Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines

Metro Manila
Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6656

June 10, 1988

AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND

EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service
officers and employees in the reorganization of the various agencies of the National Government
and of local governments, state colleges and universities expressly authorized by law, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, without sacrificing the need to
promote morale, efficiency in the civil service pursuant to Article IX, B, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Section 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause
and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern
of the department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the same functions is
created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and
the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
Section 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the following order of removal
shall be followed:
(a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service;

(b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of government service;
(c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and
(d) Employees holding permanent appointments: provided, that those in the same category
as enumerated above, who are least qualified in terms of performance and merit shall be laid
first, length of service notwithstanding.
Section 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for
appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former position
or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank.
No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have been
appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary qualification
requirements, among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to
positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless such
positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.
Section 5. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for
appointment in other agencies if they meet the qualification requirements of the positions therein.
Section 6. In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in any
reorganization, there shall be created a Placement Committee in each appointments shall be given
preference for appointment in the judicious selection and placement of personnel. The Committee
shall consist of two (2) members appointed by the head of the department or agency, a
representative of the appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the employees
holding positions in the first and second levels of the career service: provided, that if there is a
registered employee association with a majority of the employees as members, that employee
association shall also have a representative in the Committee: provided, further that immediately
upon approval of the staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned, such staffing pattern
shall be made known to all officers and employees of the agency who shall be invited to apply for
any of the positions authorized therein. Said application shall be considered by the Committee in the
placement and selection of personnel.
Section 7. A list of the personnel appointed to the authorized positions in the approved staffing
pattern shall be made known to all the officers and employees of the department or agency. Any of
such officers and employees aggrieved by the appointments made may file an appeal with the
appointing authority who shall make a decision within thirty (30) days from the filling thereof.
Section 8. An officer or employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing
authority may further appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof to the Civil Services
Commission which shall render a decision thereon within thirty (30) days and whose decision shall
be final and executory.
Section 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been
separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the
case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation.
Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and
other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their
separation or from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be:
provided, that application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the

corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a
separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such
separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the
department or agency concerned.
Section 10. All heads of department, commissions, bureaus, agencies or offices who after the
effectivity of this Act willfully violate any provision thereof, including failure to abide by the rules
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission or to implement a Civil Service Commission
reinstatement order, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not, exceeding ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) or by imprisonment of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) years or both such
fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court, and suffer permanent disqualification to hold
public office.
Section 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes within
a specified period of time authorized by law.
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which
are authorized by executive orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety
(90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their respective reorganization
plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Section 12. The Civil Service Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of this Act.
Section 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall be
retroactive as of June 30, 1987.
Section 14. If any part, section or provisions of this Act shall be held invalid or unconstitutional, no
other part, section or provision thereof shall be affected thereby.
Section 15. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in at least two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 10, 1988.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs. DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and
regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer,
who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license confiscated for
parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The
following statements were printed on the TVR:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC

OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM DATE
OF APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON.
CRIMINAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE
AFTER 30 DAYS.
VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVERS LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE
OF APPREHENSION.[1]
Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs validity, the respondent addressed a
letter[2] to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his drivers
license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint [3] with application for
preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on
12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the
validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional

prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the

MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties
on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he
suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the
deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila
Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed
out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the
fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers
are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the
validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of
powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of government in
administrative agencies.[4]
The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the
governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the
implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the courts attention
to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin,
however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he
claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26
September 1995, extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary drivers license for
twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted on 23 October 1995,
and the MMDA was directed to return the respondents drivers license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision [5] in favor of the
herein respondent and held that:

a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council
held on March 23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001,
authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.
b. The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver an
opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (drivers license) without
DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction,
cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made
permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to return to plaintiff his drivers license; th(e)
MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license without first
giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

In filing this petition,[6] the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court
below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a
property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power
in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that
revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due
process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the
judiciary retains the power to determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or
revocation of the license, the petitioner points out that under the terms of the
confiscation, the licensee has three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication
Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutors Office.

The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly
passed in the presence of a quorum, and that the lower courts finding that it had not
was based on a misapprehension of facts, which the petitioner would have us review.
Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs, the
basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself,
and that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any
implementing regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando,
implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for
the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring
motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic
enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of
traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the
date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or
vehicle plates.[7]
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin
the petitioner from confiscating drivers licenses is concerned, recent events have
overtaken the Courts need to decide this case, which has been rendered moot and
academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail
confiscating drivers licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioners
future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the
exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a
property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked
by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and

welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our
rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal [8] on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v.
Director of Forestry[9] and Oposa v. Factoran[10] on timber licensing agreements,
and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao [11] on a legislative franchise to
operate an electric plant.
Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such as State ex.
Rel. Sullivan,[12] which states in part that, the legislative power to regulate travel over the
highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be
exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and
pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration
and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first
appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained
right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the
interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to
withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Funk,[13] to the effect that: Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The
use of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and property upon the
highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but,
when operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of
destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth,
not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated
on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the
subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator
of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed to the promotion of public
safety and is well within the police power.
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in
the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how
and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[14] we
categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power,
let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that it had
the authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise, the MMDA argued that
there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street
to the public.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we
concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila
Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the
street was invalid.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar:
police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by
any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code
of 1991.[15] A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. [16] Local government units
are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units.
With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a
"special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide"
basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as
the MMDA. Thus:

. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in
R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare"
of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative

functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority
over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without
diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning
purely local matters.
.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. [17] (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower
court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the Functions and Powers of the Metro
Manila Development Authority. The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the
petitioner shall install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether
moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep.
Act No. 4136[18] and P.D. No. 1605[19] to the contrary notwithstanding, and that (f)or this
purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila,
through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic
enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of nongovernmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or
those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in
this case), the petitioner is not precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. [20]
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development
authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.

This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a
statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,
[21]
and is supported by the criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. [22]
A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact
that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by
the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management, [23] and
we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly trafficsnarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDAs
enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts
in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising
from a legitimate source.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]

Records, p. 10.

[2]

Id., p. 11.

[3]

Id., p. 1.

[4]

Memorandum for Defendants, Records, pp. 178 -185.

[5]

Id., pp. 187-190, penned by Hon. Helen Bautista-Ricafort.

[6]

Records, pp. 197-225.

[7]

Sec. 7, Mem. Circ. No. 04, Series of 2004.

[8]

56 Phil 123 (1931).

[9]

G.R. No. L-24548, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 302.

[10]

G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

[11]

G.R. No. L-22766, 30 August 1968, 24 SCRA 898.

[12]

63 P. 2d 653, 108 ALR 1156, 1159.

[13]

323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (108 ALR 1161).

[14]

G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000, 328 SCRA 836, penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno.

[15]

Sec. 16 of Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 states:

General Welfare.-Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,

improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants.
[16]

Supra, Note 18, p. 844, citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, pp. 9598 [1996], citing UP Law Center Revision Project, Part II, 712 [1970] citing Sady, Improvement of
Local Government Administration for Development Purpose, Journal of Local Administration
Overseas 135 [July 1962].

[17]

Ibid., pp. 849-860.

[18]

Entitled An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, to Create a
Land Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes, approved on 20 June 1964. Sec. 29
thereof states:
Confiscation of drivers license.- Law enforcement and peace officers duly designated by
the Commissioner shall, in apprehending any driver for violations of this Act or of any regulations
issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations, confiscate the license of the
driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Commission therefore which
shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours
from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be
extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen
days from the date of apprehension will cause suspension and revocation of his license.
(emphasis supplied)

[19]

Entitled Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Certain Powers Related to Traffic Management
and Control in Metropolitan Manila, Providing Penalties, and for Other Purposes, dated 21
November 1978.
SEC. 5.- In case of traffic violations, the drivers license shall not be confiscated but the
erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the
violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the
violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their
branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. (emphasis supplied)

[20]

Section 3(b), Rep. Act No. 7924.

[21]

Thus, in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. dela Serna, (G.R. No. 82805, 29 June 1989, 174
SCRA 524) we upheld the grant of concurrent jurisdiction between the Secretary of Labor or its
Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters to pass upon money claims, among other cases, the
provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding, as enunciated in Executive
Order No. 111. Holding that E.O. 111 was a curative law intended to widen workers access to the
Government for redress of grievances, we held,the Executive Order vests in Regional Directors
jurisdiction, [t]he provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding, it would
have rendered such a proviso - and the amendment itself - useless to say that they (Regional
Directors) retained the self-same restricted powers, despite such an amendment. It is
fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than
defeat it. (See also Philtread Workers Union v. Confessor, G.R. No. 117169, 12 March 1997, 269
SCRA 393.)

[22]

In Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, (G.R. No. 60549, 26 October 1983, 125 SCRA 221) we upheld the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain municipalities in the province of Cebu as
tourist zones. The law granted the Philippine Tourism authority the right to expropriate 282
hectares of land to establish a resort complex notwithstanding the claim that certificates of land
transfer and emancipation patents had already been issued to them thereby making the lands
expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under Presidential Decree No. 2, and
that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State

policies like those relating to the health and physical well-being of the people, and that property
already taken for public use may not be taken for another public use. We held that, (t)he
petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of anyone trying to strike down a statute or decree
whose avowed purpose is the legislative perception of the public good. A statute has in its favor
the presumption of validity. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a law. The courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except
in a clear case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). And in the absence of factual findings or evidence to
rebut the presumption of validity, the presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849; Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424).
In the same manner, we upheld in Dumlao v. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January
1980, 95 SCRA 392) the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that
any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the
retirement benefits and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected is disqualified to run for the same elective local office from
which he has retired. Invoking the need for the emergence of younger blood in local politics, we
affirmed that the constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based
upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all those belonging to the same class. (See also Tropical Homes, Inc, v. National
Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-48672, 31 July 1987 152 SCRA 540; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. L-47791, 11 March 1978, 82 SCRA 55; People v. Vera, GR No. 45685, 65 Phil 56 [1937].)
[23]

Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 7924.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent
problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best of intention,
we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall
and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road in
a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be promoted, we
stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law. h Y
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, nonprofit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private

subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street,
a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a
notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to
public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads: Court
"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic
"Dear President Lindo,
"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or
Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize the use
of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of
persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective
January 2, 1996.
"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the
points of entry and exit on said street.
"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be
extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing
traffic in the area.
"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of
the President on the matter.
"Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman"

[1]

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Sppedsc
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter
wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune
[2]

Street and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the MMDAs proposed action.
[3]

[4]

On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case
finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of
as follows: Jurissc
"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated
January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made
permanent.
"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del
Rosario in contempt is denied.
[5]

"No pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED."

[6]

The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998.
Hence, this recourse. Jksm
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
"I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC
TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT
BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION
ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED
FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO
OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET? Jlexj
V

WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE

SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED
BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?
V
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?"

[7]

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village,
a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of
Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general
public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen
(15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly
Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end
intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by
iron gates. Edp mis
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic
because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which
involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed
by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the
City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.
[8]

[9]

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary
and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
[10]

[11]

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by

law and has substantial control of local affairs." The Local Government Code of 1991
defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate" -- one endowed with
powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the provinces,
[16]

[17]

[18]

cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and political
subdivisions of the state.
[19]

[20]

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local
Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code,
known as the general welfare clause, viz: Chief
"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."
[21]

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang
panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the
municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is
the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang
bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers
of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x x." The same Code
gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary
to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote
the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon."
[22]

[23]

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government

units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,
Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina,
Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros,
San Juan and Taguig.With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative
region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the
region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.
[24]

[25]

"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be
viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units

comprising Metro Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the
scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and
traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and
sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter
services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public
safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the
following: Lexjuris
[26]

"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation,

coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and
projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and
promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods;
provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a
system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of
all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a single
ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"
[27]

In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following
powers and functions: Esm
"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority.The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and
long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land
use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with
national development objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term
investment programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources
and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall
include the packaging of projects and presentation to funding
institutions; Esmsc
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects
for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the
approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate
project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs
and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to
problems of implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro
Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically
pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request,
it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not
limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government
agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and
collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules
and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of
RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this
purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in
Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly
licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of
the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the
local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior
coordination with and consent of the local government unit
concerned." Jurismis
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the
local government units, national government agencies, accredited peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the
MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for
the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila.
[28]

The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president
of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the president of the Metro Manila
Councilors League. The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the
President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the
MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects,
and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it
approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules and regulations for
the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and
penalties. These functions are particularly enumerated as follows: LEX
[29]

"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. -

(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;

(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the
purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members
of the Council to be effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It
shall fix the compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and
approve the annual budget thereof for submission to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and
standards for metro-wide application governing the delivery of basic
services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees, and impose
and collect fines and penalties." Jj sc
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic
services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and
promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of
all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic
violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies
concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic
management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single
ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. Calrsc

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A.
No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
[30]

"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- x x

x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units
concerning purely local matters."
[31]

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate

Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission
(MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The
first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition, while the second decision
denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v.
Court of Appeals.
[32]

[33]

[34]

Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA and
three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the Ayala
Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of the
subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds
of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition on the
setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the
lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who
were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into
commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent
Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing
down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from the residential section of
the village.
[35]

The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of
Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal
Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its
boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal
Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for
the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air
Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent
thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone.
[36]

We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the
exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said street
was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply
for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate
the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Scc-alr

We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate

exercise of police power. The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to
enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".
[37]

In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street
was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion
and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic
congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village. The same reason was
given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the same
village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the police
power of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was
a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its
summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal.
[38]

[39]

Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at
bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati
and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street
is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA,
through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the
proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority
under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and
convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is
one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no
stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied
grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although
the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential
Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed
greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It
comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province
of Bulacan. Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid
growth of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these
areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services
rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently
and economically if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination,
"especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and
economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform
measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."
[40]

[41]

Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following

powers: Calrs-pped
"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby created
a public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested
with powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to
make contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate,
hold, transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are
necessary to carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be
administered by a Commission created under this Decree."
[42]

The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission
shall have the following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer
programs and provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend
money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of
indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however, continue to be
operative until otherwise modified or repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government
and review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its
jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to be not in
accordance with the established policies of the Commission, without
prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units
involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and
acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties
for any violation thereof which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00
or imprisonment of six years or both such fine and imprisonment for
a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making
functions;

8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire
services of the city and municipal governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct
garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall
direct traffic activities; Jjjuris
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities
pertaining to essential services such as transportation, flood control and
drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health and environmental
services, housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social,
economic and physical planning and development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the
affairs of their respective local governments and to propose to the
President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for
implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an
annual report to the President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic
report whenever deemed necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the
President of the Philippines." Sc jj
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. As a
"central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special
assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for
its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal
units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances,
resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had
the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any
of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P. D. No. 824 further provided:
"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and
thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in
their present form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The
members of the existing city and municipal councils in Metropolitan
Manila shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December

31, 1975, become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is

hereby created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many
barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission,
and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as
may be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Commission.
x x x.
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission
ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt; Provided,
that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall become
effective, until after its approval by the Commission; and Provided
further, that the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to
appropriate money and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions
with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the Commission."
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang
Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal
councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives
appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to
the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself,
however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and
measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs
approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to
appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully
possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the
component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval
by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the
autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sj cj
"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
herein provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy."

The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions

not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the
Visayas and Mindanao. Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided:
[43]

"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan

political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination."
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special
metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this
subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and
municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their
own local executive and legislative assemblies. Pending enactment of this law, the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power
to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
[44]

"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may

constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all
local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area."
[45]

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted
the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC
were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers
and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMAs power was limited
to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan
Manila." The MMAs governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although
composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely
given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services
requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions
and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its
rule-making power.
[46]

[47]

[48]

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible
for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction
was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended
local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide
the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development
plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of]
legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among
local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and
to "advise the local governments accordingly."
[49]

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development
authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the
affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined
in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced by
several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was
presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local Governments
chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee
consultations with the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR), with
former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA, and career officials of said agencies. When
the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments, the following debate
took place:
[50]

"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has
been debated a long time ago, you know. Its a special we can create a
special metropolitan political subdivision. Supreme
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the
Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and we have the
Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have
6. Now.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the
Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by the
Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a political
subdivision. What is the meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning
to say, that it has its own government, it has its own political
personality, it has the power to tax, and all governmental powers:
police power and everything. All right. Authority is different; because
it does not have its own government. It is only a council, it is an
organization of political subdivision, powers, no, which is not
imbued with any political power. Esmmis
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the
Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it
provides here that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power.
Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic services which have
to be delivered to the constituency. All right.

There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective as a political
subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by
the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of that power, it might
be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming
an authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in order that the
basic services can be effectively coordinated. All right. justice
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to
provide some funds, resources. But it does not possess any political
power. We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the power to
tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that it must
have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It
coordinates practically all these basic services so that the flow and the
distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot
deny that. Its before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system,
peace and order, we cannot deny these. Its right on our face. We have to
look for a solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we envision
that there should be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All
right, if you do not want to call it an authority, its alright. We may call it a
council or maybe a management agency.
x x x."

[51]

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bills presentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I
think this was already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of
the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no
objection to paragraph "f" And then next is paragraph "b," under Section
6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and
issue ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does
the MMDA because that takes the form of a local government unit, a
political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say
that it has the policies, its very clear that those policies must be followed.
Otherwise, whats the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now,
the policies may be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a
ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth,
your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the

power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the case
now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is
the case now. Youve got the power to set a policy, the body wants to
follow your policy, then we say lets call it an ordinance and see if they will
not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there is a
constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA a political
subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a
plebiscite. That is what Im trying to avoid. Ive been trying to avoid
this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a
political subdivision, once it is created it has to be subject to a
plebiscite. Im trying to make this as administrative. Thats why we
place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying
there is .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise.
Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances
of rules and regulations. That would be it shall also be enforced. Jksm
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you
impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal
connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your Honor. sc
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and
regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually
considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions."

[52]

The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of
Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a
"development authority" which is a "national agency, not a political government
unit." The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee
[53]

on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the floor and no

amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on the same day it
was presented.
[54]

When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These
amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived in
the House of Representatives.
[55]

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No.
7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman
of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform
such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local
government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Newmiso
[56]

[57]

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to solve the
chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks
plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now
crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic
has become a social malaise affecting our peoples productivity and the efficient delivery
of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter
are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private
street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general
welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Sdjad
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Annex "D" to the CA petition, Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo, p. 27.

Annex "J" to Petition, Rollo, pp. 76-78.
[3]
Minutes of the Ocular Inspection, Court of Appeals Rollo, pp. 193-194.
[4]
CA Rollo, p. 332.
[5]
Roberto L. del Rosario is a resident of Neptune Street who allegedly spearheaded a campaign to open Neptune
Street to the public-- Motion to Cite in Contempt, CA Rollo, pp. 412-415.
[6]
CA decision, p. 10, Rollo, p. 61.
[7]
Petition, p. 15, Rollo, p. 24.
[8]
168 SCRA 634 (1988).
[9]
Petition, p. 24, Rollo, p. 33.
[10]
United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 253-254 [1915]; Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 603 [1915];
People v. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440, 447 [1924].
[11]
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, pp. 95-98 [1996].
[12]
Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 44 [1995].
[13]
Id., see also 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 177 [1956 ed.].
[14]
Cruz, supra, at 44; Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508, 513-514 [1991].
[15]
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255, 272 [1994].
[16]
Bernas, supra, at 959, citing UP Law Center Revision Project, Part II, 712 [1970] citing Sady, "Improvement of
Local Government Administration for Development Purpose," Journal of Local Administration Overseas 135 [July
1962].
[17]
Section 15, Book I, Local Government Code of 1991
[18]
Id.
[19]
Titles I, II, III, IV, Book III, Local Government Code of 1991.
[20]
Section 1, Article X, 1987 Constitution.
[21]
Section 16, Book I, Local Government Code of 1991; also cited in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc. supra, at 264-265.
[22]
Sections 468 (a), 458 (a), and 447 (a), Book III, Local Government Code of 1991.
[23]
Section 391 (a), Book III, Local Government Code of 1991.
[24]
Entitled "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
[25]
Section 1, R.A. 7924.
[26]
Section 3, par. 1, R. A. 7924.
[27]
Section 3 (b), supra; emphasis supplied.
[28]
Section 9, paragraph 5, supra.
[29]
Section 4, supra. Non-voting members of the Council are the heads of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Department of Tourism (DOT),
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Committee
(HUDCC), and the Philippine National Police (PNP) or their duly authorized representatives.
[30]
Section 1, R.A. 7924.
[31]
Section 2, supra.
[32]
Op cit.
[33]
168 SCRA 634 [1988].
[34]
176 SCRA 719 [1989].
[35]
168 SCRA 634, 654-655.
[36]
Id. at 643.
[37]
Id, at 730.
[38]
Id. at 723.
[39]
Like the perimeter wall along Jupiter StreetId. at 734.
[40]
Section 2, P.D. 824.
[41]
Whereas Clauses, P.D. 824.
[42]
Section 1, P.D. 824; emphasis supplied.
[1]
[2]

Speech of then Constitutional Commissioner Blas Ople, see Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers,
pp. 706-707 [1995].
[44]
Section 11, Article X, 1987 Constitution.
[45]
Section 8, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution.
[46]
Section 3, E.O. 392.
[47]
Section 1, supra.
[48]
Section 2, supra.
[49]
Section 6, supra.
[50]
Chairmen Ismael Mathay, Jr. and Ignacio Bunye.
[51]
Deliberations of the Committee on Local Government, House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines,
November 10, 1993, pp. 46-48.
[52]
Deliberations of the Committee on Local Governments, House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines,
November 9, 1994, pp. 68-70.
[53]
Explanatory Note to H. B. 11116, p. 3.
[54]
H.B. 14170/ 11116, Sponsorship and Debates, December 20, 1994.
[55]
Compare H.B. 14170/ 11116 with R. A. 7924; see Senate Amendments, February 21, 1995.
[43]

[56]

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
[57]
Section 7 (g), R.A. 7924.