CASE TITLE

OFFENSE
DATE OF
DECISION

SUMMARY

DOCTRINE

EXCERPTS FROM THE CASE

Franco v. People
Theft
February 1,
2016

The accused was

acquitted because the
lone testimony of the
witness was not
considered by the
Court as positive
identification.

In People v. Pondivida, the Court held:

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of
identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to
the very act of commission of the crime. There are two
types of positive identification. A witness may identify
a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the
perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very
act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes
direct evidence. There may, however, be instances
where, although a witness may not have actually seen
the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be
able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is
the person or one of the persons last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together
with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion,
which is that the accused is the author of the crime to
the exclusion of all others. x x x. (Emphasis omitted
and underscoring ours)

It must be emphasized that "[c]ourts must judge the

guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and
not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or
suspicions." [T]he Court has, time and again,
declared that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more interpretations, one of
which being consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other or others consistent with his

Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive identification.
While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not
establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming that he did, was
Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell phone." He stated:
Q:

How did you know that the said cell phone was taken by the accused?

A:

[W]e were then in a conversation when I asked him to spot or assist me with the
weights that I intended to carry. We were then situated in an area very near the altar
where his cap and cell phone were placed. After assisting me, he went to the area
and took the cell phone and the cap at the same time.

Q:

[W]ho were you talking [sic] at that time?

A:

Guilbemer Franco.

Q:

It was also [G]uilbemer Franco who helped or spot you in the work out?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And after assisting you, what did Franco do?

A:

He took the cell phone of Mr. Nakamoto and his cap at the same time and covered
the cell phone by his cap and left the place.

Q:

Where was that cell phone of the private complainant placed at that time?

A:

At the top of the altar where is [sic] cap is also located.

Q:

How far was that altar from where you were working?

A:

Only inches.

Ibaez v. People
Frustrated
homicide
January 27,
2016

The Court gave more

weight to the
testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses,
including the positive
identification of the
accused, over the selfserving denial of the
latter.

Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further

crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive
identification and straightforward narration of the
prosecution witnesses. Between an affirmative
assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general
denial, the former generally prevails.

The prosecution witnesses recounted the details of the crime in a clear, detailed and
consistent manner, without any hint of hesitation or sign of untruthfulness, which they could
not have done unless they genuinely witnessed the incident. Besides, the prosecution
witnesses could not have mistakenly identified the petitioners as Rodolfo's perpetrators
considering there is so much familiarity among them. The records are also bereft of any
indication that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill motives when they testified
against the petitioners. Thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
In contrast, the petitioners' testimonies are self-serving and contrary to human reason and
experience.
The Court notes that the defense presented no witnesses, other than themselves, who had
actually seen the incident and could validate their story. Additionally, aside from the medical
certificates of Ronald and that of Bobot which was issued almost five (5) years since the
incident occurred, the defense have not submitted any credible proof that could efficiently
rebut the prosecution's evidence.
Further, the Court finds it contrary to human reason and experience that Ronald, would just
leave his son Bobot, while the latter was being stabbed and struggling for the possession of
the knife with Rodolfo, to go to a police station for assistance. Logic dictates that a father
would not abandon a son in the presence of actual harm.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the
offense but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Emilio
himself admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene when the
incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio
failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime scene on the date and time in
question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the
positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime. In
the present case, Emilio was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the
assailants. Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself and his

People v.
Salahuddin
Murder

The accused was

convicted on the basis
of the direct and
straightforward
identification of the
accused.

January 18,
2016

People v. Avila
Robbery with
homicide
June 22, 2015

One fact peculiar to

this case is that the
identifying witness
was Carl, a 5-year old
lad, whose sole
testimony positively
pointed to and
incriminated the
appellant as the person
who had entered their
home, robbed the
family, and killed his
mother. The Court

[The] direct, straightforward[,] and positive testimonies

of the [ ] witnesses pointing to the accused [ ] as the
gunman created strong and credible evidence against
him, thus no weight can be given to the alibi of the
accused.

Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of

prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any
ill-motive to testify against the appellants. Between the
categorical statements of the prosecution eyewitnesses
[ ], on one hand, and the bare denial of the appellant,
on the other, the former must prevail. After all, an
affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative
testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of
a credible witness.
The most important task of the State in the successful
prosecution of the accused is his credible and
competent identification as the perpetrator of the crime.

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for

disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past
has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December
2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof
lies on the party challenging the childs competency.
Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the
ability of the child to perceive, remember,

immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his favor, as in this case,
where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that the former was somewhere else when the
incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio's defense of alibi will not hold.
Prosecution witnesses Java and Delos Reyes were clear and consistent in the identification
of appellant as the one who fatally shot Atty. Segundo several times. As aptly held by the
CA:
In the case at bar, eyewitnesses Liezel Mae Java and Juanchito Delos Reyes positively and
categorically identified the accused-appellant to be the assailant of the murder (sic). Liezel
Mae Java, in her testimony, stated that she was one hundred percent (100%) sure that the
accused-appellant was the man who shot her uncle. She could not forget the man because
even if it was around 6 o'clock in the evening it was not yet totally dark and she was only
about one meter from the accused. Juanchito Delos Reyes also declared that he was about
lour (4) to six (6) meters away from the scene of the crime and he saw the accused making a
sign at him, by the time he aimed his gun at die assailant. These direct, straightforward and
positive testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses pointing to the accused appellant as the
gunman created strong and credible evidence against him, thus no weight can be given to
the alibi of the accused.
[T]his appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of
the robbery with homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying
witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and
incriminated the appellant as the person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and
killed his mother.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and
events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may
and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.

upheld the conviction

of the accused in light
of.

communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or

appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the
court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child.

[W]hatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his

testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or
the elements of the composite crime charged but
related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such,
their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil,
because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator.

The Court noted that the child could not have been
mistaken about his identification of him in view of his
obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily
presence in the billiard room maintained by the childs
family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly
showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed
and stabbed the victim.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwis e provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to
others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully. (19a)
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age,
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to
qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications
as listed in the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify
is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court. All
questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by
virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of
actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the
witnesses. Hence, the trial judges assessment of the witnesses testimonies and findings of

fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify
the reversal of the trial courts assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the formers findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court has concurred with the trial court.
The appellant did not object to Carls competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of
perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic
qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct
examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on crossexamination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but
not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to
perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge
favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not
disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his
testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime
charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help
upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his
credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an
adult. Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of
perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to
communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it
concerned a factual issue and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong
showing of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the trial court.
It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of the trial bare and

open. Even so, the finding of facts by the trial court are still entitled to great respect
especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA. This great respect for such findings rests
mainly on the trial courts direct and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its
presence, giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum during
intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting
and prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy. With both the RTC and the CA sharing the
conviction on Carls credibility, his capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his
perception, we cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover, according credence
to Carls testimony despite his tender age would not be unprecedented. In People v.
Mendiola, the Court considered a 6-y ear-old victim competent, and regarded her testimony
against the accused credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals, the testimony of the three-yearold victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carls testimony was entitled to full probative
weight.
People v.
Retanal
Murder
February 9,
2015

Positive identification
becomes necessary in
establishing the
presence of the
elements of a crime.
This case also shows
how positive
identification of
witnesses
complements the
results of postmortem
examination [forensic
evidence] in sustaining
a conviction.

[The Court found] no reason to disbelieve the

testimonies of these witnesses considering that their
narration of facts were straightforward and replete with
details that coincide with the medical examination
conducted on the body of the victim.

The appellate court held that the eyewitness accounts of prosecution witnesses Jose
Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, and their positive identification of appellant as the
perpetrator, aptly complemented by the findings of the postmortem examination, are more
plausible than the appellants claim of self-defense.

After a careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly met. The
prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who stabbed Pablo
several times on the chest which eventually caused the latters death. They testified that they
even tried to stop appellants attack but unfortunately, were unsuccessful. [The Court found]
no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of these witnesses considering that their narration of
facts were straightforward and replete with details that coincide with the medical
examination conducted on the body of the victim. We are not persuaded by the appellants
defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses positive identification of him
as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

Fantastico v.
People
Attempted
murder
January 10,
2015

The Court gave more

weight to the
prosecution witness
positive identification
of the accused, over
the denial of the latter.
This case also shows
how positive
identification of
witnesses
complements the
results of postmortem
examination [forensic
evidence] in sustaining
a conviction.

Anent the probative value and weight given to the

testimony of [the witness] by the CA and the RTC, the
same is not ridden with any error. In People v.
Alvarado, we held that greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witness than the accused's denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime.
This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving
evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified
on affirmative matters.

It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of

[the eyewitness] is corroborated by the medico-legal
findings[.]

It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification of the
petitioners as the assailants, thus:
Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of the house,
then, I saw Gary was hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe. Tonahawk with blade of ax
was dull and had a handle of one foot, with the diameter of one inch.
Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)
A. I also used that.
Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?
A. In the kitchen.
Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?
A. He is right in the kitchen.
Q. Then what happened?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the kitchen
door and holding a tomhack (sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my right side and my
head and I got injury (sic) and blood profusely oozing, I want to get hold of the tomhawk
(sic).
Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?
A. No sir.
xxxx

Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?
A. Rolly Villanueva.
Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from behind?
A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound.
Q. Who are they?
A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao, Saligan
Iguiron.
Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see first before
you were hit?
A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic), I saw him.
Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who hit you,
you mean you realized what he used in hitting you from behind?
A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.
Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw him
holding that pipe, how was he holding the pipe when you saw him?
A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.

It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the medicolegal findings as testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief Resident Doctor of the
Department of Orthopedics. He testified as to the following:

Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today?
A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the findings
supposedly seen when he was admitted and when I saw him in one of the sessions of our
Out Patient Department.
Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this complainant?
A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw the patient.
Q. Why does he has (sic) to make a follow up in your department?
A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated casting.
Normally, casting would take around three (3) months only but since the nature of his
fracture was relatively unstable, I think it necessitated prolong immobilization in a case.
PROSECUTOR TEVES:
Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained?
A. I think one of his leg has close fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a blunt
injury rather than a hacking injury, one on the left side, with an open wound which was very
much compatible with a hack at the leg area.
People v.
Jalbonian

This case shows the

factual circumstances
that the Court notes

Finding of guilt based on the testimony of a lone

witness is not uncommon. "For although the number of
witnesses may be considered a factor in the
appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not

It has been held that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward manner,
there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. Moreover, Valencianos
testimony on the stabbing of the victim was corroborated by the Certificate of Death

Murder
July 1, 2013

when weighing the

credibility of the
positive identification
by the witness. In the
end, the accused was
convicted for the
crime of murder.

necessarily with the greatest number and conviction

can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence
is deemed necessary only when there are reasons to
warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth
or that his observation had been inaccurate."

[T]hat the relative position of the witness from the

victim and the assailant refers to a minor detail that
does not detract from his credibility.

[W]here the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with

both the victim and the accused, and where the locus
criminis afforded good visibility, and where no
improper motive can be attributed to the witness for
testifying against the accused, then [his] version of the
story deserves much weight[.]

attesting that the cause of death was a stab wound.

As to appellants argument that it was impossible for Valenciano to personally identify him
as the assailant since the victim and his attacker had their backs turned to Valenciano, we
find the same unworthy of credence.
Suffice it to say that the relative position of the witness from the victim and the assailant
refers to a minor detail that does not detract from his credibility. What is important is that
Valenciano witnessed the unfolding of the crime and was able to positively identify
appellant as the culprit. In addition and as correctly pointed out by the OSG, Valenciano
readily identified appellant because the latter used to reside in the same barangay of which
he was barangay captain.

Also, the fact that Valenciano was just a few meters away from the victim and that the crime
was committed in broad daylight bolster Valencianos identification of appellant as the
assailant.

Likewise untenable is appellants contention that Valencianos testimony cannot be relied

upon since it was not corroborated by other witnesses to the crime. Finding of guilt based on
the testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. "For although the number of witnesses
may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily
with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and
positive testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary only
when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation had been inaccurate." This is not obtaining in this case.
Moreover, appellant also failed to attribute any improper motive to Valenciano to falsely

testify against him. There was no evidence to establish that Valenciano harbored any ill-will
against appellant or that he had reasons to fabricate his testimony. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, the presumption is that the witness was not moved by any ill-will and was
untainted by bias, and thus worthy of belief and credence. Furthermore, appellants
immediate departure from the scene of the crime and successful effort to elude arrest until
his apprehension more than five years later are not consistent with his claim of innocence.
Flight from the scene of the crime and failure to immediately surrender militate against
appellants contention of innocence "since an innocent person will not hesitate to take
prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him."

People v. de
Guzman
Murder
July 11, 2012

This is one of the

cases where the
identification of the
witness was held to be
incredible due to
inconsistencies and
improbabilities noted
in his testimony. The
positive identification
by the lone witness
was thus held to be
insufficient to sustain
the conviction for the
crime of murder.

The time-honored test in determining the value of the

testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human
knowledge, observation and common experience of
man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of
human knowledge, observation and experience
becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial
cognizance. Consistently, the Court has ruled that
evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in
itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the
knowledge and common experience of mankind. In the
case at bench, the testimony of Flores, the lone
eyewitness of the prosecution does not bear the
earmarks of truth and, hence, not credible.

Under these circumstances, the rule that "where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar
with both the victim and the accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility,
and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the
accused, then [his] version of the story deserves much weight," thus applies. We are
therefore convinced that appellants culpability for the killing of the victim was duly
established by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Valenciano.
The case for the prosecution was woven basically on the testimony of Flores, who claimed
to be a childhood friend of Urieta. This alleged eyewitness recounted that on April 20, 2002,
at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, he and Urieta were drinking beer at a store near a
"peryahan" in Barangay Francisco, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro; that after they had
finished their third bottle of beer, they decided to leave their table; that when Urieta was
about to stand up, De Guzman suddenly appeared from nowhere and stabbed Urieta using a
knife with a red handle, without any reason or provocation; that the stab blow landed on the
left breast of Urieta and caused him to fall down; that while in a kneeling position, De
Guzman stabbed him three more times; that Flores cried for help but no one came to their
aid; and that thereafter, De Guzman ran away.
Flores claimed that a certain Elmer Honato (Honato) came and brought Urieta to the corner
of the street; that Honato then went to the barangay hall allegedly to look for a physician
who would attend to the seriously injured Urieta; that he waited for Honato but sensing that
the latter would no longer return, he hurriedly went home leaving Urieta alone on the
ground; and that he did not know whether Urieta was still alive when he left him.

Flores testified that he was just a meter (an arms length) away from Urieta when the latter
was stabbed by De Guzman; that the light of the "moron" coming from the "peryahan"
illuminated the table where they were drinking, enabling him to see the face of the
perpetrator whom he identified to be De Guzman; that two (2) days after the stabbing
incident, Police Officer Gamba, Gina and Urietas father came to his house; that he then
executed a sworn statement before a police officer narrating his accounts of the stabbing
incident which led to the death of Urieta; that he did not know De Guzman and it was on the
night of the stabbing incident that he first saw him; and that he came to know of the name of
De Guzman from the policemen.
A nexus of logically related circumstances, however, rendered the testimony of Flores as
highly suspect. His testimony is laden with improbabilities that detract from his credibility.
The totality of the evidence for the prosecution leaves much to be desired. Somehow, the
Court cannot help but entertain serious doubts on the veracity of the malefactor's identity. It
is almost as if it was merely contrived to pin criminal culpability upon De Guzman.
First, the condition of visibility at the time of the stabbing incident did not favor the witness
Flores, as it did not lend credence to his testimony. The incident took place during nighttime
at 11:00 o'clock in a remote barangay with no electric lighting in the surroundings and the
only source of light then was the illumination of a "moron" coming from a "peryahan."
Apart from the testimony of Flores, no other competent and corroborative evidence was
adduced to settle this question of visibility and lighting condition as well as to confirm that
indeed the light of the "moron" was existent and adequate for purposes of identification on
the night of the incident. The Court observes that in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Flores stated
that the "moron (de gas)" was just on the table where they were drinking which was
contrary to what he had testified in court.
The distance of the "moron" in the "peryahan" from the site of the stabbing incident was not
disclosed either. It could have helped determine if the place was well illuminated. It is
important to note that illumination or brightness diffuses as the distance from the source
increases. Moreover, it is clear from the records that the stabbing incident was so swift for
ample observation and Flores, who had three bottles of beer, was admittedly very afraid so
much so that all he did was to cry for help. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the
positive identification of De Guzman by Flores hazy.
In People v. Faustino, the Court stated that the identification of an accused by an eyewitness

is a vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case for the
prosecution. In the case at bench, however, the inconclusive and unreliable identification by
Flores of De Guzman as the culprit failed to break the barrier of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
Second, Flores' story, that a certain Honato came to their aid and brought the seriously
wounded Urieta to the corner of the street but left thereafter supposedly to seek a physician
at the barangay hall, simply does not make sense. It appears strange that Honato should
proceed to the barangay hall to look for a doctor when natural instinct and reason would
dictate that he and Flores should have brought Urieta straight to the hospital for the
immediate medical treatment of his wounds. It appears even stranger that this Honato was
not presented in court to corroborate the testimony of Flores. Besides, can one really find a
physician at the barangay hall at that late hour of the night?
His story about Honato being nebulous, the Court doubts if Flores ever shouted for help at
all. If he really did, many people in the "peryahan" would have surely come to their aid.
Indeed, if he was a childhood friend, he would not have second thoughts in bringing Urieta
to the hospital himself. As he merely abandoned his dying friend, one cannot help but harbor
a suspicion.
Furthermore, the reaction of Flores, in hurriedly going home and leaving Urieta alone to die,
was unnatural and contrary to common human experience. The seemingly apathetic
behavior displayed by Flores in leaving Urieta without even checking his condition to see if
he was still breathing and his failure to report the matter to the police or at least inform the
victim's family about what happened on the same night were highly inconsistent with the
natural/common reaction of one who had just witnessed the stabbing of his childhood friend.
The Court cannot accept a story that defies reason and leaves much to the imagination. The
failure of Flores to lend a touch of realism to his tale leads to the conclusion that he was
either withholding an incriminating information or was not telling the truth.
The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its
compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man. Thus,
whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience
becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance. Consistently, the Court has
ruled that evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the knowledge

and common experience of mankind. In the case at bench, the testimony of Flores, the lone
eyewitness of the prosecution does not bear the earmarks of truth and, hence, not credible.
Third, the Court finds disturbing how the police officers were able to identify De Guzman as
the killer of Urieta. It is undisputed that on the day following the stabbing incident, De
Guzman was invited by the police officers to the municipal hall, was informed by them that
he was a suspect in the commission of a crime and then placed behind bars. De Guzman
testified, to wit:
Atty. Jennifer Garcia
(On Direct Examination)
Q: The following day, what did you do?
A: I was drying our palay, sir.
Q: While drying your palay, do you know if there was anything that happened?
A: My wife arrived, sir.
Q: When your wife arrived what happened?
A: According to her I was being looked by some policemen, sir.
Q: Why are these policemen were looking at you?
A: Because according to them they are going to ask something from me, sir.
Q: After knowing that some policemen are looking for you, what did you do then?
A: I was the one who approached them, sir.
Q: Where did you approach them?
A: I asked them why they are looking for me, sir.
Q: Did they told you why they are looking for you?
A: They are inviting me to go with them in the Municipal Hall, sir.
Q: For what purpose they are asking you to come with them in the Municipal Hall?
A: According to them they are going to ask something from me, sir.
Q: Did you reach the Municipal Hall?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While in the Municipal Hall, what happened?
A: I was incarcerated, sir.
Q: Did you come to know from them why you are incarcerated?
A: They said that I was involved in a stabbing incident, sir.
Also, on April 21, 2002, Gina, the wife of the victim, executed her Sinumpaang

Salaysay wherein she declared, among others, that she came to know the identity and the
name of the assailant from the police officers. Thus:
T: Kung ikaw ay nasa inyong bahay sa bukid naroroon kagabi ng maganap ang pananaksak
ni HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN alias "Mong" sa iyong asawa, papaano mong nalaman na
itong si
HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN nga ang may kagagawan ng pananaksak sa iyong asawa,
gayong wala ka naman kagabi sa lugar ng pinangyarihan?
S: Napag-alaman ko po sa mga Pulis na sumurender na ang sumaksak sa aking asawa kaya't
ako nga ay pumunta dito at ipinagtanong ko ang kanyang pangalan sa mga Pulis kaya ko
siya
nakilala at napag-alamang siya nga ang sumaksak sa aking asawang si Noriel.
During the trial, Gina stated the same thing as she testified, to wit:
Asst. Pros. Dante V. Ramirez
(On Direct Examination)
Q: Who was the person who killed your husband?
A: Hermogenes de Guzman, sir.
COURT
Q: You mentioned a while ago that when you were asked who killed your husband, you
answered Hermogenes de Guzman, how did you come to know the killer of your husband?
A: I came to know from the Police Officer, Your Honor.
Q: Have you known Hermogenes de Guzman before the death of your husband??
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: You came to know him only upon the death of your husband?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know any reason why Hermogenes de Guzman killed your husband?
A: I do not know any reason, Your Honor.
Two days after the incident in question or on April 22, 2002, Flores executed his
Sinumpaang Salaysay and gave his account of the stabbing incident only because Police
Officer Gamba together with the father and the wife of Urieta came to his house. Even so,
nowhere in the record does it show that Flores gave the police officers a description of the
physical features and attributes of the assailant. During the trial, he admitted that he did not
know De Guzman or his name at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus:

Atty. Jennifer Garcia

(On Cross-Examination)
Q: How about accused, did you know him personally?
A: I only saw him on that night when he stabbed Noriel Urieta and I only learned his name
from the Police Officer.
The foregoing sequence of events clearly reveals that the police officers had already a
suspect, De Guzman, in the killing of Urieta, even before Flores could give his statement
and despite the absence of any description from Flores himself as to how the culprit looked
like. Curiously, no police officer was called to the witness stand to shed light on the matter.
This gray area in the case of the prosecution is fatal to its cause and casts serious doubt on
the veracity and credibility of its evidence.
The Court is likewise puzzled as to how the prosecution came into possession of the alleged
murder weapon marked as Exhibit "B." During the trial, a knife with a red handle was
shown to Flores who specifically identified it to be the same bladed weapon used by De
Guzman in stabbing Urieta. The information, however, as to who recovered that knife, and
from whom it was seized remained a mystery. At any rate, considering the visibility
condition and other attending circumstances on the night of the stabbing incident, the Court
indeed doubts how Flores could have positively identified the murder weapon.
Lastly, it has not been shown that De Guzman had any motive for killing Urieta. The brutal
and gruesome attack on Urieta, who sustained two stab wounds on the chest, a stab wound
along the waist area which hit the liver, and a stab wound on the elbow, clearly manifested
the intention of the perpetrator to purposely bring death upon the victim. There was no
evidence, however, that De Guzman carried a grudge or had an axe to grind against the
victim or his family, or even knew the victim at all. Prosecution witnesses Flores and Gina
even attested that they did not know of any reason why De Guzman killed Urieta.
Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be
proven. Proof of the same, however, becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case,
the identity of the assailant is in question. In People v. Vidad, the Court said:
It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular motive for
taking the life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when the
commission of a crime is clearly proven, conviction may and should follow even where the
reason for its commission is unknown; but in many criminal cases, one of the most

important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the
introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which tempted the mind to indulge in the
criminal act. (Underscoring ours)
In light of the weakness in the prosecution's case, the alibi of De Guzman assumes credence
and importance. While alibi is a weak defense and the rule is that it must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court, the said rule has never been intended to change the burden of proof
in criminal cases. Otherwise, an absurd situation will arise wherein the accused is put in a
more difficult position where the prosecution evidence is vague and weak as in the present
case. The burden of proof still lies in the prosecution to establish that De Guzman was
responsible for the killing.