UNDERSTANDING THE MINDANAO INSURGENCY by: Cecille Aycocho

The Philippines faces a myriad of national security threats, which starts and ends with
insurgent groups fighting for either independence or reforms. The rebellion by Filipino
Muslims in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago has plagued past governments. The
Muslims had waged guerilla warfare since 1972, alternately pressing for either
secession or increased autonomy.
Despite various attempts at neutralizing these groups once and for all numerous peace
talks, the country is yet to have its peace. Now we are at a loss about the next step.
What more can we do that hasnt been done to solve the problem of insurgency? What
are we missing?
Disunity in Diversity
Muslims, also known as Moros, have nurtured a sense of separatism for most of our
history. There hundred years of Spanish colonization brought most areas of the
Christian population under control, but the Spanish were never able to assert broad
governance over those areas of the southern Philippines that were host to the slim
percentage of Muslims. (For much of Philippine history, Muslims represented 4-5% of
the population, but that has recently risen to 7-8%). During the American occupation,
some of fiercest battles fought against authorities were from our Muslims brothers.
Despite this long history of separatist sentiment, Filipino Christians and Muslims alike
trace current frictions and internal conflict over Muslim separatism not to differences, but
to economic inequities.
Specifically, resettlement policies in the 1950s encouraged Filipino Christians to migrate
from over-crowded Luzon province to Mindanao, where Muslims comprised a majority
of the population and owned approximately 40% of the land. Both the Muslims
percentage of the population in Mindanao and their land holdings there shank

significantly as Christians Filipinos became the majority in Mindanao and gained a solid
preponderance of land.
Those provinces of Mindanao which have significant Muslims populations are still
among the poorest in the Philippines. By the 1970s, the economic impact of this
transmigration trend was widely felt among Muslims in the Philippines and a Muslims
separatist group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), arose to challenge
Manilas rule in Mindanao. At its height as an insurgent force, the MNLF had 60,000
combatants. Already subject to insurgency of the communist New Peoples Army (NPA),
Mindanao became a busy battlefield.
The separatist goals of the MNLF were reinforced in the late 1970s and 1980s by the
global wave of Islamic fundamentalism. Over a twenty-year period, the MNLF and
Manila waged internal war but gradually came to accord, and a peace agreement was
signed in 1996.
Several years before, as it became obvious to Filipino Muslim radicals that the MNLF
was prepared to consider Manilas offer of autonomy, fundamentalist group split from
the MNLF. The most significant of these was the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf. However,
six provinces with Muslim populations voted to become the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), under MNLF political control. Approximately 25,000 MNLF
combatants were demobilized under a Philippine government program, with economic
assistance from the United States.
This program provided agricultural inputs and training to enable insurgents to become
farmers. However, the peace dividend the larger package of economic assistance
that the ARMM expected from Manila has been slow to come, causing discontent and
disillusionment. Moreover, the factionalism which has characterized the Filipino Muslim
community for centuries did not prevent further splits in the MNLF after the 1996
accords were signed.

The Roots of Insurgency

Our history with insurgencies has yet to end if we want to attain peace and unity in the
country. After all that has been said and done on the subject, one must try to look
deeper into the problem and to address there root cause/s.
In his book, Professor Thomas McKenna, author of Muslim Rulers and Rebels:
Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines, traced the causes
of the Mindanao problem and came up with the conclusion that a cultural and religious
gulf divided Muslims and Christians since the Spanish occupation.
He further writes in his book that cultural differences do not by themselves create ethnic
conflict. But the Christian Filipinos, including representatives of the Philippine state,
have often tended to view Philippine Muslims as socially backward and untrustworthy
precisely because of their history of resistance to hispanicization. While Muslims have
tended to be highly suspicious of the intentions of the Philippine government and
generally wary of Christians. Although, as mentioned earlier, this is not to say that
religion issues and cultural differences exactly caused the tension and created this
unrest, but more because of economic inequalities. The resettlement policies
encouraged Filipino-Christians to relocate from Luzon to the Mindanao area. As a result,
by the late 1960s Mindanao Muslims found themselves a relatively impoverished
minority in their own homeland. Marco Garrido an the Asian Times, agrees on these
observations and wrote, Thee events in particular Christian immigration in Mindanao,
sectarian violence, and martial law transformed the kind of pliable sanitized Islam the
colonial administration had propagated into a basis for discrimination and, eventually,
rebellion.
History would tell us that no insurgency arose without a viable reason. But political and
economic issues certainly create unrest and dissatisfaction. The root cause of
insurgency relates to the social, economic and political inequities which create conflict.

The present administration is aware of these facts, and very much so. In the Strategy
of Holistic Approach, the government outlines the roots of insurgency as: 1. Poverty,
which includes low productivity, criminality, marginalization, environmental degradation;
2. Ignorance, which includes poor resource base and low quality education; 3. Disease,
which includes malnutrition, poor delivery of health services; Injustice, which includes
human rights violations, graft and corruption, land conflicts.
Some thoughts written by Salah Jubair, in his book, Bangsamoro: A Nation Under
Endless Tyranny, are encouraging, The Moros are not asking for the whole Mindanao,
because circumstances have superseded some facts of history. They just want a parcel
of it, especially where they predominate. This will enable generations after them to live
in peace and piety, as Islam enjoins all believers. The indigenous peoples, whom the
Visayans call Lumads may opt to join their blood-brothers, the Moros, and they are
welcome. After all, the two peoples are inseparable in the history of Mindanao and Sulu.
Is this too much a price for peace, development and prosperity for all?
Keeping these observations in mind, there is only one viable solution address the
issue of poverty.
Giving Peace A Chance
Economic Standpoint
Since we have established what seems to be the obvious, that poverty is the root cause
of insurgency, addressing this should be the main focus, which the present
administration has also realized. We know that steps to address this issue have been
done, many programs formulated and planned. But what ever happened to them?
According to statistics, poverty incidence is highest in Mindanao. Forty-five (45) percent
of Mindanaos families live below the poverty line, compared to only 30 percent in Luzon
and 38 percent in the Visayas. This figure (45%) is even way below the Philippine

poverty incidence of 32 percent. According to data from National Statistics Coordinating

Board (NSCB), of the 4.5 million Filipino families that cannot meet the minimum food
requirement for survival, 1.4 million are in Mindanao.
In 1996, the Davao Consensus, which created a limited Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao, was underpinned by a wider Zone of Peace and Development dedicated to
the enactment of social economic programs. Administration by administration, agenda is
laid down. During President Joseph Estradas administration, The National Peace and
Development and the Strategy of Total Approach (STA) was laid down. It contained the
Strategy of Total Approach, which covered the various policies and programs that would
address the multi-faceted dimensions of the armed conflicts and insurgencies in the
country. Despite these plans, behind the STA, the Four-Point Agenda and other
programs was President Estradas policy of an all-out-war against the Muslim rebels. He
sought to weaken them enough to bring them to the negotiation table. According to
those who worked on the ground to help those afflicted by the fighting, all these
programs were good on paper but were not implemented. Hardly any of the resources
supposedly allocated by the government for development reached the community; this
is attributed to the high level of corruption in government agencies.
The Arroyo government has also promised to devote a substantial amount for the
development of Mindanao. As with the previous administrations agenda, we seem to
already have an understanding on what needs to be done, and yet, the problem is in the
implementation. Measures should be implemented to ensure that funds reach the
intended to ensure that the funds reach the intended project and community.
Infrastructure and facilities must be funded, and people given more employment
opportunities.
Social Strategies
Education is also very important. Rebels and insurgents use psy-war to win supporters
in their areas. Emotional approach is almost always very effective in convincing people.

When rebels go around advocating their ideologies, its almost a probability that these
people would believe them, especially the youth. Living in a poverty-stricken area, with
no evidence of development, they know very little or none at all of the governments
programs for them. And rebels in return, knowing these things so well, treat these
peoples minds like a sponge that whatever information they feed them would be
considered the truth. Who wouldnt? When you know nothing else, there is no basis for
comparison, to which you base your judgments on. With education, residents will not be
as easily swayed by leftists as easily as uneducated residents will be.
Goals of a long-range counterinsurgency plan should also include deterring alienated
youth from joining a terrorist group in the first place. This may seem an impractical goal,
for how does one recognize a potential terrorist, let alone deter him or her from joining a
terrorist group? But this one is more of a proactive approach, instead of a reactive one.
Instead of going to areas where rebels are said to be popular, it would also be logical to
also educate people in areas, where the rebels are not yet established.
Doing so, you give them the information they need, and affirm to them that their
government works for them, before they are even fed the wrong ideas. A counter
strategy could be approached within the framework of advertising and civic-action
campaigns. Not only should all young people in the region be educated on the realities
of guerilla life, but a counterterrorist policy should be in place to inhibit them from joining
in the first place.
Likewise, image building and intensive consultations with key opinion leaders in these
areas are also logical. Opinion leaders are members of the community who have the
power to influence residents in his area, to believe in his opinions. Using this, our forces
can reach out to these key opinion leaders and win their hearts and minds. That way,
they have secured help to bridge the gap with the people in the area.
Also, insurgents work by employing psy-war tactics, as we very well know. They work
by blending in with the people, interacting with them. This s also what the government

forces must do. Reach to people and establish relationships, build friendships, this will
create a positive image for the government and will also convince the people that
military forces are not there to antagonize, but to protect them. Forge alliances with the
media, to create a positive image for the government effort, and to use these tools for
information dissemination to tell the people of the programs.
Military Solutions
Military presence would still be effective. But going on an all out war should not be the
plan anymore, as the past administrations experience would tell us that this is not the
way to peace. Making our presence felt should be enough to tell these insurgents and
the people that we are serious in our efforts. It is a truism of counterinsurgency that a
population will give its allegiance to the side that will best protect it. This is why the chief
goal of insurgents is to deprive the population of that sense of security. Through
violence and bloodshed, insurgents seek to foment a climate of fear by demonstrating
the authorities weakness and inability to maintain order.
The Road of Peace
Although social and economic development when properly supported and
implemented can inhibit insurgency, development alone cannot eliminate it.
Development is most effective when it is incorporated into a multi-pronged approach
that includes wider political, military, and community-relationship dimensions. These
qualifications aside, there is a noteworthy potential for development policies to reduce
the threat of insurgency.