G.R. No.

47065

June 26, 1940

PANGASINAN
TRANSPORTATION
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
C.
de
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

G.

CO.,

Alvear

INC., petitioner,

for

petitioner.

LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the
Province of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain extent, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by
means of motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility Commission in cases Nos.
24948, 30973, 36830, 32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service
Commission an application for authorization to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on
the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a
result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the decision of September 26, 1939, granting the
petitioner's application for increase of equipment, the Public Service Commission ordered:
Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del Commonwealth, tal como ha sido
enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley No. 454, por la presente se enmienda las condiciones de los certificados de
convenciencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos. 24948, 30973, 36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el
expediente No. 53090, asi que se consideran incorporadas en los mismos las dos siguientes condiciones:
Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba mencionados seran validos y subsistentes
solamente durante de veinticinco (25) anos, contados desde la fecha de la promulgacion de esta decision.
Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el Commonwealth de Filipinas o por alguna dependencia
del mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo deseare previo pago del precio d costo de su equipo util, menos una
depreciacion razonable que se ha fijar por la Comision al tiempo de su adquisicion.
Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing certificates, the petitioner filed on
October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Public Service Commission on November
14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this
court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service Commission to certify forthwith
to this court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that this court, after hearing, render a decision
declaring section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this court should be of the
opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the
provisions thereof are not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939. Stated in the
language of the petitioner, it is contended:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
454, without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute
a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in
so far as those powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and void.
2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation of legislative
powers, the Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only to future
certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939, when said Act took effect, and
(b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by
the respondent Public Service Commission in the decision complained of in the present proceedings, reads as
follows:

With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate in the Philippines
without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of
public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner.
The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding
paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the
certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall
produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the
Commission.
In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age of the model, or
other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken into consideration.
The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually force and to those
which may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of public services and to
authorization to renew and increase equipment and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended, no public service can operate
without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of convenience and public necessity to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do business will "public interests in a proper and suitable
manner." Under the second paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public Service Commission may
prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first paragraph is that "the service can be acquired by
the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumental thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a restatement of the principle already
embodied in the Constitution, section 6 of Article XII, which provides that "the State may, in the interest of
national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication,
and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the Government. "Another condition which the Commission may prescribed, and which is assailed by
the petitioner, is that the certificate "shall be valid only for a definite period of time." As there is a relation
between the first and second paragraphs of said section 15, the two provisions must be read and interpreted
together. That is to say, in issuing a certificate, the Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation of
the service under said certificate during a definite period fixed therein "will promote the public interests in a
proper and suitable manner." Under section 16 (a) of Commonwealth Act. No. 146 which is a complement of
section 15, the Commission is empowered to issue certificates of public convenience whenever it "finds that the
operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a
proper and suitable manner." Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is
inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the Commission in determining the
question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the
only limitation to its power being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No.
146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) We have already ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard.
(People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal and
Osmea, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, citing New York Central Securities
Corporation vs. U.S.A., 287 U.S. 12, 24, 25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146; Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. I.S.,
295, 540, 79 Law. ed. 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711-712.)
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years," and
when it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454,
that the Public Service Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of a certificate that it "shall be
valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period
of more than fifty years," the National Assembly meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate.
More than this, it has thereby also declared its will that the period to be fixed by the Public Service Commission

shall not be longer than fifty years. All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative
function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition,
the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly may
itself exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not make the
provision in question constitutionally objectionable.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to
forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency
and prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the range of governmental
action and makes it subject to control by certain devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of
legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that
legislative power must be exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves
into the mass of judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the
development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest
delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De Legius et Consuetedinious Angliae,
edited by G. E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in
the Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G. R. Nos.
46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the
approval of the practice by the court. (Dillon Catfish Drainage Dist, v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S.
Ct. 178; State vs. Knox County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing tendency,
this Court, since the decision in the case of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioner (34 Phil., 136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of approval to the
"delegation of greater powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44
Phil., Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated
June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal & Osmea, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb
and Hilscher vs. People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12, 1939.).
Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
454, the power of the Public Service Commission to prescribed the conditions "that the service can be acquired by
the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its
useful equipment, less reasonable," and "that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time" is
expressly made applicable "to any extension or amendment of certificates actually in force" and "to authorizations
to renew and increase equipment and properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the subject
and have found that these conditions were purposely made applicable to existing certificates of public
convenience. The history of Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there was an attempt to suppress, by way of
amendment, the sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time," but
the attempt failed:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sr. CUENCO. Seor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina, lineas 23 y 24, pido que se supriman las
palabras 'and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period time.' Esta disposicion del
proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un plazo de vigencia certificado de conveniencia
publica. Todo el mundo sabe que bo se puede determinar cuando los intereses del servicio publico requiren la
explotacion de un servicio publico y ha de saber la Comision de Servisios, si en un tiempo determinado, la
explotacion de algunos buses en cierta ruta ya no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en cuenta; que la explotacion de
los servicios publicos depende de condiciones flutuantes, asi como del volumen como trafico y de otras
condiciones. Ademas, el servicio publico se concede por la Comision de Servicios Publicos el interes publico asi
lo exige. El interes publico no tiene duracion fija, no es permanente; es un proceso mas o menos indefinido en
cuanto al tiempo. Se ha acordado eso en el caucus de anoche.
EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. Que dice el Comite?

Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista de que esto certificados de conveniencia
publica es igual que la franquicia: sepuede extender. Si los servicios presentados por la compaia durante el
tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede pedir la extension y se le extendera; pero no creo conveniente el que
nosotros demos un certificado de conveniencia publica de una manera que podria pasar de cincuenta anos, porque
seria anticonstitucional.
xxx

xxx

xxx

By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de mayo de 1939, Asamblea Nacional.)
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been granted before
June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No.
146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them in perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine
Bill provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be granted to any corporation except under the
conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." The
Jones Law, incorporating a similar mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to
any individual, firm, or corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by the Congress of the United States." Lastly, the Constitution of the Philippines provided, in section 8
of Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public
interest so requires." The National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution, logically succeeded to the Congress of
the United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right granted prior to or after the approval
of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the
extent therein provided, has declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public
convenience.
Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of
its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established and in operation.
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of petitioner's operations prior
to May 1, 1917, they are not subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes for the regulation of public
utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As soon as the power is exercised, all phases of
operation of established utilities, become at once subject to the police power thus called into operation.
Procedures' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v.
Railroad Commission, 184 Cal. 737, 195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is applicable not only to those
public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.
The 'Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed in pursuance of the police
power. The only distinction recognized in the statute between those established before and those established after
the passage of the act is in the method of the creation of their operative rights. A certificate of public convenience
and necessity it required for any new operation, but no such certificate is required of any transportation company
for the operation which was actually carried on in good faith on May 1, 1917, This distinction in the creation of
their operative rights in no way affects the power of the Commission to supervise and regulate them. Obviously
the power of the Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as effective against companies securing their
operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as against those subsequently securing such right under a certificate of
public convenience and necessity. (Motor Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission of California et al., 209 Pac.
586.)
Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission
but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the
Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of a common carrier holds such a
peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When
private property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be juris privati only." When, therefore, one devotes
his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use,
and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created. He may withdraw his grant by discounting the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to
control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state to

exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of commissioners.
(Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg.
Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; New York etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol 151 U.S. 556,
571; Connecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.)
This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power, and statutes for the control and
regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of the public as well as of the utilities
themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of contracts, taking
property without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question
whether or not private property shall be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for
the owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot complain that it becomes
subject to the regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) in the light of authorities which hold that
a certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property right, and is
mere license or privilege. (Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456;
Roberto vs. Commisioners of Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E. 321; Scheible vs. Hogan,
113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581; Martz vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E. [d] 220;
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional, we are, however, of
the opinion that the decision of the Public Service Commission should be reversed and the case remanded thereto
for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public Service Commission has power, upon proper
notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any certificate issued under the provisions of this
Act, whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was issued have been
misrepresented or materially changed." (Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth Act No. 146.) The petitioner's
application here was for an increase of its equipment to enable it to comply with the conditions of its certificates
of public convenience. On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public
convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence.
The Commission appears to have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing
the limitation of twenty-five (25) years which might as well be twenty or fifteen or any number of years. This is,
to say the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of
Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., (304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129), "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56
S. Ct. 906, 80 :Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without or
consideration." While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked. (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This
principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary
to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service Commission for
further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-37878

November 25, 1932

MANILA
ELECTRIC
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.

COMPANY, petitioner,

Ross,
Lawrence
&
Selph
for
petitioner.
Rivera
&
Francisco
for
respondent
Pasay
Transportation
Co.
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate for respondent Raymundo Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.

MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be
paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act
No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the
petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct,
maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power
system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal."
Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or
corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on
which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee
herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was ordered that the petitioner be
required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation companies affected by the petition.
Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and opposition was entered to the
petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submission of memoranda after an oral hearing, the
petition was made ready for resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is attempted to be granted to
the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next
seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally observed
that the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the Government of the Philippine Islands, although
only a contract between the parties to it, is now made to effect the rights of persons not signatories to the
covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a
contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to
arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of
authority is hardly necessary, except that it should be recalled that in the Philippines, and in the United States for
that matter, it has been held that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties
shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of
jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co.
[1927], 50 Phil., 69; Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey
[1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and award too far. Unless the
arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should
look with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive a distinction between a private contract
for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such
purpose and affecting others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in
extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced
would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts
for a judicial determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner's
Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state legislature authorizing the commissioners'

court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not
unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the
question is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More
precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise
administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted
the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute
before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a
nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before
the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or
in the second case, if the functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of
duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The
present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court
asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at
all.lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It
is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as
the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government,
so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on
it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction
as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the
Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the
Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any
proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be
exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to exercise any
other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all
strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or
perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a
court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award
the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be
merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties,
unless Congress should at some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion
into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it
is the whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And while it executes
firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not
strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . . (Gordon vs. United
States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446
contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and
that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the

decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result,
the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.

G.R. No. L-28790

April 29, 1968

ANTONIO
H.
NOBLEJAS,
as
Commissioner
of
Land
Registration, petitioner,
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
Leandro
Sevilla,
Ramon
C.
Aquino
and
Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.

Lino

M.

Patajo

for

petitioner.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating
the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the
Executive Secretary pending investigation.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified
Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of
said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as
those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the
item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following expression:
1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in
writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving
or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas
greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of
Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First
Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action
thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by
authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross
negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof,
pending investigation of the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the
Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In
their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises
judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the
Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is
administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions
or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the
principle of the separation of powers.
Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned
(Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for
investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or
removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the
Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is
a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.
In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials
upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured officers include
(a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors
General, seven in number (Rep. Act No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City
Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To
adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and
disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere
implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials
who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the President's supervision
and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of
the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General
the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the
Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these
executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when
account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and those of the Court
of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No.
1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same causes and in the same
manner provided by law for Judges of First Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same
is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the Commissioner of Public
Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the
suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to
that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really
intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First
Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of
supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.
Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655), saying:
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S.
469, 74 Law. Ed., 972,
But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise.
It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can
have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It
cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions
which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67
L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S.

700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541,
544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)
In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with
the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between
public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil.
600).1wph1.t
Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming that under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:
Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in
doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage,
or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the
Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt,
or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of
the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and
hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such
cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That, when a party in
interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said
decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a
judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the
section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers
of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation 1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his
subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not
administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head.
But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more
properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under
Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of
his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.
Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever
possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are constrained to rule that the
grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge
of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation
by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise,
the said grant of privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the
investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service
Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered
dismissed. No costs.
A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971
PAZ
M.
vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.

GARCIA, complainant,

RESOLUTION

BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity
as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of
Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof,
committed (allegedly) as follows:
2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not
submitted his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved, the
number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three months, together with the title,
number, number of hours of court session held a day, etc., as evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio
D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A", Item No. 1,
in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "B";
3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to
December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the certificate issued by Judge
Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex "A", Item No. 2 thereof;
4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing fully
well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has
collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January to February 1971 as evidenced
by the certificate issued by the cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of Justice hereto attached as Annex "C" and
the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex "A", last paragraph thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the
certificate of service in flagrant violation of action 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as
follows:
... District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judges shall certify on their application for leave, and
upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their salaries are paid, that
all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under
submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided
on or before the date of making the certificate and ... no salary shall be paid without such certificate' (Emphasis
supplied).
5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July to December, 1970 and from January, 1971
to February, 1971 stating therein the number of hours of session that the Court holds daily, the accomplishments
of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to perform or
discharge official duties in the administration of justice.
7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him that he was
entering upon the performance of his duties, which letter of his reads in full:
'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the performance of the duties of the office of Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City (Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.'

That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood aggravates his moral bankruptcy incompatible to
the requirements of the highest degree of honesty, integrity and good moral character appertaining to holding the
position of Judge in the administration of justice.
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging pertinently that:
THE FACTS
Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at
Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from
scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the
Department of Justice, respondent decided to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply
the space for the courtroom and offices of the court; to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna
provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the national
government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all
these items must be furnished by the provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however,
informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so).
As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured the respondent that the court
could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the
municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. When the projected transfer of the
municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The
municipal mayor then requested the respondent to look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with
the commitment that the municipal government will shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice
was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the
building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by respondent was the
second floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally signed a
lease agreement with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal government
could release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was rented, which was a big
hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial
fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the provincial government appropriated the amount of
P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent
also placed his order for the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the Department of Justice but,
unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of courts of first instance was released only on December 23,
1970 and the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see
enclosed certification of the Financial Officer of the Department of Justice marked Annex "A").
"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied
for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to
pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned
beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon
respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever
respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
"Charges Have No Basis -- .
"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, grave incompetence and
violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.
"It is respectfully submitted that -- .

"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not
constitute incompetence. Respondent was like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to
assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a sala', but forces and
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from the time, effort
and money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice (please see
enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos marked Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if
respondent did no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he could, as other judges have done, have
collected his salaries as judge without being guilty of dishonesty.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried a salary of P19,000 per
annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff of the Department of Justice and Member of the
Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he was receiving P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively.
Also, in anticipation of the judicial duties which he was about to assume, respondent took a leave of absence from
his professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.
"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of
Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties.
"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started, to perform their judicial
duties to comply with the abovementioned statutory-provisions and circular (please see enclosed certification of
Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex 'C').
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring a judge who has not
entered into the Performance of his judicial duties to comply with them. Taking Section 5, how could a judge who
has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions,
and all civil and criminal cases, which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of
ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate.' And bow
could such a judge hold court in his place of permanent station as required by Section 55; observe the hours of
daily sessions of the court as prescribed by Section 58; and render the reports required by Circular No. 10 when
his court is not yet in physical existence Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular
No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge." .
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their respective complaint and answer
and considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are more or less undisputed, the Court feels that this
case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed. To begin with,
We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations for the respondent complained of. As We see it, the
situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it. Complainant's theory is that respondent
collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up
to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be
admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after
taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a
judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing
himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the
request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way
possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this
case, the government officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his
court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part. That

respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in
this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary,
what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit.
In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since
he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part.
As to whether or not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy the independence of the judiciary and failed to act
according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments
of the government will be discussed a non. At this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's theory of
dishonesty cannot hold water.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and status of cases
in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the
Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of
those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and
hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath
as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself available
for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was
appointed was not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him therewith seem to have been
caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have it read. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission
of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all these preparations, but that is
something within the initiative control of the Secretary of Justice and nor of the respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing
to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in
connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge
may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great
departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation
of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by
practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental
advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the
specific constitutional precepts a check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as
more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus
of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even
the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to
him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they
can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be.
Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be
furnished the Secretary of Justice.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro and Teekankee, JJ., took no part.
Fernando, J., concurs fully and in addition submits a brief separate opinion. Makasiar, J., concurs with the opinion
Mr. Justice Fernando.
FERNANDO, J., concurring: .

I join the rest of my brethren in yielding concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice Barredo. Respondent
Judge clearly should be exculpated of the charge filed against him. What is more the opinion of the Court
possesses the merit of setting forth in forthright and unequivocal language the disapproval of the practice hitherto
followed of having members of the judiciary perform non-judicial functions. There is no doubt to my mind of its
repugnancy to the fundamental concept of separation of power. It is to that aspect of the question as well as what,
to my mind, is the doubtful constitutionality of allowing the Secretary of Justice to exercise supervisory authority
over lower court judges that this brief concurring opinion addresses itself.
1. The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic concept under our Constitution, 1 embodies the principle of a
tripartite division of governmental authority entrusted to Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court as well
as such inferior courts as may be created by law. Three departments of government are thus provided for, the
legislative vested with the lawmaking function, the executive with the enforcement of what has been thus enacted,
and the judiciary with the administration of justice, deciding cases according to law. 2 The reason for such a
doctrine is to assure liberty, no one branch being enabled to arrogate unto itself the whole power to govern and
thus in a position to impose its unfettered will. If it were so, the rights of the individual could with impunity be
disregarded; he could be placed at its mercy. The three departments are coordinate and co-equal, each having
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and supreme in its own sphere. That is to guarantee
independence, no interference being allowed on matters left to the exclusive concern of each. Much less is control
by only one of the three departments of any or both of the others permissible. 3 .
It is to be admitted that the realities of government preclude the independence of each of the departments from the
other being absolute. This is so especially as between the legislative and executive departments. What the former
enacts, the latter implements. To paraphrase Roosevelt, the letter of the Constitution requires a separation, but the
impulse of a common purpose compels cooperation. It could be carried to the extent of such powers being
blended, without undue danger to liberty as proved by countries having the parliamentary forms of government.
This is especially so in England and in Switzerland, where the tradition of freedom possesses strength and
durability. It does not admit of doubt, however, that of the three branches, the judiciary is entrusted with a
function the most sensitive and delicate. It passes upon controversies and disputes not only between citizens but
between citizens and government, the limits of whose authority must be respected. In a system like ours, every
exercise of governmental competence, whether coming from the President or from the lowest official, may be
challenged in court in an appropriate legal proceeding. This is an aspect of the theory of cheeks and balance
likewise provided for in the Constitution. 4 It is thus indispensable that judicial independence should, by all
means, be made secure. Not only that. The feeling that judges are not in any way subject to the influence of the
executive and legislative branches must be pervasive; otherwise, there would be loss of confidence in the
administration of justice. With that gone, the rule of law is placed in dire peril.
Nor is the force, to my mind, of the preceeding observation blunted by the recognition that there could be no
precise delineation of the respective competence alloted the legislative, the executive and the judicial departments
under the Constitution. Necessarily, overlapping and interlacing of functions could not entirely be avoided. For as
observed by Justice Holmes in his famous dissent in a case of Philippine origin, "The great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other... When we come to the fundamental
distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not
go on." 6 Further on, he added: "It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by
veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires." 7 .
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the
practical demands of government precluding its doctrine application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary

being requited to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only
a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of
such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no
less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
It is opposite to quote from an opinion of Justice Cardozo, as Chief Judge of "the New York Court of Appeals,"
when that Court nullified a section of a New York statute that would vest in a justice of its Supreme Court the
power to investigate at the instance of its governor. His opinion explained why: "He is made the delegate Of the
Governor in aid of an executive act, the removal of a public officer... At the word of command he is give over the
work of judging, and set himself to other work, the work of probing and advising. His findings when made will
have none of the authority of a judgment. To borrow Bacon's phrase, they will not 'give the rule or sentence.' They
will not be preliminary or ancillary to any rule or sentence to be pronounced by the judiciary in any of its
branches. They will be mere advice to the Governor, who may adopt them, or modify them, or reject them
altogether. From the beginnings of our history, the Principle has been enforced that there is no inherent power in
Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental
to the fulfillment of judicial duties... The exigencies of government have made it necessary to relax as merely
doctrinaire adherence to a principle so flexible and practical, so largely a matter of sensible approximation, as that
of the separation of powers. Elasticity has not meant that what is of the essence of the judicial function may be
destroyed by turning the power to decide into a pallid opportunity to consult and recommend ..." 9.
Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee," 10 a 1968 decision, Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
who penned the opinion, first referred to the above Richardson decision as well as to Federal Radio Commission
v. General Electric Co.",. It went on to state: "In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the
Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring
the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs.
Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600)." 12 It is clear from the above Noblejas decision that even prior to the
motion there was a commitment to the principle that a member of the judiciary cannot be asked non-judicial
functions. For in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 13 mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm ,
speaking for this Court, was quite explicit. Thus Supreme Court and its members cannot be required to exercise
any power any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions." 14 .
3. Nonetheless, as now decided, respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise accountable. No taint
of bad faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required to do was in accordance with the practice
herefore followed by the Department of Justice. He is, under the statute in force, under the administrative
supervision of its head. Nor can the good faith of Secretary of Justice Abad Santos be impugned. What was done
by him was likewise in accordance with what previous secretaries of justice were accustomed to do. The root of
the evil then is the statutory authority of the Department of Justice over Court of first instance and other inferior
courts.15 While a distinction could be made between the performance of judicial functions which in no way could
be interfered with by the Department and the task of administration which is executive in character, still the
conferment of such competence to a department head, an alter ego of the President, is, to my mind, only unwise
but of doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing administrative rules and regulations over matters deemed nonjudicial, they may trench upon the discretion of judges which should be exercised according to their conscience
alone. What is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them, is magnified. It is already unavoidable under
our scheme of government that they court his goodwill; their promotion may at times depend on it. With this grant
of authority, the assertion of independence becomes even more difficult. It is thus objectionable in principle and
pernicious in operation. That certainly is not the way to reduce to the minimum any participation of the executive
in judicial affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even when the government as the adverse party in
criminal cases, tax suits, and other litigations is in the right, a favorable decision from the lower courts could be
looked upon with suspicion. The judiciary must not only be independent; it must appear to be so.

The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight then, is, to my mind, anomalous.
More specifically, were it not for such power granted the department head, respondent Judge in this case could not
have been called upon to assist the Secretary of Justice. Considering that the Constitutional Convention is about to
meet, it is to be hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary is to be totally freed from any supervisory authority
of an executive department.
1 Cf. "The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government." Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936) per Laurel, J.
2 Law covers not only statutes but likewise, treaties, executive orders to implement statutes, and ordinances,
municipal corporations being delegated with the competence of legislating over local affairs.
3 Cf. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Social Security Commission, L-26175, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 178.
4 As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the previously cited Angara decision, the President may approve or
disapprove legislation, his veto however being subject to be overriden; he may convene the legislative body in
special sessions. Congress may confirm or reject Presidential appointments; it may apportion the jurisdiction of
the courts and determine what funds to appropriate for their support; it may impeach certain officials; and lastly as
far as the judiciary is concerned, it has the power of judicial review enabling it to annul executive or legislative
acts.
5 Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 US 189 (1928).
6 Ibid., pp. 209-210..
7 Ibid., p. 211.
8 In re Richardson, 160 NE 655 (1928).
9 Cf. Hayburns Case, 2 Dall 409 (1792); United States v. Ferreira 13 How. 40 (1851); Gordon v. United States,
117 US 697 (1865); Matter of Sanborn 148 US 222b (1893); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154
US 447 (1894); Muskrat v. United states, 219 US 346 (1911); Tutun v. United States, 270 US 738 (1926); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis 273 US 70 (1927).
10 L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405.
11 281 US 469 (1930).
12 Noblejas v. Teehankee, L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405, 409-410.
13 57 Phil. 600 (1932).
14 Ibid., p. 605.
15 Section 83, Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, reads as follows: Bureaus and offices under the
Department of Justice. The Department of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Courts of First Instance and the Inferior Courts, the Public Service Commission, the Bureau of
Prisons, the General Land Registration Office, the Court of Industrial Relations, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Deportation Board and the Code
Commission. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel shall be merged with the Office of the Solicitor
General..."

A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS

NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this
Court a letter which reads:
Hon.
Chief
of
Manila

Marcelo
Justice

of

the

Supreme

the

Thru
channels:
Court
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Hon.

Leo

Fernan
Court
Philippines
Medialdea
Administrator

Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon.
Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created
pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326
of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte
issued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the position as
member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance
by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to
the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a
violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the
Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge of
Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd)
Judge

RODOLFO

U.

MANZANO

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are
created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent
ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee
are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have
committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of
criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative
functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such
as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre
and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the
Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag not be
designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which
discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39
SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the
practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary
being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only
a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of
such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no
less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming
indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of
government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable
purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain
from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies
involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line
insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the
performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and
orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an
element of positive action, of supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law
Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any
regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not
see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the
administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of
cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of
the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the
power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The administration of justice
cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and various other officials
concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over
these unnecessary and impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such
a quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically
insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of
justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public or private, where these findings would do
the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on Justice.
Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being
"designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If judges
cannot become members, why should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line
drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may compromise
their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the administration of justice and arriving
at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive
or legislative functions or into matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the
other departments into judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away from
public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but which, in fact,
enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary
seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study
groups. The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most
concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained interpretation of
their functions.

It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions of the
Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our jurisdiction and functions. However,
we should not overdo it. The basic principles of constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which
define or circumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of
government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the
responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this
caseconstitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasijudicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving
running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a
Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a study group
with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said committee is called for by
reason of the primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending E.O. No. 856,
need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work and will by no means extend to
the performance of judicial functions per se.
Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain
from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies
involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line
insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the
performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and
orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an
element of positive action, of supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law
Dictionary. )

we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any
regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not
see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the
administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of
cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of
the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the
power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The administration of justice
cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and various other officials
concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over
these unnecessary and impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such
a quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically
insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of
justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public or private, where these findings would do
the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on Justice.
Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being
"designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If judges
cannot become members, why should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line
drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may compromise
their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the administration of justice and arriving
at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive
or legislative functions or into matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the
other departments into judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away from
public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but which, in fact,
enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary
seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study
groups. The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most
concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained interpretation of
their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions of the
Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our jurisdiction and functions. However,
we should not overdo it. The basic principles of constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which
define or circumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of
government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the
responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this
caseconstitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to become a member
of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasijudicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving

running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a
Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a study group
with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said committee is called for by
reason of the primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending E.O. No. 856,
need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work and will by no means extend to
the performance of judicial functions per se.

G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982

EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME
R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G.
ABELLO,
SERVILLANO
DOLINA,
JUANITO
MERCADO
and
ESTANISLAO
A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent
Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are being given and
made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a
private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio
Erwin
Edgardo
Antonio
Jaime
Rafael R. Recto

J.
L.
P.
G.
R.

Puyat
Chiongbian
Reyes
Puyat
Blanco

Eustaquio
R.
Enrique

T.C.
G.
M.
Servillano
Juanito

Acero
Vildzius
Belo
Dolina
Mercado

Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat
Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The
Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body.

Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional
prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10)
shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a
Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had
filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest
in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten
shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI,
against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and
others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case,
Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman
Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation
the Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC
Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao
Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter in allowing
intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the
Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may
intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, now
reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof
is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account of
his office. (Emphasis supplied)

What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in
effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional
provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in
respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their
respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC
Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on
May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene,
he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected
to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the
ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal
Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent
Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as
counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as
Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as
counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of
the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done
by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly
prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional prohibition against
members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in
any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary
in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in
SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby
made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W.
ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del

Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division, Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG
(Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M.
DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A.
LOBREGAT
(Lone
District,
Zamboanga
City) petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN
OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA,
CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary
of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC
National Treasurer, respondents.
IMMANUEL
JALDON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON. SECRETARY
LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA CAJUCOM, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative
determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order
issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in
Mindanao." A temporary restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on January 29,
1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive Order and statute in question.
The facts are as follows:
Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan,
Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite
held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the
provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision,
these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX,
13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President
may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990
Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under
this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.

(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition, members of Congress
representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and
Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They
contended that
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions
some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the
cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand,
the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region
XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of
governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus
Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative regions in Mindanao to guarantee the effective
delivery of field services of government agencies taking into consideration the formation of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.
With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily includes the authority to
merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority
under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do
so will violate the rules of statutory construction.
The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring (reorganization) of
administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment of
congressional representatives, the same is not valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A.
6734 and Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives of
Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative districts in provinces and cities. 1
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX were
scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is
suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power
granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power
granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire
administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely the exercise
of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec, 2 and as a mere incident of his
power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices
under Art. X, 16 and Art. VII, 17, respectively, of the Constitution.

He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or
provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. He cites by
analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 3 in which the power of the
Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground that
[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships,
many of them newly created, and all of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in development and
centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a
detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.
The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" as something
fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.
He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which
took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the
establishment of the autonomous region.
Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. In
exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and
responsive national government, including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient,
effective, economical and development-oriented governmental framework:
(a) More effective planning implementation, and review functions;
(b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in decision-making process;
(c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication or overlapping of purposes, functions, activities, and
programs;
(d) Further development of as standardized as possible ministerial, sub-ministerial and corporate organizational
structures;
(e) Further development of the regionalization process; and
(f) Further rationalization of the functions of and administrative relationships among government entities.
For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing authority of the President to reorganize shall be
interpreted to encompass all agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, including
all government owned or controlled corporations as well as the entire range of the powers, functions, authorities,
administrative relationships, acid related aspects pertaining to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units.
2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:
xxx xxx xxx
f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the
National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions and
authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life,
capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters.
g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Decree.
Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:

(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or
whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid
because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion;
(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and
(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which
either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it;
and
(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX
from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their creation. On
September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a
Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or
controlled by it." The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government." 4 The
Commission on Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan not
later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within
forty days after the opening of its next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted
would become effective only upon the approval of Congress. 5
Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided the
country into eleven administrative regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of the law of the
land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed]
the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further
"restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX into two sub-regions." In 1978,
P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.
Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to
authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the
country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the
direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed
in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is
a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not
territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." 7 The power conferred on the President is similar to the power
to adjust municipal boundaries 8which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General 9 or as "administrative in
nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to
merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him
is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same
subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy
underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to
wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent

with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction
of the public business." 12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance
with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now
constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the
organization of administrative regions.
Nor is Art. XIX, 13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734. The
constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" 13 has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title is
not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to that
subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject
of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of administrative
regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because
Art. XIX, 13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the existing administrative
regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 claims:
The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision by
moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions.
Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which
did not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized action of the President, as effected
by and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental,
formerly of Region X and which did not even participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to
Region IX; (2) the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise
did not participate in the said plebiscite, were transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to
Region XII; (4) General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del Norte, from Region XII to
Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and
cities voted "NO", and thereby rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as provided
under RA No. 6734. 15
The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject
to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This
means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation
of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions
as the exigency of administration may require.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by
the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local
governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del
Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of
local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to
vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.
Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for inclusion
in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by the President.
To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, 13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President's
power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the
petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational. The fact is that, as they

themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to
wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and
language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6)
socio-economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this
Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional
centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize
administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.
It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail
the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional
offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that
courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of legislation. In any event this is a question that we will
consider only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that presented by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 23-24, Petition (G.R. No. 96754).
2 179 SCRA 287 (1989).
3 36 Phil. 549 (1917).
4 R.A. No. 5435, 1.
5 4.
6 INTEGRATED REORGANIZATION PLAN, Ch. II, Art. I, 1.
7 Supra note 2 at 300-01. Abbas in fact sustained the constitutionality of Art. XIX, 13 of R.A, No. 6734 against
claims that it contravened Art. X, 10 of the Constitution which requires approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite of the merger of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
8 Act No. 1748.
9 122 Phil. 965, 973-4 (1965). See also Government of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of Binangonan, 34
Phil. 518 (1916); Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (1917).
10 Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970).
11 See Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111812, May 31,1995.
12 R.A. No. 5435, 1.
13 Art. VI, 26(1).

14 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941); Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 365 (1992).
15 Petitioner's Memorandum, G.R. No. 96673, pp. 5-6.
16 Supra note 2 at 300.

G.R. No. 191672

November 25, 2014

DENNIS
A.
B.
FUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The independence of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is explicitly mandated under Section 1, 1 Article IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution. Additionally, Section 2, 2 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution prohibits its Members,
during their tenure, from holding any other office or employment.
These constitutional provisions3 are central to this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition brought to
assail the designation of Hon. Francisco T. Duque III, Chairman of the CSC, as a member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b)
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC),
and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Antecedents
On January 11, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The
Commission on Appointments confirmed Duques appointment on February 3, 2010.
On February 22, 2010,President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864), whose complete text is quoted
as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 864
INCLUSION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IN THE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES/DIRECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PHILIPPINE
HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
WHEREAS, Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution mandates, among others, that the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the government, shall establish a career service and adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service, and shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs
for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability;
WHEREAS, Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292) expressly states that the Chairman of the CSC shall bea member of the Board of Directors or of other
governing bodies of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment, status,

rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, such as the Government Service Insurance
System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade Service Board, National Board for Teachers, and such other similar
boards as may be created by law;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 24, 1972, explicitly empowers the President of the
Republic of the Philippines to reorganize the entire Executive Branch of the National Government, as a vital and
priority measure to effect the desired changes and reforms in the social, economic and political structure of the
country;
WHEREAS, Section 18 (a), ArticleIV of Republic Act No. 7875 (An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance
Program For All Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation For The Purpose) or
otherwise known as the "National Health Insurance Act of 1995", Section 42 (G) of Republic Act No. 8291 (An
Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, Expanding and Increasing the Coverage of Benefits of
the Government Service Insurance System, Instituting Reforms Therein and For Other Purposes) or otherwise
known as "The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, Article 176, Chapter 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 626 (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund), and Presidential Decree No. 1530 (Instituting a
System of Voluntary Contributions for Housing Purpose[s]) or otherwise known as the "Pag-ibig Fund" reveal that
while the Chairman of the CSC is not included in the list of those who could sit as a member of the Board of
Directors of the Philhealth or of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, ECC and the Pag-ibig Fund, said laws did not
expressly repeal Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Presidential
Decree No. 1; WHEREAS, it is settled that repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject;
WHEREAS, a scrutiny of the mandated functions and duties of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, ECC and
HDMF and the Board of Directors of the PhilHealth shows that the same are all geared towards the advancement
of the welfare of government officials and employees, which functions fall within the province of the CSC;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order and direct:
Section 1. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission shall sit as an Ex-Officio member of the Board of
Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission and the Home
Development Mutual Fund and the Board of Directors of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation pursuant to
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
Section 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 22nd day of February, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Ten. 4
Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the following
government-owned or government- controlled corporations (GOCCs): (a) GSIS; (b) PHILHEALTH;(c) ECC; and
(d) HDMF.
On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of
Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear
violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
The Case
The Court is confronted with the proper interpretation of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 to ascertain the constitutionality of the
designation of Duque, in an ex officio capacity, as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF.
Petitioner asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of
the CSC, which was constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures due to
the significance of its government functions. 5 He further asserts that such independence is violated by the fact that

the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of Government while the concerned GOCCs are considered
instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government. 6 In this situation, the President may exercise his
power of control over the CSC considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are attached to
the Executive Department.7
Petitioner argues that Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 unduly and unconstitutionally expands
the role of the CSC, which is primarily centered on personnel-related concerns involving government workers, to
include insurance, housing and health matters of employees in the government service. 8 He observes that the
independence of the CSC will not be compromised if these matters are instead addressed by entering into a
memorandum of agreement or by issuing joint circulars with the concerned agencies, rather than allowing a
member of the CSC to sit as a member of the governing Boards of these agencies. 9
Petitioner notes that the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF do not mention that the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of their governing Boards in an ex officiocapacity. 10 Such being the case, the President
may not amend the charters, which are enacted by Congress, by the mere issuance of an executive order. 11
Petitioner posits that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the prohibition
imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment. 12 A conflict
of interest may arise in the event that a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning
personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and their
employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations. 13
In their Comment, respondents maintain that Duques membership in the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is constitutional. They explain that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title IA,
Book V of EO 292 preserve the independence of the CSC considering that GOCCs with original charters such as
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are excluded from the supervision and control that secretaries and
heads exercise over the departments to which these GOCCs are attached. 14 Ultimately, these GOCCs are exempted
from the executive control of the President.15
As to the matter of conflict of interest, respondents point out that Duque is just one member of the CSC, or of the
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, such that matters resolved by these bodies may be resolved
with or without Duques participation.16 Respondents submit that the prohibition against holding any other office
or employment under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without
additional compensation in ex officio capacities. Relying on the pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary,17 they assert that since the 1987 Constitution, which provides a stricter prohibition against
the holding of multiple offices by executive officials, allows them to hold positions in ex officio capacities, the
same rule is applicable to members of the Constitutional Commissions. 18 Moreover, the mandatory tenor of
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 clearly indicates that the CSC Chairmans membership in the
governing bodies mentioned therein merely imposes additional duties and functions as an incident and necessary
consequence of his appointment as CSC Chairman.19
Respondents insist that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, as well as the charters of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, are consistent with each other. While the charters of these GOCCs do
not provide that CSC Chairman shall be a member of their respective governing Boards, there islikewise no
prohibition mentioned under said charters. 20 EO 864, issued in conformity with Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, could not have impliedly amended the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
because the former relates to the law on the CSC while the latter involve the creation and incorporation of the
respective GOCCs.21 As their subject matters differ from each other, the enactment of the subsequent law is not
deemed to repeal or amend the charters of the GOCCs, being considered prior laws. 22
Issue
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional
prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?
Our Ruling

The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity
as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
1.
Requisites of judicial review
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated,
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis motaof the case. 23
Here, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) only disputes the locus standi of petitioner who has filed this suit
in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer.24 In view of the earlier dispositions by the Court in
similar public law cases initiated by petitioner, we again affirm his locus standito bring a suit of this nature. In
Funa v. Agra,25 the Court has recently held:
x x x [T]he locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit ofthis
nature has already been settled in his favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law litigations he
brought. In Funa v. Villar, for one, the Court has held:
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a
result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act.
However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain
individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue
provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere
procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental
import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act. In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the
so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.
This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has "far-reaching implications," and there
is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus,
assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition. 20 (Bold emphasis supplied)
In Funa v. Ermita, the Court recognized the locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
lawyer because the issue raised therein involved a subject of transcendental importance whose resolution was
necessary to promulgate rules to guide the Bench, Bar, and the public in similar cases.
The Court notes, however, that during the pendency of this petition, Duques designation as Director or Trustee of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and PHIC could have terminated or been rendered invalid by the enactment of
Republic Act No. 10149,26 thus causing this petition and the main issue tendered herein moot and academic.
Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No.10149, which took effect on June 6, 2011, state:

SEC. 13. Number of Directors/Trustees.The present number of Directors/Trustees provided in the charter of the
GOCCs shall be maintained.
SEC. 14. Ex Officio Alternates.The ex officio members of the GOCC may designate their respective alternates
who shall be the officials next-in-rank to them and whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals.
SEC. 15. Appointment of the Board of Directors/Trustees of GOCCs.An Appointive Director shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines from a shortlist prepared by the GCG.
The GCG shall formulate its rules and criteria in the selection and nomination of prospective appointees and shall
cause the creation of search committees to achieve the same. All nominees included in the list submitted by the
GCG to the President shall meet the Fit and Proper Rule as defined un this Act and such other qualifications
which the GCG may determine taking into consideration the unique requirements of each GOCC. The GCG shall
ensure that the shortlist shall exceed by at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of directors /trustees tobe
appointed. In the event that the President does not see fit to appoint any of the nominees included in the shortlist,
the President shall ask the GCG to submit additional nominees.
xxxx
SEC. 17. Term of Office.Any provision in the charters of each GOCC to the contrary notwithstanding, the term
of office of each Appointive Director shall be for one(1) year, unless sooner removed for cause: Provided,
however,That the Appointive Director shall continue to hold office until the successor is appointed. An Appointive
Director may be nominated by the GCG for reappointment by the President only if one obtains a performance
score of above average or its equivalent or higher in the immediately preceding year of tenure as Appointive
Director based on the performance criteria for Appointive Directors for the GOCC.
Appointed to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. The appointment of a director
to fill such vacancy shall be in accordance with the manner provided in Section 15 of this Act.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all incumbent CEOs and appointive members of the Board
of GOCCs shall, upon approval of this Act, have a term of office until June 30, 2011, unless sooner replaced by
the President: Provided, however, That the incumbent CEOs and appointive members of the Board shall continue
in office until the successor have been appointed by the President.
A moot and academic case is one thatceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 27
2.
Unconstitutionality of Duquesdesignation as member
of the governing boards of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF
Nonetheless, this Court has exercised its power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot and academic
by supervening events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions, namely: (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.28
The situation now obtaining definitely falls under the requirements for the review of a moot and academic case.
For the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future, 29 the Court will not abstain from exercising its power of
judicial review, the cessation of the controversy notwithstanding. We proceed to resolve the substantive issue
concerning the constitutionality of Duques ex officio designation as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
The underlying principle for the resolution of the present controversy rests on the correct application of Section 1
and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which provide: Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions,

which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
Section 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of
any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government,
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent."Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are
not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the
Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the
exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorariby the Court
as provided by Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. 30 To safeguard the independence of these
Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others,31 imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution
certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the
functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted
by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.32
The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is the disqualification from holding
any other office or employment during Duques tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to
interpret this disqualification in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the
Courts pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.
Section 7, paragraph (2),Article IX-B reads:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
In Funa v. Ermita,33 where petitioner challenged the concurrent appointment of Elena H. Bautista as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication and as Officer-in-Charge of the
Maritime Industry Authority, the Court reiterated the pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v.The Executive
Secretary on the intent of the Framers on the foregoing provision of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law orby the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
xxxx
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with

equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to bea positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution"
must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to
wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),Article VII; or acting
as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of
Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. 34
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated
under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the Government
during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Respondents insist that Duques ex officio designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is allowed by the primary functions of his position as the CSC Chairman. To
support this claim, they cite Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, to wit:
Section 14. Membership of the Chairman in Boards.The Chairman shall be a member of the Board of Directors
or of other governing bodies of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment
status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, such as the Government Service
Insurance System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade Service Board, National Board for Teachers, and such
other similar boards as may be created by law.
As to the meaning of ex officio, the Court has decreed in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary that
x x x x The term ex officiomeans "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position." Ex officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a
board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
xxx
xxxx
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason
is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. x x x 35
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government and is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and
rewards system; to integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks; and to
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. Its specific powers and functions are as
follows:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks
in the Civil Service;
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote
economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government;
(4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation of position
classification and compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation and reallocation of pay scales,
classes and positions;

(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on all
heads of departments, offices and agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari;
(6) Appoint and discipline its officials and employees in accordance with law and exercise control and supervision
over the activities of the Commission;
(7) Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. Any entity or official in government may be
called upon by the Commission to assist in the preparation and conduct of said examinations including security,
use of buildings and facilities as well as personnel and
transportation of examination materials which shall be exempt from inspection regulations;
(8) Prescribe all forms for Civil Service examinations, appointments, reports and such other forms as may be
required by law, rules and regulations;
(9) Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily confidential, highly technical or policy
determining;
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and retention of qualified and
competent work force in the public service;
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials
and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) daysfrom receipt of a copy
thereof;
(12) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents and records pertinent to
investigation and inquiries conducted by it in accordance withits authority conferred by the Constitution and
pertinent laws;
(13) Advise the President on all matters involving personnel management in the government service and submit to
the President an annual report on the personnel programs;
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including
extension of Service beyond retirement age;
(15) Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, local
government units and other instrumentalities of the government including government-owned or controlled
corporations; conduct periodic review of the decisions and actions of offices or officials to whom authority has
been delegated by the Commission as well as the conduct of the officials and the employees in these offices and
apply appropriate sanctions when necessary;
(16) Delegate authority for the performance of any functions to departments, agencies and offices where such
functions may be effectively performed;
(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees, and accredit government
services and evaluate qualifications for retirement;
(18) Keep and maintain personnel records of all officials and employees in the Civil Service; and
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as may be
provided by law.36
On the other hand, enumerated below are the specific duties and responsibilities of the CSC Chairman, namely:
(1) Direct all operations of the Commission;

(2) Establish procedures for the effective operations of the Commission;

(3) Transmit to the President rules and regulations, and other guidelines adopted by the Chairman which require
Presidential attention including annual and other periodic reports;
(4) Issue appointments to, and enforce decisions on administrative discipline involving officials and employees of
the Commission;
(5) Delegate authority for the performance of any function to officials and employees of the Commission;
(6) Approve and submit the annual and supplemental budget of the Commission; and
(7) Perform such other functionsas may be provided by law.37
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairmans membership in a governing
body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board
member must affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government
officials and employees. Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V
of EO 292 because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government employees are
among the primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC
Chairmans membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his position as such.
Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
However, there is a need to determine further whether Duques designation as Board member of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and the condition laid down in
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292. It is necessary for this purpose to examine the functions of
these government entities under their respective charters, to wit:
The GSIS Charter, Republic Act No. 8291
SECTION 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. The GSIS shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(a) to formulate, adopt, amend and/or rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act, as well as the effective exercise of the powers and functions, and the
discharge of duties and responsibilities of the GSIS, its officers and employees;
(b) to adopt or approve the annual and supplemental budget of receipts and expenditures including salaries and
allowances of the GSIS personnel; to authorize such capital and operating expenditures and disbursements of the
GSIS as may be necessary and proper for the effective management and operation of the GSIS;
(c) to invest the funds of the GSIS, directly or indirectly, in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(d) to acquire, utilize or dispose of, in any manner recognized by law, real or personal property in the Philippines
or elsewhere necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(e) to conduct continuing actuarialand statistical studies and valuations to determine the financial condition of the
GSIS and taking into consideration such studies and valuations and the limitations herein provided, re-adjust the
benefits, contributions, premium rates, interest rates or the allocation or re-allocation of the funds to the
contingencies covered;
(f) to have the power of succession;
(g) to sue and be sued;
(h) to enter into, make, perform and carry out contracts of every kind and description with any person, firm or
association or corporation, domestic or foreign;

(i) to carry on any other lawful business whatsoever in pursuance of, or in connection with the provisions of this
Act;
(j) to have one or more offices in and outside of the Philippines, and to conduct its business and exercise its
powers throughout and in any part of the Republic of the Philippines and/or in any or all foreign countries, states
and territories: Provided, That the GSIS shall maintain a branch office in every province where there exists a
minimum of fifteen thousand (15,000) membership; (k) to borrow funds from any source, private or government,
foreign or domestic, only as an incident in the securitization of housing mortgages of the GSIS and on account of
its receivables from any government or private entity;
(l) to invest, own or otherwise participate in equity in any establishment, firm or entity;
(m) to approve appointments in the GSIS except appointments to positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature according to the Civil Service rules and regulations: Provided,
That all positions in the GSIS shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and
qualifications standards approved bythe GSIS Board of Trustees based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit
of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to the periodic review by the Board no
more than once every four (4) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity
and profitability;
(n) to design and adopt an Early Retirement Incentive Plan (ERIP) and/or financial assistance for the purpose of
retirement for its own personnel;
(o) to fix and periodically review and adjust the rates of interest and other terms and conditions for loans and
credits extended to members or other persons, whether natural or juridical;
(p) to enter into agreement with the Social Security System or any other entity, enterprise, corporation or
partnership for the benefit of members transferring from one system to another subject to the provision of
Republic Act No. 7699, otherwise known as the Portability Law;
(q) to be able to float proper instrument to liquefy long-term maturity by pooling funds for short-term secondary
market;
(r) to submit annually, not later thanJune 30, a publicreport to the President of the Philippines and the Congress of
the Philippines regarding its activities in the administration and enforcement of this Act during the preceding year
including information and recommendations on broad policies for the development and perfection of the
programs of the GSIS;
(s) to maintain a provident fund, which consists of contributions made by both the GSIS and its officials and
employees and their earnings, for the payment of benefits to such officials and employees or their heirs under
such terms and conditions as it may prescribe;
(t) to approve and adopt guidelines affecting investments, insurance coverage of government properties,
settlement of claims, disposition of acquired assets, privatization or expansion of subsidiaries, development of
housing projects, increased benefit and loan packages to members, and the enforcement of the provisions of this
Act;
(u) any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, to authorize the payment of extra remuneration to the
officials and employees directly involved in the collection and/or remittance of contributions, loan repayments,
and other monies due to the GSIS at such rates and under such conditions as itmay adopt. Provided, That the best
interest of the GSIS shall be observed thereby;
(v) to determine, fix and impose interest upon unpaid premiums due from employers and employees;
(w) to ensure the collection or recovery of all indebtedness, liabilities and/or accountabilities, includingunpaid
premiums or contributions in favor of the GSISarising from any cause or source whatsoever, due from all
obligors, whether public or private. The Board shall demand payment or settlement of the obligations referred to

herein within thirty (30) days from the date the obligation becomes due, and in the event of failure or refusal of
the obligor or debtor to comply with the demand, to initiate or institute the necessary or proper actions or suits,
criminal, civil or administrative or otherwise, before the courts, tribunals, commissions, boards, or bodies of
proper jurisdiction within thirty (30) days reckoned from the expiry dateof the period fixed in the demand within
which to pay or settle the account;
(x) to design and implement programs that will promote and mobilize savings and provide additional resources
for social security expansion and at the same time afford individual members appropriate returns on their
savings/investments. The programs shall be so designed as to spur socio-economic take-off and maintain
continued growth; and
(y) to exercise such powers and perform such other acts as may be necessary, useful, incidental or auxiliary to
carry out the provisions of this Act, or to attain the purposesand objectives of this Act.
The PHILHEALTH Charter, Republic Act No. 7875
SEC. 16. Powers and Functions The Corporation shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) to administer the National Health Insurance Program;
(b) to formulate and promulgate policies for the sound administration of the Program;
(c) to set standards, rules, and regulations necessary to ensure quality of care, appropriate utilization of services,
fund viability, member satisfaction, and overall accomplishment of Program objectives;
(d) to formulate and implement guidelines on contributions and benefits; portability of benefits, cost containment
and quality assurance; and health care provider arrangements,payment, methods, and referral systems;
(e) to establish branch offices as mandated in Article V of this Act;
(f) to receive and manage grants, donations, and other forms of assistance;
(g) to sue and be sued in court;
(h) to acquire property, real and personal, which may be necessary or expedient for the attainment of the purposes
of this Act;
(i) to collect, deposit, invest, administer, and disburse the National Health Insurance Fund in accordance with the
provisions of this Act;
(j) to negotiate and enter into contracts with health care institutions, professionals, and other persons, juridical or
natural, regarding the pricing, payment mechanisms, design and implementation of administrative and operating
systems and procedures, financing, and delivery of health services;
(k) to authorize Local Health Insurance Offices to negotiate and enter into contracts in the name and on behalf of
the Corporation with any accredited government or private sector health provider organization, including but not
limited to health maintenance organizations, cooperatives and medical foundations, for the provision ofat least the
minimum package of personal health services prescribed by the Corporation;
(l) to determine requirements and issue guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers for the Program in
accordance with this Act;
(m) to supervise the provision of health benefits with the power to inspect medical and financial records of health
careproviders and patients who are participants in or members of the Program, and the power to enter and inspect
accredited health care institutions, subject to the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Corporation;
(n) to organize its office, fix the compensation of and appoint personnel as may be deemed necessary and upon
the recommendation of the president of the Corporation;

(o) to submit to the President of the Philippines and to both Houses of Congress its Annual Report which shall
contain the status of the National Health Insurance Fund, its total disbursements, reserves, average costing to
beneficiaries, any request for additional appropriation, and other data pertinent to the implementation of the
Program and publish a synopsis of such report in two (2) newspapers of general circulation;
(p) to keep records of the operations of the Corporation and investments of the National Health Insurance Fund;
and
(q) to perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the attainment of the objectives of the Corporation
and for the proper enforcement of the provisions of this Act
The HDMF Charter, Republic Act No. 9679
SEC. 13. Powers and Functions of the Fund. The Fund shall have the powers and functions specified in this Act
and the usual corporate powers:
(a) To formulate, adopt, amend and/or rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act, as well as the effective exercise of the powers and functions, and the
discharge of duties and responsibilities of the Fund, its officers and employees;
(b) To adopt or approve the annual and supplemental budget of receipts and expenditures including salaries and
allowances of the Fund personnel, to authorize such capital and operating expenditures and disbursements of the
Fund as may be necessary and proper for the effective management and operation of the Fund;
(c) To submit annually to the President of the Philippines not later than March 15, a report of its activities and the
state of the Fund during the preceding year, including information and recommendations for the development and
improvement thereof;
(d) To invest not less than seventy percent (70%) of its investible funds to housing, in accordance with this Act;
(e) To acquire, utilize, or dispose of, in any manner recognized by law, real or personal properties to carry out the
purposes of this Act;
(f) To set up its own accounting and computer systems; to conduct continuing actuarial and statistical studies and
valuations to determine the financial viability of the Fund and its project; to require reports, compilations and
analysis of statistical and economic data, as well as make such other studies and surveys asmay be needed for the
proper administration and development of the Fund;
(g) To have the power of succession; to sue and be sued; to adopt and use a corporate seal;
(h) To enter into and carry out contracts of every kind and description with any person, firm or association or
corporation, domestic or foreign;
(i) To borrow funds from any source, private or government, foreign or domestic;
(j) To invest, own or otherwise participate in equity in any establishment, or entity; to form, organize, invest in or
establish and maintain a subsidiary or subsidiaries in relation to any of its purposes;
(k) To approve appointments in the Fund except appointments to positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature according to the civil service rules and regulations: Provided,
That all positions in the Fund shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Fund's Board of Trustees based on a comprehensive job analysis, wage
compensation study and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan
shall be comparable with prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to the periodic
review of the Board no more than once everyfour (4) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases
based on productivity and profitability. The Fund shall, therefore, be exempt from any laws, rules and regulations
on salaries and compensations;

(l) To maintain a provident fund, which shall consist of contributions made by both the Fund and its officers and
employees and their earnings, for the payment ofbenefits to such officials and employees or their heirs under such
terms and conditions as it may prescribe;
(m)To design and adopt an early retirement incentive plan (ERIP) for its own personnel;
(n) To establish field offices and to conduct its business and exercise its powers in these places; (o) To approve
restructuring proposalfor the payment of due but unremitted contributions and unpaid loan amortizations under
such terms and conditions as the Board ofTrustees may prescribe;
(p) To determine, fix and impose interest and penalties upon unpaid contributions due from employers and
employees;
(q) To ensure the collection and recovery of all indebtedness, liabilities and/or accountabilities, including unpaid
contributions in favor of the Fund arising from any cause or source or whatsoever, due from all obligors, whether
public or private; to demand payment of the obligations referred to herein, and in the event of failure or refusal of
the obligor or debtor to comply with the demand, to initiate or institute the necessary or proper actions or suits,
criminal, civil, administrative, or otherwise, before the courts, tribunals, commissions, boards or bodies of proper
jurisdiction: Provided, however, That the Fund may compromise or release, in whole or in part, any interest,
penalty or civil liability to the Fund in connection with the collection of contributions and the lending operations
of the Fund, under such terms and conditions as prescribed by the Board of Trustees: Provided, further, That the
Board may, upon recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer, deputize any member of the Fund's legal staff
to act as special sheriff in foreclosure cases, in the sale or attachment of the debtor's properties, and in the
enforcement ofcourt writs and processes in cases involving the Fund. The special sheriff of the Fund shall make a
report to the proper court after any action taken by him, which shall treat such action as if it were an act of its own
sheriffs in all respects;
(r) To design and implement other programs that will further promote and mobilize savings and provide additional
resources for the mutual benefit of the members with appropriate returns on the savings/investments. The program
shall be so designed as to spur socioeconomic take-off and maintain continued growth;
(s) To conduct continuing actuarialand statistical studies and valuations to determine the financial condition of the
Fund and taking into consideration such studies and valuations and the limitations herein provided, readjust the
benefits, contributions, interest rates of the allocation or reallocation of the funds to the contingencies covered;
and
(t) To exercise such powers and perform such acts as may be necessary, useful, incidental or auxiliary to carry out
the provisions of this Act.
The ECC Charter, Presidential Decree No. 626
ART. 177. Powers and duties. - The Commission shall have the following powers and duties:
(a) To assess and fix a rate of contribution from all employers;
(b) To determine the rate of contribution payable by an employer whose records show a high frequency of work
accidents or occupational disease due to failure by the said employer to observe adequate safety measures;
(c) To approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising
therefrom as prescribed by the System;
(d) To initiate policies and programs toward adequate occupational health and safety and accident prevention in
the working environment, rehabilitation other than those provided for under Art. 190 hereof, and other related
programs and activities, and to appropriate funds therefor. (As amended by Sec. 3, P.D. 1368).
(e) To make the necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning the grant of constant help and income
benefits for permanent disability or death, and the rationalization of the benefits for permanent disability and
death under the Title with benefits payable by the System for similar contingencies; Provided; That the

Commission may upgrade benefits and add new ones subject toapproval of the President; and Provided, Further,
That the actuarial stabilityof the State Insurance Fund shall be guaranteed; Provided, Finally, that such increases
in benefits shall not require any increases in contribution, except as provided for in paragraph (b) hereof. (As
amended by Sec. 3, P.D. 1641).
(f) To appoint the personnel of its staff, subject to civil service law and rules, but exempt from WAPCO law and
regulations;
(g) To adopt annually a budget of expenditures of the Commission and its staff chargeable against the State
Insurance Fund: Provided, that the SSS and GSIS shall advance on a quarterly basis the remittances of allotment
of the loading fund for this Commission's operational expenses based on its annual budget as duly approved by
the Ministry of Budget and Management. (As amended by Sec. 3, P.D. 1921).
(h) To have the power to administeroath and affirmation, and to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in
connection with any question or issue arising from appealed cases under this Title.
(i) To sue and be sued in court;
(j) To acquire property, real or personal, which may be necessary or expedient for the attainment of the purposes
of this Title;
(k) To enter into agreements or contracts for such services or aid as may be needed for the proper, efficient and
stable administration of the program;
(l) To perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the attainment of the purposes of the Commission
and proper enforcement of the provisions of thisTitle. (As amended by Sec. 18, P.D.850). (Emphasis supplied.)
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with
appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges,
and welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to
perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions,
whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore
derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing intereston unpaid or unremitted
contributions,38issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, 39 or approving restructuring
proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. 40 The Court also notes that Duques designation as
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per
diem,41 a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officioposition by virtue of
its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation
goes against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under
Section 17,42 Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the
Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive
Branch.43 The Court has aptly explained in Rufino v. Endriga:44
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or
must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, ormust be a quasi-judicial body or local government
unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government.1wphi1 The CCP is also not one
of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit.
Thus, the CCP must fall underthe Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency
"not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the President."

Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President
necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the
President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," x x x Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
does not exempt any executive office oneperforming executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs
executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is
true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the
Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one
President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the
Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is withoutany
legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government corporation and
are deemed attached to the Department of Health45 and the Department of Labor,46 respectively. On the other hand,
the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President. 47 The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the
President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their
respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a
member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence
vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
3.
Effect
of
declaration
of
Duques
designation
governing
Boards
of
ECC and HDMF - The De FactoOfficer Doctrine

as

of
member
theGSIS,

unconstitutionality
of
the
PHILHEALTH,

In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not
validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his
position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer while he served his term
as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed
and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. 48
That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,49 the Court has said:
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. Ithas been held that "in cases where there is no de jure,
officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the
salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the
respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, ifthe office
is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. 50 He may also be one who is in possession of
an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. 51 Consequently, the

acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned. 52
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer
legally appointed and qualified for the office. 53 This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and
integrity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duque's
official actions covered by this clarification extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board resolutions and
memoranda approving appointments to positions in the concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and
guidelines on compensation and employee benefits, and adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers of
the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292; ANNULS AND VOIDS Executive Order
No. 864 dated February 22, 2010 and the designation of Hon. Francisco T. Duque III as a Member of the Board of
Directors/Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System; Philippine Health Insurance Corporation;
Employees Compensation Commission; and Home Development Mutual Fund in an ex officio capacity in relation
to his appointment as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
VIOLATIVE of Sections 1 and 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon. Francisco T.
Duque III was a de facto officer during his tenure as Director/Trustee of the Government Service Insurance
System; Philippine Health Insurance Corporation; Employees Compensation Commission; and Home
Development Mutual Fund.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS
Associate Justice

P.

BERSAMIN

WE CONCUR:
MARIA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO
Associate Justice

LOURDES

T.

P.A.

CARPIO

PRESBITERO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

(On
ARTURO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO
Associate Justice

M.

MARIANO
C.
Associate Justice

MARTIN
S.
Associate Justice

VILLARAMA,

JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice

PERALTA

JR.

MENDOZA

SERENO

J.

VELASCO,

JR.

Leave)
BRION*

D.

DEL

CASTILLO

JOSE
PORTUGAL
Associate Justice

PEREZ

BIENVENIDO
Associate Justice

REYES

L.

(On
Official
Leave)
ESTELA
M.
PERLAS-BERNABE**
Associate Justice

MARVIC
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

FRANCIS
Associate Justice

H.

M.V.F.

LEONEN

JARDELEZA

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the court.
MARIA
Chief Justice

LOURDES

P.A.

SERENO

Footnotes
* On leave.
** On official leave.
1

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
2
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of
any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government,
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
3
Rollo, p. 8.
4
Id. at 13-15.
5
Id. at 16.
6
Id. at 18-19.
7
Id. at 19-22; ECC is a GOCC attached to the Department of Labor and Employment, PHILHEALTH to the
Department of Health, and HDMF and GSIS to the Office of the President.
8
Id. at 21-22.
9
Id. at 23.
10
Id. at 23-28.
11
Id. at 27-28.
12
Id. at 31.
13
Id. at 35-36.
14
Id. at 72-76.
15
Id. at 76.
16
Id. at 78.
17
G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
18
Rollo, p. 80.
19
Id. at 81.
20
Id. at 85-86.
21
Id. at 86.

22

Id. at 86-87.
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No.
164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 382.
24
Rollo, pp. 68-72.
25
G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, 691 SCRA 196, 207-208.
26
An Act to Promote Financial Viability and Fiscal Discipline in Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations
and to Strengthen the Role of the State in its Governance and Management to Make Them More Responsive to
the Needs of Public Interest and for Other Purposes.
27
Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308, 319.
28
Funa v.Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579, 592, citing David v. MacapagalArroyo, G.R.
Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 214-215.
29
Javier v. Commission on Elections,Nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986, 144 SCRA 194, 198.
30
Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358, 360.
31
The Constitution further vests the Commissions with the following characteristics to insure their independence:
(a) They are constitutionally created, and may not be abolished by statute.
(b) Each is expressly described as independent.
(c) Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute.
(d) The Chairmen and members cannot beremoved except by impeachment.
(e) The Chairmen and members are given a fairlylong term of office of seven years.
(f) The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity.
xxxx
(g) The salaries of the chairman and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during continuance in
office.
(h) The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy.
xxxx
(i) Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided they do not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights [though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court].
(j) The Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen their integrity.
(k) The Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service Law. (per
Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009 ed., pp. 325-326).
32
Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009 ed., p. 326.
33
G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308.
34
G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 329-331.
35
Id. at 333-335.
36
Section 12, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292.
37
Section 13, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292.
38
RA 8291, Section 43(h).
39
RA 7875, Section 16(l).
40
RA 9679, Section 13(o).
41
See RA 8291, Section 42; RA 7875, Section 18(d); PD 626, Article 176(b); RA 9679, Section 14.
42
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
43
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 68, 85.
44
G.R. No. 139554 & 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13, 63-65.
45
Section 14, RA 7875.
46
Article 176, PD 626.
47
Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II, Book III of EO 292.The Agencies under the Office of the President.
The agencies under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of
the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed
by law or order creating them under any special department.
48
Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 817, 830.
49
Supra note 17 at 339-340.
50
Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 122197, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 322, 330.
51
Id; see also The Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., G.R. No. 154674, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 773, 786.
23

52
53

Supra note 48 at 829-830.

See Seneres v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, 585 S CRA 557, 575.