G.R. Nos.

89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO
SAYSON,
ROSARIO
SAYSONMALONDA,
BASILISA
SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA
SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO
CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private
respondents and their capacity to inherit from
their alleged parents and grandparents. The
petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for
themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children,
namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had
married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972.
His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and
Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo
and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional
rights to the disputed estate as the decedents'
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of
Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the
defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit,
that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted
children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled
to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by
right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein
private respondents on the basis of practically
the same evidence.

Adoption

Page 1

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision

dated
May
26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally
adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by
virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9,
1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate dated February
27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right
of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge
Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030,
holding that the defendants, being the legitimate
heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs
from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of
Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own
decision
dated
February
28,
1989, 5 the
respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030
(CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In
Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No.
12364), the appealed decision is
MODIFIED in that Delia and
Edmundo Sayson are disqualified
from inheriting from the estate of
the deceased spouses Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in
all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for
review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent
court is sought on the ground that it disregarded
the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied
the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it
declared the private respondents as the exclusive
heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and
Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born on February 27,
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on
March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified
her parents from adopting. The pertinent
provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming
among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who
have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or natural children by legal
fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that
Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one
Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for

guardianship of the child that she was her natural

mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately
apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground
that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate
daughter at the time but in the same breath try
to demolish this argument by denying that
Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of
timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
decree of adoption, years after it became final
and executory. That was way back in
1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper
parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption,
pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have
done this earlier, before the decree of adoption
was issued. They did not, although Mauricio
claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February
27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days
before the issuance of the Order of
Adoption, the petitioners could
have notified the court about the
fact of birth of DORIBEL and
perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have
filed a petition for the revocation or
rescission
of
the
adoption
(although the birth of a child is not
one of those provided by law for
the revocation or rescission of an
adoption). The court is of the
considered
opinion
that
the
adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and
EDMUNDO
SAYSON
is
valid,
outstanding and binding to the
present, the same not having been
revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot
be faulted for granting the petition for adoption
on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents
were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the
petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of
the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in
their action for partition, but in a direct
proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding
that the requisite jurisdictional

Adoption

Page 2

facts exists, whether erroneous or

not, cannot be questioned in a
collateral
proceeding,
for
a
presumption arises in such cases
where the validity of the judgment
is thus attacked that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven
[Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec.
350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court
declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are
summed
up
in
2
American
Jurisprudence,
2nd
Series,
Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order
implies the finding of
the necessary facts
and the burden of
proof is on the party
attacking it; it cannot
be considered void
merely because the
fact needed to show
statutory compliance
is obscure. While a
judicial
determination
of
some particular fact,
such
as
the
abandonment of his
next of kin to the
adoption, may be
essential
to
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction to enter
the
order
of
adoption, this does
not make it essential
to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree
that the fact be
determined
upon
proper evidence, or
necessarily
in
accordance with the
truth; a mere error
cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the
determination must
stand until reversed
on
appeal,
and
hence cannot
be
collaterally attacked.
If this were not the
rule, the status of
adopted
children
would
always
be

uncertain, since the

evidence might not
be the same at all
investigations,
and
might be regarded
with different effect
by
different
tribunals, and the
adoption might be
held by one court to
have
been
valid,
while another court
would hold it to have
been of no avail.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold
that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by
the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's
birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence.
It is one of the prescribed means of recognition
under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172
of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners
stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. However, such evidence is
lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when
Doribel
was
born
to
Edita
Abila
was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an
interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying
her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let
alone the fact that it was never offered in
evidence in the lower courts. Even without it,
however, the birth certificate must be upheld in
line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we
ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge
must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy
cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
and accounting but in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in
the Civil Code . . . does not have
this purely evidential character. It
serves
a
more
fundamental
purpose. It actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock,
and that civil status cannot be
attacked
collaterally.
The
legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the

Adoption

Page 3

proper parties, and

period limited by law.

within

the

The legitimacy of the child cannot

be contested by way of defense or
as a collateral issue in another
action
for
a
different
purpose.
.
.
. 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we
hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and
their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from
different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the
property of the adopting parents in
the same manner as a legitimate
child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a
person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents
and thereafter spreads among his collateral
relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love
for them and as a provision for their continued
care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we
stress first the following pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right
created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree
of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he
could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is
called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented.
The
representative
does
not
succeed the person represented
but the one who the person
represented
would
have
succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the

deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the
former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of
representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter
of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to
represent her deceased father in the distribution
of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under
Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the
share her father would have directly inherited had
he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of
her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the
case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the
latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia
and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the
estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding
that only Doribel has the right of representation
in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate
estate, the other private respondents being only
the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioners.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-802 July 5, 1993
OFFICE
OF
THE
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
HON. GENARO C. GINES, as Presiding Judge,
Branch 26; MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, Court
Interpreter and Officer-in-Charge, Branch
26;
ROSIE
M.
MUNAR,
Stenographic
Reporter, Branch 26, PACITA B. DIAZ, Staf
Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court;
MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, Staf Assistant I,
Branch 26, and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA,
JR., Staf Assistant II, Branch 26, all of the
RTC, San Fernando, La Union, respondents.
PER CURIAM:

Adoption

Page 4

This case was initiated by the Office of the Court

Administrator with the filing of an administrative
complaint which reads:
Pursuant to the Resolution of the Court En Banc,
dated July 30, 1991, the undersigned hereby
institutes this administrative complaint against
Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding Judge, Branch
26; Ma. Gorgonia L. Flores, Court Interpreter and
Officer-in- Charge, Branch 26; Rosie M. Munar,
Stenographic Reporter, Branch 26; Pacita B. Diaz,
Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; Ma.
Concepcion B. Diaz, Staff Assistant I, Branch 26;
and Mr. Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr., Staff II, Branch
26, all of the RTC, San Fernando, La Union, for
Dishonesty; Violation of par. (e), Sec. 3 of R.A.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) as
amended; and Violation of Administrative Order
No. 6, dated June 30, 1975, Circular No. 7, dated
September 23, 1974, and Administrative Order
No. 1, dated January 28, 1988, by virtue of their
collective illegal acts involving deliberate and
surreptitious assignment of cases at the
Docketing and Receiving Section, Office of the
Clerk of Court, RTC, San Fernando, La Union.
1. This complaint is substantially anchored on the
Report submitted by Atty. Aurora P. Sanglay, Clerk
of Court, RTC, San Fernando, La Union, relative to
her investigation of the alleged anomaly in the
non-raffling of cases in the said Court, and the
Affidavit-complaint of Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz
dated September 19, 1991, implicating other
court personnel involved in the aforestated
irregularity;
2. Atty. Sanglay, in her Report, averred that:
2.1. From April 3, 1989 to April, 1991, there were
forty-four (44) Special Proceedings cases, twentyseven (27) Land Registration cases, six (6) Civil
Cases, and three (3) Criminal Cases which were
directly assigned to the RTC, Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union, without passing through the
mandatory, raffling procedure, of cases except for
three (3) special proceedings cases which were
assigned to Branch 27, which anomaly had been
going on since 1986;
2.2. Pacita Diaz, Ma. Concepcion Diaz and Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr. were the court employees incharge in (sic) the receiving and docketing of the
Land Registration Cases, Special Proceedings
cases and Civil Cases, respectively; and
2.3. There is a probability that the aforesaid
clerks, who were in-charge of receiving the cases,
did not submit deliberately to the Officer-inCharge, some of the cases received from
mandatory raffling in compliance with the
Administrative Orders/Circulars of the Supreme
Court.

3. In the Affidavit-Complaint dated September 19,

1991, of Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, which was
received by the Office of the Court Administrator
on September 20,1991, she asserted, inter alia,
that:
3.1. She blamed Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union,
Ma. Gorgonia Flores, Court Interpreter and
Officer-In-Charge, same Court, and Rosie Munar,
Stenographic Reporter, same Court, for applying
pressures and intimidations to her in order that
the cases of their choice may no longer be
forwarded to the proper Officer-in-Charge;
3.2. Several petitions have been prepared by the
(sic) Judge Gines himself in coordination with his
Stenographer Rosie Munar and Court Interpreter
Ma. Gorgonia Flores, some of which are as
follows:
3.2.1. Special Proceeding No. 1965 where the
petitioner, who alleged himself to be a resident of
San Fernando, La Union, is actually a resident of
Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and the Aunt of Judge Gines.
The required bond of P500.00 therein has not yet
been posted: and
3.2.2. Special Proceeding No. 1967 where the
Office of the Solicitor General and other parties
were not furnished with copies of the petition
upon the instruction of Judge Gines.
The respondents were then required to answer
the complaint.
Separate motions for an extension of time to file
their answers were made by the respondents, but
only respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma. Concepcion
Diaz filed their Answer within the extended
period. The Resolution which granted the others
the extension warned them that no further
postponements
would
be
granted.
Notwithstanding such caveat, however, they
again asked for another extension. In the
Resolution of 28 May 1992, this Court ruled, inter
alia, that:
It appearing that said respondents have not taken
this case seriously, and considering the prior
warning in the Resolution of 7 May 1992, the
above motions for another extension of time to
file the Answers are hereby DENIED. The
respondent Judge and respondents Flores, Munar
and Lacsamana are deemed to have waived the
filing of their Answer.
As it turned out, respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana were able to post their joint Answers
on 15 May 1992 the last day of the additional
period they had prayed for in their second motion

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Page 5

which
was
eventually
aforementioned Resolution.

denied

in

the

Respondents then filed a motion to reconsider the

Resolution of 28 May 1992; the same was denied
in the Resolution of 14 July 1992. This latter
resolution likewise denied the respondent Judge's
motion to reconsider the 7 May 1992 Resolution
wherein he prayed that his answer (actually a
Comment), dated 14 May 1992, be admitted.
However, this Court resolved that the said
comment be attached to the record of the instant
case.
In the same 14 July 1992 Resolution, the instant
case was referred to Mr. Justice Nathanael P. De
Pano, Jr. of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
On 31 March 1993, Justice De Pano, Jr. submitted
his 26-page REPORT. It appears therefrom that on
2 September 1992, he issued an order (a)
requiring the parties to file respective affidavits
which shall serve as their direct testimonies in
this case subject, however, to cross-examination
by the adverse parties and (b) setting the initial
hearing of the case for 28 September 1992.
Respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma. Concepcion
Diaz submitted their joint affidavit, dated 9
September 1992, as well as the affidavits of
Fortunata Gualberto, retired branch clerk of court
of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
San Fernando, La Union, and Consolacion M.
Dulay, Clerk III of the same Branch 27.
Respondents Gorgonia Flores, Rosie Munar and
Alfredo Lacsamana likewise submitted their
individual affidavits which are all dated 14
September 1992. Respondent Judge Gines, for his
part, filed a manifestation dated 17 September
1992, adopting his 14 May 1992 Comment as his
direct testimony as well as the aforesaid
affidavits of respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana.
At the hearing on 28 September 1992, the parties
entered into a stipulation of facts. They agreed on
the status and personal circumstances of the
parties as stated in the affidavits, as well as the
descriptions of their respective positions in the
RTC in San Fernando, La Union; the assumption
into office of the respondent Judge in January of
1987; the non-membership of the respondent
Judge and the other respondents in the raffle
committee; and the procedure prescribed for the
raffling of cases filed with the RTC in San
Fernando, La Union. The respondents then
marked as exhibits their affidavits and other
documents.
It further appears from the REPORT that no
testimonial evidence was offered by the parties.
While the complainant wanted to present Atty.

Sanglay, the respondents admitted her report and

agreed to dispense with her testimony. The
complainant then marked in evidence the
following documents: (1) the undated Report of
Atty. Aurora Sanglay to the Executive Judge, as
Exhibit "A"; (2) the 17 June 1991 Letter of Atty.
Aurora Sanglay addressed to the Executive Judge,
with annexes, as Exhibit "B"; (3) the Joint Affidavit
of Pacita and Ma. Concepcion Diaz dated 11
September 1992, as Exhibit "C"; (4) the
Compliance of respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana, Jr., as Exhibit "D"; (5) the Affidavit of
respondent Flores dated 14 September 1992, as
Exhibit "E"; (6) the Affidavit of Romeo Hermosura
dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "F"; (7) the
Affidavit of Teodorico Basilio dated 14 September
1992, as Exhibit "G"; (8) the Affidavit of
respondent Munar, dated 14 September 1992, as
Exhibit "H"; (9) the Affidavit of respondent
Lacsamana, Jr. dated 14 September 1992, as
Exhibit "I"; and (10) the Manifestation of
respondent Judge Gines dated 17 September
1992, as Exhibit "J". It appears that counsel for
the complainant expressed a desire to crossexamine
respondents
Flores,
Munar
and
Lacsamana but that the latter's counsel objected
on the ground of possible self-incrimination.
These three respondents further manifested that
they were not presenting any evidence against
the other respondents. Respondents Pacita Diaz
and Concepcion Diaz likewise manifested,
through counsel, that they will not present
evidence on account of the possibility of selfincrimination. Respondent Judge Gines did not
present his evidence.
Justice De Pano, Jr. then made the following
observations, findings and conclusions in his
REPORT:
Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon of the San
Fernando, La Union Regional Trial Court, in a
letter dated June 20, 1991, transmitted to the
Court, the report dated June 17, 1991, of Attorney
Aurora Sanglay, the said Court's Clerk of Court,
on the subject of cases that had not been raffled
by the appropriate committee on raffle but which
nevertheless, found their way mostly, to Branch
26 of the said Court (presided over by respondent
Genaro Gines from January 1987) and Branch 27
(the letter and its annexes were later marked
Exhibit B). In 1986, the report states, 6 criminal
cases, 9 civil cases, 51 special proceeding cases
and 9 land registration cases, (a total of 75 cases)
did not pass through the raffle committee but
went directly to the branch which apparently
acted on the cases without question. In 1987, 8
criminal cases, 9 civil cases, 13 special
proceedings cases, 2 land registration cases (a
total of 32 cases) did not pass through the raffle
committee. In 1988, 9 civil cases, 18 special
proceedings cases and 2 land registration cases

Adoption

Page 6

(a total of 29 cases) went directly to the branches

mentioned. A total of 136 cases from 1986 to
1988, Attorney Sanglay reports, went from
filing/docketing direct to two branches without
undergoing the mandated raffle by the raffle
committee.
The
more
germane
report,
one
which
demonstrates the continuing perpetuation of the
above obviously illegal and nefarious system of
directing cases filed with the Regional Trial Court
of San Fernando, La Union to Branches 26 and 27
of that court, is the undated report of Clerk of
Court Aurora P. Sanglay to Executive Judge
Braulio Yaranon, and received by his office on
June 6, 1991. The letter, uncontroverted, is
marked Exhibit A, Court Administrator, and it
reads thus:
In compliance to (sic) your memorandum dated
May 23, 1991, directing the undersigned to make
an investigation re the matter of cases filed
before my office (Office of the Clerk of Court),
which did not undergo the mandatory raffle
procedure, herewith are my findings:
The period covered by my investigation is from
April 3, 1989 to April 1991. In summary, during
this period, there were FORTY-FOUR (44) Special
Cases, TWENTY-SEVEN (27) Land Registration
Cases, SIX (6) Civil Cases, and THREE (3) Criminal
Cases which did not pass through raffle, but
which were instead directed to specific RTC
Branches, particularly Branch 26 and Branch 27.
A great majority of these cases however were
assigned to Branch 26.
Attached is the list of these cases mentioned for
your reference. This data obtained (sic) by
counterchecking the Minutes of previous raffles
covering the period of my investigation vis-a-vis
the corresponding docket books.
Until your memorandum dated May 24, 1991, the
following persons were in-charge of receiving and
docketing the following kinds of cases:
Mrs. Pacita Diaz Land Registration Cases
Miss Ma. Concepcion Diaz Special Proceedings
Cases
Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana Civil Cases
Criminal Cases were docketed by Mr. Vicente
Tatunay of the Prosecutor's Office and received by
either Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., the person
handling all cases filed for raffle, or Mr. Oscarlito
Fantastico or any of the clerks in the OCC, in his
absence.

Supposed to be, all these filed cases are to be

turned over to Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for
raffle, but as per my findings, some of these
cases were not at all included in the mandatory
raffle, but were instead directed to specific RTC
Branches. The possibility is not remote that these
clerks in-charge of receiving their respective
cases deliberately did not submit some of their
received cases for raffle.
A lapse in the system and poor monitoring also
provided for this thing to happen. Instances are
common where a client/lawyer is allowed
possession of the papers to be filed at certain
critical stages of the receiving process,
specifically after the docketing and payment of
filing fees, and after said stages, the possibility is
not likewise remote that these papers are not
submitted to the person in-charge of the raffle.
The
undersigned
had
already
instituted
procedures, i.e. centralized receiving, payment of
filing fees, docketing, and has strengthen (sic)
monitoring of the cases and the number of cases
filed to prevent occurrence (sic) of similar nature.
(Exhibit A, Court Administrator, pp. 76-77, rec.,
3rd Folder.)
Clerk of Court Sanglay's report includes 44
special proceedings cases, 27 land registration
cases, 6 civil cases and 3 criminal cases or a total
of 80 cases that did not pass through raffle from
April, 1989 to April, 1991 but found their way
directly to Branches 26 and 27 of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, La union. Of these 80
cases, all, except 3, found their way to Branch 26,
occupied by respondent Judge Genaro Gines who,
as he admits, was assigned in (sic) that branch
since January, 1987.
The respondents here are Judge Genaro Gines,
the incumbent presiding judge of Branch 26 of
the RTC in Judicial Region No. 1 based in San
Fernando, La Union; Pacita Diaz, a staff member
in that court now retired in the period covered by
the Sanglay report, in charge of filing and
docketing of land registration cases; Pacita Diaz's
daughter, Ma. Concepcion Diaz, another staff
member in Branch 26, during the period covered
by the Sanglay report, the clerk in charge of the
filing and docketing of special proceedings cases;
Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., in the period covered by
the Sanglay report the clerk in-charge of the filing
and docketing of civil cases; Rosie Munar, court
stenographic reporter; and Ma. Gorgonia Flores,
court interpreter and the Officer-in-Charge of
Branch 26. Francisco Lacsamana, Jr., additionally,
was assigned to gather all cases filed and
docketed in the week civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land one day before the weekly
raffle, and to transmit these newly filed cases to
the Committee on Raffle. Ma. Gorgonia Flores,

Adoption

Page 7

Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26, oversees the

administrative machinery of Branch 26 (pp. 8-9,
t.s.n., September 28, 1992).
The respondents felt that since the Court
Administrator limited himself to the sworn
statement and report of Clerk of Court Attorney
Aurora Sanglay, they were not called upon to
present evidence in their behalf as it would
amount to self-incrimination. They refused to
testify; they refused to be cross-examined. Your
investigator informs the Court that the Sanglay
affidavit
and
report
are
uncontroverted.
Admissions in the sworn statements forming part
of the record are utilized in this report in addition
to the stipulated facts.
The
respondents
are
administrative complaint:

charged

in

the

(1) for dishonesty, in violation of paragraph (e),

section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended;
(2) for violation of Administrative Order No. 6,
dated June 30, 1975;
(3) for violation of Circular
September 23, 1974; and

No.

7,

dated

(4) for violation of Administrative Order No. 1,

dated January 28, 1988.
The last three, Supreme Court issues, have to do
with the creation of a raffle committee in multibranch Regional Trial Courts, with supervision of
the raffle of newly-filled cases; with the manner
of raffling cases, and establish the policy that no
case, in multi-branch trial courts, may be
assigned to any branch or sala unless it had
undergone the raffle process.
Supreme Court Circular No. 7, September 23,
1974 mandates that in courts with several
branches, cases shall be assigned to the different
branches only by raffle. "No case may be
assigned to any branch without being raffled."
(Part I) And immediately after raffle, the
Executive Judge is mandated by the said Circular
to indicate the particular branch to which the
case is raffled, "the same to be written in words
and in figures on the cover of the Rollo and on
the first page of the original complaint or
information and initialled by the Executive Judge
and the two other officers who attended said
raffle." (Part III). The same circular created a
raffle committee of three, composed of the
Executive Judge and two other judges of the
court. The Executive Judge, supervises the Raffle.
Administrative Circular No. 1, (January 28, 1988)
reiterates strict compliance with Administrative
Order No. 6 (June 30, 1975) and Circular No. 7

(September 23, 1974 Raffle of cases, this later

Circular required, must be "in open session in the
presence of lawyers and spectators . . . . ."
(Section 8.1). The Court in this later Circular
restated the res ipso loquitor (sic) rule regarding
the conduct and removal of judges (Section 5.2).
It is therefore, beyond cavil, that under the rules
governing the administration of courts, all cases
filed in court must go through the raffle
committee for assignment. No case must be
assigned, in multi-branch courts, unless it is
raffled by the Raffle Committee. The 80 cases
involved in this case, filed from April 1989 to April
1991, were not raffled, but were directly assigned
to, or taken by, Branch 26 (except 3) under
respondent Judge Gines. Respondent Judge Gines
must know, under the above Supreme Court acts,
at a simple glance on the cover of the rollo and
the first page of every such record, whether a
case was assigned to him after going through
raffle or not. Cases assigned to his branch, after
going through the required raffle, show on the
face of the rollo, in words and in figures, the
branch to which the case is assigned,
authenticated by the initials of the Executive
Judge and the two other members of the
Committee. From January 1987, when respondent
Judge Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the
respondent judge had received unraffled cases,
considered them and decided them. He had done
so, apparently, not because he was a maniac of a
worker, nor because he loved his work but for
reasons unspoken in this case. Why should a sane
judge accept additional cases for study and
decision, in addition to his regular load, without
any benefit or consideration? Here obviously,
the res ipso loquitor (sic) doctrine applies.
Among the administrative officers charged here,
Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., as stipulated, gathers all
the cases filed and docketed in any particular
week, for transmittal to the Committee on Raffle.
He prepared the cases for raffle, including the
preparation of the pieces of paper properly
written on, to be picked in the raffle. It was his job
to do so. He was assigned to do so; he admitted
so. That he did not do so is obvious from the
Sanglay Report from 1989 to 1991, he failed to
transmit 80 cases and these cases found their
way (except for 3) to respondent Judge Gines.
The Sanglay report is not controverted. It was
Lacsamana's job to collect all cases docketed,
and to transmit them to the Raffle Committee. 80
such cases he did collect and failed to report to
the Raffle Committee from April, 1989 to April,
1991.
The Diazes, in the period covered by the Sanglay
report had apparently fallen out with respondent
Judge Gines and respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana. In an affidavit dated September 18,

Adoption

Page 8

1991 executed by respondent Ma. Concepcion

Diaz, the following passages appear, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The conflict between the Diazes and the other
respondents deem (sic) to have arisen from the
suspicion the respondent Judge entertained that
the Diazes had 'squealed' on him to the Executive
Judge, the Honorable Braulio Yaranon. This is
contained in the Diazes Joint Affidavit dated
September 9, 1992 (Marked C-Diaz), in the
following passage:
xxx xxx xxx
As to the two other respondents, respondents Ma.
Gorgonia Flores, who is officer-in-charge of
Branch 26 and Rosie Munar, court interpreter,
there appears to be no evidence. The record
shows that when the Court Administrator's
lawyers rested their case with the presentation of
the Sanglay report, the respondents refused to be
cross-examined on their sworn statements.
Consequently, each sworn statement lost value
as evidence against the other respondents.
However, it may be easily inferred that as court
officer-in-charge, respondent Flores was in (sic)duty bound to supervise the work of her
subalterns. The non-raffling of 80 cases during
the period covered from April, 1989 to April 1991
reflects her failure to do her job.
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court orders and circulars
complained of as having been violated, are
directed to district judges, while Section 3,
paragraph (e) of RA 3019 is inclusive in scope,
penalizing public officers for causing undue injury
to any party . . . . or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative a (sic)
judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident
bad
faith
or
gross
inexcusable
negligence. . . .
The prosecution had limited itself to presenting
the Sanglay report. It is apparent that we must
take the Diazes' statement that they were
pressured to do that which they had to do, and
whatever it was, was done without consent, and
against their will. However, under the facts here,
all the cases filed docketed in Branch 26 were
collected by respondent Lacsamana, Jr., who was
in (sic) duty bound to forward the cases to the
Raffle Committee. That 80 such cases did not find
their way to the Committee, but ended up as 80
extra cases (except 3) in the docket load of the
respondent judge, means at the very least that
Lacsamana, Jr., failed to perform his job. The
respondent judge in accepting or securing, such

80 cases, (minus 3) that did not pass through

raffle, for his action and resolution, and which he
eventually resolved violated all the Supreme
Court circulars on the matter with the help and
cooperation of respondent Lacsamana, Jr.
Evidently, respondent judge must have received
undue benefits and advantages (which have not
been demonstrated in this case) in securing this
extra load of cases, benefits and advantages
coming from the party benefited (sic) by his
action, and at the same time, granted the parties
involved in the some (sic) 80 cases that did not
undergo raffle, undue and unwarranted benefits
resulting from the bias and partiality in their favor
coming from the respondent judge. As earlier
observed, a single glance at the cover and first
page of each of the 80 or so rollos would show
that they were unraffled, and yet, the respondent
judge knowing that such cases were unraffled,
secured the said cases, considered them and
decided or resolved them, in violation of law.
It would appear, therefore, that the respondent
judge is guilty of the charges in the
administrative complaint. Along with him as
guilty, is respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. This
conclusion is bolstered by, among other things,
the Diazes' statement that cases were indeed
directly secured by the respondent judge without
their undergoing raffle.
With respect to the other respondents, it could be
deduced that the respondent Ma. Gorgonia
Flores, as officer-in-charge of Branch 26, would
have known that Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. was not
doing his job of forwarding all docketed cases to
the Raffle Committee faithfully.
He then recommends:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended:
1. That respondent Judge Genaro C. Gines be
appropriately penalized for violation of all the
Supreme Court orders and circulars mentioned in
the Administrative Complaint for the period
covered from April 1989 to April 1991, plus
apparent violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
R.A. 3019;
2. That respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for his
apparent failure to do his job, be, likewise
appropriately penalized, at least with a 6-month
suspension without pay; and
3. That respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores be
likewise penalized with a 3-month suspension
without pay; and
4. That the other respondents be warned against
committing any such violations.

Adoption

Page 9

The
continuing
deliberate
violations
of
Administrative Order No. 6 (dated 30 June 1975),
Circular No. 7 (dated 23 September 1974) and
Administrative Order No. 1 (dated 28 January
1988) for the years reported in Atty. Sanglay's
report, and their belated discovery boggle our
minds. The irregularities should have been easily
discovered by the respondent Judge either
because the fact that a case has not been
properly raffled off is at once discernible on the
cover of the records and on the first page of the
original of the initial pleading (complaint,
information, etc.), or because plain common
sense would have told him that something was
wrong somewhere as an unusual number of cases
of the same class had been "assigned" to his sala.
That he had failed to appreciate the physical
evidence or, at the very least, exhibit surprise at
the unusual number of cases is quite amazing.
Thus, we are loathe to grant him the benefit of
the doubt and conclude that he had no interest
whatsoever in having those cases raffled off to
him and that he only loved to work more than the
others. Given the circumstances of this case, we
cannot merely cut him some slack and assume
good faith on his part; he deserves no such
treatment. As the investigating Justice himself
assessed the situation:
. . . . The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from
April 1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but
were directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26
(except 3) under respondent Judge Gines.
Respondent Judge Gines, must know, under the
above Supreme Court acts, at a simple glance on
the cover of the rollo and the first page of every
such record, whether a case was assigned to him
after going through raffle or not. . . . From January
1987, when respondent Judge Gines was
appointed to Branch 26, the respondent judge
had received unraffled cases, considered them
and decided them. He had done so, apparently,
not because he was a maniac of a worker, nor
because he loved his work but for reasons
unspoken in this case. Why should a sane judge
accept additional cases for study and decision, in
addition to his regular load, without any benefit
or consideration? Here, obviously, the res ipso
loquitor (sic) doctrine applies.
The
irregularity
and
violations
of
the
aforementioned
administrative
orders
and
circular could not have been committed so
blatantly, brazenly and openly for an unusually
long period of time if the respondent Judge did
not have the cooperation of some of the court
employees. We therefore agree with the
investigating Justice that such support and
cooperation were extended by subordinates who
likewise had something to do with the raffle of
cases. Hence, the findings on the degree of
participation, either by commission or omission,

of respondents
sustained.

Flores

and

Lacsamana

are

In his report, the investigating Justice absolves

the Diazes and Munar from responsibility in the
aforesaid irregularities.
With respect to respondent Pacita Diaz, the case
has become moot as she died on 10 February
1993. 1 Thus, the case is dismissed insofar as she
is concerned.
On the other hand, while we find no evidence to
link respondent Munar to the aforementioned
irregularities, we hold that respondent Ma.
Concepcion Diaz is not entirely blameless. In her
affidavit of 18 September 1991, the relevant
portions of which are quoted in the REPORT of
Justice de Pano, she explicitly admitted:
11. In my explanation dated May 27, 1991 to the
Memorandum of Judge Yaranon, while I might
have made an admission that I was the clerk
receiving cases that later turned out to be
unraffled, I placed the direct blame on Judge
Gines and my two officemates, namely, Mrs. Ma.
Gorgonia L. Flores and Mrs. Rosie Munar who had
applied all sorts of pressures upon me, including
series (sic) of intimidation and, insinuations in
order that cases of their choice receive (sic) by
me may no longer be forwarded to the proper
officer-in-charge of the raffle, but to them directly
in Branch 26. 2
It is to be noted that Ma. Concepcion did not
elaborate on the nature of such intimidation and
insinuations. In view of the fact, however, that
she was in charge of receiving and docketing
special proceedings cases, and that out of the
controversial 80 unraffled cases, 44 were special
proceedings cases, her participation could, by no
means, be considered as insignificant. And even if
the alleged "intimidation" and "insinuations" were
true, they still would not exculpate her in view of
the length of time involved, the number of cases
questioned and the absence of proof that such
intimidation and insinuations were persistent,
continuous and irresistible. It is thus clear that
she had, by neglecting her duty, allowed herself
to be used by the other respondents.
A far more serious matter which has escaped the
attention of the investigating Justice involves the
charges set forth under paragraph 3 of the
Administrative Complaint, particularly on the
preparation by the respondent Judge, allegedly in
coordination with respondents Munar and Flores,
of petitions in certain cases, some of which are
(a) Special Proceeding No. 1965 wherein it is
made to appear that the petitioner therein an
aunt of the respondent Judge and a resident of
Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur resides in San Fernando,

Adoption

Page 10

La Union, and (b) Special Proceeding No. 1967

wherein the Office of the Solicitor General and the
other parties were not furnished with copies of
the petition upon order of the respondent Judge.
Not having undergone the prescribed raffle
procedure, these two cases were directly
assigned to the respondent Judge who then acted
thereon. The said petitions, the pertinent orders
issued in the course of the proceedings therein
and the minutes thereof were attached by the
respondent Judge to his 14 May 1993 Comment,
which he had adopted as his direct testimony
pursuant to his 17 September 1992 Manifestation
(Exhibit "J"). These documents provide conclusive
proof of more serious irregularities amounting to
either gross ignorance or malicious disregard of
applicable procedural laws, grave misconduct,
grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. The
respondent Judge made a mockery of the judicial
process as it is obvious that he had displayed a
special interest in these cases; in fact, he even
caused the cases to be excluded from the raffle.
A careful review of the abovementioned petitions
will reveal that the designation "Branch 26,"
indicating the branch presided over by the
respondent Judge, has been originally typewritten
as part of the caption, and not merely entered in
the blank space reserved for the branch to which
the case may subsequently be raffled off. It is to
be further observed that the petition in Special
Proceeding No. 1965 was subscribed and sworn
to before respondent Flores in her capacity as the
Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of
Court, Branch 26.
Special Proceeding No. 1965 involves a petition
for guardianship over the person and property of
a certain Juan R. Lagmay. The said petition was
filed by Regina Lagmay Valdez who claims to
be a resident of Poblacion, San Fernando, La
Union 3 on 24 September 1990, and alleges
that Juan R. Lagmay is "presently residing at No.
2579 Pamintuan Village, Mabalacat, Pampanga."
Upon its filing, the respondent Judge immediately
issued an order (a) giving due course to the
petition, (b) directing that notices be served to
Juan Lagmay's nearest of kin, namely Bonifacia
Lagmay, Lilia Gumangan and Mariano Lagmay, all
residents of Las-ud, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and (c)
directing the latter to submit their opposition to
the petition, if any, on or before 8 October 1990
at 8:30 a.m. 4 No order setting the case for
hearing at that particular date, time and place
was issued. It would appear, however, that this
24 September 1990 order was considered by the
respondent Judge as the order setting the case
for hearing on 8 October 1990 because
respondent Flores prepared the Minutes of the
alleged proceedings conducted on 8 October
1990. 5 The said Minutes show that the following
exhibits were offered for jurisdictional purposes,:

(1) Notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A" and (b) the

dorsal side of Exhibit "A," purportedly to show
that Juan Lagmay's nearest of kin were furnished
with the notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A-1. " Said
Minutes further disclose that the petitioner
therein was not assisted by counsel; that
respondent Flores acted as Interpreter while
respondent Munar acted as Stenographer; and
that since no opposition was filed therein, the
testimony of the petitioner was received. The
latter then allegedly declared that she is a
resident of Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union;
she is Juan Lagmay's niece as he is her father's
brother; and Juan Lagmay is an American citizen,
single, childless, a resident of 2579 Pamintuan
Village, Mabalacat, Pampanga and a retired
seaman receiving pension from the Social
Security Administration of the United States of
America in the amount of $550.00 a month.
Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an order
appointing petitioner Regina Valdez as the
guardian of the person and property of Juan R.
Lagmay, and directing her to take her oath as
such upon the filing of a bond of P500.00, after
which she would be issued letters of
guardianship. Without the bond having first been
filed, however, respondent Flores administered
the oath to Regina Valdez. 6 Thereafter, or on 18
October 1990, respondent Flores issued to the
latter her letters of guardianship. 7
A closer examination of the so-called proofs of
notice of hearing to the nearest of kin, consisting
supposedly of "registry return receipts," reveals
that there are no entries in the blanks reserved
for information on the name of sender, name of
post office, municipality or province where the
same post office is located, registry number and
case number. It is not likewise indicated therein
when the addressees received the "registered"
letter. In view thereof, the conclusion that the socalled notices were not sent at all is inevitable.

clearly violated Section 3, Rule 93 of the Revised

Rules of Court which directs the court to fix the
time and place for hearing and cause reasonable
notice to be given to the person named in the
petition, including the minor if above 14 years of
age or the incompetent himself. We have ruled
that service of notice to the minor above 14 years
of
age
or
the
incompetent
is
8
jurisdictional. Failing to have notice sent to Juan
Lagmay, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to
proceed with the hearing on 8 October 1990,
receive the petitioner's testimony, if he did at all,
and thereafter appoint her as Juan Lagmay's
guardian. Nor was the respondent Judge justified
in issuing on 22 January 1990 pursuant to the
petitioner's 17 January 1990 motion 9 an order
appointing deputy sheriffs Oscar Fantastico and
Romualdo Baladad as special sheriffs to take
custody over the person of Juan Lagmay from one
Florencio "Boy" Cortes of Bolinao, Pangasinan. In
the said order, respondent Judge further directed
Boy Cortes "to release from his custody and
deliver
the
person
of
said
Juan
R.
Lagmay, a.k.a. John
R.
Lagmay
to
the
aforementioned special sheriffs immediately upon
receipt
of
this
Order,
under
pain
of
10
contempt." Based on the special sheriffs'
report, 11 however, Boy Cortes did not release
Juan Lagmay because the latter was too weak
and sickly to travel. This refusal prompted the
respondent Judge to order Boy Cortes' arrest (for
contempt) and confinement until he shall have
complied with the said order. 12 It was respondent
Flores who forwarded the warrant of arrest to the
PNP Regional Command at San Fernando, La
Union for its service. 13

Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor

or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of
First Instance of the province, or in the justice of
the peace court of the municipality, or in the
municipal court of the chartered city where the
minor or incompetent resides,. . . . (emphasis
supplied).

Having acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case

and appoint Regina Valdez as Juan Lagmay's
guardian, respondent Judge acted clearly beyond
his authority when he designated special sheriffs
to take custody of Juan Lagmay, directed the
person who had custody over the latter to deliver
him to the said special sheriffs and ordered the
arrest of the said person who refused to
surrender custody. And even if we are to assume,
for the sake of argument, that the respondent
Judge had validly acquired jurisdiction over the
case and appointed Regina Lagmay as guardian,
and that Boy Cortes did in fact refuse to deliver
Juan Lagmay to the special sheriffs, he
(respondent Judge) would still be guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for ordering Cortes' arrest
and confinement. In such a situation, the
petitioner's remedy would be to file a petition
for habeas corpus, and not to have Boy Cortes
cited for contempt, much less arrested.

Worse, the aforesaid Order of 24 September 1990

did not even direct that notice be served on Juan
Lagmay, the very party sought to be placed
under guardianship. Such an omission, therefore,

We shall now focus our attention to Special

Proceeding No. 1967. It is very strange
proceeding. The case involves a petition for the
"judicial confirmation of the de facto adoption" of

Respondent Judge knew or ought to have known

that his court was not the proper venue for the
case because the person sought to be placed
under guardianship was alleged to be a resident
of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Section 1, Rule 92 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Adoption

Page 11

Cecilia Averion filed on 11 October 1990. The

petitioner therein alleges that she and her late
husband, Fernando Averion who died in 1987
"adopted" Cecilia Averion in 1967; only 1 year
and 3 months old at the time, Cecilia was
supposedly given up by her natural parents, the
whereabouts
of
whom
remain
unknown.
Petitioner further avers that she and her husband,
during his lifetime, reared the child and gave her
all their love, attention, care and understanding.
They also provided her with an education and
considered her as their own child. Hence, the
petition was filed "for the purpose of judicially
confirming the de facto adoption of Cecilia
Averion by herein petitioner and her late
husband." 14 The
said
petition
was
not
accompanied by the written consent of Cecilia
Averion who, at the time of filing, was already of
legal age. On the very day the petition was filed,
respondent Judge forthwith issued a Notice of
Hearing which provided that the petition would be
heard on 31 October 1990; it was likewise
ordered therein that "a copy of this notice be
published once a week for three consecutive
weeks at the expense of the petitioner in a
newspaper of general circulation in La Union and
in the Philippines." 15
From the so-called Minutes of the proceedings of
31 October 1990, 16 as prepared by respondent,
Flores, it appears that the following exhibits were
offered to establish the jurisdiction of the court:
(1) the affidavit of the Editor of the North Tribune,
"a newspaper of general circulation in La Union
and Northern Luzon provinces," published in San
Fernando, La Union, as Exhibit "A"; (2) clippings
of the published order in the 10, 17 and 24
October 1990 issues of the North Tribune, as
Exhibits "A-l," "A-2" and "A-3," respectively; and
(3) the entire issues of the North Tribune for 10,
17 and 24 October 1990, as Exhibits "B," "B-1"
and "B-2," respectively. It may further be gleaned
from the said Minutes that since no opposition
was registered by any other party, the
petitioner's testimony was received by the court.
On 6 November 1990, the respondent Judge
handed down a decision 17 granting the petition
and decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the
petition
and
hereby
confirms
the de
facto adoption of Cecilia Averion by herein
petitioner and her late spouse Fernando Averion
retroactive to the year 1967.
The remedy pursued in Special Proceeding No.
1967 is certainly unusual as we are not aware of
any prescribed action that may be instituted for
the judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption.
Nor do our adjective and substantive laws on
adoption provide for such a proceeding. In fact,
the only proper and authorized procedure relative

Adoption

Page 12

to adoption is outlined in the rule on adoption

itself. 18 That Cecilia Averion had been treated by
the petitioner and her husband as their own child
during the former's minority may only provide
compelling reasons to grant the decree of
adoption notwithstanding her (Cecilia's) having
attained the age of majority. This is one of the
exceptions provided by the Family Code to the
rule that a person of legal age cannot be
adopted. 19
In "confirming" the so-called de facto adoption
and decreeing the same to be "retroactive to the
year 1967," respondent Judge has carved a name
for himself in history for, as already pointed out,
no action or proceeding for judicial confirmation
of a de facto adoption is authorized in this
jurisdiction. Furthermore, by its very nature and
purpose, a decree of adoption can never be made
to retroact. Lastly, considering that the
petitioner's husband had died in 1987, or three
years before the petition was filed, he could not
now be resurrected for purposes of the adoption,
be in fact declared an adopter and be
subsequently bound by the decree to the
prejudice of his heirs.
Then
too,
respondent
Judge
completely
disregarded the fact that Cecilia Averion had
submitted no written consent to the adoption at
the time of the filing of the petition or at any
subsequent date a manifest infirmity. Nor was
Cecilia called to testify in the case. Moreover
there seems to be an irregularity in the
publication of the notice of hearing. It is to be
observed that as indicated in the upper right
hand corner of the first page of the petition, the
proceeding was instituted on 11 October 1990. If
this were so, the notice of hearing which was
issued by the respondent Judge on that same
date 20 could not have been published in the
North Tribune in its 10 October 1990 issue. In his
affidavit, the Editor of the said newspaper
disclosed that the notice was indeed published on
10 October 1990.
All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the
procedural rules on adoption and promulgated
guidelines for himself to suit his own purpose and
design.
Hence, it is evident that Special Proceeding No.
1965 and Special Proceeding No. 1967 were not
only directly filed with the court of the respondent
Judge without passing through the raffle
procedure, the two cases were also resolved by
the latter in a manner that may be characterized
by gross ignorance or the brazen and blatant
disregard of the applicable procedural laws, grave
misconduct, palpable abuse of authority and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. He is therefore unfit to continue in the

service a day longer. He has evidently forgotten

that the administration of justice is a sacred task.
Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be
an ordinary mortal. He becomes "the visible
representation of the law and, more importantly,
of justice." 21 A judge must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence, 22 and
should be studiously careful to avoid even the
slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a
demoralizing example to others. 23
As shown in the above disquisitions, respondent
Flores was a willing participant in the commission
of the irregularities in both proceedings. On the
other hand, however, respondent Munar's
participation has not been substantiated.
Before closing, we would like to point out that per
our Resolution of 2 March 1993, we referred to
Justice De Pano for inclusion in his investigation
the 29 January 1993 letter of Executive Judge
Braulio Yaranon which was addressed to Deputy
Court Administrator Juanito Bernard. 24 In his
letter, Judge Yaranon informs the latter about
matters discovered in the course of the audit
which are more serious than the "illegal raffling"
of cases. He then exposes alleged case fixing and
illegal office practices committed on a large scale
by a syndicate composed principally of court
officers and personnel, and describes the modus
operandi of those involved as follows:
The operation in a particular case, starts with
"AMBULANCE CHASING"; after arrangements are
made with a prospective applicant/petitioner, a
petition is prepared by the syndicate; the same is
then
signed
personally
by
the
petitioner/applicant; and the oath for purposes of
verification, is administered also by the
syndicate.
The petition/application is then filed with the
Office of the Clerk of Court, where syndicate
members receive and docket the case in the
docket book of Branch 26; the case is deliberately
separated from the cases that are turned over to
the Raffle Committee, and is directly turned over
to Branch 26. Care is taken that the date of filing
is made to coincide with the scheduled day for
raffling of cases (Tuesdays).
On the same date of filing, the ORDER setting the
case for initial hearing, is issued by Branch 26. On
the date of initial hearing, a lawyer-contact of the
syndicate enters an appearance for the
petitioner/applicant, and he then presents
jurisdictional facts.
On the very same day of initial
proceedings) and without any
(in special proceedings and
cases), for the reception of

Adoption

hearing (in special

ACTUAL HEARING
land registration
evidence on the

Page 13

material
allegations
application/petition, a
issued.

of
facts
DECISION is

in
the
forthwith

Judge Yaranon then partly concludes:

Just one aspect of the matter is herein submitted
for consideration. The issuance of a DECISION
without any previous hearing being held for the
reception of evidence by the applicant/petitioner,
constitutes
FALSIFICATION
OF
A
PUBLIC
DOCUMENT by a public officer, under Article 171,
Revised Penal Code committed by:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in an act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate; . . . (par. 2, Art. 171,
Revised Penal Code).
According to Justice De Pano, he received the 2
March 1993 Resolution just as he was about to
write his report in this case. He then suggests
that the matter subject thereof be treated
separately and that "appropriate, charges be
leveled against the respondent Judge principally,
and his cohorts with the Tanod Bayan, for criminal
prosecution." 25 Indeed, the referral of Judge
Yaranon's letter to Justice De Pano may have
been too late. In any event, the charges proffered
therein may be separately dealt with.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment
is hereby rendered:
(1) DISMISSING from the service respondent
Judge GENARO C. GINES with prejudice to reemployment, in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations,
and with forfeiture of all benefits except earned
leave credits. This dismissal shall be immediately
executory and said respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to forthwith vacate his position and
desist from performing any further official
function;
(2) SUSPENDING from office respondents MA.
GORGONIA L. FLORES and ALFREDO
V.
LACSAMANA, JR. for a period of six (6) months
each, without pay;
(3) SUSPENDING from office respondent MA.
CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, for a period of three (3)
months, without, pay.
The foregoing suspensions shall take effect
immediately upon the service of a copy of this
Decision on the aforenamed respondents MA.
GORGONIA L. FLORES, ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA,
JR. and MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ. The periods of
their respective suspensions shall not be charged
against their leave credits, if any;

(4) DISMISSING this case as against respondent

PACITA B. DIAZ in view of her demise; and
(5) DISMISSING this case as against respondent
ROSIE M. MUNAR for lack of substantial evidence.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby
directed to evaluate the 29 January 1993 letter of
Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon subject of the
2 March 1993 Resolution of this Court in this case
and to submit to this Court appropriate
recommendations thereon within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167405

February 16, 2006

ANA
JOYCE
S.
REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge,
RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY.
PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of
Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in
his capacity as Special Administrator,
CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING,
ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and
ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to modify the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14,
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the
Resolution dated May 14, 2005 denying the
motion for reconsideration. In the assailed
judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set
aside the September 18, 2002 and November 12,
2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No.
204 but refrained from dismissing the petition for
letters of administration and settlement of estate
on the ground that petitioner must first prove
that she was legally adopted by the decedent,
Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L.
Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration and settlement of estate
of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui,
Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No.
204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed
that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died
intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of
Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos,
Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising,
Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents
Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.

Adoption

Page 14

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real

properties located in the municipalities of Ramos
and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of
jewelry and money which were allegedly in the
possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a
grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed
that she be appointed administrator of the estate,
upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and
distribution of Lisings properties to the legal
heirs.1
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an
Opposition2 to the petition, claiming that she was
an adopted child of Lising and the latters
husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died on
November 30, 1970. She asserted that the
petition should be dismissed and that the
appointment
of
an
administrator
was
unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising
who passed away without leaving any debts. She
further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as
administrator of Lisings estate because of her
"antagonistic interests" against the decedent.
Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have
questioned the decedents title to a piece of real
property which forms a large part of the estate.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a
Supplement to the Opposition3 attaching thereto
the Certification4issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page
76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees,
Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin
Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in
Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3,
promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly
registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar on
January 29, 1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification 5 issued
by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City,
stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec.
Proc. No. 1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing
petitioners adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin
Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of
Judicial Form No. 436 indicating that the adoption
decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of
the adoption decree was recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court finds this
petition a proper case for adoption and therefore
grants the same. Consequently, the Court
declares that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C.
Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural parents Orlando Zalzos and May C.
Castro, and is to all legal intents and purposes
the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos
and Elena Lising.7

Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final

Distribution8 issued by the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the
death of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits
were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and his
"daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to
submit documentary evidence to prove the
jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on
petitioners opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos
appears to have filed a Comment/Reply to
Oppositors Opposition,10 after which the RTC
ordered the parties to submit memoranda
thereon.11 On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.12
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her
alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals
a petition for annulment of the adoption decree
docketed as SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no
proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took
place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) had no records of the adoption case.
Petitioners natural mother supposedly connived
with the court personnel to make it appear that
petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos
spouses and that the CFIs order for initial hearing
was published in a weekly newspaper which was
not authorized to publish court orders in special
proceedings.
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on
October 4, 1999, the suspension of hearings in
Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP
No. 53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of
Appeals dismissed15 SP No. 53457 for failure to
comply with the third paragraph of Section 4,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 16 The said dismissal
became final and executory on March 8, 2000.17
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a
motion before the RTC praying that the opposition
to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and that
the petition be dismissed.18 This was followed by
an Urgent Ex Parte Motion19 filed by petitioner on
October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate
resolution of her opposition.
On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a
Comment20 to the opposition stating that
reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioners
claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly
to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also
informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal
complaint against petitioner before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged
falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial
Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.

Adoption

Page 15

Subsequently,
the
RTC
issued
a
Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring
resolution of petitioners opposition to Spec. Proc.
No. 204, pending the outcome of the criminal
case filed against the latter. In the meantime, the
parties were enjoined from dissipating or
disposing any or all of the properties included in
the estate of Elena Lising without order from this
Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent
Motion to Appoint Special Administrator 22 before
the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true
determination and appraisal of the decedents
universal estate. It was prayed therein that the
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be
appointed special administrator as he was "an
experienced and able person in the management
of properties" and is "honest, impartial,
competent and acceptable to the majority of the
interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found
probable cause to charge petitioner with
falsification of public documents per resolution
dated January 5, 2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed
the said finding to the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents
motion for the appointment of a special
administrator and appointed its branch clerk of
court, Atty. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration on the grounds that the branch
clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the
task of special administrator, and that Atty.
Saguyod was appointed without being required to
file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the
petition should be dismissed because she is the
sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on
November 5, 2001.26
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the
Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal
complaint
against
petitioner.27 Undaunted,
Chichioco filed a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged
co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin
petitioner from conducting business in a property
belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco
alleged that petitioner converted the basement of
Lisings residence into a billiard hall without
authority of the special administrator.28
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution
on September 18, 2002, the dispositive part of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is

hereby enjoined from conducting business
activity in any of the properties left by the
decedent. The Special Administrator is also
empowered to take control and possession of the
listed personal and real properties of the
decedent and those that may be found to be
owned or registered in the name of the same.

the trial court that she was indeed adopted by

the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the
appellate court, "imputations of irregularities
permeating the adoption decree render its
authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having
been denied on March 15, 2005, 34 hence this
petition on the following assigned errors:

SO ORDERED.29
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above resolution which was denied by the RTC on
November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also
issued a resolution dismissing respondent
Chichiocos petition for review in the criminal
case.30
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the
September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002
resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said
resolutions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to
possess and use the decedents property, title
over which automatically passed on to her upon
the latters death. Moreover, the special
administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a
bond and submit an inventory of the decedents
estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc.
No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal
by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457
constituted res judicata as to the former. There
was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption
and she consequently remains to be the sole heir
of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there
was no need for the appointment of an
administrator or for the settlement proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial
court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge
Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in
appointing his branch clerk of court as special
administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez, 33 the
appellate court reasoned that such act could
engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his
clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedents
estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply
with the requirements of a bond and inventory
and could not therefore take control and
possession of any of the decedents properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss
Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No.
53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did
not operate as res judicata to the former. It was
also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before

Adoption

Page 16

A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY
OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF
IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE
39.35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A
DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS.36
The petition is meritorious.
On the first assigned error, we agree with
petitioner that she need not prove her legal
adoption by any evidence other than those which
she had already presented before the trial court.
To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from
the local civil registrars office that the adoption
decree was registered therein and also a copy of
Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by
the clerk of court that the decree was on file in
the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both
certifications were issued under the seal of the
issuing offices and were signed by the proper
officers. These are thus presumed to have been
regularly issued as part of the official duties that
said public officers perform.37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption
decree is a public document38 required by law to
be entered into the public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial
pronouncements
affecting
the
status
of
individuals, is the local civil registrars office as
well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.39 As such, the certifications issued
by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court
regarding details of petitioners adoption which
are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. These certifications suffice as
proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by the
Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or
overcome
by
sufficient
evidence.
Mere
"imputations of irregularities" will not cast a
"cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the
certifications and its contents are presumed valid
until proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such

contrary proof can be presented only in a
separate action brought principally for the
purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The
latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedents
estate, as categorically held in Santos v.
Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot
assail in these proceedings the validity of the
adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners
claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent.
Absent a categorical pronouncement in an
appropriate proceeding that the decree of
adoption is void, the certifications regarding the
matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should
be deemed legitimate, genuine and real.
Petitioners status as an adopted child of the
decedent remains unrebutted and no serious
challenge has been brought against her standing
as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioners
adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot
claim any interest in the decedents estate. For
this reason, we agree with petitioner that Spec.
Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.

matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to

the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this
Court. The remand of the case to the lower court
for further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the Court is in a position to resolve the
dispute based on the evidence before it. 42 This is
in keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules
of procedure which is to secure for the parties a
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding.43 Hence, since the
grounds for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204
are extant in the records and there is no cogent
reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc.
No. 204 should be dismissed.

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41

G.R. No. 155733

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents

- x x x and those who, like them x x x, claim an
interest in the estate x x x as alleged first
cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the
settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in
the order of intestate succession adopted
children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and
1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as
long as the adoption must be - as in the instant
case - considered valid. (Emphasis added)

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES

OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND
GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF
LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA
VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA
DELGADO
VDA.
DE
DANAO,
ANGELA
DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA,
TERESA
DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA,
RODOLFO
DELGADO,
BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO
and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF
GORGONIO
DELGADO,
namely,
RAMON
DELGADO
CAMPO,
CARLOS
DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA,
YOLANDA
DELGADO
ENCINAS,
FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA
DELGADO
CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE
DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN
and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA
RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZSISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZRODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL
R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR.,
namely,
JOSEFINA
RUSTIA
ALBANO,
VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA,
JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA,
LETICIA
RUSTIA-MIRANDA;
and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and
GUILLERMA
RUSTIA,
as
2
3
Intervenor, Respondents.

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be

valid, would necessarily exclude respondents
from inheriting from the decedent since they are
mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the
proceedings below to continue would serve no
salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of
the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec.
Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our
pronouncement relative to the presumed validity
of petitioners adoption.
Moreover, it must be stressed that all the
evidence pertinent to the resolution of the
petitioners opposition, which is actually a motion
to
dismiss
the
petition
for
letters
of
administration and settlement of the estate, is a
matter of record in the instant case. The same
has in fact been submitted for resolution before
the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the
only pending incident before the RTC. The parties
have likewise amply ventilated their positions on
the matter through their respective pleadings
filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose
will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the

Adoption

Page 17

Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need

to discuss petitioners second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

DECISION

January 27, 2006

CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed
and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its
decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the
intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively
simple: who,
between
petitioners
and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the
decedents. However, it is attended by several
collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,
consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his
nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and
the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of
the decedents.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa

Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented
to establish it, not even so much as an allegation
of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What
is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the
surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with
Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married,
his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was
"hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child
of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any
mention of the name and other circumstances of
his
father.16 Nevertheless,
oppositors
(now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record
of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean
that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972
without a will. She was survived by Guillermo
Rustia and some collateral relatives, the
petitioners herein. Several months later, on June
15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit
of selfadjudication
of
the
comprising her estate.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of
Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the
couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa
Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo,
hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all
natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only
man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis
Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio
Campo which was admittedly one without the
benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon
Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and
Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine
whether their successional rights fall within the
ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado
had been validly married, then their only child
Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother
of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from
the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs
would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation
between
the
legitimate
and

Adoption

illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple

were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs
would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados
intestate estate, as they would all be within the
illegitimate line.

Page 18

remaining

properties

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa

Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According
to petitioners, the two eventually lived together
as husband and wife but were never married. To
prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no
record of the contested marriage existed in the
civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate
naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors
referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried
woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other
hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no
marriage
transpired.
They
maintain
that
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were
married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived
together as husband and wife until the death of
Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period
spanning more than half a century, they were
known among their relatives and friends to have
in fact been married. To support their proposition,
oppositors presented the following pieces of
evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated

[December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;

ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under

oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or natural children
by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by
his death on February 28, 1974.

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D.

Rustia on June 25, 1947;

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died

without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely,
Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso,
Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia
and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24

3.
Veterans
Application
for
Pension
or
Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of
the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA
Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration
of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself
[swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in
Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of
Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to
Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had
any children. With no children of their own, they
took into their home the youngsters Guillermina
Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,
never legally adopted by the couple, were what
was known in the local dialect as ampunampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo
Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the
intervenor-respondent
Guillerma
Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According
to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his
daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that
status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers
demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which
was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children.
Also, her report card from the University of Santo
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit
that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was
never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo
died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she
presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the
death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-

Adoption

Page 19

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao,
the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo
Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3)
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
The opposition was grounded on the theory that
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other
claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood
relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a
motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
she was the only surviving descendant in the
direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein),
the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of
administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married
but had merely lived together as husband and
wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents
herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in
the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia
was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and
the other claimants remained in issue and should
be properly threshed out upon submission of
evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa
substituted
for
her
sister,
Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18,
1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota

Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of
both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of
the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and
enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are
hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said
Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of
Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to
partition the same among themselves in
accordance with the proportions referred to in
this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is
hereby declared as the sole and only surviving
heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus,
entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent,
to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other
parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of
Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J.
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared of no force and effect.

SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal
which was denied on the ground that the record
on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which
was
dismissed
by the
Court
of
Appeals.31 However,
on
motion
for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself
and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the
interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners
assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on
the ground that oppositors failure to file the
record on appeal within the reglementary period
was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the
appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed
the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent
portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed
must be followed. However,
circumstances, a delay in the
may be excused on grounds of

to do certain acts
under exceptional
filing of an appeal
substantial justice.

xxx xxx xxx

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as
yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in
accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the
petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has
established her right to the appointment as
administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the
intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR.
GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of
the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts
of administration of the subject estates, and is
likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed
administratix all her collections of the rentals and
income due on the assets of the estates in
question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to
the petitioner and appointed administratix
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA,
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The
same oppositor is hereby required to render an
accounting of her actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty
(60) days from receipt hereof.

Adoption

Page 20

The respondent court likewise pointed out the

trial courts pronouncements as to certain
matters
of
substance,
relating
to
the
determination of the heirs of the decedents and
the party entitled to the administration of their
estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but
were barred absolutely by the denial of the record
on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to
raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to
delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
the APPROVAL of the private respondents
Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial
Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.

Acting
on
the
appeal,
the
Court
of
Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the
Court
of
Appeals
amended
its
earlier
decision.36 The
dispositive
portion
of
the
amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed
decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been
legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to
partition among themselves the intestate estate
of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the
proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late
Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to
partition his estate in accordance with the
proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to
the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon
his or her qualification and filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts
of administration of the subject estates and to
turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the
assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining
to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and
posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia)
actual
administration
of
the
estates
in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from notice of the administrators qualification
and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of selfadjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings to determine the extent of
the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected
by the said adjudication.

1. whether there was a valid marriage between

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or
non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts.
Presumptions are classified into presumptions of
law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of
law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to
the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them
to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition
for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them
as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. They make much of the absence of a
record of the contested marriage, the testimony
of a witness38 attesting that they were not
married, and a baptismal certificate which
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or
unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered
a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is

Hence, this recourse.

Adoption

The issues for our resolution are:

Page 21

not always proof that no marriage in fact took

place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least
be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued
to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the
declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo
Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the
name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public
documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
of the truth of the recitals therein was presented
by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own
witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that
Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived
together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive
proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of
the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of
marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law
leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are
not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the
common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa
Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with
Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are
either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes
so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter
how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other

Adoption

Page 22

hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is

the presumption of marriage, can be relied on
only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the
contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged
marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio.
The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely
to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence
as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado
and
(2)
Luis
Delgados
and
Caridad
Concepcions Partida
de
49
Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption
of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon
Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his
half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to
observation:

this

matter

is

the

following

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y

with another woman, C; then X and Y would be
natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between
illegitimate children and legitimate children of the
same
parent,
even
though
there
is
unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It
seems that to allow an illegitimate child to
succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate
child begotten with a parent different from that of
the former, would be allowing the illegitimate
child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the
half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition
on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case
under consideration. That prohibition has for its
basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no
such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if
begotten with different persons. They all stand on
the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. We
submit, therefore, that the rules regarding

succession of legitimate brothers and sisters

should be applicable to them. Full blood
illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive
double the portion of half-blood brothers and
sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of
the half-blood, they shall share equally. 53

one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the

estate by means of an affidavit filed in the
office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado

were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they
were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each
other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado.

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia

is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As
such, she may be entitled to successional rights
only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of
an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already
the new Civil Code that was in effect.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us

are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article
972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and
sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers
and sisters, or their children who were still alive
at the time of her death on September 8, 1972.
They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or
their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of
her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they
are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other one-half.

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till

August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely
had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict
was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to
illegitimate children but only on condition that
they were first recognized or acknowledged by
the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may
compulsory
or
voluntary.60 Recognition
compulsory in any of the following cases:

be
is

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when

the period of the offense coincides more or less
with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of
status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time
when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father;

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than

Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence

or proof that the defendant is his father. 62

SECTION
1. Extrajudicial
settlement
by
agreement between heirs. If the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age,
or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two

grounds: first, compulsory recognition through
the open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing.

Adoption

Page 23

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be

made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic
writing.63

There was apparently no doubt that she

possessed the status of an illegitimate child from
her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute

acknowledgment but a mere ground by which

she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial)
action for compulsory acknowledgment has a
dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can
no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas
right
to
claim
compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of
Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas
second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This
includes a public instrument or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his. 67 Did
intervenors report card from the University of
Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary
prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately
not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did
not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The
fact that his name appears there as intervenors
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no
participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia
himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa
Delgado which was published in the Sunday
Times on September 10, 1972, that published
obituary
was
not
the
authentic
writing
contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of
Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not
the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The
failure to present the original signed manuscript
was fatal to intervenors claim.
The
same
misfortune
befalls the ampunampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was
never adopted in accordance with law. Although a
petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was
dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the
ruling of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the
deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to
inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem,
which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance
with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not
of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely
artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out,

Adoption

Page 24

otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The

fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the
claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia,
namely,
intervenor
Guillerma
Rustia
and
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia,
are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article
1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are
the remaining claimants, consisting of his
sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the
court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted. If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that the
administration be granted to some other person,
it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the
principal consideration is the interest in the
estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of
co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties
or factions be represented in the management of
the estates,72a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint

administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are
the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,

JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to

reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The
assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals
is AFFIRMED with
the
following
modifications:

ZOILO
ANTONIO
VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD
ALLAN
KELLEY
POE,
a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.

1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of

self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

G. R. No. 161824

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall

inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a)
the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who
survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa
Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have
predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to
determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half
share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be
inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares
shall be per capita) and the children of the late
Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia
and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian
and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased,
their respective shares shall pertain to their
estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still
unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint
administrators, upon their qualification and filing
of the requisite bond in such amount as may be
determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.

DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD

Adoption

G.R. No. 161634

March 3, 2004

x-----------------------------x
March 3, 2004

VICTORINO
X.
FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN
AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on
those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly
by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or
by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all
of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship
is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office
of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and
now one of the main contenders for the
presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to
face with Spanish and American colonial roots
and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law
and common law traditions, the fusion resulting
in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could
be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161434

x-----------------------------x

Page 25

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan

Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate

of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe,
his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824,
entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus
Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a
petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that
FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions
- first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to
a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the
COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate
of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an
affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y
Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a
certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of
Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the
Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there
was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification
from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives to the effect that
no available information could be found in the
files of the National Archives regarding the birth
of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two
documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being - a) a certification issued
by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of

Adoption

Page 26

the National Archives that there appeared to be

no available information regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
National Archives that no available information
about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of
Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo
Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death
of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the
City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office
during the period of from 1900 until May 1946
were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA
No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or
on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G.
R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction
or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R.
No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434,
entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections,
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.),
and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed
G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez,
vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on
the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of
FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to
or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ
was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC,

petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false"
in consonance with the general powers of
COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code "Section 52. Powers and functions of the
Commission on Elections. In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections" and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny
or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any
nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification
cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per
Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule
653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also
reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of
the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same
Constitution provides that judicial power is vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law which power "includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

Adoption

Page 27

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up

in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and
could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court.
A contrary view could be a gross denial to our
people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy the highest
government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and
Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions
of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead
take on the petitions they directly instituted
before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987
Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be
the sole judge of presidential and vicepresidential contests, has constrained this Court
to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as "not (being)
justiciable" controversies or disputes involving
contests
on
the
elections,
returns
and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on
21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An
Act Constituting an Independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and
the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same."
Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might
have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793,
the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be
deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in
reference to a post-election scenario. Election
contests consist of either an election protest or a
quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,
to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme

Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support

this premise "Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is
initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or
Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for
quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered
candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election
of the President or the Vice-President, as the case
may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A
quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as
being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office.5 In such context, the election
contest can only contemplate a post-election
scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or
third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include
cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or
vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on
Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to
first give a brief historical background on the
concept of citizenship.

Adoption

Page 28

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship

was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384
to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a
man who shared in the administration of justice
and in the holding of an office.6 Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency
of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be
adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence.7 The concept grew to include one who
would both govern and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen
to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the
other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in
public life and fundamentally willing to submit his
private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone
changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
the concept was limited, by and large, to civil
citizenship,
which
established
the
rights
necessary for individual freedom, such as rights
to property, personal liberty and justice. 9 Its
meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed
the right to participate in the exercise of political
power.10 The 20th century saw the next stage of
the development of social citizenship, which laid
emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
well-being and social security.11 The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western
Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to
the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens"
during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain"
or "Spanish subjects."13 In church records, the
natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard
for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish
laws on citizenship became highly codified during
the 19th century but their sheer number made it
difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not
all of these citizenship laws of Spain however,
were made to apply to the Philippine Islands
except for those explicitly extended by Royal
Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to
the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain
on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was
extended to the Philippines remained to be the
subject
of
differing
views
among
15
experts; however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the

Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14

August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August
1868 specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands, 17 and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July
1870, which was expressly made applicable to
the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.18

to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court

of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they
shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they reside.

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never

extended to the Philippine Islands because of the
express mandate of its Article 89, according to
which the provisions of the Ultramar among
which this country was included, would be
governed by special laws.19

Thus

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective

in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which
came out with the first categorical enumeration
of who were Spanish citizens. -

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending

legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did
not become American citizens, they, however,
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws
and were thus issued passports describing them
to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.

"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even
if they were born outside of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in
Philippine history. Already in the state of decline
as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her
sole colony in the East to an upcoming world
power, the United States. An accepted principle
of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect
on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10
December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil
rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United
States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula,
residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all
their rights of property, including the right to sell
or dispose of such property or of its proceeds;
and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce, and professions, being
subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in
the territory they may preserve their allegiance

Adoption

Page 29

"The civil rights and political status of the native

inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the
Congress."22

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands"

appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of
1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States
on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen
hundred and ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the
Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day
of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to
include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children
born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01
July 1902, during which period no citizenship law
was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to
the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
the time, that the common law principle of jus

soli, otherwise also known as the principle of

territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.25 More about this
later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United
States made the following amendment to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is
hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
other insular possession of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United
States, under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the
first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was
used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor
General in the Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for
the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy
Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in
1912 -

the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that

date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent
views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution
brought to an end to any such link with common
law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis
or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino
citizenship "Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The
following are citizens of the Philippines "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law."

"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who

were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have
since become citizens of some other country;
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under
the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935

Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that
women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns -

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of

the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are

citizens of the Philippines.

Adoption

Page 30

"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The

following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship

pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article
also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries
an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless
by her act or omission she is deemed, under the
law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable
proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now
provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
include "those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared
to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the
1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,
jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28 had

Adoption

Page 31

been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus

sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli,
per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29 (1912), did not
last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become the primary
basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner
would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate,
however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident
of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at
the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The
certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to
an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be
on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate,
Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years
old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and
an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ,
would disclose that he was born on 20 August
1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years
old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen,
twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties
on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions
that could be drawn with some degree of
certainty from the documents would be that 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to
each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September
1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient
to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born
Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F.

Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ,

and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a
public officer. The documents have been
submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A"
for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for
respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou
was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5."
While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility
thereof, particularly in reference to the facts
which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage
certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on
11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan,
were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized
those material statements in his argument. All
three documents were certified true copies of the
originals.

record which makes more likely the prior

exposure of such errors as might have occurred.31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would
indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at
the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It
could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born
sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines
was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue
that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during
the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record
about such fact in the Records Management and
Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise
failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other
place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was
stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person
at the time of his death was also his residence
before death. It would be extremely doubtful if
the Records Management and Archives Office
would have had complete records of all residents
of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Proof of Paternity and Filiation
"Original
document
must
be
produced;
exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"(d) When the original is a public record in the

custody of a public office or is recorded in a
public office."

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in
establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity
(relationship or civil status of the father to the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being
an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

"Entries in official records. Entries in official

records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated."

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force

in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up
until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the
Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish
filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if
done during the lifetime of the putative parent;
voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a
record
of
birth,
a
will,
or
a
public
32
document. Complementary to the new code was
Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing
in Section 5 thereof, that -

The trustworthiness of public documents and the

value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of
that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin
of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of

"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth

certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by
the parents of the infant or only by the mother if
the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not
be permissible to state or reveal in the document
the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any

Being public documents, the death certificate of

Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents.
Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides:

Adoption

Page 32

information by which such father could be

identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be
utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required
to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure
of such requirement rendered the same useless
as
being
an
authoritative
document
of
recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court
ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the
registry law was enacted, the question here really
is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1),
which is merely a certified copy of the registry
record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of
his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it.
While it contains the names of both parents,
there is no showing that they signed the original,
let alone swore to its contents as required in
Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them
who furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the
birth certificate is in the nature of a public
document wherein voluntary recognition of a
natural child may also be made, according to the
same Article 131. True enough, but in such a
case, there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as
his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ,
presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found.
There being no will apparently executed, or at
least shown to have been executed, by decedent
Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court
defined what could constitute such a document
as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two
classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated
by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the
means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The
1950
Civil
Code
categorized
the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory.
Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any

Adoption

Page 33

authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took

place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of
an illegitimate child who was recognized or
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to
claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally
to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during
the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to
be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or
indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include
a
public
instrument
(one
duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted
by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules;
Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child
die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall
survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.
"x x x

xxx

x x x.

"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.

"The action must be brought within the same

period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are
retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia
Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:

vs.

Court

of

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily

recognized natural child should be decided under
Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the
voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take
place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of
laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article
278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away
from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within
the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child. The provisions are intended
to merely govern the private and personal affairs
of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that
the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the
individual would also affect his political rights or,
in general, his relationship to the State. While,
indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found
in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken
in the context of private relations, the domain of
civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its
double purpose the organization of the family and
the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine
and regulate the relations of assistance, authority
and obedience among members of a family, and
those which exist among members of a society
for the protection of private interests."37

consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such

as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband
and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing
property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil
effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons
and properties of the spouses, are questions that
are governed exclusively by the national law of
the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to
Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code
a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the
Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and
family relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his
adoptive parents and accorded the same rights
as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil
law41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias
against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude
may be traced to the Spanish family and property
laws, which, while defining proprietary and
successional rights of members of the family,
provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate
and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up
of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of
titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these
bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has

held:

These distinctions between legitimacy and

illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived
when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary
source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
however, remains and should remain only in the
sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of

Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although
they reside in a foreign country; that, in

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of

determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably
tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.
The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof

Adoption

Page 34

of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not

have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations. The ordinary rules
on evidence could well and should govern. For
instance, the matter about pedigree is not
necessarily precluded from being applicable by
the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

"x x x

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court

provides -

"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had

their first child in 1938.

"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or

declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may
be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word `pedigree
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree."

"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their

first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our
mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now
Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of
Manila in 1945, except for some months between
1943-1944.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary

that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy
has occurred, and (e) the relationship between
the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.

"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to

the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate
child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by

Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC,
might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F.
Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship
with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley
and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one
house, and as one family -

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be

unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity.
In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,42 this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound

mind, presently residing in Stockton, California,
U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law
do hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the
name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known
in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20,
1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street,
Manila.

Adoption

Page 35

xxx

xxx

"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met

and became engaged while they were students at
the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was
also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister
that same year.

"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie,

were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this

12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley
Testing

Mangahas

Declarant

DNA

"Parentage
will
still
be
resolved
using
conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately,
we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing.
The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that
the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still

open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate

case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on
the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was

not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father.
It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before
the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV,
Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.

Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential

Conclusiveness

"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about

the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was
an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who
was already a Filipino because of his mother who
still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe

were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley,
Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage
with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous
and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage
between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
most doubtful at best. But the documentary
evidence introduced by no less than respondent
himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his
parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August
1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother
who were married to each other a year later, or
on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried
parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child,
FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother,
Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his
stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs.
Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra
vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by
amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the
lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was
on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a
decision constituting doctrine under the rule of
stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was
irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement
would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum
which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite
the Court to look closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about
an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was
about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was
the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese
father. The issue was whether the stepson
followed the naturalization of the stepfather.
Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson
did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.

Adoption

Page 36

"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more

complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of
Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his
father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin
therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said
that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in
fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino.
If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son
Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But
instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's
father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino
because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement
about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the
case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple,
simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs.
Vivo.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement

would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution not once but
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable
distinctions was established long ago by People
vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction
between legitimate children and illegitimate
children rests on real differences. x x x But real
differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction.
Real
differences
may
justify

distinction for one purpose but not for another

purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or
illegitimacy to elective public service? What
possible state interest can there be for
disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming
a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the
child of the fullness of political rights for no fault
of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from
holding an important public office is to punish
him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is
neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there
is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction,
then the distinction transgresses the equal
protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente
Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin
Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately
hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed
fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate
child as taking after the citizenship of its mother,
it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure
a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an
alien father in line with the assumption that the
mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most
significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on
the day, month and year of birth of respondent
FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is.
Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions
where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the
petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution
of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the
petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for
the disqualification of respondent FPJ from
running for the position of President in the
10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material

Adoption

Page 37

representation in his certificate of candidacy by

representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction
and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434
and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as
the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and
vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of
the Court can directly be invoked only after, not
before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether
grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty
of
having
made
a
material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has
been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, 48 must
not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners,
versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner,
versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse
of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the
petition in SPA No. 04-003.

until the latter died, and even before his death he

had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption, but was prevented by
petitioner's supplication, however with his further
request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to
respondent in the future.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his

surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the
feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with
the Professional Regulation Commission showed
his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally
issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his
dealings and activities in connection with his
practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M.
Sibulo.

No Costs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143989

July 14, 2003

ISABELITA
S.
LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to
as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most
less than complete without children. The
realization could have likely prodded the spouses
Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take
into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin
Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the
tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the
warmth, love and support of the couple who
treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years,
Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting
Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided
to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an
order granting the petition was issued that made
all the more intense than before the feeling of
affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping
with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga
City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to
"Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later.
Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she
averred
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and
pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to
change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the
frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband

Adoption

Page 38

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and

living alone in this city with only her household
helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care
and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to
Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the
medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became
more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those
were the times when petitioner would need most
the care and support from a love one, but
respondent all the more remained callous and
utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not
expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been
jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces
whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only
motivated by their desire for some material
benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible
attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the
latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing
that after all respondent's only motive to his
adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights
over the properties of herein petitioner and her
late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of
Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against
petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and
affection towards respondent, rendering the
decree of adoption, considering respondent to be
the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has
been negated for which reason there is no more
basis for its existence, hence this petition for
revocation,"1

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on

22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also
known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into
effect. The new statute deleted from the law the
right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now
reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption.
Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance
of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen
(18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded
on any of the following grounds committed by the
adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of
the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.

"Petitioner however, insists that her right to

rescind long acquired under the provisions of the
Family Code should be respected. Assuming for
the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption of respondent granted on
May 5, 1972, said right should have been
exercised within the period allowed by the Rules.
From the averments in the petition, it appears
clear that the legal grounds for the petition have
been discovered and known to petitioner for more
than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the
instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the
action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5,
Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises
the following questions; viz:

"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child,

shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis
supplied)

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May

1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the

petition, contending principally (a) that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b)
that the petitioner had no cause of action in view
of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552.
Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that
the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not
retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the
ground for rescission of the adoption vested
under the regime of then Article 348 2of the Civil
Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.

A brief background on the law and its origins

could provide some insights on the subject. In
ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to
assure male heirs in the family. 5 The continuity of
the adopter's family was the primary purpose of
adoption and all matters relating to it basically
focused on the rights of the adopter. There was
hardly any mention about the rights of the
adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain
and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance
within the family, neither allowed nor recognized
adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption
was given an impetus in law and still later when
the welfare of the child became a paramount
concern.8 Spain itself which previously disfavored
adoption ultimately relented and accepted the
Roman law concept of adoption which,
subsequently, was to find its way to the
archipelago. The Americans came and introduced
their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most
countries in Europe, made the interests of the
child an overriding consideration.9 In the early
part of the century just passed, the rights of
children invited universal attention; the Geneva
Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,10 followed
by
the
United
Nations
Declarations of the Rights of the Child,11 were
written instruments that would also protect and
safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil
Code of the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption,
later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code13 and then by the Family Code of the

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court

held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369
confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been
designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer of said complaint
(De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil.
365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No.
8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an
adoption earlier granted under the Family Code.
Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed
there is lack of cause of action.

Adoption

Page 39

2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action

prescribed?

Philippines,14gave
immediate
statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In
1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention
of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State
Party to the Convention, accepted the principle
that adoption was impressed with social and
moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No.
8552 secured these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the
legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in
his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to
rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties
created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No.
8552 should not adversely affect her right to
annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both
being vested under the Civil Code and the Family
Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due process 15 that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action;16 it includes not only legal
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand
but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested. 17 Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is
a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and
perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to
adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C.
Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and
Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603)
allowed
an
adoption
to
be
sought
by either spouse or both of them. After the trial
court had rendered its decision and while the
case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code
of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209), mandating joint adoption by the husband
and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued
that the case should be dismissed for having
been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without
being joined by the husband. The Court
concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. The
petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the
court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in
effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition,
without being joined by her husband, according
to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,21 spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both
aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29
July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize
Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken

Adoption

Page 40

into their care. At the time the action was

commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt.
After the decree of adoption and while on appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was
enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying
aliens from adopting Filipino children. The
Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the
adoption decree. In discarding the argument
posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled
that the controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975.
By then, the new law,22 had already abrogated
and repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that
the action for rescission of the adoption decree,
having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No.
8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the
statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule
10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise
of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of
a vested right entitled to protection. It must also
be acknowledged that a person has no vested
right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has
often been referred to in the context of a "right,"
the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate
or fundamental but rather a right merely created
by statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by
the state's determination on what it may deem to
be for the best interest and welfare of the
child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the
adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by
statute may be taken away at anytime before it
has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn
from an adopter a consequential right to rescind
the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable,
it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the
Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be
the hackneyed truism that those caught in the
law have to live with. It is still noteworthy,
however, that an adopter, while barred from
severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for
valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving

child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized

by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child
his legitime and, by a will and testament, may
freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court
a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

OF

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be

meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed
from
all
obligations
of
obedience
and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother,
and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
petitioners legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be
entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the

National Statistics Office for record purposes.

DECISION

SO ORDERED."4

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for

clarification and/or reconsideration5 praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her

natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig,
herein petitioner, filed a petition 1 to adopt his
minor
illegitimate
child Stephanie
Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga
Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her
mothers middle name and surname; and that he
is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the
assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence
presented by the petitioner, and in the absence
of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds
that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualification provided for by
law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is
qualified to maintain, care for and educate the
child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition
would redound to the best interest and welfare of
the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
Court further holds that the petitioners care and
custody of the child since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance
with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential
Decree No. 603.

Adoption

Page 41

On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied

petitioners motion for reconsideration holding
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of
whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in
depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no
law prohibiting an adopted child from having a
middle name in case there is only one adopting
parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to
have as middle name the surname of the mother;
(3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit
and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her
right to bear a proper name should not be
violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name "Garcia" (her mothers surname)
avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is
not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her
middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain

Stephanies filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code,
she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of
that relationship with her natural mother should
be maintained.

Art. 365. An adopted child

the surname of the adopter.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting

Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does
not prohibit, it allows.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a

middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of
the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family
Law Committees agreed that "the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother."7

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's

surname or

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's
name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and
is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as
the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him,
or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1)
the given
or
proper
name and
(2)
the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
him from other individuals. The surname or family
name is that which identifies the family to which
he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law. 9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code
provides the substantive rules which regulate the
use of surname10 of an individual whatever may
be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a
married woman or a previously married woman,
or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father.

Adoption

Page 42

shall

bear

xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree
annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
the surname of the father.

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add

her husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word

indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and
the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's
surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to
another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed
before
the
legal
separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased
husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names
and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname
as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and descendants,
the word Junior can be used only by a son.
Grandsons and other direct male descendants
shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's
surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name

surname of the father and permissive in the

case of the surname of the mother.

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no

law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only
considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mothers surname
shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what
middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that "an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights
and
obligations
arising
from
the
relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname
of the adopters;

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas

point is covered by the present Article 364, which
reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children
principally use the surname of the father.

shall

Justice Puno pointed out that many names

change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He
then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce
Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the
mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls
him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids
family name is Gutierrez and his mothers
surname is David but they all call him Justice
David.
Justice
Caguioa
suggested
that
the
proposed Article (12) be modified to the
efect that it shall be mandatory on the
child to use the surname of the father but
he may use the surname of the mother by
way of an initial or a middle name. Prof.
Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames
since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so
that the details can be covered in the appropriate
chapter.

x x x"
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG,
the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees
that
drafted
the
Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of
adding the surname of the childs mother as
his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees,
the
members
approved
the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a
difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the
fathers surname indicates the family to
which he belongs, for which reason he
would insist on the use of the fathers
surname by the child but that, if he wants
to, the child may also use the surname of
the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child
chooses to use the surname of the mother, how
will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied
that it is up to him but that his point is that it
should be mandatory that the child uses the

Adoption

Page 43

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the

simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that
the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their
second given name and the Latin tradition, which
is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even
include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in
principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or
surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that
the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added
that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee
approved
the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides
that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters."13Again, it is silent whether he can use
a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as

a matter of right and obligation, is for the

adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a
child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which
results
from
legitimate
paternity
and
filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also
as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party
to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted
the principle that adoption is impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and
that its underlying intent is geared to favor
the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act
of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for
the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted
is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article
V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to
a legitimate child without discrimination of
any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In
fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
Stephanies continued use of her mothers
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption)
provide that the adoptee remains an intestate
heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie
can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from
her natural mother in the future.

Adoption

Page 44

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her

mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy
family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mothers surname as her middle name will not
only sustain her continued loving relationship
with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma
of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence,
every
reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides
that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail."
This
provision,
according
to
the
Code
Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is
doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some
way of interpreting the law."28
Hence, since there is no
an illegitimate child adopted
father, like Stephanie, to use, as
mothers surname, we find no
should not be allowed to do so.

law prohibiting
by her natural
middle name her
reason why she

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense
that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mothers surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and
complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164948

June 27, 2006

DIWATA
RAMOS
LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this

Honorable Court that after publication and
hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the
adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon
Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the
minor childrens name follow the family name of
petitioner.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch
63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for
Adoption of the petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a
citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA,
filed a petition3 for the adoption of minors Elaine
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31,
1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos
who was born on August 5, 1989. 6 The minors are
the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners
brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition
that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, 7 the
children were left to their paternal grandmother,
Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now
has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by
Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time
she left up to the institution of the adoption; the
minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad;
as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the
minors have given their written consent8 to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by
the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
children of her own who are already married,
gainfully employed and have their respective
families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back to
the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her
children gave their written consent9 to the
adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
signified his willingness and commitment to
support the minors while in petitioners custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:

Adoption

Page 45

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and

equitable under the premises.10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by
Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and to submit a report thereon not
later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial
hearing of the petition.11 The Office of the
Solicitor
General
(OSG)
entered
its
appearance12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of
Tarlac to appear in its behalf. 13Since her petition
was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present
her evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also
presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the
adoptees, to testify on the written consent
executed by her and her siblings.15 The petitioner
marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol,
Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed
Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in
Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social
Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III,
Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the
following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds
minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed
Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the
following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has
voluntarily consented to their adoption by the
paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of
her inability to provide the parental care,
guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of
Consent was executed by the mother which is
hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have
also expressed their willingness to be adopted
and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the
future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto
attached.
The
minors
developed
close
attachment to the petitioners and they regarded
her as second parent.

3. The minors are present under the care of a

temporary guardian who has also family to look
after. As young adolescents they really need
parental love, care, guidance and support to
ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma
D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by
their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial
custody is hereby further recommended to be
dispensed with considering that they are close
relatives and that close attachments was already
developed between the petitioner and the 3
minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her
interview, as follows:

WHEREFORE,
it
is
hereby
ordered
that
henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from
all legal obligations obedience and maintenance
from their natural parents and that they be
declared for all legal intents and purposes the
children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody
is dispensed with considering that parent-children
relationship has long been established between
the children and the adoptive parents. Let the
surnames of the children be changed from
"Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect
the corresponding changes/amendment in the
birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19

The mother of minors came home together with

her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks
vacation. This is to enable her appear for the
personal interview concerning the adoption of her
children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their
paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived
after the death of their paternal grandmother and
guardian. The paternal relatives including the
petitioner who attended the wake of their mother
were very much concerned about the well-being
of the three minors. While preparing for their
adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a
family to stay with minors and act as their
temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the
adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. She realized that her children need
parental love, guidance and support which she
could not provide as she already has a second
family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the
petitioners & her children have been supporting
her children up to the present and truly care for
them, she believes her children will be in good
hands. She also finds petitioners in a better
position to provide a secured and bright future to
her children.18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as
witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption;
petitioner, likewise, failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in
the petition for adoption, rendered a decision
granting said petition. The dispositive portion
reads:

Adoption

Page 46

The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of

Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief 21 for
the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the
following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF
CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES
BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS
CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A
POSITION
TO
SUPPORT
THE
PROPOSED
ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a
decision22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held
that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the
childrens natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit
of consent of the petitioners children could not
also be admitted in evidence as the same was
executed in Guam, USA and was not
authenticated
or
acknowledged
before
a
Philippine consular office, and although petitioner
has a job, she was not stable enough to support
the children. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed

decision dated November 25, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in
Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 24 on
May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari26 on September 7, 2004,
assigning the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD
HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE
IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE
THREE CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings
are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is
entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos;
(b) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters
children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c)
whether or not petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees.

ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted

child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the
paramount consideration is the overall benefit
and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and perspective.
The Courts position should not be misconstrued
or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences
beyond
the
contemplation
of
law
and
jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve
adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely
on best interests of the child but likewise, with
due regard to the natural rights of the parents
over the child.31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the
Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known,
or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the
child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters,
ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s)
and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with
said adopter and the latters souse, if any;

The Courts Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to
the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v.
Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration and are
designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society
and family in the person of the adopter as well as
to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should thus be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court
also ruled that the liberality with which this Court
treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it
carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to

Adoption

Page 47

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or

to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to
the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must
be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit
the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that
she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who

arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario

in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the
Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview
her, it is incredible that the latter would not
require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written
Consent to the adoption of her minor children.
Neither did the petitioner bother to present
Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the
petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written
consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because when Amelias husband died
in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back.
The children were then left to the guidance and
care of their paternal grandmother. It is the
paternal relatives, including petitioner, who
provided for the childrens financial needs.
Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had
effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner
further contends that it was by twist of fate that
after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was
pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by
her second marriage were on vacation in the
Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker,
was able to meet her, and during the meeting,
Amelia intimated to the social worker that she
conformed to the adoption of her three children
by the petitioner.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When
she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act
No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof
provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written
consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the
biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced
the written consent of their legal guardian.

children. Petitioners testimony on that matter

follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children
now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy,
was there an instance where she communicated
with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already
married with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has
children by her second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify

the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties.33 The term means
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. If a parent
withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to
display filial affection, and neglects to lend
support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.34

A In Italy, sir.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time

undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.35To dispense with the requirement
of consent, the abandonment must be shown to
have existed at the time of adoption.36

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did

your mother communicate with you?

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her

testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her
claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her

Adoption

Page 48

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for
Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.

A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD
Social Worker also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:

xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had
been under the care and custody of their
maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov.
2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased
father now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and other
relatives abroad have been supporting the minor
children financially, even during the time that
they were still living with their natural parents.
Their mother also sends financial support but
very minimal.39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors
Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model
to her younger siblings. She helps them in their
lessons, works and has fun with them. She also
encourages openness on their problems and
concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult (sic) her
mother and petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3
children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they
had a happy and comfortable life. After the death
of her husband, her in-laws which include the
petitioner had continued providing support for
them. However being ashamed of just depending
on the support of her husbands relatives, she
decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in
need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged
their farm land which she used in going to Italy
and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she
entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of
her mother-in-law who returned home for good,
however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a
married man from Tarlac. They became live-in
partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario
who is now 2 years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that
Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his
marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is
providing his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from
P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents
who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a
month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and

Adoption

Page 49

other
paternal
relatives
are
continuously
providing support for most of the needs &
education of minors up to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not
intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently
sever
their
mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to leave
the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish
entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the
children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for,
as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her
mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems.
Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal
amounts as compared to what her affluent inlaws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the
adoption of the minors herein will have the effect
of severing all legal ties between the biological
mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
same shall then be vested on the adopter. 42 It
would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his/her children.
More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the
latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if
they are given to an adopting parent. 43 Again, it is
the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that the Court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the Court to
rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.
Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which
such document is offered, the same is merely a
scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the markings
thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary
weight on documents unless formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos
Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the
authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to
prove. The joint written consent of petitioners
children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in
Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of
Court in the same way as a document notarized
in this country it needs to comply with Section 2
of Act No. 2103,46 which states:

Section
2.
An
instrument
or
document
acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign
country shall be considered authentic if the
acknowledgment and authentication are made in
accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1)
an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation,
charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting
within the country or place to which he is
accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in
the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall
certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him, and
that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if
not, his certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary public
or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall be authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, charg de affaires,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited. The
officer making the authentication shall certify
under his official seal that the person who took
the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was
duly exercising the functions of the office by
virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as
such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
the place where the acknowledgment was taken,
and that his signature and seal, if any, are
genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners
legitimate children did not comply with the aforecited law, the same can at best be treated by the
Rules as a private document whose authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was
introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the
same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled
that petitioner was not stable enough to support
the children and is only relying on the financial

Adoption

Page 50

backing, support and commitment of her children

and her siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by
claiming that she is financially capable as she has
worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a
house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with
tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her
children and siblings have likewise committed
themselves to provide financial backing should
the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment,
banks on the statement in the Home Study
Report that "petitioner has limited income."
Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the
financial backing of her children and siblings in
order to support the minor adoptees. The law,
however, states that it is the adopter who should
be in a position to provide support in keeping with
the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the
best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should
also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly,
the adopter should be in a position to support the
would-be adopted child or children, in keeping
with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study
Report49 forwarded by the Department of Public
Health & Social Services of the Government of
Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer
supporting her legitimate children, as the latter
are already adults, have individual lives and
families. At the time of the filing of the petition,
petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a parttime basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour
and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners
main intention in adopting the children is to bring
the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at
Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the
same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise
knows that the limited income might be a
hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful
whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently
handle the financial aspect of rearing the three
children in the US. She only has a part-time job,
and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims
that she has the financial support and backing of
her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in
stating that the ability to support the adoptees is
personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates
a legal relation between the former and the latter.
Moreover, the records do not prove nor support
petitioners allegation that her siblings and her
children are financially able and that they are
willing to support the minors herein. The Court,
therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on
this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has

only the best of intentions for her nieces and
nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate
against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any
case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new
petition for adoption of the herein minors.

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the

hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially
agreed that petitioner would return the custody of
their three sons to respondent. Petitioner,
however, had a change of heart1 and decided to
file a memorandum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby DENIED.

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his

memorandum2 alleging that respondent was unfit
to take custody of their three sons because she
was habitually drunk, frequently went home late
at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent
much of her time at a beer house and neglected
her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after
their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was
respondent who left, taking their daughter with
her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa,
Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He
submitted a certification from the principal of the
Dila Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that
Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA
8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act
of 1997") family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition
for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159374

July 12, 2007

FELIPE
N.
MADRIAN, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When a family breaks up, the children are always
the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the
minor children is not only a thorny issue but also
a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is
the case here. Even the usually technical subject
of jurisdiction became emotionally charged.
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent
Francisca R. Madrian were married on July 7,
1993 in Paraaque City. They resided in San
Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Paraaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a
daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994;
Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis
Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann,
born on December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner
allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their
three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and
subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent
sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law
to patch things up between her and petitioner to
no avail. She then brought the matter to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but
this too proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas
corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in
the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act
of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to
Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the
education of their children and deprived them of
their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be
ordered to appear and produce their sons before
the court and to explain why they should not be
returned to her custody.

Adoption

Page 51

For her part, respondent averred that she did not

leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was driven
out by petitioner. She alleged that it was
petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and
drug addict. Petitioners alcoholism and drug
addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing
him to commit acts of violence against her and
their children. The situation was aggravated by
the fact that their home was adjacent to that of
her in-laws who frequently meddled in their
personal problems.4
On
October
21,
2002,
the
Court
of
Appeals5 rendered
a
decision6 asserting
its
authority to take cognizance of the petition and
ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code,
respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip
and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged
six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation
rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who
was then eight years old, the court ruled that his
custody should be determined by the proper
family court in a special proceeding on custody of
minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court
of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this
recourse.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals over the petition for habeas
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case
is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He
invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The

Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx

xxx

xxx

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of

children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
xxx

xxx

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over

petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed
by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re:
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors:

xxx

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was

has been settled with the adoption of A.M.
No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:

Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the
issue of the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody
of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over such petitions:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A

verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.
xxx

The
Court
of
Appeals
should
take
cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction
to
issue
writs
of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest

the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
of
their
jurisdiction
over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of
minors.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest

intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs
of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals]
and
BP
129
[The
Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and
BP 129 that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas
corpus where the custody of minors is at
issue.8 (emphases supplied)

Adoption

Page 52

xxx

xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with

the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with
any of its members and, if so granted, the
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to
a Family Court or to any regular court within the
region where the petitioner resides or where the
minor may be found for hearing and decision on
the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts
in habeas corpus cases where the custody
of
minors
is
involved.9(emphases
supplied)1avvphi1
We note that after petitioner moved out of their
Paraaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
transferred his sons to provinces covered by
different judicial regions. This situation is what
the Thornton interpretation
of
RA
8369s
provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases,
the lawmakers intended them to be the sole
courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus]
will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like [respondent] without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of
minors they are looking for would be helpless
since they cannot seek redress from family courts
whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here,
the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will
be left without legal remedy. This lack of

recourse could not have been the intention

of the lawmakers when they passed [RA
8369].10
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA
8369 reveals that family courts are vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases,
not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas
corpus which may be issued exclusively by family
courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in
conjunction with a petition for custody of minors
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other
words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary
to the custody case pending before the family
court. The writ must be issued by the same court
to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting
decisions, interference by a co-equal court and
judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer.11 Once a court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it
does so to the exclusion of all other courts,
including related incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002]
REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. MA.
LOURDES* D. LAXAMANA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is another sad tale of an estranged couples
tug-of-war over the custody of their minor
children. Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and
respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met
sometime in 1983. Petitioner, who came from a
well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of
Laws, while respondent, a holder of a degree in
banking and finance, worked in a bank.After a
whirlwind courtship, petitioner, 31 years old and
respondent, 33, got married on June 6, 1984.
[1]
Respondent quit her job and became a full-time
housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand,
operated buy and sell, fishpond, and restaurant
businesses for a living. The union was blessed
with three children twin brothers Joseph and
Vincent, born on March 15, 1985, and Michael,
born on June 19, 1986.[2]

Adoption

Page 53

All went well until petitioner became a drug

dependent. In October 1991, he was confined at
the Estrellas Home Care Clinic in Quezon City. He
underwent psychotherapy and
psychopharmacological treatment and was
discharged on November 16, 1991.[3] Upon
petition of respondent, the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, ordered petitioners
confinement at the NARCOM-DRC for treatment
and rehabilitation.[4] Again, on October 30, 1996,
the trial court granted petitioners voluntary
confinement for treatment and rehabilitation at
the National Bureau of Investigation-TRC.[5]
On April 25, 1997, the court issued an order
declaring petitioner already drug-free and
directing him to report to a certain Dr. Casimiro
for out-patient counseling for 6 months to one (1)
year.[6]
Despite several confinements, respondent
claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His
drug dependence worsened and it became
difficult for respondent and her children to live
with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and
irritable. On some occasions, he even physically
assaulted respondent. Thus, on June 17, 1999,
respondent and her 3 children abandoned
petitioner and transferred to the house of her
relatives.
On August 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107,
the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for
custody of his three children.[7]Respondent
opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence
of petitioner.[8]
Meanwhile, on September 24, 1999, respondent
filed a petition for annulment of marriage with
Branch 102 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.[9]
On September 27, 1999, petitioner filed in
the habeas corpus case, a motion seeking
visitation rights over his children.[10] On December
7, 1999, after the parties reached an agreement,
the court issued an order granting visitation
rights to petitioner and directing the parties to
undergo psychiatric and psychological
examination by a psychiatrist of their common
choice. The parties further agreed to submit the
case for resolution after the trial courts receipt of
the results of their psychiatric examination. The
full text of said order reads:
The parties appeared with their respective
lawyers. A conference was held in open Court and
the parties agreed on the following:
Effective this Saturday and every Saturday
thereafter until further order the petitioner shall

fetch the children every Saturday and Sunday at

9:00 oclock in the morning from the house of the
sister of respondent, Mrs. Corazon Soriano and to
be returned at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of the
same days.
That the parties agreed to submit themselves to
Dr. Teresito Ocampo for psychiatric/psychological
examination. Dr. Ocampo is hereby advised to go
over the records of this case to enable him to
have a thorough background of the problem. He
is hereby ordered to submit his findings directly
to this Court without furnishing the parties copies
of his report. And after the receipt of that report,
thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted
for decision.[11]
On January 6, 2000, Dr. Ocampo submitted the
results of his psychiatric evaluation on the parties
and their children. Pertinent portions thereof
state:
SINGLY
and
COLLECTIVELY,
the
following
information was obtained in the interview of the 3
children:
(1) THEY were affected psychologically by the
drug-related behavior of their father:
a. they have a difficult time concentrating on
their studies.
b. they are envious of their classmates whose
families live in peace and harmony.

(5) At one point one of the sons, became very

emotional while he was narrating his story and he
cried. I had to stop the interview.
(6) THEIR mother was fearful and terrified when
their father quarreled with her.
(7) THEY hope their visits to their father will not
interfere with their school and academic
schedules.
xxxxxxxxx
(3) MARILOU is one of 4 siblings. She graduated
from college with a degree in banking and
finance. SHE was a carreer (sic) woman; worked
for a bank for ten years; subsequently quit her
job to devote more time to her family.
(4) REYMOND is one of 5 siblings in a well-to-do
family. His father was a physician. During his
developmental years, he recalled how his mother
complained incessantly about how bad the father
was; only to find later that the truth was opposite
to the complaints of his mother; that his father
was nice, logical and understanding. He recalled
how he unselfishly served his father --- he opened
the door when he arrived home; he got his
portfolio; he brought the days newspaper; he
removed his shoes; he brought his glass of beer
or his shot of whisky. In short, he served him like
a servant. His father died of stroke in 1990.
REYMOND graduated from college with a degree
in LAW in 1984; he did not pass the bar.

c. once, MICHAEL had to quit school temporarily.

His work history is as follows:
(2) THEY witnessed their father when he was
under the influence of shabu.
(3) THEY think their father had been angry at
their paternal grandmother and this anger was
displaced to their mother.
(4) THEY hope their father will completely and
permanently recover from his drug habit; and
their criteria of his full recovery include:

a. 1985 to 1989 he operated fishponds.

b. 1976 to 1991 simultaneously, he operated
restaurant.
c. 1991 he engaged in the trading of vegetable,
cooking oil, and mangos.
d. HE handled the leasing of a family property to
a fast food company.

a. he will regain his easy-going attitude.

b. he wont be hot-headed anymore and would not
drive their van recklessly.
c. he would not tell unverifiable stories anymore.
d. he would not poke a gun on his own head and
ask the children who they love better, mom or
dad.

Adoption

Page 54

The findings on the examination of the MENTAL

STATUS and MENTAL PROCESSES OF MARILOU
showed a woman who showed the psychological
effects of the trauma she had in the past. She is
slightly edgy and fidgety with any external noise.
SHE answered all my questions coherently. Her
emotional state was stable throughout the
interview. She is of average intelligence. She was
oriented to person, place and date. Her memory
for recent and remote events was intact. She
could process sets of figures and sets of
similarities and differences. Her content of

thought
was
negative
for
delusions,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal
ideation. She could process abstract ideas and
general information. Her attention span was
adequate. There was no evidence of impaired
judgment.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such
as man touching a woman, 2 people on a hi-five ,
2 women chatting, beast, stuffed animal, etc. Her
past reflected on her psyche. There is no creative
process.There were no bizarre ideas.
The ZUNG anxiety/depression test highlighted I
get tired for no reason; I feel that I am useful and
needed
(re,
son). There
is
moderate
depression. However, she could still make
competent decisions.
The Social Adaptation Scale scored well in her
capacity to adapt to her situation. There is no
evidence of losing control.
The findings on the examination of the MENTAL
STATUS and MENTAL PROCESSES of REYMOND
showed an individual who presented himself in
the best situation he could possibly be. He is cool,
calm and collected. He answered all my questions
coherently. He is of average intelligence. He was
oriented to person, place and date. His memory
for recent and remote events was intace (sic). His
content of thought was negative for delusions,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal
ideation. His attention span was adequate. He
could process abstract ideas, sets of figures, and
general information.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such
as distorted chest , butterfly with scattered color,
cat ran over by a car, nothing 2 people, monster
etc. There
is no central
theme
in
his
responses. There were no bizarre ideas.
The Zung anxiety/depression test: My mind is as
clear as it used to be (most of the time). There
was no evidence of brain damage. There is no
significant affective response that would affect
his rationality.
The Social Adaptive Scale scored well in his
capacity to adapt to his situation. He reached out
well to others. He is in very good control of his
emotions.
BASED ON MY FINDINGS I MADE THE FOLLOWING
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:
I. The CRITERIA for cure in drug addiction consist
of:
1. 5-years and 10-years intervals of drug-free
periods.

Adoption

Page 55

2. change for the better of the maladaptive

behaviors of the addict consisting of telling lies,
manipulative
behavior,
melodramatic
and
hysterical actions.
3. constructive and reproductive outlets for the
mental and physical energies of the addict.
4. behavior oriented towards spiritual values and
other things.
II BASED on such scientific and observable
criteria, I do not yet consider REYMOND
LAXAMANA completely cured even though
his drug urine test at Medical City for shabu
was negative. (Emphasis supplied)
III I DO NOT DETECT any evidence that the
paternal visits of the sons would be harmful or
they would be in any danger. The academic
schedules of the sons has be taken into account
in determining the length and frequency of their
visits.
x x x x x x x x x.[12]
On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered the
assailed decision awarding the custody of the
three children to respondent and giving visitation
rights to petitioner. The dispositive portion
thereof states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered:
1. The children, Joseph, Michael and Vincent all
surnamed Laxamana are hereby ordered to
remain under the custody of the respondent.
2. The visitation arrangement as per Order of
December 7, 1999 is hereby incorporated and
forms part of this Decision. The parties are
enjoined to comply with the terms stated therein.
3. The petitioner is hereby ordered to undergo
urine drug screen for shabu for three times (3x)
per month every ten (10) days, with the
Dangerous Drugs Board. The said Board is hereby
ordered to submit the results of all tests
immediately as directed to this Court.
4. The petitioner is hereby referred to undergo
regular counseling at the Free-Clinic at the East
Avenue Medical Center, Department of Health
Out Patient Psychiatry Department until further
order. For this purpose, it is suggested that he
should see Dr. Teresito P. Ocampo to make
arrangements for said counseling.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Dangerous Drugs Board and the Free-Clinic, Out

Patient Psychiatry Department, East Avenue

Medical Center, Department of Health for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, based on the following:
I
THE COURT A QUO HAS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
CUSTODY WITHOUT CONDUCTING A TRIAL TO
DETERMINE FACTUAL ISSUES.
II
THE COURT A QUO HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
CUSTODY IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THE PARAMOUNT INTEREST AND
WELFARE OF HEREIN PARTIES THREE (3) MINOR
CHILDREN.
III
THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NULL AND VOID AS IT
DOES NOT COMPLY WITH SECTION 14 ARTICLE VIII
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.[14]
The core issue for resolution in the instant
petition is whether or not the trial court
considered the paramount interest and welfare of
the children in awarding their custody to
respondent.
In controversies involving the care, custody and
control of their minor children, the contending
parents stand on equal footing before the court
who shall make the selection according to the
best interest of the child. The child if over seven
years of age may be permitted to choose which
parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is
not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen
is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, educational, social
and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the respective resources as well as
social and moral situations of the opposing
parents.[15]
In Medina v. Makabali,[16] we stressed that this is
as it should be, for in the continual evolution of
legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis(right of

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Page 56

life and death) of the Roman law, under which the

offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents,
into a radically different institution, due to the
influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The
obligational aspect is now supreme. There is no
power, but a task; no complex rights of parents
but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred
trust for the welfare of the minor.
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the
court a quo should have conducted a trial
notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to
submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter
alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus,
petitioner is not estopped from questioning the
absence of a trial considering that said
psychiatric report, which was the courts primary
basis in awarding custody to respondent, is
insufficient to justify the decision. The
fundamental policy of the State to promote and
protect the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.
[17]
While petitioner may have a history of drug
dependence, the records are inadequate as to his
moral, financial and social well-being. The results
of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is
not yet completely cured may render him unfit to
take custody of the children, but there is no
evidence to show that respondent is unfit to
provide the children with adequate support,
education, as well as moral and intellectual
training and development. Moreover, the children
in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time
of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court
did not ascertain their choice as to which parent
they want to live with. In its September 8, 1999
order, the trial court merely stated that: The
children were asked as to whether they would like
to be with petitioner but there are indications that
they entertain fears in their hearts and want to
be sure that their father is no longer a drug
dependent.[18] There is no showing that the court
ascertained the categorical choice of the children.
These inadequacies could have been remedied by
an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of
Dr. Ocampos report and the capacity of both
parties to raise their children. The trial court was
remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it
approved the agreement of the parties to submit
the case for decision on the basis of sketchy
findings of facts.
In Lacson v. Lacson,[19] the case was remanded to
the trial court with respect to the issue of
custody. In the said case, the court a quo resolved
the question of the childrens custody based on
the amicable settlement of the spouses. Stressing
the need for presentation of evidence and a
thorough proceedings, we explained

It is clear that every child [has] rights which are

not and should not be dependent solely on the
wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his
parents. His welfare should not be subject to the
parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone.
Where, as in this case, the parents are already
separated in fact, the courts must step in to
determine in whose custody the child can better
be assured the rights granted to him by law. The
need, therefore, to present evidence regarding
this matter, becomes imperative. A careful
scrutiny of the records reveals that no such
evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter
court relied merely on the mutual agreement of
the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not
sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each
parent to be the custodian of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the
eldest is now eleven years of age and should be
given the choice of the parent he wishes to live
with. x x x.
In the instant case, the proceedings before the
trial court leave much to be desired. While a
remand of this case would mean further delay,
the childrens paramount interest demand that
further proceedings be conducted to determine
the fitness of both petitioner and respondent to
assume custody of their minor children.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, for the purpose
of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of
petitioner and respondent to take custody of their
children. Pending the final disposition of this case,
custody shall remain with respondent but subject
to petitioners visitation rights in accordance with
the December 7, 1999 order of the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26953

March 28, 1969

ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband,

FELICIANO
CASERO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, respondentappellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Once more Courts are asked to arbitrate
between rights and duties of parents and
children, and between parent and foster parent.
Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy,
Joseph Casero, was sought to be enforced
by habeas corpus proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, in its Special
Proceeding No. 1947. After hearing, the writ was

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Page 57

denied by the Court, and the case was appealed

directly to this Supreme Court exclusively on
points of law.
Uncontested facts found by the Court below are
that on February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida
Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph
Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando,
Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent
Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at
the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had
with a married man, Feliciano Casero.
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali
from his birth. The latter took care and reared
Joseph as her own son; had him treated at her
expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in
Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent
him to school. From birth until August 1966, the
real mother never visited her child, and never
paid for his expenses.
The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida
Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two
other children apparently with the tolerance, if
not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who
resides elsewhere, albeit the offspring of both
women are in good terms with each other; that
Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a
mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5
pesos a day.
The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness
stand, observed that the boy is fairly intelligent
as a witness. He never knew his mother, Zenaida.
He was calling the respondent his "Mammy". The
Court informed him that his real mother is
Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay with
his real mother or the respondent. The boy
pointed to the respondent and said "Mammy!"
The Court asked him, "Why do you choose to stay
with your "Mammy?" He answered, "She is the
one rearing me." This confrontation was made in
the presence of the two women, Zenaida, the
petitioner, and the respondent, Dra. Makabali, in
open court. (C.F.I. Rollo, p. 39).
After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to
allow the minor a free choice with whom to live
when he reaches the age of 14, the Court held
that it was for the child's best interest to be left
with his foster mother and denied the writ prayed
for. The real mother appealed, as already stated.
We see no reason to disturb the order appealed
from. While our law recognizes the right of a
parent to the custody of her child, Courts must
not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all
questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
363), and that for compelling reasons, even a

child under seven may be ordered separated from

the mother (Do.) This is as it should be, for in the
continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria
potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae
ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman
law, under which the offspring was virtually a
chattel of his parents, into a radically different
institution, due to the influence of Christian faith
and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now
supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pea, now "there
is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of
parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but
a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." 1
As a result, the right of parents to the company
and custody of their children is but ancillary to
the proper discharge of parental duties to provide
the children with adequate support, education,
moral, intellectual and civic training and
development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As remarked
by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina
proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not
only failed to provide the child with love and care
but actually deserted him, with not even a visit,
in his tenderest years, when he needed his
mother the most. It may well be doubted what
advantage the child could derive from being
coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to
be compelled to stay with his mother and witness
her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the
latter's legitimate wife.
It is hinted that respondent's motivation in
refusing to surrender the boy is to coerce
petitioner to pay for the rearing of the child. This
is not acceptable, for Dra. Makabali knew (at least
at the trial) that any expectation on her part is
illusory, given Zenaida's meager resources, yet
expressed willingness to care and educate him.
No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the
contrary, the appealed order being justified in
fact and law, we hold that said order should be,
and hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.
G.R. No. L-23482

August 30, 1968

ALFONSO
LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-23767

August 30, 1968

CARMEN
SAN
JOSE-LACSON, plaintiffappellant,
vs.
ALFONSO LACSON, defendant-appellee.
-----------------------------

Adoption

Page 58

G.R. No. L-24259

ALFONSO
vs.
CARMEN
appellant.

August 30, 1968

LACSON, petitioner-appellee,

SAN

JOSE-LACSON, petitioner-

CASTRO, J.:
These three cases (G.R. L-23482, L-23767 and L24259) involving the same parties pose a
common fundamental issue the resolution of
which will necessarily and inescapably resolve all
the other issues. Thus their joinder in this
decision.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the
petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent
spouse) were married on February 14, 1953. To
them were born four children, all alive.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left
the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision,
Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila.
She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint docketed
as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter
referred to as the JDRC) for custody of all their
children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of
their respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching
an amicable settlement respecting custody of the
children, support, and separation of property. On
April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition dated
April 21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding
6978 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI).
The important and pertinent portions of the
petition, embodying their amicable settlement,
read as follows:
3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963
when petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left their
conjugal home at the Santa Clara Subdivision,
Bacolod City, did not return, and decided to
reside in Manila.
4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject
to judicial approval as required by Article 191 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines the particular
terms and conditions of their mutual agreement
being as follows:
(a) There will be separation of property
petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson hereby

waiving any and all claims for a share in property

that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson
since they have acquired no property of any
consequence.
(b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of,
possess, administer and enjoy such separate
estate as they may acquire without the consent
of the other and all earnings from any profession,
business or industry as may be derived by each
petitioner shall belong to that petitioner
exclusively.
(c) The custody of the two elder children named
Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be awarded to
petitioner Alfonso Lacson and the custody of the
younger children named Gerrard and Ramon shall
be awarded to petitioner Carmen San JoseLacson.
(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner
Carmen San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of
P300.00 for the support of the children in her
custody.
(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of
visitation of the children in the custody of the
other at their respective residences and, during
the summer months, the two children in the
custody of each petitioner shall be given to the
other except that, for this year's summer months,
all four children shall be delivered to and remain
with petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson until June
15, 1963 on which date, she shall return the
two elder children Enrique and Maria Teresa to
petitioner Alfonso Lacson this judgment of
course being subject to enforcement by execution
writ and contempt.
5. Petitioners have no creditors.
WHEREFORE, they respectfully pray that notice of
this petition be given to creditors and third
parties pursuant to Article 191 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and thereafter that the Court
enter its judicial approval of the foregoing
agreement for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and for separation of property, except
that the Court shall immediately approve the
terms set out in paragraph 4 above and embody
the same in a judgment immediately binding on
the parties hereto to the end that any noncompliance or violation of its terms by one party
shall entitle the other to enforcement by
execution writ and contempt even though the
proceedings as to creditors have not been
terminated.".
Finding the foregoing joint petition to be
"conformable to law," the CFI (Judge Jose F.
Fernandez, presiding) issued an order on April 27,
1963, rendering judgment (hereinafter referred to

Adoption

Page 59

as the compromise judgment) approving and

incorporating in
toto their
compromise
agreement. In compliance with paragraph 4 (e) of
their mutual agreement (par. 3[e] of the
compromise judgment), the petitioner spouse
delivered all the four children to the respondent
spouse and remitted money for their support.
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in
the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged that she
"entered into and signed the ... Joint Petition as
the only means by which she could have
immediate custody of the ... minor children who
are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed
that she "be considered relieved of the ...
agreement pertaining to the custody and
visitation of her minor children ... and that since
all the children are now in her custody, the said
custody in her favor be confirmed pendente lite."
On May 24, 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed
the said motion and moved to dismiss the
complaint based, among other things, on the
grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. The JDRC
on May 28, 1963, issued an order which sustained
the petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior
judgment and lis pendens, and dismissed the
case. After the denial of her motion for
reconsideration,
the
respondent
spouse
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CAG.R. No. 32608-R) wherein she raised, among
others, the issue of validity or legality of the
compromise agreement in connection only with
the custody of their minor children. On October
14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said
appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-23767),
since "no hearing on the facts was ever held in
the court below no evidence, testimonial or
documentary, presented only a question of law
pends resolution in the appeal." .
The respondent spouse likewise filed a motion
dated May 15, 1963 for reconsideration of the
compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963
rendered in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI,
wherein she also alleged, among others, that she
entered into the joint petition as the only means
by which she could have immediate custody of
her minor children, and thereafter prayed the CFI
to reconsider its judgment pertaining to the
custody and visitation of her minor children and
to relieve her from the said agreement. The
petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and,
on June 1, 1963, filed a motion for execution of
the compromise judgment and a charge for
contempt. The CFI (Judge Jose R. Querubin,
presiding), in its order dated June 22, 1963,
denied the respondent spouse's motion for
reconsideration, granted the petitioner spouse's
motion for execution, and ordered that upon
"failure on the part of Carmen San Jose-Lacson to
deliver the said children [i.e., to return the two
older children Enrique and Maria Teresa in

accordance with her agreement with Alfonso

Lacson] to the special sheriff on or before June
29, 1963, she may be held for contempt pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 39 sections 9 and 10,
and Rule 64 section 7 of the (old) Rules of Court."
From the aforesaid compromise judgment dated
April 27, 1963 and execution order dated June 22,
1963, the respondent spouse interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
32798-R) wherein she likewise questioned the
validity or legality of her agreement with the
petitioner spouse respecting custody of their
children. On February 11, 1965 the Court of
Appeals also certified the said appeal to the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-24259), since "no
evidence of any kind was introduced before the
trial court and ... appellant did not specifically ask
to be allowed to present evidence on her
behalf." .
The respondent spouse also instituted certiorari
proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
No. 32384R), now the subject of an appeal by
certiorari to this Court (G.R. No. L-23482). In her
petition for certiorari dated June 27, 1963, she
averred that the CFI (thru Judge Querubin)
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in
excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate
execution of the compromise judgment in its
order of June 22, 1963, thus in effect depriving
her of the right to appeal. She prayed for (1) the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the respondents therein and any person
acting under them from enforcing, by contempt
proceedings and other means, the writ of
execution issued pursuant to the order of the
respondent Judge Querubin dated June 22, 1963
in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI, (2) the
setting aside, after hearing, of the compromise
judgment dated April 27, 1963 and the order
dated June 22, 1963, and (3) the awarding of the
custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa to her, their
mother. As prayed for, the Court of Appeals
issued ex parte a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the enforcement of the order dated June
22, 1963 for execution of the compromise
judgment rendered in special proceeding 6978.
The petitioner spouse filed an urgent motion
dated July 5, 1963 for the dissolution of the writ
of preliminary injunction ex parte which urgent
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated July 9, 1963. The petitioner
spouse likewise filed his answer. After hearing,
the Court of Appeals on May 11, 1964
promulgated in said certiorari case (CA-G.R. No.
32384-R) its decision granting the petition
for certiorari and declaring null and void both (a)
the compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 in
so far as it relates to the custody and right of
visitation over the two children, Enrique and
Teresa, and (b) the order dated June 22, 1963 for
execution of said judgment. The petitioner spouse

Adoption

Page 60

moved to reconsider, but his motion for

reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated July 31, 1964. From
the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the
resolution dated July 31, 1964, the petitioner
spouse interposed an appeal to this Court, as
abovestated, and assigned the following errors:
(1) The Court of Appeals erred in annulling thru
certiorari the lower court's order of execution of
the compromise judgment.
(2) The Court of Appeals erred in resolving in the
certiorari case the issue of the legality of the
compromise judgment which is involved in two
appeals, instead of the issue of grave abuse of
discretion in ordering its execution.
(3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
compromise agreement upon which the judgment
is based violates article 363 of the Civil
Code. 1wph1.t
As heretofore adverted, the aforecited three
appeals converge on one focal issue: whether the
compromise agreement entered into by the
parties and the judgment of the CFI grounded on
the said agreement, are conformable to law.
We hold that the compromise agreement and the
judgment of the CFI grounded on the said
agreement are valid with respect to the
separation of property of the spouses and the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
The law allows separation of property of the
spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership provided judicial sanction is secured
beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code provides:
In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (Art.
190, emphasis supplied)
The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well
as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of
any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that
any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition
for
dissolution
of
the
conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures
as may protect the creditors and other third
persons. (Art. 191, par. 4, emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial
imprimatur of their separation of property and

the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It

does not appeal that they have creditors who will
be prejudiced by the said arrangements.
It is likewise undisputed that the couple have
been separated in fact for at least five years - the
wife's residence being in Manila, and the
husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City.
Therefore, inasmuch as a lengthy separation has
supervened between them, the propriety of
severing their financial and proprietary interests
is manifest.
Besides, this Court cannot constrain the spouses
to live together, as
[I]t is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. .. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouse to
live under the same roof; and the experience of
those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
couple shows that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable. (Arroyo v. Vasquez de
Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, 60).
However, in so approving the regime of
separation of property of the spouses and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this
Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor
legalize the de facto separation of the spouses,
which again in the language of Arroyo v. Vasquez
de Arroyo, supra is a "state which is abnormal
and fraught with grave danger to all concerned."
We would like to douse the momentary seething
emotions of couples who, at the slightest ruffling
of domestic tranquility brought about by "mere
austerity of temper, petulance of manners,
rudeness of language, a want of civil attention
and accommodation, even occasional sallies of
passion" without more would be minded to
separate from each other. In this jurisdiction, the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support (art. 109, new Civil
Code). There is, therefore, virtue in making it as
difficult as possible for married couples
impelled by no better cause than their whims and
caprices to abandon each other's company.
'... For though in particular cases the repugnance
of the law to dissolve the obligations of
matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great
severity upon individuals, yet it must be carefully
remembered that the general happiness of the
married life is secured by its indissolubility. When
people understand that they must live together,
except for a very few reasons known to the law,
they learn to soften by mutual accommodation
that yoke which they know they cannot shake off;

Adoption

Page 61

they become good husbands and good wives

from the necessity of remaining husbands and
wives; for necessity is a powerful master in
teaching the duties which it imposes ..." (Evans
vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466,
467.) (Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, Id., pp. 5859).
We now come to the question of the custody and
support of the children.
It is not disputed that it was the JDRC which first
acquired jurisdiction over the matter of custody
and support of the children. The complaint
docketed as civil case E-00030 in the JDRC was
filed by the respondent spouse on March 12,
1963, whereas the joint petition of the parties
docketed as special proceeding 6978 in the CFI
was filed on April 27, 1963. However, when the
respondent spouse signed the joint petition on
the same matter of custody and support of the
children and filed the same with the CFI of Negros
Occidental, she in effect abandoned her action in
the JDRC. The petitioner spouse who could
have raised the issue of lis pendens in abatement
of the case filed in the CFI, but did not do so - had
the right, therefore, to cite the decision of the CFI
and to ask for the dismissal of the action filed by
the respondent spouse in the JDRC, on the
grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. And the
JDRC acted correctly and justifiably in dismissing
the case for custody and support of the children
based on those grounds. For it is no defense
against the dismissal of the action that the case
before the CFI was filed later than the action
before the JDRC, considering:.
... [T]hat the Rules do not require as a ground for
dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior
pending action. They provide only that there is a
pending action, not a pending prior action. 1
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however,
that the CFI erred in depriving the mother, the
respondent spouse, of the custody of the two
older children (both then below the age of 7).
The Civil Code specifically commands in the
second sentence of its article 363 that "No
mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure." The
rationale of this new provision was explained by
the Code Commission thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to
avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. No man can sound
the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
her child of tender age. The exception allowed by
the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the
good of the child: those cases must indeed be

rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly

hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the
penalty of imprisonment and the (relative)
divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient
punishment for her. Moreover, her moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby
who is as yet unable to understand the situation."
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 12).

should now be as follows: Enrique 11, Maria

Teresa 10, Gerrard 9, and Ramon 5.
Therefore, the issue regarding the award of the
custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa to the
petitioner spouse has become moot and
academic. The passage of time has removed the
prop which supports the respondent spouse's
position.

The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the

Civil Code, coupled with the observations made
by the Code Commission in respect to the said
legal provision, underscores its mandatory
character. It prohibits in no uncertain: terms the
separation of a mother and her child below seven
years, unless such separation is grounded upon
compelling reasons as determined by a court.

Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the

couple's agreement regarding the custody of the
children. 1wph1.t
Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides:
Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;

The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so

far as it awarded custody of the two older
children who were 6 and 5 years old, respectively,
to the father, in effect sought to separate them
from their mother. To that extent therefore, it was
null and void because clearly violative of article
363 of the Civil Code.
Neither does the said award of custody fall within
the exception because the record is bereft of
any compelling reason to support the lower
court's order depriving the wife of her minor
children's company. True, the CFI stated in its
order dated June 22, 1963, denying the
respondent spouse's motion for reconsideration
of its order dated April 27, 1963, that .
... If the parties have agreed to file a joint
petition, it was because they wanted to avoid the
exposure of the bitter truths which serve as
succulent morsel for scandal mongers and idle
gossipers and to save their children from
embarrassment and inferiority complex which
may inevitably stain their lives. ..
If the parties agreed to submit the matter of
custody of the minor children to the Court for
incorporation in the final judgment, they
purposely suppressed the "compelling reasons for
such measure" from appearing in the public
records. This is for the sake and for the welfare of
the minor children.".
But the foregoing statement is at best a mere
hint that there were compelling reasons. The
lower court's order is eloquently silent on what
these compelling reasons are. Needless to state,
courts cannot proceed on mere insinuations; they
must be confronted with facts before they can
properly adjudicate.
It might be argued and correctly that since
five years have elapsed since the filing of these
cases in 1963, the ages of the four children

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Page 62

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the
parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive
to
his
physical,
moral
and
intellectual
development.
It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision
grants to every child rights which are not and
should not be dependent solely on the wishes,
much less the whims and caprices, of his parents.
His welfare should not be subject to the parents'
say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in
this case, the parents are already separated in
fact, the courts must step in to determine in
whose custody the child can better be assured
the right granted to him by law. The need,
therefore, to present evidence regarding this
matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of
the records reveals that no such evidence was
introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied
merely on the mutual agreement of the spousesparents. To be sure, this was not a sufficient basis
to determine the fitness of each parent to be the
custodian of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique,
the eldest is now eleven years of age and
should be given the choice of the parent he
wishes to live with. This is the clear mandate of
sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court which,
states, inter alia:
... When husband and wife are divorced or living
separately and apart from each other, and the
question as to the care, custody, and control of a
child or children of their marriage is brought
before a Court of First Instance by petition or as
an incident to any other proceeding, the court,
upon hearing testimony as may be pertinent,
shall award the care, custody and control of each

such
child
as
will
be
for
its
best
interest permitting the child to choose which
parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years
of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to
take charge of the child by reason of moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or
poverty... (Emphasis supplied).
One last point regarding the matter of support for
the children assuming that the custody of any
or more of the children will be finally awarded to
the mother. Although the spouses have agreed
upon the monthly support of P150 to be given by
the petitioner spouse for each child, still this
Court must speak out its mind on the
insufficiency of this amount. We, take judicial
notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and
the steady skyrocketing of prices of all
commodities, goods, and services, not to mention
the fact that all the children are already of school
age. We believe, therefore, that the CFI may
increase this amount of P150 according to the
needs of each child.
With the view that we take of this case, we find it
unnecessary to pass upon the other errors
assigned in the three appeals.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964
and the resolution dated July 31, 1964 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject
matter of G.R. L-23482), and the orders dated
May 28, 1963 and June 24, 1963 of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter of
G.R. L-23767) are affirmed. G.R. L-24259 is
hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental for further proceedings, in
accordance with this decision. No pronouncement
as to costs.
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY
GRACE
NATIVIDAD
S.
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC
AND
ESTRELLA
ELAMPARO Respondents.

POEC.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY
GRACE
NATIVIDAD
S.
POELLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS
AND
AMADO
D.
VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

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Page 63

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions

under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with extremely urgent application for
an ex
parte issuance
of
temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution
of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September
1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner
was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three
days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported
and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCRIloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate
of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13
May 1974, the trial court granted their petition
and ordered that petitioner's name be changed
from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to
"Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although
necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on
petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the
court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive
mother discovered only sometime in the second
half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled
petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the
OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of
her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's
mother executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission which she submitted to the
OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a
new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in
1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the
local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was
issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs
(DFA).
Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998,
she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos.
L881511 and DD156616.7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a

degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines8but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of
America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in
1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of
Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro
Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a
citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who
was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back
to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony
or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her
eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie
(Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born
in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June
2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a
naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She
returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8
July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December
2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines
upon learning of her father's deteriorating
medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a
coma and eventually expired. The petitioner
stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to
take care of her father's funeral arrangements as
well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise
of her father was a severe blow to her entire
family. In her earnest desire to be with her
grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.19 The couple began preparing for their
resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine
schools
for
the
next
semester;20 coordination with property movers for
the relocation of their household goods, furniture
and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper
procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog
into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner
already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines
on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a
Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed25 while her husband was
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their
family home there.26

Adoption

Page 64

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at

her mother's place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot
at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan
City in the second half of 2005.27 The
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by
the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age
began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick
trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some
of
the
family's
remaining
household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines
on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially
informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's
change and abandonment of their address in the
U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27
April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from
his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the
country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a
major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband
acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family
home34 and to this day, is where the couple and
their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was
issued in the couple's name by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can
be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI
acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and
declared that she is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered
as
citizens
of
the
Philippines.38 Consequently,
the
BI
issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's
name and in the names of her three (3)
children. 39
Again,
petitioner
registered
as
a
voter
of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a
new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18
March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino
III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation
of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a
notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites

stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. 45 The

following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner
submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took
her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using
her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before
the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the
United
States."49 On
that
day,
she
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the
U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had
taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21
October 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship. 50 In the
same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that
she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in
the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July
1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued
to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of
the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the
COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May
13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on
16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained
Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for
the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner
attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the
upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the
subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No.
221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President,
Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to
deny due course or cancel said COC which was
docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to
the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced
that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is
that
petitioner
committed
material
misrepresentation when she stated in her COC
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day
before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61

Adoption

Page 65

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that

petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international
law does not confer natural-born status and
Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this
line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to
apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen
to
begin
with.64 Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a naturalborn Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that
status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo
pointed out that petitioner was bound by the
sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for
Senator wherein she indicated that she had
resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and
six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
Elamparo
likewise
insisted
that
assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to
regain her natural-born status under R.A. No.
9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence
could only be counted at the earliest from July
2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship
under the said Act. Also on the assumption that
petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she
failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein
she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over
Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition
for quo warranto which could only be filed if
Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary
jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action
because it did not contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would make false the
statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that
there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;
(3)
she
did
not
make
any
material
misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a.
the
1934
Constitutional
Convention
deliberations
show
that
foundlings
were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international
law to have been born of citizens of the place
where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC
for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and

that the same is in full force and effect and has

not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that
she did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before
she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in
her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake,
not binding and should give way to evidence on
her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp
the sovereign right of the Filipino people to
decide a purely political question, that is, should
she serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective
Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted
for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated a Resolution finding that
petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running
for the President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections,
contained material representations which are
false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad
Sonora
Poe
Llamanzares
is
hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December
2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December
2015 Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos.
221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate
petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D.
Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to
its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule
25
of
the
COMELEC
Rules
of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite
residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage, particularly foundlings,
cannot be considered natural-born Filipino
citizens since blood relationship is determinative

Adoption

Page 66

of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of

statutory construction that what is not included is
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings
were not expressly included in the categories of
citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of
the framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore,
the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is
a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under
international conventions or treaties to support
her
claim
that
foundlings
have
a
nationality.76 According to Tatad, international
conventions and treaties are not self-executory
and that local legislations are necessary in order
to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no
standard state practice that automatically confers
natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed
that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 because it only applies to former naturalborn citizens and petitioner was not as she was a
foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad
concluded that she did not comply with the ten
(10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined
that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon
City only from the time she renounced her
American citizenship which was sometime in
2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned
petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S.
domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband
stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or
cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No.
15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the
status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced
the view that former natural-born citizens who
are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only
their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to
their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission
in her COC for Senator that she had only been a
resident of the Philippines for at least six (6)
years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May
2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez
rejected petitioner's claim that she could have
validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In effect, his position was that
petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against
petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA
No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the
residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015
COC for President should be cancelled on the
ground that she did not possess the ten-year
period of residency required for said candidacy
and that she made false entry in her COC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended
that the reckoning period for computing

petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be

from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by
the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could
not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her
Philippine domicile since she was then living here
as an American citizen and as such, she was
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following
arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed
outright for failure to state a cause of action. His
petition did not invoke grounds proper for a
disqualification case as enumerated under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the
alleged lack of residency and natural-born status
of petitioner which are not among the recognized
grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to
an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are
basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus
on
establishing
her
ineligibility
for
the
Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a
natural-born
Filipino
citizen
is
on
the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a
presumption in her favor that she is a naturalborn citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that
foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where
they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen,
she has every right to be repatriated under R.A.
No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her naturalborn status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the
Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of
regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006
Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the
issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced
her position that she is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first
quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her
domicile of choice in the Philippines as
demonstrated by her children's resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the
construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally
reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her
American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are
complied with.100 She reasoned out that there was

Adoption

Page 67

no requirement that renunciation of foreign

citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of
a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing
in the residency portion of her COC for Senator
was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December
2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that
petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she
failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she declared
therein that she has been a resident of the
Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections
on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's
Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC,
petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance
of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary
restraining orders were issued by the Court
enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives
from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court.
The Court also ordered the consolidation of the
two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution
of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments
were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and
SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered
through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered

through its First Division, in the consolidated
cases
SPA
No.
15-002
(DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace
Natividad
Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio
P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora PoeLlamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December
2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December
2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which
the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016
National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not
the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground"
that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground
should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if,
as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of
the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our
Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C,
Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of
polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters.

Adoption

Page 68

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the

President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present
their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered. Those which seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means,
or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any
foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments
and
their
agencies
to
political
parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of
any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or
recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers
approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law
stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political

parties and the parties or organizations registered

under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4
which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over
question of the qualifications of the President,
Vice-President, Senators and the Members of
House of Representatives was made clear by
Constitution. There is no such provision
candidates for these positions.

the
the
the
the
for

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
in Romualdez-Marcos
v.
Commission
on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in
the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is
our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized
proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 1,
the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who
does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility
of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which is a
substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A,
6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from
the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially
involves an inquiry into qualifications based
on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art.
IX, C, 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules
of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds
but also in their consequences are proceedings
for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government
Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a
word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate
from the race either from the start or during its
progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers

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to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the

Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the
qualifications for a public office does not imply
that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a
public office and vice versa. We have this sort of
dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No.
473) That an alien has the qualifications
prescribed in 2 of the Law does not imply that he
does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications
provided in 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to
grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in
its statement that "the lack of provision for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the
absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and
is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be
disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election
offenses (e.g., vote
buying,
over
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined
lest he wins because of the very acts for which
his disqualification is being sought. That is why it
is provided that if the grounds for disqualification
are established, a candidate will not be voted for;
if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will
not be counted; and if for some reason he has
been voted for and he has won, either he will not
be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set
aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a
candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as
in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to
make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in
the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A.
Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the
COMELEC even after the elections of May 8,
1995. This is contrary to the summary character
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy.
That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if
candidates state in their certificates of candidacy
that they are eligible for the position which they
seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and
only in the event they are elected. Only in cases
involving charges of false representations made
in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition

against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members
of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166,
15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution
of
the election,
returns and qualifications of
members
of
Congress of the President and Vice President, as
the case may be.106

grounds of false representations regarding his or

her qualifications, without a prior authoritative
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which
the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are selfevident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions
against which the falsity of representation can be
determined.

To
be
sure,
the
authoritativeness
of
the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September
2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993
version of Rule 25, which states that:

The need for a predicate finding or final

pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false
representations
regarding
the
candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to
rule essentially that since foundlings 108 are not
mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under
the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be
citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral
arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is
a foundling, she said it all. This borders on
bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that
herein petitioner possesses blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say
that "she now has the burden to present evidence
to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who

does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or
protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found
by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification
provided
by
law
or
the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking
grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination
thereof,
shall
be
summarily
dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an
acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the
candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or
found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is
concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of
one to the other. Both do not allow, are not
authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction,
for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of
a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding
before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction.
The
prior
determination
of
qualification may be by statute, by executive
order or by a judgment of a competent court or
tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a
prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution," neither can the certificate of
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on

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Page 70

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship

with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of
the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity
and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than
sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not
a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should
have shown that both of petitioner's parents were
aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did
not shift the burden to her because such status
did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of
petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under
Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence
must have such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or no-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree
to
establish
the
probability
of
improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics
from
the
Philippine
Statistics
Authority
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number
of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986
while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country
was
10,558,278.
The
statistical

probability that any child born in the Philippines

in
that
decade
is
natural-born
Filipino
was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented
census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were
962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of
the
population
were
Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669
Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349
Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In
1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus
1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same
year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as
against
only
1,165
male
aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim
admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the
time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of
the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality
of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City.1wphi1 She also has typical
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight
black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things
have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 113 All of
the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church
in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a 99% chance that a
child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if
not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the
words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because
foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they
can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the
probability is such that every foundling would
have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50%
chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame
our questions properly. What are the chances that
the parents of anyone born in the Philippines
would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority,
from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there
were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in
the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that
sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to
natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This
means that the statistical probability that any

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Page 71

child born in the Philippines would be a natural

born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while
the total number of Filipinos born in the
Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the
ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means
that the statistical probability that any child born
in the Philippines on that decade would be a
natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We
can
invite
statisticians
and
social
anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but
I am confident that the statistical probability that
a child born in the Philippines would be a natural
born Filipino will not be affected by whether or
not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood
that a foundling would have a Filipino parent
might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos
abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps,
shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning
their children here in the Philippines thinking
those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned
children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign
couple has ever considered their child excess
baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings
and render them stateless just because there
may be a theoretical chance that one among the
thousands of these foundlings might be the child
of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical
certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a
decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an
improbable
hypothetical
to
sacrifice
the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of
human beings. Your Honor, constitutional
interpretation and the use of common sense are
not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class,
natural-born
citizens.
While
the
1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a
need to examine the intent of the framers.
In Nitafan
v.
Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping
with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure
the realization of the purpose of the framers and
of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.
It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the

Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after
subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino
mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the
proponent of the amendment. The gentleman
refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr.
Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes
natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr.
Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown
parents." Current codes consider them Filipino,
that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish
territory are considered Spaniards, because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage
is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in
the Philippines in that a child of unknown
parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr.
Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the
conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr.
Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore,
there is no [more] need for amendment.
Sr.
Rafols:
The
amendment
should
read
thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children
of unknown parentage."
Sr.
Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in
the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr.
Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this
[person] does not recognize the child, is not
unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or
not?
Sr.
Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the
amendment would exclude the children of a
Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize
the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I
think those of overseas Filipino mother and father
[whom the latter] does not recognize, should also
be considered as Filipinos.

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Page 72

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the
amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.
Sr.
Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better
to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr.
Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these
cases are few and far in between, that the
constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not
necessary to include a provision on the subject
exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried
out, it was not because there was any objection
to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law
author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate
Rafols presented an amendment to include as
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of
the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few
to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it
was believed that the rules of international law
were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother,
and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of
the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the
Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016
Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was
rejected. But note that what was declined was the
proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain
the constitutional silence is by saying that it was
the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed
that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's
or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong.
They can even overturn existing rules. This is
basic. What matters here is that Montinola and
Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in
the convention that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because
they are already impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully

explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is
to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos
under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935
Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over
into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is
appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the
constitution is not silently silent, it is silently
vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that
the framers "worked to create a just and humane
society," that "they were reasonable patriots and
that it would be unfair to impute upon them a
discriminatory intent against foundlings." He
exhorts that, given the grave implications of the
argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an
express intention to deny foundlings the status of
Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use
the
constitution
to
discriminate
against
foundlings to show that the constitution really
intended to take this path to the dark side and
inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of
special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Article II, Section 11 which
provides that the "State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
mandates Congress to "give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the "right of children
to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against
foundlings
on
account
of
their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship
upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most
basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code
which provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad." Adoption deals with
status, and a Philippine adoption court will have
jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis
and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by
aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a
proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the
subject matter of the case and over the

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Page 73

parties, but also over the res, which is the

personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15)
adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the
status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose,
she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over
the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern
the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No.
8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all
expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine
that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which
make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having
to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance,
the determination of foundling status is done not
by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly,
the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly
not
analogous
to
naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or
the election of such citizenship by one born of an
alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there
is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her
favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May
1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by
Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario
Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence
effectively affirming petitioner's status as a
foundling.123
Foundlings
are
likewise
citizens
under
international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation.
The
transformation
method
requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. 124 On the
other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws
of the land even if they do not derive from treaty

obligations. Generally accepted principles of

international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law,
and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.125 International customary rules
are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is
a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring
it.126 "General
principles
of
law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial
logic, based on principles which are "basic to
legal systems generally,"127 such as "general
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice," and the "general principle
against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,
the
Convention
Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No.
111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation."128 These are the
same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")
has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof
states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following
obligations on our country:

2. Every child shall be registered immediately

after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire
nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and

ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by
the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and
R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant
to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet
unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first
is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country
of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall
have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child's parentage is established, its nationality
shall be determined by the rules applicable in
cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved,
presumed to have been born on the territory of
the State in which it was found. (Underlining
supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling
is presumed born of citizens of the country where
he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2

Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far
as possible, the right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation
of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the
right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24

Adoption

1. Every child shall have, without any

discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right, to such measures of protection as
are required by his status as a minor, on the part
of his family, society and the State.

Page 74

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting

State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within
the territory of parents possessing the nationality
of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean
that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this
Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or
ratified the "International Convention for the

Protection of All Persons from Enforced

Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances in
the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted
principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen
states and had not even come into force and
which needed the ratification of a minimum of
twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points
out, the Court was content with the practice of
international and regional state organs, regional
state practice in Latin America, and State Practice
in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying
countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either
ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when
the case was decided in 2005. The Court also
pointed out that that nine member countries of
the European Common Market had acceded to
the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited
U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of
foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of
fourteen countries were considered and yet, there
was pronouncement that recognition of foreign
judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively
takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are
based not only on international custom, but also
on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in
Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute.
Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic
to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion
that the right against enforced disappearances
and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as "generally accepted
principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty
countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the
sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the
1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six
(26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also,
the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189
countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are
recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis countries,
show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having
been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A.
No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption,

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expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of

them, foundlings are among the Filipino children
who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been
pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to
citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930
Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of
the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by
the PSA show, that presumption is at more than
99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions
and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight of
a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot
be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member
of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to
signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties
and conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would
be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended
up using the international instruments which seek
to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny
them political status or to accord them secondclass citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned
that since the applicant must perform an act,
what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards
consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No.
9225 in particular.
In the
seminal
case
of Bengson
Ill
v.
HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has
been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where
we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation
process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x

x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on

Audit,142 which
cited Tabasa
v.
Court
of
Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation
of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his
natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission
on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner
reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No.
9225),
he
will
... recover
his
naturalborn citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth"
in the definition of natural citizens as implying
"that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth
and remain uninterrupted and continuous from
birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line
with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress
saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it had been once lost.
It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that
natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where
the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at
the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his
birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born
citizen
thereof."
Neither
is
"repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's
citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court
pointed out that there are only two types of
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born
citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third
category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of
a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a naturalborn Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member
of the House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new
rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where
we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine,
we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws of the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines." This Court also
said that "while the future may ultimately

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uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a

general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment.
Consequently,
the
people's
reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the
oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born
to" in her application for repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and
this misled the BI to presume that she was a
natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that
the data required were the names of her
biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects
of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the
biological parents and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the
adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was
also entitled to an amended birth certificate
"attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child
of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not
bear any notation that it is an amended
issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll
records, books, and papers relating to the
adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and Development],
or any other agency or institution participating in
the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential."151 The
law
therefore
allows
petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were
her birth parents as that was what would be
stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given
the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption
records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose
that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the
qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make
in the same case for cancellation of COC, it
resorted
to
opinionatedness
which
is,
moreover, erroneous. The
whole
process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of
the issue of whether or not petitioner committed
false material representation when she stated in
her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016
been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a
resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is
true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates
to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since
the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May
2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the
Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years.
In answer to the requested information of "Period
of Residence in the Philippines up to the day
before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11
months" which according to her pleadings in
these cases corresponds to a beginning date of

25 May 2005 when she returned for good from

the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991,
she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire
a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence
in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there;
and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled
with animus
non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner
presented
voluminous
evidence
showing that she and her family abandoned their
U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for
good. These evidence include petitioner's former
U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005
and her return to the Philippines every time she
travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting
in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their
household items weighing about 28,000 pounds
to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine
Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship
their dog to the Philippines; school records of her
children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July
2005; titles for condominium and parking slot
issued in February 2006 and their corresponding
tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts
dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army
in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S.
Postal Service confirming request for change of
address; final statement from the First American
Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy
where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her
family stayed with affiant until the condominium
was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's
husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and
that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish
some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the
facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that
petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as
of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence
of the first two requisites, namely, physical
presence and animus manendi, but maintained

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Page 77

there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The

COMELEC disregarded the import of all the
evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of
the position that the earliest date that petitioner
could have started residence in the Philippines
was in July 2006 when her application under R.A.
No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard,
COMELEC
relied
on Coquilla
v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero
v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the
private
respondents
also
added Reyes
v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these
cases decree that the stay of an alien former
Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a
permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
citizenship,
a
visa-free
entry
under
a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since
petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005
to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in
these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only
evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a
candidate who wanted to count residence prior to
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the
Court decreeing that residence is distinct from
citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to
establish
residence.
In Caballero
v.
COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his
place of work was abroad and that he only visited
during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an
American citizen who had not even reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was
disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
residence, the only proof she offered was a
seven-month stint as provincial officer. The
COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court,
said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence
on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold
that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast,
the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and
taken together leads to no other conclusion that
she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children
from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight
company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S.,
donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her
husband resigning from U.S. employment right
after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually reestablished her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine
schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after
all trips abroad, her husband getting employed

here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual

application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and
her family's actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for
good.

that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006

which was the period when the U.S. house was
sold and her husband returned to the Philippines.
In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in
2015 that residence could be counted from 25
May 2005.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it

against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer
look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise
known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding intent
to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who
must leave after one year. Included in the law is a
former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad
and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The
law institutes a balikbayan program "providing
the opportunity to avail of the necessary training
to enable the balikbayan to become economically
self-reliant members of society upon their return
to the country"164 in line with the government's
"reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are
not
ordinary transients.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood

the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13
May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the
time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the
change which the COMELEC itself introduced in
the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence
in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the
query if it did not acknowledge that the first
version was vague.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the

return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate
into society, it would be an unduly harsh
conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That
visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow
him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself
into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner
did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her
children and buying property while awaiting the
return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former
Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been
decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial
precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication
in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases
cited by the respondents that the Court intended
to have its rulings there apply to a situation
where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of
residence has been decided particularly on the
facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the
evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC
ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016
in her 2015 COC was false because she put six
( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of
residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC
for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she
started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC
automatically assumed as true the statement in
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified
pleadings, she misunderstood the date required
in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of
the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said

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Page 78

That petitioner could have reckoned residence

from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house
and the return of her husband is plausible given
the evidence that she had returned a year before.
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her
passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC
to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could
be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after
all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos
v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven
(7) months as her period of residence where the
required period was a minimum of one year. We
said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency
qualification
requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence
presented and see if petitioner was telling the
truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May
2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would
have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded
the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC
took the position that domicile could be
established only from petitioner's repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it
does not take away the fact that in reality,
petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was
here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When
she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in
good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner
was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed
against her with the SET as early as August 2015.
The event from which the COMELEC pegged the
commencement
of
residence,
petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was
an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6)

years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up
in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have
not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point.
From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco
discussed it in the media, the stated period of
residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances
that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was
also brought up in the SET petition for quo
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on
1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6)
years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood
the question and could have truthfully indicated a
longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a
matter of public record. Therefore, when
petitioner accomplished her COC for President on
15 October 2015, she could not be said to have
been attempting to hide her erroneous statement
in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly
mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do
not show or even hint at an intention to hide the
2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her
side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run
for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole
ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in
his COC must not only refer to a material fact
(eligibility and qualifications for elective office),
but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of
infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of
evidenced dates all of which can evince animus
manendi to the Philippines and animus non
revertedi to the United States of America. The
veracity of the events of coming and staying
home
was
as
much
as
dismissed
as
inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at
the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for
Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a
declaration and therefore an admission that her
residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based
on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the
residency requirement for President." This
conclusion, as already shown, ignores the
standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of
residence, not the statement of the person that
determines residence for purposes of compliance
with the constitutional requirement of residency
for election as President. It ignores the easily
researched matter that cases on questions of
residency have been decided favorably for the

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Page 79

candidate on the basis of facts of residence far

less in number, weight and substance than that
presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all
else, what we consider as a primary reason why
petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in
her COC for Senator which declaration was not
even considered by the SET as an issue against
her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made
the declaration in her COC for Senator that she
has been a resident for a period of six (6) years
and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May
2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference
the residency requirements for election as
Senator which was satisfied by her declared years
of residence. It was uncontested during the oral
arguments before us that at the time the
declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did
not have as yet any intention to vie for the
Presidency in 2016 and that the general public
was never made aware by petitioner, by word or
action, that she would run for President in 2016.
Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence
different from that of a senatorial candidacy.
There are facts of residence other than that which
was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such
other facts of residence have never been proven
to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May
2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in
the USA to finish pending projects and arrange
the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with
her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled
Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and
Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in
2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection
in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old
enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her
husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her
family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005,
[petitioner's] mother discovered that her former
lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in
1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and
"Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to
the US in order to supervise the disposal of some
of
the
family's
remaining
household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband
informed the United States Postal Service of the
family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April
2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned
from his work in the US. He returned to the

Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for

a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband
acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where
they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the
COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case
fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than
that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for
Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship
and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned
Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave
abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the
Resolutions, to wit:

petition

is GRANTED. The

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the

COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is
hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through
the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated
cases
SPA
No.
15-002
(DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace
Natividad
Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares,

Adoption

Page 80

respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio

P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora PoeLlamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized
Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution
of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POELLAMANZARES.
The
Resolution
dated
11
December 2015 of the Commission First Division
is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Banc, upholding
the
11
December
2015
Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
MARY
GRACE
NATIVIDAD
SONORA
POELLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a
candidate for President in the National and Local
Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.