NPC vs.

Spouses Samar
GR NO. 197329
DATE: September 8, 2014
DOCTRINE: Just compensation for the property must be based on its
value at the time of the taking of said property, not at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
RESPONDENT: LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR
FACTS:
Civil Case No. IR-2243
Sometime in 1990, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed
Civil Case No. IR-2243 with the RTC, seeking to expropriate respondent
spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar's 1,020-square meter lot covered by
Tax Declaration No. 30573 and situated in San Jose (Baras), Nabua,
Camarines Sur which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission
line. In an August 29, 1990 Order, the RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of
Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly, NPC entered the subject lot and
constructed its transmission line, denominated as Tower No. 83. However, on
July 12, 1994, the trial court issued another Order dismissing Civil Case No.
IR-2243 without prejudice for failure to prosecute because after almost
three (3) years since the said order was issued, the Committee has not met
nor deliberated on said matter and the parties in this case have not exerted
efforts in pursuing their claims despite so long a time.
Civil Case No. IR-2678
On December 5, 1994, respondents filed with the same trial court a
Complaint, 7 docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2678, for compensation and
damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which NPC took over but for
which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the dismissal of Civil
Case No. IR-2243. The complaint prayed, among others, that the defendant
compensate the plaintiff of [sic] the lot they are now occupying in
accordance with the current market value existing in the place. After
conducting their appraisal, the commissioners submitted their individual
reports. Atty. Wenifredo Pornillos, commissioner for the respondents,
recommended a valuation within the range of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per
square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense, commissioner for NPC, did not set an
amount, although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing

market prices of agricultural, and not residential, lands within the area. The
court representative, Esteban D. Colarina, proposed a P1,100.00 per square
meter valuation.
On February 21, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision pegging the value
of the subject lot at P1,000.00 per square meter and the CA, on NPCs
appeal, affirmed the same. Further, the CA held that in the resolution of Civil
Case No. IR-2678, the principles and rules of procedure in eminent domain
cases under Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court cannot apply; thus, the
rule that just compensation shall be computed from the time of the taking or
filing of the expropriation case is inapplicable, since the case is not one for
expropriation. Instead, Civil Case No. IR-2678 should be treated as a simple
case for the recovery of damages. Finally, the CA held that the trial court
properly exercised its judicial function of ascertaining the fair market value of
the property as just compensation. NPC thus instituted the instant Petition.
ISSUE:
WON Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court should apply to Civil
Case No. IR-2678; therefore, just compensation should be based not on 1995
market values, but on those prevailing on the date of taking or the filing of
the expropriation case in 1990
HELD:
YES.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that:
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property
at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the
government. However, if the government takes possession
before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value
should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession,
not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the
filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination
of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides
with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67
partly states that 'upon the rendition of the order of

expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.' However, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of
complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the
expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is
considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence,
waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that
when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves
only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just
compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer
applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable . . . .
In this case, Records show that sometime in 1990, NPC filed an
expropriation case docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2243. However, in an Order
dated July 12, 1994, the expropriation case was dismissed by the RTC for
failure of NPC to prosecute. Subsequently, or on December 5, 1994,
respondents filed Civil Case No. IR-2678 which is a complaint for
compensation and recovery of damages. Considering the dismissal of the
expropriation case for failure of the NPC to prosecute, it is as if no
expropriation suit was filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, NPC
is deemed "to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the
usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation." Nevertheless, just
compensation for the property must be based on its value at the time of the
taking of said property, not at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Consequently, the RTC should have fixed the value of the property at the
time NPC took possession of the same in 1990, and not at the time of the
filing of the complaint for compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair
market value in 1995.

Rule 67 no. 2
NAPOCOR v. Spouses Cruz, G.R. No. 165386, July 29, 2013
Petitioners: National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)

Respondents: SPOUSES SALVADOR and NENITA CRUZ et al

Facts :
An expropriation proceeding was commenced by NAPOCOR against
respondents Spouses Salvador and Nenita Cruz and several individuals
who are the owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park
Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The complaint
filed primarily sought the determination of just compensation due the
respondents after the negotiations for the purchase of the lots failed.
RTC ordered the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to
review and submit an updated appraisal report on the properties to be
acquired by Napocor in order 'to judicially guide the Court in fixing the
amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants."
In the
meantime, the RTC allowed Napocor to take possession of the lots,
after Napocor deposited an amount equivalent to their assessed value
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. After considering the
PAC's report, the RTC issued an order fixing the just compensation at
P3,000.00 per square meter.
Napocor appealed to CA. It assailed the appointment of the PAC,
claiming that its appointment was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court. It also alleged that the determination of the amount of just
compensation was without basis. CA affirmed with modification. It upheld
the appointment of the PAC and the recommendation to set the just
compensation at P2,200.00 per square meter, but removed the additional
P800.00 that the RTC imposed. Its motion for reconsideration of the CA
decision was denied.
Hence NAPOCOR filed this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Napocor asserts that the appointment of the PAC as
commissioners was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
specifically, Section 5. It contends that Rule 67 requires the trial court
to appoint three persons, and not a committee like the PAC. The
members of the PAC also did not subscribe to an oath which is
required under Section 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Napocor
further alleges that the CA erred in disregarding the compromise
agreement it entered into with the respondents. The respondents, on
the other hand, assert that Napocor's allegations are unmeritorious.
They claim that the appointment of the PAC constituted substantial
compliance with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, since the
PAC was composed of three members (the provincial assessor, the
provincial engineer, and the provincial treasurer) who are government
officials without interest in the outcome of the litigation, and who are
competent to evaluate and assess valuation of the properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of the PAC
contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

as

commissioners was

Held:
NO. In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as
commissioners substantially complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee
instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since the PAC is
composed of three members the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial
Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we
find each member of the PAC competent to perform the duty required
of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. As
correctly found by the CA, they "are government officials entrusted with
the updating and time-to-time determination of currently assessed, as
well as, market value of properties within their jurisdiction." The mere
fact that they are government officials does not disqualify them as
disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant
interest in the case.
If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to be objectionable, it
should have filed its objections early on and not belatedly raise them
in its appeal with the CA. We find nothing in the records indicating
that Napocor seasonably objected to the appointment of the PAC or to
any aspect in the order of appointment. Instead, Napocor belatedly
raised its objections only in its appeal with the CA. For its failure to
comply with the Rules, we consider Napocor to have waived its
objections against any supposed irregularity in the appointment of the
PAC.
If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation
fixed in the commissioners' report, its remedy was to file its objections
within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of the report. However, as
with the objections to the appointment of the PAC, Napocor failed to
make a timely objection to the report of the commissioners and raised
them only before the CA
It appears to us that Napocor has demonstrated a pattern of
procrastination in this case. We note that not only did it belatedly file
its objections to the appointment of the PAC and to the commissioners'
report; it also failed to submit copies of the compromise agreement
with the CA despite the numerous extensions it requested. Significantly,
the execution of the compromise agreement, by itself, did not enjoin
the CA from resolving the appeal. By its terms and as found out by
the CA, the compromise agreement required the approval of the CA for
it to take effect. Thus, Napocor can no longer assail the CA's authority
to resolve the appeal after it consistently failed to furnish the CA a
copy of the agreement.

RULE 67 NO. 3
REPUBLIC v. SAMSON-TATAD
GR NO. 187677
April 17, 2013

PETITIONER:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),

RESPONDENT:
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND
REBECCA GENATO,

FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by DPWH, filed a
Complaint for the expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the
construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. Private respondents,
Spouses Genato, are the registered owners of a piece of land.
During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter
from Engr.Gatan, reporting that the subject property was "government land
and that the title of the respondent is of dubious origin and of fabrication as
it encroached or overlapped on a government property. As a result, petitioner
filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the
proceedings.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property
"declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting
claims. The RTC admitted petitioners Amended Complaint, deferred the
release to respondents the amount of (P18,400,000) deposited in the bank,
equivalent to the current zonal valuation of the land, and declared the
property as the subject of conflicting claims.

While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject

property actually belonged to the Government, private respondents
interposed objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the
evidence, as it constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT. The
RTC then required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Upon
receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued an Order stating that the
issue of the validity of the TCT can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
it was denied.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction but it was denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the motion was also denied. Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail
the validity of respondents title.

HELD
We rule that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert
its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to just compensation.
Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should
not be construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for
expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is
taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is
asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Here, the
attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an
"attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to
appropriate private property, and the contest on private respondents' title
arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly
compensated.

The Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari and the prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assailed Decision and Resolution the
CA and RTC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. MELBA TAN TE,

respondent.
[G.R. No. 169263. September 21, 2011.]

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance No. 7951
an expropriation measure authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or
expropriation real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets
where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded to bona fide
residents. The covered property measures 1,425 square meters, and includes
the 475-square-meter lot owned by respondent Melba Tan Te. Respondent
had acquired the property from the heirs of Emerlinda Dimayuga Reyes in
1996, and back then it was being occupied by families whose leasehold
rights had long expired even prior to said sale. In 1998, respondent had
sought before MTC the ejectment case. The favorable ruling in that case
evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of Manila,
issued a Writ of Demolition at respondent's instance. The City of Manila had
instituted an expropriation case thereof. RTC dismissed the first compliant
upon motion by Melba for failure to show that an ordinance authorized the
expropriation and non-compliance with the provisions of Republic Act 7279.
On November 16, 2000, petitioner filed this second Complaint for
expropriation before the RTC, attaching a copy of Ordinance No. 7951 and it
had already offered to buy the property from Melba, which the latter failed to
retrieve from the post office despite notice. The city was thereby compelled
to file the complaint, after depositing in trust with the Land Bank of the
Philippines P1,000,000.00 in cash, representing the just compensation
required by law.
Melba, instead of filing, filed a motion to dismiss, and raised the

following grounds: Ordinance No. 7951 was an invalid ordinance because it

violated a rule against taking private property without just compensation;
that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of
R.A. No. 7279; and that she qualified as a small property owner and, hence,
exempt from the operation of R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being the only
piece of realty that she owned.
RTC: Petitioner moved that it be allowed to enter the property, but
before it could be resolved, the trial court issued its June 13, 2001 Order
dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court held that while petitioner had
deposited with the bank the alleged P1M cash in trust for respondent,
petitioner nevertheless did not submit any certification from the City
Treasurer's Office of the amount needed to justly compensate respondent for
her property. Second, it emphasized that the provisions of Sections 9 and 10
of R.A. No. 7279 are mandatory in character, yet petitioner had failed to
show that it exacted compliance with them prior to the commencement of
this suit. Lastly, it conceded that respondent had no other real property
except the subject lot which, considering its total area, should well be
considered a small property exempted by law from expropriation. In view of
the dismissal of the complaint, petitioner's motion to enter was rendered
moot and academic.
CA: dismissed the same finding no merit.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The trial court's dismissal of its complaint
was premature, and it faults the CA for having failed to note that by such
dismissal it has been denied an opportunity to show previous compliance
with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 as well as to
establish that respondent actually owns other realty apart from the subject
property. Whether or not it had complied with the law is a matter best
treated in a full-blown trial rather than in a motion to dismiss.

ISSUES:
1. WON socialized housing falls within the confines of public use.
2. WON petitioner that by virtue of its power of eminent domain included in
its charter is not bound by the provisions of Republic Act 7279

HELD:
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled in Sumulong v. Guerrero, citing the earlier
case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes: The public use requirement for a
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be
for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power
of eminent domain comes into play. . . . The constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be divided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The term "public use" has
acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. . . . Specifically,
urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost
housing are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the
expanded concept of public use but also because of specific
provisions in the Constitution. . . .
The 1987 Constitution [provides]: The State shall promote a just and
dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living and an improved quality of life for all. (Article II, Section 9)
The State shall, by law and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing program for urban land reform and
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. . . . In the implementation of such program the State
shall respect the rights of small property owners. (Article XIII, Section 9)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of
housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot
be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A
beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who

need it, all at once.

Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of
crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in
developing countries. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the
United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year
of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international
community on those problems." The General Assembly is seriously
concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local
levels and of international organizations, the driving conditions of the
majority of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements,
especially in developing countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative
and absolute terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982,
Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
2. Congress passed R.A. No. 7279, to provide a comprehensive and
continuing urban development and housing program as well as access to
land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless citizens; uplift the
conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas by
making available decent housing at affordable cost; optimize the use and
productivity of land and urban resources; reduce urban dysfunctions which
affect public health, safety and ecology; and improve the capability of local
governments in undertaking urban development and housing programs and
projects, among others. Accordingly, all city and municipal governments are
mandated to inventory all lands and improvements within their respective
locality and identify lands which may be utilized for socialized housing and as
resettlement sites for acquisition and disposition to qualified beneficiaries.
Section 10 thereof authorizes local government units to exercise the power
of eminent domain to carry out the objectives of the law, but subject to the
conditions stated therein and in Section 9.
DELICANO v. PECHATEN CORPORATION
G.R. 191251 September 7, 2011
FACTS: Respondent Pechaten Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel
of land (property) located at 852 Vicente Cruz Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
Respondent and Teodoro Alberto, Honorata Salmorin, Aquilina Hizon,
and Dalmacia Meneses entered into a two-year lease contract involving the
property. Subsequently, the lessees executed a waiver of their rights or
interest in the lease contract in favor of Virgilio Meneses.

When the lease contract expired, respondent offered Virgilio Meneses

to renew the lease agreement or purchase the property. Virgilio Meneses
ignored the offer and failed to pay monthly rentals for the property starting
July 1995.
On 6 October 1999, respondent sent a demand letter to Virgilio
Meneses to vacate the property and pay the accrued rent of P141,032 or
reasonable compensation for the use of the property. When Virgilio Meneses
refused, respondent filed with the MeTC a case for unlawful detainer with
damages against Virgilio Meneses. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondent. On appeal, judgment was affirmed by the RTC.
Meanwhile, the City of Manila filed on 12 August 2004 a complaint for
expropriation against respondent involving the property. Thereafter, RTC
issued a Writ of Possession and Order of Expropriation in favor of the City of
Manila.
Upon the death of Virgilio Meneses, he was substituted by his heirs,
who are the petitioners in this case. In view of the Orders of the RTC
involving the property in the expropriation case, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration in the RTC of its Decision in the unlawful detainer case.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case, alleging that the case was rendered
moot by virtue of the Writ of Possession issued by the RTC in the
expropriation case involving the property. The RTC then modified its decision
and set aside the order to vacate the subject property for being moot and
academic. Respondent appealed the unlawful detainer case to the CA, to no
avail.
Furthermore, petitioners stated that the City of Manila had already
turned over the property to them. Respondent opposed the motion, alleging
that the Order of Expropriation is the subject of appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the expropriation of the
property pursuant to City Ordinance No. 7984 was intended for the sole
benefit of the family of Virgilio Meneses. Thus, the CA dismissed the
complaint for eminent domain. The City of Manila did not appeal the
Decision, which became final and executor.
Respondent alleged that the decision of the CA in the expropriation
case, which became final and executor, is a supervening event which
warrants the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in this
unlawful detainer case.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are still entitled to retain possession over the
subject property despite the dismissal of the expropriation case
HELD: NO. Considering that the Decision of the Court of Appeals-Special
Sixth Division reversing the judgment of expropriation already became final
and executory, it is only proper that respondent should be restored to its

rightful possession of the property in accordance with Section 11, Rule 67 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure:
Sec. 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. The right of
the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the defendant and
appropriate the same to public use or purpose shall not be delayed by
an appeal from judgment. But if the appellate court determines that
plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered
ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to
the defendant of the possession of the property, and to determine the
damages which the defendant sustained and may recover by reason of
the possession taken by the plaintiff.
NPC v. YCLA Sugar Development Corp.
GR NO.: 193936
DATE: December 11, 2013
PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
RESPONDENT: YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government owned and
controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the
development of hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. YCLA Sugar
Development Corporation (YCLA) is the registered owner of three parcels of
land situated in Puerto Galera. In order to complete its 69 KV CalapanMamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera, NPC had to construct
transmission lines that would traverse several private properties, including
the said parcels of land owned by YCLA. Accordingly, on December 2, 1997,
NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against YCLA and
several other individuals. On April 30, 1999, the parties moved, inter alia, for
the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC to
determine the reasonable amount of just compensation to be paid by the
NPC. Thus, the RTC issued an order terminating the pre-trial conference and
directing the constitution of a Board of Commissioners, which would submit a
report and recommendation as to the reasonable amount of just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The Board of
Commissioners submitted its Report, which fixed the amount of just
compensation of the subject properties at P500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected
to the amount recommended by the Board of Commissioners, claiming that
the amount of just compensation should be fixed at P900.00 per sq m
considering the improvements in their properties. Trial on the determination
of the reasonable amount of just compensation ensued after NPCs comment
to YCLAs written affirmation. Consequently, YCLA filed a motion asking the
RTC to direct the Board of Commissioners to conduct an ocular inspection

over the subject properties and, thereafter, amend/revise the Board of

Commissioners Report dated May 2, 2001.
YCLAs motion was granted by the RTC. On September 15, 2003, the
Board of Commissioners submitted its second Report, which fixed the just
compensation of the subject properties at P1,000.00 per sq m, justified by its
location on a strategic place and the consequential damages to the whole
properties of the defendants because the plaintiff occupied the front portion
along the highway. The RTC rendered a Decision, which adopted the report
and recommendation of the BoC, and directs NPC to pay YCLA the total
amount of P5,786,000 representing the value of the expropriated lands
owned by the said defendant and its 26 molave trees which were cut down to
make way for the NPCs project, with legal interest from the time the plaintiff
had actually took possession of the subject properties on 19 April 1999 until
full payment has been made. Unperturbed, NPC appealed the RTC Decision
to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in relying on the recommendation of
the BoC as regards the amount of just compensation. NPC claimed that the
amount of P1,000.00 per sq m recommended by the BoC as the reasonable
amount of just compensation, which was adopted by the RTC, is too
excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and
undeveloped agricultural lands at the time it instituted the action for
expropriation. The CA rendered the Decision which affirmed with modification
the RTC Decision. The CA held that the RTCs determination of the amount of
just compensation was reasonable notwithstanding that it was merely based
on the Report submitted by the BoC. The RTC pointed out that there was no
showing that the said Report was tainted with irregularity, fraud or bias.
Nevertheless, the CA modified the award rendered by the RTC, by fixing the
amount of just compensation to P900.00 per sq m instead of P1,000.00 per
sq m, since YCLA only sought an award of P900.00 per sq m as just
compensation for the subject properties in the proceedings before the RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at
the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties.
HELD:
Partly meritorious. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss.
The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation"
and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The
constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one
who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual

taking by the government. It is settled that the amount of just compensation

is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. In this case, in arriving
at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily
on the BoCs Report dated September 15, 2003, which, in turn, was arrived
at after conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties on August
27, 2003. However, the BoCs recommendation as to the amount of just
compensation was based on the prevailing market value of the subject
properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of the lower courts is that the
prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to
determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint
for expropriation was filed by NPC on December 2, 1997.
Further, the Court notes that the BoC, in the said Report, merely
alleged that its members arrived at the amount of P1,000 as just
compensation for the subject properties based on actual sales, presumably
of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of "reliable persons" that
were interviewed. However, the said Report is not supported by any
corroborative documents such as sworn declarations of the "reliable persons"
that were supposedly interviewed. The Court has consistently ruled that just
compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must be
considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value
of like properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and
location. But before these factors can be considered and given weight, the
same must be supported by documentary evidence. A commissioners
report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is
manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. Under the Rules
of Court, any evidence whether oral or documentary is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but
on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. A
commissioners report of land prices is considered as evidence in the
determination of the amount of just compensation due the land owner in
expropriation cases. The recommended amount of just compensation
contained in the commissioners report of land prices, in turn, is based on
various factors such as the fair market value of the property, the value of like
properties. Thus, it becomes imperative that the commissioners report of
land prices be supported by pertinent documents, which impelled the
commissioners to arrive at the recommended amount for the condemned
properties, to aid the court in its determination of the amount of just
compensation. Otherwise, the commissioners report becomes hearsay and
should thus not be considered by the court. Because the determination of
just compensation for the subject properties is insufficient, the respective
Decisions should be set aside. Nevertheless, the Court cannot fix the amount
of just compensation for the subject properties at P500.00 pursuant to the
BoC's Report dated May 2, 2001. The said Report suffers from the same
infirmity as the Second Report - unsupported by any documentary evidence
and its recommendation are based on the prevailing market value in 2001.

This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just
compensation, in conformity with this Decision.
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 109338,
Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage
against Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC). Judgment was rendered in
favor of Leviste. When the decision became final and executory, the trial
court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno
levied upon two (2) parcels of land. The parcels of land were sold at public
auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). A copy of the writ
of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing
on certain portions of the subject property.
Vines Realty filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removal
of improvements on the subject land. Among the improvements for removal
were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner. Respondent
Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts professedly using a
chainsaw and resulting in a loud blast affecting the area. The sheriff, at the
request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in
the cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and
barangays.
It was the contention that Vines Realty was the owner of the roadside and
that petitioner could not construct power lines therein without its permission.
Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within the
right of way of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmea as granted
by the District Engineer of DPWH.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located
in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.
HELD: YES.
Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 269[36] are:
Section 16 Powers-

(j) To construct, maintain and operate electric transmission and distribution

lines along, upon, under and across publicly owned lands and public
thoroughfares, including, without limitation, all roads, highways, streets,
alleys, bridges and causeways; Provided, that such shall not prevent or
unduly impair the primary public uses to which such lands and thoroughfares
are otherwise devoted;
(k) To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law
for the exercise of such power by other corporations constructing or
operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and
distribution lines or systems.
Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of
eminent domain.
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview
of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements
of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just
compensation for private property condemned for public use.
However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the
easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of
the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land,
except those that would result in contact with the wires.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering
the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the
use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its
ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money
equivalent of the property.
No matter how commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just and
equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for
the taking of its property, which is the measure of the indemnity, not
whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.
Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of the exercise of its
right-of-way easement and not ownership over the land. Public utilities power
of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the
expropriator.

Consequently, we rule that a courts writ of demolition can not prevail

over the easement of a right-of-way which falls within the power of eminent
domain.

CASE TITLE: National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo,

GR NO.: 154411
DATE: June 19, 2003
DOCTRINE:
The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is
either an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it
finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with
an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are
appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is
taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be
questioned.

PETITIONER: National Housing Authority

RESPONDENT: Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, CA, Hon. Isaias Dicdican, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, and Pascual Y. Abordo,
Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City.

FACTS:
The National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against
Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo. The purpose for this expropriation proceeding is that the
affected lands are to be developed as a specialized housing project by

petitioner. Upon determination of the just compensation of the properties of

respondents, both petitioner and respondents filed for its reconsideration.
Prior to the denial of their reconsideration, petitioner moved to dismiss its
complaint for eminent domain on the ground that the implementation of its
socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable
value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries
can not afford. It was denied because the Partial Judgment 1 had already
become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason to
warrant the dismissal of the case.
Thereafter, respondent Sheriff Pascual Y. Abordo served on petitioner a
Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court to
enforce the Partial Judgment. Meanwhile, the CA set aside the dismissal of
the petition and reinstated the same. Consequently, a temporary restraining
order was issued enjoining respondent sheriff to preserve the status quo.
However, respondent sheriff served on the Landbank of the Philippines a
Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and interests of
petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds and
personal properties of petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for eminent domain may be dismissed where
the case had been decided and the judgment had already become final and
executory.

HELD:
No. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first,
condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will
be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just
compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. The
outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an
order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes
1 Judgment of the complaint for eminent domain which adopted the
recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the
lands of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter.

of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing
the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable.
Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court
which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of
respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and
may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court. A final and
executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not
infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through
repeated suits on the same claim.
Moreover, petitioners argument that the intended public use was
rendered nugatory by the unreasonable just compensation fixed by the
court, which is beyond the means of the intended beneficiaries of the
socialized housing project is tenuous. The public purpose of the socialized
housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just
compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent housing
to the urban poor dwellers in the locality was not lost by the mere fact that
the land cost more than petitioner had expected. Respondent landowners
had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be
permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to
abandon it later when it finds the amount of just compensation
unacceptable.
Napocor v. Bongbong

FACTS: Spouses Antero and Rosario Bongbong are the registered

owners of a 364,451square-meter parcel of land situated at Barangay
Sambulawan, Villaba, Leyte. The property is covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. R-2189 of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Leyte. As early as 1996, the National Power Corporation
(NPC) negotiated with the spouses Bongbong to use a portion of the
property for the construction of a 230 KV LCIP Malitbog-Tabango CETL
TWR SITE 1046 for the Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. When the
spouses Bongbong agreed, NPC occupied a 25,100-sq-m portion of the
property. ETISAc On April 22, 1996, NPC paid the spouses Bongbong

the amount of P33,582.00 representing the value of the improvements

that were damaged by the construction of the project. The voucher for
the payment of easement fee was prepared. However, when NPC
offered a check for P163,150.00 (representing 10% of the total market
value of the area affected) as payment for the easement fee, Antero
refused to accept the amount and demanded that NPC pay the full
value of the 25,100-sq-m portion it had occupied. On October 28,
1997, the spouses Bongbong received the P163,150.00 under protest. 3
On October 3, 1997, the spouses Bongbong demanded that the NPC
pay P8,748,448.00 which they alleged to be the just and reasonable
value for their land and improvements.
ISSUE: Whether or not the procedure laid down in Rule 67 should be
followed in determining just compensation?
HELD: No.
Rule 67 need not be followed where the expropriator has violated
procedural requirements. When a government agency itself violates
procedural requirements, it waives the usual procedure prescribed in
Rule 67. The usual procedure in the determination of just compensation
is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural
requirements. NPC's taking of Pobre's property without filing the
appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation
is a transgression of procedural due process. In National Power
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 50 the Court clarified that when there
is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint
for damages or just compensation, the provisions of Rule 67 would not
apply.

Republic v. Gingoyon
FACTS
The case involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the
terminal complex it built. The present controversy has its roots with the
promulgation of the Court's decision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in 2003
(2003 Decision). This decision nullified the "Concession Agreement for the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International

Airport Passenger Terminal III" entered into between the Philippine

Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The
agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport
terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said
terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were
nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO,
did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the
NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the
time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had
already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the
ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the
nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. After the
promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in
the possession of PIATCO. The Government and PIATCO conducted several
rounds of negotiation. It also appears that arbitral proceedings were
commenced. Thereafter the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special
Raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance
of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and
control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had
deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value
for taxation purposes. The case was raffled to respondent judge Hon. Henrick
F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day the RTC issued an Order 16
directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government. However
the RTC subsequently issued another Order designed to supplement its 21
December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the said Order, now
assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its
writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep.
Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of
Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects
and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects. An Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for Inhibition (Hon. Gingoyon) was
filed which were both denied by the court. Thus, the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Resolution permits expropriation
2. Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case.
HELD

1. The 2004 Resolution Which Is Law of This Case Generally Permits

Expropriation
The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this
case in two aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just
compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that
the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just
compensation is paid. the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3
terminal was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just
compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures.
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the
NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real
property. 26 The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute.
It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation)
recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be
titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be
made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the
NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion
Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]."
2. Application of Rule 67 Violates the 2004 Agan Resolution
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable
to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when
the national government expropriates property "for national government
infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national
government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the
assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67

continues to apply.
The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns
the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled
to a writ of possession.
Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized
government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation
for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No.
8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property
owner before the writ may issue.
Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not
necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the
letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court's requirement in
the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to
PIATCO before the Government may take over the property.
NOTE: The Proper Amount to be Paid under Rep. Act No. 8974
There could be no "BIR zonal valuations" on the NAIA 3 facility, as provided in
Rep. Act No. 8974, since zonal valuations are only for parcels of land, not for
airport terminals. Its entitlement to just compensation should be limited to
the value of the improvements and/or structures themselves. Thus, the
determination of just compensation cannot include the BIR zonal valuation
under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
"in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost
urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area
concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of
the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." As regards the amount, the Court sees
no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value.
Still, we cannot deem the Government as having faithfully complied with
Rep. Act No. 8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to the
property owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government
depositary. Without such direct payment, no writ of possession may be
obtained.
-Writ of Possession May Not Be Implemented Until Actual Receipt by PIATCO
of Proferred Value

-Rights of the Government upon Issuance of the Writ of Possession

-The Government itself is authorized to perform the acts that are essential to
the operation of the NAIA 3. However, before payment it acquires no
ownership thereto.
Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[ 62 ] this Court ruled that the
expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:
". . . The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon
the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint" . . . .
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought
to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. . . . .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
to have been completed
Final Determination of Just Compensation must be made Within 60 Days
-Appointment of Commissioners RA 8974 is silent Apply Rule 67
-Inhibition of Hon. Gongoyon The disqualification of a judge is a
depravation of his/ her judicial pwer and should not be allowed on the basis
of mere speculations and surmises. It cannot be based on the adverse
nature of the judges rulings towards the movant for inhibition, especially if
these are in accord with the law.
CASE TITLE: Republic vs. Samson-Tatad
GR NO.: G.R. No. 187677
DATE: April 17, 2013

PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH)
RESPONDENT: HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND
REBECCA GENATO
DOCTRINE:
Such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be
construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for
expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is
taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is
asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.

FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several
defendants, including private respondents, for the expropriation of several
parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue
Flyover. Private respondents, Spouses William and Rebecca Genato, are the
registered owners of a piece of land ("subject property") covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT).
During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter from
Engr. Patrick B. Gatan, Project Manager IV of the DPWH-NCR, reporting that
the subject property was "government land and that the transfer certificate
of title of the said claimant [respondent] . . . is of dubious origin and of
fabrication as it encroached or overlapped on a government property." As a
result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage
of the proceedings to an area conforming to the findings of the DPWH.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property
"declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting
claims."
While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property
actually belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed
objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence,
as it constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT. The RTC then
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.
RTC

Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued an Order finding that
the issue of the validity of the TCT can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose and not in this instant proceeding.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
CA
The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.
In this petition, petitioner argues that under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, if the ownership of a property to be expropriated is uncertain, the
court in the same expropriation proceeding is also given authority to make a
proper adjudication of the matter.
This view is allegedly supported by Republic v. Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, presided formerly by Judge L. Pasicolan (Republic) in which the
trial court hearing the expropriation proceeding was also allowed to resolve
the issue of ownership.
Private respondents, on the other hand, invoke Section 48 of P.D. 1529, viz.:
SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to
assail the validity of respondents' title under the TCT.
HELD:
The SC ruled that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its
ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining
who is entitled to just compensation.
Proper interpretation of Section 9, Rule 67
The SC first had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the case of
Republic v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided formerly by Judge
L. Pasicolan. In addressing the issue of "whether or not the court that hears
the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same
proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned," the
Court answered in the affirmative:

The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court
that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to
determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership
of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in
the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain
the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or
sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful
owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident
from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
SEC. 9.Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims.
If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain,
or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof,
the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the
clerk of court for the benefit of the persons
adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the
payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter
upon the property, or retain it for the public use or
purpose if entry has already been made.
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or
persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not
preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from
assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such
eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should
state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be
ascertained or specified with accuracy.
Such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be
construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for
expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is
taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is
asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
Inapplicability of Section 48, P.D. 1529

Here, the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized

as an "attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to
appropriate private property, and the contest on private respondents' title
arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly
compensated.
Contrary to petitioner's allegations, the Complaint and Amended Complaint
cannot also be considered as a direct attack. The amendment merely limited
the coverage of the expropriation proceedings to the uncontested portion of
the subject property. The RTC's Order declaring the property as subject of
conflicting claims is a recognition that there are varying claimants to the
sums to be awarded as just compensation. This serves as an authority for the
court to conduct a limited inquiry on the property's ownership.