TANADA v TUVERA146 SCRA 446FACTS:

The petitioner calls upon the court to subject all laws, presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, executive orders, and administrative orders
being enacted to be publishedfirst in the Official Gazette as well as a fifteen day
period before said law can be made valid inaccordance to Article 2 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official Gazette is
a requirement forits effectivity.
HELD:
For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about certain laws or
decrees beingenacted by their government, sufficient appropriation of time
and publication is necessary. According toArticle 2 of the Civil Code, all laws must
be given 15 days upon its publication in the Official Gazette for itto be enacted.
This is to give sufficient time for the people to learn of such laws as well as to
respecttheir right to be informed. The respondents however brought up the fact that the
Official Gazette maynot be the most effective medium for the people to be educated
of certain new laws given its erraticpublication dates as well as its limited number
of readers, with lieu of more potent mediums of instructions such as newspapers of
general circulation because of its wide readership and regular datesof printing.
The court nevertheless rules that such periodicals are not what is required by the
Civil Codeand such amendments are left to the legislative branch of the
government. Having said this, the courtfinds in favor of publishing all laws,
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,executive orders, and
administrative orders with a 15 day leeway, or unless stated, for them to take
intoeffect
PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY, digested
94 SCRA 641, March 29, 1954 (Constitutional Law Publication of Bank Circulars and
Regulations)
FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars,
U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through
its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by
Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had
no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the
act or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official
Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and
effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have
force and effect.

HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a
law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Philippine International Trading Corporation vs Judge Angeles Case
Digest
G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996

Justice Torres Jr.

FACTS: The Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued

Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC
for importation from the People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be
accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to
PROC carried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer
in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or,
simply, at one is to one ratio.
Private respondents Remington and Firestone individually applied for authority to import
from PROC with the petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the
requirements for importers, and after they executed respective undertakings.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by
petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter were both barred from
importing goods from PROC. As a result, the private respondents filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus against the PITC.
The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the
same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by PITC is null and void on the
ground that it was not published in accordance with Article 2 of the New Civil
Code.
HELD: Yes. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid
within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it
is otherwise provided. . . .
The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The fact that the amendments to
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP
Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to
the effectivity of the Administrative Order.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order
under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 December 29, 1998
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524

FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the
estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and
the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as null and void. Federico
anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to
succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos
Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive
portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be upheld.

ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should
prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and
binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that
the marriage be declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the
Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be
annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be
reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable
marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent
court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law
makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which
provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate;
and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel
would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that children
conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.
 People vs. Robert Quiachon (digested)
Facts:
On or about May 12, 2001 the appellant Robert Quiachon have sexual intercourse with Rowena
Quiachon, his daughter, 8-year old, and a deaf-mute minor, against her will and consent. The
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 finds the appellant guilty of a crime of qualified rape
and sentenced on September 9, 2003 to suffer a maximum penalty of death. However, in view of the
enactment of R.A. No. 9346 on lune 24, 2006; prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The
penalty to be meted on the appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Sec. 2 of the said Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may be given retroactive effect on his sentence?

RULLING:
R.A. No. 9346 is applicable of the case pursuant to the principle in Criminal Law, "favorabilia sunt
amplianda adiosa retrigenda" that Penal Laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect, under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and thus provided that he is not a
habitual criminal, as defiend in Rule 5 of Article 62 of the same code, although at the time of the
publication of such law, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
In this case the appellant Roberto Quiachon is found to be not a habitual criminal, thus making R.A.
No. 9346 applicable to him. In the decision of Court of Appeals dated August 25, 2005 was modified
and the penalty imposed to Roberto Quiachon which is death penalty was reduced to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346
Guy v. CA (Court of Appeals) Digest
Guy v. CA

502 SCRA 151

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:

1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of

Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and
Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of
Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati City.

2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving
spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left
no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters
administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that
the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by
Remedios and not by counsel.

3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by
reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for
financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and
her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all
liabilities.

4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the
supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted
guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the
waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of
non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the
lower court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the

inheritance the wards

RULING: No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents

and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of
inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best
interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release
or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not
have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as
illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that
they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do
not have.

As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of

the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters
administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental
to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship
included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be
brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the
other to claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)
Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest
Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153

Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support
of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18.
the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion
on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the
initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying
with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right
of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec,
however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners
faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided
for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1
year residency.

Ruling:
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225
may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
RA 9189.

Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency
requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was
practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and
are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote.

The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided
they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to
R.A. 9189
Alice Reyes Van Dorn vs Manuel
Romillo, Jr.
139 SCRA 139 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Laws Nationality Principle
Divorce Obtained Abroad
In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong Kong.
However, in 1982, Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA.
Later, Reyes married Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was petitioning that he
be granted management rights over a property in Manila (The Galleon). It was his
contention that the divorce decree they obtained abroad do not apply to properties in the
Philippines, hence, despite the divorce, Reyess property in the Philippines remained
conjugal with Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge ruled that the
divorce decree issued by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared
national policy of the Philippines which prohibits divorce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.
HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality (nationality principle). Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada Upton from the marriage from the standards of American
Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law,
Upton is no longer the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as Reyess
husband as he is not entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the
decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted

as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted

as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
Schneckenburger v Moran (Civil Procedure)
SCHNECKENBURGER v MORAN
G.R. No. L-44896
July 31, 1936

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine
Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected
to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no
jurisdiction to try him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend
(1) That the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case
filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and
(2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred
exclusively

upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

*CFI: overruled his motion.
Hence, he filed this PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION with a view to preventing
the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action
filed against him.

ISSUE:
WON that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner
and not the SC as provided in the constitution

HELD:
YES.
the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was NOT exclusive.
The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have
"original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by
the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original
The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth
conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding
one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction
included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already
indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of
ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country
where they reside jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original
jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union.

OTHER NOTES:
1. This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a
consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister,
but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. A
consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the
country where he resides.