AC No.

99-634 June 10, 2002 offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in
the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
Annexes D and E;
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a conduct;"
business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
xxx xxx x x x.1
consideration.
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
The Case
Discipline,2 respondent filed his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been introduced as
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former
accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following: never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this
letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former --
"x x x xxx xxx
be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer,
"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, complainant asked the process server of the former's law office to deliver the letter to the
sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices addressee.
at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent
me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do
demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; the following:
inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of
which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five 2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999,
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife
deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt
attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately; All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the
already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress; files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter
instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty.
never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal
Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office
fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost
to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and
asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court
told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the
personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to
lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to
the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at
pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told
the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while
that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give
he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the
the filing fee later.
hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the
filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First
Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify
Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill
the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by
Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999,
agreement.
attached as Annex C;
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C.
complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response,
Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with
complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's
the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of
the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had
the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their
spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 1 of 36

law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were
not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if
anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of
the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time
frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his reposed in them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant
additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the
respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress
upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent
4 quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year."
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of
the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given
for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint;
hence, the former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the
amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees and
not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
the defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not
only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the
bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession. 5 Members of the
bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him
and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds
that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his
partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
handle the case for which his service had been sought.
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view
to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. 7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. 8 Hence,
despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that
respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the
lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually
prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a
maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning
and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of
law legally applied.10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was
a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the
"mistake" -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct
the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter
and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law a Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business.11Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the administration
of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much
money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the
receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers
must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional
capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold
in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics
and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be true that
they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come
into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly
account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct.17 In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest
within the bounds of law.
Page 2 of 36
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to
the public.18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the
filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact
that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment
be imposed as a penalty.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all
courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in
respondent's file.
SO ORDERED.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 3 of 36

A.C. No. 8384 April 11, 2013
EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant, vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) tiled a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez
(respondent) alleging that respondent was engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon,
lsabela, without having been properly commissioned by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City, Isabela. This is the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the Municipality of Cordon.
This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
To support her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her pleadings:
a. Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive Judge Efren
M. Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned notaries public within the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago City for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to
2008.1 Respondent's name does not appear on either list;
b. Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent in
the years 2006, 2007, and 2008; and
c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-affidavit
notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be "authenticated as to respondent's seal
and signature as NO Notarial Commission was issued upon him at the time of the
document's notarization."2
In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have never been
notarizing any document or pleadings"3 and added that he has "never committed any
malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated thelawyers (sic) oath". 4 He dismissed such
allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies, politically motivated and x x x meant to harass
or intimidate him".5
Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were "tampered and
adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his signature." 6 He failed to attend the
mandatory conference and likewise failed to file his Position Paper.
In his Report and Recommendation dated 29 September 2008, Investigating Commissioner
Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months and disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
In a Resolution dated 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner but increased the penalty of suspension from six (6) months
to one (1) year. Respondent did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or any other subsequent
pleading.
On 12 August 2009, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to the Supreme
Court for its action following Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 8
The Court modifies the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution.
Complainant presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had notarized
various documents in Cordon, Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and that respondent's name does
not appear on the list of notaries public commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for
the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.
Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.1wphi1 Per Section
1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,9 the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges
the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez, 10where a party resorts
to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the
determination that he committed the violation is sustained. Respondent merely posited that
the notarized documents presented by complainant were "tampered and adulterated" or were
results of forgery, but he failed to present any proof. 11 Respondent also resorted to a sweeping
and unsupported statement that he never notarized any document. Accordingly, the
reasonable conclusion is that respondent repeatedly notarized documents without the
requisite notarial commission.
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest
and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the court." 12 Accordingly,
'"lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."13
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.14"Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution." 15
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts,
other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public
instruments. As noted by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of
deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high
Page 4 of 36
standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper
that he be sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial practice without
a notarial commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2)
years and DISQUALIFY him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He
is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction.

SO ORDERED.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 5 of 36

A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Pea, former head of the Records Department of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint 1 against
respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno. Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel
of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244, 2Register of Deeds of
Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She personally knew respondent
Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she
filed against her husband in 1974, and the aforementioned property was her share in their
property settlement. Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus,
as she was respondent's trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella
Kraus was always there whenever she visited respondent in connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she
(complainant) apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to
interested buyers, and that her property be offered as collateral. Respondent assured
complainant that she would work out the speedy processing and release of the loan.
Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent
her the sum of P27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was
released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent who would handle the
preparation of documents for the loan and follow-up the same, and complainant gave
respondent the authority for this purpose. From time to time, complainant inquired about the
application for the loan, but respondent always assured her that she was still preparing the
documents required by the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not bother to
check on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle speedily the
preparation of her application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her
apartment was already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed
on her property, which she later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who
bought her property from Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted respondent
about what she discovered, but respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After
verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on November 11, 1986 to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
was acknowledged.3Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., through its Managing Partner, Estrella D.
Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989. 4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd., and that she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before
respondent to acknowledge the sale. She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her
property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as
the instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign any deed
selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her
law office, and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients.
Respondent denied that she suggested that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank
to construct townhouses. She said that it was the complainant, on the contrary, who
requested her (respondent) to look for somebody who could help her raise the money she
needed to complete the amortization of her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS and
was about to be foreclosed. Respondent stated that she was the one who introduced
complainant to the Spouses Kraus when they were both in her office. In the course of their
conversation, complainant offered the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses
Kraus. The Spouses Kraus were interested, and got the telephone number of complainant.
Thereafter, complainant told respondent that she accompanied the Spouses Kraus to the site
of her property and the Office of the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the Spouses
Kraus called up respondent to tell her that they had reached an agreement with complainant,
and they requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale in favor of their company, Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to respondent's
office where complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven Thousand
Pesos (P67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took hold of
the Deed of Sale, as the understanding was that the complainant would, in the meantime,
work for the release of the mortgage, and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title,
together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses Kraus who would then pay complainant the
balance of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told respondent that she would inform
respondent when the transaction was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded in
the Notarial Book. Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of what
transpired between complainant and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she was
never entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her property in Marikina (TCT No. N-
61244). Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property in favor of
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's inaction for eight
years to verify what happened to her property only meant that she had actually sold the
same, and that she concocted her story when she saw the prospect of her property had she
held on to it. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and
affirming the veracity of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be
Page 6 of 36
scheduled by the Commission on Bar Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for
its initial hearing, and hearings were conducted from March 21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for
the reception of respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their
postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, 8 which was opposed by
complainant. The Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright
dismissal of the complaint, and directed respondent to present her evidence on October 24,
2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in
the name of complainant and the issuance of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.
However, the Register of Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing held on
July 29, 2003, respondent's counsel presented a certification 10 from Records Officer Ma.
Corazon Gaspar of the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a
copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita C. Pea in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
covering a parcel of land in Marikina, could not be located from the general file of the registry
and that the same may be considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On February 17,
2005, respondent was directed by the Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her
evidence and to submit her memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the
IBP on the ground that the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila,
Branch 36, which estafa case was anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had
been dismissed in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The
RTC held that the case for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C.
Paterno, respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, considering the absence of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof
that would show that Anita Pea's signature therein was forged and the transfer of the land
was made through fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and
preponderant evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Pea; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus
and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and
(c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP,
submitted his Report and Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed
upon her by complainant by executing a bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with
complainant's certificate of title, and that respondent also notarized the spurious deed of sale.
Commissioner Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that respondent actively
conspired with any party or actively participated in the forgery of the signature of
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
complainant. Nevertheless, Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence
supports the conclusion that her signature on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986
was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search
in the National Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Commissioner Sordan stated that the interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her
witness, Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the owner's duplicate certificate of
title was delivered to respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to
respondent's denial that complainant handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244
in November 1986 at the GSIS, as Maura Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as
Records Processor at the GSIS, testified that she saw complainant give the said title to
respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave
respondent her owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the
same as collateral in constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of
respondent for seven years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused
to return it.14 Yet, respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner. 15 Later,
complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her property in January 1994,
eight years after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent argued that it was
unfathomable that after eight years, complainant never took any step to verify the status of
her loan application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property.
Complainant explained that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank required the
submission of her title in order to process her loan application. 16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's
land to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No.
61244 with respect to the sale of the property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd. for P200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her
presence inside her office.19 However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if,
indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct examination,20 but on cross-examination,
she stated that she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of
Sale.21Estrella Kraus' affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing
by complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of
the said Deed. However, Commissioner Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he
affirmed that his participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere recording, but he
later affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. 23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's
testimony that she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's
deception. Respondent's notarization of the disputed deed of sale showed her active role to
perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed
to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party,
Anita Pea, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person
Page 7 of 36
did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having
failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable
for violation of her oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), 24 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 125 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law
and her name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that
the notarial commission of respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be
perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464,
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial commission if still existing is Revoked with
Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment as a Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the
sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be
disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. 26 Section 5,27 in
relation to Sections 128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases,
only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases,
or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the
continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of
evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. An
administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein,
based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the
respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed. 32
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. 33 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony
that she gave respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as
respondent would apply for a bank loan in complainant's behalf, using the subject property as
collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in
complainant's office at the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw
complainant give her title to respondent.35Respondent admitted in her Answer 36 that she
executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was
notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 150322 37 in complainant's title, TCT No. N-
61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of the
complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her
allegation that her signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant
by facilitating the sale of the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without
complainant's approval. However, complainant proved that respondent did not submit to the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month
of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall
keep a notarial register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature
of each instrument executed, among others, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall
keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in said records a
brief description of the substance thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the
copy of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten
days of the month next following or the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register,
when filled, to the proper clerk of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification, 41 dated February 22,
1994, stating that respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for
the year 1986, and that respondent has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her
Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and
notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could
not also be found in the National Archives per the certification 42 of the Archives Division Chief
Teresita R. Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as
notary public to submit her notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of
the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause for revocation of
her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries
Page 8 of 36
public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.44 lessening confidence in the legal system.

Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
suspended for any deceit or dishonest act, thus: and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law,
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still
existing, is perpetually REVOKED.

Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
the certificate of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent respondent's personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
who admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
signed, the important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's signature on the Deed
of Sale and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the
Sale could not be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be
Roll of Attorneys.
located in the general files of the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed
of Sale may be considered lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Manila her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,46 including the said SO ORDERED.
Deed of Sale, which was executed on November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner
Sordan opined that it appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said
Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from getting hold of the document for the purpose of
handwriting verification from an expert to prove that her alleged signature on the Deed of
Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her
Notarial Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale,
which was notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching implications and grave
consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and
showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During
her testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the
transcript of records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny that she
notarized the said Deed of Sale.

For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As
a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 9 of 36

A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014 Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification
BALIGA, Respondents. of this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his]
rights."12

RESOLUTION
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does
not render advisory opinions.13
LEONEN, J.:

On May 8, 2009, this court received a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders
May 4, 2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his
a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all
functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order
functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This
of suspension.
includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice
law.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's
resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from
ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating]
the practice of law.1
the conditions of his commission as a notary public." 15According to complainant Lingan, he
was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration. 16
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy
P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 3 and
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human
of the Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their
Rights Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human
stead, in violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended
Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since
respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and
this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-
disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years.
lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the
effectivity of the order of suspension]." 17 The Commission on Human Rights, according to
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be complainant Lingan, should have ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions
disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution 8 dated September as Regional Director. Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and
6, 2006, this court denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. action on the matter."18

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human
Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave
of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant
Lingan wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to
investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on
Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from
his position as Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for
Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension
from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for
want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended." 11
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report
and recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation 20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found
that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It
recommended that respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of
suspension with certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive
Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel and state that they desisted from
practicing law during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his
functions as Regional Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant
said that the Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]" 21 this court's order of suspension.
According to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 10 of 36

to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and
executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court
require him to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he
desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the
practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on
Human Rights be required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga
continued to perform his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the
practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch
the coverage of [his suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be
tantamount to [violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory
principle in law that what is not included is deemed excluded." 25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their
respective motions to lift order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of
suspension. This court further ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to
comment on complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his
functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law. The resolution
dated September 23, 2009 provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from
being commissioned as notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this
Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their
respective motions to lift relative to their suspension and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel,
stating that respondents have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law
during the entire period of their suspension and disqualification, unless already
complied with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on
Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped
from the performance of his functions for the period stated in the order of suspension
and disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of
complainant against them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice
hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the original)
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective
motions to lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant
Lingan's allegation that he continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his
suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he
"perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law.
These managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of
the regional office and its personnel"; 31 "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by
the [Commission on Human Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of
all other services and assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the
different units at the regional level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement
preparation and disbursement of funds and expenditure of the [Regional Office]." 34 The
Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of the legal services
matters of the [Commission]." 35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga
claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the
practice of law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment 37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued
that "the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct
from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same
acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a
"bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is
an entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the [Commission
as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the
issue and would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter.
"41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again
disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from the Commission on
Human Rights stating that he was suspended from office and desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional
Director and only performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered
that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to
performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of Cayetano
v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of
Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in] good
standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over
Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his
position as Regional Director.
Page 11 of 36
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as
Regional Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith,
he should have followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending
him from office. Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for
reconsideration of the Commission on Human Right's resolution suspending him from office.
By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and
philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that] moral
vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga be
disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib. 48 He was
allowed to resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the
requirements for issuance of a notarial commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report,
and recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective
comments of Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights. 49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant
stated that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and
responsibilities [as Regional Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of
law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional
Director which required the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that
the Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar
Confidant also recommended holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift
suspension "pending [the Commission on Human Right's filing of comment]." 52
53
In the resolution dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty.
Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to
comment on Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as
Regional Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the
penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that
might be imposed on him as Regional Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest
belief that the position of [Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice
of law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court]
arrives on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should
be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him
further from the practice of law for six months.
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." 57 It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of]
legal knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution
with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights[.]"62 It is divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to
investigate human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed
by the Regional Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance, 64 the Regional Director has the
following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights]
matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices; 66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights
complaints in the absence of the legal officer or investigator; 67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss
"immediate courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of
the matter to an alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-
invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional
office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the
legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations
are usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public 71 - officers who are
necessarily members of the bar.72Investigating human rights complaints are performed
primarily by the Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and
protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases
prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
Page 12 of 36
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the
bar in good standing and authorized to practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this
authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the
Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The
disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006,
"effective immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension
on July 5, 2006,76 he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary
qualification to his position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As
the Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from
assuming his post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is
suspended. This is without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the practice of
law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally
allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
resolved to put into effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by
decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions and
responsibilities as Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for
which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect. 77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human
Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after:
investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office. 78 Second,
the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for
reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record.
It was also immaterial.1wphi1 He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director because of his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was
disqualified to hold that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as
Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the
practice of law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order
of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director
despite lack.of authority to practice law.1wphi1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13,
2007, reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney
VI. Instead, the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating
the same offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III) No.
A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays
before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/
Attorney VI of the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007
Commission en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty.
Jimmy P. Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the
transgression by Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government employee. As records have it,
the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary public. With
this, he is mandated to act as a notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to
include the conditions expressly set forth by the Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case
No. 5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga
that is clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty.
Baliga for having contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was
granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem
to be in equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga
should keep in mind that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever
privilege the Commission grants of every official and employee.
Page 13 of 36
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on
him pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further
suspension of Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme
Court penalty is being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty.
Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public
officer.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013
and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will
merit a penalty of dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in the original)

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This
resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI
despite lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the practice of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other
issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of suspension from the practice of law. Although
the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees, 82 it can
only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with
conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully
comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6)
months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from
the practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 14 of 36

 [B.M. No. 1209. July 1, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE BAR MATTER NO. 1209 LAWYER'S OATH

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 15 of 36

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 1 2003.
RESOLUTION. B.M. No. 1209(In Re: Petition to Take the Bar Matter No. 1209 Lawyer's Oath,
Caesar Z. Distrito, petitioner.)
Before the court is a Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign in the Roll of Attorneys
dated April 22, 2002 filed by Caesar Z. Distrito, a successful 2001 Bar Examinee.
The petitioner is a former Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of Barangay Singcang
Airport, Bacolod City.On September 18, 1999, an Information for Usurpation of Authority or
Official Function under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code [1] was filed against him which
read:
That on or about the 18th day of September, 1999, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being the President of
the Bacolod City Sangguniang Kabataan Federation, a government agency, did then and there
under pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously preside over the special session of the said Federation, in violation
of the aforestated law.[2]
The petitioner was conditionally allowed to take the 2001 Bar Examinations [3] and passed the
same.He could not, however, take the Lawyer's Oath nor sign in the Roll of Attorneys pending
the resolution of the above-mentioned case.
On August 2, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter [4] from a certain Mr.
Benjie Montinola informing the said office that there were other cases filed against the
petitioner which were not duly disclosed in the latter's petition to take the bar examinations,
to wit:
1.Two counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22 filed sometime in 1999, docketed
as B.C.I.S. 99-6735 and 99-6736, before the City Prosecutor's Office of Bacolod;
2.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on July 26, 2001, before the MTCC, Bacolod, in
which an adverse decision dated April 1, 2002 was rendered;
3.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on March 15, 2002, before MTCC, Bacolod.
Mr. Montinola also alleged in his letter that the petitioner took his oath as an Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) member, knowing fully well that he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer
before the Supreme Court nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys Mr. Montinola further averred:
The fact that CAESAR Z. DISTRITO have (sic)not disclosed the above-mentioned criminal and
civil case filed against him in his application form despite his personal knowledge of the same
when he applied for the Bar Exams sometime in 2001, is tantamount to PERJURY and that
should be acted upon by your respectable office to protect the integrity of our present lawyers
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
who will be our future Prosecutors, Judges, Justices or even High Ranking Cabinet or
Government Officials or even President of our country.
The unethical act of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO when he took his oath as a lawyer/member before a
testimonial dinner tendered by the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter and witnessed not only by
it's Officials, present members and honored guests but by thousands of Television viewers not
only in Bacolod City but the whole of Western Visayas if not the whole country, despite also of
his personal knowledge that he is not qualified to do so for the same reason above-stated, is
tantamount to IMPERSONATION that should be properly acted upon by the said body who will
be furnished a copy of this information and to also protect their integrity and to avoid similar
incident that may happen in the future for lack of proper screening.
Mr. Montinola attached to his letter copies of the complaint as well as a copy of the decision in
Civil Case No. 26837.
On August 15, 2002, the OBC received another letter from a certain Ms. Christine Angelie M.
Espinosa, then SK Federation President of Bacolod City, which read:
Your Honor:
May I inquire from your good office, whether a bar passer who has not taken his oath in view
of the pending criminal case filed against him can attached (sic) to his name the
nomenclature atty.?Such is the case of Mr. Caesar Z. Distrito , SK Federation, Bacolod City
Vice-President whopassed the bar last May 2002, but has not taken his oath due to the
pending criminal case lodged in MTCC branch 4, Bacolod City for Usurpation of Power charge
against him by the undersigned.
Ms. Espinosa attached a copy of an attendance sheet of a Sangguniang
Panglungsod committee hearing dated June 21, 2002 where the petitioner's name appeared to
have been signed, along with the word "Atty."
On April 23, 2003, the petitioner filed his Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the
Roll of Attorneys alleging that on April 4, 2003, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod, rendered a decision acquitting him in Criminal Case No. 99609. [5] Attached thereto
was a certified true copy of the decision in the said criminal case and a certificate of finality of
judgment.[6] The OBC informed the petitioner of the above-mentioned charges and required
him to comment on the same.
In his Comment dated May 12, 2003, the petitioner avers that when he filed his petition to
take the 2001 bar exams, the criminal case for usurpation of authority or official function was
the only pending case against him at the time.He did not mention I.S.B.C. Case Nos. 99-6735
and 6736 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in his petition because he was of the honest belief that it
was no longer necessary for him to do so, considering that the cases had long been settled
and dismissed without even reaching the arraignment stage. [7] The said criminal cases
apparently stemmed from the debts of some 50 fish vendors at Magsungay Village.The
petitioner's father, as the punong barangay, had guaranteed the same in order to help the
Page 16 of 36
fishermen.But as the drawer of the two checks, the complainant filed the action against the The petitioner averred that the complainant in this case, Ms. Matus Espinosa, had in fact
petitioner when the debts remained unpaid. executed an affidavit of desistance[17] to attest that there was indeed no misrepresentation on
his part.
As regards the civil cases, the petitioner avers that the same stemmed from salary loans that
he, along with other barangay officials and employees, obtained from Fil-Global Credit and The petitioner manifested his sincere apology to the Court for any mistake he may have
Asset Management Inc. and SWIP Lending Corporation on January 13, 2000 and August 22, committed.
2000, respectively, when he was Barangay SK Chairman.The barangay treasurer regularly
deducted from his salary the payment for the said loans until such time when he completed On May 22, 2003, the OBC made the following recommendation:
the payment to Fil-Global on January 31, 2001 and for SWIUP Lending on April 30,
2001.The barangay treasurer thereafter issued a certification of complete payment. [8] When
Considering that there is no more pending civil, criminal or administrative cases against
the petitioner came back to Bacolod after the bar exams, he was surprised to learn that
herein petitioner, he may now be admitted as a member of the Bar.
their barangay officials and employees were facing cases for sum of money filed by Fil-Global
and SWIP Lending because apparently, their payments were not duly remitted.He received
summons only on October 22, 2001 and April 4, 2002 from the MTCC, Bacolod City.The finance Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that Mr. CAESAR Z. DISTRITO be now
officer and the treasurer promised to settle everything, but they failed to do so until their term allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required
expired on August 15, 2002.After the decision was rendered by the MTCC, the petitioner paid fees.[18]
the plaintiffs in the said cases, as evidenced by official receipt nos. 8169 [9] and 9019[10] issued
by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending respectively dated May 7, 2003.Thereafter, an order of There are thus three important matters raised before this Court, the determination of
satisfaction of judgment[11] was correspondingly issued by the court in civil cases 26837 [12] which would materially affect the fate of the present petition:
and 27447.[13]
First.The petitioner's non-disclosure of a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and of two other
Anent the IBP incident, the petitioner stated that an invitation [14] was sent to him by the IBP civil cases filed against him, albeit already dismissed at the time of the filing of his petition to
Negros Occidental Chapter to attend the testimonial dinner and the annual judicial excellence take the 2001 bar examinations.
awarding ceremonies, but that there was no mention of any induction ceremony.Considering
the he in fact successfully passed the bar examinations and was being recognized therefore Second.The petitioner's attendance and participation in an IBP testimonial dinner for new
he was inspired to attend the occasion.He admitted that during the occasion, all those who lawyers, when he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys.
just passed the bar exams were called for the induction of new members, and that he was left
with no choice but to join the others onstage when his name was called.However, the
Third.The petitioner's admitted use of the appellation "Atty." When he had no authority to do
petitioner did not intend to deceive or to keep the IBP in the dark, as he in fact informed them
so as yet.
of his status.To prove the absence of malice on his part, he did not sign any document that
night.
The Court sees fit to discuss each one, to serve as reminder to law students and prospective
applicants to the bar.
The petitioner also stated that after some verification as to the identity of the complainant in
the Letter-complaint dated August 22, 2002, he found out that Benjie Montinola awas a non-
existing person who cannot claim to be a "guardian of proper civi[c] responsibility" considering The petitioner's non-disclosure of a Criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and two other
that he is not even a registered voter of Bacolod City and that he could not be located in the civil cases filed against him, albeit already dismissed at the time of the filing of his petition to
address given, as indicated in a Certification issued by the Commission on Elections, Bacolod take the 2001 bar examinations.
City[15] and the Office of the Barangay Council of Barangay Singcang Airport.[16]
The petitioner insists that he had not read any requirement in the petition to include cases
Regarding the use of the appellation "Atty.", The petitioner admitted writing the same in the that had already been dismissed.[19] This, the Court cannot quite fathom.As stated by Deputy
attendance sheet in a committee hearing of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Bacolod City.He Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Ma. Cristina B. Layusa: [20]
reasoned that he was of the notion that a bar passer can be called "Attorney," and that what
is only prohibited is to practice law, such as appearing in court and notarizing docunments The petitioner's contention is quite hard to accept.In the ready-made petition form to take the
without the requisite oath-taking before the Supreme Court and signing in the Roll of Bar Examination, the following is written clearly:
Attorneys.
"Note: Indicate any pending or dismissed civil, criminal or administrative case against you and
attach pertinent documents:____________________________."

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 17 of 36

If petitioner had not read the notation, as what he claimed, why did he disclose his pending
case for Usurpation of authority or Official Function.Moreover, the said instruction is written in
the middle of the form, so if petitioner had not really read the same, he was not mindful of
what he was doing which should not be the case of a Bar applicant.
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the requirements for all
applicants for admission to the bar, to wit:
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and
that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.
Whether or not the petitioner shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in
the sound discretion of the Court.An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character, fit and proper to practice law. [21] The practice of law is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.Rather, it is a high
personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. [22]
It has been held that moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known.Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.The standard of personal and professional integrity is
not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law.Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[23]
Admittedly, the petitioner was less than honest when he failed to disclose the two other cases
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and the civil cases involving sums of money which were filed
against him, in his petition to take the bar examinations.He should have known that the said
petitionis not to be taken lightly as it is made under oath.The petitioner, in so doing, violated
Rule 7.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [24] which requires of every applicant
candor and truthfulness.Every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to
fully ascertain or determine the applicant's moral character. [25] The petitioner should have
realized the implication of any omission on his part, even if inadvertently made.
In the case of People v. Tuanda,[26] the Court held that "violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order," and considered
the same an offense involving moral turpitude.The erring lawyer was consequently suspended
from the practice of law.
In this case, the fact that the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 did not even reach
the arraignment stage is of no moment; it was the petitioner's duty to disclose the same as it
was a material fact which could affect his application for admission to the bar.
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
It has also been held that an applicant for the admission to the bar who made a false
statement in his application is not of good moral character.[27] The concealment or withholding
from the court of the fact that an applicant has been charged with or indicated for an alleged
crime is a ground for disqualification of the applicant to take the bar examination, or for
revocation of the license to practice, if he has already been admitted to the bar.If what the
applicant concealed is a crime which does not involve moral turpitude, it is the fact of
concealment and not the commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to
become a lawyer.It should be noted that the application was made under oath, which he
lightly took when he made the concealment.[28]
The petitioner's attendance and participation in an IBP testimonial dinner for new lawyers,
when he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys.
As to the IBP incident, the petitioner claims that he though the occasion was just a plain and
simple testimonial dinner for successful bar examinees that included an awarding ceremony
for judges.It was only later when he discovered that the program was actually a testimonial for
new lawyers.[29] However, a perusal of the invitation[30] sent by the IBP to the petitioner
reveals that there was an express mention that the affair was for new lawyers, to wit:
Dear Atty. Distrito:
The IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter will hold its Chapter's Judicial Award of Excellence to
Outstanding Judges and Proscutors and Testimonial Dinner for new lawyers on June 28,
2002, 7:00 P.M., at the Ballroom-A, Business Inn, Lacson Street, Bacolod City.
In behalf of the Officers and members of the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter, I am
inviting you to attend said after being one of the new members of the Bar.Please come in
formal attire.
Your presence on this occasion will be highly appreciated.
The Court can only conclude that the petitioner did not take his petition to take the Lawyer's
Oath and to sign in the Roll of Attorneys seriously.He would have us believe that he attended
an affair, believing in good faith that it was meant for those who recently passed the bar,
when the invitation he himself attached to his petition states otherwise.The petitioner's
forthrightness and candor with the Court leave much to be desired.
The petitioner's admitted use of the Appellation "Atty." When he had no Authority to do
so as yet.
The petitioner's erroneous belief that a person who passed the bar examinations may allow
himself to be called an attorney should be corrected.An applicant who has passed the required
examination or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and
subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. [31] The Court shall
thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and
shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such
Page 18 of 36
record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificates shall be his authority to
practice.[32] The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a Roll of Attorneys admitted to practice,
which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.. [33]

The Oath is thus a prerequisite to the admission to the practice of law, while the signing in the
Roll is the last act that finally signifies membership in the bar, giving the applicant the right to
call himself "attorney".Continued membership in the IBP and regular payment of membership
dues and other lawful assessments that it may levy are conditions sine qua non to the
privilege to practice law and to the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys. [34]

The unauthorized use of the said appellation may render a person liable for indirect contempt
of court.[35] The Court may deny the applicant's petition to take the Lawyer's Oath for grave
misconduct, such as calling himself and "attorney" and appearing as counsel for clients in
courts even before being admitted to the bar.[36] Although the evidence in this case does not
include that the petitioner actually engaged in the practice of law, the fact is that he signed in
an attendance sheet as "Atty. Caesar Distrito."He called himself "attorney" knowing fully well
that he was not yet admitted to the bar.[37]

Thus, we disagree with the findings of the OBC, and find that the petitioner is unfit to become
a member of the bar.The petitioner must show this Court that he has satisfied the moral
requirements before he can be admitted to the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO to be allowed to take the oath as

member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DENIED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 19 of 36

B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN
THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while
the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002
Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave
Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez
wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling
used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed
his Answer with the OBC.
3 pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle
his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled
because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single
incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies
the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge
of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his
petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only
the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to
take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by
an applicant.
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate
in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar."5
As regards Melings use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation
of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no
valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is,
he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he
is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use
of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of
court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath
and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders
from the Court.7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not
Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted
upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are
also known to possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act
or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at
that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are
Page 20 of 36
pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with
the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the
applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him
speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the
privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its
use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the
impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Sharia Bar who are not
likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his
private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in
a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of
service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent
and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything
short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes
infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application
to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result,
we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and
suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions
upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership
of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from
the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 21 of 36

 B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance
than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the
morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees
as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed
against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the
Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the
charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has
not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 22 of 36

Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent
of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter
engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a
ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath
but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against
him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent
him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as
a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney"
in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he
submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the
losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim
of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to
Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel
for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his
oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the
instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the
May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes
that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to
deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise,
respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
"counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated
that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized
Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent
engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:
Page 23 of 36
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." 10 Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not
support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
SO ORDERED.
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel"
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel"
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be
a member of the Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. 5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to
the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers
oath.1wphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 24 of 36

 B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws
in 19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion,
and was subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that
he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on
21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 25 of 36

February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioners
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his
answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys. 15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant petition,
subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from
the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin
to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for
the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed
the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who
called this Courts attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by
the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly
replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung
anong mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna happen. At the same time, its a
combination of apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen. And, finally its the right
thing to do. I have to come here sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice
of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully
admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that
petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that
he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1wphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years
of inaction.
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than
30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what
he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake
of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as
it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an
attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect
contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding,
however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of
charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that
petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we
Page 26 of 36
cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year
period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the
Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of
this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 27 of 36

B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012 Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino
EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner, lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as
stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. 2 R.A. No. 9225
RESOLUTION
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 3
REYES, J.:
It can not be overstressed that:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1wphi1 It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date; required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following
documents in relation to his petition:
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar
petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice 4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar
in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of
allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the 6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of 8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
the petitioners membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 28 of 36

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the

Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his
good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,

UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance
with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has
met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar
to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to

the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and
subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for
the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench
and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 29 of 36

G.R. No. 206691 October 3, 2016
Atty. Raymund P. Palad vs. Lolit Solis, et al.

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 30 of 36

ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 31 of 36
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 32 of 36
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 33 of 36
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION Page 34 of 36
 A.C. No. 10671, November 25, 2015
JOSEPH C. CHUA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
1 Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
In a verified complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Joseph C. Chua (Chua) sought the disbarment of Atty. Arturo M. De Castro
(Atty. De Castro) for his capricious and continuous unethical practice of law in deliberately
delaying, impeding and obstructing the administration of justice in his strategy for the defense
of his client in Civil Case No. 7939 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City,
Branch 84.
Chua alleged that his company, Nemar Computer Resources Corp. (NCRC), filed a collection
case against Dr. Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, represented by its counsel, Atty. De
Castro.2
According to Chua, since the filing of the collection case on June 15, 2006, it took more than
five (5) years to present one witness of NCRC due to Atty. De Castro's propensity to seek
postponements of agreed hearing dates for unmeritorious excuses. Atty. De Castro's flimsy
excuses would vary from simple absence without notice, to claims of alleged ailment
unbacked by any medical certificates, to claims of not being ready despite sufficient time
given to prepare, to the sending of a representative lawyer who would profess non-knowledge
of the case to seek continuance, to a plea for the postponement without providing any reason
therefore.3
Moreover, Chua averred that when the trial court required Atty. De Castro to explain why he
should not be held in contempt for such delays, he belatedly made his explanation, further
contributing to the delay of the proceedings.4
For his defense, Atty. De Castro countered that his pleas for continuance and resetting were
based on valid grounds.5 Also, he pointed out that most of the resetting were without the
objection of the counsel for NCRC, and that, certain resetting were even at the instance of the
latter.6
On April 10, 2013, the CBD submitted its Report and Recommendation 7 addressing the charge
against Atty. De Castro. The CBD found Atty. De Castro to have violated Canons 10, 11, 12 and
13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he deterred the' speedy and efficient
administration of justice by deliberately employing delaying tactics in Civil Case No. 7939. The
CBD recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months from notice, with a warning that a similar lapse in the future may warrant more severe
sanctions.
On April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 8 adopting and approving
with modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD. The Board of Governors
modified the penalty meted out to respondent reducing the period of suspension from six (6)
months to three (3) months. Both Chua and Atty. De Castro filed their respective motions for
reconsideration dated August 28, 20139 and August 23, 201310 but the same were denied in a
Resolution11 dated May 3, 2014.
Upon review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors to be proper under the circumstances.
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
ETHICS CASES: INTRODUCTION
administration of justice contravenes such lawyers['] duty." 12 Rule 1.03 and Rule 10.3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly states:
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
the ends of justice.
As shown by the records, Atty. De Castro violated his oath of office in his handling of the
collection case against his client. Chua was able to show that, through Atty. De Castro's
atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of the case, causing injury and
prejudice to NCRC.
The CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, correctly observed that Atty. De Castro violated
his responsibility to attend previously set engagements with the court, absent a truly good
reason to be absent. The Report and Recommendation in part states:
Through manueverings [sic] obviously orchestrated by [Atty. De Castro], who has nonchalantly
forgotten or otherwise deliberately disregarded professional commitments, much of the time
has been wasted with [Atty. De Castro's] uncharacteristic reliance on postponements for
reasons that may not be termed valid but ones that really border on plain attempts to rile the
other side. [Atty. De Castro's] lack of concern for the other party, that amounted to obvious
disrespect to the Court which has accommodated some requests for resettings which may not
have solid ground to be granted, does not speak well of [Atty. De Castro's] attitude towards his
lack of concern with the court's (and adverse parties/counsel's) time specially reserved to hear
the case.13
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on
the following grounds: (i) deceit; (ii) malpractice; (iii) gross misconduct in office; (iv) grossly
immoral conduct; (v) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (vi) violation of the
lawyers oath; (vii) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (viii)
corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.
Here, Atty. De Castro clearly caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury
to the administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral
conduct. "Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law." 14
Undoubtedly, Atty. De Castro failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of law and justice. Fie showed his great propensity to disregard court orders. His
acts of wantonly employing dilatory tactics show an utter disrespect for the Court and the
legal profession.
In line with jurisprudence, however, this Court held that disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.15 In the present case, this Court, after considering the circumstances and
records of the case, finds that the suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months oi
Atty. De Castro, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is sufficient to discipline him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo M. De Castro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of Atty. Arturo M. De Castro as a member
of the Bar and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as on the Office of the
Page 35 of 36
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

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