G.R. No.

116692 March 21, 1997

SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED,
represented by PONCIANO R. ROSALES, General
Manager, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
FROILAN RAQUIZA, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:

year of service from January 1, 1976 up to

and including the three (3) years imputed
service for which backwages was
awarded;
3) ordering respondents further to pay
attorney's fees of 10% of the total
monetary award.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for
lack of sufficient basis.

This petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order seeks the annulment of the March 10,
1994, decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
in NLRC Case No. V-0307-92, as well as its order dated
April 28, 1994, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. The antecedent facts
follow.
Private respondent Froilan V. Raquiza was employed by
petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II)
as probationary power plant operator on January 1, 1976,
and became a regular employee on July 1, 1976. On
February 9, 1980, he was appointed as switchboard
operator and sometimes alternated as acting plant
superintendent.
Raquiza's problems began when a major breakdown of the
pielstick engine causing electric failure to the whole
franchise area for a period of four months occurred during
his shift on January 21, 1988. On January 22, 1988, he was
immediately asked to explain the incident, which he did
the following day. After investigation, however, SAMELCO
II General Manager Ponciano Rosales found Raquiza and
his two companions in the shift, Manuel Balasbas and
Pascual Martinez, guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of their duty. The three were placed under
preventive suspension from January 27, 1988, until their
termination on February 29, 1988. Nine months later, or
on December 5, 1988, Raquiza filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement
and payment of unpaid wages, unpaid overtime pay,
attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages, and the
cost of suit.
Labor Arbiter Gabino A. Velasquez, Jr. rendered a decision
on September 25, 1992, finding Raquiza's dismissal to be
based on a just cause. On appeal, however, the NLRC
reversed and set aside his ruling, and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and set aside, and a new one
entered to wit:
1) declaring the dismissal of the
complainant-appellant (Raquiza) due to
gross negligence as illegal;
2)
ordering
respondents
(herein
petitioners) to reinstate the complainantappellant to his former position with full
backwages not exceeding three (3) years,
without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, or in the event reinstatement
is no longer feasible due to the realities of
the situation, to pay him his separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month for every

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

SO ORDERED.
Its motion for reconsideration having likewise failed,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
Petitioner's present action is premised solely on the grave
abuse of discretion allegedly exercised by the NLRC in
reversing the labor arbiter's decision. Its arguments,
however, fail to persuade this Court, and a closer
examination of the questioned judgment would reveal that
the NLRC disposed of the case judiciously.
Labor Arbiter Velasquez opined that since Raquiza was not
able to specifically deny the charges against him, he should
be deemed to have admitted them. Technical rules of
evidence are not, however, strictly followed in labor cases.
The Labor Code itself affirms this liberality, viz.:
Art. 221. Technical Rules not binding and
prior resort to amicable settlement. In
any proceeding before the Commission or
any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or
equity shall not be controlling and it is the
spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the
Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due
process. . . . 1
This rule is reiterated in the Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, to wit:
Rule V.
Sec. 7. Nature of Proceedings. The
proceedings before a Labor Arbiter shall
be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the
requirements of due process, the
technicalities of law and procedure and
the rules obtaining in the courts of law
shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor
Arbiter may avail himself of all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts of the
controversy speedily, including ocular
inspection and examination of wellinformed persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule VII.
Sec. 10. Technical rules not binding.
The rules of procedure and evidence

Page 1

prevailing in courts of law and equity

shall not be controlling and the
Commission shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due
process.
xxx xxx xxx
Raquiza's failure to specifically deny or explain the
charges against him should not, therefore, be
deemed fatal to his claim.
Our laws as well as this Court have consistently recognized
and respected an employer's right to terminate the
services of an employee for just or authorized causes. This
prerogative, however, must be exercised in good faith. As
we held in Mercury Drug Corp. v. NLRC, et al.: 2

remembered that the purpose of the operation of said

engine was to synchronize it with the National Power
Corporation's Geothermal Plant in Tangonan, Leyte to
augment power during the peak hours in the early
evenings. 6 Stoppage of the operation would have defeated
such purpose and violated the very franchise of petitioner.
The investigation conducted by petitioner revealed that
"the breakdown was due to the serious error committed
by Froilan V. Raquiza, Manuel Balasbas, and Pascual
Martinez, although complainant's command responsibility,
liability and negligence, . . . , was most serious and the
gravest." 7 Yet, despite this collective error, only Raquiza
was dismissed; the other two were merely suspended.
Such discrimination cannot be sanctioned by this Court.
Furthermore, the NLRC correctly pointed out from the
evidence that there was no clarity or confirmation as to the
cause of the pielstick engine breakdown. Thus, it stated:
More significantly, the findings of the
consultant who inspected pielstick Engine
No. 2 at the instance of the respondents
cost (sic) a serious doubt on the alleged
negligence of the complainant-appellant
as the proximate cause for the damage of
the said engine. It appears from the said
inspection result that the said unit bogged
down in September 1986, and in that
incident all con/rod bearings were
replaced with old sets taken from Dorelco
Units. The same con/rod bearings were
likewise noted to be due for replacement
in (sic) December 17, 1987. Lastly, the
said engine unit at the time it broke down
had a total running hours [of] 21,332.1 far
exceeding the tolerable maximum
requirement of 18,000 hrs. The above
attendant circumstances shows (sic) that
Pielstick Engine No. 2 broke down last
January 21, 1988 not due to the
negligence of the complainant but due to
worn out spare parts and its continued
operation beyond the schedule of
replacement of con/rod bearing on
December 17, 1987. 8

Management also has its own rights,

which, as such, are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play. Out of its concern for those with less
privileges in life, the Supreme Court has
inclined more often than not toward the
worker and upheld his cause in his
conflicts with the employer. Such
favoritism, however, has not blinded the
Court to rule that justice is in every case
for the deserving, to be dispensed in the
light of the established facts and
applicable law and doctrine. 3
Petitioner as employer is duty-bound to establish the
existence of a clear, valid and just ground for dismissing
Raquiza. It cannot merely allege that its employee was
grossly negligent in the performance of his duty thereby
causing great damage to its property and resulting in great
pecuniary loss.
Raquiza's dismissal was based on three factors, namely, (a)
leaving his work assignment while on duty; (b) not
properly checking the engine before starting it; and (c)
authorizing the continued running of pielstick (engine) no.
2 in spite of the discovery that there was an oil leakage.
In the case of Citibank, N.A. v. Gatchalian, 4 we ruled that
"(g)ross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure
to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them.
While it is true that Raquiza left his place of work to go to
the administration building to get the proceeds of his loan
during the testing period of the engine, such act cannot be
perceived to be so serious as would amount to gross
negligence. As to the claim that he did not check the
engine, the NLRC found that he actually made several
inspections of the engine before actually starting it. We
find no reason to disturb this finding in view of the respect
and finality which this Court has constantly accorded to
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies such as the
NLRC. 5 Finally, the fact that Raquiza failed to prevent the
occurrence of the incident does not sufficiently show nor
can it be inferred that he was grossly negligent. At most, it
can be considered an error of judgment on his part when
he continued to operate the engine. It must be

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Petitioner claimed below that Raquiza's dismissal was not

solely attributable to the January 21, 1988, incident but
was, in fact, a result of a "long string of neglect and
violations of company R & R (rules and regulations)." But
this is beside the point. What is significant is that the
employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal of
an employee is for a just cause, failing which the dismissal
cannot be deemed justified thus entitling the latter to
reinstatement. 9 The decision to dismiss must be in accord
with the law and the evidence and not merely the whim or
caprice of the employer. 10
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED
for failing to show that respondent National Labor
Relations Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at its assailed decision dated March
10, 1994, and order dated April 28, 1994.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 141702-03

August 2, 2001

Page 2

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
MARTHA Z. SINGSON, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
20 September 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
declaring respondent Martha Z. Singson illegally dismissed
by petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., and thus should
be reinstated with full back wages and awarded moral as
well as exemplary damages.
This petition traces its origin to two (2) petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 initially filed with Supreme Court:
Martha Z. Singson v. National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., SP Case No. 52104,
and Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. V. National labor Relations
Commission and Martha Z. Singson, SP Case No. 52105,
which were consolidated2 and referred3 to the Court of
Appeals in consonance with the St. Martin Funeral Homes
doctrine.
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), is an international
airline company engaged in providing international flight
services while Martha Z. Singson was a cabin attendant of
CATHAY hired in the Philippines on 24 September 1990
with home base in Hongkong.
On 26 August 1991 Singson was scheduled on a five (5)day flight to London but was unable to take the flight as
she was feeling fatigued and exhausted from her transfer
to a new apartment with her husband. On 29 August 1991
she visited the company doctor, Dr. Emer Fahy, who
examined and diagnosed her to be suffering from a
moderately severe asthma attack. She was advised to take
a Ventolin nebulizer and increase the medication she was
currently taking, an oral Prednisone (steroid). Dr. Fahy
thereafter conveyed to Dr. John G. Fowler, Principal
Medical Officer, her findings regarding Singson's medical
condition as a result of which she was evaluated as unfit
for flying due to her medical condition.
On 3 September 1991 Singson again visited Dr. Fahy
during which time the latter declared her condition to
have vastly improved. However, later that day, Cabin Crew
Manager Robert J. Nipperess informed Singson that
CATHAY had decided to retire her on medical grounds
effective immediately based on the recommendation of Dr.
Fowler and Dr. Fahy.
Martha Z. Singson was surprised with the suddenness of
the notification but nonetheless acknowledged it. Later,
she met with Nipperess and inquired of possible
employment that entailed only ground duties within the
company. She was advised to meet with certain personnel
who knew of the employment requirements in other
departments in the company, and to await a possible offer
from the company.
On 20 December 1991 Singson filed before the Labor
Arbiter a complaint against CATHAY for illegal dismissal,
with prayer for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. Efforts on initial settlement having failed,
trial followed.
Robert J. Nipperess and Dr. John G. Fowler appeared as
witnesses for CATHAY. Nipperess confirmed that the

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

decision to retire respondent was made upon the

recommendation of Dr. Fowler. In turn, Dr. Fowler testified
that the affliction of respondent with asthma rendered her
unfit to fly as it posed aviation risks, i.e., asthma disabled
her from properly performing her cabin crew functions,
specifically her air safety functions.
On the other hand, Singson presented herself and Dr.
Benjamin Lazo, a doctor in the country specializing in
internal medicine and pulmonary diseases. She denied
being afflicted with asthma at any point in her life, while
Dr. Lazo confirmed the same declaring that at the time of
his examination of Singson he found her to be of normal
condition.
On the basis of the evidence presented before him, Labor
Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu Jr. declared CATHAY liable for
illegal dismissal and ordered the airline to pay Singson
HK$531,150.80 representing full back wages and
privileges, HK$54,137.70 for undisputed benefits due her,
HK$100,000.00 as actual damages, HK$500.00 as moral
damages, HK500.00 as exemplary damages, and
HK$168,528,85 as attorney's fees. Furthermore, CATHAY
was ordered to reinstate Singson to her former position as
airline stewardess without loss of seniority rights, benefits
and privileges.
On 19 March 1993 CATHAY appealed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission.
On 29 December 1994 the NLRC reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and declared valid Singson's dismissal
from service.4 Relying on the testimony of Dr. Fowler and
the affidavit and medical records submitted by Dr. Fahy,
admitted as newly-discovered evidence, the NLRC found
Singson to be indeed afflicted with asthma that rendered
her unfit to fly and perform cabin crew functions.
Consequently, the NLRC withdrew the back wages, moral
and exemplary damages awarded to Singson for lack of
factual or legal basis. It however ordered CATHAY to retain
her services as ground stewardess, with salaries and
benefits, noting that she had been reinstated therein since
12 March 1993. In turn, Singson was granted the option to
continue her employment with CATHAY.
Thereafter, both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration5 before the NLRC which on 31 August
1995 were denied for lack of merit. Petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 were subsequently filed by both parties
before the Supreme Court which, after consolidation, were
referred to the Court of Appeals for resolution.6
Meanwhile, pursuant to the decision of the NLRC, Singson
was reinstated as cabin stewardess with ground duties on
12 March 1993 pending the resolution of the petitions.
On 20 September 1999 the Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor
Arbiter declaring Singson to have been illegally
terminated. The appellate court anchored its judgment on
the following findings: First, Dr. Fowler's opinion about
Singson's medical condition was based on the personal
examination of Dr. Fahy, and not is own. The appellate
court held that a personal and prolonged examination of a
patient was necessary and crucial before he or she could
be properly diagnosed as afflicted with asthma,7 and thus
Dr. Fowler's expert opinion was unreliable and mere
hearsay. Second, CATHAY disregarded Sec. 8, Rule I, Book
VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code8
which requires a certification by a competent public health

Page 3

authority when disease is the reason for an employee's

separation from service, since it relied merely on the
diagnosis of its company doctors, Dr. Fowler and Dr. Fahy.
Third, the NLRC erroneously relied on the affidavit
executed by Dr. Fahy since she was not personally
presented as a witness to identify and testify on its
contents. Fourth, respondent passed the medical
examination required of prospective flight cabin
attendants, the International Labor Organization's
Occupational Health and Safety in Civil Aviation
examination, prior to her employment and found to be fit
for flight-related service. Fifth, CATHAY failed to
adequately prove the health standards required in
aviation, particularly the non-qualification of flight
attendants afflicted with asthma to flight-related service.9
Consequently, the appellate court awarded respondent full
back wages with reinstatement, as well as moral and
exemplary damages, while deleting the award of actual
damages, while deleting the award of actual damages
reasoning that no undue damage inured to her since her
husband nonetheless remained in Hongkong managing
two (2) corporations. The appellate court however
declared the option given to respondent to continue her
employment as a ground stewardess with CATHAY to have
been erroneously issued and consequently nullified the
same.
CATHAY now argues that the Court of Appeals should have
confined its inquiry to issues of want or excess of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion and not into the
factual findings of the NLRC since the petition before it was
made under Rule 65.
This Court is not persuaded. CATHAY's petition for
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals assailed
specifically the judgment of the NLRC granting respondent
the choice to continue her employment with CATHAY as
ground stewardess as, in fact, she had been reinstated as
such since 12 March 1993. On the other hand,
respondent's petition attacked the NLRC decision
declaring her dismissal valid and nullifying the award of
damages in her favor on the basis of Dr. Fowler's
testimony and not Dr. Lazo's. Consequently, it was
inevitable for the Court of Appeals to examine the evidence
anew to determine whether the factual findings of the
NLRC were supported by the evidence presented and the
conclusions derived therefrom accurately ascertained. As
pointed out by the appellate court, this became even more
essential in view of the fact that there was a conflict of
decision between the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. We thus
find no error in the appellate court's evaluation of the
evidence despite the pleadings being petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65.
CATHAY next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not
admitting as evidence the affidavit of Dr. Fahy. We agree.
The appellate court may have overlooked the principle in
labor cases that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law or equity are not always controlling. 10 It is not
necessary that affidavits and other documents presented
conform to the technical rules of evidence as the Court
maintains a liberal stance regarding procedural
deficiencies in labor cases.11 Section 3, Rule V, of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC specifically allows parties to
submit position papers accompanied by all supporting
documents including affidavits of their respective
witnesses which take the place of their testimonies.12 Thus,
the fact that Dr. Fahy was not presented as witness to

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

identify and testify on the contents of her affidavit was not

a fatal procedural flaw that affected the admissibility of her
affidavit as evidence.
The non-presentation of Dr. Fahy during the trial was duly
explained she was no longer connected with CATHAY
and had transferred residence to Ireland. It is for this same
reason that we find no error in the NLRC'' admission of Dr.
Fahy's written medical notes as newly-discovered
evidence. Moreover, the submission of additional evidence
before the NLRC is not prohibited by the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, such submissions not being
prejudicial to the party for the latter could submit counterevidence.13
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we find Singson to have
been illegally dismissed from the service. Granting without
admitting that indeed respondent was suffering from
asthma, this alone would not be a valid ground for
CATHAY to dismiss her summarily. Section 8, Rule I, Book
VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
requires a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a
stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6)
months even with proper medical treatment.
In the instant case, no certification by a competent public
health authority was presented by CATHAY. It dismissed
Singson based only on the recommendation of its company
doctors who concluded that she was afflicted with asthma.
It did not likewise show proof that Singson's asthma could
not be cured in six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment. On the contrary, when Singson returned to the
company clinic on 3 September 1991 or five (5) days after
her initial examination on 29 August 1991, Dr. Fahy
diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved.
CATHAY could not take refuge in Clause 22 of the
Conditions of Service it entered into with Singson. Although
a certification by a competent public health authority is
not required, still CATHAY is obliged to follow several
steps under the Conditions of Service before terminating its
employee. The pertinent part of Clause 22 thereof provides

Clause 22. Sick Leave. x x x x In case of serious illness the

Company will grant sick leave with full pay for the first
three months and with 2/3 of pay for the fourth month.
Consideration will be given to granting the cabin crew
further sick leave, either with pay or off pay up to a further
two months, or retiring the cabin crew on medical ground
xxxx
Thus, even on the assumption that asthma is a serious
illness, this again would not excuse CATHAY from ignoring
the procedure specified in its employment contract with
Singson. Under the contract, CATHAY must first allow
Singson to take a leave of absence and not to terminate her
services right there and then. It is only after the employee
has enjoyed four (4) months of sick leave that the option to
retire the employee based on medical ground arises. In the
instant case, Singson went to the company clinic on 29
August 1991. On 3 September 1991 she returned to the
company clinic only to be told that "effective immediately"
she was dismissed on medical grounds.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its award of moral
and exemplary damages to respondent. CATHAY
summarily dismissed Singson from the service based only

Page 4

on the recommendation of its medical officers, in effect,

failing to observe the provision of the Labor Code which
requires a certification by a competent public health
authority. Notably, the decision to dismiss Singson was
reached after a single examination only. CATHAY's medical
officers recommended Singson's dismissal even after
having diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved. It
did not make even a token offer for Singson to take a leave
of absence as what it provided in its Contract of Service.
CATHAY is presumed to know the law and the stipulation
in its Contract to Service with Singson.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
20 September 1999 declaring the dismissal of respondent
Martha Z. Singson by petitioner CATHAY PACIFIC
AIRWAYS, LTD. as illegal and ordering her reinstatement
to her former or an equivalent position without loss of
seniority rights, with full back wages and benefits, and to
pay her HK$500.00 as moral damages, HK$500.00 as
exemplary damages plus ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award as attorney's fees, is AFFIRMED. The
amounts received by respondent representing her six (6)
months retirement gratuity and one (1) month pay in lieu
of notices should be DEDUCTED from respondent's
computed back wages, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118943

September 10, 2001

MARIO HORNALES, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE
CAYANAN AND JEAC INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
CONTRACTOR SERVICES, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
It is sad enough that poverty has impelled many of our
countrymen to seek greener pastures in foreign lands. But
what is more lamentable is when a Filipino recruiter, after
sending his unlettered countrymen to a foreign land and
letting them suffer inhuman treatment in the hand of an
abusive employer, connives with the foreign employer in
denying them their rightful compensation. Surely, there
shall be a day of reckoning for such a recruiter whose
insatiable love for money made him a tyrant to his own
race.
At bench is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and
set aside the (a) Decision1 dated July 28, 1994 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing
the Decision2 of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) in POEA Case No. (L) 92-07- 939,3
and (b) Resolution4 dated October 6, 1994 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1wphi1.nt
The facts as shown by the records are:
On July 15, 1992, Mario Hornales (herein petitioner) filed
with the POEA a complaint5 for non-payment of wages and
recovery of damages against JEAC International
Management & Contractor Services (JEAC) and its owner,
Jose Cayanan (herein private respondents). As private
respondents' surety, Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation (Country Bankers) was later on impleaded by
petitioner. The complaint alleged that on October 8, 1991,
private respondents sent petitioner, together with other
Filipinos, to Singapore. At their departure, they were

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

advised that someone would meet them in Singapore. True

enough, they were welcomed by Victor Lim, the owner of
Step-Up Employment Agency (Step-Up Agency).6 He
informed them that they would be working as fishermen
with a monthly salary of US $200.00 each. Thereafter, they
boarded Ruey Horn #3, a vessel owned by Min Fu Fishery
Co. Ltd. of Taiwan.
On board the vessel, petitioner was subjected to inhumane
work conditions, like inadequate supply of food and water,
maltreatment by the ship captain, and lack of medical
attendance. He was also required to work for twenty-two
hours a day without pay. Unable to bear his situation any
longer, he joined the other Filipino workers in leaving the
vessel while it was docked at Mauritius Islands on July 15,
1992.
Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner asked private
respondents to pay his salaries. Instead of doing so, they
required him to surrender his passport promising that
they would procure another job for him. Later, private
respondents gave him the amount of five hundred pesos
(P500.00).
Private respondents filed an answer7 claiming that,
petitioner, Victor Lim and Min Fee Fishery Co. Ltd are all
"total strangers" to them. To bolster the claim, they offered
in evidence the Joint Affidavit8 of Efren B. Balucas and
Alexander C. Natura, petitioner's co-workers in Singapore,
stating that while they were in Singapore, petitioner
admitted to them that he did not apply in any agency in the
Philippines; that he came to Singapore merely as a tourist;
and that, he applied directly and personally with Step-Up
Agency. These statements were corroborated by the
"Certification"9 issued by Step-Up Agency.
On January 23, 1993, petitioner filed a Supplemental
Affidavit10 claiming that he was not a "total stranger" to
private respondents, and that, as a matter of fact, he knew
respondent Cayanan since 1990, when they used to go to
the San Lazaro Hippodrome to watch horse races. He also
averred that while the vessel was docked at Mauritius
Islands on June 1992, respondent Cayanan reminded him
and his co-workers of their loan obligations by sending
them photocopies of the PNB checks he (respondent
Cayanan) issued in favor of their relatives, and the
agreements whereby they authorized Victor Lim to
deduct from their salaries the amount of their loan
obligations.
On January 5, 1994, the POEA rendered a decision in favor
of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents JEAC
International Management and Contractor Services, Jose E.
Cayanan and Travellers Insurance Corp. are hereby
ordered, jointly and severally to pay complainant the
amount of US DOLLARS: ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FORTY SIX AND 66/100 (US$ 1, 646.66) representing his
unpaid salaries and US $ 164.66 as and by way of
attorney's fees. Payment shall be made in Philippine
Currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of
payment.
For want of jurisdiction, the claim for moral and exemplary
damages is denied.
All other claims and counterclaims are denied.

Page 5

SO ORDERED."11
Incidentally, the POEA dismissed petitioner's claim against
Country Bankers on the ground that the surety bond which
was effective at the time of petitioner's deployment was
that of Travelers Insurance Corporation.
On appeal, respondent NLRC vacated the decision of the
POEA and dismissed petitioner's complaint mainly on the
ground that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the parties. The NLRC ratiocinated as follows:
"At the outset, we note that the record is bereft of any
showing that complainant applied with the respondent
agency as a job applicant and subsequently entered into an
overseas contract with the latter which was later
processed and approved by the POEA. X x x What appears
is that complainant used the agency as a stepping stone to
enter Singapore as a tourist and obtain employment
thereat on his own. This is evidenced by Annexes "A-1 " to
'"H" of Complainant's Reply (See pp. 65-72, record) which
purports to show that the batch of complainant was
obligated to pay back respondent Jose Cayanan the
expenses for their deployment. No less than the POEA
noted that the respondent agency "is a service contractor
and is not authorized to deploy fishermen." Based on this
fact, the respondent agency could not have deployed
complainant as an overseas contract worker. What is
apparent is that it obtained a tourist passport and plane
ticket for complainant as a travel agent on a clearly "fly
now pay later" plan.
We cannot rely on the employment agreements and checks
(See pp. 66-67, record) presented by complainant to show
proof of employment relations considering that his name
does not appear in any of the documents, hence they are
merely hearsay."12
In reversing the POEA's finding, respondent NLRC gave
considerable weight to the Joint Affidavit of Natura and
Balucas.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied.
Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public
respondent NLRC. He asserts that private respondents
were the ones who deployed him to Singapore to work as
fisherman; and that, respondent NLRC's conclusion that
respondent JEAC was a mere "travel agency" and
petitioner, a mere tourist, has no basis in fact and in law.
For their part, private respondents maintain that
respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it set aside the decision of the POEA, since petitioner
failed to show any POEA record or document to prove that
they deployed him to work in Singapore. Neither did he
present a Special Power of Attorney to prove that Step-Up
Agency authorized private respondents to recruit and
deploy contract workers in its behalf nor an Affidavit of
Responsibility to show that they (private respondents and
Step-Up Agency) assumed solidary liability to petitioner.13
Private respondents likewise insist that the photocopies of
the PNB checks and agreements are hearsay and
inadmissible in evidence.
The Solicitor General, in his comment,14 joins petitioner in
assailing the decision of respondent NLRC as "baseless and

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

erroneous." According to him, the conclusion of

respondent NLRC directly contradicts private respondents'
defense that petitioner was a "total stranger." Further, he
contends that the Joint Affidavit of Balucas and Natura are
hearsay.
The cardinal issue in this case hinges on the question - Are
private respondents responsible for petitioner's recruitment
and deployment to Singapore?
Let us take a closer look at the scale of evidence.
On one arm of the scale are petitioner's evidence
consisting of photocopies of the PNB checks and
agreementswhich were intended to disprove private
respondents' claim that petitioner, Victor Lim and Step-Up
Agency are "total strangers." The PNB checks represent
the payments made by respondent Cayanan to the
relatives of petitioner's co-workers (including Balucas and
Natura). The checks show the name of LIM Chang Koo
&/or Jose Cayanan, as drawers. While the agreements,
denominated "For Fisherman Deployed For Work To
Singapore,"constitute authorization to Victor Lim to deduct
from the monthly salaries of the workers the amounts of
their obligations to private respondents. Petitioner's own
undertaking to private respondents reads:
"I hereby certify that my expenses abroad in going to
Singapore as fisherman amounting to SIXTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P16,000.00) shall be temporarily
shouldered by JEAC INT'L MGT & CONT. SERVICES and as
soon as I arrive in Singapore, said amount will be charged
by MR. VICTOR LIM and will be remitted to Eng. Jose E.

(Sgd.)
F. CREW" 15

Mario

Hornales

Cayanan.
On the other side of the scale are the Joint Affidavit
secured by private respondents from petitioner's coworkers, Balucas and Natura, and a Certification issued
by Step-Up Agency. These evidence were intended to
prove the alleged admission of petitioner to Balucas and
Natura that he went as a tourist to Singapore and that he
applied directly with Step-Up Agency. The Certification of
Step-Up Agency re-echoes the allegations in the Joint
Affidavit.
The scale of evidence must tilt in favor of petitioner.
In a catena of labor cases, this Court has consistently held
that where the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.16 Private respondents' Joint Affidavit has no
probative value. It suffers from two infirmities, first,
petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine
the two affiants regarding the contents thereof, and second,
the two affiants merely swore as to what petitioner told
them but not as to the truth of the statements uttered.17
In the same vein, the Certification must not be given
weight. Private respondents not only failed to present
Victor Lim before the POEA to be cross-examined by
petitioner, but the Certification was also not verified or

Page 6

under oath.18 To our mind, it is just a last-ditch attempt on

the part of Step-Up Agency to help private respondents
free themselves from liability to petitioner. It bears noting
that private respondents, Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency,
as shown by petitioner's evidence, acted in concert in his
deployment to Singapore. Hence, such certification is, at
most, self-serving.
On the other hand, the PNB Checks and the agreements
presented by petitioner strongly disprove private
respondents' total strangers" theory .It may be observed
that, in their attempt to exculpate themselves from
monetary liability, private respondents adopted an
extreme position, i.e., that they have nothing to do with
petitioner, Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency. Such strategy
proved to be disastrous to them. The mere presentation of
documents bearing private respondents' names and that of
Step-Up Agency and Victor Lim is enough to defeat their
theory. More so, when the documetary evidence consist of
bank checks showing the existence of a joint account, and
authorization agreements revealing a contract of agency.
Private respondents' argument that petitioner's evidence
are mere, photocopies and therefore cannot be considered
as the best evidence on the issue does not persuade us. The
best evidence rule enshrined in the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that "when the subject of an inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself."19 This
rule is not without exception. Some of the exception are
when the original has been lost or destroyed; cannot be
produced in court without bad faith on the part of the
offeror; or when the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice.20
It would be unreasonable to demand from petitioner the
presentation of the original PNB Checks considering that
it is a banking practice that for a check to be encashed, the
same must be surrendered to the bank first. These checks
are, therefore, most likely in the possession of the bank. As
to the agreements, it is reasonable to conclude that
respondent Cayanan was the one in possession of the
originals thereof. It maybe recalled that these agreements
were executed by the workers for his security and benefit.
At any rate, it is worthy to note that private respondents
did not disown the PNB checks nor deny the existence of
the agreements.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be emphasized that
the proceedings before the POEA is non-litigious in nature.
The technicalities of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply
thereto and a hearing officer may avail himself of all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the case. 21 On
the applicability of the Rules of Court to labor cases, the
Supreme Court has ruled in Shoemart, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission22:
"The argument cannot be sustained. Whatever merit it
might have in the context of ordinary civil actions, where
the rules of evidence apply with more or less strictness,
disappears when adduced in connection with proceedings
before Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations
Commission; for in said proceedings, the law is explicit
that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or
equity shall not be controlling and it is the (law's) spirit
and intention that the Commission and its members and
the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or

procedure, all in the interest of due process.' Indeed, it is
not the Rules of Court enacted by the Supreme Court but
rather the regulations promulgated by the National Labor
Relations Commission which govern "the hearing and
disposition of cases before it and its regional branches**.'
The 'Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and
prevailing jurisprudence,' the law says, may be applied to
labor cases only under quite stringent limits, i.e., 'in the
absence of any applicable provision (in the Rules of the
Commission), and in order to effectuate the objectives of
the Labor Code**, in the interest of expeditious labor
justice and whenever practicable and convenient, by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect." Under
these rules, the proceedings before a Labor Arbiter are
'non-litigious in nature' in which, 'subject to the
requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law **
(do not) strictly apply."
Undoutedly, the factual and legal bases of respondent
NLRC's conclusions are bereft of substantial evidence - the
quantum of proof in labor cases. As aptly said by the
Solicitor General, its decision is "baseless and erroneous."
Its disposition is manifestly a grave abuse of discretion. 23
In concluding that respondent JEAC was a mere "travel
agency" and petitioner, a mere "tourist, " respondent NLRC
came up with a new theory which find no support even
from the evidence of private respondents, the party in
whose favor the decision was rendered. First, there is
nothing in the record which shows that respondent JEAC is
a mere travel agency. Even private respondents
consistently plead that respondent JEAC is a "licensed
recruitment agency authorized to recruit and deploy
overseas Filipino contract workers."
Second, the evidence upon which respondent NLRC based
its findings consist of agreements authorizing Victor Lim
to deduct from the salaries of petitioner and his coworkers the amount of their obligations to respondent
Cayanan. It would be too much of a coincidence to say that
petitioner and his co-workers are all mere tourists who
allowed a certain Victor Lim to deduct from their salaries
the amount of their obligations to respondent Cayanan.
What is evident here is that there is an internal
arrangement between respondent Cayanan and Victor Lim
brought about by the fact that the former deployed these
workers to serve the latter. As correctly pointed out by the
POEA, there must be a "previous arrangement" between
private respondents and Victor Lim.
Significantly, from these pieces of evidence respondent
NLRC could already see the falsity in private respondents'
"total strangers" theory. How could there be an
arrangement between two persons who do not know each
other? Note how respondent NLRC conveniently closed its
eye to the name of Victor Lim, as mentioned in the
agreements, when it ruled that Victor Lim and Step-Up
Agency are indeed " total strangers" to private
respondents. We sustain the findings of the POEA, being
more convincing and supported by substantial evidence,
thus:
"[C]omplainant applied at the office of respondent agency
and was able to seek employment in Singapore through
Engineer Jose Cayanan, owner of respondent agency.
Complainant's allegations are supported by the Annexes
he attached to his Reply (Annexes "'A" to "H"). These

Page 7

documents readily show that it was not only complainant

who was recruited by respondent agency through Engr.
Cayanan and as agreed upon, the expenses in going to
Singapore shall be advanced by respondents. Thus their
loans payable to Engr. Cayanan and charged against their
salaries. The checks representing the salaries of the
complainant and his co-workers show that they are
drawn from the account of Lim Chang Khoo and/or
Jose Gayanan. From the foregoing, it is properly noted
that complainant's salaries were taken from the funds
of respondents which means that the latter had a hand
or participated in his recruitment and deployment.
We cannot give credence to respondents' contentions
that complainant is a total stranger to them and that
MIN Fee Fishery Co. Ltd. is not its principal, neither do
we believe that respondents do not know Mr. Victor
Lim who met complainant in Singapore. Annex "B" in
respondents' position paper belies respondents'
contentions. How could respondents write to a certain
Step Up Employment Agency in Singapore,
complainant's employer, when the latter is not even
mentioned in his complaint? We wonder where
respondents got the name of this employer if the same
is really not known to them.
It is very unlikely for complainant to proceed to
Singapore as a tourist without knowing anybody at the
site and just to apply for work. Had there not been
previous arrangements with respondents, it is not all
possible for complainant to land on a job in Singapore
because he is only a tourist.
Respondents had to resort to this misrepresentation of
allowing its recruits to leave as tourist because it is a
service contractor and it is not authorized to deploy
fishermen."24
Private respondents further argue that they cannot be held
liable by petitioner because no employment contract
between him and Step-Up Agency had been approved by
the POEA. They also claim that the absence of a Special
Power of Attorney and an Affidavit of Responsibility, as
required under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 1, Book III of the
POEA Rules and Regulations25 only proves that they did
not deploy petitioner to Singapore.
Their argument is far from persuasive. Surely, they cannot
expect us to utilize their non-compliance with the POEA
Rules and Regulations as a basis in absolving them. To do
so would be tantamount to giving premium to acts done in
violation of established rules. At most, private
respondents' act of deploying petitioner to Singapore
without complying with the POEA requirements only made
them susceptible to cancellation or suspension of license
as provided by Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of POEA Rules and
Regulations:
SEC.2.Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
xxx

xxx

m. Deploying workers whose employment and travel

documents were not processed by the Administration;
n. Deploying workers workers or seafarers to vessels or
principals not accredited by the Administration;

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

But of course, such violations should be threshed out in a

proper administrative proceeding for suspension or
cancellation of license.
Meantime, we just uphold POEA's Decision holding private
respondents and Travelers Insurance Corporation jointly
and severally liable to petitioner. Section 2 (e), Rule V,
Book I of the Omnibus Rules lmplementing the Labor Code
requires a private employment agency to assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of
employment of an overseas worker.26 This provision is
substantially reiterated in Section 1 (f) (3) of Rule II, Book
II of the POEA Rules and Regulations which provides:
"Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License - Every
applicant for license to operate a private employment
agency or manning agency shall submit a written
application together with the following requirements:
xxx

xxx

f) a verified undertaking stating that the applicant:

xxx
(3) shall assume joint and solidary liability with the
employer which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the contract, including but not limited
to payment of wages, health and disability compensation
and repatriation.
With respect to private respondents' surety, its liability is
founded on Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules
and Regulations. Cash and surety bonds are required by
the POEA from recruitment and employment companies
precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective
recourse against such companies when held liable for
applicant's or worker's claims. The cash and surety bonds
shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the
license, and/or accreditations and contracts of
employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee
compliance with the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations relating to
recruitment and placement, the POEA Rules and relevant
issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the
POEA may impose.27
Accordingly, we find it proper to reinstate the Decision
dated January 5, 1994 of the POEA subject to the
modification that the amount of P16,000, the amount
which petitioner admitted to have been advanced by
respondent JEAC for his expenses in going to Singapore28
be deducted from the total amount to be awarded to him
which includes a) US$ 1,646.66 corresponding to his
unpaid salaries and b) attorney's fees. The award of
attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total
award is justified under Article 111 (a) of the Labor Code.
The solidary liability of Travelers Insurance Corp., as
surety of respondent JEAC, is maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
respondent NLRC's a) Decision dated July 28, 1994, and b)
Resolution dated October 6, 1994 are SET ASIDE. The
Decision of POEA Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson in
POEA Case No. (L) 92-07-939 is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that the sum of P16,000.00 be deducted
from the total amount to be awarded to petitioner.
1wphi1.nt

Page 8

Payment should be made in Philippine currency at the

prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH
DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO
GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES,
NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA,
BENJAMIN
BASMAYOR,
ABELARDO
SACURA,
FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR,
JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO
QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA,
BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO,
JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ,
JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON,
RUDY ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO
PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA,
DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ,
EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS,
EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO
NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon
Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks to annul the
decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, Fifth Division and remand the cases to the
Arbitration Branch for a retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
construction business nationwide with principal office at
No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In
1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel
Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant
employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private
respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the
project and worked under the supervision of Engineers
Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project
neared its completion and petitioner started terminating
the services of private respondents and its other
employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints
against petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch
XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they
claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the
minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials
and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre
were named co-respondents.
Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter
Guardson A. Siao while the others were assigned to Labor
Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan. Summonses and notices of
preliminary conference were issued and served on the two
engineers and petitioner through Engineer Estacio. The
preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were
attended by Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private
respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before
Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's
liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their
wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19,
1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

allegedly waived petitioner's right to file its position paper.

1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were
dispensing with their position papers and were adopting
their complaints as their position paper. 2
On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but
requested for another week to settle the claims. Labor
Arbiter Siao denied this request. On June 21, 1990, Arbiter
Siao issued an order granting the complaint and directing
petitioner to pay private respondents' claims. Arbiter Siao
held:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these
cases were filed, and what the complainants might think as
to how this branch operates and/or conducts its
proceedings as they are now restless, this Arbiter has no
other alternative or recourse but to order the respondent
to pay the claims of the complainants, subject of course to
the computation of the Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch
pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. The
Supreme Court ruled: "Contracts though orally made are
binding on the parties." (Lao Sok v. Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA
134).
Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that "a
court cannot decide a case without facts either admitted or
agreed upon by the parties or proved by evidence." (Yu
Chin Piao v. Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26
Phil. 160)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is
hereby ordered to pay the individual claims of the abovenamed complainants representing their wage differentials
within ten (10) days from receipt of this order.
The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby
ordered to compute the individual claims of the herein
complainants.
SO ORDERED. 3
On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order,
thus:
When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on
June 19, 1990 at 10:00 a.m. respondent thru their
representative manifested that they were willing to pay
the claims of the complainants and promised to pay the
same on June 28, 1990 at 10:30 a.m.
However, when these cases were called purposely to
materialize the promise of the respondent, the latter failed
to appear without any valid reason.
Considering therefore that the respondent has already
admitted the claims of the complainants, we believe that
the issues raised herein have become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the above-entitled
cases are hereby ordered Closed and Terminated,
however, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the
complainants their differential pay and 13th-month pay
within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof based
on the employment record on file with the respondent.
SO ORDERED. 4

Page 9

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor

Relations Commission. It alleged that it was denied due
process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no
authority to represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner's
appeal was filed by one Atty. Arthur Abundiente.
In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission
affirmed the orders of the Arbiters.
Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the
decision of respondent Commission was rendered without
jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner
claims that:
I
THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION IS A NULLITY, IT HAVING
BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION;
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY
MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON
FACTS AND BUT ON SPECULATION, SURMISE AND
EVIDENCE CONJECTURE:
A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional right to
due process of law when it was adjudged by the NLRC
liable without trial on the merits and without its
knowledge;
B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably
interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration
Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence;
C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the NLRC's ruling
that petitioner is already in estoppel to disclaim the
authority of its alleged representatives.
D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying merely
on private, respondents' unsubstantiated complaints to
hold petitioner liable for damages. 5
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor
arbiters and respondent Commission are void for the
following reasons: (1) there was no valid service of
summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent
petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on
appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the
arbiters and respondent Commission are based on
unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were
rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.
Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters
is governed by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC. They provide:
Sec. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. (a) Notices or
summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions
shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the
bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3)
days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided
that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized
representative, service shall be made on such counsel or
authorized representative; provided further that in cases of

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served

on both the parties and their counsel; provided finally, that
in case where the parties are so numerous, service shall be
made on counsel and upon such number of complainants
as may be practicable, which shall be considered
substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of the Labor
Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Proof and completeness of service. The return is
prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by
registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or
his agent. . . .
Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the
respondent shall be served personally or by registered
mail on the party himself. If the party is represented by
counsel or any other authorized representative or agent,
summons shall be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic
corporation with principal address in Quezon City. The
complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and
summonses therefor served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan
City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an
agent and authorized representative of petitioner.
To determine the scope or meaning of the term
"authorized representative" or "agent" of parties on whom
summons may be served, the provisions of the Revised
Rules of Court may be resorted to. 6
Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private
domestic corporation or partnership must be made upon
its officers, such as the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are
deemed so integrated with the corporation that they know
their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do
with any legal papers served on them. 8
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer
Dulatre, managed and supervised the construction project.
9 According to the Solicitor General and private
respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in
Iligan City and supervised the work of the employees
thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers
served on him and to relay the same to the president or
other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for
petitioner was therefore validly served on him.
Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters
and his promise to settle the claims of private respondents
is another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear
before the labor arbiter and respondent Commission in
cases before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3)
exceptions to the rule, viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. . . . .
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any
Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;

Page 10

(b) he represents the organization or its members,

provided that he shall be made to present written proof
that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office
duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto
by the latter. . . . 10
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the
NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a party to the
case; (b) he represents an organization or its members,
with written authorization from them: or (c) he is a dulyaccredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized
by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in cases referred to by the latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither
were they duly-accredited members of a legal aid office.
Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their
capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the
first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on
behalf of petitioner required written proof of
authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to
ascertain this authority especially since both engineers
were named co-respondents in the cases before the
arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and
declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters
could not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases
appealed to respondent Commission did not cure Engineer
Estacio's representation. Atty. Abundiente, in the first
place, had no authority to appear before the respondent
Commission. The appellants' brief he filed was verified by
him, not by petitioner. 12 Moreover, respondent
Commission did not delve into the merits of Atty.
Abundiente's appeal and determine whether Engineer
Estacio was duly authorized to make such promise. It
dismissed the appeal on the ground that notices were
served on petitioner and that the latter was estopped from
denying its promise to pay.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and
Atty. Abundiente were authorized to appear as
representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter
only in procedural matters before the arbiters and
respondent Commission. Petitioner's liability arose from
Engineer Estacio's alleged promise to pay. A promise to
pay amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a
special power of attorney or the express consent of
petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly
presumed and should be duly established by evidence.13
This is explicit from Section 7 of Rule III of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure, viz:
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. Attorneys and other
representatives of parties shall have authority to bind
their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot,
without a special power of attorney or express consent,
enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing
party in full or partial discharge of a client's claim.
The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio
was made at the preliminary conference and constituted
an offer to settle the case amicably. The promise to pay
could not be presumed to be a single unilateral act,
contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General. 14 A
defendant's promise to pay and settle the plaintiff's claims

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

ordinarily requires a reciprocal obligation from the

plaintiff to withdraw the complaint and discharge the
defendant from liability. 15 In effect, the offer to pay was an
offer to compromise the cases.
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission
of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against
the offeror. 16 If this rule were otherwise, no attempt to
settle litigation could safely be made. 17 Settlement of
disputes by way of compromise is an accepted and
desirable practice in courts of law and administrative
tribunals. 18 In fact, the Labor Code mandates the labor
arbiter to exert all efforts to enable the parties to arrive at
an amicable settlement of the dispute within his
jurisdiction on or before the first hearing. 19
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its
discretion in affirming the decisions of the labor arbiters
which were not only based on unauthorized
representations, but were also made in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.
Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides:
Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum.
Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable
settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the
Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the
matters taken up and agreed upon during the conferences
and directing the parties to simultaneously file their
respective verified position papers
xxx xxx xxx
After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the
workers' claims as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and
Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective
position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a
decision on the merits without at least requiring private
respondents to substantiate their complaints. The parties
may have earlier waived their right to file position papers
but petitioner's waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on
the premise that petitioner shall have paid and settled the
claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference.
Since petitioner reneged on its "promise," there was a
failure to settle the case amicably. This should have
prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their
position papers.
Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases
before labor arbiters and respondent Commission, they
"shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process." The rule that respondent
Commission and the Labor Arbiters are not bound by
technical rules of evidence and procedure should not be
interpreted so as to dispense with the fundamental and
essential right of due process. 20 And this right is satisfied,
at the very least, 'when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers. 21 Labor Arbiters
Siao and Palangan erred in dispensing with this
requirement.
Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the
expense of due process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard
specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely
intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just,

Page 11

expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes.

22

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted.

The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission,
Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is
remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166556

July 31, 2006

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
LUZ M. BAUL, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside
the May 31, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 76461 which reversed the Decision2 of the
Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case
No. GM-12984-202 denying the claim for compensation
benefits of Luz M. Baul under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 626, as amended.
Luz M. Baul was employed by the Department of Education
and Culture and Sports (DECS), Tarlac South District, as an
elementary school teacher on August 1, 1962.
Medical records show that due to extreme dizziness,
headache, chest pain, slurred speech, vomiting and general
body weakness, she was admitted to the St. Martin de
Porres Hospital inside Hacienda Luisita, San Miguel, Tarlac
from July 1 to 9, 1993. Dr. Salvador A. Fontanilla, the
medical director of the hospital, diagnosed her illness as
Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease (HCVD)-Essential
Hypertension. Prognosis was "poor" and "guarded."3 To
monitor her health condition, she had frequent
consultation and treatment as an outpatient until her
compulsory retirement on May 2, 1998.4
On January 19 to 20, 1999, Luz was confined at the Ramos
General Hospital in Ligtasan, Tarlac City. Dr. Conrado M.
Orquiola, a cardiologist, corroborated the earlier findings
of Dr. Fontanilla that she had a HCVD. On May 17, 1999,
she consulted Dr. Ernesto Cunanan, an internal medicine
specialist, and the doctor noted that her hypertension had
worsened to Transient Ischemic Attack (TIA), Essential
Hypertension Stage III (moderate to severe hypertension).
Eventually, on April 17, 2000, she suffered from a CerebroVascular Accident (CVA), i.e., stroke, and was rushed to the
Ramos General Hospital where she stayed for four days
under the medical supervision of Dr. Orquiola and Dr.
Albert Lapid, a neurologist.5 The CT Scan result revealed
the impression "ischemic infarct, right occipital lobe."6
Convinced that her hypertension supervened by reason
and in the course of her employment with the DECS and
persisted even after her retirement, she filed a claim on
June 10, 1999 before the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Tarlac Branch, for disability and hospital
medical benefits under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626,
as amended.7

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

On August 15, 2001, GSIS Tarlac Branch Manager Amando

A. Inocentes denied petitioner's claim due to the alleged
absence of proof to confirm that there was a resulting
permanent disability due to hypertension prior to
retirement.8
In its January 23, 2003 decision, the Employees'
Compensation Commission (ECC) sustained the
conclusions of the GSIS,9 holding that although
hypertension is among the listed compensable illnesses in
Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, its compensability is qualified. The ECC
declared that petitioner failed to establish that her
hypertension had caused an impairment of body organ
functions resulting in permanent disability. In the same
way, even if her CVA is an occupational disease under No.
19 of Annex "A" of the Amended Rules of the ECC, she
failed to show the existence of such conditions as required
by the Rules.
Luz filed a petition for review with the CA for the reversal
of the ECC decision. On May 31, 2004, the appellate court
reversed the ECC ruling and ordered the GSIS to pay
petitioner the benefits corresponding to permanent partial
disability before retirement and permanent total disability
after retirement benefits.10 The CA ruled that probability,
not certainty, is the touchstone of workmen's
compensation. Since hypertension is listed as a
compensable occupational disease, it is presumed that
such illness is reasonably work-connected. Petitioner had
proved by substantial evidence that her hypertension was
work-related; it emanated from the stress caused by the
mental strain of teaching many pupils aside from the loads
of obligations and responsibilities appurtenant to the
profession.
The ECC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 11 which the CA
denied.12
The GSIS, now petitioner, sought relief in this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner insists that the
ruling of the CA rests on mere presumptions, and points
out that an award of disability benefits cannot depend on
surmises and conjectures. The beneficiary must present
evidence to prove that the illness was caused by
employment or that the working conditions increased the
risk of contracting the disease. Also, there is no showing
that respondent's ailment is at all considered permanent
partial or total disability by the GSIS and approved by the
ECC medical groups.
Petitioner also claims that the Court must respect the
findings of quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under their special
technical knowledge and training. In this case, respondent
failed to file the claim before retirement and adduce
evidence to prove compensability of her illness; there was
no such finding of permanent partial or total disability at
the time of her retirement. Moreover, her sickness, which
developed after her retirement, could not be attributed to
her former occupation but to factors independent thereof.
The petition is denied.
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are
considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29,
respectively, of Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules of
P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that
there be proof of causal relation between the work and the

Page 12

illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. The

open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no
proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering
from an occupational disease is automatically paid
benefits.13
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential
hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their
compensability requires compliance with all the
conditions set forth in the Rules. In short, both are
qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular
accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there
must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at
work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and
extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue
exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a
direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the
course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack;
and (3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a
brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential
hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment
of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and
brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that, the
following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray
report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d)
funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.
The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence
of the above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is
merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. What the law requires is a
reasonable work-connection and not direct causal relation.
It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's
claim is based is probable.14 As correctly pointed out by
the CA, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is
the test of proof in compensation proceedings.15 For, in
interpreting and carrying out the provisions of the Labor
Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's
welfare. To safeguard the worker's rights, any doubt as to
the proper interpretation and application must be resolved
in their favor.16
In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions
of respondent's attending physicians sufficiently support
her claim for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the
ECC convincingly deny their genuineness and due
execution. The reports are made part of the record and
there is no showing that they are false or erroneous, or
resorted to as a means of deceiving the Court, hence, are
entitled to due probative weight. The failure of respondent
to submit to a full medical examination, as required by the
rules, to substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no
moment. The law is that laboratory reports such as X-ray
and ECG are not indispensable prerequisites to
compensability,17 the reason being that the strict rules of
evidence need not be observed in claims for
compensation.18 Medical findings of the attending
physician may be received in evidence and used as proof of
the fact in dispute.19 The doctor's certification as to the
nature of claimant's disability may be given credence as he
or she normally would not make untruthful certification.
Indeed, no physician in his right mind and who is aware of
the far reaching and serious effect that his or her
statements would cause on a money claim against a
government agency would vouch indiscriminately without
regarding his own interests and protection.20

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Significantly, even medical authorities have established

that the exact etiology of essential hypertension cannot be
accurately traced:
The term essential hypertension has been employed to
indicate those cases of hypertension for which a specific
endocrine or renal basis cannot be found, and in which the
neural element may be only a mediator of other influences.
Since even this latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is
more properly listed for the moment in the category of
unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension
defines simply by failing to define; hence, it is of limited
use except as an expression of our inability to understand
adequately the forces at work.21
It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments
tracing the etiology of essential hypertension show that
there is a relationship between the sickness and the nature
and conditions of work.22 In this jurisdiction, we have
already ruled in a number of cases23 the strenuous office of
a public school teacher. The case of Makabali v. Employees'
Compensation Commission,24 which we have re-affirmed in
the subsequent cases of De Vera v. Employees'
Compensation Commission,25 Antiporda v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission,26 and De la Torre v. Employees'
Compensation Commission,27 amply summarized, thus:
We are well aware of the fact that only a handful of public
elementary school teachers are fortunate enough to be
assigned in urban areas where the working conditions are
comparatively much better than those in the rural areas. A
large majority of public elementary school teachers, as in
the case of the petitioner, work in remote places such as
sitios and barrios under poor working conditions. Thus,
the daily task of conducting classes (normally composed of
40 to 50 pupils in urban areas and up to 70 pupils in rural
areas) in an atmosphere that is, by any standard, not
conducive to learning becomes even more physically
taxing to the teachers. Tremendous amount of paper work
during and after office hours (from correcting examination
papers, assignments, school projects and reports to
writing lesson plans and the computation and recording of
grades) can be very physically draining especially to the
senior members of the teaching profession such as the
petitioner. Such and other related school activities of a
teacher, aggravated by substandard, if not adverse,
working conditions, give rise to increased tension, if not
emotional and psychological disturbance on the part of the
teachers. This is especially true in the case of public
elementary school teachers whose pupils, being of tender
age and immature, need to be disciplined and to be taught
good manners and right conduct, as well as to be assisted
in their formal school lessons
[We] must not also neglect to mention the fact that public
elementary school teachers are the lowest paid
government workers, considering the nature and
importance of the services they render. They are the most
reliable and dedicated public servants being constantly
called upon by officials of the local and national
government to assist in various extra-curricular and civic
activities which contribute to the welfare of the
community and the country. Their responsibility in
molding the values and character of the young generations
of the country, cannot be overestimated.
Significantly, even Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise
known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers,
mandates in one of its provisions that 'teachers shall be

Page 13

protected against the consequences of employment injury

in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the
physical and nervous strain on the teacher's health shall be
recognized as compensable occupational diseases in
accordance with existing laws.' (Calvero v. ECC, et al., 117
SCRA 462 [1982].28
The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent
worsened and resulted in a CVA at the time she was
already out of service is inconsequential. The main
consideration for its compensability is that her illness was
contracted during and by reason of her employment, and
any non-work related factor that contributed to its
aggravation is immaterial.29
Indeed, an employee's disability may not manifest fully at
one precise moment in time but rather over a period of
time. It is possible that an injury which at first was
considered to be temporary may later on become
permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes
totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.30
The right to compensation extends to disability due to
disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally
resulting froma compensable injury. Where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from
the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it
is the result of an independent intervening cause
attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct.
Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow from the
primary injury are compensable.31
P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the
presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation
prevalent
under
the
Workmen's
Compensation Act. Nonetheless, we ruled in Employees'
Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,32 that:
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of
compensability established by the old law, the present law
has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a
social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of
the working man and woman still prevails, and the official
agency charged by law to implement the constitutional
guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in
favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate
policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies
and enhances. Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse,
dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the
social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic
approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants;
or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be
resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the
policy is to extend the applicability of the law on
employees' compensation to as many employees who can
avail of the benefits thereunder.33
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76461 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55624 November 19, 1982
BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIRST

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

DIVISION, LABOR ARBITER BENIGNO AYSON and

JIMMY SAJONAS, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
On August 18, 1978, the Baguio Country Club Corporation
filed with the Ministry of Labor office at Baguio City an
application for clearance to terminate the services of
respondent Jimmy Sajonas for willful breach of trust,
telling lies in an investigation, taking money paid by
customers, threatening a fellow employee, committing
dishonesty against guests and committing four violations
of the club rules and regulations which would constitute
valid grounds for dismissal.
On August 28, 1978, Jimmy Sajonas filed his opposition
alleging that his dismissal was without justifiable grounds
to support it and that it would contravene his
constitutional right to security of tenure.
After a notice of investigation was issued, the case was
referred to a conciliator who recommended the preventive
suspension of the respondent.
The Regional Director suspended Sajonas and indorsed the
case for compulsory arbitration to Labor Arbiter Benigno
Ayson.
On December 11, 1978, the labor arbiter came out with a
decision denying the application for clearance to dismiss
Jimmy Sajonas for insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner
was ordered to reinstate Sajonas with backwages from the
time of suspension up to reinstatement and without loss of
seniority rights.
The case was appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. On January 17, 1980, the Commission
rendered a decision dismissing the appeal and affirming
the decision of the labor arbiter.
The petitioner charges the public respondents with grave
abuse of discretion for, having rendered an "unlawful,
unconstitutional, and unprecedented decision."
The main issue in this petition is the contention of the
petitioner that it was denied due process because its
evidence was not considered by both the labor arbiter and
the NLRC. The petitioner states that as a result of this
ignoring of its evidence, the decisions of the public
respondents are contrary to the facts and the applicable
law.
A careful consideration of the records of this petition
convinces us that there is merit in this petition. The
summary procedures used by the public respondents were
too summary to satisfy the requirements of justice and fair
play.
The decision of the respondent Commission which
affirmed the order to reinstate Mr. Sajonas with full
backwages was based on two grounds - First, the evidence
available to the labor arbiter when he decided this case
was such that the respondent had not sufficiently shown a
just cause for the complainant's dismissal. Second, the
evidence to support the application for clearance to
dismiss the complainant was submitted too late because it
was submitted only on appeal.

Page 14

The respondent Commission committed grave abuse of

discretion when it affirmed the irregular and one-sided
procedure adopted by the labor arbiter in arriving at his
finding of insufficiency of evidence and when it decided to
uphold a decision not only contrary to the facts but
obviously unfair and unjust.
When the Baguio office of the Ministry of Labor issued as
part of the conciliation process a notice of investigation for
September 7, 1978 and September 15, 1978, the petitioner
Baguio Country Club submitted a position paper
accompanied by copies of the application to terminate
employment and the sworn statements of witnesses taken
during the investigation of the alleged anomalies. Jimmy
Sajonas did not submit any position paper. No position
paper was served on the petitioner or its counsel. The only
document submitted was one with a short two paragraphs
comprising the grounds for opposition.
As a result of the conciliator's recommendation, the case
was indorsed for arbitration to the labor arbiter. Noting
that Mr. Sajonas did not appear at the arbitration
proceedings and did not present any position paper but
left it to some union members to speak for him and
allegedly because Mr. Sajonas had promised to quietly
resign, the petitioner merely adopted the position paper
filed during the conciliation proceedings.
The irregular procedures used by the labor arbiter started
at this point.
The labor arbiter allowed a last minute position paper of
respondent Sajonas to be filed and without requiring a
copy to be served upon the Baguio Country Club and
without affording the latter an opportunity to refute or
rebut the contents of the paper, forthwith decided the case.
The public respondents now argue in their comment that
"it is of no moment that petitioner was not furnished with
a copy of Sajonas' position paper" because as early as the
conciliation stage it was already apprised of the position of
the employee, having been furnished Sajonas' opposition
and that it cannot feign ignorance. This stand of the public
respondents is erroneous. Since the case was decided on
the basis of position papers, the petitioner had a right to be
served a copy of the respondent's position paper admitted
and considered by the arbiter and an opportunity to
introduce evidence to refute it. As explained by the
petitioner, it had been lulled into thinking that because the
private respondent had offered to resign and the employer
had agreed to forego the prosecution of criminal charges,
there would no longer be any complete or full-scale
arbitration proceedings Mr. Sajonas denies that he
promised to resign and contends that criminal proceedings
were an afterthought to harass the poor laborer. The fact
that there were two divergent and clashing allegations
before them, not only on this point but also on the
'Principal issues of dishonesty and intimidation of coemployees, the public respondents should have adopted
fairer and more accurate methods of ascertaining truth.
As pointed out by the petitioner, "while an administrative
tribunal possesed of quasi-judicial powers is free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not
mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process." (Serrano v. PSC, 24 SCRA
867; and Singco v. COMELEC, 101 SCRA 420).

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

The petitioner's position paper, passed upon by the labor

arbiter, stated that the petitioner had furnished the
oppositor (Jimmy Sajonas) and the ALU (the union of
workers in the club) copies of the application to terminate,
as well as the investigations of witnesses against Jimmy
Sajonas, which distinctly show the infractions committed
by oppositor, particularly that of the incident of August 6,
1978 wherein Sajonas was supposed to have pocketed a
cash payment of a customer of the BCC, constituting
qualified theft. The petitioner specifically stressed to the
arbiter that it was "adopting the investigations which were
enclosed with the application to terminate, which are now
parts of the record of the Ministry of Labor, as part and
parcel of this position paper. "
In other words, the petitioner submitted its case on the
basis of the complete records of the conciliation
proceedings.
The position paper was before the arbiter but minus
sworn statements comprising the investigations which
formed part of the records of the same labor office.
Inexplicably, the arbiter came out with the conclusion that
"there is thus no document nor statement of evidence
value or of evidencing character which we can consider as
evidence to support, the enumerated violations for which
Sajonas is supposed to be dismissed . " Instead of calling
for the records submitted to the concilliator in the same
small Baguio office, the arbiter denied the application for
the clearance on the ground that all that was before it was
a position paper with mere quotations about an
investigation conducted by Major Pagala.
The error could have been corrected by the respondent
Commission when the petitioner urged that the sworn
statements thus ignored by the labor arbiter should be
considered on appeal.
In the appeal to the commission, the petitioner argued that
" submitted with this application to terminate are the
investigation of Erdulfo Pagala on Bernadette Saliquio,
Alma Jean Quidasol, Cristina Rico, and Clarissa Adalla.
The respondent Commission may not have committed
grave abuse of discretion when it rejected the affidavits of
these witnesses, the information for estafa against Jimmy
Sajonas filed by the assistant city fiscal, did the resolution
of the fiscal's office on the complaint for grave threats, on
the ground that "evidence cannot be submitted for the first
time on appeal." However, it was a denial of elementary
principles of fair play for the Commission not to have
ordered the elevation of the entire records of the case with
the affidavits earlier submitted as part of the position
paper but completely ignored by the labor arbiter. Or at
the very least, the case should have been remanded to the
labor arbiter consonant with the requirements of
administrative due process.
The ever increasing scope of administrative jurisdiction
and the statutory grant of expansive powers in the
exercise of discretion by administrative agencies illustrate
our nation's faith in the administrative process as an
efficient and effective mode of public control over sensitive
areas of private activity. Because of the specific
constitutional mandates on social justice and protection to
labor, and the fact that major labor management
controversies are highly intricate and complex, the
legislature and executive have reposed uncommon

Page 15

reliance upon what they believe is the expertise,

rational and efficient modes of ascertaining facts, and
unbiased and discerning adjudicative techniques of
Ministry of Labor and Employment and
instrumentalities.

the
the
the
its

Experience has shown this faith to be justified. In the great

majority of petitions for ' review of decisions from the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, we have sustained
agency determinations and denied due course to the
petitions. However, we have never hesitated to exercise
our corrective powers and to reverse labor ministry
decisions where the ministry or a labor tribunal like the
respondent commission has sustained irregular
procedures and through the invocation of summary
methods, including rules on appeal, has affirmed an order
which tolerates a violation of due process. This Court will
reverse or modify an administrative decision where the
rights of a party were prejudiced because the
administrative findings, conclusions, or decisions are in
violation of constitutional provisions; in excess of
statutory authority, or jurisdiction; made upon irregular
procedure; vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake; not
supported by substantial evidence adduced at the hearing
or contained in the records or disclosed to the parties; or
arbitrary, capricious, or issued with grave abuse of
discretion, (Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. Castaneda v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 186; Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 745;
Asprec v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921; Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, 6 SCRA 1; Air Manila v. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489;
Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners, 94 SCRA 61).
The instant petition is a timely reminder to labor arbiters
and all who wield quasi-judicial power to ever bear in
mind that evidence is the means, sanctioned by rules, of
ascertaining in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, the
truth respecting a matter of fact. (Section 1, Rule 128) The
object of evidence is to establish the truth by the use of
perceptive and reasoning faculties. (See Martin, Rules of
Court, Vol. 5 on Evidence, p. 2 citing Chamberlayne on Trial
Evidence and Thayer on Prelim. Treat.) The statutory grant
of power to use summary procedures should heighten a
concern for due process, for judicial perspective in
administrative decision making, and for maintaining the
visions which led to the creation of the administrative
office.
From the records which form part of the position paper
submitted to the labor arbiter and those raised on appeal
to the respondent commission, the following have been
establish.
At about 10:30 in the morning of August 6, 1978, Miss
Bernadette Saliquio, a waitress of the Baguio City Country
Club served two glasses of orange juice tot he maid and the
children of Mrs. Solon . Bartender Jimmy Sajonas pocketed
the cash payment of P7.00 for the juice and utilized Chit
No. 183100 signed by Dr. Lodzinski for two bottles of beer
to cover for the order of orange juice which was changed
to two beers. In other words, one chit was used twice. Miss
Alma Jean Quisadol, checker, who corroborated the
testimony of Miss Saliquio, who checks the orders for
drinks, and who mentioned an earlier anomaly involving
four loaves of raisin bread, was threatened several days
later by Sajonas for reporting the incident to management.
Miss Cristina Rico, nutritionist, corroborated the utterance
of the threat "papatayin." An information for estafa was
filed in Criminal Case No. 40292 of the Baguio City Court
but the case for grave threats where the office of the City

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Fiscal "arrived at the indubitable conclusion that the

respondent indeed uttered threatened., remarks" was
dismissed for having prescribed. We agree with the
petitioner that the loss of trust and confidence and the
wedge driven into the relationship of the private
respondent with both management and his co-employees
warrant the grant of clearance to terminate his
employment. We likewise note the petitioner's statement
that Mr. Sajonas has been working as bartender for a hotel
in Pangasinan since March, 1979 and was about to be
promoted to a hotel in Manila in November, 1979.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted. The
decision dated January 17, 1980 of the National Labor
Relations Commission affirming the December 11, 1978
decision of the labor arbiter is set aside. The appropriate
office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment is ordered
to give the petitioner a clearance to terminate the
employment of the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139368

November 21, 2002]

ROBIN M. CANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, EDGAR C.
GALVANTE, as Police Director for Personnel and
Records Management, PNP,
and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails (a) the order1
dated May 17, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 224, in Civil Case No. Q-98-36370, dismissing
the complaint filed on December 21, 1998 by petitioner
against respondents for payment of back salaries and
allowances amounting to P301,018; and (b) the order of
said court denying on July 15, 1999, his motion for
reconsideration.
The factual background of the instant petition, as culled
from the records of the case, is as follows:
For the alleged bungled investigation of the Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez rape-slay, a complaint for grave
misconduct was filed with the National Police Commission
under the Department of Interior and Local Government
against petitioner, then Police Chief Inspector of the
Calauan Police Station. The Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) found petitioner guilty and ordered his
summary dismissal from the service, in a decision2 dated
July 12, 1995. Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the
National Appellate Board of the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM). On May 15, 1997, the
NAPOLCOM reversed the decision of the PNP Chief:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find respondent
appellant,
Chief
Inspector
ROBIN
M.
CANO
administratively culpable for Simple Misconduct and
hereby orders (sic) his suspension for a period of three (3)
months. Considering, however, that said respondent had
been under suspension since August 7, 1995, pursuant to
Special Order No. 1690 dated August 8, 1995, the penalty
imposed is considered deemed served. Respondent-

Page 16

Appellant is strongly warned to be more prudent and

responsible in the exercise of his duties as a member of the
PNP.3
The NAPOLCOM decision having been allowed by both
parties to become final and executory, petitioner was
restored to full duty status effective May 15, 1997. He also
received all benefits and emoluments pertaining to his
post pursuant to PNP Special Order No. 1341. With the
modification of his penalty to three (3) months suspension,
petitioner filed a claim for payment of back salaries and
other allowances corresponding to the period he was
allegedly unjustly discharged from service until he was
restored to full duty status, or from August 7, 1995 to May
15, 1997. However, this claim, computed by the PNP
Regional Police Comptrollership and Finance Division to
be Three Hundred One Thousand Eighteen Pesos
(P301,018.00), was denied by respondent Police Director
Edgar C. Galvante of the PNP Directorate for Personnel and
Records Management (DPRM) on the strength of a
Memorandum/Opinion from the PNP Legal Service.
Petitioner forthwith asked for a reconsideration of the
denial but the same was rejected.
On account of said denial, petitioner filed on December 23,
1998 a complaint4 before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for the recovery of his back salaries and other
allowances for the said period. The court a quo dismissed
the complaint in an order dated May 17, 1999. Said the
trial court:
The Court is prone to agree with the stand and position of
the defendants that plaintiff's claim should not be granted
because plaintiff has not shown any clear and legal right
which would entitle him to back salaries, allowances and
other benefits and besides, plaintiff has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies no[t] discounting the fact that his
claim against defendants is actually a suit against the state.
xxx
This complaint is actually a suit against the government
because the ultimate liability for payment of back salaries,
etc. will fall on the government. This being so, this case
should be dismissed because the government cannot be
sued without its consent.
Accordingly, therefore, the Court has to dismiss this case
without costs against the plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5

remedies available to him so as to render the filing of the

complaint with the trial court premature?
At the outset, we note that the principal issue raised before
us is a mixed question of fact and law. There is a question
of fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts,7 and there is a question of
law where the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts.8 Here, petitioner seeks to
recover back salaries and allowances allegedly due him
from August 7, 1995, when he was unjustly discharged
from the service, to May 15, 1997, when he was restored to
full duty status. The determination of petitioner's
entitlement to said back salaries and allowances is a mixed
question as it involves the determination of his duty status
for the period of his claim and the resolution of whether
the petitioner was acquitted by the NAPOLCOM Appellate
Board in its decision finding him liable only for simple
misconduct, not gross misconduct.
Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an appeal
by certiorari to this Court should raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth in the petition. It is
elementary that a review is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when
there are special and important reasons therefor.9 As the
error raised herein includes one of fact and law, and not a
proper subject for a petition for review on certiorari, we
are constrained to decline exercise of our equity
jurisdiction in this case.
At any rate, petitioner also failed without justifiable cause
to observe due regard for the hierarchy of courts. Even on
this reason alone, we are constrained to deny the petition.
The policy of this Court respecting the hierarchy of courts
and, consequently, prohibiting the filing of a petition in
this Court in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with the
lower courts has been consistently observed in the
absence of any compelling reason for departing from such
policy.10 Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court,11 petitioner should have taken his appeal to the
Court of Appeals.
Having ruled for the denial of the petition, we need not
tarry on the other issues that may have been raised in the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 224, Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-98-36370 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs.

On May 31, 1999, petitioner moved for the reconsideration

of the trial court's decision, but his motion was denied in
an order dated July 15, 1999.

SO ORDERED.

Accordingly, petitioner filed the instant appeal via petition

for review on certiorari, raising only one issue:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LARRY LAVAPIE, SIMEON LACHANO, ARNOLD BUATES,
SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, SR., SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, JR.,
REY SAN PASCUAL, BENIGNO CATINA, JR. and SEVERAL
DOES, accused.
LARRY LAVAPIE and SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, SR.,
accused-appellants.

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to his claim for

back salaries and allowances under the terms of the
decision of the NAPOLCOM Appellate Board.6
Mainly involved in this controversy is petitioner's
entitlement to back salaries and other allowances upon the
reduction of his penalty of dismissal to mere suspension
for three months. But secondarily, it should be asked
whether petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

G.R. No. 130209

March 14, 2001

BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 16,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36,2

Page 17

finding accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San

Pascual, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Sonny Sierva,
jointly and severally, the amount of P7,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual,
Sr., together with Simeon Lachano, Arnold Buates, Santos
San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr. and
several Does, were charged in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 29th day of March, 1989, at Sitio
Tastas, Barangay San Vicente, (Buraburan) Municipality of
Buhi, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with bolos, with intent to kill and with treachery
and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and hack with said bolos one Sonny Sierva, thereby
inflicting upon the latter [a] mortal wound which directly
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs
in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), plus
other forms of damages that may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."3
Upon their arraignment on October 17, 1989, accused
Larry Lavapie and Rey San Pascual pleaded not guilty. 4
Subsequently, or on January 29, 1990, the other accused
Benigno Catina. Jr., Santos San Pascual, Sr. and Santos San
Pascual, Jr. also pleaded not guilty.5 Accused Simeon
Lachano, likewise, pleaded not guilty on July 16, 1991. 6
Accused Arnold Buates remained at large.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses against accused Larry Lavapie, Rey San Pascual,
Benigno Catina, Jr., Santos San Pascual, Sr. and Santos San
Pascual, Jr. Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Jenny Cordial, Enrico
Sierva, Domingo Samonte, Rogelio Sierva and Sgt. Jaime
Patiam. The following witnesses, on the other hand,
testified against accused Simeon Lachano Erlinda Sierva
and Rogelio Sierva. In their defense, all of the six (6)
accused, who were brought before the jurisdiction of the
trial court, testified in court, in addition to Felix Lavapie,
Juan Bongais and Loreto Camasis.
For the prosecution, eyewitness Domingo Samonte
testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he
came from the dance hall in San Vicente with Rogelio
Sierva and the victim Sonny Sierva.7 While on their way,
Rogelio and Sonny talked with some ladies, then, Rogelio
went home ahead, and left Domingo and Sonny behind. 8
While approaching Rogelio's house, Domingo and Sonny
noticed a group of persons coming towards them. Domingo
stepped backwards towards Sonny. Sonny focused the
flashlight, which he was holding, on accused-appellant
Santos San Pascual, Sr. and accused-appellant Larry
Lavapie, who was then holding a bolo. Accused-appellant
Santos San Pascual, Sr. suddenly held the hands of Sonny
behind his back, while accused-appellant Larry Lavapie
hacked Sonny.9 Domingo testified that Sonny was hit on
the neck, the same witness pointing to the left side of his
neck.10 When Sonny fell on the ground, Domingo ran
towards some pili trees. Then, Domingo saw two (2)

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

persons, a boy and a girl, who were following them and

holding a torch which they used to lighten the fallen body
of Sonny. Domingo, however, was not able to recognize
these two (2) persons. On cross-examination, Domingo
testified that when he witnessed the hacking incident,
there were other persons at the scene of the crime but he
was not able to recognize them.11 Domingo further
recounted that after he saw the hacking incident, he ran
towards the back of a pili tree and stayed there until dawn
of the following day.12 At dawn, he proceeded to his house
in Buraburan.13 He did not report the incident to anybody
else but a certain friend and his wife. Domingo also
admitted that when accused-appellant Santos San Pascual,
Sr. held the hands of Sonny behind the latter's back, he did
not tell Santos San Pascual, Sr. to stop but just took a step
backwards.14
Jenny Cordial, a 15-year-old ward of Sonny Sierva's aunt,
testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., she
and Rico Sierva15 came from a dance in San Vicente,
Buraburan and were on their way home when they came
upon the body of Sonny Sierva lying on the middle of the
road.16 They recognized Sonny Sierva because Cordial was
then holding a torch.17 Cordial and Enrico Sierva came
upon Sonny Sierva, who was lying prostrate on the road,
with a hack wound on the neck, and was almost
beheaded.18 At that instance, Cordial saw accusedappellant Larry Lavapie, who was holding a bolo, standing
at a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters from the
body of Sonny Sierva.19 Aside from accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie, Cordial also saw other persons at the scene
of the crime but she was not able to recognize them.
Thereafter, Cordial and Enrico Sierva ran away and went
home to inform the father of Sonny Sierva of what
happened but they were told by his wife that Rogelio
Sierva was also hacked. Incidentally, while on crossexamination, the prosecutor informed the trial court that
Cordial actually grew up under the care of Rogelio Sierva's
sister. Cordial testified on cross-examination that when
she and Enrico Sierva saw the body of Sonny Sierva lying
on the road, they were only about one (1) meter away
from the body. When they saw accused-appellant Larry
Lavapie, he was holding a bolo which was pointed
downwards. Cordial clearly recognized accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie because she was then holding a torch.
Cordial described the bolo held by accused-appellant Larry
Lavapie as "shiny and sharp," and "clear and clean."20
Cordial also noticed that the other persons, who were at
scene of the crime, were standing still, facing the body of
Sonny Sierva, about a meter away from accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie, and that some of these persons were
smoking.21 Cordial did not recognize these other persons
because according to her "it was dark." 22On further crossexamination, she estimated these other persons at the
scene of the crime to number about seven (7) persons.
Enrico Sierva, 15-year-old cousin of the victim, Sonny
Sierva, testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m.,
he and Jenny Cordial came from a dance in San Vicente,
Buhi and were on their way home. Near the house of the
victim's father, Rogelio Sierva, they saw a man lying
prostrate on the road. They went closer to the body and
saw that the said man sustained a hack wound on the neck.
They recognized the man lying on the road as Sonny
Sierva.23 Glancing around, Enrico saw accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie holding a bolo and standing by the road with
accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr.24 According to
Enrico, both accused-appellants were at a distance of
about five (5) to six (6) meters away from him when he

Page 18

saw them. He also saw other persons at the scene of the

crime but he was not able to recognize them because they
were in a "dark place."25 Thereafter, he and Jenny Cordial
ran towards the house of Rogelio Sierva, located about 30
meters away, and informed Rogelio's wife, Erlinda Velasco,
that her son was lying dead on the road. Erlinda Velasco
told them that her husband was also hacked and was being
brought to a hospital. On cross-examination, Enrico Sierva
testified that he told his uncle, Rogelio Sierva, that it was
the group of accused-appellant Larry Lavapie who hacked
Sonny Sierva,26 and that accused-appellants Larry Lavapie
and Santos San Pascual, Sr. were there. 27 Enrico further
testified that the torch they were carrying on the night of
March 29, 1989 was made of a round bottle of gin.

Because accused Simeon Lachano was arrested only after

the prosecution had already presented the foregoing
witnesses against the five (5) other accused, the
prosecution presented anew, Rogelio Sierva and an
additional witness, Erlinda Sierva, to testify against
accused Simeon Lachano.

Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Municipal Health Officer of Buhi II,

Camarines Sur, conducted the autopsy on the body of
Sonny Sierva and prepared an autopsy report28 dated April
25, 1989, with the following findings:

For the defense, on the other hand, all of the six (6)
accused, who were brought before the jurisdiction of the
trial court, testified together with Felix Lavapie, Juan
Bongais and Loreto Camasis.

"Lesions:

Accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, in his defense,

interposed denial and alibi. Lavapie testified that on March
29, 1989, at around 8 p.m., he was at a dance in San
Vicente, Buhi,37 with accused Santos San Pascual, Jr., a
certain Santiago Sanorjo and Danny Belardo.38 Lavapie,
Santos San Pascual, Jr., Santiago Sanorjo39 and Danny
Belardo left the dance hall at past 11:30 p.m. and went to
the barn of Santiago Sanorjo, arriving thereat at around 1
a.m.40 They slept in the said barn and went to their
respective houses on the following day.

"Incised wound at the neck, right side cutting the whole

neck structure with a portion of the skin only on the left
side holding it in place about 3 in. long.
"Cause of Death Incised wound, neck (almost whole
neck) with secondary hemorrhage (massive)."29
Dr. Mercurio explained that due to the hack wound (or
incised wound) sustained by the victim, Sonny Sierva, the
victim's head was almost severed from the body, with only
three (3) inches of flesh on the left side of the neck,
connecting the neck to the body.30 According to Dr.
Mercurio, the hack wound could have been caused by a
sharp instrument like a very sharp bolo. Dr. Mercurio
further opined that the victim could have died at around 1
or 2 a.m. of March 30, 1989.
Rogelio Sierva, father of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified
that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he came from a
dance in Buraburan, San Vicente, together with his son,
Sonny Sierva and his brother-in-law, Felix Buendia.31 On
their way home, they passed by the house of a certain
Teresita Gaite, where Sonny Sierva was left behind with
his friends. Rogelio and Felix proceeded on their way
home. When they were already near his house, Rogelio
saw six (6) of the seven (7) identified accused.32 Rogelio
continued to testify that he was hacked on his right ear by
accused Arnold Buates. Rogelio and Felix then ran towards
Rogelio's house. When Rogelio was about to open the door
of his house, he was hacked on the right arm by accused
Santos San Pascual, Jr. Rogelio then entered the house and
got a bolo but his assailants already retreated to the place
where he was first hacked. Thereafter, Rogelio sought the
assistance of his brother, Silvestre Sierva, whose house
was located about 20 meters away,33 and requested that he
be brought to a hospital. On their way to the hospital, they
saw Sonny Sierva, who was almost beheaded, lying on the
road. When Rogelio discovered that Sonny was already
dead, they proceeded to the San Vicente Assistance Center
and reported the hacking incident. Afterwards, they
proceeded to the Mediatrix Hospital where Rogelio was
treated for his wounds. Rogelio also testified that he spent
more or less P7,000.00 which he incurred due to the death
of Sonny Sierva.34 On cross-examination, Rogelio admitted
that he was previously charged for the attempted rape of
the daughter of accused Santos San Pascual, Sr.35

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Erlinda Sierva, mother of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified

that she spent less than P10,000.00 as burial and funeral
expenses on account of the death of Sonny Sierva.36
Rogelio Sierva, in testifying against accused Simeon
Lachano, merely reiterated his previous testimony against
the five (5) other accused.

Accused Santos San Pascual, Jr. corroborated the testimony

of accused-appellant Larry Lavapie that they attended a
dance in San Vicente, Buhi. They left the dance hall at past
12 midnight41 and went to the house of Santiago Sanorjo
where they slept until 6 o'clock of the following morning.42
Juan Bongais testified that in the evening of March 29,
1989, he was at a dance in San Vicente, Buraburan. He
arrived at the dance at 7 p.m. and left at about 12:30 a.m.
of the following day.43 He left the dance with Jenny Cordial,
Rico Sierva and Liza San Pascual.44 On their way home,
they met Rogelio Sierva who was hacked and being carried
by Dionesio Coronel and Felicito Conas. They continued
walking for several meters until they came upon the dead
body of Sonny Sierva, lying on the road. 45 On crossexamination, Bongais testified that when they were about
to leave the dance at around 12:30 a.m. of March 30, 1989,
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie and his co-accused Santos
San Pascual, Jr. were still at the dancing hall. 46
Accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr., likewise,
claimed denial and alibi. San Pascual, Sr. testified that in
the evening of March 29, 1989, he was resting in his house
in sitio Tastas, Labawon, Buhi.47 He slept at 7 p.m. and
awoke at 5 o'clock of the following day. 48 San Pascual, Sr.
further claimed that Rogelio Sierva, father of the victim,
was actuated by ill-motive to implicate him in this crime,
i.e., he filed a complaint against Rogelio for the attempted
rape of his daughter, Gina San Pascual. 49 On crossexamination, San Pascual, Sr. testified that sitio Labawon is
adjacent to barangay San Vicente.
The three (3) other accused, Rey San Pascual, Simeon
Lachano and Benigno Catina, Jr., likewise, interposed
denial and alibi in their respective testimonies before the
trial court.

Page 19

On January 23, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision

dated December 16, 1996, finding accused-appellants
Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr. guilty of murder
qualified by treachery. The four (4) other accused, Santos
San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr. and
Simeon Lachano were acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive part of the said Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
"1. The accused, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal[s] of the crime
of murder defined and penalized under Article [2]48 of the
Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act
No. 7659, as charged in the information, and there being
no generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, [the
Court] hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally
the heirs of the deceased, Sonny Sierva, spouses Rogelio
and Erlinda Sierva the following:
a) P7,000.00 as actual damages,
b) P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
"2. [T]he [other] accused, Santos San Pascual, Jr., Rey San
Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr., and Simeon Lachano, not
guilty of the crime charged in the information and [the
Court] hereby acquits them thereof for insufficiency of
evidence. The bonds posted for their provisional liberty
are hereby ordered cancelled and released.
"With respect to the accused, Arnold Buates, who was
never brought to the jurisdiction of this [C]ourt, let the
records of this case be sent to the archives to be revived as
soon as this [C]ourt acquires jurisdiction over [the] said
accused.
"SO ORDERED."50
In convicting accused-appellants, Larry Lavapie and Santos
San Pascual, Sr., the trial court relied primarily on the
testimony of prosecution witness Domingo Samonte that
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie was the one who hacked
Sonny Sierva on the neck with the use of a bolo while
accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. was at the back
of Sonny Sierva, holding the latter's hands.51 The trial court
also relied heavily on the testimony of prosecution witness
Jenny Cordial that she saw accused-appellant Larry
Lavapie, standing about five (5) meters away from the
dead body of Sonny Sierva; and on the testimony of
prosecution witness Enrico Sierva that he saw accusedappellants, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr.,
standing five (5) meters away from the dead body of Sonny
Sierva.52 The trial court further maintained that Jenny
Cordial's description of Sonny Sierva's body when they
came upon it, lying prostrate on the road, was supported
by the medical findings stated in the autopsy report of Dr.
Alicia M. Mercurio.53 The trial court rejected the defenses
of denial and alibi raised by accused-appellants, and ruled
that denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive
identification, and that accused-appellants' alibi was not
corroborated by any credible and disinterested witness.54
In ruling that the killing was qualified by treachery, the
trial court explained that accused-appellants awaited, in
ambush, for their victim;"55 and that the suddenness of the
attack on Sonny Sierva and the fact that his hands were

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

being held at his back by accused-appellant Santos San

Pascual, Sr. while he was hacked by accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie, rendered him "helpless to put up any
defense."56 The trial court also found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime, based on the fact
that ". . .they [accused-appellants] are related to each other
(uncle and nephew) and from their concerted acts in
killing Sonny Sierva."57
On February 3, 1997, accused-appellants filed a Motion for
New Trial, alleging that prosecution witnesses, Jenny
Cordial and Domingo Samonte retracted their respective
testimonies.58 However, in an Order dated March 12, 1997,
the trial court denied the foregoing motion, for lack of
merit.59
Hence, this appeal.
In their appellant's brief, accused-appellants raise a lone
assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
RETRACTION OF PROSECUTION WITNESS[ES] JENNY
CORDIAL AND DOMINGO SAMONTE [AS] NEWLYDISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH SHALL JUSTIFY THE
HOLDING OF A NEW TRIAL.
We find merit in this appeal.
The conviction of accused-appellants by the trial court was
predicated primarily on the testimony of prosecution
witness Domingo Samonte who "positively identified
[accused-appellant] Larry Lavapie as the one who hacked
Sonny Sierva with a bolo at his neck while accused[appellant] Santos San Pascual, Sr., was at the rear of Sonny
Sierva, holding his hands;"60 and on the testimonies of the
two (2) witnesses who arrived at the scene of the crime
shortly after the hacking incident occurred Jenny
Cordial, who "saw accused[-appellant] Larry Lavapie
standing about five [5] meters away from the dead body of
Sonny Sierva"61 and Enrico Sierva, who "saw and
recognized the same accused[-appellant] Larry Lavapie
and accused[-appellant] Santos San Pascual, Sr., standing
[five] 5 meters away from the dead body of Sonny
Sierva."62 According to the trial court, Jenny Cordial's
description of the condition of Sonny Sierva's body when
they came upon it, ". . . is supported by the medical
findings" as stated in the autopsy report.63 Furthermore,
the trial court observed that accused-appellants failed to
show "any improper motive on the part of the said
witnesses to falsely testify against them."64
While it is settled to the point of being elementary that on
the issue of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
not disturb the findings arrived at by the trial court, which
was certainly in a better position to rate the credibility of
the witnesses after hearing them and observing their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial; this
rule stands absent any showing that certain facts and
circumstances of weight and value have been overlooked,
misinterpreted or misapplied by the trial court which, if
considered, would affect the result or outcome of the
case.65 After a careful review of the records of this case,
particularly, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the
Court finds that significant facts and circumstances were
overlooked and disregarded by the trial court, which, if
properly considered, would have affected the result of this
case. The records show that there are strong and cogent

Page 20

reasons that justify a departure from the trial court's

findings.

"Q:
Mr. Sierva, on March 29, 1990 [should be 1989] at
about 11 o'clock in the evening, where were you?

In the case at bar, prosecution eyewitness Domingo

Samonte testified that accused-appellant Larry Lavapie
suddenly hacked Sonny Sierva, hitting the latter on his
neck; Samonte demonstrated by pointing to the left side of
his neck, thus:

[WITNESS ROGELIO SIERVA]:

"A:
We came from a dance at Sitio Buraburan, San
Vicente, Buhi, Camarines Sur.

"PROSECUTOR:

"Q:
You said we, who were your companions during
that time[,] Mr. Sierva?

"Q:
All right. You said Larry Lavapie suddenly hacked
Sonny Sierva[,] was Sonny Sierva hit?

"A:
My son Sonny Sierva and my brother-in-law, Felix
Buendia.

[WITNESS DOMINGO SAMONTE]:

"Q:
While you together with your late son Sonny Sierva
and your brother-in-law Felix Buendia were on your way
home from centro Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur, do you
recall of any incident that happened?

"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

Where was he hit?

"A:
He was hit on his neck. (Witness pointing to the left
side of his neck.)
"Q:
After Sonny Sierva was hacked by Larry Lavapie[,]
what happened to Sonny Sierva, Mr. Samonte?
"A:

He fell down, sir."66 (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing testimony of Samonte is belied by the

physical evidence that the deceased, Sonny Sierva
sustained an "incised wound at the neck, right side cutting
the whole neck structure with a portion of the skin only on
the left side holding it in place about 3 in. long."67
(Emphasis supplied.) While Samonte categorically testified
that Sonny Sierva was hacked on the neck, at the same
time, Samonte demonstrated by pointing to the left side of
his neck; the autopsy report clearly revealed that Sonny
Sierva was hacked on the right side of his neck and not on
the left side. This material inconsistency, consequently,
casts a serious doubt on the testimony of Samonte. As we
have ruled in People vs. Vasquez,68 since the physical
evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, conclusions as to
physical evidence should prevail. It bears reiteration that
physical evidence is that mute but eloquent manifestations
of truth which rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.69 In the light of the physical evidence obtaining
in this case, contrary to oral assertions cannot normally
prevail. Greater credence is given to physical evidence as
evidence of the highest order because it speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses.70
Moreover, Samonte's claim that on March 29, 1989, at
around 11 p.m., he came from the dance hall in San Vicente
with Rogelio Sierva and the victim Sonny Sierva, 71 and that
while on their way, Rogelio and Sonny talked with some
ladies, then, Rogelio went ahead, leaving Domingo and
Sonny behind,72 was even contradicted by Rogelio's (one of
Samonte's alleged companions on that fateful night)
testimony on two (2) different instances,73that on March
29, 1989, at about 11 p.m., he was with his son, Sonny
Sierva and his brother-in-law, Felix Buendia,74 without any
reference to the alleged presence of Samonte, thus:
"ROGELIO SIERVA'S FIRST TESTIMONY WHICH WAS
TAKEN ON AUGUST 16, 1990:

"A:

Yes, sir."75 (Emphasis supplied.)

"ROGELIO SIERVA'S SECOND TESTIMONY WHICH WAS

TAKEN ON AUGUST 5, 1993:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:
Mr. Sierva, where were you on March 29, 1989 at
about 11 o'clock in the evening?
[WITNESS ROGELIO SIERVA]:
"A:
I was then at San Vicente, Buraburan, Buhi,
Camarines Sur.
"Q:
Why did you happen to be there, Mr. Sierva during
the aforesaid date and time?
"A:

I accompanied my son to the dancing hall.

"Q:

Where was this dancing hall?

"A:

At Centro San Vicente, Bura-buran.

"Q:
What were you doing at the aforesaid place during
the aforesaid date and time?
"A:
"Q:
Sierva?
"A:
"xxx

I was watching the dance.

Who were with you, if any, during that time, Mr.
My son and my brother-in-law.
xxx

xxx"

"Q:

After watching the dance, what did you do, if any?

"A:

We went home.

"Q:

You said "we went home". Who were with you?

"A:

My brother-in-law and my son.

"Q:

What is the name of your brother-in-law?

"A:

Felix Buendia.

"PROSECUTOR:

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Page 21

"Q:
While you were on your way home together with
your brother-in-law and your son Sonny Sierva, do you
recall of any incident that happened, Mr. Sierva?
"A:

Yes, sir."76 (Emphasis supplied.)

Certainly, the foregoing testimonies of Rogelio Sierva,

which we find to be consistent on material points, further
cast serious doubt on the veracity of Samonte's testimony.
In addition, we find Samonte's response to the occurrence
to be contrary to ordinary human experience and
behavior. If indeed Samonte was present at the scene of
the crime when the victim, Sonny Sierva, whose hands
were held at the back by accused-appellant Santos San
Pascual, Sr., was hacked on the neck by accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie, while the other accused, numbering at least
five (5), were apparently merely observing the incident; it
was then unnatural and against common experience that
Samonte ran away towards some pilitrees and simply
stayed there until dawn of the following day, even as he
had already seen a boy and a girl discovered the fallen
body of Sonny Sierva shortly after the incident occurred.
Considering the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
Jenny Cordial and Enrico Sierva, that after discovering the
dead body of Sonny Sierva lying prostrate on the ground,
and seeing the several accused standing near the dead
body of Sonny Sierva, they were able to run away and go to
Rogelio Sierva's house to report what they saw, without
the several accused following them or even attempting to
threaten them in any way, it appears that the several
accused posed no threat to Samonte, which could have
forced him to remain near some pili trees. It is also
perplexing why Samonte did not see, inform or seek the
help of Rogelio Sierva, Felix Buendia, Silvestre Sierva and
an unidentified person, who also happened to come upon
the dead body of Sonny Sierva while on their way to the
hospital. This Court finds occasion, at this point, to apply a
long-held doctrine that to be credible, testimonial evidence
should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness
but it should also be credible, reasonable and in accord
with human experience.77 While we take judicial notice
that eyewitnesses to a crime are often reluctant to report
the incident, the Court finds the response of Samonte to
the occurrence contrary to human experience, and his
testimony not credible, thus, we reject his testimony.
In view of the resulting lack of positive identification,
accused-appellants' conviction or acquittal would now
depend primarily on the sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence against them, based on the testimonies of the
other prosecution witnesses, particularly, Jenny Cordial
and Enrico Sierva. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, prosecution witness Jenny Cordial
testified that she saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie,
who was holding a bolo, standing at a distance of about five
(5) to six (6) meters from the body of Sonny Sierva;78while
prosecution witness Enrico Sierva testified that after he
recognized the man lying on the road as Sonny Sierva, he
saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie with a bolo, standing
by the road, with accused-appellant Santos San Pascual,
Sr.79 The above circumstance, in the absence of other
corroborative evidence, does not satisfy the requirements

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court nor point

with moral certainty to the guilt of accused-appellants. As
we have consistently held, the mere presence of accusedappellants at the locus criminiscannot be solely interpreted
to mean that they committed the killing. The mere
presence of accused appellants at the crime scene, without
more, is inadequate to support the conclusion that, indeed,
they committed the crime.80We also observe that as
testified by prosecution witness Jenny Cordial, the bolo
allegedly held by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie was
"shiny and sharp," and "clear and clean." 81 If indeed it was
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie who hacked Sonny Sierva
on the neck, the bolo, which he allegedly used in hacking
Sonny Sierva, would not have been "clear and clean." It
should also be noted that aside from the two (2) accusedappellants, there were at least five (5) other persons who
were at the scene of the crime, and who could have been
responsible for the killing, but unfortunately, they were
not recognized by prosecution witnesses, Jenny Cordial
and Enrico Sierva. According to Jenny Cordial, the other
persons, numbering about seven (7), who were at the
scene of the crime, standing still and facing the body of
Sonny Sierva, were only about a meter away from accusedappellant Larry Lavapie,82 but she was not able to
recognize them because "it was dark."83 In corroboration,
Enrico Sierva testified that both accused-appellants were
at a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters away from
him when he saw them; and that he also saw other persons
at the scene of the crime but he was not able to recognize
them because they were in a "dark place."84
In resume, considering the evidence for the prosecution
and the attendant circumstances, the Court entertains
reasonable doubt as to the culpability of accusedappellants.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants are
guilty of the crime charged, the Decision dated December
16, 1996, of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga
City in Criminal Case No. IR-2639 is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants are ACQUITTED,
and their immediate release from confinement is ordered
unless some other lawful cause warrants their further
detention.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this
Decision and to report to this Court immediately the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-52080 May 28, 1993
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
ADMINISTRATION (ACA), respondents-appellees.
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
annulment of respondent court's resolutions dated May 7,
1979 and November 23, 1979 rendered in CA-G.R. No.
59286-R.
The facts of the case, as established by record, being
undisputed, we quote with approval the following concise

Page 22

summary thereof made by petitioner Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) in its brief filed before
respondent court:
On June 20, 1961, Fire Policy No. N-29704 (Exh. 533 and
D) was issued by the Property Insurance Fund of the
defendant-appellee Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) to cover the insurance of various grades of Virginia
leaf tobacco owned by the plaintiff-appellant and stored in
Warehouse F belonging to the Philippine Tobacco FlueCuring and Redrying Corporation (PTFC & RC), located at
Baesa, Novaliches, Quezon City, with a declared value of
P21,459.66 and for the period from July l, 1961 to July 2,
1962.
On November 17, 1961 another Fire Policy No. N-30871
(Exhs. 534 and H) was issued by the Property Insurance
Fund of the GSIS to cover the insurance of various grades
of Virginia leaf Tobacco belonging to the plaintiff-appellant
and stored in the said Warehouse F, with the declared
value of P2,048,518.50 and for the period from September
30, 1961 to September 30, 1962.
The said insurance policies provide among other things
that in the event of loss, whether total or partial the
amount thereof shall be subject to appraisal and that the
liability of the GSIS, if established shall be limited to the
actual loss, subject to the applicable terms, conditions,
warranties and clauses of the policies, and in no case to
exceed the amount of the policies. This is the open policy
clause of the said insurance policies. (Exhs. 533-A-1 and
534-A-1).
On February 15, 1962 at about 7:20 in the evening thereof,
a fire occurred which burned the said Warehouse F and
practically all the tobacco stored therein. As already stated,
the said warehouse was owned by the Philippine Tobacco
Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, then controlled by
the well known Harry Stonehill. The said warehouse is one
of the warehouses in the Baesa compound of the PTFC &
RC.
Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant filed with the GSIS its fire
claim, Exhs. N-1 to N-4.
Pursuant to the open policy clause of the insurance
policies, the GSIS, as is the practice in the insurance
business, employed three insurance adjusters to ascertain
the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff-appellant. Said
adjusters are the Manila Adjustment Company, H. H. Bayne
Adjustment Company and the Allied Adjustment Company.
The said adjusters examined the records of the plaintiffappellant and of the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and
Redrying Corporation and they employed two tobacco
experts to assist them in evaluating the loss of the plaintiffappellant. Said tobacco experts were Mr. George Flagg and
Edrington S. Penn. After the adjusters, with the assistance
of Mr. Flagg and Penn, had verified the records of the
plaintiff-appellant and of the PTFC & RC and had employed
the hogshead metal strap recovery method, the said
adjusters rendered a report on September 25, 1962 (Exh.
538) and a final report on September 25, 1963 (Exhs. 29 to
529-F; also marked as Exhs. Q to Q-6 and Exhs, 537 to 537H). In said final report, the adjusters recommend as the
basis for the adjustment of the appellant's claims the
amount of P12,557,968.68. Their verification showed that
only 15,467 hogshead of tobacco of various grades were
inside the Warehouse F at the time of the fire.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Plaintiff-appellant refused to accept the correctness of the

said report and so conferences were had between the
officials of plaintiff-appellant and the GSIS, together with
the adjusters, and as a result, the GSIS offered as final
payment of the appellant's claim the amount of
P13,500,000.00. Said offer was embodied in the letter of
December 7, 1964 of then General Manager Ramon A. Diaz,
which read as follows:
Please be advised that we are now preparing partial
payment of the captioned loss in the amount of
P2,295,873.21. We shall effect payment of the balance (of
the P13,500,000.00 proposed settlement) as soon as
possible.
We sincerely believe that the amount of P13,500,000.00 is
just and fair indemnity for the loss. Inasmuch as that office
refused to execute the required Sworn Statement in Proof
of Loss, we wish to ask your written agreement to the
following conditions (which were embodied in our letter of
July 17, 1964 to the Central Bank of the Philippines) before
we remit the above-mentioned partial payment and
subsequent payments of the balance:
1 In the event that ACA claims for additional indemnity (in
excess of the amount of P13,500,000.00) the burden of
proving such additional claim shall be its own
responsibility.
2 That should ACA be able to present additional proof and
evidence for additional indemnity, the same shall be
referred for adjudication to a competent court.
(Ex. EE; Exh. 530; pp. 13-14, tsn, May 19, 1972)
Plaintiff-appellant accepted the offer and its acceptance is
embodied in the letter of Mr. Amado A. Lansang, Officer-inCharge, dated December 16, 1964. Thus, the body of said
letter, Exh. FF (also Exh. 631) reads as follows:
In attention to your letter of December 7th which was
transmitted to us by the Central Bank under its 1st
Indorsement dated December 14, 1964, please be advised
that we agree to the following condition set by you in your
aforesaid letters, viz:
1 That in the event ACA claim further indemnity in excess
of the amount of P13,500,000.00, the burden of proving
such additional amount shall be of ACA's responsibility.
2 That ACA shall present additional proof and evidence for
further indemnity to a competent court for adjucation.
(pp. 14-16, tsn, May 19, 1972)
Pursuant to the said agreement of the parties, the GSIS
paid to the plaintiff-appellant the amount of
P13,500,000.00. (p. 17, tsn, May 19, 1972).
Since it claims that its loss from the fire is P23,610,571.61,
the plaintiff-appellant filed the present action in Court,
praying among other things, that the defendant-appellee
be ordered to pay the difference of P10,110,571.61 (p.11
Record on Appeal) (pp. 2-7, Brief for Defendant-Appellee
Government Service Insurance System; p. 83, Rollo)
ACA's complaint was filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 21, 1965 and docketed as
Civil Case No. 62683. On September 9,1975, the trial court

Page 23

rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. ACA

appealed to respondent Court of Appeals where the appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 59286-R. On December
29,1978 respondent court promulgated its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court (de Castro (P),
Reyes, Sundiam, JJ.). However, upon ACA's motion,
respondent court issued a resolution (penned by Justice
Samuel Reyes who had taken over from Justice Pacifico de
Castro due to the latter's promotion to the Supreme Court;
and with the addition of Justice Isidro Borromeo as third
member) on May 7, 1979, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHREREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
Granted and consequently, the decision in this case dated
December 29, 1978 is REVERSED, thus, entitling plaintiffappellant the balance of P10,110,571.61 on the two (2) fire
insurance policies issued by defendant-appellee covering
its tobacco stocks stored at the PTFC & REC Warehouse
"F". (p. 77, Rollo)
On July 16, 1979, GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of
the resolution of May 7, 1979, and on November 23, 1979,
the respondent court issued a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition under the following assigned
errors.
I
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in its Resolution of
May 7, 1979 and November 23, 1979 in making a wrong
interpretation and application of the term "additional
proof and evidence for further indemnity" as stipulated in
the agreement of the parties.
II
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in its Resolution of
May 7, 1979 and November 23, 1979 in making a wrong
interpretation and application of the said term as
originally made by respondent Court of Appeals in its
Decision of December 29, 1978.
III
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in refusing, and thus
committed a grave abuse of discretion, to make a physical
count of the withdrawals of tobacco hogsheads indicated
in ACA's own evidence, Exhibits QQ to QQ-2024, in the face
of the repeated protestations of petitioner GSIS that the
allegation of ACA's witness, Patrocinio Torres, that the
withdrawals recorded in said exhibits totaled only 12,922
hogsheads is a brazen lie.
IV
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
withdrawals recorded in ACA's Exhibits QQ to QQ-2024
totaled 15,679 hogsheads of tobacco, and not just 12,922
hogsheads.
V
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in totally ignoring and
in not finding that there were additional withdrawals of
1,994 hogsheads as shown in Exhs. 134 to 368.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

VI
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
ACA's evidence on the withdrawals is correct since such
conclusion is not supported by the evidence on record and
adduced during the trial.
VII
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in making a glaring
misapprehension of fact in concluding that Joseph Singh
confirmed ACA's contention that the tobacco stocks were
intact at the time of the fire, as the evidence is clear that
what were brought out of the warehouse were the
contents of the tobacco hogsheads stored there.
VIII
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
whole contents of warehouse F were substituted with
rotten tobacco before the fire.
IX
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining its
original decision of December 29, 1978 and the decision of
the trial court.
X
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the
complaint of respondent-appelle Agricultural Credit
Administration. (pp. 1-4, Brief for Petitioner-Appellant
Government Service Insurance System; p.160, Rollo)
The decisive issue involved in the case at bar is the
quantity of tobacco stored in Warehouse "F" at the time
said warehouse was totally destroyed by fire on February
15, 1962. Petitioner GSIS maintains that a total of 17,623
hogsheads of tobacco were withdrawn from Warehouse
"F" before the fire occurred. On the other hand, respondent
ACA contends that only 12,922 hogsheads of tobacco were
withdrawn.
Before resolving said issue, we shall dispose of an
incidental issue which appears to preoccupy both parties
i.e. whether or not the testimony of ACA's witnesses,
Dorotea Toledo, Aurelio B. de Jesus, Demetrio P. Tabije,
and Patrocinio Torres, is " additional proof of evidence"
within the contemplation of the letter of offer of GSIS dated
December 7, 1964 and the letter of acceptance of ACA
dated December 16, 1964. The discussion by the parties of
said issue is a futile exercise in semantics.
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines vests
upon the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts
(par. 5 sec. 4, Art. VIII, Constitution). Even the provision in
both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions that are the
rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court may be
"repealed, altered or supplemented" by the legislature
does not appear in the 1987 Constitution. Parties have,
therefore, no discretion or power to alter, modify or
circumscribe the rules on evidence to suit their particular
needs in a case brought before the courts.
We, therefore, rule that the admissibility of the testimony
of ACA's witnesses must be determined by the rules of
court. Since this testimony is relevant to the facts in issue

Page 24

and said witnesses are competent witnesses, we hold that

the said testimony is admissible in evidence and we shall
take it into consideration in resolving the issue involved.
As the general rule the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are binding upon this Court (De Gala-Sison vs.
Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 416 [1970]; Evangelista & Co., vs. Santos, 51 SCRA
416 [1973]. However, said rule admits of exceptions. The
exceptions, as set forth in Macadangdang vs. Court of
Appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]) are:
The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of
both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (b) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (9)
when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted
by evidence on record.
This Court retains the power to review and rectify findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals where said court manifestly
overlooked, ignored, or misinterpreted certain facts or
circumstances of weight and significance (Carolina
Industries, Inc., vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, 97 SCRA 734
[1980]; People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]). Considering
that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals conflict
with those of the trial court, the exercise of our power of
review over the decision of the Court of Appeals is not
unjustified.
As aforementioned, the quantity, the quantity of tobacco
delivered to Warehouse "F" is not dispute. The issue in
dispute is the quantity of tobacco withdrawn from said
warehouse before the fire of February 15, 1962.
Withdrawals of tobacco from Warehouse "F" are recorded
in the Delivery Order and Tally-Out Sheets, Exhibits QQ to
Q-2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368.
The Court of Appeals, in its resolution of May 7, 1979,
mainly based its findings, that 120,270 hogsheads of
tobacco were stored in Warehouse "F" immediately before
the fire, on Exhibit GG, a summary of the withdrawals
based on Exhibit QQ to Q-2022. The Court of Appeals
should not have merely relied on the summary but should
have gone to the original sources and the bases thereof
and should have scrutinized Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022 and
Exhibits 134 to 368, the tally-out sheets for these are the
primary documents recording each and every withdrawal
of tobacco from the warehouse at the time of delivery.
These exhibits constitute the best evidence to prove the
withdrawal of tobacco from the warehouse.
Nor may the tally sheet summary be of any significance.
The contents of the tally sheet summary were supposed to
have been merely copied from the weighers' tally sheets
prepared right at the ramps. The inability of SVTPA to
produce the original of the weighers' tally sheets or even
explain its non-production creates the impression that no

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

delivery was actually made. As testified to by the plaintiff's

witness Maria Malabanan, the weighers' tally sheets are
prepared at the same time that the weighing and grading
of the delivered tobacco are made in the presence of the
respective grader and the weigher of FVTR and PVTA.
xxx xxx xxx
The best evidence available, therefore, is that which relates
directly or has a direct connection with the deliver and
which affirm the presence of the tobacco delivered at the
FVTR warehouse. (Santiago Virginia Tobacco Planters
Asso., Inc. vs. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration,
31 SCRA 528, 538-541 [1970])
According to Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022, the withdrawals of
tobacco from Warehouse "F" during the period 1955 to
1959 were as follows:
Crop
Year
1955
Number
of
Hogsheads
Exhs.
QQ-452
to
QQ-463
87
"
QQ-465
to
QQ-466
13
"
QQ-500
to
QQ-502
23
"
QQ-652
2
"
QQ-678-A
1

Total 26
Crop Year 1956:
Exhs.
QQ,
"
QQ-79
"
QQ-117
"
QQ-244
"
QQ-325
"
"
"
QQ-467
"
QQ-503
"
"
QQ-655
"
"
QQ-704
"
QQ-756
"

Total 5,348

QQ-1
to
QQ-35
to
QQ-115
to
Q-157
to
QQ-323
to
QQ-449
QQ-451
QQ-464
to
QQ-499
to
QQ-651
QQ-653
to
QQ-674
QQ-678
to
QQ-751
to
QQ-764
QQ-1022

320
276
316
691
980
22
7
299
1,170
5
162
184
742
122
52

Crop Year 1957:

Exhs.
QQ-36
"
"
QQ-158
"
QQ-202
"
"

Total 1,155

to
QQ-116
to
to
QQ-324
QQ-450

QQ-78
QQ-201
QQ-243

414
15
404
309
6
7

Crop Year 1958:

Exhs.
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

QQ-657
QQ-679
QQ-752
QQ-765
QQ-1003
QQ-1023

QQ-654
to
to
to
to
QQ-999
to
to

QQ-678-B
QQ-703
QQ-755
QQ-767
QQ-1021
QQ-1027

2
60
295
1,150
800
5
185
336

Page 25

"
QQ-1029
"
QQ-1064

Total 4,317

to
to

QQ-1061
QQ-1214

246
1238

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Crop Year 1959:

Exhs.
QQ-1215
"
QQ-1426
"
QQ-1771

Total 4,723

to
to
to

QQ-1425
QQ-177
QQ-2024

1,226
2,019
1,478

This is an appeal from the decision1 dated January 17,

2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109,
in Criminal Case No. 00-0408, finding accused-appellant
Rodrigo Balleno y Pernetes guilty of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information reads:

(pp. 40-41, Rollo)

Adding the withdrawal by crop years, we arrive at the
following figures:
Crop
Year
1955
Crop
Year
1956
Crop
Year
1957
Crop
Year
1958
Crop
Year
1959

Total 15,669 Hogsheads

126

Hogsheads
5,348
"
1,155
"
4,317
"
4,723
"

That on or about the 18th day of March 2000, in Pasay City,

Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the stepfather of complainant Jacquelyn Balandra y
Alzate, a minor 13 years of age, with force and intimidation
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with complainant against her will
and consent.
Contrary to law.2
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued.

(p. 41 Rollo)
Therefore, according to ACA's own documentary evidence,
15,669 hogshead of tobacco were withdrawn from the
warehouse from 1955 to 1959.
In addition thereto, Exhibits 134 to 368, delivery orders
dated August 13, to 16, 1959, indicate that were further
withdrawals of 1,944 hogsheads from the warehouse
during said period. 15,669 hogsheads plus 1,944
additional hogsheads, gives us a total of 17,613 hogsheads
of tobacco withdrawn from the warehouse. Deducting
17,613 hogsheads of tobacco from a total of 15,457
tobacco hogsheads inside the warehouse at the time of the
fire on February 15, 1962. The documentary evidence on
record, therefore, clearly supports the position of
petitioner GSIS.
The presentation of the testimony of ACA's witnesses,
Doroteo Toledo, Aurelio B. de Jesus, Demetrio P. Tabije,
and Patronicio Torres is nothing but a convoluted attempt
of ACA to minimize and neutralize the impact of Exhibits
QQ to QQ-2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368. Their testimony
consisted mainly in trying to explain away, vary, and
modify the meaning and significance of Exhibits QQ to QQ2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368. Testimonial evidence is easy
of fabrication and there is very little room for choice
between testimonial evidence and documentary evidence
(Marvel Building Corporation vs. David, 94 Phil. 376
[1954]). Generally, documentary evidence prevails overtestimonial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the resolution dated May 7, 1979, as well as
that of November 23, 1979, of respondent Court of Appeals
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 62683 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149075

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO BALLENO Y PERNETES, appellant.

August 7, 2003

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

The facts of the case as established by the prosecution:

At 12:15 p.m. of March 18, 2000, thirteen year-old
Jacquelyn Balandra was with her step-sisters, Titin and
Crismarie, inside the room of their home located at Old Air
Academy, ATO, Don Carlos Village, Pasay City. Appellant
Rodrigo Balleno, the live-in partner of Jacquelyns mother,
Lorna, entered the room and ordered Titin and Crismarie
to go out.3 When they were alone, appellant sat at the side
of the bed where Jacquelyn was lying down. Then he
touched her thighs, placed her hands on her back and
covered her mouth. He then removed Jacquelyns shorts
and panties, lay on top of her and kissed her lips. He took
off his shorts and inserted his penis into Jacquelyns vagina
who tried to push him away.4
Jacquelyn went to her friends, Toochie, Nanette and
Mylene and related to them what happened. They
accompanied her to the local barangay where she reported
the incident. On the same day, barangay officials Luis
Alintana, Efren Bais and Rogelio Basagre arrested
appellant Rodrigo Balleno.5 Jacquelyn executed her
"Sinumpaang Salaysay"6 and submitted herself to a
medical examination.7
Dr. Estela Guerrero Manalo, a physician assigned at the
Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital,
Manila, conducted a physical and genital examination on
Jacquelyn on March 20, 2000. Her examination showed
that the victims external genitalia and hymen were
normal.8 There was no evidence of spermatozoa. She,
however, claimed that it was possible that the victim was
sexually abused even if the result of the examination
showed a normal genital.9
In his defense, appellant denied the charge against him,
and claimed that on March 18, 2000, he had a drinking
spree at home with his cousin Lito Balleno and Sammy
Alzate, uncle of Jacquelyn, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. They
consumed three bottles of gin.10 He admitted that he kissed
Jacquelyn because the latter took care of his youngest

Page 26

child. Thereafter, Jacquelyn pushed him away and left. He

fell asleep and was awakened by the barangay officials
who arrested him. Appellant further alleged that the crime
was imputed to him because Jacquelyn wanted her real
father, Charlie, to be reunited with her mother.11
After trial, judgment was rendered against appellant, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the
qualifying circumstance of stepparent relationship
between the accused and the complainant, as alleged in the
information, this Court finds the accused guilty for simple
rape.
It would appear therefore that accused Rodrigo Balleno y
Pernetes and the mother of the victim were not married to
each other and therefore not the stepfather of the victim,
hence, the Court finds the accused guilty of simple rape
and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua. He is
likewise ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 to the victim Jacquelyn Balandra y Alzate with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.12
In this appeal, appellant contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT
THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant assails Jacquelyns credibility by referring to the
inconsistency between her testimony and her sworn
statement. In her statement before the police, Jacquelyn
stated that there was no insertion of the penis inside her
vagina "Hindi ko naramdaman na naipasok niya kasi po sa
may itaas po ng pepe ko ito naramdaman. Sa loob ng labi ng
ari ko."13 In open court, however, she testified that
appellant inserted his penis inside her vagina.14
It has been held that some discrepancies between the
affidavit and the testimony of the witness in open court do
not necessarily impair the credibility of her testimony, for
affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often
incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer.15 An affidavit is not a
complete reproduction of what the declarant has in mind
because it is generally prepared by the administering
officer and the affiant simply signs it after it has been read
to him. In any case, open court declarations take
precedence over written affidavits in the hierarchy of
evidence. Unlike written statements, there is flexibility on
the part of the questioner to adapt his questions to elicit
the desired answer in order to ferret out the truth.16
In the case at bar, appellant has not shown any material
discrepancy between the sworn statement and testimony
of the victim that would seriously taint her credibility and
warrant a reversal of the trial courts factual findings. Even
assuming for the sake of argument, that there was no
penile penetration of private complainants vagina because
her legs were not spread apart, it has been consistently
ruled that the mere touching of the labia of the woman
consummates the crime of rape.17 Hence, the fact that no

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

laceration and no ruptured hymen were found in this case,

does not necessarily negate rape. The fact that the hymen
was intact upon examination does not, likewise, belie rape,
for a broken hymen is not an essential element of rape, nor
does the fact that the victim remained a virgin exclude the
crime. In a prosecution for rape, the material fact or
circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the
rape, which the prosecution in this case was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt.18 In any event, a medical
examination is not essential in the prosecution of a rape
case. A medical examination and a medical certificate are
merely corroborative in character. They are not
indispensable requirements for conviction, for what
matters greatly is the clear, unequivocal and credible
testimony of the victim.19
Similarly, it must be stressed that the absence of
spermatozoa in the victims sex organ does not disprove
rape. It could be that the victim washed or urinated prior
to her examination, which may well explain the absence of
spermatozoa.20
Appellant contends that he could not have possibly raped
Jacquelyn inside a room in a thickly populated squatters
area wherein a commotion can be easily heard by their
neighbors and where houses were built close to each
other. The argument deserves scant consideration. Lust is
no respecter of time and place. Several times, we held that
rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school
premises, in a house where there are other occupants, in
the same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping, and even in places which, to many, would appear
unlikely and high risk venues for its commission.21
Moreover, appellants allegation that there was no force or
intimidation because private complainant did not suffer
injuries and her clothes were not torn is not well taken.
The testimony of Jacquelyn established the fact that,
through force and intimidation, appellant pinned her
hands at her back, covered her mouth and succeeded in
abusing her. The absence of external signs of physical
injuries does not prove that rape was not committed, for
proof thereof is not an essential element of the crime of
rape.22 Settled is the rule that the force employed in rape
need not be irresistible so long as it is present and brings
the desired result. All that is necessary is that the force be
sufficient to fulfill its evil end, or that it be successfully
used; it need not be so great or be of such a character that
it could not be repelled.23 Indeed, the degree of force or
intimidation required for the act to constitute rape is
relative, and must be viewed in the light of the
complainant's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the offense.24
In the case at bar, Jacquelyns testimony is clear, candid,
straightforward and consistent. She had positively
identified appellant as her malefactor. No ulterior motive
was offered to explain why the victim would concoct a
story charging appellant with the crime of rape. Jacquelyn
testified:
Q:
As a matter of fact, you do not treat your stepfather,
the suspect in this case, as your father?
A:
xxx

I consider him as my father.

xxx

xxx

Page 27

Q:
Was it true that before this incident happened on
March 18, 2000 your mother Lorna and your stepfather
has a serious quarrel?
A:

No, sir.

Q:
Your father Charlie Balandra is not the friend of
your stepfather, am I correct?
A:

Yes, they are friends.

Q:
They have quarreled before this incident, am I
correct?
A:

None.25

Time and again, we have consistently held that when a

woman, more so if a minor, states that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed. For no woman, least of all a child, would
weave a tale of sexual assaults to her person, open herself
to examination of her private parts and later be subjected
to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of
rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to
her.26 Hence, we find no basis to depart from the wellsettled rule that trial courts assessment of the credibility
of complainants testimony is entitled to great weight,
absent any showing that some facts were overlooked
which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the
case.27
The Information alleged that appellant was the stepfather
of the victim. This was inaccurate. The word "step", when
used as prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is
repugnant to blood relationship and is indicative of a
relationship by affinity.28 Since appellant and the victims
mother were not married, no such relationship by affinity
existed between appellant and the victim. The records
indicate that the victims mother, Lorna, and the appellant
were "live-in partners," the former, in fact, lawfully
married to Charlie Balandra, the victims father. A
stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a
legitimate relationship, i.e., the appellant should have been
legally married to Lorna, the victims mother. A stepfather
is the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage
subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the
offspring.29 A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse
by previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses
by a former marriage.30
In People v. Fraga,31 we held that "although the rape of a
person under eighteen (18) years of age by the commonlaw spouse of the victims mother is punishable by death,
this penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant x x x
because his relationship was not what was alleged in the
information. What was alleged was that he is the
stepfather of the complainant." The filiation or kinship
with the accused must be alleged in the information as part
of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.32
Therefore, the failure to accurately allege the relationship
between appellant and his victim in the information bars
his conviction of rape in its qualified form. 33 The appellant,
having been referred to as the stepfather of the victim in
the information, is thus auspiciously spared from the
supreme punishment of death by this technical flaw.34
Thus, the trial court correctly convicted appellant of
simple rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 266-A of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,
otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997", which
reads:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is
committed.
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxx

xxx

x x x.

ART. 266-B. Penalties.- Rape under paragraph 1 of the next

preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Lastly, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence, the award
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the crime of rape
should be reduced to P50,000.00.35 Civil indemnity is
separate and distinct from the award of moral damages
which is automatically granted in rape cases. 36 Moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are additionally
awarded without need of pleading or proof of the basis
thereof. This is because it is recognized that the victims
injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting from
the odiousness of the crime to warrant per se the award of
moral damages.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal
Case No. 00-0408, finding appellant Rodrigo Balleno y
Pernetes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party
P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 146284-86

January 20, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON, appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Abdul Macalaba y Digayon (hereafter ABDUL)
was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, with violations of the Presidential Decree No.
18661; Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code2; and Section
16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1236, 1237 and 1238, respectively. The accusatory
portions of the informations in these cases read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 1236
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San
Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused without
the required permit/license from the proper authorities,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) caliber

Page 28

.45 pistol with Serial No. 909904, and one (1) magazine
with five (5) live ammunition thereof.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 1237
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San
Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two (2) ONE THOUSAND
PESOS bill with Serial Numbers BG 021165 and BG
995998, knowing the same to be forged or otherwise
falsified with the manifest intention of using such falsified
or forged instruments.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 1238
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San
Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) self-sealing transparent plastic
bag of methamphetamine hydrochloride "shabu" weighing
226.67 grams (3 medium sized transparent plastic bags
and 1 big heat-sealed transparent plastic bag).
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The three cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch
31 of said court. Upon his arraignment, ABDUL entered in
each case a plea of not guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1
Generoso Pandez, PO3 Ernani Mendez, Police Inspector
Anacleta Cultura and Police Inspector Lorna Tria. ABDUL
was the sole witness for the defense.
SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal
Investigation Detection Group (CIDG), testified that on 12
April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major R Win Pagkalinawan
ordered the search of ABDUL, alias "Boy Muslim," based on
a verified information that the latter was driving a
carnapped Mitsubishi olive green car with Plate No. UPV
511 and was a drug-pusher in San Pedro, Laguna. Two
teams were formed for the search. The first was headed by
Major Pagkalinawan, with SPO4 Aberion and five others as
members; and the second was led by Capt. Percival
Rumbaoa, with SPO1 Pandez and PO3 Mendez as
members.6
Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups
proceeded to Barangay Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, on
board a car and a van. They went to ABDULs apartment
where he was reportedly selling shabu, but they learned
that ABDUL had already left. While looking for ABDUL,
they saw the suspected carnapped car somewhere at
Pacita Complex I, San Pedro, Laguna, going towards the
Poblacion. When it stopped due to the red traffic light, the
CIDG officers alighted from their vehicles. Capt. Rumbaoa
positioned himself at the passenger side of the suspected
carnapped car, while Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of
the car. SPO1 Pandez, with PO3 Mendez beside him, went
straight to the driver and knocked at the drivers window.
ABDUL, who was driving the car, lowered the glass

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

window. SPO1 Pandez introduced himself as a member of

the Laguna CIDG and asked ABDUL to turn on the light and
show them the cars certificate of registration.7
When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black
Norinco .45 caliber gun8 inside an open black clutch/belt
bag placed on the right side of the drivers seat near the
gear. He asked ABDUL for the supporting papers of the
gun, apart from the cars certificate of registration, but the
latter failed to show them any.9 When ABDUL opened the
zipper of the clutch/belt bag, the CIDG officers saw inside
it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be shabu. They
likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained
the following items: two fake P1,000 bills, a list of names of
persons, a magazine and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber
gun. They confiscated the gun, the shabu, and the fake
P1,000 bills and thereafter brought ABDUL to the CIDG
office.10
PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of
SPO1 Pandez.11
The two P1,000 bills were found to be counterfeit after an
examination conducted by Police Inspector Anacleta
Cultura,12 a document examiner at Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba, Laguna. The white crystalline substance
contained in the four small plastic bags was subjected to
physical and laboratory examination conducted by Police
Inspector Lorna Tria, a Forensic Chemist at the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim. Her findings13
were as follows: (a) the three small plastic sachets
weighed 29.46 grams, while the big plastic sachet weighed
197.21 grams, or a total weight of 226.67 grams; (b)
representative samples taken from the specimens thereof
were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug; and (c) the improvised tooter and
the rolled aluminum foil with residue found in the selfsealing plastic bag were also positive of the presence for
shabu residue.
As expected, ABDUL had a different story to tell. He
testified that on 12 April 1999, between 6:50 and 7:00
p.m., he was driving a borrowed Mitsubishi Galant Car with
Plate No. UPV 501 somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna. With
him was Rose, his live-in partner, whom he fetched from
Angeles City, Pampanga. He had borrowed the car from his
friend Ferdinand Navares, who instructed him to return it
in front of the latters store at San Pedro Public Market.14
ABDUL was about to park the car when a man knocked
hard on the glass window on the drivers side of the car
and pointed at the former a .45 caliber pistol. Another one
who was armed with an armalite rifle positioned himself in
front of the car, while the third one positioned himself
near the window on the passenger side and pointed a gun
at his live-in partner Rose. ABDUL then lowered the cars
window. The man near him opened the door, held him, and
told him to alight. When the man asked him whether he
was "Boy Muslim," he answered in the negative. The same
man opened the back door of the car and boarded at the
back seat. Rose remained seated at the front passenger
seat. 15
The other men likewise boarded the car, which was
thereafter driven by one of them. While inside the car, they
saw a .45 caliber pistol at the edge of the drivers seat.
They asked him whether he had a license. He showed his
gun license and permit to carry. After taking his gun,

Page 29

license, and permit to carry, they tried to remove his belt

bag from his waist, but he did not allow them.16
Upon reaching the headquarters, ABDUL learned that
these people were C.I.S. agents. There, he was told to
surrender the belt bag to the officer who would issue a
receipt for it. He did as he was told, and the money inside
his belt bag was counted and it amounted to P42,000. They
then got his money and the cellular phone, which was also
inside the bag, together with some other pieces of paper.
They also took another cell phone from the car. He was
never issued a receipt for these items.17
Thereafter, a man entered the office with a white plastic
bag allegedly taken from the borrowed car. ABDUL denied
ownership over the plastic bag. That same man then told
him that it contained shabu. ABDUL and Rose were
detained at the headquarters. The next morning, Rose was
allowed to get out; and in the afternoon, he was
transferred to San Pedro Municipal Jail.18
After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1236 and 1237 for violations of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 and Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code, respectively, due to insufficiency of evidence.
However, it convicted him in Criminal Case No. 1238 for
violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended,19 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P500,000, as well as the costs of the
suit.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, ABDUL interposed the
present appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in (1)
convicting him for violation of Section 16 of Article III of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, despite
insufficiency of evidence; and (2) admitting the evidence
presented by the prosecution although it was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights.
In his first assigned error, ABDUL argues that the
prosecution failed to prove the material allegations in the
information. The information charges him, among other
things, that "without being authorized by law, [he] did then
and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control methamphetamine hydrochloride."
However, the prosecution did not present any certification
from the concerned government agency, like the
Dangerous Drugs Board, to the effect that he was not
authorized to possess shabu, which is a regulated drug.
Thus, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In his second assigned error, ABDUL asserts that he was
not committing a crime when the CIS agents boarded his
car, searched the same and ultimately arrested him. He
was about to park his borrowed car per instruction by the
owner when he was harassed by the operatives at
gunpoint. The gun seen was properly documented; thus,
there was no reason for the CIS agents to bring him and his
companion to the headquarters. The shabu allegedly found
in the car was brought in by somebody at the time he was
under interrogation. It was taken in violation of his
constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.
Being a "fruit of a poisonous tree" it should not have been
admitted in evidence.
Moreover, the members of the CIDG merely relied on the
information received from an anonymous telephone caller
who said that ABDUL was driving a carnapped vehicle.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

They had no personal knowledge of the veracity of the

information. Consequently, there was no legal basis for his
warrantless arrest.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) maintains that ABDUL had the burden of proving
that he was authorized to possess shabu, but he failed to
discharge such burden. Therefore, it is presumed that he
had no authority; consequently, he is liable for violation of
Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended. The OSG likewise refutes ABDULs argument
that there was a violation of his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated
on a negative allegation, or that a negative averment is an
essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the charge. However, this rule is not
without an exception. Thus, we have held:
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct
proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the
knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon
him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a
negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by
established circumstances and which, if untrue, could
readily be disproved by the production of documents or
other evidence within the defendants knowledge or
control. For example, where a charge is made that a
defendant carried on a certain business without a license
(as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with
the selling of a regulated drug without authority), the fact
that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarly within
his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer
conviction.20
In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had
no license or authority to possess methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug, has been fairly
indicated by the following facts proven by the testimonies
of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL
was driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was
caught, and he appeared to be healthy and not indisposed
as to require the use of shabu as medicine; (b) the contents
of the sachets found in ABDULs open clutch bag inside the
car were prima faciedetermined by the CIDG officers to be
shabu; and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to
be shabu by the forensic chemist. With these established
facts, the burden of evidence was shifted to ABDUL. He
could have easily disproved the damning circumstances by
presenting a doctors prescription for said drug or a copy
of his license or authority to possess the regulated drug.
Yet, he offered nothing.
And now on the second issue. The Constitution enshrines
in its Bill of Rights the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose.21 To give full protection to it, the Bill
of Rights also ordains the exclusionary principle that any
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.22
It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that
reasonable searches and seizures are not proscribed. If
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the guidelines prescribed by the

Page 30

Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court, the

search and seizure is valid.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures
is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2)
seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or
consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry
search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while
as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with
a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners.23 Another exception is a
search made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is authorized under Section 9 of R.A. No.
6235.24
The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and
seizure conducted on, ABDUL constitute a valid exemption
from the warrant requirement. The evidence clearly shows
that on the basis of an intelligence information that a
carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL, who was also a
suspect of drug pushing, the members of the CIDG of
Laguna went around looking for the carnapped car.25 They
spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was indeed
driven by ABDUL. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his
clutch bag for the registration papers of the car the CIDG
agents saw four transparent sachets of shabu.26 These
sachets of shabu were therefore in "plain view" of the law
enforcers.
Under the "plain view" doctrine, unlawful objects within
the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure of
evidence in plain view must comply with the following
requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) the plain
view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.27
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the
circumstances above discussed that all the elements of
seizure in plain view exist in the case at bar. Thus, the
warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL, as
well as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his
constitutional rights.
ABDULs sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated. We
have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial,
just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony
that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail.28
On the issue of credibility between ABDULs testimony and
the declarations of the CIDG officers, we hold for the latter.
As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses
especially when they are police officers who are presumed

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless

there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence
of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime
against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over
accuseds self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having
been framed.29 ABDUL miserably failed to rebut this
presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part
of the prosecution witnesses.
Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death under Section 16 of Article III,
in relation to Section 20 of Article IV, of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by
P.D. Nos. 44, 1675, 1683, and 1707; Batas Pambansa Blg.
179; and R.A. No. 7659 (now further amended by R.A. No.
9165). These sections provide as follows:
SEC.16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -- The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and

Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is
in any of the following quantities:

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine

hydrochloride.
There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of
shabu in Criminal Case No. 1238 was proved beyond
reasonable doubt since ABDUL knowingly carried with
him at the time he was caught 226.67 grams of
shabuwithout legal authority. There being no modifying
circumstance proven, the proper penalty pursuant to
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua. The penalty imposed by the trial court, including
the fine, is, therefore, in order.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 1238
convicting appellant ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON of the
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P500,000 and the costs of the suit, is hereby
affirmed in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140550

February 13, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.

Page 31

EDGAR AYUPAN, GERRY HABLONA (at large), accused,

EDGAR AYUPAN, appellant.

The prosecutions version of the facts is summarized by

the Office of the Solicitor General, as follows:6

PANGANIBAN, J.:

"On June 26, 1984, prosecution witness Helen Batislaong

accompanied by her younger sister, Juvy, and her cousin,
Joseph, arrived at the dance hall of Crossing Hamod, Batad,
Iloilo Province at around 9:00 p.m. At around 12:00 oclock
midnight, Batislaong heard a commotion inside the dance
hall. Concerned that her cousin might be involved in the
fight, since he was no longer near her, Batislaong ran to the
center of the dance floor. She did not see her cousin but
instead, it was the sight o a bloodied Francisco Mendoza
lying down on the floor which confronted her. Francisco
Mendoza, who is also her relative since her mother and his
father are cousins was being stabbed repeatedly in the
chest by appellant Edgar Ayupan who was kneeling over
the victim. Batislaong knows appellant since they both
reside in Batad. Batislaong saw everything clearly since
she was only four (4) meters away from the attacker and
the victim. Furthermore, there was a light bulb brightly
illuminating the scene.

When the evidence does not establish how the aggression

commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify a
killing to murder. In the present case, the lone prosecution
witness did not see how the attack on the victim was
initiated. Hence, the crime is only homicide, not murder.
The Case
Edgar Ayupan appeals the August 12, 1999 Decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City (Branch 33) in
Criminal Case No. 32949, finding him guilty of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated April 17, 1989 and signed by
Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Irene S.
Panigbatan, charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of June, 1984 in the
Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed
accused,
conspiring,
confederating
and
cooperating, with an unidentified companion, with
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of
their superior strength, and a decided purpose to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
assault and stab several times the victim FRANCISCO
MENDOZA using the bladed weapon the accused were
provided at that time, thereby hitting him and inflicting
upon FRANCISCO MENDOZA several stab wounds on
different parts of his body which caused his death."2
With the assistance of counsel,3 appellant pleaded not
guilty when arraigned on November 28, 1995.4 After trial,
the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby decrees that:
"1. Accused Edgar Ayupan is guilty of the crime of Murder
as defined and penalized by paragraph 1, Article 248 in its
further relation to paragraph 16, article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code, as proven beyond reasonable doubt;
"2. Accused Edgar Ayupan is meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua by reason of the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance;
"3. Accused Edgar Ayupan is directed to indemnify the
heirs of deceased-victim Francisco Mendoza [in] the
amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency;
"4. The Director of [the] Bureau of Correction, Muntinlupa
City is directed to credit in favor of the accused Edgar
Ayupan the duration of his preventive detention reckoned
from 24 January 1995 until the promulgation of this
Decision.
"SO ORDERED."5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

"Horrified, Batislaong shouted at appellant, demanding

why he was stabbing Francisco Mendoza when as far as
she knew her relative had done no wrong. She shouted for
people to help Mendoza. But since most of the people ran
away, nobody assisted them. Appellant and his
companions ran away after stabbing the victim. Finally, the
barangay captain came and investigated the incident.
Weak after witnessing the stabbing incident, Batislaong
was brought home by the barangay captain.
"Batislaong was not able to report the incident
immediately because at that time she was nervous and
afraid. A week after the incident, she was able to relate the
circumstances surrounding the killing to Atty. Teodosio.
Atty. Teodosio told her that they ha[d] two other witnesses
to the killing which he felt were quite sufficient in
prosecuting appellant. But he told her that he would call
her if the need arises.
"Dr. Noel C. Posadas, a retired rural health physician and a
resident of Batad, conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of
the victim. He testified that the victim received three (3)
stab wounds on the chest, the third of which was fatal. The
immediate cause of death was shock and hemorrhage."
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, presented the following
version of the facts:7
"Accused Edgar Ayupan testified that he did kn[o]w the
victim but he did not stab him. On June 26, 1984, he and
his companions Gerry Hablona, Roquito Penuela and Efren
Hablona were at the dance party. Before entering the
dance hall, the barangay tanod at the gate, frisked him and
his companions. Once inside the hall, he invited a lady to
dance with him. At said instance, the victim slapped his
hand. When he turned his head, he saw the victim and the
latter immediately boxed him. Hit at the bridge of his nose,
he lost his consciousness. Gerry Hablona and Roquito
Penuela brought him out of the dance hall when he
regained his consciousness. He did not know Helen
Batislaong; he did not leave his barangay. He only learned
of the charge against him when he was arrested on June
21, 1995.

Page 32

"Roquito Penuela corroborated the testimony of accused

Ayupan that before they entered the dance hall on June 26,
1984 at Barangay Hamod, they were bodily frisked. At
about 1:00 early morning of June 27, 1984, accused
Ayupan approached a woman. At said instance, the hand of
the x x x victim slapped the hand of the accused. Accused
Ayupan then boxed the latter on the nose. Accused fell
down. When the victim went away and walked towards the
center of the dance hall, somebody met him and stabbed
him many times and [a] commotion took [place] and
people were running. At that time, accused Ayupan was
still lying down. He carried the accused out of the dance
hall and went home when [the] accused regained his
consciousness."

In the case at bar, the prosecution could have presented

two other witnesses, Rodrigo L. Demayo and Noel T.
Estebal, but both died before they could testify.16 Be that as
it may, the trial court found Batislaongs narration of the
incident straightforward and categorical. She testified
thus:

Ruling of the Trial Court

Since I was small.

Giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Helen

Batislaong, the trial court held that the witness, having
been at the locus criminis had the opportunity to see and
observe the specific details of the crime.

Do you know the accused in this case Edgar Ayupan?

Yes, sir.

The RTC disbelieved appellants defense of denial and

rejected the evidence of good moral character offered by
the defense witnesses. It held that this defense was based
purely on conjecture and might have even been fabricated,
since it was unsubstantiated by concrete details. 8 Further,
it ruled that the flight of appellant after the commission of
the crime was an indication of his guilt.
Hence, this appeal.9
The Issue
Appellant raises this lone assignment of error for our
consideration:

"ATTY TEODOSIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:

May it please the honorable court.
Q
Miss Batislaong, you said you are a resident of Batad,
Iloilo[;] since when have you been a resident of Batad,
Iloilo?

Q
If he is present inside this courtroom will you please
point to us Edgar Ayupan?
A

Yes, sir.

Where is he?

A
(Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom
who upon being asked his name, x x x answered Edgar
Ayupan)
Q
On the evening of June 26, 1984, do you remember
where were you?
A

I was at the dance hall.

"The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant

Edgar Ayupan of the crime of murder despite the
insufficient, unreliable testimony of prosecution lone
witness Helen Batislaong."10

COURT:

This Courts Ruling

THE WITNESS:

The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be

convicted only of homicide.

At Hamod, Batad, Iloilo.

Main
Credibility of Lone Witness

Issue:

Appellant argues that the lower court erred in relying on

the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Helen
Batislaong, because her testimony was not corroborated
by other witnesses. We disagree.11
It is well-settled that the testimony of a lone witness if
found by the trial court to be positive, categorical and
credible is sufficient to support a conviction. This is so,
especially if the testimony bore the earmarks of truth and
sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and
in a straightforward manner.12 Corroborative evidence is
necessary only when there are reasons to suspect that the
witness bent the truth, or that his or her observation was
inaccurate.13 Evidence is assessed in terms of quality, not
quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted.14Therefore, it is
not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis
of the testimony of a lone witness.15

(to
Where is that dance hall?

xxx

xxx

Q
In going [to] the dance hall from your house, [did]
you have any companions?
A
xxx

My younger sister and my cousin.

xxx

xxx

What was your purpose in going to the dance hall?

To watch the dance.

Q
At about 12:00 oclock midnight[,] June 26, 1984,
could you tell us if there was anything unusual that
happened in that dance hall?
A

There was a commotion.

Q
Where were you when you noticed that there was a
commotion?
A

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

xxx

witness)

I was inside the dance hall on the bench.

Page 33

Q
And because you notice that there was a commotion,
what did you do if any?
A
I ran [to] the center of the dance hall to see x x x
what happened.
Q
Why did you r[u]n towards the middle of the dance
hall to see what happened?
A
Because I ha[d] to see x x x who were fighting
because my cousin was no longer with me.
Q
And what did you observe when you proceeded to
the middle portion of the dance hall?

Q
In what part of the body of . . Were you able to see if
Francisco Mendoza was hit when he was stabbed for
several times by Edgar Ayupan?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And could you tell the Court in what part of the body
of Francisco Mendoza was hit when he was stabbed for
several times by Edgar Ayupan?
A

On the chest.

Q
Now after you shouted considering that you saw
Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco Mendoza for several times
what next happened?

A
I saw Francisco Mendoza lying [down while] being
stabbed by Edgar.

I shouted for help [for] Francisco Mendoza.

What is the family name of this Francisco?

Then what happened next?

Mendoza.

Nobody help[ed] us because most people ran away.

And what is the family name of this Edgar?

Q
After Edgar Ayupan stabbed Francisco Mendoza for
several times[,] what [happened next]?

Ayupan.

He ran away.

Q
This Edgar Ayupan whom you said was stabbing
Francisco Mendoza, was he the same Edgar Ayupan whom
you identified a while ago as the accused in this case?

Q
Aside from do you know if Edgar Ayupan had other
companions?

Yes, sir.

Q
And do you know what kind of weapon was being
used by Edgar Ayupan when you saw him [stabbing]
Francisco Mendoza?
A

Q
What was the position of Francisco Mendoza when
he was stabbed by Edgar Ayupan?
A

He was lying [down].

Where was he lying [down]?

At the center of the dance hall.

Q
And how about this Edgar Ayupan[,] where was he
situated in relation to Francisco Mendoza when he stabbed
Francisco Mendoza while the latter was lying on the
ground?
A
xxx

Near the knee and he was kneeling.

xxx

xxx

Q
How many times did Edgar Ayupan stab Francisco
Mendoza?
A

Q
And where [were] his companions at that time that
he was stabbing Francisco Mendoza?
A

A knife.

Many times.

Q
Now what did you do when you saw Edgar Ayupan
kneeling somewhere on the knee portion of the body of
Francisco Mendoza, at the same time stabbing Francisco
Mendoza?
A
I shouted why he stabbed Francisco Mendoza
because he ha[d] no fault.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Yes, sir.

Just near him.

Q
Now you said what happened to the companions of
Edgar Ayupan after Edgar Ayupan ran away?
ATTY. LAUREA:
Incompetent, your honor, he would be incompetent as to
what happened to the companions of Edgar Ayupan after
he ran away.
COURT:
What happened to the companions after he ran away?
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
What happened to the companions of Edgar after Edgar
Ayupan ran away?
A

They ran away together.

Q
Now after Edgar Ayupan and his companions ha[d]
left, what did you do?
A

I shouted and cried for help for Francisco Mendoza.

Then what next happened when you were there?

A
When I was there[,] the barangay captain also went
there and [saw] who was there and he was left there and I
was brought by the barangay captain, because I was
crying[;] since I [could] not walk, they just brought me
home.

Page 34

Were you able to reach your house?

A
Yes, sir, I was brought by my younger sister and my
cousin.
Q
Could you tell the Court how were you able to
recognize Edgar Ayupan as the person whom you saw
[stab] for several times Francisco Mendoza, considering
that it was night?
A
Because I already knew him and he is also from
Batad."17
Moreover, Batislaong had a clear view of the stabbing
incident as shown by the following:
"ATTY. TEODOSIO:
How far were you from Edgar Ayupan and Francisco
Mendoza when you saw Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco
Mendoza?
A

Four (4) meters.

Q
And where were you situated in relation to
Francisco Mendoza who was lying on the ground when he
was stabbed by Edgar Ayupan?
A
xxx

Somewhere on the head of Francisco Mendoza.

xxx

xxx

Q
What was a condition of the light at that time in that
dance hall when you saw Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco
Mendoza?
A

The light was bright.

And from where [did] this brightness come x x x?

THE WITNESS:
Because the light [was] near x x x them because they
[were] in the center of the dance hall.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
That would be all for the witness.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Well-settled is the rule that the positive identification of

the accused when categorical and consistent and without
any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter prevails over alibi and denial which are
negative and self-serving, undeserving of weight in law.21
In the present case, there is no doubt that Batislaongs
testimony positively identified appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. First, she had a clear view of the
stabbing incident, as she was standing just four (4) meters
from the victim. Moreover, the dance hall was sufficiently
illuminated. As a witness to a violent incident, she strove
to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and
observe the manner in which it was committed.22
Second,the medicolegals testimony23 and Medical Report24
corroborated her recollection of the specific details of the
crime the stabbing of the victim on the chest several
times, the use of a knife, and the position of the assailant. A
detailed testimony acquires greater weight and credibility
when confirmed by autopsy findings.25
The fact that Batislaong is a relative of the victim does not
necessarily taint her testimony. We have held that blood
relationship between a witness and the victim does not, by
itself, impair the formers credibility. On the contrary,
relationship may strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural
for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other
than the real culprit.26
On the other hand, while appellant denies being the
perpetrator of the crime, he admits that he was in the
dance hall where the victim was stabbed to death. His
claim that he was unconscious at that particular instant
does not persuade.
The denial by appellant is inherently weak and must fail
vis--vis Batislaongs positive declaration affirming that he
was at the scene of the crime and was its perpetrator.27 It
was not physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis.28 More so, undisputed is his admission that, prior
to the stabbing incident, his hand was slapped by the
victim when the former asked a lady for a dance.29
When there is no evidence to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by an improper
motive, the presumption is that such motive was absent,
and that the witness testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.30 Between appellants denial and the witness
positive testimony, there is no doubt that the latter is
entitled to credence.

That would be all."18

Delay in Reporting

Based, on the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the

factual findings of the RTC. Time and time again, we have
held that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to
the determination of the trial court because of its unique
advantage of observing them firsthand; and of noting their
demeanor, conduct and attitude.19 It is aided by various
indicia that could not be readily seen on the records. The
"candid answer, the hesitant pause, the nervous voice, the
undertone, the befuddled look, the honest gaze, the modest
blush, or the guilty blanch"20 these reveal if the witness is
reciting the whole truth or merely weaving a web of lies
and deceptions.

In a futile attempt to discredit Batislaong, appellant argues

that since she did not immediately report the incident to
the police, her testimony deserves scant consideration. We
are not convinced.

Positive Identification

In the present case, Batislaong explained that, initially, she

was nervous and afraid to report the incident. 33 In fact, she
had to be brought home, as she was weak from crying after

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

We have held that different people react differently to a

given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience.31Delay in a witness reporting of a crime to
police authorities, when adequately explained, does not
impair that witness credibility.32

Page 35

witnessing the stabbing incident.34 Thus, it was quite

understandable that she did not immediately report the
identity of the offender after the startling occurrence,
which became an even more traumatic experience because
she was related to the victim.35 Moreover, there is no rule
that the suspect in a crime should be immediately named
by a witness.36

The RTC explained that the crime had been attended by

treachery because, at the moment of its commission,
appellant stabbed the victim who was lying on the ground.
It rationalized that such a situation propelled the method
of attack to a successful accomplishment of the criminal
act without exposing the accused to any possible
retaliation from the victim.48

Appellants Flight

True, the essence of treachery is the swiftness and the

unexpectedness of an attack upon an unsuspecting and
unarmed victim who has not given the slightest
provocation.49 However, the suddenness of the attack does
not by itself suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if
the purpose is to kill, so long as the decision is sudden and
the victims helpless position is accidental.50 In order to
appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a
continuous aggression, as in the present case, it must be
shown to have been present at the inception of the
attack.51

The crime happened in June 1984, and the indictments

against appellant commenced only in 1995. In addition, he
claims that the prosecution has no record to show that the
facts of the case have been preserved. We disagree.
First, as correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, 37 the
relevant documents had been preserved before the case
was archived. Second, appellant is to blame for the delay in
the prosecution of this case. A review of the records
reveals that an Order for his arrest was issued on July 24,
1984.38 For failure to serve the warrant of arrest, another
Order was issued on November 22, 1984, implementing an
alias warrant of arrest against him.39Because he remained
at large, another alias warrant of arrest was issued on
August 20, 1987.40
Thereafter, the case was archived on November 29, 1989,
in view of several failed attempts to apprehend him. It was
only in 1995 ten years after the commission of the crime
that he was arrested by the police, although in
connection with another crime attributed to him.
In criminal law, flight means the act of evading the course
of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid
arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of
criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of the
accused may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence
tending to establish guilt.41
In the present case, it is interesting to note that as soon as
the Information was filed and the corresponding warrant
of arrest issued, appellant could not be found in Batad,
resulting in the archiving of the case. It is thus plain that he
left the place to avoid arrest and prosecution.42 If it were
true that he never left Batad, as he claims, he should have
been apprehended by the police a long time ago. Indeed,
his flight to Masbate is an indication of his guilt.
Treachery
In his Reply,43 appellant argues that if he was responsible
for the death of the victim, he would be guilty only of
homicide, because the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not proven.
We are convinced. Well-settled is the rule that treachery
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as
conclusively as the killing itself.44 Any doubt as to the
existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the
accused.45 There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof, tending
directly and specially to insure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.46 To appreciate treachery, two
conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means
of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity
for self-defense or for retaliation and (2) the deliberate or
conscious adoption of the means of execution.47

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

We hold that the second requisite was not sufficiently

established by the prosecution. It was not able to show
that appellant had deliberately adopted the attack,
considering that it was executed during a commotion and
as a result of it.52 The lower court failed to consider that
the lone eyewitness could not have had any knowledge of
it. She arrived at the scene sometime after the stabbing
started; thus, she could not testify on whether there was
provocation on the part of the victim.53
It must be pointed out that appellant and the victim had an
altercation prior to the stabbing incident. Indeed, the
attack could have been done on impulse as a reaction to
the latters actual or imagined provocation. Such
provocation negated the presence of treachery, even if the
attack may have been sudden and unexpected.54
Further, the mere fact that, according to the testimony of
the medicolegal officer, several stab wounds were inflicted
on the victim who was either sitting or lying down did
not show treachery unless there was evidence that such
form of attack had purposely been adopted by the
accused.55 Also, the fact that a bladed weapon was used did
not per se make the attack treacherous.56
Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the
aggression
commenced,
treachery
cannot
be
appreciated.57One cannot substitute mere suppositions for
a hiatus in the prosecutions evidence, as the trial court
apparently did.58 Since the lone prosecution witness failed
to see how the attack had been initiated on the victim, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be applied. 59
Thus, appellant can be convicted only of homicide, 60for
which the imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering
the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
the proper penalty is prision mayor in its medium period,
as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.61
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor medium, as minimum to 14 years eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. The civil indemnity awarded by the RTC is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Page 36

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138933

October 28, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JERRYVIE GUMAYAO y DAHAO @ BIVIE, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated March 31, 1999
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, convicting appellant Jerryvie Gumayao of the
crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of his victim
Concordio Sulogan in the sum of P50,000.
The appellant was charged in an Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 8437-97 which reads:
That on or about the 28th day of December, 1996, in the
evening at Purok 2, barangay Kalasungay, municipality of
Malaybalay, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill by means of treachery, with the
use of a sharp bladed instrument, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and stab
CONCORDIO SULOGAN, inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused the instantaneous death of
CONCORDIO SULOGAN; to the damage and prejudice of the
legal heirs of CONCORDIO SULOGAN in such amount as
may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Republic Act No. 7659.2
Upon his arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution3
Concordio Sulogan and his wife Wilma resided at Zone 2,
Kalasungay, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Concordio was a
corn farmer by profession and tilled his own land, which
was about 5.8 hectares. The couple had three children.4
At around 10:00 to 10:45 p.m. on December 28, 1996,
Diocrly5 Binayao was standing by the Syre Highway at
Kalasungay, City of Malaybalay. He and Concordio Sulogan,
were watching a disco party being held at the plaza of
Kalasungay, which was about thirty meters6 from where
they were. The plaza was adorned with brightly colored
blinking lights. There was a gate surrounding the area of
the party place, and an area where the partygoers had to
pay their entrance fees.7
Concordio and Diocrly sat down beside each other, crosslegged, by the side of the asphalt pavement and talked as
they watched the ongoing party.8 An electric light post,
which was about ten meters away, illuminated the street.
Also about ten meters from where Concordio and Diocrly
were sitting was a nearby store, across the street and
opposite to the plaza, which was likewise lighted.9 The
store was owned by SPO1 Ersie Paano.10
Jerryvie Gumayao approached the two and joined them. In
a squatting position, he sat beside Concordio, to the latters
right.1vvphi1.nt

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Edmund Paano had known Concordio since he was seven

years old.11 They were first cousins12 and lived near each
other in Zone 2, Kalasungay. That fateful night, Edmund
was with his other cousin Kenneth in their aunties house,
which was located near the plaza.13 Edmund and Kenneth
decided to go to the plaza to check out the ongoing disco
party. On the way, they passed by the Syre highway and
saw Diocrly, Concordio, and Jerryvie, who were sitting at
the edge of the asphalt road.14 Edmund walked towards
them and shook Concordios hand, and thereafter
proceeded to the disco place.15
When Edmund and Kenneth left, Jerryvie suddenly took
out a seven-and-a-half-inch-long knife16 with his right
hand and stabbed Concordio on the left side of the chest,
and again on the abdomen, also on the left
side.17Concordio fell, mortally wounded, on his back, the
knife still embedded in his body. Jerryvie hurriedly left the
scene, going towards the direction of their house in Zone
4.18 Diocrly walked away, and sought help to aid the fallen
Concordio, in the direction of the nearby store.19
Edmund and Kenneth did not enjoy the disco because
there were no ladies there for them.20 They stayed for only
about fifteen minutes and headed back in the direction of
the highway.21 They saw Concordio lying on his back,
bloodied all over.22 Edmund ran towards the direction of
his aunties house and informed the victims brother,
Christopher, that Concordio was stabbed.23 Edmund went
back to the scene of the crime, and found that Concordio
had already been brought to the hospital. He later learned
that Concordio had succumbed to his injuries and had died
in the hospital.
SPO1 Paano was fast asleep inside his house. He was
suddenly awakened by one of his daughters and his wife,
who informed him that a stabbing incident had occurred
right in front of his residence.24 He immediately proceeded
to the area, and saw the victim lying prostrate on the
ground, beside the road.25 A crowd had by then already
gathered around the crime scene. SPO1 Paanos brother
Edmund revealed that the persons who were with the
victim before the incident were Diocrly and Jerryvie.26
Because he was more interested in apprehending the
suspect and getting on with the investigation, SPO1 Paano
instructed the persons present to bring the victim to the
hospital.27
SPO1 Paano immediately went to Diocrlys house and
inquired about the incident. Diocrly told him that the
person responsible for the stabbing of Concordio was
Jerryvie.28 SPO1 Paano then proceeded to look for Jerryvie
in Purok 4, Kalasungay, City of Malaybalay, where the
latters father lived. Jerryvie was not there, but his father
accompanied SPO1 Paano to his residence, which was
about fifty meters away.29 Jerryvie was nowhere to be
found.
At around 6:00 a.m. the next day, December 29, 1996,
SPO1 Paano went to the Malaybalay Police Station to verify
if the incident had already been recorded in the police
blotter. At around 7:10 that same morning, SPO1 Boy
Solito brought Jerryvie to the Malaybalay Police Station.30
Wilma Sulogan, the victims widow, testified that her
husband sustained two stab wounds on the chest, above
his left nipple.31 Her husband was buried on December 31,
1996. They spent P1,500 for the embalmment, and
P30,000 for the wake. The coffin was a donation from the

Page 37

barangay.32 She also suffered sleepless nights and mental

anguish upon her husbands untimely death.
The Evidence for the Defense33
Jerryvie denied the charges against him. He testified that
he was a long-time resident of Kalasungay, City of
Malaybalay.34 He was married to Josalyn Binayao, and they
lived with his mother.
Jerryvie testified that he and a certain Popoy Helacio were
enemies.35 The misunderstanding apparently came about
when Jerryvies cousin drove without permission the
motorcycle of Helacios uncle, about two years ago. 36On
December 24, 1996, Jerryvie had an "encounter" with
Helacio.37
At 7:00 p.m. of December 28, 1996, Jerryvie was in his
aunties house, which was about 2 kilometers away from
the plaza. He and three others were having a drinking
spree.38 At around 9:00 p.m., Jerryvie and his companions
thereafter proceeded to the plaza to participate in the
ongoing disco. Upon entering the area, Jerryvie came face
to face with Helacio, who challenged him to a fight.39
Jerryvie gamely asked where, and Helacio replied, "On the
portion outside by (sic) this disco place."40
A fight ensued. Jerryvie punched Helacio, and the latter fell.
When he got up, Jerryvie saw that he was armed with a
knife and declared, "We will kill you now." 41 Jerryvie
replied, "Wait for me" and ran towards his mother-in-laws
house. When he returned, he saw that Helacio had
summoned two more companions, Edmund and
Concordio. The three men surrounded him. Sulogan was
able to take hold of him, twist his head, and say, "We will
kill him."42Jerryvie struggled to free himself, and was able
to do so. He then took hold of Concordio and stabbed the
latter with the knife, which he had tucked by his waist.
Jerryvie testified that he could no longer remember how
many times he stabbed Concordio.43
Jerryvie fled from the scene and went to his godfather,
George. He told George that he had stabbed a person in the
plaza whose identity he did not know.44 Jerryvies father
thereafter arrived and told him to surrender to the
authorities. Jerryvie decided to follow his fathers advice
and surrendered to Boy Solito, the husband of his mothers
niece, who also happened to be a policeman. On Solitos
advice, Jerryvie surrendered the following morning where
he was brought to the CID to be investigated.
Jerryvie also testified that prosecution witness Diocrly
Binayao was his brother-in-law, and that the two of them
had differences because the latter did not want him to
marry her sister in the first place.45 He insisted that he did
not intend to kill anyone that fateful night, but when
Concordio held him, he had no choice but to stab the
latter.46
Lilency Liman-ay testified that Jerryvie was her nephew
and that she had known him since he was a small boy. His
misunderstanding with Helacio started during a drinking
spree at the house of Lilencys niece. Lilencys son, along
with Jerryvie, apparently used a motorcycle parked near
the house. The motorcycle was owned by Helacios
relative, Arlene. Arlene got angry, and Helacio joined in the
fray.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

On December 29, 1996, Lilency woke up very early and

found out that the authorities were looking for Jerryvie.
She assisted the latters mother in the search, and they
found Jerryvie in Lumayagan, near the BFI Nursery at
Kalasungay, about two kilometers away from the latters
residence.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
The trial court rendered a decision on March 31, 1999,
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Jerryvie Gumayao
guilty of murder and penalized under Republic Act No.
7659. Considering the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender which is not offset by any generic
aggravating circumstance, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of his victim Concordio Sulogan in
the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.47
The Case on Appeal
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court
contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE ANENT
THE STABBING INCIDENT;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AND HIS WITNESS;
III
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS
GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM
OF MURDER AS THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS ONLY
HOMICIDE.48
According to the appellant, his passive stance, when
Helacios group confronted him, proved the fact that he
was not the unlawful aggressor as the prosecutions
evidence tends to establish. He was surrounded by three
men; Helacio was armed with a knife, and Concordio was
backing up the latter. The use of a knife in inflicting the
fatal blow on Concordio was justified, as it was reasonable
under the circumstances then prevailing. The appellants
also points out that he was clearly outnumbered and
literally pushed to the limit, without any means to choose
what kind of weapon with which to defend himself. Popoy
Helacio, who was accompanied by the victim, was
determined to attack the appellant, owing to the longstanding feud between them.
That the appellant acted in self-defense in stabbing the
victim is clear and convincing, as the prosecution did not
present rebuttal witnesses to assail the same. The claim of
self-defense is further strengthened by the fact that the
appellant voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after

Page 38

the stabbing incident. In fact, the trial court had no other

recourse but to accept the fact of voluntary surrender
when the prosecution admitted the same during the trial.
The appellant further insists that there was a fight
between the appellant and Helacio prior to the stabbing
incident. Thus, when the appellant returned to the scene,
armed with a knife, the victim and his companions were
forewarned of an impending danger. Thus, should the
Court render a verdict of conviction, the crime committed
by the appellant would only be homicide.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends
that the appellants claim that he acted in self-defense
when he stabbed the victim is belied by the location,
nature and number of wounds inflicted. The appellant
stabbed the victim on the chest and the abdomen, and the
wounds proved to be fatal. Furthermore, the appellants
attack on the victim was sudden, without affording
opportunity on the part of the victim to defend himself. As
such, the appellant committed murder, not homicide.
The Courts Ruling
The appellants contentions are devoid of merit.
The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-defense
is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to
fabricate.49 In a case where self-defense is invoked by the
accused, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove,
with clear and convincing evidence, the following essential
requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. There can be no
complete or incomplete self-defense unless the accused
proves unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. 50 The
accused must rely on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. This is
so because in pleading self-defense, the accused thereby
admits to the killing and can no longer be exonerated of
the crime charged if he fails to prove the confluence of the
essential requisites of self-defense.51
The appellant failed to discharge his burden.1awphi1.nt
First. After stabbing Concordio, the appellant fled from the
situs criminis. Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and
negates the plea of self-defense.
Second. Although the appellant surrendered to the police
authorities early the next day, he failed to inform them that
he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim.
Moreover, the records show that the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Malaybalay issued a subpoena on January
10, 1997, requiring the appellant to submit his counteraffidavit, but the latter failed to do so. It was only during
the trial that the appellant, for the first time, invoked selfdefense.
Third. The appellant stabbed the victim twice on the chest,
and both wounds proved fatal. As correctly contended by
the prosecution, the nature and the number of the wounds
of the victim negate the appellants claim that he acted in
self-defense. On the contrary, they prove that the appellant
was determined to kill the victim.52
Fourth. As found by the trial court, the appellant made
inconsistent and conflicting statements. During the direct

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

examination, the accused told the court that it was only

with Popoy Helacio that he was to have a confrontation. It
was only when he went back to the plaza with a knife that
he found that Helacio had already summoned two
companions.53 However, when the court questioned the
appellant how he and Helacio met that fateful night at the
disco entrance, the appellants version of the story
changed, such that the victim was already a participant in
the fray, even before the appellant went back to the plaza
to get a knife.54 Thus, the appellants testimony is
inconsistent on material points, and cannot be given
credence.
Case law has it that the trial courts findings of facts, its
calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses, its
assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of the
parties, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said
findings, are accorded great weight, and even conclusive
effect, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of
the case. This is because of the unique advantage of the
trial court to observe, at close range, the conduct,
demeanor and the deportment of the witnesses as they
testify.55 Upon careful review of the records of the case, the
Court finds no cogent reason to overrule the trial courts
finding that the appellant stabbed the victim in cold blood.
An eyewitness account, coupled with the fact of the
victims death, are sufficient proof of the guilt of the
appellant, beyond cavil of doubt, for the crime of murder. 56
In this case, the appellant failed to show any ill or
improper motive on the part of Diocrly to impute the crime
of murder to the appellant, for which the latter could be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. As this Court had the
occasion to state in People v. Sibonga:57
This Court has consistently ruled that the testimony of a
single prosecution witness, as long as it is positive, clear
and credible is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of
conviction. Corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a
prerequisite to the conviction of the accused. Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses but by the
quality of their testimonies.58
The trial court found Diocrly to be a credible witness. He
testified that he was very sure that Jerryvie was
Concordios assailant, since the scene of the crime was
adequately lighted:
Q: Now, considering that, that was 10:45 in the evening
already of December 28, 1996, how were you able to really
recognize Jerryvie to be the one who stabbed Concordio?
A: I saw him.
Q: That is why, why were you very sure that, that was he
who stabbed?
A: The moon was bright.
Q: Other than the moon was bright what light [sic], if there
was any?
A: The electric lights coming from the electric bulb of the
store and the disco dance area.
Q: Now you mentioned of [the] street lights a little while
ago, what kind of light installed in that street light [sic]?

Page 39

A: A big lamp.
Q: Have you seen a very big lamp along Fortich Street, is
that a big lamp also at Kalasungay?
A: Yes.59
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder,
qualified by treachery under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. There is treachery in the commission of the
crime when (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; (b) the offender
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
method and form of attack employed by him. Even a
frontal attack may be considered treacherous when
sudden and unexpected, and employed on an unarmed
victim who would not be in a position to repel the attack or
to avoid it.60
In this case, the victim was merely sitting on the pavement
at the edge of the road, chatting with a friend as they
watched an on-going disco party. The appellant joined
them, without giving the victim any inkling as to the
tragedy that was about to befall the latter. Suddenly, and
without warning, the appellant pulled out the knife hidden
in his waist, and stabbed the victim twice, on vital parts of
the body, ensuring the latters immediate death. Thus, the
appellant killed the victim in a treacherous manner.
Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty.61 As such, the
circumstance of voluntary surrender will not affect the
penalty to be meted on the appellant, since under Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua must be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the crime.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
The trial court correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000, which needs no
other proof than the death of the victim.62 The trial court
was, likewise, correct in not awarding actual damages to
the said heirs, considering that there were no receipts to
support them.63 The heirs are, nevertheless, entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.64
Finally, the trial court was correct in not awarding
damages for lost earnings. The prosecution merely relied
on Wilma Sulogans self-serving statement, that her
husband was earning more or less P40,000 a year as a corn
farmer. Compensation for lost income is in the nature of
damages, and requires adequate proof thereof. For loss of
income due to death, there must be unbiased proof of the
deceaseds average income as well as proof of average
expenses. The award for lost income refers to the net
income of the deceased; that is, the total income less
average expenses. No proof of the victims average
expenses were adduced in evidence; as such, there can be
no reliable estimate of lost earnings.65
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, in Criminal
Case No. 8437-97 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Jerryvie Gumayao y Dahao is found GUILTY of
murder, qualified by treachery, penalized under Republic
Act No. 7659, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim

Concordio Sulogan P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as
moral damages; and P25,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172322

September 8, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
RENE SANTOS, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly sexually assaulting 5-year-old AAA, Rene
Santos was charged with Rape in an Information1 alleging

That on or about in the afternoon of between 17th and

23rd of July 1999 in the [B]arangay of xxx, [M]unicipality
of xxx, [P]rovince of Pampanga, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, RENE SANTOS, with lewd designs and by means
of deceit, force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with AAA, 5 years of age, against her
will.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge.2 Trial thereafter ensued, after which the Regional
Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, rendered
judgment3 imposing the death penalty thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of all the foregoing, the Court
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and as a consequence of which, this Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the mandatory penalty of
death and to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P75,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.4
Owing to the imposition of the death penalty, the case was
elevated to the Court for automatic review. Pursuant,
however, to the ruling in People v. Mateo,5 the case was
referred to the Court of Appeals for evaluation in a
Resolution dated September 7, 2004.6
In his appeal, appellant alleged that
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT WOULD EXCULPATE
HIM FROM THE CRIME OF RAPE.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED UPON
THE ACCUSED THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH.
In its Decision7 dated October 19, 2005, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of conviction and, in addition to the
P75,000.00 civil indemnity imposed, ordered appellant to
pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Page 40

The prosecution's version of the incident narrates that

sometime between July 17 and 23, 1999, AAA was playing
at the northern portion of xxx Bridge, xxx, Pampanga,
when she was taken by appellant and brought to his house,
which is about one kilometer away from AAA's residence.
While inside the house, appellant took off the clothes of
AAA and had sexual intercourse with her.8 The victim felt
pain and her vagina bled.9
After a complaint was lodged with the barangay and the
police authorities, AAA was brought to the Jose B. Lingad
Memorial Regional Hospital in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where she was examined.10 The Medico Legal O.B. Gyne
Report indicated multiple superficial healed lacerations.11
The victim, who was already six years old when she
testified in court,12 positively identified the appellant
during the trial and testified on the affidavit she executed
before the police officers of xxx, Pampanga.13
Appellant's version of the incident is one of denial and
alibi. He testified that he was the driver of BBB who lived
in Barangay xxx, xxx, Pampanga which is a kilometer away
from his place in Sulipan.14 Appellant usually leaves his
house at 7:00 a.m. and stays at his workplace up to 7:30
p.m. or sometimes even up to 10:00 p.m. when necessary.15
His job was to drive his employer whenever the latter had
appointments in Manila.16 When BBB had no
appointments, he drove a passenger jeepney plying San
Fernando, Pampanga and Malolos, Bulacan, a route which
passed Sulipan.17 On July 17, 1999, appellant drove his
employer to the Wheels Motor Shop at E. Rodriguez
Avenue, Quezon City leaving Apalit at 9:00 a.m. and
returning at 8:30 p.m. On July 18, 1999, appellant left his
house at 6:00 a.m. arriving at his workplace at 7:30 a.m.
and from there he delivered surplus bumpers to Malinta,
Manila.18 On July 19, 20, 21 and 22, 1999, appellant plied
the San Fernando-Malolos route on board his passenger
jeepney.19 On July 23, 1999, appellant went to Makati
leaving xxx at 10:00 a.m., returning only at 10:00 p.m.20

more so, if she is a 5-year-old child as in this case. The

revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been
abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo
the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an
eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so
testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the
truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive. 27
The trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to
the testimony of AAA who was only six years old when she
narrated the sordid details of her ravishment, viz:
FISCAL PINEDA
Questioning
If Rene Santos is inside this courtroom, can you point at
him?
WITNESS
Answering
Yes, sir.
Q Please point at him?
A There he is, sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who
[when] asked gave his name as Rene Santos.
Q Between the period of July 17 to 23, 1999, do you
remember where were you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you then?

On July 30, 1999, between 6:30 to 7:30 a.m.,21 he was

sweeping the ground in front of his house when a white
car pulled over.22 The vehicle's occupants introduced
themselves as police officers and asked him if he was Rene
Santos.23 Thereafter, he was taken to the police
headquarters for questioning. Once they arrived at the
headquarters, he was detained and remained in detention
up to the time of his trial.24

A...

We have examined the evidence on record and find no

cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. We accord great respect on the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies, for the trial judge observes the
behavior and demeanor of the witnesses in court. His
evaluation or assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and of testimony acquires greater significance in rape
cases because from the nature of the offense, the only
evidence that can oftentimes be offered to establish the
guilt of the accused is the victim's testimony."25

A Yes, sir.

This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is

an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts
can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and
attitude during the direct and cross-examination by
counsel.26 It is likewise well established that the testimony
of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit,

Questioning

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Q You said you know this Rene Santos, why do you know
him?
A Because he raped me, sir.
Q Can you remember when was that?

Q When?
WITNESS
Answering
I do not know when, sir.
FISCAL PINEDA

Do you recall where?

A In their house, sir.
Q And where is that house?

Page 41

A In Sulipan, sir.

Answering

Q In Apalit, Pampanga?

Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir.

Q Point to him?

Q You said that this Rene Santos raped you, what

particular actuations did he do?

A There he is, sir.

A He inserted his penis, sir.

Q Where?
A Here, sir, in my vagina.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to her private organ.
Q Where did that happen?
A In their house, sir.
Q In what portion of his house?
A Inside their house, sir.
Q You said that Rene Santos inserted his penis into your
vagina, what did you feel?
A I felt pain, sir.
Q When he inserted his penis into your vagina did he have
any clothings (sic)?
A...
ATTY. VIOLA
Leading, Your Honor.
COURT
Reform the question.
FISCAL PINEDA
Questioning
When he inserted his penis into your vagina, what was his
appearance?
WITNESS
Answering
It was hard, sir.
Q What was hard?
A His penis, sir.
COURT
Questioning
Is this Rene Santos inside this courtroom?
WITNESS

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who
when asked gave his name as Rene Santos.28(Emphasis and
italics supplied)
Counsel for the defense attempted, albeit futilely, to
impeach the credibility of the victim.29 We have held time
and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young
and immature, as in this case, deserve full credence
considering that no young woman, especially one of tender
age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert
herself by being subject to a public trial if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the
wrong committed against her. It is highly improbable for
an innocent girl of tender years like the victim, who is very
naive to the things of this world, to fabricate a charge so
humiliating not only to herself but also to her family.
Stated succinctly, it is beyond the mind-set of a six-year old
child, like the offended party herein, to fabricate a
malicious accusation against appellant if the crime did not
truly transpire.30 Verily, when a guileless girl of six
credibly declares that she has been raped, she has said all
that is necessary to prove the ravishment of her honor.31
Appellant's reliance on the corroboration by his wife of his
alibi cannot overturn the clear and categorical declarations
of the victim identifying him as the perpetrator of the
crime. The corroboration should, furthermore, be received
with caution coming as it does from appellant's spouse
whose emotional ties and interest in his acquittal cannot
be gainsaid. Indeed, it has even been held that some wives
are overwhelmed by emotional attachment to their
husbands such that they knowingly or otherwise suppress
the truth and act as a medium for injustice to
preponderate.32
In addition to his defense of alibi, appellant further faults
the trial court with "acting as the prosecutor and the judge
at the same time"33 for allegedly initiating and
propounding "the questions, short of supplying the desired
answer from the witness."34
The argument is tenuous. As has been pointed out in
People v. Guambor:35
The trial judge is accorded a reasonable leeway in putting
such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial
judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both law and the
facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of
their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a
result of a failure to propound a proper question to a
witness which might develop some material bearing upon
the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may
put such question to the witness as will enable him to
formulate a sound opinion as to the ability and willingness
of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or
cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to

Page 42

extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and

material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths
which tend to destroy the theory of one party. (Emphasis
supplied)
The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the
courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child
witness.36 Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on
Examination of a Child Witness,37 child witnesses may
testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be
allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if
the same will further the interest of justice.38 It must be
borne in mind that the offended party in this case is a 6year old minor who was barely five when she was sexually
assaulted. As a child of such tender years not yet exposed
to the ways of the world, she could not have fully
understood the enormity of the bestial act committed on
her person. Indeed
Studies show that children, particularly very young
children, make the "perfect victims." They naturally follow
the authority of adults as the socialization process teaches
children that adults are to be respected. The child's age
and developmental level will govern how much she
comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it
affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has
happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she
has no comprehension of the consequences. Certainly,
children have more problems in providing accounts of
events because they do not understand everything they
experience. They do not have enough life experiences
from which to draw upon in making sense of what they
see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a
limited vocabulary. With her limited comprehension,
the child could not have a perfect way of relating that
she had been sexually abused.39 (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
The record discloses that the questions propounded by the
judge were intended to elicit the truth from the child
witness. This perceived undue inquisitiveness of the judge
did not unduly harm the substantial rights of the appellant.
In fact, it is only to be expected from the judge who, with
full consciousness of his responsibilities could not, and
should not, easily be satisfied with incompleteness and
obscurities in the testimonies of the witness.40
While judges should as much as possible refrain from
showing partiality to one party and hostility to another, it
does not mean that a trial judge should keep mum
throughout the trial and allow parties to ask questions that
they desire, on issues which they think are important,
when the former are improper and the latter immaterial. If
trials are to be expedited, judges must take a leading part
therein, by directing counsel to submit evidence on the
facts in dispute by asking clarifying questions, and by
showing an interest in a fast and fair trial. Judges are not
mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch
and decide the results of a game; they should have as much
interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence, calling attention of counsel to
points at issue that are overlooked, directing them to ask
the question that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, and clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses.
Unless they take an active part in trials in the above form
and manner, and allow counsel to ask questions whether

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

pertinent or impertinent, material or immaterial, the

speedy administration of justice which is the aim of the
Government and of the people cannot be attained.41
Appellant also invites the Court's attention to what he
perceives as uncharacteristic behavior of the victim who,
according to him, should be traumatized after undergoing
"the onslaught of sexual molestation."42 He insists that it is
unnatural for the 6-year old victim to go to school the day
following her supposedly shocking experience. He also
points out that "she was answering not as seriously as one
who has been sexually molested."43
The contention is neither novel nor persuasive. There is no
standard form of behavior that can be expected of rape
victims after they have been defiled because people react
differently to emotional stress.44 Nobody can tell how a
victim of sexual aggression is supposed to act or behave
after her ordeal.45 Certainly, it is difficult to predict in
every instance how a person especially a 6-year old child,
as in this case would react to a traumatic experience.46 It
is not proper to judge the actions of rape victims,
especially children, who have undergone the harrowing
experience of being ravished against their will by the
norms of behavior expected under such circumstances
from mature persons.47 Indeed, the range of emotions
shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by
calculus.48 It is thus unrealistic to expect uniform reactions
from them.49 In fact, the Court has not laid down any rule
on how a rape victim should behave immediately after her
ravishment.50
In his attempt to extricate himself from criminal liability,
appellant further insinuates that his sons may be the
possible perpetrators of the felony saying that "it could
have been Rene Santos, Jr. or Michael Santos who could
have raped the victim" considering that AAA and her sister
CCC allegedly complained earlier that they were raped by
the two brothers.51
If at all, the foregoing suggestion that his sons may have
been the malefactors who sexually assaulted the victim
and her sister only succeeds in underscoring his moral
depravity and his capacity to commit the crime. Only one
whose degree of wickedness plumbs the deepest depths of
criminal perversity would have no qualms of laying the
onus of his guilt even on his own offspring and, worse,
blacken the memory of one of them who is already dead in
his endeavor to exculpate himself from the consequences
of his felonious acts.
Much less convincing is appellant's proposition that ill
feelings and ill motives of the victim's mother impelled the
filing of the charges against him. Ill-motives become
inconsequential where there are affirmative or categorical
declarations establishing appellant's accountability for the
felony.52 We have, furthermore, observed not a few
persons convicted of rape have attributed the charges
against them to family feuds, resentment or
revenge.53However, as borne out by a plethora of cases,
family resentment, revenge or feuds have never swayed us
from giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant
for rape, especially a minor who remained steadfast and
unyielding throughout the direct and cross-examination
that she was sexually abused.54 It would take a certain
degree of perversity on the part of a parent, especially a
mother, to concoct a false charge of rape and then use her
daughter as an instrument to settle her grudge.55

Page 43

Given the foregoing factual, legal and jurisprudential

scenario, we agree with both the trial and appellate courts
that the appellant is guilty as charged. He was, likewise,
correctly meted the penalty of death because rape
committed against a "child below seven (7) years old" is a
dastardly and repulsive crime which merits no less than
the imposition of capital punishment under Article 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code.56 That AAA was only five years
old when she was ravished is clear from her birth
certificate.57
However, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346
entitled "An Act Prohibiting The Imposition Of The Death
Penalty In The Philippines," the penalty that should be
meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated
does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court affirms the
award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and increases the Court of Appeals'
award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.58
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. H.C. No. 01424 finding appellant Rene Santos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and odering
him to indemnify the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONthat the award of
moral damages is increased to P75,000.00 and that in lieu
of the death penalty, appellant Rene Santos is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without possibility of parole.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142930

March 28, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
KAKINGCIO CAETE, appellant.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision1 of
the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36, in Criminal
Case No. 2523, convicting appellant of rape, imposing on
him the death penalty and ordering him to pay damages to
the victim in the amount of P50,000.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The spouses Paquito Caete and Sedaria Caete had three
children, one of whom was Alma, who was born on March
24, 1983. In 1986, the spouses decided to live separately.
Sedaria resided in Pook West, Cubala, Biliran, with some of

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

her children by Paquito. The latter decided to live in Basey,

Samar, and brought Alma with him. Thereafter, Paquito
decided to live with his older brother, Kakingcio Caete,
and the latters common-law wife, Alejandra Caete, whom
Alma called Yaya Alejandra, and their two children, five
and four years old, respectively, in Barangay Gayad,
Capoocan, Leyte. After some years, Paquito and Alma
decided to return to and live in Basey, Samar. In the
meantime, Paquito became blind and a paralytic. In
January 1996, Kakingcio had Paquito and Alma fetched
from Basey, Samar, and brought to Barangay Gayad,
Capoocan, Leyte, to live with him and his family. By then,
Alma was already twelve years old. She noticed that her
uncle Kakingcio was nice and amiable to her.
On February 1, 1996, Alejandra visited her daughter in
Montebello, Kananga, Leyte, leaving behind Kakingcio and
their two young children and Paquito and Alma. At about
8:00 p.m., Alma was already asleep. Paquito was sleeping
near her feet. The house was dark. Momentarily, Alma was
awakened when she felt someone caressing her. When she
opened her eyes, she saw her uncle Kakingcio who was
wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up. He
was beside her with his left palm touching her forehead,
down to her face, hand and feet. She could smell liquor
from his breath. He poked an 8-inch long knife on her neck
and whispered to her: "Ma, dont tell your yaya because I
will do something to you." Kakingcio then removed his
short pants, lifted her skirt and pulled down her panties.
He threatened to kill her if she made a sound. Alma was
terrified. Kakingcio then inserted his private organ into
Almas vagina and made a push and pull movement of his
body. Alma felt pain in her private part and could do
nothing but cry as Kakingcio ravished her. In the process,
Alma lost consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, it was already 6:00 in the morning of
February 2, 1996. She was weak and could hardly stand
up. She noticed blood in her vagina. By then, Kakingcio had
already left the house. Alma could do nothing but cry.
Kakingcio arrived back home after lunch time. Alma hid
from her uncle.
On February 3, 1996, at 8:00 in the evening, Alma was
asleep in the sala of their house. She was awakened when
she felt her pants being pulled down. She was aghast when
she saw Kakingcio beside her pulling down her pants. She
resisted and ran out of the house to escape from Kakingcio.
She rushed to the house of a neighbor Ka Caring to whom
Alma revealed that her uncle raped her and that he was
about to rape her again. Caring adviced Alma not to return
to their house. Alma slept in the house of Caring. Alma
returned to their house the next day, February 4, 1996. By
then, Kakingcio was no longer in the house.
On February 5, 1996, Alejandra went up the hill to gather
camote tops. She was then armed with a bolo. Alma
followed Alejandra to the hills and revealed to her that
Kakingcio raped her on February 1, 1996. Alejandra was
livid with rage. She rushed back to the house and
confronted Kakingcio with the charge of Alma. Alejandra
and Kakingcio quarreled. She berated him for having taken
advantage of his own flesh and blood. She told him to leave
the house. Kakingcio agreed on the condition that he
would bring his personal belongings with him. After
Kakingcio left, Alejandra accompanied Alma to the
barangay captain and complained against Kakingcio. The
Barangay Captain wrote a letter to the local police
authorities requesting assistance to Alejandra and Alma.

Page 44

On February 9, 1996, Dra. Bibiana A. Cardente, the

Municipal Health Officer of Capoocan, Leyte, examined
Alma. The doctor prepared and signed a medico-legal
certificate on her examination of Alma which contains her
findings:

Breast:
normal, no abrasions, no lacerations, no
hematoma
Abdomen: normal
Extremities: normal
Pelvic Examination: scanty pubic hair noted
External Genitalia: grossly normal
Internal & Speculum Examination Findings:
non-parous, admits 2 fingers with slight

Cervix: pinkish, soft hymenal healed old lacerations at 6

oclock and 9 oclock
Discharges: scanty brownish discharges
Uterus: small
Adnexa: negative for masses and

Kakingcio returned to their house on February 7, 1996.

Kakingcio testified that he was not aware of any reason
why his wife and Alma would charge him with rape.

"Physical Examination Findings:

Introitus:
difficulty

however, left the two. The next day, Rolly and Kakingcio
went back to the mountains and gathered coconuts.

tenderness"2

On February 4, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision

finding Kakingcio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
and imposing on him the penalty of death in view of the
presence of the special qualifying circumstance of the
minority of private complainant Alma and her relationship
to Kakingcio and the special aggravating circumstance of
use of a deadly weapon and without any mitigating
circumstance in the commission of the crime.
In his appellants brief, appellant Kakingcio assails the
decision of the trial court contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY
AND ACTIVELY IN THE PRESENTATION AND RECEPTION
OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE THEREBY FAILING TO
UPHOLD THE "COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL
JUDGE."
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF RAPE DESPITE WANT OF CLEAR,
POSITIVE AND CONVINCTING IDENTIFICATION.

Alma was entrusted to the Lingap Center in Pawing Palo,

Leyte.

III

On April 26, 1996, an Information was filed with the

Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36, charging
Kakingcio with rape, thus:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT

AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND IN DISREGARDING
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.

"That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the

municipality of Capoocan, Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with
lewd designs and by use of force and intimidation then
armed with the short bladed weapon, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with ALMA CAETE, a minor (12 years old) against her
will to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned on September 18, 1996, Kakingcio,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
When he testified, Kakingcio denied having sexually
assaulted Alma. He interposed the defense of alibi. He
claimed that he was a farmer. He planted root crops such
as banana. On February 1, 1996, he went to the house of
Romulo Lukaba located at Barangay Gayad, Capoocan,
Leyte, about three kilometers from his house, for the
purpose of accompanying and helping Rolly Lukaba, the
son of Romulo, gather coconuts in the coconut plantation
of Romulo in the mountains. It took Kakingcio thirty
minutes to reach the place. At about 9:00 in the evening,
Kakingcio, Rolly and Romulo drank tuba. By 10:00 in the
evening, Rolly and Kakingcio went to sleep. Romulo,

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

IV
ON THE ASSUMPTION HOWEVER THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT IS GUILTY OF RAPE, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON HIM THE PENALTY OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP WAS
NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION, HENCE, THE
APPROPRIATE PENALTY SHOULD ONLY BE RECLUSION
PERPETUA.4
On the first three assignments of errors, the appellant
avers that the prosecution had a difficulty proving that the
appellant raped the private complainant in light of her
testimony that when the appellant mounted her, he still
had his short pants on. When the prosecution tried to elicit
from the offended party how appellants penis could have
been inserted into her vagina with his pants still on and
the appellants counsel objected to the question, the
presiding judge himself took the cudgels for the
prosecution and propounded questions on the private
complainant. Worse, the presiding judge posed leading
questions to the private complainant. The presiding judge
was biased and partial to the prosecution. To buttress his
contention, the appellants counsel cited a portion of the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the trial
on September 17, 1997:

Page 45

PROS. PERIDA:
Q
So, after he laid himself over you with his trouser what
else happened?
A

His penis was inserted into my vagina, sir.

Q
Where did he let his penis exit considering that he is
then wearing a short pants?
ATTY. DILOY:
Objection your Honor! It is leading.
COURT:
Q
How did he manage to have his penis inserted to
your vagina?
A
No, sir, because when he placed himself on top of me
he pulled down his shorts and thereafter he inserted his
penis into my vagina.
Q
At that time what was your apparel going up from
your vagina?

must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such

questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial
judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and
the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance
of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as
a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a
witness which might develop some material bearing upon
the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may
put such question to the witness as will enable him to
formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may
examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths
which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
In this case, the relevant direct-examination questions
posed by the public prosecutor of the private complainant
and her corresponding answers, the objections thereto by
the appellants counsel and the questions propounded by
the trial court were as follows:

I was wearing then a t-shirt and skirt, sir.

About your skirt?

Q
After taking off your panty or underware (sic) what
else transpired?

He pulled up my skirt, sir.

What about your t-shirt?

Q
Please describe to us your uncle at that moment
when he placed himself over your body!

He did not do anything about my t-shirt.

Q
After placing his penis on your vagina, what else
transpired?
A

He keeps on kissing me sir.

He placed himself on top of me sir.

He placed himself on top of me in a prone position.

Q
What was he wearing at that time when he was
carressing (sic) your face down to your arm?
A

He was just wearing a short pants sir.

Q
At that time he keeps on kissing you, where was his
penis in relation to your vagina?

What about the upper portion of his body?

None sir.

It was inside my vagina sir.5

The appellant further stresses that when Alma was raped

it was nighttime and the place where she was molested
was dark. She could not have recognized and identified the
appellant as her rapist. Furthermore, Alma failed to report
the rape immediately to the police authorities.
The Court does not agree with the appellants submission.
In People v. Ancheta,6 this Court emphasized that a
presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining
witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules. The
presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should
not be incomplete or obscure. After all, the judge is the
arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to
the respective claims of the parties in the criminal
proceedings. In People v. Zheng Bai Hui,7 this Court
reiterated that:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some
of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the
truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for
a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an
evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had
intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Q
At the time he put himself over you on a prone
position, what about his short pants, was it still there?
ATTY. DILOY:
We request Your Honor that the question not be made in a
leading manner!
COURT:
Place of record the comment!
PROS. PERIDA:
I withdraw that Your Honor!
Q
Where was the short pants which your uncle
originally wearing that time?
ATTY. DILOY:
He was wearing it Your Honor as described by the witness!

Page 46

PROS. PERIDA:

I was wearing then a T-shirt and skirt sir.

At this moment now, when he was already on top of the

victim!

About your skirt?

He pulled up my skirt sir.

What about your t-shirt?

He did not do anything about my t-shirt.

ATTY. DILOY:
It was answered by the witness! According to the witness,
accused was wearing short pants but the upper part of his
body the accused had nothing worn!
PROS. PERIDA:
That is agreed Your Honor. Now my question is, at the time
Kakingcio Caete was already on top of Alma where was
this short pants!
ATTY. DILOY:
It was being worn by the accused!
PROS. PERIDA:
Let the witness answer that Your Honor!
ATTY. DILOY:
We submit Your Honor!
COURT:
Q
What were your uncle, when your uncle placed
himself on top of your body as you said, in a prone
position, was he wearing clothes or none?

Q
After placing his penis on your vagina, what else
transpired?
A

He keeps on kissing me sir.

Q
At that time he keeps on kissing you, where was his
penis in relation to your vagina?
A

It was inside my vagina sir.

Q
While his penis was inside your vagina and the
accused keeps on kissing you what else transpired?
A
(witness weeping in tears as been directly examined
by the Public Prosecutor).
COURT:
Place it of record that the child witness is crying in the
witness stand!
PROS. PERIDA:

He was still wearing Your Honor.

May we ask for suspension Your Honor! I move for

suspension considering the condition of the victim witness
Your Honor! Hes already crying!

What clothes?

COURT:

Short pants Your Honor.

We can come back tomorrow.8

Proceed Fiscal!
PROS. PERIDA:
Q
So, after he laid himself over you with his trouser,
what else happened?
A

His penis was inserted into my vagina sir.

Q
Where did he let his penis exit considering that he is
then wearing a short pants?
ATTY. DILOY:
Objection Your Honor! It is leading!
COURT:
Q
How did he manage to have his penis inserted to
your vagina?
A
No sir, because when he placed himself on top of me
he pulled down his shorts and thereafter he inserted his
penis into my vagina.
Q
At that time what was your apparel going up from
your vagina?

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed

by the trial court. Neither are the questions prejudicial to
the appellant or suggestive of any partiality of the trial
court. It bears stressing that from the testimony of the
private complainant, the appellant was wearing his short
pants before he mounted her and even when he was
already on top of her and managed to penetrate her sexual
organ with his penis. The public prosecutor wanted the
private complainant to explain to the court how the
appellant could have inserted his penis into her vagina
considering that he was still wearing his short pants.
Although crudely and ungrammatically phrased, the
question of the public prosecutor "where did he let his penis
exit considering that he is then wearing a short pants" was
not leading. The trial court should have overruled the
objection and allowed the private complainant to answer
the question. However, the trial court was not precluded
from asking questions to avoid further wrangling between
the public prosecutor and the appellants counsel which
may frightened or unnerved the private complainant, a
minor and who was unused to judicial proceedings. After
all, the trial court was mandated to discover the truth. As it
turned out, the private complainant cried profusely as she
testified impelling the trial court to order a continuance.
Even the counsel of the appellant agreed to a continuance.
Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness which took effect on

Page 47

December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a

narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by
the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same
will further the interest of justice. Objections to questions
should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead,
confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:

A
Because we were the only one staying in the house,
and besides I can detect his smell.

Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. The court shall exercise

control over the questioning of children so as to (1)
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste
of time.

WITNESS:

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a

narrative form.9
While it may be true that it was dark when the appellant
ravished the private complainant in his house, it cannot,
however, be gainsaid that the private complainant could
have sufficiently identified the appellant as the culprit. The
appellant was the uncle of the private complainant. She
and her father Paquito had been living with the appellant
and his family off and on for years before she and her
father were brought back with appellant in January 1996
to Capoocan, Leyte, to live anew with the appellant and his
family. The private complainant was thus familiar not only
with the physical build of the appellant but also with his
voice and peculiar smell. A person may be identified by
these factors. Once a person has gained familiarity with
another, identification is quite an easy task. 10 In this case,
the appellant poked a knife on her neck and whispered to
the private complainant before she raped her: "Ma, ayaw
pagsumat kan imo yaya kay may-ada ako ha imo
bubuhaton" (Ma, dont tell to your yaya because I will do
something to you." "Ma" was the nickname of Alma, the
private complainant. "Yaya" was Alejandra Caete, the
common-law wife of the appellant.11 Moreover, as testified
to by the private complainant, the only persons left in the
house in the evening of February 1, 1997 were the
appellant and his two young children, Paquito, who was
blind and an invalid, and the private complainant:
PROS. PERIDA:
Q
You stated that on February 1, there was no light at
the place where you were raped. How did you recognize
with certainty that it was Kakingcio Caete who raped
you?

PROS. PERIDA:
Q

Why? What was his smell?

Smells like a smoker.12

When Alejandra Caete confronted the appellant on

February 5, 1997, with the claim of the private
complainant that he raped the latter and demanded that
the appellant leave the house, the appellant did not deny
the charge and even agreed to leave the house on
condition that he be allowed to take his personal
belongings with him:
PROS. PERIDA:
Q
On the following day, that was Monday, February 5,
1996, what did you do if any?
WITNESS:
A
That morning Monday, my auntie Yaya Alejandra
went up the hill and I followed them and I told them about
my ordeal that I was raped by my Yayo Kaking.
PROS. PERIDA:
Q
Who was the companion of your Yaya Alejandra who
went up the hill?
WITNESS:
A

Her daughter Ate Belen.

PROS. PERIDA:
Q

What is her real name?

WITNESS:
A

Belen Pepito.

PROS. PERIDA:
Q

Was he already married?

ATTY. DILOY:

WITNESS:

I object to that Your Honor. It should have been taken

during the direct examination.

PROS. PERIDA:
No, Your Honor. We are already talking about lights Your
Honor.
COURT:
Well, at least for purposes or in the interest of the trial, let
the witness answer!
WITNESS:

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

That her family name is the surname of her mother.

PROS. PERIDA:
Q
When you told your Yaya Alejandra, how did she
react to your information?
WITNESS:
A
Upon learning about the rape incident she was very
angry and she reacted angrily and carried with her the
camote tops and went down proceeding towards their
house bringing with her a long bolo, in our dialect it is used
for farming and cutting grass and a long pointed bolo, a
sharp instrument, and upon reaching their house they
have a quarrel with my uncle.

Page 48

PROS. PERIDA:
Q
How about you, did you follow your Yaya in going
home?
WITNESS:
A

Yes, sir.

PROS. PERIDA:
Q

After they quarrel, what transpired?

WITNESS:
A
My auntie, Yaya Alejandra told my uncle Yayo
Kaking to leave the house because he ate his own blood,
and Yayo Kaking answered in the affirmative, saying Yes, I
will leave the house so long I will bring with me all my
belongings.13
The credibility of the private complainant was not
degraded by her and Alejandra Caetes reporting the
sexual assault to the police authorities only on February 5,
1996. The evidence shows that the private complainant
was only twelve years old when she was raped by the
appellant. She and her father, who was completely blind
and a paralytic, were living in the house of the appellant.
The latter threatened to kill her if she revealed what he did
to her. It was thus easy for the appellant to fulfill the threat
if she divulged the violation of her honor.14 The private
complainant could do nothing but cry. When the appellant
tried in the evening of February 3, 1996 to violate her
again, she ran to a neighbor, Ka Caring, divulged to her that
the appellant tried to rape her anew and sought her help.
In fact, the private complainant slept in the house of Ka
Caring that evening and went back home only the next
morning on February 4, 1996. On February 5, 1996, the
private complainant revealed to her Yaya Alejandra, the
wife of the appellant, that the latter had raped her. In
People v. Bea,15 this Court held that it is not uncommon for
a young girl at the tender age of sixteen years to be
intimidated into silence and conceal the sexual assault on
her by the appellant.16
When cross-examined by the public prosecutor, the
appellant unabashedly admitted that he did not know any
improper or ill-motive on the part of the private
complainant for charging him with rape, and on the part of
his wife Alejandra Caete for reporting the sexual assault
on the private complainant by the appellant to the police
authorities:
Q
The complainant here testified in Court that she was
raped by you at 9:00 oclock in the evening of February 1,
1996. Are you aware of that?
A

No, sir.

Q
In fact the victim here testified that it was your very
own wife who accompanied her to report this matter to
the barangay (sic) Chairman of Barangay Gayad, and
likewise reported this matter to the PNP of Capoocan. Are
you aware of that?
A

No, sir.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Q
Do you know of any reason or reasons why your
own wife would report this rape incident against your
person?
A

I dont know sir what is her reason.

Q
And you dont know likewise of any reason or
reasons why your own niece, a twelve (12) year old child
would accuse you of rape, right?
A

I dont know also, sir.17

The records show that the private complainant lived in a

rural area, unaffected by the worldly ways of urban life. It
is thus incredible that the private complainant would
weave a story of defloration and undergo a medical
examination of her private parts and charge the appellant
with rape for which, if convicted, he could be meted the
penalty of either reclusion perpetua or death. As this Court
held:
Accused failed to attribute any ill motive on the part of the
victim to testify falsely and impute against him the
commission of a grave offense such as rape. To the
contrary, the trial court observed that the victim lived in
place "more rural than most rural villages" in the country,
and was still "unaffected by the wordly ways of urban life."
"It is highly inconceivable for a young barrio lass,
inexperienced with the ways of the world, to fabricate a
charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of
her private parts, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish
her familys honor and reputation unless she was
motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong
committed against her."18
In contrast to the positive and straightforward testimony
of the private complainant, the appellants denial of the
charge, which is merely a negative self-serving evidence,
cannot prevail. Equally undeserving of merit is his defense
of alibi. Appellant failed to prove with clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have
been in his house at the time when the private
complainant was raped.19 The only evidence adduced by
the appellant to prove alibi was his own testimony. By his
own admission, the appellants house was barely a thirtyminute walk to the house of Romulo Lukaba. It was thus
not physically impossible for the appellant to have been in
his house at 8:00 in the evening of February 1, 1996, when
the private complainant was raped.
Proper Penalty on Appellant
The trial court imposed the death penalty on the appellant
on its finding that the appellant used a knife when
committing the crime and that the private complainant
was under eighteen years of age and the niece of the
appellant and, hence, a relative of the private complainant
within the third civil degree.
This Court agrees with the trial court that the appellant
used a knife in committing the crime charged and that he is
the uncle of the private complainant and, hence, her
relative within the third civil degree. However, as to the
latter, there is no allegation in the Information that the
appellant is the uncle of the private complainant as
required by Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.20 In People v. Bernaldez,21 this Court
held that the minority of the private complainant and her
relationship to the appellant must be alleged in the

Page 49

Information because these circumstances are special

qualifying circumstances for rape to warrant the
imposition of the death penalty. Although this rule took
effect on December 1, 2000, or before the crime charged in
the Information was committed, the Court has consistently
applied the rule retroactively. Thus, since the relationship
of the private complainant and the appellant was not
alleged in the Information, the appellant cannot be
convicted of qualified rape, otherwise he would be
deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the
charge against him. The appellant may only be convicted of
simple rape with the special aggravating circumstance of
use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime.
Rape with use of a deadly weapon is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death under the third paragraph of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Since
the prosecution failed to prove any aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant
may be meted only the penalty of reclusion perpetua
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability of Appellant
The trial court ordered the appellant to pay P50,000 as
civil indemnity but failed to award moral damages and
exemplary damages considering the tender age of the
private complainant and of the uncle-niece relationship of
the appellant and the private complainant.22 In light of
recent case law, the Court must order the appellant to pay
the private complainant the amounts of P50,000 as moral
damages23 and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36, in Criminal Case
No. 2523, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
appellant KAKINGCIO CAETE is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of simple rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to
pay to private complainant Alma Caete the amounts of
P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and
P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137933

January 28, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN BARING, JR., accused-appellant.
BUENA, J.:
Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted
for statutory rape committed against a seven-year-old girl
in an information that reads"That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several occasions
thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of
Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of
force, violence and intimidation taking advantage of his
superior strength over the person of the victim who is only
seven (7) years old, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one
Jennifer Donayre, against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

"CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite
rendered a decision dated January 20, 1999, convicting
accused-appellant of rape, to wit
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of rape, the accusedValentin Baring Jr. is sentenced to die by lethal injection
and to pay the victim an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus
moral damages of another P50,000.00 plus the cost of this
suit.
"SO ORDERED."2
In a sworn complaint,3 Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin
Baring, Jr., her grandmothers commonlaw husband, of
raping her on several occasions. It appears that Jennifer
was living with her grandmother in Dasmarias, Cavite.
She does not know her real father since her mother and
father were separated.4 Since 1990, when she was about 8
months old5 until 1997, she was left under her
grandmothers care and custody. She calls Valentin Baring,
Jr. as "Papa."6
According to Jennifer, the repeated sexual abuse happened
when she was about 6 years old whenever she was left
alone in the house. Accused-appellant would touch her
private parts, and on such occasions, accused-appellant
would remove her panty, mount on her and violate her.
She informed her grandmother that accused-appellant
sexually abused her.7
On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her
daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in Dasmarias, Cavite. She
learned from her daughter that the latter was sexually
abused by accused-appellant. Acting on her daughters
accounts of sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the National
Bureau of Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter,
Jennifer underwent a medical examination at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service
in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Dennis G. Bellen, the
medico-legal officer at Camp Crame found that Jennifer
was in "non-virgin state physically." The examination
disclosed a "congested, fleshy-type hymen with shallow
healing laceration at 9 oclock position and the external
vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiners smallest
finger."8
For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations
against him.9 According to accused-appellant, he has been
living with Jennifers grandmother for ten (10)10 or
eighteen (18) years.11 Accused-appellant claimed that
Jennifer was not living with them during the time the
alleged rape occurred.12 Later on, he testified that prior to
July, 1997, Jennifer was living with them since 1990.13
However, Jennifer was taken from them sometime in July
1997, but he does not know why.14
The trial court meted out its judgment of conviction on the
basis of the victims clear, trustworthy and positive
testimony that she was raped several times by accusedappellant. Because of the penalty imposed, this case is now
before us on automatic review.

Page 50

On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel,

filed a petition before this Court to dismiss the case that is
subject of our automatic review because (i) the three-page
double-spaced decision of the trial court is bereft of
material facts supporting the conviction; (ii) the medicolegal certificate is merely a scrap of paper since the
physician who conducted the examination was not
presented as a witness that deprived accused-appellant of
his right to cross-examination; (iii) the case of attempted
homicide filed by the victims grandmother against
accused-appellant was provisionally dismissed; and (iv)
accused-appellant was merely a "fall guy" and that another
person is responsible for the commission of the crime
charged against him.15

engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against

accused-appellant but by the trial courts failure to fully
explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or
admissibility of the evidence presented for or against the
accused, the assessments made from the evidence
presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after
applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision.

In the appellants brief filed on November 4, 1999,

accused-appellant assigns the following errors-

Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in

convicting him of the crime of rape despite prosecutions
failure to present the examining physician to appear in
court depriving him of his constitutional right to confront a
witness against him.20 However, a review of the transcript
of stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellants
counsel waived presentation of the medico-legal officer
and thus, was not deprived of his constitutional right to
confront said witness, to wit-

"The lower court erred:

"PROS. ORQUIEZA:

"I. In promulgating a brief and short decision with material

facts that have been omitted with no allusions to the
transcripts of records erroneous of tenses and grammar
jotted by the Court Stenographer.

Your Honor, I was informed by the mother of the private

complainant that the doctor is no longer connected with
the Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City
but was reassigned to the Eastern Police District at
Mandaluyong City.

"II. In denying the accused his right to plead for a DNA Test
to determine that the blood found in the panty of the
victim is not his but of another man, Venancio Mendoza,
live-in husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer Donayre,
the victim.
"III. In not finding the accused as a fall guy framed up to
take the place of Venancio Mendoza, live-in husband of
Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer, whose behavior in the
courtroom as a witness has been beyond normal."16
The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.17 This vital requirement is not only
demanded from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are
similarly required to give basis for all their decisions,
rulings or judgments pursuant to the Administrative
Code18 whose roots may also be traced to the
Constitutional mandate.
A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence
presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly
and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn
therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in
order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is
imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to
the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the
case, summarize the facts with references to the record,
and contain a statement of the applicable laws and
jurisprudence and the tribunals assessments and
conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable
a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether
the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be
enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and
conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the
decision.19 Compliance with this requirement will
sufficiently apprise the parties of the various issues
involved but more importantly will guide the court in
assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent
with the facts and the law.
In the case at bar, the trial courts decision may cast doubt
as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt may be

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
I just prefer that a subpoena be sent. We have to ask for
the postponement.
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We can dispense with the testimony.
"COURT:
Provided this is admitted.
"COURT:
Do you admit the due execution and authenticity of the
report of the doctor?
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We admit everything written here because (sic) doctor
says.
"COURT:
Yes, whatever is written there, do you admit that?
ATTY. ABUBAKAR
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT:
No need to present the doctor
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
We will no longer present Dr. Dennis G. Bellen of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service at
Camp Crame, Quezon City. We have here the xerox copy of
the medico legal report no. M-2831-97.
"COURT:

Page 51

Will you show that to Atty. Abubakar.

"A:

"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:

"Q:
You were pointing to your stepfather, do you know
what things or particular things, if any, he did to you?

Yes, your Honor.

"A:

"COURT:

No sir. He is my stepfather.

Yes, sir.

Admitted.

"Q:
What were those particular things your stepfather
had done to you?

You dispense the testimony of the doctor.21

"A:

A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove

the commission of rape.22 It is well entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a medical examination of the victim is
not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as
the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to
convict the accused of the crime.23 Besides, testimonies of
rape victims who are of tender age are credible,24 and the
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
credit.25

"Q:
When your stepfather raped you, what actually did
your stepfather do to you?

"A:

He placed himself on top of me.

Accused-appellant likewise impugns the credibility of the

victim by pointing out that the rape was filed one year
after its commission, which allegedly leaves doubt as to the
real identity of the culprit.

"Q:

Was he naked when he placed himself on top of you?

"A:

Yes, sir.

Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any

doubt over the credibility of the complainant nor can it be
taken against her.26 The following realities justified the
delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant: (1)
the victim was merely six years old when she was sexually
abused; (2) the victim lived separately from her mother
and was left under her grandmothers care; and, (3) the
victims sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather.

"A:

He raped me.

He removed my panty.

"Q:
What did your stepfather do after removing your
panty?

"Q:
When he was on top of you, did he place his penis
inside your private parts?
"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:
What did you feel when his penis was inside your
private parts, if any?
"A:

I felt pain.

According to accused-appellant, he was simply framed-up

and that another person also raped the victim.27 He avers
that his allegation is supported by the testimony of the
victims mother Jenelyn that the victim was likewise
abused by the latters husband.

"Q:
Was your private part bleeding as a result of the
insertion of the penis of your stepfather into your private
parts?
"A:

Yes, sir.

The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped

by accused-appellant cannot be overturned by the bare
denial and defense of being framed-up interposed by
accused-appellant. The victim made a positive, clear and
categorical declaration pointing to accused-appellant as
the person who sexually ravaged her-

"Q:

Did he kiss you while he was on top of you?

"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

What parts of your body or face was kissed?

"A:

My cheek.

"Q:

Where did this happen?

"A:

Dasmarias, Cavite.

xxx

"Q:

In whose house or place?

Who is your father?

"A:

In the house of my grandmother.

"Q:

Who are the residents of that house at that time?

"Q:
Are you the same Jennifer Donayre the private
complainant against the accused Valentin Baring, Jr.?
"A:
"x x x
"Q:

Yes, sir.
xxx

"A:
I do not know the name of my father because my
father and mother are separated.
"Q:
If your father is in the courtroom can you point to
him?
"A:
Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man inside this
courtroom when asked given [sic] his name as Valentin
Baring.)
"Q:

Is he your true father?

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

"A:
At that time nobody was in the house because they
were working.
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"Q:
Can you recall if the rape you mentioned to us
happened while you were 7 years old, 6 years old? What
was your age then if you can recall?

Page 52

"A:

6 years old.

"Q: How many times did your stepfather do to you these

things you mentioned to us that is by placing (sic) on top of
you and inserting his penis into your private parts and
kissing you?

examination of child witnesses who may either be victims,

accused or witnesses to a crime.37 This rule ensures an
environment that allows children to give reliable and
complete evidence, minimize trauma, encourage children
to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the
ascertainment of truth.38

"A:

10 times.

"Q:

Do you know how to count?

In line with our foregoing thrust to protect children, we

observed the peculiar physical examination performed by
the doctor on the seven-year-old victim in this wise-

"A:

Yes, sir.

"GENITAL

"Q:
How many is this? (prosecutor is depicting two
fingers)
"A:

Two, sir.

"Q: How about this, how many? (Prosecutor is depicting

five fingers).
"A:

Five, sir.

"Q:

How about this?(Prosecutor is depicting 10 fingers)

"A:

Ten, sir.28

Accused-appellant even contends that the failure of the

prosecution to establish the dates when the other alleged
rapes were committed justifies the outright dismissal of
the case.29
Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes
occurred does not ipso facto make the information
defective on its face.30 When all the essential elements of
the crime of rape are stated in the information, an accused
is sufficiently apprised of the charged against him.
Moreover, the precise time of the commission of the crime
of rape is not an essential element of rape. 31 Neither is the
exact date of commission of rape an element of the crime32
for the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual
intercourse without consent.33
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court denied him
his right to subject the blood found on the victims panty
for DNA testing.
The records reveal that accused-appellants counsel
initially asked the court to subject the alleged blood found
in the victims panty to a DNA test for comparison with
accused-appellants blood.34 However, he voluntarily
withdrew his proposition.35 Obviously, accused-appellants
counsel is misleading the Court. It was even accusedappellants counsel who recalled the submission for DNA
testing. The alleged denial of accuseds right to avail of the
DNA tests is a futile attempt to confuse the issues. He lost
sight of the categorical testimony of the victim pinning him
down as the perpetrator. It would have been more prudent
for him to attack this damaging evidence directly. It must
be noted that in the prosecution of rape cases, the
presentation of the bloodstained panty is not even
essential.36 The victims credible testimony, standing alone,
is sufficient basis for the conviction of accused-appellant.
Cases subject of our review, especially those in the nature
of child sexual abuse, often involve victims of tender years.
On account of the increased number of children coming
into the realm of the judicial system, we adopted the "Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness" to govern the

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex

and slightly gaping with the pinkish brown labia minora
presenting in between. On separating, the same disclosed a
congested, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing
laceration at 9 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice
admits tip of the examiners smallest finger."39
(emphasis ours)
This Court is disturbed by the method of physical
examination done on the seven-year-old victim. We
noticed that in the examiners effort to show the existence
of abuse, the examining physician inserted his smallest
finger, as shown in the medico-legal report that the
external vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiner's finger.
It bears to stress that this particular manner of
establishing
evidence

by
determining
the
diameter/hymenal opening in rape cases was a common
practice in the past. With the passage of R.A. 7610, this
Court has nonetheless allowed the utilization of the same
kind of evidence in the prosecution of Child Abuse cases. In
light however of radical medical developments and
findings, specifically as to the determination of the
existence of child sexual abuse, this Court deems it
necessary to firmly adopt a more "child sensitive"
approach in dealing with this specie or genre of crime.
In the international scientific community, recent medical
studies have shown that measurement of hymenal opening
is unreliable in determining and/or proving child sexual
abuse
"The diameter of the hymenal opening previously has been
used as a diagnostic criterion for abuse. More recent
studies have shown this to be undependable (Paradise,
1989).Factors affecting hymenal and anal diameter include
the examination position (McCann, Voris, Simon, & Wells,
1990) and the degree of relaxation of the child. The anal
diameter is also affected by the presence of stool in the
ampulla. Hymenal diameter may increase with age and
with the onset of pubertal development."40
In fact, there is no evidence, nor published research
studies which show that enlarged hymenal opening
diameter is any more common in abused than in nonabused children."41 Thus "In the latest revision of the classification system,
enlarged hymenal opening is also removed as a criterion
that should be considered suspicious for abuse. With labial
traction, the hymenal opening may appear quite large,
especially to the less experienced clinician, and internal
structures such as vaginal ridges, rugae, and vaginal
columns may be visualized. This is purely a matter of how
much traction is applied, and the degree of patient
relaxation, and has no proven correlation with past sexual

Page 53

abuse. Likewise, it is not possible to obtain accurate

measurements of the dilated hymenal opening, unless
photographs are taken at the point of maximal dilation and
measurements are taken from the photographs using a
calibrated measuring device. Rings of different sizes that
are etched into eyepieces of certain types of colposcopes
can be used to estimate diameter size but not to obtain
exact measurements."42
Hence, insertion of a finger or any foreign matter inside
the hymenal opening under the pretext of determining
abuse is unnecessary and inappropriate. The Philippine
Judicial Academy [PHILJA] training program for family
court judges,43 through the auspices of the U.P.-P.G.H. Child
Protection Unit, sanctioned that in prepubertal girls 44
without active bleeding, all that is needed is an external
examination with a good light source and magnification. Be
that as it may, the physical findings alone will not be
conclusive of child sexual abuse, for a child who gives a
clear, consistent, detailed, spontaneous description of
being sexually molested may still have normal genital
examination. Despite the physical or laboratory findings,
however, a childs clear and convincing description of the
abuse has a high rate of probability.
We are not at all uninformed in this regard for we, in a
plethora of cases, have consistently upheld the full weight
of a young victims unwavering testimony.45 Also, there is
Section 22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,
which categorically states:
Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not be
required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible
by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact,
conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard proof
required in criminal and non-criminal cases.
What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate to
reiterate, is that forensic examination inclusive of
physical examination and forensic interview of sexually
assaulted children [adolescents included] must be
conducted with maximum sensitivity to the young victims
feelings of vulnerability and embarrassment. Great care
must be observed in order to make the examination less
stressful lest they be more traumatic to the victim than the
very assault itself. The value of collecting evidence should
always be weighed against the emotional cost of the
procedure and examination of the child.
We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed
by the trial court. The single information filed against
accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6334-98,
charged him with the crime of "Multiple Statutory Rape."46
Even then, accused-appellant cannot be held answerable
for the other incidents of rape committed. Each and every
charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each
of the other rapes charged should be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.47
Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the Revised Penal Code,
imposes death penalty when the victim is a child below
seven (7) years old. The allegation in the information
specifically stated that "xxx the victim xxx is only seven
years old" which clearly rules out the application of this
specific provision that can justify the imposition of the
capital punishment. Paragraph No. 1 of the same article
which warrants the imposition of the death penalty if the
crime of rape is committed where the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

ascendant,
step-parent,
guardian,
relative
by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim,48 will
not apply for while the victim is under eighteen (18) years
old, the accused-appellant is not the common-law husband
of the victims mother. The trial court therefore erred in
meting out the death penalty upon accused-appellant for
qualified rape. Thus, accused-appellant may only be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In line with our prevailing jurisprudence,49 we sustain the
trial courts award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. 6334-98,
finding accused-appellant Valentin Baring, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO
O.
GARCILLANO,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE
AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275

December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.

AGCAOILI,
petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C.
AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a
wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They
captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the
country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the
present administration on the line, and resulted in the
near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly
contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC

Page 54

Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her

favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of
both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005,
then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a
privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a
congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation
emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan
Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director
Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the
supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged
and impassioned debate by the committee members on the
admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes
were eventually played in the chambers of the House.2

(R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative

inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech,
articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or
communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
However, she recommended a legislative investigation into
the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the
Philippine National Police or other government entities in
the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. 9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and
Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals,
filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R.
No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its
scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that
the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate
proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci"
tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees

decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless,
they decided to prepare committee reports based on the
said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
persons.3

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q.

Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon,
Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S.
Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on
the petition on September 25, 2007.

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O.

Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that
the respondent House Committees be restrained from
using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained"
wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and
for any other purpose. He further implored that the said
recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken
off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House
Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.5

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 17

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion

and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo
Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege
speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his
discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public
"the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens,
wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap, and
sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious
wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons
speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon,
who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the
sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to
prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
performing electoral duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy
debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his
concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of

the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by
the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to
intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate
G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello
Garci" recordings, they have different objectivesthe first
is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the
House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee
reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the
conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and
grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall
first resolve the issue on the parties standing, argued at
length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal
standing or locus standi refers to a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1)
he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

Page 55

challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be

redressed by a favorable action.21

satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has

"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."22

Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of

Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranadas
and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the
continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned
legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure
of public funds.32 It should be noted that in Francisco,
rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they
invariably invoked the vindication of their own rightsas
taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or
in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal
professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the
therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33

However, considering that locus standi is a mere

procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has
relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. MacapagalArroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v.
Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast
media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of
Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission.
The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy
that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to
wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and resolving serious legal questions that
greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the
Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine
whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his
standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the
person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his
was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27
Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees actions and
charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his
standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify
their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens,
taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm
conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes
will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal
and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be
defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried
by the continuous violation of the laws and individual
rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional
processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries
purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due
process considering that he is summoned to attend the
Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his
rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but
also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public
funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an
interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor
Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275

shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to
the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the
liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the
more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal
standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge.
- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being
moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior
decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual
cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for
otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an
advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot
question in a case in which no practical relief can be
granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has
become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or,
in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the
Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive
writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from
playing the tape recordings and from including the same in
their committee report. He likewise prays that the said
tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings.
But the Court notes that the recordings were already
played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is
also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports
on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and
submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the
Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and

Page 56

academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to

restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.41
- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the
same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.

every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the
term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving
less than a majority of Senators to continue into the
next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935
Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute
a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in
Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987
Constitution is not a continuing body because less than
majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress.
The consequence is that the Rules of Proceduremust be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of
twelve Senators.47

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly

provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set
forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."44

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our

Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the
same case, viz.:

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their

pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had
been published in newspapers of general circulation only
in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate
of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of
its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session

shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same

question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be
in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires
the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because
every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years
for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition
of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure,
the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring
Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no
longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate
has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this

Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as
it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election
or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate
of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

XLIV

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate

upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first
time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters,
not in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding
Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not
be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of
which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then
pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an
institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate
(i.e. the Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of
office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision.

Page 57

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion

which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended
or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an
election and the possibility of the amendment or revision
of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly
elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that
its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of
their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such
language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules
simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended
or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the
two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the
Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily
adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which
come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make
the published rules clearly state that the same shall be
effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next
Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it
had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite
that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates
internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment
to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear
and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that
the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or
not these rules have undergone amendments or revision.
The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by
the respondents is illuminating:

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of

the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is
not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure
even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to
comply with the due process requirement because the
Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792
considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words,
the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence
(for their being the original) of electronic data messages
and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do
so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this
fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of
the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned,
the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not
be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees,
because no published rules governed it, in clear
contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it
unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the
consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is
DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its
committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of
legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186228

March 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION

Page 58

PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of
the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v.
Cabalquinto,1 the real name and the personal
circumstances of the victim, and any other information
tending to establish or compromise her identity, including
those of her immediate family or household members, are
not disclosed in this decision.
The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,2 the appellant
was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the
evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of
Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter
AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.3
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.4 During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution
and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the
correctness of the findings indicated in the medical
certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that
AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged
offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of
the appellant.5 On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the
prosecution, namely: victim AAA;6 her brother BBB;7 and
one Moises Boy Banting,8 a "bantay bayan" in the
barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at
home.9 AAAs father, the appellant, was having a drinking
spree at the neighbors place.10 Her mother decided to
leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit
of mauling AAAs mother.11 Her only brother BBB also
went out in the company of some neighbors.12
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke
AAA up;13 removed his pants, slid inside the blanket
covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;14
warned her not to shout for help while threatening her
with his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed
above her head.16 He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss
her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her
vagina."17
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. 18 Appellant
claimed he scolded her for staying out late.19 BBB decided
to take AAA with him.20 While on their way to their
maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted her
harrowing experience with their father.21 Upon reaching
their grandmothers house, they told their grandmother
and uncle of the incident,22 after which, they sought the
assistance of Moises Boy Banting.23
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing
only his underwear.24 He invited appellant to the police
station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost,
he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was
unable to control himself.26

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical

examination.27 Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health
Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate,
which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly
lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody
discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident28
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense.
He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated
because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front
of their children after engaging in a heated argument,29
and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. 30 He
went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the
alleged rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food
prepared for him at lunchtime.31 Shortly after, AAA
arrived.32 She answered back when confronted.33 This
infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.34
Appellant went back to work and went home again around
3 oclock in the afternoon.35 Finding nobody at home,36 he
prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of
the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting.38They
asked him to go with them to discuss some matters. 39 He
later learned that he was under detention because AAA
charged him of rape.40
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision41 in
Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape
qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 42 It also
ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with
exemplary damages of P25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS44 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.45 The appellate
court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and it
increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.46
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due
course to the appellants notice of appeal. 47 This Court
required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs,48 but both manifested that they will
no longer file supplemental pleadings.49
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is
that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,50 because: (1) there
were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession before
Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a
counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;52 and (3)
AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.53
Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his
alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and the
credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.

Page 59

Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession

before a "Bantay Bayan"

Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative

well-known in his community.62

Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to

Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a
lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.54

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based

volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as
in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the
local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly
on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned.

The case of People v. Malngan55 is the authority on the

scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article
III, Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the Constitution. In
Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman
and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court
distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay
Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article
III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When
accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the
morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect,
actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several
houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied
to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay
Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation
made by the latter admittedly conducted without first
informing accused-appellant of her rights under the
Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to
Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x
in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x
x.1avvphi1
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x
x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through
questioning by the police or their agents but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x
x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x
[of the private complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this
Court needs to ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan"
may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59 this Court had the
occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is,
"a group of male residents living in [the] area organized
for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x
PNP."60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section
1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November
1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each
barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing
arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the
Barangay level."61 The composition of the Committee
includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as
Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan;
(3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay
Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing
Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of

appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely
from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the
confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt."63
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of
AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB
accompanied her to the house of their grandmother.
Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to
look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified
that he brought her sister to the house of their "bantay
bayan" after he learned of the incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64 appellant argues
that "where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot
stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or
both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere
concoction."65
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar.
In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not simply stand
together because:
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not
have possibly seen the hacking incident since he had
accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to
accept the testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have
possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with
Vicente at that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of
BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a "bantay
bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when
the help was sought for, which this Court could well
attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut
version of AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed
account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that
the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the
veracity of the testimonies.66 In fact, inconsistencies which
refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances
even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they

Page 60

erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or

rehearsed.67
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only
because she bore grudges against him is likewise
unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by
motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.68 As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong
enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a
charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation
upon them and their families but also bring their fathers
into the gallows of death.69 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to
charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the
ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting
her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was
not in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman,
could attain such height of cruelty to one who has sired
her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for
which she naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness.71
Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to
concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for
the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the
family including herself to a lifetime of shame. 72 It is highly
improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual
perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake
charges much more against her own father. In fact her
testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing
words were directed against a close relative.73
Elements of Rape
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the AntiRape Law of 199774 to the case at bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among
others, "[b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman" "through force, threat or intimidation." 75 The
death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with
aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include,
"[w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent."76
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing
how she was raped, culminating with the penetration of
appellants penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that
appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman
states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. 77Further,
when such testimony corresponds with medical findings,
there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential
requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.78
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force
or intimidation is not essential when the accused is the
father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral
ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and
intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by
appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly placed above
AAAs head.80
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward
testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion

because it is easy to fabricate." 81 "Alibi and denial must be
supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to
merit credibility."82 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must establish two elements (1) he
was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was
committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene at the time of its commission. 83 Appellant
failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship with the offender in the instant case has
likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying
circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information,
stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference,
and testified to by both parties in their respective
testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding
upon this Court because they are judicial admissions
within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and
damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to
the effect that where, as here, the rape is committed with
any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim
is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto84 and
P75,000.00 as moral damages.85 However, the award of
exemplary damages should have been increased from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.86 Also, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed
considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon
appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. 87 We
further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on
appellants non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346 clearly provides that "persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetuaby reason
of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is
hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72244 May 8, 1992

Page 61

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE AGRIPA, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
A grisly sight awaited the authorities who had come to
investigate reports of a stabbing in the house of Jose and
Adelfa Agripa at barangay Humapon in Legazpi City. On the
floor awash with blood, Jose was locked in a final embrace
with his wife, who was already dead. Adelfa had sustained
fifteen wounds and had expired due to shock and massive
hemorrhage. Jose himself had four wounds in his body and
was hardly alive. Because he refused to release his hold on
his dead wife, the couple was rolled in a mat and rushed to
the hospital. All this occurred at about one o'clock in the
morning of April 30, 1980.
That same morning, Corporal Wilfredo Bermas, a member
of the investigating team took down the following
exchange between him and Jose, 1 whom he believed to be
on the verge of death:
Q What is your name please?
A Jose Agripa.
Q Who stabbed you?
A I myself.
Q Who stabbed your wife?
A I myself.
Q Why did you stab your wife?
A Because of problems in the family.
Q What do you think, will you die from your wounds?
A No.
Q Was it really your intention to kill your wife?
A Yes, I want to die with her.
The statement was not signed by Jose. On Bermas's
request, it was witnessed by the barangay captain,
Salustiano Botin, who was present during the recorded
conversation.
Jose survived to face prosecution for parricide two months
later. He was convicted on July 18, 1985. 2
The principal evidence presented against him at the trial
was the above-quoted statement, which was offered as a
dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. Also
submitted as an exhibit was the 8-inch bolo-knife used in
the killing, which was turned over by Botin to the police at
seven o' clock that same morning. He had received it from
a neighbor of the couple who had picked it up at the scene
of the killing. 3 The police had evidently neglected to look
for it when they went to investigate.
In his defense, Jose gave a different version of the killing of
his wife. He said that he had gone to sleep early that night
but was awakened when he felt a stab wound in his
stomach. He could not see his assailant because it was

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

dark. He covered the wound with his right hand but there
was a second thrust that wounded him again almost in the
same place. Instinctively, he curled himself into a fetal
position with his hands at the back of his neck and asked,
"Why did you stab me?" He received no answer but soon
enough a third thrust sliced through his left arm and
pierced the right part of his chest. It was then that he
grabbed the fist of his attacker and the two of them
wrestled in the dark for possession of the weapon. He
could not recall what happened afterwards as he must
have fainted. He said he also had no recollection of the
statement he supposedly made before he was brought to
the hospital. He recovered consciousness there only on
May 4, 1980, and was then told that his wife had tried to
kill him. 4
His statements were corroborated by his 18-year old son,
Edwin, who testified that there was no quarrel between his
parents when his father went to sleep early that night of
April 29, 1980. His mother was in her usual angry mood,
however. After studying his lessons, he himself went to
sleep while his mother continued folding clothes. He was
awakened later by the sound of a scuffle, and when he
turned on his flashlight he saw his mother stabbing his
father. He amplified his testimony with gestures, swinging
his right arm downward in simulation of stabbing. Afraid
to succor his father, he woke up his two brothers and
rushed with them to their grandfather's house to seek his
help. On their way out, they heard his father say, "Why did
you stab me?" 5
Edwin identified the bolo-knife as belonging to his mother,
who he said usually carried it on her person for cutting
leaves to cover herself whenever it rained. On two
occasions, however, she used it for a different purpose.
The first incident was when Adelfa stabbed Jose on the
right side of his body, and the second was when she
hacked Jose's upper right arm. Both incidents were
reported to the barangay captain. 6
Edwin admitted loving his father more than his mother. He
recalled that when he was in Grade I, his mother hanged
him by the neck from a coconut tree with a piece of katsa
cloth. 7
The violent nature of Adelfa was affirmed by another
witness, Manuel Cardel, who testified that he was in the
store of one Macedonio in the afternoon of April 29, 1980,
when he heard Adelfa say she would stab Jose if he came
home without any money. (As it turned out, Jose did come
home without his salary, saying he would collect it the
following day. This could have been the reason why Edwin
observed his mother to be in a sullen mood that night.)
Cardel also recalled one time when Adelfa ran after her
husband with a bolo in her hand. 8
The trial court correctly rejected the above-quoted
interrogation as a dying declaration because it did not
comply with all the requirements of this particular
exception to the hearsay rule. The statement does not
show that it was made by the declarant under the
consciousness of impending death (although it is true that
Jose was near death at that time). Nevertheless, it was
correctly admitted as part of the res gestae, having been
made soon after the startling occurrence of the multiple
stabbing of Jose and Adelfa.
But the mere fact that evidence is admissible does not
necessarily mean that it is also credible. The testimony of a

Page 62

competent witness may be admissible if relevant but it is

not for this reason alone believable. According to Rule 128,
Sec. 3, "evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules." Credibility
depends on the evaluation given to the evidence by the
court in accordance with the guidelinesprovided in Rule
133 of the Rules of Court and the doctrines laid down by
this Court. 9
As the Court sees it, Jose's statement, while admissible as
part of the res gestae, is not credible evidence of his
criminal liability. It is quite obvious that he was not in full
possession of his faculties when he made that statement,
which, significantly, he did not sign. We note that when the
authorities came upon the wounded couple, Jose refused to
let go of his dead wife and was rolled up with her cadaver
in a mat to be brought to the hospital. That was not the
conduct of a rational man. Moreover, Jose was himself
suffering from four stab wounds which could have cost
him his life had he not been treated immediately. Given the
condition of his mind and body at the time the statement
was made, Jose could not be expected to think clearly and
to willingly make the serious and damning confession now
imputed to him.
It is true that when the accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional
presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of
proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the
justification for his act. 10 The essential elements of selfdefense, according to Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, are: a) unlawful aggression: b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. We feel that all these requisites are present and
have been sufficiently established in the case at bar.
The accused-appellant was sound asleep when he was
suddenly attacked by his wife, who fell upon him with
intent to kill. There was no warning at all of the deadly
assault. There was no provocation either, unless it be her
frenetic anger over his failure to bring home his salary,
which was not the sufficient provocation required by the
law. Jose was totally unprepared for the knife thrusts in his
stomach and chest that posed an immediate threat and
danger to his life. Under this vicious attack, he had no
choice but to defend himself against his unknown assailant
and by the only means available to him. He grabbed the
knife from his maddened wife and struck wildly at his
would-be killer. He stabbed blindly, thinking only to save
his life even as it drained from the wounds he had
sustained. If it appeared later that he had wounded his
wife no less than fifteen times, it was not because he was a
cruel and bloodthirsty killer. The only reason was that he
was fighting desperately for his very life and, animated
only by his mortal fear of his unknown aggressor and
moved like a wild beast by the elemental instinct for
survival, did not know when to stop.
Jose Agripa was a peaceful law-abiding person with no
known police record. He pursued the humble tenor of his
life, working quietly as a lowly laborer, struggling as best
he could to provide for his wife and children. If suddenly
he became a killer, it was not by inclination or design or
with malice aforethought. He was merely a hapless pawn
of fortune, an unfortunate victim of tragic circumstances,
more so, indeed, than the wife he killed.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

The Court sees in this case a man dominated if not terrified

by a wife given to cruelty and violence. It is not unlikely
that she was paranoid. Twice before, she had hacked her
husband with her bolo, and there was also that time he ran
for dear life as she chased him with her trusty weapon. The
act of hanging a small child by the neck from a coconut tree
can hardly be called the manifestation of a normal psyche.
It was this woman who, heeding the urgings of her twisted
mind, decided to kill her sleeping husband in the dark even
as her children slumbered peacefully nearby.
A Higher Tribunal shall judge Adelfa Agripa. But this Court
need not wait a minute longer to absolve the accusedappellant. Jose Agripa is innocent. There is no stronger
instinct than the instinct for survival, which moved him
without fault to do what he did.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and
accused-appellant Jose Agripa is ACQUITTED on the
ground of self-defense. It is the order of this Court that he
be released immediately. No costs.
G.R. No. 181037

January 19, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SAIDAMEN MACATINGAG y NAMRI alias SAI, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01487, which affirmed in toto the June 16,
2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo,
Laguna, Branch 32 in Criminal Case No. 14730-SP(04),
finding appellant Saidamen Macatingag y Namri guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
In its Brief for the Appellee,3 the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the
facts as follows:
On January 17, 2004, about 8:00 oclock in the morning,
the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in
Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Calamba City formed a
buy-bust team because of a report from a confidential
informant about the drug pushing activities of a certain
"Sai," who later turned out to be appellant. The team was
composed of P/Sr. Insp. Julius Cesar V. Ablan, as leader,
and PO3 Marino A. Garcia as the poseur-buyer and PO3
Danilo Leona as the arresting officer, as well as two police
officers. After discussing the buy-bust procedure including
the pre-arranged signal which is the removal of PO3
Garcias cap, and the preparation of two P500.00 bills
initialed with "MAG," the police authorities immediately
proceeded to the target area at the vicinity of Phase I, Villa
Antonio, San Pablo City.
Upon arriving thereat about 11:30 oclock in the morning
of that day, PO3 Garcia and the confidential informant
waited for appellant at the entrance gate of Villa Antonio
Subdivision in San Pablo City. Some twenty (20) minutes
later, appellant arrived sporting black pants and dark gray
t-shirt. PO3 Garcia was introduced to appellant as the
prospective buyer. Appellant, on the other hand, asked
PO3 Garcia about the money amounting to P52,500.00.

Page 63

PO3 Garcia then pulled out an envelope containing the two

P500.00 bills with the boodle money from his pocket, and
demanded the drugs. Appellant thereafter pulled out from
his pocket one plastic sachet and handed it to PO3 Garcia.
Immediately upon giving appellant the marked money,
PO3 Garcia lost no time in giving the pre-arranged signal to
PO3 Leona. PO3 Leona thereupon hurriedly seized from
appellant the marked money, while PO3 Garcia recovered
the plastic sachet containing suspected shabu from
appellant. The policemen thereafter brought appellant to
their station in Canlubang, Calamba City. PO3 Garcia
marked the seized plastic sachet with markings "A" and
"MAG" representing his initials, and the date and time of
arrest. After making an inventory on the seized suspected
shabu, the police authorities requested for the laboratory
examination thereof with the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The seized suspected sachet of shabu was shown positive
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 25.23
grams per Chemistry Report No. D-54-04 issued by P/Insp.
Lorna R. Tria, Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime
Laboratory.4
On January 19, 2004, appellant was charged with Violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, 5 in an Information6
that reads:
That on or about January 17, 2004, in the City of San Pablo,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell 25.23
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, without being authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.8 He
maintained that he was at home with his wife on January
17, 2004 when four armed men suddenly entered their
house, seized his money, placed handcuffs on his wrists,
and forcibly brought him to the police headquarters in Bgy.
Canlubang. He averred that he was not allowed to talk with
anybody when he was incarcerated for two days and that
he was alone during the preliminary investigation.
Thereafter, he was transferred to the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) in San Pablo City, where
he was formally charged with selling shabu.
On June 16, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, accused SAIDAMEN MACATINGAG Y
NAMRI alias "SAI" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act 9165 also known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002", and there being no
mitigating circumstance, accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer a penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), and to pay
the costs.
The effects of the crime are ordered confiscated in favor of
the government. The custodian of the shabu subject of the
case is hereby ordered to submit the same to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition within 48
hours from receipt of a copy of this judgment and the latter
is given 48 hours from receipt of the same to submit an

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

acknowledgment receipt to this Court to form part of the

records of this case.
SO ORDERED.9
The trial court found that all the elements of the crime
charged were present and proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the evidence of the prosecution and the
testimonies of the poseur-buyer and the arresting officer
who are presumed to have performed their duties
regularly. It disregarded the allegations of the defense that
appellant was a victim of a frame-up and that he was not
arrested pursuant to a valid buy-bust operation.
On July 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the ruling of the
trial court. The appellate court held that the constitutional
right of appellant against warrantless arrest and search
was not violated; that appellant failed to assail the legality
of the arrest and the seizure of the sachet of shabu prior to
his arraignment or at any stage in the proceedings of the
trial court; that the arrest was pursuant to a buy-bust
operation which is a valid form of entrapment of felons in
the execution of their criminal plan; and that the search
conducted on appellant was incidental to a lawful arrest.10
The appellate court also gave more weight and credence to
the testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team
because they were not shown to have been impelled by illmotives in testifying against appellant.
Hence, this petition.11
Appellant avers that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in giving undue credence to the
testimonies of the police officers and in upholding the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official functions. He also assails the validity of his arrest
because the police officers were not armed with any
warrant when he was arrested. Finally, he assails the
propriety of the chain of custody of the shabu allegedly
seized from him due to the non-observation of Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.12
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale
of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.13
These elements have been proven to be present in the
instant case. PO3 Garcia who acted as the poseur-buyer,
categorically testified about the buy-bust operation from
the time he was introduced by the informant to appellant
as the buyer of the shabu; to the time when appellant
agreed to the sale; to the actual exchange of the marked
money and the heat-sealed sachet containing a white
crystalline substance; and until the apprehension of
appellant, to wit:
A I myself together with confidential informant just
walked, as well as the area and waited the poseur at the
agreed place situated at the vicinity of entrance of Villa
Antonio, San Pablo City.
Q You were waiting for the suspects at the entrance of Villa
San Antonio and then what else transpired next?

Page 64

A After more or less 20 minutes of waiting maam we saw a

man wearing a black pants and dark gray t-shirts arrived
in our position, it was introduced our confidential
informant, he was introduced our confidential that as the
poseur, likewise I was also introduced as the seller, [sic] I
was also introduced by the confidential informant as the
buyer.

Q What happened after the exchanged of the money and

plastic sachet?

Q Who are the supposed to be the buyer, you were

introduced as a buyer?

Q After you removed your cap, what happened?

A Yes, maam.
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q And this suspect who was the seller, is he present in
Court today?
A Yes, maam.
Q Would you kindly point to him?
A The 6th man from the Steel Cabinet.
INTERPRETER
Makikitayo, anong pangalan mo?
ACCUSED

A After I gave him the buy bust money as agreed upon

before we discovered as the bodol money, I immediately
executed the pre-arranged signal which is remove my cap,
maam.

A I saw PO3 Leona arrived and assisted me, after the

arresting.
Q While you were arresting this Saidamen, this accused,
what did you do as a matter of procedure, what did you tell
him?
A We informed him the constitutional rights, maam. PO2
Leona was able to recovered this custody control of bodol
money.
xxxx
Q So, after that, where did you bring Saidamen?
A We immediately brought him at our office at Camp
Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna together with confiscated
pieces of evidence for proper disposition.

xxxx

Q You said that you were able to buy 1 plastic sachet of

shabu that was supposed to be worth of P52,500, would
you be able to identify the plastic sachet if you will be
shown to you?

FISCAL LAGMAN

A Yes, maam.

Q So, after the introductions were made what happened?

Q What markings did you place if any?

A The seller identified the money, maam, which is

amounting to P52,500.00.

A I put my exhibit A, my initials, the date and time of arrest

included the month and year, maam.

FISCAL LAGMAN

Q I am showing to you exhibit F, would you kindly tell us if

this is the one that you brought from Saidamen
Macatingag?

Saidamen Macatingag po.

Q What did you do?

A I immediately pull out from my pocket the envelope
which is contained the 2 pieces of P500 bills and the bodol
money as agreed amount of P52,500. Likewise as also the
seller if it has a dangerous drugs, maam.

A Yes, maam.14

Q And then what happened?

Q After you placed yourself 10 meters a way from the

house, from the site and likewise Marino Garcia and the
informant and the fence near the site, what happened
thereafter?

A I immediately pulled out 1 plastic sachet from his pocket

and handed it over to me maam.

PO3 Leona, the back-up arresting officer during the buybust operation corroborated PO3 Garcias testimony, thus:

A Yes, maam.

A I saw a person came out from that way near the hollow
blocks fence wearing black pants and green t-shirt and I
saw they were talking with our confidential informant.

Q After you handed that money?

FISCAL COMILANG

A No, maam we handed first to me the sachet and he

demanded the payment of sachet, maam.

Q Could you see the person who just arrived and talked
with your confidential informant on said occasion, is he in
Court?

Q One (1) plastic sachet was handed to you?

xxxx
FISCAL LAGMAN

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please point to him if he is present?

Page 65

INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person who gave us his name as
Saidamen Macatingag.
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Now, Mr. Witness after the confidential informant and
the accused had a conversation what did if any transpired
after this conversation?
A After 30 minutes I saw the pre-arranged signal that this
PO3 Marino Garcia will remove his cap.
Q You mean to say or to impress this court that Mr.
Witness that the informant and Mr. Garcia were together
when they had a transaction with the accused?
A Yes, sir because the confidential informant introduced
Mr. Marino Garcia to the accused.
xxxx
FISCAL COMILANG
Q After you saw PO3 Marino Garcia removed his cap, what
did you do after that?
A I went to the area to help PO3 Garcia.
Q What if any did you find out after helping PO3 Marino
Garcia?
A I arrested Saidamen and I removed from him the 2
pieces of P500 the bodol money.
xxxx
Q Now after recovering that 2 P500 bills from the accused
what will be, were you able to recover?

identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses.19

Moreover, appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence to overturn the presumption that the arresting
officers regularly performed their duties. It was not shown,
by any satisfactory degree of proof, that said policemen
were impelled by ill-motives to testify against him. There
is, therefore, no basis to suspect the veracity of their
testimonies.
With regard to the validity of his arrest, evidence shows
that appellant was the subject of a buy-bust operation. In
this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a
common and accepted mode of apprehending those
involved in illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It
has been proven to be an effective way of unveiling the
identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of
obscurity.20 It catches the violator in flagrante delicto and
the police officers conducting the operation are not only
authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and
to search him for anything that may have been part of or
used in the commission of the crime.21
Finally, this Court likewise finds no merit in appellants
contention that the police officers failed to comply with the
guidelines on the chain of custody and disposition of the
seized sachet of shabu as provided in Section 21, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165. Testimonies of prosecution witnesses
convincingly state that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized item was properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. P03 Garcia testified that he marked
the sachet of shabu with his initials, and the date and time
of appellants arrest.22 PO3 Leona confirmed that he had
seen PO3 Garcia mark the same sachet of shabu sold by
appellant; that a letter of request for the examination of
said sachet was made; and such request was received by
the regional crime laboratory office. Thus:
Q Were you able to see that the shabu was actually was
you said that recovered PO3 Marino Garcia from the
accused?

A I recovered from the accused the money and it was SPO3

Marino Garcia who recovered the 25 grams of shabu
conducted.15

A Yes, sir.

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the

credibility of the police officers who conducted the buybust operation.16 It is a fundamental rule that findings of
the trial courts which are factual in nature and which
involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative,
arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial
court is in a better position to decide the credibility of
witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
The rule finds an even more stringent application where
said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.17

Q Did you put your initial in the specimen?

The testimonies of police officers Garcia and Leona, and

the sachet of shabu sold by appellant sufficiently proved
the crime charged. Moreover, the prosecution was able to
establish that the substance recovered from appellant was
indeed shabu.18
In view of these testimonies and evidence of the
prosecution, appellants denial must fail. The Court has
consistently stressed that denial, like alibi, is a weak
defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

COURT

A I was only accompanied Marino Garcia in bringing to the

crime lab.
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Since you have seen Mr. Witness the actual shabu was
taken from the accused, do you know if Mr. Garcia placed
any reference on the said article, if any?
A Yes, sir, the initial of Marino Garcia.
Q What is that initial?
A MAG.
Q Mr. Witness, why do you know that police officer Marino
Garcia actually placed his initial on the said specimen or
item?
A Everytime that we conducted the buy bust, it is our SOP
to place the marking.

Page 66

Q Mr. Witness I will show you that item confiscated Marino

Garcia from the accused on the alleged of the item, could
you identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show to you now the plastic sachet big plastic
sachet which contained white crystalline substance, could
you please tell us what is the relationship of this item from
that item allegedly taken by Marino Garcia from the
accused on which marking was placed?
A This is the item which is recovered from the accused. Mr.
Garcia placed his initial.
Q What is MAG?
A MAG referred to Marino A. Garcia.
xxxx
Q After the specimen and the accused were transferred to
the investigator of Regional director what happened to the
accused and the specimen?
A The investigator prepared a paper for the filing of
theand prepared a letter request for the examination.
Q Would you specify what are those documents prepared
by the investigator as pre-requisite of filing of this case?
A We prepared the letter request for the crime lab request
for the accused we first report to the effectdid not suffer
physical injury.
xxxx
Q Do you know if this document was actually received by
the addressee?
A Yes, sir, because I was with them.
Q What proof that this document was actually received by
the addressee?
A There was a stamp marked of receipt, sir.23
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the seized sachet of
shabu was immediately marked for proper identification
and, thereafter, forwarded to the Crime Laboratory for
examination. The Chemistry Report of the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office stated that the specimen submitted by
the apprehending officers indeed bore the marking "Exh A
MAG 171200-01-14" and that the same gave positive
result to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride. Forensic Chemical Officer Tria confirmed
on the witness stand that she examined the specimen
submitted by the PDEA and that she was the one who
prepared the Chemistry Report No. D-54-04.24
It is thus evident that the identity of the corpus delicti has
been properly preserved and established by the
prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is
presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with. The appellant in this case has the burden to show
that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to
overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of
exhibits by public officers and a presumption that public

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

officers properly discharge their duties.25 Appellant failed

to discharge such burden.
This Court has held that non-compliance with Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 26
In People of the Philippines v. Del Monte,27 it was held that:
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence
is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids
its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence
must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight
that will accorded it by the courts. One example is that
provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
wherein a party producing a document as genuine which
has been altered and appears to be altered after its
execution, in a part material to the question in dispute,
must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall
make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is
clearly provided for in the rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in
any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the
confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance
with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue
therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is
not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or
probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to
be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.28
All told, We see no reason to disturb the findings of the
trial court that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal sale of a dangerous drug, as defined and
penalized in Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Under
said provision, the illegal sale of any dangerous drug,
regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life
imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00.
For illegally selling 25.23 grams of shabu, and there being
no modifying circumstance alleged in the Information, the
trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance
with Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code29 and a fine
of P500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01487 dated
July 31, 2007, sustaining the conviction of appellant
Saidamen Macatingag y Namri for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and imposing upon him
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA,

Page 67

Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.

error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary

matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction.

PADILLA, J.:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of

merit, is hereby DISMISSED. 1

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court which seeks to reverse the decision * of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled
"Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora,
Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
and Rafael S. Ortanez".
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint
for annulment of marriage with damages against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City
presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present

petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no
basis in law nor previous decision of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent
judge, the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court as the question of admissibility in evidence of tape
recordings has not, thus far, been addressed and decided
squarely by the Supreme Court.

Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally

formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M".

11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge,

the Court of Appeals has likewise rendered a decision in a
way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were

three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations
between petitioner and unidentified persons.

11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in

nature, the same can still be [the] subject of a petition for
certiorari. 2

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private

respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on the
same day, the trial court admitted all of private
respondent's offered evidence.

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the

remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of
Appeals.

A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied

on 23 June 1992.

The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not

available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial
court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said
appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the

Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the
aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
which is the subject of the present petition, which in part
reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for
two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and
any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for
certain purposes, depending on how they are presented
and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the
interest of truth and fairness and the even handed
administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to
rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced
during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous,
the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the
judgment on the merits and not through the special civil
action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it
exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly
correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.Otherwise, we
will have the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a
counterproductive "ping-pong" to and from the appellate
court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is

patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order
admitting all of the evidence offered by private
respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the military to
wire tap his home telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy
of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The
relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or taperecorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Page 68

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the

existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed
to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in
admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under
Rep. Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the abovementioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes a
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months
and up to six (6) years for violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the
parties, involving the applicability of American
jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the
subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in evidence under
Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE. The subject cassette
tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121087

August 26, 1999

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of
the Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner
Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months, and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
but increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of
the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
The information against petitioner alleged
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the
nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena
Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike
Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where
authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of
their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with
the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell,
by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a
consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral
concussion and shock which directly caused his death.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of

February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike"
Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in
Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing
the nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at
a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared
on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed
her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a
picture.2
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a
security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
demanded to know why he took a picture.3 Jalbuena
replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my
job."4Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he
warned the latter that he would kill him. 5 When Jalbuena
saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of
the joint followed by his companions.6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to
report the matter. Three of the policeman on duty,
including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front
of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his
companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to
the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a
while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle. 7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who
talked with them in a corner for around fifteen
minutes.8Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to
Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang
ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo
Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?"9 Petitioner Navarro then
pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the
face of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?" 10
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner
Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan pumarito kami para
magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate."11 Petitoner Navarro
replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo."12He
then turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to make of
record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.13
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan"14
Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko."15The
two then had a heated exchange.16 Finally, Lingan said:
"Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at
magsuntukan na lang tayo."17 Petitioner Navarro replied:
"Ah, ganoon?"18
As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him
with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow.
Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He
tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow
on the forehead which floored him.19
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo
yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon."20
He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa
harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon."21 He then poked his gun at the right temple of
Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. 22
Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was
trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.23
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner
Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI,

Page 69

Boy, Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been

taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died
from his injuries.24
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to
record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased.25 The following is an excerpt from the tape
recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the
problem. I'm out of the problem.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .

Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley,
dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here
to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the
number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na
tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan: I'm brave also.
Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka
namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng
ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka
dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda.
Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang
minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi
lang ikaw!
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo!
Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare
hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko.
Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa
harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh.
Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni
Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako,
kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa
hospital yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased
who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to
duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the

concrete.26
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the
trial court stated:
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court
finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more
credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral
certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is
criminally responsible.
The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial
could not under the circumstance overturn the strength of
the prosecution's evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more
particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make
false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or
cause accusation of one who had neither brought him
harm or injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report
issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed
account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan
sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of
Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the
head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the
latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid
disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting
versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and
we find the trial court's factual conclusions to have better
and stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a
victim of appellant's aggression does not impair the
probative worth of his positive and logical account of the
incident in question. In fact, far from proving his
innocence, appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena,
which the defense has virtually admitted, clearly betrays
his violent character or disposition and his capacity to
harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that led him
into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also
attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and
humiliated him and further challenged to a fist
fight.1wphi1.nt
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan

was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is
in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of
Lingan's injuries as shown in thepost-mortem report (Exh.
D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when
he was outbalanced in the course of boxing the appellant.
And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left
forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right
eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of
the head (Exh. E.). Certainly, these injuries could not have
been resulted from Lingan's accidental fall.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:

Page 70

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE

CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS
CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION,
SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS
JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;
ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON
RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN
THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the
testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased
witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a
witness who has an interest in the conviction of the
accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. 27 Trial
courts, which have the opportunity observe the facial
expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while
testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her
testimony should be given credence.28 In the instant case,
petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred
in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording had made. It may be asked whether the tape is
admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law
provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or
dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or taperecorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant
or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for
any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the

existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications.29 Since the exchange

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its

tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations;
(2) that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of
the persons such are claimed to belong. 30 In the instant
case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the one
he recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape were
petitioner Navarro and Lingan.33 A sufficient foundation
was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented
by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established:
(1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of
an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form
of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and
Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the
autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued the medical
certificate,34 dated February 5, 1990, containing the
following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral
eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between
the left & right eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth,
forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamato testified:
Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of
this findings number one, which is oozing of blood from
the forehead?
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to
a hard object, sir.
Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this
wound No. 1.?
A It is possible, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by
bumping on a concrete floor?

Page 71

A Possible, sir.
FISCAL:
What could have been the cause of the contusion and
swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a
butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q How about this findings No. 4?

Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term

shock?
A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have
said earlier sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

FISCAL:
Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a
concrete floor have caused shock?
WITNESS:
Possible, sir.

A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.

How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause

shock?

Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?

A Possible, sir.35

A Same cause, sir.

The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena

that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his
pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the
forehead with his fist.

Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?

A Same thing sir.
Q How about the last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers
and toes, what could have caused it doctor?
WITNESS:
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
FISCAL:
In this same post mortem report and under the heading
cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral
concussion and Shock, will you explain it?
A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang
utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.
Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death
of the deceased?
A May be, sir.
FISCAL:
Which of these two more likely, to cause death?
WITNESS:
Shock, sir.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of

sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceding the act should have been
appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is
defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the
offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or irritating
anyone.36 The provocation must be sufficient and should
immediately precede the act.37 To be sufficient, it must be
adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which
must accordingly be proportionate in gravity.38 And it
must immediately precede the act so much so that there is
no interval between the provocation by the offended party
and the commission of the crime by the accused.39
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which
immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted
sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso,40 we
appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the
accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter
had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence,
this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor
of petitioner Navarro.
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed should also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro
after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him
shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this
mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in
determining the penalty that should be imposed on
petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating
circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.41 In People v. Castro,42 the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor
of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a
crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged

Page 72

in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated

against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was
committed right in the police station where policemen
were discharging their public functions.43
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and
one aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed
in its minimum period.44 Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within
the range of the penalty next lower degree, i.e., prision
mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in
its minimum period.45

others, PO3 Amilassan Salisa as team leader, and PO1

Mariano as poseur-buyer. PO1 Mariano, who was given
two one hundred peso bills bearing Serial Numbers
BT219634 and XN547078 to be used as buy-bust money,
wrote his initials "ARM" thereon at the lower left portion.
The operation was recorded in the police blotter and
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) which gave it control number NOC-1305-03-10.3

The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from

P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with the
current jurisprudence.46

At around 8:00 in the evening, the team, together with the

confidential informant, proceeded to the residence of
appellant who was standing in front of her house. The
informant at once introduced PO1 Mariano as buyer. As
appellant inquired how much, PO1 Mariano handed her
the two marked bills upon which appellant drew out one
substance-filled sachet from the "outside wall" of her
house. At that instant, PO1 Mariano removed his cap, the
pre-arranged signal for the team members to, as they did,
close in.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe
Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of
18 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

PO1 Mariano then held appellants arm, identified himself

as a police officer, and apprised her of her constitutional
rights as he retrieved from her the buy-bust money. He
thereafter marked "EXH-A arm/05/13/03" on the
substance-filled sachet "sold" to him by appellant.

SO ORDERED.

The buy-bust team brought appellant to the Rizal Medical

Center for physical check-up and later to the police
detachment office where P/Sr. Insp. Chief Villaruel
prepared the following memorandum of May 13,
20034addressed to the Chief of the Eastern Police District
Crime Laboratory Office, requesting the conduct of
laboratory examination on the seized substance-filled
sachet to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and
their weight:

G.R. No. 186459

September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Nita Eugenio y Pejer (appellant) was charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City1 for violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No.
9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
allegedly committed as follows:2
On or about May 13, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being
lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
PO1 Aldrin Mariano, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3)
centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance,
which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said
law.

1. Respectfully forwarded to your good office

herewith/attached (sic) submitted specimen for
laboratory examination to wit:
NATURE OF OFFENSE

VIOLATION OF RA

NAME OF SUSPECT

NITA
EUGEN
57
years
Res.
At
Vi
Malinao, Pasig Cit

D.T.P.O.

On or about 8:30 P

2003 at Vicper Co

Contrary to law. (underscoring supplied)

Malinao, Pasig Cit

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following

version is culled:
On the night of May 13, 2003, at around 7:30 p.m., a
confidential informant reported to PO1 Aldrin Mariano
(PO1 Mariano), officer-on-duty at the Pasig City Hall
Detachment, that one alias "Aruba" was selling shabu at
Vicper Compound, Malinao, Pasig City.
P/Sr. Insp. Chief Rodrigo Villaruel at once formed a buybust team to conduct an operation composed of, among

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

ARRESTING OFFICER

Elements
of
Action
Team
Detachment,
Police Station
PO1 Aldrin Marian

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED

One
(1)
transparent
containing

Page 73

2. Request acknowledge (sic) receipt.5

underscoring supplied)

amount of suspected
of all dangerous
"shabu"
drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs,
Marked
EXHcontrolled
A precursors
ARM and essential chemicals, as well as
05/13/03
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
so confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(emphasis and

Acting on the above-quoted memorandum, P/Sr. Insp.

Annalee R. Forro, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern
Police District Crime Laboratory Office, who received the
sachet, conducted on the same night of May 13, 2003, at
around 8:33 P.M, a laboratory examination of the contents
of the sachet, the result of which she recorded in
Chemistry Report No. D-889-03E6 wherein she concluded
that the substance inside the sachet weighed 0.03 gram
and was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Hence, the filing of the Information against appellant.
Denying the charge against her, appellant gave the
following version:
On May 11, 2003, while fetching water from a nearby well,
she was, in the presence of family and neighbors, accosted
by police officers who brought her to the police station. At
the station, she was questioned whether she knew one
"Baylene Ramba," to which she replied in the negative. She
was later surprised to learn that an Information for
violation of R.A. 9165 had been filed against her.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of
May 31, 2005, convicted appellant, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused NITA EUGENIO y
Pejer @ Aruba GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 and imposes upon her the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Php500,000.00
SO ORDERED.7 (underscoring supplied)
By Decision of September 16, 2008,8 the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision.
In affirming the trial courts rejection of appellants
defense, the appellate court held:
. . . As correctly observed by the trial court, the claim that
accused-appellant was arrested without reason is not
supported by evidence. Not one of the alleged witnesses to
the unlawful arrest, including accused-appellants own
daughter, was presented to corroborate the claim. Hence,
the court a quo is correct in considering the defense
incredible for being self-serving and uncorroborated.9
(underscoring supplied)
In her present appeal, appellant claims, in the main, that
there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, hence, it compromised the integrity and
evidentiary value of the allegedly seized item.
Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant specifically claims that no physical inventory
and photographing of the specimen took place. Respecting
the required conduct of an inventory, since only one sachet
was seized, failure to comply therewith may
understandably have been rendered unnecessary.
As for the required photograph of the seized item, a
reading of the testimony of PO1 Mariano confirms the
prosecutions failure to follow such requirement:
Atty. Ronatay:
Q: Are you aware that it is required under the dangerous
drugs law that in case of the buy-bust operation, the
subject specimen their (sic) must be a picture taken on the
subject specimen?
A: What I said is that impossible, we have a buy-bust to
verify.
Atty. Ronatay:
Your Honor, I think the answer is not responsive to the
question. We moved (sic) to strike that out and the witness
to answer the question.
Court: Answer the question.
Witness:
A: Not yet maam.
Atty. Ronatay:
Q: How many times have you been engaged in buy-bust
operation?
A: More or less ten maam.
Q: And in those ten cases, was there ever an occasion that
the subject specimen, there was a picture taken on that
subject specimen?
A: None, maam.
Q: Are you also aware Mr. witness that under the
dangerous drugs law, it is standard operating procedure
that in cases of operation specifically in a buy-bust
operation, there has also be (sic) a presence of the media?
A: I do not know, maam.

Page 74

Q: In this case was there a media present at the time of the

operation?
A: None maam.
Q: Are you also aware that under the dangerous drugs law,
it is required that there has to be coordination with the
Local Brgy.?
A: None maam.10 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Failing to comply with the provision of Section 2 of R.A. No.
9165 does not necessarily doom the case for the
prosecution, however. People v. Pringas enlightens:
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with
Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its noncompliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.11 (citation omitted, emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
The Courts pronouncement in Pringas is based on the
provision of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations12 of R.A. No. 9165 reading:
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items; (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Clearly, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu was
preserved.
As reflected in the above-quoted Memorandum of P/Sr.
Insp. Chief Villaruel, the time of operation was "on or
about 8:30 P.M., 13 May 2003." If the allegedly seized
substance-filled sachet was confiscated at 8:30 p.m., it is
highly improbable that it was received at the Crime
Laboratory at 8:33 P.M or a mere three minutes after the
seizure, given that appellant was after his arrest first
brought to a hospital for physical check-up.
Doubt is thus engendered on whether the object evidence
subjected to laboratory examination and presented in
court is the same as that allegedly "sold" by appellant. In
fine, the prosecution failed to prove the integrity and
evidentiary value of the 0.03 gram specimen.
Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the
present case questioned early on, during the cross
examination of PO1 Mariano, the failure of the
apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and
photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165. And the defense raised it again during the offer of
evidence by the prosecution, thus:

xxxx
Exh. C - we object to its admission as well as the purpose
for which they are being offered for being planted
evidence, your honor. 13 (underscoring supplied)
The prosecution having failed to discharge the burden of
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the burden of the evidence did not shift to the
defense to thus leave it unnecessary to pass upon the
defense evidence even if it were considered weak.
Appellants acquittal based on reasonable doubt is then in
order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Nita
Eugenio y Pejer, is ACQUITED for failure of the prosecution
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections for Women, Mandaluyong City who
is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant,
unless she is being lawfully held for another cause, and to
inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from
notice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181831

March 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RODNIE ALMORFE y SEDENTE and RYAN ALMORFE y
VALLESTER, Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Appellants Rodnie Almorfe y Sedente (Rodnie) and Ryan
Almorfe y Vallester (Ryan) were convicted of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 70. Appellant Rodnie was
further convicted of violation of Section 11 of the same
law.
The Information against appellants for violation of Section
5 (Crim. Case No. 13116-D) reads:1
xxxx
On or about November 27, 2003 in Pasig City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
conspiring and confederating together, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, not being
lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
PO1 Janet Sabo y Ampuhan, a police poseur-buyer, one (1)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3)
centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance,
which was found positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in
violation of said law.
xxxx

Atty. Ronatay:

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Page 75

The Information against appellant Rodnie for violation of

Section 11 of the same law (Crim. Case No. 13117-D)
reads:2
xxxx
On or about November 27, 2003 in Pasig City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not
being lawfully authorized by law to possess any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his custody
and control two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing two (2) centigrams (0.02 gram) each, of white
crystalline substance, which were found positive to the
test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug, in violation of said law.
xxxx
Culled from the records of the case is the following version
of the prosecution:
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of November 27, 2003,
an informant personally reported to the Pasig Police
Station about the rampant selling of "shabu" in Callejon 64,
Purok 6, Villa Antonio, Brgy. Bambang, Pasig by a certain
"Taga," prompting a team belonging to the Mayors Special
Action Team of Pasig City to conduct a buy-bust operation
at the target area.
The team was composed of PO1 Aldrin Mariano, P01
Roland Panis, PO2 San Andres, PO3 Salisa and PO1 Janet
Sabo (Janet).
Together with the informant, the team members, in
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency, repaired to and arrived at the target area at
around 8:30 p.m. of the same day, November 27, 2003.
After the service vehicle bearing the team members
parked "along Akasya St., in a vacant lot," 3 a "lengthy street
[with many alleys intersecting it],"4 Janet, together with
the informant, at once proceeded to the target address
about 50 meters away, leaving behind the other team
members inside the vehicle.
On reaching the target address, the informant nodded at
one of two men standing in front thereof who turned out to
be Rodnie a.k.a. "Taga". Rodnie at once asked the
informant what their purpose was, to which the informant
replied "Iiskor kami." Rodnie then asked "Magkano?," and
the informant answered "Dos, pare" which means P200 in
the drug trade.

possession, and affixed her signature thereon, as well as on

the plastic sachet subject of the sale.
The contents of the three sachets were found positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride by the Eastern Police
District Crime Laboratory Office,6 hence, the indictment of
appellants.
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on, inter alia,
the "existence but not the source" of the three plastic
sachets; and the due execution and genuineness of the
result of the examination of the specimens to thus
dispense with the testimony of the Forensic Chemist
P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural-Cejes7 who examined and found
the contents of the sachets to be positive for
"methylamphetamine hydrochloride."8
Upon the other hand, appellants gave the following
version:
On November 27, 2003, as he was assisting his wife who
was about to give birth, Rodnie saw his cousin Ryan being
pushed by Janet and four other companions towards his
house. Once inside the house, Janet frisked Ryan and
Rodnie. The members of the team soon took money inside
Rodnies pocket and searched his house which yielded
nothing. Appellants were, however, handcuffed and
brought to the police station.9
Appellants neighbor, Aida Soriano (Aida), corroborated
appellants version.10
By Decision of July 29, 2005,11 Branch 70 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig convicted both appellants in the first
case and appellant Rodnie in the second case, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 13116-D filed against Rodnie Almorfe
and Ryan Almorfe for violation of Section 5, Article II,
Republic Act 9165 (Illegal Sale of Shabu), they are hereby
sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to solidarily pay a
Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 13117-D filed only against Rodnie
Almorfe for violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act
9165 (Illegal Possession of Shabu), said accused is hereby
sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty
(20) Years and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00). (underscoring supplied)

Janet, who was designated as poseur-buyer, gave the premarked P200 (in five P20 and two P50 bills) to Rodnie
who placed them inside his pocket. Rodnie thereupon took
out a "black plastic container"5 from his pants back pocket
from which container he drew two plastic sachets which
he, however, returned to the container.

On appeal, the appellate court, by Decision of August 30,

2007,12 affirmed that of the trial courts. It discredited
appellants claim of frame-up in the absence of proof of illmotive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely accuse
them, aside from the fact that the officers are presumed to
have regularly performed their official duty.

Rodnie thereafter parted with some of the money bills to

his companion who turned out to be his co-appellant Ryan,
whom he asked "Akina yung binigay ko sa yo kanina." Ryan
at once gave Rodnie a sachet of shabu which Rodnie in turn
gave to Janet. At that instant, Janet executed the prearranged signal to the other members of the team who
swooped down on appellants and arrested them. Janet
then and there seized the money and the two plastic
sachets inside the black plastic container in Rodnies

The appellate court discredited too the testimony of Aida

which it found to be laced with several inconsistencies vis-vis those of appellants.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

Hence, the present appeal, appellants assigning as sole

error of the appellate court their conviction despite the
failure of the prosecution "to prove that the shabu
submitted for laboratory examination is the same one
allegedly taken from them.

Page 76

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 charts the procedure on the

custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, given the severity of the
penalties imposed for violations of said law, viz:
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments, paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
During the cross-examination of Janet, appellants counsel
elicited the following testimony:13
Q: Now, madam witness, these two (2) accused were being
charged of violating Section 5 and Section 11, of Republic
Act 9165. And it is presumed that you know R.A. 9165?
A: Section 5 is the only case we filed against them, sir.
Q: During the inventory, did you secure the presence of the
media team?
A: We did not conduct an inventory, sir.
Q: You did not conduct an inventory with regard to this
case?
A: We just marked the sachets right then and there for
purposes of not alternating the sachets we recovered from
them, sir.
[Defense counsel]
Atty. Sorongon:
But the law provides, your Honor, that it should be
inventoried.
COURT:
Let the Court decide on that matter. You have already
established that there was no inventory.
x x x x (italics and underscoring supplied)
Oddly, from the above-quoted testimony of alleged poseur
buyer Janet, she clarified that they filed a case against
appellants only for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
Appellant Rodnie was, however, additionally indicted for
violation of Section 11.
Respecting the teams non-compliance with the inventory,
not to mention the photograph, requirement of R.A. No.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

9165, the same does not necessarily render void and

invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs. There must,
however, be justifiable grounds to warrant exception
therefrom, and provided that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/s.14
For the saving clause to apply, it is important that the
prosecution should explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses15 and that the integrity and value of the
seized evidence had been preserved:
x x x [N]on-compliance with the strict directive of Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecutions case; police procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence may still have lapses, as in the
present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized
and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must
be shown to have been preserved. 16 (italics in the original)
The presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus
delicti of the offenses,17 calls for the necessity of proving
beyond doubt that they are the same seized objects. This
function is performed by the "chain of custody"
requirement as defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, 18 which
requirement is necessary to erase all doubts as to the
identity of the seized drugs by establishing its movement
from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and
finally to the court.19
In the present case, even if the requirement to conduct an
inventory were to be excused, given that there were only
three sachets confiscated, the prosecution just the same
failed to discharge its burden. Although Janet identified
Exhibits "C-1," "C-2" and "C-3" as the drugs seized from
appellants which she claimed to have marked immediately
after the bust, she did not disclose the name of the
investigator to whom she turned them over. And there is
no showing if that same investigator was the one who
turned the drugs over to the forensic chemist, or if the
forensic chemist whose name appears in the physical
science report20 was the one who received them from that
investigator, or where the drugs were kept for safekeeping
after the chemical test was conducted up to the time they
were presented in court.
It bears recalling that while the parties stipulated on the
existence of the sachets, they did not stipulate with respect
to their "source."
People v. Sanchez21 teaches that the testimony of the
forensic chemist which is stipulated upon merely covers
the handling of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and
the result of the examination, but not the manner the
specimen was handled before it came to the possession of
the forensic chemist and after it left his possession.
While a perfect chain of custody is almost always
impossible to achieve, an unbroken chain becomes
indispensable and essential in the prosecution of drug
cases owing to its susceptibility to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. 22
Hence, every link must be accounted for.
In fine, the prosecution failed to account for every link of
the chain starting from its turn over by Janet to the
investigator, and from the latter to the chemist.

Page 77

As for the presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duty relied upon by the courts a quo, the same
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence
nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to

forthwith implement this decision and to INFORM this
Court, within five days from receipt hereof, of the action
taken.

Parenthetically, the following testimony of Janet raises a

nagging doubt regarding the buy-bust version of the
prosecution:

Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the PNP

Director and the Director General of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for information and guidance. No
costs.

Q: So, you were fifty (50) meters away from your

companions, where did you meet the accused?
A: We entered Callejon 64, and they were standing by in
front of their house where there was a lighted post, sir.
Q: Madam witness, you stated that you entered Callejon 64,
which is an alley, and you left your vehicle fifty (50) meters
away from Callejon 64. Was your vehicle parked
perpendicularly to Callejon 64 or, was it parked parallel to
Callejon 64?
A: We parked in one of those alleys named Akasya, when
you make a turn, there was a creek. And after that, there
were several other alleys, and there is a two-way street
and then after that, there were alleys again, sir.
Q: From the place where you parked your service vehicle,
you have to enter into different streets before arriving at
the house of the accused, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir, when we parked, we walked straight, and when
we reached the street, we walked again. After that, was an
alley, Callejon 64, sir.
Q: Will you agree with me, madam witness, that you have
to turn from one street to another before arriving at
Callejon 64? You testified that awhile ago, will you agree
with me?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then, you stated during the direct examination, madam
witness, that before you alighted from your vehicle, there
is this agreement of the pre-arranged signal?
A: Yes, sir.24 (underscoring supplied)
Given Janets description of the target address and the
location of her fellow team members, how could the latter
have seen Janet execute the pre-arranged signal to draw
them to close in and arrest appellants?
Just as the lack of showing whether the team confiscated
the black container allegedly brought out by Rodnie
containing two sachets raises a nagging doubt. If it did,
why was it not presented? If it did not, why? That was an
object evidence which could have lent credibility to the
prosecutions version.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. H.C. No. 02178 is REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Rodnie Almorfe y
Sedente and Ryan Almorfe y Vallester who are accordingly
hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged against them
and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless
they are being held for some other lawful cause.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168644

February 16, 2010

BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr.

RICARDO BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 876001 dated April 20, 2005, which reversed
and set aside the September 13, 20042 and November 5,
20043 Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 364 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for qualified
theft. The said orders, in turn, respectively denied the
motion filed by herein respondent Sally Go for the
suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence
relative to a Security Bank account, and denied
reconsideration.
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized
domestic
corporation presided by its herein
representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent
Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally
Go-Bangayan, is Bangayans wife, who was employed in
the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others,
to receive and account for the payments made by the
various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office
a complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft5 against
respondent, alleging that several checks6 representing the
aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the
companys customers in payment of their obligation were,
instead of being turned over to the companys coffers,
indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her
personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and
Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila
Branch.7 Upon a finding that the evidence adduced was
uncontroverted,
the
assistant
city
prosecutor
recommended the filing of the Information for qualified
theft against respondent.8
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an Information, the
inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised
(sic) between January 1988 [and] October 1989, inclusive,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent
[to] gain and without the knowledge and consent of the

Page 78

owner thereof, take, steal and carry away cash money in

the total amount of P1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB
GROUP OF COMPANIES represented by RICARDO
BANGAYAN, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in
the aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50, Philippine
currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused
acted with grave abuse of confidence, being then employed
as cashier by said complainant at the time of the
commission of the said offense and as such she was
entrusted with the said amount of money.
Contrary to law.9
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. 10 The
trial ensued. On the premise that respondent had allegedly
encashed the subject checks and deposited the
corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking
account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the
respective managers or records custodians of Security
Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings
Bank (now Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in
Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.11 The trial court
granted the motion and issued the corresponding
subpoena.12
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated
November 4, 2003, addressed to Metrobank, noting to the
court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the
prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank
account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security
Bank account identified as Account No. 01-14-006,
allegedly deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks.
Interestingly, while respondent characterized the
Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case, she, in the
same motion, nevertheless waived her objection to the
irrelevancy of the Security Bank account mentioned in the
same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly
willing to address the allegations with respect thereto.13
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the
relevancy of the Metrobank account on the ground that the
complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks
which respondent allegedly deposited in an account with
the said bank.14 To this, respondent filed a supplemental
motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential
nature of the Metrobank account under the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.15 The trial court did not
sustain respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash
for lack of merit.16
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court
the testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the
representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans
testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989,
respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group,
Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the
company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit
the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit
account with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony,
the subject checks were presented to Marasigan for
identification and marking as the same checks received by
respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal
account with Security Bank.17 But before the testimony
could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to
Suppress,18 seeking the exclusion of Marasigans testimony
and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

on the subject Security Bank account. This time

respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the
privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its
September 13, 2004 Order.19 A motion for reconsideration
was subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order
dated November 5, 2004.20 These two orders are the
subject of the instant case.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion in acting the way it did, respondent elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed orders
of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision. 21The
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed orders dated September 13, 2004 and November
5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of
the SBTC representative is ordered stricken from the
records.
SO ORDERED.22
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,23
petitioner is now before the Court pleading the same
issues as those raised before the lower courts.
In this Petition24 under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the
main that the Court of Appeals had seriously erred in
reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect
striking out Marasigans testimony dealing with
respondents deposit account with Security Bank. 25 It
asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had
a direct relation to the subject matter of the case for
qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one of the
exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A.
1405.26 Petitioner believed that what constituted the
subject matter in litigation was to be determined by the
allegations in the information and, in this respect, it
alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial
court, which declared to be erroneous the limitation of the
present inquiry merely to what was contained in the
information.27
For her part, respondent claimed that the money
represented by the Security Bank account was neither
relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the
criminal information suggested that the money therein
deposited was the subject matter of the case. She invited
particular attention to that portion of the criminal
Information which averred that she has stolen and carried
away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50.
She advanced the notion that the term "cash money" stated
in the Information was not synonymous with the checks
she was purported to have stolen from petitioner and
deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the
checks which the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as
well as the testimony itself of Marasigan, should be
suppressed by the trial court at least for violating
respondents right to due process.28 More in point,
respondent opined that admitting the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining to the
Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule
under R.A. No. 1405.29

Page 79

In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the

allegations in the criminal Information for qualified theft,
as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the
offense charged. It posits that through Marasigans
testimony, the Court would be able to establish that the
checks involved, copies of which were attached to the
complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had indeed
been received by respondent as cashier, but were,
thereafter, deposited by the latter to her personal account
with Security Bank. Petitioner held that the checks
represented the cash money stolen by respondent and,
hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash
amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by
respondent, but also the checks themselves.30
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties
that the issue for resolution is whether the testimony of
Marasigan and the accompanying documents are
irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative
of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and,
hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. The
question of admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the
fore. And the Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the
subject evidence to be indeed inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal
prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must
be established with unwavering exactitude and moral
certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to a
finding of guilt. 31 Theft is present when a person, with
intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things, takes the personal
property of another without the latters consent. It is
qualified when, among others, and as alleged in the instant
case, it is committed with abuse of confidence. 32 The
prosecution of this offense necessarily focuses on the
existence of the following elements: (a) there was taking of
personal property belonging to another; (b) the taking was
done with intent to gain; (c) the taking was done without
the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done without
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence. 33 In
turn, whether these elements concur in a way that
overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question
that must pass the test of relevancy and competency in
accordance with Section 334 Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

hand, by impressing upon the Court that there obtains no

difference between cash and check for purposes of
prosecuting respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is
mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of
personal property of one by another with intent to gain,
and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose of the property stolen because the
deprivation relative to the offended party has already
ensued from such act of execution.36 The allegation of theft
of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented
must have a tendency to prove that the offender has
unlawfully taken money belonging to another.
Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to
draw a connection between the evidence subject of the
instant review, and the allegation of theft in the
Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulently
deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of
argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in
effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of theft, but
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and
check is true in other instances. In estafa by conversion, for
instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is
immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an
information for that offense; a check, after all, while not
regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under
commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it
represents in stated monetary value is properly capable of
appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the
offender does with the check subsequent to the act of
unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as this
offense is a continuing one.37 In other words, in pursuing a
case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its
cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These
checks would then constitute the best evidence to
establish their contents and to prove the elemental act of
conversion in support of the proposition that the offender
has indeed indorsed the same in his own name.38

Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be

suppressed in
well as the checks purported to have been stolen and

Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our

purposes, as the Information in this case accuses
respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to
establish that respondent has actualized her criminal
intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds
thereof in her personal account, becomes not only
irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score,
inadmissible in evidence.

relevant, is to be addressed by considering whether they

have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether they
relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic,
an inference may be made as to the existence or nonexistence of the fact in issue.35

We now address the issue of whether the admission of

Marasigans testimony on the particulars of respondents
account with Security Bank, as well as of the
corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly deposited
in said account, constitutes an unallowable inquiry under
R.A. 1405.

The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken

away cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers
of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks
to establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by
adducing evidence that respondent, at several times
between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to
her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner
addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft
of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the
evidence that respondent had first stolen the checks and
deposited the same in her banking account, on the other

It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not

bothered with the triviality of specifically addressing
privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there,
nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate
expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The
source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is
found in R.A. No. 1405,39otherwise known as the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1955. 40

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to

discourage private hoarding and at the same time

Page 80

encourage the people to deposit their money in banking

institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of authorized
loans and thereby assist in economic development. 41
Owing to this piece of legislation, the confidentiality of
bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the
Philippines.42 Section 2 of the law institutionalized this
policy by characterizing as absolutely confidential in
general all deposits of whatever nature with banks and
other financial institutions in the country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines,
its
political
subdivisions and
its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.1avvphi1
Subsequent statutory enactments43 have expanded the list
of exceptions to this policy yet the secrecy of bank deposits
still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the
legally recognized zones of privacy.44 There is, in fact,
much disfavor to construing these primary and
supplemental exceptions in a manner that would authorize
unbridled discretion, whether governmental or otherwise,
in utilizing these exceptions as authority for unwarranted
inquiry into bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the
present legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits.45
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been
explained in China Banking Corporation v. Ortega.46That
case principally addressed the issue of whether the
prohibition against an examination of bank deposits
precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment.
Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found
guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held
that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405
actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or
investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or
investigation is merely to determine the existence and
nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in any given
bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or
inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely
required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not
the defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank
would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal
until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of
the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351
and House Bill No. 3977which later became Republic Act
No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to
place banks deposits beyond the reach of execution to
satisfy a final judgmentThus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should
like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue

[(BIR)] or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and
because of this the deposit of this individual [has been]
attached by the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court
has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such
person. But where the primary aim is to determine
whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a
proper assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not
allowed by this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under
the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there
is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or
for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a
certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment
will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is
that prohibited by... the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the
inquiry... is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax
liability already declared for the protection of the right in
favor of the government; but when the object is merely to
inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of
taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into
the existence and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x47
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality
rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that the account
maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the
proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently
appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the
kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To
highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,48 that the subject matter
of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or
personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in
relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the
instant case should refer to the money deposited in the
Security Bank account.49 On the surface, however, it seems
that petitioners theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper
treatment tends to show that it has argued quite offtangentially. This, because, while Mathay did explain what
the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so
only to determine whether the class suit in that case was
properly brought to the court.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in
relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly
and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals,50 in which the Court noted that the
inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405
must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in
the account is itself the subject of the action. 51 Given this
perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the
action in the case at bar is to be determined from the
indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and
not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be
admitted into the records. In the criminal Information filed
with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain
language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing
petitioners trust and confidence and stealing cash in the

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amount of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no

factual allegation that in some material way involves the
checks subject of the testimonial and documentary
evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the
allegations in said Information make mention of the
supposed bank account in which the funds represented by
the checks have allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the
indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the
ostensible subject of the prosecutions inquiry. Without
needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged
in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this
case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to
have been stolen by respondent, and not the money
equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted
in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound
to prove with its evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and
documentary evidence relative to respondents Security
Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish
the existence of such account, its nature and the amount
kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at
an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the
privacy and confidentiality of which is protected by law.
On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in
her motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to
the controversy at the very first instance it was raised
before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the
particulars of respondents supposed bank account with
Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented
by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No.
1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as
they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable
connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified
theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondents
objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of
Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed
orders of the trial court.
A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of
privacy extends its scope to include an individuals
financial privacy rights and personal financial matters,
there is an intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by
courts and legislators to laws infringing such rights.52
Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the
authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts
must be resolved in favor of the former. This attitude
persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse the
general state policy respecting the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits.53
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20,
2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5,
2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EVIDENCE Rule 128 Cases

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