A.M. No. AC 4762 June 28, 2004 husband and respondent.
husband and respondent. He also vehemently took exception to the imputation that he was
LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint 1 with the then Court
Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis Oriental Chapter, for "having employed fraud,
trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino,
when he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00." According to complainant, respondents
unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly triggered the death of her husband, who died
"disillusioned and embittered."2 The letter-complaint and affidavit also alleged that
notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by Mr. Espino and complainant (after the death of
Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the amount represented by the eight checks which
had all been dishonored. Complainant surmised that Atty. Presquitos refusal to pay may be due
to his reliance on the influence of his father-in-law, a former Executive Judge of the RTC
(Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro).
The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was introduced to
complainants late husband, Mr. Virgilio M. Espino. Mr. Espino, a resident of Davao City, had
sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of Cagayan de Oro, regarding the sale of his
piece of land with an area of 11,057.59 sq.m. situated in Misamis Oriental. The discussion
between Mr. Espino and the respondent resulted in the sale of the property to
respondent.3 Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino and respondent, 4 the
purchase price of the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by
installments.5 Pursuant to the terms of payment in the agreement, respondent issued eight post-
dated checks, totaling P736,060.00.6 Respondent then entered into a joint venture or partnership
agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its
development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own use. 7 The land was
eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.
Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino
made repeated demands for payment from respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died in
December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect from respondent the value of the
eight checks. When complainants numerous pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint
in June 1997.
In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that
the allegations that he had employed "fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr.
Espino were totally false and baseless. The complaint, according to respondent, stemmed from
complainants lack of knowledge as to "the real story" of the transaction between complainants
banking on the influence of his father-in-law and uncle-in-law.
Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What respondent claims, however,
is that the nonpayment was justified by the unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares have with
respect to the right-of-way of the land. He alleged that Mr. Espino had made assurances that the
land had a right-of-way required for its development, but respondent later found out that such
road-right-of-way required the consent of four other land owners, and the expense would be
considerably more than he was made to believe. According to respondent, he and Mr. Espino
had agreed that the latter would not encash the checks or demand the equivalent of the same
until the right-of-way problem of the land had been resolved. 8 Respondents position is that until
the problem of obtaining a right-of-way to the land has been resolved, nothing has yet accrued
against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be "very unfair and unjust" for them to pay Mr.
Espino when the land could not be developed and sold.9
Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount he owes Mr. Espino
or his heirs from the purchase of the land, the advances he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost he
incurred when he defended Mr. Espinos son in a criminal case. He later on manifested that he
has fully paid the portion of the land which had been titled in his name through the same
advances and incurred expenses.10
In a resolution dated November 26, 1997, 11 the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision, and assigned to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002,12 Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay
found that "the facts and credible evidence made available in this case indubitably establish
respondents failure to live up to the demands of the Lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics." For having failed to act with candor and
fairness toward complainant, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months, and ordered to immediately account with complainant
regarding the sale of the piece of land which had been subdivided in the name of respondent
and his business partner. On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a
Resolution adopting/approving the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Dulay, finding
that "respondents lack of fairness and candor and honesty [was] in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility."
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree that respondent was
wanting in fairness, candor and honesty demanded of him by the Lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. We find, however, the recommended
penalty of six (6) months suspension too light considering respondents gross misconduct.
Complainants testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was an agreement
between respondent and complainants late husband for the sale of the latters land; (2)
respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with said agreement; (3) these checks
were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-right-of-way.
Complainants exhibits were formally offered as early as January 6, 1999, 13 and were admitted
without objections from respondent.14
In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon respondent to prove a legal
excuse or defense for nonpayment of the eight checks.
Respondent utterly failed in this regard.
From the termination of complainants presentation of evidence on December 1998 until
Commissioner Dulays report on November 12, 2002, the records show that respondent was
unable to present evidence - either testimonial or documentary - to prove that he had legal
cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Even respondents own
statements - which, without corroborating evidence, remain mere self-serving allegations - fall
short of testimony, as he failed to submit to cross-examination by opposing counsel or for
clarificatory questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen documents to his
comment, but only went so far as to mark (without a formal offer) the agreement between him
and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and the partnership agreement between him and Mrs.
Ares. Thus, respondent had no evidence other than his own allegations.
Respondents failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,15especially in the light of the numerous postponements and resettings he
requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed more time to prepare his
evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to present his evidence on December
14, 1998. Two years - five resettings, and three orders submitting the case for resolution - later,
respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary evidence.
Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his financial difficulties, i.e.,
he could not afford to spend for travel expenses of his witnesses. 16 We are not persuaded. First,
it boggles the mind how financial constraints could have prevented respondent from presenting
the originals of the documents attached to his comment, proving, among others, the alleged
advances and costs on Mr. Espinos behalf. The originals of these documents are presumably in
his possession. Second, with respect to the absence of testimony, respondent could have
submitted the affidavits of his witnesses - the taking of which he could have done himself in
Cagayan de Oro to keep down the cost. The records are clear that he was allowed this
option.17 But he did neither.
All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion that respondent could not
present evidence because there really was none to justify his nonpayment.18
Even if we were to excuse respondents procedural lapse and consider his written pleadings as
testimony, we agree with Commissioner Dulay that respondents problems with respect to the
right-of-way or his partnership with Mrs. Ares do not excuse his nonpayment. As stated in the
IBP-CBD report:
[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands of
respondent.We note that respondent has already taken title over the property
together with Guadalupe Ares by making complainants late husband, sign over the
property by way of the Deed of Sale. We therefore find respondents position vis--vis
the widowed complainant sneaky and unfair. We reiterate that respondent has
assumed responsibility for the negotiations on the road-right-of-way and was aware of
the problem. To [sic] our mind he has used the alleged road-right-of-way problem only
as an afterthought and a reason to delay and in fact deny the complainant payment of
what is due her. Respondent also alleges and blames the deceased husband of
complainant for the failed project but the facts show otherwise. They are just bare
allegations and remain unsubstantiated. Besides, respondent and Ares took risks in
the business venture and are now the titled owners of the property. The seller cannot
be blamed for any failure in the project. Respondents actuations in the whole
transaction is [sic] not at par with the standards demanded of him as a member of the
bar. Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The fact that he
has unreasonably delayed and failed to account with complainant for a long time and
the fact of his having allowed the checks he issued to bounce is [sic] unacceptable
and censurable behavior for a member of the bar.19 [citations omitted]
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored checks, respondents
indifference to complainants entreaties for payment was conduct unbecoming of a member of
the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late
husband,20 first by allowing the eight (8) checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the
repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint, and finally by
deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics. Considering that the
property of complainant and her late husband is already in respondent and Mrs. Ares name, the
injustice of respondents different maneuvers to evade payment of the eight checks - due and
unpaid since 1996 - becomes more manifest.
It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without
regard to its deleterious effects to public interest and public order. We have already declared,
most recently in Lao v. Medel,21that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct, and puts the erring lawyers moral character in serious doubt, though it is not
related to his professional duties as a member of the bar. 22 He not only sets himself liable for a
serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the
respect for law.
It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is
not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.23 A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private
capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. 24 Thus, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued worthless
checks - Lao v. Medel,25 Co v. Bernardino,26 and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr.,27 - we find respondents
reprehensible conduct warrants suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross misconduct

and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered to immediately
account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land, which has been subdivided in
the name of respondent and his business partner.

Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar Confidant and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010
ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
1
An Information for Estafa was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa
(complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto
(respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the
involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial
court granted.2 Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was
denied3
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31
of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them.4
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez
Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of
GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of
Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager.5 The notice was signed by
respondent.
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt.
Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then current Board, 6 Gerango,
complainants predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed
others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its
premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent
letter-notices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal
from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from
further discharging the duties of their positions.7
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-
Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001
Special General Assembly.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the
questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of
GEMASCOs By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. 8 The RDs Resolution of
February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.
In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that
respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID
AND CONSENT TO THE SAME11
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION12
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL13
X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW14
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES
COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING
COMMUNITY AS WELL15
Despite the Courts grant,16 on respondents motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment,
respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with,18but just the same he failed to comply.19
The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.20
It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the
following issues:
1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly the following:
1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal [processes].
1.2 Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
1.3 Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
1.4 Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law.
 1.5 Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyers
oath, particularly the following:
2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein
2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court
2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same
2.4 will delay no man for money or malice
3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for
disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.21
Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of
whether, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by
respondent.22
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position
papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of
time, did not file any position paper.
25
In her Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found
respondent guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been previously
suspended for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for
two years.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the
complaint, however, for lack of merit.261avvphi1
On Motion for Reconsideration,27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the
GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which provides
that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he
violated the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed
to file any and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar28 teaches:
x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondents obstinate refusal
to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect
to their processes.29 (Citations omitted).
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six
months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have
received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her
when he had not.31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more
severe penalty this time is thus called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the
practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7922 October 1, 2013
MARY ANN T.MATTUS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against Atty.
Albert T. Villaseca for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-
02.
Background Facts
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in Criminal
Case No. 10309-02 a case for estafa thru falsification of public document filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite. The complainant and her husband, German,
engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the proceedings. The complainant
maintained that she and German were convicted due to Atty. Villasecas gross and inexcusable
negligence in performing his duties as their counsel.
In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1) was
often absent during court hearings but still collected appearance fees; (2) frequently sought the
postponement of trial when he was present; (3) failed to ask the RTC to direct a National Bureau
of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter 2 in
the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite having been
granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one; (5) failed to present evidence on behalf of the
defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and German of the dates of the
presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously
indicated the wrong case number in the notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty.
Villasecas negligence in handling the case resulted in her own and her husbands conviction.
In the Courts Resolution3 of July 16, 2008, we required Atty. Villaseca to comment on the
complaint.
On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his comment, 4 refuting the allegations against him.
Atty. Villaseca explained that he made known to the complainant that the testimony of a
handwriting expert was necessary only if the prosecution would be able to produce the original
copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences during the hearings, as well as
his numerous motions for postponement, were justified and were never intended for delay. He
denied having collected appearance fees when he did not attend the scheduled hearings, and
maintained that the fees he received were intended to compensate him for his services in the
other cases filed by the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he immediately
corrected the case number in the notice of appeal when he discovered this error.
In a Resolution5dated October 15, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation6 dated September 16, 2009,Investigating Commissioner
Salvador B. Hababag recommended that Atty. Villaseca be suspended for six (6) months from
the practice of law.
Commissioner Hababag ruled that Atty. Villasecas reckless and gross negligence deprived his
clients of due process; his actuations in the criminal case showed utter disregard for his clients
life and liberty. Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty. Villaseca failed to file a demurrer to
evidence despite the sufficient length of time that had been given to him by the RTC to submit
this pleading, and waived his right to present evidence for the defense, opting instead to file a
memorandum only. Commissioner Hababag concluded that Atty. Villasecas failure to properly
attend to the interests of his clients led to their conviction.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-2517 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, but increased Atty. Villasecas period of
suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support
the IBPs findings. We, however, increase Atty. Villasecas period of suspension from the practice
of law from one (1) year to five (5) years.
We stress at the outset that a lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve
his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice."8 Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in maintenance and defense of his clients rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld
from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.9
The records of the present case show that Atty. Villaseca had been grossly remiss in handling
Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To recall, Atty. Villaseca requested for time to file demurrer to
evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. In its order 10 of July 1, 2004, the RTC gave
him 20 days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes within which to file a demurrer to
evidence. Atty. Villaseca, however, did not file a demurrer to evidence, without offering any
explanation why he failed to do so. As a result, the RTC issued an order 11 stating that Atty.
Villaseca "is deemed to have waived his right to file the said pleading."
To our mind, Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence to explain such omission
constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his
clients cause. We point out that nine months had lapsed from the time the RTC granted Atty.
Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time it ruled that he was deemed to have waived his
right to file this pleading. Clearly, Atty. Villasecas actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so."
The records further disclosed that after Atty. Villasecas failure to file a demurrer to evidence, the
RTC set the initial presentation of defense evidence on May 9, 2005. However, this hearing was
postponed thrice: the May 9, 2005 hearing was reset to August 8, 2005 due to Atty. Villasecas
failure to appear;12 the August 8, 2005 hearing was reset to November 17, 2005 upon Atty.
Villasecas motion;13 and the November 17, 2005 hearing was reset to March 1, 2006 because of
Atty. Villasecas manifestation that his intended first witness was unavailable. 14During the March
1, 2006hearing, the respondent manifested that the defense would no longer present any
evidence, and moved that he be given time to file a memorandum.15
We point out that the prosecution rested its case on July 1, 2004; yet Atty. Villaseca waited until
March 1, 2006 only to manifest that he would no longer present any evidence. We are at a loss
why Atty. Villaseca chose not to present any evidence for the defense, considering that the
accused wanted and were ready to take the witness stand. As a result, the testimony of the lone
prosecution witness remained uncontroverted. To make matters worse, Atty. Villaseca directed
German to attend the hearing on June 6, 2007without informing him that it was already the date
of the promulgation of judgment.1wphi1
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." 16 It further mandates
that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." 17 It also states that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable."18
Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the
defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed
his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his
clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but the presented
prosecution evidence. He could have presented the complainant and/or her husband to the
witness stand, instead of just opting to file a memorandum. Or, at the very least, the reason for
this move should have been fully explained to the clients, and later to the IBP and to this Court.
But no such explanation ever came. We are thus left with the stark reality that Atty. Villaseca
failed to file, despite the promise made to the lower court, a demurrer to evidence. After failing in
this first line of defense for his clients, it should have been incumbent upon Atty. Villaseca to
present evidence for the defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do this, leaving the lower
court with no evidence to appreciate except that of the prosecution, to the detriment of his
clients cause.
We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a
case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law
to support his clients cause. A memorandum, no matter how lengthy, should not be made a
substitute for testimonial, object or documentary evidence, more so in a criminal case where a
conviction could lead to dire consequences. In saying so, we are not insinuating that the RTC
decision would have tilted in favor of the defense had Atty. Villaseca presented evidence; we
simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention are demanded once counsel agrees to take the
cudgels for his client's cause.
We again remind members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal
profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the
latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence, and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the
interests of his client.19 A lawyers diligence and vigilance is more imperative in criminal cases,
where the life and liberty of an accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and
to the public. As we explained in Spouses Bautista v. Atty. Arturo Cefra:20
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform
their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
"The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts." 21 Under the circumstances, we find that the IBPs
recommended penalty of one years suspension from the practice of law is not commensurate to
Atty. Villasecas transgressions. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society indicate a high degree of irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the
legal profession.
The present case finds a close forerunner in Santeco v. Atty. Avance, 22 where we suspended
Atty. Luna B. Avance from the practice of law for five(5) years for being grossly remiss in the
performance of her duties as counsel. In this cited case, the civil case entrusted to Atty. Avance
was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During the pendency of her motion for reconsideration
(which she had filed way beyond the reglementary period), she told her client that she would file
a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the dismissal of the civil case. She did not file this
petition, but failed to inform her client of this omission. Moreover, Atty. Avance stopped
appearing as counsel for her client without notifying the latter.
Atty. Villasecas negligence in the present case had much graver implications, as the legal
matter entrusted to him involved not merely money or property, but the very liberty and livelihood
of his clients. We stress that the moment Atty. Villaseca agreed to handle the complainants
criminal case, he became duty-bound to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and to
champion their cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his clients every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law, Atty. Villaseca fell short of what is expected of him as an
officer of the Court. We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
to his clients.
All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and utter disregard to his clients cause; his failure to
exercise due diligence in attending to their interest in the criminal case caused them grave
prejudice. Under the circumstances, we find a five-year suspension from the practice of law to
be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against him. The increased penalty serves the purpose
of protecting the interest of the Court, the legal profession and the public.

WHEREFORE premises considered, we find Atty. Albert T. Villaseca guilty of negligence, in

violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133090 January 19, 2001 ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, o'clock [in the morning] the subpoena.
vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial ATTY. BUGARING: May we put in on record that as early as
Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent. November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of
Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion,
DE LEON, JR., J.: your Honor please, and the record will bear it
out. Until now they did not file any answer,
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court opposition or pleadings or pleadings with respect
of Appeals1affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, to this motion.
declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.1wphi1.nt
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well I was not informed because I am not the
Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel 2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy
Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala receiving clerk of our office regarding this case.
of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, As a matter of fact I was surprised when I
Cavite. received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on record
issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite that the manifestation of the respondent that he
to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register was not informed.
of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran
on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis
everything that you say here is recorded.
pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On
November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we
a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court.3 want to be specific because we will be [filing] a
case against this receiving clerk who did not
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following [inform] him your Honor please, with this
incident transpired: manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of
Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of
ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready. the official duty of the clerk not to inform the
parties concerned.
ATTY. CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, your
Honor. COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this
fellow who is taking the video recording at this
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to proceedings. There is no permission from this
the prosecution of our motion for contempt, your Court that such proceedings should be taken.
Honor. May we know from the record if the
Register of Deeds is properly notified for today's ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to
hearing. take a video he just accompanied me this
morning.
COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared
INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your process and you should secure the permission
Honor. of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.
COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection
with the order of this Court which directed your
office to register lis pendens of the complaint in
connection with this case of Royal Becthel
Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and
Beatriz Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video
tape.
COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not
give him the go signal that shots should be done.
ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor
please, we just came from an occasion last night
and I am not yet come home, your Honor please.
 I could prove your Honor please, that the
contents of that tape is other matters your Honor
please. I was just surprised why he took video
tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology
of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor
please.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public
proceedings but the necessary authority or
permission should be secured.
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a
video tape.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal
problem your Honor please, that is personal to
that guy your Honor please if this representation
is being .
COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.
ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to
mark our documentary evidence as part of our
motion for contempt, your Honor please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with
this matter?
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well as I have said before, I have not received
any motion regarding this contempt you are
talking. I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it
is not yet the defense. This is a criminal
proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance
from the Fiscal.
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence
of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of
Deeds.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but
a private counsel, your Honor.
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider
that you should be amply represented.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty.
Barzaga if he is willing.
ATTY. BARZAGA4: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present
my witness but I will just mark our documentary
exhibits which are part of the record of the case
and thereafter your Honor please.
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a
preparation being done by newly appointed
counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is
considered as the privately hired counsel of the
register of deeds and the respondent of this
contempt proceedings. How much time do you
need to go over the record of this case so that
we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.
--------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after
reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I
noticed that the motion for contempt of Court
was filed on November 6, 1966 and in paragraph
6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the record
of the case shows up to the filing of this motion,
the Register as well as the Deputy Register
Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did
not comply with the Court Orders dated February
27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.'
However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado
Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming
from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September
18, 1996 addressed to the Register regarding
this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT
Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this
letter request, your Honor for the annotation of
the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been
already entered in the book of primary entry. We
would like also to invite the attention of the Hon.
Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was
filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the
annotation of the lis pendens was made by the
counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18,
1996, your Honor. However, your Honor, as early
as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been
issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows,
'Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of
the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby
directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens
annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos.
519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor,
 will first mark our documentary evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what
you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made
manifestation, he has not prayed for anything.
So let us wait until he is finished and then wait
for the direction of this Court what to do to have
an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BUGARING: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear
to be a little bit complicated your Honor,
considering that the order regarding the
annotation of the lis pendens has already been
revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just
request that we be given a period of ten days
from today your Honor, within which to submit
our formal written opposition your Honor.
COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the
manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in
connection with the refusal of the Register of
Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of
certain reasons. According to the manifestation
of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier
part of the record of this case, the reason for that
is because there was a pending subdivision
plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March,
1996. May 1 have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with
respect to that matter.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he
could already explain this, your Honor.
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the
manifestation so that this court can be guided
accordingly. Because this Court believes that the
root of the matter started from that. After the
submission of the . What are you suppose to
submit?
ATTY. BUGARING: Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty.
Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment and
furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel
for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the
counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within
which to submit his reply.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this
representation your Honor please, that we will be
marking first our documentary evidence because
this is set for hearing for today, your Honor
please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they
do not have their comment yet what are we
going to receive as evidence.
ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever
you have to do after the submission of the
comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record
will show that the motion for contempt was copy
furnished with the Register of Deeds and
Diosdado Concepcion.
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get
what the Court would want to do. This should be
an orderly proceedings and considering that this
is a Court of record the comment has to be in
first then in your reply you can submit your
evidence to rebut the argument that is going to
be put up by the respondent and so we will be
able to hear the case smoothly.
ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the
respondent had been long time furnished of this
contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion
they should have filed it in due time in
accordance with the rules and because it is
scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our
evidence and present to this Court, your Honor
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.
COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your
Honor please, we are all officers of the Court,
your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we
know also our procedure, your Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the
procedure of the Court first and then do
whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel
the antagonistic approach of the Court of this
representation ever since I appeared your Honor
please and I put on record that I will be filing an
 inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in
town.
COURT: Do that right away.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are
deprive to present our witness.
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an
adverse witness that was presented.
ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court
is for the respondent to file his comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I
don't want to comment on anything but I reserve
my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before
trying this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your
Honor.
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to
follow the rules.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are
putting the cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, I've been challenged by this
Court that I know better than this Court.
Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've
been winning in many certiorari cases, your
Honor.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite
you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel)
You call the police and I am going to send this
lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my
client your Honor please.
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have
been abusing the discretion of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the
appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am
protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is
an abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning
to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is
put in jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)
Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol cited petitioner in direct contempt
of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one
(1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case
while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that
he was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in
contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the
appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came
from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him
and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out
the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the
proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its
permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he
needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio
Barzaga to present him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call,
Atty. Burgaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his
documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that
he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion
has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary
evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact
that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring
appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for
the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so.
Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the
uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he
has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the
Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the
discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the
Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring
committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant,
and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is
sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His
detention shall commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal
Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.6
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6,
1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.7
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in
direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that
respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct
contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the Constitution
and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes
of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant,
at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and
sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine
of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, 10 and ordered
the excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the
petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING
THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S
SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE
IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION. 11
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject
proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual
and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he
always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95
provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward
others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt
by such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge
thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the
trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the
proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of
the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule
11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers
from attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the
proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to
Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to
"maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its importance
in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to
the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he
was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the
petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of
Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse
witness "with fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional
Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase
"your honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in
his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should
not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court
proceedings.12
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the
extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and
the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative of
justice.13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the
case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. 14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim
that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order
inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an
immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court
during he hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration
of the contempt order on the same day.15
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the
case of his client by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the
respondent judge's contrary order he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect
the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda
v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court,
bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432,
439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
 justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes,
in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred
in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It
was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly
ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment
meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to
return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27662 October 29, 1968
MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, as Chief Hearing
Officer of Regional Officer of the Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA and
MARIO ABITRIA, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was persuaded, regrettably as it turned out, to give
due course to a certiorari and prohibition proceeding with a plea for preliminary injunction, a
restraining order being issued, in view of the rather vehement and earnest protestations of
petitioner Manila Pest ControI, Inc. that it was denied procedural due process. As will be more
fully explained, such is not the case at all.
More specifically, it was alleged that on February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission, through its referee, considered a complaint filed against it by the
other respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation submitted for decision after he and a
physician had testified, petitioner's counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of February
24, 1967.1 Then came, according to the petition, a motion for reconsideration dated March 7,
1967, petitioner praying that he be allowed to present evidence on his behalf. 2 It was denied in
an order of April 4, 1967, as a decision had already been rendered against petitioner, as
employer, awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his disability compensation benefit. It was
also pointed out in such order that there was no plea in such motion for reconsideration for such
decision being set aside, as it was limited to seeking an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses. It could not be granted as the matter was looked upon as "moot and academic." 3 It
was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware of any decision
rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its
counsel.4 After a denial of such motion for reconsideration on April 24, 1967, and a plea for
execution on behalf of respondent Abitria, which was granted on June 14, 1967, the City Sheriff
of Manila, likewise made a respondent, levied on petitioner's properties on June 14, 1967, by
virtue of the above writ of execution.5
It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the above alleged infringement of procedural due
process, the actuation of respondent Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. That was the basis for the relief sought, seeking a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining City Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale at public auction of
petitioner's properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of execution and likewise all
the proceedings in RO4-WC Case No. 5503, thereafter making the injunction permanent, and
ordering respondent Abitria to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00 as attorney'sfees. Thus was
imparted more than just a semblance of plausibility to the petition, deceptive in character, as
subsequent pleadings proved, but nonetheless insufficient to call for its summary dismissal.
On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution to this effect: "The respondents in L-27662
(Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.) are required to file,
within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition for
prohibition; let temporary restraining order issue, effective immediately and until further orders
from this Court."
The answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and the later
pleadings, revealed quite a different story. It is now quite clear that instead of being the offended
party suffering from a legitimate grievance, its right to due process having been summarily
disregarded, petitioner was not above resorting to every technicality the law affords to evade the
performance of an obligation, which under the law it must fulfill, namely, to compensate for the
serious and debilitating ailment of tuberculosis acquired in the course of employment by
respondent Abitria. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition should be, as it is
hereby, denied.
The facts as found by respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, which must be
deemed conclusive, can yield no other conclusion but the undeniable liability for compensation
to respondent Abitria on the part of petitioner. Thus: "From the recorded evidence, it appears
that claimant was employed with the respondent since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a
week and receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as laborer for the respondent. He was
assigned in the Research Division which conducted research on rat traps and other matters
regarding extermination of pests, animals and insects. It was testified to by the claimant and his
witnesses that in the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the
atmosphere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of
work was also warm and humid in view of the products being manufactured by the respondent.
He was not extended any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the
painting and soldering. In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were] used.
Sometime in July, 1966 while the claimant was soldering [he] began to experience symptoms of
pulmonary tuberculosis. Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to consult Dr.
Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic,
active moderately advanced, right: minimal, left. He was confined at the Quezon Institute under
the care of Dr. Felix Tuazon. According to the attending physician, he was admitted in the
hospital ward as a hemoptic patient or one who is bleeding from the lungs. When he was
admitted he was prescribed Vita K. ampules, bronocal, ablocid, duestrep injections and other
anti-TB drugs. His clinical history showed that the claimant was diagnosed with severe coughing
followed by expectoration of fresh blood amounting to two glassful [when] he was brought to the
Philippine General Hospital and given injection and was X-rayed. From that hospital he was
transferred to the Quezon Institute where he was subsequently admitted. The attending
physician testified further that the right lung had bronchogenous lesions in the upper lobe with
honeycomb at 2nd and 3rd intercostal space, while the left lung had fibrotic lesion behind the
anterior rib II. ... He was discharged from the Quezon Institute on September 3, 1966, but the
illness was not yet arrested although there was stopping of the hemoptysis. The doctor testified
on cross examination that the nature of work of the claimant involving strenuous physical
exertion and other factors of work such as the lowering of his resistance in view of the enormous
inhalation of chemical fumes also brought about the aggravation of the claimant's present
condition. According to the claimant the respondent was duly notified of his illness through the
general manager and in view of the respondent's refusal to pay him disability compensation
despite repeated demands, claimant filed this instant claim."6
The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the above decision, was "to determine in this case
... whether ... there is sufficient or substantial evidence in support of the claim for disability
compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The evidence on record is
crystal clear that the claimant had already substantially proven his case and all indications point
that the illness of moderately advanced, pulmonary tuberculosis was service connected in view
of his work as laborer involving strenuous physical exertion which brought about the lowering of
his resistance due to the massive inhalation of injurious chemical fumes to the extent that he
was made an easy prey to the contraction of TB bacilli. The fact that there was no evidence on
record that claimant was sick upon entrance to his employment, it is presumed that he was
normal in every respect during the first period of his employment and the disease of pulmonary
tuberculosis showed only during the later part of his employment when he was assigned in the
research division of the respondent. The attending physician himself stated that claimant's
exposure to his work aggravated the illness and we believe that the respondent had failed to
dispute the work connection as there is no showing that claimant's ailment was due to the
lowering of his resistance by causes other than the nature of his work as laborer of the
respondent."7
It must be a realization that no valid defenses could be interposed that prompted petitioner to
rely on the alleged deprivation of due process, a contention, which as will now be shown, is
without basis.
The petition was so worded that the employer's right to be heard appeared to have been
disregarded. No further attention should be accorded such an alleged grievance. If it did not
introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to blame. No fault could be attributed to respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission. There must be such a realization on the part of
petitioner for its four-page memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument did not bother to
discuss such a matter at all. Accordingly, such a contention need not detain us further as it ought
never to have been raised in the first place.
Petitioner would make much however of the allegation that, as shown in the answer of
respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission,8 the decision was sent to a certain Attorney
Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz. Petitioner would
emphasize that the one "officially furnished" with a copy of such decision was not its counsel,
who was without any connection with the aforesaid Attorney Camacho. It would conclude,
therefore, that it had not received a copy of a decision which could not thereafter reach the stage
of finality calling for a writ of execution.
This contention was squarely met in the reply-memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. Why it happened thus was explained in an affidavit of
one of its employees, a certain Gerardo Guzman, included therein. 9 As set forth in such reply
memorandum: "As stated in the affidavit of Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of Atty. Corpuz, on
March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the said
decision alleging that he was no longer handling the case. Atty. Corpuz, instead instructed Mr.
Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was already Atty, Camacho who
was handling the case, and Atty. Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even had the records of
the case."10In view of such instruction, it was further noted, Guzman "went the office of Atty.
Camacho, but since Atty. Camacho was not around he handed the copy of the decision to the
receiving clerk therein, who received it as evidenced by the stamp pad bearing the name of the
Law Office of Camacho, Zapa, Andaya & Associates on the attached true copy of the Notice of
Decision, ..."11
From which it could make the apt observation. "It is indeed sad to note that after the Counsel for
Petitioner refused to receive the copy of said decision, he is now impugning the delivery of said
decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying knowledge of it when in fact and truth the delivery of
said decision to Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction to Mr. Guzman, as evidenced by
the attached affidavit of Mr. Guzman."12
In view of the rather persuasive character of such an affidavit and the understandable reflection
on the actuation of counsel for petitioner, there was, as could be expected submitted by
petitioner's counsel a rejoinder, dated November 26, 1967. He would have this Court believe that
the reply-memorandum is contradicted by what appeared in respondents' answer, where it was
stated that a copy of the decision was received, not by him but by the law office of a certain
Attorney Camacho. He would then ask why Guzman did not serve a copy of the decision to him.
He would even assume, for argument sake, that there was a refusal on his part to accept a copy
of this decision, but he would argue why did not Guzman, who could be expected to know the
duties of a service officer, fail "to state said refusal in his official return."
Which of the above conflicting versions is entitled to credence? That of respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission would appear to be more in accordance with the realities of the
situation. It is entitled to belief.
This would not be the first time, in the first place, where out of excess of zeal and out of a desire
to rely on every conceivable defense that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction of an
obligation incumbent on one's client, counsel would attempt to put the most favorable light on a
course of conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that it would clear
counsel of any further responsibility. His conduct leaves much to be desired. His responsibility
aside, it made evident why, to repeat the effort to evade liability by petitioner by invoking the due
process guaranty must not be rewarded with success.
Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied such
a constitutional requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision;
that such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. True, there was a
denial; it is far from persuasive, as already noted. It does not have the ring of truth. There is no
reason why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if there where no such
misinformation, if there where no such attempt to mislead.
No benefit would have accrued to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was
merely performing its official function. Certainly, it could be expected to see to it that the law's
beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much less frustrated, by its failure to follow the regular
procedure prescribed. It was unlikely that the employee entrusted with serving a copy of the
decision, in this particular case, and in this particular case alone, would depart so radically from
what the law requires, if there were no such intervening cause that resulted in his going astray.
How could petitioner escape responsibility?
Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be expected to furnish such a cause. Who would benefit
thereby? The answer cannot be in doubt. Through such circumstance, wether intended or
otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of the fulfillment of a just claim. For it is to be
noted that there is no, as there could not be any, valid ground for denying compensation to
respondent Abitria on the facts as found. Considering how great and pressing the laborer's need
for the compensation due him was and the consequent temptation to settle for less if in the
meanwhile, the money he had the right to expect, was not forthcoming, petitioner, as the
employer liable, had everything to gain and nothing to lose by such a turn of events. Even if it
were an honest mistake, the consequences were still deplorable.

It is quite revealing that in not one of the pleadings filed by petitioner did it ever indicate how it
could validly avoid its liability under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which disclosed
that the ailment suffered by respondent Abitria while in its employment was indeed
compensable. Neither in its memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967 nor rejoinder of
November 21, 1967, did it ever occur to petitioner to allege that if given the opportunity for
hearing it could interpose a plausible, not to say a valid defense. It did not do so because it
could not do so. Our decisions as to the undeniable liability of an employer similarly situated are
impressive for their number and unanimity.13

It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process concept, in itself an assurance and a guaranty of
justice and fairness, would be the very vehicle to visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant
injustice and unfairness. The law itself would stand in disrepute, if such a gross perversion of its
dictates were allowed. Any other view is unthinkable. Otherwise, there would be a stultification of
all our efforts to promote social justice 14 and a mockery of the constitutional ideal of protection to
labor.15

Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be required to pay forthwith the sum due
respondent Abitria. The unseemly conduct, under the above circumstances disclosed, of
petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz calls for words of reproof.

It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite
another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of
events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and
demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and poverty-
stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our
countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond the means of our
poverty stricken masses.

The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be
kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member in
good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious responsibility of seeing to it
that no deviation from such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be
characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law is less than fair and
far from honorable. What happens then to the ideal that only he is fit to belong to such a
profession who remains a faithful votary at the altar of justice? Such an ideal may be difficult to
approximate. That is true, but let it not be said that when such a notorious breach of its lofty
standard took place, as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court exhibited magnificent
unconcern.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied.
With treble costs against petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.
[A.C. No. 6289. December 16, 2004]
JULIAN MALONSO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is
also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly, no one, not even
the Court can deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so.[1]
In a Complaint[2] for disbarment dated 6 June 2001 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Julian Malonso claimed that Atty. Pete Principe, without any authority entered
his appearance as Malonsos counsel in the expropriation proceedings initiated by the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he complained that Atty. Principe, after illegally
representing him in the said case, claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the
NAPOCOR by way of attorneys fees and, further, in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co-
owner of Malonsos property.[3]
In his Answer,[4] respondent replied that the services of his law office, Principe Villano
Villacorta and Clemente Law Offices, was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA), through its President, Danilo Elfa, as embodied
in the Contract of Legal Services executed on 01 April 1997.[5] The Contract states in part:
The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows:
I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the
collection, claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of its members with the
NAPOCOR;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the
following conditions:
A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court proceedings
and other related activities;
B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and liaison
fees;
C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY:
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members;
this forty (40%) [percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated depending on the volume
of work involved;
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
i.) Attorneys Fees of FIRST PARTY;
ii.) His representation expenses and commitment expenses;
iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.
D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best price from
NAPOCOR.
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that said
member executed a special power of attorney[6] in favor of Elfa, which served as the latters
authority to act in behalf of Malonso. In the document, Malonso authorized Elfa in the following
manner:
Ako, si JULIAN M. MALONSO, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa 92
New York St. Cubao, Q.C., sa pamamagitan nito ay ITINATALAGA at BINIBIGYANG
KAPANGYARIHAN si G. DANILO V. ELFA, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at
naninirahan sa 038 Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, upang gumanap at umakda
para sa akin/amin upang gumawa tulad ng mga sumusunod:
1. PANGASIWAAN, ISAAYOS at MAKIPAGKASUNDO (negotiate) para sa
pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa, sa National Power Corp. (NAPOCOR), na
may Titulo Bilang T-229122, na nasasakupan ng Dulong Bayan, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan;
2. TUMAYONG KINATAWAN O REPRESENTANTE ko/naming saan man at ano
man maging sa hukuman o alin man sa mga opisinang may kinalaman hinggil
sa aming nabanggit na pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa;
3. TUMANGGAP AT MAGSUMITE ng mga papeles na nauukol sa lupang nabanggit
sa Bilang 1;
4. GUMANAP ng ano man sa inaakala ni G. DANILO V. ELFA na nararapat,
matuwid at makabubuti para sa nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
5. NA sa pamamagitan ng kasunduan at kapasyahang ito ay binibigyan ng
karapatan at kapangyarihang lumagda sa lahat ng papeles/dokumento si G.
Danilo V. Elfa, ngunit sa isang pasubali na HINDI KAILAN MAN SIYA DAPAT
AT WALA SIYANG KARAPATANG LUMAGDA S GANAP NA BENTAHAN
(ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE).
DITOY AKING IGINAGAWAD sa naturan naming kinatawan ang lahat ng karapatang kumilos at
magsagawa upang isakatuparan ang kapangyarihang magbili sa bisa ng karapatang dito ay
iginagawad sa kanya nang kahalintulad nang kung kami, sa ganang aming sarili ang mismong
nagsasagawa, at ditoy AMING PINAGTITIBAY ang lahat ng kanyang gawin na nasa aming
naman ang lubos na karapatang siya ay palitan o bawiin ang Gawad na Karapatang ito.
In his Reply,[7] Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf,
considering that while the Contract of Legal Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa was
dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a much later date, 27
November 1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf since
he already had his own lawyer in the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered into by
SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing one and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of
the contract even if he executed the special power of attorney on a later date. Likewise, as a
member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the organizations commitments.[8]
The Court adopts the chronological order of events as found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo:
In the early part of 1997, National Power Corp. (NPC for brevity) instituted expropriation
proceedings against several lot owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this case.
On April 1, 1997, a Contract of Legal Services was entered into between the law firm Principe
Villano and Clemente Law Offices and SANDAMA, Inc. (Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng National Power Corporation) represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa.
SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation proceedings.
Complainant is a member of this organization.
On November 27, 1997, complainant executed a Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan in
favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter
of negotiation with the NPC.
On December 21, 1999, NPCs Board of Directors approved the amicable settlement of the
expropriation cases by paying all the lot owners the total of One Hundred Three Million Four
Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos(P103,413,200.00).
More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while complainant was
represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants.
About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees, respondent filed his
Notice of Entry of Appearance (dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal
counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said case.
On February 12, 2000, Sixty Nine (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a letter to
NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of
the respondents law firm to represent them in the expropriation cases.
On February 17, 2000, complainant filed an Opposition to respondents entry of appearance and
motion to separate legal fees.
On March 7, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien claiming 40% of the selling price
of the properties being expropriated by NPC.
On April 10, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and interest of the lot owners over their lots being
expropriated including that of complainant.
On November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the
expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of the property being expropriated.
On February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise Agreement submitted
by the lot owners and NPC for court approval.
Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision approving the
compromise agreement between the lot owners and the NPC was delayed.[9]
The Report found that the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA, a corporate
being, and respondents law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings
instituted by NAPOCOR, neither does it claim co-ownership of the properties being expropriated.
Furthermore, the power of attorney was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa and not
SANDAMA, and that said power of attorney was executed after SANDAMA entered into
the Contract of Legal Services. Thus, the Report concluded that the right of co-ownership could
not be derived from the said documents.[10]
Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal representation could not be derived from
the above-mentioned documents. A contract for legal services between a lawyer and his client is
personal in nature and cannot be performed through intermediaries. Even Elfa, the attorney-in-
fact of Malonso, was never authorized to engage legal counsels to represent the former in the
expropriation proceedings. Moreover, SANDAMA is not a party litigant in the expropriation
proceedings and thus Atty. Principe has no basis to interfere in the court proceeding involving its
members.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the evidence presented by both
parties, Atty. Principe was guilty of misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to have violated
Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04. [11] In representing himself as
Malonsos and the other lot owners legal counsel in the face of the latters opposition, Atty.
Principe was found to be guilty of gross or serious misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely
claiming to be the co-owner of properties being expropriated and his filing of several actions to
frustrate the implementation of the decision approving the compromise agreement make his
conduct constitutive of malpractice. The Report recommended the penalty of two (2) years
suspension from the practice of law. [12]
In its Resolution[13] dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors ordained:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-241
 CBD Case No. 01-848
Julian Malonso v.
Atty. Pete Principe
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification,and
considering respondents violation of Rule 3.01 of Canon 3, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule
12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Pedro Principe is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In his Appeal Memorandum,[14] respondent claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-241
has no factual and legal basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness and
greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.[15] According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to
investigate the instant case despite the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule
139-B, without any extension granted by the Supreme Court. [16] Moreover, in the subsequent
review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere consensus,
and the required number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there
were only five (5) governors present. [17] Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board
were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP National
President.[18]
We find for the respondent.
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior
towards the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the public. However, the duty of the
Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation
of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty.
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law
profession, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.[19] Despite its duty to police the ranks, the IBP
is not exempt from the duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain
from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
[20]
Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions
of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules formulated for
their observance.[21] For the very same reasons, the Court cannot accept the explanation [22] of
Atty. Carlos L. Valdez, Jr. on the non-holding of a formal voting for respondents case that:
Eventually, the Board reached a consensus to reduce the recommended penalty from two years
to one year suspension. Since there was already a consensus, the Board did not hold a formal
voting. A formal voting became unnecessary inasmuch as it was obvious that the decision of the
Board became unanimous.
I assure the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court that due process was observed and the
Rules governing the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and
complied with by the IBP Board of Governors.
The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared
from the wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted out their just due. These
rules cannot be taken lightly.[23]
This Court underscores the procedural transgression incurred by the IBP Board when it
issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 which was reached through a mere consensus, and not
through a formal voting, with the required number of votes not secured. As to the issue of the
protracted investigation without the requisite permission from the Supreme Court to extend the
investigation period, we agree with respondent that no such request was made to this Court.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B read:
Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall
have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and
counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation
shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application.
...
Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a)
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
Relevantly, Sec. 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court provides in part:
Sec. 6. Board of Governors. the Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine
Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the
representation basis of one Governor from each Region.
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and at such time and
place as it shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum
to do business.
 From these provisions, it is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice
of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigators report; (2) a formal voting; and
(3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a
decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the
Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. This is
in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after
deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority
vote.[24] Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Boards
resolution. Without a vote having been taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No. 01-
848) is void and has no effect.
The Court views with disapproval the fashion by which the IBP Board of Governors, with a
fellow lawyer and fellow governors reputation and good name at stake, cavalierly brushed aside
the procedural rules outlined no less by this Court for the discipline and protection of its
members. The IBP, more than anyone, knows that the success of a lawyer in his profession
depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything, which will harm his good name, is to be
deplored.[25] And yet the IBP Board of Governors, despite clear evidence to the contrary, and
without any remorse, even asserted that due process was observed and the Rules governing
the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied.
Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the
case.[26] However, on many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of
the case, or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial
court had already received all the evidence of the parties. [27] In view of the delay in resolving the
instant complaint against the respondent, and in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases, the Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it.[28]
Before delving at length on the merits of the other aspect of the present proceedings,
there is need to dwell first on a dimension of expropriation proceedings which is uniquely its
own.
There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination by the courts of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The
second phase is concerned with the determination by the court, with the assistance of
commissioners, of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken which relates to the
valuation thereof. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before,
and findings of, the commissioners would be final and would dispose of the second stage of the
suit, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. [29] During this stage, the
main bone of contention is the valuation of the property concerned.
The second stage which involves the issue of just compensation is as important, if not
more, than the first stage which refers to the issue of public purpose. But as it frequently
happens, as in this case, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested. Moreover, in
their quest to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the owners
seek inroads to the leverages of executive power where compensation compromises are
commenced and given imprimatur. In this dimension, the services of lawyers different from the
ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court
and relies, for most part, on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness
of the negotiator.
In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties
subject of the expropriation, the same order which is subject of the appeal filed by the
NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally resolved, and in
view of the delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for
a compromise agreement. To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president,
Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of respondent. It is clear that
respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case.
Now, on to the merits.
As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual
stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs. [30] The rule
is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and
employees, are its sole liabilities.[31] Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be
attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect
interest in the assets and business of the former. [32] Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator,
respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the
expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving
the members. But things are not as simple as that.
A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can
intervene and claim from the individual landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners
into SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondents firm so as to make negotiations with
NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation
aimed towards the promotion of the landowners common interest. It presented a unified front
which was far easier to manage and represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent
still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner.
Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA
president and attorney-in-fact of the members, with whom he entered into a contract for legal
services. Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to contract his firms services.
After all, Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly,
individual grants of authority from the SANDAMA members, including Malonso.
Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty percent
(40%) of the selling price of the lands to be expropriated, the same amount which was reflected
in the deed of assignment made by the individual members of SANDAMA. Respondent could
have easily and naturally assumed that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same
amount earmarked for its legal services as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock,
non-profit corporation, where else would SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the legal fees due
to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of its members.
Lastly, respondents legal services were disengaged by SANDAMAs new President
Yolanda Bautista around the same time when the SANDAMA members abandoned and
disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the negotiations bore fruit. With all
these circumstances, respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be
deprived of his lawful compensation for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and
its members. With the prevailing attitude of the SANDAMA officers and members, respondent
saw the immediate need to protect his interests in the individual properties of the landowners.
The hairline distinction between SANDAMA and its individual members interests and properties,
flowing as it does from a legal fiction which has evolved as a mechanism to promote business
intercourse but not as an instrument of injustice, is simply too tenuous, impractical and even
unfair in view of the circumstances.
contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. [38]Nevertheless, when it is shown that a
contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon
his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court
must, and will protect the aggrieved party.[39]
WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases
involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.

Thus, the Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice justifying SO ORDERED.
the penalty recommended. While filing the claim for attorneys fees against the individual
members may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that he instituted the
same out of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all,
SANDAMA procured his firms services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the
same. There is evidence which tend to show that respondent and his firm rendered legal and
even extra-legal services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their
properties. They facilitated the incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations
between the owners, the appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several
political personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just
after concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the
compromise agreement for the courts approval, SANDAMA disengaged the services of
respondents law firm.

With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered
legal service for years without having received anything in return, and with the prospect of not
getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members,
respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been
mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the
practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly
compensated for professional services rendered. [33] It is but natural that he protect his interest,
most especially when his fee is on a contingent basis.[34]

Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement was entered

into by the lot owners and NAPOCOR.[35] Its motions for separate legal fees as well as for
intervention were dismissed by the trial court. Prescinding from the ultimate outcome of an
independent action to recover attorneys fees, the Court does not see any obstacle to respondent
filing such action against SANDAMA or any of its members. Any counsel, worthy of his hire, is
entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. [36] Such independent action may be the proper
venue to show entitlement to the attorneys fees he is claiming, and for his client to refute the
same.[37] If respondent could resort to such separate action which obviously is more
cumbersome and portends to be more protracted, there is similarly no rhyme or reason to
preclude him from filing mere motions such as the ones he resorted to for the purpose of
providing what he perceives to be his legitimate claim. The bottom line is that respondent is not
proscribed from seeking recovery of attorneys fees for the services he and his firm rendered to
SANDAMA and its members. As to whether he would succeed in the quest, that is another story
which obviously does not have to be resolved in this case.

The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees
does not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by
law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as
A.C. No. 7062 September 26, 2006 1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355] P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.50
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN
BACULBAS, complainants, 1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.
vs. P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33 4,053.05
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, respondent.
P263,225.81
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Complainants, via a complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have xxxx
sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice,
violation of Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 7. RONALD SAMBAJON
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98,
"Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. 8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) (same as Conos) 263,225.81
and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents. Said case
was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma
9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON
Ardan, et al.," for Illegal Strike.
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
By Decision of August 29, 2001,3 Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike
case, and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter Total Backwages P2,370,674.38
disposed:
Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for including the various monetary claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24,
lack of merit. 1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney's fees of all sums
owing to complainants.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared
guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2,
complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04- 2003 a Writ of Execution.5
03161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate all the complainants to their
former position with full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27,
computed as follows: 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal
Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter
3. CRISANTO CONOS dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March
9, 2004. 6
Backwages:
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or
Basic Wage: having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at
bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil,
2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos. "frustrated" the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter
P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104, 504.40 the spurious documents.

10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos. In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against
P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69, 732.00 respondent, together with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of
Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203.7
11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos. In his Report and Recommendation 8 dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B.
P250.00 x 26 days x 10 = 65,000.00 Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended
that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning, in
P239,236.40 light of his following discussion:

13th Month Pay: The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged
1/12 of P239,236.40 = 19,936.36 manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein
complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified.
SILP A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby
becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of
2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos. assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.
P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22
 Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a
litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him
damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties
as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and
preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered
[the] aspects of the case.
All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due
execution of the questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING resolution in their
respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the
identities of the herein complainants is not impleaded by the complainants when it was
his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real identities of person executing
Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of
regularity unless proven otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005
clarificatory questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed
the despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable under the
circumstances.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the
Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP 10 transmitted additional records including a Motion to
Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-22611 filed by respondent.
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition 12 filed before the OBC,
assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to
assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the Resolution on
February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who
could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the
present petition, in the interest of justice, this Court gives his petition due course.
In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those whom
he met face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw
before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. 13 He hastens to add though that he was not
familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before Arbiter
Santos.14 Complainants15 and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan 16 claim otherwise,
however. And the Minutes17 of the proceedings before the National Conciliation Mediation Board
in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, "Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute," which
minutes bear respondent's and complainants' signatures, belie respondent's claim that he had
not met complainants before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004
on the request of his clients who "told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants
w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and waivers ,"
heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who
executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same
responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients' interest, especially given the
amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers
to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he
discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the money of your
client would go to the deserving employee?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you
call it before a precedent in February of 1998 when my client directly made
settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original complainants, Your
Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang
usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have a
dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion,
we'll let them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor,
sad to say, when lawyers are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the
dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number
one, to witness the signing of the documents of Quitclaim and Waiver;
number 2, so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent
them in that proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG:
My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given to you and yet
there would be a signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there were no
complaints, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is
a voucher so you just rely on your precedent, is that what you mean?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties who are talking
and it is my client who knows them better than I do, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter
Cadiente Santos office because there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt
and Release, it that clear?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money intended
for the payment of these workers?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not ask.
COMM. HABABAG:
 You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the documents?
ATTY. SUING:
As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of 1998.
COMM. HABABAG:
When you say they whom are you referring to?
ATTY. SUING:
I'm referring to my client, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of
Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do
recall that I made one but this document, Your Honor, is only a single
document where all the signatories named are present because my purpose
there really, Your Honor, is that so that each of them will be there together
and they will identify themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila-
sila yong magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing
took place in February of 2004 it was made for any [ sic] individual, Your
Honor, no longer the document that I prepared when all of the seven
will be signing in one document.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there
are already people there, the seven complainants plus another
woman.18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor
Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert vigilance to
protect his clients' interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his
presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus:
ATTY. SUING:
To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these
document[s] are properly signed and that these people are properly
identified and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente
Santos.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a
compromise agreement with his clients in which he "did not participate" and from which no
problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the Labor
Arbiter's office "that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter."
Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the
true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. 20 That should have
alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients' interest. But he
was not and he did not.
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence." A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that
norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to
the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and
the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be
taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in
the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the
client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or
that "extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is
ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater
familias. x x x21 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel
Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG:
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong
may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Sila po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo
nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Si Atty. Suing po.
ATTY. SUING:
In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong
ito or what?
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito
bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang
nagmakinilya nito?
MR. RODIL:
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
COMM. HABABAG: Opo.
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, COMM. HABABAG:
tauhan o abogado ang gumawa nito?
Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?
MR. RODIL:
MR. RODIL:
Matagal na ho yan eh.
Atty. Suing po.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay.
Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel
Cadiente Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos? ATTY. SUING:

MR. RODIL: Your Honor,

Si attorney po. COMM. HABABAG:

ATTY. SUING: Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan
ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?
Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino
ang nagdala ng mga dokumento? MR. RODIL:

MR. RODIL: Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.

22
Yong mga tao. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an
apparent attempt not to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted respondent's claim
COMM. HABABAG: that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one
presented at the Arbiter's Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of the
ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and Quitclaim? documents.
MR. RODIL: As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is
Kay attorney po. an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. 23 While the Commission on Bar
COMM. HABABAG: Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a
disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney? or an examination into his character.24
ATTY. SUING: In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong. attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this
Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him
COMM. HABABAG: "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession."
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo. While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case,
not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that
MR. RODIL: respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.
Opo. WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross
COMM. HABABAG: misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious tayo dito.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
MR. RODIL: Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
Opo serious po. SO ORDERED.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
MR. RODIL:
G.R. No. L-35252 October 21, 1932 7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-
1, reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, with the appellant bank.
vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee. 8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the
amount claimed in the complaint with costs.
Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for appellee. On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the
Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum
amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount
with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his
VICKERS, J.: failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264
and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied
This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the to the payment of the judgment.
defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila
The appellant makes the following assignments of error: sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14,
1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
The trial court erred:
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his
1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same
the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of
Manila. Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the
bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In
2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274 other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold
situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the the two parcels of land.
appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy
Teng Piao. The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with
interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the
balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328. In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to
redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an
4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance
promise to condone, could bind the appellant corporation. of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the
complaint.

5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for
the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una
senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said
judgment.
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not
to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct
examination was as follows:

6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of
P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even
discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said
property.
P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del
Banco Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de
recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de
octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; quiere usted
explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? R. Si, seor.
Esto desde mil novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo
bien, me haba dicho el seor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos
intereses mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson, "como puede usted recibir
alquileres y no paga usted intereses?"
P. Quien es ese seor Pecson? R. Era encargado de este asunto.
P. Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? R. Era encargado de estas
transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al seor Pecson.
Entonces hable al seor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los
alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado.
Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta.
Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion.
JUZGADO. Que la termine.
TESTIGO. Me dijo el seor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "por que usted cobra
alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir
sus deudas.
P. El seor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," a que
bienes se referia el ? R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco.
P. Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el
Exhibit 1? R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos.
P. Pero este Exhibit 1, a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? R. Parece
que Paco.
P. No recuerda usted muy bien? R. No recuerdo.
P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el seor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, le
dijo a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? R. Al Banco Nacional.
P. Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el seor Pecson con respecto al saldo
deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? R. No
recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.
P. Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria?
Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.
JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.
P. Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?
SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos.
Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.
JUZGADO. Puede contestar.
Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted
esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas.
Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije
que queria yo comprar.
P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este
documento Exhibit 1, recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? R. Nada,
absolutamente.
When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of
defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked
when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not
remember.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem
the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested
in buying it.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing
in Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the
law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the
courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they
should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.)
Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as
the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the
case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should
avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in
Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in
Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is
reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem
both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon
some evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right
to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was
willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount
of the sale.

Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the
defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such
agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of
directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that
since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged
agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the
instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the
resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to
redeem.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is
condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per
cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION
OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND
NATIONALISM-OLALIA,petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA
ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees,
and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17,
1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets'
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to
and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with
food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their
red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with
the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and
Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose
C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets
might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes
direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving
the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito
Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders
of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty.
Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union
leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-
Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then
and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C.
Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of
record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court
for the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He
likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were
wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under
the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket
was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog
Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in
the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution
of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court
has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the
citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court
required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents
complied with on July 17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of
the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by
this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES
UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30,
1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will
not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts
as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice." 3
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments.
However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter
the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction
of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies." 4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court,
but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence
the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty.
Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the
pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder
to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly
apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to
labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth,
no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one
way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of
any and all courts.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003]
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL
GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN
MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY
VELEZ, petitioners, vs.ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, respondents.
DECISION
TlNGA, J.:
This is a Petition[1] filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony
Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from being
elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP
Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent
President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set on April 26, 2003, a
month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so
set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the national
convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution[2] No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003,
reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal
Chapter, sent a letter[3] dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its
Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the
mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least
one month prior to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being politicized since
post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable
political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the
outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31,
2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two
days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the
Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition,
the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to
consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the
Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution
No. XV-2003-162.[4]
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon
of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition[5] dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board
seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week
of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected Regional
Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent
portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections
for regional governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the
postponement of the elections especially considering that preparations and notices had already
been completed.
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the
petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election of
IBP regional governor.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the
petition.[6]
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date,
May 29, 2003, the petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same
reliefs as those sought in their Petitionbefore the IBP.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners application, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents,
representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from proceeding
with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.[7]
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the
IBP officers from the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board
which is its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:
 IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP
Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule.
The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern
Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western
Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the
first year and ending on the 30th of June of the second year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP)
shall be chosen, also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both
the Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a chance to serve the IBP,
to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the
incumbent EVP will automatically be the National President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have
had two (2) National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected
Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will
automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term in
turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically
assume the post of IBP National President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his
IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to
Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency. [8] The transfer of
IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the
rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao
for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.[9]
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor,
executive vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera
lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by
the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the
deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have been
disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered his
California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the
position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24,
2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws.[10]
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful
Comment [11] on the Petition.
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP,
including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is
purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and
administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners legal standing,
pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for the disqualification of IBP
members aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is only
an election protest under Article IV, Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can
validly lodge an election protest which is to be made after, not before, the election. He posits
further that following the rotation rule, only members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del
Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term
2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not thus
qualified to be nominees.[12]
Meeting the petitioners contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP
member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. [13] He cites the last
paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a
particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city,
political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located.
In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on
any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership
to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made
not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in
Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the above-
quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter,
a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision
or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur
IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is
unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for
convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship.[14]
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to
the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder
law. As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was
practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to
practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or
lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the
petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in
character similar to the recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses
that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he
misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by
the investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National
Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was
campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for
governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present any
evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his
region at the Century Park Hotel.[15]
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply[16] to the Respectful Comment of
respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder.[17]
In a Resolution[18] dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this
case, the IBP Board, to file its comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General
Counsel, filed a Manifestation[19] dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated in
its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that it finds the petition to be premature considering that no
nomination has as yet been made for the election of IBP Regional Governors.[20]
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the
determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-
issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper
remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is
not premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for
Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De
Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the
qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP,
including the election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution.
Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly
worded provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution [21] through all the years have been the
sources of this Courts authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term Bar refers
to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. [22] Pursuant to this
power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on
October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.[23] Not long after, Republic Act No. 6397 [24] was enacted
and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per curiamResolution of this Court captioned In the Matter of
the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines, we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in
accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-
making power under the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP
independence from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 [25] of the IBP By-Laws vests
on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon
recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15, [26]the Court is
authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section 44 [27] empowers
the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the
irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No.
491 entitled In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results
of the investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal
candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws. 28 The
Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well as explicitly
disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities
in the elections, in order to impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the
seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is
viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not
entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering.
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed
direct election by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP
President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the
IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from among
themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic
succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon the expiration of their common two-
year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall
be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that the position of
Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different chapters in the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP
and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action
against him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to
disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or
post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two
days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the
Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition,
the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to
consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the
Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election
protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees
for the position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of
the IBP By-Laws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a
candidate must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the
Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who shall
forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of
the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of
Governors may be had in accordance with Section 40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of
the Board of Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members of
the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other year.29 The election was a two-
tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than
two nor more than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all
the nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board within the
full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all
the Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one
nominee for Governor for each Region. 31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest
number of votes was declared and certified elected by the Chairman.32
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court
deemed it best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The
Court localized the elections, i.e,each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the
delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following
provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for
each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The
position of Governor should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the
choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool
from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process
operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar
which is non-political33and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the
legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and
progress of the Philippine society.34
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on
disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition
has no firm ground to stand on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the
IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to
be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that
following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members
from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
 Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition,
petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only
nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds
therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members
from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the
election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation
rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is
from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the
Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be
nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to
seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern
Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the
post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no
nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from
Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can
always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not
really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a
member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the
way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency.
Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile
rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. -
....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall
be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case
shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a
lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He
has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only
when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the
place where he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering ones
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section,
transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set
forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership
roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the
grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to
another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not
less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not
less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes
to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to
Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar
wrote a letter35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and
Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent
De Veras transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records.
This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as
aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001
and September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-
Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last
Saturday of February of every other year.36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003,
seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done
more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not
morally fit to occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements
provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes
to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the
IBP;37 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration
Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he
belongs;38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been
elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle; 39 and (4) he is not in the
government service.40
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral
fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates.
Indeed, based on each members standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any
member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another,
basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
 Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged
sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the
plunder law, is apparently referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re:
Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by
Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt
of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his
remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the
pertinent portions of the report, with De Veras statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed
by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court
insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder
Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch,
a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.
We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices-
considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most
likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague,
the group said.42
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard De Vera
of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II if the
rumor turned out to be true.
People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty
must prevail. 43
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said
statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public
confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute. 44 He explained that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed
at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for
which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.48 The determination of whether an act involves moral
turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation
of the statute.49
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public interest
issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did
not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the
Plunder Law.50 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as
evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was
still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the
California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest
the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to
pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary
proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the
same.51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects
respondent De Veras moral fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the
delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his
candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be
emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under our Rules of Court.52
 WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the
position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30
May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern
Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold
said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-12871. July 25, 1959.] involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day
filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, Respondent. petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ
of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by
Baizas & Balderrama for Petitioner. respondent Salva.

MONTEMAYOR, J.: The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that the affidavits and confessions sent
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated
against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel
continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in Monroy.
connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City.
To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of
pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated. People v. Oscar Castelo, Et Al., G. R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before
us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing
and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case
Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent
others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case
would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was
was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence because of the latters oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with
was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court. his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein
presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary,
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he
case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacaang conducted the
investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to
appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had
trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy. been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel
Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said
those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacaang. Fiscal Salva conferred with witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions,
the Solicitor General to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed
Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be
Malacaang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants. postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no
opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with the investigation.
this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those
persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his
Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on committee began, ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally,
said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of
In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, had sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided
of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said
was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the
purpose a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct
Herminio A. Avendaio and Ernesto A. Bernabe a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, Et Al.,
testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at that time and one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included in the trial much
place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, Et Al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, less in the judgment for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of
petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had commenced, even after the
investigation from September 21, due to the fact that his counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally,
attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of
Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims
appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan
respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case
of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original
case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to
him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said
evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons
criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and
convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador
Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against
Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as
suggested by authorities, the duty and role of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and
secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
"We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting
officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by
such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in
appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they
have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." (69 United States Law Review, June,
1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil., 556).
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at
the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that
investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in
the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies
respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he
need not be present at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a
right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent
Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said
investigation, if he later changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously
objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the Respondent. If,
as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and
evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme
Camo and others by questioning them, then he respondent, could well have conducted the
investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondents office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wasted to witness the proceeding, including
members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere
and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of,
if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a field day.
Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar
Caymo had concluded his testimony, respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said,
"Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the
questions asked will be reproduced as my own" ; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said,
"Gentlemen of the press is free to ask question to the witness if you want to. We are willing to
adopt the questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right
and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in
favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent,
wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible.
Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor
appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this
according to the transcript now before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on
the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took
place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of
Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and
which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in
the press, and all with the apparent placet and complaisance of Respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what we regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any
excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a
criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it is being tried in court; but
when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable,
even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an
end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure,
even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored
the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally
agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason
the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that
in view of petitioners objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may
not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by
respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in
part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby
publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism
that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find
to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet
with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970
EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO,
ALBERTO SOTECO, SOLFERINO TITONG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE ALEJANDRO, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, AVELINO C. MENEZ,
EFRAIN S. MACLANG, ET AL., respondents.
Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners.
Colonel Manuel V. Reyes (Judge Advocate General, GSC), Major Samuel M. Soriano (JAGS),
Major Higinio E. Dacanay, Jr. (JAGS, PC) and Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant
Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Jaime M. Lantin and Guillermo Nakar, Jr. for
respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major
Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the
officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the
alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando
training on the island of Corregidor. Once before the question was raised before this Court
whether the general court-martial, convened on April 6, 1968 to try the case against the
petitioners, acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the fact that earlier, on March 23, a
complaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite City by Jibin Arula
(who claimed to have been wounded in the incident) against some of the herein petitioners. The
proceedings had to be suspended until the jurisdiction issue could be decided. On June 23,
1969 this Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military court. 1
The jurisdiction question thus settled, attention once again shifted to the general court-martial,
but no sooner had the proceedings resumed than another hitch developed. This came about as
the petitioners, the accused in the court-martial proceedings, in turn came to this Court, seeking
relief against certain orders of the general court-martial.
It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the
disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that
he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the case
had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was
being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November
11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the
challenge.
Thereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col. Alejandro, as president of
the court-martial, and Col. Olfindo, Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col. Blanco and Col.
Malig, as members. With regard to peremptory challenges it was the petitioners' position that for
each specification each accused was entitled to one such challenge. They later changed their
stand and adopted that of the trial judge advocate that "for each specification jointly tried, all of
the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory challenge; and that with respect to the
specifications tried commonly, each one of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge."
They there contended that they were entitled to a total of eleven peremptory challenges. On the
other hand the court-martial ruled that the accused were entitled to only one peremptory
challenge as the specifications were being jointly tried.
The petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders of the
court-martial denying their challenges, both peremptory and for cause. They allege that the
adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it
became an issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly
influence the members of the court-martial. With respect to peremptory challenges, they contend
that they are entitled to eleven such challenges, one for each specification.
On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition, required the respondents as
members of the general court-martial to answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from
proceeding with the case.
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no
proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality
have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed
confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court. As a
preliminary consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the petition on the
ground that it has no power to review the proceedings of the court-martial, "except for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence
pronounced," and that at any rate the petitioners failed to exhaust remedies available to them
within the military justice system.
I
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." 2 But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion
what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise to
a defect in their jurisdiction.3 This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its
nature as one for certiorari and prohibition, namely, whether in overruling the petitioners'
challenges, the general court-martial committed such an abuse of discretion as to call for the
exercise of the corrective powers of this Court. It is thus obvious that no other way is open to this
Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrust upon it. Nor will the fact
that there may be available remedies within the system of military justice bar review considering
that the questions raised are questions of law.4
And so the threshold question is whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners
was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial. As already stated, the petitioner Martelino
challenged the court-martial president on the ground that newspaper accounts of what had
come to be referred to as the "Corregidor massacre" might unduly influence the trial of their
case. The petitioner's counsel referred to a news item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of
the Daily Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that "coffins are being prepared for the
President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that according to Senator Aquino "massacre victims were
given sea burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President candidate, had gone
to Corregidor and "found bullet shells." In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila
Times editorial of August 26, 1969 which states that "The Jabidah [code name of the training
operations] issue was bound to come up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition
could not possibly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration." The
petitioners argue that under the circumstances they could not expect a just and fair trial and that,
in overruling their challenge for cause based on this ground, the general court-martial committed
a grave abuse of discretion. In support of their contention they invoke the rulings of the United
States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd,5 Rideau vs. Louisiana,6 Estes v. Texas,7 and Shepard v.
Maxwell.8
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely disparate from this
case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin, for instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after
the petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed in Vanderburgh County, Indiana,
the prosecutor and police officials issued press releases stating that the petitioner had
confessed to the six murders and that "a barrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and
pictures was unleashed against him during the six or seven months preceding his trial." In
reversing his conviction, the Court said:
Here the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present
throughout the community, ... was clearly reflected in the sum total of
the voir dire examination of a majority of the jurors finally placed in the jury
box. Eight out of the 12 thought petitioner was guilty. With such an opinion
permeating their minds, it would be difficult to say that each could exclude
this preconception of guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks in
an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights
detachment from the processes of the average man. ... Where one's life is
at stake and accounting for the frailties of human nature we can only
say that in the light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does
not meet the constitutional standard.9
Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of prejudicial
publicity. 10 In the earlier case of Shepherd v. Florida, 11 which involved elements of publicity,
the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial discrimination in the selection of the
jury, although to concurring Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice Frankfurter, "It is hard to
imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer of the court charged with
defendants' custody stating that they had confessed, and here just such a statement unsworn to,
unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was conveyed by the press to the jury. 12
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana and in the
kidnapping of three of its employees, and in the killing of one of them, was similarly given "trial
by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was taken of him in an
"interview" with the sheriff. The "interview," which lasted approximately 20 minutes, consisted of
interrogation by the sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank robbery,
kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen and heard on television by 24,000 people. Two
weeks later he was arraigned. His lawyers promptly moved for a change of venue but their
motion was denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death. Rideau's counsel had
requested that jurors be excused for cause, having exhausted all of their peremptory challenges,
but these challenges for cause had been denied by the trial judge. In reversing his conviction,
the Court said:
[W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for
a change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had been exposed
repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in
detail to the crimes with which he was later to be charged. For anyone who
has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this
spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a
very real sense was Rideau's trial at which he pleaded guilty to murder.
Any subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed
to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. 13
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being inherently a denial of
due process.
The state ... says that the use of television in the instant case was "without
injustice to the person immediately concerned," basing its position on the
fact that the petitioner has established no isolate prejudice and that this
must be shown in order to invalidate a conviction in these circumstances.
The State paints too broadly in this contention, for this Court itself has found
instances in which a showing of actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to
reversal. This is such a case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of
due process deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to
the accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State
involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is inherently
lacking in due process. 14
In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of the murder of
his wife Marilyn, the Supreme Court observed a "carnival atmosphere" in which "bedlam reigned
at the courthouse ... and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of
the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard." It observed that "despite the extent and nature
of the publicity to which the jury was exposed during the trial, the judge refused defense
counsel's other requests that the jury be asked whether they had read or heard specific
prejudicial comment about the case. ... In these circumstances, we assume that some of this
material reached members of the jury." The Court held:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news
comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process
requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and
the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make
an independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing
that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the
courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
 prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until
the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with
publicity. In addition sequestration of the jury was something the judge
should have sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceeding
threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we
must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts
must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes
from prejudicial outside interference. Neither prosecutors, counsel for
defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers
coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its
function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information
affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is
highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measure. 15
In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners
but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of
Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the
Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from
massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial 16 either by a
failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone
it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial
of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of
those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the
petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply
that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial
proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since
been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we
believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
II
Article of War 18 provides that "Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but the
law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause." The general court-martial
originally interpreted this provision to mean that the entire defense was entitled to only
one peremptory challenge. Subsequently, on August 27, 1969, it changed its ruling and held that
the defense was entitled to eight peremptory challenges, but the petitioners declined to exercise
their right to challenge on the ground that this Court had earlier restrained further proceedings in
the court-martial.
It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one
peremptory challenge," and therefore because there are eleven charges they are entitled to
eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents, upon the other hand, argue that "for
each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge
and that with respect to specifications tried commonly each of the accused is entitled to one
peremptory challenge." Although there are actually a total of eleven specifications against the
petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with two other specifications, "since
in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight
specifications." The general court-martial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are
entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges.
We thus inescapably confront, and therefore now address, the issue here posed.
We are of the view that both the petitioners and the general court-martial misapprehend the true
meaning, intent and scope of Article of War 18. As will hereinafter be demonstrated, each of the
petitioners is entitled as a matter of right to one peremptory challenge. The number of
specifications and/or charges, and whether the accused are being jointly tried or undergoing a
common trial, are of no moment.
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful
of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies
who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in
military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically
inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program.
Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the
meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed.
Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September
14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory
challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the accused. After December
17, 1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial 17 of the Philippine Army became effective, the
Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive
program of training and education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the
Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific on
December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of
the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances
that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory
challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for
cause."
By its very inherent nature a peremptory challenge does not require any reason or ground
therefor to exist or to be stated. It may be used before, during, or after challenges for cause, or
against a member of the court-martial unsuccessfully challenged for cause, or against a new
member if not previously utilized in the trial. A member challenged peremptorily is forthwith
excused from duty with the court-martial.
The right of challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself, and has always
been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury. 18
As was said by Blackstone, and repeated by Mr. Justice Story: 'In criminal
cases, or at least in capital ones, there is in favorem vitae, allowed to the
prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain
number of jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is called a
peremptory challenge; a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to
 prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous. This is grounded on
two reasons: 1) As every one must be sensible, what sudden impression
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks
and gestures of another; and how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put
to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which
might totally disconcert him; the law has conceived a prejudice even without
being able to assign a reason for his dislike. 2) Because, upon challenges
for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the
juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke
a resentment, to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is still
at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.' 19

The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who
remain an impartial military court is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial
is maintained. ... 20

As we have hereinbefore stated, each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general court-
martial) is entitled to one peremptory challenge, 21 irrespective of the number of specifications
and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in common. Three overriding
reasons compel us to this conclusion.

First, a peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, honestly
feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in judgment over
him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not enough that objectively
the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that subjectively the
accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. Because the
petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and
different individual members of the court-martial, it follows necessarily that each of the accused
is entitled to one peremptory challenge.

Second, Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does it
make the nature or number of specifications and/or charges a determinant. Reference is made
by the respondents here to US military law, in support of their argument that for each
specification jointly tried all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and
with respect to all specifications tried in common each of the accused is entitled to one
peremptory challenge. We have carefully scrutinized U.S. military law, and it is unmistakable
from our reading thereof that each accused person, whether in a joint or common trial,
unquestionably enjoys the right to one peremptory challenge. 22

Third, a perceptive analysis of the companion articles 23 to Article 18 convinces us that the
word, "each side," as used in the said article in reference to the defense, should be construed to
mean each accused person. Thus, Articles of War 17 (Trial Judge Advocate to Prosecute;
Counsel to Defend), 19 (Oath), 21 (Refusal or Failure to Plead), 28 (Court to Announce Action),
29 (Closed Sessions), 30 (Method of Voting), and 36 (Irregularities Effect of), unequivocally
speak of and refer to the "accused" in the singular.

ACCORDINGLY, subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one
separate peremptory challenge, the present petition is denied. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on August 29, 1969 is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs. .
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001]
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing
the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live
television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the
proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the
country, sent a letter[1] requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial
of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full ransparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history."[2] The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his
letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and
Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the
instant petition,[3] submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the
land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the
prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over
which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing
the live radio and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual
purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse
the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived
attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases against
the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada."[4]
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the
public to vital information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this
Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of
cameras in the courtroom.Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the
question squarely.
While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad
Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal
Courts of the United States prohibit the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress
of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of
any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be
treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which
pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial
proceedings are formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or
televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a
television or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring
his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting
5-4, the Court through 'Mr. Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which
might arise from the impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the
defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:
"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on
witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are
subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences which might affect their testimony.Also,
telecasting not only increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human beings also and are
subject to the same psychologjcal reactions as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form
of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the
effective presentation of his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel
a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional
rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally
necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by
due process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should
not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the
courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair
and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and
the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading
and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be
allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to
shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during
the trial proper.
"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court
resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of
court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has
become an important instrument in the quest for truth. [5] Recent history exemplifies media's
invigorating presence, and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently,
has taken judicial notice of the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during the
impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched
program in the boob-tubes during those times, that would soon culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one
hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional
power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. [6]
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence [7] tells us that the right of the
accused must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an
accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on
the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of
pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract
from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, [8] and decreed by a judge
with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's
attention[9] and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or
influence[10] but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and
calm ambiance is demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in
hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it
must also be conceded that "television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people
it focuses on."[11] Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media
can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact,
nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or
unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision
of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt
or innocence to yield to it. [12] It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor
against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.[13]
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle
threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate
dispensation of justice can create.[14] The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of
proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we
know it now.[15]
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not
too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally
free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.[16]
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to
public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process [17] which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced,
"while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the important function of
informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the
maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process."[18]
This Court, in the instance [19] already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas, [20] the United
States Supreme Court holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent
denial of due process rights of an accused, also identified the following as being likely
prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest significance. x x x. From the
moment the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause celebre. The
whole community, x x x becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The
approaching trial immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the accused
is highly publicized along with the offense with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him
into the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in
every criminal case. x x x
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a
witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply
incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to
overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of
statement may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be
televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the
discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television
places on the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This
most difficult task requires his undivided attention. x x x
4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is
a form of mental - if not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third
degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial
might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the
proceedings before him - sometimes the difference between life and death - dispassionately,
freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific
crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The
heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevitably result in
prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio
coverage could have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere that
should always surround the judicial process.[21]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 April 2001, expressed its own
concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to
paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses
during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life
and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and
live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto
themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be
acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the
ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays
in the prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a declaration of
mistrial on account of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or
disallowing live media coverage of the court proceedings because of supposed abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the case law on the
matter. Just to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October
1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its
23rd October resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion
regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not
(theretofore) had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in
point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart,[22] the Nebraska State trial judge issued an
order restraining news media from publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the
accused or facts strongly implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond
Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia,[23] the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public and all
participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge was reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court which ruled that criminal trials were historically open. In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior
Court,[24] the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required trial judges to
exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of
certain sexual offenses.
Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida,[25] where two police officers charged with
burglary sought to overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that
the television coverage had infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the constitutional
violation perceived by the Estes Court did not stem from the physical disruption that might one
day disappear with technological advances in the television equipment but inhered, rather, in the
hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and recording devices might have an effect on
the trial participants prejudicial to the accused."[26]
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live
television and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so
involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have
twice become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III
where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited
anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved? The transcendental events
in our midst do not allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of
mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in the dispensation
of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court
contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in
any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of
what alone is submitted before them.[27] A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a competing
market of thoughts the known test truth in a courtroom.[28]
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to
chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply them, even
before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly
addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 90083. October 4, 1990.]
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros
Occidental, respondents.
RESOLUTION
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People
of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros
Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non-payment of P316.50 for the
legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the
questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration,
the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved
for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50
was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's
decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The
motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the
assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration
was denied "with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty.
Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President
of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and or
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The complaint
was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.
Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and
intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President,
which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove,
Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite
For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices
concerned, as Respondents (sic)." 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and
jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they
are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no
more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do
by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that
they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds
the various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the
President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as
follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable
Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to
our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos
Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and just
investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and principle, or
otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for being maliciously
deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the
Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally
created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing ignorance
of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned
and believed by him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common
intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the
genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to their
advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision
to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and progress of
your people and the only country which God has given us PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they
refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren in rank
and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . . 14
IX
. . . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of
the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money reasons. .
. . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to
face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of
fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-accused
(complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person in our Judiciary to be heard
in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and can't be
reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and
meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our
Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any man, regardless of
ranks and status in life." 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a motion for Reconsideration to
the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the
requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which legally
hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict or
inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and
beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by records of both
cases mentioned above. 16
xxx xxx xxx
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges
and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no
Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any
presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous
and innocent complainant and to favor any person with close relation. 17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did
so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the
dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court
maintains a double standard in dispensing justice one set for the rich and another for the poor
went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the cause of his
client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter
of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in
resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous influence as
he disparagingly intimates.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure
to fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious
disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989,
after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for
reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate
original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date
he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No.
1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the
other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation
given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in
our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration,
"no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought."
Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance
with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it
be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his
deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately,
the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper.
As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of
the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a
"lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo." 22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through
the criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever
mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or have materiality to the case.
xxx xxx xxx
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second
Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system the separation of powers
between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty.
Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the
Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No
other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24
Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief
Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices,
concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and
irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no
jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in
claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing
lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism.
Rather, Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of
the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice
according to law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT
and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution
becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with
more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges
of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name
"CDO," filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr.,
popularly known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including
Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program
KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG
BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3)
disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread
to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD).
Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted
a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000
as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in
contravention of company policy and, in any event, "outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the
Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the
Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime
or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-
be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 2 which
complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it
and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to
the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer
earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the
Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place
paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN 3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint
before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. 4 Respondent, who affixed his
signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid
that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking complainant
to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per
issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile 6 of the television program KAKAMPI
MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate
cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c)
season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid
amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the
television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer,
respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and
threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station
DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which
announcement was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio
ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-
7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang
contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan.
Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong
companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g]
contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong
sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in
the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light.
Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article
captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG
PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13,
2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another
article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published
in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles: 11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread,"
Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12(b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); 14 (d) "Uod sa liver
spread kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng
uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); 16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); 19 (i) "CDO
guards pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); 20 (j) "May uod na CDO
liver spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288); 21 (k) "Desperado na ang
CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); 22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO,"
Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero,"
Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre
23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an
article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread."26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo
ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the
"same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it.27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending
at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint.28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly
Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to
happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his
complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an
investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can
Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them
in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their
cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been
the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with
reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past
distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere
staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their
respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates
and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the
Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that
Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here;30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which respondent filed, as
counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick
skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.32 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several
others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City
and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding,
respondent continued to publish articles against complainant 34 and to malign complainant
through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report
and Recommendation:35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the
Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge
Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
"Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the
instant plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file
an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in
order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any
person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising
and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the
imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch
Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10
December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein
addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out
with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the December
16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the
Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of
Professional Responsibilitywhich reads: "A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela
City, respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These
Cases To the Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the following
statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of
the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent
clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it
and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by
respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and
[m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist
[o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the
Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said
"Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this
accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the
complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media
offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the
numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17
December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come
out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining
order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he
indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the
defects of complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a
baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for
complainants failure to give in to respondents "request" that complainant advertise in the
tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible.
Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against
complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind
the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval.
Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned
around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said
agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could
have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless
against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent
constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted
the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent
from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking
advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas
Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television
program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products.
At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his
(respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession,
respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a
lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession." 401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay
v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as "she
was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media
personality,"42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an
exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was
suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and
watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have
affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for reconsideration,
took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification
charges against the therein complainant.43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the
premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics
of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos
City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the
Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental,"
was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the requirements of
Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and
the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned
decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court
dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was
remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision,
and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed
orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied
"with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano
a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the
Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5The complaint was
signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang,
allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate
language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he
should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the
Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. 7 On
March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt
Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices
concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction
of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are
Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more
jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the
mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will
not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the
various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the
President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as
follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most
Honorable Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file
this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and
determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and
Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and
just investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such
procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the
undersigned with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied
of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and
most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being
Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic),
being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering
unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by
him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose
common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from
innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they
will be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice
of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision to bring
back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and
progress of your people and the only country which God has given us.
PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of
Justice, yet they refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-
complainant, so to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge
Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14
IX
. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the
Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was
based more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our
very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts
of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for
the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-
 accused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person
in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the
respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for
the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the
common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our
Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to
any man, regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his
appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet
the respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in
the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict
or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine
justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a
common tao, as proved by records of both cases mentioned above. 16
xxx xxx xxx
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly
abused by Judges and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants
and all Filipino people in general for no Judges or Justices since the
beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any presiding
Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a
righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person with close
relation. 17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition
did so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B.
Templado," and that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his
insinuation that the Court maintains a double standard in dispensing justice one set
for the rich and another for the poor went beyond the bounds of "constructive
criticism." They are not relevant to the cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast
aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable
controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in
resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous
influence as he disparagingly intimates.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to
fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious
disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989,
after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for
reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate
original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date
he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No.
1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the
other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation
given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in
our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration,
"no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought."
Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance
with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it
be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his
deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately,
the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper.
As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of
the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a
"lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo." 22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the
criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever
mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD
INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menancing language or behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not
supported by the record or have materiality to the case.
xxx xxx xxx
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division,
even the most basic tenet of our government system the separation of powers between the
judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty. Castellano. We
therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is
supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department
or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to
the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment
on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to
correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as
Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to
question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a
contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however,
reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty.
Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second
Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
A.C. No. 6155
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN,
- versus -
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL
Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint [1] on 15 August
2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath,
gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No.
152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M.
Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on
Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the
above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the
prejudice of petitioners therein.
The facts are as follows:
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3
Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein
as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two
individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them
before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty
and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan [2] found the accused guilty of two counts of
homicide and one count of attempted homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the
accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was
denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion
for Reconsideration.[3] Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this
Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent
telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries,
complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out
without any forwarding address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to
personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and
IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution
becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with
more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges
of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover
that the Court had already issued a Resolution[4] dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late
filing and non-payment of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants
of arrest[5] had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose
whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking
reconsideration from lapsing.
In his Comment,[6] respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes
that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide
and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on
hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties.
But only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion
for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made
informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the
Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the
efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and
that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He
stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he
filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,[7] seeking an
additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition
by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed
within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the herculean efforts he made in assisting
the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He
considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of
his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of
adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United
States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as
counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served
as the contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to
withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the
accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but
unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the
case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court.
Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to
find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent.Respondent
suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three
complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference
held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further
participate in the IBP proceedings.[8]
The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005,
Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility [9] and recommended the imposition of
penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months. [10] On 12 November 2005, the
Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and
approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to
recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented,
whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-
23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension
recommended by the IBP proper.
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused,
respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the
property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and
liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:[11]
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules,
ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary
duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential
character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is
required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that
distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x[12]
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out
of time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he
should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading [13] and it
rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion
did not toll the reglementary period to appeal.Having failed to do so, the accused had already
lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore,
respondent cannot now say he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is
the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.
As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely
fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the
rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been
quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though
respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the
examination of the pleadings[14] he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the
same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents
office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent
step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they
had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew
that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may
have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as
counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return
their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters
between them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a
lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the
notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed
this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his
clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by
Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the
Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused
and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies
credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the
proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if
such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return
card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to
PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that
complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the
latter had filed the ad cautelam petition.He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel
only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.[15]
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among
the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises
only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.[16]
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition
was primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed
in Aromin v. Boncavil[17] that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care,
and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and
 the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession.[18]
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated
without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed
such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated
deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime
Portugal with account number 7186509273.[19] Respondent has neither admitted nor denied
having claimed the deposited amount.
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement
between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper
consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v.
Atty. Magulta:[20]
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes
fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the
attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in
which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration. [21]
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
G.R. No. L-26868 February 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Bar.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task of ascertaining whether certain acts
and conduct of a member of the Bar deserve disciplinary action.
The problem arose because of facts that follow:
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of Samar, 1 and
sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. His case came up before this Court on review.
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by this Court as
Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to prepare
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it
is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x [22]
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to
defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case
should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the
shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: the accused
police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and
Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato.[23] Rule 14.01[24] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of
the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own
clients as being the culprits that salvaged the victims. Though he might think of his clients as
that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had
not done so.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6)
months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain
why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal
brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court
imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension. [25] The Court finds it
fit to impose the same in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant
for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was advised that to enable him to examine the
case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano received this notice on December 20, 1966.
On January 19, 1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in
mimeographed form. On February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension (his second).
This was followed by a third filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27, also for
fifteen days. He moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought
a special extension of five days. All these motions for extension were granted. The brief was due
on April 26, 1967. But no brief was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof
why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite
the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any explanation.
For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3, 1968,
resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500 payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice
with a warning that upon further non-compliance with the said resolution of September 25, 1967
within the same period of fifteen days, "more drastic disciplinary action will be taken against
him." Still, counsel paid no heed.
Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from
notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct
and violation of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of this Court, the resolution was
personally served upon him on December 18, 1968. He ignored the resolution.
Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass judgment.
1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a
destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a
duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." 2 A lawyer so
appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand,
"should always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's behalf. 3
Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The effect of this long delay need
not be essayed. We, therefore, find that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has violated his oath that he
will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge and discretion".
2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers. The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." By the oath of office, the
lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities." In People vs. Carillo, 8 this Court's pointed observation was that as an officer of the
court, it is a lawyer's "sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."

Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of lawful
No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet, between
orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is thus present for suspension or disbarment. 9 Counsel
December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his appointment, and December 5, 1968, when
has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring compliance of its orders. To be
the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient time was afforded
recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days from notice, to show
counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio. The death sentence below imposed was upon a
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure to file appellant's
plea of guilty. The record of the proceedings leading to the lower court's sentence consists of but
brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Nothing was done by counsel for over a year. To
31 pages. Counsel had the record since January 19, 1967. In fact, in his third motion for
impress upon counsel the gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders, on October
extension of time, he manifested that the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way
3,1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days. He
through" and that "additional time is needed to review, effectuate the necessary corrections, put
was in that order also required to file his brief in fifteen days. He was warned that more drastic
in final form and print the said brief." In his motion for fourth extension, he intimated that the
disciplinary action would be taken upon his failure to do either. Still he remained unmoved. Then,
preparation of the brief "is almost through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft and
this Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding him to show cause
rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the same stencilled and mimeographed
within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for
upon completion of a definitive text." His motion for last (fifth) extension of time came with the
gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office. The Court made it certain that this order
excuse that he "suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of redrafting and rehashing some
would reach him. He personally acknowledged receipt thereof. He has not paid the fine. He has
significant portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and interrupted his work thereon for
done nothing.
sometime." Finally, in his "Special Extension of Time" to file brief, he claimed that he needed
only five days from April 21, 1967 to put said brief in final form and have the same stencilled and
mimeographed.lawphi1.nt This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite of the fact that as early as March
27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth extension of time to file his brief de oficio, he represented
to this Court that all that was needed was to redraft and to rehash some significant portions of
In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's statements in his motions for
the brief which was almost through and to have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon
extension have gone down to the level of empty and meaningless words; at best, have dubious
completion of a definitive text.
claim to veracity.

Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in order.

It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he
has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as
in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the
person assigned to his care. His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant
expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not accept the
paradox that responsibility is less where the defended party is poor. It has been said that courts
should "have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of attorneys appointed to defend
indigent persons charged with crime." 4 For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self interest.
Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends.
Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter of Jose Robles Lahesa. 5 He was
counsel de oficio before the Supreme Court in two cases: one for robo en cuadrilla and the other
for homicide. He failed to take any action in behalf of the defendants in both eases. This Court
imposed upon him a fine of P200. Significant is the pronouncement we there made that: "This
court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their
official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily result
in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases and the detention of accused persons pending
appeal." The validity of the foregoing observation remains to the present day. 6 It applies to the
present case.
Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty. Filoteo Dianala Jo. 10 There, as here,
counsel failed to file appellant's brief (in a criminal case) despite extensions of time granted him
by this Court. Likewise, this Court issued a show-cause order why disciplinary action should not
be taken against him. The explanation was considered unsatisfactory. This Court imposed a fine
of P50 payable in ten days from notice. Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay that fine. Came the
subsequent resolution of this Court advising him to pay the fine, otherwise, he would be arrested
and confined to jam. This warning was not heeded. On November 18, 1960, the Court resolved
to give him ten days from notice within which to explain why he should not be suspended from
the practice of law. Despite receipt of this notice, he did not care to explain his behaviour which
this Court considered as "consumacy and unwillingness to comply with the lawful orders of this
Court of which he is an officer or to conduct himself as a lawyer should, in violation of his oath of
office." He was suspended from the practice of law for three months.
In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a propensity on
the part of counsel to benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the
courtesy and respect that should be accorded this Court.
For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the practice of law Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record, in this Court, of Lope E. Adriano
throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1) year. as member of the Bar. So ordered.