Ridgeview Publishing Company

What Is "Naturalized Epistemology?"

Author(s): Jaegwon Kim
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, Epistemology (1988), pp. 381-405
Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214082
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1988
Philosophical
Perspectives,
2, Epistemology,

WHATIS "NATURAUZED
EPISTEMOLOGY?"
JaegwonKim
BrownUniversity

1. EpistemologyAs a NormativeInquiry
intheMeditations
Descartes'epistemological
inquiry
beginswith
are worthy
ofbelief?In theFirst
thisquestion:Whatpropositions
MeditationDescartescanvassesbeliefsof variouskindshe had
heldas trueand findshimself
formerly
forcedto concludethathe
oughtto rejectthem,thathe oughtnottoacceptthemas true.We
ofthefollowing
two
can viewCartesian
as consisting
epistemology
projects:to identify
thecriteria
bywhichwe oughtto regulateacofbeliefs,
and to determine
whatwe may
ceptanceand rejection
tothosecriteria.
be saidtoknowaccording
Descartes'
epistemological
to thisday.
agendahasbeen theagendaofWestern
epistemology
Thetwinproblems
ofidentifying
criteria
ofjustified
beliefandcoming to termswiththe skepticalchallengeto the possibility
of
knowledgehave definedthecentraltasksoftheoryofknowledge
sinceDescartes.Thiswas as trueoftheempiricists,
ofLockeand
HumeandMill,as ofthosewhomorecloselyfollowed
Descartesin
therationalist
path.'
Itisnowonder
thenthatmodern
hasbeendominated
epistemology
andtwofundamental
bya singleconcept,thatofjustification,
quesit: Whatconditions
musta beliefmeetifwe are
tionsinvolving
inaccepting
itas true?andWhatbeliefs
arewe infactjustified
justified
inaccepting?
Notethatthefirst
question
doesnotaskforan "analysis"
or"meaning"
oftheterm"justified
belief".
Anditisgenerally
assumed, evenifnotalwaysexplicitly
stated,thatnotjustanystatement

382/ JaegwonKim
fora belieftobe justified
will
andsufficient
condition
ofa necessary
hasbeenthatthestatedconditions
must
do.Theimplicit
requirement
andforthisitis necessary
ofjustified
that
belief,
constitute
"criteria"
theuse ofepistemic
terms.Thus,
theconditions
be statedwithout
ofjustified
beliefinsuchtermsas "adequate
formulating
conditions
"goodreason","beyonda reasonable
evidence",
"sufficient
ground",
note
doubt",and so on, wouldbe merelyto issuea promissory
arethemselves
terms
explainredeemable
onlywhentheseepistemic
ed in a waythataccordswiththerequirement.2
whileitpointsin therightdirection,
does not
Thisrequirement,
ofjustified
belief
go farenough.Whatis crucialis this:thecriteria
ornaturalistic
mustbe formulated
on thebasisofdescriptive
terms
theuseofanyevaluative
ornormative
ones,whether
alone,without
or ofanotherkind.3Thus,an analysisofjustified
belief
epistemic
and
thatmakesuse of suchtermsas "intellectual
requirement"4
thisgeneralized
con"havinga rightto be sure"5wouldnotsatisfy
andenlightensuchan analysiscanbe informative
dition;although
ofthesenormative
itwill
concepts,
ingabouttheinter-relationships
ofcriteria
countas a statement
of
not,on thepresentconception,
providjustified
belief,unlessofcoursethesetermsare themselves
Whatisproblematic,
ed withnonnormative
criteria.
about
therefore,
criteria
ofjustified
beliefis not
theuse ofepistemic
termsinstating
intheusualsense;rather
itisthefactthatthese
itspossible
circularity
termsarethemselves
normative.
Weshalllater
essentially
epistemic
discusstherationaleofthisstrengthened
requirement.
thetwoquestions
we have
As manyphilosophers
haveobserved,6
ofjustified
beliefandtheotherabout
setforth,
oneaboutthecriteria
whatwe can be saidtoknowaccording
to thosecriteria,
constrain
havebeenwilling
toswallow
eachother.
somephilosophers
Although
criteria
ofjustified
skepticism
justbecausewhatwe regardas correct
thatnone,or
beliefare seen to lead inexorably
to theconclusion
is that
theusualpresumption
veryfew,ofourbeliefsare justified,
ouranswertothefirst
shouldleaveourepistemic
situation
question
Thatis tosay,itis expectedtoturnoutthataclargelyunchanged.
tothecriteria
ofjustified
beliefwe cometoaccept,we know,
cording
think
orarejustified
inbelieving,
muchwhatwe reflectively
pretty
we knowor are entitled
to believe.
ofjustificatheexacthistory,
itisevident
thattheconcept
Whatever
on thenature
tionhascometo takecenterstageinourreflections
ofknowledge.
Andapartfromhistory,
thereis a simplereasonfor

Whatis "Naturalized
/ 383
Epistemology"?
it is the only specifically
our preoccupation
withjustification:
epistemiccomponentin the classic tripartite
conceptionof
Neither
isa specifically
knowledge.
beliefnortruth
epistemic
notion:
beliefisa psychological
a semantical-metaphysical
conceptandtruth
one. Theseconceptsmayhavean implicit
epistemological
dimentheirinvolvement
with
sion,butiftheydo,itis likelytobe through
normative
essentially
epistemic
notionslikejustification,
evidence,
andrationality.
Moreover,
justification
iswhatmakesknowledge
itself
a normative
concept.On surfaceat least,neither
truth
norbeliefis
normative
orevaluative
(I shallarguebelow,though,
thatbeliefdoes
havean essentialnormative
Butjustification
dimension).
manifestly
is normative.
Ifa beliefis justified
forus,thenitispermissible
and
reasonable,fromtheepistemic
pointofview,forus to holdit,and
itwouldbe epistemically
irresponsible
toholdbeliefs
thatcontradict
it.Ifwe considerbelieving
or accepting
a proposition
to be an "action"in an appropriate
sense,beliefjustification
wouldthenbe a
ofaction,whichinitsbroadesttermsis
specialcase ofjustification
thecentralconcernofnormative
ethics.Justas itis thebusinessof
normative
ethicsto delineatetheconditions
underwhichactsand
fromthe moralpointof view,so it is the
decisionsare justified
ofepistemology
andanalyzetheconditions
business
toidentify
under
whichbeliefs,
andperhapsotherpropositional
arejustified
attitudes,
fromthe epistemological
pointof view. It probablyis onlyan
historical
accidentthatwe standardly
ethics"
speakof"normative
butnotof"normative
is a normative
epistemology".
Epistemology
as muchas, and inthesamesenseas, normative
ethics.
discipline
We cansummarize
ourdiscussion
thusfarinthefollowing
points:
thatjustification
isa central
conceptofourepistemological
tradition,
inthistradition,
thatjustification,
as itis understood
is a normative
andinconsequencethatepistemology
itself
isa normative
concept,
whoseprincipal
aimis a systematic
inquiry
studyoftheconditions
ofjustified
belief.I take it thatthesepointsare uncontroversial,
aboutthedetailsofcoursetherecouldbe disagreement
although
forexample,aboutwhatitmeanstosaya conceptortheory
is "normative"or "evaluative".
2. The FoundationalistStrategy
In orderto identify
thetargetofthenaturalistic
critique-inpar-

384/ JaegwonKim
ticular,
Quine's-itwillbe usefulto takea brieflookat theclassic
responseto the epistemological
programset forthby Descartes.
isa familiar
ofjustification
Descartes'
approachtotheproblem
story,
at leastas thetextbook
ofwhatisnowcomtellsit:ittakestheform
The foundationalist
is to
monlycalled"foundationalism".
strategy
dividethetaskofexplaining
intotwostages:first,
toidenjustification
inthattheyarejustified
tify
a setofbeliefs
thatare"directly"
justified
without
theirjustified
statusfromthatofanyotherbelief,
deriving
and thento explainhowotherbeliefsmaybe "indirectly"
or "ininan appropriate
relation
to those
ferentially"
justified
bystanding
or "basicbeliefs",
alreadyjustified.
Directly
justified
beliefs,
are to
constitute
thefoundation
of"nonbasic"
uponwhichthesuperstructure
or"derived"
beliefsis torest.Whatbeliefs
thenaredirectly
justified,
according
toDescartes?
Subtleties
aside,heclaimedthatbeliefs
about
ourownpresent
conscious
statesareamongthem.Inwhatdoestheir
consist?
Whatis itaboutthesebeliefsthatmakethem
justification
directly
justified?
Somewhat
simplistically
again,Descartes'answer
isthattheyarejustified
becausetheyareindubitable,
thattheattentiveand reflective
mindcannotbutassentto them.How are nonbasicbeliefs
justified?
By"deduction"-that
is,bya seriesofinferentialsteps,or"intuitions",
eachofwhichis indubitable.
If,therefore,
we takeCartesian
as a psychological
indubitability
notion,
Descartes'
can be saidtomeetthedesideratum
ofproepistemological
theory
vidingnonepistemic,
naturalistic
criteria
ofjustified
belief.
initsessential
Descartes'foundationalist
was inherited,
program
Inparticular,
his"mentalism",
thatbeliefs
outlines,
bytheempiricists.
aboutone's owncurrent
mentalstateare epistemologically
basic,
wentessentially
and positivists,
unchallenged
by the empiricists
untilthiscentury.
havediffered
fromone another
Epistemologists
in regardto twoquestions:
whatelse belongedin our
chiefly
first,
andsecond,howthederivation
ofthenoncorpusofbasicbeliefs,
basic partof our knowledgewas to proceed.Even the Logical
Positivists
were,by and large,foundationalists,
althoughsome of
them came to renounceCartesianmentalismin favor of a
werefoundationalists
"physicalistic
basis".7In fact,thePositivists
twiceover:forthem"observation",
whether
or
phenomenological
servednotonlyas thefoundation
ofknowledge
butas the
physical,
foundationof all "cognitivemeaning"-thatis, as both an
and a semanticfoundation.
epistemological

/ 385
Whatis "Naturalized
Epistemology"?
3. Quine's Arguments
forepistemologists
whoprofess
allegiance
Ithasbecomecustomary
topayhomagetoQuine
ofknowledge
toa "naturalistic"
conception
oftheirinspiration-especially
provenance
as thechiefcontemporary
Naturalized".8
Quine'sprinto hisinfluential
paper"Epistemology
inthispaperagainsttraditional
is basepistemology
cipalargument
programhas
ed on the claimthatthe Cartesianfoundationalist
is"a lostcause".While
failed-that
theCartesian
"questforcertainty"
"questforcertainoftheCartesian
thisclaimaboutthehopelessness
ofnortheveryconception
ty"is nothing
new,usingitto discredit
thatanyseriousstudent
of
is new,something
mativeepistemology
mustcontendwith.
epistemology
intotwoparts:
program
Quinedividestheclassicepistemological
thoseof
conceptualreductionwherebyphysicalterms,including
to termsreferring
theoretical
science,are reduced,via definition,
anddoctrinal
reductophenomenal
features
ofsensory
experience,
worldare appropriately
obtionwhereby
truths
aboutthephysical
truths
aboutsensory
The"appropriateness"
tainedfrom
experience.
to therequirement
thatthefavoredepistemic
justalludedto refers
forclassicepistemologists,
toQuine)of
status("certainty"
according
to derivourbasicbeliefsbe transferred,
undiminished,
essentially
ifthederivational
ed beliefs,
a necessary
processis to
requirement
Whatderivational
methods
have
knowledge.
yieldknowledge
from
thisproperty
ofpreserving
status?
Perhapstherearenone,
epistemic
as inanything
else,
toerrinframing
derivations
givenourproneness
in
notto mention
thepossibility
oflapsesofattention
andmemory
Butlogicaldeduction
comesas closetobefollowing
lengthy
proofs.
ifnot
truth,
ingone as any;itcan at leastbe reliedon to transmit
status.It couldperhapsbe arguedthatno methodcan
epistemic
truth;
(orisknowntopreserve)
preserve
certainty
unlessitpreserves
andifthisisso,logicaldeduction
worthconsideristheonlymethod
of mostclassic
ing.I do notknowwhetherthiswas theattitude
if
doesn'tfilltheir
butQuineassumesthat deduction
epistemologists;
will.
bill,nothing
in
as culminating
reduction
Quinesees theprojectofconceptual
Carnap'sDer LogischeAufbauder Welt.As Quinesees it,Carnap
"came nearestto executing"the conceptualhalfof the classic
epistemological
project.But comingclose is not good enough.
Because of the holisticmannerin whichempiricalmeaningis

386/ JaegwonKim
ofthesortCarnapandothers
noreduction
generated
byexperience,
be completed.
Fordefinitional
so eagerlysoughtcouldinprinciple
meaningrelations9between
reductionrequirespoint-to-point
andphenomenal
something
thatQuine'sholism
terms,
physical
terms
doctrinal
tellsus cannotbe had.The secondhalfoftheprogram,
reduction,
is in no bettershape;in fact,itwas theone to stumble
was decisively
first,for,accordingto Quine, its impossibility
demonstrated
longbeforetheAufbau,by Humein hiscelebrated
showsthat
The "Humeanpredicament"
discussionof induction.
theresimply
deducedfromobservation;
theory
cannotbe logically
the
thatwilltransmit
theory
from
observation
is nowayofderiving
latter'sepistemic
statusintactto theformer.
I don'tthink
anyonewantstodisagreewithQuineintheseclaims.
It is notpossibleto "validate"scienceon thebasisofsensoryexif"validation"
through
logicaldeducmeansjustification
perience,
tion.Quineofcoursedoes notdenythatourtheoriesdependon
he hassaidthatsensory
evidence
forevidential
observation
support;
against
is theonlyevidencethereis. To be sure,Quine'sargument
reduction
hasa newtwist:theapplicathepossibility
ofconceptual
is no surprise;
"translational
tionofhis"holism".
Buthisconclusion
And,as
formanyyears.10
has been moribund
phenomenalism"
reduction,
againstthedoctrinal
notes,hisargument
Quinehimself
is onlya restatement
ofHume's"skeptical"
the"questforcertainty",
induction
afterall is notdeducinduction:
conclusions
concerning
Quine
tion.Mostof us are inclined,
I think,to viewthesituation
withno greatalarm,andI ratherdoubtthattheseconcludescribes
when
sions of Quine's came as news to most epistemologists
We are tempted
to
Naturalized"
was first
published.
"Epistemology
interms
ofsenseconcepts
physical
respond:
ofcoursewecan'tdefine
Thatis why
"underdetermines"
theory.
data;ofcourseobservation
observation
is observation
and nottheory.
So itis agreedon all handsthattheclassicalepistemological
proknowledge
validating
physical
ject,conceivedas oneofdeductively
from
sensory
data,cannotsucceed.Butwhatisthemoral
indubitable
lessontous?Having
ofthisfailure?
Whatshouldbe itsphilosophical
notedthefailureoftheCartesianprogram,
Quinegoes on:11
is all theevidence
The stimulation
of hissensoryreceptors
in arriving
at his
anybodyhas had to go on, ultimately,
pictureoftheworld.Whynotjustsee howthisconstruction

Whatis "Naturalized
Epistemology"?
/ 387
Sucha
reallyproceeds?Whynotsettleforpsychology?
oftheepistemological
burdento psychology
is a
surrender
movethatwas disallowedin earliertimesas circular
Iftheepistemologist's
goal is validation
ofthe
reasoning.
groundsofempirical
science,he defeatshispurposeby
or otherempirical
sciencein the
usingpsychology
have
validation.
However,suchscruplesagainstcircularity
ofdeducing
littlepointonce we havestoppeddreaming
Ifwe are outsimplyto understand
sciencefromobservation.
thelinkbetweenobservation
and science,we are well
that
advisedto use anyavailableinformation,
including
providedby theverysciencewhoselinkwithobservation
we are seekingto understand.
AndQuinehas thefollowing
to say aboutthefailureofCarnap's
in theAufbau:12
reductive
program
To relaxthedemandfordefinition,
and settlefora kindof
thatdoes noteliminate,
is to renouncethelast
reduction
remaining
advantagethatwe supposedrationalreconto have overstraight
struction
psychology;
namely,the
Ifall we hopeforis a
reduction.
advantageoftranslational
thatlinksscienceto experiencein explicit
reconstruction
thenit wouldseemmoresensible
waysshortoftranslation,
Betterto discoverhowscienceis in
to settleforpsychology.
a fictitious
factdevelopedand learnedthanto fabricate
to a similareffect.
structure
Ifa taskis entirely
hopeless,ifwe knowitcannotbe executed,no
doubtit is rationalto abandonit; we wouldbe betteroffdoing
else thathas somehopeofsuccess.We can agreewith
something
scienceon
is,logicaldeduction-of
Quinethatthe"validation"-that
thebasisofobservation
cannotbe had;so itis rationalto abandon
ifindeediteverwasa prothisparticular
program,
epistemological
undertook.
ButQuine'srecommendagramthatanyoneseriously
tionsgo further.
Inparticular,
thereare twoaspectsofQuine'sprohe is notonlyadvising
to us:first,
posalsthatare ofspecialinterest
us totake
of"validating
us toquittheprogram
science",buturging
an empirical
psychological
studyofour
up anotherspecific
project,
thatthisnewprocognitive
processes;second,he is also claimihg
aparepartofsomething
gramreplacestheold,thatbothprograms

388/ JaegwonKim
is tobe
Naturalized
epistemology
propriately
called"epistemology".
to classical
afterall,a "successor
subject"'13
a kindofepistemology
epistemology.
Whatshouldbe our
How shouldwe reactto Quine'surgings?
from
sciencestarting
projectofvalidating
response?
TheCartesian
foundation
of first-person
psychological
reports
the indubitable
first
principles)
is not
(perhapswiththehelpofcertainindubitable
blush.
so itwouldseematfirst
thewholeofclassicalepistemology-or
theCartesian
proInourcharacterization
ofclassicalepistemology,
ofepistemic
gramwasseenas onepossibleresponsetotheproblem
the criteriaof
the two-partprojectof identifying
justification,
anddetermining
whatbeliefs
areinfactjustified
epistemic
justification
Inurging
on
epistemology"
tothosecriteria.
"naturalized
according
thatwe giveup theCartesianfoundaus,Quineis notsuggesting
tionalist solution and explore others within the same
to adoptsomesortof"coherentist"
strategy,
framework14-perhaps,
credibilortorequireofourbasicbeliefs
onlysomedegreeof"initial
or to permitsome sortof
ity"ratherthanCartesiancertainty,
in additionto deductive
ofnonderivation
derivation
probabilistic
ortoconsider
theuseofspecialrulesofevidence,
basicknowledge,
ofevidence",15
orto giveup thesearch
likeChisholm's
"principles
in
fora derivational
undiminished
certainty
processthattransmits
favorofone thatcan transmit
butstillusefuldegreesof
diminished
justification.
Quine'sproposalismoreradicalthanthat.He is asking
of justification-centered
us to set aside the entireframework
ThatiswhatisnewinQuine'sproposals.
Quineisaskepistemology.
causal-nomological
ingus to putin itsplace a purelydescriptive,
scienceof humancognition.16
in generaltermsthedifference
beHow shouldwe characterize
suchas foundationalism
tweentraditional
programs,
epistemological
and coherencetheory,
on theone handand Quine'sprogramof
naturalized
on theother?Quine'sstressis on thefacepistemology
hesays,"Whynotsee
tualanddescriptive
character
ofhisprogram;
how[theconstruction
from
actually
proceeds?
oftheory observation]
how
"Better
to
discover
again,
Whynotsettleforpsychology?";17
scienceis infactdevelopedandlearnedthan..."18 We are givento
thatincontrast
traditional
is nota descripunderstand
epistemology
at a "validation"
or"raRather,
itis an attempt
tive,factual
inquiry.
toQuine,protionalreconstruction"
ofscience.Validation,
according
via definition.
ceeds via deduction,and rationalreconstruction

Whatis "Naturalized
Epistemology"?
/ 389
However,theirpointis justificatory-that
is,to rationalize
oursunclaims.So Quineis askingustosetasidewhatis "radryknowledge
tional"in rationalreconstruction.
thatQuineisaskingustorepudiate.
Thus,itisnormativity
Although
traditional
characterize
as
Quinedoes notexplicitly
epistemology
"normative"or "prescriptive",
his meaningis ,unmistakable.
is to be "a chapterof psychology",
a law-based
Epistemology
likeanyothertheory
within
predictive-explanatory
theory,
empirical
science;itsprincipal
job is to see how humancognizersdevelop
theories
(their
"picture
oftheworld")
from
observation
("thestimulationoftheirsensoryreceptors").
Epistemology
is to go outofthe
We earlier characterizedtraditional
businessof justification.
epistemology
as essentially
normative;
we see whyQuinewantsus
torejectit.Quineisurging
ustoreplacea normative
theory
ofcognitionwitha descriptive
science.
4. Losing KnowledgefromEpistemology
itselfdrops
Ifjustification
dropsoutofepistemology,
knowledge
Forourconceptofknowledge
outofepistemology.
is inseparably
As earliernoted,knowledge
itself
isa nortiedtothatofjustification.
naturalized
has
mativenotion.Quine'snonnormative,
epistemology
no roomforourconceptofknowledge.
Itis notsurprising
that,in
describingnaturalizedepistemology,
Quine seldomtalksabout
and
knowledge;instead,he talksabout"science"and "theories"
howsensory
"representations".
Quinewouldhave us investigate
stimulation
"leads"to"theories"
and"representation"
oftheworld.
I take it thatwithinthe traditional
and
schemethese"theories"
ofbeliefs;
"representations"
correspond
tobeliefs,
orsystems
thus,
whatQuinewouldhaveus do istoinvestigate
stimulahowsensory
tionleads to theformation
ofbeliefsabouttheworld.
Butinwhatsenseof"lead"?I takeitthatQuinehasinminda causal
or nomological
us to developa theory,
an emsense.He is urging
thatuncoverslawfulregularities
thepropiricaltheory,
governing
cessesthrough
cometodevelopbeliefs
abouttheir
whichorganisms
environment
as a causalresultof havingtheirsensoryreceptors
in certainways.Quinesays:19
stimulated
studiesa naturalphenomenon,
[Naturalized
epistemology]
viz.,a physicalhumansubject.Thishumansubjectis

390/ JaegwonKim
controlled
patterns
of
input-certain
accordedexperimentally
forinstance-andin the
in assortedfrequencies,
irradiation
fullness
oftimethesubjectdeliversas outputa description
externalworldand itshistory.
The
ofthethree-dimensional
output
is a
input
and
torrential
the
meager
relationbetween
the
to
study
for
somewhat
we
are
prompted
relationthat
namely,
epistemology;
same reasonsthatalwaysprompted
and in what
in orderto see how evidencerelatesto theory,
anyavailable
waysone'stheoryofnaturetranscends
evidence.
Therelation
Quinespeaksofbetween"meagerinput"and"torrenthat
tialoutput"
is a causalrelation;
at leastitis qua causalrelation
it. It is none of the
investigates
the naturalizedepistemologist
andtowhat
toassesswhether,
business
naturalized
epistemologist's
of
theoutput,howa givenirradiation
degree,theinput"justifies"
or"rational"
forthesubmakesit"reasonable"
thesubject's
retinas
is strictly
output.His interest
jectto emitcertainrepresentational
oflawlike
he wantsus to lookforpatterns
causalandnomological:
relations
theinput-output
forthisparcharacterizing
dependencies
and othersofa likephysicalstructure.
ticularorganism
to relatehisnaturalized
Ifthisis right,
itmakesQuine'sattempt
to traditional
lookat bestlame.Forin
epistemology
epistemology
betweenphysical
whatsense is the studyof causal relationships
and theresulting
output
stimulation
ofsensoryreceptors
cognitive
a way of "seeing how evidence relates to theory"in an
relevant
sense?The causalrelationbetweensenepistemologically
between"evidence"
and
isa relation
output
soryinputandcognitive
itis notan evidential
relation.
Thiscan be seen
"theory";
however,
thatQuine
patterns
consideration:
thenomological
from
thefollowing
urgesus to look forare certainto varyfromspeciesto species,
nonon theparticular
wayeachbiological(andpossibly
depending
relation
buttheevidential
biological)
speciesprocessesinformation,
and
sensemustabstractfromsuchfactors
in itspropernormative
concernitselfonlywiththe degreeto whichevidencesupports
hypothesis.
fromthatof
In anyevent,theconceptofevidenceis inseparable
sense
inan epistemological
Whenwe talkof"evidence"
justification.
foranother
is"evidence"
we aretalking
aboutjustification:
onething
orjustificatendstoenhancethereasonableness
justincase thefirst

Whatis "Naturalized
/ 391
Epistemology"?
tionofthesecond.Andsuchevidential
relations
holdinpartbecause
oftheitemsinvolved,
ofthe"contents"
notmerelybecauseofthe
causalornomological
connections
betweenthem.A strictly
nonnormativeconceptof evidenceis notour conceptof evidence;it is
thatwe do notunderstand.20
something
Noneofus,I think,
wouldwantto quarrelwithQuineaboutthe
interest
or importance
ofthepsychological
studyofhowoursensoryinputcausesourepistemic
output.Thisis onlytosaythatthe
is ofinterest.
studyofhuman(orotherkindsof)cognition
Thatisn't
is whether,
ourdifficulty;
ourdifficulty
andinwhatsense,pursuing
is a wayofdoingepistemology-that
Quine's"epistemology"
is,a
wayofstudying
"howevidencerelatestotheory".
Perhaps,
Quine's
recommendation
thatwe discardjustification-centered
epistemology
is worthpondering;
and his exhortation
to takeup the studyof
psychology
perhapsdeservestobe heededalso.Whatismysterious
is whythisrecommendation
has to be coupledwiththerejection
ofnormative
isnota possiepistemology
(ifnormative
epistemology
ble inquiry,
thewould-be
turnto,say,
whyshouldn't
epistemologist
or ornithology
ratherthanpsychology?).
But of
hydrodynamics
courseQuineis sayingmore;he is sayingthatan understandable,
ifmisguided,
motivation
(thatis, seeing"howevidencerelatesto
ourproclivities
forindulgence
innormative
theory")
does underlie
butthatwewouldbe better
servedbya scientific
epistemology,
study
of humancognition
thannormative
epistemology.
Butitis difficult
tosee howan "epistemology"
thathasbeenpurged ofnormativity,
onethatlacksan appropriate
normative
concept
ofjustification
or evidence,can haveanything
to do withtheconcerns of traditionalepistemology.And unless naturalized
andclassicalepistemology
sharesomeoftheircentral
epistemology
it'sdifficult
tosee howonecouldreplace theother,orbe
concerns,
a way(a betterway)ofdoingtheother.21
To be sure,theybothin"howevidencerelatesto theory".
Butputting
thematter
vestigate
thiswaycan be misleading,
andhasperhapsmisledQuine:thetwo
do notinvestigate
thesamerelation.
Aslatelynoted,nordisciplines
mativeepistemology
is concerned
withtheevidential
relation
properlyso-called-thatis, the relationof justification-and
Quine's
naturalized
is meanttostudythecausal-nomological
epistemology
relation.
Forepistemology
to go outofthebusinessofjustification
is forit to go outofbusiness.

392/ JaegwonKim
and Rationality
5. BeliefAttribution
Perhapswe havesaidenoughtopersuadeourselvesthatQuine's
inscientific
whileitmaybe a legitimate
naturalized
epistemology,
thatthequesand,therefore,
quiry,is nota kindofepistemology,
cannotarise.In
tionwhetherit is a betterkindof epistemology
reply,however,it mightbe said thattherewas a sensein which
couldbe viewed
andtraditional
epistemology
Quine'sepistemology
namelythis:theybothconcern
a common
subjectmatter,
as sharing
is thattheformer
The onlydifference
beliefsor "representations".
whereasthelatand connections
theircausalhistories
investigates
and
properties
orjustificatory
withtheirevidential
teris concerned
ifQuineis right,
leadstoanother(so conThisdifference,
relations.
thelatteris not.
is a feasibleinquiry,
tinuesthereply):theformer
a stepfurther:
I shallarguethat
I nowwanttotakemyargument
one,and in
normative
theconceptofbeliefis itselfan essentially
is whollyexcludedfromnaturalizconsequencethatifnormativity
ofas beingaboutbeliefs.
itcannotevenbe thought
ed epistemology
is tobe a scienceofbeliefspropepistemology
Thatis,ifnaturalized
conceptofbelief.
a normative
erlyso called,it mustpresuppose
Quine'sprois this.In orderto implement
theargument
Briefly,
andinwe shallneedtoidentify,
epistemology,
gramofnaturalized
The input,forQuine,
theinputand outputofcognizers.
dividuate,
ofsensoryreceptors")
ofphysicalevents("thestimulation
consists
or "picture
oftheworld"andtheoutputis saidto be a "theory"
Let
environment.
of
the
cognizer's
a
set
of
thatis,
"representations"
In
to
the
sensory
input-cognitive
usfocuson theoutput. order study
we mustfindout
therefore,
forthegivencognizer,
outputrelations
as a resultoftheparticular
what"representations"
he has formed
Settransducers.
stimulations
thathavebeenappliedto hissensory
is
to
attribute
to
do
to
able
tingasidethejargon,whatwe need be
intentional
states,to thecognizer.But
andothercontentful
beliefs,
ofthe
a "radicalinterpretation"
beliefattribution
ultimately
requires
must
we
conthat
and
intentional
is,
of
his
states;
speech
cognizer,
thatsimultaneously
assignsmeanings
an "interpretive
struct
theory"
andotherpropositional
tohimbeliefs
tohisutterances
andattributes
attitudes.22

thatsuchan interpretation
indicates
Evena cursory
consideration
in oursubject'srealmof
a
foothold
cannot
cannotbegin-we
get
we
assumehistotalsystem
states-unless
andintentional
meanings

Whatis "Naturalized
/ 393
Epistemology"?
to be largelyandessenofbeliefsandotherpropositional
attitudes
As Davidsonhas emphasized,
a given
tiallyrationaland coherent.
ithasinpartbecauseofitslocationin a netbeliefhasthecontent
workofotherbeliefsand propositional
attitudes;
and whatat botthisnetwork
is theevidential
tomgrounds
a relationthat
relation,
regulates
whatisreasonable
tobelievegivenotherbeliefs
oneholds.
Thatis, unlessour cognizeris a "rationalbeing",a beingwhose
cognitive"output"is regulatedand constrained
by normsof
rationality-typically,
thesenormsholistically
constrain
hispropositionalattitudes
invirtue
oftheircontents-wecannotintelligibly
inhis"output"
as consisting
ofbeliefs.Conversely,
ifwe are
terpret
oursubject's
unabletointerpret
meanings
andpropositional
attitudes
ina waythatsatisfies
a minimal
standard
ofrationality,
thereis littlereasontoregardhimas a "cognizer",
a beingthatforms
representationsand constructs
theories.
Thismeansthatthereis a senseof
"rational"in whichtheexpression"rationalbelief"is redundant;
everybeliefmustbe rationalin certainminimalways.It is not
forthe purposesof the presentargument
whatthese
important
ofrationality
is
minimal
standards
are; theonlypointthatmatters
inacthatunlesstheoutputofourcognizeris subjectto evaluation
cordancewithnormsofrationality,
thatoutput
cannotbe considered
as consisting
of beliefsand hence cannotbe the objectof an
whetherplainor naturalized.
epistemological
inquiry,
We canseparatethecoreoftheseconsiderations
from
controversialissuesinvolving
minimal
ratheso-called"principle
ofcharity",
and othermatters
in thetheoryofradicalinterpretation.
tionality,
Whatiscrucialisthis:fortheinterpretation
ofbeliefs
andattribution
to be possible,notonlymustwe assumetheoverallrationality
of
butalsowe mustcontinually
the
evaluateandre-evaluate
cognizers,
beliefsofa cognizerintheirevidential
to one
putative
relationship
anotherandotherpropositional
Itisnotmerely
thatbelief
attitudes.
attribution
abouttheoverallrarequirestheumbrellaassumption
reofcognizers.
tionality
Rather,
thepointis thatbeliefattribution
of
inaccordancewithnormative
standards
quiresbeliefevaluation,
in
evidenceand justification.
Ifthisis correct,
rationality itsbroad
a virand fundamental
ofbeliefs,
senseis notan optionalproperty
tuethatsomebeliefsmayenjoyandotherslack;itis a precondition
of the attribution
and individuation
of belief-thatis, a property
withoutwhichthe conceptof beliefwouldbe unintelligible
and
pointless.

394 / JaegwonKim
Two objections
mightbe raisedto countertheseconsiderations.
First,
onemight
arguethatatbesttheyshowonlythatthenormativity
ofbeliefis an epistemological
assumption-that
we needto assume
therationality
andcoherenceofbeliefsystems
whenwe are trying
toa cognizer.
tofindoutwhatbeliefstoattribute
Itdoesnotfollow
from
thisepistemological
point,
theobjection
continues,
thattheconIn replying
to thisobjection,
we
ceptofbeliefis itselfnormative.23
can by-passtheentireissueofwhether
therationality
assumption
of beliefattribution.
concernsonlytheepistemology
Even ifthis
premise
(whichI think
is incorrect)
is granted,
thepointhasalready
beenmade.Foritis an essentialpartofthebusinessofnaturalized
as a theoryofhowbeliefsare formed
epistemology,
as a resultof
sensorystimulation,
to findout whatparticular
beliefsthegiven
Butthisis precisely
whatcannotbe done,
cognizershaveformed.
if our considerations
show anything
at all, unlessthe would-be
naturalized
evaluatestheputative
beliefs
epistemologist
continually
ofhissubjectsin regardto theirrationality
and coherence,
subject
to theoverallconstraint
oftheassumption
thatthecognizersare
rational.
Thenaturalized
with
largely
epistemologist
cannotdispense
ordisengage
himself
from
valuational
normative
concepts
activities.
be thought
thatwe couldsimply
avoidtheseconSecond,itmight
siderations
frombeliefattribution
stemming
byrefusing
tothinkof
of"beliefs",
cognitive
outputas consisting
namelyas stateshaving
propositional
contents.
The"representations"
Quinespeaksofshould
be takenas appropriate
andthismeansthatallwe need
neuralstates,
istobe abletodiscernneuralstatesoforganisms.
Thisrequires
only
andthelike,notthenormative
neurophysiology
theory
ofrational
belief.
ofa dilemma:
either
the"appropriate"
Myreplytakestheform
neuralstatesare identified
by seeing how theycorrelatewith
inwhichcase we stillneedto contendwiththeproblem
beliefs,24
ofradicalinterpretation,
Inthelatorbeliefsareentirely
by-passed.
ter case, belief,along withjustification,
dropsout of Quinean
anditis unclearinwhatsensewe are leftwithan inepistemology,
to do withknowledge.25
quirythathas anything
6. The "Psychologistic"Approachto Epistemology
Manyphilosophers
now workingin theoryof knowledgehave
to philosophical
stressedtheimportance
ofsystematic
psychology

Whatis "Naturalized
/ 395
Epistemology"?
forthisarevarious,andso arethe
Reasonsproffered
epistemology.
of the properrelationship
betweenpsychology
and
conceptions
intheirrejection
Buttheyare virtually
unanimous
epistemology.26
tradition
ofDescartes
ofwhattheytaketo be theepistemological
in
likeRussell,
C. I. Lewis,
anditsmodern
embodimentsphilosophers
Roderick
andA. J.Ayer;andtheyareunitedintheirenChisholm,
approach
ofQuinewe havebeenconsiderdorsement
thenaturalistic
as "aprioristic",
is oftencondemned
ing.Traditional
epistemology
as a product
ofnatural
andas havinglostsightofhumanknowledge
and
its
function
in
survival
of
the
and
organism
causalprocesses
the
ofthetraditional
approach
thespecies.Sometimes,
theadherents
are takento taskfortheirimplicit
antiscientific
biasorindifference
inpsychology
andrelateddisciplines.
Their
tothenewdevelopments
and"scientific",
ownapproachincontrast
is hailedas "naturalistic"
fields
betterattuned
tosignificant
advancesintherelevant
scientific
such as "cognitivescience" and "neuroscience",promising
farricherthanwhattheaprioristic
methodof
returns
philosophical
Weshallherebrieftraditional
hasbeenabletodeliver.
epistemology
in epistemology
is to be
ly considerhow thisnew naturalism
and
in relationto theclassicepistemological
understood
program
Quine'snaturalized
epistemology.
proponent
ofthenewapproachexLetus see howonearticulate
of hispositionvis-a-vis
thatofthetradiplainsthedistinctiveness
theapproachhe
tionalepistemologists.
toPhilipKitcher,
According
attitude
thattakes
byan "apsychologistic"
rejectsis characterized
the difference
between knowledgeand true belief-thatis,
in"wayswhichareindependent
ofthecausal
consist
justification-to
antecedents
ofa subject'sstates".27
writes:28
Kitcher
approach]
...we can presenttheheartof [theapsychologistic
theway in whichit wouldtacklethe
by considering
questionofwhethera person'struebeliefthatp countsas
the
knowledgethatp. The idea wouldbe to disregard
lifeofthesubject,lookingjustat thevarious
psychological
in therightway'
propositions
she believes.Ifp is 'connected
to otherpropositions
whichare believed,thenwe countthe
thatp. Ofcourse,apsychologisitc
subjectas knowing
willhaveto supplya criterion
forpropositions
epistemology
to be 'connectedin the rightway' ... but proponentsof this

is to be
viewofknowledge
willemphasizethatthecriterion

396/ JaegwonKim
giveninlogicalterms.We are concernedwithlogical
notwithpsychological
relations
amongpropositions,
relations
amongmentalstates.
thecrucial
Ontheotherhand,thepsychologistic
approachconsiders
betweenknowledgeand truebelief-thatis, epistemic
difference
whichproduced
turnon"thefactors
thebelief",
focusjustification-to
whichproducebelief,
processes
whichwillalways
ingon"processes
events".29
contain,at theirlatterend,psychological
It is not entirelyclear fromthischaracterization
whethera
is to be prohibited
frommakpsychologistic
theoryofjustification
tologicalrelations
amongbeliefcontents
(itis difinganyreference
tobelievehowa theory
ofjustification
respecting
sucha blanket
ficult
conversely,
an
prohibition
couldsucceed);noris itclearwhether,
willbe permitted
torefer
at all tobeliefs
qua
apsychologistic
theory
todo so. But
psychological
states,orexactlywhatitis fora theory
suchpointsofdetailare unimportant
here;it is clearenough,for
as belief
toexplicate
justified
belief
example,
thatGoldman's
proposal
process30
nicelyfitsKitcher's
generated
bya reliablebelief-forming
ofthepsychologistic
characterization
approach.Thisaccount,one
was
oftheso-called
ofjustification,
form
theory"
probably
"reliability
his general
whatKitcherhad in mindwhenhe was formulating
inofepistemological
naturalism.
another
characterization
However,
ofthereliability
doesnotqualify
underKitcher's
fluential
form
theory
characterization.
Thisis Armstrong's
proposalto explainthedifferencebetweenknowledgeand true belief,at least fornonin termsof"a law-likeconnection
between
inferential
knowledge,
thestateofaffairs
thatp] and thestateof
[ofa subject'sbelieving
affairs
thatmakes'p' truesuchthat,giventhestateofaffairs
[ofthe
thatp],itmustbe thecasethatp."31 Thereis here
subject's
believing
that
of beliefs,something
no reference
to thecausalantecedents
theories.
Kitcher
requiresofapsychologistic
needs to be
characterization
Perhaps,Kitcher'spreliminary
ofthe
broadenedandsharpened.
However,a salientcharacteristic
naturalistic
approachhas alreadyemerged,whichwe can putas
in termsofcausal or
follows:justification
is to be characterized
beliefs
aspsychological
statesor
nomological
connections
involving
orrelations
perprocesses,
andnotintermsofthelogicalproperties
ofthesebeliefs.32
tainingto thecontents
in thisway,
Ifwe understand
naturalism
current
epistemological

Whatis "Naturalized
Epistemology"?
/ 397
how closelyis it relatedto Quine'sconceptionof naturalized
is obvious:notverycloselyat
The answer,I think,
epistemology?
all.Infact,itseemsa gooddealclosertotheCartesian
tradition
than
thatmatters
toQuine.For,as we saw,thedifference
between
Quine's
andthetraditional
is theformer's
epistemological
program
program
of the latter'snormativity,
totalrenouncement
its rejectionof
as a normativeinquiry.The talk of "replacing"
epistemology
withpsychology
is irrelevant
andat bestmisleading,
epistemology
a senseofdeprivarelieffrom
thoughitcouldgiveus a momentary
andothervaluational
tion.Whenoneabandons
justification
concepts,
oneabandons
theentire
framework
ofnormative
epistemology.
What
remains
isa descriptive
empirical
theory
ofhumancognition
which,
ifQuinehashisway,willbe entirely
devoidofthenotionofjustificationor anyotherevaluativeconcept.
As I takeit,thisis notwhatmostadvocatesofepistemological
naturalism
are aimingat. By and large theyare not Quinean
in regardto justification,
in itsfulleliminativists
and justification
sensecontinues
to playa centralrolein their
fledgednormative
Wheretheydiffer
from
their
nonnaturalist
epistemological
reflections.
is thespecific
are
adversaries
wayin whichcriteria
of-justification
to be formulated.
Naturalists
and nonnaturalists
("apsychologists")
can agreethatthesecriteria
mustbe statedin descriptive
termsoranyotherkindofnormative
thatis,without
theuse ofepistemic
terms.According
to Kitcher,
an apsychologistic
theoryofjustificain termsoflogicalproperties
and
tionwouldstatethemprimarily
ofbeliefs,
relations
contents
whereasthe
holdingforpropositional
psychologistic
approachadvocatestheexclusiveuse ofcausalproandrelations
forbeliefs
as eventsorstates.Manytradiperties
holding
tionalepistemologists
criteria
thatconfer
mayprefer
upona cognizer
a positionofspecialprivilege
andresponsibility
withregardto the
statusofhisbeliefs,
whereasmostself-avowed
naturalists
epistemic
prefer"objective"or "externalist"
criteriawithno such special
forthecognizer.Butthesedifferences
are amongthose
privileges
normative
andareconsisthatarisewithin
thefamiliar
framework,
ofthe
tentwiththeexclusionofnormative
termsin thestatement
criteriaofjustification.
Normative
ethicscan serveas a usefulmodelhere.To claimthat
like"good"and"right",
onthebasis
basicethicalterms,
aredefinable
thatitis the
ofdescriptive
ornaturalistic
terms
isonething;
toinsist
or criteriafor
businessof normative
ethicsto provideconditions

398/ JaegwonKim
indescriptive
ornaturalistic
terms
isanother.
One
"good"and"right"
theso-called"ethicalnaturalism",
rejecttheformer,
mayproperly
havedone,and holdthelatter;there
as manymoralphilosophers
who
here.G. E. Mooreis a philosopher
is no obviousinconsistency
criticofethical
didjustthat.As is wellknown,he was a powerful
holdingthatgoodnessis a "simple"and "nonnatural"
naturalism,
At the same time,he held thata thing'sbeinggood
property.
He
properties.
"follows"fromits possessingcertainnaturalistic
wrote:33
ofsuggesting
thatgoodnesswas
I shouldneverhave thought
in
unlessI had supposedthatit was 'derivative'
'non-natural',
thesensethat,whenevera thingis good (in thesensein
question)itsgoodness...'dependson thepresenceofcertain
characteristics'
possessedby thethingin
non-ethical
question:I have alwayssupposedthatit didso 'depend',in
thesensethat,ifa thingis good (in mysense),thenthatit is

so followsfromthe factthatit possesses certainnatural

intrinsicproperties...

from
properties"
intrinsic
Itmakessenseto thinkofthese"natural
whicha thing'sbeinggood is thoughtto followas constituting
oratleastpointing
totheexistence
ofgoodness,
naturalistic
criteria
thedoctrine
that
ofsuchcriteria.
Onecan rejectethicalnaturalism,
infavorofnaturalistic
eliminable
ethicalconceptsare definitionally
ortheascripproperties,
terms,
andatthesametimeholdthatethical
criteria.
Itis
tionofethicalterms,
mustbe governed
bynaturalistic
in
"naturalism"
ambiguously
clear,then,thatwe are hereusing
In ourprenaturalism"
and "ethicalnaturalism".
"epistemological
sentusage,epistemological
does notinclude(nordoes
naturalism
aredefinitionally
itnecessarily
terms
exclude)theclaimthatepistemic
is eliminative,
terms.(Quine'snaturalism
reducibleto naturalistic
eliminativism.)
thoughit is nota definitional
we locatethesplitbetweenQuineand traditional
If,therefore,
atthedescriptive
vs.normative
divide,thencurrently
epistemology
inepistemology
is notlikelytofallon Quine's
influential
naturalism
side.Onthisdescriptive
vs.normative
issue,onecansidewithQuine
in one of two ways: first,one rejects,withQuine,the entire
or second,likeethical
program;
epistemological
justification-based
naturalists
butunlikeQuine,one believesthatepistemic
concepts
I doubtthatverymanyepistemological
arenaturalistically
definable.

Whatis "Naturalized
/ 399
Epistemology"?
willembraceeitherofthesealternatives.34
naturalists
Epistemology
7. EpistemicSupervenience-OrWhyNormative
Is Possible
criteria
Butwhyshouldwe thinkthattheremustbe naturalistic
Ifwe take
beliefandothertermsofepistemic
appraisal?
ofjustified
andsystematization
ofsuchcriteria
to be thecentral
thediscovery
is thereanyreasonto thinkthat
taskofnormative
epistemology,
thatnormative
is
epistemology
pursued,
thistaskcan be fruitfully
Quine'spointis thatit is not.We have
a possiblefieldofinquiry?
of Quine'snegativearguments
in
alreadynotedthe limitation
butis therea positive
reasonforthinkNaturalized",
"Epistemology
isa viableprogram?
Onecouldconepistemology
ingthatnormative
ofnormative
ethics.
sidera similarquestionaboutthepossibility
a detailinitial
answer,
although
I think
thereisa short
andplausible
ed defenseofitwouldinvolvecomplexgeneralissuesaboutnorms
andvalues.Theshortansweristhis:we believeinthesupervenience
in
on naturalistic
ones,andmoregenerally,
ofepistemic
properties
on
ofall valuationaland normative
properties
thesupervenience
Thiscomesoutin variousways.We think,
conditions.
naturalistic
thatiftwopersonsoractscoincideinall descripwithR.M.Hare,35
inrespect
ofbeinggood
tiveornaturalistic
theycannotdiffer
details,
or right,or any othervaluationalaspects.We also thinkthatif
is "good" a "goodcar","gooddropshot","goodargusomething
way",
ment"-then
thatmustbe so "invirtueof"itsbeinga "certain
thatis,itshavingcertain"factual
Beinga goodcar,say,
properties".
cannotbe a bruteand ultimate
fact:a car is goodbecauseit has a
havingtodo withpercertain
indicated
setofproperties
contextually
etc.Thesamegoes
economy,
comfort,
styling,
reliability,
formance,
thatmustbe so becauseit
forjustified
belief:ifa beliefis justified,
suchas perhapsthat
properties,
has certainfactual,
nonepistemic
beliefthat
itis "indubitable",
thatitisseentobe entailedbyanother
causedbypercepthatitis appropriately
is independently
justified,
beliefcannotbe
Thatitis a justified
tualexperience,
orwhatever.
a brutefundamental
to thekindofbeliefitis. There
factunrelated
mustbe a reasonforit,and thisreasonmustbe groundedin the
like
belief.
Something
ofthatparticular
factual
descriptive
properties
is whatwe believe.
this,I think,

400 / JaegwonKim
themesunderlietheseconvictions:
Two important
first,
values,
notreducible
tofacts,
mustbe "consistent"
withthem
though
perhaps
inregard
tofactmustbe indiscerinthatobjectsthatareindiscernible
niblein regardto value; second,theremustbe nonvaluational
"reasons"or "grounds"forthe attribution
of values,and these
"reasons"or "grounds"mustbe generalizable-that
is, theyare
rules
or
norms.
These
two
ideas
coveredby
correspond
to "weak
and "strong
thatI have discussed
supervenience"
supervenience"
Beliefin the supervenience
of value upon fact,
elsewhere.36
to theveryconceptsofvalueand valuais fundamental
arguably,
mustbe governtion.37
Anyvaluational
concept,to be significant,
andthesecriteria
ed bya setofcriteria,
mustultimately
reston facand relationships
of objectsand eventsbeing
tualcharacteristics
evaluated.Thereis something
abouttheidea of
deeplyincoherent
series
an infinitely
of
valuational
descending
eachdepenconcepts,
ofapplication.38
dingon theone belowitas itscriterion
thatepistemological
It seemsto me,therefore,
is
supervenience
inthepossibility
whatunderlies
ourbelief
ofnormative
epistemology,
and thatwe do not need new inspirations
fromthe sciencesto
acknowledge
theexistenceofnaturalistic
criteria
forepistemic
and
othervaluational
Thecase ofnormative
concepts.
ethicsis entirely
ofnormative
ethicsis rootedinthe
parallel:beliefinthepossibility
beliefthatmoralproperties
andrelations
aresupervenient
uponnonmoralones.Unlesswe are preparedto disownnormative
ethicsas
a viablephilosophical
we hadbetterrecognizenormative
inquiry,
as one,too.39We shouldnote,too,thatepistemology
epistemology
islikelytoparallelnormative
ethicsinregardtothedegreetowhich
results
scientific
are relevant
or usefulto itsdevelopment.40
Saying
thisofcourseleaveslargeroomfordisagreement
concerning
how
relevant
anduseful,
ifatall,empirical
psychology
ofhumanmotivationandactioncanbe tothedevelopment
ofnorandconfirmation
In any event,once the normativity
of
mativeethicaltheories.41
epistemology
is clearlytaken note of, it is no surprisethat
andnormative
epistemology
ethicssharethesamemetaphilosophical
fate.Naturalized
epistemology
makesno more,and no less,sense
thannaturalized
normative
ethics.42
Notes
1. In makingtheseremarks
I am onlyrepeating
thefamiliar
textbook

Whatis "NaturalizedEpistemology"?/ 401

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

whatourtextbooks
ofphilosophy;
sayaboutthehistory
however,
history
of
concepthas muchto do withourunderstanding
ofa philosophical
thatconcept.
as a desideratum
of
explicitly
statesthisrequirement
AlvinGoldman
inGeorge
Belief?",
ofjustified
belief
in"WhatisJustified
hisownanalysis
andKnowledge
(Dordrecht:
Reidel,1979),
S. Pappas(ed.),Justification
inhisTheory
M.Chisholm's
definition
of"beingevident"
p. 1.Roderick
N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1977)
does
ofKnowledge,
2nded. (Englewood
Cliffs,
on an unanalyzed
thisrequirement
as it restsultimately
notsatisfy
conceptofone beliefbeingmorereasonablethananother.
epistemic
workforChisholm
is his"principles
Whatdoesthereal"criteriological"
ofKnowledge,
See especially
which
ofevidence".
(A)onp. 73ofTheory
descriptoprovide
nonnormative,
canusefully
be regarded
as an attempt
beliefs.
tiveconditions
forcertaintypesofjustified
seemsimplicit
inRoderick
requirement
Thebasicideaofthisstronger
Cerinhis"Coherence,
property"
Firth's
notionof"warrant-increasing
ofPhilosophy
Journal
61 (1964):545-57.
Priority",
tainty,
andEpistemic
similar
inmindwhenhe
ItseemsthatWilliam
P. Alstonhassomething
isa superveepistemic
justification
property,
says,"...likeanyevaluative
theapplication
ofwhichis basedon morefundamental
nientproperty,
to Firth's
papercitedabove),in
properties"
(atthispointAlstonrefers
ofPhilosophy
73(1976):165-85
Journal
"TwoTypesofFoundationalism",
occurson p. 170).Although
Alstondoesn'tfurther
(thequotedremark
thecontext
properties",
explainwhathemeansby"morefundamental
tosupposethathehasinmindnonnormative,
descripmakesitplausible
discussion.
See Section7 belowforfurther
tiveproperties.
refers
toa "person's
responSee Chisholm,
ibid.,p. 14.HereChisholm
or dutyqua intellectual
being".
sibility
between
thedifference
ThistermwasusedbyA.J.Ayertocharacterize
ofKnowledge
andknowing;
see TheProblem
(NewYork
luckyguessing
& London:PenguinBooks,1956),p. 33.
in TheoryofKnowledge,1sted.,ch. 4.
Notablyby Chisholm
and Meaning",
ofScience
See RudolfCarnap,"Testability
Philosophy
3 (1936),and 4 (1937).We shouldalso notethepresenceofa strong
coherentist
streakamongsomepositivists;
see, e.g.,CarlG. Hempel,
2 (1935):49-59,
Analysis
"OntheLogicalPositivists'
TheoryofTruth",
2 (1935):93-96.
and"SomeRemarks
on'Facts'andPropositions",
Analysis
InW.V.Quine,Ontological
andOtherEssays(NewYork:ColRelativity
umbiaUniversity
Press,1969).Alsosee hisWordandObject(Cambridge:
MITPress,1960);TheRootsofReference
1973);
(LaSalle,Ill.:OpenCourt,
TheWebofBelief(NewYork:Random
House,1970);
Ullian)
(with
Joseph
inSamuelGuttenplan
"TheNature
ofNatural
Knowledge"
andespecially
Clarendon
Press,1975).See Frederick
(ed.),MindandLanguage(Oxford:
inHilary
F. Schmitt's
epistemology
excellent
bibliography
onnaturalistic
MIT/Bradford,
Kornblith
(Cambridge:
Epistemology
(ed.),Naturalizing
1985).
verificationist
Orconfirmational
theory
relations,
giventhePositivists'
ofmeaning.

402 / JaegwonKim
10. I knowofnoseriousdefenseofitsinceAyer'sTheFoundations
ofEmpiricalKnowledge(London:Macmillan,
1940).
11. "Epistemology
Naturalized",
pp. 75-76.
12. Ibid.,p. 78.
13. To use an expression
ofRichardRorty's
inPhilosophy
and theMirror
ofNature(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,1979),p. 11.
14. Elliott
Sobermakesa similarpoint:"Andon thequestionofwhether
the failureof a foundationalist
programme
showsthatquestionsof
cannotbe answered,
itisworthnoting
justification
thatQuine'sadvice
'SinceCarnap'sfoundationalism
failed,whynotsettleforpsychology'
carries
weight
onlytothedegreethatCarnapian
exhausts
epistemology
thepossibilities
ofepistemology",
in"Psychologism",
JoumalofTheory
ofSocialBehaviour8 (1978):165-191.
15, See Chisholm,
2nded.,ch. 4.
TheoryofKnowledge,
16. "Ifwe areseekingonlythecausalmechanism
ofourknowledge
ofthe
external
ofthatknowledge
world,andnota justification
intermsprior
to science...", Quine,"GradesofTheoreticity",
in L. Fosterand J.W.
Swanson(eds.), Experienceand Theory(Amherst:University
of
Massachusetts
Press,1970),p. 2.
17. Ibid.,p. 75. Emphasisadded.
18. Ibid.,p. 78. Emphasis
added.
19. Ibid.,p. 83. Emphasisadded.
20. Butaren'ttherethosewhoadvocatea "causaltheory"
ofevidenceor
I wantto maketwo briefpointsaboutthis.First,the
justification?
or causal input/output
nomological
relationsare notin themselves
evidential
theselatterare understood
relations,
whether
causallyor
otherwise.
ofevidenceattempts
Second,a causaltheory
tostatecriteria
for"e is evidenceforh"incausalterms;
evenifthisissuccessful,
itdoes
notnecessarily
giveus a causal"definition"
or "reduction"
oftheconceptofevidence.Formoredetailssee section6 below.
21. 1amnotsaying
thatQuineisunderanyillusion
onthispoint.
Myremarks
aredirected
rather
atthosewhoendorse
Quinewithout,
itseems,a clear
ofwhatis involved.
appreciation
22. HereI amdrawing
on DonaldDavidson'swritings
chiefly
onradicalinSee Essays9, 10,and 11 in hisInquiries
terpretation.
intoTruthand
Interpretation
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press,1984).See also DavidLewis,
"RadicalInterpretation",
Synthese27 (1974):33144.
23. RobertAudisuggested
thisas a possibleobjection.
24. Forsomeconsiderations
to showthatthesecorrelations
tending
cannotbe lawlike
seemy"Psychophysical
LePoreandBrian
Laws",inErnest
McLaughlin
(eds.),ActionsandEvents:Perspectives
on thePhilosophy
ofDonaldDavidson(Oxford:
Blackwell,
1985).
25. Fora moresympathetic
accountofQuinethanmine,see HilaryKornblith's
introductory
inKornessay,"Whatis Naturalistic
Epistemology?",
blith(ed.),Naturalizing
Epistemology.
26. See formoredetails
Alvin1.Goldman,
andCognition
Epistemology
(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1986).
27. TheNatureofMathematical
Knowledge
(NewYork:Oxford
University

Whatis "NaturalizedEpistemology"?/ 403

Press,1983),p. 14.
28. Ibid.
apconsiders
theapsychologistic
29. Ibid.,p. 13.I shouldnotethatKitcher
as
epistemology,
century
ofthetwentieth
proachto be an aberration
like Russell,Moore,C.I. Lewis,and
by philosophers
represented
rather
thanan historical
characteristic
oftheCartesian
tradiChisholm,
Australasian
Journal
ofPhilosophy
Turn",
tion.In "ThePsychological
givesan analogouscharacteriza60 (1982):238-253,HilaryKornblith
tojustification;
he associates"justificationtionofthetwoapproaches
withthepsychologistic
approachand"epistemic
conferring
processes"
approach.
rules"withtheapsychologistic
Belief?".
"Whatis Justified
30. See Goldman,
Cambridge
(London:
Truth,
BeliefandKnowledge
31. DavidM.Armstrong,
University
Press,1973),p. 166.
approach
ofthe"apsychologistic"
32. Theaptnessofthischaracterization
KeithLehrer,
JohnPollock,
etc.
likeRussell,
Chisholm,
forphilosophers
vs."externalism"
canbe debated.
Also,thereistheissueof"internalism"
from
the
whichI believemustbe distinguished
concerning
justification,
vs. apsychologistic
division.
psychologistic
in P.A.Schilpp(ed.),ThePhilosophy
33. Moore,"A Replyto MyCritics",
ofG.E.Moore(Chicago& Evanston:
OpenCourt,1942),p. 588.
rolein hisarguments
claim,whichplaysa prominent
34. RichardRorty's
inPhilosophy
andtheMirror
ofNature,
epistemology
againsttraditional
thenormative
conflated
thatLockeandothermodernepistemologists
is itself
withcausal-mechanical
based,
concepts
conceptofjustification
here.See RorI believe,on a conflation
ofjustthekindI amdescribing
conflation
consists
in notseeing
Again,thecritical
ty,ibid.,pp. 139ff.
like
thatepistemic
justification,
thattheview,whichI believeiscorrect,
naturalistic
criteria,
concept,musthavefactual,
anyothernormative
whichI think
ofthedoctrine,
consistent
withtherejection
is entirely
itself
is, or isreducibleto,a naturalisticis incorrect,
thatjustification
nonnormative
concept.
Oxford
Press,1952),p.145.
University
35. TheLanguageofMorals(London:
and Phenomenological
Philosophy
36. See "ConceptsofSupervenience",
Research65 (1984):153-176.
as a special
supervenience
epistemological
37. ErnestSosa,too,considers
on naturalistic
concase ofthesupervenience
ofvaluational
properties
ofFoundationalism",
Nous14(1980):547-64;
in"TheFoundation
ditions,
in
discussion
p. 551.See alsoJamesVanCleve'sinstructive
especially
TheMonist68
andtheCircleofBelief",
his"Epistemic
Supervenience
pp. 97-99.
(1985):90-104;especially,
regress
byembrac38. Perhapsonecouldavoidthiskindofcriteriological
intuitionism)
valuational
properties
(asinethical
apprehended
ingdirectly
couldbe
forothervaluational
on thebasisofwhichcriteria
properties
on
ofvaluational
formulated.
Thedenialofthesupervenience
concepts
connection
wouldsevertheessential
factualcharacteristics,
however,
itseems,thewholepointofourvaluabetween
valueandfactonwhich,
thevery
tionalactivities
depends.Intheabsenceofsuchsupervenience,

404 / JaegwonKim
and relevance.The
notionof valuationwouldlose its significance
ofthesepoints,however,
wouldhaveto waitforanother
elaboration
noteformore
occasion;butseeVanCleve'spapercitedinthepreceding
details.
themboth.For
39. Quinewillnotdisagreewiththis:he will"naturalize"
ofMoralValues"inAlvin1.Goldman
hisviewsonvaluessee"TheNature
Kim(eds.),ValuesandMorals(Dordrecht:
andJaegwon
Reidel,1978).
oftherelationship
betweenepistemic
andethicalconFora discussion
"AreEpistemic
Reducible
toEthical
Concepts
ceptssee Roderick
Firth,
in thesamevolume.
Concepts?"
40. Fordiscussions
ofthisand relatedissuessee Goldman,
Epistemology
and Cognition.
41. Fora detailed
ofa normative
ethical
theory
thatexemplifies
development
A Theory
theviewthatitis crucially
relevant,
see RichardB. Brandt,
The Clarendon
oftheGoodand theRight(Oxford:
Press,1979).
oftheKoreanSocie42. Anearlyversion
ofthispaperwasreadata meeting
in 1984inSeoul.Anexpandedversionwas
tyforAnalytic
Philosophy
at theWesternDivisionmeetings
of the
presented
at a symposium
AmericanPhilosophicalAssociationin April,1985, and at the
at BrownUniversity
in honorof Roderick
conference
epistemology
Audiwho
in 1986.1 amgrateful
toRichard
Chisholm
FoleyandRobert
ConattheAPAsessionandtheChisholm
presented
helpful
comments
I amalsoindebted
toTerenceHorganandRobert
ference
respectively.
and suggestions.
Meyersforhelpful
comments
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Alston,
William
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73 (1976):165-85.
DavidM., Truth,
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Knowledge
(London:Macmillan,
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(NewYork& London:Penguin
Ayer,
A.J.,TheProblem
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Brandt,RichardB., A Theoryof the Good and theRight(Oxford:The
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Carnap,Rudolf,
"Testability
and 4 (1937).
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