Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LAST-MINUTE
NOTES ON THE 2012 BAR EXAMINATION IN LABOR LAW BASED ON THE SUPREME
COURT-PRESCRIBED SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
The following are the provisions of the Constitution mentioned in the Syllabus. The reviewee is
advised to be familiar with the keywords or keyterms found in the provisions which, for purposes of ease
and convenience, are underlined herein:
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES STATE POLICIES
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote
full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for
all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
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2. The notice and hearing required under the Due Process Clause applies before the power
of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the
case of termination of employment under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code
because the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The
purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage. Then
that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due
process. Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he
dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality
of his dismissal.
3. The notice requirement under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code cannot be
considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause since the employer cannot really
be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause.
ii. Agabon v. NLRC case.
In the 2004 en banc decision in the case of Aeabon v. NLRC. [G.R. No. 158693. November
17. 20041. the Supreme Court further expounded on the doctrine laid down in Serrano by making a
distinction between constitutional due process and statutory due process. Thus:
"Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from
being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
Resultantly, where there is just cause for dismissal but due process has not been properly
observed by an employer, it would not be right to order either the reinstatement of the dismissed
employee or the payment of backwages to him. In failing, however, to comply with the procedure
prescribed by law (Article 277[b] of the Labor Code) in terminating the services of the employee, the
employer must be deemed to have opted or, in any case, should be made liable, for the payment of
separation pay. It might be pointed out that the notice to be given and the hearing to be conducted
generally constitute the two-part due process requirement of law to be accorded to the employee by the
employer. Nevertheless, peculiar circumstances might obtain in certain situations where to undertake the
above steps would be no more than a useless formality and where, accordingly, it would not be imprudent
to apply the res ipsa loquitur rule and award, in lieu of separation pay, nominal damages to the employee.
b.Right to Equal Protection of the Laws.
It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its authority. The equal protection clause erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful it may have been.
Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Welcome Philippines. Inc.. [G.R. No. 162994.
September
17.20041.
The employer's policy prohibiting its employees from any personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies was held not violative of the equal protection clause in the
Constitution and not unreasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after
repeated requests to the employee to comply therewith. Indeed, the application of the said policy was
made in an impartial and even-handed manner with due regard for the lot of the employee. In any event,
from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that the
company does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those
of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their
own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employees
and the company that may arise out of such relationships.
Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines. Inc.. fG.R. No. 168081. October 17.20081.
Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to measure up to the weight standards set by respondent.
His termination due to obesity was held legal and not violative of the equal protection clause in the
Constitution. The High Court observed that the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment which is the source of the equal protection guarantee in the 1987 Constitution, is
consistent in saying that the equal protection clause erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful it may be. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal
protection guarantee.
c. Right to Counsel.
Manuel v. N. C. Construction Supply. fG.R. No. 127553. November 28.1997.282 SCRA 3261.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of Article III [Bill of Rights] of the 1987 Constitution is meant
to protect a suspect in a criminal case who is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the
stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is that point when questions are initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon
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the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under said provision of the Bill of Rights of
the 1987 Constitution applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in
an administrative investigation. Thus, if the investigation conducted by the employer is merely
administrative and not criminal in character, the admissions made during such investigation may be used
as evidence to justify dismissal.
Punzal v. ETSI Technologies. Inc.. fG.R. Nos. 170384-85. March 9.20071.
But according to this case, the failure of the employer to inform the employee who is undergoing
administrative investigation of his right to counsel would amount to deprivation of due process. Petitioner's
contention that she was denied due process was upheld because the records do not show that she was
informed of her right to be represented by counsel during the conference with her employer. The
protestations of respondent-employer that the right to be informed of the right to counsel does not apply
to investigations before administrative bodies and that law and jurisprudence merely give the employee
the option to secure the services of counsel in a hearing or conference, fall in the light of the clear
provision of Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code that "the employer xxx shall afford [the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated] ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representatives if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment," and the Supreme Courts explicit
pronouncement that "[a]mple opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must
accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation."
Consequently, the petitioner was awarded nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for violation of
her right to statutory due process.
d.Right Against Self-Incrimination.
Pascual. Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners. fG.R. No. L-25018. May 26.19691: Cabal v. Kapunan.
Jr.. fG.R. No.
L-19052. December 29.19621.
This constitutionally-guaranteed right which is usually invoked in criminal cases, may be validly
invoked in an administrative proceeding if it partakes of the character of a criminal proceeding because of
the nature of the penalty that may be imposed for the offense.
The right against self-incrimination was established on the ground of public policy and humanity.
Of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place him under the strongest temptation
to commit perjury; and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confession by duress.1
e.Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.
Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC. fG.R. No. 113271. October 16.1997.280 SCRA 7351.
The constitutionally guaranteed right against unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
invoked against the employer. As applied to labor cases, the Supreme Court declared that it finds no
reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People v. Marti. fG.R. No. 81561. January 18. 1991. 193
LABOR
LAW: A
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A labor union certified as the "sole and exclusive bargaining agent' means that it shall remain as
such during the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor organizations, and no petition
questioning its majority status shall be entertained nor shall certification election be conducted outside of
the sixty-day freedom period immediately before the expiry date of the five-year term of the CBA.
Once certified, what is represented by the bargaining agent are not only its members but also its
non-members who are included in the bargaining unit.
b. Individual employee or group of employees cannot bring grievable issues
for voluntary arbitration without the participation of the bargaining union.
The designation of a bargaining agent, however, does not deprive an individual employee or group
of employees to exercise their right at anytime to present grievances to their employer, with or without the
intervention of the bargaining union.
Article 255 explicitly provides that an individual employee or group of employees may validly bring
grievances directly to the employer even ifthereisan existing exclusive bargaining representative.
Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation. [G.R. No. 183335. December 23.20091.
The Supreme Court, however, clarified in this case of Tabigue that an individual employee or group
of employees cannot be allowed to submit or refer unsettled grievances for voluntary arbitration without
the participation of the bargaining union. The petitioners in this case are members of INTERCO
Employees/Laborers' Union (the union), the bargaining agent in respondent company. Without the
participation of the union, petitioners filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the NCMB against
respondent for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on the grievance
conference/meeting. As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners requested to
elevate the case to voluntary arbitration. However, the president of the union of which petitioners are
members wrote a letter stating that petitioners "are not duly authorized by fthel board or the officers to
represent the union, [hence]... all actions, representations or agreements made by these people with the
management will not be honored or recognized by the union." The Supreme Court ruled that the right of
any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to the employer does not imply
the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. In this case, petitioners have not been duly
authorized to represent the union, hence, they cannot present their unsettled grievances for voluntary
arbitration.4
Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao. [G.R. Nos. 174040-41.
September 22.
20101.
This case reiterated the said ruling in Tabigue. In this case, the Davao Insular Hotel Free Employees
Union- National Federation of Labor (DIHFEU-NFL), the recognized labor organization in respondent hotel
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent which superseded the affected
provisions of the existing CBA. The MOA was executed to effect the re-opening of the hotel which earlier
suspended its operation due to extreme business losses. Individual members of another union, the Insular
Hotel Employees Union-National Federation of Labor (IHEU-NFL), petitioner in this case, which claimed to be
affiliated also with the same federation, questioned the validity of the MOA by filing a Notice of Preventive
Mediation with the NCMB.
On the issue of the identity of the duly recognized union, the respondent contended that it is
DIHFEU-NFL which is the only recognized bargaining unit in their establishment, the other union named
IHEU-NFL being a non-entity since, as certified by the DOLE, it is not a registered labor organization. It was
held, however, that respondent is already estopped from questioning the same as it did not raise the said
issue in the proceedings before the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrator. A perusal of the records revealed
that the main theory posed by respondent was whether or not the individual employees had the authority
to file the complaint notwithstanding the apparent non-participation of the union. Respondent never put in
issue the fact that DIHFEU-NFL was not the same as IHEU-NFL. Consequently, it was declared already too
late in the day to assert the same.
Resolving the issue raised by respondent of whether the individual members of IHEU-NFL have the
requisite standing to question the MOA before the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrator, the Supreme Court,
invoking its 2009 ruling in Tabigue [supra] and Section 3, Rule IV of the NCMB Manual of Procedure which
provides that only a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative which has the right to file a
notice or request for preventive mediation, declared that the individual members of the union have no
authority to file the case. Clearly, therefore, the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to
entertain the Notice of Preventive Mediation and the voluntary arbitration case, respectively.
c.In order to have legal standing, the individual members should be shown to have
been duly authorized to represent the bargaining union.
4
SassteJ/tf*s Fwm he. K NLRC, G.R Ab 142244, Nov. 18.2002,440Phi 620.
LABOR
LAW: A
FUNDAME
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NOTES ON THE 2012 BAR EXAMINATION IN LABOR LAW BASED ON THE SUPREME
COURT-PRESCRIBED SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
The following are the provisions of the Constitution mentioned in the Syllabus. The reviewee
is advised to be familiar with the keywords or keyterms found in the provisions which, for purposes
of ease and convenience, are underlined herein:
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES STATE POLICIES
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the vouth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed
investments.
NOTES ON THE 2012 BAR EXAMINATION IN LABOR LAW BASED ON THE SUPREME
COURT-PRESCRIBED SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
The following are the provisions of the Constitution mentioned in the Syllabus. The reviewee is
advised to be familiar with the keywords or keyterms found in the provisions which, for purposes of
ease and convenience, are underlined herein:
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES STATE POLICIES
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote
full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for
all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the vouth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors. to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.
2
2. The notice and hearing required under the Due Process Clause applies before the
power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously
not the case of termination of employment under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor
Code because the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The
purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage. Then
that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due
process. Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he
dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to question the
legality of his dismissal.
3. The notice requirement under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code cannot be
considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause since the employer cannot really
be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause.
ii. Agabon v. NLRC case.
In the 2004 en banc decision in the case of Agabon v. NLRC. fG.R. No. 158693. November
17. 20041. the
Supreme Court further expounded on the doctrine laid down in Serrano by making a distinction between
constitutional due process and statutory due process. Thus:
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal,
civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects
employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
Resultantly, where there is just cause for dismissal but due process has not been properly
observed by an employer, it would not be right to order either the reinstatement of the dismissed
employee or the payment of backwages to him. In failing, however, to comply with the procedure
prescribed by law (Article 277[b] of the Labor Code) in terminating the services of the employee, the
employer must be deemed to have opted or, in any case, should be made liable, for the payment of
separation pay. It might be pointed out that the notice to be given and the hearing to be conducted
generally constitute the two-part due process requirement of law to be accorded to the employee by the
employer. Nevertheless, peculiar circumstances might obtain in certain situations where to undertake
the above steps would be no more than a useless formality and where, accordingly, it would not be
imprudent to apply the res ipsa loquitur rule and award, in lieu of separation pay, nominal damages to
the employee.
b.Right to Equal Protection of the Laws.
It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to
the state or those acting under color of its authority. The equal protection clause erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful it may have been.
Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Welcome Philippines. Inc.. fG.R. No. 162994.
September
17.20041.
The employers policy prohibiting its employees from any personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies was held not violative of the equal protection clause in the
Constitution and not unreasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after
repeated requests to the employee to comply therewith. Indeed, the application of the said policy was
made in an impartial and even-handed manner with due regard for the lot of the employee. In any
event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear
that the company does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees
and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between
the employees and the company that may arise out of such relationships.
Yrasueeui v. Philippine Airlines. Inc.. fG.R. No. 168081. October 17.20081.
Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to measure up to the weight standards set by respondent.
His termination due to obesity was held legal and not violative of the equal protection clause in the
Constitution. The High Court observed that the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment which is the source of the equal protection guarantee in the 1987 Constitution,
is consistent in saying that the equal protection clause erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful it may be. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal
protection guarantee.
c. Right to Counsel.
Manuel v. N. C. Construction Supply. fG.R. No. 127553. November 28.1997.282 SCRA 3261.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of Article III [Bill of Rights] of the 1987 Constitution is meant
to protect a suspect in a criminal case who is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the
stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
3
the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under said provision of the Bill of Rights
of the 1987 Constitution applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those
made in an administrative investigation. Thus, if the investigation conducted by the employer is merely
administrative and not criminal in character, the admissions made during such investigation may be
used as evidence to justify dismissal.
Punzal v. ETSI Technologies. Inc.. fG.R. Nos. 170384-85. March 9.20071.
But according to this case, the failure of the employer to inform the employee who is undergoing
administrative investigation of his right to counsel would amount to deprivation of due process.
Petitioner's contention that she was denied due process was upheld because the records do not show
that she was informed of her right to be represented by counsel during the conference with her
employer. The protestations of respondent-employer that the right to be informed of the right to counsel
does not apply to investigations before administrative bodies and that law and jurisprudence merely give
the employee the option to secure the services of counsel in a hearing or conference, fall in the light of
the clear provision of Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code that "the employer xxx shall afford [the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated] ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with
the assistance of his representatives if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment," and the Supreme Court's
explicit pronouncement that "[a]mple opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management
must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal
representation." Consequently, the petitioner was awarded nominal damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 for violation of her right to statutory due process.
d. Right Against Self-Incrimination.
Pascual. Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners. fG.R. No. L-25018. May 26.19691: Cabal v. Kapunan.
Jr.. fG.R. No.
L-19052. December 29.19621.
This constitutionally-guaranteed right which is usually invoked in criminal cases, may be validly
invoked in an administrative proceeding if it partakes of the character of a criminal proceeding because
of the nature of the penalty that may be imposed for the offense.
The right against self-incrimination was established on the ground of public policy and humanity.
Of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place him under the strongest temptation
to commit perjury; and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confession by duress.1
e. Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.
Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC. fG.R. No. 113271. October 16.1997.280 SCRA 7351.
The constitutionally guaranteed right against unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
invoked against the employer. As applied to labor cases, the Supreme Court declared that it finds no
reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People v. Marti. fG.R. No. 81561. January 18. 1991. 193
4
c. Some principles on this provision.
In case there is a clash between labor and management, it is an accepted norm that the rights of
the general public, represented by the state, are paramount.2
The concern of the law for the workers is further stressed in the provision in the Civil Code which
ordains that in case of doubt, all labor legislations and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
the safety and decent living for the laborers.3
r
51CJS, Sec 1, p. 567.
3
ArticjB f 702 hereof
5
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained
any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.
(g) "Labor organizationi" means any union or association of employees which
exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.
(h) "Legitimate labor organization" means any labor organization duly registered
with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch
or local thereof.
(i) "Company uniorf' means any labor organization whose formation, function
or administration has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor
practice by this Code.
(j) "Bargaining representativemeans a legitimate labor organization whether or not
employed
by the employer.
(k) "Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined
bytheCode.
(I) Labor disputeincludes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions
of
employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee.
(m) "Managerial employeep is one who is vested with the powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise
of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling
within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
(n) "Voluntary Arbitrator" means any person accredited by the Board as such or any
person
named or designated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the
parties to act as their Voluntary Arbitrator, or one chosen with or without
the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
pursuant to a selection procedure agreed upon in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, or any official that may be authorized by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment to act as Voluntary Arbitrator upon
the written request and agreement of the parties to a labor dispute.
(o) "Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute.
(p) "Lockout? means any temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result
of an
industrial or labor dispute.
(q) "Internal union disputef' includes all disputes or grievances arising from any
violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and
by laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of
union membership provided for in this Code.
(r) "Strike-breaker" means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with by
force,
violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation any peaceful picketing
affecting wages, hours or conditions of work or in the exercise of the
right of self-organization or collective bargaining.
(s) "Strike arecf means the establishment, warehouses, depots, plants or offices,
including the
sites or premises used as runaway shops, of the employer struck
against, as well as the immediate vicinity actually used by picketing
strikers in moving to and fro before all points of entrance to and exit
from said establishment.
Article 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers' participation in policy
and decision-making. - The labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be
the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
6
A labor union certified as the "sole and exclusive bargaining agent" means that it shall remain as
such during the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor organizations, and no petition
questioning its majority status shall be entertained nor shall certification election be conducted outside of
the sixty-day freedom period immediately before the expiry date of the five-year term of the CBA.
Once certified, what is represented by the bargaining agent are not only its members but also its
non-members who are included in the bargaining unit.
b. Individual employee or group of employees cannot bring grievable issues for
voluntary arbitration without the participation of the bargaining union.
The designation of a bargaining agent, however, does not deprive an individual employee or
group of employees to exercise their right at any time to present grievances to their employer, with or
without the intervention of the bargaining union.
Article 255 explicitly provides that an individual employee or group of employees may validly
bring grievances directly to the employer even if there is an existing exclusive bargaining representative.
Tabieue v. International Copra Export Corporation. [G.R. No. 183335. December 23.20091.
The Supreme Court, however, clarified in this case of Tabigue that an individual employee or
group of employees cannot be allowed to submit or refer unsettled grievances for voluntary arbitration
without the participation of the bargaining union. The petitioners in this case are members of INTERCO
Employees/Laborers' Union (the union), the bargaining agent in respondent company. Without the
participation of the union, petitioners filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the NCMB against
respondent for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on the grievance
conference/meeting. As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners requested to
elevate the case to voluntary arbitration. However, the president of the union of which petitioners are
members wrote a letter stating that petitioners "are not duly authorized by [thel board or the officers to
represent the union, [hence]... all actions, representations or agreements made by these people with the
management will not be honored or recognized by the union." The Supreme Court ruled that the right of
any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to the employer does not imply
the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. In this case, petitioners have not been duly
authorized to represent the union, hence, they cannot present their unsettled grievances for voluntary
arbitration.4
Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao. fG.R. Nos. 174040-41.
September 22.
20101.
This case reiterated the said ruling in Tabigue. In this case, the Davao Insular Hotel Free
Employees Union- National Federation of Labor (DIHFEU-NFL), the recognized labor organization in
respondent hotel entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent which
superseded the affected provisions of the existing CBA. The MOA was executed to effect the re-opening of
the hotel which earlier suspended its operation due to extreme business losses. Individual members of
another union, the Insular Hotel Employees Union-National Federation of Labor (IHEU-NFL), petitioner in
this case, which claimed to be affiliated also with the same federation, questioned the validity of the MOA
by filing a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the NCMB.
On the issue of the identity of the duly recognized union, the respondent contended that it is
DIHFEU-NFL which is the only recognized bargaining unit in their establishment, the other union named
IHEU-NFL being a non-entity since, as certified by the DOLE, it is not a registered labor organization, It
was held, however, that respondent is already estopped from questioning the same as it did not raise the
said issue in the proceedings before the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrator. A perusal of the records
revealed that the main theory posed by respondent was whether or not the individual employees had the
authority to file the complaint notwithstanding the apparent non-participation of the union. Respondent
never put in issue the fact that DIHFEU-NFL was not the same as IHEU-NFL. Consequently, it was declared
already too late in the day to assert the same.
Resolving the issue raised by respondent of whether the individual members of IHEU-NFL have
the requisite standing to question the MOA before the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrator, the Supreme
Court, invoking its 2009 ruling in Tabigue [supra] and Section 3, Rule IV of the NCMB Manual of Procedure
which provides that only a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative which has the right to
file a notice or request for preventive mediation, declared that the individual members of the union have
no authority to file the case. Clearly, therefore, the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrator had no jurisdiction
to entertain the Notice of Preventive Mediation and the voluntary arbitration case, respectively.
c.In order to have legal standing, the individual members should be shown to have
been duly authorized to represent the bargaining union.
See also /UfesFarms, (to v. NLRC. G.R.Ab. 142244. Nov. 1B, 2002,440 m 620.
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3.IN RE: SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 255:
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