Opp To MTD

Case 3:14-cv-00169-L-NLS Document 34 Filed 09/29/14 Page 1 of 37
1 THE LAW OFFICE OF JACK FITZGERALD, PC

JACK FITZGERALD (SBN 257370)
2
jack@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com
3 The Palm Canyon Building
2870 Fourth Avenue, Suite 205
4
San Diego, California 92103
5 Phone: (619) 692-3840
Fax: (619) 362-9555
6
7 Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class
(Additional Counsel on Signature page)
8
9
10
11
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13
Case No.: 3:14-cv-0169-L-NLS
14
15 THAMAR SANTISTEBAN CORTINA, OPPOSITION TO GOYA FOODS
ANDREW J. PARK, and JILLIANN INC.S MOTION TO DISMISS
16
PEREZ, on behalf of themselves and all PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED
17 others similarly situated CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO
18
Plaintiffs, STRIKE CERTAIN
19 v. ALLEGATIONS
20
GOYA FOODS, INC., Judge: Hon. M. James Lorenz
21 Date: October 13, 2014
Defendant.
22
[NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS
23 REQUESTED BY THE COURT]
24
25
26
27
28
Cortina, et al., v. Goya Foods, Inc., No. 14-cv-0169-L-NLS
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
291289.1 GOYA
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. iii
3
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 1
4
5 FACTS ..................................................................................................................................... 2
6
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................... 4
7
8 I. STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS ........................................................ 4
9
II. PLAINTIFFS COMPLIED WITH PROPOSITION 65S NOTICE
10 REQUIREMENT ................................................................................................ 4
11
A. Plaintiffs Waited the Prescribed Time to Assert a Proposition
12 65 Claim .................................................................................................... 4
13
B. Plaintiffs Initial Complaints Were Not Based on Proposition
14 65 ............................................................................................................... 4
15
III. PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ARE NOT EXPRESSLY PREEMPTED ................... 7
16
17 A. Statutory Scheme ...................................................................................... 7
18
B. Legal Standard Governing Express Preemption ....................................... 8
19
20 C. Goyas Preemption Argument is a Straw Man ....................................... 10
21 D. The FDCA Does Not Regulate 4-MeI Content or Labeling ................... 10

22
E. In Any Event, the Goya Beverages are Misbranded Under 21
23 U.S.C. 343(a)........................................................................................ 12
24
IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT REFER THIS ACTION TO FDA
25
UNDER THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE ................................ 14
26
27 A. Standards for Primary Jurisdiction .......................................................... 14
28
i
291289.1 GOYA OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
1 B. This Action May Plausibly be Adjudicated Without FDAs

Expertise .................................................................................................. 16
2
3 V. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGES GOYAS DECEPTIVE
4 OMISSION OF MATERIAL FACTS ABOUT THE AMOUNT AND
POTENTIAL HARMS OF 4-MEI IN ITS BEVERAGES ............................... 19
5
6 VI. PLAINTIFFS BREACH OF WARRANTY AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLAIMS ARE ADEQUATELY PLED ................................ 20
7
8 A. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Pled Breach of Express Warranty .............. 20
9
B. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim for Unjust Enrichment ........................... 21
10
11 VII. PLAINTIFFS MAY REPRESENT CLASS MEMBERS WHO
PURCHASED SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR GOYA
12 BEVERAGES .................................................................................................... 23
13
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 24
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ii
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Federal Cases
3
Adelphia Cable Partners, Inc. v. E & A Beepers Corp.,
4 188 F.R.D. 662 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ........................................................................................ 22
5
Alpharma, Inc. v. Pennfield Oil Co.,
6 411 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005).............................................................................................. 15
7
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,
8 555 U.S. 70 (2008) ............................................................................................................... 9
9
Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co.,
10 888 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ............................................................................. 23
11
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
12 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ....................................................................................................... 4, 23
13
Astiana v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc.,
14 C 10-4387 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) .................................. 21, 22
15
Astiana v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc.,
16 C-11-2910 EMC, 2012 WL 2990766 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012)....................................... 23
17
Baggett v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
18 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ............................................................................. 24
19
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
20 544 U.S. 431 (2005) ............................................................................................................. 9
21
Baxter v. Intelius, Inc.,
22 SACV09-1031 AG MLGX, 2010 WL 3791487 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010)....................... 4
23
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
24 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................................................................................... 19
25
Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc.,
26 277 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2002)............................................................................................ 15
27
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,
28 131 S. Ct. 1068 n.2 (2011) ................................................................................................. 10
iii
1 Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC,

280 F.R.D. 524 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ....................................................................................... 24
2
3 Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,
225 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000)............................................................................................ 14
4
5 Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co.,
752 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ......................................................................... 9, 19
6
7 Chae v. SLM Corp.,
593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010)................................................................................................ 8
8
9 Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co.,
268 F.R.D. 365 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ....................................................................................... 14
10
11 Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Allenby,
958 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1992).............................................................................................. 11
12
13 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
505 U.S. 504 (1992) ....................................................................................................... 8, 12
14
15 Clark v. Time Warner Cable,
523 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2008)............................................................................................ 15
16
17 Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc.,
588 F.3d 1237(9th Cir. 2009)............................................................................................. 15
18
19 Comm. of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distributors v. Stratton,
92 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1996)................................................................................................ 11
20
21 Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41(1957) .............................................................................................................. 19
22
23 Cooper v. Pickett,
137 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1997).............................................................................................. 24
24
25 Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Washington Natural Gas Co.,
99 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 1996)................................................................................................ 16
26
27 Davel Commc'ns, Inc. v. Qwest Corp.,
460 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2006)............................................................................................ 15
28
iv
1 Delacruz v. Cytosport, Inc.,

C 11-3532 CW, 2012 WL 1215243 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2012)......................................... 22
2
3 Delacruz v. Cytosport, Inc.,
C 11-3532 CW, 2012 WL 2563857 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) ........................................ 18
4
5 Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc.,
818 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ............................................................................. 16
6
7 Dorsey v. Rockhard Labs., LLC,
CV 13-07557 DDP RZX, 2014 WL 4678969 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014) ........................ 24
8
9 Fagan v. Neutrogena Corp.,
5:13-CV-01316-SVW-OP, 2014 WL 92255 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) .............................. 13
10
11 Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
496 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ........................................................................... 5, 6
12
13 In re Bisphenol-A Polycarbonate (BPA) Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 1967, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104451 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2009)..................... 18
14
15 In re Ferrero Litig.,
794 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2011) ........................................................................ 20, 21
16
17 In re Hydroxycut Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
801 F. Supp. 2d 993 (S.D. Cal. 2011) ................................................................................ 21
18
19 In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc.,
880 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Ohio 2012) ................................................................................ 6
20
21 In re Quaker Oats Labeling Litig.,
C 10-0502 RS, 2012 WL 1034532 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2012)...................................... 9, 20
22
23 In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, &
Products Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ............................................ 6
24
25 In re Vistaprint Corp Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
MDL 4:08-MD-1994, 2009 WL 2884727 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2009) ................................ 4
26
27 Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc.,
961 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ....................................................................... 13, 18
28
v
1 Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,

912 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ............................................................................... 18
2
3 Larsen v. Trader Joe's Co.,
917 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ............................................................................. 12
4
5 Law v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
114 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1997)................................................................................................ 9
6
7 Leonhart v. Nature's Path Foods, Inc.,
5:13-CV-0492-EJD, 2014 WL 1338161 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) ................................. 18
8
9 Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc.,
597 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ............................................................................. 19
10
11 Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,
565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009)................................................................................................ 4
12
13 MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co.,
3:13-CV-02988-JST, 2014 WL 1340339 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014).................................. 5
14
15 Martorella v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.,
931 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (S.D. Fla. 2013) .............................................................................. 22
16
17 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470 (1996) ............................................................................................................. 8
18
19 Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co.,
912 F. Supp. 2d 861 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ............................................................................... 23
20
21 Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc.,
885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989).............................................................................................. 24
22
23 Morey v. NextFoods, Inc.,
10CV761 JM (NLS), 2010 WL 2473314 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 2010)................................... 20
24
25 Morgan v. Wallaby Yogurt Co.,
13-CV-00296-WHO, 2013 WL 5514563 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013) .................................. 16
26
27 O'Shea v. Epson Am., Inc.,
CV 09 -8063 PSG CWX, 2011 WL 3299936(C.D. Cal. July 29, 2011) ............................. 6
28
vi
1 Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.,

96 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 1996).............................................................................................. 21
2
3 Pollard v. GEO Grp., Inc.,
607 F.3d 583n.3 (9th Cir. 2010)........................................................................................... 4
4
5 Pom Wonderful LLC v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.,
642 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ............................................................................... 9
6
7 Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62 (1970) ............................................................................................................. 14
8
9 Rahman v. Mott's LLP,
CV 13-3482 SI, 2014 WL 1379655 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014)........................................... 17
10
11 Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96 (1963) ............................................................................................................... 8
12
13 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947) ............................................................................................................. 8
14
15 Ryan v. Chemlawn Corp.,
935 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1991).............................................................................................. 18
16
17 Shum v. Intel Corp.,
499 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007).......................................................................................... 21
18
19 Stengel v. Medtronic Inc.,
704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013)............................................................................................ 10
20
21 Swearingen v. Amazon Pres. Partners, Inc.,
13-CV-04402-WHO, 2014 WL 1100944 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) ............................... 17
22
23 Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc.,
307 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2002).............................................................................................. 14
24
25 Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Access Telecom, Inc.,
642 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2009) .............................................................................. 22
26
27 Trazo v. Nestle USA, Inc.,
5:12-CV-2272 PSG, 2013 WL 4083218 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013).......................16, 17, 18
28
vii
1 United States v. 45/194 Kg. Drums of Pure Vegetable Oil,

961 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1992).............................................................................................. 13
2
3 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
828 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987)......................................................................................14, 15
4
5 United States v. Locke,
529 U.S. 89 (2000) ............................................................................................................... 8
6
7 Victor v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc.,
13-CV-02976-WHO, 2014 WL 1028881 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014) ............................... 18
8
9 Vicuna v. Alexia Foods, Inc.,
C 11-6119 PJH, 2012 WL 1497507 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) .................................. 21, 22
10
11 Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers,
12-CV-02724-LHK, 2013 WL 5487236 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013).................................... 10
12
13 Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc.,
961 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ............................................................................. 23
14
15 Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009) ............................................................................................................. 8
16
17 Zatkin v. Primuth,
551 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1982) ....................................................................................... 24
18
19 Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc.,
C 10-01192 JSW, 2010 WL 9509506 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010) ...................................... 14
20
21 Zupnik v. Tropicana Products, Inc.,
CV 09-6130 DSF RZX, 2010 WL 6090604 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010) ........................ 12, 13
22
23
State Cases
24
25 Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co.,
20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999) ........................................................................................................ 7
26
27 Collins v. eMachines, Inc.,
202 Cal. App. 4th 249 (2011) ......................................................................................... 5, 6
28
viii
1 Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,

144 Cal. App. 4th 824 (2006) ............................................................................................. 5
2
3 Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court,
2 Cal. 4th 377 (1992) ........................................................................................................ 14
4
5 Ghirardo v. Antonioli,
14 Cal. 4th 39 (1996) ........................................................................................................ 21
6
7 In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases,
42 Cal. 4th 1077 (2008) ..........................................................................................9, 10, 12
8
9 In re Vaccine Cases,
134 Cal. App. 4th 438 (2005) ............................................................................................. 7
10
11 Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank,
77 Cal. App. 4th 723 (2000) ............................................................................................. 21
12
13 LiMandri v. Judkins,
52 Cal. App. 4th 326 (1997) ............................................................................................... 5
14
15 Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp.,
185 Cal. App. 3d 135 (1986) ............................................................................................ 20
16
17
Federal Statutes
18
19 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. ........................................................................................................... 7
20
21 U.S.C. 343 .................................................................................................................. 7, 13
21
21 U.S.C. 343(a)(1) ......................................................................................................... 8, 12
22
23 21 U.S.C. 343-1(a) .......................................................................................................... 8, 14
24
21 U.S.C. 343-1(a)(2).......................................................................................................... 14
25
21 U.S.C. 343(e)(1) ............................................................................................................. 14
26
27 21 U.S.C. 343(k) ................................................................................................................... 8
28
ix
1 State Statutes
2
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq. (West) ................................................................... 3
3
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq. (West) ................................................................... 2
4
5 Cal. Civ. Code 1750 et seq. (West) ................................................................................... 2
6
Cal. Com. Code 2313 (West) ............................................................................................ 20
7
Cal. Health & Safety Code 25249.6 (West) ........................................................................ 3
8
9 Cal. Health & Safety Code 25249.7 (West) ........................................................................ 3
10
Cal. Health & Safety Code 25249.7(d)(1) (West) .............................................................. 4
11
Cal. Health & Safety Code 110100(a), 110660 (West) .................................................. 12
12
13
Federal Rules
14
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ................................................................................................................. 22
16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) ............................................................................................................ 22
17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ...................................................................................................... 4, 15
18
19
Federal Regulations
20
21 21 C.F.R. 101.5 ................................................................................................................... 14
22
21 C.F.R. 182.1235 ............................................................................................................. 11
23
21 C.F.R. 73.85 ................................................................................................................... 11
24
25 21 C.F.R. 73.85(d)............................................................................................................... 11
26
27
28
x
1 Other Authorities
2
60 Fed. Reg. 57120 (Nov. 13, 1995) ................................................................................ 12, 13
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
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15
16
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26
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xi
1 INTRODUCTION
2 The Court should deny each of Goyas six arguments for dismissal.
3 First, plaintiffs have complied with the Proposition 65 notice requirements, having only
4 first asserted a Proposition 65 violation in the First Amended Consolidated Complaint
5 (FACC) long after Mss. Cortina and Perez satisfied the 60-day waiting period following
6 notice. Plaintiffs initial complaints did not impermissibly plead around Proposition 65, but
7 instead were based on independent duties to disclose arising under California law.
8 Second, plaintiffs claims are not expressly preempted. Plaintiffs allege Goya
9 deceptively omits that the subject soft drinks contain dangerous levels of 4-MeI, which may
10 expose consumers to cancer. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not
11 regulate statements concerning 4-MeI, and its regulation regarding artificial coloring is totally
12 irrelevant to plaintiffs claims concerning 4-MeI, which is a manufacturing by-product. Since
13 this case is a routine false advertising class action, and not the type of complicated matter for
14 which Congress intended the Court to secure expert agency advice, referral to the Food and
15 Drug Administration (FDA) under the primary jurisdiction doctrine is inappropriate
16 Third, FDAs vague, qualified statements about 4-MeI, and only in regard to food (not
17 even relating to beverages), do not render plaintiffs claims implausible under Rule 8.
18 Fourth, plaintiffs breach of express warranty claim is sufficiently pled under
19 California law, covering each of the required elements: terms (i.e., that Malta Goya is
20 nutritious), reliance, and breach proximately causing injury.
21 Fifth, plaintiffs have properly pled an unjust enrichment claim as an alternative basis
22 for recovery on restitution and quasi-contract grounds: not only do California federal and
23 state courts recognize unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action in false advertising
24 cases, but it is well settled that alternate and even inconsistent theories are permitted at the
25 pleading stage.
26 Sixth, as a matter of law, plaintiffs may represent class members who purchased Goya
27 Sangria and Ginger Beer, because those beverages are substantially similar, in ways material
28 to the lawsuit, to the Malta Goya beverages that plaintiffs purchased.
1
1 FACTS
2 Goya sells beverages including Malta Goya, Goya Sangria, and Goya Ginger Beer.
3 (FACC 1.) Each contains 4-methylimidazole (4-MeI), a by-product created in the
4 manufacture of caramel coloring. (Id. 1, 14.) The National Toxicology Program has
5 reported that 4-MeI causes lung tumors in laboratory animals,1 and the International Agency
6 for Research on Cancer determined it to be possibly carcinogenic to humans. (Id. 14.)
7 Early this year, Consumer Reports announced testing results demonstrating that Malta
8 Goya beverages sold in California from April to September 2013 contained an average of
9 352.5 micrograms of 4-MeI per 12-ounce serving, and in December 2013 contained an
10 average of 316.1 micrograms per 12-ounce serving. (Id. 17-18.) The Executive Director
11 of the Consumer Reports Food Safety & Sustainability Center, Urvashi Rangan, has said that
12 [t]here is no safe level of 4-MeI, and that consumption of any amount represents an
13 unnecessary risk. (Id. 16.)
14 Goya has had, and continues to have, exclusive knowledge of material facts concerning
15 the amount of 4-MeI in its Malta Goya (and Goya Sangria and Goya Ginger Beer) beverages,
16 and the resulting potential health harms. (Id. 22.) But Goya has actively concealed these
17 facts from California consumers (id. 23-24), including plaintiffs, who were regular Malta
18 Goya drinkers but would not have purchased Malta Goya if they knew the beverages
19 contained a known or suspected carcinogen, which is believed to be dangerous at the levels
20 actually present in these beverages. (Id. 27-30.)
21 On January 23, 2014, plaintiff Thamar Santisteban Cortina filed an action against Goya
22 in this Court for violations of Californias False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
23 17500 et seq. (West), Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1750 et seq. (West),
24
1
25 See National Toxicology Program, NTP Technical Report on the Toxicology &
Carcinogenesis Studies of 4-Methylimidazole in F344/N Rats and B6C3F Mice (Fee Studies),
26 NTP Publication No. 07-4471 (Jan. 2007) [hereinafter NTP 4-MEI Report], available at
27 http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/htdocs/lt_rpts/tr535.pdf (last accessed September 29, 2014).
Plaintiffs respectfully request judicial notice of the NTP 4-MEI Report, as it is referenced and
28 relied upon in their FACC.
2
1 and only the fraudulent prong of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
2 17200 et seq. (West), all based on Goyas deceptive omission of information concerning 4-
3 MeI in its Malta Goya beverages. (See generally Cortina Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Cortina did
4 not assert a cause of action for violation of Californias Proposition 65, either directly, or
5 indirectly under the UCLs unlawful prong. The only mention of Proposition 65 in
6 Cortinas Complaint was in a quotation of a toxicologist opining on levels of 4-MeI
7 consumption. (Id. at 9.) But Proposition 65 was in no way important to or even related
8 to Cortinas claims.
9 On March 11, 2014, plaintiff Andrew J. Park filed a second action against Goya in the
10 Central District of California, concerning the same behavior, initially styled Park v. Goya
11 Foods, Inc., No.14-cv-1789. He brought claims for violation of the UCL, CLRA, and FAL,
12 as well as for Breach of Contract, Intentional Misrepresentation, Negligent
13 Misrepresentation, Unjust Enrichment, and Breach of Express Warranty. On March 14,
14 plaintiff Jilliann Perez filed a third action against Goya, also in the Central District of
15 California, and also concerning the same behavior, initially styled Perez v. Goya Foods, Inc.,
16 No. 14-cv-2001. She brought claims for violations of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA. On May
17 30, the Park and Perez parties stipulated to transferring the actions to this Court, and all
18 parties agreed to consolidation. On July 25, plaintiffs filed the FACC. (Dkt. No. 27.)
19 Unlike any of plaintiffs separate initial Complaints, the FACC contains a cause of
20 action under Cal. Health & Safety Code 25249.6 (West), also known as Proposition 65,
21 as well as for violation of the UCLs unlawful prong, based on that Proposition 65 violation
22 (FACC 87-98). Prior to asserting these claims in the July 25 FACC, on February 10, Ms.
23 Cortina served the Proposition 65 notice prescribed by Cal. Health & Safety Code 25249.7
24 (West). (FACC 88; see also Dkt. No. 32-10, Goya RJN Ex. 10.) Ms. Perez served such
25 notice on April 3. (FACC 88; see also Dkt. No. 32-11, Goya RJN Ex. 11.)
26
27
28
3
1 ARGUMENT
2 I. STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS
3 [A] motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
4 failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. In re Vistaprint Corp
5 Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., MDL 4:08-MD-1994, 2009 WL 2884727, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
6 Aug. 31, 2009) (citing Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009)). The
7 complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and all well-pleaded facts must
8 be taken as true. Id., at *3 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
9 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Additionally, the court must accept as true all
10 factual allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences from those
11 allegations, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baxter v.
12 Intelius, Inc., SACV09-1031 AG MLGX, 2010 WL 3791487, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010)
13 (citing Pollard v. GEO Grp., Inc., 607 F.3d 583, 585 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010)).
14 II. PLAINTIFFS COMPLIED WITH PROPOSITION 65S NOTICE
15 REQUIREMENT
16 A. Plaintiffs Waited the Prescribed Time to Assert a Proposition 65 Claim
17 On February 10, plaintiff Cortina served her Proposition 65 notice, 165 days before
18 asserting Proposition 65 claims in the FACC on July 25. Perez did so on April 3, 113 days
19 before asserting such claims. Plaintiffs have complied with Cal. Health & Safety Code
20 25249.7(d)(1) (West), which requires only 60 days notice.
21 B. Plaintiffs Initial Complaints Were Not Based on Proposition 65
22 As Goya admits, [n]one of the original complaints expressly alleged Prop 65
23 violationsat most, they just cited Prop 65s safe harbor level. Mot. at 7. Goya
24 nevertheless argues that plaintiffs have tried improperly to plead around Proposition 65. Id.
25 at 10-11. Goya accuses plaintiffs of recasting their [Proposition 65] claims as violations of
26 the UCL, FAL or CLRA, id. at 10, but this is based on Goyas erroneous premise, that the
27 only basis for an unfair business practices claim is an underlying statutory violation [of
28 Proposition 65], see id.
4
1 As Ms. Cortina previously argued when Goya challenged her original Complaint (see
2 Dkt. No. 16 at 206), plaintiffs earlier claims were based on duties that arise under the UCL,
3 FAL, and CLRA independent of Proposition 65, and therefore their claims as initially pled
4 did not even indirectly rely on a Proposition 65 violation.
5 This is because Californias consumer protection statutes prohibit omissions of
6 material facts that a defendant has a duty to disclose. See Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor
7 Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 835 (2006) ([A] claim may be stated under the CLRA in
8 terms of constituting fraudulent omissions, and is actionable if there was an omission of
9 fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.); MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 3:13-CV-
10 02988-JST, 2014 WL 1340339, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (the CLRA bars omission
11 of any material fact relating to those goods sold by a defendant). A duty arises in a defendant
12 to disclose material facts if any one of four circumstances is present:
13 (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2)
14 when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to
the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the
15 plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also
16 suppresses some material fact.
17 Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting LiMandri
18 v. Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 337 (1997) (citation omitted)); see also Collins v.
19 eMachines, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 255 (2011) (same). Here, plaintiff invokes the second
20 and third circumstances, alleging that Goya was aware of material facts concerning the
21 amount of 4-MeI in the Malta Goya beverages (FACC 22), and actively concealed from
22 Plaintiff and the class material facts concerning the amount of 4-MeI in the Malta Goya
23 beverages, as well as its potential health harms (id. 23). Since Goya was in a superior
24 position to know of the existence of 4-MeI in its beverages, plaintiff[] successfully state[s]
25 a CLRA claim for omission of a material fact which lay within [Goyas] exclusive
26 knowledge, and [t]his alone defeats [Goyas] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
27 a claim. See Falk, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1096-97 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
28 reasoning applies equally to plaintiffs UCL and FAL claims. See MacDonald, 2014 WL
5
1 1340339, at *7-8 (collecting cases). Accordingly, these allegations state deceptive omission
2 claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, without any regard to Proposition 65. (Compare Id.
3 46, 52, 57.) See Falk, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1095-97.2
4 In addition, the allegations are plausible. A fact is material, requiring the manufacturer
5 to disclose it, if a reasonable consumer would deem it important in determining how to act
6 in the transaction at issue. Collins, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 256; see also O'Shea v. Epson Am.,
7 Inc., CV 09-8063 PSG CWX, 2011 WL 3299936, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2011)
8 (Materiality exists if the omitted information would cause a reasonable consumer to behave
9 differently if he or she were aware of it.). Plaintiffs allege the Goya beverages contain an
10 amount of [4-MeI] . . . sufficient to expose California consumers to substantial health risks.
11 (FACC 1.) They allege 4-MeI is a carcinogen (id. ) that has been shown to cause lung tumors
12 in laboratory animals (id. 14). They allege that a prominent toxicologist asserts [t]here is
13 no safe level of 4-MeI, and that if you have to set a threshold of daily consumption, it
14 should be like 3 micrograms/day (id. 16), while Malta Goya contains as much as 352.5
15 micrograms (id. 17), more than 117 times that amount. Nondisclosures about safety
16 considerations of consumer products are material. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended
17 Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Products Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1173
18 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citation omitted). Thus, [a] defect that poses an objective, identifiable
19 safety risk to consumers will trigger a duty to disclose under the CLRA. In re Porsche Cars
20 N. Am., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 801, 827 (S.D. Ohio 2012)). That is the case here.
21 The mere fact that Proposition 65 also regulates Goyas behavior (by mandating that
22 Goya provide the Proposition 65 warning if any of its products sold in California expose
23 consumers to 4-MeI levels above 29 micrograms per day), does not mean that plaintiffs, in
24 challenging Goyas behavior under Californias consumer protection statutes when they filed
25
26 2
The allegations in the FACC also form the basis for some of plaintiffs remaining
27 previously-pled claims without any regard to Proposition 65: Intentional and Negligent
Misrepresentation, Unjust Enrichment, and Breach of Express Warranty. (Compare FACC
28 66, 74, 79, 86.)
6
1 their initial Complaints, improperly pled around Proposition 65. In re Vaccine Cases, 134
2 Cal. App. 4th 438 (2005), is distinguishable. See Mot. at 11. Unlike here, the Vaccine Cases
3 plaintiffs expressly alleged Proposition 65 violations and, [b]ased on this alleged statutory
4 violation, . . . also allege[d] a violation of the Unfair Competition Law[.] In re Vaccine
5 Cases, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 444. More specifically, [t]he UCL cause of action alleged that
6 defendants violations of Proposition 65 (The Act), . . constituted per se an unlawful business
7 practice in violation of the UCL. Id. at 457. Thus, as the court noted, [b]y alleging violations
8 of The Act, the [UCL] cause of action alleges unfair competition that is unlawful rather than
9 unfair or deceptive. Id.
10 While some of the language in Vaccine Cases speaks of the UCL more generally
11 (including that which Goya quotes on page 10 of its Motion), that courts decision must be
12 read in light of the manner in which the claim there was pledplaintiffs were directly and
13 expressly alleging a Proposition 65 violation prior to the 60-day waiting period. Here,
14 plaintiffs initially did not directly allege a Proposition 65 violation, and did not even borrow
15 a Proposition 65 violation to state a UCL unlawful claim; they made no UCL unlawful
16 claim at all.
17 Goyas reliance on Cel-Tech Commcns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.
18 4th 163 (1999), is also misplaced. As set forth above, it is not the case here that the only
19 basis for an unfair business practices claim is an underlying statutory violation [of Proposition
20 65], Mot. at 10. Rather, under Californias consumer protection statutes, including the
21 UCLs fraudulent prong, Goya was under a duty to disclose regardless of Proposition 65.
22 III. PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ARE NOT EXPRESSLY PREEMPTED
23 A. Statutory Scheme
24 The FDCA, 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. requires FDA to protect the public health by
25 ensuring that . . . foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled[.] Id.
26 393(b)(2)(A). The Act prohibits the manufacture, sale, and distribution of any food deemed
27 to be misbranded if it meets criteria set forth in 343. Id. 331(a)-(c), (g). This includes
28 [i]f it bears or contains any . . . artificial coloring . . . unless it bears labeling stating that
7
1 fact, id. 343(k), and if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular, id. 343(a)(1).
2 In 1990, Congress amended the FDCA by enacting the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
3 (NLEA), Pub. L. No. 101-535, 6(a), 104 Stat. 2353 (1990), which provides:
4 [N]o State or political subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly
5 establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate
commerce . . . (3) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required
6 by section . . . 343(k) of this title that is not identical to the requirement of
7 such section . . . .
8 21 U.S.C. 343-1(a).
9 B. Legal Standard Governing Express Preemption
10 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state law when Congress
11 enacts a statute that explicitly preempts state law. See Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 941
12 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). There are two cornerstones of preemption jurisprudence:
13 First, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption
14 case. . . . Second, in all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,
15 [courts] start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
16 were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.
17
18 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal quotations, citations and alterations
19 omitted) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n,
20 Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
21 Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). In short, Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law
22 causes of action. Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485.
23 This assumption demands that courts give preemption statutes narrow reading[s].
24 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992). The appropriate inquiry [is]
25 whether the purposes and objectives of the federal statute[] . . . are consistent with concurrent
26 state regulation. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 115 (2000). Moreover, where there are
27 plausible alternative reading[s] of an express preemption provision, courts have a duty to
28
8
1 accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S.
2 431, 449 (2005).
3 The strong judicial presumption against federal preemption applies with particular
4 force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States. Altria
5 Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008). [C]onsumer protection laws such as the UCL,
6 false advertising law, and CLRA, are within the states historic police powers and therefore
7 are subject to the presumption against preemption. Laws regulating the proper marketing of
8 food, including the prevention of deceptive sales practices, are likewise within states historic
9 police powers. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 42 Cal. 4th 1077, 1088 (2008) (internal
10 quotations, citation, and alterations omitted); see also Law v. Gen. Motors Corp., 114 F.3d
11 908, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1997) (Given the importance of federalism . . . we entertain a strong
12 presumption that federal statutes do not preempt state laws; particularly those laws directed
13 at subjectslike health and safetytraditionally governed by the states. (citations
14 omitted)).
15 Given this strong presumption against preemption, Congress was careful to ensure that
16 the NLEA has limited preemptive effect, which by design is sensitive to the regulatory roles
17 played by the States and refined to provide national uniformity where it is most necessary,
18 but otherwise preserving State regulatory authority where it is appropriate. 136 Cong. Rec.
19 S-16609 (1990). Thus the NLEA contains a savings clause providing that it shall not be
20 construed to preempt any provision of State law, unless such provision is expressly
21 preempted, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 6(c)(1), 104 Stat. 2353, 2364 (1990), 21 U.S.C. 343-1
22 note (1). This means plaintiffs can avoid preemption if they show either that the labeling
23 material they challenge does not constitute a [regulated claim] or, if it does, that the product
24 effectively is misbranded, In re Quaker Oats Labeling Litig., C 10-0502 RS, 2012 WL
25 1034532, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2012)); see also Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F.
26 Supp. 2d 1111, 1118-19 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Pom Wonderful LLC v. Ocean Spray Cranberries,
27 Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
28
9
1 As a result, [t]he presumption against preemption in this case is a strong one, see
2 Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, 12-CV-02724-LHK, 2013 WL 5487236, at *7 (N.D.
3 Cal. Oct. 2, 2013), and Goya bear[s] the considerable burden of overcoming the starting
4 presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law, see Stengel v. Medtronic
5 Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotations omitted); see also
6 Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1087 n.2 (2011); In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases,
7 42 Cal. 4th at 1088 (the party who asserts that a state law is preempted bears the burden of
8 so demonstrating (citations omitted)).
9 C. Goyas Preemption Argument is a Straw Man
10 Plaintiffs do not ask that Goya be compelled to list 4-MEI on product labels, or list
11 the amount of 4-MeI in Malta Goya, Mot. at 14, but instead only allege that [i]n advertising
12 and selling the Malta Goya beverages, Goya deceptively omits that these soft drinks contain
13 dangerous levels of 4-MeI that expose consumers to cancer. (FACC 24.) Plaintiffs Prayer
14 for Relief only requests [a]n Order enjoining Goya from selling the Goya beverages so long
15 as they contain a potentially dangerous amount of 4-MeI, if Goya omits the disclosure of that
16 content and its potential health harms (id. 99(b)). While beverage labeling is regulated
17 under the FDCA, neither a manufacturers general advertising, nor its disclosure of material
18 information generally (as through press releases, for example) is even subject to the FDCA,
19 and thus cannot be expressly preempted by the NLEA.
20 D. The FDCA Does Not Regulate 4-MeI Content or Labeling
21 Regardless of the nature of plaintiffs requested relief, there is no express preemption
22 because there is no regulation governing either the use or disclosure of 4-MeI. Goya relies on
23 inapposite regulations concerning artificial coloring, including caramel coloring. See Mot. at
24 4-5, 13-14. But 4-MeI is not directly added to food, and instead forms as a trace impurity
25 during the manufacturing of certain types of caramel coloring (known as Class III and Class
26 IV caramel coloring) that are used to color coca cola-type beverages and other foods. Dkt.
27 No. 32-4, Goya RJN Ex. 4 (FDA 4-MeI Q&A). While 4-MeI may form as a result of
28 manufacturing a substance that is regulated by the FDCA, i.e., caramel coloring, 4-MeI itself
10
1 is not regulated. Nor is 4-MeI even a necessary consequence of using caramel coloring: as
2 FDA explains, the term caramel coloring on a food label does not necessarily mean that
3 the food contains 4-MEI, because the term caramel coloring also may be used to describe
4 Class I and Class II caramel coloring, which do not contain 4-MEI. (Id.) Further, the same
5 document confirms that FDA does not currently regulate 4-MeI, since it is apparently
6 considering what, if any, regulatory action needs to be taken. (Id.)3 With no 4-MeI
7 requirements imposed by the FDCA, there simply cannot be any inconsistent requirement
8 imposed by state law, and thus no express NLEA preemption.
9 The regulations Goya cites do not support its argument. While 21 C.F.R. 182.1235
10 provides that caramel is generally recognized as safe, and thus may be used by food
11 manufacturers as a food additive, it does not regulate labeling at all, much less relating to 4-
12 MeI. See Mot. at 5, 17. Similarly, 21 C.F.R. 73.85 is merely a standard of identity for
13 caramel coloring, and does not permit or prohibit any aspect of a foods labeling. See id. at
14 4-5, 13-14, 17-18. Rather, the only labeling aspect that regulation addresses is the labeling
15 of the color additive itself, for example, when packaged for sale to manufacturers for use in
16 the manufacturing of foods and beverages. See id. 73.85(d) (The label of the color additive
17 and any mixtures prepared therefrom and intended solely or in part for coloring purposes shall
18 conform to the requirements of 70.25 of this chapter.).
19
20
21
22 3
If plaintiffs claim that Goya deceptively omits the amount and danger of Malta Goyas 4-
23 MeI content is expressly preempted by the NLEA, this means Proposition 65 itself is
expressly preempted insofar as it requires a carcinogen warning when more than 29
24 micrograms of 4-MeI are present in a food. The case law, however, suggests this is wrong.
25 See Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Assn, Inc. v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Proposition 65 warning requirements did not constitute cautionary labeling preempted by
26 the Federal Hazardous Substances Act); Comm. of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distributors v.
27 Stratton, 92 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 1996) (Proposition 65 warning requirement was not
specific enough to trigger preemption and would not impede on federal regulation to enforce
28 specific federal requirements).
11
1 E. In Any Event, the Goya Beverages are Misbranded Under 21 U.S.C.

2 343(a)
3 To the extent the FACC might be construed as challenging the Goya beverages labels
4 rather than Goyas advertising and failure to disclose material facts more generallywhich
5 is not a necessary or even fair construction of the FACCeven if the labels otherwise
6 complied with an FDCA regulation, the product is still misbranded because its label is false
7 or misleading in any particular. 21 U.S.C. 343(a)(1).
8 That same premisethat Goyas advertising and selling the Goya beverages is
9 misleading because Goya deceptively omits material informationforms the basis of
10 plaintiffs false advertising claims. [U]nder FDA regulations, if the State requirement is
11 identical to Federal law, there is no issue of preemption. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases,
12 42 Cal. 4th at 1086 (citing 60 Fed. Reg. 57120 (Nov. 13, 1995)). That is the case here: while
13 federal law does prohibit state food labeling requirements that are not identical to federal
14 requirements, the FDCA and California law contain identical prohibitions on false or
15 misleading advertising. Larsen v. Trader Joes Co., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023 (N.D. Cal.
16 2013) (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code 110100(a), 110660 (West); 21 U.S.C.
17 343(a)(1)).
18 Congress carefully chose to exclude 21 U.S.C. 343(a) from the NLEA, see generally
19 21 U.S.C. 343-1, intentionally leaving a place for state law to concurrently regulate behavior
20 that violates both state false advertising laws, and the FDCA, because the labeling is false
21 and misleading in any particular. Such [s]tate-law prohibitions on false statements of
22 material fact do not create diverse, nonuniform, and confusing standards, Cipollone, 505
23 U.S. at 529, and thus do not undermine the purposes of the NLEA. Rather, [b]ecause
24 Congress has also allowed states . . . to pass statutes identical to 343(a), a private party
25 equipped with a private right of action under state law is able to sue to enforce a state statute
26 identical to 343(a), just as the FDA would be able to sue to enforce 343(a) itself. Zupnik
27 v. Tropicana Products, Inc., CV 09-6130 DSF RZX, 2010 WL 6090604, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
28 Feb. 1, 2010).
12
1 In short, plaintiffs claims, if proved, would simply require Defendant to truthfully

2 state material information, or not sell its products; such relief would not impose a state
3 requirement that is different from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with
4 that of the FDCA. See Fagan v. Neutrogena Corp., 5:13-CV-01316-SVW-OP, 2014 WL
5 92255, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (quotation omitted)); compare FACC 99(b) (praying
6 for [a]n Order enjoining Goya from selling the Goya beverages so long as they contain a
7 potentially dangerous amount of 4-MeI, if Goya omits the disclosure of that content and its
8 potential health harms).
9 Since plaintiffs allege Goyas marketing is false or misleading, rejecting plaintiffs
10 claims as preempted would contravene the NLEAs promise that if the State requirement
11 does the same thing that the Federal law does . . . then it is effectively the same requirement
12 as the Federal requirement . . . . [T]he only State requirements that are subject to preemption
13 are those that are affirmatively different from the Federal requirements on matters that are
14 covered by [21 U.S.C. 343-1]. 60 Fed. Reg. at 57120; see also Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global,
15 Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (where plaintiffs are only seeking to
16 impose state law requirements that are identical to federal regulations, there is no express
17 preemption under the FDCA). As one court has explained:
18 Defendant implies that if a food product has otherwise complied with the
provisions of 343 and its implementing regulations, no ad hoc claim for a
19
false and misleading label can be brought. Defendant argues that the claim
20 would, in effect, impose requirements that are not imposed or different
from those explicitly laid out in the federal statutes and regulations and,
21
therefore, would be preempted. * * * This logical argument is undercut by the
22 lack of any indication that the FDA could not sue under 21 U.S.C. 343(a)
for a false and misleading label where the label does not violate another,
23
more specific food labeling statute or regulation. In fact, the authority that
24 exists strongly suggests the opposite. Congress presumably chose to include
343(a) in the statutory scheme in order to allow the FDA to target specific
25
false or misleading labels without having promulgated regulations that
26 address the specific false or misleading aspect of the particular label.
27 Zupnik, 2010 WL 6090604, at *2 (citing United States v. 45/194 Kg. Drums of Pure Vegetable
28 Oil, 961 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1992) (The statute condemns every statement, design, and
13
1 device which may mislead or deceive. (citation omitted))); see also Zeisel v. Diamond
2 Foods, Inc., C 10-01192 JSW, 2010 WL 9509506, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010) (claims
3 premised upon allegations that a label is false or misleading in any particular do not fall
4 within the scope of Section 343-1(a), so that [b]ased on the plain language of Section 343-
5 1(a), . . . . to the extent [plaintiffs claims] allege [defendants] labels are false or misleading,
6 they are not expressly preempted by the NLEA); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co.,
7 268 F.R.D. 365, 372 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (despite compliance with implementing regulations for
8 origination statements subject to NLEA express preemption, 4 plaintiffs claims were
9 governed by section 343(a) which do[es] not fall within express preemption provision of
10 section 343-1, and were thus not preempted).
11 IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT REFER THIS ACTION TO FDA UNDER THE
12 PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
13 Goya provides no salient reason the Court should delay this matter by referring it to
14 FDA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine for determination of some threshold issue.
15 A. Standards for Primary Jurisdiction
16 Pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, [w]hen there is a basis for judicial
17 action, independent of agency proceedings, courts may route the threshold decision as to
18 certain issues to the agency charged with primary responsibility for governmental supervision
19 or control of the particular industry or activity involved. United States v. Gen. Dynamics
20 Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn
21 v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 68 (1970)). However, a court and agency
22 may share jurisdiction, and its application is committed to the sound discretion of the court,
23 Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 2002).
24 In federal and California state courts, no rigid formula exists for applying primary
25 jurisdiction. Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000)
26 (citing Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 391 (1992)). However, it is to
27
28 4
See 21 U.S.C. 343(e)(1), 343-1(a)(2); see also 21 C.F.R. 101.5.
14
1 be invoked sparingly, as it often results in added expense and delay. Alpharma, Inc. v.
2 Pennfield Oil Co., 411 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The doctrine only
3 applies in a limited set of circumstances, and is not designed to secure expert advice from
4 agencies every time a court is presented with an issue conceivably within the agencys ambit,
5 but instead is to be used only if a claim requires resolution of an issue of first impression, or
6 of a particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed to a regulatory agency.
7 Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see
8 also Davel Commcns, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 460 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006) (primary
9 jurisdiction does not require that all claims within an agencys purview be decided by the
10 agency (citation omitted)); Brown v. MCI Worldcom Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166,
11 1172 (9th Cir. 2002); Gen. Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d at 1363 (While it is certainly true that
12 the competence of an agency to pass on an issue is a necessary condition to the application
13 of the doctrine, competence alone is not sufficient.). Thus, primary jurisdiction should only
14 be used where there is (1) a need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress
15 within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to
16 a statute that subjects an activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4) requires
17 expertise or uniformity in administration. Davel Commcns, 460 F.3d at 1086-87.
18 At the motion to dismiss stage, when deciding whether to defer jurisdiction, courts
19 must apply a standard derived from Rule 12(b)(6) jurisprudence: whether the complaint
20 plausibly asserts a claim that would not implicate the doctrine. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra
21 USA, Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to invoke primary jurisdiction
22 where action could plausibly be adjudicated without agencys expertise (citations
23 omitted)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 131 S. Ct. 1342 (2011). Where the allegations
24 of the complaint do not necessarily require the doctrines applicability, then the primary
25 jurisdiction doctrine may not be applied on a motion to dismiss . . . . Davel Commcns, 460
26 F.3d at 1088.
27 The Court should not invoke primary jurisdiction here because no FDA expertise is
28 required to adjudicate these claims.
15
1 B. This Action May Plausibly be Adjudicated Without FDAs Expertise

2 Goya argues FDAs expertise is needed to determine whether the presence of 4-MEI
3 should be explicitly disclosed, Mot. at 15, or what standards govern 4-MEI in caramel
4 coloring used in foods, id. at 16. Goya also asserts that FDA should determine [i]f products
5 containing . . . 4-MEI[] truly pose a health risk, id. at 18. Plaintiffs, however, allege that the
6 4-MeI in the Goya beverages is dangerous, and these allegations must be accepted as true at
7 the motion to dismiss stage. Where the threshold decision defendant would have a court
8 refer to an agency must necessarily be resolved in plaintiffs favor at the motion to dismiss
9 stage, primary jurisdiction doctrine is inapplicable. Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Washington
10 Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 949 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, in this case, there does not
11 appear to be a large body of scientific evidence requiring expertise that is beyond the abilities
12 of the judiciary. See Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
13 (rejecting primary jurisdiction abstention).
14 Additionally, courts have generally declined to dismiss the complaint on primary
15 jurisdiction absent concrete evidence that the FDA is currently involved in creating a new
16 regulation concerning the subject of the lawsuit. Trazo v. Nestle USA, Inc., 5:12-CV-2272
17 PSG, 2013 WL 4083218, at *6 n.55 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (citation omitted). Goyas
18 assertion that standards govern[ing] 4-MeI in caramel coloring used in foods [ ] fall within
19 an area over which Congress has given the FDA broad regulatory and enforcement authority,
20 and that the FDA has developed expertise in the area of food and beverage labeling over
21 time, Mot. at 17, is insufficient justification for primary jurisdiction referral. See, e.g.,
22 Morgan v. Wallaby Yogurt Co., 13-CV-00296-WHO, 2013 WL 5514563, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
23 Oct. 4, 2013) (While food regulation is undoubtedly in the purview of, and an area of special
24 competence for, the FDA, [defendant] has given no reason why determining whether a label
25 is misleading is outside the ability of the Court.).
26
27
28
16
1 Without any indication (beyond a general, vague reference, in an unofficial, non-

2 binding Questions & Answers document 5) that FDA intends to, in fact, regulate 4-MeI, it
3 is not even clear what referral to FDA would accomplish, other than delaying adjudicating
4 Goyas liability. Compare Rahman v. Motts LLP, CV 13-3482 SI, 2014 WL 1379655, at *3
5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014) (The Court declines to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
6 based on speculation about what the FDA may do in the future.); Swearingen v. Amazon
7 Pres. Partners, Inc., 13-CV-04402-WHO, 2014 WL 1100944, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18,
8 2014) (It remains unclear when or if the FDA will conclusively resolve this issue. . . .
9 Lacking definitive guidance, this case will proceed apace.).
10 That referral to FDA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine would likely be fruitless
11 here is highlighted by FDAs recently declining primary jurisdiction over three cases
12 involving challenges to natural claims on foods. 6 As set forth in a January 6, 2014 letter
13 from FDA to the courts before which those cases are pending, FDA declined to allocate its
14 limited resources to natural issueswhich are far more pervasive than 4-MeI issues.
15 Furthermore, FDA stated that, even if we were to embark on a public process to define
16 natural in the context of food labeling, there is no assurance that we would revoke, amend,
17 or add to the current policy, or develop any definition at all. 7 Here, there is even less
18 assurance that, after referral, FDA would do anything. See Victor v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., 13-
19
20 5
While Goya requests judicial notice of an FDA document titled Questions & Answers on
21 Caramel Coloring and 4-MEI, Dkt. No. 32-4, Goya RJN Ex. 4, this does not indicate any
22 definite intention of FDA to regulate 4-MeI, as would, for example, a formal notice of
proposed rulemaking in the federal register. Likewise, FDAs considering a citizens petition
23 requesting changes to the regulations for caramel color, Dkt. No. 32-12, Goya RJN 12, does
24 not indicate that the FDA is currently involved in creating a new regulation, Trazo, 2013
WL 4083218, at *6.
25
6
Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-6502 (N.D. Cal.); Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. 12-5185
26 (N.D. Cal.); and In re Gen. Mills, Inc. Kix Cereal Litig., No. 12-249 (D.N.J.).
27 7
Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court take Judicial Notice of FDAs January 6 letter, a
28 copy of which appears as Docket No. 70 in Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-6502 (N.D. Cal.).
17
1 CV-02976-WHO, 2014 WL 1028881, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014) (taking FDA letter
2 into account in declining to invoke primary jurisdiction).
3 Goya also argues that the Court should refer the action to FDA because proceeding
4 here would undermine the goal of uniformity, Mot. at 14. This action, however, does not
5 seek to establish any particular standard. It only asks whether Goyas specific behavior,
6 failing to disclose that Malta Goya beverages contain approximately 350 micrograms of 4-
7 MeI per serving, and its potential health harms, is deceptive. Goyas argument is also
8 disingenuous since food and beverage manufacturers who use caramel coloring in foods sold
9 in California must already conform to the requirements of Proposition 65, which imposes a
10 far more restrictive standard than would be applied here if plaintiff was successful in claiming
11 that the omission of the presence of more than 350 micrograms of 4-MeI per serving in a soft
12 drink, as well as its potential health harms, is deceptive.
13 Finally, FDA cannot provide the monetary relief plaintiff seeks, which counsels against
14 referral. See Ryan v. Chemlawn Corp., 935 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Bisphenol-A
15 Polycarbonate (BPA) Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1967, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16 104451, at *31-32 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2009) (With respect to the type of relief requested,
17 Plaintiffs seek only monetary remedies, which FDA cannot provide. This factor further
18 supports denial of Defendants claim that FDA has primary jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
19 claims.); Trazo, 2013 WL 4083218, at *6 n.55 (The FDA does not enforce the California
20 state rights Plaintiffs seek to vindicate.).
21 Unsurprisingly, courts routinely decline primary jurisdiction transfer to FDA in
22 consumer fraud actions concerning foods and beverages like this one. See Leonhart v.
23 Natures Path Foods, Inc., 5:13-CV-0492-EJD, 2014 WL 1338161, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
24 2014) (Defendant has not demonstrated that this Court could not determine whether such
25 claims are misleading without FDA expertise.); Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 912 F. Supp.
26 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (allegations regarding deceptive labeling do not require FDA
27 expertise to be resolved); Delacruz v. Cytosport, Inc., C 11-3532 CW, 2012 WL 2563857, at
28 *10 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (FDAs expertise . . . is not needed to determine whether the
18
1 labels are misleading.); Chacanaca, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 ([P]laintiffs advance a

2 relatively straightforward claim: they assert that defendant has . . . marketed a product that
3 could mislead a reasonable consumer. As courts faced with state-law challenges in the food
4 labeling arena have reasoned, this is a question courts are well-equipped to handle.
5 (quoting Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2009))).
6 V. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGES GOYAS DECEPTIVE
7 OMISSION OF MATERIAL FACTS ABOUT THE AMOUNT AND
8 POTENTIAL HARMS OF 4-MEI IN ITS BEVERAGES
9 Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
10 is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
11 grounds upon which it rests, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (quoting
12 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Goya contends the FACC fails Rule 8s
13 plausibility standard because plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege that Goya had any duty to
14 disclose the presence of 4-MeI. Mot. at 19. To the contrary, as discussed above, Goya does
15 have a duty to disclose material facts, especially those that present a danger to consumers
16 health and well-being.
17 Goyas reliance on FDAs statement thatat the time it was madeFDA ha[d] no
18 reason to believe that there is any immediate or short-term danger presented by 4-MEI at the
19 levels expected in food from the use of caramel coloring, is misplaced. See Mot. at 20. First,
20 the statement is qualified in time and language: no reason to believe is not the same as no
21 danger. Second, the statement addresses foods, not beverages. Third, the statement vaguely
22 refers to levels expected in food, but gives no indication of what those levels are; the
23 likelihood is that FDAs expected amounts are significantly less than the very high 4-MeI
24 levels in the Goya beverages. Fourth, the statement only speaks to the short-term danger of
25 4-MeI consumption, but not its cumulative effect. Fifth:
26 [E]ven if it were the case that the FDA had clearly and specifically found that
[4-MeI is] safe in small quantities (notwithstanding possible consequences of
27
cumulative exposure), that would not justify dismissing the complaint under
28 Twombly and Iqbal as implausible. . . . [T]here is no basis on a motion to
19
1 dismiss to conclude the FDA is so infallible that it is wholly implausible for

plaintiff[] to contend [4-MeI] present[s] a health risk.
2
3 See In re Quaker Oats Labeling Litig., 2012 WL 1034532, at *2 (addressing similar argument
4 with respect to artificial trans fat in foods).
5 VI. PLAINTIFFS BREACH OF WARRANTY AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
6 CLAIMS ARE ADEQUATELY PLED
7 A. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Pled Breach of Express Warranty
8 In California, an express warranty is created by, among other things: (a) [a]ny
9 affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
10 becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
11 conform to the affirmation or promise; and (b) any description of the goods which is made
12 part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
13 the description. Cal. Com. Code 2313 (West).
14 In order to state a claim for breach of express warranty, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the
15 terms of the warranty; (2) her reasonable reliance thereon; and (3) a breach of the warranty
16 which proximately caused the her injury. In re Ferrero Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1117
17 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 185 Cal. App. 3d 135, 142
18 (1986)). A complaint satisfies these requirements where it alleges [defendant] utilized the
19 advertising media to urge the use and application of [the subject product] and expressly
20 warranted to the general public . . . , that said product was effective, proper and safe for its
21 intended use. Id. at 1117-18 (quoting Williams, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 142).
22 Courts have consistently found causes of action for breach of express warranty in food
23 marketing and mislabeling cases. Id. at 1118 (statements describing Nutella as healthy and
24 beneficial to children when in fact it contains dangerous levels of fat and sugar were
25 sufficiently specific and unequivocal to state claim for breach of express warranty); Morey
26 v. NextFoods, Inc., 10CV761 JM (NLS), 2010 WL 2473314, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 2010)
27 (statements that drink would Support Healthy Digestion [and] Natural Immunity were
28 sufficiently specific to state a claim for breach of express warranty); Vicuna v. Alexia Foods,
20
1 Inc., C 11-6119 PJH, 2012 WL 1497507, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) (plaintiffs have
2 adequately stated a claim that the designation All Natural constituted a description of the
3 potato products, or a statement of fact about the potato products, and that the warranty was
4 breached by the inclusion of an ingredient that was arguably synthetic.).
5 Here, Goyas description and advertisement of Malta Goya as nutritious is
6 sufficiently definite and objective to constitute an express warranty that the product does not
7 contain harmful or unhealthy ingredients, and was used by Goya to urge the use and
8 application of [the Goya beverages], see Ferrero, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. (See FACC 2,
9 8, 13, 70-76.) Thus, plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a claim for breach of express warranty.
10 B. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim for Unjust Enrichment
11 Goya argues unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action in California. Mot. at
12 22. To the contrary, both California federal and state courts have recognized unjust
13 enrichment claims in false advertising cases. See In re Hydroxycut Mktg. & Sales Practices
14 Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 993 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (while California courts may diverge on the
15 proper way to conceptualize unjust enrichment, it is nevertheless a claim and a basis for
16 recovery); Astiana v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., C 10-4387 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796,
17 at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) [Ben & Jerrys] (plaintiffs stated unjust enrichment
18 claim as part of a claim of restitution based on quasi-contract related to all natural
19 advertising); Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 14 Cal. 4th 39, 50 (1996) (plaintiff was entitled to seek
20 relief under traditional equitable principles of unjust enrichment); Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank,
21 77 Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (2000) (plaintiff satisfied the elements for a claim of unjust
22 enrichment). The Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit have likewise held a plaintiff may bring
23 a claim for unjust enrichment in the alternative as a quasi-contract action under California
24 law. See Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996);
25 Shum v. Intel Corp., 499 F.3d 1272, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
26 Moreover, while plaintiffs may not ultimately be entitled to recover under both theories
27 at trial, they are permitted to plead alternative and inconsistent theories at the pleadings stage.
28 See Vicuna, 2012 WL 1497507, at *3 (while a claim for restitution is inconsistent and
21
1 incompatible with a related claim for breach of contract or a claim in tort, at the pleading
2 stage, a plaintiff is allowed to assert inconsistent theories of recovery.); Martorella v.
3 Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 931 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Plaintiff may .
4 . . maintain an equitable unjust enrichment claim in the alternative to her legal claims against
5 Defendants. . . . Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 8(d)(2) specifically authorize a
6 plaintiff to plead causes of action in the alternative. (citing Adelphia Cable Partners, Inc. v.
7 E & A Beepers Corp., 188 F.R.D. 662, 666 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ([a]lthough equitable relief
8 ultimately may not be awarded where there exists an adequate remedy at law, Plaintiff
9 certainly may plead alternative equitable relief))); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Access
10 Telecom, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (Although Plaintiff has alleged
11 a breach of contract claim which I have concluded can proceed, it would be premature to
12 dismiss Plaintiffs count for unjust enrichment in this case. (citation omitted)).
13 Plaintiffs have properly pled unjust enrichment as an alternative basis of recovery on
14 restitution and quasi-contract grounds. (See FACC at 75-79.) Plaintiffs paid for a
15 nutritious product and they got something different from Goya, whereas Goya was unjustly
16 enriched by plaintiffs and other putative class members. Restitution for unjust enrichment in
17 such a case is an available remedy. As discussed above, and as pled in the FACC, marketing
18 statements are material to consumers, who are entitled to, and do rely on them. Further, as
19 discussed above, plaintiffs theories of liability based in both fraud and unjust enrichment are
20 viable. Indeed, restitution and unjust enrichment claims have been permitted to go forward in
21 analogous food marketing and mislabeling cases. See, e.g., Ben & Jerrys, 2011 WL 2111796,
22 at *11 (denying motion to dismiss allegations of unjust enrichment in All Natural food
23 labeling case); Vicuna, 2012 WL 1497507 (same); Delacruz v. Cytosport, Inc., C 11-3532
24 CW, 2012 WL 1215243, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2012) (similar). Thus, Plaintiffs unjust
25 enrichment claim should proceed.
26
27
28
22
1 VII. PLAINTIFFS MAY REPRESENT CLASS MEMBERS WHO PURCHASED

2 SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR GOYA BEVERAGES
3 The Court should deny Goyas request to strike plaintiffs allegations concerning Goya
4 Sangria and Goya Ginger Beer, Mot. at 23-24, because, as alleged in the FACC, those
5 products are substantially similar such that plaintiffs, under Rule 23, may represent
6 purchasers of those products.
7 In putative class actions, plaintiffs can demonstrate standing at the pleading stage if
8 they plead sufficiently detailed facts that the non-purchased products are substantially
9 similar to the purchased products for which they have standing. Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am.,
10 Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140-41 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see also Astiana v. Dreyer's Grand Ice
11 Cream, Inc., C-11-2910 EMC, 2012 WL 2990766, at *11, *13 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012)
12 (courts may consider whether the challenged products are of the same kind, whether they are
13 comprised of largely the same ingredients, and whether each of the challenged products bears
14 the same alleged mislabeling); Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869
15 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ([t]he majority of the courts that have carefully analyzed the question hold
16 that a plaintiff may have standing to assert claims for unnamed class members based on
17 products he or she did not purchase so long as the products and alleged misrepresentations
18 are substantially similar); Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1006 (N.D.
19 Cal. 2012) (finding sufficient similarity between the products purchased . . . because the
20 same alleged misrepresentation was on all of the [products] regardless of flavor).
21 Here, plaintiffs purchased Malta Goya, but not Goya Sangria or Goya Ginger Beer.
22 However, due to the substantial similarity in their ingredients, i.e., their caramel coloring
23 containing 4-MeI, and in Goyas conduct, its deceptive omission of information about the
24 content and health harms of the 4-MeI in the beverages, 8 plaintiffs should be permitted to
25
26 8
Goya complains that plaintiffs allegations concerning these beverages are not as specific
27 as they are with respect to Malta Goya. See Mot. at 20, 23. Although a plaintiff must plead[]
factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is
28 liable, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), the rule may be relaxed as to matters
23
1 represent purchasers of those products. At a minimum, the Court should reserve this issue for
2 class certification, after more facts have been developed through discovery. See, e.g., Dorsey
3 v. Rockhard Labs., LLC, CV 13-07557 DDP RZX, 2014 WL 4678969, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal.
4 Sept. 19, 2014) (citing Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 530-31 (C.D.
5 Cal. 2011)).
6 CONCLUSION
7 For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Goyas
8 motion in its entirety, however, if the Court grants the motion in any part, plaintiffs
9 respectfully request it be without prejudice, and with leave to amend.
10
11 Dated: September 29, 2014 Respectfully Submitted,
12 By: /s/ Jack Fitzgerald
13
THE LAW OFFICE OF JACK
14 FITZGERALD, PC
JACK FITZGERALD
15
jack@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com
16 The Palm Canyon Building
2870 Fourth Avenue, Suite 205
17
San Diego, CA 92103
18 Phone: (619) 692-3840
Fax: (619) 362-9555
19
20 [Additional Counsel Identified Below]
21
22 within the opposing partys knowledge, Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531,
23 540 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39, 42 (S.D. Cal. 1982) (Where
. . . plaintiffs cannot be expected to have personal knowledge of the facts constituting
24 wrongdoing . . . a complaint based on information and belief is sufficient if it includes a
25 statement of the facts upon which the belief is based.). Similarly, while typically
[a]verments of fraud must be accompanied by the who what when where, and how of the
26 misconduct charged, claims based on omissions can succeed without the same level of
27 specificity required by a normal fraud claim. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir.
1997); see also Baggett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal.
28 2007).
24
1 SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, APC

SCOTT EDWARD COLE
2
scole@scalaw.com
3 MATTHEW R. BAINER
mbainer@scalaw.com
4
COURTLAND W. CREEKMORE
5 ccreekmore@scalaw.com
1970 Broadway, Ninth Floor
6
Oakland, California 94612
7 Telephone: (510) 891-9800
Facsimile: (510) 891-7030
8
9 GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG LLP
LIONEL Z. GLANCY
10 MICHAEL GOLDBERG
11 MARC L. GODINO
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
12 Los Angeles, CA 90067
13 Phone: (310) 201-9150
Fax: (310) 201-9160
14 E-mail: info@glancylaw.com
15
KIRTLAND AND PACKARD LLP
16 MICHAEL LOUIS KELLEY
mlk@kirtlandpackard.com
17
BEHRAM V. PAREKH
18 bvp@kirtlandpackard.com
HEATHER M. BAKER
19
hmb@kirtlandpackard.com
20 2041 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 300
El Segundo, California 90245
21
Phone: (310) 536-1000
22 Fax: (310) 536-1001
23 Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class
24
25
26
27
28
25

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Case 3:14-cv-00169-L-NLS Document 34 Filed 09/29/14 Page 1 of 37

1 THE LAW OFFICE OF JACK FITZGERALD, PC

21 D. The FDCA Does Not Regulate 4-MeI Content or Labeling ................... 10

1 B. This Action May Plausibly be Adjudicated Without FDAs

1 Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC,

1 Delacruz v. Cytosport, Inc.,

1 Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,

1 Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.,

1 United States v. 45/194 Kg. Drums of Pure Vegetable Oil,

1 Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,

1 E. In Any Event, the Goya Beverages are Misbranded Under 21 U.S.C.

1 In short, plaintiffs claims, if proved, would simply require Defendant to truthfully

1 B. This Action May Plausibly be Adjudicated Without FDAs Expertise

1 Without any indication (beyond a general, vague reference, in an unofficial, non-

1 labels are misleading.); Chacanaca, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 ([P]laintiffs advance a

1 dismiss to conclude the FDA is so infallible that it is wholly implausible for

1 VII. PLAINTIFFS MAY REPRESENT CLASS MEMBERS WHO PURCHASED

1 SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, APC

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