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Abstract
Although financial losses from white-collar crime continue to exceed those of street crime, the criminal justice system has traditionally
focused on the latter. Past research suggested that citizens are more likely to support punitive sanctions for street offenders than white-collar
offenders. Recent corporate scandals have increased public awareness of white-collar crime, but whether public attitudes have been altered
remains to be determined. Using a 2005 national sample of 402 telephone survey participants, the current study examined citizen perceptions of
white-collar and street crime, as well as attitudes regarding apprehension and punishment. This research extended prior studies by also
considering the influence of sociodemographic characteristics as well as perceptions of white-collar crime and punishment on the public's
support for increasing resource allocation. Implications for future research and development of more effective white-collar crime control policy
are discussed.
2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Recent statistics indicate that offenses collectively referred
to as white-collar crime result in annual losses to victims in
excess of $250 billion, compared to estimates of $17.6 billion
for losses accrued due to personal and household crimes
(Rosoff, Pontell, & Tillman, 2004, p. 27). Although these
differences have persisted over several decades, the focus of
criminal justice authorities and many criminologists has been
on explaining, preventing, and responding to personal and
household crimes. Recent evidence indicates that white-collar
crime remains a low priority compared to violent crime and
threats to national security, such as terrorism (United States
Department of Justice, 2005).
Critics have noted that public perception and perceived risk of
violent victimization in the streets has disproportionately fueled
the attention of researchers and criminal justice agencies (Cullen,
Clark, Mathers, & Cullen, 1983; Cullen, Link, & Polanzi, 1982;
Friedrichs, 2007; Holtfreter, 2005; Sutherland, 1940; Vaughan,
1980). Historically, a commonly held view is that the American
public perceives white-collar crime to be relatively harmless
compared to violent crime. One consequence associated with
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 850 644 4299; fax: +1 850 644 9614.
E-mail address: kholtfre@fsu.edu (K. Holtfreter).
0047-2352/$ - see front matter 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2007.12.006
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Table 1
Variable coding and descriptive statistics (N = 402)
Variable
Categories
Dependent
Likelihood of apprehension White-collar offender
Violent offender or equal
Perceived sanctions
White-collar offender
Violent offender or equal
Normative sanctions
White-collar offender
Violent offender or equal
Enforcement resources
Equal or white-collar crime
Violent crime
Independent
Race
Gender
Household income
Education
Political ideology
Age
Marital status
Region
Housing
White-collar risk
Violent risk
White
Non-White
Female
Male
$50,000
$49,000
College degree
Non-college degree
Moderate or conservative
Liberal
60 years
59 years
Married
Other
Urban
Rural
Own
Rent
High
Low
High
Low
Values n
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
105
297
90
312
64
338
245
157
26.1
73.9
22.4
77.6
15.9
84.1
60.9
39.1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
332
70
217
185
205
197
161
241
307
95
99
303
221
181
158
244
158
244
155
247
84
318
82.6
17.4
54.0
46.0
51.0
49.0
40.0
60.0
76.4
23.6
24.6
75.4
55.0
45.0
39.3
60.7
39.3
60.7
38.0
61.4
20.9
79.1
55
Table 2
Bivariate relationships
Likelihood of
apprehension
Perceived sanctions
Normative sanctions
Enforcement resources
Yes
Otherwise
Yes
Otherwise
Yes
Otherwise
Yes
Otherwise
33.3
33.2
4.60
37.1
28.4
16.9
17.6
29.9
31.1
24.1
14.9
6.32
37.6
28.9
18.13
31.8
33.6
17.2
17.4
30.8
20.9
18.2
30.1
29.6
36.8
6.76
26.4
39.1
48.7
17.7
3.86
49.5
15.9
26.6
39.8
28.4
37.1
Gender
Female
Male
2 =
23.4
13.7
Household income
$50,000
$49,000
2 =
14.7
22.4
Education
College degree
Non-college degree
2 =
11.9
25.1
Political ideology
Conservative
Liberal
2 =
28.6
8.5
Region
Urban
Rural
2 =
15.7
21.4
Housing
Own
Rent
2 =
26.9
10.2
Violent risk
High
Low
2 =
10.0
27.1
30.6
32.3
7.91
20.6
12.9
34.3
28.6
8.39
11.4
22.1
28.2
34.8
5.43
10.4
23.2
47.8
15.1
27.6
6.0
0.09
23.6
39.3
12.7
20.9
0.88
2.19
0.03
26.6
7.0
2.56
10.9
52.0
5.07
50.2
16.2
11.2
55.2
7.88
24.9
36.0
53.0
12.4
26.9
7.7
44.7
16.2
23.9
37.1
23.9
10.7
7.27
48.0
12.9
6.5
28.1
11.9
49.0
0.62
31.6
7.5
2.92
10.9
23.6
5.21
14.4
51.0
15.2
23.9
0.15
0.21
0.66
9.7
23.9
13.7
20.8
0.02
0.20
50.0
12.9
0.65
15.4
23.6
0.01
28.9
10.2
1.29
9.0
30.1
0.65
p .05.
p .01.
56
Table 3
Logistic regression models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Likelihood of apprehension
Perceived sanctions
Normative sanctions
Resource allocation
b
Race
Gender
Household income
Education
Political ideology
Age
Marital status
Religion
Urban
Homeowner
White-Collar risk
Violent risk
Apprehension
Perceived sanctions
Normative sanctions
Nagelkerke R2
Model 2 (df)
SE
.53
.31
.56
.22
.18
.11
.23
.11
.04
.26
.01
.01
.28
.24
.28
.26
.29
.23
.30
.28
.14
.23
.55
.28
.10
29.89(12)
Odds ratio b
.59
1.75
.83
.80
1.04
1.00
1.32
.76
1.08
.74
.87
1.74
SE
.39
.32
.40
.23
.28
.12
.29
.25
.39
.28
.02
.01
.47
.25
.27
.27
.06
.24
.37
.31
.16
.24
.80
.28
.13
40.04(12)
Odds ratio b
.68
1.49
.75
.72
1.47
1.00
1.59
.77
1.07
1.45
.85
2.22
.41
.34
.01
.01
.15
.01
.09
.04
.61
.65
.12
.28
SE
Odds ratio
SE
Odds ratio
.30
.22
.11
.11
.27
.27
.24
.26
.23
.28
.29
.30
.08
23.25(12)
.67
1.40
1.00
1.00
.86
1.01
.91
.96
1.84
1.91
1.10
1.32
.01
.56
.08
.03
.38
.01
.15
.49
.17
.03
.25
.15
.15
.27
1.08
.31
.23
.12
.11
.27
.01
.24
.28
.23
.29
.24
.25
.24
.25
.23
.14
44.22(15)
1.01
.57
1.08
1.03
.69
1.01
.86
.62
.84
1.03
1.30
.86
.86
.76
2.94
57
58
10
11
1. Age
2. Female
3. Education
4. Minority
5. Married
6. Income
7. Urban
8. Homeowner
9. Conservative
10. White-collar risk
11. Violent risk
12. Apprehension
13. Perceived sanctions
14. Normative sanctions
15. Enforcement resources
.13
.12
.23
.15
.08
.02
.27
.04
.14
.08
.01
.03
.12
.08
.01
.01
.02
.18
.04
.01
.06
.04
.06
.14
.11
.07
.13
.16
.20
.38
.11
.19
.18
.03
.09
.14
.17
.05
.06
.15
.09
.05
.22
.07
.08
.23
.04
.04
.09
.04
.29
.01
.33
.03
.03
.21
.02
.03
.04
.00
.09
.21
.07
.02
.22
.16
.19
.01
.06
.11
.06
.00
.09
.05
.02
.11
.01
.10
.01
.14
.08
.04
.13
.06
.01
.05
.02
.10
.02
.09
.27
.04
.06
.03
.11
.06
.03
.10
.01
12
13
.33
.04
.02
.07
.10
14
15
.24
p b .05.
p b .01 (two-tailed).
Notes
1. Only one national study of public opinion on white-collar crime was
conducted during the past twenty-five years (Rebovich & Kane, 2002);
accordingly, this study served as a guide for the development of survey
measures used in the current research.
2. Specifically, the sample was drawn using a form of random digit
dialing that is referred to as a Mitofsky/Wasksberg design (Tourangeau, 2004;
Waksberg, 1978), in which telephone numbers are chosen in two stages. This
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