be useful, therefore, for me to set out briefly
the proposition about which I talked with you two weeks ago./2/
/2/No record of this discussion has been found.
1. Perhaps the most firmly based proposition about the use of airpower is that its
systematic and thorough application against a few target systems is geometrically more
effective than its diffuse application against many target systems.
2. For this reason, there is little doubt that the most effective use of airpower against
North Viet Nam would be systematically to attack certain target systems which are critical
to the military supply and production capabilities of that country. The two best candidates
are: oil storage and electric power. Although attacks on these target systems need not be
sanguinary in terms of civilian casualties, it is evident that they raise issues which have
led the President thus far to hold off.
3. This fact does not relieve us of the responsibility of insuring that the use of airpower
against North Viet Nam, within present limits, is as efficient as it can be made. At the
present time, from the evidence available, I believe our attacks on North Viet Nam suffer
from excessive diffusion of effort with respect to target systems. We are attacking
ammunition dumps; barracks; some accessible power stations and oil storage depots;
transport targets; etc. The indecisive character of the results is suggested by the analyses
of the effectiveness of our bombing. They indicate that we have damaged or destroyed a
modest proportion of each target system (roughly 5-20%).
4. I propose, therefore, that while keeping open the question of an optimum use of
airpower (i.e., systematic attack, including targets near Hanoi, on oil storage and electric
power), we devote ourselves forthwith to a transport interdiction campaign with the
objectives of:
--isolating Hanoi from the Laos and South Viet Nam borders;
--isolating particular regions of southern and western North Viet Nam from each other and
from Hanoi.
5. This judgment is based on ample evidence that our transport attacks in North Viet Nam
are producing a series of substantial effects on the military and civil economy, as well as
on psychological and political morale; but there is also evidence that the lack of system
and follow-through in those attacks is denying us their full potentialities.
6. To do this we must establish, by careful analysis, the 50 or so critical transport
bottlenecks in North Viet Nam and make a maximum commitment of force to hold those
cuts, if possible, by night as well as by day. In turn, this would require that we permit the
use of our full sortie capabilities against this transport target system, dropping, if
necessary, attacks on target systems of doubtful or lesser value--perhaps barracks and
ammunition dumps.
7. No guarantee concerning results can, of course, be made. But a careful reading of the
evidence suggests that the transport system of North Viet Nam has been rendered so
vulnerable by bombing up to the present point that such a truly systematic interdiction
effort might not only make even small military movements across the North Vietnamese
borders impractical but also produce significant economic, social, and political
consequences.
7. [sic] The adoption of such a program would make urgent an effort which is not lacking
in our government; namely, a sophisticated and systematic effort to evaluate from all
sources the various different military and civilian effects being imposed by our bombing
in the North.
8. A related transport interdiction system should be considered for concurrent or later
application; namely, the interdiction of Hanoi from external sources of supply. This
system involves the cutting (and holding of cuts) in the rail and road system between
Hanoi and the Chicom borders and the mining of Haiphong harbor. A government in
Hanoi isolated from its own borders and hinterland and from regular flows of external
supplies is likely to take a relatively dim view of its prospects, while still retaining its
hard-won industrial and urban infrastructure.
138. Memorandum by Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Pt.
SUBJECT
Status Report on U.S. Non-Military Programs in Vietnam
Attached is a brief discussion and status report/2/ of our more important non-military
programs. This represents the first in a series of monthly reports for the President.
The range and complexity of our non-military activities are noteworthy--from training
village policemen to controlling inflation. The key elements of this comprehensive
program are touched on briefly below.
Security and Political Operations. An ambitious internal security program is concentrating
on building national, provincial and Special Branch police forces. Recruiting, training and
equipping a force of almost 80,000 men is proceeding on schedule. Important steps have
also been taken to improve techniques of population control; 7 million identity cards have
been issued and population checkpoints have been established. CIA-trained counterguerrilla units are operating against the VC in its own territory.
The objective of attracting popular support for the Saigon government permeates the full
range of programs involved in the counterinsurgency effort. Ky has attempted to project
an image of revolutionary reform, but promises have only been slowly fulfilled, and the
lack of effective government ties into the villages has dulled the impact of Ky's
revolutionary fervor.
The Mission is encouraging Ky to give concrete meaning to his program and to build
support for it among the various elements of Vietnamese society. In theory these groups
welcome Ky's objectives, but his defensive attitude and the problem of enlisting the
support of one group without alienating another inhibit greater progress.
On the level of local action, CIA has trained and equipped various types of small, highly
motivated teams which operate throughout the provinces, applying Viet Cong tactics of
living and working with the villagers.
The Mission is working with all important political groups to sublimate their deeply
embedded historic frictions and encourage their joint effort to defeat the Viet Cong. There
is greater covert than overt room for maneuver and programming in this field and CIA has
initiated programs to convince both leaders and rank and file that only through
cooperation and concentration on prosecuting the war can they avoid Communist
domination and realize their respective objectives. The evolution of a national program
which can attract their collective energies and subordinate their self-serving interests
remains essential if greater progress is to be achieved.
Provincial Operations--Ex Security. The comprehensive military-civilian operation in the
Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon has shown progress. The political situation is stable
except in Hau Nghia Province where GVN military interference with the Province Chief's
operations and instances of indiscriminate shelling have alienated some of the local
population.
The refugee problem continues to be serious, although not critical except in the
overcrowded camps at Qui Nhon where additional housing is being built. Through the
Mission and Dr. Howard Rusk/3/ we are bringing maximum assistance from both U.S.
private and public sectors to bear on the problem.
/3/With the active encouragement of the Johnson administration, Dr. Howard Rusk was
involved in creating an American Southeast Asia Foundation as a non-government fund
raising and assistance program for public participation in President Johnson's Southeast
Asian program. Secretary Rusk told Dr. Rusk to ignore bureaucratic obstruction with his
plans as he had "a direct line to the President." (Memorandum from Thomson to
McGeorge Bundy, September 2; Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia,
Vietnam, Howard Rusk Project) McGeorge Bundy sent the President a memorandum on
September 23, summarizing Rusk's recommendations. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Howard Rusk Mission)
The recommendations of the Chieu Hoi (rally and amnesty) task force have been
approved by our Mission and form the basis for current negotiations with the GVN for a
much improved program.
Economic and Social Operations. Economic assistance programs are giving priority to
countering the growing threat of inflation, meeting serious logistic problems created by
Viet Cong interdiction of land routes, and developing tactics for combatting Viet Cong
economic subversion.
Traditional AID programs for agricultural and industrial development continue within the
limits of security, with most progress in the Delta and Saigon areas. There is special
priority for establishing a light industry complex and creating a planned community in the
Cam Ranh Bay area where a major port and U.S. military base are being constructed.
Emphasis is being placed on improving medical facilities in the provinces and increasing
the number of surgical suites staffed by U.S. and other Free World medical personnel.
The GVN has initiated some limited new land reform measures. While the GVN is still
moving cautiously because of landlord sensitivities, at least the initial step has been taken
after a long period of inactivity in this important area.
Psychological Warfare and Information. USIA propaganda directed at North Vietnam has
increased considerably with the expansion of Voice of America Vietnamese language
service and the initiation of extensive leaflet drops.
Propaganda and psychological operations in South Vietnam have also expanded and
grown more effective with the buildup of U.S. information personnel.
U.S. troop orientation programs are attempting to reduce potential causes of friction
between U.S. troops and the Vietnamese. There have been instances of friction in urban
areas near U.S. military installations; there does not seem to be much of a problem in the
countryside.
Veterans benefits programs for the Vietnamese military are being developed to improve
morale and sustain their commitment to the war effort and a non-Communist Vietnam.
Our efforts to convince the GVN of the necessity for an effective external information
program are now bearing fruit. Pamphlets and other materials have been produced for
foreign distribution; newly recruited personnel for assignment abroad are being trained;
foreign correspondents, at long last, are being briefed by Saigon spokesmen. The GVN is
focusing on better diplomatic representation abroad; agrement has been requested for a
new and effective Ambassador to Washington.
C
Washington, September 12, 1965, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, September 13, 1965. Top
Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
11 AM Meeting on Monday with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Raborn and Bundy/2/
There are several important topics that are ripe for discussion at this meeting. Most of
them grow out of a long session on Saturday afternoon of Rusk, McNamara, Ball and
myself./3/
/3/According to Rusk's Appointment Book, the Secretary met with McNamara, Ball, and
McGeorge and William Bundy from 2:30 to 4 p.m. on Saturday, September 11. (Johnson
Library) No other record of this meeting has been found.
I. Vietnam
1. Bombing policy. Bob McNamara is eager to get general guidance for the next few
weeks on bombing in North Vietnam. As you know, he is engaged in a running discussion
with the Chiefs on this subject. His own view is that we should continue with carefully
measured attacks on clearly defined military targets that do not take us into the HanoiHaiphong area, or into direct engagement of Migs, IL-28s, or the SAM-site systems as a
whole. (SAM sites outside the Hanoi-Haiphong area would remain targets of opportunity,
as I understand it.) The wider recommendations of the Chiefs have been referred back for
additional study./4/
Yesterday Dean Rusk felt that while the present pattern of bombing should certainly
continue, we should not extend it, as Bob initially suggested, into the part of North
Vietnam which is northeast of Hanoi. Bob accepted this advice, and I think the targets he
will put forward will be acceptable to Dean. It was also agreed that there would be a
further study of target systems in North Vietnam, with the thought that a more
sophisticated analysis may permit selection of target systems that would hurt the DRV a
lot more, without increasing civilian casualties. It was agreed that the target selection so
far has not had this level of sophistication.
2. Diplomatic situation. We had an extended discussion also of the diplomatic situation.
On this you must be psychic. I told you yesterday that the Ruppert discussions/5/ were
continuing. But the fact is that Ruppert cancelled a meeting scheduled for last Tuesday,
and X has come home. X got the feeling at his last meeting that Ruppert had been called
up short, and that there might even be someone watching from behind a curtain which had
been drawn for the first time across a doorway in the meeting room. Ruppert carefully
drew back from one or two marginal positions taken in earlier talks, and even insisted that
he had never taken those positions.
/5/Reference is to the informal conversations between Mai Van Bo and Edmund Gullion;
see Document 112.
In this situation, there is general agreement that we ought not now to look as if we were
very eager for more talks, and we are inclined to keep X at home and show no eagerness
for further probes in the next few weeks. We will need your judgment on this also.
(Discussion of this matter on Monday will be indirect and fuzzy because Red Raborn is
not currently a member of the Ruppert club--and I doubt if he should be cut in right now
unless for some reason you want him to be.)
At the same time that we suspend private diplomatic probing, we think that we should
adopt a public posture that our position on negotiations is now totally clear and that the
next move is up to the Communists. While we do not like Lodge's leaks to Reston and
Nixon, we are inclined to agree with his assessment and to feel that we now have a
perfectly good public posture which does not need to be regilded every day. I take it from
our phone conversation yesterday that this is your own general view.
Our most difficult and inconclusive discussions turned on the actual program within
Vietnam. Our common guess is that the Viet Cong will try to avoid major engagements
with our forces and that they will be quite successful in doing so. In this situation, Rusk
raised the question whether we really need to move up toward 200,000 men. McNamara
continues to feel that we do, and I agree. The problem is to make sure that the role of our
troops is so understood that neither the country nor the troops themselves get frustrated if
the scene of major action shifts toward smaller terrorist activities in which our troops
cannot play the dominant role.
We finally agreed that we should ask Lodge and Westmoreland for a general assessment
of the prospects for the next few months in this area. We seem to have got past the big
monsoon dangers, and we need to be sure that we have an agreed program for the
continuing contest of pacification. We will not have anything sharp to report tomorrow
morning, but you should know that all of us feel that this is the most important area of
effort for the coming weeks and months.
[Here follows discussion of South Asia and Europe.]

McG. B.

Department of State
Washington, DC

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, September 13, 1965. Top
Secret. Prepared by Califano.
SUBJECT
Luncheon Meeting with the President, Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Raborn, Ball,
Moyers (first half), and Califano/2/
/2/The meeting lasted from 1:16 to 2:20 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The agenda
of the meeting is ibid., National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with
the President, Vol. I.
McNamara informed the President that the JCS had recommended the bombing of SAM
sites, airfields having IL-28s and other targets in areas previously restricted around Hanoi
and Haiphong and close to the Chinese border. McNamara said he considered this a
significant escalation of war against North Viet Nam and believed that it was premature
for the President to consider or act upon any such recommendation until we had a better
feel for the likelihood of North Vietnamese use of IL-28s and the North Vietnamese and
Chicom reaction to any such action. Rusk agreed with McNamara. McNamara also
recommended that certain other targets be hit. Rusk was worried about hitting two bridges
between Hanoi and the Communist Chinese border indiscriminately and recommended
that the action with respect to each of those bridges be limited to one day. McNamara
agreed with Rusk and the President approved this decision. McNamara said that he would
be back to the President, after study by Adm. Raborn, with a more fully considered view
of the recommendations of the JCS.
[Here follow an extensive discussion of South Asia and a short report by Ball on a trip to
Europe.]
JA Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President

Washington, September 14, 1965, 7:44 p.m.
Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, approved in draft by McGeorge Bundy and
McNamara, and approved by Ball. A September 12 draft of this telegram with
handwritten revisions by McGeorge Bundy is in the Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos. The substantive changes by McGeorge
Bundy are indicated in footnotes below.
753. Eyes only Ambassador.
1. Informal high-level review over weekend of Vietnam situation leaves us with feeling
situation has more major uncertainties, variables, and possibly occasions for changes in
our actions than for some time past. Purpose this message is to give you feel of our
thinking and of questions we see becoming acute.
2. Seems likely increasing US ground strength is driving Hanoi/VC to avoid major unit
actions and in effect revert to pattern of placing primary emphasis on small-scale actions.
Quite possibly we may be faced with VC tactics of prolonged small-scale struggle in
which they will rely on international pressures and their doubtless exaggerated view of
our internal political opposition to bring about eventual reduction in our effort, while they
also hope and work for adverse internal political developments in GVN. In combating
such prolonged tactics we need to consider just how we propose to use our greatly
increased ground and air strength, especially the degree to which it can and should be
employed in any wider countryside efforts beyond necessarily slow securing efforts close
to our base areas./2/ (We also question whether and how we can move from patrolling to
real pacification in these areas--can ARVN and GVN police take advantage of our nearby
strength for this purpose in these areas?) There is even a residual question whether further
increases in strength at presently planned pace are wise, or whether we should in some
small degree defer further increases. Obviously one crucial element in this is GVN and
SVN popular reaction to more extensive US ground operations, and on this subject we
would welcome your over-all and up-to-date assessment. In short, if we move rapidly up
in force strength, question is bound to arise of effective employment these forces and
exactly what concept and strategy we should follow against VC lie-low tactics.
/2/In the September 12 draft, McGeorge Bundy changed the phrase "extending perhaps
eventually up to 30-50 miles from our base areas" to read as it does at this point. He also
added the subsequent sentence in the parentheses.
3. Related question concerns scale and effective employment and continuing evaluation of
results of presently planned massive further increase in air strike capacity. On this we
have noted Westmoreland's excellent directive concerning civilian implications of
operations,/3/ but still feel there is need for better over-all analysis of operations and for
some mechanism to evaluate operations currently from all standpoints. One possibility
would be to find civilian and military people akin to those who did operations analysis in
World War II to act as survey group either on one-shot or continuing basis. Obviously,
this too is matter you have under continuing close study, and we need to know your
thoughts./4/
/3/On September 7, Westmoreland issued MACV Directive 525-3 prescribing guidelines
designed to minimize non-combatant battle casualties. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL)
/4/In the draft, the phrase originally read: "exchange our thoughts."
4. As to pacification/reconstruction effort, we wonder whether time is not fast
approaching, or already here, when GVN forces freed by US deployments could put far
more steam into Hop Tac and perhaps other key pacification areas where efforts have
been pretty much stalled because of force shortage and general security situation. This
might involve selecting provinces for really planned and systematic extension of GVN
control with firm allotment of necessary military forces, plus police and all other elements
of effort. In this connection, we would like for you to develop specific plan for our joint
consideration involving concentration of GVN forces on pacification and reliance on US
forces to handle large VC actions. What areas would be chosen for pacification; when
could the plan be started and what objectives would be set; how many GVN forces would
be required, where and when; how many US forces would be required, where and when;
etc?/5/
/5/Not marked as excised in the September 12 draft, but excised by McGeorge Bundy
from the final text of the telegram, was the following paragraph 4:
"Content of bombing program against DRV is next military question. Our inclination is to
extend strike program very gradually into area northeast of Hanoi, stressing key targets on
northeast rail line and limited number other valid military targets. This would be without
stepping up over-all number of strikes per week, but might be accompanied by some
intensification armed recce particularly designed to keep key transportation links out of
action in area roughly up to 20th parallel. We are still inclined not to hit Hanoi/Haiphong
targets or to take actions that would have major chance altering ChiCom posture."
5. Still further possibility, which we know you have thoroughly in mind, would be
extended GVN application of key elements in Acheson plan/6/ (land reform, Chieu Hoi,
etc.) on over-all basis. Moreover, we wonder if it may not become possible to select one
or more areas (perhaps in IV Corps area) for application of all elements Acheson plan
including local electoral process.
6. On negotiating front we share your view that there is no need to stress our basic
position further and that additional stress runs considerable risk misunderstanding in both
Hanoi and Saigon. Believe we have taken it far enough to make abundantly clear in all
reasonable quarters that it is Hanoi, and especially Peiping, who are the obstacles to
peace. Obviously, we shall have to reiterate our position in UN debate, and may have to
respond to further third country initiatives, although the field is happily fairly clear at the
moment. But we agree we do not need to add to the record or to state our position further
except in response to clear need.
7. GVN internal political progress naturally remains basic to any lasting solution whether
by negotiation or by course of events without any "settlement". We have impression Ky
Government settling down somewhat and generally acting wisely, with your advice, to
deal with possible threats from various quarters. We have no particular suggestions in this
area, but look forward to your continuing reports especially directed to the prospects for
generating younger, more energetic, and more cohesive leadership group, and winning
more positive popular support./7/
/7/McGeorge Bundy added the last phrase to this sentence.

8. Above are general thoughts on which we would welcome your comment. Some of these
areas require continuing decisions and action, but we are inclined to think also that overall complexity of situation may make it desirable to set up conference--perhaps in
Honolulu and perhaps in late October for intensive discussion all these problems. By that
time Porter should be in harness and time right for such stock-taking./8/
/8/McGeorge Bundy suggested deleting the last two sentences of paragraph 8 for the time
being. In telegram 1062 from Saigon, September 27, Lodge stated that the Embassy
would prefer a Honolulu meeting after November 9 because it wanted time to get
pacification and refugee programs started in areas of small guerrilla concentrations and
because of the number of official visitors to South Vietnam. (Department of State, Central
9. Although we have slugged this message for your eyes only, you may of course discuss
it with your top people if and to the degree you see fit.
Rusk
142. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
SUBJECT
Air Strikes Against North Vietnam
We have considered the Joint Chiefs of Staff's proposed Rolling Thunder 32/33 program
for 17-30 September. That program would implement immediately a major, concentrated
effort of air strikes against North Vietnam's Phuc Yen and four other Hanoi/Haiphong
airfields, against rail and highway routes and traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong, against
rail and highway arteries and traffic between Hanoi/Haiphong and China, against four
thermal power plants generating nearly 50% of the DRV's thermal power, and against
SAM installations which defend the above areas.
At this date I am not persuaded by the reasoning of JCSM 670-65/2/ that the military
advantages the Joint Chiefs of Staff state would flow from the proposed strike effort
outweigh the military and political risks involved in implementing the proposal.
/2/In this September 2 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs recommended the program
summarized in the preceding paragraph. (Ibid.) Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance's
comments on JCSM 670-65, September 4, are contained in a memorandum to the JCS.
(Ibid.)
There is doubt whether the proposed program will mean a net advantage to US/GVN
operations within South Vietnam. For example, while the LOC targets proposed in
northeast North Vietnam all relate to interdiction of war materials into North Vietnam and
therefore add to our efforts to interdict the flow of materials out of North Vietnam into
South Vietnam, the intelligence estimates have been that such US strikes may well lead to
a more vigorous effort by the DRV in support of the VC in South Vietnam. And the
estimates have been that strikes of the kind proposed by the Joint Chiefs would not at this
time significantly injure the VC ability to persevere in the South or persuade the Hanoi
Government that the price of persisting was unacceptably high.
More important is the risk of a US-Chinese confrontation, which could well be increased
by a program of the kind proposed. I am acutely aware that it is possible that US/GVN
forces at Da Nang may be subjected to air attack by North Vietnam's eight IL-28s (and
perhaps MIG 15/17s). The intelligence judgment, however, has been that such an attack is
unlikely, largely because of the fear of widespread and large-scale retaliation on North
Vietnam by the United States. The judgment has been that such a DRV attempt to strike in
the South might be triggered by a US/GVN strike against the Hanoi/Haiphong area, and
that there is a substantial risk that a strike program of the weight recommended would
induce the Chinese Communists to intervene in the air from Chinese bases.
It has been decided therefore that:
1. The Rolling Thunder program proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 1730 September will not be approved at this time.
2. A new up-to-date Special National Intelligence Estimate will be obtained to determine
the likely DRV, Chinese and Soviet military reactions to a program of the magnitude,
timing, and scope recommended by the Joint Chiefs./3/ This SNIE also should evaluate
the effect of the strike program on the effort within South Vietnam and should take into
account any new element introduced into the equation since earlier SNIEs were prepared,
such as the Pakistan-India war.
/3/SNIE 10-11-65, September 22, "Probable Communist Reaction to a US Course of
Action," concluded that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would probably be more
susceptible to a U.S. program of bombing attacks on certain new targets than it had been
in the past. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State dissented
fundamentally from this estimate, and its dissent is included in the SNIE. (Department of
State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, SNIE 10-11-65)
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should make recommendations with respect to any further
intensification of air defense and early warning capability required to properly defend
South Vietnam and our forces there.
Robert S. McNamara/4/

The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at
6:36 a.m. Lodge sent this unnumbered telegram to the Department of State with
instructions to pass it to the White House, but a note on the source text indicates that it
was not.
Unnumbered. For the President.
1. Refugees--an opportunity.
Am developing program on crash basis to make refugee situation an opportunity for
spearheading a national political revolution against Communist-subversion/terrorism
instead of treating it as a social and economic liability. New approach now being studied
prior to my discussing with GVN.
Program envisages providing adequate care, temporary housing to refugees who will be
immediately organized into self-governing units (essentially their own former village
organization) and trained in processes of democracy while undergoing rehabilitation. Men
of military age will receive paramilitary training for village defense with maximum effort
through Chieu Hoi surrenderee program to secure return of those men (often the majority
of those villages in refugee areas) still under Viet Cong control. Military civic action
personnel expected play important role in all aspects of refugee program in zones of
American influence.
Objective of program (in coordination with military progress) is to send village groups,
like pilgrim fathers, well trained and organized, back to their original villages wherever
economically desirable, inspired and equipped to build new lives, and able and willing to
defend themselves against Communist marauders in same way Texas pioneers fought
Comanches and Apaches.
Proposal should not be released prior to coordination here with GVN.
2. U.S. troops.
I made my first visit to US ground troops--the Third Marine Division at Danang and the
First Cavalry Division at Qui Nhon./2/ I wish I could describe the feelings of confidence
which they inspire--both as to the understanding of the mixed political and military nature
of their mission and as to the confidence which they create among Vietnamese.
/2/Lodge's full report on his visit is in telegram 888 from Saigon, September 14. (Ibid.)
3. Political.
The Convention of the Armed Forces met in a day-long closed session in a Saigon movie
theater on September 11, with more than 1600 officers from all services. They adopted
resolutions rejecting any negotiations with or coalition with North Viet-Nam and
denunciation of maneuvers tending to create disorder and division. Purpose of the meeting
was to put pressure on the students, the intellectuals and the provincial councils by
presenting an image of monolithic solidarity within the armed [forces].

4. Military.
The lull in large-scale Viet Cong activity continued with the Viet Cong apparently going
through a period of realignment of their units and re-evaluation of their plans.
5. Economic.
End of the month rice stores in both Saigon and the Delta dipped to lower levels and the
previous favorable decline in Saigon rice price was arrested. Since recent rice arrivals
have been delivered to Danang, the supply situation in Saigon remains a matter of
concern. Expected rice shipment in the next fortnight should relieve the situation.
6. Psychological.
Editorials in the Vietnamese language press were marked by optimism on the course of
the war.
7. Negotiations.
(1)Ambassador Goldberg is quoted by the Associated Press under a September 12 dateline
as saying that an honorable peace "can only be achieved by negotiation premised on the
principles of self-determination".
(2) If Ambassador Goldberg is correctly quoted, then I would like respectfully to disagree
for reasons set forth in my letter to you of August 31./3/ I am positive that negotiation is
certainly not the "only way", and I believe that under certain circumstances it may not be
the best way.
/3/Document 131.
(3) To the points of my letter of August 31, let me add the following thoughts which have
occurred to me upon further reflection:
(A) To maintain that the purpose of our military operations is to bring about
"unconditional negotiations" puts a floor under the risks which the Communists run. If
they know that they can always get to the conference table they have the initiative in
setting the time and the terms for negotiations and thus they will have every incentive to
continue military operations.
(B) When considering the word "negotiations", one must never forget that the
Communists will not enter negotiations with any intention of "settling" anything, but with
the aim of winning at the conference table the prize which eluded them on the battlefield.
One thing is absolutely certain: there can be no hope of negotiating them out of anything
that they hold on the ground. They will strive not for stability, but for victory, and by then
the contest will be largely psychological.
(C) I am, of course, not opposed to negotiations in principle, provided we have a clear and
sagacious program, but we must recognize that negotiations begin a new phase of the
struggle rather than mark the end of the old phase. Stakes remain extremely high and the
conduct of affairs grows more complicated, because it depends on so many intangibles.
Negotiations, therefore, require as careful and thoughtful preparation as do our military
campaigns.
Lodge

at 6:08 a.m.
953. Ref: Deptel 753./2/ Following comments keyed to numbered paragraphs reftel:
/2/Document 141.
Para 1
Agree with your feeling situation has more imponderables than usual. While US military
presence appears to have blunted VC offensive, improved Vietnamese morale and given
us great opportunity, exploiting this opportunity depends upon climate of mutual trust and
confidence with young, inexperienced and highly sensitive government facing
complicated political problems.
Para 2
A. Agree with you that increasing US ground strength may be driving VC to avoid major
unit actions and to place primary emphasis on small scale actions. These must be dealt
with successfully by the Vietnamese themselves making the main effort in conducting a
combined politico-military campaign. The presence of American troops does provide the
opportunity for thorough pacification of the areas in which they are stationed and full
advantage should be taken of this opportunity. It is a very big dividend from our
investment of men and money. For example, the Third Marine Division has scored
impressive successes north, south and west of Danang, while the police in the city of
Danang itself were doing a mediocre job. As I reported in another telegram,/3/ I directed
that the USOM police advisor concentrate entirely on the city of Danang.
/3/Not identified.
B. In this connection, consider the case of 1st Lt. Paul Ek, USMC, who commands a joint
action company consisting of 60 Americans and 150 Vietnamese in Phu Bai. They are
causing somewhat of a sensation in cleaning out the Viet Cong and, by their able political
conduct, increasing the intelligence "take". If our American troops can emulate this
performance (and many are doing so now) in the ratio of 60 to 150, ought to get a
tremendous amount of small unit nighttime effective pacification, and we would be
neglecting an opportunity not to use American troops for this purpose, thereby pacifying
the country and transforming the ARVN, making it into a much more vital and effective
element of Vietnamese society, able at some not too remote date to carry on by
themselves without outside help.
C. General Westmoreland has had under continuous study how he would use the
increased ground and air strength; in fact, the determination of his Phase I troop request
was based on a detailed analysis. The strategy and tactics that he contemplates employing
have been discussed in detail with the Vietnamese JGS and a MACV concept paper is
published for the guidance of US commanders. This policy publication is being forwarded
by MACV through military channels./4/ Westmoreland feels strongly that the full Phase I
troop list should be deployed in accordance with the schedule worked out in Honolulu in
August. It is noted that the 1st Division has been alerted but no public announcement has
been made for its deployment. We believe this division should be deployed on schedule.
In close coordination with the Vietnamese High Command, General Westmoreland
proposes to follow the following broad strategy:
/4/The MACV Concept Paper, August 30, is in CINCPAC Command History, 1965,
Annex A, MACV, pp. 141-153.
1. Halt the VC offensive--stem the tide.
2. Resume the offensive--destroy VC units where they can be found and pacify selected
high priority areas.
3. Restore progressively the entire country to GVN control.
4. Support "rural construction" with comprehensive attention to the pacification process as
regards regional and popular force units, the police, and the relationship therein between
US and GVN regular forces. Emphasis should be accorded the role of civic action of
which a police precinct program is a necessary prerequisite. Appreciation and support of
political and psychological requirements would be stressed.
5. It is assumed that the air campaign will continue against the DRV and infiltration routes
in Laos.
D. We need sufficient strength to insure the success of our strategy and tactics. As we
succeed it becomes more difficult for the Viet Cong to marshal main-force units and the
pressure will be on them to withdraw such units to more remote areas and/or to transform
themselves into small units. This is a considerable triumph for us, because it means that
the US presence has in effect fragmented the main force, prevented it from coming into
being, or at least has forced it to play a lesser role. We will have kept the main force from
becoming more akin to a regular army with which the enemy hoped to conquer the
country militarily and without which he surely cannot do so. We will have to keep up the
pressure on the main force whenever and wherever it appears to prevent its resurgence on
a large scale.
E. General Westmoreland and I are intensively studying the question of "what concept
and strategy we should follow against VC lie-low tactics". With our bases secure and
aggressive action against VC concentrations keeping them under pressure and off-balance,
the lie-low tactics that the VC may adopt become more a problem for police-and-socialaction-type program. We would expect to urge Vietnamese to use the police in the cities,
and police-type operation by military forces working out from thoroughly pacified centers
to pacify the environs as the basic element in what the Vietnamese call "rural
construction". We are already discussing with the Vietnamese the possibility of singling
out areas that look like good prospects, that are potentially pretty much over on our side,
and then pacifying them so as to get a little smell of across-the-board success in the air.
F. I also think it is prudent to expect increased VC terrorism, attempts to overthrow the
government and economic warfare.
G. We have had no unfavorable GVN and SVN reactions of significance to more
extensive US ground operations. Government leaders have made clear their support for
our efforts and their desire that we continue. While personal, psychological and economic
frictions can arise, there is no evidence that these negative factors now outweigh the
positive factors. Our buildup and activity have convinced the Vietnamese that we do not
intend to pull out, which has been a nagging fear. Our efforts have contributed to the
belief that the VC cannot win and have raised national morale and confidence in the
success of the anti-Communist struggle. There are many variables at work and it is hard to
predict how long this favorable attitude will continue or whether CQ [VC?] may possibly
diminish. In the near future we do not expect unfavorable attitudes of any great
significance. We are keeping our collective ears to the ground.
Para 3
We have under evaluation the use of the increased air strike capacity. Westmoreland
recently appointed a board of officers to study this matter in depth so as to assure that this
available firepower is used effectively, efficiently, and with discretion. This measure by
Westmoreland is an extension of the policy directive concerning minimizing battlefield
non-combatant casualties./5/ Westmoreland feels and I agree that an outsider survey
group is not needed at this time. He believes that he is able to translate recent experience
into improved methods. He has in his J-3 office a Requirements and Analysis Division
which is manned with well qualified officers who devote their entire time to operational
studies and analysis of force utilization and requirements. They consult with the civilian
elements of the Mission. He will be quick to ask for help when he feels the need.
Para 4
A. I have directed the US Mission Liaison Group to grapple with needed actions in this
whole area, which it is starting to do most actively. Also, fine early progress by the staff
was made through informal liaison with Minister Ung, Secretary-General of the Council
of Rural Construction (Pacification), with the Prime Minister's staff, and with key
technicians in GVN Ministries participation in pacification. The unexpected death of
Minister Ung in an Air Vietnam crash Thursday/6/ suddenly has imposed a whole new set
of circumstances. Meanwhile, the improvement of Hop Tac operations is receiving
priority attention now, including my discussing this with General Ky and making a
personal visit to the Hop Tac area on Thursday morning./7/
/6/September 16.
/7/September 23.
B. I am not ready to say, "what areas would be chosen for pacification, when could the
plan be started, what objectives would be set," but hope to be able to do so soon. I am now
encouraging General Ky to concentrate GVN efforts and enthusiasm on pacification so
that this can have sustained, wholehearted GVN participation. This will permit
development of realistic requirements for our planning.
C. On the military side of the questions raised in para 4, Westmoreland informs me that a
campaign plan is being refined by his staff in coordination with the JCS. A first phase
schedule of operations has been agreed to between himself and General Co. Further, a
study by MACV and JGS is now in progress for the purpose of reviewing AB 139 of 25
December 1964/8/ (this concerns the roles and missions of the various elements of the
RVNAF) and the Chien Thang plan (GVN pacification plan) to bring them in line with the
campaign plan. I believe these efforts are responsive to what you have in mind; however
this can be better determined after you are briefed on MACV's plans. In this connection,
Westmoreland's J-3, Brigadier General Depuy, is going to CINCPAC for a conference the
last week of this month and thence to Washington for two weeks leave. Westmoreland
states that he will be available with appropriate charts and maps to brief the JCS if such is
agreed to by CINCPAC following the Honolulu meeting. In this connection the main
purpose of the Honolulu military meeting is to allow Westmoreland to present his Phase II
troop deployment concept. The Mission Council is being briefed on this subject by
MACV on Sept 21.
Para 5
Development of popular electoral processes from the rice roots up is part of all our current
planning for counter subversion/terrorism in "rural construction" (pacification). For
example, this has been taken into account in developing temporary refugee status within
rural communities which have fled to safe zones pending their return home. I have also
been talking with General Ky about making use of provincial councils elected last May 30
in their further election of delegates to Consultative National Council which also will be
given further task of commencing draft of new Constitution. GVN has made progress on
land reform and is giving increased emphasis to Chieu Hoi. But in this connection I
cannot believe it would be prudent to call a halt to military operations anywhere.
Para 6
Appreciate what you say about the "negotiating front".
Para 7
On the internal political front, we have had a period of relative quiet ever since my arrival.
I am studying extraordinary measures to protect ourselves from a coup and hope that with
the passage of time and with our advice plus his own natural aptitude, General Ky can
become a really effective political leader. The present leadership is sufficiently "young
and energetic", but I agree that the problem is to maintain its cohesion and gain more
positive popular support.
Para 8
Hope you will keep Honolulu date open for a while, as it may be that late October would
be bad from the standpoint of the work here and that mid-November would be better.
Lodge

/1/Source: U.S. Military History Institute, Johnson Papers, Close Hold File No. 3. Top
Secret. Drafted by Abrams on September 27.
SUBJECT
JCS Executive Session with SecDef and Deputy SecDef, 20 Sep 65, 1400 hours
1. This was the first of the regular Monday meetings in executive session with only the
Chiefs present initiated by the Chairman for better communication between the Chiefs and
SecDef. At the conclusion all the Chiefs felt it had been one of the most useful meetings.
2. The SecDef doubted that there was a need for more air power in Vietnam. He wondered
if some of the air effort was not wasted. The Chairman indicated that Westmoreland had
set up a group to study this.
3. The SecDef wondered what lies ahead for US troops. Based on the thesis that a
moderately successful blunting of the VC Monsoon strategy has occurred, it would appear
doubtful that the VC would make sustained attacks for the next three to six months. What
strategy will VC use? Will they go to small-scale operations, and if so how do we combat
it? The Marines favor an oil spot strategy, expanding their enclaves gradually to hook
them together to keep the VC from getting the rice in the coastal plain, mingling with the
population there; at the same time training Regional Forces and Popular Forces to take
over. SecDef wonders how we hasten this process. It was pointed out that Westmoreland's
concept for US forces would prevent main force concentrations; combination of US and
RVN forces to attack main force sanctuaries that had been in existence for 25 years, move
in and drive them out, then police by RVN. Do away with the sanctuaries. At the same
time build up RVN forces. There should be a day when US forces should leave the
country. By the end of October we need a plan, a strategy. The Chairman noted that
Westmoreland has developed a strategy and a plan in conjunction with the senior Vietnam
leadership and Ambassador Lodge.
4. The Secretary of Defense spoke with regard to the next Rolling Thunder, indicating
some fixed targets have not been too useful, that fixed targets should be somewhat
extended to interdiction in the northwest rail and road lines, increasing slowly with no
dramatic impact.
5. The matter of air defense should be reviewed by the Army and Air Force.
6. The SecDef concluded with a talk about leaks on security. He pointed out the many
times he had gone into this, including some investigations he had had, which really
produced no substantial results, but he urged everyone to look into this again, maybe with
a new group, to see what could be done. He pointed out that some leaks had probably
resulted in increased casualties for the US and he wished it could be stopped.
7. In leaving he mentioned that he would like to have one of the Chiefs go to Vietnam
about each quarter. It was pointed out that General McConnell is going in October and
General Wheeler plans to be there at Christmastime.
Creighton W. Abrams
General, United States Army
Acting Chief of Staff

Saigon, September 22, 1965, 3 p.m.
Received at 3:37 a.m. and passed to the White House. There is an indication on another
copy of this telegram that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Cables)
991. For the President.
1. Political-psychological
A. The Govt of Vietnam has finished its twelfth week of stability--a rather astonishing
fact which I attribute in large part to the conviction that the U.S. is truly committed to
staying as long as is necessary and to doing whatever is necessary to ward off the Viet
Cong aggression. This conviction is created by the U.S. combat presence on the ground.
B. The above statement is impossible to prove, but some unusually well informed and
sagacious persons believe it. In other words, your decision on troops is not only a great
thing militarily, but is paying big dividends politically.
C. Let us hope that this stability continues, and I try to leave no stone unturned to see that
it does. I have made it clear in strategic places that a coup would be most unwelcome. I
also am taking steps to make sure we are organized to hear about coup plotting in time to
do something about it.
D. The Viet Cong defection rate is still disappointing, and the level of VC activity remains
high, disruptive and not effectively checked by the GVN.
E. But there is encouragement in figures indicating an increase in the amount of
information which Vietnamese citizens are giving to the govt concerning the Viet Cong.
Surely this is a most significant index. In a very real sense, the citizen is not just
expressing a Gallup Poll type preference; he is actually "voting with his life." If he
decides to give information about the Viet Cong and then gets caught, he may very well
get killed. This, therefore, represents a vital judgment. I am having the CIA look into it.
F. I also hear that an order has gone out in some places to the Viet Cong not to congregate
in groups of more than 100 men, or at any one place for more than 48 hours. If this
becomes a general Viet Cong policy, it would be significant. Much of their strength has
been because, in this medievally structured country, they, too, organized themselves in
medieval fortresses which were totally impregnable on the ground, where they could stay
in safety with plenty of rest for long periods, coming out only to make very well prepared
attacks on what the govt had been doing in the countryside. This made the govt's job quite
hopeless. Now we are destroying the fortresses.
G. Americans in Vietnam report "cautious optimism"--based on belief in the GVN's
ability to carry out its programs, in awareness of Viet Cong reverses, and in passive
resistance to Viet Cong "taxes" on recruiting.
H. Yet, all of the above is only the beginning of the impact of the American presence--an
impact before the First Cavalry and before most of the First Infantry Division were here at
all. Moreover, the U.S. troops which are here have by no means done everything they can
do to organize the Vietnamese "regional" and "popular" forces for joint
American/Vietnamese police type tactics and night patrolling. Thorough pacification has
thus yet to be done even within the U.S. base areas. When this happens, the psychological
effect should be marked.
I. The proposed deployment of the First Infantry Division should allow successful
operations against the oldest and most vital Viet Cong redoubt which is not only what has
been threatening Saigon for so long, but which is the line of communication from the food
source in the Delta to the Viet Cong north of Saigon.
J. On another political front, PriMin Ky traveled to Ban Me Thuot and personally presided
over the return of 483 Montagnard dissidents who had rallied to the govt. In two speeches,
Ky stressed the need for national solidarity, freedom from discrimination, and for the
complete merger of the Montagnard and lowland people. He also told me he had evidently
taken my advice and had urged his local military commander to be gradual and tactful in
his relationships with the Montagnards. Tension continues and tangible measures must be
taken to relieve their inferior status. The U.S. stands ready to help.
K. In Quang Nam Province of central Vietnam, govt forces broke up demonstrations
protesting against govt air and artillery bombardments, demanding reimbursement for
damages caused by military operations and calling for the release of husbands and sons
from military service. These demonstrations apparently had nothing to do with the recent
Hue struggle movement. They followed the pattern of disturbances which have occurred
at widely separated points in the past, often as a result of Viet Cong agitation.
2. Military
A. Combined forces (U.S., Vietnamese, Australian, and New Zealand) thrust into a Viet
Cong base area in Binh Duong Province to upset Viet Cong plans to concentrate strong
forces in the area. The 101st Airborne Brigade defeated a major Viet Cong unit north of
An Khe in Binh Dinh Province. Meanwhile the Viet Cong mounted only one battalionsize attack, their main activity continuing to be interdiction of communication routes.
3. Pacification
A. The death of Minister for Rural Construction Nguyen Tat Ung was a serious loss to the
rural construction (pacification) effort. He was a forceful Minister and Lansdale had
begun a relationship with him which promised to be fruitful.
4. Economic
A. Wholesale rice prices began edging up, reflecting low rice stocks in Saigon, poor
prospects for further deliveries from the Delta this season, and estimates that the 1966
crop will be 10 to 12 percent below the level of the 1965 crop. The GVN is now relying
on PL-480 imports for immediate needs and for stockpile buildup.
5. General Ky
A. I took the occasion during our most recent joint meeting with the Vietnamese to
commend Ky's approach to the desertion problem. He is stressing the necessity of
eliminating corruption among top officers, of improving the troops' understanding of the
war, and of carrying out in practice the policy of equal sharing by officers of hardships
and dangers. I also congratulated him for his imaginative attitude regarding the refugee
problem.
Lodge

Bundy, Vol. XV. Secret.
General Westmoreland has requested a reaffirmation of his authority to use standard riot
control munitions in certain specified combat situations in South Vietnam and
Ambassador Lodge has supported his request. This authority would extend only to
lacrimatory agents (tear gas) known as CS and CN. Use of nausea-producing agents DM
and CN-DM would not be authorized.
The agents would be used primarily to clear tunnels, caves, and underground shelters in
cases where their use will lead to far fewer casualties and less loss of life than would the
combat alternatives which involve high explosive or flame munitions. Of particular
importance would be the reduction in casualties to civilians who are inevitably mingled
with hostile military elements as the result of VC tactics.
I agree with General Westmoreland that the use of these riot control agents far outweighs
disadvantages that may accrue; in fact there is every indication that we may be in for
censure if civilian casualties should accrue because we didn't use tear gas. The
disadvantages to which I refer are the likelihood of some sharp international criticism,
spurred by Communist propaganda, of the U.S. Government authorizing the employment
of what will inevitably be called "poison gas".
Unless you indicate otherwise I will reaffirm to General Wheeler the current national
approval for the use of the riot control agents CS and CN under the combat conditions
described above.
Secretary Rusk concurs in this recommendation.
If you approve, the Department of State will send a message to all posts informing them
of the decision and providing public affairs guidance.
Robert S. McNamara
148. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 10-11-65
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, SNIE 10-11-65. Top Secret;
Sensitive. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency and the
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA participated
in drafting the estimate. All members of the USIB concurred except the representatives of
the AEC and FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A
US COURSE OF ACTION
The Problem/2/
/2/The Director of INR, Department of State, dissents from this entire estimate. His
reasons are set forth at the end of the estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]
To estimate probable Communist reactions to a US program of air attacks on certain new
targets in North Vietnam.
Assumptions
For the purposes of this estimate we assume air strikes against Phuc Yen and four other
airfields near Hanoi and Haiphong; against rail and highway routes and traffic between
Hanoi and Haiphong and between Hanoi-Haiphong and China; against four major thermal
power plants; and against SAM installations defending these areas. We further assume
that attacks on all these targets are begun within the next few weeks and in a roughly
simultaneous fashion. We also assume restrikes as necessary and subsequent armed
reconnaissance against the rail and highway targets.

The Estimate
1. For many months our estimates have emphasized the crucial importance of the fact that
the Communists, especially the DRV and China, believed they were winning the war in
South Vietnam and needed only to maintain their momentum until the GVN collapsed and
the US was forced to abandon the struggle. In this confidence Hanoi has been willing to
endure bombings of the DRV, to accept the increasing US commitment, and to refuse any
negotiations. Moreover, the Communists have counted on international and domestic
pressures on the US, as well as on the growing capabilities of air defense around the
critical Hanoi-Haiphong area, to deter further escalation. Finally, they probably have had
strong doubts about US determination to face a protracted war, and these feelings have
probably been strengthened by repeated US soundings and overtures for negotiations.
2. We think, however, that recently this general confidence has been weakened both by
US/GVN military successes and by tangible evidence that the US is willing to increase its
commitment. The situation has come to seem more dangerous and discouraging than they
probably had expected, and victory must seem to them much further off than it did a few
months ago. Thus, we think that the assumed US action would come at a time when DRV
doubts may be growing.
3. Public Communist declarations and commitments to continue the struggle, however,
remain as firm as ever. Recently, the DRV has once again vigorously rejected negotiations
on any terms except its own, apparently in response to approaches from various
intermediaries. The Chinese have been vehement in denouncing negotiations altogether;
they have even warned the DRV more or less openly against them. Their warnings may
indicate Chinese worry that the DRV is weakening; indeed, there are a few indications,
private and tentative, that Hanoi may not be quite as adamant in its position as its public
declarations assert.
Immediate Reactions
4. The Communists, while they have hoped that the US would continue to exempt the
Hanoi-Haiphong area from attack, probably have rated as fairly high the chances of the
kind of US attacks assumed here. Their reactions, therefore, would probably not be
greatly affected by shock or surprise.
5. The North Vietnamese would, of course, defend as best they could against the attacks.
Beyond this, they might retaliate quickly. It is possible that the DRV has contingency
plans for surviving aircraft to attack American bases in the South or US carriers. There is
no evidence of training for this type of mission. They would probably expect such strikes
to provoke wider and heavier US attacks. Thus, we think that the chances would be
against such retaliation, though it cannot be ruled out.
6. A second immediate danger would be Chinese air intervention--either over the DRV or
against South Vietnam or US carriers. It is possible that Hanoi and Peking already have an
agreed plan for the Chinese to intervene from their own bases in response to the kind of
US attack assumed in this estimate. We doubt this; the Chinese are not likely to have
made a firm or unqualified commitment. They would wish to weigh the effectiveness of
the initial US attack and to receive the DRV reaction before making any move likely to
invite a US attack on South China. However, the danger of accidental encounters would
be particularly high if US aircraft were operating close to the border.
7. Thus in the first few days, during and immediately following the onset of the US
attacks, there would be a chance of an attack on US bases or ships and a chance of
Chinese air intervention. But we think these unlikely.
8. Of course, there would also be a great hue and cry from the Communist side, and the
usual stream of protests, threats and warnings. We would also expect new acts of
terrorism and sabotage inside South Vietnam, particularly against US forces. Viet Cong
capabilities in these fields are considerably greater than they have yet chosen to
demonstrate. The principal Communist reactions however, would come in later weeks and
months, and they would of necessity be greatly affected by the ongoing course of military
and political events as well as by the US actions we consider in this estimate.
Subsequent Reactions
9. China. The Chinese would strongly urge the DRV to continue the fight; to this end they
would probably promise more equipment and personnel to build up air defenses, and
particularly to defend and repair the interdicted lines of communication to South China.
The Chinese might agree to send their own aircraft and pilots to the DRV, but on balance
we think this unlikely in the wake of the demonstrated vulnerability of DRV airfields./3/
Almost certainly the Chinese would oppose negotiating, and they might warn the DRV
not to count on Chinese support if it moved toward a cease-fire or a diplomatic settlement.
We think Chinese views carry great weight in Hanoi, particularly if the DRV leaders were
divided over future policy.
/3/The Director, NSA, National Security Agency, considers the chances of the Chinese
sending their own aircraft and pilots to the DRV despite the demonstrated vulnerability of
its airfields as being about even. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. It may be that these US attacks would tip the balance and cause Chinese intervention.
The Chinese might believe that the war had passed the point of no return and that a USChinese confrontation was the inevitable price of continuing the war in South Vietnam.
The Chinese have made this war the test case for their doctrine of "peoples war" against
the US; they have staked much prestige on it. We cannot be very confident that the
Chinese would continue to refrain from intervening in the air from their own bases as the
US continued attacks near the Chinese border and against a weakened DRV. But on
balance we think it unlikely that they would so intervene./4/ With somewhat more
confidence, we estimate that the US attacks would not provoke large-scale Chinese
intervention with ground combat forces; Peking would almost certainly believe that this
would run very high risks of war with the US.
/4/The Director, NSA, National Security Agency, considers the chances that the Chinese
will intervene in the air from their own bases as the US continues attacks near the Chinese
border as being about even. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. The USSR. The Soviets would increase their efforts to halt the conflict. They would
put pressure on the US and urge negotiations on Hanoi. There are some recent indications
that the Soviets are now more willing to put some pressure on the DRV, perhaps because
they believe their military assistance and the trend of the guerrilla war gives their view
greater authority. The Soviets would almost certainly agree to DRV requests to replace air
defense equipment, although they would do so more to retain their influence with the
DRV than in the expectation that they could furnish an adequate defense against US
operations.
12. The Soviets could try to relieve pressures on the DRV by moving against the US in
Berlin. We continue to believe there are strong inhibitions against a double crisis.
Carefully controlled harassments and occasionally provocative demonstrations of US
vulnerabilities are always possible, however. A potentially unstable situation in the Soviet
leadership adds an element of uncertainty to the Soviet positions.
13. The DRV. In Hanoi, reactions would probably develop along one of two conflicting
lines:
(a) Hanoi might believe that the new US attacks and the subsequent interdiction campaign
did not alter the basic situation. The North Vietnamese might stick to their belief that the
guerrilla war is, by definition, a prolonged struggle against heavy odds, that there will be
setbacks and defeats, but that the ultimate gain is worth it. They might feel that damping
down the war in the wake of US attacks would appear a capitulation. They might feel that
if the war were interrupted the Viet Cong movement could not long maintain its morale
and cohesion. Along this line of reasoning they might also conclude that the US escalation
of bombings would still not do intolerable damage and would probably not be extended to
attacks on urban population. They might decide that the US was desperate in the face of a
long war involving US troops in the South, and that further struggle, perhaps involving
the dispatch of PAVN units to the South on an increased scale, was the best course to
crack the Saigon Government and US resolve.
(b) On the other hand, the DRV might estimate the situation quite differently. The
growing US commitment in the South might persuade them that the guerrilla war could
not be prosecuted to final victory. Without such a promise of ultimate success they might
believe Viet Cong morale could not be sustained. Moreover, the attacks on the DRV's air
defenses and on a wider range of targets might convince them that the US intended to
escalate the air war almost indefinitely, if necessary. Thus they might decide that, while
their position in the South was still strong and the Viet Cong still intact, it would be more
expedient to move toward negotiations or some tacit understanding in order to pursue
their objectives through political means, and possibly at some future time to resume
guerrilla warfare.
14. We believe that the US course of action assumed here would reinforce the thinking
described in subparagraph (b) above. Even so, it is not likely that the North Vietnamese
would move immediately to the conference table; they would probably feel that there was
still time to test the effectiveness of the Viet Cong against US forces. They might still
hope to strike a critical blow against US and GVN morale, perhaps by engaging US forces
somewhere in the hinterland. Failing this, they might next revert to hit and run tactics for
a time. And there is still the question of whether China could prevent a switch to political
tactics.
15. In general, however, we think it unlikely that in the new situation created by the US
attacks assumed here, the DRV would simply continue the war along present lines. We
think that this US course of action would be more likely in time to move the North
Vietnamese toward political and diplomatic initiatives than to cause them to escalate the
war.
16. The Viet Cong. As noted above, Viet Cong morale is an important ingredient in DRV
estimates of how to prosecute the war. We have little good evidence on the state of Viet
Cong morale. And it is difficult to judge the impact of specific US moves, since their
effectiveness is a gradual cumulative process. In the assumed instance, the new US air
attacks on the DRV would be unlikely to affect Viet Cong capabilities or intentions in the
short run. Over the longer term, however, if it became apparent that supply and
reinforcement were more and more difficult, it is likely that VC morale would deteriorate,
particularly if they suffered setbacks on the order of Chu Lai together with continuing
pressure on the ground and from the air.
17. Other Considerations. A current factor which might play some role is the IndoPakistani conflict. The Communists might see the new US move in Vietnam as an attempt
to take advantage of the diversion of world attention to the Indian subcontinent. The US
attack might help to dissuade the Chinese from any major involvement there. Peking
would almost certainly be increasingly reluctant to divert resources to support Pakistan in
the face of new escalation in Vietnam, its primary area of concern. In general, however,
we think that the course of the Indo-Pakistani conflict would not greatly affect Communist
reactions to the US course of action considered in this estimate.
The following is the position of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State:
1. The Director, INR, Department of State, dissents fundamentally from the key estimates
made above. He believes that the postulated air strikes against the DRV's SAM sites,
airfields, thermal plants, and prime rail, road, and traffic targets would be seen by the
Communists--as well as by most other observers--as marking a fundamental change in the
character of our escalation of the Vietnam war. Separated strikes on these targets,
carefully spaced over time, would help reduce adverse reactions, although these would be
serious in any event. The composite program assumed here, however, would be regarded
as a political and military watershed comparable to that of last February when our
bombing of the DRV began.
2. Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow would all view the strikes as initiating--and in large part
executing--the highest level of militarily significant escalation available in the DRV short
of ground invasion. Even assuming precision bombing, the strikes would inextricably
involve industrial and civilian losses beyond the objectives deliberately targeted, as well
as almost certain Soviet and Chinese casualties. In operation the new program would
appear to have exempted only deliberate attacks (of no military significance) on the
population itself. Communists and non-Communists alike would consider that this sudden
massive action contradicted the many prior official indications, public and private, that we
intended to respect the special sensitivity of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. They would
regard these undifferentiated and simultaneous strikes as a gross departure from our past
policy of graduated pressure. They would probably conclude that we had decided to
forsake further efforts to project a judicious combination of political-military pressures
against the infiltration network, and had chosen instead the blunt instrument of a broad
military assault on the chief elements of the DRV economy and its self-defense capability.
The credibility of our protestations of limited objectives would slump, and our actions
would just as plausibly be seen to invite the capitulation of the DRV under pain of total
destruction, raise the specter of an eventual invasion on the ground, and in any case
appear to threaten the DRV's ability to survive.
3. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that Hanoi would choose to move toward
negotiations or compromise; it is unlikely that Moscow could afford or would be willing
to urge Hanoi to do so; and it is certain that Peking would press Hanoi to persevere. These
positions would be mutually reinforcing.
4. The DRV leaders, as the estimate notes, have recently indicated that their terms for
negotiation may not be as inflexible as they have sometimes seemed. The assumed
attacks, however, would immediately deter Hanoi from any diplomatic overtures it may
possibly have been contemplating. It would fear that any sign of compromise under such
pressure would be read by friends and enemies as capitulation, would undermine all
possible future bargaining positions, would irreparably damage Viet Cong morale, and
would predispose the US to renew these pressures at any time and under any conditions it
thought appropriate. Whatever hesitancies the DRV may have had would now be resolved
in favor of militant prosecution of the war and of more insistent requests for, and far fewer
qualms over, Chinese and Soviet aid.
5. Far from seeking a respite from the bombings, the DRV would attempt to retaliate by
raising the tempo of the ground war. It would send additional ground forces to Laos and
South Vietnam as rapidly as the infiltration routes permit. It probably would surface these
efforts, at least to the extent of acknowledging the despatch of "regrouped southerners"
and "volunteers," both to raise Viet Cong morale and to discourage the US and its
supporters with the prospect of a long jungle war.
6. The DRV would certainly at once press Peking and Moscow vigorously for prompt aid
in rebuilding its defenses against air attacks. Inhibitions about additional Soviet and
Chinese presence in the DRV would diminish. Hanoi might well drop whatever
reservations it may have had against the use of Soviet or Chinese pilots. It would be most
impatient with Sino-Soviet disputes about transit rights, but would expect those past
hurdles to be overcome in the new atmosphere.
7. Although Hanoi's reaction will continue to be of primary importance, the locus of
decision making will shift perceptibly away from Hanoi to Peking and Moscow. Peking
will have a major role in determining the overall Communist response to the assumed US
actions. Given the preceding estimate of Hanoi's response, these reactions will be
consistent. Hence the frustrating dilemma of the main estimate probably will not arise-Hanoi's switching to a negotiatory track despite giving China's contrary views "great
weight." (Compare paragraphs 9 and 15 of the SNIE.)
8. It is almost certain that Hanoi and Peking have concerted their preparations and
discussed plans for Chinese action in the event of US attacks such as the ones assumed
here. The Chinese would strongly urge Hanoi to reject any thought of negotiations, and
they will purposefully underwrite the DRV's will to persist. They would furnish the DRV
with logistic assistance in prosecuting the war in the south and in making further US air
attacks as costly as possible. They would give safe haven to any DRV planes which
escaped our strikes and would permit them to operate from Chinese bases. They would
probably provide Chinese planes and pilots to operate from the remaining DRV facilities
if and when useable.
9. The Chinese would immediately increase their defensive air patrols along their frontier
and perhaps over adjacent DRV territory in which their ground forces appear to be active.
The danger of accidental encounters with US planes will be high and will increase as US
planes approach the border. If the DRV airfields are successfully interdicted, there is a
better than even chance that Chinese air will intervene from Chinese bases.
10. The Chinese would probably in any case increase their presence on the ground in
North Vietnam, furnishing anti-aircraft, engineer, and supply units and, if asked,
providing combat forces to defend against a possible US invasion of the north, thus
freeing DRV forces to go southward. With the destruction of the rail line into China, the
logistical problem of supplying the DRV would increase. To the degree that the US
program is successful and South China must become the operational and infrastructure
base for further air defense of the DRV, the Chinese will need Soviet support and
protection. Greater Soviet involvement might reluctantly be desired to deter the US. This
is an additional factor likely to promote a constructive resolution of previous Sino-Soviet
frictions over the speed, scope, and method of aiding Hanoi and bolstering South China
bases.
11. We do not believe that the Pakistan-India war is likely to place any limitation on
Peking's willingness and ability to carry out the foregoing responses. Peking has prepared
its forces and its population for some time to face the eventuality of the US actions
assumed in this estimate. Its likely actions against India, outlined in SNIE 13-10-65, will
probably not be deterred by such US actions, nor will the Indian theater require the
diversion of Chinese air or ground forces available to support North Vietnam and to
defend South China.
12. Indeed in addition to the general increase in pressures generated by the interacting
nature of the two Asian theaters of war, Peking would be aware of certain comparative
advantages in an escalatory response to the American move in North Vietnam. Peking
knows that the Vietnam theater tends to bring the US into confrontation with both China
and the USSR, while the Indian theater tends to bring the US into confrontation only with
China. Therefore Peking would hope to breach US-USSR relations on the matter of
Vietnam, reducing thereby the freedom of both the USSR and the US to respond against
Chinese pressures in the Subcontinent.
13. The Soviets would be specifically affronted by the assumed US course of action in
Vietnam. They would almost certainly interpret it as an assault on the viability of North
Vietnam, whose security they have committed themselves to defend. They would be
likely to regard the US action as a direct challenge to themselves, the more so since it
would probably result in Soviet casualties. They would be unlikely to place any credence
in assurances that US intentions were still limited (something they have been prepared to
do thus far). The sensational nature of the American initiative and the obstinacy of the
Chinese and DRV reaction to it would harden the Soviet response.
14. Under these circumstances Moscow would be less likely than ever to press Hanoi to
negotiate, and it would redouble its effort to participate meaningfully in the defense of the
DRV. Moscow would renew its earlier offers of additional aircraft and pilots and would
attempt to increase the flow of SAMs and technicians to man them. The Soviets would
renew their proposals of last spring for a cooperative effort with the Chinese to aid Hanoi.
The Chinese, for their part, would find it more difficult than previously to refuse
reasonable cooperation in expediting Soviet aid, especially in view of the assumed
destruction of DRV-Chinese rail lines. Despite the continuing hostility between Chinese
and Soviets, their respective stakes in the struggle are likely to lead to competition to see
who can help Hanoi most effectively.
15. Unfortunately for them, Soviet problems in providing rapid and effective aid would be
serious. DRV airfields and associated installations would be unusable, heavily damaged,
or under continuing attack. Previously prepared SAM sites would likewise be difficult to
replenish, and the US would presumably not abstain from attacking sites in preparation, as
it did during the installation of the present Soviet-supplied SAM capability. Under these
conditions, it is likely that the Soviets would make a strong attempt to mount an air
defense effort from Chinese territory and we believe that, despite haggling, some
arrangement to this end would be consummated. As a bargaining factor with Moscow,
Peking will probably request--and Moscow provide--sophisticated Soviet air defense
equipment (MIG 21s and SAMs) to protect bases and logistical lines in South China.
16. We believe that fundamentally the Soviets would nevertheless remain interested in an
end to the conflict. While under the stepped up military assistance effort which we believe
they would be bound to make the Soviets would be prepared to run the risk of direct
engagements with US forces in Vietnam, we believe that they would not contemplate
these risks with any equanimity and would still attempt to prevent escalation from running
out of control. Accordingly, even in addition to its greater military involvement, Moscow
can be expected to resort to various forms of political pressures to deter the US, including
a further substantial worsening in bilateral relations.

Memos (A). Top Secret.
This memorandum outlines the basis for the increase in estimated US force requirements
in South Vietnam from the 175,000 discussed in early July and mentioned in my July 20
recommendations/2/ to the 210,000 figure referred to in my September 1 memorandum to
you./3/
/2/Document 67.
/3/Document 132.
You will recall that at your July 28 press conference/4/ you stated that you had ordered
deployments which would raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost
immediately, that additional forces would be needed later, and that they would be sent as
requested.
/4/See Document 97.
Prior to that date--specifically, on July 24--the Joint Staff, as a result of MACV requests,
had revised their total for 1965 deployment, increasing it to a little more than 195,000. I
mentioned this higher figure to you at the time. At the August 2-6 Honolulu Meeting of
General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, the 1965 "Phase I"
requirements were refined to 210,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23 therefore
made specific deployment recommendations totaling approximately 210,000./5/
Refinements continue to be made. For example, General Wheeler on September 4 listed
an additional 3,000 for the 1965 Phase I (mainly three engineer construction/combat
battalions); at the same time he indicated that approximately an equivalent number listed
earlier (mainly helicopter personnel) will be arriving after the end of 1965. My prediction
is that the final version of the 1965 Phase I requirement will end up exceeding 210,000 by
a few thousand.
The differences between the 175,000 figure first mentioned in July and the 210,000
number now being discussed are primarily attributable to additional (a) air lift to move
supplies around the country for both civilian and military purposes, (b) air defense, (c)
artillery to support offensive operations and to provide immediate response to calls for
help by villages under attack, (d) strike aircraft and associated support, (e) engineers,
primarily to construct additional air bases, and (f) fleshing out, according to General
Westmoreland's requests, of existing operational units and advisory and support elements
(refugee relief teams, intelligence teams, communications, and security units, etc.).
You have authorized the deployment of 175,000 US personnel. I recommend that, at the
present time, you authorize the movement of an additional 35,000 men, bringing the total
to 210,000. These deployments are essential to our effort. The authority will cover our
requirements as they now appear although, as we have discussed before, forces in addition
to the 210,000 may be needed later.
Robert S. McNamara

Department of State
Washington, DC
Washington, September 23, 1965, 3 p.m.
Bundy, Vol. XV. Secret.
RE
Tear Gas in Vietnam
General Westmoreland has requested a reaffirmation of authority to use certain riot
control agents in Vietnam, and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara join in recommending
that he be given clear authorization to use tear gas (CS and CN), but not the more violent
nausea-producing gases (DM and CN-DM), either alone or in combination. As you know,
Ambassador Goldberg has had reservations about this recommendation, and in deference
to his wishes, the recommendation has been held up until after his initial speech. But now
Westmoreland wants to use the tear gas in an operation on Saturday, and we all think it is
time to go ahead.
If this recommendation is approved, our plan would be to have no announcement in
Washington, but to have Westmoreland make it clear in due course after the Saturday
operation that tear gas (and tear gas only) is authorized in cases where it is more humane,
and especially with respect to civilians.
There will be some international criticism, but even the New York Times is resoundingly
with us on this. I do not worry you with the pros and cons because it seems to me that the
common sense of the matter is so clear.
Secretary McNamara's letter is attached./2/ Can we go ahead?/3/
McG.B.
/2/Apparent reference to Document 147.
/3/Next to the "Yes" recommendation on this memorandum is a handwritten note that
reads: "Returned per our conversation."
Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President
saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Current and Future Strategy in Vietnam--An Exchange of Views between Washington
Principals and Lodge
A recent review of the situation in Vietnam by key officials of State and Defense and
myself indicated that the emerging situation there required some hard thinking on future
U.S. military and political actions. We posed several questions to Lodge for comment./2/
U.S. Ground Operations. In the light of our military build-up we felt that the VC may be
avoiding major unit actions and reverting to a strategy of small-scale actions over a
prolonged period. The problem arises as to how we use our substantial ground and air
strength effectively against small-scale harassment-type action, whether we should engage
in pacification as opposed to patrolling actively, and whether, indeed, we should taper off
our ground force build-up.
Lodge agreed that VC may seek to avoid large-scale operations but felt that the
Vietnamese must deal with small-scale actions through an effective military-political
campaign. U.S. forces should undertake "thorough pacification" within their own areas.
Lodge endorses Westmoreland's current strategic concept which calls for the deployment
of all troops now scheduled for Vietnam. Westmoreland's concept:
1. Halt the VC offensive.
2. Destroy VC units where they can be found and pacify selected high priority areas.
3. Restore progressively the entire country to GVN control.
4. Support "rural reconstruction" with comprehensive attention to the pacification process.
5. Continue the air campaign against the DRV and infiltration routes into Laos.
Lodge and Westmoreland feel VC "lie-low" tactics will become increasingly a policesocial action problem. They expect increased VC terrorism, subversion and economic
warfare. Thus far, there is no evidence of significant GVN resentment of U.S. ground
actions.
Use of Airpower. We noted and endorsed a recent directive by Westmoreland concerning
civilian implications of U.S. air operations, but we still felt a need for a better overall
analysis and evaluation of our air operations. We suggested the possibility of sending a
military-civilian survey team (similar to those of World War II) to Vietnam.

Lodge replied that Westmoreland is already looking into the problem of using our
increased air capability more effectively and is opposed to a group coming out from
Washington at this time.
Pacification. We asked Lodge to develop a specific plan for our joint consideration which
would involve the concentration of GVN forces on pacification and the reliance on U.S.
forces to handle large-scale VC actions. We suggested that he propose a system of
priorities and a definition of clear objectives in the pacification program.
Lodge reports that the Mission has started to grapple with this whole problem. The Hop
Tac operation (pacification of provinces bordering Saigon) is getting priority attention and
Lodge is encouraging Ky to concentrate GVN efforts on pacification. Westmoreland is
working up a joint U.S.-GVN campaign plan and will be prepared to brief Washington on
this by the end of this month. Lodge believes this will be responsive to our desire for a
definition of the respective roles for U.S. and GVN forces.
Acheson Plan. We posed the possibility to Lodge of getting the GVN to apply some of the
key elements of the Acheson Plan (land reform, Chieu Hoi, etc.) and to select one or more
areas for the application of the plan as a whole, including local elections.
Lodge feels that GVN is already giving attention to land reform and Chieu Hoi. He agrees
with our desire to get an electoral process started and has been talking to Ky about having
the provincial councils elected last May elect, in turn, representatives to a national
assembly. The assembly would concentrate on working up a national constitution.
Negotiations. Lodge and we both agree that we have sufficiently stressed our willingness
to negotiate and any further public emphasis, except as necessary in the UN, might be
misunderstood by the Communists.
Internal Political Situation. Lodge and we agree that Ky's government seems to be
settling down. We also agree on the necessity to keep a watchful eye on any potential
coups and to encourage Ky to generate more positive popular support.
McG.B.
to President Johnson/1/
Memos (A). Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw this
memorandum.
SUBJECT
Hanoi's 23 September Memorandum on Negotiations/2/
/2/The text of the memorandum is printed in FBIS, Daily Report, Far East, September 24,
1965, no. 184. On September 24, the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA prepared
an intelligence memorandum, OCI No. 2324/65, assessing the DRV memorandum.
(Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 251, NV/SV Negotiations Sept-Dec 1965) The
Director of Intelligence and Research sent the Secretary of State, also on September 24,
an intelligence note on the DRV memorandum. (Ibid.: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam INR
Studies, 64-65) The DRV memorandum rejected unconditional discussions and solutions
seeking U.N. intervention, insisted on recognition of the NLF's right to have a "decisive
say" in negotiations, and asserted that the DRV's four points were the "sole correct basis
for a settlement."
Hanoi has now responded to U.S. policy statements on settling the war with an official
government memorandum detailing their own current "views". This statement, in the form
of a Foreign Ministry paper, is the most extensive pronouncement on Hanoi policy since
the four point proposal of 8 April./3/ Hanoi probably regards the document as its side of a
dialogue with Washington on terms for negotiation. The memorandum also serves as a
response to the many recent proposals by free world leaders on ending the war. Its timing
may have been set by a Hanoi desire to go on record prior to the opening of the UN
General Assembly. (Incidentally, the paper flatly rejects the use of the UN in settling the
war.)
The memorandum offers no new proposals for settling the conflict, and no explicit
concessions. It does, however, by dint of its phraseology on several points and by its
omission of several hard-line concepts contained in prior statements, convey an
impression of greater flexibility than has been present overall in any past policy
pronouncements. It is apparently not a signal that Hanoi is now ready to step to the
negotiating table, but rather that the North Vietnamese have reviewed their bidding, made
some adjustments, and are waiting to hear the response of the other principals, most
notably the United States. The statement follows other indications, both public and
private, that Hanoi is now more interested in hearing what U.S. officials and friends of the
U.S. have to say about negotiations, and that Hanoi is also trying to be more explicit in
outlining its own position.
CLC
153. Memorandum From the National Security Council Executive Secretary (Smith)
Memos. Top Secret.
Mr. Bundy:
Califano told me the following Friday afternoon:/2/
/2/September 24.
1. The President asked him to discuss with McNamara the McNamara memo/3/ on
increasing the number of US forces in South Vietnam. The President wanted to know
whether a decision had to be made immediately.
/3/Document 147.
2. Califano said McNamara told him a decision did not have to be made today.
3. Upon reporting this information to the President, the President asked that a meeting be
set up Tuesday to include McNamara, Secretary Rusk, you and Califano to discuss any
increase in the current level of forces. The President appeared reluctant to contemplate
going above 200,000 and asked Califano to ask McNamara to be prepared with an
alternative ceiling.
4. McNamara will be ready with an alternative proposal on Tuesday, including a phased
movement of forces spread over a longer period of time so that a decision could be taken
at any time to stop further increases.
Marvin Watson has scheduled a luncheon for Tuesday at 1 p.m. at which time this subject
can be discussed./4/
BKS
/4/A note on the source text in Smith's hand reads as follows: "Later: Luncheon cancelled.
Reason not given. Meeting now being set up for noon Wednesday. BKS." See Document
155.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Drafted by
Thompson and approved in S/AL on September 27.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
Dobrynin asked if we had really made clear to the North Viet-Namese what our position
was for a settlement. I said that we had been in touch with the North Viet-Namese through
various channels but so far had found no disposition on their part to have any serious
discussion. He urged that we make clear to them our exact position on their four points. I
said I thought we had done this in our many public statements as well as some indirect
private ones.
Upon being pressed by him, I said the one point that gave us the most trouble was that
concerning the role of the National Liberation Front. Dobrynin said that including
dependents, about eight hundred thousand people supported the Viet Cong and our
position left them no way out. I disagreed with this and said that if peace were established,
they could participate in elections and obtain representation. I said that in dealing with this
matter, however, we had to take account of the attitude and position of the South VietNamese Government. I said it seemed clear that the Chinese Communists were pressing
Hanoi not to negotiate. Dobrynin asked if I did not think there was some difference in the
positions of Peking and Hanoi. I said I was not an expert in this field but it seemed to me
that there was always a slight difference in the public statements of Peking and Hanoi and
that Hanoi always seemed to want to keep the door open just a bit, whereas Peking's
position was absolutely rigid.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, Sept. 29, 1965. Top Secret.
Prepared by Califano.
SUBJECT
Luncheon Meeting with the President, Ball, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Raborn,
Moyers, and Califano/2/
/2/The meeting was held from 12:29 to 1:20 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White
House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) An agenda for the meeting is ibid., Memos to the
President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV.
Level of Forces in Vietnam
McNamara reviewed his memorandum of September 22, 1965, (attached)/3/ concerning
the need to increase the level of forces in Vietnam. He said that the original estimate of
175,000 was now increased to 210,000. The proposed 35,000 increase did not involve any
increase in combat troops; they were support troops, such as communications personnel
and refugee relief units. McNamara requested an interim authorization to go to 195,000
men and indicated that he would be back to the President about November 15 with a
request for the remaining 15,000 men. The President commented that it was a situation in
which he had no choice but to approve the increase. McNamara confirmed the President's
comment and the President approved the increase to 195,000 men.
/3/Document 147.
McNamara said that the public announcement of increased troops would be made from
Saigon as the troops arrived there. While he admitted that this would encourage rumors,
he said that this was important for the security of our men and in line with previously
announced policies.
Tear Gas
Bundy noted that Secretary McNamara had authorized a one-time use of tear gas by
General Westmoreland./4/ He said that the question of the continuing use of tear gas was
still up in the air, although the authority to use tear gas technically remained with the field
commander, General Westmoreland. Ball said it would be desirable for Westmoreland to
use tear gas before the end of the week because of the Red Cross conference next week in
Geneva, which might make some statements opposing the use of tear gas. McNamara said
that the use of tear gas must be handled carefully in the right operation and that he was
opposed to pushing Westmoreland to use it within the next few days unless Westmoreland
felt such action was desirable. Bundy said that the President might get a press query about
tear gas if he held a press conference tomorrow. McNamara suggested that the President
respond by stating (1) tear gas is a humane way to restore order under certain
circumstances and (2) Westmoreland is authorized to use it in those circumstances. Bundy
underscored the importance of using the words "tear gas" rather than "non-lethal agents"
or "riot control agents". Moyers said that we had been too defensive in our public
handling of the tear gas situation, that we should remind the world that the Viet Cong slit
throats and bomb children and that any human being in one of the Vietnam caves would
prefer to cry from tear gas rather than be killed by hand grenades. Ball and Raborn agreed.
Rice Shipments
Bundy said Lodge had requested 100,000 tons of rice as fast as possible. Bundy proposed
to make the rice available in four shipments of 25,000 tons each, rather than in a single
shipment. The President approved this. McNamara said that no matter how we were
shipping the rice, we were not sending enough rice to South Vietnam and that we should
be sending three or four hundred thousand tons of rice. The President agreed and Bundy
said he would make sure there was a continuing program for the purchase and shipment of
rice to South Vietnam.
Possible Press Conference Statement
Bundy said he was inclined to the view that the President should make a statement at his
press conference about the non-military elements of our Vietnam effort. Bundy said that
only when the President makes such statements did they get any substantial coverage. He
believed it was important to obtain such coverage in view of the world opinion and
forthcoming student demonstrations. Bundy said he would submit a statement to the
President for his consideration this afternoon./5/
/5/At 7:30 p.m. on September 29, McGeorge Bundy sent the President a statement that he
entitled, "The Works of Peace in Vietnam." Bundy stated that he had learned from Bill
Moyers that a press conference was unlikely, but Bundy thought the President might be
interested in reading the statement and might consider releasing it in conjunction with
publicity for Dr. Howard Rusk's mission to Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV) The statement was not issued.
[Here follows discussion of the Dominican Republic, foreign visitors to Washington,
India-Pakistan, foreign aid, and Cuba.]
The Shipping Question

The meeting adjourned to the President's office with McNamara, Ball, Moyers, Bundy
and Califano./6/ McNamara presented the proposed Rolling Thunder program./7/ He also
discussed the question of Hanoi's hardening attitude. He noted that there was a National
Intelligence Estimate indicating that Hanoi's attitude was hardening, largely because we
were not rough enough in our bombing./8/ McNamara pointed out that the estimate was
made without the benefit of advice from experts in the government such as Llewellyn
Thompson, Maxwell Taylor, et al. He urged a special study of the problem of Hanoi's
hardening attitude and the reasons for it. Ball concurred and pointed out that it may well
be that some aspects of the bombing program were responsible for Hanoi's hardening
attitude. The President approved the Rolling Thunder program proposed by McNamara as
well as the recommended study by Taylor, Thompson, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, et al. on
the reasons for Hanoi's hardening attitude.
/6/This portion of the meeting took place in the Oval Office from 1:22 to 1:30 p.m.
Despite the heading, this discussion had nothing to do with shipping 50 percent of U.S.
wheat to Communist nations in U.S. carriers, which was the item on the agenda.
/7/Rolling Thunder 34/35 (Oct 1-Oct 14). (Memorandum from William Bundy to Rusk,
September 28; Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling
Thunder Memos, 1965)
/8/Apparently a reference to SNIE 10-11-65, Document 148.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

a.m. A retyped copy of this telegram indicates that the President saw the telegram.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol.
XV)
1100. For the President. Politico-Military.
1. Progress along strictly military lines appears to be considerably ahead of progress along
civil and political lines. Yet civil-political progress is utterly indispensable to a successful
outcome.
2. For one thing, the majority of Viet Cong are probably still in small groups rather than
in main force units and will thus not be reached by the planned military offensives. These
small VC groups cannot be overcome without the support of the population, organized on
a precinct basis. If these VC are not overcome, the worst of the aggression will still be
going on, requiring continuing presence of American ground troops.
3. It seems clear that U.S. military can prevent the Viet Cong from taking over the state,
can destroy or neutralize main force units, and can destroy hitherto impregnable redoubts.
These are very big achievements indeed. But they do not prevent the Viet Cong from
continuing to have a disruptive and debilitating effect on the country which would mean
that as soon as we left, the Viet Cong would take over again. In other words, a durable
result would not have been accomplished.
4. In order to hasten the day when a true precinct organization exists which will destroy
the Viet Cong in small groupings, I called a meeting on Monday and presented a working
paper for illustrative purposes which was discussed in detail paragraph by paragraph. As a
result, there is in the U.S. Mission an organized effort under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Porter to help the GVN create their own precinct type structure which will
enable it to overcome the VC in small groups.
5. The text of the working paper is as follows:
"In each city precinct and each rural hamlet immediately adjacent to a thoroughly pacified
city (i.e. the smallest unit from a public safety standpoint) the following program should
be undertaken in the following order:
A. Saturate the minds of the people with some socially conscious and attractive ideology,
which is susceptible of being carried out.
B. Organize the people politically with a hamlet chief and committee whose actions
would be backed by the police or the military using police-type tactics. This committee
should have representatives of the political, military, economic and social organizations
and should have an executive who directs.
C. With the help of the police or military, conduct a census.
D. Issue identification cards.
E. Issue permits for the movement of goods and people.
F. When necessary, hold a curfew.
G. Thanks to all those methods, go through each hamlet with a fine tooth comb to
apprehend the terrorists.
H. At the first quiet moment, bring in agricultural experts, school teachers, etc.
I. The hamlet should also be organized for its own defense against small Viet Cong
external attacks.
J. When the above has been done, hold local elections.
End text of working paper
6. I believe that all Americans here are pulling together on this--which is the indispensable
first step towards getting the GVN to move. We now await appointment of a Minister of
Rural Construction (Pacification) by Prime Minister Ky--at which time we are prepared to
move in.
7. After the Viet Cong has been overcome by force, both in its large and small grouping,
there must be a certain degree of indigenous political development. Otherwise, our defeat
of the VC by force could be followed by a Communist takeover by political means. It
could then well be said: the operation was a great success, but the patient died. Tran Van
Do, the sagacious Vietnamese Foreign Minister, says:
"If peace were suddenly to return to the land and if elections were to take place soon
afterwards, the results would be catastrophic. What would happen if there were to be a
cease-fire? The Communists would simply step in to fill a political vacuum."
8. The United States must thus leave no stone unturned politically, working through both
the official and the unofficial (but highly influential) Vietnamese to insure that our victory
over the Viet Cong by force is not followed by a Communist takeover by politics. End of
politico-military.
Government of Vietnam
9. The government shot three VC ringleaders at Danang on the night of September 22.
The VC subsequently shot two American military prisoners. U.S. Mission actively
studying implications of this tragic subject. Separate telegram coming./2/
/2/The Department of State publicly condemned the execution of U.S. military prisoners
Captain Humbert R. Versace and Sergeant Kenneth M. Roroback; see American Foreign
Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 901-902. In telegram 1109 from Saigon, September
30, the Embassy offered courses of action in response to these executions. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET) See footnote 2, Document 167.
10. Prime Minister Ky went to Hue on September 23 and shared the platform with
General Thi, I Corps Commander, who castigated those who caused trouble on the home
front while troops were dying in the field. This represents a change in Thi's public
attitude.
11. We hear that Ky is planning to make a number of changes in key military posts and in
the Cabinet in the interests of increased efficiency. The military changes may in fact
reflect a response to sentiments expressed by junior officers during the recent armed
forces convention in Saigon.
12. While waiting for the Korean Prime Minister's arrival at the airport Ky talked at length
and quite freely with the press. He probably did some injudicious ad libbing, but the
overall impression he gave was one of complete self-assurance.
13. The Viet Cong became considerably more active militarily during the week
particularly in central Vietnam, but so far have taken heavy losses. They seem to be
making a major effort along Highway No. 1 north of Qui Nhon.
Economic
14. The Prime Minister and Chief of State put out a decree increasing custom duties on a
wide range of goods which should increase annual customs revenues on the order of some
1.8 billion piasters.
15. I have appointed a small economic warfare working group to recommend policy
measures to deny needed resources to the VC and to monitor the execution of such denial
programs. This has great potential importance.
16. The rice situation in central Vietnam is improving with the arrival of PL-480 and Thai
rice. Last week I signed a PL-480 Title I agreement with the Prime Minister providing for
shipment of an additional 100,000 metric tons of rice to meet November and December
needs. This too is vital.
Psychological
17. Field reports and Vietnamese newspaper coverage reflected considerable optimism,
perhaps almost over-optimism, among Vietnamese regarding the progress of the war.
Added note:
18. Since writing the above, I have just learned that Prime Minister Ky sent for Lansdale
Wednesday morning in Lansdale's capacity as Chairman of the U.S. Liaison Committee to
the Vietnamese Agency for Pacification./3/ Lansdale arrived with members of his
committee. Ky kept them for five hours, provided lunch and went over his ideas for
pacification which appear to be in harmony with ours. Encouraging is his awareness of the
psychological factor. He discussed places to receive priority for pacification. He wants
our views. He announced his intention of appointing Le Van Tien as Minister of
Pacification--an appointment he said he had thought about a great deal, and a man whom
he considers very able. Tien has reputation as a brilliant braintruster and idea man. A
Catholic, he is said to "retain Buddhist tenets".
19. Ky said that he will run pacification himself--which he should do, as its importance to
Vietnam and to the U.S. is absolutely central.
20. I called a special meeting of the U.S. Mission Council so that we can all take fullest
advantage of this unusual and promising opportunity.
21. I am advising Ky that he must not have his pacification plan known as the "Ky plan"
because this will automatically put a lot of people to work to sabotage it. He must manage
to get credit for many others and to involve all the leading men in Vietnam personally in
the plan's success.
Lodge
Saigon, September 30, 1965, 6:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Received
at 9:27 a.m. and passed to the White House, Department of Defense, and CIA.
1111. 1. I am glad to be able report that pacification has taken an encouraging new step
forward.
2. Yesterday Prime Minister Ky asked Lansdale in his capacity as chairman of the USLiaison Committee to the GVN Agency for Pacification to bring his committee members
from MACV, USOM and JUSPAO and join him and some of his staff in a wide-ranging
informal five-hour discussion (including lunch) of a revitalized pacification program.
3. Program has three main elements: (A) General Co will be appointed Deputy Prime
Minister for "War and Peace" with overall charge of pacification. Le Van Tien will be
appointed Minister of Pacification--an appointment he said he had thought about a great
deal, and a man whom he considers very able. Tien has reputation as brilliant braintruster
and idea man. A Catholic, he is said to "retain Buddhist tenets". (B) Special pacification
emphasis will be placed on three selected areas. (C) Cadres will be reorganized.
4. Ky also intends discuss his ideas with General Co and chiefs of certain selected
provinces tomorrow. He asked that Lansdale's group meet with him again on October 2 to
give him benefit of U.S. views. Accordingly, I called special meeting of Mission Council
this morning to discuss new program and to enable us to respond constructively.
5. Ky's program calls for mounting major pacification effort in following selected areas:
(A) Prime areas--Danang-Quang Nam area: Binh Dinh Province; Saigon-Cholon-Gia
Dinh area; (B) Possible additions: Phu Yen area, Cai Son resettlement area (part of An
Giang-Ken Giang Province), Phu Quoc island. Pacification efforts now under way other
areas should continue.
6. Secondly, he intends to reorganize existing 25,000 cadres in such a way that they would
be operationally responsible to Deputy PM for War and Peace to whom new Minister for
Rural Construction (Pacification) would also report. Cadres would only receive technical
guidance from other interested Ministries. Teams of perhaps 100, composed of 40 PATs
and popular forces and 60 public admin, health, works, education, info technicians, would
be tailored to needs of each district in Vietnam. Furthermore, he plans establish 4 training
centers, [garble] per zone, and give cadres one month of motivational and basic military
training. He also plans revitalize concept of national institute of administration and give
selected cadres periods of training there, interspersed with periods of duty in districts.
7. Following emerged from U.S. Mission Council discussion:
A. Selected areas. While Council generally concurred in concept and location of 3
selected areas, believed that one area from IV Corps should be added to prime targets.
Was noted that Danang-Quang Nam and Binh Dinh targets, while in contested areas, are
places where increasing U.S. and allied presence will afford solid shield. It is presumed
greater Saigon area will correspond roughly to Hop Tac area and that latter will probably
be gradually dropped as a separate concept or operation.
In sum, Council endorsed idea of a few well-aimed rifle shots rather than buck-shot
approach; first emphasis should be on worth and durability of programs in selected areas
rather than on number of areas. Hopefully these successes would spread.
B. Cadre. Essential that cadres be drawn from local areas whenever possible in order
inculcate local responsibility. Existing cadres should be used and reorganized rather than
imposing yet another layer of officials. Employment in this cadre should be a substitute
for army draft. Council endorsed idea of integrating PAT teams into 100-man teams.
District-based mobile cadre should be broken down and assigned to villages. Although it
is not clear how Ky sees role of province and district chiefs in this set up, Council
believes it best to try use them as part of chain of command, thus helping get government
apparatus reestablished in countryside. Relationship to these teams of U.S. military and
civilians in field will have to be studied in order best weave together our joint efforts and
put resources where they most needed.
C. General observations. Important that Ky put over this new program in statesmanlike
manner, trying to ensure adhesion all important leadership groups. At same time, in light
jaundiced press reaction to somewhat similar schemes that failed in past, publicity on this
program should be handled with great caution until some tangible results are actually in
hand. Advance notice of areas to be pacified should not be given. In general we all hope
this [garble] an historical date for getting more lasting pacification accomplished while
taking advantage of the presence of allied combat forces. Weaving all the strands together
is complex.
8. Lansdale will present Ky with two papers along foregoing guidelines. After Ky returns
from trip to Malaya on October 10 or 11, he plans convene meeting of province chiefs and
one elected from each provincial council for discussion of these pacification plans.
9. Comment: These developments are encouraging and are responsive to our long standing
desires. Ky has taken a sensible approach to this all-encompassing problem of
pacification, notably his awareness of crucial psychological factor. His designation of a
Deputy PM for War and Peace in overall charge of pacification, his concept of telescoping
our joint efforts in a few areas (while normal pacification is continued elsewhere along
present lines), and the consolidation of cadres with a more clearly defined line of authority
to Saigon, are all steps in the right direction. Finally, we are pleased that Ky has seen fit to
engage in this fruitful exchange of views and to seek our advice before his ideas jelled any
further.
Lodge
158. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

New York, September 30, 1965.
Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Also sent to Acting Secretary Ball. There
is an indication on the source text that the President saw this memorandum. Rusk and
Gromyko were at the United Nations for the 20th session of the General Assembly.
We had our first dinner this evening with a second meeting scheduled Friday/2/ evening
when he returns hospitality. I will report separately on the dinner table discussions on
Kashmir and disarmament matters.
/2/October 1.
Before dinner Gromyko and I had a private talk with no one else present. I told him that
following Harriman's discussion with Kosygin,/3/ we had taken Kosygin's suggestion and
had been in contact with Hanoi for the purpose of exploring possibilities of peaceful
settlement and counter proposals on Hanoi's four points./4/ He was much interested,
appeared to have been uninformed by Hanoi, and did not press for details on the nature of
the contact beyond asking whether a third government was involved--to which I replied
no.
/3/See Document 68.
Gromyko refused to acknowledge the basic fact of North Vietnam's infiltration and other
action against South Vietnam, but it was quite clear that he surely understood that we
knew about such things even if on policy grounds he could not admit it. He said it was his
impression that Hanoi could not possibly enter into discussions on negotiations while
bombing was going on. His point was that Hanoi looked upon discussion during the
bombings as a plea from a position of weakness. I told him that Hanoi was not denying to
us the facts of their intervention or the presence of regular units of the North Vietnamese
Army. I told him we were not asking for conditions because we were prepared to talk
while the fighting continued or were prepared to have preliminary discussions about
circumstances which would permit more formal negotiations to occur. I told him that we
had been unable to get from any communist capital the slightest indication as to what
would happen if the bombing stopped. We were not asking this question to raise a
condition but were simply asking for a simple factual statement as to what consequences
any one could see in the direction of making peace. Obviously, if we stopped the bombing
and nothing else happened this would be unacceptable.
Gromyko was much interested in whether contacts with Hanoi had been definitively
concluded without result or whether such contacts remained open. I told him that it was
my impression that both sides were prepared to renew contact if there was anything
interesting to say. His attitude seemed to indicate a hope that whatever channel that was
involved would remain open. He did not confirm but did not contradict my remark that
there seemed to be some differences of views in Hanoi and that some debate might be
going on in that capital.
Under the impact of Chen Yi's Press Conference/5/ he seemed less reticent about
acknowledging that Moscow has a real problem with China than he personally has been
with me in the past. For example, in response to a question from me, he stated "very
flatly" that he was confident that if Hanoi came to a conference at which the Soviet Union
and the United States were present that Peiping would not use force to prevent it.
/5/Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's uncompromising answers to questions on the
attitude of the People's Republic of China to the question of a negotiated peace in
Vietnam are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 902-903.
It was significant to me that he showed no bluster or threats about the matter of Soviet
support for Hanoi that he reflected in Vienna in May./6/
[Here follows discussion of Soviet propaganda attacks on the President and IndiaPakistan.]
My general impression was that Gromyko did not bring with him any instructions to heat
up crises on particular points with us, that he did not expect any major break-through in
the direction of agreements on important matters, and that he was prepared to be relaxed
but direct and businesslike in discussing any matters in which we both are involved. He
did not attempt to apply pressure nor did he use threats or any of the normal language
associated with the rugged discussions of 1961 and 1962.
159. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(McNaughton)/1/
Washington, October 1, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret.
McNaughton passed a copy of this letter to the JCS on October 6. (Washington National
Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381)
Dear John:
This is in reply to your letter of September 28./2/ I am not in a position to comment
further at this moment on the question of locks and dams, but I would like to respond
immediately to your last paragraph referring to the language in paragraph 2 of the State
dissent to SNIE 10-11-65./3/
/2/Not found.
/3/Document 148.
I have not attempted to go through all of the public statements and press conferences, but
it certainly would be my impression that--even though there might not have been specific
statements on the question--the various responses indicated generally that we would
continue, as far as we could then see, the policy we have been pursuing, which of course
does not include attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. I am confident that our statements have
been interpreted in this sense by diplomatic observers and sophisticated newspapermen,
and that if Hanoi has any eyes and ears at all the overwhelming reading that has been
reported to it is that we were not planning to hit H-H at any early time. I say this despite
the fact that the general line of response in all our public statements has been not to
exclude such action.
As to private indications, I think you know that we have repeatedly been asked pointblank by the British, Japanese, and others whether we intended to extend our bombing to
H-H. We have always replied with some care that we had no such current plan, although
the time might come when it would be necessary as a part of the over-all pattern of
pressure on the DRV. I do not know whether these diplomatic conversations get back to
Hanoi, but I would suspect strongly that some of them do.
More broadly, the question of hitting H-H has repeatedly come up in background
conversations and briefings with Congressional groups and newspapermen. We have
taken the same line as with the diplomats, but on occasion, notably with Congressmen, I
myself--and I am sure others--have necessarily argued the pros and cons in such a way as
to indicate that we certainly did not exclude this but had doubts, as of the time of the
statements, that it was likely to bring the DRV to accept a solution. Again, I think the net
of all these discussions must have been an impression that we would weigh hitting H-H as
a very major step and that we were not inclined to do it except for grave reasons or unless
there were a clear basis to believe it could significantly help in effecting a favorable
resolution of the problem. I cannot help but believe that discussions with these groups
necessarily percolate into the bloodstream of Washington, and reach Communist ears
which in turn pass them to Hanoi.
On one specific point, I would like to flag that we have seen one TDCS, brought to our
attention by Andy Goodpaster, in which a CAS representative was quoted as telling his
Soviet contact that we had no plan to hit the SAM sites because Soviet personnel were
present. This was not an authorized statement, and we have flagged it to CIA.
On the basis of all this, I do not suppose any of us can say what the DRV leaders really
think we intend. The massive air defense effort in Hanoi strongly suggests the assumption
that we will eventually hit H-H. But I do think that the statement in the paragraph in
question--that there have been many "official indications, public and private," to the
contrary, at least for the present--does represent the fact. It may be that the sentence is a
shade overstated, in light of our consistent refusal to exclude such action at some time, but
I think the inevitable thrust of all our statements has been in the direction indicated.
In any case, whether the sentence could have been improved or not, those of use who saw
the INR dissent--and this included Ambassador Thompson, Alex Johnson, Len Unger, and
myself--would still agree with its essential point, namely that the Communists (and nonCommunists) would feel that the program discussed in the Estimate would in fact
represent a very major change in our level of action.
I am writing this to meet your deadline of October 1, and without having dug up the
relevant memoranda of conversations and briefing notes in any detail. But I am confident
that I have summed up fairly what has been said. I do want to conclude by assuring you
and General Wheeler that we have no intention of changing the line we have taken
consistently, basically that we are not excluding this or any other action. Obviously, we
must not say anything that could impair our freedom of action or the President's freedom
of choice on future actions.
Sincerely,
William P. Bundy/4/

Department of State
Washington, DC

SecDel/MC/19
New York, October 7, 1965, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by
Emmett B. Ford, Jr., of the Office of German Affairs on October 8 and approved in S on
October 13. The meeting was held at USUN.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965
SUBJECT
Viet Nam (Part I of II)/2/
/2/Part II is unrelated to Vietnam.
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
Secretary Rusk
Emmett B. Ford, Jr.
Hungary
Foreign Minister Peter
Ambassador Janos Radvanyi
Peter asked the Secretary his views on the situation in Viet Nam. He asked if the Secretary
could see any way out.
The Secretary said that this would depend on what Hanoi is willing to do with respect to
its own actions in South Viet Nam. The United States is in South Viet Nam solely because
of the infiltration from North Viet Nam to South Viet Nam of armed men and munitions.
If this infiltration would stop, we could go home. But we want to be sure that South Viet
Nam can solve its problems without armed pressure from the North.
The Secretary went on to say that he had received the impression that differing and
sometimes contradictory attitudes had become apparent in Hanoi of late. We think

Moscow would be prepared to take part in a conference if Hanoi would assent. It is
Peiping which says no. Hanoi is somewhere between the two but currently leaning toward
Peiping.
Peter said that, in his opinion, as long as the United States continues to bomb North Viet
Nam, no discussion could take place./3/ It is difficult to see what advantage can be gained
from the continuance of these air attacks.
/3/Secto 39 from USUN, repeated to Saigon as telegram 50, October 7, summarized this
conversation. The cable also noted that after the discussion, Peter was interviewed by the
press at some length and he repeated his belief that a cessation of the bombing was an
indispensable first step to creating an atmosphere necessary for negotiations. (Department
of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1)
The Secretary recalled that large-scale infiltration South of the 17th parallel began in 1959
and 1960; we have waited four years before beginning the bombing of North Viet Nam.
Peter made the point that there had been no advance warning of these bombings and no
opportunity for negotiations. The Secretary said that the United States had tried every
means before the bombings began--all of this is a matter of record. At any rate, the United
States has learned since that holding off does not produce a peaceful settlement. In various
ways we have tried to ask the question, "What will happen if we stop the bombing; what
will this lead to?"
The Secretary pointed out that we have asked Hanoi what will happen and get no answer.
Gromyko says to wait and see. But the bombing and killing goes on every day in South
Viet Nam. What is the difference whether explosives are carried by a man on foot or
delivered in planes from the air? If we stop the bombing, will the North Viet Namese
troops go home? Will the Communists come to the conference table?
Peter expressed his conviction that, if the DRV answered such questions as to their intent
while the bombing continues or the threat of bombing is still present, it would be regarded
by the world as an indication of their weakness. The DRV does not want to look weak.
The Secretary observed that, by the same logic, the reverse would be true if we stopped
bombing before we received any indication of intent from the DRV.
Peter said nobody could seriously believe that the United States would stop the bombings
out of weakness.
The Secretary saw a difference in opinion on this point. Peiping is continually preaching
that the United States is a "paper tiger". Chen Yi enjoins the Soviet Union not to take such
a gloomy view of war. We take a very gloomy view of war, indeed.
The Secretary was of the opinion that there should be some way to avoid the impression
of weakness. We don't think that there can really be any misjudgment on this score. If
"face" or public posture is involved, surely some private arrangement can be made. We
are prepared to stop bombing if we can be assured that this is a step toward peace.
Peter said that it certainly would be a step toward peace. It would create the atmosphere
which is necessary to bring all the factors for peaceful negotiation into play. In the present
situation, however, Hungary is not able to propose negotiations to its friends in North Viet
Nam. The Soviets are in the same position.
The Secretary remarked that part of the answer lies in Peiping. What will Hanoi do if
Peiping says no?
Peter said that the Hungarians have some direct contacts with Hanoi. He mentioned that a
Hungarian delegation is scheduled to arrive in Hanoi today. Peter's firm conviction was
that the DRV is ready to negotiate but that certain conditions must be met. Yet, while
North Viet Nam is being bombed or under the threat of bombing, any talks are impossible.
The Secretary pointed out that this works both ways. There is also bombing in South Viet
Nam.
Peter said that this situation will continue as long as there is no improvement in the
attitude of the United States. The United States should show its goodwill in this matter.
The halt in the bombing last summer was not effective because the DRV was still under
the threat of renewed attack.
The Secretary observed that Hanoi had not shown any indication of a desire to talk at that
time. In fact, they just sent our message back and stuck it under our door. Three days later
Gromyko termed our suspension of bombing "an insult".
We have indicated our willingness to settle this problem not only to the other side, but to
our own people. The Secretary said he had repeatedly indicated his willingness to depart
"tomorrow" if any one wanted to talk. We have said that we will come to the conference
table, we will agree to a cease-fire in the event that a conference is imminent, or that we
will come home if the DRV stops its aggression. We have repeatedly said that we want no
bases in South Viet Nam and that when the fighting in Viet Nam could be stopped we will
join in an economic development project for Southeast Asia./4/
/4/The next paragraph began with the sentence: "We are not rabbits to be frightened by a
snake." It was apparently erased in the Secretary's office, but remains legible on the
source text.
If the DRV continues its aggression, the war will continue. It is that simple. How do we
deal with that situation? Peter said that a decrease of military action would be a start.
There is no other way to decrease military action but to halt the bombing of North Viet
Nam. Otherwise escalation will continue with all its dangers.
The Secretary said that escalation is the tragedy. If the war continues to escalate, North
Viet Nam will be destroyed. Why do we have to go down that road?
Peter replied that the key to the matter is in United States hands. If bombing is halted,
conditions will improve, and negotiations leading to peace will be possible.
The Secretary said that we would get nowhere if such unilateral action meant our
acceptance of a program of the "liberation movement".
Peter reiterated that the conditions necessary to negotiations would arise if the United
States stopped its bombing. It would be impossible to get any guarantee from the DRV
until after the cessation of bombing.
The Secretary remarked that we cannot move very long on a unilateral basis.
Peter said that before the United States started its air attacks there had been no real
proposal for negotiations on the situation in South Viet Nam. The air attacks began
without notification thus, if the United States stops its bombing, it is not purely a
unilateral concession, but a new start to try to find a solution.
The Secretary asked how long Peter felt it would take for the other side to enter
negotiations after the proposed halting of air attacks.
Peter replied certainly a few weeks, provided the attacks were stopped without the threat
of renewal. The United States would not lose anything by it and the rest of the world
would surely gain.
The Secretary remarked that there are traditional ways and means of coming to an
understanding on such matters as this. In the past history of such disputes, there have been
means of making clear the possibilities for peaceful settlement which existed.
Peter remarked that, while the bombings continue, any prior indication on the part of the
DRV that it is willing to negotiate would be a sign of weakness. They would think that the
United States had gotten what it wanted, namely negotiations, through military action.
The Secretary said that it is, indeed, very difficult to get the idea of reciprocity across this
ideological gulf. If Hanoi thought it could succeed in achieving its objectives in this way,
would the DRV come to the conference table?
Peter said that it may be a long way to the conference table.
The Secretary feared that Hanoi takes an exaggerated view of the force of international
opinion. We have consulted with most governments on the problem of North Viet Nam
and we know what they think. Hanoi may well believe that, if we stop, the force of world
opinion may prevent us from resuming the air attacks. Thus the DRV believes they will
have an advantage if we stop.
Peter said that this would not be a unilateral advantage. The United States would gain
much more in the way of international support if the air attacks were stopped.
The Secretary said he supposed there was always universal support for the idea of a
peaceful settlement, except in Hanoi and Peiping. Some countries, however, feel
themselves unable to express their support until Hanoi assents to negotiations.
The Secretary then recalled the manner in which Peiping had torpedoed the conference on
Laos and Cambodia. He said that we understand the difficulties currently present in the
Socialist world. But it does seem to us that Hanoi has the key.
The Secretary said that, if Hanoi comes to the conference table with the United States and
the Soviet Union, Peiping would hesitate to interfere, at least with force. Therefore, Hanoi
holds the key. It simply doesn't appear that Hanoi is ready to make any effort toward a
peaceful solution. If they wish to do so, there are ways and means of letting us know.
Peter said that as long as the present situation continues, there can be no change in the
attitude of Hanoi. The bombing must cease.
The Secretary asked what, besides the bombing, would cease. There must be some
reciprocal action on the part of the DRV.
Peter was certain that reciprocal action would come, perhaps on the ground as well. It is
impossible to get both sides to move at once.
The Secretary asked why, at a very private level and in the most sophisticated manner, is
it necessary for one party to move in advance of the other. This is not the traditional way
to negotiate.
Peter didn't agree. The Secretary then reminded him that, as an example, we had contacts
with the Soviet Union while Berlin was still under blockade.
Peter termed such contacts as of a special nature and well-established.
The Secretary then explained that the United States has no national ambitions in Southeast
Asia. South Viet Nam can be non-aligned, if it is left alone. We want no military bases in
Viet Nam. But we do feel strongly about a small nation being overrun by force. Thus,
there is an enormous gap between our attitude and that of Peiping.
Peter said that, if the United States has no ambitions in that area, the points of agreement
between the two sides are much closer than they seem. The main thing now is to stop the
bombing. For Hungary, as a Socialist country, it is impossible to talk to friends in the
DRV about negotiations while the bombing goes on. Peter went on to point out that the air
attacks are different from the ground fighting in South Viet Nam.
The Secretary said he found it difficult to accept a distinction between the bombing and
the fighting in South Viet Nam. Peter repeated his certainty that the key is in the hands of
the United States.
The Secretary remarked that, in conflict, surely the key is in the hands of both sides.
Peter said that the United States is the major power in this case.
The Secretary said that other elements entered into the picture. When campaigning for reelection, President Johnson had told the American people that we did not wish a larger
war in Viet Nam. After the President had won the election, Hanoi evidently
misunderstood the meaning of the President's victory. They thought that they could
expand the war without danger of response from the United States.
Peter said that, if the United States were to stop the bombing, it could still maintain "all
the present possibilities" if Hanoi acted in bad faith. He then asked the Secretary whether
he had anything favorable to say on this whole matter.
The Secretary remarked that he had been very interested in hearing Peter's views. He
couldn't say more than he had already said. The whole matter needs further exploration.
The greatest difficulty is the absence of any reciprocal intent on the part of the DRV.
Peter told the Secretary that reciprocity would come.
The Secretary said he did not want to mislead Peter. We have thought very hard about this
problem and we want peace very much. It is too late in history for war; no one
understands this better than we. Most of the great powers understand the dangers of war,
with the signal exception of Peiping. This creates problems in the Socialist world as well
as in the West.
Suppose that we stop the bombing and the Chinese calculate that they can intervene in
safety?
Peter thought that this was an extremely unlikely possibility.
The Secretary felt that, nevertheless, we would have heavy responsibility if such should
be the result.
Peter said that there could not be any danger in stopping. It would change the whole
atmosphere.
The Secretary recalled one of the deepest disappointments the United States has ever
experienced--the failure of President Kennedy's fresh approach on Laos. The DRV never
did reduce its forces in Laos more than a few thousand men and continued to use Laos as
a base to infiltrate South Viet Nam. Everyone was ready for a peaceful settlement but it
didn't work.
Peter remarked that if one binds one's hands as a result of bad experiences one will never
get out of a bad situation.
In return, the Secretary quoted an old saying of American horse traders: "If someone
cheats me once it is his fault; if he cheats me twice it is my fault."
Peter said that the United States would have many good friends supporting it if there was
a cessation of bombing. This would include the Soviet Union.
The Secretary said that, since both he and Peter were Calvinists, we will continue to give
the entire matter "our prayerful Presbyterian consideration." He wanted to make it clear
that he had not made any promise or commitment to Peter. He expressed his appreciation
for the opportunity for talking with Peter./5/
/5/This last paragraph was typed on a different typewriter and was probably added in the
Secretary's office when the memorandum was approved.
161. Editorial Note
On October 7, 1965, from 12:45 to 1:50 p.m., President Johnson met with Secretary of
Defense McNamara, Acting Secretary of State Ball, and McGeorge Bundy. Bundy left the
meeting at 1:20 and Ball left at 1:30 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No
other record of this meeting has been found, except an agenda that lists Vietnam as one of
four items to be discussed. Under Vietnam are three sub-topics: "1. Rolling Thunder, 2.
New voluntary organization, 3. Domestic debate." (Ibid., National Security File, Memos
to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV)
According to a memorandum from William Bundy to Ball, October 7, the Department of
Defense informed the Department of State that Rolling Thunder was not to be a topic for
discussion at the October 7 meeting with the President. (Department of State, Vietnam
Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder--1965) The reference to a new
voluntary organization is apparently to efforts by Dr. Howard Rusk to extend voluntary
medical services and personnel to South Vietnam's war victims and veterans. An October
6 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, describing Howard Rusk's
recommendations and containing a note that it was to be "Put on the Pres's desk," is in the
Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol.
XV. In an October 7 memorandum to Chester Cooper, William Jorden previewed the
upcoming demonstrations of October 15-16 in the United States and abroad against the
Vietnam war and discussed the composition of the protest movement within the United
States. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos (A))

Saigon, October 8, 1965, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to
USUN, Moscow, and Budapest.
1216. Ref: USUN's 50./2/
1. Cables from USUN indicating systematic campaign to bring US pause in bombing and
disturbing implications of Vienna's dispatch [sic] well recognized by Deptel 975/3/
embolden me to make following comments:
/3/Reference is to telegram 512 to Vienna for Abba Schwartz, repeated as 975 to Saigon,
October 7. Schwartz was in Vienna to explore with the International Committee of the
Red Cross a possible exchange of prisoners in Vietnam. The Department of State
informed him in the telegram that he should not make contact with DRV or NLF
representatives who might be in Vienna, but rather work through the Red Cross
representative. Schwartz should also "downplay the idea" that DRV/NLF willingness to
exchange prisoners "might signal the beginning of something more
important." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET)
2. Mr. Peter's assertion that "US has nothing to lose by cessation of bombing" is
manifestly untrue. Bombing is our strongest current weapon against Viet Cong aggression
and to cease it, in the way in which Mr. Peter suggests, would be a very serious blow both
to our effort in Vietnam and to that of the Vietnamese.
3. Believe the Secretary was absolutely right to reaffirm US position.
4. It is extraordinary to one who worked eight years at the UN to find such apparently
widespread indifference to the concept of aggression the prevention of which is, after all,
one of the prime aims of the Charter. Yet, if the press is any guide, it is seldom
mentioned. President Johnson is right in all that he has said about suppressing aggression.
The UN rests on the principle that it is wrong to use force except in self-defense. If the
UN does violence to that principle it will cease to deserve respect. Our actions in Vietnam
are in full accord with purposes of the UN Charter, rooted in Article I, "Measures for the .
. . Suppression of Acts of Aggression."
5. One of the most effective things which we can do to ward off aggression and promote
peace is our bombing in the north. There should be no pause from us without a pause from
them. If we stop cutting roads and blowing up bridges in the north, let them stop doing the
same thing in the south, or stop destroying the railroad. A proposition whereby their side
is allowed to do with impunity the things which we are not to be allowed to do is
manifestly unacceptable.
6. The agitation for a pause should not be taken at face value. When it comes from one of
the so called non-aligned countries, it often represents a response to an organized minority
more than it represents what the government really thinks.
7. We must avoid steps which: will cause the Hanoi regime to think we are weak and near
defeat; of being believed in South Vietnam to be about to negotiate in a UN to which SVN
does not belong and behind their backs; of thus lowering morale and destroying an
important quantity of Vietnamese fighting power which our own fighting men will have to
pay for; or in general, of giving up something and really getting nothing back.
Lodge
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI,
Memos (A). Confidential.
SUBJECT
Refugees
The Refugee Situation
There is no accurate estimate of the current number of refugees in Vietnam. Best guesses
hover around 600,000 and more (possibly as much as 400,000 more) by December.
Although there are refugees in virtually every provincial capital, the major concentrations
are in I and II Corps.
Refugees have flowed in from a variety of causes: floods, VC repression, rice shortages,
and the destruction of villages by military (VC and U.S.-GVN) action. If one can
generalize at all, the refugees are largely apolitical; the vast majority are children, women
and elderly folk with no special skills.
Conditions in the refugee camps are probably not too bad from the physical point of view
when compared to the general standards of the country as a whole, which is not to say that
there aren't serious problems of food and shelter. But it is the political-psychological
aspect of the problem which needs careful attention; the refugees represent a potential
source of disaffection and unrest exploitable by the Viet Cong.
The GVN Approach
Despite the enormity of the problem and the prodding of the U.S. Mission, there is a lack
of interest, planning and action at the top levels of the GVN. This is reflected in
uncertainty and confusion at the province level. The Commanders of I and II Corps regard
the refugee problem as a tactical one and take the view that additional refugees should be
turned away from the existing centers and that resettlement of those in the centers should
be undertaken immediately.
In a country where poverty and misery are so widespread and where social welfare
resources are spread so thin, it is not unnatural that refugees are regarded as an
unnecessary burden by the government. Moreover, there are many instances where
refugees in well-run and well-supplied centers are much better off than non-refugees
nearby. The Government is justifiably concerned that "model" centers will simply attract
"rice refugees".
The GVN's Ministry of Social Welfare is the executive agency for the care of refugees
and in terms of its resources and capabilities, is doing what it can. But it is not big enough
for the job. Enter the U.S.
The U.S. Program
The U.S. Mission has been concerned with the refugee problem since the major floods of
last April. With the increase of Viet Cong activity in II Corps and the stepped-up military
activity of late spring and summer the refugee rolls began to swell and U.S. AID and
private efforts expanded. During the summer USOM established a Refugee Task Force
and a coordinator for refugee matters was appointed until AID could recruit a refugee
expert. Several Task Force teams were dispatched to the principal refugee centers.
In September a Refugee Relief Division was established in USOM and a Vietnam relief
coordinator was appointed in Washington. Sixteen specialists in relief and refugee
problems have been recruited for the Relief Division and most are already in place. The
Chief of this Division (Ed Marks) and I have had two useful sessions; he will leave this
weekend for Saigon.
At least as important, is an overall policy and program which was developed in
consultation with the Ministry of Social Welfare. (It is hoped that General Ky will soon
announce his Government's interest in and policy toward the refugee problem.) The
operative concept for USOM is to "advise and recommend", but also to be ready to
compensate for gaps in GVN capabilities. We must, however, make sure that this is
basically and conspicuously a GVN program.
The Voluntary Agencies
The principal agencies now operating in Vietnam are CARE, the Church World Service
(primarily Mennonites), the Catholic Relief Service, and the Friends. Each of these
agencies, with our urging and encouragement, are expanding their activities and some
agencies not now active in Vietnam (notably the Lutherans) may soon undertake
programs there. Most of these agencies intend to intensify their fund-raising activities
(CARE has already launched theirs) to finance these expanded programs.
In my own contacts with them, in their testimony to the Kennedy Subcommittee, and in
discussions with AID officials, the voluntary agencies have revealed a great sensitivity to
coordination by a new "umbrella" group and infringement of their sovereignty in fund
raising. They are taking steps to increase their coordination effort (which the more candid
admit has been thus far unsatisfactory) through their trade association, the American
Council of Voluntary Agencies.
Representatives of about 7 key Voluntary Agencies will leave for Vietnam in about a
week for a five-day investigation. They are scheduled to return to Washington before
Senator Kennedy arrives in Vietnam in late October.
The Kennedy Subcommittee
This group, a non-legislative subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, became interested
in the Vietnam problem in late June. It has held a large number of hearings, but transcripts
are hard to come by (I have obtained several involving the Voluntary Agencies).
According to Committee staff members, the Report will be prepared around midNovember following the Senator's return from Vietnam. I suggest we get a reading on
Senator Kennedy's thinking before he leaves and before we get too deeply into our
Foundation. Should I endeavor to do this? (Yes__ No__)/2/
/2/A note on the source text in McGeorge Bundy's hand reads: "I want to call Ted
Kennedy on this on Monday [October 11]. McGB." No record of the Kennedy-Bundy
telephone conversation has been found.
Problems Ahead
--Any programs undertaken in the refugee field by the Foundation should clearly be of the
kind the Voluntary Agencies are not doing and cannot do. Examples: Statistical data;
large-scale medical assistance; family tracing service; orphan care and adoption services
(Cherne is ready to fold in his program); assistance in resettlement and training.
--Whatever the USG or American voluntary agencies do it must appear, as much as
possible, to be a Vietnamese effort. This will become increasingly difficult as American
efforts expand.
--The GVN must be encouraged to take a greater role and especially to proceed with
political orientation, training and sound resettlement programs.
--The U.S. military logistics capability must be geared closely into U.S. and GVN relief
efforts; this is the only way the increased quantities of relief goods can reach refugee
centers in timely and adequate fashion.
--Coordination, especially in Saigon, of U.S. voluntary efforts must be strengthened.
C
164. Paper by the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XVI,
Memos (A). Secret. Thompson sent this paper to Bundy under cover of a memorandum
that reads: "The attached report was largely prepared in State and was reviewed by
General Taylor, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Unger and myself.
"McNamara also received a copy, which indicated that he saw it on October 26.
(Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 1266,
Vietnam 381)
CONCLUSIONS/2/
/2/This is part VII of a nine-part study, of which only the conclusions were distributed to
the White House and Secretary of Defense. The other parts were: I. Historical
Background, undated; II. Aims and Interests of the Communist Countries Involved,
October 8; III. Aims and Interests of the U.S., October 9; IV. Alternatives to be
Considered, undated; V. Communist Reactions, undated; VI. Discussion (not found); VII
(a). General Taylor's Views 10/11/65; and Annexes, undated. (Department of State,
Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Thompson Study, 1965)
The increased military power we are bringing to bear in South Viet-Nam must have made
the Viet Cong realize that we are going to make a determined and serious effort to destroy
their capability. As this power makes itself felt, they will probably decide in the near
future to break up most of their large units and to move toward one or the other of two
strategies: They may change their tactics in the direction of small acts of terror and
sabotage; or less likely, they could adopt an even more passive strategy of apparently
"fading into the woodwork."
The purpose of the latter strategy would be to cause a cessation in United States pressures,
north and south, until a more propitious moment. This would not be easy for the Viet
Cong to accomplish; they would have problems of morale, organization, etc. But if it were
attempted it would face us with a critical point of decision with regard to bombing of the
north. Two sharply divergent theses could be argued. On the one hand it could be argued
that a step-up in bombing of the north would be justified in this circumstance since we
could not permit the VC to turn the pressure on and off at their convenience. Stepped up
bombing would be designed to force the issue. On the other hand, it could be argued,
probably more convincingly, that the bombing should be reduced, perhaps in proportion
to the reduction in military activity in the south. This would assume that the pacification
program could be pursued successfully and that the United States could persevere in its
political and military commitments recognizing that to effectuate the pacification program
will take a long period, perhaps years. Though we do not believe we are yet at the
preceding point of decision, we do believe that it should be anticipated and the
groundwork laid for reaching the necessary policy decisions when and if required.
It is unlikely, however, that our actions in the south have made them ready to switch from
a military to a political strategy, and they are unlikely to do so for a matter of months at
best. They will in all likelihood recede from "Stage 3" and pursue a strategy of active
guerrilla hit-and-run strikes, terror and sabotage. They will continue to oppose
negotiations except upon their own terms until such time as it becomes clear to them that
we will stay the course and successfully, if gradually, push them back into the woodwork
and begin a discernible trend toward pacification of most of the country. The more
immediate question, therefore, is what our policy should be with regard to bombing the
north in the interim, that is, during the period when the intensity of our own effort in the
south is growing, when the VC are pursuing a "1963-4" or "Stage 2" strategy, and when
the question whether the VC will recede to "Stage 1" is still unclear.
It is now obvious that we shall probably be faced with the prospect of a continuation of
our present courses of action, including the bombing of North Viet-Nam, for many
months more. The present rate of escalation of our bombing, however, is bringing us to a
point where in a few months further escalation will be possible only by attacking sensitive
targets which may pose, in acute form for the other side, the issue of greater Chinese
and/or Soviet involvement. We are beginning to attack the last remaining geographic area
apart from the area around Hanoi and Haiphong. We may be able to recognize the
optimum time for exerting further pressure by increasing the level of our bombing but an
increase in our bombing of the North at the present time may bring matters to a head too
soon.
It does not appear to us necessary that there be a pronounced escalation in our bombing at
the present time since our present activities, while not destroying the military and
economic capacity of North Viet-Nam, are causing great strain as indicated in the letters
quoted in Annex B./3/ (As noted below, Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Bundy would
interpret the permissible continuing level of bombing somewhat more narrowly than
would General Taylor and Mr. McNaughton.) Moreover, the effects of our present attacks
are to some extent cumulative and are bringing a steady increase of pressure on Hanoi.
The impressive reports of the growing number of targets destroyed or damaged in the
daily armed reconnaissance reports illustrate this. We therefore believe we should more or
less level off at about the present rate of bombing in the North. For the present, we should
not attack the most sensitive targets, large dams, Phuc Yen and the Hanoi/Haiphong area
before January 1, 1966. Though we would not initially recommend hitting such targets as
thermal power plants, as we begin to exhaust profitable targets, we might begin very
gradually to nibble at some of the industrial targets.
/3/Not found.
The northeast quadrant presents a special problem. Mr. McNaughton would favor
maintaining approximately the present level of attacks; i.e. about four or five missions
every two weeks against major LOC targets, to assure destruction of the railroad. These
missions should include specific armed recce to prevent daylight movement on the roads.
General Taylor would prefer a slight increase from the present level. Ambassador
Thompson and Mr. Bundy feel that the present level of activity might well tempt the
North Viet-Namese to throw their MIGs into the equation and that this, aside from its
intrinsic disadvantages, could lead to a succession of events broadening hostilities still
further. Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Bundy would favor a reduction to approximately
one attack on the railroad every two weeks and no armed recce except in very special
cases and limited to specific targets.
We also conclude that serious consideration should be given to employment of a pause.
Though it would have to be carefully managed, its objective would be to provide an
opportunity for the north to give concrete evidence of a willingness to come to terms, an
evidence which it is difficult, in a political and psychological sense, for it to give while
under the pressure of our bombing. We would have to exercise great care that a mere
willingness to initiate negotiations would not in and of itself qualify for an indefinite
moratorium on the bombing. We would have to convey our intent to reinstitute bombing
if the North Viet-Namese refused to negotiate or if their willingness to negotiate is not
accompanied by a manifest reduction of VC aggression in the south. If it is necessary to
reinstitute bombing, we should be prepared to consider increasing the pressure, e.g.
through striking industrial targets, to make clear to Hanoi our continuing, firm resolve.
In summation, we conclude that:
1. the present escalation in the bombing of the north is likely to become increasingly out
of phase with the progress of our military operations in the south. It would thus run the
risk of forcing the other side prematurely to face the issue of negotiations or greater
Chinese and Soviet involvement.
2. we should therefore level off our bombing of the north (with some variance of views
among us as to permissible levels in the northeast quadrant, see above) for the interim.
3. we may well be faced with the prospect of altered Viet Cong strategy in the south
which will require a reevaluation of our policy on bombing of the north and that this
problem should be anticipated and study of its implications begun at once and finally,
4. that a pause in the bombing should be considered, recognizing that it may be a
prerequisite to establishing the political and psychological framework for initiating
negotiations, but recognizing also that unless carefully managed it contains dangerous
pitfalls.

Saigon, October 13, 1965, 1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to
CINCPAC for POLAD.

1269. Subject: Vietnamese attitudes.
1. Completion of Ky government's first hundred days seems an appropriate moment to
review Vietnamese attitudes toward the government. In general, on the basis of contacts
with opinion molders within key groups, one is forced to the conclusion that the
Vietnamese continue
to be fence-sitters. There is no evidence of any rise in public acceptance of Ky
government, and the various key groups appear to be awaiting some demonstration of
performance on the part of the government, although there is little clarity as to what form
such performance might take. It seems noteworthy that there was little editorial reaction to
Ky's hundred day speech in vernacular press and what comment there was seemed
perfunctory and unenthusiastic. One can only deduce that the editors chose not to react to
the speech because they were aware that critical commentary would be censored. Press, in
general, continues to be somewhat unsympathetic toward the Ky government. This
unhappiness has, in part, a selfish base, stemming from government's attempts to control
the number of newspapers and their opinions.
2. Within individual groups, general attitude seems to be as follows:
A. Catholics. Ky government is for the moment acceptable to some Catholic groups but
there is no great enthusiasm for it. Northern refugees and southerners alike are still
devoted to idea of civilian government. They are prepared to give Ky a further grace
period but they will be watching every move the government makes and will be prepared
to criticize when they feel their interests are in danger. Catholic daily Xay Dung continues
to display friendly attitude toward Ky but paper is the personal vehicle of Father Nguyen
Quang Lam, a friend of Ky's, and no great importance should be attached to it.
B. Buddhists. Tri Quang continues to indicate his displeasure with present government.
However, he has not shown any inclination to mount a full-scale campaign to bring it
down. He has taken line that it will, in time, collapse of its own weight. Fact of matter
probably is that Quang has not been able to find an issue with which he might rally a
significant following in an anti-government campaign. Quang probably found instructive
the failure of the student campaign in Hue in August to achieve much backing. Tam Chau
continues to talk on what is apparently a friendly and frequent basis with Prime Minister
Ky. Chau has told Ambassador Lodge that he believes Viet-Nam needs a government that
can stay in place at least two years, thus signalling his intention not to oppose the GVN.
The GVN is extending substantial support to the UBA (e.g., Van Hanh University) which
undoubtedly makes it easier for Chau to support it. There seems to be a parallel between
the current state of play within the UBA vis-a-vis the GVN and that which existed during
the early days of the Khanh government. At that time, Chau was able to assure that the
UBA would not oppose the GVN. This equilibrium proved fragile then and could prove
equally fragile now, especially since preparations are now underway for the biennial
meeting of the Unified Buddhist Association (UBA) in December at which Chau will be
re-elected or a successor will be chosen.
C. Sudistes. There is no great affection for Ky government amongst southern politicians
or southerners in general. Ky is regarded as a brash young man from the north and despite
the presence of certain southerners in the Cabinet, his government is not considered
representative of the southerners. As has so often been the case in the past, the southerners
lack the organization and energy to make their displeasure known in any concerted
fashion. Nevertheless, their attitude prevents Ky from being able to rally support within
mass of the Vietnamese people, ten million of whom are, after all, Cochin-Chinese.
D. Military. In wake of the September 11 Armed Forces Convention at Saigon, the army
continues to give the impression of being unified. Directorate members also provide a
public impression of unity. In August and September, General Nguyen Chanh Thi
supported GVN against agitators in Hue, and this display of Directorate unity undoubtedly
contributed to easing the situation. Lately, however, we have heard rumblings that
command changes announced by Ky at his October 1 press conference were not well
received in some quarters (e.g., certain southern officers view appointments of Generals
Nguyen Bao Tri and Nguyen Duc Thang as further evidence that northerners are gradually
taking over all key positions within the military). All this demonstrates that Directorate
unity is a fragile thing, constantly subjected to divisive forces. It will require frequent
reaffirmation.
E. Student-intellectuals. Student-intellectual group has recorded its unhappiness with the
Ky government. Hue student newspaper is continuing to publish despite general Thi's
open expression of displeasure and has not restricted its criticism of the military regime.
Intellectuals, after their late August seminar in Hue, have not as yet organized a promised
follow-up meeting in Saigon. Individually, however, they continue to voice their dislike of
the military and wish for a civilian government. This group, despite its articulateness, has
little power unless it can draw on the Buddhist mass.
F. Labor. Tran Quoc Buu's CVT raised threat of general strike at the beginning of
September. Immediate cause for CVT grievance was rigid enforcement by government of
a Diem era decree prescribing 48-hour advance notice before trade union meetings could
be scheduled. CVT felt this procedure unduly restrictive if applied to public meetings held
in union offices. Behind this issue, however, were other grievances: workers'
dissatisfaction with regime's failure to cope with rising cost of living and to provide
solutions to accumulated specific labor problems, denial of exit visas to permit attendance
at international meetings, and GVN refusal to discuss grievances.
3. By and large, Vietnamese populace seems convinced that the VC will not now be able
to achieve a military victory. Thus, this fear no longer preoccupies their attention. Neither
is there any longer any doubt about US intention. Main preoccupations of the Vietnamese
now are their concern over the damage being inflicted on VN as the war intensifies and
their concern over their economic problems. Cost of living has risen sharply in last year,
particularly in period since Ky government came to power. Costs of basic commodities
have increased an average of 33 percent since this time last year. Significant fraction of
that increase has been registered since June 19, when Ky government was formed and
great build-up of American forces became apparent. In the minds of the city dwellers and
those Vietnamese in regions where the American buildup has been most obvious, an
unfortunate equation of American presence with rising prices has asserted itself. Editorials
have begun to appear in certain Saigon dailies (notably the Buddhist Institute organ Chanh
Dao) which, though they do not directly criticize the American presence, nevertheless
take line that the sharp increase in the number of foreigners in Viet-Nam endangers
Vietnamese culture and national way of life. Hanoi and the VC can be counted upon to
encourage public dissatisfaction, building upon daily irritations and complaints about the
cost of living, in order to develop an active hostility to the American presence, something
which has not previously been a factor here.
Lodge

Saigon, October 13, 1965.
a.m. Bundy sent the President a retyped copy of this telegram on October 14 under cover
of a memorandum that reads: "We are puzzled by his conversation with Thieu--in the
sense that we see no reason why the Viet Cong should be able to win politically in a fair
fight if they are as unpopular as we all believe. I am having a further analysis made on this
point. Otherwise, an interesting report.
"Bundy also noted that there had been progress on the rice shortage, at least for the short
term. The White House copy of this telegram has an indication that the President saw it.
XV)
1273. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram:
First and foremost my warmest respectful congratulations on your recovery and best
wishes for good health./2/
/2/On October 8, President Johnson was operated on for removal of his gall bladder.
1. Trend of the war
A. General Thieu, Chief of State, during a call by me to present CIA visitors, made a
rather sweeping review of the whole situation, during the course of which he said:
B. He would not be surprised if the Viet Cong eventually accepted an offer to negotiate-as soon as they were convinced that they could not achieve a military victory with main
force units, as guerrilla doctrine prescribes. The purpose of accepting the offer to
negotiate would be to end or suspend U.S. military activities, presumably in the
expectation that the effect on public opinion in the U.S. would be such that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for us to continue operations.
C. He believed that for the last three months, the Viet Cong had been training political
cadres to go into the communities in Vietnam and win the war politically which they had
been unable to win militarily. He thought there might be as many as 150,000 such cadres.
It would mean 5 Viet Cong political cadremen where now there was one. He spoke of a
VC demobilization following an armistice, with the demobilized men returning to their
villages to become active Communist political subversive workers. They were already
taking credit for the U.S. and GVN economic and social programs. GVN was wholly
unready for such a political contest. I reported the same from Foreign Minister Tran Van
Do in my wire to you of 30 Sept./3/
/3/Document 157.
D. There was no doubt in Thieu's mind that they "could beat us politically now", not
because of their appeal, but because of their superior organization. Evidence available to
me indicates only about 15 per cent "sympathize" with the VC and that an aversion to
Communist methods, particularly to ChiCom domination, continues strong. But these are
no substitute for terrorism and poor GVN operations. Incidentally, a recent survey
indicates 97 percent of the people know the U.S. is helping, with good opinions of
Americans prevailing over bad, and 81 percent believing that Americans are here mainly
to prevent Communism. Thieu recognized that his view about negotiation was frankly a
guess but he seemed absolutely certain that as soon as the Viet Cong were convinced that
they could not win militarily, they would switch their effort to gain a political victory,
with or without diplomatic negotiations.
E. It is not a fair criticism of the Vietnamese to say that they cannot defeat the Viet Cong
politically because they are tired and weak and this implication is a major fallacy in
Lippmann's recent article, "The Stalemate in Vietnam."/4/ The truth is they have not had
the chance to do so. When the chance to win over the people was missed some years ago,
a situation came into being in which it was indispensable for the Viet Cong large units to
be defeated before true community building, with its mixture of political and security
measures, would be possible. Otherwise, the Viet Cong battalions, emerging from
untouchable sanctuaries, would destroy whatever community building had painstakingly
been achieved.
/4/The Washington Post, September 30, 1965.
F. Now it looks as though we can surely overcome the Viet Cong main force units.
Furthermore, it looks as though the Viet Cong knows this and has already begun to act on
this knowledge, transforming themselves into small units, into individual terrorists, and
into subversive political operators. General Westmoreland reports an intensification of
Viet Cong "incidents" from 605 to 701 in the last week, including a sharp rise in acts of
terrorism. This is the highest weekly total since September 1964. There is also a
downward total in actions by large units. In fact, no major battles occurred during the
week. This transformation to terrorism is emphatically not "de-escalation" as one
American "expert" recently said. But it is a change, and a change which we have been
anticipating.
G. It cannot be said that since we began defeating main force units the GVN have let the
grass grow under their feet. When the Minister of Rural Construction (i.e. community
building), Mr. Ung, was killed in a plane crash, the GVN developed a new governmental
organization which I discussed in my 1190 to you of 6 Oct,/5/ and which is as well
thought out as one can expect. Lansdale's committee is in close and constant touch. This
week they called a meeting, which I attended, of all province chiefs plus elected
provincial councillors to enthuse them and give them a clear idea of what they had to do.
Vietnam is indeed much further ahead militarily than it is politically for the simple reason
they could not really get going politically until the Viet Cong battalions were put out of
business.
/5/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
H. I believe the U.S. Mission is doing everything that it can to help prepare this country
for a political struggle. But I am eager for new ideas and would very much appreciate any
ideas or guidance which Washington can give me so that if a major political offensive
were to be undertaken by the Viet Cong, we could gain time until we could score a real
political victory. When we win such a victory, we can feel that we have accomplished
something durable and truly worthy of our sacrifice.
2. Coup rumors
A. It is disagreeable to have to report a few coup rumors, the first which have occurred
since my arrival. Although they do not look serious today, they are a preoccupation to me,
and I am putting out the word in every way available that we do not want a coup, that this
is the time to subordinate petty individualistic jealousies and ambitions, and also, that it
behooves those who are in government to try to act like real political leaders, by reasoning
with the people who are disaffected, by involving them in the new projects, and by
arranging matters so that others get some of the credit. This is not normal procedure for
Orientals, particularly those who have had a long dose of the egoism of French politicos,
but we are trying it.
B. I am also planning to visit the III Corps headquarters which I have not yet visited, to
have some frank and, I hope, helpful talks with Generals who, although theoretically
military, are actually the heads of civil and political activity and a serious potential threat.
3. Economic
A. The general price trend for the grade of rice used by the working classes continued
slow increase as for more than a month. The end of November stock levels are expected to
be low but not dangerously so, as a result of delayed PL-480 arrivals. The early rice crop
from the Delta area has begun moving into the milling centers. USOM's index of food
prices last week rose by 4 percent to a level 6 percent higher than a month ago and 34
percent higher than a year ago. Non-food consumer prices went up 3 percent to a level 6
percent over last and 18 percent over last year. The Vietnamese piaster continued to
weaken in terms of hard currencies and gold.
4. Psychological
A. Vietnamese popular attitudes during the week reflected continuing feeling that the war
was going badly for the Viet Cong and increasing concern over economic matters.
Lodge

Washington, October 13, 1965, 8:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET. Secret; Exdis.
1015. Ref: Embtel 1109./2/
/2/In telegram 1109 from Saigon, September 30, the Embassy suggested that the Viet
Cong executions of American prisoners were an effort to spare or save the lives of Viet
Cong agents and terrorists convicted and sentenced to death by South Vietnam. The
Embassy outlined three possible courses of action: 1) tacit submission, by convincing
South Vietnam to declare a de facto moratorium on executions of Viet Cong agents and
terrorists; 2) taking indirect action against Viet Cong reprisal executions by mobilizing
world opinion against them; and 3) retaliation at a level of violence calculated to induce
the Viet Cong to become reluctant to employ executions. The Embassy favored the third
option. (Ibid.)
1. Greatly appreciate your most thoughtful message on VC reprisal executions of
American prisoners and DRV threats to treat their US prisoners as war criminals. We
agree that we can neither submit tacitly to these actions or threatened actions, nor can we
ignore them. However, problem is to find ways and means of bringing effective pressure
against DRV and VC to move them to treat prisoners in accordance with 1949 Geneva
Convention. At same time, GVN must be free to go on treating VC terrorists in
accordance with Vietnamese law (but ensuring that punishment is commensurate with
crime) and we must continue to do everything possible to reaffirm and emphasize to
world clear distinction between such terrorists and prisoners of war.
2. Your proposals reftel are under active consideration here. In meantime, hope shortly to
get cable to you and other posts concerned on possibility of naming Protecting Power to
assume responsibilities for US prisoners in Communist hands as provided for under
Geneva Convention. We also are planning diplomatic approaches following up Vienna
Conference and designed to stimulate international pressure on DRV/VC to abide by
DRV's obligation under Geneva Convention.
Rusk

Washington, October 14, 1965, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by
Lisle and approved in S on November 26. The source text is labeled "Part I of III." The
meeting was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State.
SECRETARY'S DINNER FOR RUMANIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER MANESCU
SUBJECT
Vietnam
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
Secretary Rusk
Assistant Secretary John Leddy
Ambassador-Designate Richard H. Davis
Raymond E. Lisle, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs
Rumanian
Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu
Deputy Foreign Minister Mircea Malita
Ambassador Petre Balaceanu
Ion Baschiru, Counselor, Rumanian Embassy
Sergiu Celac, interpreter
The Secretary said there is no lack of means for communicating with Hanoi, Peiping or
Moscow, but we have no evidence yet that they are prepared to talk. We have the
impression that Hanoi might be willing to talk, and that Moscow would like to see talks
take place, but that Peiping is the real obstacle. Nevertheless, there has been some
progress. Hanoi no longer denies the existence of infiltration into South Vietnam from the
North, and they no longer insist upon a complete withdrawal of US forces as a
precondition for discussions. They still insist, however, that any settlement must be on
terms imposed by the NLF--a condition which the US can never accept.
The Rumanians, according to Manescu, have some contacts with Hanoi. Since Hanoi is no
longer insisting on withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam as a prerequisite
to negotiations, it is unfortunate that the United States apparently cannot consider the
cessation of bombings.
The Secretary said we very definitely can think of stopping the bombing. The
Government has promised its own people--and this should be convincing--that American
troops will be withdrawn as soon as North Vietnam ceases its attempt to impose its system
on the people of South Vietnam by force. But Hanoi still insists on acceptance of the NLF
program as a prerequisite to negotiations. We cannot accept the imposition of the NLF on
South Vietnam--whether by Hanoi, a combination of Hanoi and Peiping, or of Hanoi and
Moscow. The Secretary said he was prepared to go to Geneva tomorrow if Hanoi would
agree to negotiate without preconditions. There is hope that we may see moves toward
peace in Vietnam early next year. It appears that there are divided counsels in Hanoi. The
Foreign Minister said he hoped the Secretary was not being too optimistic. The US may
be taking external signs as indications of division in Hanoi.
The US has sufficient contact with Hanoi and with Peiping, according to the Secretary.
Apart from our own regular contacts, there are many people who are constantly offering
their services. At critical moments, however, when there seems to be possibility for
agreement, Peiping moves to get in the way of a settlement. Mr. Manescu asked whether
the four points made by NVN are unacceptable. The Secretary replied that three of the
four points are negotiable. One is entirely unacceptable--imposing the NLF program on
the people of South Vietnam.
The Foreign Minister said that one of his colleagues had suggested that, in view of
Rumania's relations with Hanoi, it should try to do something. Mr. Manescu had replied
that in his view a solution could be reached only by direct talks and that Rumania could
not act as a mediator.

The Secretary said that we have our own contacts with Hanoi and he was not asking Mr.
Manescu to act as a mediator. One could never tell, however, what channel, direct or
indirect, might be used. If Rumania should pick up a signal he would only ask Mr.
Manescu to make sure that the signal was not blocked. The Foreign Minister replied that
he would inform his Government of this request.
Rumania wants its relations with the US to be better than "normal". The present situation
in Southeast Asia could create very great problems. The Foreign Minister said that so far
as Vietnam is concerned, he would be saying too little if he said only that we were in
disagreement. Rumania cannot understand the US position. The dangers of escalation are
always high and the ladder of escalation is one which is very difficult to descend. In the
Rumanian view a military solution is impossible; the problem of Vietnam can be solved
only by the Vietnamese.
The Secretary pointed out that we had suffered a great disappointment in Southeast Asia.
President Kennedy had come into office and taken a new look at Laos and concluded that
if the Laotians were left alone they would not be interested in killing each other. Both the
President and Khrushchev had agreed at Vienna that everyone should leave the Laotians
to themselves. Thus the Geneva Conference of 1962. We had withdrawn our military, but
Hanoi had never accepted the agreement, and had never had less than 6,000 troops in
Laos. Nor has NVN stopped using Laos as an infiltration route into South Vietnam. We
do not hold Moscow guilty of bad faith, but it is a disappointment to us, since we had
hoped it would be the first step to peace in Southeast Asia.
The Foreign Minister asked, "How do you think that the US will emerge from this mixedup and venturous program in Southeast Asia?"
The Secretary replied that he did not know. The choice is between peace, which is
possible if North Vietnam leaves South Vietnam alone, or war. This is the agonizing
problem. The US would not object if South Vietnam should decide by free and peaceful
means to join with North Vietnam. We cannot permit North Vietnam to impose this unity
by force, however. We will remain only so long as Hanoi persists in seeking to impose its
solution by force. If North Vietnam continues to use force for 20 years, we also will be
there for 20 years. If North Vietnam thinks it can wait until the US loses interest and
withdraws its forces, it is wrong. Moscow understands that we cannot accept a forceful
change in the status quo, just as Moscow itself would not accept a change in the status quo
by force. But Hanoi does not understand this.
The Foreign Minister suggested that perhaps the US should look at the opinions of other
countries, to which the Secretary replied that we had done so and are doing so. The 17
unaligned nations have urged negotiations without conditions; we have agreed, but Hanoi
has said no. The British Commonwealth had tried to send a group to Peiping, but China
had responded by calling the British Prime Minister a nit-wit. Hanoi had sent a delegation
to Moscow, but Peiping had moved to block all possibility of agreement.
The Foreign Minister remarked that Cambodia had put forward a sound proposal some
years ago, but the US had rejected it. The Secretary pointed out that we had thought that
before there was a general conference there should first be bilateral discussions between
Cambodia and Thailand, and Cambodia and South Vietnam. We had used our influence to
that end, but Prince Sihanouk had been unwilling to discuss any problems with his
neighbors. At any rate, that was three years ago. The Laotian settlement of 1962 had been
a critical moment in the move toward peace, but Hanoi had rejected it.
In response to a remark that in the long run everyone might say that the Chinese were
right, the Secretary said that China is being rejected by one country after another--even
Indonesia. The Chinese doctrine of military conquest has not been accepted either by the
Socialist world or by the Free World. China is headed either to a basic change of policy or
to catastrophe. Fortunately many of the Chinese leaders are practical men who are more
prudent in actions than in words. The US is not looking for a pretext to attack China. After
all, Chinese nuclear capability within the foreseeable future will always be trivial as
compared to that of the US. We are not seeking an opportunity for a preventive strike--all
that we want is that smaller nations within the range of China be allowed to live in peace.
The Rumanians have a stake in this--it is important to establish that the presence of a great
power does not mean that small powers in the area must lose their independence or
security. We cannot forget that Hitler moved into the Rhineland and into the Sudetenland
without opposition, as Japan moved into Manchuria. These developments led to World
War II, for which we were partly responsible. We are not going to make the same mistake
again. There is one important element which might bring the opposing parties together in
Southeast Asia. Peiping and Hanoi continue to talk of the 1954 agreement, as do we. Both
parties have also referred to the 1962 Laos agreement. There is some reason to think that
these agreements can be the basis for peace in Southeast Asia. If there are disputes, let
them be solved by peaceful means. This is basically the position of Moscow, although it
cannot fail to support North Vietnam because of its own dispute with Peiping.
169. Editorial Note

On October 18, 1965, at 10:26 a.m., McGeorge Bundy telephoned Secretary Rusk to
inform him that Secretary of Defense McNamara would like to arrange for them to meet
with George Ball and William Bundy to discuss the "Vietnam bombing problem." Rusk
suggested to McNamara possible times for the meeting, including 6 p.m. on that day.
(Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
According to Rusk's Appointment Book, the Secretary met with McNamara, Ball, and
McGeorge Bundy at 6:06 p.m. on October 18. (Johnson Library) William Bundy did not
attend this meeting. On October 19 at 11:15 a.m., William Bundy called Rusk and stated
that he had learned from Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton "that there had been
some decision between McNamara, Bundy and Sec re looking at pause question." Rusk
replied that "Ball would follow up on that" and asked Bundy to come up to his office.
(Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) No other
record of the meeting has been found.

Department of State
Washington, DC

/1/Source: Department of State, Central File, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.
The source text does not indicate time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:26
a.m.
1356. For Secretary from Ambassador. Your 1058./2/
/2/In telegram 1058, October 19, Rusk asked Lodge to send him privately his reaction to
three questions concerning the proposed second phase deployment of U.S. troops to
Vietnam. The answers provided by Lodge would aid in the consideration of the issue in
Washington. The first question concerned the need for such substantially increased
deployment, the second related to the problems such deployment might create in Vietnam,
and the third question dealt with the best timing and phasing for such deployment if the
U.S. Government decided to undertake it. (Ibid.)
A. I believe that substantially increased deployment such as is envisioned in Phase 2
would have a good political effect because it would enable us effectively to destroy or
neutralize the VC main force units and destroy their present redoubts more quickly than is
now the case. This would surely help the GVN in getting an effective community building
pacification program going.
B. Clearly an increase in U.S. personnel has possibilities for friction, but I think a long,
drawn out American military presence creates more friction in the end than a shorter
presence with the people.
C. The contemplated timing is satisfactory.
D. CIA believes and I concur that the VC is working hard to restore the old balance which
our U.S. presence has upset. In other words, we have achieved some momentum and
should not only maintain, but increase it if we can.
Comment: The President, Secretary McNamara and yourself can take pride in both the
diversified scope and thoroughness of the present American effort here, which I believe is
quite unprecedented. The extent to which all Americans are pulling together is
noteworthy. I feel that some very big things are being created of which Phase 2 is an
important part. But if for any reason you cannot undertake Phase 2, I believe we can still
do big things with what we have, although it will take longer. If a feeling should catch
hold among the people that they have a real stake in this government, things could go very
fast indeed. Of this, however, there is as yet no dependable sign.
Lodge

The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at
2:40 a.m. McGeorge Bundy sent a retyped copy of this telegram to the President under
cover of an October 20 memorandum that states that Lodge "sheds more light this time on
the shape of the political problem. In this sense, it is a better report than last week's,
though the more we learn of the problem the harder the job looks." Bundy noted that
"good reporters coming back from Vietnam are optimistic as they have never been before.
I have talked at some length with both Joe Alsop and Warren Rogers--listened rather than
talked--and both of them are encouraging.
"There is an indication on the White House copy that the President saw the telegram.
XV)
1355. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram. Hope you are feeling better.
1. Current political.
The most striking political news of the week was the complete failure of the Viet Cong's
call for a general strike in Saigon on October 15 to inaugurate a "hate America" month. In
Saigon and throughout the countryside the population paid not the slightest attention to
the strike call.
Prime Minister Ky went on the air with the first in a series of five planned fireside chats.
He talked about the rising cost of living for which he blamed hoarders, speculators and the
Viet Cong. He explained that the displacement of a number of families in Saigon was due
to the construction of a projected new bridge which would increase access to the port of
Saigon and thereby increase the port's cargo handling capacity. He promised that death
benefits to families of deceased servicemen would be paid within a month or that full
explanations would be required.
A conference of province chiefs and members of provincial assemblies was held to
improve communication between the national and provincial levels of government. The
conference came up with a number of recommendations concerning training,
standardization of salaries, and tenure for province chiefs. Some older politicians among
the provincial representatives took the occasion to circulate a petition calling on the GVN
to form an interim assembly from the provincial councils and to prepare for National
Assembly elections. This initiative aroused very little public attention.
2. Basic political.
The more I study and learn, the more impressed I am with the savage and thorough way in
which the Viet Cong has destroyed the political structure of this country. Everything that I
have read about successful counter-guerrilla activity says that one must start in each
hamlet by picking out a good man to be chairman of a committee of up and coming young
men. In this country the "good man" all too often has had his head cut off, the grade B
people have been driven out and what is left are the old and the weak and the children-not a real community at all.
The GVN, therefore, faces the need of actually bringing in the proposed local leadership. I
thought the war veterans would be a likely nucleus but I now learn that 80 percent of the
war veterans are afraid to live out in the country and have gathered in the cities. We are,
therefore, not just starting from scratch but starting well below scratch.
The plan to form cadres of about 200 carefully selected people with above average
gumption and recruited as much as possible among men who used once to live in the
village which it is planned to pacify seems sensible.
The political action teams which the CIA has formed can be the nucleus and should be a
big help.
Lansdale is working on this--and on the psychological and emotional side to try to make
people want a new life and stir them up a little bit with songs.
He and I think rural electrification has a great potential as something that can be done
quickly--action rather than words--and which has a wonderful psychological effect.
As the GVN picks its first group of 200 and pacifies--or rather rebuilds--its first
community, it will, of course, have the USOM resources in back of it.
I believe a few genuine successes can have a profound psychological effect. We saw how
radically psychology can change for the better following your decision to send U.S.
troops. I have just learned of 1400 refugees in Binh Dinh Province to whom Americans
have given such confidence that they actually went back home. A similar change as
regards community building is not inconceivable. The Viet Cong clearly do not expect it.
But neither did they expect the capacity to destroy main force units which we have
demonstrated.
Whatever we do must be durable. Dependable, local security forces must remain. The new
village leaders must be protected from assassination. It is better to do nothing rather than
simply recreate another pattern of terrorism and assassination.
3. Security.
The total number of Viet Cong incidents increased for the fourth successive week
reflecting largely increased acts of terrorism and increased anti-aircraft fire. The total
number of actual Viet Cong attacks decreased considerably. Big U.S. sweeps in two
provinces failed to trap Viet Cong units but did keep the Viet Cong on the move, thus
weakening their ability to mount attacks.
4. Economics.
Saigon retail rice prices dropped slightly during the week, reversing a slow upward trend
that had continued for over a month. The prices dropped despite a decrease in rice stocks
on hand. This reflected confident expectations that PL 480 shipments will bring in
sufficient rice to meet demands. However concern continued over the increased cost of
living in general and the Vietnamese piaster continued to weaken in terms of hard
currencies and gold.
The government took a number of measures against the increased cost of living. It
rationed sweetened condensed milk. It withheld new price schedules, reflecting tariff
increases, pending the liquidation of old stocks. It arrested and fined merchants who sold
old stocks at new prices.
5. Psychological.
The failure of the Viet Cong's call for a "day of revenge" to include a general strike and an
"hour of silence" on October 15 demonstrated that the Viet Cong enjoy very little real
support from the people. The failure of this effort represented a psychological defeat for
the Viet Cong and this fact has not been lost on either the Vietnamese people or on
foreign correspondents, particularly Asians, who were watching developments closely.
The high cost of living continued to dominate much Vietnamese thinking throughout the
country.
Lodge

to USUN and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 5:52 a.m.
1361. 1. Henry Kissinger/2/ and I had lunch with PriMin Ky at Nha Trang Oct 19. Ky has
been in Nha Trang recuperating from a bad cold. In relaxed environment Ky discussed
problems of a negotiated settlement and his internal political difficulties with considerable
candor.
/2/Henry Kissinger recalls that Lodge asked him to visit South Vietnam as a consultant.
He toured the country for 2 weeks in late October and early November talking with
civilian and military leaders. See White House Years, pp. 231-233. Records of 12 of
Kissinger's "more important" conversations were transmitted in airgram A-285 from
Saigon, November 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
2. When the subject of negotiations came up, Ky stated emphatically that Vietnam was in
no position at the present time to negotiate a settlement with Hanoi. He said there were
two basic reasons for this: (A) Fragility of internal situation and the continuing presence
of political divisions, especially on the civilian side. The political fabric of Vietnam is
weakened to the extent that it could not yet compete with the Viet Cong in many parts of
the countryside--not because VC are popular, but because of their ruthless organization.
(B) The announcement of the acceptance of negotiations could weaken the morale and
will to resist Communism to a dangerous extent--even to the point where the ARVN could
lose its will to fight with "many soldiers giving up and going home." Ky said also that he
did not think a cease-fire at the present time would do anything but provide a means by
which the Viet Cong would further consolidate their hold over those areas of the country
which they now controlled. This would in effect perpetuate the partition of South Vietnam
into pro-Viet Cong and anti-Communist areas.
3. He said that he believed that Hanoi had made a great error from its viewpoint in not
accepting the offer to negotiate several months ago when South Vietnam was in even
worse shape politically. Things were a little better now. Nevertheless, much had to be
done in reorganizing South Vietnam before the govt would be in a position to deal with
the Viet Cong politically on the ground. Viet Cong cadres remained well disciplined and
the re-orientation and re-dedication of GVN cadres was yet to be accomplished. Ky said
that the military strength of South Vietnam, supported by its allies, had now reached the
stage where pacification and strengthening of the govt's position could proceed so that
hopefully in about one year's time things would be much better.
4. Ky said that the most important political requirement for the immediate future was the
maintenance of unity among the various Generals in the armed forces. He said that the
only element able to provide necessary leadership in South Vietnam was the armed forces.
Civilian political groups had demonstrated their inability to work together and the age-old
problems of regionalism and religious differences were such that any govt built around
one group would automatically draw to itself such internal political opposition from
others that it could not survive. In the circumstances the armed forces must seek to rise
above sectional and religious differences. They were capable of doing so because its
various people for years had been used to working together regardless of traditional
factional factors.
5. He then described a recent conversation with General Co, Deputy PriMin, and other
military leaders in which he had impressed upon them the importance of maintaining their
unity. This plea, he said, had been occasioned by the interjection of regional and religious
differences over the appointment of certain key officers in the last governmental changes.
He claimed that as a result of conversations among the Generals, unity had been
reaffirmed and the situation was quieter.
6. Ky said that he recognized the importance of enlisting the support of various nonmilitary elements in the work of the govt. He was hopeful that the recent conferences of
province chiefs and provincial council reps was a first step in securing a wider
participation of all key elements in the community. He intended that such confs would
now take place at the regional level to be followed later by another national conf. In this
way people would get to know each other and used to working with each other. It would
give him the chance to weed out any Communist sympathizers. A national advisory
council drawn from the provincial councils and leading sects and groups to serve as a
consultative group for the govt would be created. He would see how the first steps now
being taken work before formalizing any such arrangements. Its work should be limited to
matters which did not embarrass the govt in the conduct of foreign relations or which did
not endanger the security of the state.

7. Finally, Ky said that he was placing great emphasis on the new pacification and rural
construction effort which was getting underway under the leadership of General Co and
General Thang. Cadre reorganization and training would soon begin and he wanted to get
the program in action in primary areas: Danang-Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, and the SaigonCholon-Gia Dinh area. He asked for full support from the U.S. for these efforts, which I
assured him was going to be forthcoming. He said that over the next year he expected that
these efforts would yield great results and he expressed confidence in the ability of the
govt to re-organize itself to meet the needs of the fundamental political and social
economic struggle in the countryside.
8. When I was alone with Gen Ky after lunch, I brought up our concern over the leakage
of info to the Viet Cong about military operations. We knew that it worried him as much
as it did us. He agreed and said that this was due largely to the frequent changes which
had taken place in the GVN and in the military structure. Whenever there were changes, it
gave the Communists the chance to work in. He assured me of his best efforts.
9. I took occasion to express the hope that whenever sentence is passed on prisoners that it
be publicly made very clear that the punishment was commensurate with the offense. His
treatment of prisoners concerned us very intimately because of the fate of our own
prisoners. He said he understood and agreed to cooperate.
10. Coming back to the problem of inflation, I stressed the points which had been put to
him by Mann at a previous meeting and went on to make a few suggestions as follows: he
should particularly watch the prices of the important staples which the people eat, such as
rice, nuoc mam, milk, pork, etc. Ky said that he was having this done. I said that it was
not too difficult to watch these and that he was in a position to act affirmatively, and that
action was better than words or a futile attempt to set up a big administrative structure.
11. I cited reports of Viet Cong in ARVN uniforms diverting truckloads of rice. I pointed
out that the police were not allowed to arrest anybody in uniform and that therefore the
Vietnamese military should establish checkpoints to stop these trucks and verify the
presence of Viet Cong in army uniform.
12. I especially suggested establishing a few emergency sales outlets in Saigon for
children and the needy where the scarce staples could be sold at govt price. This was
something simple and it too was action rather than words. Yet it would create favorable
sentiment for the govt. He could later consider the question of giving some food away.
13. I referred to the congestion in the port of Saigon. He had obviously thought about this
a great deal and felt it was not due to trouble with labor unions, but to a very real labor
shortage.
14. He referred specifically to a pier owned by the Messageries Maritimes, a French
steamship line under control of the French Govt. This pier was not in use and yet the
steamship line refused to make it available. General Ky told me finally he had decided to
requisition the pier.
15. Comment: This refusal to make an unused pier available to the Vietnamese or to the
American military is widely believed to be a direct manifestation of de Gaulle's antiAmerican policy. How this helps the French colony in Vietnam, or how it helps the rank
and file French people in France, or how it can be considered the reaction of an ally are
questions the answers to which do not exist here.
16. Every time I see General Ky, I am impressed with the way in which he has grown, in
knowledge of this job, in judgment and in general stature. If fate enables him to stay on
the job for a reasonable period of time, he could become a first class political leader in the
best sense of the term. If there are govts in this world which have a man of much better
quality and potential than General Ky, then I do not know what they are.
17. When, therefore, I read Dar-es-Salaam's no. 11/3/ in which Nyerere speaks seriously
of "establishing a broader based regime," I am astounded. I presume the phrase "broader
based regime" means putting in the Communists which, of course, means taking out
General Ky. I can understand why a Communist would suggest this, but I cannot
understand why anyone should consider it other than a crass attempt at gaining by
political intrigue what they have not been able to obtain in other ways.
/3/In this telegram, October 18, sent to the Department of State as telegram 757 and
repeated to Saigon, Ambassador William Leonhart reported a conversation on Vietnam
with Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere. (Ibid.)
Lodge

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET. Secret. Repeated to
CINCPAC for POLAD.
1360. Dept repeat as desired. Ref: Depcirtel 630./2/
/2/In circular telegram 630, October 20, the Department suggested that, in light of the
increasing number of U.S. personnel in North Vietnamese hands, the question of
appointing a protecting power capable of assuming the rights and responsibilities under
the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War of 1949 should be urgently explored. (Ibid.)
1. Following are Mission comments on idea of protecting power for US prisoners in NVN
under Geneva Conventions of 1949.
2. As Dept is aware we have long been dubious of significant practical benefits which can
reasonably be expected in terms of improved treatment for US prisoners from any of
series of legal or propaganda gambits which have been suggested or attempted recently.
Dept has under consideration our recommendations for more belligerent measures to
improve prisoners' lot./3/ We continue to believe that self-interest is only motive
governing Hanoi treatment of our prisoners and that normal compunctions of relatively
civilized govts do not apply, nor does decent respect for opinion of mankind. It is
possible, however, that Hanoi regime does value favorable attitudes of some segments of
foreign opinion sufficiently to take their sensitivities into account in weighing best use to
make of prisoners. We have in mind here especially Japanese and some other Asian
opinion. Thus, for instance, if Hanoi were convinced that Japanese left-wingers would be
more upset by execution of U.S. prisoners following sham war-crimes trials than by
horrors suffered by NVN civil populace they would be accused during such trials of
having caused, then NVN might take this factor into account, along with others, in
deciding whether to execute prisoners or not. Thus, our legal and moral leverage through
the exercise of public opinion is extremely limited, though there are some points at which
we can bring it to bear.
3. The above considerations are relevant to subject at hand for two reasons: we should not
expect too much from this proposal, and we should recognize that proposal is essentially
an attempt to marshal international public opinion to protect welfare of our prisoners.
4. We think it likely that if request for acceptance of protecting power is advanced by
U.S., Hanoi will reject request and will also reject request for assumption by ICRC of role
of protecting power. Hanoi has refused to respond substantively to ICRC question about
whether it is willing to apply Geneva Conventions to present conflict, and it therefore
presumably regards itself as not bound by their provisions. Admittedly, its position is
equivocal and inconsistent, since it has cited one of its reservations to Geneva
Conventions in laying groundwork for possible trial of U.S. prisoners as war criminals,
and has accused U.S. of violating Conventions in our bombings. Nevertheless, we
strongly believe that Hanoi regime does not want a third country acting in interests of U.S.
nor an international body such as ICRC traveling about NVN visiting prisoners, etc., as
required by Conventions. Furthermore, we do not believe Hanoi will want to set any
embarrassing precedents for their Front stooges and the VC in accepting applicability of
Geneva Conventions.
5. Having said the above, we agree with Dept. that there may be some advantages in
propaganda field to be gained from proposal. We should bear in mind our propaganda
objectives in making our request and in subsequent steps. First three specific advantages
cited in para 3 of reftel presuppose Hanoi's agreeing to protecting power or ICRC, so
fourth advantage is one we should be prepared to hammer home./4/ One other advantage
of course would be that ICRC would be given another project to work on besides alleged
U.S. and GVN shortcomings in application Geneva Conventions and it would set record a
little straighter on which side trying to act humanely in this conflict. Another advantage
would be improvement in our posture with U.S. public and Congress to show that we are
doing everything possible, regardless of seeming futility, to try to improve welfare and
safety of U.S. prisoners. For same reason it would have a helpful effect on morale of U.S.
pilots engaged in NVN missions.
/4/In this paragraph of circular telegram 630, the Department enumerated three
advantages of applying the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. The first was its
provisions requiring due process of judicial proceedings (and exposing reprisals
masquerading as war crime punishment); the second was 35 specific articles in the
convention defining the role of the protecting power vis-a-vis POWs; and the third was
the fact that the protecting power's role supplemented and complemented the ICRC. A
fourth advantage would be a propaganda one accruing from the refusal of North Vietnam
to accept a protecting power and casting itself in a bad light in world opinion.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET)
6. We likewise do not see serious disadvantages in proposal, since it is even more unlikely
NVN would request protecting power in SVN, as they do not admit having forces in
conflict or legitimacy of GVN. Such an eventuality might be embarrassing for GVN and
ourselves until handling of prisoners has improved (it is continuing to get better daily and
most problems are of administrative nature) and would presumably also afford fine
propaganda opportunities for Communists. Should Front call for a protecting power
(which we also think unlikely), we might be faced with public opinion problem ourselves
in refusing to permit one. This would however open way for us to demand protecting
power (perhaps same one as in NVN) for prisoners held by VC.
7. With reference to last sentence para 5 reftel,/5/ we note USSR and other Communist
states expressed reservation limiting application second paragraph Article 10, and wonder
whether DRV also did so when it adhered to Conventions (our files are incomplete).
/5/In paragraph 5, the Department noted that since the NLF was not recognized and North
Vietnam denied its forces were in South Vietnam, there was no question of their
requesting a protecting power for their prisoners. However this did not mean that
prisoners held by the GVN should not have a protecting power appointed. As the last
sentence in paragraph 5 indicated: "Second paragraph Article 10 GPW [Geneva Prisoner
of War treaty] requires Detaining Power (GVN) to appoint neutral state or impartial
organization to fufill this function, if Hanoi fails to take action in this regard."(Ibid.)
8. Subsequent paragraphs are concerned with which protecting power we should choose.
As Dept aware UK assumed protection of U.S. interests and custody of U.S. property
when we closed Hanoi Consulate in December, 1955 and UK continues to function in that
capacity. Why would continuance that role on behalf U.S. prisoners raise recognition
issue more than it already has been? Since UK is already our "protecting power," in one
sense, perhaps British could simply notify Hanoi they had been asked expand that role to
cover U.S. prisoners and see when Hanoi responds.
9. We have expended great efforts to persuade Morocco and Senegal not to send reps to
Hanoi. Is it worthwhile suggesting they do so now, especially since we doubt DRV would
let them subsequently adopt protective power role? Rabat and Dakar of course have better
feel for effects of our switch in position on local attitudes.
10. Could ICC be asked to take over this role? Article 10 seems to refer to such
possibilities. Even if such were possible, however, we doubt wisdom of involving ICC in
this question and do not think they would wish to enter into it. Nevertheless, there may be
advantages to such idea which we here do not know about.
11. Bearing in mind propaganda aspects of this proposal, what would be pros and cons of
requesting Czechs or Rumanians to be our protecting power, after Hanoi had rejected
other choices? Do Eastern European regimes feel themselves now under sufficiently
greater moral restraint to warrant our choosing a relatively unfriendly and Communist
state to look after our prisoners? Hanoi would surely find it harder to refuse bloc country
as protecting power, and if they did, propaganda gains for U.S. would be even greater. If
contrary to expectations, Hanoi accepted them, bloc protecting power presumably would
be better than none.
12. We doubt very much that GVN would request a protecting power for their own troops
held by VC (so far as we know none are held by NVN) since problems of recognition
would be raised.
13. Finally we wish to note that none of above affects prisoners held by VC. They are the
ones who suffer greatest hardships and the three prisoners who have been executed in
reprisals were murdered by the VC.
Lodge
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Negotiation.
Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Lodge vs Goldberg
The attached telegram/2/ raises a delicate matter which merits your attention. Lodge here
(and I believe in conversations with Alsop, Reston and others) is taking a line which has
already stirred up some speculation and difficulties (see attached Mansfield's remarks)./3/
/2/Apparent reference to Document 162.
/3/Apparent reference to Mansfield's October 19 speech to the Senate, in which he
claimed that unnamed U.S. officials had encouraged press stories that the war in Vietnam
need not end in a negotiated settlement, but with a total military solution--the defeat of the
Viet Cong. (Congressional Record-Senate, October 19, 1965, pp. 27288-27291)
Potentially more serious is the difference between Goldberg's public and private
statements at the UN (which are presumably made on instructions from Washington) and
Lodge's not-so-private views. We may be confronted with the Hawk-Dove syndrome in
the press and, more importantly, with the erosion of the government's credibility. The fact
of the matter is that if Hanoi gives a clear "signal" that it is ready to talk we will be placed
in a very awkward position if we don't respond in the light of the President's statement
(most recently re-asserted in a speech by Cy Vance)/4/ that we will go "anywhere anytime
without preconditions."
/4/Not found.
I was told yesterday by Joe Sisco that Goldberg is very concerned about this--as well he
might be.
You may recall that before Lodge left I suggested that the President clear up the
negotiations matter with him. The longer we leave this in limbo the more difficult it will
be to deal with when we have to. At a minimum, I suggest that Lodge be instructed to
keep his private thoughts private and be reminded that when and if the time comes when
Hanoi says "Geneva here we come", we will be going too. One of Lodge's high priority
tasks should be to reach the kind of understanding with the GVN that will permit the U.S.
and the GVN to proceed in tandem.
C
175. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President
Johnson/1/
New York, October 20, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Negotiation.
Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the original letter was in the U.N.Goldberg correspondence file.
Dear Mr. President:
I wish to make a further suggestion concerning United States posture toward
unconditional negotiations on Vietnam.
Contrary to our earlier expectations, the situation in Vietnam did not receive overriding
emphasis in the General Assembly's general debate--a development due primarily to the
sudden eruption of the conflict between India and Pakistan.
Vietnam was, of course, the second topic most frequently touched upon in the general
debate. It has been encouraging to find not only that the United States role in Vietnam
found considerable support but also that criticism of the American role was neither so
severe nor so widespread as had been anticipated. Unqualified criticism of our role and
full support for Hanoi was voiced by only the Congo (Brazzaville), the Soviet bloc, plus
Cuba, Albania and Cambodia (the latter three predictably exceeded all others in
harshness); in addition, somewhat less hostile, but still very critical, statements were made
by Kenya, Guinea and Mali. On the other hand, the United States position received
support from some eighteen countries, including--and this is worthy of particular note-most of those countries in the Far East which are closest to the threat posed by Hanoi's
actions toward South Vietnam. The remainder of the speeches, some with implied
criticism of the United States and some with implied criticism of Hanoi, tended to
emphasize one of two themes: first, the impossibility of a military solution and the
urgency of beginning negotiations (often combined with appeals for a cessation of all
hostilities); second, the advocacy of negotiations, coupled with the argument that
continued American bombing of North Vietnam virtually rules out negotiations.
It is clear to me that the relatively good treatment the United States role in Vietnam
received in the general debate is a direct product of two factors: the frequent reiteration, in
months past, of our willingness to begin unconditional negotiations; the excellent work
done in Washington and in our Embassies throughout the world to explain the United
States goals in Vietnam. In short, the posture the United States has assumed toward
negotiations, besides being correct in terms of substance, has proved advantageous in
terms of our international image.
Despite the outcome of the general debate, however, I must report that I have sensed some
doubt (even among some of our friends) whether we really want negotiations. This doubt
has, of course, been compounded by certain statements made recently, as well as by
reports of South Vietnam's opposition to unconditional negotiations. It is generally
expressed not in outright questioning of United States sincerity; it takes the form, rather,
of a feeling that United States publicly-expressed interest in negotiations may stem less
from a desire to begin negotiations immediately than from a desire to maintain a positive
international image while improving our military posture for negotiations in the future.
Senator Mansfield's speech of October 19/2/ was, of course, immensely helpful in
countering this undercurrent of doubt. It would be even more helpful, in my view, if there
were to be further periodic reiteration by you and the Secretary of both our continued
desire for prompt unconditional negotiations and of our willingness to suspend bombings
provided there were some assurance North Vietnam would respond with comparable
measures to restrain its military activities in the South. I can, of course, emphasize such
statements here, as I have in the past, with good effects on other countries.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur J. Goldberg/3/

Saigon, October 21, 1965, 6 p.m.
Received at 8:37 a.m. and passed to the White House.
1377. For the President and the Secretary from Lodge. Subj: If Hanoi decides to negotiate.
I. Vietnam not ready
A. This telegram is occasioned by General Thieu's statement to me on Oct 13 that he
guessed there would eventually be an offer to negotiate from the Viet Cong (presumably
through Hanoi). To this Thieu added the statement (concurred in emphatically by FonMin
Tran Van Do and on Tuesday, Oct 19, by PriMin Ky) that Vietnam is absolutely unready
for the serious political warfare with the Communists of which such a move would be the
beginning; that this offer would cripple Vietnamese military activities; and that it would
thus jeopardize all that we and they have struggled to achieve./2/

B. I concur with the remarks of these Vietnamese leaders. At present South Vietnam
suffers from a fragile political structure, governmental authority is not strong in the
countryside. The govt is so overwhelmed with immediate pressures that it has not been
able to prepare public opinion for a negotiated settlement. Unless the way has been most
carefully prepared--and perhaps even then--entering into negotiations could lead to a
direct threat to the existence of the govt. It might not lead to a coup but it would almost
certainly lead to frantic jockeying for position in Saigon and encourage Viet Cong
political and military pressure against the stability of the govt. To minimize these dangers
requires stating conditions which the GVN can endure. Any pressure on the GVN to
depart from what they consider a satisfactory outcome could have disastrous
consequences.
C. Clearly Hanoi can call for a meeting at any time that it wishes. It is prudent to assume
that they will do so at a moment of maximum disadvantage to us. In the light of what has
been said we cannot refuse to meet. The protection of our vital interests, therefore,
depends on the terms of the negotiation rather than on a refusal to meet. It also means that
we be clear and specific in our own minds with respect to these terms. I say this as one
who approves the decision of last spring to express a willingness to enter into
unconditional discussions, which, I believe, played a big part in bringing about public
support of our Vietnam policy in the United States and abroad.
D. If we are going to get ready to negotiate--or to discuss--then I believe it is essential that
we have as a standard of measurement what concretely we consider would be a
satisfactory outcome of our efforts in Vietnam. In other words it is time to attach specific
meaning to such phrases as "ward off the aggression" or "to help the Republic of Vietnam
achieve and then maintain its independence." A satisfactory outcome could be achieved
by military, civil-political, economic, and psychological means within South Vietnam or
by persuasion on North Vietnam, or by a combination of these various factors. We should
decide to remain here until it has somehow been accomplished.
E. The opinion of the U.S. Mission here on what concretely constitutes a satisfactory
outcome is obviously pertinent. Accordingly, this matter was discussed at a meeting of the
U.S. Mission Council on Tuesday, Oct 19. What follows is the consensus which emerged,
broken down into its component parts, of what seems reasonable at this juncture.
II. A satisfactory outcome in Vietnam
A. A satisfactory outcome is, to be sure, distinct from a negotiating position. Off-hand, I
would think that an opening negotiating position might insist on a complete elimination of
all Viet Cong activity in the entire country, removal of the Viet Cong to North Vietnam, a
UN inspection system in North Vietnam to see that no further aggression is committed,
freedom for anti-Communists in North Vietnam to move south, and assurance of
economic aid (to pull them away from Peking)--all to be agreed to by the GVN.
B. What we consider a satisfactory outcome to be would, of course, be a very closely kept
secret. It would include the following, not necessarily in this order:
1. The area around Saigon and south of Saigon (all of the Delta) must be pacified. This
area includes about 55 to 60 per cent of the population of Vietnam. "Pacified" is defined
as the existence of a state of mind among the people that they have a stake in the govt, as
shown by the holding of local elections. It also means a proper local police force. In brief,
a pacified area is economically, socially and politically a part of the RVN.
2. The thickly populated northeastern strip along the coast which includes 25 per cent of
the population would be completely pacified.
3. The GVN would retain its present control of all cities and all provincial capitals.
4. All principal roads would be open to the Vietnamese military day and night.
5. Those areas not pacified would not be safehavens for the Viet Cong but would be
contested by energetic offensive forays to prevent consolidation of a Communist base.
6. The Viet Cong disarms; and their weapons and explosives are removed from their
hands. Their main force units would be broken up.
7. North Vietnam stops its infiltration.
8. North Vietnam stops its direction of the war.
9. Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") rehabilitation would be extended to individual Viet Cong
who are suitable (including those who were impressed into the VC by terrorism), with
plans to resettle them.
10. Hardcore VC to go to North Vietnam.
11. GVN to approve.
Comment: This means that we would not be insisting on the complete elimination of the
Viet Cong from all corners of the country although no land of safehaven would be allotted
to them. It would mean that we and the GVN would control 80 to 85 per cent of the
population and that the Viet Cong would be limited to the jungle and mountainous areas
where they would go on as bandits, much as their counterparts do today in Malaya and in
Luzon--and where the GVN would have the right to pursue them and try to destroy them.
III. Conduct of talks
A. I assume, of course, that the above will not become relevant unless Hanoi itself asks
for talks.
1. If this happens, I would advise that our military activity be at first intensified and then
continued during the talks. Without continuing military pressure by us, no worthwhile
results can be expected.
2. Under no circumstances should a cease-fire be agreed to, because a cease-fire would
legalize and make permanent the present occupation of part of the country by the Viet
Cong and would stultify our sacrifices. Communists never give up the terrain where they
are except under pressure. Moreover, the VC would try to expand their present influence
into new areas under cover of the cease-fire.

3. We should place a time limit on the talks--perhaps not more than a month. Failure to set
such a time limit will give scope to the favorite Communist tactic of delay which makes
us look contemptible, impatient and undignified. It also means that they will use the time
which their diplomats gain for them to bring about an improved military position which
their soldiers, unaided, had been unable to achieve.
4. Agreement on supervision of any understanding should be item one on the agenda, at
the beginning, when our pressure is greatest.
IV. Value of talks
A. In spite of the fact that the Communists will attempt to violate any agreement which is
reached if they think it is in their interest to do so, negotiation with the Communists can
be said to have value if, in fact,
1. It ends or reduces the bloodshed, and
2. Sets down enforceable conditions which, if we are strong enough to maintain them, will
prevent a relapse into the aggression which brought about the conflict in the first place.
While we must never depend on the given word of the Communists, an agreement can
have value if it can be inspected and enforced.
B. A prolonged negotiation, or one in which we aim to force Ho Chi Minh into a corner
by requiring him to admit his defeat by signing a paper, can drag out the conflict and
increase the bloodshed. A de facto end of hostilities would be preferable to either of these
alternatives and would also be easier for the GVN to accept.
C. It seems clear that we were not as ready for the end of hostilities in 1945 and in 1953 as
we should have been. Surely we should learn from these experiences and be perfectly
ready for the new turn this war will take if Hanoi decides to try negotiation. You have
mounted an American effort here which is unprecedented in the breadth of its sweep, the
thoroughness of its execution and in the extent to which all Americans are pulling
together. I am sure that our reaction to the next move--if it comes--will be on the same
level of excellence.
Porter

Paris, October 21, 1965, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Mai Van Bo, 1965. Secret;
Limdis. Received at 6:08 p.m.
2189. In separate conversations October 18 and 20 Quai Director Asian Affairs Manac'h
told EmbOff:
(1) Vietnam. His major impression of changes since his return from 5-weeks vacation
were (a) effectiveness of US buildup (b) isolation of China and (c) lack of movement
towards peaceful settlement, despite what would appear to be propitious psychological
moment view (a) and (b) for new US gesture (presumably bombing pause).
(2) Peace negotiations. He asked Mai Van Bo ten days ago whether Hanoi could accept
conditions given Rusk by Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter, i.e., "cease bombardment,"
and "cease military operations." Bo answered "Yes and no," adding third condition that
Americans must specifically accept NLF as negotiating party. When EmbOff asked if 4
points were now 3 points, Manac'h shrugged and suggested that if EmbOff wished ask Bo
he could arrange private luncheon, adding Bo confused by approaches private US
citizens./2/ EmbOff did not accept invitation. Manac'h confirmed that Tho delegation
from Hanoi had had nothing constructive to say.
/2/Apparent reference to Mai Van Bo's discussions with American businessman Urah
Arkas-Duntov (see Document 98) and with retired Foreign Service officer Edmund
Gullion (see Documents 112, 113, 120, 122, and 133).
(3) Bion. French Consul was alive and now well, after initial poor treatment and sickness.
Quai upset that "intermediaries" (unnamed) offering release Bion at Hanoi, which would
involve 1000-mile trek with risk bombardment. Manac'h pressing for Cambodian border
or Saigon. Bion had "poor reputation among Americans," but had not been engaged as
rumored in negotiations with Viet Cong on behalf plantation owners.
[Here follow paragraphs on the India-Pakistan situation, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, and
the Asian Development meeting at Bangkok.]
(9) Reprisals. Manac'h was not aware of the deaths of the two Americans in North
Vietnam. He asked how much warning we had and indicated that France would have been
willing to intercede although they had been unsuccessful with Hertz. Undertook to
mention issue to Bo and Soviet Charge Usachev whom he seeing Oct 21.
Department repeat as desired.
Bohlen
178. Draft Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
Memos (A). Top Secret. According to a typed notation on the source text this was a
second draft. A copy of the first, dated October 20, is in the Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 380.
ELEMENTS OF SECOND PAUSE SCENARIO
A. Positive and Negative Objectives

1. Positive Objectives
a. To remove for an adequate time the element of continued bombing of the North and
thus to test the willingness of North Vietnam to reduce its support of the Viet Cong and
Viet Cong activities in the South, and to enter into negotiations without preconditions
(i.e., to abandon the present conditions particularly on the "four points"). In other words, a
second pause is first and perhaps foremost a serious effort to see if there can be real
progress toward a political solution.
b. Whether or not this pause brings about such results, to underscore again our willingness
to work toward a solution by reciprocal actions.
c. To satisfy domestic and international opinion that we have indeed exhausted for the
time being all possibilities of progress toward a peaceful solution, as a prelude to
whatever increased action might then become necessary, such as Phase II deployments or
further expansion in the bombing of the North.
d. To halt temporarily the possibilities of a wider war. However, this can only be a
subsidiary objective because we must envisage that, if there is no response, we will
resume bombing and there may be a larger chance of escalation thereafter.
e. By varying the pattern of bombing attacks on the North, to make the resumption of
bombing, if and when it takes place, more psychologically damaging and effective.
f. To insert a proposal that may produce substantial disagreement among the various
Communist parties.
2. Negative Objectives
a. We do not wish to upset confidence in South Vietnam or faith in our continued firmness
as necessary.
b. To avoid any misunderstanding in Hanoi that our action means we are ready to
compromise our objectives and are ourselves afraid we cannot or will not stay the course.
c. To avoid getting into a position where we abandon bombing of the North in return for
the DRV entering into negotiations while still continuing major support of the Viet Cong.
This is an essential point in itself, made more so by our public statements that we would
suspend or cease bombing only if Hanoi took appropriate corresponding action with
respect to its support of the VC.
d. If a reciprocal reduction in hostilities should result, to avoid getting into a situation in
the South in which the GVN was not able to go about restoring its control throughout the
country.
Discussion
If our primary objective is to move Hanoi toward a peaceful solution, it means that we
must frame our communications to them and all our public discussion in such a way as to
play down the threat of stronger action in the event the pause fails; in other words, we
must not appear to be delivering an ultimatum. Yet we must recognize that, even if we do
not stress what we will do if the pause fails, and even if we do not take preparatory actions
for additional measures, it will be widely assumed that we will resume, and we shall
almost certainly have to commit ourselves to the GVN to that effect. In other words, we
can only seek to play down the element of threat; we cannot fully remove it.
A second consequence in the listing of our objectives as above is that we must put the
diplomacy of the pause at the very front of our calculations. Our May pause lost effect in
the world because it seemed too short and because the negative indications from Hanoi,
while conclusive to us, could not really be spelled out to the world. This time, we must
have a pause that is long enough and includes enough diplomatic openings so that the
most skeptical will be persuaded that it was a serious and honest try. In this respect, there
is no latent conflict among the various objectives, for what we do towards Hanoi, even if
it cannot be revealed in toto, will strengthen our case with the world.
B. What We Do at the Outset of the Pause
1. Nature of Military Action
a. Against the North, we would stop all strikes and armed reconnaissance but would
continue Lucky Dragon and Blue Springs (as appropriate) for all North Viet-Nam, and
low-level reconnaissance (Blue Tree) in the infiltration areas (south of approximately 20
degrees north latitude and west of 105 degrees west longitude), with peripheral low-level
reconnaissance elsewhere. Also sea/air ELINT to cover key areas.
b. Air operations against Laos (Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger) would be continued and
intensified including any effective means such as defoliation.
c. Air operations in South Vietnam (including B-52 strikes) would continue as required.
d. As to ground operations in South Vietnam, we should continue all aspects, both
pacification and search/base area operations. Not only is this almost certainly required in
order to secure GVN concurrence and avoid unfavorable developments, but it appears to
have no significant disadvantages in terms of effect on Hanoi.
Discussion
There is a serious issue whether operations in the South should be as stated above. Since
one of the DRV responses we seek is a major reduction in VC attacks and terrorism the
continuation of all US/GVN operations at then current levels (possibly even increasing as
a result of our force increases) might make it harder to identify serious VC reductions.
Thus, there is a case for some reduction of military pressure, particularly in US actions
such as the B-52 strikes, at least for a period of 2-3 weeks at the outset of the pause.
An opposite alternative, if reassurance to the GVN were considered crucial, would be to
step up activity to a real maximum.
The proposal above steers between these two and relies on the continuing arrival of our
troops as a major reassuring element to the GVN. In practice, it does not appear that it will
be too difficult, even with continuing US/GVN operations, to identify what happens to the
basic attack-incident rate by the Viet Cong.
2. Timing and Duration
a. The best time would appear to be toward the end of November, as our Phase I strength
nears its peak but while we are still introducing significant forces (to reassure the GVN)
under decisions already taken in principle. This timing also allows for an adequate
duration before we would have to take or announce further decisions.
b. The duration should be not less than four weeks, in order to allow a convincing time for
response by action. At the same time, the GVN would almost certainly be strongly
opposed to any significantly longer period. Another element is the desirability of
terminating the pause with a month or more then elapsing before we came to major new
decisions; the point of this is to avoid the conclusion that we paused simply to permit
ourselves to resume at a higher level as had always been planned. On balance, a period of
about a month seems optimum.
c. We must consider whether we should not be prepared to resume short of the planning
period, if there are clear negative readings from the DRV. For example, our
reconnaissance may pick up clear and significant military movements toward the South.
Alternatively, the DRV might (although we think it unlikely) give an absolutely explicit
negative diplomatic response. There might be marginal cases in between, such as the
discovery of additional DRV regular units in the South, sent down prior to the pause. We
might also have strident and continued DRV propaganda denunciation of the pause; some
of this must be expected and discounted, but at a certain level it might be persuasive of a
totally negative reading. We cannot decide now just what would constitute a clearly
negative DRV response evident before the end of the planning period. Nor can we decide
now whether we should let that negative response sink in for a short time even before we
resumed. However, we probably should recognize that there may be developments that
should properly cause us to resume before the end of the planning period. (We do not
necessarily have to say this to others, as we did to Hanoi in May.)
3. Coordination with the GVN
a. We must bring Ambassador Lodge fully aboard, and wider elements of the Embassy
should be briefed so that our contacts with the GVN at all levels are used to keep their
reactions under control.
b. Ambassador Lodge should then personally take the lead in explaining the pause to the
GVN. (The alternative of a Washington mission working with the Ambassador in the
explanation seems less attractive, and undercuts his personal position. But there is a case
for this alternative.)
c. The GVN should then be associated in the formal announcement. This seems vital if we
are to avoid widespread criticism in South Viet-Nam on the now-familiar basis that the
US is acting alone.
Discussion
GVN concurrence could well be the stickiest part of the whole operation. In any event, it
must not be hasty or forced; yet, the fact that we would have to mention it to at least four
top leaders gives us an immediate security problem. Ideally, we should try to get the
Ambassador aboard in a consultation in Washington or Honolulu a few days before he
goes to the GVN. The approach to the GVN should then be roughly four days before the
initiation of the pause. (If we wish to have GVN couple the pause announcement with a
more sweeping declaration of internal policy, as discussed under B 7 below, we would
have to allow a longer time to work on that announcement. But it still might be possible to
withhold discussion of the pause until very shortly before it was initiated.)
In presenting the matter to the GVN, we should of course make maximum use of our
continuing Phase I deployment and of our concurrent plan for continued actions within
South Vietnam. We could also point out that the DRV would not be able to take much
advantage of a pause without our knowing it at once. Arguments based on domestic and
international opinion factors might also be used, but might be less persuasive than the
others indicated.
Query if we should indicate to the GVN that we will be prepared to go still further if the
pause fails: on the one hand, this would be highly persuasive in bringing them aboard; on
the other hand, it forces our hand on Phase II decisions and reduces our flexibility to deal
with varied responses to the pause under which, for example, we might wish to resume at
a different level and not go forward with major Phase II deployments.
4. Communications with Hanoi
a. In May, we did not alert any third-country channels, apart from the Soviets, who made
clear their unwillingness to act as intermediaries. This time, the public and prolonged
nature of the pause imposes no security obstacle, and we should alert every possible
channel with Hanoi contacts. We would explain to each of these "useful" countries and
parties--as a first crack, the USSR, Canada, India, UK, France, Japan, Poland, and U
Thant--as to what we were doing and that we would listen carefully for whatever Hanoi
had to say. The fact that we would not wish to continue the pause merely in return for
Hanoi's entering into negotiations raises a serious tactical question: Should we make this
clear at the outset, or should we say we are interested in any message of any sort? This
problem is particularly acute for U Thant. Might the answer be to say that we were
interested in indications either of reciprocal action or of willingness to negotiate, but felt
highly doubtful that the latter would be persuasive without the former?
Discussion
We do not have to communicate with the Chicoms in any way.
As to the Soviets, there is an issue whether they should be given special treatment. There
were some indications in May that they resented being singled out, and they have
subsequently stressed that they are not intermediaries and that we must deal with Hanoi. It
can be argued that they might be more helpful than otherwise if they were treated simply
on the same footing as a number of other interested nations, and were told in so many
words that this was the case. On the other hand, our over-all relationship with the Soviets
might benefit if we sent a private Presidential message noting repeated Soviet references
to this very action, expressing the hope that Hanoi would be responsive (while not
suggesting any specific action by the Soviets), but equally making clear that we could not
lay off indefinitely if action continued in the South.
b. There is a question whether we should ask any third country or party to make public
appeals to Hanoi. U Thant might have the urge to do so, and of course in the last analysis
we could not stop him. However, the adamant rejection of the UN role by the DRV seems
to make this most unpromising, and it is also likely that U Thant would pitch any appeal
(even privately) on the basis of the DRV getting the bombing stopped for good if it would
only agree to negotiate, without taking any other action.
5. US Domestic Handling
Congressional leaders might be consulted prior to decision, and the full Leadership should
certainly be informed prior to public announcement.
6. Notifications of Key Allies and Others
Subject to security considerations, key Asian and NATO allies should be informed in
advance leaving off only any special stress on keeping their ears open to Hanoi. We might
try to make a rather special production of notification also of countries that have been
pressing us on a pause, such as Yugoslavia, India, Ghana, etc.
Most of our key allies could be informed only just prior to the pause. [3 lines of source
text not declassified]
7. Public Announcement and Press Backgrounding
a. The public announcement should include the following points:
(1) GVN and US have agreed that bombings of the DRV should be suspended "for a
significant time" in order to demonstrate GVN/US desire to seek a peaceful solution and
in order to see if there will be a constructive response from Hanoi. The length of the pause
would not be specified nor would we attempt to indicate just what response was required
or anticipated.
(2) The announcement would make clear that we would continue to conduct necessary
reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam and necessary air and ground operations in South VietNam. We could add some general sentence that "all other relevant operations will
continue" to hint clearly that we would go on acting in Laos.
b. Backgrounding of the press should not go beyond the public announcement. One point
of particular difficulty here is that we are on the public record as insisting on an action
response, and not simply a willingness to negotiate. Press speculation may find in our
failure to reiterate this position a suggestion that we are ready to settle for the latter.
Discussion
Several points in the above script are open to question. The arguments against naming a
specific duration publicly seem overwhelming. The opposite alternative of making the
suspension entirely open-ended has some appeal, but increases the already-present chance
that the GVN would leak the agreed duration. Moreover, we have to reckon that we will
be dealing with pressures to turn the suspension into a cessation in any event, and
resistance to these might be harder if we had left the thing entirely open.
As to the methodology of the announcement, there is the alternative of avoiding formal
announcement until press inquiry made it compulsory. On balance, though this had some
merit in May, the fact that the press would probably now be considerably more alert, and
the fact that this is intended as a much more prolonged operation, argue for putting it right
out in the open at the outset.
The third issue concerns possible additional elements in the US/GVN announcement. We
have been hoping for some time that an improved military climate would provide a good
setting for the GVN to make a more public and forthcoming statement addressed to the
individual members of the VC, to the general effect that they would be received back into
South Vietnamese life if they stopped their armed action and accepted an independent
SVN without DRV influence. If military actions have continued to go well in the period
up to the initiation of the pause, we might well be urging such a statement in any case, and
it might be a most effective rounding out of the total message ("DRV get out, but deluded
brothers come in") against a background of continuing strength and firmness in pursuing
actions within SVN. On balance, this looks like a good addition; to do it properly will
require careful consultation with a wider circle in the Saigon Embassy than we might
otherwise bring in at the outset (notably Lansdale).
C. What We Do As We Go Along
1. Probable Communist responses.
a. Chicoms will almost certainly attack pause as US/GVN "trick." We should ignore and
play down such statements, but react promptly and hard if Chicoms take any military
action, separating such reactions from continuation of pause against the DRV unless the
latter has taken some action itself.
b. Soviet response may include some public denunciation to keep in line, but will almost
certainly be reserved and cautious. One of our hopes must be that the Soviets will get busy
with the DRV to suggest at least a somewhat forthcoming response and even a serious
beginning toward a peaceful solution. As stated earlier, any special effort by us with the
Soviets to this end would probably not be fruitful, however.
c. NLF/VC may well oppose DRV attempts to make any significant response to the pause;
they may see any such DRV action as unjustified surrender to the implied US/GVN threat
to resume bombing, i.e., that the DRV would have decided "to save its own skin." The VC
might, on their own, seek to disrupt the pause by some specific terror actions in SVN. We
should probably strive, necessarily in consultation with the GVN (which could be hard),
not to respond specifically against the DRV to such VC actions. However, a really major
event in the South might compel us, consistently with our over-all theory of Hanoi
responsibility, to make a one-shot interruption of the pause in reprisal. This is a tough
issue.
d. Hanoi's response is of course the most crucial. It is hard to see Hanoi making no
response whatever, or confining its response merely to propaganda denunciation. Alone or
in combination we might have any one of the following;

(1) At attempt to indicate willingness to talk but without any clear change in position.
Hanoi might choose this time to say somewhat more clearly that it does not insist on US
withdrawal, and it might use a gentle formulation on NLF representation in negotiations.
The crux of the matter would be, however, whether there was any change in the insistence
on acceptance of the third point, the NLF entering a coalition in Saigon.
(2) An attempt to indicate willingness to talk with some clear change on the third point,
but possibly without any indication of reducing support to the VC.
(3) A suggestion that limited responsive action was being taken such as failure to send
additional regular units.
(4) A suggestion that real responsive action was being taken such as withdrawal or lying
low of the 325th Division.
Perhaps the most troublesome of all possible Hanoi actions would be a message (perhaps
through channels sympathetic to such an approach, such as the French) that Hanoi was
indeed willing to talk but only if we undertook not to resume the bombing.
2. Responses to Variations in Hanoi's Action
The variations are so great that it is almost impossible to spell out how we would handle
these possibilities. The point would be to shoot down any idea that we would settle merely
for willingness to negotiate, while at the same time losing no opportunity to pin Hanoi
down to compromises in its present position. Whatever message was conveyed by Hanoi,
we would have to weigh carefully what channels to use in reply and how to determine just
how far Hanoi was ready to go, without letting ourselves get drawn into a dilatory and
fruitless exchange designed on their part to make it extremely difficult for us to resume.
The possibility that we might be drawn into at least preliminary negotiations requires that
we review again our negotiating position and see if there are any areas where we could
show further "give"--as we have done during the summer on the reunification issue and,
verbally at least, on NLF representation.
3. Third-Country Pressures
Most of the "useful" countries would probably not put pressure on us to extend the
suspension into a cessation. However, there would undoubtedly be many countries and
voices raised in this direction. Our general course of action would seem to be to avoid
getting drawn into the issue, let our announcement speak for itself, and keep our mouths
shut. However, we might be faced even with UN resolutions or other formal actions that
we would have to combat.
A second form of international pressure might arise to extend the suspension into a
"ceasefire" in SVN. Apart from the obvious GVN opposition to any such extension, we
ourselves would be squarely opposed to it because of the difficulties we have always seen,
notably the danger that a total "ceasefire" would consolidate the VC position in secure
areas and get us into a Pathet Lao type of situation. Our line of defense should probably
be that the GVN and we are entitled to go on dealing with the VC as long as it continues
active, and that any suggestion of a complete "ceasefire" is premature until we have seen
whether a more limited reduction of hostilities is possible first. On the whole, it would
appear probable that we could contain pressures for a complete "ceasefire" at least from
our responsible domestic critics, but the general heat on this subject is one of the
significant difficulties in the operation.
4. Continued US and GVN Actions
By hypothesis, we would be continuing already decided Phase I deployments during the
pause. Beyond this point, even the possibility of decisions for Phase II deployments may
require preparatory measures that will become known. We need an assessment from DOD
on this point.
D. Conditions and Method of Resumption
1. Basically, we would expect to resume at the end of the agreed period unless we were
satisfied that the DRV had made a response that gave really serious and continuing
promise of leading toward a peaceful solution. Undoubtedly, the DRV will have tried to
muddy the record as much as possible; however, it would have to weigh any attempt to
portray itself as having changed position or taken action against the morale drawbacks,
particularly vis-a-vis the VC, of such a public position. It might not be too difficult to
make up our own minds that the DRV was not responding, but we should be thinking
always of the kind of record we could make with key allies and other countries to prove
that our reading was correct.
2. When and as we decided to resume, we should probably make a clear and firm public
announcement of just what we were doing and why.
3. The pace of resumption needs careful thought. From the military standpoint, renewed
destruction of the LOC in the southern areas of the DRV would appear the first
requirement. However, we might start with some targets at the northern limits of present
strikes to emphasize that we were resuming at least on the old basis.
There is an issue whether we should resume with a "bang", by some strike beyond present
geographic and category limits. This cannot be decided in advance. The case for such
extension would be strong if Hanoi had been drastically negative, but even in this case we
would have to weigh whether such action, in an atmosphere where tension would go up
automatically, might be more likely to produce air battles or Chicom responses that we
would still not wish to have to deal with.
Another element in our initial targeting might, of course, be the intervening extension of
the SAM system. If we had to hit a number of SAM sites for reasons of military necessity,
this in itself would give a considerable psychological "bang" although with much less
chance of escalation risks that might attend geographic or category extensions.
4. Finally, there is the question of what additional actions we would then take to increase
our pressures in the South. If the pause had made our case clear to the world, we would be
in a stronger position to go ahead with greater reinforcements along Phase II lines. But, as
noted earlier, we would probably do well to allow a period to elapse before we announced
major new decisions. One factor here is that we must not, for future purposes, get our
pauses characterized as simply devices to justify major new measures. If the pause does
not work this time, its usefulness for the future should still be preserved if possible.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Point
Attached is a report on progress of our non-military programs in Vietnam./2/ I'm afraid it
is long and somewhat turgid, but our activities are so wide and comprehensive in this field
that it is difficult to tell you anything meaningful without going into some detail.
In essence, we are making perceptible progress on a broad front--from inflationary curbs
to nurse recruitment, from police training to agricultural experiment stations. Our
problems are formidable: the difficulty of communication from the capital to the province
towns and from these centers to the countryside; the increasing flow of refugees; the
shortages of skilled manpower; the thin administrative resources of the GVN. But I am
convinced that each of these are being tackled aggressively.
We will keep you informed periodically.
McGeorge Bundy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature

Department of State
Washington, DC
Washington, October 22, 1965, 3:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower. Top
Secret. President Johnson wrote the following note on the source text: "See me on this. L"
1. Because it reports General Eisenhower's view, I think you will want to see the attached
memorandum from Andy Goodpaster./2/ In essence, Eisenhower is asking why we do not
close off shipping to Hanoi. He suggests a declaration that a state of war exists and some
undefined reinforcing naval action. But he seems to think the declaration itself might do
the trick.
2. Goodpaster has promised Eisenhower additional information on this problem, and
McNamara wants you to know that it is one of the issues which is being carefully
reviewed as we consider where we go in Vietnam next year. Bob does not think it is a
matter which needs urgent attention and decision at your level, and I agree with him.
McG. B.
181. Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Memos (A). Top Secret. According to a note attached to another copy of this paper,
William Bundy sent it "Strictly Eyes Only" to Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Thompson on
October 26. (Department of State, Bundy Papers: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)
POLICY CHOICES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
ON VIETNAM
Based on the Depuy briefing,/2/ the draft pause scenario,/3/ and Lodge's 1377,/4/ we
confront major policy decisions in the next month or six weeks. This memorandum is a
very rough attempt to frame the substance of the choices, and to identify some of the
related problems we face.

/2/On October 21, MACV J-3, General Deputy briefed Rusk, McNamara, the JCS, Taylor,
and others on COMUSMACV's Phase II program for deployment of U.S. forces to
Vietnam. He stated that, with the exception of a few elite units, ARVN forces would be
mainly employed in pacification activities behind a fighting screen of U.S. forces. The
U.S. troops would carry the battle to the war zones and wherever VC main forces were
found. The GVN favored the concept. (JCS telegram 4827 to CINCPAC, October 22;
Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
/3/Document 178.
/4/Document 176.
I. Elements of the Problem
A. MACV (through Depuy) makes a strong case that we cannot keep up adequate pressure
on the VC without additional deployments totalling about 115,000 men during the course
of 1966, raising our total to 325,000 by the end of the year. While the Depuy presentation
may be unduly pessimistic in assuming that VC morale will stay up and that they will be
able to obtain adequate equipment and even reinforcements, it is also possible (though I
think less so) that it errs in the other direction by not assuming a really major DRV effort
to increase forces in the South. At the very least, Depuy seems realistic in stating that we
shall probably have to make a major additional commitment to attain our basic objectives,
and that even with a second phase we cannot say with anything like absolute assurance
that we are going to get there. Somewhere along the line the VC will probably weaken,
and this may be well short of filling in Depuy's bar charts in blue and green. But we have
to have the worst case constantly in mind, and the realistic median view would be that we
do have to do a great deal more.
B. If both the American public and international opinion are to accept our doing a great
deal more, even on the ground in the South without an expansion of bombing of the DRV,
we have to worry about whether we have a convincing case that we have exhausted all
avenues to negotiation. We are currently in a fairly easy position on this because of
universal reading that the DRV's September statements/5/ add up to a rejection of
negotiations. For the moment, there is no favorable negotiating effort going on on any
front, with the SYG effort being known privately to us (and we would suspect to other key
countries) to have elicited no response from Hanoi. At the same time, the strength of our
position of willingness to negotiate is being slightly eroded by the interpretation put out
by Senator Mansfield and others and the apparent diplomatic reading in Washington that
we have hardened and are really set to fight the thing through to the end, even including
the erroneous exaggerated interpretation that we intend a total military victory over the
VC for its own sake, as opposed to whatever degree of pressure will induce the VC and
Hanoi to lay off and turn to a political line, which is what we still really intend. The noises
out of Saigon, both from the GVN and from our Embassy's dealings with the press, have
also tended to confuse matters and to confound the perhaps legitimate point that the GVN
needs time to get its house in order with the illegitimate conclusion that they and we could
not live with negotiations and that we really are both opposed to it whatever we say in
public. In sum, our posture cannot be considered firm and wholly tenable if we look ahead
3-6 months without further moves.

C. On the other hand, any demonstrable move toward a peaceful solution, such as a pause
in the next three months, raises the most serious questions of creating misunderstanding in
Hanoi and/or interrupting the slow effort we are making to build some real political
structure in Saigon. Lodge's 1377 makes it perfectly clear how he would react initially to a
pause, and one cannot dismiss his reading of the internal political situation as simply due
to his own personal rather superficial view of things. At the very best, we have a major
tactical job to do to bring Lodge and the GVN aboard if we are to make a major move
such as a pause.
D. The Depuy briefing was somewhat reassuring as to the degree of US casualties we may
expect (N.B. it would help to see a projection of this in terms of casualties per committed
battalion per month accepting Depuy's judgment that the present rate can be maintained).
Nonetheless, we are faced with the pressures from various quarters, symbolized by
General LeMay and the Ford/Adair line, to hit the North substantially harder. The degree
to which this will rise during the next 3-6 months will depend heavily on actual casualty
experience and also on the proportion of apparent successes to apparent reverses (any
really adverse engagement could really set the pressures off).
E. The Soviets have been reserved in their private comment, but there may well be
substance to the report from Matseev, the Isvestia correspondent, to Robert Kleiman to the
effect that the Soviets would like to see a pause of at least three weeks to get diplomatic
pressures started that might bring Hanoi onto a negotiating track./6/ In other words, the
vital Soviet factor argues strongly for a pause. Equally, it almost certainly argues against
any real step-up in the bombing, and was a major factor in the Thompson Group
conclusion that this was not wise, for this reason as well as because it would probably not
have a favorable effect on Hanoi in the absence of greater progress than we have yet
achieved in the South./7/
/6/Thompson's account of this meeting as related to him by Kleiman on October 22 is in
Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam--October 1965.
II. Broad Policy Choices
A. A serious pause for a month, followed--if it fails--by decisions on Phase II deployment
and possibly by some step-up in the bombing of the North. On the objective international
factors, this has a great deal to commend it. It would clear the decks in a convincing
fashion and probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation even after we had resumed,
at least as to the Soviets.
On the other hand, as noted above, bringing the GVN (and Lodge) aboard would be
terribly difficult just in itself, and we must have serious doubts whether it would have an
adverse effect on GVN solidity. Any major falling out between the GVN and the US, or
any overturn in the GVN political structure, could at this stage set us back enormously, if
not fatally.
Another contrary argument is that it might at least confuse our message to Hanoi and
justify their tendency to think that, despite all our actions, we are really looking for an
easy way out. We could offset this to some degree by the kind of message we get through
to them and by our continued actions in the South, but there would still be some chance
that the hard-liners in Hanoi would read it the other way notwithstanding. In other words,
it could conceivably be a step away from getting Hanoi to seeking a peaceful solution.
Still a third element would be the US domestic reaction. There would be a lot of rumbling
below decks and among the harder-action school of critics. This might be kept under
control during the pause, but it could also mean that the pressures would be enormous
thereafter to "really clobber" the DRV.
B. Finish up Phase I deployments and proceed to Phase II decisions and actions without
any major action such as a pause, or any appreciable change in the bombing pattern
against the DRV.
In terms of effect on Hanoi and Saigon, this might quite well be the best course. It would
indicate steadiness and firmness, as well as patience, and it can be strongly argued that
this will bring Hanoi to a peaceful solution more surely and perhaps even sooner than any
other course.
The major adverse argument is that the President would have to go through another round
of major decision-making in which our soft-line critics, both here and abroad, would raise
a great deal of noise that we were not leaving the door sufficiently open to negotiation and
that we were really moving inexorably to a wider war. It is hard to say just how serious
these pressures would be, but at the very least we should give thought to some less
dramatic alternative to a pause--such as another third country mediation effort--that would
somewhat dampen these pressures without the adverse effects we might see in a pause in
terms of Hanoi and Saigon reaction. It is far from easy to see just what such a "pause
alternative" might be, and one cannot identify off-hand any effective or persuasive
mediator who would be willing to act in the absence of a pause.
C. Complete Phase I deployments and stop at that point for perhaps three months before
going further, while continuing the present bombing pace against the North.
This course, too, can be argued persuasively. It will be January before the weight of our
full Phase I effort really comes into play, and, despite the gaps identified in the Depuy
analysis (notably the total absence of effort in the IV Corps), we might see at least a
significant adverse morale trend in the VC that would indicate we were getting
somewhere.
Moreover, it may be useful to give ourselves time to digest the impact of 200,000 men in
terms of their effect on the Vietnamese psychology and economy. This is a factor that
some reports, notably a recent cable from Saigon on inflationary and labor/diversion
problems,/8/ suggest may be becoming very serious, even to the point of being a real
limiting factor on our basic effectiveness in appealing to the people.
Thirdly, the GVN would have additional time, hopefully without serious frictions with us,
to get on with its part of the job and to build up a GVN contribution that would not be
dwarfed by the US role, a present tendency sharply highlighted by Depuy's presentation.

On the drawback side, deferring additional US deployments--particularly in the face of
military recommendations that would almost certainly become known--raises extremely
grave problems in our domestic situation. This is not solely a question of the war dragging
on--which it can be argued it would be likely to do even with Phase II deployments--but
rather, a question of our confronting the 1966 Congressional elections without having
clearly done all that our military thought was wise just on the ground alone (leaving aside
the problem of extended bombing of the DRV). It would be still more serious, of course,
if the rate of progress slowed down, as is certainly a significant possibility.
Variance of B and C in terms of bombing in the North and
Negotiating Actions.
As noted above, Course B needs the best possible "pause alternative." Course C, just by
the passage of time, has somewhat the same problem but far less acutely.
Both courses, in addition, raise questions on the policy of bombing the North. The Soviet
and international argument against expanding our bombing will remain very cogent. But
we have always agreed that they might be outweighed by the arguments in favor of a final
"coup de grace" when Hanoi and the VC really find the going in the South extremely
difficult. On balance, the objective case would seem to favor not expanding the bombing
except as a "coup de grace" or conceivably on a one-shot reprisal basis for some really
serious VC outrage for which we could find some parallel target. In one respect, the
continuation and growth of US domestic pressures is an asset to us, in that they will keep
alive Hanoi's fears that "hawk" views would ultimately prevail in the USG.
III. Knowledge Gaps and Variables
There are a number of factors that could vary the situation, which we should follow
closely, and on some of which we simply are not adequately informed. These include:
A. What is really happening with respect to DRV infiltration. We probably need to stress
the bombings of Laos very heavily, and may wish to divert some part of our DRV air
effort to this end. We also need a much better intelligence picture than now exists of how
much equipment and reinforcement is really coming down, and how.
If we become convinced that individual targets such as Phu Quoc Island are really heavily
contributing to infiltration, might we not conduct a specific amphibious operation against
these?
B. We need to follow extremely closely what the ChiComs and Soviets are doing in the
DRV. This may well increase, and could suggest at any point that we were nearing some
kind of flash signal.
C. South Vietnamese popular reactions to the process will have to continue to be followed
extremely closely. We are reasonably satisfied with our current reading that we have not
triggered significant adverse reactions either by our presence or by our military tactics,
including air attacks on villages. But we surely need to have an acute watch on this and
perhaps--as MACV is looking into--tighter control on the use of air.
D. The extent of civilian damage resulting from our DRV attacks also needs a great deal
of watching and possibly a review of what we are doing. The recent compilation of
photographs of Nam Dinh casts grave doubt on any claim that we can hit urban areas in
any surgical fashion. Another cause for concern is the number of unspecified "buildings"
being hit by our armed recce. Apart from humanitarian considerations, the degree of
civilian damage in the North probably tends to stiffen DRV toughness, and may
increasingly give the DRV a propaganda weapon against us, which it now seems they are
making a considerable effort to mount.
E. In addition to the civilian damage element, our DRV bombing pattern is being looked
at from the standpoint of simple effectiveness. It is disturbing to get reports that bridges
have been re-built in the southern areas of the DRV and then not struck again. Are we
focussing enough, as a primary and irreducible objective, on keeping key LOC out of
action?
F. Even the possibility of a pause, or a "pause alternative," means that we must look hard
again at our over-all negotiating position. Ambassador Unger's special group has done
some further work on this, but our thoughts are not nearly as clear as they should be, nor-perhaps above all--have they thoroughly been shared with Saigon, as Lodge's 1377
highlights. It may be that Alexis Johnson would be the man to pull this together into a
much more definitive script than we now have. I do not myself see any major change or
"give" that we should now display. This, too, needs a hard look in addition to the question
of tactical arguments and handling.
IV. Decision-Making Procedures
The pause scenario has suggested that the best time for such action, if taken, might be late
November. This means bringing Ambassador Lodge aboard in the middle of November,
and it may well be that this could only be done at Presidential level. Another factor is the
absence of Secretary Rusk from November 13 till November 25, roughly. How and where
are we to consult with Lodge, and how are we to get through to him a somewhat different
outlook on the whole subject, even if we should eventually decide not to do the pause
itself? Washington seems indicated, but we must decide very soon.
Obviously, a major factor is the degree of visibility of our decision-making. With the
President in Texas, major and prolonged gatherings are much more difficult to conceal.
182. Memorandum From the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular

Affairs (Schwartz) to Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff/1/
Memos (A). Secret. Also sent to McNaughton, William Bundy, Unger, Meeker, and
Assist-ant Secretary of State for Public Affairs James L. Greenfield. Drafted by Frank A.
Sieverts, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam and the ICRC

This report reviews the main points on Viet-Nam matters emerging from my talks with
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others in Vienna and Geneva.
Most of the topics were reported in telegrams to the Department. However this report may
be useful as a summary and as an indication of possible actions.
1. Compliance by GVN with Geneva Conventions. This subject is rapidly approaching a
critical state. In a letter to President Gonard of the ICRC sent August 10 Secretary Rusk
stated "In regard to the hostilities in Viet-Nam the U.S. Government is applying the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and we expect the other parties to the conflict to do
likewise."/2/ In a subsequent letter the Secretary told M. Gonard that, "In view of the fact
that prisoners taken by United States forces are transferred promptly to the Government of
the Republic of Viet-Nam, we think it is more appropriate for that Government to supply
such lists and to arrange for such visits by International Committee representatives, and
we have every reason to believe that it will do so. You will recall that the Government of
the Republic of Viet-Nam informed your representatives on August 11 that it will fulfill
its obligations in this regard under the Geneva Conventions of 1949."/3/
/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, p. 447.
/3/ found.
Up to the present the GVN has failed to comply with the Conventions in a number of
important ways. It has not furnished the ICRC with lists of prisoners. It has refused to
permit the ICRC delegate in Saigon to make the kind of unescorted visits to prisoner
camps that he believes are his responsibility under the Conventions. As far as I know it
has taken no steps to transmit prisoner mail to relatives. Nor has it established a central
office for collecting names of prisoners as required by the Conventions. In addition, the
GVN thesis that all but a handful of the thousands of prisoners in custody are refugees or
criminals subject to trial under domestic law is unlikely to convince the ICRC.
The matter is acute for several reasons:
(a)The ICRC may publicly criticize the GVN for failure to comply with the conventions.
This would reduce the GVN's already precarious standing in the eyes of many other
countries.
(b) As long as GVN compliance is incomplete U.S. military forces in Viet-Nam are
obligated not to turn over prisoners they take to GVN custody.
(c) GVN non-compliance inhibits our ability to take public or private actions to obtain
better treatment for American military personnel held by the Viet Cong and the DRV.
The GVN attitude on this subject, while understandable in light of what their country has
endured at the hands of the Viet Cong, and conceivably explainable to someone on the
spot who can see at first hand the character of this ugly war, is however virtually certain
to be unacceptable as a permanent answer to the ICRC's repeated entreaties on this
subject. This will be all the more so if the DRV, which already is substantially complying
with important parts of the prisoners Convention by furnishing in some instances at least
names, photographs, statements, and mail, takes specific public steps to comply formally
with the Conventions. It is by no means out of the question that the DRV will do this.
From their own point of view there is little reason (beyond their own fanaticism) why they
should not.
Nor is there any valid reason why the GVN should not comply. The steps outlined in
Deptel 863 of September 25/4/ should be fully acceptable and could serve to enhance the
GVN's reputation with its own population. A change in definitions so that the bulk of
prisoners taken in military operations be classified in the first instance as subject to the
protection of the Conventions should not cause serious inconvenience. Since education or
indoctrination programs free of duress are not proscribed by the Conventions the Chieu
Hoi program could continue. Individual terrorists convicted of specific acts could still be
charged as criminals and handled outside the Conventions. Refugees who are rehabilitated
could of course be freed to return to their villages.
/4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET)
It is worth noting that the narrowness of the GVN category of prisoners undermines our
thesis that this is more than a civil war. Our critics can be expected to fasten on to the fact
that only 74 of the thousands of prisoners captured or in custody represent an external
force and use this as further evidence of DRV non-involvement. By altering the language
of the definition large numbers of detainees could be classified as affiliated with Viet
Cong-DRV armed forces fighting in South Viet-Nam against the GVN. This would not
only have important legal and propaganda advantages, it would also square with the facts
as we know them.
If the ICRC delegates in Saigon are not satisfied with the degree of GVN compliance very
soon the US Government must examine its own position very carefully. For one thing, our
mission should take care not to place itself between the ICRC and the GVN, explaining
the one to the other and, ultimately, satisfying neither. The ICRC should go direct to the
GVN, the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as the Foreign Office, to explain their
obligations under the Conventions and in turn to hear from the Vietnamese themselves
what they are doing to comply. The U.S. position must be squarely on the side of the
Conventions. If the ICRC delegates aren't able to make their case with sufficient force to
the GVN Ministries of Interior and Defense, the U.S. mission should be instructed to
approach the Saigon Government at the highest level to explain the importance of full and
prompt compliance.
In the meanwhile, consideration should be given to having U.S. forces keep prisoners they
actually capture. The present policy set forth in the Joint State-Defense message of
September 24 (Deptel 858 to Saigon)/5/ provides that lists be kept of prisoners turned
over to the GVN. The additional step of holding at least some prisoners would not only
keep us in compliance with the Conventions during the time that the GVN is in the
process of working itself up to this, it would also provide us with a small amount of
additional leverage for use in connection with a possible exchange of prisoners with the
DRV or even, conceivably, with the Viet Cong.
/5/Not printed. (Ibid.)
2. Prisoner exchanges. The ICRC is aware of our interest in this subject. They also
understand the problems. The fact that we hold no prisoners, and that the GVN so far has
not asked their assistance in this regard, does not help matters. The ICRC understand the
special nature of the Hertz case, though the argument that he as a bona fide civilian held
by the Viet Cong is unique is beginning to wear a bit thin now that Dodd, the civilian
construction firm employee, has been captured, to say nothing of the three other civilians
believed held by the VC.
3. Blockade of medical supplies. This is obviously a most difficult and delicate matter,
which was raised several times by the ICRC, both in conference and in private
conversations. Without seeking to examine the pro's and con's of the policy, let me just
note that the legal argument justifying it will be subject to the ICRC's critical scrutiny.
The moral question depends to some extent at least on how the policy is carried out and
what consequences it has both for the Viet Cong wounded and for civilians in Viet Congheld areas.
To be sure, to some extent it depends on how the policy is stated. The ICRC is less likely
to object if emphasis is put on the fact that captured medical supplies are not marked with
a Red Cross and are comingled with military supplies, in contravention of the
Conventions. But the policy cannot be phrased that way just for the benefit of the ICRC.
This is not a subject on which it would be wise to try to delude or mislead the ICRC, for
short as well as long run reasons. However, a policy carried out on such terms could very
likely lead to the interdiction of virtually as many medical supplies as are presently
blockaded.
4. ICRC donations to DRV and Viet Cong. Using its own funds the ICRC has donated
50,000 Swiss francs ($11,500) each to the Red Cross of the DRV and GVN. This gift to
the DRV was deposited in a DRV bank account in London and the DRV acknowledged
receipt. The gift to the GVN is in the form of supplies.
As a result of a communication sent to National Red Cross Societies on August 11
concerning relief action on behalf of victims of the war in Viet-Nam, the ICRC had
received by September 20 donations in cash and in kind of a total of about 600,000 Swiss
francs ($140,000). These donations came from National Red Cross Societies of: Australia,
Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway
and Switzerland; and from the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland as well as from
the Viet-Nam Relief Committee in Finland and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
in Britain. Many of the donors requested that the goods in kind or funds be made available
to "all three sides", apparently not including the U.S. as a party to the war. From these
gifts the ICRC sent a consignment consisting mainly of medical supplies to the Viet Cong
through the NLF representative in Moscow. It has not yet received any acknowledgment.
If an acknowledgment is received, it may well be the opening of a channel of
communication to the Viet Cong. Several members of the ICRC pointed out to me that
they are hopeful that gifts to the Viet Cong may help gain the confidence of the Viet
Cong--an essential precondition for any useful actions by the Red Cross with regard to
prisoners or other aspects of the Conventions.
5. Cambodia. I was informed that the Cambodians feel that if they act as a channel to send
packages to U.S. prisoners held by the Viet Cong, and even more if they help send
medical supplies to the Viet Cong, the U.S. will view this as confirming evidence of our
charges, which they deny, that their country serves as a pipeline for supplies going to the
Viet Cong. Whether or not any of this is accurate, either as a statement of the facts or as a
characterization of their views, it might well be useful, and could do no harm, to have an
intermediary act on our behalf to assure Sihanouk that, far from criticizing efforts by his
Red Cross to get packages to our prisoners, we would be most grateful, and that we would
not be publicly critical if bona fide medical supplies went to the Viet Cong at the same
time, if in fact that is our view.
6. ICRC initiatives. The ICRC and its delegates are using a number of means to establish
contact and establish a relationship of confidence with the DRV and the Viet Cong. They
have sought out the DRV and NLF representatives in Moscow, Prague, Budapest, Paris,
and Phnom Penh. They used a forum like the Vienna conference to make additional
contacts. They have enlisted the Red Cross leadership of the USSR, Cambodia, Indonesia,
France, Britain, and other countries for this purpose. They have applied for a visa to
Hanoi in Warsaw and elsewhere. While they remain wholly realistic and thus nonoptimistic about these efforts the possibility remains that one or more may at any time
bear fruit. Most likely would be an invitation from Hanoi for an ICRC visit, possibly
accompanied by a request for supplies, conceivably accepting our proposal that the ICRC
inspect their allegations of hospital and leprosarium bombings. If such a visit occurred the
ICRC would seek to visit prisoners (including Americans) held by the DRV, and would
attempt to take them packages and mail. It would also discuss conditions of prisoners and
related matters with the DRV. It is not too soon to consider additional matters we might
wish the ICRC to explore if such a visit were to take place.
(Note: while the visa application is in the name of an ICRC delegate (Maunoir, I believe)
my understanding is that if the visa is granted President Gonard might himself seek to
make the trip, accompanied by staff and possibly by other members of the Committee.)
7. Character and Role of ICRC. It hardly needs saying that the ICRC as a private Swiss
organization with unique legal and international responsibilities acts independently on the
basis of its own judgment consistent with its well known principles. What may be less
obvious is that constituted this way and behaving this way the ICRC is almost certain to
serve our own interests. Plainly, this is a point to be made quietly. Any prospects for
success the ICRC may have in the delicate undertakings that it is broaching in connection
with the Viet-Nam conflict would be shattered if the other side were given public cause to
doubt its independence. But the fact remains that individually and collectively the ICRC
is, in the most basic sense, on our side. This is very specifically true of the President,
Samuel Gonard, formerly the commanding general of the Swiss armed forces, and of his
leading associate of the Committee, Vice President Jacques Freymond, Director of the
Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. (Freymond's views on wars of
national liberation, and the urgent need for the countries of Europe to find ways to get
together on a united policy for the West to fight them, as expressed in a paper he wrote for
a recent Ford-sponsored conference, are wholly congenial to U.S. policy--and somewhat
unusual coming from a European intellectual.)
In light of this I believe that the ICRC does not at present need additional specific
proposals. A suggestion like that in Deptel 651 to Geneva,/6/ besides being overtaken by
the ICRC's own initiative in sending medical supplies to the Viet Cong, might well sound
a wrong note among the more conservative members of the ICRC, who in the reductive
tradition of European intellectualism might well conclude the proposal was a deal partial
to U.S. interests and thus not for them to implement. Our present relationship with the
ICRC is such that it can best be served by maintaining an open channel of discussion with
them, with occasional nudges from us to point them in directions we consider fruitful
and/or essential. And by getting the GVN to comply with the Conventions.
8. Publicity. As a corollary to the previous point, publicity now for our efforts to work
with and through the ICRC might well interfere with their efforts to gain the confidence of
the other side and thus obtain better treatment for our prisoners. The argument that
maximum publicity will help get better treatment for U.S. prisoners and will make it
harder for the DRV to conduct mock war crimes trials and carry out executions, even if
valid, does not contravene this view, since such publicity could be sought without
reference to the ICRC.
The domestic U.S. problem is more serious. The families obviously want to know what
we're doing to help the boys, as do the military services. Congressional interest is building
up. To a point this can be handled by quiet off-the-record briefings. But that point will
soon be reached.
I discussed this problem with members and staff of the ICRC. They themselves are
becoming more public relations conscious than has been their tradition. They are
interested in our own methods of backgrounding and news dissemination. At the right
time I believe they will release on their own initiative, or can be gotten to release some
information on what they are doing for the benefit of U.S. prisoners. By coordinating in
advance we could then give their release our own emphasis here. I am convinced this
would be more satisfactory for the present than for us to attempt to background here.
9. Strengthening South Viet-Nam's Red Cross. Without going into details of present
shortcomings, suffice it to say that a lot can be done to beef up the South Vietnamese Red
Cross. And at relatively little cost or difficulty (with respect to the Conventions, for
example) to the GVN. The areas of need are obvious: refugees, direct material aid,
children, separated families, etc. Putting the South Vietnamese Red Cross more into the
picture would assist efforts being made by other private groups, would enhance the RVN's
image abroad, and would deflect attention from shortcomings of the GVN in other areas.
Both the ICRC and the American Red Cross would do much more with the Vietnamese
Red Cross. But the requests should come from them. A specific project within their
competence would be to set up a tracing service to reunite families, both now and when
the fighting ends. The ICRC could provide technical assistance for this.
10. Protecting Power. ICRC experts on this subject see no reason not to explore this
possibility. They suggest we consider asking an Eastern European country (Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania) to take on the job. They have no illusions that any such
arrangement will be accepted by the DRV or do much good if it were.
11. Mail, clearing house, official Bureau for Prisoners. Noting that letters from U.S.
prisoners have reached their families in a variety of ways, the ICRC thinks it would be
useful if a more comprehensive and efficient effort were made to keep track of the mail
flow. I am exploring this with the American Red Cross and DOD. The ICRC is seeking to
find out what kind of "infractions" regarding mail the DRV is citing as reason for halting
the mail flow.
The ICRC also recommends that an official Bureau for Prisoners as provided in the GC be
established here and in Saigon. While this would be a formality on our part, it would be an
additional argument for the ICRC to use when it tries to get compliance by Hanoi.
183. Draft Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Memos (A). Secret. There is no indication on the source text that this message was sent.
Joint State-Defense-White House message. For Ambassador and Westmoreland only.
1. As we prepare for later discussions with the President on future policy in Vietnam, we
are all eager for your personal comments on some of the major problems. Since there is no
immediate prospect of meeting with you, we would like to use this channel for
informational exchanges in the next few weeks. We count on you to reply in whatever
way is convenient to you, and we are not seeking formal Embassy or MACV positions so
much as the benefit of your own thinking in whatever form you wish to present it.
2. Last week we listened with great interest to De Puy/2/ in his preliminary presentation of
Phase II plans. While we are impressed by the high quality of the thinking behind this
plan, a number of questions have occurred to different ones of us on which we would
value your early comment.
3. As presented, these plans focus sharply upon a dominant fighting role for U.S. ground
forces. They appear to imply that aggressive operations will be conducted almost
exclusively by U.S. forces. We recognize that for planners it is vastly easier to plan in
terms of the deployment and use of U.S. forces under direct U.S. command. But some of
us are greatly concerned by the possibility that what began as a Vietnamese war with U.S.
assistance may end as a U.S. war with only passive Vietnamese cooperation. We doubt if
this is your plan, but we fear that the momentum of U.S. military planning and
deployment may force us all in this direction if we do not take very strong action to insure
maximum use of Vietnamese forces in all forms of combat. It may be that De Puy briefing
has misled us because of its natural focus upon the role of additional U.S. troops
suggested for Phase II. But in reaching conclusions on Phase II and related problems, we
would all be helped if we could have a clearer picture of the efforts you currently envisage
for strengthening the Vietnamese armed forces at all levels and for all purposes.
4. Some of us also wonder whether we adequately understand what is now happening in
Vietnam. GVN losses are still running several times higher than those of U.S. forces, and
we believe, on the basis of estimates here, that most Viet Cong casualties still come from
engagements in which the ground forces on our side are mainly Vietnamese. Thus there
appears to be a substantial difference between the war as it now is and the war as the
Phase II briefing suggests that it may be next year. Your comments on this apparent
discrepancy would be welcome.

5. De Puy's briefing relates to the situation on the ground in South Vietnam, and did not
directly treat the question of air operations either in the South or in the North. There is an
evident requirement on us for correlation of all military action in the theater, and we
would be glad to know of your thinking about the relation between ground and air action
in the South, and the relation of both to the various possible rates at which the Rolling
Thunder campaign might be carried forward.
6. Finally, we face major political decisions in connection with any additional
deployments, and it may well be that we would wish to precede any Phase II deployments
by another pause in bombing the North. Our preliminary estimate is that any such pause
would be unlikely to produce a satisfactory response from Hanoi and would simply
demonstrate again that root of problem of war and peace is in Hanoi. Here again we
would value your thinking on ways and means of executing such a political preliminary to
a further buildup.
7. Very existence of this message series will be held extremely closely here. You can
speak as freely on this channel as if you were at the Cabinet table in a carefully restricted
meeting. We will do the same.
184. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

No. 2391/65
Memos (A). Secret; No Foreign Dissem [text not declassified]. Disseminated by the
Directorate of Intelligence.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM/2/
/2/This memorandum is CIA's issuance of a joint CIA-DIA study prepared monthly for
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Footnote in the source text.]
Effects on the DRV Economy
1. The cumulative economic losses caused by air strikes in North Vietnam are still small
in relation to total economic activity because the targets attacked thus far have not been
located in areas of major economic activity. However, there are now considerably more
indications of localized strains upon the economy, most notably in food supply and
distribution. The bombings of the railway lines leading from Hanoi to the northwest and
northeast are probably having a greater adverse effect on the economy than any targets
attacked to date. With the interdiction of three important land lines of communication,
domestic production, distribution, and reconstruction are being curtailed and exports and
imports are being reduced. Another serious effect is the diversion of scarce resources from
productive uses to the repair of damaged facilities and development and the use of
alternate means of transportation. This diversion has almost certainly retarded, if not
stopped, work on a number of high-priority economic construction projects. The
capabilities of North Vietnam's armed forces have not been affected significantly by
attacks on economic facilities, but the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies is
being hampered by damaged transportation facilities. The armed forces place little direct
reliance on the North Vietnamese economy for materiel.
2. Damage to economic facilities and equipment is now estimated at between $15 and 16
million. Measurable indirect economic losses amount to more than $8 million--mainly
reductions in foreign trade and agricultural output. The direct economic losses that can be
measured have fallen most heavily on the transport sector of the economy. The cost of
permanent reconstruction of rail/highway bridges would be on the order of $7 to 8 million
and the replacement or repair of destroyed or damaged transport equipment would cost an
additional $3.3 million. Reconstruction of the damaged electric power plants would cost
about $4.5 million. Repair costs for the petroleum storage facilities are estimated at about
$500 thousand. The growing loss of foreign export earnings--now totaling almost $5
million--is appreciable, though not yet serious. In addition there have been losses from
lowered production. Most losses cannot be quantified, but it is estimated that the potential
reduction in rice crops this year resulting from shortages of power for irrigation will
amount to roughly $3.5 million. The cost of reconstruction, replacement, and repair of
damaged facilities, if attempted, would represent over 7 percent of total annual investment
in the economy and about 15 percent of annual investment in industry.
3. The official North Vietnam press has tacitly admitted failure to carry out
simultaneously all the necessary defense, reconstruction, and production tasks. Party
leaders have called for a major reorganization of the Communist Party apparatus in order
to strengthen the provincial and district committees of the party. These officials have
primary responsibility for directing defense mobilization and production in their
respective regions. Thus problems in organization are compounding the chronic shortages
of skilled manpower which have become even more apparent during the period of the air
strikes. Large numbers of workers have been sent south to repair the damage. Their
effectiveness has been impaired, however, by severe local shortages of food and
construction materials caused by poor distribution and problems in transportation. Some
of the effects of the shortage of skilled manpower may be avoided, however, by the arrival
of additional Soviet and Chinese technical personnel. North Vietnam is now receiving
increasing numbers of technical advisers to assist in reconstruction as well as quantities of
structural components and materials, not only from China, but also from other Communist
countries. The transfer of a considerable portion of North Vietnam's limited resources of
skilled labor and construction materials to repair and reconstruct the bombed facilities
constitutes an appreciable drain in amounts available for the planned investment program
and has required a reordering of investment priorities. If orderly economic development is
to be continued, there must be a more rapid increase in aid from other Communist
countries than has been observed to date.
4. The most significant air strikes against transportation in North Vietnam have been the
bombing of two bridges on the Dong Dang-Hanoi railroad line. The Dong Dang-Hanoi
line is the principal means by which North Vietnam has received imports of military
equipment and economic goods from China by land. The organization of alternative road
and sea transportation to compensate for the loss of through rail traffic will take some
time. In the meantime, the North Vietnamese will resort to temporary expedients to try to
keep military and high-priority economic traffic moving past and interdicted bridges.
Continued interdiction of the line will have serious consequences in maintaining
production of the two blast furnaces at Thai Nguyen, North Vietnam's only iron and steel
complex, which has been receiving about 500 tons of coking coal from China by rail each
day.
5. North Vietnam has made little progress in repairing damaged electrical power facilities.
Damage to five power plants has reduced the total generating capacity by 13.5 percent,
and has caused minor curtailment of mining and industrial operations and loss of power
for an irrigation system. Destroyed petroleum storage facilities reduced total capacity by
16.7 percent. Since total national capacity is large in relation to normal consumption, the
loss of these facilities has had only a localized impact in the southern part of the country.
Dislocations in telecommunications have necessitated the use of priorities and alternate
means of communication, and the effectiveness of postal service has declined. Food
rations in an area south of Hanoi reportedly have been cut, and food shortages are
reported to be particularly serious in the southern provinces. The bombings of the electric
power network in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An provinces have interrupted normal irrigation
services which, if not restored, will cause a reduction in the fall rice harvests in these
areas. The volume of seaborne exports continues to decline and the loss of foreign
exchange earnings has been intensified.
North Vietnamese Political and Public Reactions
6. There continues to be no basic change in Hanoi's attitude toward the war. Hanoi
continues to assert its determination to press on with the war in South Vietnam despite the
continuing attrition of the air war and the increase of US troops in the south. This
determination was evident in regime propaganda which placed special emphasis on
assertions that the US is not prepared to conduct a prolonged war in Vietnam, but that the
Vietnamese insurgents are prepared to do so and have the necessary resources.
7. On the subject of negotiations, Hanoi was unusually vocal. Coverage of this issue
centered on a Foreign Ministry memorandum broadcast on 23 September. This and other
statements offered no policy departure from the "four-point stand" of 8 April. Rather, by
phrasing, emphasis and omission, these statements tend to convey the impression that
Hanoi is endeavoring to clarify its position on settling the war and to avoid locking itself
into an inflexible position on negotiations.
8. There are no indications that the Hanoi regime's attitude toward the war is being
influenced to any greater extent than in the past by the reaction of the DRV populace to
the air strikes. The morale of the populace seems to be standing up fairly well, although
signs of deterioration in some quarters continue. For the first time in many weeks the
regime did evidence some concern over the effect that the air strikes were having on the
populace. A broadcast directed to the populace of one region of the country chided them
for failing to comply with the planned civil defense measures when strikes occur. The
broadcast implied that the local people had little regard for the government's plans and
took their own measures to protect themselves.
Effects on Military Targets
9. Air strikes against North Vietnam have further eroded national capacities in measurable
areas (see annex),/3/ while far-ranging armed reconnaissance has disrupted movement
along lines of communication and North Vietnamese attempts at reconstruction. Further
reduction in national capacities in certain categories will be inhibited to some extent by
the heavy concentration of targets in the sanctuary areas. About 51 percent of maritime
ports, and about 60 percent of POL, power plant, and railroad yard capacities are within
the restricted areas. However, only 10 percent of barracks, 14 percent of supply, and 15
percent of ammunition storage capacities are located in these areas. The continued
absence of restoration of barracks and supply and ammunition depots confirms earlier
assessments that a large-scale dispersal of men and materials to less vulnerable facilities
has occurred. No indications of shortages of ammunition have been detected, and the
movement of such materiel is given top priority on the disrupted transportation nets.
10. The four damaged airfields at Vinh, Dong Hoi, Na San, and Dien Bien Phu remain
unserviceable. The North Vietnamese appear to be discarding these facilities and
concentrating on improving and reactivating airfields in and north of the Hanoi area.
11. Armed reconnaissance sorties passed 11,000 with an attendant increase in destruction
of surface vessels, vehicles and railroad rolling stock. While these losses have disrupted
North Vietnamese operations, particularly in Military Region IV, they are being offset in
part by increased aid from the Communist countries. Similarly, although our air
operations have restricted North Vietnam's freedom of movement, especially in the
southern provinces, infiltration of materiel to the Viet Cong continues.
12. Increased pressure has been placed on Hanoi by the sustained air attacks on the more
sensitive lines of communication and on their supply base. While these operations have
not significantly reduced North Vietnamese capabilities to conduct current levels of
defense operations, they have substantially curtailed the PAVN's capability to invade
South Vietnam. Quick reaction paid dividends last week when an air strike was launched
against an occupied SA-2 site near Kep Ha within 48 hours of the site's detection. The
attack surprised the North Vietnamese and resulted in destruction of missiles, radar vans,
and missile transporters, marking the first successful attack on such a site. The losses
incurred constitute a sharp setback to North Vietnamese plans for augmenting SA-2 firing
elements northeast of Hanoi. Nevertheless, North Vietnam is steadily increasing its AAA
and SA-2 sites, primarily in the Yen Bai and Lang Son areas, and SA-2 firing elements
are now in operation to the south, east, and north of Hanoi. The mission of the armed
forces of the DRV is unchanged and includes: defending the homeland, training their own
and infiltration forces for South Vietnam and Laos, and providing logistics support for
their forces and those Communist forces presently deployed in South Vietnam and Laos.
To the present, the capability of North Vietnam's armed forces to perform their mission at
current levels of activity, while hampered, has not been diminished to an appreciable
degree.
185. Editorial Note

On November 1, 1965, retired Foreign Service officer Paul Sturm (Y) replaced Edmund
Gullion as Mai Van Bo's contact. The unpublished portion of United States-Vietnam
Relations summarizes Sturm's instructions as follows:

"November 1, 1965--X introduces Y by letter to R
"Instructions for Y:
"1. Stress building pressures in the U.S. for escalation--not a threat but a fact.
"2. Take an anti-Chinese tack.
"3. Develop theme of Asian economic development and aid.
"4. DRV Aide-Memoire, September 23, 1965:
"a. Asserts U.S. insists on keeping forces in SVN. With respect to this, pursue the idea of
stages.
"b. Asserts U.S. insists on separate Vietnams forever.
"c. Seeming change on point three--now NLF 'must have decisive say.'
"d. What is meant by 'solemnly declaring acceptance of four points--stopping all action,
withdrawal or agreement to withdraw, bombing cessation?'
"e. Rules out any DRV response to a bombing cessation." (United States-Vietnam
Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part VI, C, 1, page 21)
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's aide-memoire, September 23, is printed ibid.,
Book 12, Part VI, B, pages 160-163.
On November 18, when Sturm and Bo met, their discussion was unproductive with Bo
expressing puzzlement that Sturm had no new knowledge to convey. (Ibid., Book 12, Part
VI, C, 1, page 21)

Saigon, November 2, 1965, 7:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret. Repeated to
CINCPAC for POLAD.
1532. 1. Ky government is just over four months old. While certain strengths are apparent
certain stresses within and outside the government also exist. Trouble spots have appeared
although the overall situation in Viet-Nam is better today than it was in the early part of
1965. Behind the shield of American power a greater measure of security has been
established but the political and administrative fabric has not yet developed the necessary
strength. This report is designed to outline some of the problems which Ky now confronts
as he seeks to retain unity among the leadership and develop effective government.
2. Ky is well aware of his problems. He recognizes the need for actions and persuasive
leadership if he is to survive the pressures threatening a government massively engaged in
fighting a bitter war that reaches into almost every corner of the land and affects every
facet of Vietnamese life.
3. Government is faced with complex and potentially dangerous economic problem in
form of shortages certain commodities, sharply rising living costs, and inflation.
Important as these are intrinsically, they take on greater importance because they have
become magnified in the public mind and provide political enemies of government a
"safe" weapon for attack. Too timorous to launch a head-on campaign against military
government, these elements consider themselves quite safe in associating with
spontaneous complaint against inflation and food shortages.
4. Situation has also produced internal stresses within Ky Cabinet. Minister National
Economy Ton was under such heavy fire that he was talking of resigning. Although Ky
and Directorate colleagues considered his replacement it appears that Ton has survived for
the time being. Merits of case aside, there is always powerful impulse to fire a minister
when his area of responsibility presents politically difficult problem.
5. Pressures for change exist elsewhere within government. The Minister of Interior is
unsure of his job. Minister of Public Works and Minister of Social Welfare have been
drawing criticism because of alleged failures of their Ministries to function effectively.
(Friday Ky told Ambassador he had dismissed Minister of Public Works because of his
inefficiency, but this has not yet been made known publicly.)
6. There continues to be grumbling within the military establishment. DepPriMin Nguyen
Huu Co is apparently still unhappy at being relieved from post of Chief, Joint General
Staff. He has criticized Ky sharply before American and Vietnamese auditors on a number
of occasions and word of his remarks has circulated widely in civilian and military circles
(and must certainly have been carried back to Ky). In a recent conversation with General
Westmoreland, Co wondered out loud whether anything could be done to deflate Ky's
arrogance and force his nose to the grindstone. This is probably an unfair attack on Ky but
illustrates the lengths to which Co is now going in his criticism. We have also been
hearing of milder criticism of Ky from other senior military quarters.
7. There is a rash of coup rumors, although none are worthy of my trying to react in any
way. Before his departure for Hue, Bonze Thich Tri Quang called to warn EmbOff that at
least three sudiste groups he knows of are plotting. Adherents to General "Big" Minh and
Major General Duong Van Duc, September 13-14 coup leader, are allegedly involved.
Story is given substance by fact that Duc was forcibly removed from Ba Xuyen Province
last week by military security service and returned to Saigon (where he was set free)
presumably at request of Province Chief who objected to his activities. Re "Big" Minh,
town has been full of stories of his imminent return for last two weeks. As we have seen
in past, Saigon rumor mills need little raw material in order to operate at full blast. We
have also noted that VC are quick to pick up and broadcast stories of disunity within
GVN. We can assume that they are not idle now. While coup reports so far appear to have
no firm basis, their currency is a manifestation of the difficulties within the government.
They have become so common that Ky has seen fit to denounce the possibility of a coup.
Most recently he told press no one could organize a coup at the present time.
8. On Catholic side of ledger there has been rumor that Generals Nguyen Chanh Thi and
Nguyen Huu Co were plotting to become Chief of State and Prime Minister respectively
with Unified Buddhist Association concurrence and support. Central Buddhists headed by
Tri Quang remain highly critical of government effectiveness and of General Thieu in
particular, while old political circles continue to grumble on the sidelines. Catholic circles
have been remaining quiet and not agitating against the government but they are basically
uncommitted in support of the Ky government.
9. Much of foregoing would be irrelevant and unimportant if Ky government could
generate momentum and successfully come to grips with more important problems
confronting it. However, on basis past experience, rumors and facts of this sort can have
insidious effect on minds of many Vietnamese. As the government steels into its tasks for
a longer haul the "out-politicians" launch what have often been irresponsible attacks
against government. Members of government are more fully aware of the enormity of
tasks confronting them and are forced to come to grips with the hard task of maintaining
unity and getting on with the work of government. Some of them, it appears, would rather
think of sudden change as a solution.
10. Ky does not give any obvious outward sign of running out of steam. He remains selfassured and has declared his determination remain as Prime Minister regardless number
and magnitude problems confronting him. He is being responsive to the Ambassador's
advice to calm his opponents, seek out his critics, and maintain his authority by
persuasion as well as action. He appears more and more as a reflective man. He retains
control of the air force and his potential rivals seem to show a healthy respect for U.S.
power and some consideration for the desirability of maintaining unity in government.
Although Ky has not been receiving the credit due his successes, he has had a few. More
than anything, favorable trends in military solution over past few months have
strengthened government's position and dampened earlier fears for security which fostered
irrational changes and inspired adventures in leadership.
11. Important to recall that Directorate unity remains key to political stability in present
situation. As long as ten Generals who comprise this body remain in essential accord on
this point, coups which bring about fundamental changes in GVN's organization or
direction can probably be avoided. However, pressures such as those outlined above are
putting their unity to an important test.
Lodge

Saigon, November 3, 1965.
a.m. McGeorge Bundy sent a retyped copy of this telegram to the President with the
observation that it was "more cheerful than usual." There is an indication on the White
House copy that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to
the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVI)
1544. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram.
1. American popularity--You would have been proud of the U.S. troops at the Vietnam
National Day celebration on last Monday, November 1. They looked lean and hard--and
tall coming after the Vietnamese. The white and Negro soldiers were inter-mingled--a
powerful psychological stroke to a crowd conservatively estimated of non-whites. What
particularly impressed me was that when, with their massed flags, they appeared, they
were the only troops which drew a great roar of applause from the public. Other
formations had drawn applause from the reviewing stand but the crowd of rank and file
people on the sidewalk applauded only the United States.
When I attended this same celebration two years ago, the public was nowhere to be seen
and was not allowed to be present. Today was the first time everyone was allowed to see
the parade. The government's self-assurance was justified, for there was no terrorism.
In the afternoon I attended the National Day ceremony at the Buddhist Institute. Mine was
the only vehicle, either diplomatic or Vietnamese, which, with its flag, received warm and
grinning applause from the crowd outside the pagoda.
We Americans are definitely not considered colonial. They think they know us and our
non-imperialistic record in the Philippines and Korea and elsewhere. They know that our
soldiers are helpful and friendly. Unfortunately the Army of Vietnam still makes enemies.
2. Economic--Happily, retail rice prices continued their slow downward trend despite a
continued decline in rice stocks on hand and despite the fact that prices normally rise at
this season. Saigon's needs in rice, which are largely met from private stocks, should be
provided for at a reasonable price.
The cost of other local and imported products continued to rise, however, and the retail
price index was up 3 percent over last week.
American and Vietnamese representatives agreed on a number of measures to speed up
cargo handling and reduce congestion in the port of Saigon.
3. Military--For the third week in a row the pace of the war quickened with the Viet Cong
attacking in regimental strength in Phu Yen Province and in battalion strength in Hau
Nghia Province and against the U.S. Marines' perimeter outside Danang. Heavy fighting
mostly in a battle zone stretching from Phu Yen Province north to Thua Thien Province
led to increased casualties on both sides.
The total number of Viet Cong incidents decreased slightly reflecting a decline in the
number of anti-aircraft fire and propaganda incidents but the number of Viet Cong attacks
went up and terrorism and sabotage increased slightly.
4. Basic political--The number of Viet Cong military or political cadres who came over to
the government side during October increased slightly over the September figure
continuing a slight but steady upward trend since June.
5. Psychological--Press comment reflected optimism and hopefulness that traditional

differences among South Vietnamese religious minorities were diminishing. Press
attitudes toward the GVN were generally favorable although complaints continued
concerning rising and fluctuating prices and the preference for an elected government.
6. Pacification--Minister Thang of Rural Construction (Pacification) is in the final phase
of organizing his Ministry so that he will be free for field supervision of the pacification
program in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh starting November 5. After considerable neglect
of the program these past two years, and the resignation of most of the Ministry's civilian
staff after the death of Minister Ung, Thang has worked hard to get a competent staff, a
doctrine designed to win the voluntary support of villagers, with democratic elections in
villages as one major goal, and to make some order out of the many types of cadres
assigned to this work by past governments. He got GVN approval for his selection of
Colonels Lac, Chau, and Anh to be his chief assistants. All three are highly regarded by
Americans for their experience and competency in pacification; the latter two have been
outstanding province chiefs.
The political action team training center at Vung Tau, started, funded, and guided by CIA,
will be made into a national training center for what the Vietnamese call rural
construction and which is truthfully translated as community building. I have visited this
center and was favorably impressed. Now the Vietnamese want it to play a key role in
building a political structure in this country from the ground up. Also, 73 selected
graduates of the National Institute for Administration (NIA) are being given a special
course in pacification. Thang, who has been participating in this training of selected civil
service civilians, will assign the top third in the class to be assistant district chiefs (or
district chief, if this is required) in areas selected for priority attention; the middle third of
the class will be used at Vung Tau to strengthen the instructor staff; the last third will be
used in the Ministry.
7. Medical program--With a party of journalists, I visited USOM aided hospital at Can
Tho where major surgery cases went from 86 in 1963 to 170 in 1965 and minor surgery
from 30 to 623 in the same period. Outpatient cases went from some 3,300 in 1964 to
some 6,600 in 1965.
I also used the opportunity to have a long private talk with the Corps Commander (one of
four political satraps in this country) about the importance of national unity and of
everyone pulling together.
Lodge
188. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson/1/

Bundy, Vol. XVI. Secret. McGeorge Bundy sent this letter to the President under cover of
a November 8 memorandum that reads as follows:
"Here is a letter which has just come in from Cabot Lodge for you. I have taken the liberty
of giving copies to Rusk and McNamara only, because Lodge's views are deeply relevant
to the discussions now going forward. I have not sent a copy to Arthur Goldberg because I
am afraid it would only stir him to a very strong reaction. On the other hand, it may be
useful for Arthur to know Saigon's thinking. Which do you prefer?
"The memorandum, which has an indication that Johnson saw it, did not show the
President's preference. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (B))
Dear Mr. President:
Herewith is my best attempt to peer into the future:
1. We are beginning to master the technique of thwarting and eventually overcoming the
Viet Cong main force units and military redoubts. The process will be long and difficult,
but we know what is required to accomplish it.
2. The next step must be to eliminate Viet Cong terrorism and to smash Viet Cong
organization in the villages. The GVN, with our help, is just beginning this process.
3. If governmental stability is maintained, I believe that the GVN, with our help, can
succeed. But the process is, if anything, more complex than the military one because it
involves braiding so many programs together. If the pacification program moves ahead as
we intend, I would expect that, within six months, about 300 additional villages of the
2,685 in the country for a total of about 1,100 will have been pacified in the three different
areas which are the initial objectives. From then on, it will be straightforward, if slow,
plowing ahead with the light at the end of the tunnel growing brighter all the time.
4. No assurance can be given that the government will stay in power. But I try to leave
nothing undone to prevent a sudden change. Everyone in the U.S. Mission is alerted to let
me know of any rumor that they hear, and whenever I hear one worthy of attention, I will
certainly try to do something effective.
5. Let us assume that the government stays in power and that the Viet Cong decide that
we and the Vietnamese are able to overcome the terrorists as individuals and in small
groups. I expect them then to accept our offer for unconditional discussions and to do so
at the time and in the way most embarrassing to us. I do not expect to hear through
intelligence ahead of time. Mao Tse-tung's manual says, "Fight, Fight. Talk, Talk." When
the fighting goes against them, they will try to win by talking, by politics, by propaganda,
by public opinion. They go to an international discussion not to end the war but to win it.
6. The three most embarrassing things which I can think of now are: 1. a cease-fire; 2. an
end to the bombing of the North; and 3. recognition of the Viet Cong (self-styled National
Liberation Front) in some form. Let me submit my views on each of these issues.
Cease-Fire
7. As things stand now, if we were to accept a cease-fire (without supervision and without
withdrawal of troops), the Government of Viet-Nam would be seriously threatened and
could even fall, and the fighting spirit would go out of the Vietnamese military--beyond
reasonable hope of being pumped up again. The Viet Cong would thus win in one
diplomatic stroke what they had not been able to win by fighting.
8. Moreover, since civilian pacification still lags behind the military program, a premature
cease-fire would confirm Viet Cong control in a large portion of the country, enable them
to terrorize the population in much of the remainder and would do so in an artful way
without seeming to do so.
9. An offer of cease-fire has a superficially attractive appearance and yet at the U.N. an
offer of cease-fire was not generally considered worthy of respect unless it was
accompanied at the same time by an offer by the aggressor to withdraw troops, together
with a practical scheme to supervise the withdrawal.
10. One answer to a cease-fire proposal, therefore, could be a.) a cease-fire must be
accompanied by the aggressor's withdrawal of troops and by machinery to supervise and
verify; and b.) these are obviously things to be discussed at the meeting and should go on
the agenda.
11. But I stress the communist tactic of inscribing as an agenda item the substantive result
which they wish finally to achieve at a conference. We think of an agenda as a list of
things to discuss; they think of it as an opportunity to win the conference before it has
even started.
12. We should thus insist that the first item on the agenda should be machinery to
supervise and to verify whatever agreement is ultimately reached.
13. We should also hold that the GVN has a sovereign right to move anywhere in its
territory and to suppress armed terrorists where it finds them. This is an exercise of the
domestic police power which no sovereign state should be asked to abdicate.
Bombing
14. An end of bombing of the North with no other quid pro quo than the opening of
negotiations would load the dice in favor of the communists and demoralize the GVN. It
would in effect leave the communists free to devastate the South with impunity while we
tie our hands in the North./2/
/2/President Johnson quoted this paragraph in The Vantage Point, p. 234.
15. We might agree to end the bombing of the North for a limited period--say thirty days-if the following conditions are met:
a. A withdrawal of NVN units through international checkpoints to the North.
b. Unimpeded access of the GVN to any part of its territory.
c. A significant reduction of incidents.
d. Cessation of infiltration of men and materiel.
e. If enforcement of all these measures is the first item of any agenda.

16. Your advisers might study the merits of making a new discussion offer in which you
said in effect that on April 8/3/ you offered unconditional discussions and were rebuffed;
that this offer had stood from April 8 to the present time; that it was not, however, an offer
to last through all eternity; and that, therefore, you were revising it along the lines of
paragraph 15. Such an initiative might relieve you of the embarrassment of a communist
cease-fire proposal by making in effect a cease-fire proposal of your own.
/3/Reference is to Johnson's April 7 speech at Johns Hopkins University; see vol. II,
Document 245.
17. Such a public announcement, like all public announcements, should be coordinated in
advance with the GVN.
Recognition of Viet Cong
18. Any form of recognition of the Viet Cong--other than as individual members of a
Hanoi delegation--will lead to a collapse of the GVN. It would be taken in the
countryside--and so represented by the still potent communist underground--as the
beginning of a communist takeover. This would, I believe, lead to a rapid disintegration of
all we have sacrificed so much to create.
19. I would therefore suggest that our attitude on this be that the Viet Cong will not be
recognized, though Hanoi is free to include in its delegation any individual it chooses.
20. I would hate to see you in a position where you had to choose between flying in the
face of overwhelming U.S. public opinion on the one hand or losing everything you have
gained with so much struggle and sacrifice in Viet-Nam on the other.
21. I believe it will be possible to reconcile U.S. and Vietnamese positions with regard to
the holding of discussions with Hanoi, but American opinion must be prepared to give a
little ground inasmuch as the Vietnamese have a very different viewpoint, due to their
being so close to the conflict and so small and weak a nation, which has suffered so much.
Also they take themselves seriously as a sovereign nation--and thus cannot accept a ceasefire for their own troops in their own country in the exercise of their own police power.
With warm and respectful regards,
Faithfully yours,
Cabot L.
189. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President

Johnson/1/
Washington, November 3, 1965.

3470, South Vietnam, Statements and Supporting Papers. Top Secret. Designated as "1st
rough draft." McNamara wrote the following note on the source text: "A copy of this was
sent to the Pres. by courier through Mac's office on 11/7 and discussed with him by me,
Dean, George, and Mac on 11/7. RMcN" According to the President's Daily Diary, the
President's meeting with McNamara, Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy was held at the
LBJ Ranch in Texas on November 11, not November 7. See Document 189 regarding the
meeting. The President was at the LBJ Ranch October 23-November 14, recovering from
surgery. (Johnson Library)
The copy of this memorandum in the Johnson Library has a covering memorandum by
McNaughton, who hand-delivered it to McGeorge Bundy on November 4. McNaughton
informed Bundy that Rusk and Ball were also getting copies and related McNamara's
desire that Bundy not show this memorandum to anyone else without telephoning
McNamara first. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos
(B)) In The Vantage Point (pp. 233-234), Johnson describes this memorandum and recalls
that his "first reaction" to it was "one of deep skepticism."
SUBJECT
Courses of Action in Vietnam
We confront major policy decisions with respect to our course of action in Vietnam. This
memorandum attempts to frame the substance of the choices and to identify some of the
problems we face.
1. US strategy. The February decision to bomb North Vietnam and the July approval of
Phase I deployments make sense only if they are in support of a long-run United States
policy to contain Communist China. China--like Germany in 1917, like Germany in the
West and Japan in the East in the late 30's, and like the USSR in 1947--looms as a major
power threatening to undercut our importance and effectiveness in the world and, more
remotely but more menacingly, to organize all of Asia against us. The long-run US policy
is based upon an instinctive understanding in our country that the peoples and resources of
Asia could be effectively mobilized against us by China or by a Chinese coalition and that
the potential weight of such a coalition could throw us on the defensive and threaten our
security. This understanding of a straightforward security threat is interwoven with
another perception--namely, that we have our view of the way the US should be moving
and of the need for the majority of the rest of the world to be moving in the same direction
if we are to achieve our national objective. We would move toward economic well-being,
toward open societies, and toward cooperation between nations; the role we have inherited
and have chosen for ourselves for the future is to extend our influence and power to
thwart ideologies that are hostile to these aims and to move the world, as best we can, in
the direction we prefer. Our ends cannot be achieved and our leadership role cannot be
played if some powerful and virulent nation--whether Germany, Japan, Russia or China-is allowed to organize their part of the world according to a philosophy contrary to ours.
There are three fronts to a long-run effort to contain China (realizing that the USSR
"contains" China on the north and northwest): (a) the Japan-Korea front; (b) the IndiaPakistan front; and (c) the Southeast Asia front. Decisions to make great investments
today in men, money and national honor in South Vietnam makes sense only in
conjunction with continuing efforts of equivalent effectiveness in the rest of Southeast
Asia and on the other two principal fronts. The trends in Asia are running in both
directions--for as well as against our interests; there is no reason to be unduly pessimistic
about our ability over the next decade or two to fashion alliances and combinations
(involving especially Japan and India) which will keep China from achieving her
objectives until her zeal wanes. The job, however--even if we can shift some
responsibilities to some Asian countries--will continue to require American attention,
money, and, from time to time unfortunately, lives.
Any decision to continue the program of bombing North Vietnam and any decision to
deploy Phase II forces--involving as they do substantial loss of American lives, risks of
further escalation, and greater investment of US prestige--must be predicated on these
premises as to our long-run interests in Asia.
2. Estimate of the situation in South Vietnam. The massive infusions of US ideas, aid and
manpower have frustrated any Communist design to move into their conventional-warfare
"Stage 3," but the guerrilla war continues at a high pace, the economy of South Vietnam is
deteriorating, and there are no convincing indications that the South Vietnamese bodypolitic is reviving.
a. Military. The large US deployments have thwarted the VC monsoon offensive that was
threatening a serious military defeat for the GVN forces at the time of my July
memorandum./2/ These "Phase I" deployments, 160,000 of whom are already in place,
have enabled the GVN forces to begin restoration of their strength, morale and tactical
integrity, which is essential if they are to retain their fighting capability in the months
ahead. The US forces have also substantially secured their own bases and the areas
immediately adjacent to the bases. (see Map I, attached)/3/ US ground combat elements
deployed offensively have moved rapidly--in conjunction with tactical air support and
often following up B-52 strikes--to probe into VC base sanctuaries that had long been
untouched. The US forces have also proved to be an effective quick-reaction reserve for
GVN forces that has turned potential defeat in several battles into VC retreat or at least a
stand-off.
/2/Document 67.
But the pace of the war remains high, with VC last week attacking in regimental strength
in Phu Yen province and in battalion strength in Hau Nghia province and against the
Marine perimeter outside Danang. There are increased casualties on both sides. VC
attacks, terrorism and sabotage show no sign of abating. Desertions from Government
Forces remain high, but recruitment has improved, permitting a gradual increase in force
levels. Defections from the VC are running at 1000 a month and are increasing slowly.
The present assessment is that our Phase I deployments (bringing the US total to about
210,000 to 225,000 men) when completed will achieve the limit of their military potential
between December 1965 and March 1966. As can be seen on Map I, the estimate is that
Phase I forces, working with the Vietnamese, will result in "control" of 40 per cent of the
population and 5-10 per cent of the area; it will keep open 20-25 per cent of the critical
lines of communications; it will permit 10-20 per cent disruption of the VC bases and
military logistics infrastructure, and 5 per cent disruption of the VC political/security
infrastructure. We will then be in a position where a few enclaves, including perhaps

5,500,000 of South Vietnam's 15,000,000 people (of which only some 1,000,000 are in
the Delta) are under US or GVN "control"--and even these will of course be subject to
sporadic VC mortar and suicide satchel-charge attacks of the October 27 kind./4/ Security
conditions within the enclaves will be suitable for reconstruction of political
infrastructure, but it is probable that the enclaves will be too small and the per cent of
population controlled too little to give any hope that such pacification will be rapid or that
it will tend to snowball beyond the enclaves.
/4/Apparent reference to an October 27 Viet Cong attack on a GVN ranger battalion, 10
miles west of Saigon. (Memorandum for the President by the White House Situation
Room briefing officer, November 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (A))
The capabilities and intentions of the VC and of North Vietnam are troublesome
unknowns complicating our estimate of the situation at this time. There are signs that VC
morale is sagging. But, even when confronted by the US force-build-up and by our
program of actions against North Vietnam and with increasing casualties and weapons
losses, the VC have demonstrated an ability to continue the build-up and supply of their
forces in the South, both from in-country sources and by infiltration over improved roads
in Laos, by sea and via Cambodia. The indications are that the VC are not reverting to a
lesser level of insurgency, but are still striving to build up for the transition to
conventional warfare--that they are continuing both to upgrade guerrilla units in the Delta
and to infiltrate additional regular army elements from the North in order to restore the
balance temporarily upset by US deployments.
The VC forces are now estimated at 71,300 VC "main force and logistics," 40,000
political cadre, and 110,000 guerrillas--an increase in the estimate since early last summer
of some 6,000 (9%), 10,000 (33-1/3%) and 18,200 (20%) in the three categories
respectively. In addition, although as of last month there were estimated to be three
regiments of North Vietnamese regular forces in the South, early this month two
additional North Vietnamese regiments were confirmed and three others were estimated
as possible. In total, therefore, the NVN/VC forces are now believed to number about
230,000 men, and there is reason to believe that they will continue to increase.
b. Political. In Saigon, the Ky "government of generals" has survived, but accomplished
little more during the period since last summer. The government, while recognizing many
of its problems and working willingly with the US Mission, still lacks any broad, or even
developing, base of support among the various political factions. No major faction (e.g.,
Buddhists, Catholics) is in open opposition, and all appear to be continuing their "wait and
see" attitude. This lack of support probably will not be important over the short-run, so
long as the generals in power remain united; over the longer term, however, some base of
political support must be developed if the non-Communist elements in SVN are to
become prepared to develop a viable society as security in the countryside is expanded
and after hostilities cease.
In the countryside, the government's political situation is even worse than in Saigon and
other urban centers. The VC have savagely and thoroughly destroyed the political
structure of the rural areas. The potential leaders who could form the nucleus of counterVC efforts in each locale have been killed, intimidated or driven out, leaving the old,
weak and incompetent behind. Even most of the war veterans are afraid to live in the rural
areas and gather in the cities. Absent security (and where there is security, absent willing
and able leadership), rural reconstruction (pacification) continues to make little, if any,
progress. The very difficult problem of getting pacification moving has not been solved.
c. Economic. SVN's economic situation today is grave for two reasons: (1) The
Communist strategy has been to use some of Vietnam's economy to support the VC's own
operations and to withhold the remainder from the Government and from those of the
people who support it. Thus, in large part as a consequence of VC operations, Vietnam
has become a food-import area, commodities cannot move freely within the country (e.g.,
rice from the Delta to Saigon), and the VC are in a position to derive much of their own
needs (e.g., construction material, food, medical supplies) from the GVN. (2) The rapid
and large US/GVN force build-up has introduced a new and strenuous competition for
Vietnam's human and material resources. When added to the VC economic warfare
efforts, the US/GVN build-up has resulted in a growing inflation in the Vietnamese
economy.
3. Objectives in Vietnam. In my July 20 memorandum to you, I stated that in my view a
"favorable outcome" for Vietnam has nine fundamental elements:
(a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.
(b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our
obtaining confirmation of this fact.
(c) US/GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.
(d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral).
(e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.
(f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.
(g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not
regroupees) from South Vietnam.
(h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization.
(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.
I added that a "favorable outcome" could include also arrangements regarding elections,
relations between North and South Vietnam, participation in peace-keeping by
international forces, membership for North and South Vietnam in the UN, and so on. It
was, and is, my belief that the nine fundamental elements can evolve with or without an
express agreement and, except for what might be negotiated incidental to a cease-fire, are
more likely to evolve without an express agreement than with one.
Ambassador Lodge has set down his settlement terms (in Saigon 1377):/5/
/5/Document 176.
(a) The area around Saigon and all of the Delta (55 to 60 per cent of the population of
South Vietnam), the thickly populated northeastern strip along the coast (25 per cent of
the population), and all cities and provincial capitals would be pacified; and all principal
roads would be open to the Vietnamese military day and night. ("Pacified" is defined as
the existence of a state of mind among the people that they have a stake in the government
as shown by the holding of local elections; it also means a proper local police force. A
"pacified" area is economically, socially and politically a part of the Republic of
Vietnam.)
(b) Those areas not pacified would not be safehavens for the VC, but would be contested
by energetic offensive forays to prevent consolidation of a Communist base.
(c) The VC would disarm, and their weapons and explosives would be removed from their
hands. Their main force units would be broken up. Hardcore VC to go to North Vietnam.
Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") rehabilitation would be extended to individual VC who are
suitable, with plans to resettle them.
(d) North Vietnam would stop its infiltration and direction of the war.
(e) The Government of South Vietnam would approve.
Ambassador Lodge added that "this means that we would not be insisting on the complete
elimination of the Viet Cong from all corners of the country although no land or
safehaven would be allotted to them. It would mean that we and the GVN would control
80 to 85 per cent of the population and that the Viet Cong would be limited to the jungle
and mountainous areas where they would go on as bandits, much as their counterparts do
today in Malaya and in Luzon--and where the GVN would have the right to pursue them
and try to destroy them."
The question whether we should be prepared ultimately to settle for a "compromise
outcome"--for something less than the terms indicated above--may have to be faced soon.
The areas where there may be pressure to ease our terms are these:
(a) Safehavens. The degree to which the VC are permitted to hold safehavens tacitly
allotted to them; the extent to which the VC are permitted to tax in "their" areas and to
retain a military organization for "defensive" purposes.
(b) Force withdrawals. The extent to which hardcore VC on the one hand and US forces
on the other must withdraw from South Vietnam.
(c) Role of NLF. The extent to which the National Liberation Front is permitted to play a
role in the political life of the republic--at local, provincial and national level.
Easing of terms in any of these three areas--especially in giving the NLF status in the
Saigon government--runs large risks of putting South Vietnam on the skids toward a
Communist-controlled government, probably not "Titoist" but rather subservient to China.
Furthermore, because of the attitudes of the present Saigon government and because of
the importance of the GVN in any compromise gambit, a "compromise outcome" would
be very difficult to manage. The GVN would probably support the "favorable outcomes"
described above; but the GVN almost certainly would not support any "compromise
outcome"--especially one which appears to "cede" territory or political recognition to the

NLF.
Our tactical concern in moving toward any compromise settlement, therefore, is the high
probability that the Government of South Vietnam will shake apart in the process. That is,
so far as tactics are concerned, we seem to have the problem that if we lower our sights to
a "compromise outcome," we lose the support of the GVN, making the compromise
impossible. (It follows that an essential part of any scenario to compromise would be the
creation of a Saigon government not hostile to the compromise course.)
On the substantive side of the compromise issue: It should be noted that the decisions that
have already been taken this year, and the ones proposed here, are consistent with the
strategy stated in paragraph 1 and with a striving for a "favorable outcome," and are
probably inconsistent with any lesser objectives or other strategy. Specifically, we may
already have passed the "Y" in the road: Our course of action has been and is increasingly
becoming inconsistent with any design to settle, through negotiations or otherwise, for a
compromise solution--especially one involving Communists in the Saigon government
and the consequent high risk of quick Communist take-over.
4. Tools available. We have four tools available to us in working toward a solution to the
problem in South Vietnam: (a) Military power in South Vietnam, Laos and in the adjacent
waters; (b) military interdiction in and pressure on North Vietnam; (c) non-military effort
in South Vietnam; and (d) efforts to negotiate.
5. Military variables. The military variables are (a) a Pause, (b) Rolling Thunder, and (c)
Phase II deployments:
a. Pause. An interruption in the program of bombing North Vietnam. The Pause would
stand down all strikes and armed reconnaissance in North Vietnam for approximately four
weeks unless its futility became apparent earlier. It would not involve stoppage of other
reconnaissance or intelligence operations in North Vietnam or of any operations
elsewhere. Particularly, ground and air operations in South Vietnam would continue. The
Pause would be publicly acknowledged, but a serious effort would be made to avoid
advertising it as an ultimatum to the DRV. Third countries would be encouraged to help
produce meaningful negotiations and substantial reductions in DRV/VC activity. With
respect to termination of the Pause, our state of mind could be (1) "hard-line" or (2) "softline":
(1) "Hard-line" Pause. Under a "hard-line" Pause, we would be firmly resolved to resume
bombing unless the Communists were clearly moving toward what is described above as a
"favorable outcome." Special care would be taken to avoid being trapped in a status-quo
cease-fire or in negotiations which, though unaccompanied by real concessions by the
VC, made it politically costly for us to terminate the Pause.
(2) "Soft-line" Pause. Under a "soft-line" Pause, we would be willing to feel our way with
respect to termination of the Pause, with less insistence on concrete concessions by the
Communists. (This kind of Pause makes sense only if we are working toward a possible
"compromise outcome.")
b. Rolling Thunder. The program of bombing North Vietnam (1) could be intensified
abruptly by a sharp, heavy blow, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or (2)
could continue to evolve at the present pace (the possibility of reducing the program is
omitted):
(1) JCS "sharp blow." The JCS would initiate immediately, and carry out in a few days, a
program of air strikes against
--Phuc Yen, Hanoi/Gia Lam, Hanoi/Bac Mai, Haiphong/Cat Bi, and Haiphong/Kien An
airfields, including the aircraft thereon (Phuc Yen to be struck by B-52s).
--Rail, highway and waterway routes and traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong and
between Hanoi-Haiphong and South China.
--POL storage facilities at Haiphong (or four thermal power plants generating
approximately 50 per cent of North Vietnam's thermal power).
--SAM installations and other AA defenses which pose a threat to the above air
operations.
The JCS would permit normal armed reconnaissance in all of North Vietnam, and would
order follow-on strikes as necessary to keep the targets destroyed. They would conduct
naval surface force operations against targets near the coast and against North Vietnamese
shipping at sea. They would mine the harbors. Every effort would be made to minimize
destruction of non-military installations; and the civilian populations, as such, would not
be targeted.
(2) Present evolving RT. At the present time, we are carrying out 600 armed
reconnaissance sorties a week in the "three quadrants" and striking 2 fixed LOC targets a
week in the "northeast quadrant" (but not against targets in the "China strip," the "Hanoi
circle," or the "Haiphong circle"). Natural evolution of the program over a five-month
period would maintain activity in the three quadrants at the present level, and would
evolve in the "northeast quadrant" as follows:
--1st month. Include Hanoi-Haiphong lines-of-communications targets (outside the Hanoi
and Haiphong circles), with 2 fixed LOC targets in the quadrant each week.
--2nd and 3rd months. No fixed targets in the quadrant, but "controlled armed
reconnaissance" of selected routes at selected times and at the rate of 100 sorties a week.
--4th month. EXTEND "controlled armed reconnaissance" to LOCs within the Hanoi and
Haiphong circles and ADD strikes on 3 key POL targets a month.
--5th month. In the first two weeks, ADD mining of Haiphong harbor; thereafter, change
the armed reconnaissance in the northeast quadrant to the kind carried out in the other
three quadrants and with no geographical limit except the strip next to China. (Left
unstruck would be population targets, power plants, and locks and dams.)
c. Phase II Deployments. US force deployments (1) could stop at the Phase I 225,000+/or (2) could continue by deployment of a Phase II 125,000+/-.
(1) Stop at Phase I. Limit US forces to Phase I deployments. Added expenditures

attributable to Phase I, through FY 1967, are estimated to be $13 billion.
(2) Deploy Phase II forces. Deploy 28 additional combat battalions and 4 additional
tactical air squadrons and associated support forces (125,000 additional men), bringing the
totals to 62 US combat battalions (plus 10 third-country battalions) and 26 US tactical air
squadrons, or approximately 350,000 Americans, in South Vietnam. These deployments
would be essentially completed by the end of 1966. They could be accomplished without
calling up the Reserves or extending tours of duty, but, in that case, they would lead to
further reductions in the strength of our strategic reserve to meet contingencies elsewhere.
(An alternative would be to call up Reserves--not only replenishing the strategic reserves,
but also giving a clear demonstration of US power and purposes.) Expenditures
attributable to Phase II for its first 18 months are estimated very roughly to total $3
billion.
It is estimated--as can be seen on Map II/6/--that, by the time Phase II forces are making
their full impact in the Spring of 1967, the US/GVN would have "control" of 65 per cent
of the population and 20-30 per cent of the land; 60-65 per cent of the critical lines of
communications would be kept open; 40-50 per cent of the VC bases and military
logistical infrastructure would be subject to disruption; and 30 per cent of the VC
political/security infrastructure would be disrupted.
It should be noted that the MACV-proposed Phase II does not allocate any forces to the
Delta. To handle the Delta properly, Phase II would have to be augmented by one or two
additional divisions--30-60,000 additional men--bringing the Phase II total to 155,000 to
185,000 men.
6. Illustrative scenarios. Here are three illustrative courses of action for the future. It is
my recommendation that we follow Course C.
Course A: "Soft-line" Pause, then feel way re RT and force levels toward a "compromise
outcome." This is a compromise course, aimed at reduced objectives described in
paragraph 3 above. It would be extremely difficult to gain public acceptance of this
course, in view of the size of the US investment already on the line; and it is very doubtful
that a scenario for this course can now be written that would support the strategy in
paragraph 1. The scenario probably would end up in disintegration in Vietnam, in political
humiliation for the US, and in impaired US political effectiveness on the world scene. It
also could lead to more costly confrontations with the Chinese later on.
Course B: No Pause, with evolving RT, with no Phase II. This is a continuation of the
present evolving course of action.
This course of action can be supported in this way: (1) It will be January before the weight
of our full Phase I effort really comes into play. By then we might see at least a significant
adverse morale trend in the VC that would indicate we were getting somewhere. (2) It
may be useful to give ourselves time to digest the impact of 225,000 men in terms of their
effect on the Vietnamese psychology and economy. This is a factor that some reports,
notably a recent cable from Saigon on inflationary and labor division problems,/7/ suggest
may be becoming very serious, even to the point of being a limiting factor on our basic
effectiveness in appealing to the people. (3) It would give the GVN additional time,
hopefully without serious frictions with us, to get on with its part of the job and to build
up a GVN contribution that would not be dwarfed by the US role, a present tendency in
Vietnam.
/7/Not found.
On the drawback side are two factors: (1) Deferring additional US deployments-particularly in the face of continuing increases in VC strength--raises grave problems in
our domestic situation. This is not solely a question of the war dragging on--which it can
be argued it would be likely to do even with Phase II deployments--but rather, a question
of not having clearly done all on the ground in Vietnam that appears wise. It would be still
more serious, of course, if the rate of progress slowed down, as is likely to be the case. (2)
The second drawback is that, by delaying the added deployments, we shall lose
momentum in Vietnam--a momentum displaying a determination and confidence that is
crucial to the psychology of the confrontation if we are to emerge with an acceptable
solution. That is, the product of this course of action is virtually certain to be a stalemate
by March 1966 under the unsatisfactory conditions described in paragraph 2 above.
Course C: "Hard-line" Pause, then evolving RT with Phase II. This course involves all
three controversial ingredients--(a) a Pause, (b) an evolving Rolling Thunder, and (c)
Phase II deployments.
a. Pause. The arguments for the Pause are four: (1) It would offer the DRV and VC a
chance to move toward a solution if they should be so inclined--and we continue to
receive hints that such may be the state of their minds. (2) It would demonstrate to
domestic and international critics that our efforts to settle the war are genuine. (3) It
would probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation after we had resumed the
bombing, at least in so far as the Soviets were concerned. And (4) it would set the stage
for another Pause, perhaps in late 1966, which might produce a settlement.
Arguments against the Pause are not so much that the North Vietnamese might profit from
the respite to repair the damage or to increase infiltration. The arguments are related to
Saigon, Hanoi and US hard-liner reactions: (1) In Saigon, bringing the GVN aboard
would be difficult just in itself, and it could adversely affect GVN solidity. Any major
falling out between the GVN and the US, or any overturn in the GVN political structure,
could at this stage set us back enormously. (2) In Hanoi, a Pause might at least confuse
our message and justify their tendency to think that, despite all our actions, we are really
looking for an easy way out. We could offset this to some degree at the time by the kind
of message we get through to them and by our continued actions then and later in the
South, but there would still be some chance that the hard-liners in Hanoi would read it the
other way notwithstanding. In other words, it could conceivably be a step away from
getting Hanoi to seek a peaceful solution. (3) In the US, there would be rumbling among
the harder-action school of critics. This might be kept under control during the Pause, but
it could also mean that the pressures would increase thereafter to hit the DRV harder.
b. Rolling Thunder. Intensification of the Rolling Thunder program, following the Pause,
on an "evolving" (not "sharp blow") basis as described in paragraph 5(b)(2) above, is
designed to accomplish the three fundamentals underlying the bombing program. Those
are:
--To promote a settlement. The program was designed (1) to influence the DRV to
negotiate (explicitly or otherwise), and (2) to provide us with a bargaining counter within
negotiations.
--To interdict infiltration. The program was calculated to reduce the flow of men and
supplies from the North to the South--at the least, to put a ceiling on the size of war that
the enemy could wage in the South.
--To demonstrate US commitment. The program was intended to demonstrate to South
Vietnam, North Vietnam and the world the US commitment to see this thing through.
While the gradual intensification runs some risk of "flashing" China or the USSR into
some form of escalation, the risks of this are not great, especially after a Pause, and should
be taken in order to keep pressure on the North to stop the aggression in the South.
c. Phase II deployments. The predicted results of Phase II deployments are discussed in
paragraph 5(c)(2) above.
Note: There are two variants of Course C: (1) Delete the Pause, and carry out the evolving
Rolling Thunder at the same time as (in parallel with) an early Phase II; (2) Postpone
Phase II, putting Phase II after (in tandem with) a several-month's evolution of Rolling
Thunder.
7. South Vietnamese reaction to Course C. The GVN will enthusiastically support the
evolving Rolling Thunder portion of Course C; the people of South Vietnam, so long as
we avoid population targets per se, will likewise support the program. Ambassador Lodge
has advised that the GVN will react well to our Phase II deployments, performing better
as a consequence (he states that the South Vietnamese, knowing our good record in the
Philippines, Korea and elsewhere, are more afraid of our leaving than of our becoming
entrenched as a "colonial" power);/8/ I agree with that assessment, provided we take
appropriate action especially on the economic side to offset the shortages and inflation
caused by the added US and GVN (and VC) efforts. The GVN, as indicated in the
discussion of Course C in paragraph 6 above, may misconstrue the Pause--thinking that
we are on Course A, looking for an easy way out; but this fear we should be able to
handle. Absent Course C--or a course similar to it--we are very likely to find ourselves in
a stalemate by Spring of next year. The odds are less than even that South Vietnam could
hang on for long in that condition; centrifugal forces in the government and society, on
which the VC have always counted to make up for their inferiority in numbers, would be
likely to take over causing an eventual collapse and disintegration of the nation we have
been supporting. While a similar stalemate could follow even Course C, it is considerably
less likely and would certainly come later if it happened. The people of South Vietnam
will, I believe, support our moves even though our numbers and functions by that time
will be approaching those of an occupation force.
8. Communist reactions to Course C. The Soviets would probably seize upon the Pause as
an occasion both to persuade the DRV to negotiate (and perhaps to dampen activities in
the South) and to maneuver us into a position so that we could not resume the bombing of
the North. With respect to the other aspects of Course C, the USSR can be expected only
to throw propaganda barbs and to continue material assistance to North Vietnam.
The Chinese have already sent non-combat personnel into North Vietnam to do
construction and repair work. This could be expected to continue at an even higher scale.
But they would probably not send regular combat forces or aircraft into the war unless we
invaded North Vietnam or struck China. As in the case of the USSR, China might react
against our ships at sea if she lost a ship to a mine at Haiphong.
The DRV, like the Soviets, would try during the Pause to maneuver us into a position so
that we could not resume the bombing. Later on, under the pressure of the bombing and
blockade by us (and fearing the influx of men and influence from China) would probably,
over time, look more favorably on a settlement in South Vietnam. At the same time, the
DRV can be expected to send into Laos and South Vietnam up to several divisions of
regular forces to help the VC. As stated in paragraph 2 above, there are indications that
this is already under way. They could, by such deployments, match our deployments on a
1-for-3 or 1-for-4 basis, thus effectively canceling the likelihood that our Phase I and
Phase II forces will be able to provide security to areas beyond the enclaves shown on the
attached maps. If the DRV does this, we could find ourselves in a position where the
pressures were great to invade or to bomb the cities in the North--actions which are likely
to lead to open war with China if not with the Soviet Union.
The VC can be expected to continue their "Phase II" sabotage, murder and guerrilla
activities, while continuing to strive to build up a conventional military capability. They
will depend more and more on regular PAVN forces; they will draw harder on the men
and material in the areas they control, including the Delta; and they can be expected to try
to bring the economy of South Vietnam to a grinding halt. The question, of course, is
whether the pressure on the North and the added forces in the South can frustrate these
VC designs.
9. Other actions in South Vietnam. The military moves recommended in this
memorandum are essential to success in Vietnam, but they are not sufficient. The heart of
South Vietnam will begin to beat and the body to breathe only when GVN militia, police,
intelligence and administrative personnel have been introduced in sufficient strength to
saturate the area, destroy the VC infrastructure and reestablish the agencies of
Government. We are repeatedly told that the GVN is "just now starting" to revitalize this
program. We must work hard with the government in Saigon, we must bolster the
economy (inflation must be brought under control promptly and boldly), we must press on
with our psychological warfare campaign, and we should be prepared to take a more
active role in administration of the provinces and districts--even though it will have some
attributes of a "military occupation." Ambassador Lodge is driving hard in these most
difficult areas.
10. Actions in Laos. The pattern of infiltration and VC force augmentation strongly
implies that Laos is being heavily used both as a channel and as a staging base for
operations in South Vietnam. We may soon have to expand our air actions in Laos and to
initiate large-scale ground operations there. Furthermore, as a part of any Phase III, if the
tide of the war has not begun to turn, the time may come to attempt to seal off South
Vietnam by land and sea. Contingency plans should therefore be available for the creation
of a 175-mile-long anti-infiltration "barrier" to run near the 17th Parallel from the sea to
Thailand. Any such barrier would of course have to be complemented by effective
measures countering infiltration by sea and from Cambodia. To minimize political costs,
Laotian FAR and Thai forces should probably be used at the west end, and Vietnamese
and US forces at the east end of the barrier; and Souvanna's approval should of course be
obtained if possible. (In the long term, taking into account the unstable nature of any
likely settlement in Vietnam, such a barrier, perhaps manned ultimately by an
international force, seems to be an essential.)
11. Political moves. Whatever military actions are taken, the US should continue to keep
our lines of communication open with friends and enemies alike and should continue to
keep our objectives well understood. Specifically, (a) we should continue the dialogue
with Moscow, and should keep our ears open for signals from Hanoi or the VC, and (b)
we should keep our allies and neutrals informed--at best, bestirring them to help toward a
solution and, at worst, keeping their opposition within manageable proportions.
12. Appraisal. In view of the stagnation, and therefore the beginnings of disintegration,
that is otherwise likely to occur in South Vietnam in early to mid-1966, we seem to have
only two major courses open to us. One is to start immediately and carefully to plot a
course toward cutting our losses (as listed under Course A in paragraph 6 above); the
other is to increase our investment (via Rolling Thunder, Phase II, or both). The former
course, as I indicated earlier, is inconsistent both with our strategy for Asia (see paragraph
1) and with our objectives in Vietnam (see paragraph 3). I therefore have recommended
that we increase our investment in an effort to make further progress in Vietnam.
Further progress inside Vietnam, beyond that predicted for Spring 1966 in paragraph 2
above, will have to be based on one or more of the following developments:
--Snowballing support by the people of South Vietnam.
--Increases in, and better, South Vietnamese forces.
--Additional US or Free World forces.
Popular support can be expected to snowball only after there is "hard" security; such
security for most of South Vietnam is beyond the immediate horizons. GVN force
increases and improvements are under way; but they will be slow and insufficient. We are
left therefore with the need to deploy additional US or Free World forces.
An acceptable and early end to the war, however, turns not only on proving that the VC
cannot win in the South. It turns also on continuing pressure on the North. Both elements
are required.
The situation therefore clearly requires the Phase II deployments and probably requires
continued evolution of the Rolling Thunder program. The best timing of these actions is
debatable--whether they should proceed together or one before the other, and whether
action should be postponed by way of a Pause.
Taking into account all considerations--likelihood of success, risk of escalation, South
Vietnamese reaction, domestic support, etc.--I favor the tandem, one-after-the-other
scenario: Pause, then evolving RT, and then Phase II.

I favor this sequence because I believe that there is a finite chance that a Pause will lead to
a reduction in DRV infiltration and in VC activity (and possibly to profitable
negotiations), and because I believe that a Pause is a prerequisite to US public and
international acceptance of the stern actions implicit in the evolving Rolling Thunder and
Phase II. I favor "evolution" of Rolling Thunder before Phase II deployments because,
here too, I believe that there is a finite chance that added pressure on the North, without
Phase II deployments, may be enough to bring the DRV/VC to terms; further, US public
acceptance of Phase II deployments will be greater if such a Rolling Thunder program has
been given a fair run first.
It must be remembered, however, that none of these actions assures success. There is a
small but meaningful risk that the course I have recommended--especially the harbormining aspect of Rolling Thunder--will lead the Chinese or Russians to escalate the war.
US killed-in-action can be expected to increase to 500-800 a month. And the odds are
even that the DRV/VC will hang on doggedly, effectively matching us man-for-man
(taking into account the lop-sided guerrilla war ratio advantage), while our efforts may not
push the South Vietnamese over the crest of the hill, so that the snowball begins to roll
our way. That is, the odds are even that, despite our efforts, we will be faced in early 1967
with stagnation at a higher level and with a need to decide whether to deploy Phase III
forces, probably in Laos as well as in South Vietnam. And even if my recommended
course of action is successful in moving Vietnam toward a "favorable outcome," it will be
difficult to disengage our forces. Any negotiated agreement would, as was the case in
Laos, be little better than a reflection of the power situation on the ground. Unless an
international force of some kind can be substituted, large numbers of US forces may be
required to stay in Vietnam for some time.
My overall evaluation is that the best chance of achieving our objectives, and of avoiding
a costly national political defeat, lies in the combination of political, economic and
military steps described in this memorandum. If carried out vigorously, they stand the best
chance of achieving an acceptable resolution of the problem within a reasonable time.

Department of State
Washington, DC
190. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and

Washington, November 7, 1965, 12:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No
classification marking. Transcribed by Mildred Asbjornson. A handwritten note on the
source text reads: "Amb Johnson was present for the call."
TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. MAC GEORGE BUNDY
Sec asked if he had seen Saigon's Nodis 1605/2/ and about the request to do some
probing. Mr. Bundy said it seemed to him his senior was right and he was more hopeful
than he was. Sec asked if he had seen the ticker about the Commissar of the North
Vietnamese battalion turning himself in--UPI 820. Bundy said he thought the Sec was
right on the nose on the basic structure yesterday./3/ Bundy said he came out where the
Sec did. It is not a time to make great changes. Sec said he had lived through the Berlin
Blockade, Korea and you played for breaks. He was confident the breaks would come.
Bundy said he was all for that. Sec asked about getting this to the ranch. Bundy said he
was worried about the sensitivity of it and would pouch it. Sec said to mark it Eyes Only
President. Bundy will get it on first plane.
/2/For the text as sent to the President, see Document 191.
/3/Rusk met with McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Vance at 2:58 p.m. on November 6.
They were joined at 3 p.m. by Ball and then U. Alexis Johnson, and the meeting lasted
until at least 4:25 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) For a general account
of these discussions, see Document 192.
Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis. The President was at the LBJ Ranch.
CAP 65666. Dean Rusk has asked me to send you at once an extremely interesting cable
from Lodge and the answer which we have sent to him. Lodge's cable reports a possible
feeler from the National Liberation Front that might look toward an end of fighting by
them. Rusk's answer authorizes a very cautious probe of this feeler. None of us knows
how much substance there is in this, but it is barely possible that it represents the
beginning of a major change in our favor.
Control: 5676.
Received: November 7, 1965, 2:45 a.m.
From: Saigon.
Action: SecState priority 1605./2/
/2/The Department of State copy of telegram 1605 is in Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S.
Date: November 7
Top Secret November 07.
Nodis. Eyes only for Bundy.
The Secretary of the Apostolic Delegation called the Political Section to arrange an
appointment for Archbishop Palmas to see me. The date was set for Monday afternoon./3/
/3/November 8.
Saturday afternoon I heard rumors of dissatisfaction among some of the Vietnamese
Catholic clergy and decided to see Palmas sooner and called at his residence Sunday
morning.
He wished me to know the following:
A "former Vietnamese Cabinet Minister" who, he said, is well known to me, who is
reputable and intelligent, and whose name Palmas did not wish to divulge, had called a
week ago to say that a "duly accredited" representative of the "National Liberation Front"
who had "proper letters of credentials" wished to talk with me. Under questioning from
Palmas the former Cabinet Minister said that the purpose of this was to approach me "on
the basis of Vietnamese nationalism." When Palmas asked why they did not wish to speak
to the Government of Vietnam, the answer was that they did not trust the Government of
Vietnam and that they thought that it was composed entirely of military men who would
not perceive political factors. The aim in talking to me would be as Vietnamese
nationalists who had achieved independence from the Communist domination of Hanoi.
In short, the visit would reflect a desire of the nationalist element in the "National
Liberation Front" who apparently were now independent of Hanoi to cease their military
activities in the south.
Palmas said that obviously if this were what it appeared to be on its face it was a
capitulation and was of greatest significance. On the other hand, he was extremely
skeptical about it and thought it probably would amount to nothing.

Palmas called on Tran Van Do two days ago and, as he said, out of curiosity, asked Do
what his reaction would be if someone representing the nationalist element in the socalled "National Liberation Front" were to propose an end of the war. Do's answer was
that such a thing was inconceivable and that the Viet Cong was completely under the
domination of Hanoi.
My only answer was that I would have to report this to the US Government and await
instructions.
Comment: I obviously agree with Palmas that if this were what it appears to be on the
surface or in fact a capitulation it would be of the greatest possible significance. But I also
share his skepticism. As far as my talking with this individual is concerned, I foresee
considerable difficulty due to the fact that I am under constant observation twenty-four
hours a day. For one thing the Government of Vietnam follows me around with four men
in a jeep wherever I go. In addition I am sure the Viet Cong observe me too. If therefore
such an individual were to come to my house or to come to the Chancery it would surely
be observed.
I asked Palmas what he meant by "duly accredited" and having "a letter of credentials". I
wanted to know who had signed the letter but he said that he did not know, that those
were the phrases which his Vietnamese informant had given him.
It seems to me highly probable that they would themselves use a relatively junior officer
for an initial feeler (hence the need for credentials) while hoping that we would respond at
my level. Anything involving me, however, would of course entail severe risks and
dangers for us which would require careful study.
Therefore, in my judgment, we should first insist, through Palmas, on seeing copy of letter
and if satisfied on that point we could consider arranging meeting without me at relatively
junior level purely for "size-up" purposes. At that point, we would be in a better position
to assess the validity and usefulness of this feeler, without having exposed ourselves in the
meantime. Obviously there could be many things which such people would say to no one
but me.
I am aware that we could be entering a period of such feelers and caution and wariness are
needed though no opportunity should be over-looked. Lodge.
Top Secret./4/
/4/This is telegram 1257 to Saigon, November 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S)
AmEmbassy Saigon. Priority; Nodis.
Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Embtel 1605.
1. Agree with you that reported approach could be of utmost significance. Whether or not
it could mean capitulation--of which we, like you, are highly skeptical--it might at least
mean opening wedge in reaching non-Communist nationalistic elements of NLF. Contacts

could provide real indication of how significant such elements are and, by careful
handling, we might induce some degree of controversy and split within NLF-Hanoi
relations. Even if only result is defection of one or more key individuals, this could be of
immense psychological significance.
2. We therefore concur wholly in your proposed course of action, asking to see copy of
letter and thereafter, depending on contents, arranging meeting at relatively junior level
for "size-up" purposes. You should proceed on this basis. While we leave this to your
judgment, are inclined to think officer should not be from Lansdale group or identifiably
from CAS.
3. Danger obviously exists that approach is on "agent provocateur" basis designed to trap
us into dealings with NLF that could be publicized as recognition by US or, perhaps more
likely, leaked in GVN circles to drive wedge between US and GVN. This danger is far
outweighed by constructive possibilities.
Please keep us informed Nodis.
Washington, November 8, 1965, 11:42 a.m.
Bundy, Vol XV. Top Secret. President Johnson was at the LBJ Ranch. There is an
indication on the source text that the President saw the telegram.
CAP 65668. 1. After intensive discussions over the weekend, Rusk, McNamara and I
continue to believe that it is highly important for us to meet with you before Rusk goes to
Latin America on Friday./2/
/2/November 14. Rusk attended the Second Special Inter-American Conference in Rio de
Janeiro November 17-30.
2. The overriding subject for discussion is Vietnam. We have at hand firm military
recommendations for further deployment of more than 100,000 additional men in 1966,
and heavy pressures also for strongly intensified attacks on North Vietnam. The tendency
here is to accept the probable necessity of additional troop deployment and to defer
decisions on bombing targets for the present. But we are divided on a number of major
tactical issues. The most urgent of these is whether a substantial pause in the bombing
should precede additional deployment decisions. McNamara tends to favor a pause. Rusk
and I tend to be opposed until we get some signal from someone that a pause would have
results in matching action by Hanoi.
3. Evidence of increasing North Vietnamese infiltration continues to come in, and at the
same time there is little evidence that Hanoi is ready to negotiate--though there may well
be heavy strains on "Liberation Front" in South Vietnam. We will gradually have to make
a choice between the contrasting diplomatic postures recommended by Goldberg and

Lodge. Goldberg would continue to emphasize need for negotiations. Lodge would softpedal this topic as essentially irrelevant in the light of continuing Hanoi intransigence.
4. A still deeper question upon which McNamara has focussed attention in recent
discussions is the question of our underlying purpose in Vietnam. Are we seeking a
negotiated solution after which the superior political skill of the Communists would
eventually produce a Commie takeover? Or are we determined to do all that is necessary
to establish and sustain a genuinely non-Communist South Vietnam? All three of us
incline to the latter position, but it is clear that its costs continue to grow, and it is still
more clear that only the President can decide it.
5. A substantial staff paper is going into second draft today. It deals with these topics in
detail and presents the choices as we now see them. We hope it may lay a basis for an
effective discussion with you.
6. Secondary topics are: European nuclear policy, U.S. policy at the Rio conference,
progress of the review of the aid program, and tactics with Shastri and Ayub. It does not
now appear that any of these will require major decisions this week, but in all of them
work goes forward, and there is no substitute for a clear sense of your own concerns, with
guidance both on the positions you want taken and the questions to which you want
answers.
7. I therefore recommend that a meeting be set up for either Wednesday or Thursday of
this week. Thursday would be a little better at this end, but either day is entirely workable,
depending on your convenience.

at 8:07 a.m.
1623. Eyes only for Bundy. I called on Archbishop Palmas and said that nothing could be
said or done as far as I was concerned unless I could see the so called "letter of
credentials".
Archbishop Palmas said, "Then you would be willing to receive somebody who would
bring you the letter".
I said that I did not think I should commit myself to see some junior person not of the
equivalent rank to me and that the letter should probably be delivered to someone I would
indicate. Archbishop Palmas thought this was reasonable.
He then asked me if I would receive the former Vietnamese Cabinet Minister/2/ referred
to in my 1605/3/ and that he hoped that I would talk to him.
/2/In telegram 1282 to Saigon, November 10, the Department postulated that the "former
Cabinet Minister" might be Le Van Hoach. His Cao Dai affiliation made him a likely
candidate as a possible intermediary, but he had a "fairly checkered past." (Ibid.)
/3/Text in Document 191.
I said, "He is not the Viet Cong representative, is he?"
Archbishop Palmas explained, with a laugh, that he certainly was not.
He agreed to convey the message about my seeing the letter and said he would get in
touch with me to give me the result.
We then had a more general discussion in which he agreed with me that unless there was
sincerity in this proposition there was no point in wasting time on it. He and I agreed that
it might be skullduggery designed to get me in wrong with General Ky. Archbishop
Palmas said it had long been evident to him that when I was appointed Ambassador many
Vietnamese thought that the Viet Cong would take note of my experience at the United
Nations and my interminable negotiations with Communists and might think that my
presence here might give a way out.
Lodge
194. Memorandum for President Johnson/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII,
Memos (A). Top Secret. On a covering index listing the nine sections of this
memorandum, a handwritten note reads as follows: "The Secretary (from Ambassador
Johnson)." A handwritten note by McNaughton on the Department of Defense copy
indicates that U. Alexis Johnson was the author of the memorandum. (United StatesVietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 6, Part IV, C, 7 (a), footnote 31)
Rusk and McGeorge Bundy discussed this memorandum on the telephone on November 9
at 6:07 p.m. Rusk asked Bundy if he had any reaction to the memorandum; Bundy replied
there was none from McNamara and he had not read it yet. Rusk said that McNaughton
and Vance "had mild reactions" to it and Rusk himself thought it "pretty
good." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
SUBJECT
Courses of Action in Viet-Nam
We face major policy decisions with respect to Viet-Nam. This memorandum attempts to
frame the substance of the choices and to recommend a course of action.
I. Underlying Strategy.
We are helping the South Vietnamese as part of our underlying strategy of seeking to
prevent the extension of Communist power beyond the outer limits of aggression reached
by the overrunning of China in 1949-50. This strategy is based on the conviction that the
extension of Communist power by force beyond these limits could so alter the power
balance as to create unacceptable risks for the United States and the rest of the Free
World.
In pursuance of this strategy we have consistently opposed all aggressive actions by-(a) the Soviet Union (Berlin, the Cuban Missile Crisis);
(b) Communist China (Formosa, India); and
(c) smaller Communist regimes supported by both the Soviet Union and Communist
China (Korea, South Viet-Nam).
We have made few exceptions to this strategy:
(a) We did not intervene militarily to support French efforts to deny the whole of
Indochina to the Communists in 1954.
But we did (in the SEATO Treaty and subsequently) commit ourselves to assist the
Government of South Viet-Nam to prevent Communist aggression beyond the 17th
Parallel.
(b) We have not yet put ground combat troops into Laos (although we have delivered
certain air strikes) because President Kennedy sought a political settlement which has not
yet succeeded because of non-compliance by Hanoi.
The decision you now face is whether to invest substantially more men and money in
South Viet-Nam and to assume the increased risks of a higher level of action against
North Viet-Nam. This decision must be made in relation to our over-all strategy, our past
commitments and the effect of the decision on our relations both with our friends and
opponents.
This decision should be approached in light of the following considerations:
A. Such a decision must be consistent with our larger strategy.
It is justified only if the United States is determined to continue that strategy (pending
limited settlements, as the major Communist power centers become sufficiently benign
and tractable). This means:
(1) That we will continue to play an active role in Western Europe and maintain the
NATO defenses;
(2) That we will continue building the strength, and encouraging the anti-Communist will,
of the countries on the southern and western frontiers of China.
(a) Japan-Formosa-Korea;
(b) India-Pakistan;
(c) Southeast Asia.
B. The decision must be made in relation to all that has gone before.
We have made commitments to South Viet-Nam. We have taken losses of men and
money. We have accepted substantial political costs. To quit now would mean a major
loss of prestige and would undermine the credibility of our commitments elsewhere in the
world.
C. In deciding our actions in Viet-Nam we should--so far as possible--avoid those acts
that exacerbate relations with countries friendly to the United States.
D. We should also--to the greatest extent possible--avoid actions that might enlarge the
war by involving either China or the Soviet Union in more active intervention.
In planning our air offensive against North Viet-Nam, we should, therefore, be quite clear
as to the possible effects of particular types of attack. We should avoid actions likely to
provoke Chinese reactions, since it is explicitly not our purpose to seek to create a pretext
for the destruction of Chinese war-making power. We should instead concentrate on those
actions designed:
(1) To impede the supply of men and equipment to South Viet-Nam; and
(2) To persuade Hanoi of the need to settle the South Vietnamese conflict on a basis more
advantageous to South Viet-Nam than a mere ratification of the situation on the ground.
II. Estimate of the situation in South Viet-Nam.
The massive infusions of United States ideas, aid and manpower have frustrated any
Communist design to move into their conventional-warfare "Stage III," but the guerrilla
war continues at a high pace, inflation in South Viet-Nam is becoming increasingly
serious, and the internal political situation remains fragile.
a. Military. The large United States deployments have thwarted the Viet Cong monsoon
offensive designed to impose a major defeat on the Government forces. The "Phase I"
deployments, 160,000 of whom are already in place, have enabled the government forces
to begin restoration of their strength, morale and tactical integrity, which is essential if
they are to retain their fighting capability in the months ahead. The United States forces
have also substantially secured their own bases and the areas immediately adjacent to the
bases (see Map 1, attached)./2/ United States ground combat elements deployed
offensively have moved rapidly--in conjunction with tactical air support and often
following up B-52 strikes--to probe into Viet Cong base sanctuaries that had long been
untouched. The United States forces have also proved to be an effective quick-reaction
reserve for Government forces and have turned potential defeat in several battles into Viet
Cong retreat or at least a stand-off.
/2/Not found.
But the pace of the war remains high, with the Viet Cong at the end of October attacking
in regimental strength in Phu Yen province and in battalion strength in Hau Nghia
province and against the Marine perimeter outside Danang. There are increased casualties
on both sides. Viet Cong attacks, terrorism and sabotage show no sign of abating.
Desertions from Government forces remain high, but recruitment has improved,
permitting a gradual increase in force levels. On the other side, defections from the Viet
Cong are running at 1,000 a month and are increasing slowly.
The present assessment is that our Phase I deployments (bringing the United States total
to about 210,000 to 225,000 men) when completed will achieve the limit of its military
potential between December 1965 and March 1966. Assuming, as we in prudence must,
that the Viet Cong are able to maintain the strength and morale of their forces, the military
estimate illustrated by Map 1 is that Phase I forces, working with the South Vietnamese,
will result in "control" of 40 percent of the population and 5-10 percent of the area; these
forces will keep open 20-25 percent of the critical lines of communication; these forces
will permit 10-20 percent disruption of the Viet Cong's political/security infrastructure.
We will then be in a position where a few enclaves, including perhaps 5,500,000 of South
Viet-Nam's 15,000,000 people (of which only some 1,000,000 are in the Delta) are under
United States or Government "control"--and even these will, of course, be subject to
sporadic Viet Cong mortar and suicide satchel-charge attacks of the October 27 kind./3/
Security conditions within the enclaves will be suitable for reconstruction of political
infrastructure, but it is probable that the enclaves will be too small and the percent of
population controlled too little to give any hope that such pacification will be rapid or that
it will tend to snowball beyond the enclaves.
The capabilities and intentions of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese are
unknowns complicating our estimate of the situation at this time. There are signs that Viet
Cong morale is sagging. But, even when confronted by the United States force build-up
and by our program of actions against North Viet-Nam--and with increasing casualties
and weapons losses--the Viet Cong have demonstrated an ability to continue the build-up
and supply of their forces in the South. The build-up is continuing both from in-country
sources and by infiltration over improved roads in Laos and, to a lesser extent, by sea via
Cambodia. The indications are that the Viet Cong are not reverting to a lesser level of
insurgency, but are still striving to build up for the transition to conventional warfare--that
they are continuing both to upgrade guerrilla units in the Delta and to infiltrate additional
regular army elements from the North in order to restore the balance temporarily upset by
United States deployments.
(The other factor difficult to estimate in the situation is the degree to which improved
morale among the South Vietnamese will be reflected in more effective military
operations and governmental performance as well as in resistance of the local population
to cooperation with the Viet Cong.)
The Viet Cong forces are now estimated at 71,300 "main force and logistic," 40,000
political cadre, and 110,000 guerrillas. This represents an increase in our estimate since
early last summer of some 6,000 (9%), 10,000 (33-1/3%) and 18,200 (20%) in the three
categories respectively. In addition--although as of last month there were estimated to be
three regiments of North Vietnamese regular forces in the South--early this month two
additional North Vietnamese regiments were confirmed and three others were estimated
as possible. In total, therefore, the Communist forces are now believed to number about
230,000 men, and there is reason to believe that they will continue to increase.
b. Political. In Saigon, the Ky "government of generals" has survived, but accomplished
little more during the period since last summer. The Government, while recognizing many
of its problems and working willingly with the United States Mission, still lacks any
broad, or even developing, base of support among the various political factions. No major
faction (e.g., Buddhists, Catholics) is in open opposition, and all appear to be continuing
their "wait and see" attitude. This lack of support probably will not be important over the
short-run, so long as the generals in power remain united; over the longer term, however,
some base of political support must be developed if the non-Communist elements in
South Viet-Nam are ever to build a viable society. While we are doing all possible to
facilitate and encourage the development of such a political base, this is a long-term
process. It reaches into the roots of Vietnamese society and psychology and is not subject
to quick solution by any measures within our power. The only encouraging factor in the
situation is that responsible Vietnamese seem to be increasingly concerned with the
problem.
In the countryside, the Government's political situation is even worse than in Saigon and
other urban centers. The Viet Cong have savagely destroyed most of the political structure
of the rural areas. The potential leaders who could form the nucleus of counter-Viet Cong
efforts in each locale have been killed, intimidated or driven out, leaving the old, weak
and incompetent behind. Absent security (and where there is security, absent willing and
able leadership), rural reconstruction (pacification) continues to make little, if any
progress. The very difficult problem of getting pacification moving has not been solved.
c. Economic. South Viet-Nam's economic situation today is grave for two reasons:
(1) The Communist strategy has been to draw on the Vietnamese economy to support the
Viet Cong's own operations and to withhold the remainder from the Government and from
those of the people who support it. Thus, in large part as a consequence of Viet Cong
operations, Viet-Nam has become a food-import area; commodities cannot move freely
within the country (e.g., rice from the Delta to Saigon), and the Viet Cong are in a
position to derive much of their own needs (e.g., construction material, food, medical
supplies) from within the South Vietnamese economy.
(2) The rapid and large United States/South Viet-Nam force build-up has introduced a
new and strenuous competition for Viet-Nam's human and material resources. When
added to the Viet Cong economic warfare efforts, the build-up has resulted in a growing
inflation in the Vietnamese economy.
III. Acceptable Settlement Objectives.
Our basic objective is the restoration of a South Viet-Nam "free to determine its own
future without external interference."
We are proceeding on the assumption that South Viet-Nam can eventually be made into a
workable and reasonably stable non-Communist nation, which, under the right conditions,
could cope with the powerful Communist-led apparatus that is now the Viet Cong.
We recognize the possibility--at the end of the road--of North and South Viet-Nam freely
deciding the issue of reunification.
In concrete terms--and roughly in the order they might be approached--the conditions
precedent to the attainment of our objective--whether worked out through new formal
negotiations or resulting from tacit arrangements--are:
A. A cessation of infiltration of men and arms, and an end to leadership ties (represented
concretely by radio communications) with the North.
B. Cessation or sharp reduction in military actions and terrorism in the South.
C. Withdrawal to the North of the maximum possible number of those who continue to
accept Hanoi discipline.
This means particularly post-1954 North Vietnamese citizens (whether Northern or
Southern born). In practice this group breaks down into readily identifiable North
Vietnamese regular units and individuals born in North Viet-Nam, and the much less
readily identifiable "regroupees" or "returnees" who are of Southern origin and who
formed the bulk of the infiltration up to early 1964.
D. Cessation of United States/South Vietnamese bombing attacks on the North.
We have said we would do this in return for some combination of A through C above.
E. The establishment of conditions for a viable political structure in the South.
The South Vietnamese have spoken of the use of "established democratic processes," by
which they clearly mean a gradual and controlled extension of indirect representation
methods, perhaps based on progressive local elections, subject at every point to security
considerations and controls.
Hanoi's present position calls for the National Liberation Front taking over through the
device of a coalition (without elections).
The United States has categorically rejected Hanoi's position and would equally oppose
the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong remaining intact under any name as a legal
political organization. But we have left the door open to amnesty and non-reprisal
treatment for any individuals now in the Viet Cong who lay down their arms and accept
Government rule.
F. An eventual total "cease-fire."
The United States and the Government of Viet-Nam would insist on total freedom for the
Government to establish law and order throughout the country, and would resist the
probable Hanoi attempt to create a situation in which the Viet Cong were able to maintain
themselves in key areas they now control. (Hence the danger of the terms "cease-fire" and
"stand-fast" as they have been used, e.g., by Senator Mansfield.)/4/

G. Restoration of the Geneva non-interference provisions between North and South for
the future.
On this point we and Hanoi are not far apart--verbally. Hanoi adds "pending
reunification," but this need not be serious. However, the substance of this is what the war
is about.
H. Better international machinery to verify cessation of infiltration and withdrawal, and to
enforce future non-interference between North and South.
We have not tried to spell this out, partly because we do not want to get drawn into any
acceptance of international supervision of the political structure in the South. (Such
supervision could well favor the Viet Cong, as Acheson has stressed.)/5/ But--to the
degree possible--we would wish to see stronger machinery than the present ICC to police
external interference, perhaps backed by some form of multilateral power guarantee.
/5/Presumably a reference to the argumentation supporting the Acheson Plan; see vol. II,
Document 287.
I. Acceptance of limited "Neutrality" for an independent South Viet-Nam.
We have said that South Viet-Nam need not be tied to any alliance--and thus "neutral" in
this sense. But the South Vietnamese insist that they must retain the sovereign right to call
for outside help if they need it, and we would insist on this too unless there were
equivalent and really effective international, multilateral guarantees and policing
machinery.
J. Withdrawal of United States combat forces and elimination of United States bases.
We have said we would accept this when the South is truly free to run its affairs without
interference, i.e., when at least points A through F are resolved satisfactorily. In this sense
we agree verbally with Hanoi on the eventual status. However, Hanoi occasionally says
our withdrawal must precede any negotiations (we don't believe they mean this), and
would in any event seek to get American forces out much sooner and with concomitant
performance on their side being limited to the withdrawal of only their own regulars. We
would probably seek to retain military advisors, and in any case would expect to maintain
economic assistance, which would be badly needed for a long time.
K. Provisions for possible reunification.
We have taken our stand squarely on the principle of ultimate free determination under
international supervision, but have said nothing on timing. Hanoi does not mention free
elections, but appears content to let the issue be handled later, doubtless expecting that
they will succeed in establishing a Communist-oriented government in the South that
would move toward reunification in due course. At this stage they also may not wish to
offend Southern sentiment--even in the Viet Cong--by making their ambitions nakedly
clear. The South Vietnamese are generally willing to accept an indefinite division of the
country.
IV. Practical Elements of Achieving Settlement.

While the above analysis indicates the ultimate complexity of a settlement--whether
through negotiation or withering away--in practice, we do not have to cross all these
bridges now. What we really need to focus on is the kind of factual situation in the South
that would, over time, give us the best chance that a stable non-Communist South VietNam would emerge.
From the standpoint of our public posture and any communications we may have with
Hanoi on any channel, we need to focus on five areas where we could be "hard, "less hard
but still acceptable", or "soft" in ways that would affect the chances of a favorable nonCommunist outcome. It would be convenient if we could stay absolutely firm on
conditions that would assure a 100% chance over the long run of a non-Communist
outcome. In fact, there can never be such absolute assurance. And, in assessing whether to
keep up the military pressure in the hope of achieving an ideal result we must weigh the
scale of conflict this might involve and the intangible, but perhaps crucial, effect of our
continued massive presence on a future healthy South Viet-Nam.
The patient has got to learn to walk some time, and attempted total eradication of his
Communist disease may be worse for his recovery than throwing him more on his own-with some degree of risk--as soon as the chances look reasonably good.
The five areas we need to focus on are:
1. What to accept in return for cessation of bombing of the North.
We should rule out even a limited pause if the quid pro quo were only the initiation of
negotiations. Bombing is our only bargaining counter that offers hope of an agreement
that does more than ratify the situation on the ground in South Viet-Nam and the balance
of forces there. It is, therefore, important that we carefully preserve it and play the card of
cessation of bombing only at the optimum point in any type of negotiations.
2. What degree of withdrawal of Hanoi-directed elements.
Our initial position must be that of the South Vietnamese Government--that they all be
withdrawn. We should maintain this position inflexibly as to Northerners and also as to
identified Southern-born military and political leaders. At the same time we must
recognize that it would not be practicable to try to weed out every last man of the 45,000
estimated to have infiltrated--or to attempt to deport to the North all the Viet Cong,
whether they come from the North or not. In carrying out any final agreement it would be
necessary to apply a practicability test to the former, and to let some of the latter stay.
3. What political status in the South for individuals now in the Viet Cong.
The Geneva Accords--which we are seeking to revive--contain a non-reprisal provision.
We do not wish such a provision to be policed by an international body, and we certainly
cannot accept the National Liberation Front as a legal political entity. But a full-scale
amnesty program--now at best limping along--would be most useful even while the
conflict continues. It might be extended, as the Acheson Plan suggests, to allow political
participation, under Government control at all stages, of Viet Cong individuals who had
laid aside their arms.

4. How complete a roll-up of the Viet Cong military forces.
Although there should certainly be no legalized safe havens, and we must insist that the
Government's police power have the right to operate throughout the country, we could in
practice settle--as Ambassador Lodge has suggested--for some hard-core Viet Cong
remnants off in the hills.
5. What timing for United States withdrawal.
This depends on too many variables for us to take any sure position now. If, as suggested
above, we settled for less than total withdrawal of the infiltrators, it would give us the
basis to keep some of our forces for a long time if we desired to do so.
The above analysis indicates areas where we could show some "give" at the right time and
still have as good a chance as we could expect of the final favorable outcome. But it also
identifies "soft" positions that, if taken, would so greatly prejudice the chances of
attaining our objectives that we should not accept them unless and until we decide that the
problem is not manageable.
Among these are: (a) stopping bombings in return merely for initiation of negotiations,
without more concrete action; (b) accepting the National Liberation Front as a valid
political entity; (c) legalized Viet Cong safe havens; (d) United States withdrawal on any
firm timetable unrelated to other elements.
V. Tools available.
The interacting tools available to us in working toward a solution to the problem in South
Viet-Nam are:
(a) Military power in South Viet-Nam, Laos and in the adjacent waters;
(b) Military interdiction in, and pressure on, North Viet-Nam;
(c) Political, economic and psychological efforts in South Viet-Nam; and
(d) Political and diplomatic pressures on Hanoi and Peiping.
Military variables.
The military variables are (1) a pause, (2) Rolling Thunder, and (3) the deployment of
additional forces:
1. Pause--An interruption in the program of bombing North Viet-Nam.
It has been suggested that we have a pause that would stand down all strikes and armed
reconnaissance in North Viet-Nam for approximately four weeks unless its futility became
apparent earlier. It would not involve stoppage of other reconnaissance or intelligence
operations in North Viet-Nam or of any operations elsewhere. Ground and air operations
in South Viet-Nam would continue. The pause would be publicly acknowledged, but a
serious effort would be made to avoid advertising it as an ultimatum to North Viet-Nam.
Third countries would be encouraged to use the pause to help produce negotiations for an
acceptable settlement. With respect to termination of the pause, our state of mind would
be (a)"hard-line" or (b) "soft-line":
(a) "Hard-line" Pause.
Under a "hard-line" pause, we would be firmly resolved to resume bombing unless the
Communists were clearly moving toward what is described above as an acceptable
settlement.
(b) "Soft-line" Pause.
Under a "soft-line" pause, we would be willing to feel our way with respect to termination
of the pause, with less insistence on concrete concessions by the Communists. (This kind
of pause makes sense only if we are working toward something much less than what has
been described above as an acceptable settlement.)
2. Rolling Thunder and armed reconnaissance.
This program (a) could be intensified abruptly by a sharp heavy blow, as recommended by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (b) could continue to increase at the present pace, or (c) could be
maintained at approximately its present level.
(a) JCS "sharp blow."
The JCS would initiate immediately, and carry out in a few days a program of air strikes
against
--Phuc Yen, Hanoi/Gia Lam, Hanoi/Bac Mai, Haiphong/Cat Bi, and Haiphong/Kien An
airfields, including the aircraft thereon (Phuc Yen to be struck by B-52s).
--Rail, highway and waterway routes and traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong and
between Hanoi-Haiphong and South China.
--Petroleum storage facilities at Haiphong (or four thermal power plants generating
approximately 50% of North Viet-Nam's thermal power).
--SAM installations and other anti-aircraft defenses which pose a threat to the above air
operations.
The Joint Chiefs would permit normal armed reconnaissance in all of North Viet-Nam,
and would order follow-on strikes as necessary to keep the targets destroyed. They would
conduct naval surface force operations against targets near the coast and against North
Vietnamese shipping at sea. They would mine the harbors. Every effort would be made to
minimize destruction of non-military installations; and the civilian populations, as such,
would not be targeted.
(b) Extrapolation of Rolling Thunder Program.

Up to this point we have been conducting the Rolling Thunder program on the assumption
that our air attacks against North Viet-Nam would become progressively more severe,
both with respect to intensity and geography. At the present time, we are carrying out 600
armed reconnaissance sorties a week in the "three quadrants" and striking two fixed linesof-communication (LOC) targets a week in the "northeast quadrant" (but not against
targets in the "China strip," the Hanoi circle," or the "Haiphong circle"). If we should
continue this progressively intensifying program over a five-month period, we would
maintain activity in the three quadrants at the present level. The program might, however,
evolve in the "northeast quadrant" along the following illustrative pattern:
--1st month. Include Hanoi-Haiphong LOC targets (outside the Hanoi and Haiphong
circles), with two fixed LOC targets in the quadrant each week.
--2nd and 3rd months. No fixed targets in the quadrant, but "controlled armed
reconnaissance" of selected routes at selected times and at the rate of 100 sorties a week.
--4th month. EXTEND "controlled armed reconnaissance" to LOCs within the Hanoi and
Haiphong circles and ADD strikes on three key petroleum installation targets a month.
--5th month. In the first two weeks, ADD mining of Haiphong Harbor; thereafter, change
the armed reconnaissance in the northeast quadrant to the kind carried out in the other
three quadrants and with no geographical limit except the strip next to China. (Left
unstruck would be population targets, power plants, and locks and dams.)
(c) Maintenance at present level.
This would involve continuing a level of armed reconnaissance sorties throughout North
Viet-Nam adequate to keep military installations and the line of communication to the
south as fully out of action as possible, and to maintain a limited pattern of fixed strikes in
the "northeast quadrant". It might involve elements of the extrapolated program such as
strikes on the Hanoi-Haiphong line of communication targets (out-side the circles). And it
might be extended in a small way to the "controlled armed reconnaissance" in the
northeast quadrant designed to keep these major lines of communication under continuing
harassment and interruption.
While the present level of 600 armed reconnaissance sorties a week would remain a rough
benchmark, we would need to consider in any case whether the growing evidence of
expanded lines of communication in Laos may warrant some diversion of effort to that
area. We should also consider getting a much more pronounced daily and weekly
variation into the total pattern of air activity over the North, so that the rate of sorties
varies greatly. This varied pattern would have merit under any program, but it would be
particularly applicable to a "continuing" level in that it would keep Hanoi guessing and
minimize any implication that we had settled down without an increase.
The argument for maintaining bombing at the present level is that no feasible amount of
bombing of the North is going to achieve an acceptable settlement in the absence of a
substantial improvement in the situation on the ground in the South. Therefore, a
substantial increase in bombing of the North will have a maximum "climactic" effect if
carried out at a time when the situation in the South is more clearly moving in our favor. It
would also continue to maintain the Haiphong Harbor and petroleum storage as "hostage"
for the now very vulnerable port and petroleum storage at Saigon.
3. Additional (Phase II) Deployments.
United States force deployments (I) could stop at the presently approved 225,000 # during
1966.
(a) Stop at Phase I. Limit United States forces to the presently approved 225,000. Added
expenditures attributable to Phase I, through FY 1967, are estimated to be $13 billion.
(b) Deploy additional Phase II forces. Deploy 28 additional combat battalions and four
additional tactical air squadrons and associated support forces (125,000 additional men),
bringing the totals to 62 United States combat battalions (plus 10 third-country battalions)
and 26 United States tactical air squadrons, or approximately 350,000 Americans in South
Viet-Nam. These deployments would be essentially completed by the end of 1966, and
would be--as proposed by MACV--at a considerably slower rate than the AugustDecember 1965 rate, specifically at the rate of six, seven, nine and six ground combat
battalions for each of the four quarters of 1966.
These deployments could be accomplished without calling up the reserves or extending
tours of duty, but, in that case, they would lead to further reductions in the strength of our
strategic reserve to meet contingencies elsewhere. (An alternative would be to call up
reserves--not only replenishing the strategic reserves, but also giving a clear
demonstration of United States power and purposes.) Expenditures attributable to Phase II
for its first 18 months are estimated very roughly at $3 billion. It is estimated--as can be
seen on Map II/6/--that, by the time Phase II forces are making their full impact in the
spring of 1967, the United States/South Vietnamese forces would have "control" of 65
percent of the population and 20-30 percent of the land; 60-65 percent of the critical lines
of communications would be kept open; 40-50 percent of the Viet Cong bases and
military logistical infrastructure would be subject to disruption; and 30 percent of the Viet
Cong political/security infrastructure would be disrupted.
/6/Not found.
It should be noted that the MACV-proposed Phase II does not allocate any forces to the
Delta. To handle the Delta properly, Phase II would have to be augmented by one or two
additional divisions--30,000 to 60,000 additional men--bringing the Phase II total to
155,000 to 185,000 men, or an overall total of between 380,000 and 410,000 men in
South Viet-Nam.
VI. Alternative Courses of Action.
A theoretical case can be made for a course of action such as a "soft line" pause, extreme
negotiating efforts and--following the pause--maintenance of present force levels in the
South and the present level of Rolling Thunder attacks in the North, all designed to feel
our way toward a "compromise outcome". We all believe, however, that such a course of
action would not support our basic strategy. It would end up in disintegration in VietNam, in political humiliation for the United States, and impaired American political
effectiveness on the world scene. It could also lead to more costly confrontations with the
Chinese Communists later on. In essence, it simply is not consistent with the definition
given above of what would constitute an acceptable settlement.
Thus, the realistic choices boil down to:
First Course: No Pause, With Continuing or Evolving Rolling Thunder and With No
Substantial Further Deployments to South Viet-Nam.
This course of action can be supported in this way:
(a) It will be January before the weight of our full presently-approved deployments really
comes into play. By then we might see at least an adverse morale trend in the Viet Cong
that would indicate we were getting somewhere.
(b) It may be useful to give ourselves time to digest the impact of 225,000 men in terms of
their effect on the Vietnamese psychology and economy. This is a factor that some
reports, notably a recent cable from Saigon on inflationary and labor division problems,
suggest may be becoming very serious even to the point of being a limiting factor on our
basic effectiveness in appealing to the people.
(c) It would give the Government of Viet-Nam additional time, hopefully without serious
frictions with us, to get on with its part of the job and to build up a South Vietnamese
contribution that would not be dwarfed by the United States role.
On the drawback side are two factors:
(a) Deferring additional United States deployments--particularly in the face of continuing
increases in Viet Cong strength--raises grave problems in our domestic situation. This is
not solely a question of the war dragging on--which, one can argue, it would be likely to
do even with additional deployments--but rather a question of not having clearly done all
on the ground in Viet-Nam that appears wise. It would be still more serious, of course, if
the rate of progress slowed down, as is likely to be the case.
(b)The second drawback is that, by delaying the added deployments, we should lose
momentum in Viet-Nam--a momentum that reflects a determination and confidence
crucial to the psychology of the confrontation.
Basically, this course can continue to assure against a Viet Cong "victory" as long as our
relations with the Vietnamese government and people remain good; it can, as indicated
above, result in an indefinite stalemate if Hanoi and the Viet Cong can maintain the
morale and strength of their forces. It presents the least danger of overt Chinese
Communist or Soviet intervention. The two important variables difficult to predict are the
morale on the South Vietnamese side (and correspondingly our relations with them) and
the morale on the Hanoi-Viet Cong side. Morale has unquestionably improved in South
Viet-Nam and we are beginning to see a few small signs of deterioration in morale among
the Viet Cong. These hopeful trends may be expected to continue for the time being as the
forces we are now deploying there move toward full effectiveness. Their indefinite
continuation might result in an acceptable settlement at some time in the foreseeable
future even though the balance of military force were not such as to assure a military
destruction of the Viet Cong.

But it is not possible to be certain that these trends will continue indefinitely. If there were
a stalemate, or only very slow progress, there would--sooner or later--be a tendency for
South Vietnamese morale to sag and frustrations to focus on the American presence and
the problems associated with that presence. On the Viet Cong-Hanoi side, the continued
infusion of North Vietnamese forces may serve somewhat to offset the many factors
unfavorable to them.
This development would not be overcome merely by intensified bombing of the North.
We have always thought such bombing would bring Hanoi to an acceptable settlement
only if the tide were clearly running against them in the South. If the prediction of
probable stalemate above held true, in the absence of additional deployments, even the
extrapolated Rolling Thunder program would be unlikely to bring Hanoi around.
In sum, this course of action does not appear hopeful.
Second Course: Pause, Extrapolated Rolling Thunder, and Additional Deployments.
In view of the intensified actions involved, Secretary McNamara would not recommend
this course of action unless it were preceded by a "hard-line pause", as set forth in
Paragraph V 1. (a) above.
The purposes of--and Secretary McNamara's arguments for--such a pause are four:
(a) It would offer Hanoi and the Viet Cong a chance to move toward a solution if they
should be so inclined, removing the psychological barrier of continued bombing and
permitting the Soviets and others to bring moderating arguments to bear;
(b) It would demonstrate to domestic and international critics that we had indeed made
every effort for a peaceful settlement before proceeding to intensified actions, notably the
latter stages of the extrapolated Rolling Thunder program;
(c) It would probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation after we had resumed the
bombing, at least insofar as the Soviets were concerned;
(d) It would set the stage for another pause, perhaps in late 1966, which might produce a
settlement.
Against these propositions, there are the following considerations arguing against a pause:
(a) In the absence of any indication from Hanoi as to what reciprocal action it might take,
we could well find ourselves in the position of having played this very important card
without receiving anything substantial in return. There are no indications that Hanoi is yet
in a mood to agree to a settlement acceptable to us. The chance is, therefore, very slight
that a pause at this time could lead to an acceptable settlement.
(b) A unilateral pause at this time would offer an excellent opportunity for Hanoi to
interpose obstacles to our resumption of bombing and to demoralize South Viet-Nam by
indefinitely dangling before us (and the world) the prospect of negotiations with no intent
of reaching an acceptable settlement. It might also tempt the Soviet Union to make threats
that would render very difficult a decision to resume bombing.
(c) In Saigon, obtaining South Vietnamese acquiescence to a pause would be difficult. It
could adversely affect the Government's solidity. Any major falling out between the
Government and the United States, or any overturn in the Government's political
structure, could set us back very severely.
(d) An additional factor is that undertaking the second course of action following a pause
would give this course a much more dramatic character, both internationally and
domestically, and would, in particular, present the Soviets with those difficult choices that
we have hereto-fore been successful in avoiding.
On balance, the arguments against the pause are convincing to the Secretary of State, who
recommends that it not be undertaken at the present time. The Secretary of State believes
that a pause should be undertaken only when and if the chances were significantly greater
than they now appear that Hanoi would respond by reciprocal actions leading in the
direction of a peaceful settlement. He further believes that, from the standpoint of
international and domestic opinion, a pause might become an overriding requirement only
if we were about to reach the advanced stages of an extrapolated Rolling Thunder
program involving extensive air operations in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Since the
Secretary of State believes that such advanced stages are not in themselves desirable until
the tide in the South is more favorable, he does not feel that even accepting the point of
view of the Secretary of Defense, there is now any international requirement to consider a
"Pause".
Third Course: No Pause, Continuing Rolling Thunder at Present Levels, and Gradual
Phase II Deployments.
This course of action would, like all of those considered, also include maximum
diplomatic efforts to explore and exploit all possibilities of achieving an acceptable
settlement.
The principal element in this Third Course would be to increase our ground deployments
on the basis of a progressive evaluation of need and effectiveness, but to avoid any
dramatic decision to the maximum extent possible. This would involve immediate
preparations for additional deployments to the South along Phase II lines during 1966. It
would almost certainly mean a final decision in early January to carry out first and second
quarter Phase II deployments (six and seven combat battalions respectively). Such further
deployments would be presented, not as a new "phase" but as the carrying out of your
often repeated statement that "we are going to do what we need to do."
Preparations would also go forward for third and fourth quarter Phase II deployments, but
final decision would not be made until late spring.
(Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State agree that at the present time
and under present conditions the risks resulting from the reduction in our ready reserve
that will result from such additional deployments are acceptable.)
Under this course of action the Rolling Thunder program would be conducted on the
"continuing" basis defined in Paragraph V 2. (c) but leaving open the option of moving to
the extrapolated program if Hanoi appeared to be weakening. Likewise, a pause would be
deferred, but might later be considered if Hanoi appeared to be weakening.
Essentially, this course of action is designed to maintain momentum in the South so that
South Vietnamese morale and performance can be improved. In essence, it is designed to
"play for the breaks" (as we did in the Berlin blockade and Korea) without actions that
would bring the situation prematurely to a head.
From a strictly military standpoint, even the full carrying out of Phase II deployments
during 1966 would not extend the areas of government control or weaken the Viet Cong
structure decisively. (See Map II.) The major variables would continue to be whether the
South Vietnamese Government achieves effectiveness--and above all whether Viet Cong
morale cracks significantly.
We cannot say that the chances are better than even that this would happen by the end of
1966, but at least we would be keeping the pressure on and giving ourselves every
reasonable chance of getting this decisive "break".
As between the Second and Third Courses, the Second Course may offer us--if it were to
work out favorably--a somewhat greater chance of an acceptable outcome by the end of
1966. On the other hand, with the political dangers of an immediate pause, and the
uncertainty and possible widening of the war involved in the latter stage of the
extrapolated Rolling Thunder program, the Second Course would also involve
significantly greater chances of either an adverse development in the South or a wider
war.
The Third Course would give us every reasonable chance of moving ahead in the South
before we had to take the critical and difficult actions involved in a pause and a
substantially intensified Rolling Thunder program. It would clearly be slower, but it might
in the end be surer, particularly in light of the time needed to develop a more solid and
effective political structure in the South.
VII. Possible Further Actions.
Neither the third nor any of the other courses of action considered in this memorandum
could give positive assurance of success. The North Vietnamese probably could, by
additional deployments, match our deployments on a 1-for-3 or 1-for-4 basis, thus
effectively cancelling the likelihood that the additional forces set forth in this
memorandum would be able to provide security to areas beyond the enclaves shown on
the attached maps. If the Hanoi authorities should do this, we could find ourselves in a
position where--with our killed-in-action casualties at 500 to 800 per month--the pressures
would be great to invade or to bomb the cities in the North--actions which would be likely
to lead to a severe reaction from China and possibly from the Soviet Union.
The Viet Cong can be expected to continue their "Phase II" sabotage, murder and guerrilla
activities, while continuing to strive to build up a conventional military capability. They
will depend more and more on regular PAVN forces; they will draw harder on the men
and material in the areas they control, including the Delta; and they can be expected to try
to bring the economy of South Viet-Nam to a grinding halt. The question, of course, is
whether the pressure on the North and the added forces in the South can frustrate these
Viet Cong designs. The question also is whether Hanoi will continue to have the will and
the morale to carry this on.
If Hanoi and the Viet Cong are successful in their efforts to stand firm, we may be faced
in late 1966 or early 1967 with critical decisions. One possibility which needs further
analysis would be military action to "seal off" an infiltration corridor in Laos to a "barrier"
just south of the 17th Parallel from the sea to Thailand. Such a "barrier" would require
major military forces, including Thai and Laos forces on the West end and Vietnamese
and United States forces on the East end. It would create major political problems in Laos,
particularly in terms of obtaining the support of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, and
major international complications in that it would be an open breach of the Laos
settlement.
Another, and perhaps more likely, possibility would be the requirement for still additional
deployments of American forces in the South. Finally, there would of course be the
pressures mentioned above to invade or bomb the cities in the North, with the risks that
would flow therefrom, as well as to mine Haiphong Harbor.
(Any consideration of the mining of Haiphong Harbor will, among other considerations,
have to consider its effects on and our interests in the relative positions of Moscow and
Peiping influence in Hanoi.)
VIII. Non-Military Actions.
Regardless of which of the possible courses outlined above is adopted, maximum effort
must be given now and for an extended period to the political, economic and
psychological efforts without which South Viet-Nam will never be made into a workable
and reasonably stable non-Communist nation able to cope with the Viet Cong apparatus.
In a sense, our military effort, however essential, is buying us time in which to work with
the Vietnamese to build a political, economic and social base among the bulk of the
people and primarily the rural people who make up 80 percent of the population.
The following are the principal elements in our present program:
(1) Do what we can to develop out of the present Government of Viet-Nam at all levels a
government which will increasingly develop a commitment not only against Communism
but also to the cooperation of all its factions and tendencies for the achievement of that
objective and also to programs designed to enlist the loyalty and support of the people. As
noted previously, this is a long-term process and there is nothing we can do that will
produce dramatic results.
(2) Assist and encourage the Vietnamese Government and, where possible, groups with
large popular followings, to develop cadres who can form the nucleus in rural areas for
organization of the population for economic and social reconstruction and against the Viet
Cong infrastructure.
(3) Develop with the Vietnamese Government, and press it to prosecute vigorously,
national programs which will give support to the efforts of the cadres mentioned above.
This includes land reform and agricultural credit, land development, tax reform,
encouragement of small industry and handicrafts, and provision of a range of community

development projects which can be put at the disposal of the cadres to be used by the
cadres to support their political objectives.
(4) Advise and encourage the South Vietnamese Government to build from the provincial
councils elected in May of 1965 toward some national representative body which might
initially be elected indirectly and for some time would have only limited responsibilities,
such as drafting of a new constitution. At provincial and lower levels, however, elected
bodies should promptly be given increasing responsibility where security permits, and
particularly where there are cadres who can work with such bodies effectively.
(5) Meanwhile support the Government of Viet-Nam and occasionally on an ad hoc basis
substitute for it, in immediate programs (a) to meet emergencies such as the refugee
problem, (b) to supply urgently required infrastructure and logistics for the military effort
while trying to minimize adverse effects on the civilian economy, (c) to stem inflation, (d)
to deny resources to the Viet Cong and secure those resources for those areas under
government control, and (e) to establish machinery and a priority system to minimize to
the extent possible competition for the increasingly scarce manpower and materials,
Vietnamese and American, required for the complex of efforts now under way in South
Viet-Nam.
The intensification of these efforts, of course, particularly the increased imports essential
to control inflation, means increased AID expenditures. AID expenditures this fiscal year
are likely to be in the order of $550 million. The amount required for FY 1967 is not yet
determined but it can be anticipated that something in the order of $650 million will be
required.
IX. Conclusion.
Perhaps all of the foregoing does not give sufficient weight to the problems as they appear
to the other side. As has been pointed out they can now have no hope of "victory". A large
part of our task is to reinforce this conviction and not only to consult our own fears but
also to weigh the fears of the other side in drawing up our balance. A stalemate can have
no more attraction for them than it has for us. Our determination and our will are certainly
not less than theirs. If we can, as recommended in this memorandum, continue to display
an increasing level of determination we should not despair, any more than we did in
Berlin, Korea and Cuba, of reaching a satisfactory conclusion even though at the moment
we may only see through the glass darkly exactly how this is to be accomplished.
195. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Memos (A). Top Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
State's Memo to the President (Courses of Action in Viet-Nam)/2/

/2/Document 194.
The State paper is not substantially different from your draft/3/ in a number of respects.
For example, the statement of US grand strategy is not fundamentally different, nor is the
estimate of the situation in South Vietnam, nor is the paragraph dealing with "acceptable
settlement objectives," nor is the pessimism with respect to what can be done on the nonmilitary side inside South Vietnam.
/3/Document 189.
The State memo departs from your version in the following four important ways:
1. Pause. Secretary Rusk opposes a Pause now, preferring to consider it later "if Hanoi
appeared to be weakening." State's main arguments are (1) that a Pause would allow
Hanoi to trap us short of our goal so that we would not be able to resume Rolling Thunder
and (2) that it would cause serious trouble in Saigon. They add (3) that it (especially if
coupled with an intensified RT) would increase the risk of a Soviet "flash" when bombing
resumed. They see no chance of a Pause leading to a favorable reaction from Hanoi or
from the "nationalist" VC, and they see no need for a Pause to lay the domestic
groundwork for the increase in US deployments--perhaps because they believe that Phase
II deployments can be carried out quietly by a salami-slice technique. (Incidentally, it is
interesting to note that the State memo seems to assume that the Pause is a "card" that can
be "played" but once; whereas it is more reasonable to think that it could be played any
number of times, with the arguments against it, but not those for it, becoming less each
time.)
2. Rolling Thunder. Secretary Rusk opposes what State calls our "extrapolated" Rolling
Thunder program, preferring a "leveled-off" program (with periodic "hot and cold"
treatments to keep the enemy off base). State says that "no feasible amount of bombing of
the North is going to achieve an acceptable settlement in the absence of a substantial
improvement in the situation on the ground in the South." Specifically, they would
postpone strikes on POL targets and would postpone mining of harbors; they would
permit strikes at LOC targets between Hanoi and Haiphong and would permit "controlled
armed recce" in the northeast quadrant outside the Hanoi-Haiphong circles; they would
perhaps shift some of the 600 sorties per week to Laos. As in the case of the Pause, State
would postpone the intensification of Rolling Thunder, "leaving open the option of
moving to the extrapolated program if Hanoi appeared to be weakening."
3. Phase II. State apparently agrees with your proposal to deploy Phase II forces. They
apparently would put the deployments in two packages (first two quarters of 1966 and last
two quarters of 1966) and wrap the packages as inconspicuously as possible. I gather that
they would not postpone preparations or budget submissions beyond what would be
required to meet the MACV Phase II schedule. (Notice that you may have had in mind a
faster deployment of Phase II than MACV requested or that State's plan would permit.)
4. Evaluation. State seems to be more optimistic than you. While they do not give good
odds of success (and while they give your approach higher odds both of a quick success
and of a "flash"), they are avowedly choosing a course "designed to play for the breaks (as
we did in the Berlin blockade and Korea) without actions that would bring the situation
prematurely to a head."
My judgment is (a) that there is no real issue with respect to Phase II deployments, (b)
that State has a good point in their opposition to "extrapolating" Rolling Thunder, and (c)
that State is wrong with respect to the Pause (I hate to miss the small chance it offers to
turn this thing around).
Furthermore, I think (d) that both papers set the goals unrealistically high (we should not
be fooling ourselves in this respect), (e) that neither memo gives adequate emphasis to
what Phases III and IV are likely to look like ("occupation" of South Vietnam,
"quarantine" of Indo-China, pressures to invade North Vietnam, war costs at a rate equal
to 10-20 times the GNP of the people being fought for, etc.) and the odds that we will
have a Phase III and a Phase IV (50-70%), and (f) that neither memo spells out a vigorous
"diplomatic offensive" to accompany the military actions.
John T. McNaughton/4/
196. Letter From the Consul General in Hong Kong (Rice) to the Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Hong Kong, November 9, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Correspondence with the
Field, June 1965. Secret; Official-Informal. A copy was sent to INR Director Hughes.
Dear Bill:
As you know, Mr. Clark Clifford and Mr. Patrick Coyne were with us October 30. I
expect that you have had a more complete run-down than I could give you of the matters
which concerned them. If you have heard all you want to know on the subject, you can
toss this letter aside. But I will cover the ground of what was said here--just in case you
are interested.
Mr. Clifford, who did the talking, said the President spends much of his time on Vietnam,
and feels forced to make a great many decisions on the basis of inadequate information.
What we lack and what he wants, despite the difficulties, is hard intelligence, including
intelligence on matters outlined below.
1. Definite information about the Viet Cong. What about their attitudes? Are they reevaluating their position? Are their attitudes softening or hardening?
2. North Vietnam. What is the thinking in Hanoi? Are the leaders there determined, or are
they seeking a way out? Should we extend and accelerate the bombings? What about the
populace: is it softening or hardening? What is the attitude in North Vietnam towards
peace overtures?
3. What is the situation today in Red China? What is the attitude of the Government there
towards the war in South Vietnam? That they cannot permit the war to be lost? Or that
there are more important considerations, such as the drive to make Communist China a
nuclear power? What is the attitude towards actual participation in the war? What is the
possibility they will, for instance, send troops? What degree of assistance will Communist
China give the DRV: unlimited, or if not unlimited, what is the limitation? Are the leaders
in Peking determined to see the thing through all the way? What is the degree of fear of
becoming over-involved--e. g., in a war with the U.S.?
I thought it might be useful to Mr. Clifford to be given an indication of opinions we have
formed on some of these questions, and of our bases for forming them. In giving them I
observed that I was not trying to make him a channel for our reporting. That deserved the
greater degree of precision possible with written material as opposed to oral
communication, and the qualifications one omits from thumb-nail summaries. The
following paragraphs represent, except as otherwise noted, an effort to reconstruct from
memory what I said after making those caveats.
It is hard for us at this distance, and with access to only some of the available intelligence,
to judge whether the VC are softening up or hardening. We watch the statistics, but many
of them are of questionable value. For instance, for seven weeks the VC had lost more
weapons than the ARVN, whereas the opposite used to be true. But did these losses mean
that VC morale and discipline were slipping, or that they now had such a relatively
plentiful supply of weapons that they were no longer exercising the same care to prevent
weapons losses? (Incidentally, accounts I have seen of the Pleime battle suggest that the
fighting discipline of the attackers, comprising VC and DRV regulars, was good indeed. I
wonder whether the bombing of the DRV does not give the DRV regulars a doubled
motive for fighting--there is added to the motive of "liberating" the south, preparatory to
reunification, the motive of getting back at an enemy which is bombing their homeland.)
I expressed to Mr. Clifford the belief that the leaders in the North are a tough lot, unlikely
to soften under bombings. If they lost the relatively small industrial sector they have built
up, I expected them to count on rebuilding it with Soviet and Chi-Com help. The accounts
of visitors to the DRV and the intercepted letters from people there which we had read led
us to think the bombings were, if anything, hardening popular attitudes towards the U.S.
and cementing the loyalty of the people to the regime. It did not look to us as though the
leaders and people of the DRV were ready to respond to overtures.
I said the leaders of Red China regarded the war in South Vietnam as a highly important
proving ground for Mao's doctrines on wars of national liberation. They would certainly
give all the necessary material assistance they could spare. We believed the DRV would
not want them to send in masses of Chinese troops into North Vietnam itself unless that
proved absolutely necessary, and that Communist China's leaders would hesitate to send
them unless the existence of the DRV appeared threatened. The Chinese Communists are
very powerful defensively on their own terrain--Communist China is probably
impregnable to military occupation and political domination; it is sensitive about its
borders and formidable in areas near them; it lacks the strategic mobility to project
military power very far beyond those areas. There was plenty of evidence that Communist
China feared U.S. attack and that people in South China fear war (our reading of
intercepted letters shows this to be so). Communist China would fight if attacked, but I
was not convinced the Chinese Communists would surely throw in their own troops to
prevent the defeat of the Viet Cong rebellion, should our forces appear to be bringing the
situation in South Vietnam under control. They conceivably could respond to dwindling
prospects with the decision it would be better for the VC to draw back, preserve all the
assets they could and wait for a better day. However, I thought the leaders in Communist
China were like the leaders of other governments in some respects: they probably make
some important decisions only as the relevant situations develop, instead of having
decided in advance what they would do in all of a variety of contingencies.
I added that I thought some of the answers to the questions Mr. Clifford asked should be
available within the U.S. Government through a careful fitting together of all relevant bits
and pieces of information. (I also might have observed that some answers will come to
those with sufficient background and experience by a process sometimes considered
intuitive, i.e. by "feel"--but that would have raised the question of whose "feel" is to be
trusted, and whose not? Still, to me, at least, it seems unlikely that we shall get many
answers to the hard questions in the form of pieces of intelligence we can point to as
"hard.")
Mr. Clifford asked very few questions about this analysis as I went along and none about
it afterwards. We then set forth our various sources of information and there was a little
discussion of how they could be improved--e.g., by more extended tapping of British
businessmen engaged in trade with Communist China. The meeting then closed.
This "open" meeting included myself, my deputy, the chief of the China Mainland
Section, the three military liaison officers, and the CAS station chief. The station chief
also had a private session with Messrs. Clifford and Coyne, which he has reported through
his channels.
I should have liked to write this hard upon Mr. Clifford's visit, when I could reconstruct
my part of dialogue with greater confidence. But we have been inundated by visitors-Governors, trade missions, and CODELs. We will have one arriving on the average every
day, with most of them staying for some days, at least through November--but will do the
best we can to continue turning out the necessary regular work meanwhile.
I'm sending a copy of this letter to Tom Hughes in INR.
Sincerely,
Edward E. Rice/2/
197. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge)/1/
Memos (A). Personal and Secret; Nodis.
Dear Cabot:
This personal letter is something of a comment on your 1377/2/ which gives much room
for thought.
/2/Document 176.
At present we do not see, through all of the processes of diplomatic "osmosis", an
indication that Hanoi is prepared to enter seriously into negotiations on the basis of
stopping their aggression against South Viet Nam and establishing peace in Southeast
Asia. It is my impression, and this has been reflected by some comments in the
Communist world, that there may well be divided views within Hanoi. But these shades of
difference do not indicate any decision in Hanoi to hold their hand and make peace.
It may well be that Hanoi and the Viet Cong would prefer to pull back de facto rather than
through negotiations. This was the way the Greek guerrilla affair was wound up. From
Hanoi's point of view, a de facto cessation would avoid their having to confess that they
were ever doing anything against the South and would avoid commitments with respect to
the future. We should always be very alert to significant signs that they are in fact pulling
out--but I have not yet seen them.
The subject of "negotiation" is complex and difficult. I am convinced that one of the
important strengths of our situation, both at home and abroad, is the demonstration that
the obstacle to peace in Southeast Asia is not the United States. I have just finished talking
with more than 70 Foreign Ministers--most of whom were here for the opening session of
the General Assembly. It seems evident that we have made the point convincingly that the
obstacle to peace in Southeast Asia is Hanoi and Peiping. The principal means by which
this has been achieved has been a demonstrated readiness on our part to have
"negotiations without preconditions", as the 17 non-aligned nations phrased it, or
"unconditional discussions" as the President phrased it./3/ The rejection by Hanoi and
Peiping of many peace efforts has clarified the policy problems very well.
/3/For text of the appeal by 17 nonaligned countries, March 15, see American Foreign
Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 843-844. President Johnson expressed U.S.
readiness for "unconditional discussions" in his address at Johns Hopkins University on
April 7; the text is ibid., pp. 848-852. See also Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II,
Document 245.
I also believe that this is an issue which has to do with what might be called "war
leadership" of the American people. There is no more peace-loving people in the world.
But the American people will do what has to be done if they are convinced that the object
is right and that there is no honorable alternative. Our attitude toward negotiation is an
integral part of the willingness of our own people to sustain a mean disagreeable struggle
half way around the world.
The point which would concern me most would be the idea that the war must be
continued because the South Vietnamese authorities with whom we are dealing are afraid
of peace. I find it hard to accept the view that the South Vietnamese people would be the
first people in history voluntarily to accept a Communist regime through genuinely free
elections. All of our effort in South Viet Nam for more than a decade has been based upon
the assumption that the South Vietnamese people do not want communism, do not wish it
imposed by force, and would not have it if they had a choice. In any event, I see great
difficulty in accepting the internal political difficulties of the South Vietnamese as a war
aim of the United States. I had supposed that American combat forces are in South Viet
Nam because of the infiltration of large numbers of men and large quantities of arms by
North Viet Nam into the South. We are there to defend South Viet Nam against external
aggression--an attempt to impose a political solution by force upon the South Vietnamese
against their own wills.
Frankly, I do not know whether the negotiations will come about in the near future or at
all. I do know that it will be contrary to our most fundamental policy to permit
negotiations to accomplish what we have resisted by force. It may be that Hanoi and
Peiping recognize this elementary point and, therefore, see no possibility of
accomplishing their purposes through negotiation. If so, they are well advised.
I realize that the current crop of GVN leaders may be nervous about the idea of
negotiations. But they must realize that we have not made the effort and undertaken the
burdens of supporting a free South Viet Nam in order to throw in our objectives at a
conference table.
I was much interested in the recent conversation you had with the Apostolic Delegate and
we shared your skepticism. But if there is any reality in this possibility, nothing could
give the entire effort out there a bigger shot in the arm than something important along
that line.
We think of you daily and are grateful for the quality and dedication of the job you are
doing.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
Dean Rusk/4/
198. Editorial Note

On November 11, 1965, from 2:30 to 3:45 p.m., President Johnson met with Rusk,
McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Moyers at the LBJ Ranch in Texas. (Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary) According to a tentative agenda for the meeting,
prepared for the President by Bundy on November 11, Vietnam was one of nine items to
be discussed. In the annotated agenda, Bundy briefed the President on Vietnam as
follows:
"The most important issues here are treated in the long draft Defense memorandum as
revised in the State Department [Documents 189 and 194]. In the main, we are not
looking for major decisions but for guidance in further planning. In essence, the issues are
these:
"(1) Should we currently plan for substantial additional deployments in 1966?
"(2) Should any such additional deployments be preceded by a pause in bombing and/or a
new diplomatic effort to prevent further enlargement of the contest? If we want a pause,
we must begin to plan for it very promptly.
"(3) What should be our current attitude toward increased bombing in the North in 1966?
"(4) Do we need to choose between the Lodge and Goldberg views of negotiation now?
"(5) Are we agreed on the underlying purpose of our effort in Vietnam: is it to seek a
compromise settlement which would eventually turn Communist--or is it to ensure by all
necessary means the establishment and maintenance of a non-Communist South Vietnam-and is this the real choice we face?
"(6)We also have questions of timing and consultation: when should Lodge come back or
when should we go to him? When should we begin additional consultation with Congress-or is such consultation needed? What, in short, is the time-table of decision in the coming
weeks?" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. XVI)
No record of the meeting has been found.

Saigon, November 11, 1965, 8:14 p.m.
to CINCPAC.
1677. 1. There is given below the text of an "Estimate of Viet Cong Situation" drafted by
the Mission Intelligence Committee and concurred in by Ambassador Porter and General
Westmoreland which I have found of value and believe will be of interest to concerned
Washington agencies:
2. "The basic trends and patterns in the situation noted in our last estimate (19 August
1965)/2/ have continued through October. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front broadcasts
reflect determination to continue the war, and Viet Cong forces are maintaining relatively
strong military pressure. Following a brief decline in Viet Cong activity in September,
which may have marked the transition from the largely frustrated summer campaign to the
current autumn-winter campaign, the tempo of Viet Cong actions has risen to the highest
levels in over a year. The scene of major operations appears to have shifted with the rainy
season from the highlands to the coastal provinces, with large-scale attacks recorded in
Quang Tri, Phu Yen, and Binh Dinh. Nevertheless, current activity in Pleiku Province
indicated that the enemy retains significant capabilities in the highlands.

3. "No regimental-size operations have been mounted by the Viet Cong since June in the
III Corps area. Viet Cong main force units in this region apparently have been kept off
balance by US-GVN ground and air operations, which have inflicted substantial losses in
terms of equipment and supplies. Viet Cong capabilities in this area evidently are being
reinforced, however, by the movement of North Vietnamese Army elements from the
highlands and the continuing flow of Viet Cong elements coming from the Delta.
4. "Activity in the Delta has increased markedly during the past two months, but consists
largely of small-scale harassments and sabotage activities. The lack of aggressive largescale attacks in this area suggests that the capabilities of main force units have been
temporarily reduced by the transfer of cadres and troops to other areas. Nevertheless, the
sizeable Viet Cong forces remaining in the Delta appear capable of maintaining their hold
on wide areas of the countryside.
5. "The build-up of Viet Cong conventional military capabilities is continuing, despite the
heavy losses suffered in large-scale engagements. Documents captured in the Delta in
August directed the upgrading of half of the village guerrillas to permit the build-up of
main force units. This extraordinary measure, which could produce enough manpower to
form two or three new regiments, was rationalized in the documents as necessary to
restore the balance of forces which had been upset by the introduction of U.S. and allied
ground combat units.
6. "Paralleling this internal reinforcement, the enemy has infiltrated a number of
additional North Vietnamese Army elements in recent months. Two additional
regimental-sized North Vietnamese Army units have been identified, and there are
indications that at least two others may also have arrived. While some of these may
comprise cadre groups to permit the creation of new Viet Cong main force units, others
apparently are integral North Vietnamese Army combat units. In either case, these
elements, well equipped with modern small arms and heavy weapons, represent a
significant reinforcement of Viet Cong capabilities.
7. "Paralleling the continuing build-up of Viet Cong forces is the construction of a
motorable road from North Viet-Nam through the Laos panhandle to a point at least as far
south as Kontum Province. This main route, which is nearing completion, together with
lateral roads leading into South Viet-Nam at several points, will permit a substantial
increase in the flow of supplies and equipment through Laos, and may replace the now
insecure sea infiltration route as the principal axis for Viet Cong logistical support. With a
dependable supply route capable of moving ammunition in quantities, the capabilities of
Viet Cong forces in the highlands to sustain large-scale operations will be enhanced. Their
forces in the Delta, however, will remain largely dependent on shipments by sea or via
Cambodia.
8. "Politically and psychologically, the Viet Cong position is less favorable. Although
many of the basic factors which contributed to political instability in Saigon last year
remain unresolved, the rebuff of the Viet Cong summer campaign and the U.S. and allied
military build-up have removed popular fears of an early Viet Cong victory and thereby
enhanced the prospects for governmental stability. Nevertheless, the Ky government
remains subject to political pressure from the Viet Cong and from opposing political
circles. The government has not had time to demonstrate progress in implementing its
programs and faces growing economic difficulties. An effective, integrated pacification
program is only in the early stages. Repeated success by security forces in uncovering
terrorist and propaganda rings in urban areas have disrupted Viet Cong capabilities in this
field and shaken the confidence of their clandestine agents. The Liberation Front suffered
a significant psychological setback when the populace generally ignored the Front's
unprecedented propaganda appeal for a general strike and hour of silence on 15 October
to commemorate the anniversary of the execution of a Viet Cong terrorist. The failure of
this appeal, and the absence thus far of any spectacular terrorist acts during the muchheralded, month-long 'Hate America' campaign represent a blow to Viet Cong prestige
among the populace which they may try to recoup. Despite these failures terrorism
remains a potent Viet Cong weapon, and the Viet Cong can be expected to make
concerted efforts to embarrass and harass Americans through terrorist attacks.
9. "There are growing signs of declining morale among Viet Cong military units as well
as in the population in Viet Cong-dominated areas. This decline appears to be the result of
tactical setbacks and the impact of sustained U.S.-GVN air attacks on Viet Cong areas. It
is reflected in the growing rate of deflections and Chieu Hoi ralliers, as well as in captured
documents, statements of captives, and the defensive tone of Front propaganda. Although
the Communists have overcome morale setbacks before through extensive indoctrination
programs, no significant improvement in Viet Cong morale is likely in the absence of
some successes on the battlefield which they are certain to seek.
10. "Viet Cong economic fortunes have been mixed. Their propaganda is actively
exploiting the rising cost of living throughout Viet-Nam. Viet Cong efforts to disrupt the
economy further and thereby add to inflationary trends are reflected in their continuing
sabotage of communications lines and their imposition of an embargo on the flow of
goods to markets in some GVN-controlled areas. On the other hand, economic hardships
are increasing in Viet Cong-dominated areas. There are indications that their tax
collections are not sufficient to meet their financial requirements despite increasingly
heavy tax rates. Moreover, the income of farmers has been further reduced by the
restrictions on delivery of goods to markets.
11. "In view of their mixed prospects, it is pertinent to review the alternatives which the
Viet Cong may adopt in pursuing their aims in South Viet-Nam. The broad alternate
approaches open to them are: a) major overt escalation in order to seek an early military
decision; b) continuation of the current strategy of augmenting their capabilities for the
gradual transition to conventional warfare; c) reversion to a lesser scale of insurgency; or
d) a negotiated settlement.
12. "Although the first course offers prospects for quick success, it carries with it the risk
of triggering a massive U.S. response. While North Vietnamese ground forces possess
considerable strength, disruption of the lines of communication in the north by U.S.-GVN
airstrikes may have restricted the size of forces which could be supported in a
conventional invasion of the south. The extent of this restriction has not yet been
determined. North Vietnamese air capabilities remain weak, and while these could be
augmented by the commitment of Chinese Communist air units, the latter course would
risk U.S. retaliation against the Chinese Mainland. Despite its continuing propaganda
bombast, Peking has shown no inclination to risk general war with the U.S., and its
actions in support of North Viet-Nam have been essentially defensive in scope. U.S.
airstrikes on the north and the deployment of U.S. ground forces to South Viet-Nam must
have raised doubts in Peking regarding their image of the U.S. as a "paper tiger," and
created uncertainties as to how the U.S. would react to any further escalation of the war.
Peking may also hold back because it sees no need to change its past strategy, except to
strengthen its support to the DRV.
13. "The second alternative--continuing the build-up for transition to conventional
warfare--may be viewed by the Communists as carrying less risk of provoking any new
major escalation by the U.S. This course is in accordance with Chinese and North VietNam's doctrinal concepts of "liberation wars," and any deviation from it would be difficult
for them to rationalize to their adherents. Both Hanoi and the Liberation Front had stated
that their major aim for this year was the build-up of Viet Cong capabilities to achieve a
strategic balance of force as a prelude to the general counteroffensive. There is evidence
that they concluded this summer that this goal is still attainable, despite the build-up of
U.S. and allied forces, and that they have undertaken new measures to restore the balance.
Lines of communication from the north are adequate to sustain the infiltration and
operations of a limited number of additional North Vietnamese Army units. Although the
Viet Cong have suffered substantial losses in large-scale operations, their replacement
system appears effective and the Communists do not seem thus far to have been deterred
from continuing such actions. The Communists may calculate that this alternative,
combined with extensive terrorism--a course which proved successful against the French-offers the best prospects for wearing down the will and determination of the U.S. to
continue the war. If their build-up permits them to regain the initiative and momentum on
the battlefield which they enjoyed earlier this year, they may feel that the impact on
ARVN and civilian morale will cause a resumption of political instability which could
prove decisive on the outcome of the war.
14. "The third alternative--reversion to a lesser level of insurgency--would entail serious
risks to Viet Cong morale. The Communists might feel that, by foregoing large-scale
attacks and diverting their main forces units to support of local forces in small-scale
guerrilla actions, their vulnerability to air attacks and large-scale sweeps by U.S.-GVN
forces would be reduced. The Communists would encounter substantial problems,
however, in rationalizing this doctrinally. Moreover, the loss of momentum would almost
certainly cause a major drop in the morale of Viet Cong troops and political cadres, and
result in a substantial increase in defections which could reach disastrous proportions for
the Viet Cong. It would similarly enhance the confidence of the civilian populace int he
ultimate defeat of the Viet Cong. Although guerrilla activity would continue to disrupt
lines of communication and harass pacified areas, U.S.-GVN forces would be able to
devote more support of rural construction programs and permit the gradual extension of
GVN control into areas now held by the Viet Cong. Thus the Communists would risk
substantial--and possibly irretrievable--losses to their position by adopting this alternative.
15. "The fourth alternative--seeking a negotiated settlement--also offers mixed blessings
to the Communists. The Viet Cong would first negotiate to gain time to build their
strength and undermine ours and second to gain a satisfactory settlement. Doctrinally,
negotiations would be a feasible alternative if their outcome assured attainment of their
ultimate goals, which are unchanged. If their position became progressively weaker
through the failure of other alternatives, so that a favorable settlement were not feasible,
they might prefer a withering away of the Viet Cong insurgency to embarking on fruitless
negotiations. In any event, they are unlikely to seek negotiations, unit they are convinced
that victory through other means is not possible.

16. "Current indications point to the second alternative--continuation of the build-up of
Viet Cong capabilities for conventional operations. These indications include: a) evidence
of the infiltration of additional military units from North Viet-Nam; b) the build-up of
main force units at the expense of village guerrilla units; c) captured documents of late
July stating that Viet Cong goals for 1965 remain unchanged; d) continued confidence and
determination to press the war as reflected in Hanoi and Liberation Front statements; e)
final construction of a motorable supply south through Laos; f) resumption of large-scale
attacks despite losses suffered in previous actions; and g) the marked increase in Viet
Cong activity since early October; h) continued development of North Viet-Nam's air
defense capabilities, with Chinese and Soviet support, to reduce the effectiveness of U.S.
air strikes and enhance the ability of the DRV to survive them; and i) the continuing
fragility of the GVN and its vulnerability to Viet Cong pressures.
17. "In conclusion, we believe the enemy will continue for the next several months at least
on his current course of action. We believe the Viet Cong are forming new main force
units within South Viet-Nam, and will infiltrate additional units--perhaps the equivalent of
one or two divisions--from the north. By doing so, the Communists will hope to restore a
strategic balance of forces in order to regain the initiative through a combination of largescale attacks and widespread guerrilla action. Their purpose will be to expand their base
areas, inflict maximum attrition on U.S. and GVN elite units, erode U.S. determination to
continue the war, and weaken Vietnamese morale with a view to creating conditions
favorable for the collapse of the GVN. We do not expect the Viet Cong to revert to a
lesser level of insurgency or to seek a negotiated settlement until they are convinced that
their current course will not succeed. The point is not likely to be reached until the
capabilities of the forces now being created and deployed have been neutralized or
impaired in battle. The units recently infiltrated from North Vietnam will probably be
ready for battle within a month after arrival. It may be three months before units now
being created are ready for combat."
Lodge

Department of State
Washington, DC

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET. Secret. Drafted by
Schwartz; cleared by Unger, Meeker, Sieverts, and Robert H. Miller, Director of the
Vietnam Working Group; and approved by Rusk.
1315. Exdis for Ambassador from Secretary. I am deeply concerned about limited degree
of GVN compliance with Geneva Conventions on treatment of prisoners. As you know,
US is responsible under GC for treatment of prisoners transferred from US to GVN
custody. Matter is urgent for sake of GVN and US image abroad and as it affects plight of
US prisoners held by DRV and VC.
We have an obligation to our soldiers and citizens to take every action not detrimental to
security that increases likelihood American prisoners will receive satisfactory treatment.
Leverage we can bring to bear on DRV and VC through ICRC and other international
efforts depends to considerable extent on degree to which US and GVN standards of
prisoner treatment meet requirements of Geneva Conventions. I believe that substantial
compliance by GVN and USG with Convention and publicity given such compliance
constitute one of best available protections against further mistreatment American
prisoners.
Accordingly request you raise matter personally on urgent basis with Prime Minister and
other GVN officials where it will have most effect, impressing on them in strongest terms
need for concrete, visible actions to implement GC. Most urgent requirement is for
compliance with ICRC request for lists of prisoners and unaccompanied visits to POW's.
This is essential first step, should not cause serious difficulties, and would have high
potential for reciprocal benefits for American prisoners and for favorable publicity.
Detailed discussion in septel./2/
Rusk
/2/Telegram 1314 to Saigon, November 12. (Ibid.) In telegram 1725 from Saigon,
November 15, Lodge responded that he was preparing an approach to Ky on this issue,
but would discuss it with South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry officials to lay the
groundwork in advance. (Ibid.)

a.m. McGeorge Bundy sent President Johnson a retyped copy of this telegram under cover
of a November 17 memorandum that reads: "Here is Lodge's weekly telegram. He lays
proper emphasis on the fact that this week it is the military developments that are the most
interesting, but paragraph 4 on rural construction is of equal long-run importance." There
is an indication on the copy of the telegram that the President saw it. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVI)
1. Military
The most interesting event of the week was the appearance of military units in South VietNam consisting entirely of North Vietnamese personnel. In addition to the three regiments
of the North Vietnamese 325th Division already carried, General Westmoreland has
evidence of the presence of the equivalent of one other division and possibly more. The
North Vietnamese appear to be giving considerable attention to the improvement of the
line of communications through the Laos panhandle. Earthmoving equipment had been
observed. This would permit greater support to the Viet Cong.
This adds a third facet to the war. We have hitherto had to cope with (1) the main force
Viet Cong units, containing about 35 percent of Viet Cong strength and (2) the guerrilla
terrorists containing some 65 percent--all directed by Hanoi. Now come units which are
all from the north.
The U.S. First Cavalry heavily engaged elements of four regular North Vietnamese
regiments west of Pleiku near the Cambodian border for three days at the beginning of
this week inflicting heavy casualties in what may turn out to be the biggest U.S. battle in
the war to date.
Prime Minister Ky told me at Tay Ninh today that he believes there are two NVN
divisions in SVN and that "they will keep on sending divisions down until the line of
communication is cut".
2. Basic political
Today I went to Tay Ninh where Prime Minister Ky officially inaugurated a GVN
program whereby about 700,000 acres of state-owned land goes to about 180,000 farmers.
Communism took over China largely on the strength of the slogan "land to the tiller." In
Tay Ninh I saw this slogan actually being carried out. I know of your long-standing
interest in this and, as you know, the U.S. has helped a great deal. To me this is a concrete
example of what we mean by "true revolution".
The number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program again increased over last week's
figure. Analysis of police arrest figures for the first week of November showed a
downward trend in the number of deserters and draft dodgers apprehended and an increase
in the number of suspected VC and illegal residents rounded up.
3. Economic
For the second successive week prices declined in Saigon, notably in pork, fish, charcoal
and rice--the things the masses consume. Rice is actually below last year's level. This is in
particular a vindication of our rice policy and in general none of the above would have
been possible without U.S. help--and heroic measures in which many hardworking
Washington officials can take pride.
4. Pacification--"Rural Construction"
Minister Thang of "Rural Construction" traveled to I, II and IV Corps to meet new and
provisional rural construction committees consisting of Corps and Divisional
Commanders and Province Chief. He urged realistic planning, stimulation of local
initiative, teamwork between military and civilians and, above all, response to the needs
and aspirations of the people. He wants elections for executive leadership in the villages
to be held as soon as there is freedom from intimidation. He shows marked enthusiasm
and verve in all of this.
Thang is also working on creating groups (cadre) which can go into the village and stay
indefinitely, capable of self-defense.
I now have learned that his two top priority objectives will be eight villages each in
Quang Nam and Binh Dinh. The talk now is of a team of 60 men for each village of which
the 40 man political action team will be the nucleus. These estimates and plans change all
the time as they learn more about the realities, I report it as I learn about it.
My feeling about pacification is two-fold: that we are certainly on the right track and all
too often, that the train isn't moving. And then I think of the unfortunate results of going
too fast and of striving for flashy effects as the Vietnamese are all too prone to do. I also
recall that Minister Thang is not impulsive and is a careful, thorough, though energetic,
man. And I conclude that maybe we can't go much faster at this stage.
Lodge
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6AA, High
Level Comments re Bombing Pauses. No classification marking.
I think you will want to look at this memorandum from George Ball/2/ on the subject you
charged us to study in our meeting last week./3/ It may help you to decide whether you
need a meeting on this subject tomorrow or Friday.
/2/The Top Secret attachment was not seen by Johnson until November 28, after it was
resubmitted by McGeorge Bundy on November 27; see Document 208.
As you will see on pages 8 and 9,/4/ the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State
come out on opposite sides, and for very good reasons. The man who has to present next
year's defense budget will want to have made a last full try. The man who has to cope
with an effort by the Communists to embarrass us by ambiguous responses to a pause
tends to be against it. (Schoenbrun's story today about the North Vietnamese feelers to the
French is an example of what we could expect in spades in a new pause.)
/4/Pages 8 and 9 of Tab A to Document 208 comprise Section IV.
My own judgment is marginally against the pause, perhaps because I am more concerned
with the diplomatic aspects than with the military budget. But I also have some feeling
that if we pause, we may seem to admit that our bombing is the cause of the trouble, and
this is simply not so. This is a matter which we can brood over without a meeting for
another few days--if you wish--but it is of such importance that I feel an obligation to
submit it to you now.
McG.B./5/
203. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

Rio de Janeiro, November 18, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Immediate;
at 10:13 a.m.
Secto 16. Eyes only for the President and the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. I
deeply regret that I am not in Washington to assist in handling press problems deriving
from Sevareid story./2/ Here are my comments and suggestions as seen from here. You
may wish to draft a suggested statement for me to make, taking into account issues which
have been raised up there.
/2/In the November 30 issue of Look magazine (on the newstands by November 16) Eric
Sevareid wrote an account of a conversation with Adlai Stevenson, held just 2 days before
Stevenson died. Sevareid's article, entitled "The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai
Stevenson," claimed that U.N. Secretary-General Thant obtained agreement from North
Vietnam in early autumn 1964 to send an emissary to Rangoon to discuss with U.S.
representatives possible peace terms. According to the Sevareid article, "someone in
Washington" insisted on postponing the meeting until after the Presidential election.
When the matter was pursued after the election, Sevareid stated that Hanoi was still
willing to talk, but McNamara was opposed to the idea. Thant supposedly offered to let
Washington write the terms of a cease-fire, but McNamara turned him down and Rusk did
not respond.
1. I am confident that Adlai Stevenson would not have written the Look article./3/ That is
why he put his talk off the record. Nor am I confident that the article fairly represents the
long conversation. I do not suggest we get into a pitched battle with Sevareid on veracity
when the referee is dead. But I note that Sevareid did not report his conversation as a
working reporter through his normal channel (television) but wrote a special article for
which he probably received a very substantial fee. Under these circumstances, such an
article is not likely to avoid the temptation of dramatic effect. But those of us who have
spent long hours over a period of many years with Adlai know that one of his charms was
a touch of Hamlet. On the subject of resigning, he and I had just had a long talk before his
departure for Europe about his plans and arrangements and travel for the rest of the year
and the handling of the General Assembly. He was reluctant to accept the job in
December 1960 and every few months since then said something about perhaps staying
through the "next General Assembly."
/3/Ball discussed the Sevareid article on the telephone with Yost, Goldberg, Rusk, and
McGeorge Bundy on the morning of November 17. Transcripts of Ball's telephone calls of
9:15 (with Yost), 10:45 (Goldberg), 11 (Rusk), 11 (Yost), and 11:15 a.m. (McGeorge
Bundy) are in the Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations,
Vietnam.
2. On the Hanoi matter, my recollection is that there was some discussion of some such
contact before November but I would have to check my own calendar for my own visits to
New York and Adlai's visits to Washington to help my memory./4/
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 957-958.
3. At no time did Adlai Stevenson and I talk about this problem in connection with the US
election. We discussed (a) the third-hand nature of the contact and U Thant's warning that
Soviet official representatives in New York and Washington were not informed; (b) the
absence of any indication as to substance; (c) the difficulties of contact in a relatively
small country where diplomatic representatives are under many eyes; (d) the negative
results of other contacts of which we were then aware.
4. You might consider, after checking with Paul Martin, surfacing the timing of the first
Seaborn contact in Hanoi. The Canadians have already surfaced a part of them and the
negative reactions which Seaborn encountered were a part of this problem.
5. Most compelling concern in my own mind was the possibility of a trap in the absence
of any indication of a forthcoming attitude on any point of substance. I was concerned that
bilateral contact in Rangoon would be made the basis for spreading the word among the
South Vietnamese that the US was dickering for a settlement behind the backs of Saigon.
Recalling the then situation in Saigon, this could well have been disastrous.
6. In diplomacy there is a difference between rejecting a proposal and not accepting it.
This is illustrated by Stevenson's remark to Cleveland about "there may be a time--but not
now." I did not think that we should use this particular channel at that time but, on the
other hand, did not wish to foreclose that or any other channel for the future. This
distinction was made to U Thant but was apparently lost on him.

7. Bob McNamara had nothing whatever to do with these particular conversations. Why
Adlai Stevenson (or Sevareid) attributed a negative reaction to him is beyond my
comprehension.
8. I recall that Stevenson and I together had a brief exchange with U Thant on this matter
but I would have to check my calendar carefully to try to identify the date. In that
conversation, I affirmed to U Thant our interest in a peaceful settlement and suggested to
him that he use the same channel to probe the substance. He was very reluctant to do so
and I do not wish to get into the problem of veracity with U Thant with Stevenson no
longer here.
9. The President and I early this year discussed one aspect of this matter on which I
believe an error was made and by me. U Thant, Stevenson and I were so concerned with
secrecy that neither Stevenson nor I kept a written account of the conversations of last
year. The President quite rightly suggested that anything in the nature of proposals
coming from or through Stevenson be reduced to writing and that our response and
reaction also be in writing in order to avoid misunderstanding.
10. U Thant's own recollections as reflected in Tosec 39/5/ seem to remove the idea that
we on our side discussed this in relation to our elections although apparently he himself
took such elections into account.
/5/In Tosec 39, November 18, the Department of State reconstructed the Rusk-U Thant
discussions from August 1964 to March 1965 on the Secretary-General's suggestion that
the United States and the DRV meet in Rangoon to discuss peace in Vietnam. Ball told
Rusk that the "highest authority" wanted Rusk's "best recollection of private talks with
Stevenson on this subject," as well as any comments on modification of the reconstructed
chronology. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam--U Thant)
11. I would have to say that neither U Thant nor Stevenson would lose the chance to
believe that peace was about to break out and that they themselves had played an
important part in it. But I would add that, at the time, Adlai did not express disagreement
to me but seemed fully in accord with the idea that the possibility should be left open but
that it should not be acted upon under the then existing circumstances.
12. It might be well to review the chronology of Hanoi's attitude beginning with their
contempt for the Laos Agreements of 1962. It is ridiculous to suppose that Hanoi's
attitude toward continuing or stopping the war turned upon whether one particular channel
out of all of the channels which have been attempted was to be used. They have had
literally dozens of opportunities to bring this matter to discussion or conference. Instead,
they continue their infiltration, including regular army units, and have been resistant to
suggestions for a peaceful settlement which have come to them even from within the
Communist world.
13. Please let me know whether you think it is well for me to make a statement on this
subject. I am appalled that Eric Sevareid would feel that the off-the-record nature of this
discussion was canceled by Stevenson's death. But, I would have to say in his behalf that
under the circumstances of off the record, Adlai could say things, as a scintillating
conversationalist, which he himself would not say under conditions of complete context
and responsibility.
Rusk
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Pt.
SUBJECT
The Status of Non-Military Actions in Vietnam
Attached is our status report for non-military programs covering roughly the past five
weeks./2/ It may provide the President with a useful feel for what we've been doing.
/2/Not printed. Bundy sent the report to the President under cover of a note that reads: "If
you have time for it, this report on the non-military program in Vietnam is worth your
attention--this continues to be our toughest long-range set of problems, in spite of all the
headlines." There is an indication on the covering memorandum that the President saw it.
(Ibid.)
The very nature of the non-military struggle in Vietnam is such that we cannot
realistically expect dramatic progress from one month to the next. During the past month
there have been some concrete results and advances. Both our own efforts and those of the
Vietnamese have been impressive, but these efforts must be measured against a backdrop
of enormous economic, social, political and security problems. Much is being done. Much
more has yet to be done.
At the national level, the most encouraging sign continues to be the growing
responsiveness of the GVN leadership to the requirements in this field and its willingness
to take new initiatives. This constructive attitude is particularly evident in the areas of
pacification program planning, rural reconstruction, labor relations, land reform. But this
is but a first step. New programs must be implemented, enlarged, and sustained over the
long run. The capabilites of the GVN to perform well here have yet to be proven. Its
appeal and ties with the people, especially the peasantry, remain tenuous.
At the GVN working level, the picture continues to be a dismal one of too much
corruption, too little motivation. At the grass-roots level there continues to be decreasing
effectiveness of local government. However, the GVN, supported by Ky personally, is
giving renewed attention to this critical problem. Moreover, USAID efforts to improve the
flow of funds to rural construction operations appear to be having positive results. It is the
Mission intention, of course, to see that this attitude and trend continue and improve.
The most critical immediate problem is the inflation which could undo the good effects of
all our programs. This is being tackled vigorously not only on the monetary front, but by
increasing the supplies of essential goods to areas outside of Saigon. Another critical
problem, one that does not come through a program-by-program report, is the growing
scarcity of manpower and materials in Vietnam. This is a matter calling for a
comprehensive program review both here in Washington and in Saigon. You will be
hearing more on this subject shortly.
C
205. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Drafted by William Bundy and described on the source text as "Final Draft." The
President was at the LBJ Ranch in Texas November 19-December 12.
We have now done a careful official translation of the letter which Fanfani addressed to
you through Ambassador Goldberg, on which Goldberg informed Valenti. Text is as
follows:
Begin text
New York, November 20, 1965.
The President of the General Assembly
Mr. President:
In the interview which you graciously accorded me at the end of May you repeated anew
your firm intention to seek assiduously a negotiated solution for the conflict in Vietnam.
In the hope of being able to assist in the realization of this noble purpose, I bring to your
attention the following:
On Thursday, November 11, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and the President of the Council,
Van Dong, expressed to two persons (known to me) the strong desire to find a peaceful
solution to the conflict in Vietnam and, in summary, stated--according to what they wrote
me--that "in order for the peace negotiations to come about, there will be necessary (a) a
cease-fire (by air, by sea, by land) in the entire territory of Vietnam (north and south); the
cessation, that is, of all belligerent operations (including therefore also the cessation of
debarkation of further American troops); (b) a declaration according to which the Geneva
Agreements of 1954 will be taken as the basis for the negotiations--a declaration made up
of the four points formulated by Hanoi, points that are in reality the explanation of the
Geneva text and which, therefore, can be reduced to a single point: application in other
words, of the Geneva Accords."
The text of the communication which I have received adds that "the Government in Hanoi
is prepared to initiate negotiations without first requiring actual withdrawal of the

American troops."
To the same interlocutors Ho Chi Minh said: "I am prepared to go anywhere; to meet
anyone."
These are the essential points that one of the two interlocutors of Ho Chi Minh and Van
Dong sent me in writing last night and which, in this letter of mine--confided to Mr. A.
Goldberg, the US representative to the UN, so that he can deliver it promptly and
confidentially--I bring word for word to your attention.
You surely have other elements by which to judge the importance of the above. As
President of the 20th Assembly, as a high official of Italy, as a sincere friend of the United
States and of yourself, I hope that this contribution to the sought-for peaceful solution,
always more necessary and more urgent, may be a useful one. And I am at your
disposition for any step that you consider opportune in the matter.
With sincere pleasure at your recovery and with best wishes for your high mission, I send
my respectful greetings.
Yours,
(Signed) Amintore Fanfani
The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States
Washington
End text
As we read the message, it represents a simple restatement of the familiar Hanoi position.
Although worded in the most palatable form possible, the second of the stated
requirements for peace negotiations amounts simply to our accepting in principle the
familiar Hanoi four points, the third of which required the establishment, under the NLF
program, of an immediate coalition government in Saigon in which the NLF would play a
leading and probably dominant role. We have never accepted this as a basis for
negotiations, and never could without surrendering the most crucial of our objectives.
The language about a "cease-fire" has never been expressed in quite this way before, but
would amount to an immediate ban on our air operations in the North and on our
continuing ground reinforcements, without any compensating act by Hanoi whatever in
the form of stopping infiltration, reducing activity in the South, and withdrawing at least
regular units. As you know, we have repeatedly told Hanoi through third parties that we
cannot consider even stopping the bombing without compensating action in these three
areas, and we have in effect said the same thing publicly in more general form.
Accordingly, the message in substance adds up to a reiteration of a firm and inflexible
Hanoi position consistent with all our other readings. It corresponds closely with what
several third parties have told us of the position asserted by Ho and Pham Van Dong, and
also with Hanoi's most recent public statements. The only possible glimmer of light is that
Hanoi would not insist on prior withdrawal of US forces--but this too we have long
believed they would not press for in the last analysis, and a similar statement was
conveyed to us explicitly when the North Vietnamese approached the French just at the
end of the pause last May./2/
I have consulted with Bob McNamara and Mac Bundy, and it is our recommendation that
you approve an instruction to Ambassador Goldberg to discuss the matter promptly and
fully with Fanfani along the following lines:
a. Thank him profusely for his helpful effort.
b. Explain carefully the generally familiar nature of the message and its unacceptable
elements.
c. Make clear that we would be most interested in pursuing the matter, in any appropriate
way, if Fanfani's sources should be in a position to indicate, on the basis of a report which
Fanfani might make to them, that there is some new light or some change in the
unacceptable elements, which in effect amount to a reiteration of preconditions for any
useful discussion.
So that the record would be left in no doubt whatever, we have worked out with
Ambassador Goldberg an informal written aide-memoire/3/ that would be left with
Fanfani to supplement Ambassador Goldberg's oral presentation and to provide a
complete record, for future reference both to Fanfani and to ourselves.
/3/The aide-memoire was approved by Rusk on November 29 in the form of a letter from
Rusk to Fanfani, December 4. (Memorandum from David H. Popper (IO) to Rusk;
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The letter is printed in American
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 918-919. William Bundy prepared a draft
aide-memoire for Fanfani, November 22. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D
412, Vietnam Negotiations, Fanfani) Goldberg prepared a revised version on November
24. (Ibid.)
206. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State

Ball and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, November 23, 1965, 10:10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam.
McN said he had talked to the President about one aspect without consulting B because
McN felt he knew how B stood. The Chiefs have been coming to a boiling point on
bombing Haiphong. McN felt it would be wise to insure that Chiefs' views got to the
President if Wheeler saw the President. Wheeler saw the President the day before the
[he?] left. Wheeler got the impression from the President he favored bombing (POL?) and
asked that Wheeler and McN come forward with a joint recommendation. McN said that
he had briefly warned the President not to do it at this time. However, because of this
feeling, McN thought he had better talk to the President himself. McN told the President
on his own long-run program it would be some time in February and didn't see any
objection in bringing it forward at the present time. He told him he knew State felt
strongly opposed; that he thought McG leaned against it; and that he (McN) was not
prepared to recommend it at this time. He didn't feel strongly about changing it from
February to December. Said he would be willing to wait until Rusk's return, at which time
they would discuss it. McN said that he did not tell the President his own
recommendation--an installation of four to six weeks, with several bridges (7-9) and let
them hit four of them, plus the surface-to-air missile support facilities. B replied that he
would look at this with Bill.
McN continued we have to decide what to do in Phase II. He believes we should put the
troop strength and financial requirements into our budget; and, assuming the President
does not want to make a firm commitment to the end of Phase II, we should begin
shipping the troops in the battalion against that schedule in January, without commitment
to go beyond a month--unless the President wants to make a stronger recommendation. B
replied that this was his interpretation. McN said on this basis, he would be stopping in
Saigon on his way back from Paris./2/ He had spoken briefly to the Secretary on this
before he left. He was in favor; and the President is in favor of it. McN said he didn't
know when we wanted to get Lodge back; since we face the decision to make it would be
helpful to sit down with Westmoreland. The President doesn't want a Honolulu meeting or
Lodge and Westmoreland both in Washington at the same time. For this reason, the best
substitute would be for McN to visit Saigon on the way home. He would plan to be there
24 hours. This raises the problem of transportation. Does B want him to send a plane to
pick him up in Paris? B replied that he would plan to go to Paris with McN (from London)
and from there come back to Washington commercially.
/2/McNamara was in Paris for the November 27 meeting of the Special Committee of
NATO Defense Ministers. He was in Saigon November 28-29. For McNamara's
recommendations to the President after his trip to Saigon, see Document 212.
McN asked if B wanted to meet tomorrow or Thursday to talk about our approach to
Wilson. B replied this could perhaps be done on the plane going over. However, he is
available should McN wish to do it before that. McN replied they could decide this
tomorrow.
McN said he would draft a cable to Lodge telling him of his plans; would let B see it
before it is sent./3/
207. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International

Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam Negotiations,
Fanfani. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson and William Bundy.
SUBJECT
Goldberg Meeting with Fanfani
Goldberg saw Fanfani this afternoon (November 24) and informed him that we are
actively working on a response to his letter and that our answer would come soon. Fanfani
confirmed that one of his sources is Lapira. There are two other points of interest which
Fanfani mentioned to Goldberg. Fanfani said that one of the sources reported to him orally
that Ho Chi Minh said that he is so eager to get this settled that he would be willing even
to go to Washington. Fanfani also told Goldberg that both sources had told him orally that
their impression is that there is very deep suspicion in Hanoi of Peking.
Today's conversation between Goldberg and Fanfani is being reported to us more fully by
letter overnight./2/
/2/Letter from Yost to Sisco, November 25, attached to a memorandum from Sisco to
Rusk, November 26. (Ibid.)
IO--Joseph J. Sisco/3/
The Bombing Pause and the Diplomatic Peace Initiative.

November 17-December 31
Level Comments re Bomb Pauses. Top Secret; Sensitive. A note on the source text states
that this memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch in Texas at 8:30 p.m. on November
28, and there is an indication that the President saw it.
SUBJECT
Once more on the pause
This is such an important question that I think you may want to look at it once again. Bob
McNamara and I have the impression that your mind is settling against a pause, but we
both believe that the matter is too important to be decided without making sure that the
question has been explored to your satisfaction. I have mentioned our concern to Dean
Rusk and while he is still against a pause at present, he has encouraged me to raise the
matter with you once more.
On November 17 I sent forward a memorandum from George Ball to you/2/ which
outlined a scenario for a pause, and gave the pros and cons. The scenario is out of date,
but the pros and cons are still pretty solid, and I attach them at Tab A, together with the
conclusions and recommendations then reached by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State.
/2/For the covering memorandum, see Document 202.
In the last ten days, one or two additional considerations have developed.
First, the Sevareid episode,/3/ rightly or wrongly, has strengthened the impression among
critics at home that we have not gone the full distance in seeking negotiations. There is
now increased value in proving our good faith by a new pause.
Second, Westmoreland's recommendations for 1966 deployments have increased, and the
fighting in the Plei Me area shows that we may have to look forward to a pretty grim
year./4/ This again strengthens the argument for one further demonstration that our
determination to seek peace is equal to our determination on the battlefield.
/4/On October 19, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces attacked a Special Forces
camp at Plei Me, 25 miles southwest of Pleiku, beginning a month-long campaign that
pitted U.S. and ARVN troops against VC/NVN forces. On November 14, the campaign
culminated in a battle in the Ia Drang Valley when elements of the U.S. First Cavalry
Division engaged VC/NVN troops in more than division strength in the fiercest fighting
of the war to date. On November 22, Westmoreland informed CINCPAC that because of
the influx of North Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam, he would require a minimum
of 13 additional battalions and probably twice that amount. (COMUSMACV telegram
210122Z to CINCPAC, repeated to the White House; Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Cables)
Third, McNamara's budget shows that the alarming figure he mentioned at the Ranch may
turn out to be an understatement. Thus the argument for preceding that budget request by
one or more peaceful effort is strengthened.
Fourth, there is growing evidence that we can count on quiet but strong Soviet diplomatic
support in pushing Hanoi toward the conference table during another pause. At the
minimum, a pause will certainly intensify dissension between Peking and Moscow, with
Hanoi in the middle. Moreover Dobrynin said to me that they were thinking of a pause of
only 12-21 days./5/
/5/The last sentence of the paragraph is in Bundy's handwriting. He is referring to a
conversation with Dobrynin on November 24. In a November 24 memorandum to the
President, Bundy described the conversation as "the most candid and cordial conversation
of our three-year acquaintance." Bundy related that Dobrynin "expressed again the well-
known Soviet view that a renewed and longer pause would be helpful." Dobrynin
suggested a pause of 12 to 20 days to allow for intense diplomatic effort, but offered no
advance assurances of the results of such discussions. Dobrynin repeated the observation
that it was impossible for North Vietnam to negotiate while under U.S. bombardment.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memos of
Conversation, 1964-1966)
Finally, it is clear from the McNamara/Ball discussions in London/6/ that Prime Minister
Wilson has some new Vietnam gambit up his sleeve which he means to discuss with you
on December 17./7/ (He has not said what it is.) We will spike his guns and those of
everyone else like him if we have a pause in effect at the time of his visit.
/6/No records of these conversation have been found.
Thus, both the domestic and the international arguments for a pause seem to me
substantially stronger than they were two weeks ago, and on balance my own judgment
has shifted over toward McNamara. I think that any pause should be very hard-nosed, and
we should expect that it will not lead to negotiations, but it will strengthen your hand both
at home and abroad as a determined man of peace facing a very tough course in 1966. It is
quite true, as I have argued before, that the bombing is not what started the trouble, but it
is also true that we have a great interest in proving our own good faith as peace lovers.
I also think that the diplomatic risks can be minimized by firmness and clarity about what
we are doing, and that hardline criticism at home can be answered by what is done after
the pause ends.
Do you want further work from Rusk and McNamara on this?/8/
/8/The source text does not indicate the President's decision on this question.
McG. B.
Tab A/9/
/9/Top Secret. As Bundy noted in the covering memorandum, this attachment comprises
sections III and IV of a November 17 memorandum from Ball to the President. Section I
was entitled "Basic Elements of a Second Pause," and section II was "Possible Date-Time
Scenario of a Second Pause." Section III, printed here, was entitled "Pros and Cons of a
Second Pause." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President,
McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII)
III.
PROS AND CONS
Pros
The principal arguments for a pause are:

1. A pause could lead to either successful negotiations or a tapering off of military action
in South Viet-Nam. Although the odds of this happening at this time may be long, the
stake is high enough to justify the risks involved. It seems quite clear that the other side
does not believe it can agree to negotiations or a cessation of military action while the
bombing continues and we cannot know whether or not they desire a settlement until we
try them out by a pause. Even if this pause does not bring about the desired result, it can
set the stage for a later pause which may bring the desired result.
2. The President's offer of unconditional negotiations greatly strengthened our position
throughout the world. A pause can have a similar effect by taking away from the other
side the one valid argument they have against negotiations.
3. American casualties are mounting and further involvement appears likely. A pause can
demonstrate that the President has taken every possible means to find a peaceful solution
and obtain domestic support for the further actions that we will have to take.
4. There are already signs of dissension between Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and the Viet
Cong. The pause is certain to stimulate further dissension on the other side and add to the
strains in the Communist camp as they argue about how to deal with it.
5. A pause could reduce the likelihood of further Soviet involvement. It would not only
help to convince Moscow that we genuinely desire a settlement but would also decrease
the ability of Hanoi or Peking to bring pressure upon the Soviet Union for escalating their
support.
6. Judging by experience during the last war, the resumption of bombing after a pause
would be even more painful to the population of North Viet-Nam than a fairly steady rate
of bombing.
7. The resumption of bombing after a pause, combined with increased United States
deployments in the South, would remove any doubts the other side may have about U.S.
determination to stay the course and finish the job.
Cons
The principal arguments against a pause are:
1. Although Hanoi has repeatedly stated that it cannot "negotiate" as long as the bombing
goes on, there is no indication whatever from Hanoi that a pause would lead to
meaningful negotiations or actions. Hanoi's continued military reinforcement of the South,
plus what Hanoi undoubtedly considers a still weak security and political situation in the
South, add up to what appears to be a very small chance that a pause would produce a
constructive response.
2. Hanoi's objective with respect to the bombing is not a "pause," but rather a complete
cessation. They could be expected to do all in their power to exploit a pause, not to move
toward an acceptable settlement, but to prevent our resumption of bombing and cause us
to lose the one card that we have which offers any hope of a settlement that does more
than reflect the balance of forces on the ground in the South.

3. Regardless of any resolve we have made beforehand, a unilateral pause at this time
would give Hanoi an excellent chance to interpose obstacles to our resumption of
bombing and to demoralize South Viet-Nam by indefinitely dangling before us (and the
world) the prospect of negotiations with no intent of reaching an acceptable settlement.
For example, they could offer to enter into negotiations on condition that the bombing not
be resumed and that the Viet Cong be seated at the conference on a basis of full equality
with the Government of Viet-Nam. As it would not be possible to accept this latter
condition, they could place us in the position of having resumed the bombing over a
"procedural" question with respect to a conference. Thus, in the absence of any expression
of interest or intent on their part to move toward a settlement that we would find
satisfactory, the other side could at this time use a pause to reverse the present
international situation, which is very favorable to us.
4. There is danger that, in spite of any steps we may take to offset it, Hanoi may misread a
pause at this time as indicating that we are giving way to international and domestic
pressures to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam and that our resolve with respect to
South Viet-Nam is thus weakening.
5. Resumption of the bombing following a pause of considerable duration would assume a
much more dramatic character than otherwise and could present the Soviets with those
difficult choices that we have heretofore been successful in avoiding presenting to them.
6. Apart from the foregoing considerations, it will at this time be very difficult to obtain
GVN acquiescence to a pause and could adversely affect the tenuous stability of the
present government. Any overturn of the present government in South Viet-Nam could set
us back very severely. Even if we obtained the acquiescence of the GVN, it would be very
difficult to obtain their continued cooperation, particularly in public statements,
throughout the duration of the pause.
IV.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Secretary of Defense believes that a pause, with the associated obvious efforts to
bring the DRV to a settlement, should be carried out. His main reason is (1) to lay a
foundation, especially in the minds of the American people and of our allies, for the
increased U.S. deployments, casualties, costs and risks that are in prospect. He believes
also (2) that a pause now has a bare chance of starting a chain reaction toward a
settlement. He thinks that, before intensifying the military confrontation and risks in VietNam, the United States should make every effort to back the DRV/VC down by other
means.
Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense believes (3) that, even if a pause does not produce
the full result this time, it would contribute toward a settlement later--that the "tacit
bargaining" process with the Communists will probably involve several stages before the
DRV/VC sights are brought down to a "settlement level" and that a pause now, even if the
bombing must be resumed, will contribute to that end.
The Secretary of State feels the balance of arguments is against undertaking a pause at the
present time and that a pause should be considered only at such times as the chances
appear to be greater than they now seem that it would lead in the direction of a peaceful
settlement acceptable to us.
The Secretary of State thus recommends that we continue our discussions with the other
side through all possible channels, particularly exploring "what would happen" if there is
a pause in the bombing. If such probes at any time give firm indications of a response by
specific and acceptable actions on the part of Hanoi, a pause should then be undertaken.
This is also entirely consistent with our public position and maintains what he feels is our
present favorable international posture.
George W. Ball
Acting Secretary

the President's Special Assistant (Valenti)/1/
November 28, 1965, 2:05 p.m.
classification marking. Secretary Rusk was in Washington; Valenti was in Texas.
TELEPHONE CALL TO VALENTI (AT THE RANCH)
Sec. said he couldn't reach McGeorge Bundy; wanted to find out whether a copy of the
memorandum of conversation between B. and Dobrynin/2/ had reached the President. V.
said it was on the President's desk now. Sec. said to tell the President that he thinks
references in there to a pause are very important and that it seems to him that it would be
useful to have McNamara bring Amb. Lodge back with him so we can go into this matter
a bit;/3/ a time problem involved because McNamara might be leaving Saigon tonight.
Sec. asked that the President him [give] him a ring or the Sec. will check in with him in an
hour or two.
/3/According to telegram 1484 to Saigon for McNamara, November 28, the President did
not wish Lodge to return with McNamara after the latter's trip to Saigon November 28-29.
This did not preclude the possibility of Lodge returning to Washington in the near future.
(Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 OSD)

Department of State
Washington, DC
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Exdis.
Several representatives of the American Friends Service Committee called this morning
on Mr. Unger to recount a conversation which one of them, Mr. Lewis Schneider, had on
November 16/2/ in Paris with Mai Van Bo, DRV commercial representative. This
conversation suggested that the North Vietnamese position is considerably more flexible
than we have heretofore been led to believe; it is of course difficult to evaluate how much
was being said for the benefit of an American group which does not support the war in
Viet Nam and how much represents approved DRV policy.
/2/NB--Two days before last XYZ--BHR" [Footnote in the source text in Read's hand.
Regarding the November 18 conversation with Mai Van Bo, see Document 185.]
The following are the principal points made by Mai Van Bo in the Paris conversation (a
full account is in course of preparation):/3/
1. Mai Van Bo accepted that the United States for reasons of face could not accept North
Viet-Nam's four points and said that all that would be required to open the way to
negotiations would be a clear statement by the United States in support of the principles of
the Geneva Accords of 1954.
2. The withdrawal of American forces is not a prerequisite to negotiations; all that is
required is a U.S. statement accepting the principle of withdrawal of US forces,
presumably eventually.
3. The DRV will not agree to a ceasefire. Mr. Schneider also did not remember any
reference to a cessation of the U.S. bombing of the North./4/
/4/Mai Van Bo also mentioned the possibility, instead of a ceasefire, of a mutual deescalation of military actions but did not indicate how this might be brought
about." [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Mai Van Bo said the DRV was prepared to make an important concession in that it was
ready to accept the existence of two separate Viet-Nams, with South Viet-Nam as an
independent country.
5. The DRV is prepared to talk with the U.S. but not with the Government in Saigon. On
the other hand there are acceptable individuals outside the NLF (and possibly including
some people presently in the Government) who could constitute a group which could be
represented in the negotiations. Interestingly, Mai Van Bo stated that the DRV would
have been prepared to negotiate with the Diem Government but it does not recognize its
successors as governments.
6. Mai Van Bo said nothing about next steps. In answer to Mr. Unger's question, the
Friends left open the possibility of their carrying the dialogue farther forward, although
this point was not pursued.
The AFSC called on Mai Van Bo for the purpose of asking whether North Viet Nam
would permit the Friends to carry on humanitarian, civilian relief activities there. Mai Van
Bo's answer on this is being awaited. The Friends realize of course that there would be
questions about licensing goods to go to North Viet Nam and validation of passports for
any American Friends who would wish to participate.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted
by Lake and approved by Herbert Thompson of S/S on December 22. The source text is
labeled "Part II of II." The following note is typed at the top of the source text: "As
indicated in the attached letter to Mr. Schneider from Mr. Unger, subsequent accounts of
the conversation with Bo by Messrs. Mendel and Wood presented a less optimistic picture
of the possibility of the DRV's agreeing to talks." The letter, dated December 5, is ibid.
SUBJECT
Mr. Schneider's Conversation with Mai van Bo, DRV Commercial Representative at
Paris--Comments on Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Gilbert F. White, Professor in Department of Geography, University of Chicago;
Chairman of the Board, AFSC
Colin Bell, Executive Secretary, AFSC
Louis Schneider, Associate Executive Secretary for Program, AFSC
Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
W.A.K. Lake, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
1. Mr. Schneider said that Mai van Bo had made the following comments to him during
the course of a conversation on November 16 in Paris on the possibility of the American
Friends Service Committee's giving assistance to the people of North Viet-Nam:
(a) It might be difficult for the US to accept Pham van Dong's four points as a basis for
negotiations as it would entail a loss of face. Bo suggested that a U.S. declaration of

agreement with the principles of the Geneva Accords would be satisfactory to the DRV
Government as a basis for negotiations. In response to Mr. Schneider's question, Bo said
that the DRV would not demand the withdrawal of American forces as a precondition to
negotiations but would require that the US declare its agreement in principle to their
eventual withdrawal.
(b) Schneider raised the question of a ceasefire. Bo said that the DRV would not agree to
a ceasefire before negotiations began but gave the impression that the DRV would agree
to some sort of de-escalation.
(c) Bo said that the DRV would not negotiate with the present Saigon regime, although it
would have negotiated with the Diem Government. The successors to the Diem
Government were not representative. However, there were many good people in South
Viet-Nam, within and outside the National Liberation Front, from whom a group could be
formed with which the DRV would negotiate. It was Mr. Schneider's impression that Bo
might even have been suggesting that the US form such a group. (In response to Mr.
Unger's question, Mr. Schneider said Bo mentioned no names but did mention some
categories, including the Buddhists. He would check on what the other categories were.)
(d) Bo said that the DRV was prepared to accept the existence of an independent South
Viet-Nam, although they knew that this would not be in accordance with the Geneva
Accords.
(e) Mr. Schneider raised the question of an international body to guarantee a settlement.
Bo volunteered the thought that the best international supervisory body might be a
revitalized International Control Commission.
(f) Bo said that the North Vietnamese were fighting for their independence. They knew
what colonialism was like, as they had been fighting against it for a thousand years. Bo
made no specific mention of either the USSR or the CPR.
2. In response to Mr. Unger's questions, Mr. Schneider stated that he thought that Bo was
anxious to pass these thoughts on to an American and believed that Schneider would
forward them to the USG. Bo said nothing, however, about what steps could be taken by
the US to follow up on these statements, beyond his proposal that we declare our
agreement with the principles of the Geneva Accords and our acceptance of eventual
withdrawal of American forces. In response to Mr. Unger's specific question on whether
the Friends would carry the dialogue further with Bo, Dr. White said that the Friends
would try to be of assistance in any humanitarian way possible. They would prefer not to
allow their involvement in political questions prejudice the success of their non-political,
strictly humanitarian efforts, however. In response to further questions, Mr. Schneider
said that Bo did not mention how de-escalation could be achieved, any connection
between US bombing of North Viet-Nam and negotiations, or how the DRV assesses the
protest movement in the United States (beyond his remarks on Norman Morrison). Mr.
Schneider thought Bo understood well the fact that the AFSC was appealing to the DRV
as well as to the US to find a solution to the conflict.
3. Mr. Unger thanked Mr. Schneider for passing on this information, remarking that some
of it represented a change from previous DRV statements we had heard.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE, Primarily
McNamara's Recommendations re Strategic Actions. Top Secret. There is an indication
on the source text that the President saw the memorandum.
This is a supplement to my memorandum to you dated November 3./2/ This memorandum
incorporates the implications of events since then and information gained on General
Wheeler's and my visit with Ambassador Lodge, Admiral Sharp and General
Westmoreland in Vietnam on November 28-29./3/
/2/Document 189.
/3/This visit lasted 1-1/2 days. A copy of the extensive briefing paper by MACV for the
Secretary of Defense and General Wheeler, November 28, is in the National Defense
University, Taylor Papers, T-324-69.
1. Introductory comments. Before giving my assessment of the situation and
recommendations, I want to report that United States personnel in Vietnam are performing
admirably. The massive Cam Ranh Bay complex has sprung into operation since our last
visit in July; the troops that we visited (the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 1st Cavalry
Division) have fought and are fighting well and their morale is high; and the team in
Saigon is working harmoniously.
2. The situation. There has been no substantial change since my November 3
memorandum in the economic, political or pacification situation. There is a serious threat
of inflation because of the mixture of US force build-up and GVN deficit on the one hand
and the tightly stretched Vietnamese economy on the other; the Ky "government of
generals" is surviving, but not acquiring wide support or generating actions; pacification
is thoroughly stalled, with no guarantee that security anywhere is permanent and no
indications that able and willing leadership will emerge in the absence of that permanent
security. (Prime Minister Ky estimates his government controls only 25% of the
population today and reports that his pacification chief hopes to increase that to 50% two
years from now.)
The dramatic recent changes in the situation are on the military side. They are the
increased infiltration from the North and the increased willingness of the Communist
forces to stand and fight, even in large-scale engagements. The Ia Drang River Campaign
of early November is an example. The Communists appear to have decided to increase
their forces in South Vietnam both by heavy recruitment in the South (especially in the
Delta) and by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces from the North. Nine regular
North Vietnamese regiments (27 infantry battalions) have been infiltrated in the past year,
joining the estimated 83 VC battalions in the South. The rate of infiltration has increased
from three battalion equivalents a month in late 1964 to a high of 9 or 12 during one
month this past fall. General Westmoreland estimates that through 1966 North Vietnam
will have the capability to expand its armed forces in order to infiltrate three regiments
(nine battalion equivalents, or 4500 men) a month, and that the VC in South Vietnam can
train seven new battalion equivalents a month--together adding 16 battalion equivalents a
month to the enemy forces. Communist casualties and desertions can be expected to go up
if my recommendations for increased US, South Vietnamese and third country forces are
accepted. Nevertheless, the enemy can be expected to enlarge his present strength of 110
battalion equivalents to more than 150 battalion equivalents by the end of calendar 1966,
when hopefully his losses can be made to equal his input.
As for the Communist ability to supply this force, it is estimated that, even taking account
of interdiction of routes by air and sea, more than 200 tons of supplies a day can be
infiltrated--more than enough, allowing for the extent to which the enemy lives off the
land, to support the likely PAVN/VC force at the likely level of operations.
To meet this possible--and in my view likely--Communist build-up, the presently
contemplated Phase I forces will not be enough. Phase I forces, almost all in place by the
end of this year, involve 130 South Vietnamese, 9 Korean, 1 Australian and 34 US
combat battalions (approximately 220,000 Americans). Bearing in mind the nature of the
war, the expected weighted combat force ratio of less than 2-to-1 will not be good enough.
Nor will the originally contemplated Phase II addition of 28 more US battalions (112,000
men) be enough; the combat force ratio, even with 32 new South Vietnamese battalions,
would still be little better than 2-to-1 at the end of 1966. The initiative which we have
held since August would pass to the enemy; we would fall far short of what we expected
to achieve in terms of population control and disruption of enemy bases and lines of
communications. Indeed, it is estimated that, with the contemplated Phase II addition of
28 US battalions, we would be able only to hold our present geographical positions.
3. Military options and recommendations. We have but two options, it seems to me. One
is to go now for a compromise solution (something substantially less than the "favorable
outcome" I described in my memorandum of November 3), and hold further deployments
to a minimum. The other is to stick with our stated objectives and with the war, and
provide what it takes in men and materiel. If it is decided not to move now toward a
compromise, I recommend that the United States both send a substantial number of
additional troops and very gradually intensify the bombing of North Vietnam.
Ambassador Lodge, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland concur
in this pronged course of action, although General Wheeler and Admiral Sharp would
intensify the bombing of the North more quickly.
a. Troop deployments. With respect to additional forces in South Vietnam to maintain the
initiative against the growing Communist forces, I recommend:
1. That the Republic of Korea be requested to increase their present deployment of nine
combat battalions to 18 combat battalions (the addition of one division) before July 1966
and to 21 combat battalions (the addition of another brigade) before October 1966.
2. That the Government of Australia be requested to increase their present deployment of
one combat battalion to two combat battalions before October 1966.
3. That the deployment of US ground troops be increased by the end of 1966 from 34
combat battalions to 74 combat battalions.
4. That the FY '67 Budget for the Defense Department and the January Supplement to the
FY '66 Budget be revised to reflect the expansion of US forces required to support the
additional deployments.
The 74 US battalions--together with increases in air squadrons, naval units, air defense,
combat support, construction units and miscellaneous logistic support and advisory
personnel which I also recommend--would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to
approximately 400,000 by the end of 1966. And it should be understood that further
deployments (perhaps exceeding 200,000) may be needed in 1967.
b. Bombing of North Vietnam. With respect to the program of bombing North Vietnam, I
recommend that we maintain present levels of activity in the three quadrants west and
south of Hanoi, but that over a period of the next six months we gradually enlarge the
target system in the northeast (Hanoi-Haiphong) quadrant until, at the end of the period, it
includes "controlled" armed reconnaissance of lines of communication throughout the
area, bombing of petroleum storage facilities and power plants, and mining of the harbors.
(Left unstruck would be population targets, industrial plants, locks and dams.)
4. Pause in bombing North Vietnam. It is my belief that there should be a three- or fourweek pause in the program of bombing the North before we either greatly increase our
troop deployments to Vietnam or intensify our strikes against the North./4/ The reasons
for this belief are, first, that we must lay a foundation in the mind of the American public
and in world opinion for such an enlarged phase of the war and, second, we should give
North Vietnam a face-saving chance to stop the aggression. I am not seriously concerned
about the risk of alienating the South Vietnamese, misleading Hanoi, or being "trapped" in
a pause; if we take reasonable precautions, we can avoid these pitfalls. I am seriously
concerned about embarking on a markedly higher level of war in Vietnam without having
tried, through a pause, to end the war or at least having made it clear to our people that we
did our best to end it.
/4/My recommendation for a "pause" is not concurred in by Ambassador Lodge, General
Wheeler, or Admiral Sharp. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Evaluation. We should be aware that deployments of the kind I have recommended will
not guarantee success. US killed-in-action can be expected to reach 1000 a month, and the
odds are even that we will be faced in early 1967 with a "no-decision" at an even higher
level. My overall evaluation, nevertheless, is that the best chance of achieving our stated
objectives lies in a pause followed, if it fails, by the deployments mentioned above.
Robert S. McNamara
Washington, December 2, 1965, 8:34 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII,
Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Flash. Also from Califano and Moyers.
CAP 65799. We have been talking about Vietnam deployment recommendations for an
hour this afternoon, and think the following preliminary thoughts are worth reporting.
We accept for planning that Westmoreland's deployment recommendations should be
approved and that in all probability these deployments will take place in 1966. We do not
see any good way of second-guessing Westmoreland and McNamara, although we can
have a whack if you ask us to.
On this assumption, the December decisions seem to fall in four categories:
1. Proving that we have done everything that we could to move toward peace;
2. Preparing a solid base for the chosen level of later military action;
3. Building advance consensus for the probable budgetary consequences;
4. Balancing the size and energy of Westmoreland's effort by action to the limit on the
political, social and economic front in Vietnam.
Our preliminary thoughts on each of these follow:
1. Efforts for peace. We see four broad general possibilities here.
(1) First and most narrowly, we could make a high-level official gesture to Hanoi
proposing unconditional discussions at any one of a number of fixed times and dates and
places. One way of doing this would be to send Harriman to Paris to speak to Bo, since
Bo is the most visible representative of Hanoi in the West, and Harriman is your most
distinguished envoy of peace. We think this should probably be done privately for later
surfacing. But it could also be publicly announced if that seemed better. Even if Hanoi
unyielding, you will have made specific dramatic effort before Congress returns. Other
simultaneous messages to appropriate capitals should be going on during this effort.
(2) You can have a pause in bombing the north. Califano and Moyers think any such
pause should probably be very brief, while Bundy shares McNamara's feeling that if we
do, it should have a length of 3-4 weeks for international reasons. We all agree that such a
pause should be quite hard-nosed. We would make it very clear that we were doing it to
see whether there would be a response, and that in the absence of a response we would
keep a fully free hand. One strong argument for a pause is that we all expect that it will be
necessary to intensify the bombing substantially in 1966, and we will need to have shown
that this is the fault of others.
(3) We are in the Christmas season, and it is possible that you could declare a Christmas
armistice or ceasefire on a still wider basis, both in the north and in the south. Such a
moment of peace could be as short as Christmas day, or as long as three weeks, depending
on the balance of advantages and disadvantages. There are real difficulties with this
course in South Vietnam, but it has a certain Johnsonian scale. During such a pause our
men would of course be free to defend themselves and to reply sharply to any particular
attack.
(4) Our diplomatic position on the Geneva Accords and free elections and the eventual
future of Vietnam still lacks sharpness and punch. We think you should insist on a wholly
new level of directness and definition in our peace aims for your State of the Union
message.
2. Preparations for next military courses.
(1) Our principal preliminary thought here is that you might call Westmoreland back to
consult with you. The deepest domestic danger we see is from those who will charge us
with a no-win policy, and our best protection is that you and the responsible commander
are on all fours. Moreover, we all feel that reading Westmoreland through other men's
eyes--even the eyes of McNamara--is not good enough for a Commander-in-Chief facing
the decisions that are now before you. Understanding between you and Westmoreland will
also help in insuring that the Chiefs stay with us. Only Wheeler himself among them is as
broad gauged as Westmoreland.
(2) December should also include contingent decisions to make Westmoreland's
deployments and probably to intensify bombing in the north in 1966, unless peace breaks
out. Such preliminary decisions would help keep the Chiefs and other military on board
during any pause or ceasefire or diplomatic peace offensive.
(3) We would side strongly with McNamara--and might even go beyond him--in avoiding
any reserve call-up or other action not immediately required to meet Westmoreland's
needs. In other words, we would carry forward the principle of minimum necessary action
which you laid down in July.
3. Preparing the country for the FY-66 supplemental and the FY-67 budget.
(1) During this month, the military budget, as well as the civilian one, must be pushed
down as far as is consistent with both your basic programs and your ability to withstand
charges of concealment. In this connection we are exploring the manner in which the
Korean war was financed by Truman.
(2) As your budgetary decisions become clearer, more of the advance background notices
of the kind Moyers gave last week could be released to selected elements of the press.
(3) We should get the Business Council to support your budget and any related actions we
take as noninflationary, and we should get the top labor leaders to keep the labor
movement within economic guidelines.
(4) Before you make any dramatic decisions related to tax increases or even more drastic
anti-inflationary steps, people like Heller should be consulted, as well as your principal
economic advisers.
Peace steps, military preparations and overall budgetary/economic planning will require
most careful orchestration and a gradually growing process of public comment which we
should turn our way just as far as possible. It occurs to us that someone like David
Ginsburg might be called in to give full time to this problem, so that we get the speeches
and statements of support which we want all across the spectrum of opinion from Tom
Dewey to Walter Reuther.
These are just our preliminary thoughts. You will clearly need close consultation with
Rusk and McNamara before these bridges are crossed, and we think you may also need a
chance to talk with more detached advisers like Clifford and Fortas. And as you approach
final decisions, you will also want to consult Eisenhower and the Congressional
leadership.
Washington, December 3, 1965.
Cables. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The date-time-group on the source text is
illegible. An earlier draft indicates that the telegram was sent on December 3. (Ibid.)
CAP 65810. 1. In two meetings today,/2/ Rusk and McNamara have made significant
progress in clarifying their own thinking on Vietnam. So far they have concentrated
mainly on the actual course of war and diplomacy, and have not yet got deeply into the
critical questions of political management which Joe and Bill and I opened in our message
to you last night./3/ But I cannot disagree with their judgment that it is important to sort
out the military and diplomatic priorities.
/2/According to Rusk's Appointment Book, the Secretary met with McNamara, McGeorge
Bundy, and U. Alexis Johnson from 12:30 to approximately 3 p.m. Rusk also met with
McNamara, Vance, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy from 6:03 p.m. to
7:52 p.m. This telegram was apparently sent during the evening of December 3. (Ibid.)
/3/Document 213.
2. Today's discussions confirm the judgment that we shall almost surely wish to proceed
energetically on Westmoreland's course in South Vietnam. Thus all of us believe that we
should accept for planning purposes additional deployments averaging fifteen thousand a
month over the next year. It does not follow that we should announce a large lump sum
increase anytime soon. Indeed our preliminary judgment is that steady increase of
pressure on the ground should be as undramatic as possible--and of course should have as
many third country battalions as we can get (separate paper from McNaughton on this will
be in tomorrow's pouch)./4/
/4/Dated December 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam,
Vol. XLIII, Memos (A))
3. At the same time the two Secretaries do share increasing concern about possible
Chinese involvement. There will be a special briefing tomorrow morning/5/ at which they
will hear what Max Frankel has already been told. I continue to share Alex Johnson's view
that Chinese Communists will not fight for South Vietnam but only for what they regard
as survival of North Vietnam.
/5/Hughes and Whiting of INR briefed Rusk, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Thompson,
McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, and McGeorge Bundy beginning at 9:35 a.m. on

December 4 at the Department of State. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) No other record
of the briefing has been found.
4. The open question is the pause. The day's discussions here have increased support for
some form of pause. I will send a memo tomorrow developing pros and cons further,/6/
but the long and short of it is that we think the international advantages outweigh the
international traps. We also think that firm and steady action in the south, together with
public awareness of Chinese Communist danger, should keep most Americans in line with
any decision you take on this matter.
/6/Document 215.
5. We have agreed to make assignments for detailed planning documents in all relevant
fields in a further meeting tomorrow morning,/7/ and it is our current intention to have all
papers ready for discussion with you by the end of Monday,/8/ so that we could fly to you
on Tuesday if you wish. The controlling item in urgency here is the pause, because it will
require intensive diplomatic preparation in more than one capital if it is to have minimum
danger and maximum benefit.
/7/These assignments were probably made at the briefing by Hughes and Whiting
described in footnote 5 above.
/8/December 6.
6. Meetings today have shown the Secretary of State at his best in the leadership of a
complex discussion with a small group he knows well. At the direct request of the two
Secretaries, Califano and Moyers have not been included in these meetings, but I have
told the Secretaries that I think it important to keep them both fully informed of the course
of discussion separately, and both Secretaries have agreed. Both Joe and Bill have a deep
and penetrating understanding of your immediate interest, and together the three of us will
try to keep in touch with all aspects of the matter from your point of view. But the
Secretary of State feels that he has a direct instruction from you to operate this review and
my judgment, in which Moyers concurs, is he should run it his way unless you have other
instructions.
Bundy, Vol. XVII. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. There is an indication on the source
text that this memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch in Texas at 11 a.m. on
December 4, and that the President saw it.
1. I promised you yesterday a memorandum by this pouch on the pros and cons of the
pause as it now looks. This memorandum is a personal assessment for your interim
consideration. There should be a further paper with fairly general support within the
Administration by the end of the day on Monday./2/
/2/December 6; see Document 220.
2. The opinion in favor of a pause continues to grow here. This morning there seems to be
a favorable consensus among Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Ball, McNaughton, the Bundy
brothers, and Tommy Thompson. We think this is the best single way of keeping it clear
that Johnson is for peace, while Ho is for war. This has great advantages in balancing the
further military deployments and the big military budget. It has advantages with all third
countries, and perhaps particularly with the Soviet Union. Thompson points out that a
pause would greatly strengthen the Russian resolve to stand clear of our fighting in
Vietnam.
3. The pause also has an important political advantage which has only recently emerged in
our discussions. If a pause should lead to the conference table, it would mean that Hanoi
had given up one of its current conditions--which is the acceptance of the program of the
NLF (the Viet Cong). Thus such a move by Hanoi would drive a sharp wedge between
Hanoi and the Communists in South Vietnam. We know that it is just this kind of sell-out
that the southern Communists fear. Thus, a pause which led to negotiations could be
strongly defended in Saigon and with hard-liners at home as a very powerful instrument
of attack on Viet Cong morale--since all of our mounting pressures in the South would
still continue. Moreover, we are increasingly persuaded that there is no trap we cannot
manage in deciding when and how to end the pause. We would make it clear at every
stage that the continuation of the pause and its ending would both be governed by our
judgment on the continuing aggression from the North against the South. (To put it
another way, while a pause might lead to negotiations, we would never commit ourselves
to a permanent end of the bombing merely in return for a conference.) Thus either the
infiltration would stop, or we would have a perfectly legitimate and internationally
defensible reason for renewed bombing at a time of our choice.
4. We are not agreed here on the timing of a pause. Most of us have thought that it
probably ought to happen in December and early January, so that you could end it or not-as you chose--around the time of the State of the Union message. But we now think that
perhaps it could come later--and might even be a balancing element in your military
announcements for the effort in South Vietnam in January. This needs more thought.
5. The weaknesses of the pause are two--one international and one domestic:
The international danger is that it would simply shift the propaganda of soft-liners from
the bombing to the need to recognize the NLF. Our current line on this is fairly good--that
Hanoi can bring anyone it wants. But the pressure would grow to give some more explicit
recognition to people who "control one-half the country." This is exactly what we must
not do if we do not wish to lose the whole game in South Vietnam. But sooner or later we
are going to have to face this music, and perhaps it is not so bad to face it now during a
pause.
The domestic problem is more severe. The Joint Chiefs are now pressing very hard for
escalation of the bombing, and the whole American Right is likely to be tempted by the
argument that just at the moment of trial we are weakening in our support for our men in
Vietnam. McNamara can make a very convincing argument that the bombing in the North
is only marginally related to the fighting in the South--whether or not we escalate. But it is
hard to get certified military agreement to this proposition. Against this, of course, we
have the pronouncement of the National Council of Churches, but it is far from clear that
they really represent their congregations./3/
/3/On December 3, the general board of the National Council of Churches in Madison,
Wisconsin, released a policy statement that noted with approval the Johnson
administration's commitment to unconditional discussions with North Vietnam and its
policy of not bombing population centers. It also urged the President to take new
initiatives in seeking peace in Vietnam.
6. This is only a preliminary paper, but I think it does contain the central elements of what
will be the most urgent question before us when we meet with you.
McG. B.
216. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President
Johnson/1/
Memos (A). Secret.
Dear Mr. President:
I have today had a long conversation with Dean Rusk and George Ball regarding the
situation in Vietnam./2/ I know that you will be faced with some further difficult decisions
in the coming days ahead in light of the report made to you by Bob McNamara on his
recent trip. Dean and George will convey my views in detail to you at your meeting on
Tuesday./3/ However, I would like you to know that I strongly favor an early pause in the
bombing of North Vietnam, perhaps for 3 or 4 weeks, with a new indication of our
willingness to negotiate. I come to this conclusion even though I realize that there is risk
that if a pause leads to negotiation it would be difficult to resume bombing North Vietnam
as long as those negotiations continued.
/2/According to Rusk's Appointment Book, Rusk left the briefing by Hughes and Whiting
at 11:08 a.m. (see footnote 5, Document 214) for discussions with Goldberg and Sisco,
which lasted until 11:31 a.m. Rusk rejoined Goldberg, Sisco, and Ball from 12:30 to
12:55 p.m. (Johnson Library)
/3/December 7; see Document 223.
My reasons are as follows:
1. If further escalation is in prospect, such a move would help tremendously in carrying
world opinion with us.
2. From my talks with the Secretary General and with many UN delegations, I am
convinced that such action would be welcomed and strongly supported all over the world
as further confirmation of the earnestness and sincerity of the United States' determination
to leave no stone unturned in trying to move the Vietnam problem from the battlefield to
the conference table. A pause would be a concrete act adding immense reality and weight
to your statements calling for unconditional discussions. Such a decision, despite no
positive signals from the other side, would be viewed as an undisputed act of
statesmanship, an act only a great and strong nation could take.
3. The same is true as regards American domestic opinion. The recent statement of the
National Council of Churches is only one sign of mounting concern among responsible
citizens as a result of our increased commitment of manpower and the additional
American casualties being incurred. A pause would increase the confidence and assurance
of the preponderant majority of the American people that while we intend to honor our
commitments in Vietnam, you will exhaust every means to make our willingness to
negotiate unmistakably clear.
4. Such a proposal would put the Communists further to the test and would intensify
pressure on them to negotiate.
5. It would make it less difficult for the Soviets to abandon their present passive attitude
and actively to seek to bring Hanoi to the conference table, even in the face of continued
opposition from Peking. At least it would offer hope of a more fruitful Soviet-American
dialogue on this subject.
6. It would place Hanoi and Peiping in a defensive position in relation to the non-aligned
world; it would reassure our friends and supporters and reinforce their domestic position;
it would restore the initiative in this matter where it properly belongs, to the leader of the
greatest power in the world, the US.
The impact of such an announced pause would be enhanced if coupled with a strong
personal reaffirmation on your part of our willingness to go anywhere, at any time, at any
level, to negotiate. You might well link this with a restatement of our peace aims in
Vietnam.
If you approve this course of action, I would strongly urge you to make such an
announcement in the UN General Assembly, before the Assembly closes on December
21. This would have the maximum dramatic effect and would be consistent with your
desire to use the UN to the utmost.
I have set forth these views of mine which I strongly hold in rather brief and summary
fashion, but I shall be very glad to elaborate upon them if you so desire.
Respectfully submitted,
Arthur J. Goldberg/4/

Saigon, December 6, 1965.
at 12:41 a.m.
2024. Eyes only for Bundy.
1. Archbishop Palmas, the Apostolic Delegate, "bumped into" me at the garden party last
Sunday night celebrating the King of Thailand's birthday and immediately brought up the
matter of the Viet Cong wanting to see me with regard to ending the war./2/ He said:
2. Just as he and I had surmised, it has taken them one month to consult with each other.
The "former Minister" had called on Palmas last Wednesday or Thursday/3/ and had said:
/3/December 1 or 2.
3. The leaders of the VC with whom he is in touch had had a long discussion on just what
their terms for ending the war should be, and they have decided on three things:
4. First, the United States presence should remain in South Viet-Nam.
5. Second, the United States would guarantee the sovereignty of South Viet-Nam.
6. Third, there would be no negotiations with North Viet-Nam.
7. They also would send a man with "Ambassadorial" rank to see me who would have the
necessary letter of credentials.
8. Palmas added that his "former Minister" wept while talking about the sufferings of the
Viet Cong, and stressed the urgency of ending the war. He also said there was great alarm
among the VC about the entrance of the North Vietnamese troops into South Viet-Nam.
He implied that the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam have the same feelings about Hanoi that
Hanoi has about Peking.
9. The "former Minister" also said, according to Palmas, that those who say he and his
friends are pro-French "should remember that it is we who killed the French Vice Consul
Bion."
10. Palmas asked what I wanted to do when the "former Minister" came again and asked
whether I would receive him. I said I would like to know what his name was before I
could answer such a question, but that I would certainly "make some arrangement."
11. He asked me whether I would receive the representative of the Viet Cong. I said that if
he was of high rank--a true envoy plenipotentiary--that I would talk with him but that I
did not want to have them send a subordinate official to talk with me. Palmas said that he
had been assured that they would send a man "with ambassadorial rank."
12. Comment: This is a surprising development. I suspect this is a splinter group who will
not be able to end the war. But it may presage a real split within the VC. If they could end
the war, then we could not possibly ask for better terms. If I am in any doubt as to whether
the so-called representative is really senior or not, I will have an Embassy official talk to
him to verify that point. I am sure, however, that there is no use in any American here
other than me talking peace terms. Both my Residence and that of the Apostolic Delegate
are constantly watched, but I think I can find a place which is not watched and where I
can meet this man.
Lodge
218. Personal Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, December 6, 1965, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy, Notes for December 6, 1965. No
classification marking. These notes were handwritten by Bundy for his personal use. The
meeting was held in Rusk's conference room at the Department of State.
PARTICIPANTS
Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Vance, UA Johnson, McNaughton, WPB, Wheeler, Raborn,
Clifford, McG. B.
Rusk and McNamara state the current military program. Chiefs concur.
A. Scenario
A. Political and Social Action Program
Clifford wonders where the Hell we are going--further & further in with no prospect of a
return. Kind of war Mao Tse-tung would fight. But we must do the job--he is sure of that.
Can't we use Air Power & hold in defensive positions on ground. Without 600,000 ground
troops in jungle war. Clifford remembers Korea. Can we get to the same limited goal by
less costly means.
DR: retrospectively perhaps we should have done much more in 1961--maybe 200,000
men to cool 'em off quick.
Wheeler: We have got a real initiative. No one ever won anything by remaining on
defensive. We already are pouring air on in SVN--a quantum jump in air power.
DR: US people will do what has to be done if they are sure that everything possible is
being done.
Increasing non-military actions.
1. model provinces
2. education
3. health
4. civic action
5. progress toward elections
6. Private Foundation
Sargent Shriver to be deputy for Peace [of a] Southeast Asia Peace Agency.
Clifford's negative argument: 1. admit you're wrong. 2. they put you in a box if you ever
resume.
Wheeler: any substantial pause will allow them to repair & move. We've paid price once
in planes & pilots; we'll have to pay it again; violent reaction is possible in our own
public; the other side will get the wrong signal. Once you stop it's hard to start again &
you could shake GVN to its toenails.
If we increase the bombing in the North, we could argue for it now. The world is happier
because of it.
Clifford: try & get the benefit of Pause without Pausing. This is the time to negotiate: an
all out effort with some indication that it is a last minute effort.

Nodis. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by William Bundy.
1576. Literally eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I was much interested in
your Nodis 2024./2/ While one must be skeptical for a lot of reasons, the possibility of
any significant defection from the liberation front has great potential importance. I would
suggest that you follow up along the lines of your telegram.
/2/Document 217.
It may be that such a group is only a splinter. There would be great advantage, however, if
such a splinter had any territorial base which opens up the possibility of a rapid peace in
even two or three provinces. Amnesty arrangements might be made and through full
cooperation with intelligence, police activities, etc., North Vietnamese elements could be
prevented from punishing the splinter group. Depending upon the circumstances, some
tacit understanding might even be thinkable which would leave the splinter group certain
privileges in a particular area provided the writ of the government ran on other matters. I
have in mind the arrangements worked out with the two sects in the Southwest.
You would have to be a little careful about a commitment not to negotiate with Hanoi
unless the dimensions of the breakaway are far greater than you and we presently believe.
In view of the public position of the President, a commitment on negotiations would need
checking with us.
I leave to your judgment the complex question as to when and whether General Ky ought
to be informed very privately of such a contact./3/ I should think that he would be tempted
by the possibility of a major defection and there is always the possibility that he would
learn about a contact through channels other than your own.
/3/In telegram 2037 from Saigon, December 7, Lodge agreed fully about avoiding any
commitment to negotiate with Hanoi and said he would "agree to nothing" at any meeting
with an "Ambassador" from the National Liberation Front. Lodge wanted to tell Tran Van
Do, rather than Ky, after the meeting took place. (Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S)
We are not allowing our hopes to rise on this matter but a significant split within the Viet
Cong would be a most welcome Christmas present.
With warm regards.
Rusk

Department of State
Washington, DC
Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Austin for Moyers.
CAP 65828. 1. Joe Califano has told me that you wonder if we are really ready for the
meeting tomorrow./2/ It is a fair question, and this message aims to answer it. In the
largest sense, we are not fully ready, but nevertheless there are immediate decisions that
cannot wait, and on these we believe we are ready.
2. We do not have a complete and fully developed political, economic and social program
to match the major new military deployments proposed for 1966. We can and will develop
such a program, but we have to understand that unless and until there can be military
victories, this program is irrelevant. Moreover, we are making major non-military efforts
now which should produce results with victories, although they will come to nothing
without them.
3. A strengthened political and economic program can and will include such items as the
following:
A. New economic programs to prevent inflation.
B. Intensified countrywide health programs.
C. Highlighted educational efforts.
D. Stronger propaganda, including television.
E. Strengthened defector programs.
F. Establishment of model pacification districts and provinces.
G. Economic warfare denial program.
H. Streamlined organization for peace actions both in Saigon and in Washington.
I. Appointment of outstanding executives for peace in both capitals.

J. Redeveloped political action efforts leading toward strengthened anti-Communist
political organization and to pave the way for elections.
K. Wider and stronger agricultural reform programs.
Lodge and company would say that they are doing much of this now, but we all know it
can be done better, and in any event it should be a major part of your 1966 Vietnam
policy.
4. But with or without this stronger non-military program, we face major immediate
military and diplomatic decisions. McNamara and the Chiefs are already engaged in
detailed planning for the additional deployments and expenditures Westmoreland's
program requires. Thus the issues presented in the military paper which was sent to you
earlier today (CAP 65822)/3/ have to be decided this week.
/3/CAP 65822, December 6, sent to the President in Texas, transmitted a draft of
McNamara's memorandum, Document 222. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Situation Room File, Outgoing Traffic)
5. We also have to decide now on a pause, if we are to have one before January.
Advocates and opponents of a pause agree that it must be about three weeks in length to
have any value. It is also agreed that it must have preliminary diplomatic preparation in
Saigon and other capitals if it is not to backfire. We also agree that you should have
freedom to end the pause before Congress returns, if you wish. In combination, these
requirements mean that we must decide to go ahead now, if we are to go ahead at all
before Congress returns. It is the calendar and not a lot of insistent subordinates that is
forcing the hour of decision.
6. Next following messages contain three papers relating to a pause./4/ The first is State
Department's statement of a plan, with a summary of the pros and cons. Second is
suggested points for Presidential statement announcing a pause. The third is a paper
giving questions and answers that might be used by U.S. spokesman in the wake of a
Presidential announcement.
/4/These papers were not sent separately but are included in this telegram.
7. We have discussed these papers at length today with Clark Clifford, and he sides with
Raborn, Wheeler and the Joint Chiefs against a pause. The rest of us are for it. I will be
prepared to summarize arguments pro and con tomorrow. Two basic arguments against a
pause are, first, that it suggests that bombing is wrong, and second, that it exposes us to
diplomatic entrapment which would make resumption very difficult.
8. My own conviction is still that the best preparation for the tough programs of January is
a peace offensive in December, and that the pause is the necessary centerpiece of that
effort.
PAPER NO. 1
A PLAN FOR A PAUSE

In view of the major additional effort required to continue the South Vietnam conflict
along present lines during 1966, we can and should take a major new initiative at an early
date both (A) to make another bona fide effort to find a peaceful solution; and (B) to
convince the American public and all the key nations that we have in fact exhausted all
possibilities before stepping up our effort.
The public and private exchange of negotiating positions between Hanoi and ourselves
has been most active in the last nine months. We have gone as far as we can in verbal
messages, and only some major new element in the form of a "pause" offers real hope
toward either (A) or (B).
Need for a Pause:
1. A pause may be essential to achieve either successful negotiations or a tapering-off of
military action in South Vietnam. There is a significant difference between our activities
in the south and our bombing of the north. For reasons of face, the Hanoi regime may find
it difficult to begin negotiations while its own territory is being bombed. For reasons of
prestige in the Communist world, Peiping--and perhaps even Moscow--may feel
compelled to prevent any negotiations while a fellow socialist state is under air attack by
the United States.
2. This thesis has been reinforced by Ambassador Dobrynin, who has made it clear to
McGeorge Bundy that the Soviets would really make an effort if we undertook a pause of
"12-20 days"/5/--although he made it equally clear that the Soviets could give no
assurance of Hanoi's response.
3. In addition to improving (although by no means guaranteeing) the chances for a
possible successful negotiation, a pause could improve our peace-seeking posture
throughout the world, which has been significantly weakened by the Sevareid story in
Look./6/
4. A pause could also make it easier for the American people to accept the substantial
increase in our 1966 effort, since it would further demonstrate that, before committing
more American lives and resources to Vietnam, we are doing everything possible to find a
peaceful solution.
5. A pause should reduce the likelihood of further Soviet involvement and stimulate
further dissension between Moscow and Peiping.
The Dangers and Disadvantages of a Pause:
1. The peace demonstrations in this country and the first heavy U.S. casualties have
increased the danger that Hanoi might interpret a pause as a signal of weakness.
Continued large U.S. deployments during the pause period would partially offset the
chances of such an interpretation.

2. There is no assurance that a pause would lead to significant negotiations; the chances
are much less than fifty percent.
3. What Hanoi is seeking is not a pause, but a complete cessation of bombing. They could
be expected to do everything possible to prevent our resumption of bombing--and in this
effort they would probably be joined not only by the Soviet Union and Peiping, but by
many of our friends around the world.
4. Ambassador Lodge foresees great dangers in a pause and it would certainly be hard to
persuade the GVN that a pause is necessary. We must, therefore, assume that a pause
would create considerable concern in Saigon.
Recommendation for a Pause:
After balancing these considerations, we recommend that you approve a pause as soon as
possible this month. This decision would, of course, be subject to consultation and joint
action with the GVN.
Action Issues:
The two main issues that need to be faced in carrying out a pause are:
1. The conditions under which we would resume bombing or continue the pause.
2. A timing scenario for a pause now.
1. Conditions of resumption or continuation. We have all along taken the position that we
could suspend or cease bombing only in return for reciprocal actions by Hanoi. We all
believe that this must be the way in which we present the pause both publicly and through
diplomatic channels.
Nonetheless, the question arises whether we would in fact be prepared to continue the
suspension of bombing if Hanoi were to drop its present conditions for negotiation,
specifically its insistence on the acceptance of the "NLF program." Such a switch in
Hanoi's position would make it difficult for us to resume bombing at an early date. But it
would also represent a really major concession by Hanoi that would tend to create sharp
frictions and loss of morale as between Hanoi and the Liberation Front. The latter would
see the concession as the possible start of a sell-out of their position. This is a possibility
to which both Hanoi and the NLF are most sensitive because of the general belief of
Vietnamese Communists that Hanoi itself was sold out in similar fashion by the Soviets in
1954.
We now believe we should be prepared to continue the suspension if Hanoi makes this
concession, provided, however, that we would reserve the right to resume bombing if
Hanoi in fact kept up the infiltration and high levels of military activity in the south,
particularly by regulars. So we are talking of a suspension that might be continued while
we fully explore the new possibilities of negotiation, but we would maintain our freedom
to resume bombing even while negotiating efforts were still underway.
There is a third Hanoi response that might cause us difficulty: agreeing to negotiate only if
the NLF were accepted as a principal party. We believe that your July 28 statement,
offering the NLF the chance to present its views but not as a principal party, has gone as
far as we can go. We would have to accept the difficulties and criticism of refusing to go
further.
2. Timing scenario. We estimate that it would take 12-15 days to complete the preparatory
actions after decision, before a pause could be begun. The key elements are:
A. Consultation with Lodge. We would need to bring him carefully aboard, probably in
Saigon, and this would take 3-4 days, with an emissary far preferable to attempting to
handle it by cable. We have to go over with him carefully just how he would handle it
with Ky, and we have to bring him into all our reasoning.
B. Lodge's consultation with GVN. This will certainly encounter some initial skepticism
or resistance, and we may have to make quite firm commitments on our future ground
force deployments. Moreover, the group nature of the GVN means that at least four and
possibly more senior leaders have to be brought in. We cannot estimate less than four
days for this process.
C. Notification of the Soviets and key allies, and consultation with Congress. We believe
this must take place not less than 2 days before the announcement.
The scenario would also provide for a message to Hanoi just before the announcements,
and for a short public announcement by the South Vietnamese and U.S. Governments
jointly on the day the pause starts, probably supplemented by a fuller statement by you.
PAPER NO. 2
SUGGESTED POINTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ANNOUNCING
SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTHVIETNAM
1. Aggression in Vietnam continues to be gravest current threat to peace of world.
2. Brief review of basic U.S. position as stated July 28-A. Firmness against aggression;
B. Readiness to do all that is necessary to turn it back;
C. Strengthened economic and social action in South Vietnam;
D. Energetic efforts to move toward peace.
3. Events since July have shown-A. Gallantry and effectiveness of U.S. combat forces;
B. Persistent and increasing aggression from the north;
C. Need for still further strengthening of nonmilitary effort; and

D. Continued complete rejection of peace efforts by Hanoi and Peking.
4. The continuing and increasing Communist infiltration and aggression now produce the
prospect of further sharp increases in the level of fighting, with mounting losses and
suffering for all concerned.
5. The U.S. remains strong and determined and can meet any challenge at any necessary
level.
6. But the U.S. wants peace and will leave no path unexplored.
7. The President has therefore decided to suspend air attack on North Vietnam in order to
see whether parallel actions by others can open the way to peace.
8. Meanwhile, our joint effort in South Vietnam will continue. Our peaceful photographic
surveillance of North Vietnam will continue, the effort for political progress in the south
will continue, and our search for unconditional discussions will continue.
9. This action is based on strength, not weakness. Bombing was and is amply justified, but
the object of the bombing is peace, and if a suspension can move us in that direction, no
one will be more pleased than the United States.
10. The responsibility for aggression rests with others. The responsibility for action in
response to the new decision also rests with them. It is for them to decide whether to
move now toward peace or whether their continued aggression will force upon all
concerned the additional costs of still more violent war in 1966.
11. Designation of Ambassador Harriman as U.S. plenipotentiary for peace talks at any
time, at any place.
12. Designation of Vice President Humphrey to undertake a diplomatic mission to
friendly countries explaining both this initiative for peace and the determination of the
United States to move forward firmly if there is no adequate response.
PAPER NO. 3
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR APPROPRIATE U.S. SPOKESMAN IN THE
WAKE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SUSPENSION OF
BOMBING
1. The Military Consequence of the Suspension.
Q. Does this suspension increase the danger to U.S. fighting men in South Vietnam?
A. No. There is only a slow and indirect relation between bombing activity in the north
and the level of battle in the south, and it will be quite practicable to make up the time lost
in the pause by intensified air attack afterwards if necessary. Moreover, the whole purpose
of the suspension is to induce matching action by the other side to back off from its
infiltration and aggression, and any such back-off would itself greatly decrease the
dangers facing U.S. forces in South Vietnam.
Q. Will not the pause allow dangerous time for reconstruction in the north?
A. No. Any repairs which are effected during a pause can be dealt with afterwards. Our
reconnaissance will continue, and our forces will be ready to renew their attacks promptly
if necessary.
Q. But you have claimed the bombing is effective. Surely it must follow that the
suspension gives an advantage to the enemy.
A. Obviously, the suspension does give a respite while it lasts. But we have never
believed or asserted that the bombing of the north is the central part of our activity. To put
it another way, we have been bombing the north for 40 weeks. Each week of suspension
loses for us only a small proportion of the overall effect of our bombing so far. This is an
acceptable loss in order to demonstrate our good faith in seeking peace and in order to
open the door to peace if possible.
2. Political Terms and Conditions of the Suspension.
Q. Under what conditions do you plan to resume the bombing?
A. The President has said that this decision will be determined by the actions of others,
and we do not wish to lay down precise conditions or to make any sort of ultimatum. We
are trying to make it easy for others to respond--not hard.
Q. Are you in communication with Hanoi and Moscow and Peking about this matter?
A. We are making appropriate diplomatic communications on a very wide scale but we
think it more productive to do this privately, and we do not expect to discuss these private
communications. All of them are governed by the policy declaration of the President.
Q. You used to say that you would only suspend the bombing if there were evidence that
others would respond by action on their side. Do you have persuasive evidence or have
you changed your position?
A. We have no clear evidence, but the situation has changed in one important respect. The
increasing infiltration from the north, and increasing Communist violence in the south
have made it clear that unless there is a change in the situation, there will be much
intensified warfare in 1966. In this situation the President thinks it right to explore every
opportunity for peace, and it is in that spirit that he has suspended the bombing.
Q. Would you keep up suspension in return for unconditional discussions?
A. We could certainly welcome unconditional discussion, and that would be a very
encouraging development. But we could hardly sustain this pause for a protracted time if
aggression and infiltration from the north are continued as at present.
Q. Is the designation of Governor Harriman indication that you expect another Geneva
Conference?
A. The designation of Governor Harriman is designed to underline the sincerity and
determination of the United States in seeking to move to the peace table. The form and
membership of such a conference are not important to the United States, which will meet
with any interested government at any time.
Q. The Communists will undoubtedly now press you on the question of negotiations with
the Viet Cong. Are you ready to soften your position on this as you have apparently
softened your position on a pause in the bombing?
A. We continue to stand on the President's statement of July 28. "If Hanoi is ready to
negotiate, the Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their
views presented. We would not think that would be an insurmountable problem at all."
221. Telegram From the National Security Council Executive Secretary (Smith) to
President Johnson, in Texas/1/
Washington, December 7, 1965, 9:44 a.m.
Cables. Secret; Exdis. Also sent to McGeorge Bundy for information. Received at the LBJ
Ranch at 9:07 a.m.
CAP 65830. Following is text of cable from Lodge, Saigon 2034./2/ Secretary Rusk has a
copy in his briefing book:
/2/Dated December 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.)
1. The Viet Cong bombing of the Metropole,/3/ with its toll of American, New Zealand
and Vietnamese dead and wounded, is the fourth such event which has happened during
my service in Viet-Nam. Like its predecessors, it stimulates the thought, first, that we are
not interlopers or trespassers here but that we are here legally and have a right to be here.
This prompts the further thought that we have a duty to protect our own personnel against
future terrorist attacks of this kind. For us to strike back, therefore, is not only a just
punishment for an outrageous aggression but it may also head off another similar outrage.
This is a worthy aim.
/3/Reference is to the bombing of the U.S. servicemen's Metropole Hotel on December 4
in which 9 persons were killed (1 U.S. Marine, 1 New Zealand artilleryman, and 7 South
Vietnamese civilians) and 137 injured (of which 62 were civilians).
2. I therefore recommend that we inflict some punishment on North Viet-Nam which we
will state is a retaliation. It could be something which we intend to do anyway.
3. You in Washington are much better informed than I am but some possibilities which
seem to me to be worthy are bombing coal mines, textile mills, irrigation ditches, the
coastal waterway between South China and North Viet-Nam, steel mills, fertilizer
factories and any other unmanned objectives. Lodge./4/

/4/In telegram 1595 to Saigon, December 8, the Department informed Lodge that it had
approved a bombing attack on an isolated electric power plant north of Haiphong.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.)

Memos (A). Top Secret. Sent to the President in Texas in CAP 65822, December 6. (Ibid.,
Vol. XLIII, Cables) There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the
memorandum. This memorandum is a revision of Document 212. A draft of this
memorandum with minor revisions and comments by McGeorge Bundy, December 4, is
in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos
(A). Another draft with significant revisions, December 6, is ibid., 2EE, Primarily
McNamara Recommendations re Strategic Actions.
SUBJECT
Military and Political Actions Recommended for South Vietnam
I. Appraisal of Situation in South Vietnam
A. Non-military situation. There has been no substantial change in the past few months in
the economic, political or pacification situation. There is a serious threat of inflation
because of the mixture of US force build-up and GVN deficit on the one hand and the
tightly stretched Vietnamese economy on the other; the Ky "government of generals" is
surviving, but not acquiring wide support or generating actions; pacification is thoroughly
stalled, with no guarantee that security anywhere is permanent and no indications that able
and willing leadership will emerge in the absence of that permanent security. (Prime
Minister Ky estimates his government "controls" only 25% of the population today and
reports that his pacification chief hopes to increase that to 50% two years from now.)
B. Military situation. The dramatic recent changes in the situation are on the military side.
They are the increased infiltration from the North (mainly on greatly improved routes
through Laos) and the increased willingness of the Communist forces to stand and fight,
even in large-scale engagements. The Ia Drang River Campaign of November is an
example. The Communists appear to have decided to increase their forces in South
Vietnam both by heavy recruitment in the South (especially in the Delta) and by
infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces from the North. We believe that nine
regular North Vietnamese regiments (27 infantry battalions) have been infiltrated in the
past year, joining the estimated 83 VC battalions in the South. The rate of infiltration has
increased from three battalion equivalents a month in late 1964 to a high of 9 or 12 during
one month this past fall. General Westmoreland estimates that through 1966 North
Vietnam will have the capability/2/ to expand its armed forces in order to infiltrate three
regiments (9 battalion equivalents, or 4500 men) a month, and that the VC in South
Vietnam can recruit and train 7 new battalion equivalents a month--together adding 16
battalion equivalents a month to the enemy forces. Communist casualties and desertions
can be expected to go up if our recommendations for increased US, South Vietnamese and
third-country forces are accepted. Nevertheless, the enemy can be expected to enlarge his
present strength of 110 battalion equivalents to more than 150 battalion equivalents by the
end of calendar 1966, when hopefully his losses can be made to equal his input.
/2/They may or may not intend to use their capability--indications are that they will.
[Footnote in the source text.]
As for the Communist ability to supply this force, it is estimated that, even taking account
of interdiction of routes by air and sea, more than 200 tons of supplies a day on the
average can be infiltrated--more than enough, allowing for the extent to which the enemy
lives off the land, to support the likely PAVN/VC force at the likely level of operations.
To meet this possible--and in our view likely--Communist buildup, the presently
contemplated Phase I forces will not be enough. Phase I forces, almost all in place by the
end of this year, involve 130 South Vietnamese, 9 Korean, 1 Australian and 34 US
combat battalions (approximately 220,000 Americans). Bearing in mind the nature of the
war, the expected weighted combat force ratio of less than 2-to-1 will not be good enough.
Nor will the originally contemplated Phase II addition of 28 more US battalions (112,000
men) be enough; the combat force ratio, even with 32 new South Vietnamese battalions,
would still be little better than 2-to-1 at the end of 1966. The initiative which we have
held since August would pass to the enemy; we would fall far short of what we expected
to achieve in terms of population control and disruption of enemy bases and lines of
communications. Indeed, it is estimated that, with the contemplated Phase II addition of
28 US battalions, we would be able only to hold our present geographical positions.
II. Recommendations for Military Deployments
We believe that, whether or not major new diplomatic initiatives are made, the United
States must send a substantial number of additional forces to Vietnam if we are to avoid
being defeated there. Specifically, to maintain the initiative against the growing
Communist forces, we recommend:
1. That the Republic of Korea be requested, at the appropriate time early in 1966, to
increase their present deployment of 9 combat battalions to 18 combat battalions (the
addition of one division) before July 1966 and to 21 combat battalions (the addition of
another brigade) before October 1966.
2. That the Government of Australia be requested to increase their present deployment of
1 combat battalion to 2 combat battalions before October 1966 and that efforts be made to
obtain combat forces from other friendly countries--e.g., the Philippines, Thailand and
Greece.
3. That the US be prepared to increase its deployment of ground troops by the end of 1966
from 34 combat battalions to 74 combat battalions and approve now the initial increments
of this deployment. If the 74 US battalions--together with increases in air squadrons, naval
units, air defense, combat support, construction units and miscellaneous logistic support
and advisory personnel which we also recommend--were to be deployed, it would bring
the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 400,000. The end 1965 strength of
200,000 would increase during 1966 at the rate of approximately 15,000 a month. It
should be understood that further deployments (perhaps exceeding an additional 200,000
men) may be needed in 1967. Although the 1966 deployments to South Vietnam may
require some shift of forces from other theaters, it is believed that they can be
accomplished without calling up reserve personnel; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do
not believe additional forces can be deployed to Southeast Asia or elsewhere unless
reserves are called.
The above program is concurred in by General Westmoreland, Admiral Sharp,
Ambassador Lodge and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
III. Budget Recommendations
Decisions already taken together with those recommended above will require increased
obligational authority both in FY 1966 and FY 1967.
1. In the January 1966 Supplemental for FY 1966, the Department of Defense, to cover
increased Vietnam costs, will require approximately $11 billion/3/ of new obligational
authority to be added to the $1.7 billion authorized in the August Supplemental. The
expenditure effect in FY 1966 of these two add-ons will be $4-1/2 billion.
/3/The January Supplemental for DOD will total about $12.5 billion, including provision
for the military and civilian pay increases authorized by Congress after the original '66
budget was submitted by the President. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. In FY 1967 the Department of Defense will require $9.8 billion in new obligational
authority and $11.8 billion in expenditures to finance the war in Vietnam.
3. The increases in non-military costs attributable to Vietnam in both the FY 1966 January
Supplemental and in the FY 1967 budget can be expected to be somewhat less than $1
billion--whatever is required must be provided.
(The estimates of military costs given above are based on the premise that the war will
end by June 30, 1967. As time passes and as actions must be taken to cover war costs
beyond that date, additional obligational authority will have to be sought. Thus, it may be
necessary to go back to the Congress in June or July 1966 for an amendment to the FY
1967 authorizations and appropriations to take account of those added costs.)
IV. Prognosis Assuming the Recommended Deployments
Deployments of the kind we have recommended will not guarantee success. Our
intelligence estimate is that the present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the
war vigorously in the South. They continue to believe that the war will be a long one, that
time is their ally, and that their own staying power is superior to ours. They recognize that
the US reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination to avoid defeat, and that more US
troops can be expected. Even though the Communists will continue to suffer heavily from
GVN and US ground and air action, we expect them, upon learning of any US intentions
to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and to test US capabilities and will
to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties (US killed-in-action with the
recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month).
If the US were willing to commit enough forces--perhaps 600,000 men or more--we could
ultimately prevent the DRV/VC from sustaining the conflict at a significant level. When
this point was reached, however, the question of Chinese intervention would become
critical./4/ The intelligence estimate is that the chances are a little better than even that, at
this stage, Hanoi and Peiping would choose to reduce the effort in the South and try to
salvage their resources for another day; but there is an almost equal chance that they
would enlarge the war and bring in large numbers of Chinese forces (they have made
certain preparations which could point in this direction).
/4/We are generally agreed that the Chinese Communists will intervene with combat
forces to prevent destruction of the Communist regime in the DRV. It is less clear whether
they would intervene to prevent a DRV/VC defeat in the South. [Footnote in the source
text.]
It follows, therefore, that the odds are about even that, even with the recommended
deployments, we will be faced in early 1967 with a military standoff at a much higher
level, with pacification still stalled, and with any prospect of military success marred by
the chances of an active Chinese intervention.
223. Personal Notes of Meeting With President Johnson/1/

LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 7, 1965, 10:25 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy, Notes of December 7, 1965. No
classification marking. The notes are in McGeorge Bundy's hand with a small
contribution by Komer. At 10 a.m. on December 7, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara,
Robert Komer, and McGeorge Bundy arrived by aircraft at the LBJ Ranch in Texas. At
10:10 a.m., they assembled in the living room for this meeting with the President to
discuss Vietnam policy. At 10:47 a.m., Bill Moyers and Joseph Califano arrived from
Austin and joined the meeting. The participants broke for lunch at 12:35 p.m., and
resumed their meeting at 1:35 p.m. on the front lawn of the ranch. At 4:34 p.m., Rusk,
McNamara, Komer, and McGeorge Bundy returned by aircraft to Washington. (Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary)
President pressing for more non-military action/leadership of more senior rank and
energy.
RSM: they are running out of money & they feel restraints. Lansdale: a bunch of hot air.
Lansdale: a good talker--use him on the Hill.
P[resident]: How to get a policy decision. Republicans on the panel--no[thing?] comes
before [illegible--men?] and money.
Can't have 'em all off in different directions.
What is best course?
The chicken [?] is political decision.
We have to try to bring them aboard before we & [?]

Traitors to an Administration who are talking to press.
First get Executive Branch; then get key Legislators; then get key men in committees.
We mustn't take off into wild blue yonder. I don't want to take off till I know I can get
back.
What makes it so tough: I've had little real sympathy with Fulbright, but I don't see any
light down that barrel. We're getting deeper and deeper in. I bogged my car down. I don't
want a bulldozer to come & get me.
Where we were when I came in--I'd trade back to where we were. If I have to decide this
morning, full steam ahead.
Let's see if we can't get a little team play & see who'll fight for us--hard to get.
DR responds: the middle choice is still right--as against the alternatives. If you go to them
and make them fair choices odds are strong they'll back you--if we go with our own best
judgment of what to [do?] with alternatives.
RSM: 1. The alternatives are many. 2. we can do other things. 3. we need a new
resolution. We should have a military and a political program.
LBJ: a substantial group: jugular from the air? JCS all would go further to the North.
RSM: As a practical matter the pressure for increased bombing will grow & cannot be
resisted under Phase II.
DR: the bombing.
LBJ: POL?
[DR]: JCS strongly recommend in favor it it.
LBJ: any evidence that they are getting ready for a peace offer?
DR: not yet received.
RSM: the evidence points to the opposite view: a decision to escalate.
LBJ: is there any reality in the notion that there were real peace feelers?
We all say NOT. DR reviews the U Thant case--they were ready to give us a face-saving
exit.
LBJ: Do any of them really believe it? Stevenson probably said it?
DR: Yes.
DR: How do we get Congress Leaders on board.
The Pause:
President presses on the Pause. Is there any chance?
RSM and McGB: some.
DR: You can get European Communism broken off.
[LBJ or DR:] Wouldn't give 4# for Dobrynin.
RSM: wouldn't recommend a pause if he didn't think we could manipulate it all. We ought
to probe.
LBJ: we tried that, every which way, all over the world with a shirttail out. We'll do
anything you want--we are prayin' to negotiate.
I think the boys in the rice paddy wouldn't understand a pause. We don't have much of a
leadership.
Rusk: prob of war leadership. Chance of getting Fulbright and Kenn[edy]s if we convince
them we willing make peace.
Pr[esident]: Doesn't think so.
McN: Won't get Fulb[right], he wants let Commies in.
Pr: Won't get Mans[field] either. Wants to know where the moderates went?
We ought to present: 1. alternatives 2. pause again? We haven't disclosed budget. I haven't
got a single thing secret from my government.
How do we determine? Before we take off.
1. Mansfield: Metropole: hit a barracks: we should plaster 'em--4 tits for a tat. 2. Dirksen.
3. Bob Kennedy 4. Russell--cross between LeMay and Fulbright. See them before we go
overboard.
Put it all in the debate. Everything will come out there. Bob Kennedy cut off some of our
support when he said 700,000,000 is not a blank check.
Send all the men you can anywhere you want--but every time you say it again it's
weakness (Ambassador). You've got to make the other fellow price his product. Harriman
can go from capital to capital by 707.
I think we'll be spending more time defending ourselves from hawks than from doves.
The hawks will be with you longer.

You ought to go visit with Russell. Goodpaster to see Ike on Pause? We're spending too
much time with crybabies. Average fella doesn't have much respect. Afraid we'll lose our
own fighting men.
You ought to probe Dobrynin.
We've got a new election here. This is a priority problem. It comes ahead of poverty &
education. It's a new ball game. 1966 election. Make the old bucks talk.
[illegible] at Westmoreland: [illegible]--is job one.
1st reinforcement is Congress. I won't yield to y'all on that.
P[resident] [asks] RSM to see Bob Kennedy to send Averell (Bob K has to live with
Times)./2/
/2/There is no clear indication when Bundy's notes no longer related directly to the
discussion at the meeting, but at this point they appear to change into follow-up notes
arising out of the meeting.
Johnson briefly described this meeting in The Vantage Point (p. 235), stating that the one
thing that "troubled me deeply" was the fear that once the bombing was stopped the
United States would have difficulty in resuming it. Johnson wrote that all his advisers
assured him that if Hanoi did not respond to the pause, the world would understand the
U.S. decision to resume the bombing.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis;
Priority. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was
received at 5:24 a.m.
2065. Literally eyes only for Bundy from Lodge.
1. I called on Palmas because I wanted to make it absolutely clear that I would be willing
to meet his "former Minister".
2. I brought up the matter of the so-called "Ambassador's" credentials and how to judge
their value. He did not answer this, but he did say that he vouched absolutely for the
seriousness and respectability of the "former Minister".
3. Comment: I do not know how to judge the so-called letter of credentials and am
disposed to go ahead on the basis that Palmas vouches for the "former Minister" and that
the "former Minister" in turn vouches for the "Ambassador".

4. I said that I was absolutely opposed to any kind of a trick whereby we would be lulled
to sleep while the Viet Cong went ahead and gained ground. Also would I be opposed to
using talks as a device to get me in wrong with the Government of Viet-Nam. Palmas
absolutely vouched for the fact that there would be no trickery of this kind.
5. He then read me what purported to be the entire text of his telegram to the Vatican.
Some of the points which became very clear from what he was reading and which I did
not cover adequately in my previous telegram were as follows:
6. The entrance into South Viet-Nam of the troops of the Hanoi regime changes the nature
of the war completely. Palmas recalled the change in the psychology in Italy during World
War II when the Germans came into Italy. The Viet Cong is frightened of North VietNam taking over the entire country and defeating the Americans. They no longer wish
help from Hanoi. They had used Hanoi when they were trying to conquer South Viet-Nam
but had never wanted to be taken over by them. One reason they want the American
troops to stay is to guarantee the independence of South Viet-Nam.
7. It was also made clear in the telegram to the Vatican that the Viet Cong recognized that
at the proper time I would have to tell the GVN. I suggested that I do this after the first
meeting and he agreed. He also agreed with my judgment that it would be better to tell
Tran Van Do in the first instance rather than Ky. It was Tran Van Do who had said to
Palmas that he could not conceive of the nationalist element of the Viet Cong defecting
but that it would, of course, be wonderful if it happened.
8. Palmas believes that the so-called Liberation Front is distinct from the Viet Cong High
Command. He believes that a majority of the Front are nationalist, but that the military
command is controlled by Communists.
9. His "former Minister" had said last Wednesday that he would be in touch with Palmas
within ten days. One week went by today.
10. Palmas suggested that when the "former Minister" was with him that he could call me
up and I could come over and have my talk at the Apostolic Delegate's house.
11. Comment: Upon reflection, I think that would be a good thing to do. In fact, I would
not object to having all the discussions in the house of the Papal Delegate. They would
know everything, which might be just as well.
12. Your view of para. 11 would be appreciated.
13. If I may turn to another matter, I hope you will read Embtels 1931 and 1997./2/
Approving these telegrams would be a tremendous boost to morale here, which badly
needs it. Only about 30 women are involved. American women are constantly arriving
here to fill places which could be filled by men.
/2/In telegram 1931, November 29, and telegram 1997, December 3, Lodge recommended
allowing spouses to return to Saigon for the Christmas holiday. (Ibid., PS 7-6 US-VIET S)
Lodge
Level Comments Re Bomb Pauses. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
I attach a copy of a conversation that Dean Rusk had with Ambassador Dobrynin after our
meeting at the Ranch. The Secretary tells me that he and Thompson both interpret this
conversation as confirming their view that the Soviets would make an effort to move
things onward during the pause. In this sense they incline to think that it substantiates
their belief that Dobrynin's talk with me was important./2/ My own valuation remains
somewhat more cautious, although I must say I think the two talks together are worth a
little bit more than the 4# you said you would not pay for what Dobrynin said to me!/3/
McG. B
Attachment
Memorandum of Conversation/4/
/4/Secret. Drafted by Thompson on December 8 and approved in S on December 9. The
meeting took place in Rusk's office.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
The Secretary said with respect to the hostilities in Viet-Nam, that it was not clear how we
turn at this point. We had been in touch with Hanoi and with various capitals around the
world. We had also had conversations with the Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter here in
Washington./5/ The Ambassador inquired if we had been in touch with Hanoi after the
General Assembly discussion.

The Secretary replied that we had./6/ There had been no indication of the slightest interest
in bringing this affair to a peaceful conclusion. He did not fully understand why the two
co-Chairmen could not take some initiative. He said that both we and Hanoi had referred
to the 1954 Agreements. Hanoi puts four points as its interpretation of these Agreements
but the Secretary wished to point out that the NLF is not mentioned in these Accords.
The Ambassador asked if we had talked with them with regard to the other points. It
appeared to him that we were asking unconditional surrender. He said he was not
speaking of Hanoi but of the Liberation Front. He said that even yesterday the Secretary
indicated he did not want to speak with the people when we were fighting; namely, the
NLF. At least they were doing the major fighting.
The Secretary pointed out that our combat troops had not been in Viet-Nam until Hanoi
had moved in.
The Ambassador said our own figures showed the great number of South-Vietnamese that
had been fighting us. He said no one from their side could accept that it was only Hanoi.
The Secretary said that among the fourteen million people in South Viet-Nam there was
an overwhelming consensus that they did not want Hanoi. We were prepared to support
the elections in South Viet-Nam but the Liberation Front said, "no."
The Ambassador asked under what formula we would propose elections. The Secretary
replied on the condition that there was peace in the country which would permit elections.
The Ambassador pointed out that Diem had refused to talk of elections. He then inquired
about the possibility of stopping the bombardment of North Viet-Nam. Were we prepared
to consider this? Parenthetically, he noted that a twelve hour suspension of fighting had
been offered/7/ and that our press spokesman had said neither yes nor no.
/7/A communique of the Central Committee of the NLFSV, broadcast by Liberation
Radio on December 7 in Vietnamese to South Viet-Nam, stated that "the NLFSV decides
that the South Viet-Nam Liberation Armed Forces will stop attacks throughout South
Viet-Nam during Christmas night" for a 12-hour period so that Catholic soldiers of
various forces could attend Mass and celebrate Christmas Eve. The same broadcast
carried a similar communique from the South Viet-Nam Liberation Armed Forces
Command which contained regulations governing the cease-fire, including the condition
that troops carry no weapons or means of spying. (Text in FBIS, South Vietnam,
December 8, 1965)
The Secretary asked that if the Ambassador were in Viet-Nam, would he put his arms
down for twelve hours. The other side had said they would not shoot people who went to
church unarmed.
Dobrynin said that this was an aside and he returned to the subject of bombing, which was
the main thing.
The Secretary said he had been careful not to close the door on this in his public
statements but he could not understand why it was impossible to find out privately what
would happen if we did stop the bombing. He had asked Mr. Peter and we had asked
Hanoi. Ho Chi Min had sent Linus Pauling a message which Pauling interpreted to mean
that the four points were not a precondition of negotiations. If this were a fact, why did
they not say so?
Dobrynin said they could not talk of negotiations while the bombing went on. He said,
frankly, he did not understand the American stubbornness. The United States was a big
power. No one would think we were weak if we stopped the bombing to create a better
atmosphere. His feeling was that we were too sensitive to domestic criticism.
The Secretary said this was not the problem. Dobrynin said he did not understand our
position and he made clear that in these and other remarks he was speaking personally. He
said the suspension for four days had not been enough and may even have done harm.
This did not give anyone any chance to do anything about it. He asked what harm it would
do to have some criticism in the United States. He was sure it would be understood
abroad.
The Secretary said he agreed this was an informal conversation. He continued that we
don't even know the direction of the attitude the Soviet Union would take if we stopped
bombing. Would they try to arrange a settlement on the basis of the 1954 Accords?
Dobrynin said that stopping the bombing would create a better atmosphere. He could not
give any undertaking as to what would happen but the Soviet Union would not try to
influence North Viet-Nam while they were being bombed.
The Secretary remarked that only the United States is not supposed to have face. During
the Berlin blockade we had talked to the Soviet Union privately. (The Ambassador
interjected that there had been no fighting going on.) The Secretary continued that during
the Korean war we had private talks that had led to peace.
Dobrynin said he did not see any loss for the United States in stopping the bombing. No
one would seriously say that the United States was a weak power. He asked whether the
Secretary thought the Soviet Government would think that we had lost face.
The Secretary said it was not a question of Moscow, but of Hanoi. Apparently they
thought the United States was about to collapse, judging from the publicity they gave the
demonstrations in this country against United States policy. Perhaps stopping the bombing
would make them think this was so. Neither he nor the Ambassador knew what Hanoi's
reaction would be.
The Ambassador said he did not invite us to resume bombing after a suspension, but
implied that this was our option. He asked whether the Secretary thought that more and
more bombing would convince the other side.
The Secretary said he was prepared to bet a new hat that when Johnson defeated
Goldwater, Hanoi had said to themselves that they could have a larger war without
reaction from the United States.

Dobrynin said the question was how to finish the affair. Why not begin with the
suspension of bombing? The only argument he had heard was that this would be a sign of
weakness.
The Secretary said that Hanoi had never even hinted that they would do anything if the
bombing stopped. Dobrynin pointed out that both the Hungarians and the Soviets had
suggested that this could be a step on a way out. Neither of them, however, had the
authority to speak for others.
The Secretary said it was hard for us to understand the failure to carry out the agreement
on Laos. Hanoi had never complied with it and there was nothing we wanted more than
one thousand percent compliance with it in every respect. The other side had referred to
the military clauses of the 1954 Agreement. Why not get back to this and the 1962
Agreement? We have said that we wanted no bases or forces in that area. The South VietNamese could determine their own fate provided North Viet-Nam did not intervene by
force. Dobrynin said that in view of what the Secretary said regarding bombing in North
Viet-Nam, and he was aware that we were already bombing in Laos, he did not see any
way out or how the conflict could fail to be enlarged.
The Secretary said we did not want even the present level of hostilities. Dobrynin said that
he had heard talk of bombing Haiphong and Laos and Cambodia. The Secretary said the
problem was how could we find restraint on the other side? Dobrynin repeated that the
United States was a big power but did not want to make any gestures. We were increasing
our troops. Were we trying to impress the Soviets? The Secretary said no, we were trying
to impress Hanoi. Dobrynin asked what would come afterwards. Would we intervene in
North Viet-Nam? If this occurred, then what would happen?
The Secretary said that Dobrynin had used the phrase "unconditional surrender." Speaking
frankly, this was an abuse of language. We were not asking the other side to surrender or
do anything but to stop their intervention. Dobrynin said we were trying to force the
Liberation Front to admit they were only tools or stooges of Hanoi. He pointed out that
they had representatives in Peking and Moscow and elsewhere. The other side was asked
to accept unconditional discussions, ignoring the Liberation Front, and to accept the
United States position that it was only Hanoi that was involved. This made the situation
very difficult for Hanoi, as well as for the Soviet Union. He was not sure that some of the
people in South Viet-Nam would continue their activities no matter what happened.
The Secretary pointed out that we were not shooting them until Hanoi came in. Dobrynin
repeated that from the beginning we demanded Hanoi accept our condition that we were
not fighting local people but Hanoi. He said there could be no armed intervention unless
there were local people fighting and we did not wish to recognize the people that were
fighting us.
The Secretary replied that we wished to recognize them all, including the Buddhists, the
Catholics, the Montagnards.
Dobrynin contended that the Secretary was saying to the other side, "Accept our formula
and then we will have unconditional talks." He asked if we were at war with Hanoi.
The Secretary said we had told Hanoi that they could talk about their four points but we
wanted to talk about our points. He did not see any other way than to sit down at the table
to do this.
Dobrynin again said his personal feeling was that the best thing was to stop the bombing.
He could not say what would happen but he was sure the atmosphere would be better.
The Secretary inquired whether if we did stop bombing and there were no response,
would the crisis then be greater?
Dobrynin responded that if we stopped it only for a short time and put it in the form of an
ultimatum, this might be. The Secretary asked what if we stopped and there were an
ultimatum from Peking or from Moscow as to what would happen if we resumed? We did
not even know if this would happen or not.
Dobrynin said there was nothing to discuss now while we continued to wage a big war.
The Secretary said it was extraordinary that there could be discussions only if one side
stopped shooting.
Dobrynin replied that he presumed we would continue shooting in the South, although he
was not suggesting we do so.
The Secretary raised the question as to whether North Viet-Nam would keep infiltrating
the South. Dobrynin said that the Soviets were sure that North Viet-Nam did not have
control of all Viet Cong units. The Secretary rejoined that we were very sure and had
good information that there were very few that Hanoi did not control.
After a brief discussion reported separately on non-proliferation, the Secretary said that
both the Soviet Union and the United States had enormous stakes in Asia. We believed
that frontiers should not be changed by force. If help were needed to demarcate the
frontier or to settle disputes, we should both help. We had a considerable community of
interest in this.
Dobrynin said that as far as he knew, there was no question of frontiers. The Secretary
said the Chinese had asked for changes in their frontier with India. Dobrynin interjected
that the Soviet Union had made clear its disapproval of this.
The Secretary said they also had some claims for a large chunk of Soviet territory.
Dobrynin replied that there had been reports in the press to this effect but in fact they had
asked for only five kilometers. (It was not clear whether he was talking of square
kilometers or what.) Dobrynin continued that he thought we must give more attention to
our relations, which were not developing well. He did not know if this deterioration was
deliberate or a result of a chain of events. He made reference to the Penkovsky papers/8/
and a recently published Dodd Committee report/9/ which accused the leaders of the
Soviet Union of being murderers. He also mentioned a man who paraded near the Soviet
Embassy with a placard saying that Kosygin and Brezhnev were murderers.
/8/Oleg Penkovsky, The Penkovsky Papers (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1965).
The Secretary remarked that he understood there were ten thousand demonstrators in front
of our Embassy today. Dobrynin continued that he now understood that Soviet attaches
had no right to buy books in Brentano's on certain subjects unless they asked the Pentagon
first. He thought this was incredible. The Secretary replied that we were aware of the
instructions given to the Communist Party in this country. Dobrynin said they did not
come from his Embassy.
The Secretary concluded by stating that perhaps he would be in touch with the
Ambassador again on how to proceed. He again referred to the bitterness in this country
after the breaking of the Laotian agreement. He also referred to a recent interview
charging us with aggression./10/ He said the Soviets must realize what disappointment the
breaking of the Laotian agreement had caused here./11/
/10/Reference is to an interview of Kosygin on December 6 by James Reston of The New
York Times; extract in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 580-581.
/11/See the response by Rusk to a question asked at a news conference on December 9;
ibid., pp. 789-790.
Dobrynin said the Soviets were in favor of compliance. The Secretary asked if they could
not get together with the British and demand compliance.
Dobrynin said this was difficult now as our planes were flying there. The Secretary said
this should not be a problem as we were ready to comply completely. He continued that
the Soviets had accused us of being dragged along by the Germans. We thought that the
Soviets were being dragged along by Hanoi. Dobrynin referred to the number of times he
had come to the Secretary to try to get discussions going on Cambodia, but he had
refused. The Secretary replied that this was because Sihanouk had raised these matters in
complete hostility to Thailand and South Viet-Nam. We had been working with Thailand
and South Viet-Nam to get these matters settled before a conference.
At this point, since both the Ambassador and the Secretary had dinner engagements, the
conversation ended.
Bundy, Vol. XVII. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch at noon on December 10.
There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum
1. I attach Bob McNamara's account of his telephone conversation with members of
Congress on South Vietnam. It is highly instructive. Before he left for Chicago and the
Coast, Dean Rusk had seen Sparkman, Church, and Javits./2/ He gave me the following
account of their views:
/2/Rusk met with Sparkman from 12:05 to 12:33 p.m. on December 8, with Church from
3:30 to 4:06 p.m. also on December 8, and with Javits from 8:45 to 9:20 a.m. on
December 9. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book)
Sparkman thinks we need a resolution and that it should be quite a tough one. He would
favor a pause if there is even a 5% chance that it would be successful in opening the road
to negotiations.
Senator Church does not think a resolution would be a good idea unless we are proposing
some major change, like bombing Hanoi, or putting ground forces in Laos. He is strongly
in favor of a pause.
Senator Javits is in favor of a resolution and would like to be helpful in any way he can
about it. He would also favor a pause unless the military authorities say it would have a
major military impact on the effectiveness of our effort in the south. (This last sounds like
an effort to have it both ways.)
2. I continue to be a strong believer in a December pause, and of course the time is getting
shorter every minute. Rusk and McNamara and I plan to review this matter again on
Saturday morning,/3/ and at that point it may be wise for us to call you and take a final
reading. It will be very difficult to do a good job of the pause if the decision is put over
beyond that point.
/3/December 11.
3. My own basic reason for supporting the pause is simply that we are going to have to do
these other tough things in January. I think the criticism the pause will get will be rubbed
out by the energy of our January message, and on the other hand, I think the peace-lovers
will support our January actions a whole lot more if there has been a pause beforehand. I
find that Komer strongly shares this view, and that Califano seems to be shifting toward it.
McG. B.
Attachment
Memorandum by Secretary of Defense McNamara/4/
/4/No classification marking. A typewritten note at the end of the source text reads:
"Dictated but not read."
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RELATING TO SOUTH VIETNAM
I called but was unable to talk to the following men:

Senator Lister Hill--has had minor surgery and will be out of his office for two or three
days.
Senator Stuart Symington--out of the country
Senator Henry Jackson--in Vietnam
Representative Glenard Lipscomb--in the Far East
Representative Robert Sikes--in the Far East
Representative George Mahon--on vacation; cannot be reached until 14 December
Representative William Bates--in Europe
Representative Philip Philbin--in Europe
Representative Mendel Rivers--in Europe
With each of the following I summarized the current situation, the prospects for
continuing increases in Viet Cong strength, the possibility that the conflict would increase
in intensity, and the need for increased U.S. deployments if we were to avoid a military
defeat or stalemate. I estimated that the cost of our South Vietnamese operations would
require a January Supplement of some $10-12 billion and a FY '67 budget of equal
amount. I asked for their opinions on expanding U.S. forces; requesting Congressional
support; intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam, and initiating diplomatic initiatives,
(e.g., a pause in the bombing, an appeal to the UN, visits to Communist states by peace
emissaries).
1. Senator John Pastore
a. He asked theoretically where we are going if we put in 400,000 men.
b. Most of the American public doesn't understand what we are up against--the American
public won't take the war for long.
c. We should make a serious effort to settle the conflict (through use of pause, etc.) before
we start bombing on an expanded scale or further increase the number of U.S. troops in
South Vietnam.
d. The President should come before the Congress and see the matter debated before he
expands U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.
2. Senator Mike Monroney
a. He is leery of escalation beyond the current level of conflict. The country doesn't want
to see the war expanded beyond its present boundary.
b. The country would accept the deployment of a total of 400,000 men if it believes the
war will not spread beyond South Vietnam.
c. We should not undertake an expanded military program without holding out the
opportunity for peace negotiations through the UN or through other third parties.
d. He seriously questions whether we should substantially expand the bombing in North
Vietnam--he does not believe the added bombing would be worth the risk.
e. We should go to Congress for a Joint Resolution if substantial additional forces are to
be sent to the Far East.
3. Senator Warren Magnuson
a. The people now feel we are at war and we should do whatever is required to finish the
job--in particular, we should deploy whatever troops are necessary.
b. He is not certain how the bombing program should be changed, if at all. He is unclear
as to how effective it has been to date, but he is certain the people would support more if
the President considers it desirable.
c. Peace moves should be made to coincide with whatever additional military action we
take.
d. The President should request Congressional support in the form of a Joint Resolution.
e. He wished to emphasize again the President should with one hand carry on the war and
with the other hand fight for peace.
4. Senator Leverett Saltonstall
a. Increasingly, the people are asking what do we want and how far are we going.
b. The Congress will support the deployment of additional troops, but such action should
be complemented by a request for some form of Congressional Resolution.
c. The increasing number of casualties is beginning to stir up the people to ask why are we
in South Vietnam; what can be done about further losses; how far are we going.
d. Expanding the bombing program in the North is a terrible risk, but we must consider it.
He would support a Presidential decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong because we must
do enough to bring the Viet Cong to a sensible peace negotiation. He believes we should
mine Haiphong Harbor.
e. He doesn't believe a pause in the bombing would accomplish anything. We must keep
the military pressure on so that Hanoi will be forced to sit down at the bargaining table.
5. Senator Robert Kennedy
a. It is difficult for him to provide a worthwhile judgment after only two or three minutes
of thought.
b. People are becoming more and more concerned as the casualties rise. They do not
understand the alternatives open to us and these should be explained to them. The political
situation is extremely dangerous because the people do not understand the war.
c. He cannot give an answer as to whether or not we should expand our troop deployments
after only two or three minutes of discussion.
d. We should take some form of dramatic political action. Such action might be built
around Christmas. Political action is absolutely required if a further military buildup is
likely. Among actions which might be considered would be an appeal to the Pope; a cease
fire; contacts with the Liberation Front in Algeria; a longer suspension of the bombing.
Political actions are important for support both within the U.S. and also abroad. He sees
no sign of any major effort on the political side.
e. If we do authorize an additional military buildup, some form of Congressional action is
desirable.
6. Speaker John McCormack
a. We are committed in Vietnam and we must do everything necessary to carry out our
commitment.
b. He is on the side of expanding our military strength in Vietnam.
c. The situation is comparable to that faced by the Free World when Hitler started his
aggression. If South Vietnam goes, the rest of Asia will collapse like dominoes before an
aggressive China.
d. Whatever additional bombing is necessary he would initiate.
e. Without further thought, he would be hesitant to ask action of Congress, but he would
want more time to think about this question.
f. Whatever decisions are made by the President he will back up.
7. Representative Gerald Ford
a. People are asking: are we getting too deeply involved on the ground; are we fully
utilizing our air power; why don't we stop the flow of goods into the port of Haiphong.
b. Before supporting an expansion of our ground forces, he would like to see us use more
air power against military targets in North Vietnam, and, in particular, he believes we
should mine Haiphong Harbor.
c. He believes it would be wise to ask for Congressional support of an expanded program
of military deployments.
8. Representative Edward Hebert.

a. We should do whatever is necessary to win. If more troops are required, send them. If
more bombing is necessary, including mining the Haiphong Harbor, initiate it.
b. We haven't made clear to the people why we are there.
c. Diplomatic moves may help psychologically, and if so, they should be undertaken,
although nothing concrete is likely to follow from them.
d. If additional deployments are undertaken, it may be necessary to go back to Congress to
get a Resolution of support.
9. Senator Sam Ervin
a. We ought to bomb North Vietnam out of existence because they are initiating the
aggression. We can't afford to retreat further in the world.
b. He would put more troops in South Vietnam if they are needed.
c. It might be advisable to go back to Congress for further support.
d. He believes it would be wise to give North Vietnam a warning or a chance to negotiate
(e.g., through a pause) before expanding the bombing.
10. Representative Leslie Arends
a. If we need more men in South Vietnam we should send them, although he hates to think
about it.
b. He believes we should expand the bombing in North Vietnam and he is certain we
should do this if we send in more troops.
c. He would favor a request for a Congressional Resolution of support.
d. He does not favor diplomatic moves now. He doubts the values of negotiation because
we can't trust the other side. However, we should continue to probe peace offers when
they come.
e. He believes we should stay in Vietnam. We are doing what needs to be done. He will
continue to support us.
11. Senator Thomas Kuchel
a. He believes we should and must expand our forces in South Vietnam.
b. The people in California want us to get on with the war and would favor expanding the
bombing.
c. The people would like to see the problem moved to the conference table, but they
believe the initial move must come from Hanoi.
d. He does not feel qualified to advise on whether we should initiate a pause or move to
the UN.
e. He does not believe additional Congressional action is required.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel
File, Senator Mansfield's Trip (Southeast Asia). Secret; Nodis. Received at the LBJ Ranch
at 12:50 p.m.
CAP 65864. Secretary Rusk asked Francis Meloy, a senior Foreign Service officer,
traveling with the Mansfield party,/2/ to seek the Senator's reaction, very privately, to a
possible early pause in the North Vietnam bombing. The exchange of cables follows:
/2/Senators Mansfield, Aiken, Boggs, Muskie, and Inouye, along with three staff aides,
were in South Vietnam December 2-5. Memoranda of conversation between this
delegation and Generals Thieu, Ky, and Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, all on December
3, were transmitted as enclosures to airgram A-356 from Saigon. (Department of State,
Central Files, LEG 7 MANSFIELD) A briefing of Mansfield's delegation by the U.S.
Mission in Saigon, December 2, is in the University of Montana, Mansfield Library,
Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 99, Fld 4.
(Repeat Manila 1132 and Deptel to Hong Kong 762 attached)/3/
/3/Copies of these telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
For Meloy from Secretary.
Would you inform Senator Mansfield we have been having some discussion here about
the various public proposals for a limited possibility of an early pause in the bombing of
North Viet-Nam. Although we have no significant indication that there would be any
constructive Hanoi response, it can be argued that such a pause would at least open the
way to Soviet activity and at the very least might persuade people that we were exhausting
every reasonable avenue to peace. On the negative side, we have been somewhat
concerned at the possibility of misinterpretation in Saigon or even in Hanoi, and Senator
Mansfield may have had relevant discussions or observations in Saigon.
I would be most grateful if you could discuss this privately and quietly with him, so that
his reactions could be conveyed to me at once.
For the Secretary from Meloy.
Your message was received and discussed with Senator Mansfield just prior departure
Hong Kong for Manila. Senator Mansfield has given careful thought to the question and
has consulted Senator Aiken privately. Following is substance Senator Mansfield's views:
1. American officials in Saigon made little reference to subject of bombing North
Vietnam or its expansion or suspension, taking the position they have no responsibility for
it. Neither was matter discussed in detail by Vietnamese authorities during Saigon visit.
However, it could be expected that Ky and his colleagues might well look with disfavor
and concern on any action which would appear to be letting up of our military pressure on
the enemy. On other hand bombing of north is now less of a psychological factor in south
in view of the reassuring presence of large U.S. forces.
2. Influx of men and material from North Vietnam will probably continue whether
bombing is suspended, maintained or extended. Senator certainly received the impression
that present bombing of the North was not an insuperable impediment to such a flow and
holds view that it is probably hardening the North Vietnamese will to continue conflict.
3. In conversations with Rumanians and particularly with Poles and Soviets the point was
repeatedly made that they could do nothing as long as bombing of North Vietnam and
"U.S. aggressive actions" continued. They were especially emphatic regarding bombing of
the north. Conversely, however, none indicated what, if anything, they could or would do
or what would happen if bombing were stopped. Suspension of bombing for an
appreciable period could perhaps smoke out whether there is any real disposition on part
of Eastern Europeans and Soviets to be helpful, although in this connection Senator
observed no indication on the part of the Russians of willingness to take action at this
time.
4. Although originally opposed to bombing, Senator not at all persuaded that an isolated
act of suspension at this point would prove fruitful, particularly if it is intended as a
measure which, if it fails to produce negotiations, will be followed by a resumption and
extension of the bombing.
5. Senator feels that if it is attempted at all at this time, it ought to be not "a wait and see"
gesture but, rather, coupled with other direct U.S. initiatives, with Poles, Rumanians and,
perhaps, even with Chinese in Warsaw.
6. Senator suggests, further, that consideration be given not solely to question of
suspending North Vietnamese bombing, which involves only a unilateral forbearance on
our part but also to a call for a suspension of all hostilities throughout Viet Nam in
connection with recent reported Viet Cong offer of a 12 hour cease-fire over Christmas.
He believes thought should be given to the practicability of calling upon the Viet Cong to
extend this period of cease-fire from Christmas through the important Vietnamese New
Year holiday (Tet) which is generally observed for approximately three days beginning
January 21 or 22. If it works, this would have virtue of providing substantial period of
about one month in which possibility for negotiations may be thoroughly tested. If it does
not, it would still be a significant initiative for peace from our side which should have
considerable effect on world and domestic opinion.
7. In sum, Senator feels that pause in bombing of itself would likely be of doubtful utility
in bringing about negotiations at this time unless coupled with broader U.S. initiatives in
other fields.
228. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Califano) to President

Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 230,
Vietnam 1964-65. Secret; Eyes Only. There is an indication on the source text that the
President saw the memorandum.
I appreciate the magnitude and the difficulty of the decisions you now face in respect to
Vietnam. Although I do not want to complicate your problems or impinge upon the roles
of your primary advisers in the national security area, I have myself given a lot of thought
to this over the past week-end as a result of the meetings last week. For what they are
worth, my views are as follows.
The more I think about it, the more I am opposed to a pause in the bombing as the
dramatic gesture for peace. I think it is very difficult for a President to order such a pause
when the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unanimously opposed to it and when they (to some
degree) base their opposition on the ground that the bombing is effective in supporting the
effort of 200,000 American boys on the ground in South Vietnam. Further, I think many
Americans, including many influential Congressmen, would raise vigorous objections to
such a pause and would become aware through one means or another (and through no
fault of the Chiefs) of the JCS views. Finally, I fear that Hanoi may be able to place us in
the position of protracted but totally non-productive negotiations with our men still
fighting on the ground--only so long as we do not resume bombing. By shrewd
diplomacy, they may be able to present us with the dilemma of denying us the benefits of
bombing through such pseudo-negotiations or putting the onus of breaking off such
negotiations on us for resumption of bombing.
Nevertheless, I believe some dramatic peace gesture is necessary. In part, it can be the trip
of Averell Harriman to various capitals of the world. However, I would suggest that some
consideration be given to your responding to the 12-hour ceasefire proposed by the Viet
Cong with a longer ceasefire--perhaps to run from Christmas through Tet (the Vietnamese
holiday), with the obvious caveat that our boys would fire in self-defense and resume the
attack on ground and in the air if the Viet Cong do not honor the ceasefire. (I do not know
how workable in the field a step of this kind is but you might want to have the Defense
Department explore the feasibility of an action such as this.) While the ceasefire was in
effect, you might offer to send some distinguished American directly to Hanoi.
Short of an action such as a ceasefire, and in addition to Averell Harriman's trip, I believe
you might at least offer to send someone directly to Hanoi to try to bring them to the
negotiating table.
Bundy, Vol. XVII. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is an indication on the source text that the
President saw the memorandum.
RE
Broodings on Vietnam
As I said on Saturday,/2/ I think the moment of truth on peaceful moves before Christmas
is likely to be Friday morning/3/ after Dean Rusk's return. (Bob McNamara gets back
Wednesday night, but Dean is spending another day on a long scheduled visit to Madrid.)
As of Saturday, Rusk and McNamara and all their top subordinates were strongly
favorable to the pause. Rusk himself has moved steadily and strongly in that direction
over the last two weeks, although he wants you to be absolutely certain that whatever you
decide will also be his recommendation. The arguments are wearisomely familiar to you,
but the interesting thing to me is that people with very different basic views of the course
of the war think that a pause would help now. And no one believes, either that the other
side can trap us or that a two-week pause in the North would weaken us in the South.
/2/December 11.
/3/December 17.
Today Bill Moyers and George Ball and I have discussed the wider proposal of a ceasefire and a peace mission to Hanoi in accordance with your instruction to Bill this morning.
This is an idea which has real attractions and real disadvantages. We will be working on it
some more tomorrow with Cy Vance, because it turns out--not for the first time--that the
people in Defense have done more staff work in this peace proposal than the people in
State.
The possible advantages of a cease-fire are these:
1. To the degree that it is respected by the other side, our casualties stop;
2. We get a chance to emphasize peaceful actions and to go about the work of relief and
reconstruction, and other works of peace. If the other side allowed such free movement,
we should be able to make some money in the countryside. If they did not, it would be
plainly their fault.
3. If the cease-fire is rejected--which is quite possible--the international political rewards
are very great indeed.
4. If the cease-fire is accepted, the chances of turning the whole business toward the peace
table are considerably greater than they would be with a pause.
The disadvantages a cease-fire offers are also serious:
1. The Chiefs and Lodge and Westmoreland would all be unanimously and very strongly
opposed. They would use some or all of the arguments that follow.
2. The whole object of our deployment is to get the initiative against the Viet Cong. A
cease-fire would hand it back to them and allow them to rest, refit, regroup, retrain, and
redouble their resistance after the fighting begins again.
3. A cease-fire would gravely shake the morale of the GVN and of the people in Saigon. It
would also reopen the whole question of U.S. determination, doubts of which were so
near the center of the crisis in morale a year ago.
4. A cease-fire offer could convey a very bad signal of apparent weakness to Hanoi. (I
don't quite believe in this one myself because if we ourselves use a cease-fire to move
around the countryside, we can make things very tough for Hanoi and the Viet Cong
both.)
5. If the South Vietnamese stop fighting, it may be very hard to get them to start again.
My own personal worry about a cease-fire right now is that I doubt if we can get
organized to do it right in the short time between now and Christmas. I also believe that it
is a card which we can play a little better some distance down the road than we can today.
I believe the pause is both easier to defend and easier to execute, and I do not believe that
it carries unacceptable costs with the troops in the field or public opinion. I feel this far
more strongly because I am quite certain that with careful explanation of the need for a
pause as a prelude to cease-fire, we can get the solid support of both Westmoreland and
Eisenhower and if they are with us, I do not fear those who are against us.
McG. B.
P. S. George Ball made an interesting argument this afternoon to the effect that it would
be a very good thing for us all if we could get out of bombing in the North altogether. He
was talking from rough notes, and I asked him to leave them with me for my instruction.
Because of your interest in every aspect of this problem, I think they may interest you too,
and I attach them at Tab A.
Attachment/4/
/4/No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: "G.
Ball's informal notes on bombing."
VIET-NAM
Original purpose of bombing North:
1. Primarily to improve morale in South.

2. To interdict movement of supplies to South.
3. To persuade Hanoi to quit or to come to conference table.
Present consequences of bombing:
1. Is it fulfilling purposes?
a. Not needed to raise morale in South with massive troop deployments.
b. Not effective to reduce flow of supplies below critical level although it raises cost.
c. It is not breaking popular will of Hanoi but is uniting country against U.S.
2. Unfavorable aspects:
a. Driving Soviet and Peking together when we should be splitting them since Soviets
want a pause.
b. Prevents possibility of settlement since Communist cannot settle in the face of US
bombardment of socialist state.
c. Enormously raises the dangers of escalation--already signs of creeping involvement on
both Chinese and Soviet sides.

Department of State
Washington, DC

a.m.
1. Course of the war
The entrance of North Vietnamese troops in large numbers into South Viet-Nam is truly
an escalation of the war, with all the serious connotations which attach to the word
"escalation". For Hanoi, it means grave risks; for us it means the grimness of intensified
effort.
If it were not for the incursion from Hanoi we could be taking some satisfaction from the
progress which has been made with regard to the rank and file Viet Cong.
Porter recently was in a village surrounded by Viet Cong when one defector came into the
village and said that he and his comrades simply could not stand the air and artillery
attacks anymore, adding that if he was well treated many more of his comrades would
come out. He appeared emaciated.
Viet Cong defectors to the Chieu Hoi camps during November numbered 1,482, the
highest monthly total on record, with air and artillery attacks also playing a big part.
22 members of a V.C. platoon surrendered a few days ago to the U.S. 173rd Airborne
Brigade. This is believed to be one of the largest single groups ever to surrender
voluntarily to U.S. forces.
Mr. Goure, of the Rand Corporation, told me that his 14 selected Vietnamese investigators
had interviewed about 180 Viet Cong prisoners and defectors between July and December
of this year. They noted a change as between 1965 and 1964. In 1964, 65 percent believed
in victory because they were convinced the Viet Cong had the support of the people. In
1965, only 20 percent believed in victory.
This too is due in great part to the jets, the B-52s, artillery and helicopters. In particular,
the B-52s had had a big impact with their destruction looming large in Viet Cong eyes
because of the comparison of sizes of bomb craters with the sizes of their own dwellings.
The air attacks had put the value of their passive defense measures in doubt and made
them realize there was no survival by digging.
They also had fear of detection and were obsessed with the idea that there were agents
among them. The officers of one main force battalion made everybody strip off their
clothes so as to look for hidden radios. Defoliation had been effective in enhancing
detection. V.C. had adopted the practice of cooking in villages so that the smoke of their
cooking would not be detected. If villages were not available, they cooked in special
ovens so as to dispel the smoke. These are cumbersome. They also try to put out a fire
when a plane appears. The result is that many units are down to one hot meal a day at 3
o'clock in the morning. The average food consumption is one can and a half of cold rice a
day. There is much beri-beri. There is also a high rate of malaria in the army of North
Viet-Nam.
Other items are:
The army of North Viet-Nam abandoned the dead at Plei Me.
It is curious, he said, that there are no amputees, blind men, under-nourished veterans to
be seen anywhere in the towns of North Viet-Nam. What happens to them?
The V.C. believe that the refugees, by taking farmers away from the farm, are reducing
the Viet Cong food supply.
70 percent of the recruits are said now to be deserting.
The V.C. are transferring the civilian cadres to military work, many of whom, although
loyal when in a civilian capacity, desert from the military.
Shortage of thoroughly indoctrinated officers means that when an officer is criticized, he
tends to leave.
They are depressed by the reports of the bad condition of their family at home.
The saying now is: The ocean in which we are supposed to swim is receding and drying
up. We must depend on the people; but the people are leaving us. End Goure account.
Keyes Beech, of the Chicago Daily News, who is, I believe, the senior American
journalist as regards Viet-Nam, and a former combat correspondent in Korea, believes
that success in Viet-Nam is now assured, provided U.S. opinion remains steadfast. He
considers this to provide really the only chance for defeat. He believes that Hanoi intends
to drag the conflict out until the 1968 Presidential election and is counting on the ending
of the war being the issue which will cause an outcome in which the V.C. are still in
power in the country-side. Incidentally, he added that there were more casualties after the
peace talks began in Panmunjon than there had been in that period preceding the peace
talks.
2. Economic and social
After remaining steady for four weeks the piaster has moved up in terms of gold and the
dollar. Retail food prices and the prices of imported goods eased slightly during the week.
The cost of coastal trading between Danang and Saigon has gone down from 8,000
piasters per metric ton in July to 2,000 piasters in October to 1,200 today as result of
measures USOM and the GVN have taken to supply more ships.
The U.S. medical teams are being received with enthusiasm in the provinces.
3. Psychological
There was much editorial comment about the recent terrorism attack against the U.S.
enlisted billet./2/ The vein of this commentary was generally one of loathing and hatred
for the Viet Cong for having perpetrated this attack which produced so many civilian
casualties.
Lodge

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, December 17 Meeting on Vietnam.
Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. McGeorge Bundy sent the President a
briefing memorandum for this meeting, which reads in part:
"Rusk and McNamara both believe that the most important question before us is that of
peaceful actions before January. When last heard from, they were both strongly in favor
of the pause. Bob and I have been doing further work on the wider notion of a cease-fire
in all Vietnam. I do not know his views, but I continue to think we are not ready for this
one yet.
"Another matter for discussion is Rusk's report on his European trip. Like Bob McNamara
he has found the responses pretty thin on Vietnam. But it remains a good thing that he put
our case as strongly as he did." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, High
Level Comments Re Bomb Pauses)
PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Ball, Valenti
(The following is taken from notes by Jack Valenti.)
The meeting opened with a discussion of the visit of Prime Minister Wilson./2/ Then the
President turned to Secretary Rusk, who had just returned from NATO,/3/ and asked:
/2/Harold Wilson arrived in New York on December 15 to address the U.N. General
Assembly. On December 16, he traveled to Washington for a formal meeting at the White
House in the late morning. In the late afternoon, Wilson and Johnson met privately for
almost two hours. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Wilson described his meeting with the
President in A Personal Record, pp. 186-188. On Vietnam, Wilson recalled that he
pressed Johnson for a suspension of the bombing to test North Vietnamese sincerity.
Wilson also recalled that he warned the President that if the United States bombed Hanoi
and Haiphong, the United Kingdom would have to publicly disassociate itself from such
action.
/3/Rusk attended the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris December
14-16.
Did you bring back any peace proposals:
Rusk: No. After moving around in NATO, I find Wilson is a paragon of courage. The rest
are doing nothing. I really can't see why the British can't put in men to support the
Australians.
President: Wilson is going to do nothing. He wants a DSC for fending off his enemies in
Parliament. I think this man Cameron's articles are having a large effect on this country. I
wish I could see to the end of the gun barrel in Viet-Nam.
The Viet Cong atrocities never get publicized. Nothing is being written or published to
make you hate the Viet Cong; all that is being written is to hate us.
Ball: There is a racial element in what we do to the North. It's not there when the North
hits the South.
President: they do a far better propaganda job than we do. On NBC today it was all about
what we are doing wrong. We've got to find some way to do another Baltimore speech./4/
Not desperate, but proper. Wilson says his line has been steady since the Baltimore
speech. Wilson tells his opposition to bring the Viet Cong to a conference table and he'll
produce the President.
/4/Reference is to Johnson's address at the Johns Hopkins University on April 7. For text,
see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 848-852. See also Foreign
Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245.
I'm willing to take any gamble on stopping the bombing if I think I've got some hope of
something happening. We must evaluate this very carefully. You have no idea how much
I've talked to the Fulbrights and Lippmanns. They're not coming aboard.
McNamara: We will increase bombing. It is inevitable. We must step up our attacks.
President: (The President read an editorial by Norman Cousins.)
Ball: I am holding an heretical view but I think the bombing in the North is having a
negative effect./5/
/5/A different view prepared jointly by DIA and CIA is in a DIA Special Intelligence
Supplement, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam," December 12. (National
Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-311-69)
McNamara: We just don't know if we are hurting the North Vietnamese or the Chinese.
We may be able to hurt them enough without 400,000 men to make them behave
differently. If we don't, what should we do? We shouldn't be doing anything that has a
one-in-three chance.
Perhaps a cease-fire in place.
Bundy: Not now. It takes time.
Rusk: It could cause the dissolution of South Viet-Nam.
McNamara: Our military has a one-in-three success order.
Bundy: I'm more optimistic. Our military is hurting them.
Ball: No one can say. If we look hard at bombing in the North, it isn't producing a salutary
effect. We started bombing:
1) to raise morale
2) to interdict supplies
3) to get Hanoi to change its mind
The first is not needed any more. Bombing hasn't served the other two reasons. We can
restrict supplies only to a critical level, no lower.
Obviously we are not breaking the will of North Viet-Nam. They are digging in. A
hardened line. I was in Charge of bombing surveys in World War II and bombing never
wins a war. We are driving the North Vietnamese into a greater dependency on China-and boxing in the Soviets. We are also making plans for negotiation more difficult.
I think the risks of escalation are very great--and the risk is in the North, not in the South.
The one hope we have is to stop bombing and seize every opportunity not to resume.
Meanwhile, (we should) conduct the war in the South with redoubled vigor.
President: That has some appeal to me. The problem is the Chiefs go through the roof
when we mention this pause.
McNamara: I can take on the Chiefs.
President: I don't think you can sell the American people on the merits of stopping the
bombing.
McNamara: The Navy and the Air Force are conducting 3,000 sorties in North Viet-Nam.
There is no way to stop bombing in the North except as part of a political move.
Rusk: On Ball's remarks, I don't think bombing has caused North Viet-Nam to escalate.
They are determined to do so.
We tell the Russians: you ask us to pause--we pause--now what would you do for us?
McNamara: You need several of these moves. We had one pause; we need more.
Bundy: Look at what would happen if there wasn't any bombing from the day before
Christmas until the day after New Years.
President: I have no objections. What are the objections?
Rusk: The Russians need more time to get something on with the Chinese.
McNamara: If the press asks us why no bombing, we answer we are increasing our effort
in Laos and the South.
Ball: Only 40 per cent of the missions are going on now. Concentrate in the South.
President: Shouldn't we have someone moving throughout the world trying for peace?
McNamara: All the time this is being done we will move toward increasing our forces in
Viet-Nam.
(President thinking--thoughtful, quiet, obviously concentrating deeply.)
President: Is this what you want to explore with the Chiefs?
McNamara: No, I need to know what you want. The Chiefs will be totally opposed.
(Problem with Wheeler--he has eye trouble and needs to be operated on.)
We decide what we want and impose it on them. They see this as a total military problem-nothing will change their views. They will answer: we are better off now with bombing
than without it.
President: We are there now because of the bombing. We wouldn't be there without it.
McNamara: I know exactly what the arguments of the Chiefs are. Before you decide, I
cannot deliver. After you decide, I can deliver.
Rusk: Work on specific suggestions and get back to the President later.
President: I am opposed to announcements of a pause. If you pick weather as an excuse
and Christmas as a factor--the position of the allies also--take a poll where they say we are
not doing enough to find peace.
Take all this--try to sell our enemies that we want peace. We owe this to the American
people. We can't do this if we are dropping bombs on the enemy. (Like Kosygin in
Hanoi.)
Anything with bombs is bad for the peace effort. Let's put off bombing until we can talk
to others.
Because of weather, receiving thousands more people, solidifying our position, we can
have a pause. Let McNamara say to the Chiefs: we've got a heavy budget, tax bill,
controls, danger of inflation, kill the great society. With all these things, we've got to
make sure the diplomats can talk. They claim they can't talk with bombs dropping. Period:
22 December through 22 January.
Sometime during this period have Westmoreland and Lodge come here to the U.S.--or the
President go to Honolulu--and look at it--letting the people know what we're doing.
Then on the 23rd of January, tell the people where we stand. Meanwhile, try to figure out
how to cut losses. Don't believe that bombing will help us.
They are right: the weakest chink in our armor is public opinion. Our people won't stand
firm--and will bring down the Government.
We're going to suffer political losses. Every President does in off years. But it is because
of damn fool liberals who are crying about poverty (which funds I doubled in one year).
But we need money for all these programs. How do you divide up this money? Every
hangover Kennedy columnist is sniping about Johnson cutting off Great Society
programs.
The only man that helps me survive is Jim Webb. He is trying to reduce funds in his
agency. Orville Freeman is a soldier--he's trying.
Meeting ended at 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis;
Priority. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was
2172. Eyes only for Bundy.
1. I received word from Mission officer that a man purporting to be connected with the
Viet Cong had said that a V.C. attempt to approach me had been unsuccessful because I
was apparently not interested.
2. This was so much the reverse of the truth that I told Archbishop Palmas about it so that
he would be in a position to clear up any misunderstanding. He vouched for the complete
lack of basis for such an idea. On the contrary, he said I had always made it clear that I
was interested.
3. In fact, Archbishop Palmas will tell his "former Minister" when he sees him that he
feels that he had not been dealt with in a correct manner.
4. Palmas assumes that either his "former Minister" has been cheated and deceived by the
V.C. or there has been an intervention from the north to quash separate peace making
activities from among the Viet Cong. A sign of this can be found in the new Viet Cong
flag which now contains the hammer and sickle.
Lodge
233. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel
File, Senator Mansfield's Trip (Southeast Asia). No classification marking. There is an
indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Summary of Conclusions of the Report on Viet Nam/2/
/2/Dated December 17. (Ibid.) Printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1966, pp. 738-740.
If the objectives of our policy remain the same, the war in Viet Nam is just beginning for
the United States. The ultimate needs cannot be estimated, either as to U.S. manpower,
costs or time. Prudence requires, however, that we anticipate a doubling and redoubling of
U.S. forces in the next year or two. The truth is that we are up against an open-ended
military situation which can eventually spread to encompass Southeast Asia and even
China. The war has, in fact, already spilled over into Laos and may be on the verge of
involving Cambodia.
The end of the road on the basis of present policy is not in sight either in the sense of a
military solution or a solution by negotiations. The Communists give no signs of
acquiescing in the basic requirement of our present policy which, in effect, is that North
Viet Nam either agree to or be compelled "to leave its neighbors alone". That concept, in
any event, is an oversimplified interpretation of the situation. The bulk of Communist
manpower in South Vietnam is still South Vietnamese. South Vietnamese and North
Vietnamese are all mixed together, on both sides, in this conflict. The disputants are not
only "neighbors," they are also "relatives".
Any immediate prospects of opening a Conference (and they are slim) are not likely to be
realized on the "neighbor" concept but, if at all, on the basis of "cease fire and stand fast."
That would appear to be a necessary preliminary to straightening out the complex
Vietnamese relationships in general accord with the Geneva Agreements of 1954. A cease
fire and stand fast now, as a practical matter, would leave the Viet Cong in control of most
of the rural areas, and the government in control of the cities which probably contain in
excess of 50% of the total population of South Viet Nam.
It is not likely that third parties can be of much help in bringing about a Conference any
more than they can be counted on for much real assistance in carrying on the war. Almost
without exception, the principal concern other nations have, whether in Europe or in Asia,
is staying clear of involvement themselves.
The Russians, in particular, are unwilling to help bring about negotiations at this time.
Indeed, it may well be that they do not find the present situation at all without benefits
from their point of view. The fact is that their principal rivals in the world and in the
Communist bloc (the United States and China respectively) are both deeply involved in
Viet Nam. The Russians, as of now, are in the clear and have almost a free hand in
promoting their position and interests both within the bloc and in the world in general.
The most realistic hope (and it is not much) for a conference in the near future would
appear to lie in a direct initiative with the Chinese and North Vietnamese and on the initial
basis of "cease fire and stand fast." A possible approach was outlined to Secretary Rusk in
a cable on December 10, 1965./3/ If a Conference on this basis could be achieved, the
present state of the war in Viet Nam would obviously not give the Saigon government and
the United States control of all South Viet Nam but we would still have a substantial
position for negotiating purposes.
/3/Text in Document 227.
If a Conference cannot be brought off at this time, the decision which faces us resolves
itself into this: Shall we plunge in further militarily, into depths which are unfathomable
and could eventually involve war with China or can we hold a more limited position in
South Viet Nam by more limited military means until the Communists come around to
negotiations? Apart from the costs in lives and resources which have to be considered in
this decision, there is the additional factor of the worldwide consequences of a deeper and
more widespread U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. In my judgment, these
consequences are likely to be very adverse to the position of the United States,
particularly with respect to Europe and Japan which are, in fact, the only other two major
power-seats in the non-Communist world.
This is a conflict in which all the choices open to us are bad choices. We stand to lose in
Viet Nam by restraint; but we stand to lose far more at home and throughout the world by
the more extensive military pursuit of an elusive objective in Viet Nam.
234. Draft Papers/1/

Memos (B). Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the papers.
The following draft papers have been prepared for discussion at 11:45 AM, December
18:/2/
/2/For a record of the December 18 White House meeting, see Document 235.
1. An outline of the U.S. public position. (Tab 1)
2. A draft message to Ambassador Lodge (Tab 2)
3. A one-page scenario of initial diplomatic action (Tab 3)
4. A draft statement by Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador
Dobrynin (Tab 4)
5. A draft circular telegram to selected capitals. (Tab 5)
Tab 1/3/
/3/Top Secret; Sensitive.
OUTLINE OF U.S. PUBLIC POSITION DURING A SUSPENSION
OF BOMBING
1. Assumptions
(1) Bombing would be suspended from December 22 and the U.S. must keep free to
continue or end the suspension as the President determines. An internal planning
assumption is that suspension might last through Vietnamese New Year, which comes on
January 21, 22 and 23.
(2) The U.S. will make absolute minimum of official public comment on the suspension
of the bombing, as such. The U.S. instead will emphasize during the suspension the
overriding need for unconditional peace talks and will make it clear that all of its actions
at every level--political, military, and diplomatic--are directed at achieving a peaceful
settlement.
2. Official Public Statements
(1) Within the next few days, and not later than December 22, the Secretary of State
makes a major statement on peace in Vietnam. He rehearses the full list of our efforts to
start negotiations. He re-states and re-emphasizes our readiness for free elections and
Geneva agreements and the other elements of our strong diplomatic position as last
developed by the President on July 28. He rededicates the U.S. to this search for peace
and hails the readiness of Prime Minister Wilson to do his best. He announces on behalf
of the President that Vice President Humphrey and Governor Harriman will be proceeding
to friendly and neutral capitals right after Christmas to explain in full the U.S. position
and to enlist the help of all concerned in moving toward peace.
(2) On December 22 bombing is suspended in the North, but without comment. This
position of "no comment" is rigorously sustained at every official headquarters, and there
is no comment on background either, until the President gives the word.
(3) At a time determined by the President, the White House Press Secretary responds to
questions on the suspension by saying that every action of the U.S. is related to two
purposes: first, to turn back the aggressor in the South, and second, to open the way to
peaceful settlements. This comment is echoed precisely by all U.S. officials. All officials
continue to draw attention to the statement of the Secretary of State and to the diplomatic
missions of the Vice President and Governor Harriman.
3. Background comments
At times directed by the President, the following background comments will be made by
officers of the appropriate departments:
(1) Our military effort in the South is being sustained and intensified. The deployments
continue and the aircraft not being used in the North are being redirected against Laos and
South Vietnam where they have work to do. The South is where the contest will be
decided. (Defense)
(2) The fact that there is no bombing is directly related to the desire to create a favorable
environment of response for the Secretary's speech and the Humphrey/Harriman missions.
We do not wish to have this series of peace appeals punctuated by the sound of bombs
exploding in the North. (State)
(3) The suspension of the bombing carries no serious military risks because
--the aircraft are doing their job elsewhere;
--the weather is bad over North Vietnam this month anyway;
--reconnaissance continues over North Vietnam;
--if no progress is made toward peace, we can catch up later in the North (Defense).
(4) the whole peace effort, including the suspension of the bombing, has two purposes: to
open the way for peace if possible, and to prove to men of good will in every country the
good faith of the U.S. in its commitment to a peaceful settlement. (State)
(5) If this peace effort does not work, the prospect of more and heavier fighting is real,
because the determination of the U.S. is unchanged. (every one)
4. Very deep background or off the record
(1) This effort is the necessary peace punch to go with the military punch which is coming
in January. We face a big budget, larger reinforcements, and possibly other drastic
measures in the field of taxes and controls. The President cannot ask the American people
to join in united support of these hard measures until we have given complete proof of our
determination to move toward peace, if possible. (Defense)
(2) This peace effort, including the suspension of bombing, is designed to give an opening
for debate and pressure for a peace conference within the Communist world. We make no
comment at all about what one Communist capital may be saying to another, but we do
know that it has been hard for any of them to speak of peace while a Socialist country was
being bombed. We hope they are making the most of the suspension. (State)
Tab 2
Draft Telegram/4/
/4/Top Secret; Nodis.
Literally eyes only for Ambassador from President.
1. I am determined to leave no stone unturned in pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the
war consistent with our objective of an independent and secure South Viet-Nam. But over
the past few weeks we have been repeatedly told by the Soviet Union, representatives of
various Eastern European countries, our Western Allies and various significant leaders of
American opinion that effective steps toward peace are difficult if not impossible while
North Viet-Nam is under air bombardment.
2. None of us has illusions that a suspension of bombing would be likely to lead to
acceptable peace moves by Hanoi. But before taking the critical next steps that I now face,
I must satisfy myself, the American people, and the world that every opportunity has been
provided for peaceful initiatives. If it did nothing else we have reason to believe that a
suspension could add to the strains and dissensions in the Communist camp and make it
easier for Moscow to avoid deep involvement.
3. These next steps include budget increases of many billions of dollars which will
become public in January, the deployment of large numbers of additional men during
1966 and the acceptance of stepped-up casualties associated with such increased
deployments.
4. I am confident the American people will be prepared to do whatever is necessary to see
the struggle to a successful conclusion and that our additional efforts will have the support
of most of our friends around the world. But it appears to me that sustained support for
these very difficult undertakings can be best assured by one further measure to satisfy the
world that America is doing everything possible to create the conditions that will facilitate
progress toward peace.
5. With these considerations in mind--and after an exhaustive balancing of all implications
and consequences--I have decided to order the suspension of air attacks on NVN
beginning December 22 in order to permit opportunity for both Communist and friendly
countries to exercise all diplomatic initiatives they can and will undertake. For the
moment no decision will be made as to precise duration of suspension. This will depend
on progress of diplomatic efforts being undertaken by our friends and on both the words
and the actions of Hanoi. We will, of course intensify our efforts in the South, and
continue our actions against infiltration routes in Laos. We will also continue unarmed
reconnaissance over DRV.

6. I do not contemplate any public announcement of suspension. At the beginning, the
stand-down may hopefully be related to weather conditions. As attention becomes focused
on continued suspension we shall publicly explain it as a step in the search for peace. At
the same time the press can be informed on background basis that suspension is taking
place during period when weather conditions in Viet-Nam limit effectiveness of bombing.
Press will certainly draw its own conclusions about relation of suspension to the
Christmas season.
7. But while there will be no public announcement we do plan quietly to inform various
key governments, including certain Communist governments, which have indicated
interest in some diplomatic initiative. Moreover I shall dispatch various emissaries to key
capitals to explore possibilities of probing intentions and encouraging diplomatic
initiatives.
8. I know of your own reservations regarding any suspension of bombing and am fully
aware of possible costs and dangers. Nevertheless, I feel that this action is a necessary
preparation for the difficult days that lie ahead.
9. I also recognize the delicate and complicated problem you will face in handling this
matter with the GVN. This will draw on your best diplomatic resources. We must
emphasize to the GVN that the American determination is unswerving but that before
entering into a new and more costly phase of the conflict requiring a very much greater
US effort we must satisfy our people and the world that all measures are being exhausted
to bring about peace on a basis consistent with the objectives for which we are both
fighting. Our stake is so large in this enterprise that we cannot permit the GVN to veto
this essential measure.
10. I leave it to your best judgment how to approach GVN. I know you will bear in mind
the serious problem of premature leaks. You carry a very high responsibility and I know I
can trust you to do everything possible in bringing off this difficult but essential
undertaking.
Tab 3/5/
/5/Top Secret.
SCENARIO
1. December 21,
P.M.
Speech at the UN.
2. December 21,
P.M.
Following speech Goldberg informs U Thant of plan with

regard to suspension.
3. December 21,
P.M.
Following speech Ambassador Thompson and/or Secretary

Rusk informs Ambassador Dobrynin along lines of attached
draft
4. December 22
Delivery of personal message from Secretary Rusk to

Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter similar to message given
Ambassador Dobrynin.
5. December 22,
A.M.
UK requested to deliver oral message to Hanoi informing

Hanoi of suspension and willingness of UK to act as channel
of communication and otherwise to hold itself in readiness to
do anything possible that will move situation toward peaceful
solution.
6. December 22,
A.M.
Instructions transmitted to US Ambassadors following

countries for delivery to the Chief of Government personal
message from the President along lines attached draft: United
Kingdom, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Canada,
India, Japan, Philippines (both Macapagal and Marcos).
7. December 22,
P.M.(December 23
A.M. Saigon Time)
Initiation of suspension.
8. December 26
Vice President departs for Japan and inauguration of

Philippine President. Following Philippine inauguration he
visits Australia, New Zealand and India.
9. December 26
Gov. Harriman departs for European capitals.
Tab 4/6/
/6/Top Secret.
DRAFT STATEMENT TO DOBRYNIN
I wish to inform you confidentially in advance that on December ___ we will suspend our
bombing operations against North Vietnam. We are taking this step fully conscious of the
risks involved. One of these is that the other side may take advantage of our action to step
up the intervention in South Vietnam. We will, therefore, continue our reconnaissance of
North Vietnam. Another risk is that the authorities in Hanoi and Peiping may interpret our
action as a sign of weakness or lack of determination to carry out our commitment to the
Government and people of South Vietnam. This risk is heightened by the fact that as
always is the case in a society such as ours when controversial issues are under public
discussion, a small minority has come out in opposition to our policy in Southeast Asia. I
am sure that on the basis of reports from you and other sources your government can put
these manifestations in their proper perspective. I am not so sure that this is the case in
Hanoi and Peiping.
The resistance to the North Vietnamese controlled and directed hostilities in South
Vietnam will continue but can quickly be brought to an end either by formal negotiations
or by the simple cessation of North Vietnamese intervention. I realize that we do not have
a common view of the past history of this affair but I am hopeful that we do hold in
common a desire to see peace restored in that unhappy land; to see the killing and the
terrorism ended and the long-suffering people of this area given the opportunity to devote
their lives to peaceful pursuits in which we stand ready to assist them. As we have
repeatedly stated, we seek no military bases or other advantages in this area and we
believe that the Geneva Accords of 1954 could furnish the basis for a settlement.
I can assure you of our sincerity when I tell you that we are determined to live up to our
commitments but that peace is our objective and that the action of which we are informing
your Government has no other purpose.
Tab 5/7/
/7/Top Secret.
DRAFT CIRCULAR TELEGRAM TO U.S. AMBASSADORS IN SELECTED
CAPITALS
The President requests that you call on Chief of Government before the close of business
on __________ to give him the following personal message from the President.
"I want you to know that in pursuit of the objective set forth in my address at the UN, I
have instructed the Secretary of State to conduct a renewed and intensive effort to move
the problem of Vietnam to the peace table. I have asked the Secretary to coordinate a
number of efforts of all sorts, public and private, to persuade the Government of North
Vietnam of the importance of moving in this direction.
"In order to insure the most favorable possible environment for this effort, I have agreed
with the Government of Vietnam that there will be a suspension of the bombing in North
Vietnam beginning on December ______.
"In all its actions in Vietnam, my Government has aimed from the first for a peaceful
settlement. These new actions are a part of this same policy and purpose. It is my hope
that the climate that should result will make it possible for your Government to take
initiatives of its own in furtherance of the objective of a peaceful settlement. I have asked
my Ambassador to be available to you at any time for further discussion of these matters."
For the Ambassador's information: Unarmed reconnaissance of North Vietnam will
continue and we will be alert to and reserve full freedom of action to deal with any
aggressive actions that the DRV may take which are clearly contrary to our objective of
peaceful solutions. We also expect to maintain and even accelerate the pace of military
action in South Vietnam. In your discretion you should insure that these elements of our
policy are understood.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, December 18 Meeting with Foreign
Policy Advisers on Vietnam. Secret. The source text does not indicate a drafter, but the
notes were taken by Valenti. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. President
Johnson describes this meeting in The Vantage Point (pp. 235-237), and quotes from this
document.
PRESENT
The President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Clifford, Ball, Alex Johnson, Abe Fortas, Jack
Valenti
SUBJECT
Possible bombing pause in North Vietnam
President: Publicity seekers and amateurs cannot have a hand in our affairs with other
nations (in regard to Fanfani affair). When Adlai (wrote) letter rebuking the Sevareid
break, CBS only carried 30 seconds. The denial never catches up with the accusation.
Stevenson had a martyr complex but he never was going to resign.
Amateur excursions into diplomacy can cost you greatly. But having to reply to it, it
destroyed its effectiveness. We can't conduct negotiations . . .
(Guard these papers/2/ we are reading. We simply cannot allow this information to get
out. I had a conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/3/--and I can
understand what McNamara is living with--he gave me the reasons why the Chiefs are
against a cease-fire and a pause--it almost makes it impossible to attack . . .
/2/Document 234 and attachments.
/3/No record of this conversation has been found.
(I would treat missions without mentioning or pointing up. After the fact, it is alright but
we cannot announce their schedule as a peace mission. It would get nowhere.)
The military say a month's pause would undo all we've done.
McNamara: That's baloney--and I can prove it.
President: I don't think so. I disagree. I think it contains serious military risks. It is
inaccurate to say suspension of bombing carries no military risk.
Bundy and McNamara: We can resume bombing at any time.
President: If we're confronted with 60-100,000 more men, and we didn't anticipate it,
that's an error. If they fix all their bridges and transportation . . . (I thought we took this
power plant out.)
Rusk: I don't believe the suspension will last to January 27 unless we are well on the way
toward peace.
President: I agree. It could be of very short duration.
Bundy: It would be better to start on the 23rd or 24th.
McNamara: It would leak if we give Lodge longer than 23rd. Start Wednesday the 22nd.
Bundy: Which is then Thursday, their time. If you go to the UN, the pause ought to come
right after.
Think carefully about if there is a turnaround on Lodge's part. The question is do we want
to know more before we push the button. If he says the situation would collapse, you may
want to know more.
President: What does Max Taylor think? How would he vote?
McNamara: On balance, "no". But he would vote with the Presidnt.
Bundy: This is not what he considers his arena.
McNamara: He thinks the military program and pacification is going better than it is.
President: Why do it the 22nd? Why not the 7th or 8th?
Bundy: Christmas time is a good time psychologically--also get it started before Congress
comes back.
President: If you wind up bombing during New Year, wouldn't it be better to do it during
their New Year?
Ball: Wouldn't it be better to do it before Congress comes back?
President: Incidentally, do we want a personal State of the Union message? Clark, I want
you to think about this. My inclination is not to speak in person. We wrote an 8-year
program in our first State of the Union message. We've got all this the first year.
McCormack thinks personal delivery will help elect the Congress. I don't agree.
Rusk: I disagree. If you didn't, you would be giving up your leadership, here and abroad. I
do have objection to a 9 p.m. appearance.
McNamara: I don't think you have to go before Congress to assert leadership. You ought
not to go unless (the message) has something to say.
Clifford: I think it would be a serious mistake if you didn't go in person. Last year you
laid out a domestic program. This time you report on the shape of the program.
I think, after your illness, failure to appear would be injurious to world leadership. To
break a long standing custom would be serious.
Rusk: If we were at peace in Viet-Nam, it might be alright, but not now.
President: I think there is a good deal to what Cliff says.
Clifford: I would do it on the 11th or 12th.
President: We could do it on Monday, the 10th, the first day. That's what we did last year.
(Fortas, Rusk, Clifford all intensely in favor of personal delivery.)
(After reading the position paper on a pause)
It rankles me that we have to prove again to Congress we are striving for peace. We've
done that again and again.
Rusk: It's "What have you done for me lately?"
President: Would we read about the suspension on the 23rd?
Bundy: The British will probably leak it.
President: Who will you tell about this?
Rusk: The UK, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Canada, India, Japan, the
Philippines. We need to tell them something within 36 hours.
Alex Johnson: After the first Saigon briefing of no mention of an attack on the North, the
press will be hounding us.
President: You better move your dates back. I'm not ready to do anything yet. We have a
lot of talking to do.
Dean, tell me what you think will be achieved by execution of this recommendation of a
pause?
Rusk: First, there is the underlying question of the American people. They are isolationists
at heart. (I am) convinced the people will do what has to be done in a war situation if they
are convinced there is no alternative. You must think about the morale of the American
people if the other side keeps pushing.
We must be able to say that all has been done.
President: Haven't we done this?
Rusk: To my satisfaction, but perhaps not to that of the American people.
Second, it's our deepest national purpose to achieve our goal by peace not war. If there is
one chance in ten or twenty, a step of this sort could lead to a settlement on the Geneva
agreements and 17th parallel I would take it. One chance in twenty is my guess.
Try to create a heavy obligation on the Russians' part to settle. If we pause, they will owe
us something. The Russians, Yugoslavs, Hungarians have all pressed this with me. There
is a possibility of deception.
President: They are pretty good at that, aren't they?
Rusk: If there is a chance Russia would take advantage of a suspension to start a
movement toward peace, it is good. If it fails . . .
(I am) influenced by the fact Russia and Iron Curtain countries acted in India-Pakistan
crisis.
Also they don't want China policy to win. Also, they don't want a confrontation with the
United States over Southeast Asia policy.
If it moves to the U.S. and China directly engaged, they have a deadly problem. This
worries them. This ought to be clarified. We may get this clarified on the 3rd day like the
last time.
A minor point (it would) make sure the world knows the U.S. is not the obstacle to peace.
Those who support us will find it easy to support us.
President: From a propaganda point, there is a long shot chance. First, the Russians owe
us something; second, it gives supporters reasons to go along with the U.S.
Rusk: Possibility of trap--parlay pause into unilateral pause.
President: Do we eliminate this by keeping the pause on an indefinite time limit?
Rusk: Right.
Another concern is a pause that fails. It will bring pressure to go all out to get it settled.
President: That is the most dangerous aspect. Don't we know a pause will fail? If we are in
worse shape then, won't we be bringing a deadly crisis on ourselves? The Republicans are
looking for an exit. When we suffer reverses, it will be attributable to this. The support we
have will be weak as dishwater.
Rusk: The answer to Dirksen is that no real settlement came from Korea . . . They allowed
North Viet-Nam to become communist.
President: Bob?
McNamara: The Soviets have not applied all the pressure they could.
President: Have they ever applied pressure?
Rusk: Yes. During the first pause. They said they didn't have time.
McNamara: Our first pause was a propaganda effort. It was a propaganda effort--not for
the Soviets to help.
Rusk: Another indication is that the Russians have waged a great struggle against China.
President: Do we gain anything by doing this on the heels of the Italian move?/4/
Rusk: There is some disagreement in the timing. (One) the hardliners say you paused in
the face of Hanoi's intransigence. (Two) the leftwing says you are pausing because you
don't believe anything will happen.
McNamara: My point is they haven't made all the effort they are capable of.
President: How do you know that? Have they talked with you?
McNamara: No. No contacts. This comes from State.
This pause will give us leverage on them. It stops them from precipitous action against us-such as an amphibious landing. Such Russian action is less likely if we pause.
I think there is some movement from the DRV. We don't really understand the DRV
reactions. We don't really know. We are out of communication. (There is) danger because
of this. (There is a) bare chance this pause will help them move toward us.
President: What does Thompson say about the Russians?
Ball: It would relieve them of intense pressure on response to our actions. (There is) more
danger of Russian response than Chinese response. So we must push them into a corner.
Rusk: Suppose the Russians were trying to avoid a confrontation with the U.S.? What are
those Americans up to?
(The President left the room to take a phone call at 1:40. He re-entered at 1:50 p.m.)
Bundy: We don't think you should contact Ford of the House of Representatives. He will
denounce us.
(The President did not answer.)
McNamara: 1. The Soviets have not applied all the pressure they are capable of.
2. Action stops Russians from responding as forcefully to our attacks . . .
3. North Viet-Nam might make a favorable movement. We don't know enough of their
reactions to judge.
4. Suspension of bombing will widen the gap between the Russians and Chinese.
5. Strong feeling of American public that Government peace efforts have been superficial
and inadequate.
6. Military solution to problem is not certain--one out of three or one in two. Ultimately
we must find solution, we must finally find a diplomatic solution.
President: Then, no matter what we do in military (field) there is no sure victory.
McNamara: That's right. We have been too optimistic. One in three or two in three is my
estimate.
Rusk: I'm more optimistic, but I can't prove it.
McNamara: I'm saying: we may not find a military solution. We need to explore other
means. It is impossible to negotiate a settlement we find acceptable.
Rusk: I don't agree. The other side knows South Viet-Nam is not going to negotiate on
uneven terms.
McNamara: Our military action approach is an unacceptable way to successful
conclusions.
Ball: What you are saying is: they quit and come to the conference table?
McNamara: Right. This seems a contradiction. I come to you for a huge increase in VietNam--400,000 men. But at the same time it may lead to escalation and undesirable results.
I suggest we look now at other alternatives.
1. Military advantage to North Viet-Nam infiltration. I don't think it is serious--small
advantage to North Viet-Nam.
2. Possibility North Viet-Nam will interpret a pause as a sign of weakness.
3. May lead to trouble with Lodge and the South Vietnam. It doesn't make any difference
what or who is in South Viet-Nam--don't worry about them.
Lodge is a great admirer of the President. He will act like a soldier.
President: I differ with you. I think Lodge and the South Vietnamese government are
problems. We've had enough governments out there. We must give thought to where the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch episode/5/ leads to.
/5/On December 17, the Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Richard Dudman, broke the story of the Rusk-Fanfani exchange of November 20December 4, compelling the Department of State to release the texts of the exchange on
December 17. See Document 205 and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1965, pp. 917-919.
Ask Dobrynin in the light of North Vietnamese reaction where are we?
Also Mansfield--he is arriving with a full report.
McNamara: Pressure for escalation after suspension. Don't believe it will be a major
problem. This pressure is only in terms of the North.
Republicans don't dare suggest we bomb cities.
P.O.L.? I will recommend we bomb them too.
Mine Haiphong Harbor? I will suggest this later myself. Three to six months from now we
will have to do this. But danger is Russian reaction. It will be less if we have pause.
Rusk: Think you underestimate problem we face with South Viet-Nam.
McNamara: Find it inconceivable that is so.
Greatest danger is right in this room. Simply cannot discuss this with your wife. I can see
stories about this--and I am embarrassed. Please let us check ourselves and discuss with
no human being.
(Meeting adjourned for lunch at 2:20 p.m. Meeting resumed at 3:05.)
Bundy: For the pause. Share McNamara view that settlement must be political. This will
be form of diplomatic initiative.
President: I'm not in position to quote Wheeler on pros or cons of pause. He is a good
soldier and will follow Commander-in-Chief. Don't think his views are emotional. He is
loyal to McNamara and me-- --but has convictions . . . point up systematically his views.
McNamara: Whatever decision you make, Wheeler will follow.
Bundy: If we are going to do a pause, I'd much rather have done it before the Congress
comes back.
Fortas: Divide into two parts:
1. Military effects.
2. Psychological and political aspects.
Political effects on this country:
(1) Case is not proven. Believe this action will be good--if it results in some kind of
conference or suspension of hostilities.
Think public reaction will be negative--showing uncertainty. Always think there is
possibility of error in assessing public opinion. What they really want is cessation of
hostilities. Not very much point in responding to manifestation of public opinion that says
"you're not doing enough".
Anytime there is evidence of lack of certainty on the government's part, it leads to
negative thinking in the public mind. It will cause people to worry about depth of
conviction in government objective.
Negative on net balance.
Real question--on whether this action should be taken--is whether this action results in
actual accomplishment.
As I understand it, this action will not be done with pre-arrangement with Russians. This
is an action ambivalent and ambiguous. We use the Christmas season--and by that fact
and presentation we are diluting the effort [effect] in its hoped-for psychological and
political results. Also diluting effect on Russians--and any bringing about of peace
negotiations.
Concerned as to what happens if this fails.
If failure, we won't get credit for it. There will be renewed pressure for drastic action.
We'll have obstacles to negotiations because of failure of major and spectacular effort.
President: What do you think? What would be the value?
Fortas: If we could do this by pre-arrangement with the Russians: "If we would finally
consider a pause, would this give you an opportunity to get the VC to the conference
table?"
President: We've already done this with the Russians.
Bundy: We don't think we can put them in a corner. The paper to the Russians is drafted
carefully to go as far as we can with the Russians.
Rusk: We've tried to engage the Soviets in the Viet-Nam settlement but Moscow can't
deliver Hanoi.
Fortas: This venture depends on the Russians using our actions for some purpose with
North Viet-Nam. All I do is raise the question as to whether we have adequate reason for
assumption.
Ball: This assumption is not based on one conversation, but on a number of them. Very
often the means used by communists is not direct. Also this assumption is based on direct
conversation with the Soviets. If we paused, the Soviets tell us they will do the best they
can (based on twenty or more conversations).
Fortas: There is danger Hanoi would greet a pause as visible evidence that protests have
had effect on the U.S. Government.
Ball: The thing that offsets that is heavy deployment in the South.
Alex Johnson: We can't have it said by Hanoi and China that Russia is conspiring with the
United States.
Clifford: Arguments for pause are well presented. Even if I accepted them, I still feel deep
concern over this move.
1. Tried to figure out the circumstance under which North Viet-nam would talk. Only
their belief they are not going to win the war in South Viet-Nam. I don't believe they are
at that stage now. I think they believe they are not losing. They are sending large numbers
of men down. They have the example of the French before them. They believe that
ultimately the United States will tire of this and go home and North Viet-Nam will
prevail. Until they know they're not going to win the war, they will not talk and the
Russians cannot convince them.
2. Believe the President and the government have talked enough about peace. Don't
believe any more talk will do any good. Any objective citizen knows the government's
position. Talk of peace is interpreted as a sign of weakness.
This pause would encourage North Viet-Nam--take this to be a step backward, in response
to U.S. protest opinion and world opinion.
Anything that hinders the North Viet-Namese from figuring they can't win hinders the
close of the war.
3. When the time comes to resume (and it will resume because chances are only one in
twenty or one in fifty) those who want peace at any price, who want us to get out are . . .
that we not resume. They will urge enough . . . events to happen to encourage the pause to
go on.
4. If you accept the hypothesis that there is no chance of success, others will know it too.
And I don't like the President to take a posture that is clearly unproductive. Might end up
being viewed as a gimmick. Timing during Christmas is unfortunate.
5. Don't believe Viet-Nam is going to be settled publicly. Humphrey and Harriman

publicized trips will not settle anything. Only when Hanoi feels nothing to be gained by
further fighting is this war going to end.
6. If Soviets believe it is to their best interest to take favorable steps, they can do it at any
time. Simply because bombing is going on will not stop them from intervening.
7. Time might come when pause would be valuable--if we thought there was a chance it
would be successful, then and only then would I do it.
Ball: Think we make a mistake in feeling Hanoi has freedom of action. They can no more
give up this war alone than we would let Saigon fall. It's what the communist powers
believe is the right course. The bombing immobilizes China and the USSR.
McNamara: Should we pursue military estimate of 50-50 chance of victory--or what
should we do?
Rusk: In carrying the political battle, I need something more than we have at the present
time. We need to make clear that the United States is honorable and has been given no
alternative. We strengthen our position by proving we want peace.
Fortas: Seems to me you have already made your case for peace. Perhaps it looks different
on the inside than it does on the outside.
McNamara: If we put in 400,000 men, what will they do? They will match us. We are
going to be bombing assets of North Viet-Nam dearer to them than the ones we are
bombing. China is beginning to ready planes to meet us in the skies. It appears that MIGs
are being introduced into North Viet-Nam. They are getting ready for escalation--and will
call on Russia. They don't want to confront us in Vietnam--they want a way out.
Fortas: The way we are doing it is too little to get the Soviets to do anything.
Ball: But North Viet-Nam would know a diplomatic offensive is going on on behalf of the
Russians. If North Viet-Nam says "no" to the Soviets, they have a way out when North
Viet-Nam calls on them for more arms and men.
President: Dean, have you given any thought to me going to the UN?
Rusk: Yes. It is related to whether or not you envisage doing the pause. If you are going
up to greet and thank the UN on their last day--a short statement--recount the main
elements of our policy--also try to look beyond Viet-Nam--and the hopes of mankind all
over the world--education, health and peace--that kind of twenty minute visit would be
worthwhile. It would be particularly worthwhile if you do the pause.
McNamara: Not so sure if you are not going to pause. Want to see the speech before final
decision.
President: Anything further to be gained between the Secretary or Goldberg and the
Russians--on the basis: We will do this if you will follow through? Tell them: Here's what
we want to do if you will acknowledge that you will do something.
Bundy: You're never going to be in a position to be in partnership with the Russians. They
will always deny being in league with a capitalistic power.
Rusk: Moscow, Poland and Hungary have been in touch with Hanoi. We have never heard
from Poland and Hungary.
If we don't do this, have we any other diplomatic moves we can make--any approaches
with any other government?
(Silence for a few minutes)
Rusk: We could take it to the Security Council if the Russians didn't veto and ask the
Secretary General to go to Hanoi. We could press the Hungarian channel pretty hard--they
are in touch with Moscow.
I worry about bringing this to the assembly in view of the Rhodesia question.
We could continue these discussions of which we have had a lot.
President: Did Wilson say anything about this?/6/ I don't know.
Rusk: He was very relaxed about it.
President: He asked me about the 12-hour truce.
Rusk: That should be left to local commanders. It's not very long.
President: Let's outline all other courses and see them.
Ball: We have just about exhausted third party contacts based on what we have given
them about our position.
President: But the Viet Cong haven't done anything. They get a lot of hay by just talking.
Bundy: If we had a newspaper in Hanoi not under their control, we could do more
(laughter).
Down the road there are a lot of areas we haven't done--such as formulas on when they
shoot and we shoot back as we move around Vietnam.
We could plow a straight furrow during winter and spring and clean out the South--and
put the onus of continued fighting on them.
I would like to get the diplomatic experience of this pause. We have a lot of diplomatic
maneuvering to do.
Rusk: One of the pitfalls is that a new situation can always turn out different. For
example, lifting of the Berlin blockade came as a surprise. In the Pusan peninsula, we
thought we couldn't hang on--and we did.
I have a feeling that the other side is not that tough--and it does not follow in a year or two
we won't be in the far more favorable position. I think the other side is hurting just as we
are hurting.
Clifford: We could make quite a case that our stand is producing good results by
preventing the Viet Cong from achieving their objective. Perhaps we can connect
beneficial events in Indonesia with our presence in Viet-Nam. At heart we are preventing
a communist takeover in Viet-Nam and that is to our credit.
Rusk: I presume you don't think we can put a greatly increased offensive? (to McNamara)
McNamara: No. We are increasing but so are the Viet Cong. We have 34 U.S. battalions
plus 7 more soon, plus 10 Australian and others. South Viet-Nam has 600,000 men. The
Viet Cong have 240,000 (probably two or three North Vietnamese divisions--and
increasing). By the end of January, 230,000 U.S. and others.
President: What do you think we ought to do if we don't pause, Bob?
McNamara: As a minimum, carry on the military buildup.
Study the possibility of a ceasefire, which I would recommend in a few months, whether
as a propaganda device or a military standstill.
President: Any solid information of increasing of North Vietnamese activities?
McNamara: Stepped-up infiltration to 1500 a month through Laos. Soon up to 4,000 a
month--this has not been proved, however. About a year ago they began bringing in
regular troops instead of cadres. About nine regiments of regulars are there. They have
substantially expanded facilities.
Fortas: What would the Viet Cong propose in this 12-hour truce?
Alex Johnson: They said that soldiers without arms would not be attacked for 12 hours.
Fortas: If we are concerned about public opinion, this is something we ought to consider
carefully. This would be capable of producing an adverse reaction in this country.
President: Mac, would you undertake to lay out a speech for Tuesday?
Dean, would you lay out alternatives available to us?
Alex, do you have any strong views. If you were President what would you do?
Alex Johnson: I'd take the pause--if for no other reason than to engage the Russians.
President: Couldn't we engage them by saying we are ready to stop if the Viet Cong are?
Alex Johnson: No, I don't think we can without a bombing pause.

President: What troubles me more is their doubt as to our will to see this thing through.
What problems do we get into if we don't bomb on Christmas--and tell the Russians what
we are doing--and that we might do more?
You say the Russians won't and can't do any more unless we stop bombing. And they
probably won't do anything.
Bundy, Vol. XVII. No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text
that the President saw the memorandum.
I attach two papers which you commissioned yesterday afternoon.
At Tab A is a memorandum from Dean Rusk on alternative diplomatic actions. As he
points out himself, the proposals are modest--not because of caution, but because there
simply is not much more that we can do by diplomatic means alone.
At Tab B is a draft speech for your use in the United Nations./2/ It is very much of a first
draft, and it needs a lot of cutting and polishing. There are three points worth making
about it:
1. It includes an announcement of a pause. I know this is not something you are planning
to do, but I thought it important to have a try at the right kind of language because Art
Goldberg has told me most emphatically that he thinks it would be a great mistake for you
to go to the UN if you do not have some sort of dramatic announcement to make. I can't
think of any other.
2. I have included a pretty full discussion of the international programs which are now
being prepared by Joe Califano's office in the fields of food, health and education. I have
also drafted a pretty bold statement on population policy. I feel sure that Joe would
recommend strongly against such a discussion of major elements of your 1966 program in
the UN forum. But we have given all the general assurances before, and without
something concrete, this part of the speech would have little interest.
3. I have reviewed your speech to the 20th Anniversary celebration in San Francisco, and
I attach a copy at Tab C,/3/ because I think it shows the problem we are up against. That
speech was thoughtful and eloquent, but it had little hard news in it, and it got a
disappointing reception. Unless we go beyond it in some clearly specific way, we run the
risk of a renewal of this same line of argument--that the Johnson Administration takes no
real interest in the UN and has nothing of importance to tell it.
/3/For text of the speech given on June 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 703-706.
I think there may well be some way of stating our Vietnam position which is a little less
precise about the pause but which still has some news and punch in it, and I will have
another look at that problem this evening. But I send you these papers now because I
know how hard and steadily you are thinking about this whole business.
McG. B.
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/4/
/4/Top Secret.
1. We have established the American position with regard to Viet Nam and have made
known our position through all possible channels, public and private. The result has been
a firm and repeated negative from Hanoi and Peiping.
2. We see no serious possibility of immediate diplomatic progress of a public nature
unless we are prepared to change the conditions under which public diplomatic action
could be undertaken. The principal change of condition available to us would be a pause
in the bombing.
3. We have reexamined the question of a formal consideration of Viet Nam by the United
Nations Security Council or General Assembly. I have discussed this today with
Ambassador Goldberg. We both believe that the results would be negative. There would
not be general and strong support, in the votes cast, for the United States position, and
there is a high probability that a majority in the Security Council or in the Assembly
would call for a unilateral termination of the bombing by the United States. We believe
that the Soviets would bitterly resist any constructive action by the United Nations and
would veto any resolution in the Security Council acceptable to us. The point remains that
a bitter debate in the United Nations would further freeze the Soviet public position and
reduce their options for the future.
4. Private diplomacy. I do believe we should continue our discussions with the Soviet
Union, Hungary, Yugoslavia and others to make sure that at least the Eastern European
Communists fully understand our position and understand that Hanoi's insistence upon
their four points (amounting to victory in South Viet Nam) is the central obstacle to peace.
I am attaching a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Zinchuk of the
Soviet Embassy and William Bundy which you will find of interest./5/ From this
memorandum it appears that Hanoi's attitude toward a pause would be negative, but that
the Soviets themselves would be much interested in one.
/5/Dated December 16, not printed. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S.
5. I believe that we should send a new circular on Viet Nam to all of our Missions abroad
giving them an up-to-date recapitulation of peace efforts and our understanding of the
present position of Hanoi, as a basis for full discussion of the problem with other
governments.
6. The Vice President, after attending the Philippine inauguration, should visit Korea and
Japan and make a special effort in Japan to explain the Viet Nam question.
7. I should think, also, that Averell Harriman might take a trip after the Christmas
holidays and combine interest in Viet Nam with a number of other matters, visiting, for
example, Paris, the North African Arab countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran. There are a
number of other questions which he could usefully take up in a number of these capitals.
While in Paris he could get a full report from Chauvel's trip to Hanoi and Peiping./6/
/6/Reference is to French diplomat Jean Michel Henri Chauvel's visit to Hanoi and
Peking. No record of Harriman receiving a briefing on the trip while in Paris has been
found.
8. The above proposals are rather modest. The central point is, however, that diplomacy
cannot produce miracles if Hanoi remains determined to seize South Viet Nam. I have no
doubt that this remains their objective. The reason they do not come to a conference table
is that they know that we would not agree to the attainment of their objective at such a
conference. What is true of Hanoi is even more true of Peiping. In this instance diplomacy
is working within the limitations imposed by Hanoi's objectives in South Viet Nam, which
are still in fundamental conflict with our own, and Hanoi's continuing hope that they can
somehow succeed on the battlefield.
Dean Rusk
237. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to
Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Saigon, December 21, 1965, 1:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV,
Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Goodpaster.
MAC 6569. Reference: JCS 4939-65./2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Papers of William C. Westmoreland, Eyes Only File)
Part I--General
1. In accordance with reference, commencing 0300 this morning I discussed thoroughly
with Lodge and Westmoreland subject President outlined to me last Friday evening./3/ I
covered the following salient points:
/3/Wheeler met with the President from 5:50 to 6:47 p.m. on December 17. (Ibid.,
President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.
A. The international and domestic pressures on the administration to undertake this action.
B. The desire to bolster our position both at home and abroad by silencing, or at least
disarming, critics of our policy in order that we may proceed with solid backing to
achieve US objectives in SE Asia.
C. The fact that, for military and other reasons, I had recommended that this course of
action not be adopted. The JCS agree unanimously with the foregoing recommendation.
D. That, if this course of action were adopted, I believed the following safeguards, as a
minimum, were needed: (1) no public announcement of the fact; (2) continue as flying
conditions permit photographic, visual and other reconnaissance over the DRV; (3)
continue and possibly increase air reconnaissance, air strikes and armed recce against
infiltration routes through Laos; (4) continue and possibly increase ground and air
operations in South Vietnam; and (5) continue our military buildup in South Vietnam.
E. That the President had authorized me to consult with General Goodpaster regarding
this matter in order further to analyze and evaluate the problem and to inform him,
through Goodpaster, of any "alarming or overly-dangerous aspects".
F. That, in evaluating the problem, we should consider this course of action could be
followed throughout the period Christmas Eve through Tet (21-22-23 Jan '66) unless DRV
actions led us to resume pressures on DRV.
2. Upon conclusion of our discussion we agreed that Ambassador Lodge would prepare
separate comments. The remainder of this report is arranged accordingly.
Part II--Views of General Westmoreland and General Wheeler
1. We can identify no military advantage to be derived from this course of action except
the faint chance that US objectives in SE Asia might be achieved without prolonged
armed conflict. In this connection, we note that advocates of this course of action consider
chances of this action bringing the Hanoi regime to the conference table are so remote as
to be negligible.
2. In theory advantages could accrue if conditions/safeguards could be established on a
practical basis. But it is a fact of life that the covert nature of the VC/DRV operations
makes it virtually impossible to determine on a day-to-day basis the extent of infiltration
of men and equipment. We could therefore find ourselves in a position of ceasing to apply
our primary instrument of pressure on the DRV regime without adequate means of
proving or determining the extent of continued DRV aggression. Reconnaissance aircraft
are reasonably effective in good weather in detecting movement along well established
routes. However, we have limited capabilities of determining movement at night or in foul
weather. The extent of compliance with our demands can be ascertained to a degree by
enemy fire on reconnaissance aircraft. However, this action is completely unrelated to the
aggression which we are trying to stop.
3. We consider it a surety that the DRV would use a period of relaxed pressure on the
DRV and lessened restrictions on movements of men and materiel to repair and improve
LOC's, to improve the readiness of AA defenses, to increase security of vital installations,
and to step up the movement of men, equipment, and supplies to the south. In summary,
we believe that our relative military posture could be weakened substantially.
4. Additionally, we consider that there are important political and psychological
detriments inherent in this course of action. These are:
A. We could be inhibited from resuming pressure against the DRV by the force of world
opinion, by publicized threats or commitments of aid by the USSR and/or the ChiComs
which would raise the specter of intervention by one or both, and by lack of clear
evidence on our part that the DRV are in fact continuing substantial movements of men
and materiel to the south.
B. Inevitably the nature of our action would leak and concern would be created in the
minds of the RVN military leadership, which concern would be difficult to dispel. Our
actions could be interpreted as a prelude to US unilateral negotiations and as a softening
in attitude toward Hanoi while the VC are stepping up their military initiatives and acts of
terror.
C. It would seem that we would be in a stronger psychological and political position if we
had achieved a more solid military posture with respect to troops, airfields, and logistics
prior to any consideration of slackening our military efforts. We believe that we have now
stopped losing but have not yet started to win. A winning stance would seem to be
essential to any successful negotiations. Can we expect Hanoi to negotiate until she has
been convinced that she cannot win?
5. In briefest terms, the "alarming or overly-dangerous aspects" of this course of action
are comprised of the following:
A. Finding ourselves inhibited from resuming pressure against the DRV, despite the need
to do so for the protection of our forces and to prove to the Hanoi regime the costs of
aggression.
B. Allowing our forces to be tactically endangered because of rapid deployment of DRV
forces to the south.
C. Encountering increased risks of further confrontation with the ChiComs or Soviets
should resumption of pressure against the DRV be required.
D. Risking misinterpretation of our actions by the GVN leadership.
6. In consonance with the foregoing, we recommend against adoption of this course of
action for the reasons set forth, which we believe cogent. However, if this course of action
is nevertheless adopted, we recommend that the safeguards set forth in sub-paragraph 1D
of Part I be established as a minimum.
7. We feel that there is merit in cessation of our bombing campaign in the DRV on
Christmas day, on New Year's eve and New Year's day, and during the three day period of
Tet (21, 22 and 23 January). During these days reconnaissance aircraft should be evident
in the skies over the DRV for the purposes of distributing leaflets as part of a psywar
campaign and to demonstrate that the GVN/US are calling the shots in this war.
Part III--Views of Ambassador Lodge
Herewith my comments on the proposal for an indefinite suspension of bombing, said
suspension to begin at Christmas, bombing to be resumed if infiltration from North VietNam is continued, the purpose being to bring North Viet-Nam to the negotiating table.
Comment:
1. I recognize current political realities and the appeal of this idea to some persons. Yet it
rests on fundamental misconceptions as to the real nature of Communist governments and
would, if carried out, tend to defeat its own purpose.
2. Actually a proposal like this will lead the Communists away from negotiations because
it will be interpreted by them as being a sign of weakness and indecision. The proposal
assumes that the Communists are like us; that they are in effect like misguided Americans
who will reciprocate our kindness and our toleration and our sense of fair play when every
experience we have had with Communists, whether at the United Nations or Panmunjom,
or in Berlin, shows that the reverse is the case and that they can only be induced to follow
a certain course by the application of pressure. They are in truth indifferent to human life
and are always probing.
3. The way to end this war, therefore, is by the application of U.S. force. If talks should
ever begin, they must be held to the accompaniment of the application of force or else
they are foredoomed to failure. We should not forget that there were more people killed
after the peace talks began at Panmunjom than there were before because we overlooked
this simple principle. I believe the proposition, therefore, as stated, looks at the
Vietnamese situation through the wrong end of the telescope, and that it would achieve
the opposite result from what its sponsors intend.
4. The fact is that our bombing of North Viet-Nam must be equated with the Viet Cong
aggression against South Viet-Nam--and not merely the infiltration aspect. Indefinite
cessation of bombing without cessation of the Viet Cong aggression would leave the Viet
Cong free to devastate the south with impunity while we tie our hands down in the north.
5. Cessation of bombings should be equated with withdrawal of North Vietnamese units
through international checkpoints to the north; unimpeded access of the GVN to any part
of its territory; a significant reduction of incidents; cessation of infiltration of men and
materiel; and an agreement that at any talks which would be held the matter of an
inspection system and enforcement devices would be the first item on the agenda.
6. There is, to be sure, in the proposal no mechanism wherewith to check infiltration or

withdrawal of North Vietnamese units. Suppose we started bombing again on the basis of
intelligence information, the source of which we could not reveal. Would not the uproar
among the wishful thinkers be even greater than it is now? Would we not be in an
interminable wrangle over resumption?
7. As far as the GVN is concerned, the Fanfani talks had a devastating effect here because
the GVN thought for a moment that we were negotiating their very life behind their backs.
It threatened to destroy much that had been built up here in the way of confidence and
good feeling. An open ended, unequated suspension of bombing could, I think, either
bring about the collapse of the government or its determined opposition. It would also
collapse morale in the ARVN.
8. Finally, it would destroy the very big political accomplishments which the President's
policies have brought about. Let us not forget that the strongest thing in Viet-Nam is not
seeing the B-52s overhead; it is not having the Seventh Fleet come circling in; it is not the
huge expenditures by USOM. It is faith in American steadfastness. It was when the
Vietnamese saw the American soldier on the ground that they were persuaded that we
were committed, and said to themselves: "If the Americans can commit themselves, then I
can commit myself." It is on this belief that the government, which no one thought would
last more than three weeks, has lasted as long as it has. This was a big political
accomplishment before our troops even fired a shot. When they distinguished themselves
in battle, of course, it added to the confidence.
9. An open ended, unequated cessation of bombing would destroy the tremendous
political accomplishments President Johnson has wrought, and for which American
fighting men sacrifice themselves--some of them, their lives. This is a very serious thing
to do without a real chance that the objective of peace will be achieved--a chance which I
do not see.
10. A variant of the main proposal is that the bombing be stopped for Christmas, New
Year, Tet and during bad weather. It might be possible to do these things without a public
announcement and not do too much harm, although I believe we should tell the GVN, as
they would certainly find out about it.
11. I recognize the President's very grave problem.He is the one who must cope with the
Senate and with public opinion. Yet he deserves to know what his representatives on the
spot in their heart of hearts think of the consequences. I shall, of course, loyally support
his decisions.
Appendix:
I believe steps should be taken to educate public opinion about the nature of the problems
involved in negotiating with Communists; for example:
That NBC or CBS make a TV documentary based on Admiral Joy's book about
negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom./4/
/4/C. Turner Joy, How the Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1955).
That Professor Henry Kissinger, who is extraordinarily well informed and persuasive on
this subject, having taken part in the Berlin negotiations himself, have private
conversations with Senator Mansfield, Senator Fulbright, and so forth. He would not be
suitable for television but he is very persuasive in private with intelligent, well-informed
men.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers.
Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, but the notes were taken by
Valenti. The time of the meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room, is from the
President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
(President, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, A. Johnson, Bundy, Valenti)
Rusk: Let the Christmas stand-down go.
President: What should I say?
Ball: There is perfectly good language.
A Johnson: Not everyone in Saigon is signed on--they are getting to Ky now. This
evening the Vietnamese will be making a statement./2/ It's a good statement. Having
urged this on them, I wouldn't want to take the play away from them.
/2/Apparent reference to an announcement by Republic of Vietnam authorities on
December 23 that they would observe a cease-fire from 6 p.m. on Christmas eve until
midnight on Christmas day. The United States made a similar statement.
President: I can't say anything tomorrow. If we have anything, we ought to say it and get
credit for it.
A Johnson: The question is, how it is said in Vietnam. Tonight our time. Everybody but
the Prime Minister has signed on.
President (?): I don't think I should say anything except yes or no on the cease fire.
A Johnson: My thought was we'd follow up with a similar statement.
President: I would say: "We and our allies will take no military initiative except in self
defense on Christmas Day". We'd say this as soon as it is cleared. What about New Years
and Tet?
Rusk: Much more comprehensive operation on Tet.
President: Do we do anything else?

Bundy: We ought to examine the question of a continuous pause, the only kind useful
with the Soviets. Benevolent, but not internationally significant unless we have a clear
specific period. We could get a major political advantage from this.
One paragraph in Lodge's message says that bombing be stopped on Christmas, New
Years, and Tet--bad weather, etc./3/
/3/Apparent reference to Part III of Document 237.
Rusk: Would that story work?
McNamara: Not really, but we can blur it with statistics and bad weather.
Rusk: I'd go ahead with Christmas--and beyond that, talk to the Hungarians to see.
We won't link anything else to it--and wait to hear.
Bundy: But you won't hear in that time frame. Unless you tell the Russians something
they won't do anything.
Rusk: I'm not giving up the possibility for a pause. But we ought to talk to the Hungarians
and Russians.
Bundy: I don't see where it leads us.
Rusk: Go for one day at Christmas. Defer further action until we talk to the Hungarians
and Russians.
Bundy: Do you think they will tell us anything they haven't before?
Rusk: If Thompson had one of his personal chats with Dobrynin he might pick up
something.
Does the President think a pause is possible while Congress is in session?
President: Yes, but don't look with favor on it--it's more a sign of weakness than anything
else. All we'll get is distrust from our allies, despair from the troops, and disgruntled
generals.
Hanoi and Peking tell us we're weak--won't do anything if we pause. If we suffer a severe
reverse as a result of this, we'd never explain it. It's not difficult to explain why we fight
when we are attacked every hour. But when commanders say it's suicide, and we do it
anyway, there's no explanation.
I want more evidence from the Russians before I override Taylor and Wheeler et al.
Rusk: Congress returns on the 10th? We'll see if we can get more evidence from the
Hungarians and Russians.

Bundy: I don't find the cables persuasive, but I understand your position. I think the cables
miss the point--as a commitment to do nothing for a month. We can stop bombing, not say
anything, and resume when we choose.
President: Would pressure mount to tell the press?
Bundy: Yes, it would be brutal. But Christmas and [Congress' recess?] seem a logical time
to pause.
Ball: We don't know if the Russians are really organizing a Communist Congress in the
spring.
President: 1. Once we take our step, we could have serious problems to resume bombing.
2. The danger is that it conveys the wrong signal--and I think it does.
If men we rely on to fight for us feel as strongly as they do--as Lodge does--I'd hate to
have them at odds with us.
McNamara: We've had a good discussion. But we need political initiative. But we have
had the best discussion ever on this subject.
President: Yes, but this is not the political initiative we want now.
McNamara: Question: Should we take out POL in Haiphong? I say we need to--but not at
this time.
We need to go into Hanoi circle--30 miles--and take three bridges in this circle. Let the
field commanders pick up 4 out of 7 possible targets. This would begin Thursday noon
our time. The probability is that it will be after Christmas due to weather. Those targets
are only a few miles inside the circle.
Bundy: There is a Cambodian problem as a result of giving commanders the right to
defend their troops.
The leak came from Saigon. The first story came from Keyes Beech--and Times
confirmed it.
President: Mansfield was very laudatory about Keyes Beech. I think our Congressmen go
out and are very frank--and to show how smart they are.
I had the Governors out to my Ranch--and I told Reed of Maine he was the leak to
Charles Mohr of the Times.
[Here follows a short discussion unrelated to Viet-Nam.]
239. Special Intelligence Supplement/1/

SIS 1221-65
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-311-69. Secret; No Foreign
Dissem. Prepared jointly by CIA and DIA. A table entitled "DIA Results of Strikes on
DRV Targets Thru Tuesday, 14 December 1965" and a distribution list are not printed.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
Effects on the DRV Economy
The US/GVN air strikes to date fall far short of crippling the North Vietnamese economy.
But the sustained and increasing rate of attrition is causing the economy to develop a
noticeable limp. Even with increasing assistance from other Communist countries, the
adverse impact is now becoming more apparent in the economically important areas of the
country. The extension of interdiction measures to lines of communication joining
important industrial centers is compounding already aggravated distribution problems.
The regime is apparently making increased use of ocean transport to provide relief to
overland distribution channels. Hanoi now admits publicly to a substantial upheaval of
production plans in many industrial plants. Import and export programs are in disarray.
The planned program under the First Five Year Plan (1961-1965) has undergone
substantial rearrangement. A recent report indicates, moreover, that implementation of the
Second Five Year Plan scheduled to begin in January 1966 has been postponed. The
increasing rate of deterioration of some important sectors of the economy still has not
greatly reduced total economic activity. The primary strains continue to be in distribution,
allocation of manpower, and management resources. In the face of great difficulties,
however, priority traffic continues to move. The air strikes have not yet halted, or even
reduced, priority short-term support by the economy to North Vietnam's military efforts,
but this support has been maintained only by transferring men and materials away from
long-term activities and projects.
The air strikes against overland transport facilities and routes in North Vietnam have
hampered the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies but have not significantly
reduced the North Vietnamese capability to provide and increase their logistic support for
the Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. The capacity of specific transport
routes has been reduced by the bombings, but on most routes it is still in excess of the
present level of logistic movements. The North Vietnamese have demonstrated a
remarkable capability to keep supplies moving in spite of the air attacks. The various
improvements and improvisations instituted by the Communists have increased their
capability to move men and supplies into Laos and South Vietnam during the present dry
season. Even with an intensification of air attacks it is doubtful that the capacity of the
overland transport system can be reduced below the level required to provide logistic
support at the existing scale of combat in South Vietnam.
The ability of the North Vietnamese to keep the industrial economy moving on a
makeshift basis, to maintain priority transportation movements, and to provide the support
necessary for military operations, is in large part a result of increasing assistance from
other Communist countries. This assistance has taken several forms: the assignment of
elements of two Chinese railroad engineer divisions to help keep transportation lines
open; large increases in shipments of motor trucks; the provision of structural steels and
prefabricated shapes for bridge repair and reconstruction; and the assignment of technical
and industrial advisers from the USSR and European Satellite countries. The amount and
scope of this support continued to grow in recent weeks.
Direct losses caused by damage to economic facilities and equipment are now estimated at
almost $23 million and measurable indirect losses amount to almost $9 million. The cost
of permanent reconstruction of rail/highway bridges would be more than $10 million, and
the replacement or repair of destroyed or damaged transport equipment would cost an
additonal $5.4 million. The cost of temporary repairs to bridges would be more than $1
million. Reconstruction of the damaged electric power plants, the petroleum storage
facilities, and the Nam Dinh textile mill would cost about $6 million. The loss of foreign
exchange earnings totals at least $5.2 million. The growing losses from lower production
throughout the economy can be quantified only in agriculture where losses in the fall rice
crop may have amounted to about $3.5 million. The measurable costs of reconstruction,
replacement, and repair of damaged facilities, if attempted, would represent more than 20
per cent of total gross annual investment in industry. The additional cost which North
Vietnam is incurring for temporary expedients to compensate in part for the damaged
facilities cannot be quantified at this time.
The most severe disruptions of economic activity in North Vietnam have been in the
southern part of the country where the transportation system has been heavily bombed and
electric power stations have been destroyed. Industry in this part of the country normally
accounts for only about 20 per cent of total gross industrial output, however, and consists
mainly of textile production, food processing, lumber and paper production, chromite
mining, and processing of crude phosphate fertilizers. Continued shortages of manpower
and equipment in the areas directly affected by bombing have hampered reconstruction
efforts and created severe hardships for local populations, but the primarily rural nature of
these regions has permitted continued functioning of the subsistence economy.
The disruptions caused by bombing are now being felt in the more economically
important areas of the country. The difficulties in maintaining production in the face of
insoluble management problems and shortages of skilled manpower have been
compounded by the disruption of the distribution system. In November, for the first time,
the transportation system connecting North Vietnam's major industrial areas was attacked.
Through rail service between Hanoi and Nam Dinh was interdicted by the destruction of
the Phu Ly railroad bridge on the Hanoi-Vinh line. However, rail traffic is apparently still
moving on stretches of this rail line between interdicted points. A combination railroad
and highway bridge serving the Hanoi-Haiphong railroad line and Route 5 was also
attacked. The damage to this bridge was light and by undertaking priority repair measures
rail service on the line was quickly restored. Nevertheless, these air strikes undoubtedly
further disrupted the flow of exports, imports, and goods for domestic use. According to
the regional press, distribution problems resulting from damage to the transportation
system have "turned upside down" production plans in many enterprises in Haiphong,
where some plants have been substituting inferior materials for unavailable regular
supplies. Essential materials and equipment can still be delivered to Haiphong by sea,
however, and until 1 December other industrial centers could still receive supplies from
China via the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line where previous bomb damage was quickly
repaired. On 1 December, however, the Cao Nung railroad bridge on the Hanoi-Dong
Dang line was again attacked and several spans were dropped. Several weeks will be
required to make temporary repairs to the bridge. In the meantime some cargo probably
will be moved across the river by fording, and some can be moved by road on alternate
routes such as 13B, which has not been attacked, and 1A and 18, where enough time has
probably elapsed for bomb damage to have been repaired. Some freight normally shipped
by rail between China and North Vietnam probably was already being transferred to sea
transportation before the 1 December strike. This action was taken so that high priority
items such as military supplies could be handled more easily by rail. Despite the
increasing disruptions, work on major economic development projects of the First Five
Year Plan (1961-1965) is continuing and several new projects have been undertaken in the
past few months.
The Hanoi-Lao Cai railroad line reportedly was opened for through traffic early in
December even though there were a series of strikes against this line at the end of
November. Although photography is not available to assess the results of these strikes,
damage must have been slight or negligible for the line to be opened so quickly. If the line
remains open we would expect to see a resumption of apatite shipments moving to
Haiphong for export. Practically no Chinese transit traffic to and from Yunnan has moved
through North Vietnam since July. There have been no indications, however, that either
Yunnan or the rest of China has suffered serious shortages because of the loss of transit
service through North Vietnam. Truck transport within China apparently is being used to
replace this transit service. Transportation in the southern part of North Vietnam continues
to be complicated by air attacks. In spite of heavy damage to bridges, substantial amounts
of both economic and military traffic continue to be hauled by motor truck and on a
makeshift rail line south of Vinh. The movement of all types of traffic on the waterways
also appears heavy. Supplies are again being moved from North Vietnam on Route 15 to
Routes 12 and 23 in Laos through Mu Gia Pass and on a newly reported truckable by-pass
around the Pass. The transport system of North Vietnam appears to be carrying as much
tonnage during 1965 as it did during 1964. The interruption on certain rail lines, however,
will result in a considerably lower performance in terms of ton-kilometers.
There have been no recent strikes or restrikes against bulk oil storage facilities or electric
power plant in North Vietnam./2/ There are localized problems in petroleum distribution
and storage, but there is no over-all petroleum shortage in the country. Bulk petroleum
storage facilities have been reduced in capacity by about 17 per cent. No action has been
taken to rehabilitate any of these bombed POL storage facilities. However, recent
photography discloses the existence of seven additional petroleum storage sites distributed
in an arc at distances of about 30 miles north of Hanoi. These sites include a total of about
300 semi-buried tanks (each about the size of an airport refueling tank truck), but
represent total storage of only 2,200 tons. The size of the tanks and the number of sites
suggest that this storage is intended to disperse petroleum supplies rather than provide for
significant reserves. The reduction of total generating capacity by about 14 per cent
continues to cause relatively minor curtailment of mining and industrial operations and
loss of power for irrigation systems. A continuing study of all available source material
has disclosed no recent information concerning bomb damage to machine building plants
or to non-food light industrial plants. Priorities and alternate means of communication
have been established in the telecommunications industry.
/2/This assessment does not take into count the 15 December air strike against Uong Bi
Thermal Power Plant, since Bomb Damage Assessment data is not yet available to
confirm initial pilot reports. [Footnote in the source text.]
There is no evidence that the air strikes have further aggravated the tight food situation in
North Vietnam. The harvest promises at best to be mediocre, and in light of increased
distribution problems because of the war the tight food situation will continue. Labor
shortages in the agricultural cooperatives continue to be aggravated because of the air
strikes.
North Vietnamese Political and Public Reactions
There continues to be no indication of any significant decline in North Vietnamese
morale. Regime propaganda continued to stress the resolve and ability of the Vietnamese
to ultimately defeat the "US aggressors." Hanoi paid particular attention to the Vietnam
protest movements in the US and cited them as an indication that the cost of the war in
men and materiel could ultimately undermine American morale and force a change in the
US policy toward the war. This theme was generally coupled in DRV propaganda with
claims of world-wide support for the Vietnamese Communists and references to the recent
Viet Cong "victories" over US and GVN forces. Although both these themes were
designed to sustain the fighting will of the insurgents as well as the DRV populace, they
probably accurately reflect current Hanoi estimates of the situation.
The disruptive effect of the air strikes on the DRV's economy was reflected in the
regime's propaganda. This recently took the form of efforts to spur the populace on to
greater patriotic endeavors in order to meet and overcome the difficulties caused by the
strikes. A party daily editorial on 18 November in taking note of the disruption in
transportation and communications called upon persons to pay more attention to these two
areas and to be "determined, urgent and flexible in meeting war circumstances." In
addition, other articles stressing the necessity of increasing food production and
distribution as well as improving public order "for the sake of the anti-US and national
salvation cause" were highlighted in DRV propaganda.
The growing disruption caused by the bombings also appeared to be the motive behind
Hanoi's dispatching its high-ranking economic expert, politburo member Le Thanh Nghi,
to Moscow, Peiping and Pyongyang in late November. Nghi's trip--his second in less than
six months--is probably an indication that the bombings have affected the DRV economy
to such an extent that consultations on additional economic aid from the Bloc are now
needed. Through Nghi's trip Hanoi may be seeking additional supplies of capital
equipment for bomb damage repair and perhaps even food, clothing and other necessities.
The North Vietnamese may also believe it essential to get some long range commitment
on future Bloc assistance in the event that US bombings destroy most of North Vietnam's
industry and transportation system.
Effects on Military Targets
There has been no recent, appreciable change in the intensity of air operations against
North Vietnam. The air effort continued to place emphasis on the armed reconnaissance
program, aimed at inhibiting movement over the lines of communication and restriking
and neutralizing previously attacked targets. The JCS-designated targets recently attacked
have been predominantly rail and highway bridges north of 20 degrees. As the air strikes
concentrated on targets north and east of Hanoi, the requirement to neutralize SA-2 sites
accelerated. Armed reconnaissance aircraft have continued to attack SA-2 sites. These
attacks produced few dramatic results, but possibly caused a more frequent displacement
of SA-2 firing elements which could result in reduced operating efficiency. Since no
major effort has been expended against barracks, supply and ammunition depots and POL
storage areas, related national capacities have not been appreciably altered. The North
Vietnamese are continuing their efforts to disperse such vulnerable elements of their
infrastructure as barracks, supply and ammunition depots. Recent evidence points to a
new program of dispersing POL stocks to locales north of Hanoi within the SAM
protected area.
While there are periodic indications of specific, tactical, reactions to the air offensive, the
most overriding reaction is the emergence of strategic indicators which suggest Hanoi's
willingness to persevere indefinitely. These latter indicators include dispersal of industry,
partial mobilization, intensified coordination with other Communist countries to obtain
increased military aid, and long range construction programs aimed at improving military
air facilities. In a tactical sense, the North Vietnamese have recognized the effectiveness
of US measures to counter the SA-2 threat. In this regard, they have taken action to
degrade our capability to detect and counter FAN SONG (SA-2 guidance radar)
operations by compressing the operating time of this vital guidance system.
While the air strikes against logistics facilities and sensitive lines of communications are
causing major distribution problems, these operations have not significantly reduced the
DRV capability to continue to support the Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam.

Department of State
Washington, DC
240. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President

Johnson/1/
Memos (B). Secret. This memorandum was sent to the President who saw it on December
31. (Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, December 31; ibid.) Harriman sent a copy of
this memorandum to Rusk. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers,
Johnson, President, '65)
On the plane back to Washington from the Ranch on Friday afternoon, December 10, I
discussed with Bob McNamara the potential for new flags and additional military
contributions to Viet-Nam. I also reviewed the problem with Dean Rusk on my return. It
was agreed that both Secretaries would discuss the possibility of a Greek and Turkish
military contribution at the NATO Meeting in Paris,/2/ and that other NATO countries
would be encouraged to increase their material assistance. As you know, Dean made a
vigorous speech at NATO, urging that NATO Members make a greater effort in support
of South Vietnam. Dean's initiative will be followed up with each country, as you did with
Erhard./3/
/2/The Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council met in Paris December 14-16.
/3/During the visit of Chancellor Erhard to Washington December 20-21.
As to the Far East, Hubert Humphrey will take up the question of a Philippine military
contribution with the new Philippine President, and will discuss getting a second division
from Korea when he visits Seoul./4/ These Korean negotiations are already under way.
/4/The Vice President visited Manila, Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul December 28, 1965January 3, 1966.
I talked with the Australian Ambassador here last week and our Embassy in Canberra has
been in touch with the Australian Government. Bob Menzies plans to undertake to
increase the Australian military contribution but he believes that any action should be an
Australian self-starter rather than under pressure from the U.S. I told the Ambassador of
your personal interest and he agreed to pass the message on to Menzies.
The manner in which Thailand can be most helpful is being reviewed. As you know, the
Thais are giving us the fullest possible cooperation in the use of their facilities.
In Latin America, Brazil is the first case. Ambassador Gordon explained to President
Castelo Branco that while the program loan decision was not contingent on a Brazilian
military contribution in Viet-Nam, it was expected that Castelo Branco would make every
effort to help in Vietnam. In a long and serious conversation with Castelo on December
15th he explained our position in great detail. Castelo has promised to give the matter his
prayerful consideration. He pointed out that under the Brazilian Constitution
Congressional approval is required before troops can be sent abroad and the Brazilian
Congress does not reconvene until March. Gordon and our military attache, General
Walters, will follow this up closely and, although keenly aware of the political problems
Castelo faces, they are hopeful that a Brazilian contribution in some form can be worked
out.
We will take up with each of the other Latin American countries on a case by case basis
the kind of contribution each might be induced to make.
As far as Africa is concerned, all hands agree that there is no possibility of a contribution
from any African country particularly at this time with the preoccupation over Southern
Rhodesia.
On Iran, Dean feels that a military contribution might stir up the Russians and that it
would be better to let sleeping dogs lie. We are, however, going after Iran for a militarymedical team on a large enough scale to take care of one Province. The senior USOM
Public Health officer in Saigon, General Humphreys, will go to Iran to work out the
details.
I will continue to keep in close touch with the Regional Bureaus to see that the maximum
effort is made to get more flags and more assistance, military or material, as well as to try
to get more publicity on what is being done.
Dean thinks that it might be useful for me to make a trip in January to certain European
countries, possibly including Yugoslavia. Based on my talks with Tito last summer, there
is a possibility that he might be induced to exert his influence on Moscow to persuade the
Soviets to take greater initiative with Hanoi to come to the negotiating table. It might also
be useful to stop off in the North African countries and Iran.
Averell

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-VIET. Secret; Exclusive
Distribution. Drafted by Squire and approved in S on December 27. The meeting was held
in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Christopher A. Squire, OIC Hungarian Affairs, EUR
Hungarian
Janos Radvanyi, Charge d'Affaires a.i., Hungarian Legation
Endre Szluka, Hungarian Legation
Hungarian Charge Radvanyi came to the Department at the Secretary's request. The
Secretary said that he appreciated Radvanyi's coming to the Department just before the
Christmas holidays, and expressed interest in whether Foreign Minister Peter had
developed any postscript to his last talk with the Secretary in New York,/2/ at which
Charge Radvanyi had been present. He was not inquiring whether Radvanyi had any
instructions, although he assumed not. The Secretary had invited Minister Peter to use a
little "16th Century Hungarian diplomacy", and would now be grateful if Radvanyi could
ask Minister Peter if there were anything Peter could add to what was said in New York.
The Secretary said that he might make two or three comments as background for asking
Charge Radvanyi to come to the Department. American newspapers had referred recently
to peace feelers. Hanoi had denied these stories, and he knew of no instance in which
Hanoi had taken an initiative in this matter. Others, such as U Thant and the Mayor of
Florence, had taken such initiatives. All such initiatives were, however, taken by third
parties. He had the impression that Hanoi's representatives abroad, and in Hanoi itself,
were socially very busy; everyone wanted to see them. When third parties go to see such
representatives, they come back with initiatives which evidently they believe important.
We are not aware of any initiative taken by Hanoi at its own instance.
His second point, the Secretary said, was that many initiatives had been taken by a large
number of people towards unconditional discussions. The initiatives known publicly were
only a fraction of those taken privately. Thus far no initiative had produced any results.
The key question continued to be Point 3 of Hanoi's 4 points, namely acceptance of the
program of the Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam. The third point was what the
shooting was all about. Hanoi wanted it, and they could not have it by force.
The Secretary said he would like to review for Minister Peter the things said publicly on
our side with respect to peace in Southeast Asia:
1. We have said that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are a basis for peace in
Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia, or on any part of it;
3. We would welcome negotiations without preconditions (using the terms of the 17
nations);
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions (using the President's term);
5. The question of cessation of hostilities can be taken first and then made the grounds for
a conference, or, if anyone preferred, made the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's 4 points can be discussed at a conference, provided that those points others
have in mind are also discussed;
7. We do not wish to maintain any bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not wish to retain any military forces in South Viet-Nam;
9. There could be free elections in South Viet-Nam;
10. The question of reunification is to be subject to the free choice of the people of VietNam, and not to be imposed by force;
11. We would much prefer to use our resources, both economic and social, in developing
Southeast Asia. North Viet-Nam was free to join in a regional program in which we were
prepared to invest $1 billion;
12. We could stop bombing as a step towards peace, as Minister Peter knows we have
said. But tell us what would happen if we stopped bombing. Would the bombing in South
Viet-Nam stop? Would they come to the conference table? Would the 325th Division go
home?
When one put it all together, the Secretary continued, the basket was filled from our side.
The only thing not in the basket was South Viet-Nam. The only thing we could add was
"Take South Viet-Nam." That we could not say. Perhaps Hanoi did not believe some of
these things we have said. The Secretary recalled he had said he would go to Geneva
tomorrow afternoon. The way for Hanoi to find out, added the Secretary, is to find out.
We can get there faster than they can. Perhaps they do not believe what we say about
bases in Southeast Asia. But they can find out.
Secretary Rusk told Charge Radvanyi that he just wanted Radvanyi to tell Minister Peter
that he had thought often of their talk in New York. The Secretary wondered if there was
anything else that Minister Peter wished to pass on.
Charge Radvanyi asked the Secretary to clarify what had been reported in the papers
about a 30-hour Christmas lull in Viet-Nam. The Secretary said that the 12-hour ceasefire
proposed by the Viet-Cong was not very significant to us from the religious point of view
since Christmas Eve and Christmas Day were a single unit. We were not particularly
attracted to the Viet Cong idea that we take 12 hours to trim our Christmas trees and then
watch out for the plastic bombs. So we had said we would treat the period as a whole, for
30 hours.
He owed it to Minister Peter, the Secretary continued, to point out that this was an
indication of some flexibility on our part. We did not expect the 30-hour period to be a
political initiative, as the period was too short. It was indicative of some flexibility, just a
tiny indication. If he were advising Charge Radvanyi how to report the importance of the
30-hour lull, he would not stress its political importance too much. The US had decided,
so far as the Viet Cong would allow it, to introduce this lull at Christmas not only in
South Viet-Nam but also as far as bombing of the North was concerned. The opportunity
might arise again, at the time of the Vietnamese New Year. If the other side were
responsive, we might find a way to move towards peace by steps like these.
The Secretary stressed that no commitments could be made at this time with respect to the
future, but he did mention the fact that New Year was coming, with its Viet-Nam holiday
also, and this fact might offer an occasion to do something like the Christmas ceasefire
again. No decision could be made on the future yet, however, as it depended partly on
what happened at Christmas.
The Secretary noted that he would also appreciate it if Minister Peter had any comments
regarding the Hanoi and Peiping statements of the last two weeks which had been of some
interest./3/ The Secretary would protect Minister Peter's discretion. Peiping had chided
Moscow, which made it sound as if Peiping knew that the subject of peace moves had
been discussed in Hanoi. Broadly speaking, the Secretary continued, what he was asking
was that in the light of the very interesting conversation the Secretary had had in New
York with Minister Peter, was there anything else that Minister Peter could add privately?
/3/Apparent reference to a commentary in Hanoi's official paper, Nhan Dan, on December
9, broadcast by Hanoi in English; an interview of Ho Chi Minh by British journalist Felix
Greene, broadcast by Hanoi on December 8; and a broadcast by Hanoi on December 10,
commenting on the deceptive nature of U.S. peace moves. (Texts in FBIS, North
Vietnam) On December 20, speaking at a reception in Peking in honor of the fifth
anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front, Chou En-lai accused the
Soviet Union of "sowing discord in an attempt to undermine the Vietnamese people's
unity against U.S. aggression and the unity of the Vietnamese and Chinese people against
U.S. imperialism." (Peter Cheng, A Chronology of the People's Republic of China
(Totowa, NJ, 1972), p. 212)
At this point Charge Radvanyi remarked that although the Secretary could count on
absolute discretion from the Hungarian side, there had already been press inquiries about
the subject of the Charge's call on the Secretary. It was agreed by the Secretary and by
Charge Radvanyi that the press would be informed only that the present meeting was a
continuation of the Secretary's previous discussion with Minister Peter in New York, on
general questions and bilateral questions. Charge Radvanyi noted that as to bilateral
questions, he believed the present atmosphere was less of an obstacle for bilateral USHungarian talks in Budapest then it was in Washington. The Secretary observed that the
reverse was true in terms of US-Soviet relations. The Secretary indicated that after the
holidays he would be glad to discuss bilateral US-Hungarian affairs at greater length.
Charge Radvanyi said that he would inform Budapest immediately of the discussion, and
would convey an answer to the Secretary as fast as he received it. The Secretary said he
would await any answer with interest, that he would remain in Washington over the
Christmas holidays, and that he could be reached at any hour of the day or night through
the White House switchboard.
242. Editorial Note
In telegram 1744 to Saigon, December 22, 1965, the Departments of State and Defense
instructed General Westmoreland to announce in Saigon that U.S. commanders had given
instructions to U.S. forces not to fire except in self-defense between 6 p.m. on December
24 and midnight on December 25, local time. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S) At President Johnson's urging, the Departments of State and Defense also
informed the Embassy in Saigon, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Commander,
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in telegram 1786 to Saigon, December 24, that
the Christmas truce should not end by U.S. acts of force, but by a renewal of Viet Cong
violence. Therefore, until confirmed and public evidence of significant Viet Cong
violence was available, the restrictions prohibiting firing except in self-defense,
suspending operations against North Vietnam and North Vietnamese troops in Laos, and
halting B-52 operations would remain in force. Washington fully expected the Viet Cong
to break the truce within a day or so. (Ibid.)
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, who was in Bangkok at the
time, expressed "grave concern at the military hazards inherent in the directives," which
he believed created a "de facto in-place cease-fire for US/GVN forces while permitting
VC/PAVN forces complete freedom of movement." Wheeler feared that the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese forces would capitalize on U.S. restraint and not renew hostilities.
(Telegram BNK 1876 from Wheeler to McNamara, December 25; Johnson Library,
Papers of William C. Westmoreland, Top Secret, Eyes Only Message File) General
Westmoreland added his opinion that the military advantages of the Christmas cease-fire
were outweighed by military disadvantages and hoped that it would not be repeated
during Tet. (COMUSMACV telegram 260936Z, December 26; ibid., National Security
File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables) Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief,
Pacific, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he agreed completely with Westmoreland.
(CINCPAC telegram 262159Z, December 26; Washington National Records Center, RG
330, OSD Pentagon Papers Files: FRC 77 A 62, SecDef Cable Files, binder 45)
In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (JCSM 907-65), December 27, the Joint
Chiefs reviewed the results of the Christmas cease-fire and concluded that "from a
military standpoint, no advantages accrued to the US/GVN from the ceasefire," and there
were considerable military disadvantages. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs opposed a
similar cease-fire during the Tet holiday (January 21-22, 1966). (Ibid., OSD/ADMIN
Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 380)
243. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and
Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 12 VIET S. Secret. According to a
December 24 memorandum from Read to Rusk, Rostow felt "some pressure to get his
paper to the White House today." Rusk approved sending it immediately. (Ibid., POL 2714 VIET)
Herewith four ideas about Viet Nam, submitted to you at Jack Valenti's suggestion.
A. A South Vietnamese Political Party

1. Proposal. That we focus our political energies in Saigon--and seek Korean assistance-in building a widely based South Vietnamese political party.
2. Discussion. The critical missing element in the stabilization of politics in South Viet
Nam is an effective political party engaging the major groups which constitute now--and
will constitute in the future--an effective majority.
We all understand the deep splits in the political and social life of South Viet Nam:
Northerners v. Southerners; French trained Catholics v. more indigenous Buddhists; etc.
We are doing what we can in Saigon to urge them to come closer together; Ky is
considering a representative advisory group; and the most wholesome political fact about
South Viet Nam is that the Vietnamese are beginning to talk and worry about what the
Communists will do to them if they remain split and peace (or negotiations) breaks out.
Focussing right now on a political party may seem like a gimmick. But our experience in
Korea over the last five years indicates that it is something more: it may prove the device
for crystallizing minimum national unity.
I am now convinced, for example, that it was the creation of the government party in
Korea that converted Park from a well-meaning soldier into an effective politician and,
even, a statesman--laying the base for the true Korean "miracle" now under way.
To my certain knowledge, our people were almost as hopeless about Korea in 1961, after
the young officers' coup, as they now are about politics in South Viet Nam. The Koreans
were about as fragmented, inexperienced, and helpless in making a political life as the
Vietnamese have been.
Moreover, what we have seen happen in other parts of the world suggests that a widely
based national political party is fundamental to stable government in a developing
country.
The secret of Indian democracy, for example, is not the British-trained civil service: it is
the Congress Party, containing representatives of all regions and major social groups.
Such parties are the secret of success in Mexico and Tunisia and of the relative stability of
Tanzania, Kenya, and Ghana. I believe Castelo Branco is on the right track with his effort
to force by law the making of big parties in Brazil.
Why is this so?
Big national parties force the various regional and special interests to come to
compromise and to formulate national programs in order to get elected and enjoy the
fruits of victory. They also establish a minimum political base and the minimum political
discipline to permit an elected President to govern.
The central political weakness in the developing nations is that fragmented political
parties and squabbling politicians, representing narrow regional interests, press directly
and irresponsibly against the democratically elected presidents. The presidents are so busy
balancing off these pressures they find it hard to act. And that is why military coups
happen.
What General Soglo said the other day in Dahomey, as he took over, is the epitaph of
scores of early experiments in democracy in developing nations:
"Considering that after two years, the political authorities demonstrated their inability to
lead the country to a better future by struggles for influence harmful to the superior
interests of Dahomey; . . .
"Considering that our country is obviously on the eve of a veritable catastrophe whose
only victims will be the humble workers in our towns and rural areas;
"[We]/2/ therefore decide in the superior interests of the nation and in order to safeguard
our prestige on the international scene to take over power temporarily and endeavor to
effect national reconciliation on which alone depends the moral and economic recovery of
our dear fatherland."
/2/Brackets in the source text.
Can the job be done now in Viet Nam?
I don't know. But I do know we should focus our efforts around the task. I do know there
are glimmerings of a desire among the Vietnamese to pull together. And I do know they
are beginning to understand they will either hang together or hang separately.
Moreover, we should enlist the Koreans in the effort. Their experience is the closest
parallel to that in South Viet Nam. They, too, began with a mandarin autocrat; then had
squabbling civil politicians; then a young officers' coup.
Finally, the Koreans have, next to us, the biggest direct political as well as military stake
in the future independence and stability of South Viet Nam.
3. Action.
a. We should approach General Park and suggest that he write directly to General Ky
explaining fraternally the lessons of his experience in building a stable civil government
in South Korea over recent years; the role of the government party in that process; and
offering to send to General Ky men who will explain in detail how his national political
party was organized and how they made the transition in Seoul from military to civil
politics.
b. That Ambassador Lodge and his staff, including the Lansdale team, focus their efforts
on encouraging the government in Saigon and various non-governmental political persons
to move in this direction. Many specific political projects now under consideration or
under way in South Viet Nam would begin to take better shape if they were related to the
making of a national political party; for example, the proposed Advisory Group, the
attempts to formulate national objectives; to design a national economic reconstruction
and development plan; to mobilize student leaders; to create a domestic peace corps; etc.
B. The Military and the Future of Politics and Administration in South Viet Nam
1. Proposal. That we begin to consider with a few selected military leaders in South Viet
Nam how the military organization now fighting the Viet Cong can, in the future, be used
to bridge the gap until the time that a stable, civil politics can fully take hold.
2. Discussion. At the moment the military structure in South Viet Nam holds the country
together and represents the biggest single pool of administrative competence. It probably
also contains many of the men most capable of assuming political leadership in the
postwar phase of the country. Until the kind of party proposed in suggestion A, above,
comes into being and generates momentum, the country will have to rely heavily on the
army for both administrative skill and political leadership.
This could take many forms:
--A massive civic action and public works rehabilitation program;
--The actual transfer of competent officers into civil administrative posts;
--The kind of literacy and agricultural education programs the Korean army has
conducted;
--The packing away of their uniforms by key officers as they assumed full time political
life.
In short, as we look ahead to the future of South Viet Nam, we should be looking at the
army as a critically important administrative and political asset; and, as suggested in
proposal A, the Korean experience should be made fully available to our friends in South
Viet Nam.
3. Action. That we suggest this line of thought to Ambassador Lodge; make available to
him full details of the Korean experience on the transitional role of the military in these
various civil functions; and encourage the Koreans, under proposal A, to widen their
discussions with the South Vietnamese to include this range of issues.
C. The Proper Use of Air Power Against North Viet Nam
Note: I appreciate that you, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary McNamara may well have
come to solid conclusions about this subject; but I am moved to set down my own
reflections because of continued evidence of widespread confusion at lower levels,
reflected, for example, in the recent SNIE 10-12-65, "Probable Communist Reactions to a
U.S. Course of Action."/3/
/3/Dated December 10. This SNIE included footnotes indicating dissenting views of most
of the chiefs of the intelligence agencies. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D
240, WPB Chron, Aug-Dec 1965)
1. Proposal. That we systematically bomb the oil refining and storage capacity and the
electric power facilities in North Viet Nam.
2. Discussion. Thought in this town is split between those who advocate massive and
somewhat generalized air attacks on the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and those who fear that
such attacks would dangerously escalate the war, deny Hanoi a stake in its future by
destroying what has been built over the last decade, and lead to a last-ditch mentality
which would make a negotiated settlement impossible.
As you know, I have long felt that the proper course of action was a systematic but
surgical use of air power to take out the oil refining and storage capability and electric
power systems in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. This would exact a considerable cost but still
leave the cities and factories standing. Given the possibilities of protracting the war by
continued infiltration, this has seemed the only practical way to force Hanoi to pay a price
sufficient to induce them to negotiate soon, without denying them a future.
It is difficult for those who did not live through the application of systematic, precision
bombing against the German air force, German oil facilities, and the Seine-Loire bridges
to understand how vastly more effective this kind of bombing is than generalized air
attacks. By systematic, I mean the attack on all the major plants in a given target system.
In the Far Eastern war we conducted generalized bombing against Japan, including the
burning of cities. In the Korean war we hit everything we could see and a lot we couldn't
see.
No one can tell you for certain--and only an irresponsible man would guarantee to you-that this kind of precise, systematic application of force will tip the balance of thought and
policy in Hanoi to the acceptance of the kind of negotiation we envisage. Clearly, we must
continue to hold them on the ground in the south and exact there a high price for
continued aggression. Clearly, we must maintain minimum political stability in Saigon;
for they would be tempted to continue the war, even if hamstrung around Hanoi, if their
prospects for early military or political victory in the south were good.
For what it is worth, however, my judgment is this:
--We have an enormous stake at home and abroad in forcing an early, rather than late,
ending to the war in Viet Nam.
--There is a possibility that this kind of purposeful, systematic, and surgical attack on the
Hanoi-Haiphong oil and power installations might so limit the economic and military
capacity of North Viet Nam that those who now argue for a negotiated settlement in
Hanoi might, at last, prevail.
--The North Vietnamese civil casualties involved could be quite severely limited if the
operations are well planned; and we should be conscious that our present level of sorties
in armed reconnaissance and other attacks are imposing some civilian casualties on them
and the loss of some of our own finest and best-trained men.
--This kind of attack is not likely to change radically the degree of Soviet and Chinese
Communist involvement in the war.
--Such attacks will heighten the noise level in the Free World against us, but, if our backs
remain stiff, it will also heighten the pressure on Hanoi from the outside to negotiate,
including, especially, the pressure from Moscow.
3. Action. That we proceed early in the New Year to go swiftly and purposefully into the
systematic attack on oil and electric power, but try to establish--even before the attacks-direct diplomatic contact with Hanoi, as suggested in proposal D.
D. Direct Contact With a Representative of Hanoi
1 Proposal. That we soon quietly establish, at our initiative, direct diplomatic contact with
a representative of Hanoi.
2. Comment. In all the other postwar confrontations with Communists, there was no great
problem of communication when they decided to cease their aggression. They either
knocked it off without talking to us, as in the case of the Greek guerrilla campaign, or they
found a way to communicate through diplomatic channels, as in the case of the Berlin
blockade of 1948-49, the Korean war, and the Cuban missile crisis.
In these cases of communication, we were then, however, dealing with Russians. And,
when the time comes, this is the way it may be again.
But the fact is that Hanoi, not Moscow, is the center of this war; it is in a complex relation
to both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Communists; in the long run it must live
with Communist China, even if it decides to negotiate; and, thus, the Sino-Soviet split
makes it hard for them to turn wholly to Moscow at this critical moment in their history.
Therefore, direct contact with us may facilitate getting over the hump into negotiations-even if what we discuss is whom to talk to and where.
Hanoi's position is compounded by the fact that if they knock off the war, without
negotiations, they leave the U.S. with all our troops and bases in South Viet Nam and with
great freedom of action. For that reason alone, they may be led to get the best deal they
can out of a negotiation, including our withdrawal; but negotiations in the midst of a large
guerrilla war are exceedingly complex and require quite a bit of talk to get started.
I am led to the view that a direct contact would be useful for another reason. Every war
game I have been involved in has been marked by signals that were not accurately read.
One side will say something or do something designed to give the other side a message;
but the receiving side will not hear or it will misinterpret the message.
Now we and the Russians have been at this game for a generation. And we rarely misread
each other's messages. But this has taken a long time; and our communications are thick-operating at many places and levels.
We must constantly bear in mind that, this time, we are not dealing with a self-confident
major power. We are dealing with a small, provincial, isolated power which has had little
contact with us, and is caught up between two allies who are bitterly contending with one
another.
Finally, our experience with third parties, however well meaning, suggests that they are
not necessarily accurate; they leak; and they are too often bucking for a Nobel Peace
prize.
Action. That we consider promptly establishing a direct contact with a North Vietnamese
representative. I would not pretend to expertise, but Mai Van Bo in Paris would be my
first choice, for two reasons: he is quite high in rank; and Paris is a big city, easier for
quiet contacts than most of the alternatives. Cairo, Vientiane, and Djakarta are other
possibilities. If discovered, we should simply say that if we can talk with the Chinese
Communists, we can certainly talk with the North Vietnamese Communists. The contact
should be set up, if possible, before the bombing attacks suggested in proposal C. The first
message should be an authoritative statement of all our present negotiating proposals. We
should remain in contact steadily as the air attack mounts. If there is any indication of
willingness to negotiate, we should be willing to explore formulae which would save
Hanoi's face and offer a golden bridge of retreat.
It is wholly possible that they will not be willing to make direct contact with us; but,
especially if we plan to increase the heat on Hanoi-Haiphong, it is appropriate to try.
Walt
244. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Prepared at the
request of the President who wanted key officers in the Department of State below the
Secretary and Under Secretary level to present him with ideas on new diplomatic
initiatives in Vietnam. (Memorandum from Read to Rusk, December 24; ibid., POL 27-14
VIET)
SUBJECT
Viet Nam Initiatives
Background
To summarize quickly, the United States in ten years has moved from the provision of
military assistance to Viet Nam, through the furnishing of military advisers, the increase
of their numbers and giving them an active role in combat, to infusing ever larger
contingents of American fighting men in organized units to wage the war against the
Communists. At the end of 1965's long monsoon season, we are evidently not poised for
dramatic gains and military victory.
We confront a limited number of choices: (1) to seek negotiations now; (2) to continue
military operations at recent levels, with the aim of inducing a greater disposition on the
part of the Communists to negotiate; (3) to increase three-fold or more our already heavy
military investment in Viet Nam in order to crush North Viet Nam and wipe out the Viet
Cong.
Experience to date negatives any likelihood that carrying on the war will improve the
prospects of negotiation. Stepping up the US military commitment to somewhere between
500,000 and one million American troops--in order to eliminate the Communist
opposition in Viet Nam--threatens the following consequences: greatly increased US

casualties, on a scale not known since World War II; substantially increased taxes at
home, probably accompanied by inflation and increasing economic and social
dislocations; an end, for practical purposes, to the struggle against poverty at home and
the building of the Great Society; escalation of the Viet Nam conflict that could put the
US in a war with Communist China, whose magnitude and course are withheld from our
view today.
The net of this paper is that we will do better to accept the fact of conflict in Viet Nam
and seek to transfer it to the political plane; to wait out with patience and intelligent action
the long period while Vietnamese nationalism gradually asserts itself against China, and
while China goes through the process of development enabling it to function--in the way
the Soviet Union has come to function--as a member of the community of nations.
For the United States--with the aims and purposes we hold--the path is narrow between
prevention or frustration of forcible aggression, on the one hand, and being drawn into
actions that lead progressively to larger--and perhaps nuclear--conflict, on the other. There
have been signs, coming out of Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow that we may be better able to
pursue our aims at this stage through shifting to a political and diplomatic offensive. We
are at a point where it may be possible to strengthen significantly the hand of the peace
party throughout the Communist camp.
Suggestions
An armistice. The basic idea advanced here is that we want a cessation of fighting in Viet
Nam followed by negotiations. It should be a total cessation, of ground action in the
South, of air strikes against the North, of terrorism in the cities and in the countryside. The
cessation could be initiated in connection with the observance of Tet in Viet Nam. It could
be related to a public appeal that selected governments or Pope Paul VI might address to
all the authorities concerned. The cessation could be proclaimed for a fixed time period
(such as 30 days) and could be extended without limit of time if satisfactory steps were
being taken with a view to negotiated settlement; this feature should probably be made
clear from the outset.
Whether such an armistice could last would, of course, depend on the willingness of the
two sides. We should test the Communist side to see whether it would keep a cease-fire.
An armistice seriously intended by both sides could survive incidents of violation through
mistake or misunderstanding. If the Communist side breached the armistice, this would
quickly be apparent. The US and GVN would be free to resume military operations. The
responsibility would be clear, and this should have a good effect in furthering greater
understanding and increased support for US policy toward Viet Nam.
Upon the taking effect of an armistice, neither side would stand down its preparations,
reinforcement, etc. If fighting had to be resumed, relative military advantage would be
essentially unchanged. But this is not a state of affairs we should wish to see indefinitely
continued. We should want to see the process of armament and military preparation put in
reverse. This can only be done as the result of negotiated agreements.
Negotiation. At the earliest possible time the United States should make a formal and
comprehensive statement of our aims in Viet Nam. You summed them up very cogently at
the end of the large staff meeting this last Thursday morning. A statement like this should
be made to press, radio and TV. The text should be formally communicated to
governments around the world. We should take pains to see that it is delivered to Hanoi-through the French, the Canadians, India, the USSR, other Eastern European countries,
etc. This could be a factor in deciding the debates that must now be going on in Hanoi.
Once an armistice is begun, a peace conference should follow whatever reasonable time is
required to prepare it. There are many ways of organizing a conference. The Geneva CoChairmen could take the initiative. A meeting of 14 nations could be convened, or it could
be limited to some of them. Perhaps the meeting should involve directly only Hanoi, the
NLF, Saigon and the United States. The UK and USSR could stay in the background and
seek to act as catalysts in the negotiating process. We should not exclude from
consideration the idea of Communist China being absent from the international meetings,
except to attend a formal conference of larger size which would confirm the
understandings reached by a smaller group. We should look forward to protracted
discussions. So long as the armistice were kept, we should be prepared to engage in a very
long negotiation.
It is impossible at this stage to block out the contents of a settlement. Terms can emerge
only from prolonged and close bargaining and the inter-action of negotiating efforts.
Negotiation might run through a series of phases, just as a settlement itself would have
multiple phases.
An early subject of discussion should probably be observation and policing of the
armistice. International teams of military observers--perhaps made up of Commonwealth
and Bloc personnel--might be employed. Withdrawal of military forces should be a focus
of attention. International observation could identify what forces are present in Viet Nam,
and could later verify and supervise an agreed withdrawal--perhaps first to staging areas,
some for North Vietnamese units and others for US forces. Ultimately, all foreign forces
would be withdrawn from South Viet Nam.
One of the most difficult of all questions is what to do about the Viet Cong and their
weapons. It is not likely to be practicable to segregate them in any supervised garrison
areas. Experience with the disarming of insurgents and the central collection of their
weapons gives no ground for believing this would be feasible in South Viet Nam. The
Viet Cong would have to be left alone during the armistice, as would the GVN's military
units. The military problem is likely to be solved only after a new political structure has
been created in the South, following on internationally supervised elections, the
establishment of a representative assembly, and the effective functioning of institutions of
local government.
International assistance. During the long period of negotiation as well as afterward there
would be great value in a wide program of international assistance for the reconstruction
of South Viet Nam. Organizations such as the United Nations, the FAO, and voluntary
agencies could perform great humanitarian service and also contribute significantly to
political settlement through the provision of needed food and medical relief, technical
assistance in agriculture and building, war-scarce materials for civilian use, and personnel
to help with community services. It might be possible for a large and imaginative program
of this sort to supply the needs of local government for a substantial period of time-obviating the assertion of authority and the exercise of control by the GVN or Viet Cong
in disputed areas. The US should be prepared to contribute largely to the financing of such
a program, which would have to be under neutral direction. We should seek also at an
early date to give practical effect to President Johnson's long-standing offer to arrange for
the participation of North Viet Nam in an internationally aided program of economic
development for Southeast Asia.
Humanitarian measures. Whether or not an armistice is arranged in the near future, we
should make every effort to proceed with an exchange of prisoners held by the two sides
in Viet Nam. This could be undertaken by the ICRC along with its other responsibilities.
Exchanges need not be on a one-for-one basis, but could be so calculated as to bring about
the repatriation of all prisoners held on each side. In the event of an armistice, an early
measure for consideration in the ensuing discussions would be an amnesty for political
prisoners and others detained on account of offenses in connection with the war.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV,
Cables. Top Secret; Exdis. The President was at the LBJ Ranch in Texas, December 21January 2, 1966.
CAP 65917. Following is the text of a message from Westmoreland/2/ regarding the
resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.
/2/COMUSMACV telegram 45265 to CINCPAC, December 27. (Department of State,
1. Although I am not aware of all the considerations leading to the continuation of the
standdown in Rolling Thunder air operations over North Vietnam, I consider that their
immediate resumption is essential.
2. Strictly from the standpoint of the war in South Vietnam it is difficult to understand
why the pressure has been taken off the nerve center of direction, supply and manpower
located in North Vietnam.
3. Air attack against lines of communication is extremely difficult in this part of the
world. It is clear that air interdiction at any one point can be circumvented by the Viet
Cong/North Vietnamese forces and all local obstacles can be overcome by ingenuity and
hard work, both of which they display in ample quantities. Therefore, our only hope of a
major impact on the ability of the North Vietnamese to support the war in Vietnam is
continuous air attack over the entire length of their lines of communication from the
Chinese border to South Vietnam, and within South Vietnam. Although at any one point
the impact may not be great, the cumulative effect of armed reconnaissance, bridge
busting, rail cutting and barge sinking and forcing them to operate almost exclusively at
night, must be great.
Notwithstanding the heavy pressure on their transportation system over the past 9 months,
they have demonstrated an ability to deploy forces into South Vietnam at a greater rate
than we are now deploying US forces.
4. I notice that since the 3d of September, there has been a steady decrease in ordnance
delivering sorties over North Vietnam. During the period 3 to 16 September, 982 such
sorties were flown. By 15 to 28 October, this had been reduced to 700, and in the period
10 to 23 December, it had further diminished to 662. I recognize that part of this can be
explained in increased activity in Laos, but this does not change the basic fact that our
pressure against North Vietnam is decreasing.
5. Considering the course of the war in South Vietnam and the capability which has been
built up here by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces--the full impact of which we
have not yet felt--the curtailment of operations in North Vietnam is unsound from a
military standpoint. Indeed, we should now step up our effort to higher levels./3/
/3/Admiral Sharp in Honolulu sent comments that were relayed to the LBJ Ranch in
White House telegram CAP 65918, December 27, 10:51 p.m.:
"1. I have already indicated some of the disadvantages in a continued stand down of
Rolling Thunder and recommended immediate resumption.
"2. Westmoreland has made a plea for resumption of Rolling Thunder and notes the
decrease in Rolling Thunder strike sorties in the last three months. He requests that
pressure on North Vietnam be increased.
"3. I have recommended programs for Rolling Thunder designed steadily to increase the
pressure on North Vietnam. These programs will drastically reduce the flow of military
supplies reaching North Vietnam and hence the Viet Cong.
"4. The armed forces of the United States should not be required to fight this war with one
arm tied behind their backs. I urgently recommend that Rolling Thunder commence
immediately and that the target programs I have recommended be approved." (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Reprisal Program, Vol. IV)
246. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations European Office to the
Department of State/1/
Geneva, December 27, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Nodis. The
source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:33
p.m.
1106. For Secretary. Subj: Quaker Committee meeting with DRV rep in Paris./2/
/2/Prior to the December 21 meeting with Mai Van Bo, Duncan Wood of the American
Friends Service Committee called on Tubby in Geneva and asked if there was anything
the United States wanted passed to Mai Van Bo. Tubby was noncommittal, but noted that
the previous meeting on November 16 was discouraging. (Telegram 1063 from Geneva,
December 20; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET S) Accounts of the November 16 meeting are in
telegram 925 to Geneva, December 1; telegram 960 from Geneva, December 2; and
telegram 2563 from London, December 4. (All ibid.)
1. Duncan Wood of Friends Service Committee told me today that meeting with Mai Van
Bo on 21st in Paris not productive. Wood and Wolfe Mendel spent about hour with Bo,
who rather ill at ease.
2. Bo had no response re Quaker offer aid to DRV, promised to let Committee know when
or if received. When Wood raised question political situation in Viet Nam, Bo switched
conversation to discussion differences family life in England, France.
3. Wood: "The time of our meeting could hardly have been worse, after the Italians'
disclosure and especially after Chou En-Lai's speech."
Tubby
247. Paper by Secretary of State Rusk/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Misc. Vietnam, Vol. IV. No
classification marking. Cooper, in The Lost Crusade (pp. 293-294), describes and quotes
from this paper. He states that it was prepared by Rusk "in considerable haste" for the
benefit of Vice President Humphrey, Harriman, and the other high-level emissaries sent to
other countries to explain the U.S. position in potential peace negotiations. Also printed in
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 740-742.
THE HEART OF THE MATTER IN VIET-NAM
I. The Fact of Aggression
The simple fact is that tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the
North Vietnamese regular army, have been sent by Hanoi into South Viet-Nam for the
purpose of imposing Hanoi's will on South Viet-Nam by force. It is this external
aggression which is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces. Indeed, it was not
until the early summer of 1965 that the number of U.S. military personnel in South VietNam reached the number of those which have been infiltrated by Hanoi. If this aggression
from the outside were removed, U.S. combat forces would not be needed.
II. The U.S. Commitment
The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Viet-Nam
against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the
United States and South Viet-Nam, upon the SEATO Treaty (whose obligations are both
joint and several), upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South Viet-
Nam, upon the policy expressed in such Congressional action as the August 1964
resolution, and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. Presidents. At stake is not just
South Vietnam, nor even Southeast Asia; there is also at stake the integrity of a U.S.
commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe.
III. Initiatives for Peace
A. We are not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past five
years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. Reports of "peace feelers" have to do with
initiatives by third parties. Hanoi has denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers". We
ourselves know of none. During 1965 Hanoi has consistently insisted that its four points
must be accepted as the sole basis for peace in Viet-Nam. The third of these four points
would require the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Viet-Nam,
whether the South Vietnamese wanted it or not.
B. The initiatives for peace undertaken by our side, and by many other governments,
would be hard to count. They began with President Kennedy's talk with Premier
Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and have not ceased. The publicly known initiatives
have been multiplied many times by private initiatives not yet disclosed. On the public
record, however, are the following instances:
1. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in June 1961;
2. Geneva Conference on Laos;
3. U.S. reference of Gulf of Tonkin matter to the UN Security Council in August 1964;
4. The Polish proposal to convene the two Co-Chairmen and the three members of the
ICC (India, Canada and Poland) to take up the question of Laos;
5. The call of 17 non-aligned nations for negotiations without pre-conditions;
6. Attempts by U Thant to visit Hanoi and Peiping;
7. President Johnson's call for unconditional discussions;
8. The British Commonwealth Committee on Viet-Nam;
9. Attempted or actual visits by Patrick Gordon Walker, Mr. Davies (MP), and Ghanaian
Delegation.
IV. U.S. Contributions to the Basket of Peace
The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U.S. believes
can go into peace in Southeast Asia;/2/
/2/These 14 points appeared in The Washington Post, December 29, 1965.
1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast
Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without pre-conditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be
the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish
to propose;
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a
government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese
through their own free decision;
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of
Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a
regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;
13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented
and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease
aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."
14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North VietNam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion
from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.
In other words, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of
South Viet-Nam.
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Prepared at the President's request; see footnote 1, Document 244.

SUBJECT
Possible Diplomatic or Peace Initiatives
1. Review of Elements of US Position.
A summary of our basic position, and of Hanoi's contrasting resistance to any agreement,
is a "must" in any case. This could be based on the memorandum you did today for the
use of the Vice President,/2/ and might be supplemented by an up-dated history of the
various negotiating efforts that have been made since the circulation of our 15-point list in
July./3/ Such an up-dating should be ready in a day or two, although I would note that it is
less thick and impressive than the record of negotiating efforts through July.
/2/Document 247.
/3/The 15-point list, July 26, updated the June 10 list of 13 points by adding references to
the June 19 British Commonwealth initiative and the Harold Davies mission to Hanoi of
July 9-13. (Johnson Library, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, McNaughton Files, State (Bundy)
on Negotiations) The 13-point list is ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV.
2. Re-Statement of our Position in Four-Point Form.
In your television appearance of last August, you dealt with the essential elements of a
settlement in the same order as Hanoi's four points, but took out the clear objections in
Hanoi's formulation. A more systematic effort in this direction might be used as a
framework for an offer to negotiate on the basis of such a four-point statement. This
would have the appeal in many world quarters, and among sophisticated domestic critics
such as the New York Times, of using Hanoi's own framework and indicating the general
principles which would be acceptable. It could be stated as a possible basis for
negotiations, while we reiterated at the same time that we were prepared for negotiations
without any conditions or basis whatever, or--as we explicitly said in the Fanfani reply-on the basis of Geneva Accords of 1954. If we provided two or three possible
formulations, it would tend to strengthen our position verbally, without any substantive
change.
3. Bombing Position.
Assuming that we do not continue the Christmas pause, the next possible occasion for a
pause would be the stand-down of all military operations that we have now virtually
agreed with the GVN to take place over Tet, January 21-23. With a three-day opening
period already agreed, we might well extend this for another ten days and take the prior
diplomatic measures that we have all considered useful and indeed essential in the pause
scenario discussed in the last six weeks. I would most emphatically not recommend a
pause at this or any other time that lasted for less than about two weeks. It must be long
enough to be convincing to third countries that a serious opportunity was given for
diplomatic activity. Similarly, it must be preceded by careful consultation with the GVN
and our key allies, and by messages at the last moment to Hanoi through various possible
intermediary channels.
4. Pacing our Bombing in Accordance with Communist Activity in the South.

Many of us have felt for some time that our bombing of the North would be much more
effective in the military and psychological sense if it were more irregular in pattern in any
case. It may be too difficult to introduce daily variation pegged to the level of VC activity
in the preceding day or two, as today's Washington Post seems to be suggesting.
However, we could make a general statement that the level of our bombing in the North
would be governed by the pace of Communist activity in the South in the preceding
period (not specified). This would have the advantage of a built-in justification for
increasing the level of our bombing if Communist activity increases. But it would also
have the "peace" significance of opening the way for the other side, by reducing its own
activity, to bring about a reduction in our bombing and thus to open the way to what
Kennan and others have urged as a progressive de-escalation of hostilities. At the same
time, this line of approach is inherently more controllable than an outright pause and
leaves the way open to increases that do not raise the problem of outright resumption after
a pause.
5. Cambodian Supervision.
We have already started probing with the British the question of their discussing this with
the Soviets and the ICC members. We have Sihanouk's own request for expanded ICC
supervision in certain areas, and the issue is one that is wholly consistent with our own
past position. Conceivably it might be a matter for UN Security Council discussion, but
only if the Soviets fully agreed. I would be much more favorable to a co-chairmen/ICC
format, which could produce discussions that might go beyond Cambodia, although this
should emphatically not be stated as a purpose at the outset. This strikes me as a useful
initiative in any event, although of limited utility at least for a time in meeting any need
for a Vietnam peace initiative.
Bundy, Vol. XVII. No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text
that the President saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Further Notes on Bombing the North
1. I had a meeting of second-level public relations people dealing with Viet Nam this
afternoon, and they all said very strongly, that if the pause goes more than another day or
so, it should go long enough to be a real answer to our critics. Otherwise, we would fall
between two stools and get criticized by the military without making any money with the
peacemakers. I argued with them, but I think the point has force.
2. Bill Moyers has reaffirmed to me this afternoon his own feeling that since we have
gone these days, we should go on through New Year's Day. He thinks we will be heavily
criticized for a half-hearted effort if we resume now.
3. Most interestingly, General Taylor came to see me this afternoon to say that he now
feels very strongly that since we have endured three days of pause, we might as well go
on for long enough to take the starch out of the idea once and for all. He also undertook to
write personally to Westie and to Admiral Sharp if you decide to continue the current
suspension and to explain to them the great importance of this course of action from the
point of view of proving to the American public that we have left no door to peace
untried./2/ Taylor said that he does not think the military cost is great. He thinks the
political reward of a solid pause is worth it at this stage.
4. I should report that I planned to be in New York tomorrow for a day of talks with my
prospective employers./3/ I can easily cancel this visit if you wish, and of course, I can be
reached on the telephone through the White House Board at all times. Bob Komer will
cover here and is fully briefed.
/3/On December 4, McGeorge Bundy tendered his resignation and informed the President
that he had been offered a position at the Ford Foundation. Bundy agreed to remain in his
post until February 28, 1966. (Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, Deceamber 4, with
attached letter of resignation; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the
President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII)

Department of State
Washington, DC
250. Letter From the President's Consultant on Vietnam (Taylor) to President

Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312
(Situation in Vietnam, 1964-1965). Secret. McGeorge Bundy sent this letter to the
President with the following comment: "Max Taylor prepared this at my request, and I
think you will find it an interesting and thoughtful contribution." A note on Bundy's
covering memorandum indicates this letter was sent to the President in Texas on
December 31 at 11:45 p.m.; a notation on the memorandum indicates that the President
saw it.
Dear Mr. President:
As the New Year approaches, I am sure that the thought uppermost in your mind and that
of your senior advisers is what to do about Viet-Nam in 1966. Not knowing exactly the
present state of development of plans within the government, I am venturing to convey to
you some of my personal views as to the goals set for next year.
Our overall objective remains that of assuring South Viet-Nam the right to determine its
own form of government and its own way of life without having to accept a Communist
government imposed by Hanoi. It may or may not be possible to attain this objective in
1966; we should, however, establish ambitious bench marks in all sectors of our
endeavors which, if reached, should offer a reasonable hope of convincing the Communist
leaders that the invincibility of the "War of Liberation" being waged in South Viet-Nam is
a myth and hence they had better change their game.
In seeking to establish an objective for the ground combat in South Viet-Nam during
1966, I would suggest its expression in terms of population made sufficiently secure to
permit progress by the non-military agencies in developing the secured areas. At present,
it is estimated (although the estimate is sometimes challenged) that about 53 percent of
the population is already in this state of security. If we took some figure like 75-80
percent of the population as our year-end goal for security, it would have the effect of
focusing the military effort more specifically on population as our primary objective
rather than territory. If we take control of territory as our goal, it invites us to disperse our
forces throughout the jungles and forests of negligible military and political value and into
terrain most favorable to the military operations of the enemy. It will create endless U.S.
troop requirements if we undertake to pursue the guerrilla bands into the remote fastnesses
of Viet-Nam; we had better concentrate our troop resources on securing the maximum
number of people and thus get the most out of our deployments.
The role of our U.S. ground forces in this campaign for increased population security
should be primarily the destruction of mainline Viet Cong-North Vietnamese units,
preferably after they have been located by South Vietnamese ground action. Let the South
Vietnamese army find and fix the enemy; we are best suited to hold and destroy them. I
know that no pat formula such as this can apply in all cases but it can serve as a general
guide. I have been disturbed by growing evidence from Saigon that our military in South
Viet-Nam are inclined to turn over all or most of the heavy fighting to U.S. forces and
allow the bulk of the Vietnamese forces to retire behind a screen of U.S.-provided
protection to perform clearing jobs and local defense. At least half of the South
Vietnamese regular units should be used in mobile combat roles and some such level of
Vietnamese participation should be required by the U.S. military authorities in Saigon.
It is more difficult to set concrete goals in the area of development and rural
reconstruction. I would suggest one, however; namely, that we take as a 1966 objective
the conduct of free elections in all the secure areas of South Viet-Nam for the purpose of
electing a constituent assembly. If all elements of civil government are oriented toward
this goal, I would expect substantial progress to be made in all the subordinate programs
for such purposes as the improvement of administration, agriculture, distribution of
commodities, public health and the like. For our part, we should indicate our unequivocal
support for such elections and our willingness to accept the results whatever they may be.
In planning the air campaign against North Viet-Nam for 1966, we should first remind
ourselves of the three purposes we had in starting it in February, 1965. First, there was the
need to give the South Vietnamese the opportunity for the first time in eleven years of
conflict to strike back at the source of all their troubles; it also gave us an opportunity to
retaliate for such terrorist attacks as the mortaring of the Bien Hoa air base, the bombing
of the Brink hotel and the attack on U.S. barracks at Pleiku. Second, there was the need to
use our air superiority to retard and make more difficult the continued infiltration of men
and materiel from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. No one expected air power
alone to be able to stop infiltration and clearly it has not. But any serious examination of
the physical destruction of our bombings and the effect on daily circulation of our armed
reconnaissance is bound to conclude that the air campaign has made life very difficult for
those in the North who are supporting the Viet Cong insurgency.
The third and, in the long run, the most important purpose of our bombings was and is to
convince the Hanoi leaders that the aggression must stop or they will have to pay an
increasingly high price for its continuance. We are all aware that they have thus far given
no indication of an intention to mend their ways. But neither did the leaders in Moscow
give any intention of calling off the Berlin airlift or the North Korean-Chicom leaders of
abandoning their effort to take over South Korea until the game had been played down to
the last card. Up to that point, their attitude was one of defiant, aggressive confidence. We
should expect nothing different from Hanoi now. The leaders there still hope that
international or U.S. domestic pressures will cause us to weaken and modify our purpose-or perhaps the Saigon Government may cave in as it has in the past. Until these hopes
prove vain, I am convinced we must keep up the pressure and pursue inexorably a bold
offensive course in 1966.
In this spirit, I would recommend that, during 1966, we continue the deliberate destruction
of all fixed targets in North Viet-Nam outside of heavily populated areas which have any
relation to the war-supporting capability of North Viet-Nam and continue to interdict road
and rail movement throughout the country. This will require after due warning the aerial
mining of the principal ports. In order to increase the reluctance of the DRV to denude
North Viet-Nam of army units to reinforce the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam, it may be
desirable to encourage the South Vietnamese to conduct commando raids with U.S.
support along the North Vietnamese coast to give an occasional reminder that the ground
of North Viet-Nam may eventually be no more of a sanctuary than its air space.
On the politico-economic front in Saigon, we need to sustain and improve the Ky
government and work increasingly to hold inflation within bounds. We also need to keep
the Saigon political leaders in mental step with us as we plan for the termination of
hostilities. If, as I believe, we are going to be obliged to take the Viet Cong in some form
into any negotiation, we need to work hard now to overcome the inevitable objections of
our ally.
In conditioning Hanoi for negotiation, we need to work much harder in 1966 to carry the
message to the people of North Viet-Nam and to the Viet Cong that a better life awaits
them if they abandon their aggression against the south. Some of the specific advantages
need to be spelled out more precisely than up to now. All our propaganda activities should
then be directed at getting this message to a people who must be coming increasingly
unhappy under the burdens of war.
On our domestic front, I am sure you will agree that there is continuing work to be done in
explaining the Viet-Nam situation to our people. Since returning to the U.S. in August, I
have made nearly fifty speaking or TV appearances from which I have drawn two
conclusions. The substantial people of the country are solidly behind the actions of our
government but there is wide-spread criticism that the government does not adequately
explain what is going on. There is even some suspicion that this government is holding
back and perhaps concealing some of the facts. At the moment, in many quarters there is
an unreasoning confidence in negotiations as an end in themselves and their initiation as
necessarily synonymous with the restoration of peace. Our people need to be reminded
again and again of our Korean experience--twenty-five months of negotiations while we
lost some 46,000 American and 150,000 allied casualties. I suggest the need in 1966 of
many more high-level explanations to our people of the basic issues in South Viet-Nam to
give them the feeling of being taken more into the confidence of their government.
In closing, let me say that, as one of your advisers, I am not discouraged or dismayed by
the prospects in Viet-Nam for 1966--provided we stay on course and refuse to be diverted
from the overall objective which you have stated so many times--the independence of
South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. My attention was recently drawn to a
staunch sentence of Sir Francis Drake which gives me considerable comfort in such times
as these. "There must be a beginning of every matter but it is continuing unto the end that
yields the true glory."
With warm regards for a New Year which will bring its share of glory,
Respectfully,
Maxwell D. Taylor

classification marking.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR MAC BUNDY
B told of his talks with the Pres re the pause;/2/ he feels he has gotten into this without
making a diplomatic record except with the Hungarians. Sec said he would be inclined to
go ahead; the Hungarian Charge just came in; he had a message from Foreign Minister, a
question; Sec briefed B on the talk;/3/ Sec did not feel this affected the bombing in the
north problem. B said it was not any argument for going ahead either. Sec agreed; the
argument for going ahead is not to have misunderstandings; if we start now we would be
under a handicap of doing a four days pause. They had a rather lengthy discussion of the
problem. Sec was inclined to go ahead with the bombing and perhaps have another pause
beginnning with our new year; we cannot count these four days if we expect to develop a
pause from a diplomatic point of view; it also misleads Vietnamese for we have not
developed with them the concept of a pause; Sec said he was with Thompson, Johnson
and Wm Bundy/4/ and all of us feel we should resume even if we can develop another
type of pause in the next few days. B will report Sec's views; B did not think anything
would be done until Pres had talked with McNamara.
/2/According to his diary, the President and McGeorge Bundy talked by telephone at 9:35
a.m., noon, and 1:06 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
/4/Rusk was meeting with these men from 6:55 to 7:35 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk
Appointment Book)
252. Draft Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/
Bundy, Vol. XVII. Secret.
1. I talked to Dean Rusk/2/ to urge him to get on every diplomatic wire and tell people
that there has been no noise over North Vietnam for four days and that we certainly would
like to know it if anyone has heard any signal of any sort that this lack of action has done
any good. I found him very resistant indeed and he told me that he and Alex Johnson and
Tommy Thompson and my brother Bill all think that we cannot get diplomatic mileage
this way. They really would prefer to resume bombing right away and have a longer pause
later on, with advance notice to the Russians, as they initially recommended last week.
2. I tried gently to say to Dean that this was not the present problem. I said that I thought
we now had a 4-day start and the question was what use we could make of it if we
continued for another period of up to a week. He continued to resist my suggestion, and I
do not feel that I should make further diplomatic contacts tonight behind his back.
3. What I do think is that if you should decide--as I myself hope you may--that it makes
sense to withhold the bombing for another several days, you might then speak to the
Secretary yourself about the usefulness of directing the attention of every available
diplomat to the fact that there is a pause and the further fact that we certainly want to
know it if anyone has any way of finding out whether there is any prospect of a response.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-310-69. Top Secret. This
memorandum, dated January 3, 1966, is based on Taylor's notes, which he took at the
time of the conversation.
Telephone call to my apartment from President Johnson, 10:00 PM on December 27,
1965.
President Johnson called me from the Ranch to ask my opinion of an extension of the
Christmas bombing pause in North Viet-Nam. Secretary McNamara was on the line. The
President explained his feeling of the need of the extension to meet domestic opinion and
to strengthen all fences prior to asking the Congress for more funds and more men for
Viet-Nam.
He had had a strong message from Westy and Admiral Sharp supporting an immediate
resumption of the bombing of North Viet-Nam/2/ and was clearly reluctant to override
their military arguments. I told him that I had always opposed a pause in the bombing,
feeling that it was futile to expect Hanoi to make any responsive moves during a pause
while international attention was concentrated upon their every move. I expressed the
view from a military point of view the commanders were right and we should get on with
the bombing campaign.
/2/See Document 245 and footnote 3 thereto.
However, in my judgment, a few days delay would not matter from a military point of
view if the President felt that, by an extension of the cease-fire, he could expose once and
for all the futility of expecting reasonableness from the leadership in Hanoi and Peking. I
felt there was no danger to our troops in terms of loss of life or exposure to attack as the
result of the extension of the bombing pause for a few days.
I repeated my often expressed fear of being trapped into extended negotiations in the
course of a pause.
The President expressed his determination not to be caught and to resume bombing within
a few days as soon as he had given our opponents a reasonable chance to respond to the
extension of the cease-fire.
MDT
254. Editorial Note

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on December 27, 1965, President Johnson called Secretary
Rusk from Texas and advised him that he had decided to defer resumption of the bombing
of North Vietnam for several more days, possibly into the middle of the week beginning
January 2, 1966. At 10:55 p.m. on December 27, Rusk called the Department of State
Operations Center and asked that Vance, U. Alexis Johnson, Thompson, and McGeorge
and William Bundy be asked to assemble at the Operations Center immediately.
(Chronology of Second Pause in US/GVN Bombing Program against North Vietnam;
Johnson Library, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, McNaughton Files, V, Planning Pressures)
According to Cooper (The Lost Crusade, page 291), the men assembled at the Operations
Center and dispatched instructions to Saigon; see Document 255.

Pinta; Exdis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Thompson,
and in substance by McGeorge Bundy and Vance; and approved by Rusk. A copy of this
telegram was sent to the President in Texas in White House telegram CAP 65927,
December 28, 11:06 a.m. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables)
1805. Eyes only for Ambassador and Porter from Secretary.
1. President has given most searching consideration to question of further delay in
resumption of bombing of DRV, and has taken fully into account views expressed by you
and Westmoreland on this subject./2/ He has decided that he wishes to defer resumption
of bombing for several more days, possibly into middle of next week. No commitments
would be made, publicly or privately, which would limit our freedom of action in the
event of a major contingency or serious provocation. Air, ground, and sea operations in
SVN would continue, including Arc Light, as well as air operations in Laos.
2. For your own personal guidance, a major factor in decision is the action which will
have to be made public in January. The prospect of large scale reinforcement in men and
defense budget increases of some twenty billions for next eighteen month period requires
solid preparation of American public. A crucial element will be clear demonstration that
we have explored fully every alternative but that aggressor has left us no choice.
3. We do not, quite frankly, anticipate that Hanoi will respond in any significant way. We
have seen nothing in the mass of speculation or diplomatic gossip pointing to an interest
in peace on Hanoi's part and we have certainly had no such indication through any official
channel. If, contrary to our expectations, there was some significant response, we would
of course be in touch with you immediately. Thus, we do not want to commit ourselves
irrevocably to a specific date for resumption.
4. While confidential until published this week, most recent Harris poll will show that
73% of American people would favor renewed effort for cease-fire (including 64% of
Goldwater voters) and 59% would favor bombing pause (including 48% of Goldwater
voters). Same poll will show 61% favoring increased bombing effort if cease-fire or pause
fails to elicit interest of other side. Such polls do not make decisions, but they illustrate
need to prepare our people for major sacrifices by making it crystal clear where
responsibility lies. Same problem is reflected in Congress which will be reconvening on
January 10 to face hard facts of required national effort. The simple fact is that we must
sustain support for what has to be done in months ahead, if the other side is not interested
in peace. Compared to this over-riding requirement, the destruction of the limited targets
which would otherwise be struck during this period is a secondary matter.
5. Underlying above reasons is our genuine interest in securing SVN without major
bloodshed if that can be accomplished. There is only the slimmest of chances that
suspension of bombing will be occasion for basic change of objective by other side but
communist propaganda on this point should be tested and exposed.
6. Another purpose of continuing suspension would be to drive rift between Communist
powers and between Hanoi and NLF. We have considerable reason to believe differences
exist that would come into play in a suspension, and tend to interpret Hanoi's propaganda
blast against pause on December 10 and 11 in sense that Hanoi itself is concerned about
this./3/ To this end we will be in touch with a few interested governments.
/3/Reference is to a Hanoi radio broadcast in English on December 10 and a commentary
in Hanoi's official paper, Nhan Dan, December 11, that the potential U.S. bombing pause
was a trick to mask aggression, which deceived no one. (FBIS, North Vietnam, December
13, 1965)
7. Accordingly, you should discuss this decision ASAP with GVN officials, in whatever
way you think best, to obtain their private understanding and concurrence with this brief
delay in resumption of bombing./4/ Following are additional elements you should explain:
/4/In telegram 2306 from Saigon, December 28, Lodge reported that he called on General
Ky and gave him the "pertinent and appropriate parts of Deptel 1805. When I had
concluded he allowed a moment's silence to go by and said: 'I understand the problem
and, of course, I have no objection.'" (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
a. We plan no formal announcement other than responding to questions as to when

bombing will resume by saying no decision taken.
b. All actions for further reinforcement in SVN will go forward without change, including
specifically plans for two additional brigades and Marine Landing Team due to arrive in
January. USG plans major further reinforcement in 1966 as required, and you may tell
GVN this.
c. On side of countering possible GVN objections, you should note that Hanoi can hardly
doubt our resolve in face of our present and planned effort. Suspension does not suggest,
nor is there, slightest change in our negotiating position and objectives, which are familiar
to GVN.
8. I know you will appreciate the importance of overwhelming support from the home
front for the gallant job you and all hands are doing on the fighting front.
Rusk
256. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the

Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/
December 28, 1965.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Johnson, Pres.,
1965. No classification marking. The President was in Texas; Harriman was in
Washington. According to his diary, President Johnson telephoned Harriman from the
LBJ Ranch at 10:36 a.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
The President called WAH.
P--Hello, Averell, how are you getting along?
H--I wrote you a little note. Hope you saw about the . . .
P--Averell, I talked to Rusk this morning and I don't know how you feel about it. We
talked to the Hungarians last Thursday./2/ Are you familiar with the conversations?
H--Only in a general way.
P--We told them that we were listening and we were hoping they would listen if they
heard anything we would like to know about it and if they could get any encouragement
along the peace front, it would certainly be appealing to us. They come in now and want
to know if we are willing to talk to the VC on some of our 14 points and we told them we
would have no trouble for the VC to be adequately heard./3/ Actually, we don't have
much confidence that much will come out of this but that is no reason not to try. I don't
think I would be elected to Congress the first time when I ran. I think with your friends
Fulbright, Scotty Reston, Mansfield, Arthur Krock and the New York Times (men), all
these people thinking there could be peace, if we were only willing to have peace, we
ought to give it the old college try. There's the poll--43% of the people think we haven't
tried enough diplomatic moves--they don't know enough what economic work we are
doing in SEA. If you don't mind picking up your old kit bags, going to visit your old
friend Tito, tell him how we feel and how I feel, sit down and talk to him, and see if he
has any channels, go to Poland--just quietly, one of your general vacationing around, the
elder statesman visiting around the world to see the state of the world, then probably get
into see that Hungarian Foreign Minister; you can go to Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia,
any place you drop in or out.
H--What about seeing Bo in Paris?
P--That would be good. He ought to be talked to.
H--I think all of this ought to be done with Rusk's blessing.
J--I have told him this morning that I wanted you to do this. You report directly to me like
when you were down in Chile and some of these other good trips you have taken. When
you get back, you can talk to the Times people, etc. I think that yesterday it has been four
days now and there hasn't been a bomb dropped on NVN. We are not going to drop any
until after the New Year if there is no serious provocation. Keep your trip at low level as
you can. Don't be making us explain--you never do. I talked about it to Bob McNamara
this morning. Said you went down to Chile and nobody knew (you were there until you
got the job done). Bob McNamara is here. There is a plane warming up. You go see Dean
Rusk. You just get him the word just as soon as you can. . . . There has been five days
since there hasn't been a bombing.
H--Which should I go to first?
J--You be the judge. I think you want to build Gronouski up a little and pull him in on it.
Tito, good. Hungarian Foreign Minister--they are the first ones (notify). You ought to
look at it--when I go before the Committee for 25 billion dollars for special mission in
VN--and an extra 500,000 men. Then I can say the day before Christmas no bombing, and
then we sent Harriman to Poland, to Yugoslavia, and we sent Goldberg and Rusk here and
Wilson there. We have walked the last mile.
H--Do you think we ought to go to Hungary first?
J--It seems to me that they are not any of them in State very strong for this. You bear that
in mind. But they weren't strong for Chile. You can at least explain when you get back to
Washington where you have been, whom you have talked to, you have tried everything.
And maybe you can see the Russians later. We are seeing Dobrynin.
H--It might be good for me to stop there.
J--Don't you let Dean talk you out of it. You had a mighty good year. You were a great
comfort. My love to Marie.
H wished the President a Happy New Year and said no one deserved it more.
257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA. Secret; Flash;
Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by
Rusk.
202. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.
1. President has decided that he wishes defer resumption of bombing for several more
days. We are most anxious that word of this action be conveyed directly to DRV, although
we are also naturally conveying message to key Communist governments that are in touch
with Hanoi.
2. Accordingly, you should convey aide-memoire in text given below in some manner to
DRV Ambassador Rangoon. Moscow experience last May was that DRV Ambassador
refused to meet with Kohler or to accept written communication. However, junior
member of Embassy was able to hand written note to junior member of DRV Embassy
staff so that effective delivery was achieved even though DRV Embassy returned note on
following day allegedly unopened. We would suspect DRV Embassies may now have
prior instructions to reject any communication from us, and you will have to explore
carefully how to make first move in way that would ensure physical delivery of note to
some DRV representative, even if, as we expect, Ambassador himself refuses to receive
you. Use of reliable Burmese intermediary is not excluded if purpose can only be
achieved in this way. If necessary, you could approach appropriate level RGUB to remind
them of Burmese willingness, expressed to U Thant apparently during 1964, that Rangoon
would be available as site for contacts between US and DRV. We leave method entirely to
you, but action should be taken soonest and in way that ensures effective delivery. Please
give full account of actions you take and of DRV reactions.
3. Text of aide-memoire is as follows:
Begin text:
"1. As you are no doubt aware, there has been no bombing in North Viet-Nam since
December 24 although some reconnaissance flights have continued. No decision has been
made regarding a resumption of bombings and unless there is a major provocation we
would hope that the present stand-down, which is in its fifth day, could extend beyond
New Year. If your government will now reciprocate by making a serious contribution
toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further
extending the suspension.
"2. I and other members of my Embassy staff stand available at any time to receive any
communication you may wish to address to me or to us."/2/ End text.
/2/In Paris, Paul Sturm was instructed to inform Mai Van Bo of his knowledge of this
telegram and that a possible DRV response to a bombing cessation would be "a clear
major reduction in level of VC military activity and terrorism in SVN." On January 1,
1966, Sturm tried to contact Bo but was told that Bo was sick. On January 3, Sturm met
with Vo Van Sung of the DRV delegation in Paris and gave him a copy of the Rangoon
aide-memoire. (Telegrams 3707 and 3732 from Paris, January 2 and 3, 1966; ibid., POL
27-14 VIET/XYZ)
Rusk
258. Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol.
1. Secret.
Record of the Secretary's Contacts with the Hungarian Charge
1. December 23. The Secretary called in the Charge in order to give him a message
inquiring whether the Hungarian Foreign Minister had received any information that
would throw light on the question the Secretary had asked Peter at the UN in October.
(The Secretary's question had been, in effect, what would happen on the other side if we
were to stop bombing.)
In the course of the conversation, the Secretary spelled out in some detail 12 basic points
concerning the US position. He asked that these points be brought to the attention of the
Hungarian Foreign Minister and anyone else he chose.
The Charge said that he would report the conversation urgently./2/
2. December 24. The Charge called the Secretary to say that he would like to see him
urgently. The Charge asked for clarification of our intentions concerning a Christmas
truce. The Secretary responded that we had received no indication of the VC attitude on
our own 30-hour military ceasefire. He stated emphatically that any ceasefire, of 12 or 30
hours, could not be unilateral. He said that he might know more about our precise military
plans during the day. Finally, the Secretary said that we remained interested in knowing
what the other side would do if we stopped shooting or bombing.
3. December 25. The Secretary telephoned the Charge during the evening to say that the
outcome of the ceasefire within South Viet-Nam depended on the VC attitude and actions.
However, he went on to say that he wished the Charge to know that we did not expect to
conduct bombing attacks in North Viet-Nam for "a day or two" after Christmas. He said
that he would be most interested in any message the Charge might produce on the basis of
this information.
4. December 27. The Secretary called the Charge early in the afternoon to ask if he had
had any message. The Charge responded in the negative, but later in the afternoon called
again to say that he now had instructions. Accordingly, the Secretary received him at 6
p.m.
The Charge conveyed a very precisely phrased message from Peter:
"Can the Secretary's messages be interpreted to mean that the USG is ready or willing to
enter into negotiations on 'the platform presented by you' with the NLF?"
The Charge went on to say that the "platform" obviously referred to the 12 points
summarized by the Secretary to the Charge on December 23.
The Secretary responded by making five points:
1. He referred to President Johnson's remarks at his July 28 press conference/3/ to the
effect that the VC would not have difficulty being represented or having their views
presented, "if Hanoi decided it wished to cease aggression."
/3/See Document 97.
2. The US problem of peace lies with Hanoi, not the NLF. US forces are in Viet-Nam
only because Hanoi has sent tens of thousands of men, including regular forces, into
South Viet-Nam. If Hanoi had not done this, US forces would not be there. Thus, our
problem is with Hanoi.
3. Our 12 points are a matter of public record. If the NLF is seriously interested in these
12 points, they can tell us or Peter or anyone such as the Geneva Co-Chairmen. We would
be interested if Peter has any indication that the NLF is thus interested.
4. There is no technical problem applicable to contact with the NLF. Members of the NLF
have family ties and are well known in Saigon. The Charge interjected to ask whether this
meant they could talk to the US or to South Viet-Nam in both directions. The Secretary
responded by going on to his fifth point below.
5. The USG cannot enter into negotiations with the NLF. The Secretary emphasized this
two or three times in the conversation. He pointed out that there were other groups in
South Viet-Nam--Buddhists, Catholics, Montagnards, sects, etc., who had their own
leaders and would have to be considered. The local VC were part of a population of 14
million. One could not negotiate with them simply because they happened to have rifles.
At this, Charge grunted disagreement, and the Secretary remarked: "I predicted your
disagreement," and the Charge responded: "You predicted correctly."
Having made these five basic points, the Secretary went on, "in confidence," to say that at
times there seemed to be nuances of difference between the NLF and Hanoi, between
Hanoi and Peiping, and of course well known differences between Moscow and Peiping.
Under these circumstances, it was very hard to find anyone with whom to make peace.
The Secretary said he put this remark in confidence because he did not wish to
exaggerate, but that this was the reason for the suggestion that he would be interested in
any expression of NLF views on the 12 points.

The Charge complained at this point that they had been given very little time to get any
response and had had no time to get out "to the jungle."
The Secretary then said he did not connect Peter's message to the bombing. He could not
say at that moment when the bombing would be resumed. It could be at any time.
However, he wished to underscore that even the cessation of bombing for these three days
had shown that it was a point of flexibility on our side, if there was any interest on the
other side.
At this point the Charge asked if he might make a personal remark, and asked rhetorically:
"Do you think Peter speaks on his own?" (The obvious intended implication was that
Peter had been in touch with Hanoi or the NLF, or both.) The Secretary responded that if
Peter had reported Hanoi moving in the direction of peace, that would be very important.
Peter's report on the NLF was also interesting, but he repeated that he did not connect
Peter's message with the bombing of the North. The Secretary went on to say that we
could stop the bombing but we still wanted to know what Hanoi would then do--not a
commitment but at least an indication. He recalled his own participation in the
negotiations that terminated the Berlin Blockade and started up in 1951 concerning Korea,
and said that there were ways for diplomats to find these things out privately. He went on
to say that our 12 points meant exactly what they said and were reliable. If Hanoi thinks
we are not in good faith, let them probe us.
The Charge interjected that the present US response appeared to be that we could not
negotiate with the NLF. The Secretary said this was indeed the case. The Secretary said
however that we mean all we say, for example about not having bases or a military
presence in South Viet-Nam and that if Hanoi gets out, we will.
The Charge put on an act of discouragement at this point and asked how we could find a
solution. The Secretary responded that if Hanoi was determined to absorb South VietNam by force, there was bound to be further war. The Charge then asked what would
happen if free elections led to Communist control of the South. The Secretary said this
was a matter for the people of South Viet-Nam. The Charge then backtracked a bit with
some remarks about how hard it was to find the will of the people in any circumstances,
and admitted under the Secretary's teasing that he took a standard Communist view of
elections.
The conversation then went back to what would happen if the bombing continued to be
suspended. The Charge again complained that he had had no time to get "to the jungle."
He thought this was a pity, as this was a very good psychological moment. Now, he
regretted to say, he found our response discouraging and was afraid the bombing would
resume. Nonetheless he would carefully report the Secretary's statement that our action
should at least be taken as an indication of our flexibility on this point.
The Secretary then noted that the VC had put on at least 20 incidents even during their
own ceasefire period, and then 60 more during ours. The Charge responded that he had
been surprised there hadn't been a major attack; the VC didn't have IBM machines to give
orders.
The Charge then referred to the Secretary's call on Christmas evening. The Secretary said
that our informing the Hungarians of our intent was part of our saying that we were
interested in peace, but could not pay the price of South Viet-Nam. If you looked at our 12
points, we had been fair and constructive on every other element, but we were simply not
about to trade South Viet-Nam for peace. The Charge then reverted to saying that that was
all very well, but we still wouldn't talk with the NLF.
The Secretary then asked, as a point of information, whether there was now an NLF office
in Budapest. The Charge responded that one had just been installed.
The Secretary brought the conversation to a close by saying that he did appreciate Peter's
interest.
5. December 28. The Secretary summoned the Charge about noon to give him a simple
statement that we were not proposing to resume bombing for at least several more days.
The Secretary's message followed exactly the text used with the Soviets and Poles as well,
and is attached.
In response, the Charge gave the Secretary the following message from Peter
(subsequently phoned in absolutely correct form to Mr. Bundy). It was as follows:
"I have got your newer message and your pressing questions. Every one of your proposals
is under careful study [in place of 'I am carefully studying all your proposals,' which the
Charge explained orally to Mr. Bundy meant that the proposals were being studied by
'someone other than Peter.']/4/
/4/Brackets in the source text.
"I will give a complete answer soon."
Attachment/5/
/5/No classification marking.
1. As you are doubtless aware, there has been no bombing in North Viet Nam since
December 24th although some reconnaissance flights have continued. I have been asked
to tell you that no decision has been made regarding a resumption of bombing and that
this will depend upon developments. We would hope that the present standdown, which is
in its fifth day, could extend at least through New Year's. We cannot make a flat
commitment as to timing because of the possibility of some particularly outrageous action
or some major new move by the other side. If, on the other hand, the other side should
reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a
favorable effect on the possibility of extending the suspension.
2. Because of the interest and concern of your government about this problem, this
information is being passed to you for whatever use your government may wish to make
of it.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by
Thompson and approved in S/AL.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
I made the following oral statement to Dobrynin:
[Here follows the identical text of the statement that Rusk gave to Radvanyi; see the
attachment to Document 258.]
Dobrynin said he would, of course, promptly inform his Government but he wished it
understood that he was not undertaking to pass this information to Hanoi. He asked if we
were taking any steps to inform Hanoi, to which I replied that we were informing the
Hungarian Government and possibly some other Governments and assumed that the
information would reach them. In any event, they would be aware that the bombing had
been suspended.
Dobrynin said that, speaking quite off the record, his Hungarian colleague had obtained
the impression from the Secretary that as of yesterday the Secretary had thought that the
bombing might be resumed any day, including possibly today. He asked me if I could tell
him for his own information whether the Hungarian had misunderstood or whether
something had happened between yesterday and today.
I replied by drawing his attention to the fact that the President was in Texas and said that
my guess was that the Secretary was simply being cautious in order not to mislead the
Hungarian the other way.
Dobrynin asked me what the words "could extend beyond New Year's" meant. When I
said I hesitated to make any interpretation of these words as I wished to be very careful
not to mislead him, he said that he would assume that the stand-down would probably go
for a few days beyond New Year's. I said I thought this was probably a reasonable
interpretation

Department of State
Washington, DC
260. Draft Telegram From the President's Consultant on Vietnam (Taylor) to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-360-69. Secret. Also addressed
to Westmoreland. Taylor sent this draft to the President under cover of a memorandum
that reads: "I understand you indicated yesterday to Mac Bundy that it would be helpful if
I sent some such message as the attached to Sharp and Westmoreland. If the text is
satisfactory, I shall send it at once." A note by Taylor on the memorandum indicates that
the President wanted Wheeler to receive a copy as well. Apparently the telegram was sent.
Having noted your messages on the resumption of Rolling Thunder/2/ and understanding
thoroughly the sound military reasons behind your recommendations for a prompt
resumption, it occurred to me that you might be interested in getting more of the feeling at
the Washington end on this subject.
/2/See Document 245 and footnote 3 thereto.
Since returning from Saigon last August, I have made nearly fifty speaking or TV
appearances about the country, an experience which has opened my eyes to problems of
the domestic front which I did not know existed. Although there is a strong majority
support for the Administration's position on Viet-Nam, it is more the normal American
reaction to rally around the President in time of crisis than the result of any deep
conviction that our course of action is necessary and right. There is still confusion over
the basic issues in spite of the many statements of our leaders and a subdued but real
uneasiness that important facts are being held back or concealed from the public.
One often expressed doubt is over the sincerity of our desire for a negotiated settlement in
Viet-Nam. This doubt has been fed by the false rumors of rejected feelers which have
received extended press treatment. A recurrent allegation is that we deliberately create
conditions under which Hanoi could not be expected to respond to our offer of
unconditional discussions.
Most of these critics make common cause in urging a prolonged bombing pause to give
Hanoi a chance to respond. I have always opposed such a pause for a variety of reasons
but have always feared that pressures for one might sometime get out of hand. Hence,
once the Christmas cease-fire became a fact, I was inclined to take the position that, if a
bombing pause were ever to be undertaken, now is the time to do it. It can be done in a
low-key way without elaborate comment or explanation and terminated without fanfare
after running for a short, unspecified period. If such an action would expose once and for
all the futility of letting up the pressures on the enemy, it would be a worthwhile exercise
despite the military disadvantages which you see so clearly.
The overall thought which I want to convey is that there is justified concern over the longterm durability of our home front. Everything depends on the ability of the President to
keep the country aligned behind his Viet-Nam policy in spite of mounting casualties, a
vast budget increase and the seeming endlessness of the conflict. If the suspension of
Rolling Thunder to New Year's or some such time will materially help him in this task, I
have no personal hesitation in advising him to do so. After this test period is over, I would
hope that Rolling Thunder would be resumed with a heightened intensity which, after the
lull, would be all the more unpleasant for Hanoi.
Regards to you both,
Taylor
261. Memorandum for Personal Files/1/

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Divison, Harriman Papers, Secretary Rusk,
1963-1966. No classification marking. Drafted by Harriman.
SUBJECT
Conversation with the Secretary following the President's telephone call to me/2/ to travel
to certain capitals
The Secretary took a negative view. I told him the President told me "Don't let Dean talk
you out of it." He proposed my going to Paris to see Chauvel./3/ Also to Rome and Iran. I
said I wasn't going to Iran--that would not achieve the President's purposes, and there was
also no use my trying to twist people's arms to increase aid to Viet-Nam during the bomb
pause; and anyway the President wanted me to be able to testify when I got back that he
had sent me to go the last mile in trying to come to a settlement.
He seems opposed to my seeing Bo. He says we are making a contact. He didn't tell me
who. He said he would talk to the President this afternoon. I said the President wanted me
to go today. That seemed to take him aback. I said it wasn't much time before the end of
the year and the President wants the time to be used.
He is afraid talking to the Hungarians would put them on the spot and be
counterproductive. I asked him why, because I understood they had indicated that we
hadn't taken their contact sufficiently seriously.
He said "You and Tommy/4/ talk it over some more." Tommy suggested I talk to Alex to
see whether the South Vietnamese wouldn't be terribly upset. I said "Tommy, this is the
President of the United States, not South Viet-Nam, whom you are working for. South
Viet-Nam we can protect as much as possible, but the President has the job of convincing
Congress he has made the last effort. Anyway, Alex is basically opposed to talks." He
suggested going to Paris, Rome, Yugoslavia, which could be done without any harm. I
said that wouldn't equip me to testify that we had run down every lead.
/4/Llewellyn E. Thompson.
W.A.H.
262. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Defense

McNamara and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam.
Mc said now that we have it we should try to make something of it./2/ B said we had sent
a telegram to Byroade in Rangoon for him to get in touch with the DRV Ambassador and
give him an Aide-Memoire./3/ B said he was also getting Presidential letters to Wilson,
Erhard, Pearson, Moro and de Gaulle. B said we would get the French Ambassador in
tomorrow subject to clearance with the Ranch.
/2/The bombing pause.
Mc asked Ball if he thought it would be wise for Ball to go to see Wilson. B said he
thought Wilson would appreciate a quiet Presidential letter more than he would someone
coming over. B thought the same thing could be done in Ottawa. B told Mc that Harriman
was going to Warsaw tonight. B said he and Rusk agreed that the Hungarians should work
their own way out re Harriman. They have given indications they are trying to make a
serious effort here. The Charge came back today with a lot of questions. B said we
proposed, if approved by the President, that Harriman go to Budapest only if invited by
the Hungarians. After spending a few days in Warsaw H[arriman] could go to Paris.
B told Mc that Goldberg was on his way to N.Y. and presumably would see U Thant
tonight; then he would fly to see the Pope; and return home.
Mc said he thought this was what had been discussed earlier today. Mc thought it would
be desirable for H to see Tito if he could. Ball said he thought the problem was that Tito is
so unpopular with the rest of the Bloc.
Mc said one of the things we should get are views of other people. How do they see this
shaping up in the future. Mc said he realizes as well as Ball that it is unlikely that this is
all going to end with unconditional surrender by NVN. They both agreed there had to be
face savers.
McN said if we send these people out we cannot end this pause New Year's Eve. Ball
agreed and said if it did not run until at least the end of next week we would be charged
with bad faith. Mc said he had told the Pres this last night and he thought he was prepared
to go beyond the first if we get anything at all. Mc said he had sent a telegram to
Westmoreland,/4/ Wheeler, and Sharp telling them why we were doing this and saying we
were going to keep a sharp eye.
/4/Telegram 5041-65 from McNamara to Westmoreland, December 29. (Center of
Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV, Message Files)
Mc said we were going to start our Blue Tree Reconnaissance again. We are not to return
fire unless trying to recover a pilot who has been shot down and we are trying to rescue.
Ball informed Mc of Moscow's announcement that Shelepin is going to Hanoi shortly. B
thought this might be in our favor re timing.
It was decided that when Rusk, McN and Ball meet tomorrow they should discuss what
should be said to the press./5/
/5/No record of this meeting has been found.

(Ball) and President Johnson/1/
December 28, 1965, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Presidential
Conversations. No classification marking. The President was in Texas; Ball was in
Washington.
Ball informed the Pres that he had sent him a long memorandum describing exactly what
we were doing and proposing including some draft letters./2/
/2/Dated December 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Pres asked Ball to give him the gist of what was being transmitted. President told Ball he
wanted him here because he was inspiring, stimulating and "shoving" just as he had on
two or three other occasions in this field. Pres said even if all this comes to naught he
would feel better. He said he had to survive this thing. He has 3 more years to go and he
said he wanted Ball sitting at the bridge calling the signals and he is not to let "them" talk
him out of "it". Pres told Ball to get his Dutch toes in concrete and is to say "this is what
the man (the Pres) wants and I am here to shove."
Ball told the Pres that Harriman left tonight at 8:00 and while enroute we are expecting
clearance from the Polish Govt so he will go straight to Warsaw and will plan to spend a
couple of days with the Poles. Ball said we had asked the Hungarian Govt whether they
would like to have H come there. We have had an indication from the Charge that the
Govt wants to be active in this. They have asked clarification of 2 or 3 of the things we
gave them and Dobrynin told Thompson the Charge (Hungarian) had been in touch with
him regularly. Ball said we think something significant might come from the Hungarian
efforts. However, Ball said, we don't want to send Harriman there unless they want him
but we do want to have him available and at their option so he can be helpful to them. We
don't want to take a chance of Harriman's coming in and having them close-up by saying
he has embarrassed them by coming.
Pres said this is all right, however, he would not worry about the Hungarians. Pres thinks
Harriman should go to Hungary in any event. He said we could always find reasons for
his not going. Pres said he would not hesitate to take the responsibility.
Re the Yugoslavs Ball said we had not been able to set it up with Tito. He has left Brioni
but we would keep working on it.
Ball said he thought we would have an answer from the Hungarians tomorrow and in the
meantime H would go on to Warsaw and we would not lose any time. H will try to get the
Polish govt to start moving.
Ball said we had sent an Aide-Memoire to Amb. Byroade in Rangoon to deliver to the
NVN Consul General there./3/ This was our appraisal of the best fellow to deal with on a
fast basis and this is the fellow U Thant would have used last fall. Ball said he was going
to have Goldberg tell Thant tonight what we were doing so he will know what we are
talking about. Ball explained this was a formal way we could deal with the Govt and we
would have an absolute record made. It should be delivered tomorrow as early as possible.
Goldberg should be leaving for Rome tonight at 2:00 Ball said. However, there is one
problem, Ball told the Pres. Fanfani tendered his resignation today to Moro over the La
Pira incident/4/ and apparently it appears that the Italian Govt is in a shakey position. Ball
said he was concerned that since Goldberg was associated with Fanfani in the La Pira
incident that the Italian press would say we are interfering in domestic politics. The Pres
interrupted to say he wanted a Jew seeing the Pope. Ball said the problem was that since
Goldberg was a high official in the Govt he would have to see the Italian officials. Pres
said this had nothing to do with it. Goldberg is to call on the Pope and get right on to
Paris.
/4/Italian law professer and ex-Mayor of Florence Giorgio La Pira went to Hanoi for
discussions with DRV officials. He then transmitted a peace feeler from the DRV through
Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani to Goldberg; see Documents 205 and 207. When La
Pira's identity was leaked by the Italian press and his connection to Hanoi revealed, the
DRV disassociated itself from the peace feeler.
Pres said Goldberg is to tell the Pope we appreciate what he said about the Christmas
truce and we are responding to what he said about a truce on New Years and we want him
to get busy and get some action of us and get right into Hanoi. Pres said what he liked best
was a Jew talking to a Catholic. Ball said we would send Goldberg on but he wanted to
alert the Pres to the difficulties that might arise. Pres said Goldberg should say he could
not discuss the La Pira incident at all. It is an internal matter.
Ball said on the UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy we have drafted letters from the
President./5/ Re Italy when Goldberg sees the Pope he would also deliver this letter from
the Pres to Fanfani which would be a courtesy. Ball said we were trying to get the letters
out tonight. Pres said he would look at them the minute they reach the Ranch.
/5/The text of the letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Moro of Italy is in
telegram 1362 to Rome, December 29; the letter to Pope Paul VI is in telegram 1363 to
Rome, December 29; the letter to British Prime Minister Wilson is in telegram 3677 to
London, December 29; and the letter to French President de Gaulle is in telegram 2899 to
Paris, December 29. (All in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Ball read the Wilson letter and the President approved. He suggested that Ball add that he
is restricting this information to a very few and he would hope that Wilson, etc. would do
the same.
Pres also said he preferred something other than the statement "the first of the year". He
suggested "for a more extended period", or "for many days". Pres said he did not want to
be committed. Ball said he would fix this.
Pres said he thought someone should talk to Pearson. Ball said he could go up. Pres said
he would rather Ball stay here. Pres thought MacBundy could perhaps meet Pearson in
Philadelphia or go to Ottawa.
Pres said Ball should be sure to have a letter from him to the Pope for Goldberg to deliver.
It should thank him for the Christmas truce and the New Year's truce so the Pope would
feel we were complying. Ball said he would do this.
Pres said he was depending on Ball as his lawyer and his devil's advocate. Pres said Ball
was not to let "them" talk him out of anything. Pres said Ball should stay right on it until
we are sure we have bled it for all it is worth.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis;
Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 4:35 a.m.
2308. For the Secretary from Lodge. Herewith some comment on ideas in your 1805./2/
/2/Document 255.
A. Your para 8. No one will applaud more than I your efforts to secure support from the
homefront. With homefront support we cannot fail. Without, we cannot win.
B. Your para 5 statement that "assuring South Viet-Nam without major bloodshed" is
obviously of capital importance in bringing about steadfast homefront support. For this
reason, I urge that USG in its own mind be clear as to what it regards as a satisfactory
outcome of this war since some outcomes may require more bloodshed than others.
C. Let me think aloud purely for illustrative purposes. It is obvious that if we define a
satisfactory outcome as 1.) seeking out and utterly destroying the North Vietnamese
military main forces and potential, or 2.) seizing the Laos panhandle and the valley of the
Mekong, or 3.) as meaning a state of affairs in which elections free from any intimidation
can be held in every one of the 2, 658 villages in all 43 provinces, we may be taking on
jobs which cannot be done without major bloodshed.
D. If, on the other hand, we define "satisfactory outcome" as the U.S. Mission tried to do
it in our 1377,/3/ this is, hold the delta and the coastal plain, the provincial capitals and the
roads, push out durably, even though slowly, within South Viet-Nam through the kind of
pacification-countryside rebuilding which Lansdale is promoting and ward off the North
Vietnamese aggression so as to make possible the achievement of the above, perhaps we
could hold on for a long time without "major bloodshed". I realize that even this may
cause bloodshed too.
/3/Document 176.
E. Your para 4. There is no doubt of the intense interest which public opinion polls must
hold for all of us in government, and I do not question the authenticity of the Harris Poll.
It does, however, point up the need for us who are in the work of foreign relations to
educate one [our?] public at least in two respects:
First, that a cease fire, unaccompanied by a verified withdrawal of forces in effect
confirms the Viet Cong aggressors in all the places where they are now. It also denies the
sovereignty of the Government of Viet-Nam. In a very real sense, therefore, it gives the
Viet Cong the victory before negotiations have been started. In fact, had our Christmas
truce offer been accepted, we might have been in an extremely critical situation for the
above reason. Therefore, we should first consider educating public opinion about what
constitutes an honest and a dishonest cease fire, and it was in that connection that I
suggested that a television documentary be made based on Admiral Joy's book about
negotiations at Panmunjom./4/
Secondly, the public needs to be educated on the fact that Hanoi and Peking do not react
like Americans, and that over-eagerness on our part is interpreted by them as a sign of
weakness. Therefore the 72 per cent who favor "renewed effort for a cease fire" in the
belief that it would promote the chance of peace are actually defeating their own purpose
and are hardening the resolve of the enemy.
I believe that sooner or later we are going to have to make these things very clear, and, of
course, I will do everything I can to help.
F. I am also interested in your paragraph 6 about differences existing between the Viet
Cong and Hanoi. As my conversations with Palmas have shown, we suspect this also.
Lodge
265. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State/1/

Rangoon, December 29, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was
315. Eyes only for Secretary. Ref: Deptel 202;/2/ Embtel 311./3/ I called upon DRV
Consul General at 3 p.m. today. Was received initially by Lam Bao who remained as
interpreter during discussion. I took Leo Reddy, junior officer of Political Section who
speaks French, in hopes he might be useful if further liaison develops.
/2/Document 257.
/3/Telegram 311 from Rangoon, December 29, concerned preliminary arrangements for
delivery of the aide-memoire under discussion here. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27-14 VIET)
Vu Huu Binh then received me with slight smile and ready handshake. I told him I was
grateful for opportunity to see him personally as my government wished me to convey
message directly to him for transmittal to his government. I then handed him the aidememoire. He and his interpreter studied document together with interpreter translating
parts thereof into Vietnamese.
After studying document Vu Huu Binh said he would transmit it to his government. At
this point we were served with beer (I believe South Vietnamese). I thanked him and told
him I planned to keep my visit to him and the subject thereof quite confidential. I had
come in official U.S. Embassy car but not my own because it was conspicuous. He said
that on his part he would also keep matter confidential.
I told him my instructions had reached me just as I was departing for the airport to go to
Sandoway for a few days rest and to join my family who were already there. I wanted him
to know that I was cancelling my vacation and would be available in Rangoon anytime of
day or night if he should wish to see me. Also, a member of my staff could always be
available if he wished to relay a message. I told him I cared nothing about protocol
niceties and we could meet quite secretly if he so desired.
Vu Huu Binh said he could tell me nothing except that he would transmit message to his
government. I thanked him again for receiving me and he thanked me for coming. He
accompanied me to car and politely shook hands. Discussion lasted about eight minutes.
Although conversation was interpreted, it was obvious Vu Huu Binh understood my
remarks. Moreover, by his acceptance of formal communication I believe we got our
message across to DRV.
Byroade
266. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 29, 1925.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Nodis;
at 8:47 a.m.
1060. For the President and Secretary from Harriman.
1. Ambassador and I have just concluded one hour and a quarter talk with Rapacki,
Winiewicz, Michalowski and Wierna.
2. I outlined President's position regarding pause in bombing as a step towards peace with
hope Hanoi would respond. We gave Rapacki the Secretary's 14 points as U.S. attitude
towards peace in Southeast Asia.
3. Rapacki, after some argument that we were giving ultimatum to Hanoi by threat of
resuming bombing with possible escalation, finally accepted my contention that pause
was in fact giving Hanoi an opportunity for peaceful settlement if she would seize it and
respond with a return indication.
4. Rapacki suggested adjournment for lunch. He said our talk had resulted in an
understanding of each other's position and that this afternoon he wants to discuss the kind
of message he might convey to Hanoi.
5. Ambassador feels my visit and our discussion have been useful as Rapacki is obviously
gratified to be consulted and is anxious to play a role in these events.
Gronouski

at 12:26 p.m. and passed to the White House.
1066. For the President and Secretary from Harriman. We lunched with Rapacki and same
group of his associates. After some informal discussion on changes in Soviet leadership
and Sino-Soviet dispute, Rapacki focused discussion on what he might transmit to Hanoi.
He asked for explanations of several matters particularly President's statement on NLF
representation at conference. As he tried to read into it acceptance on our part of NLF as

full members conference I firmly stated our position that only governments could be
members but Front could be fully heard. Argument over this lasted some time, but
Rapacki finally accepted fact that we were only dealing at the moment with the possibility
of a favorable reaction by Hanoi to the President's pause in bombing. Question of how
further talks could take place was left open, necessarily through Geneva type conference.
Rapacki was eventually satisfied on the points he had raised and said he would try to
transmit US position faithfully to Hanoi for its consideration which might take some time.
The Ambassador and I underlined pressures on the President which required a prompt
reaction from Hanoi. We emphasized not only military considerations but early date of
decision on State of Union message and budget. Discussion ended on most cordial note.
Rapacki stated simply and with dignity that he would do what he could and pointed out
how important ending of Vietnam war was to world stability.
We agreed to give press brief statement that I had come to Warsaw to talk with Polish
Government about Vietnam in its capacity as member ICC and had discussion with
Rapacki, etc. Statement is now being drafted. Detailed memcons follow./2/
/2/The memorandum of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 1069 from Warsaw,
December 30. (Ibid.)
Gronouski

Pinta. Drafted by Bundy and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House.
1815. Eyes only for Ambassador and Porter.
1. You should be aware of following diplomatic actions we have taken in connection with
deferring resumption of bombing:
a. We have informed British, Australians, and New Zealanders very fully here, and
Canadians [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./2/ Our Ambassadors have also
informed ROK, Japan, GRC, RLG, and RTG at highest levels, and we expect to do same
for Marcos probably 31st./3/ We have urged all these governments to hold our intentions
closely, and we have no indication either way as to whether they are informing their
Saigon representatives. Any inquiry from these governments in Saigon should be met by
saying simply that their governments have been informed. Naturally, if representatives
indicate they have received the word, you may elicit comment for whatever use it may be.
/2/Further details are in William Bundy's Pinta Log, December 28-29. (Department of
State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1)
/3/Instructions were sent in telegram 651 to Seoul, also sent to Bangkok, Vientiane,
Tokyo, Taipei, and Manila, December 28. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
b. We have informed Soviets, Poles, and Hungarians here,/4/ treating matter as one of
information and not pressing them for specific action. We have specifically told them
period might be shorter in event of major provocation, but also that we are most interested
in any Hanoi response. Our supposition is that one or more may already have been in
touch with Hanoi, and Hungarians came back to us even over Christmas period to ask if
we would negotiate with NLF. We replied clearly that we would not, for familiar reasons.
/4/See Documents 258 and 259. No record of the discussions with the Poles in
Washington has been found. In telegram 937 to Warsaw, December 28, Rusk instructed
Gronouski to inform Rapacki of the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
c. Byroade yesterday conveyed note directly to DRV Consul General in Rangoon
informing them that resumption might be deferred at least over New Year's./5/ Same
format as notification to Soviets, Poles, and Hungarians. Noteworthy that DRV rep
received Byroade personally and did not seek to play games as DRV Ambassador in
Moscow did last May./6/
d. We have also informed U Thant and Indians in general terms.
e. Harriman has been dispatched to Warsaw and is talking today to Rapacki./7/ We have
also indicated to Hungarians that Harriman available to go to Budapest, but have had no
response. He may also be sent to Belgrade, to talk with Tito. Purpose of his mission is to
show concretely our interest in discussion with Eastern European countries and generally
to make strong record of diplomatic activity. There may be speculation Warsaw trip
related to contact with Chicoms. We are doing nothing to encourage this here, and it
might be specifically useful for us to tell Do privately this is not part of Harriman mission.
f. Goldberg has been sent to Rome to inform Pope and consult with him./8/ This done in
light Pope's general interest and not with expectation he has effective contact with Hanoi.
2. Above adds up to broad notification and essential diplomatic effort so that we will learn
rapidly of any response by Hanoi. Only direct contact with DRV has been by Byroade.
We have no reason to believe this will be publicized, but if it should be there is ready
parallel to our May efforts through DRV Ambassador Moscow and through British in
Hanoi, which are well known to GVN and have been made public subsequently.
3. You may be assured that if anything substantive should appear as a result of this
activity we will be in immediate touch with you.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis;
Pinta. Drafted by Rusk. Repeated to the White House.
1821. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Many thanks for your helpful 2308./2/ My
1805/3/ was sent under some pressure of time and did not therefore go into certain details.
Following are some additions.
/2/Document 264.
/3/Document 255.
1. No one is under any illusion here about our elementary choices if Hanoi and Peiping
continue to push into Southeast Asia by force. We can either get out of their way and let
them have it or we can meet them. We have decided to meet them. When I spoke of
"securing South Viet-Nam without major bloodshed" I was referring to the contingency
that the other side may look down the road ahead and decide that it is too costly or too
dangerous for them to persist. This has happened with the Greek guerrillas, the Berlin
blockade, Korea and the Cuban missile crisis. I realize important differences of attitude
publicly expressed by Peiping but thus far (fingers crossed) Peiping has been much more
cautious in its actions than it has been in its words. My remark was addressed to giving
the other side every chance to pull back.
2. I personally do not see any "satisfactory outcome" which involves giving Hanoi and
their Viet Cong puppets the fruits of their aggression by force in South Viet-Nam. A deal
was made in 1954 and 1962. Once again the communist world is saying what is ours is
ours and what is yours must be talked about and divided up further. I feel we should insist
upon the 1954 and 1962 agreements. If the other side persists in attempting to destroy
those agreements by force, then I fear there shall be bloodshed.
3. I agree with you fully that there is a fundamental difference between an honest and a
dishonest cease-fire. From an operational point of view the most important point would be
a pulling apart of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam militarily. That would mean
stopping infiltration, return of northern infiltrators and comparable actions on our side.
This is feasible although verification would present some difficulties. We do not have in
mind a cease-fire within South Viet-Nam itself which would deny the authority of the
Government of South Viet-Nam in any part of the country. A long-term internal cease-fire
could only be based upon a cessation of DRV aggression and acceptance by the Viet Cong
of the idea that they must lay down arms and take their chances in peaceful political
processes. It may be that public opinion needs more education on this subject. We have
not undertaken it in any significant way because we have not even reached the point
where Hanoi is willing to stop its aggression.
4. Your point that Hanoi and Peiping may interpret interest in peace as weakness is a good
one and this has been much in our minds. We have talked about this frankly with Eastern
European governments. If there is any such misunderstanding, it will be dramatically
corrected when the President asks the Congress in January for $25 billion for Viet-Nam
for the next eighteen months. You should know personally that we have made it very clear
to those in touch with the other side that Hanoi is up against a moment of truth. If they do
not now move towards peace, they must face the most disagreeable possible
consequences.
5. As you may know, the Vatican is concerning itself very actively with Viet-Nam. They
have not revealed to us fully what they are doing but our impression is that they are very
busy. This makes it quite important that Archbishop Palmas fully understand that if there
is any delay or reluctance in connection with his conversations with you, these are to be
bound on the other side and not on our side. If you have not done so in the last ten days, I
would suggest you merely inquire of him whether he has anything further pursuant to
earlier conversations.
6. I am sending in a separate telegram a listing of points already made public by the
United States on various occasions having to do with the basis for peace in Viet-Nam./4/ I
find that when these are drawn together most people, including foreign diplomats as well
as newsmen, are surprised. Their surprise comes from their lack of diligence in doing their
homework. But under Pinta restrictions, I should tell you that the Hungarian Foreign
Minister asked me the other day whether the United States would be prepared to negotiate
with the National Liberation Front on the basis of "this platform". I replied that the
Government of the United States cannot negotiate with the Liberation Front since they are
only one element in a population of fourteen million and the views of Buddhists,
Catholics and other sects and others must be taken into account. I told him I would be
interested if he himself learned that the Liberation Front was interested in the points
which we have made public./5/ Thus far no reply. I cannot overemphasize the importance
of any substantial defection from the Liberation Front away from Hanoi. If this
momentum should begin to roll, the other side's position would, in my judgment,
deteriorate very fast.
/4/Reference is to circular telegram 1243, December 30, which repeated the text of
Document 247, to all diplomatic posts and Hong Kong. (Department of State, Central
7. I need not repeat to you how grateful the President and I are for the job you are doing. I
am deeply convinced that the American people will do what has to be done in meeting
their commitments if they can do so in good conscience and with a clear understanding
that all honorable and peaceful avenues have been closed by the aggressor.
Warm regards.
Rusk

Department of State
Washington, DC
270. Memorandum From the Director of National Intelligence Estimates (Kent) to

the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)/1/
Memos (B). Secret.
SUBJECT
Three Memoranda Attached Re Vietnam
1. I have asked the boys, on the basis of the bombing pause and press reports of some kind
of US contact with the DRV, to think about a number of the possibilities raised if these
stories are true. The results, which I attach, are:/2/
/2/All of the tabs are attached but none is printed.
(a) A paper outlining current Soviet tactics on Vietnam and how these relate to Moscow's
recent maneuvers against China; it concludes that Shelepin in Hanoi will push hard the
case for more reliance on diplomacy and politics, less on military means. (Tab A)
(b) A paper thinking about China's attitude toward negotiations and concluding that
Peiping will threaten big difficulties whenever it senses a weakening of Hanoi's resolve to
continue fighting. (Tab B)
(c) A paper on South Vietnamese attitudes toward negotiations, which concludes that they
are largely negative but not insurmountably so. This one was promised to the Director
some time ago and has been approved by the Board of National Estimates. (Tab C)
2. None of these deal with the central question of how Hanoi itself now views its options.
Some in this town may be better informed than we on this one; perhaps we'll get some
evidence soon.
3. I think you will find all of these papers interesting and hopefully a contribution to your
thinking. At least the first two (A and B above) were written with this principally in mind
and we do not recommend any further circulation. In a few days we may all know enough
more to warrant review, revision, and circulation to a wider audience.
SK
271. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/

Rome, December 29, 1965, 11:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Nodis;
Pinta. Also sent to USUN for Yost. Received at 6:49 p.m. and passed to the White House.
1654. For President Johnson LBJ Ranch, SecState Rusk, Under Secy Ball. From
Ambassador Goldberg.
1. I arrived in Rome at 1600 and shortly thereafter at 1800 had an hour-long private
audience with Pope Paul VI. His interpreter Mons. Cronin, an American priest, was only
other person present. I handed His Holiness letter from the President/2/ which he read
with great care. He immediately expressed his appreciation for what he termed a very
sincere and prompt response to his appeal for a Christmas truce and to mankind's anxiety
for concrete steps working toward permanent peace in Vietnam. He said he would like me
to assure the President that he does not want to disturb in any way the American situation
in Vietnam but rather to be of help in the direction of a fair and honorable settlement. His
Holiness said that all his efforts would be directed to this end, which he was confident the
President shared. He enquired about the President's health and I assured him the President
was in fine fettle.
/2/Transmitted to Rome in telegram 1363, December 29. (Ibid.)
2. His Holiness said he recalled with great satisfaction his private conversation with the
President during his visit to the UN in October and said there too he was impressed with
the President 's sincerity and devotion to peace, now reaffirmed by this communication. I
then enquired whether he had received any specific replies to his Christmas appeal. In
answering he handed me a copy of Osservatore Romano of Dec 27 which contains full
text of his message and in his own hand underlined text of appeal on Vietnam. I
understand this text has already been forwarded to Washington. The Pope then went on to
say that he had received replies from Ho Chi Minh and from the Govt of South Vietnam.
He termed the Ho Chi Minh reply harsh and distressing. The text (in French) of this reply
is being sent by separate telegram./3/ He apparently had received the reply from South
Vietnam only this morning and therefore had no extra copies. He showed me the text
which he termed, and I agreed, to be quite affirmative. He directed Mons. Cronin to make
this reply available to us shortly and it will be forwarded as soon as received./4/ His
Holiness then said he intended, notwithstanding the harsh nature of Ho Chi Minh's reply,
to pursue the matter further. To this end he was planning to send to Vietnam Mons.
Rodhain, a French priest who is head of Caritas, a charitable organization of the Church.
He said Mons. Rodhain's purpose would be charitable in nature but that he would also be
vested with instructions from the Pope to explore avenues of a peaceful settlement. The
Holy Father emphasized that Mons. Rodhain is a man of great discretion and enjoyed his
complete confidence. Plan would be for Mons. Rodhain to go Hanoi as well as Saigon and
the Pope indicated that enquiries had been made to Hanoi as to whether Rodhain would be
received there. The proposal is to send him promptly.
/3/Not found.
/4/The text of this December 27 message is in telegram 1657 from Rome, December 30.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. The Pope then enquired as to our govt's views on the situation in Vietnam. I reviewed
the various steps which President Johnson and his administration have taken to transfer
this conflict from the battlefield to the bargaining table and stressed that the latest move-the bombing pause--was further evidence of the US Govt's desire to seek peace in this
troubled area. The Pope then specifically enquired whether the Geneva Agreement of
1954 was considered by the US Govt a cornerstone of a possible peace settlement. I
replied that the President on several occasions, the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and I at
the UN had repeatedly confirmed that we would be willing to negotiate on the basis of the
Geneva Accords, at Geneva or at any other appropriate forum. I explained that we did not
agree with Hanoi's interpretation of the Geneva Accords; particularly their point--one of
the four--that the Government of South Vietnam had to be reconstituted along the lines of
the program of the National Liberation Front. I pointed out that this nowhere appeared in
the Geneva agreement and that postwar experience had shown that governments
reconstituted by Communist movements had frustrated rather than forwarded genuine
self-determination by the people involved. I recalled that Poland, among other countries,
was a case in point. His Holiness nodded in agreement at this stage.
4. I conveyed the content of the aide-memoire cabled to Rangoon (Dept's 202 to
Rangoon)/5/ to be communicated by Ambassador Byroade to the North Vietnamese
Ambassador there. His Holiness was much impressed by the forward step taken in this
aide-memoire and again repeated that this was great evidence of President Johnson's
sincere desire for peace and willingness to take long steps forward toward achieving it.
His Holiness then turned to another aspect of the problem. He said he wanted the
President to know that his own efforts stood apart from any initiatives by La Pira. He
esteemed La Pira as a good person but the Pope was pursuing his efforts in his own way
and through his own channels. In this connection the Pope mentioned Archbishop Palmas,
Apostolic Delegate to Vietnam and Cambodia. The Archbishop, while concerned
primarily with refugees and religious matters, was also being employed by the Pope to
help in the political situation. I interjected to express our grave concern at the sanctuary
being afforded the North Vietnamese in Cambodia and indicated that this situation was
most troublesome, particularly in light of Prince Sihanouk's failure to take effective action
to prevent his territory from being used for purposes of aggression by Hanoi. I also
reminded the Holy Father that Sihanouk had avoided resumption of the Geneva
conference on Cambodia which, hopefully, might have led to discussions on Vietnam.
/5/Document 257.
5. At this point I conveyed the greetings of Secretary General U Thant which U Thant had
asked me to express when I met with him last night. The Pope expressed great regard for
U Thant as a man of peace and said that before issuing his Christmas appeal he had in
general terms obtained U Thant's concurrence that such an appeal would be desirable. The
Pope showed great interest in the fact that the President had conveyed messages
concerning the bombing pause to Moscow, Budapest and Warsaw, as well as to a number
of our allies. He enquired whether we had communicated with Peiping. I replied that I did
not know, but doubted that we had, in the belief that Peiping would not accept a direct
approach. I pointed out, however, that undoubtedly Peiping would have knowledge of this
development through a Communist source. The Pope indicated indirectly that he shared
the belief that the Soviets would be more inclined to urge a favorable response than the
Red Chinese.
6. Finally His Holiness indicated that after consultation with his Secretary of State and
other advisors he would prepare a written reply to the President's letter, hopefully in time
for delivery before my planned departure tomorrow evening. It will be cabled when
received./6/
/6/The text was transmitted in telegram 1661 from Rome, December 30. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA)
7. Although His Holiness was warm, affable and gracious to me, recalling our exchanges
when I was part of the President's party in New York on the occasion of his UN visit, and
also when he received me in private audience in the summer of 1964, his general
demeanor was one of grave concern about the Vietnam situation.
8. The Pope asked whether the President's letter could be made public. I said that this was
in his discretion but that I would not do so. With his approval I prepared following press
statement to be made tonight by Embassy spokesman.
9. "The Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg, US Ambassador to the United Nations, arrived in
Rome late this afternoon and immediately had an audience with His Holiness Pope Paul
VI lasting about an hour.
10. "The President sent Ambassador Goldberg on a special mission to convey to His
Holiness Pope Paul VI the President's gratitude for the Holy Father's message and
inspiration which were so helpful in helping to bring about a Christmas truce in Vietnam.
The President also asked Ambassador Goldberg to thank His Holiness for the continuous
efforts he is making in furtherance of peace in Southeast Asia. The President's gratitude,
on behalf of the American people, is, in his view, shared by all mankind."
11. The Pope stated that upon inquiries from the press he would make a statement of
similar import. It was my latest impression that he would not publicize the text of the
President's letter but would refer to it in favorable terms.
12. Following the audience I called upon Secretary of State Cicognani and spent
approximately one half hour reviewing in briefer terms my conversation with His
Holiness. The Sec of State indicated sympathy with the American point of view on
Vietnam, but added that perhaps the best way towards a peaceful solution was the Pope's
more evenhanded approach.
13. Prime Minister Moro is out of Rome but is returning tomorrow and has asked to see
me about 7:00 p.m. tomorrow evening. He requested that the President's letter/7/ be sent
to him through Pompei, his diplomatic advisor. This has been done. Pompei indicated he
would make a copy of the letter to the Prime Minister available to President Saragat.
/7/The text was transmitted in telegram 1632 to Rome, December 29. (Ibid., POL 27
VIET S)
Reinhardt
272. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/

Bangkok, December 30, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 2, Vol.
1. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission;
the telegram was received at 8:53 a.m. and passed to the White House.
1277. Deptel 1075 to Bangkok./2/
/2/In telegram 1075, December 28, the Embassy in Bangkok was instructed to inform the
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the decision on and purpose of the suspension of
the bombing of North Vietnam. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
1. In absence of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, I conveyed requested information
to Acting FonMin Pote Sarasin as directed in para 4 reftel.
2. After a long pause Pote asked that I convey to the Secretary his understanding of the
action taken. He said that as an Asian, thinking as an Asian, he thought it was a mistake. It
would be interpreted in Asia as a sign of weakness and indecision and would reinforce
Hanoi determination to carry on until American public opinion forced withdrawal.
Consequently, he thought it would prolong war rather than shorten it and cost more
American casualties rather than fewer.
3. In referring to third purpose as outlined in para 4-D reftel, Pote doubted effect on third
countries would be as beneficial as we might have thought. He said it would not help to
convince the already convinced and as for the others we would always get the argument
that if the pause had been extended for "another day, another week, another month," it
might have been successful.
4. In response to my direct inquiry he said that he personally had no doubt whatever as to
American firmness.
5. I later conveyed the same information to Deputy Prime Minister Praphat who had much
the same reaction as Pote. He added reporting of comment which Tun Razak, Deputy
Prime Minister of Malaysia, attributed to Ne Win, who had suggested closer consultations
between Burmese, Thai, and Malaysians for their own protection when Americans pull
out. He said he had told Tun Razak he did not expect Americans to leave until the safety
of Southeast Asia was assured. He also added that every day the pause continued,
however, the more question there would be of American intentions and this, he added,
was a dangerous attitude to let build up for too long a time./3/
/3/In telegram 1096 to Bangkok, December 30, the Department of State sent assurances to
Thailand that the bombing pause was not the prelude to U.S. withdrawal from Southeast
Asia, but a test to see if Hanoi could come to a realistic appraisal of the situation. The
United States was in Vietnam "to stay whatever and how long it takes." (Ibid., EA/ACA
Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 2, Vol. 1)
Martin

(Ball) and President Johnson/1/
December 30, 1965, 11:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Presidential
Conversations. No classification marking. The President was in Texas; Ball was in
Washington.
Ball reported to the President that Goldberg had made a courtesy call on the Italian Govt
and the press had not created any problems.
Ball said we had had word from Paris that De Gaulle is prepared to see Goldberg at noon
tomorrow. Ball said the radio was announcing that Harriman had seen Gomulka and was
seeing Tito. Ball said there were two proposals for H. 1) H might go on to India because
India is a member of the ICC. Pres thought this a very good idea. In covering this Pres
thought it should be said that the Pres had given his views in some detail to PM Wilson,
Chancellor Erhard, and Ayub Khan. He had sent McG Bundy to talk to Pearson; Goldberg
to certain diplomats at the UN and to the Pope because the Pope had been in
communication with the Pres and the Pres wanted him to know his views on VN;
Goldberg will also be seeing others. Pres said he thought Mann should fly down and see
the Pres of Mexico and tell him how strongly we feel; how much we are trying; what we
are trying to do. Pres thought India as head of the Commission should be talked to. Pres
thought Shastri needs a little buttering up. Shastri should be told how much we are
looking forward to his visit; what a fine visit we had with his Agricultural Minister; we
thought the talks went very well with Ayub although there is a lot of bitterness there; we
thought the visit with Ayub a plus; we are getting our experts together to go to India on
their food problem; and tell him how we feel on VN; what can they do; we salute them;
we just want to keep them informed.
Ball agreed these were all good points and it would be good to get Harriman out to see
Shastri before he leaves for Tashkent and sees the Russians. Pres thought in talking to
Shastri the point to be stressed would be the food problem and his visit. This gives it a
little cover and we don't want to give the impression that we are in a panic or frantic, the
Pres said.
Pres said he wanted to be sure that every person that should be informed of our views is
informed and that we come through loud and clear. Pres said Ball knows how he feels-like Ball on this peace business--but he is not sure this has been conveyed. Pres thinks that
this is now a good chance to do this.
Pres said he had talked to Bundy and told him to get in touch with Ball and for them to
spend an hour to see who has not been informed and who could be informed. Pres said it
did no harm for an Ambassador to say the Pres of the US asked me to tell you that he
wants you to know how he feels.
Pres said for Ball to get the Mann thing cleared up. Ball said he would do that right away.
Pres said if it could be arranged for Harriman to go by New Delhi it might be a good idea
for him to come by and see Nasser. Ball agreed with this. Pres thought they should be
informed right away so they would not think they were on the second table.
Ball told the Pres that the Hungarians would rather not have Harriman at the moment.
They have given the impression this would embarrass them.
Ball said that our intelligence people had told us that Shelepin would probably be in
Hanoi over the week-end.
Ball said that Harriman had come in asking about seeing Bo in Paris. Ball told the Pres
that we had another contact we were reactivating there on another basis. Pres thought we
had better be careful here and he did not think it wise for Harriman to see Bo. Pres said he
would leave it up to Ball's judgment. Ball said he thought it would create problems. Pres
said Ball should tell Harriman to see just the above two and when he finishes seeing them
we would have other plans--imply that H will come by there (Paris) later, but we don't
want the visits too close together. Pres said we did not want to mess the Bo thing up.
Pres asked Ball if he had any ideas for Moyers. Pres said he had to be a little more
affirmative. Pres suggested saying, "The Pres, Sec. of State and Bundy have been giving
their views. We are going to other capitals. The discussions that are taking place are not in
any way unusual." Ball said he thought this good enough and that the press would be
fairly understanding.
Pres said he thought Ball should give some serious thought to getting away a few hours
and flying down to talk to Fulbright. Pres said Ball was first to explain to Fulbright that
the stories about his not being invited to the WH had no basis and were nonsense. Pres
said there was no custom where the head of the For. Relations Committee had to be
invited to all the WH functions. Pres said they had checked the records and found that
Fulbright had been invited to the WH at least three times more than anybody else. Second,
when Princess Margaret was here, Fulbright had been in New Zealand. Third, no one but
govt people had been invited to the Wilson dinner. And there was nothing significant
about Ayub that they thought should call for including Fulbright in the dinner. Pres said
Ball should tell Fulbright that he (the President) had been laughing about most of this
bunk and that he thought most of it was coming from Marcy. Re VN Ball should point out
that this is what Fulbright has been saying and the Pres is trying to show our real feelings
in the matter and our attempt to do so is not because we are in a panic. Ball should tell
him that Bundy talked to Pearson; Pres talked to Erhard; Bruce talked to Wilson. This is
just reiteration of our points and our feelings. It is just an execution of what Fulbright has
talked about. Ball should try to make it a Fulbright proposal.
President thought Ball should do the same thing with Mansfield. Ball should say the
President had thought it over carefully and thought he should try for peace. Goldberg and
Harriman do not have any great hope but in effect are doing what Mansfield has said. Pres
said Ball should do this if he has someone in the Dept who could take over for him. Ball
said that Johnson was backstopping him. Pres said this was fine if he had enough initiative
to go on through. Ball said that Dirksen was also in Florida. Pres said Ball should tell
Fulbright, Mansfield, and Dirksen not to tell anyone that he is coming down.
Ball mentioned Hickenlooper. Pres said he should be talked to. Pres said Hickenlooper
says he does not know enough. Ball should emphasize that this is just a continuation of
what the President has said--starting in Baltimore. Ball should not let Hickenlooper think
we are retreating. Re the bombing nothing much could be gained by bombing during Holy
Week; the weather is not good; and we are just telling everybody about our position.
Pres told Ball to get Mann out and for him to say we are exchanging views. Ball is to tell
Mann he should come back by the Ranch.
Ball said re the Goldberg visit to de Gaulle, they would like not to have it announced until
after the meeting. Pres agreed with this.
Pres thought more thought should be given to seeing some other people. He said the main
thing was to call them and tell them that the President had asked Ball to talk to them.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis;
at 12:51 p.m. and passed to the White House.
1073. From Harriman.
1. Memcon with Michalowski, Director General, FonMin, 7:30-8:00 p.m., December 29,
1965 at Ambassador Gronouski's residence.
2. Michalowski said the Polish Government was treating our approach on the Viet-Nam
matter very seriously and would do its best and use all means at its disposal, but he would
like to impress upon us question of time. He said it was not easy to communicate rapidly
with Hanoi through ordinary channels and they might have to use special means. He
repeated it may take time to get an indication of any value from Hanoi.
3. He said Poles were transmitting to Hanoi their opinions and judgment together with
their own formulation of U.S. position. He wanted to make clear there would be no
misunderstandings of the facts concerning U.S. position in the Polish approach. He listed
the following five points the Polish Govt intends to send to Hanoi as their interpretation of
U.S. views:
A. The U.S. realized that in order to facilitate entry onto a road of negotiations in the VietNam conflict that a period of calm and tranquility is required. So the U.S. made a pause in
the bombing beginning December 24. The U.S. expects that the Viet-Nam side will
reciprocate with a parallel gesture. The U.S. side hopes that mutual gestures of that kind
will facilitate entry on the road to negotiations. The U.S. has made certain suggestions as
examples of the gestures which it would expect from the North Viet-Nam side. It
envisages possibilities of other types of gestures and would welcome any other similar
gesture from the North Viet-Nam [side].
B. The U.S. side is quite conscious of the need to give appropriate time. However it
wishes to draw attention to the difficulties stemming from the convening of the U.S.
Congress, the approaching budget considerations and other domestic pressures. In this
connection it would appreciate some indication from the Viet-Nam side at the earliest
possible time.
C. The U.S. side has reiterated the statement of President Johnson's of July 28, 1965 that
there will be no difficulties with finding ways for the Front to present its attitudes and
views during talks. It elaborated, however, that it does not recognize the Front as a
government and from this fact, in the U.S. opinion, would stem certain limitations for the
role of the Front in the possibility or event of a conference of the Geneva type. On the
other hand, future negotiations can take various forms. The U.S. attitude in this regard is
flexible and it is ready to consider the possibilities of talks in all variations and with
different participants including also the National Liberation Front.
D. In the course of eventual talks the U.S. side is ready to discuss the 4 points of the DRV
as well as all other proposals coming from other parties including also South Viet-Nam.
E. The U.S. side wishes also that the known position of the USG in the 14 point statement
published on December 29/2/ also be taken into consideration as expressing the general
attitude of the U.S.
4. I told Michalowski there was an urgent need for quick action and prompt response from
Hanoi. I described at some length the pressures affecting the USG. Michalowski reiterated
that in such a complicated situation it was necessary to be patient and quiet. He said the
Polish initiative is in good faith and time would be required. He said he understood
pressures on USG, but we must understand Hanoi is in a very delicate position and will
need a little time to work out its response.
5. He said Poles are convinced of necessity of secret negotiations and they are afraid
publicity might jeopardize their initiative. I agreed the less publicity the better.
Gronouski

Pinta. Drafted by William Bundy. Repeated to the White House.
1853. 1. We are again keeping you up to date on diplomatic developments for your own
information and for use with GVN as you see fit.
2. Harriman had most useful talks in Warsaw. Since major operating result is message that
Poles may now convey to Hanoi, we are repeating to you Warsaw's 1073./2/ Although not
in exact form stated by Harriman we believe this represents fair summary of position as it
might be conveyed to Hanoi. Reference to "14-point statement" is to memorandum
(actually composed by Secretary) which you will receive through circular to all posts sent
tonight./3/ We suspect Poles may be most active Eastern European at least until Shelepin
reaches Hanoi.
/2/Document 274.
3. We continue to have only public information on Shelepin visit to Hanoi,/4/ but fact that
announcement came only very shortly after we informed Dobrynin that we were deferring
resumption of bombing indicates that visit arranged on some other basis. Our best guess is
that it was political in character (Shelepin being Party man) and perhaps related to large
volume of reports suggesting plans for early conference of Soviet-oriented nations, in
which Vietnam would be major topic. We have reports Shelepin may arrive Hanoi over
weekend, and his presence and possible statements there may of course become major
factor in situation even though trip arranged on other grounds.
/4/Assessments of the announced visit to Hanoi of A.N. Shelepin are in telegram 2040
from Moscow, December 29, and Intelligence Note No. 651 from Hughes to Rusk,
December 30. (Both in Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 277, Communist
Positions and Initiatives--Soviet) A CIA assessment by William Hyland, December 29, is
in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos
(B).
4. Harriman is now in Belgrade and we believe will go to New Delhi thereafter, rounding
out ICC consultations represented by Harriman in Warsaw and McGeorge Bundy in
Ottawa. (Latter released today.) FYI: Harriman may then go to Karachi, Teheran, and
Cairo, in some order, plans not yet final. End FYI. We do not anticipate significant
substantive results from talks with Tito or Shastri.
5. Goldberg had useful, although general, talk with Pope, who among other things
expressed gratification at message received from GVN. You might convey this to Do and
indicate it was distinct plus in worldwide terms. Goldberg now goes to Paris and will see
de Gaulle tomorrow. We will naturally take no initiatives and will not encourage any from
French side.
6. Mann going to Mexico for consultation there on general basis, as part of effort to
cement our Latin relations on Vietnam and generally. This will probably be announced
sometime tomorrow.
7. All of above adds up to continuing effort to demonstrate diplomatic activity and to open
all avenues for constructive Hanoi response. So far there has been no such response. We
have of course noted first indirect Hanoi reference to situation but have not completed our
analysis. At first glance, Hanoi is at least taking somewhat different rhetorical line, even
though it concludes with familiar statements about accepting four points and taking other
actions./5/ Would be much interested in your analysis.
/5/Reference is to a broadcast by the Voice of Vietnam on December 30, entitled "We Are
Determined To Smash All Maneuvers of War Expansion and All Peace Tricks of the U.S.
Aggressors." Text in FBIS, North Vietnam, January 3, 1965. A Department of State
telegram sent as 717 to Harriman in Belgrade and 2960 to Goldberg in Paris, December
30, provided INR interpretation of the North Vietnamese commentary. (Department of
8. One sidelight of Harriman talk with Rapacki was that latter brought up "second-hand"
report that Chauvel may propose handling NLF representation issue on basis co-chairmen
convening conference, with each then free to invite any party they choose. Would
appreciate your comment on this suggestion. Rapacki conversations generally, as well as
Hungarians over weekend, have indicated NLF representation issue may well become
central focus of some Communist counter-gambit. We have all along taken line that any
position NLF might be granted should be matched by equivalent status for other interested
groups in South Vietnam such as Buddhists, Catholics, sects, etc. Chauvel proposal might
lend itself to such handling, although it would remain vital to affirm position of GVN as
sole legitimate government of SVN.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis; Pinta. The
source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:12
a.m. and passed to the White House.
2337. For the Secretary from Lodge.
1. In response to your 1821,/2/ I called on Archbishop Palmas, told him that I was indeed
still interested in meeting his "former Minister" and asked him if there was any news.
/2/Document 269.
2. Palmas said that he had received a note from the "former Minister" under date of
December 23 (when I was in Bangkok) asking to be excused because of his inability to
come personally to express his good wishes for Christmas and the New Year. The note
went on to say that for more than twenty years, the war had gone on in Vietnam and that
he prayed to God to put an end to it, saying that the Vietnamese people had paid a heavy
price, and that if the war continued there would be a "general extermination".
3. The note went on to say that he was "still waiting for news of the matter we talked
about", adding that "when I do get news I will come and we can examine the question
together".
4. On December 28, Archbishop Palmas acknowledged receipt of the note. He showed me
the note which was written in rather illegible French, and down at the bottom was a rather
illegible signature, which could be interpreted as spelling out Hoac. If so, it would
confirm our surmises.

5. Palmas' theory that the "former Minister's" initiative had been genuine, but had been
quashed by Hanoi as soon as Hanoi heard of it seems plausible.
6. We then branched out into a general discussion, with Palmas expressing the view that
the one thing above all others which was keeping the war going was the division of
opinion within the free world. He believed that if the French Government would
recognize the true interest of the French people, and merely show verbal non-disapproval
of the U.S. effort that it would have a very discouraging effect in Hanoi. The Hanoi
regime, it appears, pays attention to French moods and French postures way out of
proportion to the amount of chips which France actually has bought in the poker game-which is practically nil.
7. He said the fact that the Pope had sent messages both to Ho Chi Minh and General
Thieu did not mean that he equated them both, or that he was unmindful of the fact that
North Vietnam was the aggressor and wished to exterminate Christianity. Indeed, said
Archbishop Palmas, if it were not for the arrival of American troops, Christianity would
already be in the process of extermination in South Vietnam now, and he, Palmas, would
not even be here at this time.
Lodge
277. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State/1/

Belgrade, December 31, 1965.
at 9:02 a.m. and passed to the White House. Repeated to Warsaw for Gronouski.
965. For President and Secretary from Harriman./2/
/2/Harriman was in Yugoslavia to talk to Tito, but his appointment was delayed until
January 1, 1966.
1. Upon reflection on talks at Warsaw I and officers traveling with me are convinced from
statements and attitude of Rapacki and Michalowski as well as Gomulka that Polish
Government intends to carry our message faithfully to Hanoi and add their own arguments
to influence Hanoi. They are deeply concerned over their own possible involvement if war
continues to escalate and as Rapacki put it "everyone including U.S. may lose control of
events".
2. Poles also frankly expressed concern over possibility of increased Chinese influence
unless we move towards peaceful solution.
3. The Poles repeatedly emphasized the time required to present their arguments to Hanoi,
indicating that their usual means of communication were erratic and that special means
might have to be used.

4. In order maintain pressure on Poles for prompt response from Hanoi you may wish to
authorize Ambassador Gronouski to tell Rapacki that the U.S. Government is following
with close interest the Polish efforts with Hanoi and also explain purpose of my trip to
India as consultation with Chairman ICC--although we realize that Indians do not have the
intimate relations with Hanoi as have the Poles. Furthermore, because of Polish emphasis
on secrecy he might indicate that my visit to India (ICC Chairman) and other countries
will serve to divert attention from Polish efforts.
Elbrick

Paris, December 31, 1965.
Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was
received at 3:15 p.m. and passed to the White House.
3701. For Secretary, Under Secretary and Yost. Department pass LBJ Ranch. As arranged
I/2/ called on General de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace and conversed with him for about an
hour and ten minutes. General de Gaulle opened the discussion by expressing great
appreciation to President Johnson for his letter/3/ and for the President's extreme courtesy
in advising him privately and promptly as to the moves President Johnson was taking in
regard to the Viet-Nam conflict.
/2/Ambassador Goldberg.
/3/The text was transmitted in telegram 2899 to Paris, December 29. (Department of State,
I in turn on behalf of the President congratulated General de Gaulle upon his re-election,
assured him of the President's great respect for substantial achievements on behalf of the
people of France and thanked him for his courtesy in receiving me as the President's
representative on short notice.
As requested in the Department's 2943,/4/ I brought up the question of Cambodia and told
the General that our desire [was?] to preserve the neutrality of this country provided
Prince Sihanouk would maintain a neutral attitude on his part. The General expressed the
strong hope that the Viet-Nam war not be extended in any form to Cambodia and I
assured him this was not our government's plan or desire. The problem, I explained, was
the failure on the part of the Cambodian Government and the ICC properly to ensure that
the border was sealed and that Cambodia was not used as a sanctuary for the North
Vietnamese or Viet Cong and as a source of supply. I urged the General as I had done
earlier in the day to Couve de Murville that the French Government support our efforts for
an enlarged and effective ICC supervision of the international boundary. As reported in a
separate telegram Couve de Murville stated that he had already made representations to
this effect/5/ and the General indicated support for this move.
/4/Dated December 30. (Ibid.)
/5/The discussion between Couve de Murville and Goldberg, which lasted 50 minutes,
was reported in telegram 3700 from Paris, December 31. (Ibid.)
The General then spoke at some length about Viet Nam. He said that the President's latest
move could have a good and constructive effect upon world opinion and would strengthen
the position of the United States in the eyes of nations troubled as to its intentions. In all
candor, however, he added that he did not believe that the bombing pause would lead to
an acceptance by Hanoi of President Johnson's offer for unconditional negotiations at
Geneva or in any other forum. He said that in his view that only tenable solution for the
Viet Nam problem was the withdrawal of US forces but he recognized how difficult this
was since the honor and prestige of America as a great and powerful nation was involved
by its commitments. Perhaps, he said, it is too late to consider whether these commitments
should have been publicly extended but he recognized that they were there and that they
were a substantial factor in the situation. Notwithstanding, he stressed that he thought
withdrawal was the key to a solution of the problem and the only basis on which
negotiations were possible. This, he added, did not mean that American troops had to be
withdrawn immediately but he stressed that withdrawal had to be agreed upon in principle
before the negotiations commenced if Hanoi was to be brought to the bargaining table. I
intervened to point out that it has been our repeated policy that we desire no permanent
presence in Viet Nam and that the President and his advisors had made it clear that
American troops could and would be withdrawn after the aggression from the north
ceased and the south had an opportunity under free conditions to determine its own
destiny. The principle of self determination did not preclude reunification, provided that
the unification was determined by the people of South Viet Nam in a free and properly
supervised [garble--election]. America, I added, however, would not withdraw its troops
under pressure or force and leave South Viet Nam and its people to the tender mercies of
the Communists.
This was not contemplated by the Geneva agreements and is not contemplated by our
government. Without debating the point, the General went on to say that his view was that
it was not detrimental to the interests of the free world, including the United States, if all
of Viet Nam, Thailand and Laos were to have Asiatic Communist regimes. Asiatic
Communism, in his view, would not be either Chinese or Soviet Communism but would
follow its own patterns, and emergent nationalisms would control the future of these
countries. Cambodia could and might remain neutralized although the same philosophy
could be applied to Cambodia. The General, however, recognized that America was,
despite his contrary views, firmly determined to support the independence and
sovereignty of South Viet Nam. Of course, he said, the United States has the power to do
this and perhaps after one or two years of demonstration of this power Hanoi might be
willing to come to the conference table but he did not conceive that it would do so before
then. Red China had no interest in any peaceful accommodation in that area of the world
but he agreed that the Soviets and the Eastern bloc countries would be much more likely
to encourage a detente with the U.S. Hanoi, however, would not now agree to any such
detente and its lack of agreement would ultimately be supported not only by China but by
the Soviet Union and the other bloc countries as well. I emphasized that one of the
considerations leading to the pause was the repeated assertions of the bloc countries and
even intimations from the Soviet Union that this would possibly lead to the conference
table. General de Gaulle dismissed this as an assumption on their part not warranted by
realistic understanding of Hanoi's determination to unite the country along its lines and to
eliminate American influence in the area.
As requested in the Deptel,/6/ I did not invite any proposals from President de Gaulle as to
our future course of action nor did I attempt to indicate what it would be if the bombing
pause did not lead to negotiations.
/6/See footnote 4 above.
The views expressed by General de Gaulle were on his own motion.
The General reiterated that he was extremely grateful that the President had sent him a
private letter indicating our intentions and he was particularly pleased that the President
had dispatched me to give him a more extended review of President Johnson's thinking in
this grave matter.
He inquired about the President's health and I assured him that President was in the best of
health and spirits. I extended on behalf of the President and Mrs. Johnson their best
wishes for the New Year.
As the meeting concluded, I brought up the question of our cooperation at the UN,
pointing out that this was increasingly necessary because of the voting strength of the
Afro-Asian bloc. I praised the cooperative attitude of his representative, Ambassador
Seydoux, and told General de Gaulle that the Ambassador had played a very cooperative
role in the Kashmir debate and in other matters before the Security Council. I further said
that the Ambassador and I had discussed the necessity for coordination of the four big
powers activities in preparation for the next General Assembly. The General said in reply
that he in turn was grateful for my cooperation at the UN and that indeed the future of the
UN depended upon the cooperation of the five major powers including China. He
obviously meant Communist China. I said that we were not finding Communist China
cooperative in Viet Nam or anywhere else. We parted, however, on the more cordial note
of his expression of greetings for the New Year to President and Mrs. Johnson.
McBride

Xvietnam War White House CIA Foia 07lbjvol3

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Xvietnam War White House CIA Foia 07lbjvol3

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968, Volume III

United States Government Printing Office

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

University of Montana; the Library of Congress; and officials at other specialized

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Selection and Editorial Policies

6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

POL 15 VIET S, government of Vietnam

material on the President's Panel of Foreign Affairs Consultants, 1965.

Files of John T. McNaughton, 1964-1967

James C. Thomson Papers

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Abbreviations and Terms

BLT, battalion landing team

COMUSKOREA, Commander, United States Forces, Korea

ICC, International Control Commission

MAROPS, Maritime Operations

ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency

SecGen, Secretary-General of the United Nations

UPI, United Press International

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Ky, see Nguyen Cao Ky

Member of the Armed Forces Council in early 1965

Defense for International Security Affairs

Tran Van Do, Vietnamese Foreign Minister

Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Vietnam, June - December 1965

2. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

3. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Vietnam I. No classification marking.

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

7. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/

(c) Other Possibilities

8. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

4312. Prospects for new GVN.

3. On negative side, government starts with following liabilities:

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

throughout the United States. This is not presently the case.

11. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

15. Memorandum for the Record/1/

3. Rolling Thunder 20 was approved, Target 43 being chosen instead of 51.12/82.15.

16. Editorial Note

17. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

21. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special

(Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/

U.S.-Soviet relations. It was therefore reassuring to me personally to have Gromyko

26. Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

/5/See Document 27.

29. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

not show "self-control" can expect trouble from him.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1. Neutral Capital Initiative.

31. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

32. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

negotiations and that the intransigence is on the Communists' side.

34. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

in response to McNamara's request.