NERWIN G.R. No.

167057 TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or

INDUSTRIES preliminary mandatory injunction against a
CORPORATION, Present:
Petitioner, government contract or project acts contrary to law.
CORONA,C.J.,
Chairperson, Antecedents
- versus - LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
*
BRION, The following antecedents are culled from the
PNOC-ENERGY BERSAMIN, and assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
DEVELOPMENT VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
(CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz:
CORPORATION, and
ESTER R. GUERZON, Promulgated:
Chairman, Bids and In 1999, the National
Awards Committee, Electrification Administration (NEA)
Respondents. April 11, 2012 published an invitation to pre-qualify
x--------------------------------------------------------------- and to bid for a contract, otherwise
--------------------------x known as IPB No. 80, for the supply
and delivery of about sixty thousand
DECISION (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and
twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of
BERSAMIN, J.: crossarms needed in the countrys
Rural Electrification Project. The said
contract consisted of four (4)
Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits components, namely: PIA, PIB and
any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing PIC or woodpoles and P3 or
crossarms, necessary for NEAs
any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary projected allocation for Luzon,
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to Visayas and Mindanao. In response to
restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any the said invitation, bidders, such as
private respondent [Nerwin], were
of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity,
required to submit their application for
whether public or private, acting under the eligibility together with their technical
Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, proposals. At the same time, they were
and developing the right-of-way, site or location of informed that only those who would
pass the standard pre-qualification
any National Government project; (b) bidding or would be invited to submit their
awarding of a contract or project of the National financial bids.
Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting,
Following a thorough review of
executing, implementing, or operating any such the bidders qualifications and
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any eligibility, only four (4) bidders,
such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or including private respondent
[Nerwin], qualified to participate in
authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for
the bidding for the IPB-80
such contract or project. contract. Thereafter, the qualified
bidders submitted their financial bids
where private respondent [Nerwin]
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC)
emerged as the lowest bidder for all
that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a schedules/components of the
1
contract. NEA then conducted a pre-
award inspection of private
respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing
plants and facilities, including its
identified supplier in Malaysia, to
determine its capability to supply and
deliver NEAs requirements.
In the Recommendation of
Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC
and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply
and Delivery of Woodpoles and
Crossarms dated October 4, 2000,
NEA administrator Conrado M.
Estrella III recommended to NEAs
Board of Directors the approval of
award to private respondent [Nerwin]
of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on
account of the following:
a. Nerwin is the lowest
complying and responsive
bidder;
b. The price difference for
the four (4) schedules
between the bid of Nerwin
Industries (lowest responsive
and complying bidder) and
the second lowest bidder in
the amount of $1.47 million
for the poles and $0.475
million for the crossarms, is
deemed substantial and
extremely advantageous to
the government. The price
difference is equivalent to
7,948 pcs. of poles and
20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
c. The price difference for
the three (3) schedules
between the bids of Nerwin
and the Tri-State Pole and
Piling, Inc. approximately in
the amount of $2.36 million
for the poles and $0.475
million for the crossarms are
equivalent to additional
12.872 pcs. of poles and
2
20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
and
d. The bidder and
manufacturer are capable of
supplying the woodpoles and
specified in the bid
documents and as based on
the pre-award inspection
conducted.
However, on December 19, 2000,
NEAs Board of Directors
passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by
50% the material requirements for IBP
No. 80 given the time limitations for
the delivery of the materials, xxx, and
with the loan closing date of October
2001 fast approaching. In turn, it
resolved to award the four (4)
schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced
number to private respondent
[Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin]
protested the said 50% reduction,
alleging that the same was a ploy to
accommodate a losing bidder.
On the other hand, the losing
bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy
appeared to have filed a complaint,
citing alleged false or falsified
documents submitted during the pre-
qualification stage which led to the
award of the IBP-80 project to private
respondent [Nerwin].
Thus, finding a way to nullify the
result of the previous bidding, NEA
officials sought the opinion of the
Government Corporate Counsel who,
among others, upheld the eligibility
and qualification of private respondent
[Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said
officials attempted to seek a revision
of the earlier opinion but the
Government Corporate Counsel
declared anew that there was no legal
impediment to prevent the award of
IPB-80 contract to private respondent
[Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA
 allegedly held negotiations with other On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its
bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract,
prompting private respondent rejoinder to respondents reply, the RTC granted a
[Nerwin] to file a complaint for TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.[4]
specific performance with prayer for
the issuance of an injunction, which
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,
injunctive application was granted by
[5]
Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil as follows:
Case No. 01102000.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing
In the interim, PNOC-Energy considerations, an order is hereby
Development Corporation purporting issued by this Court:
to be under the Department of Energy,
issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 1. DENYING the motion to
or an invitation to pre-qualify and to consolidate;
bid for wooden poles needed for its
Samar Rural Electrification Project 2. DENYING the urgent
(O-ILAW project). motion for reconsideration;

3. DISQUALIFYING Attys.
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition Michael A. Medado, Datu
Omar S. Sinsuat and
No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin
Mariano H. Paps from
filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as appearing as counsel for the
Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries defendants;
Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development
4. DECLARING defendants
Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, in default;
Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to 5. GRANTING the motion
for issuance of writ of
subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 preliminary injunction.
to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden Accordingly, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue enjoining
poles.
the defendant PNOC-EDC and its
Chairman of Bids and Awards
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Committee Esther R. Guerzon from
continuing the holding of the subject
Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint
bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a
averred no cause of action, violated the rule that bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to
government infrastructure projects were not to be answer for any damage or damages
subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory which the defendants may suffer
should it be finally adjudged that
prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the petitioner is not entitled thereto, until
corporate president had no authority to sign and file final determination of the issue in this
the complaint.[3] case by this Court.

This order shall become

effective only upon the posting of a
3
 bond by the plaintiffs in the amount
of P200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be
immediately served on the defendants
and strict compliance herein is
enjoined. Furnish the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel copy
of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of
the order of July 30, 2003, and also to set aside the
order of default and to admit their answer to the
complaint.
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied
respondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside
order of default, and to admit answer.[6]
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court
of Appeals (CA) a special civil action
for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that
the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite
the express prohibition from the law and from the
Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant
violation of the Rules of Court and established
jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default;
and in disqualifying respondents counsel from
representing them.[7]
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its
decision,[8] to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Orders
dated July 30 and December 29,
2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET
4
ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No.
03106921, private respondents
complaint for issuance of temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction before Branch 37 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CA denied the motion on February 9, 2005.[9]
Issues
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following
issues:
I. Whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing the case on the basis of
Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the
issuance of temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions,
except if issued by the Supreme
Court, on government projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in
ordering the dismissal of the entire
case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975
which prohibits the issuance only
of a preliminary injunction but not
injunction as a final remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing the case considering
that it is also one for damages.
Ruling
The petition fails.
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA
explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC issued on July 20,
2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether
dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of
the instant case is the propriety of
respondent Judges issuance of a
preliminary injunction, or the earlier
TRO, for that matter.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in entertaining an
application for TRO/preliminary
injunction, and worse, in issuing a
preliminary injunction through the
assailed order enjoining petitioners
sought bidding for its O-ILAW
Project. The same is a palpable
violation of RA 8975 which was
approved on November 7, 2000, thus,
already existing at the time respondent
Judge issued the assailed Orders dated
July 20 and December 29, 2003.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no
uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance
of temporary Restraining
Order, Preliminary
Injunctions and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions. No
court, except the Supreme
Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory
injunction against the
government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials, or any
person or entity, whether
public or private, acting
under the governments
direction, to restrain, prohibit
or compel the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of
contract/project of the
national government as
5
defined under Section 2
hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply
in all cases, disputes or
controversies instituted by a
private party, including but
not limited to cases filed by
bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such
bidders involving such
contract/project. This
prohibition shall not apply
when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that
unless a temporary
restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.
xxx
The said proscription is not entirely
new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD
1818 which earlier underscored the
prohibition to courts from issuing
restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources
Development projects of, and public
utilities operated by, the government.
This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to
have such a mandatory nature by the
Supreme Court in an administrative
case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance
of the said prohibition, the Supreme
Court had the same embodied in
its Administrative Circular No. 11-
2000 which reiterates the ban on
issuance of TRO or writs of
Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory
Injunction in cases involving
Government Infrastructure
Projects. Pertinent is the ruling
in National Housing Authority vs.
Allarde As regards the definition of
infrastructure projects, the Court
stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs.
Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha
Construction: The term infrastructure
projects means construction,
improvement and rehabilitation of
roads, and bridges, railways, airports,
seaports, communication facilities,
irrigation, flood control and drainage,
water supply and sewerage systems,
shore protection, power facilities,
national buildings, school buildings,
hospital buildings and other related
construction projects that form part of
the government capital investment.
Thus, there is nothing from the law or
jurisprudence, or even from the facts
of the case, that would justify
respondent Judges blatant disregard of
a simple, comprehensible and
unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818)
prohibiting the issuance of injunctive
writs relative to government
infrastructure projects. Respondent
Judge did not even endeavor, although
expectedly, to show that the instant
case falls under the single exception
where the said proscription may not
apply, i.e., when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a whether public or private, acting under
constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury
will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have
legally declared petitioner in default
because, in the first place, he should
not have given due course to private
respondents complaint for
injunction.Indubitably, the assailed
orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the
need to resolve the other grounds
proffered by petitioners.[10]
6
The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The
RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it
entertained the complaint of Nerwin against
respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby
contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to
enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW
Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and
the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8975 provide:
Section 3. Prohibition on the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions. No court, except the
Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials or any person or entity,
the governments direction, to restrain,
prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and
development of the right-of-way
and/or site or location of any national
government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of
contract/project of the national
government as defined under
Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution,
execution, implementation, operation
of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of
any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or
authorization of any other lawful
 activity necessary for such
contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all
cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including
but not limited to cases filed by
bidders or those claiming to have
rights through such bidders involving
such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil
constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury
will arise. The applicant shall file a
bond, in an amount to be fixed by the
court, which bond shall accrue in
favor of the government if the court
should finally decide that the applicant
was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court
finds that the award of the contract is
null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances,
award the contract to the qualified and
winning bidder or order a rebidding of
the same, without prejudice to any
liability that the guilty party may incur
under existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and
Orders. - Any temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction
issued in violation of Section 3
hereof is void and of no force and
effect.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and
unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do
except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin
obedience to them. The RTC could not have been
unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No.
8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed
all judges and justices of the lower courts, through
7
Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with
and respect the prohibition against the issuance of
TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or
mandatory injunction involving contracts and
projects of the Government.
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that
Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of
Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact
already found administratively liable for gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the
result of his issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could
only fine him in the amount of P40,000.00 last
August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening retirement
from the service. That sanction was meted on him in
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,
[11]
where this Court stated:
The Court finds that, indeed,
respondent is liable for gross
misconduct. As the CA explained in its
above-stated Decision in the petition
for certiorari, respondent failed to
heed the mandatory ban imposed by
P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975
against a government infrastructure
project, which the rural electrification
project certainly was. He thereby
likewise obstinately disregarded this
Courts various circulars enjoining
courts from issuing TROs and
injunctions against government
infrastructure projects in line with the
proscription under R.A. No.
8975.Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon.
Burgos and National Housing
Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this
Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818
expressly deprives courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs
against the implementation or
execution of a government
infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory
mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court
in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted
a judge for grave misconduct for
issuing a TRO against a government
infrastructure project thus:
xxx It appears that
respondent is either feigning
a misunderstanding of the
law or openly manifesting a
contumacious indifference
thereto. In any case, his
disregard of the clear
mandate of PD 1818, as well
as of the Supreme Court
Circulars enjoining strict
compliance therewith,
constitutes grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to
the proper administration of
justice. His claim that the
said statute is inapplicable to
his January 21, 1997 Order
extending the dubious TRO
is but a contrived subterfuge
to evade administrative
liability.
In resolving matters in
litigation, judges should
endeavor assiduously to
ascertain the facts and the
applicable laws. Moreover,
they should exhibit more
than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules. Also,
they are expected to keep
abreast of and be
conversant with the rules
and the circulars which the
Supreme Court has
adopted and which affect
the disposition of cases
before them.
8
Although judges have in
their favor the presumption
of regularity and good faith
in the performance of their
judicial functions, a blatant
disregard of the clear and
unmistakable terms of the
law obviates this
presumption and renders
them susceptible to
administrative sanctions.
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The pronouncements
in Caguioa apply as well to
respondent.
The questioned acts of
respondent also constitute gross
ignorance of the law for being patently
in disregard of simple, elementary and
well-known rules which judges are
expected to know and apply properly.
IN FINE, respondent is guilty
of gross misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law, which are
serious charges under Section 8 of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He
having retired from the service, a fine
in the amount of P40,000 is imposed
upon him, the maximum amount fixed
under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an
alternative sanction to dismissal or
suspension.[12]
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered
any further treatment and discussion of Nerwins other
submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court
notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate the
real nature and true purpose of the injunctive remedy.
This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this
decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long
standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance
of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on
conformity to them by all litigants and lower courts.
Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in
Civil Case No. 03106921 be avoided.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted
at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or
acts.[13] It is an ancillary or preventive remedy
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his
rights or interests during the pendency of the case. As
such, it is issued only when it is established that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the
act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or
non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting
to do, or is procuring or suffering to
be done, some act or acts probably
in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.[14]
The existence of a right to be protected by the
injunctive relief is indispensable. In City Government
of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System
(CBS), Inc.,[15] the Court elaborated on this
requirement, viz:
As with all equitable remedies,
injunction must be issued only at the
9
instance of a party who possesses
sufficient interest in or title to the right
or the property sought to be protected.
It is proper only when the applicant
appears to be entitled to the relief
demanded in the complaint, which
must aver the existence of the right
and the violation of the right, or whose
averments must in the minimum
constitute a prima facie showing of a
right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the
issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a)
that the right to be protected
exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of
that right; and (c) that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a
right not in esse, or a right which is
merely contingent and may never
arise; or to restrain an act which
does not give rise to a cause of
action; or to prevent the
perpetration of an act prohibited by
statute. Indeed, a right, to be
protected by injunction, means a
right clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter
of law.[16]
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be
protected is not demanded, however, for, as the Court
has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,[17] it is enough
that:
xxx for the court to act, there
must be an existing basis of facts
affording a present right which is
directly threatened by an act sought
to be enjoined. And while a clear
showing of the right claimed is
necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. In fact, the
evidence to be submitted to justify
preliminary injunction at the hearing
thereon need not be conclusive or
complete but need only be a sampling
 intended merely to give the court an idea
of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the
case on the merits. This should really
be so since our concern here involves
only the propriety of the preliminary
injunction and not the merits of the
case still pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of
preliminary injunction, the private
respondent needs only to show that it
has the ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.
[18]
minds should be to guard against a change of
circumstances that will hamper or prevent the
granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.
[30]
It is well worth remembering that the writ of
preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent
the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to
the applicant before the claim can be justly and
thoroughly studied and adjudicated.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad

latitude to the trial courts considering that conflicting
claims in an application for a provisional writ more
often than not involve and require a factual
determination that is not the function of the appellate
courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion
must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ,
though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and
in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is done,
the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing court
in injunctive matters must not be interfered with
except when there is manifest abuse.[21]

Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the

injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently or
unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of
injunction that tend to disposeof the merits without or
before trial. Granting an application for the relief in
disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,
[22]
for it is never the function of a TRO or
preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a
case,[23] or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a
preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent
threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable
harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties
can be settled. Judges should thus look at such relief
only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to
render a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their

10

FELIPE SY DUNGOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUAN A. GATO, in his official
capacity as RTC Sheriff, Lapu-Lapu City
and CARLOS GOTHONG LINES,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the
Decision[2] dated 14 May 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48788, as well as the
Resolution dated 24 August 1999 denying the motion
for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed
outright the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus filed by petitioner Felipe Sy Dungog
(Felipe) against respondents. The petition questioned
the propriety of the Order[3] dated 14 August 1998
(Order) and the writ of preliminary injunction (Writ)
dated 18 August 1998 issued by the RegionalTrial
Court of Cebu, Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 53 (trial
court) in Civil Case No. 5020-L.
The Antecedents
Tracing the roots of this controversy, Felipe
alleges[4] that he and his sister, Fortune, agreed to sell
their lots in Canjulao, Cebu, through their parents,
Juan L. Dungog and Emma S. Dungog (Spouses
Dungog). The Spouses Dungog convinced other lot
owners in Canjulao to sell their lots either directly to
them or to Felipe and his sister. On 31 December
1996, the Spouses Dungog entered into a Contract to
11
Sell (Contract) with private respondent Carlos A.
Gothong Lines, Inc. (Gothong Lines) covering
several lots in Canjulao. The lots which the Spouses
Dungog contracted to sell to Gothong Lines belonged
to various individuals as listed in the Contracts
Annex A[5] which specified the corresponding
approximate land areas of each lot. Among these was
Lot 1031-F registered in the name of Felipe and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10359 of
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City. Under the
Contract, Gothong Lines was to pay on installment
basis the purchase price of P65,520,475.00 computed
at P500 per square meter. Thus, Gothong Lines paid a
down payment of P12,000,000.00.For the balance
of P53,520,475.00,[6] Gothong Lines issued 15
postdated checks of P3,568,031.00 each beginning on
31 January 1997 as payment for 15 equal monthly
installments.Gothong Lines made good all the
checks, except the last 4 checks dated 30 December
1997, 31 January 1998, 28 February 1998 and 30
March 1998, which bounced due to Gothong Lines
stop payment order.
Felipe alleges further that as of 31 December
1997, his parents had delivered 66 parcels of land to
Gothong Lines with a total area of 101,104.20 square
meters valued atP50,552,100.00. Felipe also states
that as of the same date, Gothong Lines had
paid P51,248,345.00 in encashed checks plus the
initial down payment of P12,000,000.00. This left an
overpayment of P696,245.00 in the hands of the
Spouses Dungog. Felipe claims, however, that despite
Gothong Lines stop payment order of its last four
checks, the Spouses Dungog still delivered in
February 1998, 8 parcels of land with a total land
area of 11,590 square meters valued
at P5,795,000.00. Among those delivered was Lot
1031-F. The Spouses Dungog demanded payment for
these 8 parcels of land, but Gothong Lines refused to
pay. The Spouses Dungog became frustrated with
Gothong Lines complete silence on their demands for
payment, as well as the earlier stop payment order on
the last 4 checks. Thus, the Spouses Dungog
informed Gothong Lines in a letter dated 18 June
1998 that they would no longer push through with
their offer to sell the remaining lots.
On 6 July 1998, Gothong Lines filed a complaint
for Specific Performance, Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the
Spouses Dungog to enforce the Contract.Gothong
Lines faulted the Spouses Dungog for non-delivery of
some of the parcels of land in breach of the
Contract. Gothong Lines alleged that while the total
amount of P51,248,348.26 paid to the Spouses
Dungog corresponds to 102,496.69 square meters, the
Spouses Dungog actually delivered to Gothong Lines
only 100,613.69 square meters. Gothong Lines
claimed that it paid an excess
of P941,848.00[7] corresponding to 1,883 square
meters. To protect its interest, Gothong Lines ordered
the bank to stop payment on the remaining postdated
checks.Gothong Lines asked the trial court to issue a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the Spouses
Dungog from canceling the Contract and from
preventing its representatives and vehicles from
passing through the properties subject of the
Contract. Gothong Lines offered to post a bond
of P500,000.00 and consigned the P4,048,950.00
representing the balance of the purchase price.
Traversing Gothong Lines allegations, the
Spouses Dungog contended that it was Gothong
Lines which breached the Contract by stopping
payment on the last 4 checks. The Spouses Dungog
also charged Gothong Lines with competing with
them in acquiring one of the lots subject of the
Contract. They further countered that Gothong Lines
violated a verbal agreement between them not to
develop the roads until after 30 June 1998, the last
day for the Spouses Dungog to deliver and turn over
the lots. The Spouses Dungog opposed Gothong
Lines application for a writ of preliminary injunction
on the ground that Gothong Lines violated the terms
of the Contract and the other contemporaneous
agreements between them.
Based on the pleadings and affidavits presented
by the parties, the trial court granted on 14 August
1998 Gothong Lines prayer for injunction. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, plaintiffs application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction is
GRANTED. Consequently, after the filing and
approval of a bond in the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue, enjoining defendants,
their representatives, or anyone acting in their
behalf; (a) from canceling the contract to sell dated
December 31, 1996; and (b) from disallowing or
12
preventing the entry and exit of plaintiffs vehicles
and those of its representatives through Lot 1031-F
and other undelivered lots concerned.[8]
Based on this Order, the trial court issued the
Writ on 18 August 1998 which the sheriff served on
the same date.
Felipe assailed the Order and the Writ in a
special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, however, dismissed
outright Felipes petition. The appellate court also
denied on 24 August 1999 Felipes motion for
reconsideration. Thus, Felipe filed the instant petition
questioning the propriety of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court.
The Rulings of the Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals
In granting the Writ, the trial court stated -
There is no dispute that plaintiff has already paid
defendants the amount of P51,248,348.26 out of the
total consideration of P65,520,475.00. Plaintiff has
also deposited with the Office of the Clerk of Court
the amount of P4,048,950.00, leaving a balance
of P10,223,176.74.
Plaintiff had already started the road development in
the properties delivered to it. In other words, it has
already spent much to develop the properties which
form the bulk of the parcels of land subject of the
contract.
Ingress to and egress from plaintiffs development
activities lie on an undelivered parcel of
land. Through it pass the vehicles, equipment,
supplies and materials, as well as the workers,
required by the project.The closure of this passage
has apparently stymied the development in the area.
About 78% of the properties are in the hands of
plaintiff. Access to these properties is under the
control of defendants, the entrance being located in
Lot 1031-F, one of the remaining undelivered
lots. Since the entrance gate has been closed by
defendants, it strikes the mind of the court that Lot
1031-F and the other undelivered lots have now, in a
manner of speaking, imprisoned the delivered
properties.
It is not therefore hard to see that the closure of the
entrance gate has worked to the prejudice of plaintiff
and will certainly jeopardize the development work
in the delivered properties. Elementary justice and the
spirit of fair play thus dictate that the status quo ante,
which is the situation before the closure when
plaintiffs representatives were able to pass through
Lot 1031-F, be restored.
Insofar as defendants threatened cancellation of the
contract to sell, the Court has seen that out of the total
area of 131,040.95 square meters covered by the
contract, plaintiff had already paid for 102,496.69
square meters, and that it had
deposited P4,048,950.00 to pay for some of the
undelivered parcels. It is but fair that such a move be,
in the meantime, disallowed.[9]
In dismissing outright Felipes petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the
trial courts Order and the Writ, the Court of Appeals
stated -
The petition should be dismissed outright, the
petitioner has no standing here. He may be the owner
of the lot in question but he is not a party litigant in
the case a quo. His being a son of defendant spouse in
the lower court does not give him the capacity to
sue. Of course, he is not without legal remedy to
protect his interest.[10]
The Issue
In his Memorandum, Felipe narrows the inquiry
to -
MAY PETITIONER BE DEPRIVED OF HIS
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR
THE BENEFIT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT?[11]
Felipe laments that the dismissal of his petition
resulted in the outright confiscation of his property
for the private use of Gothong Lines, without due
process of law and just compensation. Felipe claims
13
that in dismissing his petition, the Court of Appeals
effectively sustained the trial courts Order divesting
him of his rights over Lot 1031-F.
The question of whether Gothong Lines may
demand the turn over of the parcels of land listed in
Annex A of the Contract is not our concern here. The
issue in this petition is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing Felipes petition.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Dismissal by the Court of Appeals of
Felipes petition was proper.
Felipe committed a procedural blunder in filing a
special civil action for certiorari to assail the Order
and the Writ. Felipe was not a party in Civil Case No.
5020-L. He could not, therefore, assail the writ of
preliminary injunction through a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Felipe does not
possess the requisite standing to file such suit.
In Ciudad Real v. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court
ruled that there is grave abuse of discretion if the
appellate court recognizes the standing of a party, not
a litigant in the trial court proceedings, to join a
petition for certiorari. The Court explained:
Worse was the ruling of the respondent appellate
court sanctioning the standing of Magdiwang Realty
Corporation to join said petition for certiorari. As the
records show, Magdiwang filed a Motion for
Intervention on July 18, 1989 invoking its alleged
Memorandum of Agreement with Doa Juana
Development Corporation dated July 15, 1982. The
trial court, however, denied this motion and
Magdiwang did not question the ruling in the
appellate court. The ruling thus, became final. After
about two (2) years or on August 27, 1991,
Magdiwang again filed a Motion to Substitute and/or
Join as Party/Plaintiff relying on the same
Memorandum of Agreement. The trial court similarly
denied the motion, and the denial also attained
finality as Magdiwang did not further challenge its
correctness. Despite the finality of the order denying
Magdiwangs intervention way back in 1989, the
respondent court in its Decision of August 20, 1992
recognized the standing of Magdiwang to assail in the
appellate court the Compromise Agreement. Again,
this ruling constitutes grave abuse of discretion for
Magdiwang was not a party in interest in Civil Case
No. Q-35393.
The wisdom of this ruling is all too apparent. If a
person not a party to an action is allowed to file a
certiorari petition assailing an interlocutory order of
the trial court, such as an injunctive order and writ,
proceedings will become unnecessarily complicated,
expensive and interminable. Eventually, this will
defeat the policy of our remedial laws to secure
party-litigants a speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action.
Felipe could have simply intervened[13] in the
trial court proceedings to enable him to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by
such proceedings. A motion to intervene may be filed
at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court.[14] The purpose of intervention is not to obstruct
or unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the
machinery of trial. The purpose is merely to afford
one, not an original party but possessing a certain
right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity
to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect
such right or interest.[15] Indeed, Felipe could have
easily joined his parents as defendants in resisting the
claim of Gothong Lines.
A resolution affirming the Court of Appeals
outright dismissal of Felipes petition for these
reasons would have been sufficient. Nevertheless, we
deem it best to address the propriety of the issuance
by the trial court of the writ of preliminary injunction
before writing finis to this petition.
Issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
was also proper.
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of an action, prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to
perform or to refrain from performing a particular act
or acts.[16] A preliminary injunction, as the term itself
14
suggests, is merely temporary, subject to the final
disposition of the principal action. Its purpose is to
preserve the statusquo of the matter subject of the
action to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the
pendency of the suit. Otherwise, if no preliminary
injunction is issued, the defendant may, before final
judgment, do the act which the plaintiff is seeking the
court to restrain. This will make ineffectual the final
judgment that the court may afterwards render in
granting relief to the plaintiff.[17]
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
rests entirely within the discretion of the court and is
generally not interfered with except in cases of
manifest abuse.[18] The assessment and evaluation of
evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to
the trial court for its conclusive determination.[19]
We find that there was adequate justification for
the issuance of the assailed writ of preliminary
injunction. There is no dispute that the Spouses
Dungog entered into the Contract with Gothong
Lines which included Lot 1031-F owned by
Felipe. Felipe admitted that he authorized his parents
to sell this lot. He also admitted that his parents had
delivered to Gothong Lines Lot 1031-F along with
other parcels of land. However, the Spouses Dungog
threatened to cancel the Contract and to deny
Gothong Lines passage through Lot 1031-F allegedly
due to non-payment of the subsequent installments.
In applying for the Writ, Gothong Lines sought
to restrain in the meantime the Spouses Dungog from
canceling the Contract in order not to render the
judgment ineffectual. Gothong Lines also sought to
preserve its right of way through Lot 1031-F to
maintain access to the other parcels of land
previously delivered by the Spouses Dungog to
Gothong Lines.
A careful reading of the trial courts assailed
Order discloses that the Writ enjoined the cancelation
of the Contract on the basis of Gothong Lines
substantial performance of the Contract. The trial
court also enjoined the closure of the entrance gate in
Lot 1031-F to preserve the status quo ante.
Under Section 3, Rule 58[20] of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction is proper
when the plaintiff appears entitled to the relief
demanded in the complaint. The trial court found that
Gothong Lines had already paid P51,248,348.26 out
of the total consideration of P65,520,475.00. Gothong
Lines also consigned with the court an
additional P4,048,950.00 leaving a balance
of P10,223,176.74. The trial court likewise found that
78% of the properties were already in the possession
of Gothong Lines. Moreover, the status quo, which is
the last actual peaceable uncontested status that
preceded the controversy,[21] was that Gothong
Lines had access to the lots subject of the Contract
through the entrance gate in Lot 1031-F. That is why
Gothong Lines commenced construction of its pier
and the development of the roads within the parcels
of land covered by the Contract. The issuance of the
Writ would no doubt preserve the status quo between
the Spouses Dungog and Gothong Lines that existed
prior to the filing of the case. We agree with the trial
court that the status quo should be maintained until
the issue on the parties respective rights and
obligations under the Contract is determined after the
trial.
Clearly, in issuing the Writ, the trial court did not
forthwith deprive Felipe of his ownership of Lot
1031-F. Neither did the Writ have the effect of
ousting Felipe from possession of the lot.The trial
court did not rule on the merits of the case so as to
amount to a deprivation or confiscation of property
without due process of law or just
compensation. There was no adjudication on the
rightful possession or ownership of the contested
parcels of land subject of the Contract. The trial court
issued the injunction only as a preventive remedy to
protect during the pendency of the action Gothong
Lines right to a final and effective relief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.

15
 for Reconsideration. The CA set aside the
11,Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
[3]
MANUEL D. RECTO, CESAR A. DIGNOS, and 2010
FRANCISCO S. AONUEVO, of Quezon City, Branch 93, in Civil Case No. Q-01-
Petitioners, 43011.

- versus -
The factual antecedents are as follows:
BISHOP FEDERICO O. ESCALER, S.J.,
JOAQUINA De ARANAZ, FILOMENA Buklod ng Pag-ibig Foundation, Inc. (Foundation) is
BAGAMASBAD, ELADIA BANGUILAN,
TEODONIA BANZON, TERESITA BELEN, a non-stock, non-profit foundation, duly registered
REMEDIOS CALO, MANSUETA CO, with the Securities and Exchange Commission
ZENAIDA CRUZ, LINA DATU, AURORA (SEC). On June 24, 1997, its principal co-founder
ELORIAGA, MAGDALENA
FAJATIN, LEONARDA FALLARME, CHI
* and Spiritual Director, Fr. Pascual Adorable, S.J.,
GANA, LUTGARDA GARCIA, UBALDO passed away. Fr. Nicasio Cruz, S.J. (Fr. Nic)
ISAAC, CATHERINE LIM, CORAZON succeeded him as the Foundations Spiritual Director. [4]

LORENZO, ENRIQUETA MANABAT,

GUADALUPE MATADOS, DOMINGA
MENOR, EFREN MONJE, PILAR MONJE, However, on September 15, 1999, petitioners,
POMPEYA NAVAL, WILTECK ONG, as the Foundations Council of Elders (Elders), wrote
ELEODORO PARENTELA, ANTONIA
to Rev. Fr. Romeo Intengan, Jesuit Provincial of the
PARENTELA, OLIVIA PEREZ, ALICIA
QUIMSON, ELSIE RODRIGUEZ, RAFAELA Society of Jesus (Jesuit Order), informing him that
SANTOS, MELENCIA SESE, VIRGINIA they were returning Fr. Nic to the Jesuit Order
SUGCANG, DIONISIA TRINIDAD, JOSELITO effective September 15, 1999 since the latters vision
B. FLORO, LOURDES FLORO, ANDREA
GUTIERREZ, FENNY ESPINORIO, AND and mission differed from those of the Foundation.
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners also sent Fr. Nic a letter terminating him
Respondents. as the Foundations Spiritual Director. Some members
x------------------------------------------------------------------- of the Foundation requested that Fr. Nic be retained,
---------------x but petitioners did not heed the request.
[5]

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners Manuel D. Recto (Recto), Cesar A.
Consequently, Bishop Teodoro Bacani
(Bishop Bacani), as representative of then Manila
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin, intervened. He
reinstated Fr. Nic until the latter could turn over the
position to Bishop Federico Escaler, S.J. (Bishop
Escaler), either 30 days after March 6, 2000 or on
April 15, 2000. Petitioners agreed with Bishop
Bacanis proposal. [6]

Dignos, and Francisco S. Aonuevo assail the

Decision dated February 21, 2006 of the Court of
[1]

On May 10, 2000, acting as the Foundations

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78227 and its
Spiritual Director, Bishop Escaler informed the
Resolution dated June 9, 2006, denying their Motion
[2]

16
Foundations Apostles that, pursuant to its By-laws,
[7]
the term of the present Elders should have ended on
March 17, 2000. He then set May 19, 2000 as the
date for the selection of a new set of Elders. Bishop
Escaler also sent petitioner Recto, the Foundations
Executive Director, a letter requesting for the
Foundations latest annual financial report and list of
personnel.[8]
Instead of complying with the letter,
petitioners issued Buklod ng Pag-ibig Bulletin
Number 6, informing their members that Bishop
Escaler was not their Spiritual Director; and that the
Foundation had no Spiritual Director at that moment.
Bishop Escaler reset the intended selection of Elders
to May 24, 2000. [9]
Subsequently, petitioners submitted to the
SEC the Foundations Amended By-laws, supposedly
ratified by 2/3 votes of the members who were
qualified to vote in a special meeting held on May 14,
2000. The SEC approved the same on May 16, 2000.
Petitioners also issued a notice to the Foundations
members, naming Fr. Dominador Guzman as their
Spiritual Director, and inviting qualified members to
attend the selection of Elders on May 24, 2000.[10]
On May 23, 2000, respondents filed before
the SEC a Petition to Declare the Nullity of the
Amended By-laws with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Respondents alleged that the
subject Amended By-laws was void because Bishop
Escaler, the Foundations Spiritual Director, did not
preside over the supposed meeting where the
amendments were approved, and the majority of
qualified members was not even notified or given the
opportunity to participate in the voting. Respondents
17
also prayed that petitioners be restrained from
conducting their scheduled selection of Elders on
May 24, 2000. [11]
On the same day, the SEC issued a 72-hour
TRO barring petitioners from holding the scheduled
selection of Elders. On May 29, 2000, the SEC
extended the TRO for another 20 days. The SEC also
directed petitioners to submit the Foundations
financial reports, and scheduled the examination of
the same on June 5, 2000.[12]
At the hearing on the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on May 30, 2000, the parties
agreed to respect the May 29, 2000 Order, pending
determination of the injunction case. However, on
June 9, 2000, Bishop Escaler set the special assembly
for the election of the new set of Elders on June 17,
2000.[13]
Petitioners, in their Answer with Special
Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim and prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of a TRO filed on June 13, 2000, asked that
Bishop Escaler be enjoined from proceeding with the
June 17, 2000 assembly. They also asserted that the
number of members qualified to vote was 27 not 59
as claimed by respondents and that the Amended By-
laws was approved by 2/3 of said members, as
required by the previous By-laws. Petitioners
specifically denied having accepted Bishop Escaler as
the Foundations Spiritual Director.
[14]
On June 15, 2000, petitioners filed an
Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Retraining Order, praying for a TRO
effective only for 72 hours to prevent respondents
from conducting an election on June 17, 2000. The
following day, a hearing on petitioners motion was
held. After the parties respective counsels oral
arguments, the SEC Hearing Officer ordered
petitioners Urgent Motion to be submitted for
resolution. [15]
On June 22, 2000, a hearing on respondents
application for Preliminary Injunction was held,
while hearings on petitioners own application for
Preliminary Injunction were held on June 28, and
July 3 and 4, 2000.
In the meantime, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8799 took effect in August 2000. Pursuant to
[16]
Section 5.2 of that law, the case was transferred to the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93. [17]
Consequently, during the August 1, 2000
hearing, the SEC Hearing Officer submitted the issue
on the issuance of Preliminary Injunction for
resolution. On the other hand, the trial court issued an
Order on February 5, 2001, setting a status hearing on
May 15, 2001. [18]
On May 15, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order resolving to focus on the issues of (1)
[19]
whether or not the court should proceed to hear the
case on the principal prayer for the nullification of
the Amended By-laws of the concerned corporation;
and (2) whether or not the court should proceed to
resolve the injunction incident, which appears to have
been submitted for final resolution before the SEC
even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8799. The
RTC directed the parties to submit their simultaneous
memoranda on these two issues and, upon receipt
thereof, to consider these incidents submitted for
18
resolution. The RTC also ordered respondents to file
their Comments and/or Opposition to Defendants
(herein petitioners) Motion to Expunge, and
petitioners to file their Comment and/or Opposition
to respondents Motion to Admit Amended Petition,
setting the hearing for these motions on July 5, 2001.
[20]
On July 5, 2001, the trial court submitted for
resolution petitioners Motion to Expunge from the
Records Audit Report, and respondents Motion to
Admit Amended Petition.
Subsequently, on November 21, 2001, the
trial court issued an order denying petitioners
[21]
Motion to Expunge and respondents Motion to
Admit, and resolving to proceed to hear the case on
the principal prayer for the nullification of the second
Amended By-laws, and to consider the resolution of
the parties respective applications for injunction.
On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued the assailed
Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
[22]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing
premises considered, the court finds in
part, for the plaintiffs. The acts of the
council of elders and of the general
assembly held on May 3 and May 14,
2000, respectively, insofar as the
amendment of the by-laws is
concerned, are considered irregular
and consequently, the alleged
Amended By-laws of May 14, 2000 is
declared null and void.
This is not to say that Buklod
or the elders may not initiate the
amendment of their by-laws. They
may do so but only in keeping with
the requirements as explained above.
 The counterclaim is
consequently dismissed.
No award of damages. No
costs. [23]
The trial court noted that the only question
raised in the case was the validity of the 2000
Amended By-laws as allegedly approved in the
special meeting called for that purpose. [24]
Both parties appealed the Judgment to the
CA.
In its assailed February 21, 2006 Decision, the CA
disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs-
Appellants Appeal is GRANTED.
Defendants-Appellants Appeal is
accordingly DISMISSED. The
assailed Judgment, dated July 29,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 93, in Civil Case
No. Q[-]01-43011, is
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE.
In view of this, the case
is REMANDED to the court a quo for
the required pre-trial conference and
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED. [25]
The CA held that the RTC failed to comply with Rule
4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for
Intra-Corporate Controversies, which provides that a
pre-trial conference is mandatory.
The CA found that, at the time of the promulgation of
the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
19
Controversies, the SEC Hearing Officer submitted for
resolution the prayer for injunction but chose not to
proceed with the hearing of the merits of the case to
enable the judge to hear the case in court. Upon
transfer, the RTC did not issue an order, as required
by the Rules. Instead, the RTC issued a Judgment,
wholly deciding the merits of the complaint. [26]
Thus, the CA ruled that, at the time of the issuance of
the RTCs Judgment, the case was not yet ripe for
decision. It also noted that there was nothing in the
records to suggest that the parties had agreed to
waive their right to a pre-trial conference or to a
hearing on the merits to allow the RTC to resolve the
case without complying with the mandatory rule. The
issuance of the Judgment was premature, the CA
concluded.
In this petition, petitioners seek the reversal of the
CAs February 21, 2006 Decision. They pray that this
Court modify the trial courts Judgment and declare
that Bishop Escaler is not and has never been the
Foundations Spiritual Director; thus, dismissing the
complaint and declaring that the Foundations
Amended By-laws was duly ratified by 2/3 votes of
its qualified apostles in an assembly duly called for
the purpose, and therefore, valid and effective. [27]
The petition has no merit.
Even a cursory examination of the issues
raised immediately leads this Court to conclude that
these are questions of fact that are not within the
province of this Court to decide. More importantly,
these are questions of fact that have never been
ventilated in the proper proceedings before the trial
court because the case did not even reach the pre-trial
stage.
Prior to rendering the assailed Judgment, the
RTC issued an Order, to wit:
This resolves the following incidents:
1. whether or not the court
should proceed to hear the case on the
principal prayer for the nullification of
the by-laws of BNP Foundation;
2. whether or not the court
should proceed to resolve the
injunction incident which appears to
have been submitted for resolution
before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC);
3. motion to expunge from
the records the audit report that was
prepared by the petitioners and the
opposition thereto;
4. motion to admit amended
complaint. [28]
The RTC then ordered:
The case now being with the
court pursuant to Republic Act No.
8799, and the parties being both in
agreement that the incidents then
pending with the SEC may now be
resolved by this court, the first two
issues above-listed are therefore
resolved in the affirmative.
The court therefore shall
proceed to hear the case on the
principal prayer for the nullification of
the second amended by-laws and shall
also consider the resolution of the
incidents then pending with the SEC
20
which involve the parties respective
applications for injunction.[29]
Clearly, even the RTC itself recognized the
need to hear the case in order to resolve the principal
issue of the validity of the Foundations Amended By-
laws. Yet, after issuing the Order, and without any
further proceedings, the RTC promulgated its
Judgment, resolving the main issues of the case.
Further, the conduct of a pre-trial is mandatory under
the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies. Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim
Rules provides:
Section 1. Pre-trial
conference; mandatory nature. Within
five (5) days in Rule 3 hereof,
whichever comes later, the court shall
issue and serve an order immediately
setting the case for pre-trial
conference and directing the after the
period for availment of, and
compliance with, the modes of
discovery prescribed parties to submit
their respective pre-trial briefs. The
parties shall file with the court and
furnish each other copies of their
respective pre-trial brief in such
manner as to ensure its receipt by the
court and the other party at least five
(5) days before the date set for pre-
trial.
Rule 4, Section 4 further states:
Sec. 4. Judgment before pre-
trial. If, after submission of the pre-
trial briefs, the court determines that,
upon consideration of the pleadings,
 the affidavits and other evidence
submitted by the parties, a judgment
may be rendered, the court may order
the parties to file simultaneously their
respective memoranda within a non-
extendible period of twenty (20) days
from receipt of the order. Thereafter,
the court shall render judgment, either
full or otherwise, not later than ninety
(90) days from the expiration of the
period to file the memoranda.
However, the RTC never ordered the
submission of the parties pre-trial briefs. Neither
were they made to submit their memoranda. Earlier
in the proceedings, both parties were ordered to
submit their memoranda on the issue of whether the
RTC should proceed with the hearing of the case on
the merits. Both parties agreed that it should. They
believed that the case was not yet ripe for final
disposition and that the RTC should proceed to hear
the case on the principal prayer for the nullification
of the Amended By-laws of the Foundation.
Thus, petitioners said:
Therefore, in so far as the
Petitioners [herein respondents]
are concerned, there appears to be
three remaining matters that needs
(sic) to be resolved: the
nullification of the by-laws, the
proscription from the enforcement
of the recently amended by-laws
by the respondents and the matter
of the attorneys fees. Petitioners
[herein respondents] may have
presented evidence on the first two
but the third cause of action does
not appear to have been ventilated
as yet. There is also the matter of
the compulsory counterclaim of
the Respondents [herein
petitioners], which was not yet
likewise heard. This would verily
21
take this case out of that
classification of being ready for
final resolution or disposition of
the intra-corporate dispute.[30]
On the other hand, respondents said:
However, the SEC has not ruled yet on
the parties respective formal offer of
Exhibits relative to the injunction
issue; and was yet to hear the main
case where one of the main reliefs
prayed for was the declaration of the
nullity of the assailed amended By-
laws. [31]
Likewise, the Judgment of the RTC is bereft
of any justification for dispensing with the pre-trial
and trial. There was no discussion of any agreement
by the parties to dispense with the trial and submit
the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. In
fact, because there was no pre-trial, it remains unclear
exactly what issues are to be resolved by the trial
court.
It must also be pointed out that there was a
preliminary issue that of the parties respective
petitions for injunction that had to be determined
before the resolution of the main case. When the case
was transferred from the SEC to the RTC, only the
matter of the petitions for preliminary injunctions had
been heard and submitted for resolution. The hearings
to resolve the petition to nullify the Foundations
Amended By-laws were yet to be held.
An injunctive writ is not a judgment on the
merits of the case.[32] A writ of preliminary injunction
is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing
on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
is not conclusive or complete, for only a sampling is
needed to give the trial court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending
the decision of the case on the merits.[33]
conduct a pre-trial in Civil Case No. Q-01-43011, and
thereafter to hear and decide the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

An order granting a preliminary injunction

is not a final resolution or decision disposing of the
case. It is based on a preliminary determination of
the status quo and on petitioners entitlement to the
Writ.[34]

Thus, the findings of fact and opinion of a

court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
are interlocutory in nature and made before the trial
on the merits is commenced or terminated. There may
be vital facts to be presented at trial which may not
be obtained or presented during the hearing on the
application for the injunctive writ.[35] The trial court
needs to conduct substantial proceedings in order to
put the main controversy to rest.[36]

As such, even as respondents claim that the

RTC correctly ruled that the Amended By-laws are
not valid, they are still contesting the latters finding
on the number of qualified apostles. This only
[37]
MICHELLE I. PINEDA,
further underscores the need for trial to determine Petitioner,
which of the parties claims are true and relevant.
There are other questions raised that cannot be
answered in the present petition, and nothing less
than a full-blown trial is needed in order to test the - versus -
conflicting claims of the parties.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,

COURT OF APPEALS (Former
the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of
Ninth Division) and the
the Court of Appeals dated February 21, 2006 in CA- DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
G.R. CV. No. 78227 is hereby AFFIRMED. The represented by Assistant Secretary
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to CAMILO MIGUEL M. MONTESA,
22
 Respondents. Dr. Blas sent a letter-reply on September 17, 2004
[4]

X
---------------------------------------------------------------- and an exchange of correspondence followed.
-----------------------X Meanwhile, on August 14, 2004, Pineda and Dr.
[5]

Blas executed another MOA (August-MOA)

superseding the May-MOA. This time, the August-
[6]

DECISION MOA followed the standard form under Department

Order No. 95, Series of 1998 or the Revised
[7]

Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School

MENDOZA, J.:
Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 In this regard, on October 20, 2004, Assistant
filed by petitioner Michelle I. Schools Division Superintendent Isabelita M.
Pineda (Pineda) seeking to annul and set aside the Santos (Ms. Santos) and Administrative
June 15, 2007 Decision of the Court of Officer Vicente N. Macarubbo (Mr. Macarubbo)
Appeals (CA), which reversed the March 14, 2005
[1]
wrote a letter to Dr. Quiones relaying their
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig observations on the controversy and recommending
City (RTC) directing the issuance of a Writ of that their findings be submitted to the DepEd -
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining Central Office for its final word on the matter. Ms.
[8]

respondent Department of Education (DepEd) from
enforcing its decision to cancel a 5-year lease of the
school canteen.
It appears from the records that on May 14,
2004, Pineda entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (May-MOA) with [2]
Lakandula High
School (LHS) represented by its principal, Dr. Alice
B. Blas (Dr. Blas), for a five-year lease of the school
canteen with a monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an
additional P4,000.00 monthly for the schools feeding
program as well as medicines for the school clinic.
Thereafter, Pineda renovated the canteen and
equipped it with new utensils, tables, chairs, and
electric fans. [3]
Santos and Mr. Macarubbo were of the view that Dr.
Blas did not violate any rule in executing the August-
MOA. They even found the lease to Pineda beneficial
to the school. Thus, Dr. Quiones wrote the DepEd
seeking its decision on the matter.
On February 11, 2005, respondent DepEd,
through Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon (Usec. Gascon), declared the August-
MOA null and void ab initio and ordered it cancelled.
Pineda was also ordered to cease and desist from
further managing and operating the canteen. DepEd
made clear that the management and operation of the
canteen should revert to the Home Economics
Department of the School. This prompted Pineda to
[9]

file a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary

On August 5, 2004, the faculty and personnel restraining order(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
of LHS sent a letter to the Division School injunction before the RTC.
Superintendent, Dr. Ma. Luisa Quiones (Dr. On March 14, 2005, the RTC ordered the
Quiones), questioning the validity of the May-MOA. issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory

23
Injunction enjoining the enforcement of Usec.
THE HONORABLE
Gascons decision. DepEd, represented by Usec.
[10]
COURT OF APPEALS
Gascon, Dr. Quiones and Ms. Olympiada COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
Camilo (Ms. Camilo), who succeeded Dr. Blas as DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF
School Principal, sought the dismissal of Pinedas
JURISDICTION WHEN INSTEAD
petition before the RTC on the ground that the latter OF DISMISSING THE PETITION
failed to state a cause of action. On June 7, 2005, the FILED BY RESPONDENT
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
trial court denied its motion. For said reason,
[11]

THROUGH ASSISTANT
DepEd, this time represented by Assistant Secretary SECRETARY CAMILO MIGUEL
Camilo Miguel M. Montesa (Asec. Montesa), filed a M. MONTESA, IT GAVE DUE
petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to set COURSE TO IT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE
aside the March 14, 2005 and June 7, 2005 orders of GLARING FACT THAT IT WAS
the RTC. NOT A PARTY AT ALL IN SCA
NO. 2797, HENCE, WITH NO
LOCUS STANDI.
The CA affirmed the June 7, 2005 order of the
RTC denying DepEds motion to dismiss but reversed
its March 14, 2005 order granting the issuance of the II
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. According
THE HONORABLE
to the CA, DepEds order cancelling the August-MOA COURT OF APPEALS
had already been partially implemented as Pineda COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
herself recognized such fact in her amended petition DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF
before the RTC. In effect, this was the status quo. In JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID
addition, the CA held that Pineda appeared to have no NOT DISMISS OUTRIGHT THE
clear or unmistakable right to be protected since the PETITION SINCE NO MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS
MOA that granted her the right to operate the school FILED FROM THE ORDERS
canteen was, in fact, invalidated by the DepEd for not DATED MARCH 14, 2005,
being sanctioned by its existing rules and regulations. GRANTING THE WRIT OF
INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF
Finally, the CA also held that there was no pressing
HEREIN PETITIONER AND THE
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which ORDER DATED JUNE 7, 2005,
would warrant the issuance of the injunctive writ as DENYING RESPONDENTS
(USEC JOSE LUIS MARTIN C.
the purported damage to Pineda, if she would not able
GASCON, SUPT. MA. LUISA
to operate the canteen, was readily quantifiable.
[12]
QUINONES AND OLYMPIADA
CAMILO) MOTION TO DISMISS,
Hence, Pineda filed this petition IN MANIFEST VIOLATION OF
SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE
for certiorari relying on the following 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
GROUNDS:

III
I
24
 In her petition for certiorari before the RTC,
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS Pineda impleaded Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiones and
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF Ms. Camilo in their official capacities as
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO Undersecretary of DepEd, Division Superintendent
LACK OR EXCESS OF
and Principal of Lakandula High School,
JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DISSOLVED THE WRIT OF respectively. Although the petition mentioned that
INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE Usec. Gascon was merely a nominal party, it stated
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT therein that Dr. Quiones and Ms. Camilo were being
BRANCH 153, PASIG CITY, IN
SCA NO. 2797, THEREBY sued for having been tasked to immediately carry out
UNJUSTIFIABLY INTERFERING his order of February 11, 2005. The Court is of the
WITH THE LOWER COURTS view that DepEd was the proper party and Usec.
DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE
WRIT OF INJUNCTION IN Gascon, Dr. Quiones and Ms. Camilo were just its
FAVOR OF HEREIN representatives. Thus, they were sued in their official
PETITIONER WHO HAS A capacities.
CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE
LEGAL RIGHT TO BE
AFFORDED THIS REMEDY AND A review of Usec. Gascons order discloses
CONSIDERING THAT that the cancellation of Pinedas August-MOA was
RESPONDENTS DID NOT FILE A
pursuant to DepEds existing guidelines on the turn
MOTION TO DISSOLVE BOND
WITH THE TRIAL COURT OR AT over of school canteens to teachers cooperatives, laid
LEAST FILED AFFIDAVITS IN out in Department Order No. 95, series of 1998. He
SUPPORT OF THEIR was simply applying a DepEd policy when he
OPPOSITION. [13]

ordered the August-MOA cancelled. So, what was

On November 18, 2009, after the parties had
filed their respective pleadings, the Court gave due
course to the petition and ordered the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. [14]
actually being assailed by Pineda in her petition
before the RTC was the implementation of DepEds
existing guidelines with the nullification of the
August-MOA entered into by Dr. Blas, then principal
of LHS. As Asec. Montesa merely took over the
[15]

functions of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly authorized

On the first ground, Pineda argues that the CA
gravely abused its discretion in entertaining the
petition for certiorari of DepEd considering that Asec.
Montesa was not the proper party to file the
petition. She adds that, even assuming that DepEd
had the locus standi to file said petition before the
CA, Asec. Montesa was not duly authorized to do so.
The Court cannot accommodate the view of
Pineda.
to institute the petition before the CA in order to
advance and pursue the policies of his office DepEd.
Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it will
surely be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the
final resolution of the case before the RTC.
Thus, it would be absurd not to recognize the
legal standing of Asec. Montesa, as representative of
DepEd, but consider Dr. Quiones and Ms. Camilo as
the proper parties when they were merely tasked to

25
implement a directive emanating from a superior
official (Asec. Montesa) of the DepEd.
On the second ground, Pineda questions
DepEds failure to move for reconsideration before
going to the CA on certiorari.
The general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to
grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any
error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. There are,
[16]
however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to
the special civil action for certiorari without first
filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case
of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, it was written:
[17]
The rule is, however,
circumscribed by well-defined
exceptions, such as where the order is
a patent nullity because the court a
quo had no jurisdiction; where the
questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;where there is
an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question, and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner, or the
subject matter of the action is
perishable; where, under the
circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
where the petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the grant of such relief by
the trial court is improbable; where the
proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; where
the proceedings were ex parte or in
26
which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and where the
issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.
[18]
(underscoring supplied)
As previously discussed, the present case
concerns the implementation or application of a
DepEd policy which had been enjoined by the RTC.
Certainly, there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interest of the government.
Moreover, the subject matter of the case involves the
operation of the canteen of a public secondary school.
This is of public interest for it affects the welfare of
the students, thus, justifying the relaxation of the
settled rule.
Still on the second ground, Pineda points out
that the March 14, 2005 Order of the RTC was
received by the DepEd on March 16, 2005 and the
latter filed its petition before the CA on June 28,
2005, which was beyond the sixty (60)-day
reglementary period. Going over DepEds petition
before the CA, it appears that DepEd reckoned the
60-day period from June 28, 2005, the date of its
receipt of the June 7, 2005 Order of the RTC. Pinedas
Comment and Memorandum, however, did not raise
this procedural lapse as an issue. Instead, Pineda put
forth her own arguments in support of the two RTC
orders.
The rule in pleadings and practice is that that
no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading
which by due diligence could have been raised in
previous pleadings. Thus, it is too late in the day for
[19]
Pineda to question the procedural lapse.
At any rate, the Court finds no cogent reason
for the reversal and setting aside by the CA of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
the RTC. The very writ of preliminary injunction set
aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts orders from
respondents Mrs.
sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished Camilo and Dr.
or consummated. The DepEd already prohibited
[20]
Quiones who
Pineda from operating the school canteen. As immediately executed
the assailed illegal
correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned decision,
decision from the
since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school respondent
canteen since 2005, the RTCs preliminary writ should undersecretary,
prevented the canteen
be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The
workers from entering
Court agrees with the CA when it explained: the school and the
delivery of softdrinks
A preliminary injunction is a such as Pop Cola to the
provisional remedy that a party may petitioner. On the same
resort to in order to preserve and date, more canteens
protect certain rights and interests sprouted, in addition to
during the pendency of an action. Its those found in the H.E.
sole objective is to preserve the status and dressmaking
quo until the merits of the case can be rooms, operated by the
heard fully. teachers, under the
guise that they were
Status quo is defined as the last doing service to the
actual, peaceful, and uncontested students in the
status that precedes the actual meantime that the
controversy, that which is existing at canteen was closed. x x
the time of the filing of the case. x.
[21]

Indubitably, the trial court must not

make use of its injunctive relief to
alter such status.
In the case at bench, the
Decision of Undersecretary Gascon
dated February 11, 2005, ordering
Pineda to cease and desist from
operating and managing the school
canteen and to revert the management
thereof to the Home Economics
Department and to the Principal, has
Finally, while the grant or denial of a
preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of
the trial court, grave abuse of discretion is committed
when it does not maintain the status quo which is the
last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which
preceded the actual controversy. If there is such a
commission, it is correctible through a writ of
certiorari. In this case, the status quo ante litem or
[22]

already been partially implemented.

This is evident from the allegations of the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of
Pineda in her amended petition, to wit: the case was that Pineda was already prohibited from
operating the school canteen. For said reason, the trial
Earlier, in the
dawn of same date, 22 court cannot make use of its injunctive power to
February 2004 (should change said status. [23]

be 2005), the guards of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Lakandula High
School, taking strict

27
 MANILA INTERNATIONAL G.R. No.
143870
AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO,
- versus - Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
NAZARIO, JJ.

RIVERA VILLAGE
LESSEE
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Promulgated:
INCORPORATED, September 30, 2005
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------
x

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on

Certiorari[1] dated August 23, 2000 filed by the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated
June 30, 2000 which directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from

28
evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village from their
dwellings.
The antecedents, culled from the petition and the
assailed Decision, are as follows:
The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
was entrusted with the administration, operation,
management, control, maintenance and development
of the Manila International Airport (MIA), now the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Among its
powers was the power to enter into, make and
execute concessions and concession rights for
purposes essential to the operation of the airport.
On May 25, 1965, the CAA, through its
Director, Capt. Vicente C. Rivera, entered into
individual lease contracts with its employees (lessees)
for the lease of portions of a four (4)-hectare lot
situated in what is now known as Rivera Village
located in Barangay 199 and 200 in Pasay City. The
leases were for a twenty-five (25)-year period to
commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990
at P20.00[3] per annum as rental.
On May 4, 1982, Executive Order No. (EO)
778 was issued (later amended by EO 903 on July 21,
1983), creating petitioner MIAA, transferring
existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and vesting the
latter with the power to administer and operate the
MIA.
Sometime in January 1995, MIAA stopped
issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept
rental payments from the lessees. As a result,
29
respondent Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners
Association, Inc. (homeowners association),
purportedly representing the lessees, requested MIAA
to sell the subject property to its members, invoking
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1517
or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016.
The MIAA, on February 14, 1996, denied the
request, claiming that the subject property is included
in its Conceptual Development Plan intended for
airport-related activities.
Respondent then filed a petition for
mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction[4] against MIAA
and the National Housing Authority (NHA). The
petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1598 in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109,
sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing its
Conceptual Development Plan insofar as Rivera
Village is concerned. It also sought to compel MIAA
to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the
Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take
the necessary steps for the disposition of the property
in favor of the members of the homeowners
association.
MIAA filed an answer[5] alleging that the
petition fails to state a cause of action in view of the
expiration of the lease contracts and the lack of
personality to sue of the homeowners association.
MIAA also claimed that the homeowners association
is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because it does
not have a clear legal right to possess the subject
property and MIAA does not have a corresponding
duty to segregate Rivera Village from its Conceptual
Development Plan.
 A preliminary hearing on MIAAs affirmative
defenses was conducted, after which the trial court
issued an Order[6] dated October 12, 1998, denying
the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the prayer
for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby denied
for lack of merit and the above-entitled
petition is hereby ordered dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The trial court held that PD 1818 bars the
issuance of a restraining order, preliminary injunction
or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case,
dispute or controversy involving infrastructure
projects of the government or any public utility
operated by the government. It also ruled that the
petition failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as
petitioner therein (respondent homeowners
association) is not the real party-in-interest, the
individual members of the association being the ones
who have possessory rights over their respective
premises. Moreover, the lease contracts have already
expired.
As regards the contention that the lessees are
entitled to possess the subject property by virtue of
PD 1517, Proclamation No. 1967 and PD 2016,
which respectively identify parcels of urban land as
part of the Urban Land Reform Zone, specify certain
areas in Metro Manila, including Rivera Village, as
areas for priority development or urban land reform
30
zones, and prohibit the eviction of occupant families
from such lands, the trial court declared that the
subject property has been reserved by MIAA for
airport-related activities and, as such, is exempt from
the coverage of the Comprehensive and Continuing
Urban Development and Housing Program under
Republic Act No. (RA) 7279.
Respondent filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, interposing essentially the same arguments
raised before the trial court. The appellate court
annulled and set aside the order of the trial court and
remanded the case for further proceedings. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the assailed October
12, 1998 Order is annulled, set aside
and reversed. The case is remanded
to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
A writ of preliminary injunction is
issued restraining and preventing
respondent MIAA from evicting the
members of petitioner Rivera Village
Association from their respective lots
in the Rivera Village. Petitioner is
ordered to post a bond in the amount
of P500,000.00 with the condition
that petitioner will pay to respondent
MIAA all damages it may sustain by
reason of the injunction if the court
should finally decided that petitioner
is not entitled thereto. Upon approval
of the bond, the writ of preliminary
injunction shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The appellate court foremost ruled that the
case can be construed as a class suit instituted by the
Rivera Village lessees. The homeowners association,
considered as the representative of the lessees, merely
instituted the suit for the benefit of its members. It
does not claim to have any right or interest in the lots
occupied by the lessees, nor seek the registration of
the titles to the land in its name.
On the issue of the expiration of the lease
contracts and the application of PD 1517,
Proclamation No. 1967 and PD 2016, the Court of
Appeals held that the expiration of the lease contracts
cannot adversely affect the rights acquired by the
lessees under the foregoing laws. Besides, the lease
contracts were impliedly renewed by virtue of
MIAAs acceptance of rental payments from May 25,
1990 up to December 1994. This resulted in an
implied new lease under Article 1670 of the Civil
Code.
Moreover, the appellate court construed Sec.
5(c) of RA 7279 to mean that if the government lot
has not been utilized during the ten (10)-year period
for the purpose for which it has been reserved prior to
1983, then said lot is encompassed by the law and is
subject to distribution to the legitimate and qualified
residents of the area after appropriate proceedings
have been undertaken.
As to whether PD 1818 bars the issuance of
an injunctive writ in this case, the appellate court
ruled that PD 1818 is a general law on the issuance of
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction.
On the other hand, PD 2016 is a special law
specifically prohibiting the eviction of tenants from
lands identified as areas for priority development.
Thus, the trial court can issue an injunctive writ if the
act sought to be restrained will enforce the eviction of
tenants from urban land reform zones.
31
The court, however, declared that it cannot
make a definitive ruling on the rights of the members
of the homeowners association vis--vis the MIAA
Conceptual Development Plan, considering the need
for a full-blown trial to ferret out whether the claimed
rights under the pertinent laws have ripened to actual
legal and vested rights in their favor.
MIAA now seeks a review of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals. In the instant petition, MIAA
contends that the appellate court erred in ruling that
PD 2016, which prohibits the eviction of occupant
families from real property identified as areas for
priority development or urban land reform zones, has
modified PD 1818, which bars the issuance of
injunctive writ in cases involving infrastructure
projects of the government, including public utilities
for the transport of goods and commodities.
It argues that the petition filed by the
homeowners association with the trial court fails to
state a cause of action because the homeowners
association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit.
Allegedly, the Board Resolution presented by
respondent shows that it was only the board of
directors of the association, as distinguished from the
members thereof, which authorized respondent to act
as its representative in the suit.
MIAA also stresses that the subject property
has recently been reserved by MIAA for airport-
related activities and, as such, Sec. 5(c) of RA 7279
applies. Under the said law, lands which are used,
reserved or otherwise set aside for government
offices, facilities and other installations are exempt
from the coverage of the law.
 Moreover, MIAA avers that the Court of
Appeals should not have granted injunctive relief to
respondent, considering that the grant of an
injunction would inflict greater damage to petitioner
and to the public.
Respondent filed a Comment[9] dated
November 20, 2000, arguing that MIAA is mandated
by law to dispose of Rivera Village to the
homeowners thereof. Under existing laws, the
homeowners have the right to possess and enjoy the
property. To accept MIAAs pretense that the property
has been recently reserved for airport-related
activities and therefor exempt from the coverage of
RA 7279 will allegedly violate the right of the
homeowners as bona fide tenants to socialized
housing.
Respondent further argues that PD 1818 is
inapplicable to this case because it has established a
clear and unmistakable right to an injunction.
Besides, PD 2016 which protects from eviction
tenants of lands identified for priority development, is
a later enactment which should be deemed to prevail
over PD 1818.
In the Resolution[10] dated January 24, 2001,
the petition was given due course and the parties
were required to submit their respective memoranda.
Accordingly, MIAA submitted
[11]
its Memorandum dated March 20, 2001, while
respondent filed its Memorandum[12] dated April 20,
2001. For its part, NHA manifested that it is adopting
the memorandum of MIAA as its own insofar as the
same is germane and material to NHAs stand.[13]
32
As presented and discussed by the parties, the
issues are the following:
1. Has PD 2016 modified PD 1818?
2. Did the petition filed by
respondent with the trial court
state a cause of action against
petitioner?
3. Is petitioner obliged to dispose of
the subject properties in favor
of the members of respondent
association after appropriate
proceedings?
4. Is respondent entitled to the
issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction?[14]
We first resolve the threshold question of
whether respondent has personality to sue.
MIAA contends that the real parties-in-
interest in the petition filed with the trial court are the
individual members of the homeowners association.
Not having been brought in the name of the real
parties-in-interest, the suit was correctly dismissed by
the trial court for failure to state a cause of action.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of
Court) requires that every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.[15] A case is
dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof
that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
[16]
 The petition before the trial court was filed by
the homeowners association, represented by its
President, Panfilo R. Chiutena, Sr., upon authority of
a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file [A]ll
necessary action to the Court of Justice and other
related acts necessary to have our Housing Project
number 4 land be titled to the members of the
Association.
Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a
class suit under Sec. 12, Rule 3[17] of the Rules of
Court, the requisites therefor not being present in the
case, notably because the petition does not allege the
existence and prove the requisites of a class
suit, i.e., that the subject matter of the controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons
and the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, and
because it was brought only by one party.
In Board of Optometry v. Colet,[18] we held
that courts must exercise utmost caution before
allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the
requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties.
For while no difficulty may arise if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary
would result if the decision were otherwise as those
who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed
representatives would certainly claim denial of due
process.
There is, however, merit in the appellate
courts pronouncement that the petition should be
construed as a suit brought by the homeowners
association as the representative of the members
thereof under Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
33
Sec. 3. Representatives as
parties.Where the action is allowed to
be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the
real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor
or administrator, or a party authorized
by law or these Rules. An agent acting
in his own name and for the benefit of
an undisclosed principal may sue or be
sued without joining the principal
except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal.
[Emphasis supplied.]
It is a settled rule that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest. Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary must be included
in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries
shall, likewise, be included in the complaint.[19]
Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a
party to sue or be sued, or the authority of a party to
sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be
averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an
action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an
actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a
person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either
a natural or an artificial person. The party bringing
suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the
representative character that he claims. If a
complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a
party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to
do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
complaint. It must be stressed that an unauthorized Rivera Village from the scope of its Conceptual
complaint does not produce any legal effect.[20] Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary
steps for the disposition of the subject property in
In this case, the petition filed with the trial
favor of the members of the homeowners association.
court sufficiently avers that the homeowners
association, through its President, is suing in a
Parenthetically, while the procedural rule is
representative capacity as authorized under the Board
that a party is required to indicate in his brief an
Resolution attached to the petition. Although the
assignment of errors and only those assigned shall be
names of the individual members of the homeowners
considered by the appellate court in deciding the
association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-
case, it is equally settled that appellate courts have
in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the title of
ample authority to rule on matters not assigned as
the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple
errors in an appeal, if these are indispensable or
expedient of requiring the association to disclose the
necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.
names of the principals and to amend the title and
[22]
averments of the petition accordingly.

For instance, the Court has allowed the

Essentially, the purpose of the rule that
consideration of other grounds not raised or assigned
actions should be brought or defended in the name of
as errors specifically in the following instances: (1)
the real party-in-interest is to protect against undue
grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not
will have the benefit of having before it the real
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or
adverse parties in the consideration of a case. This
clerical errors within the contemplation of the law;
rule, however, is not to be narrowly and restrictively
(3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
construed, and its application should be neither
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a
dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in
just decision and complete resolution of the case or to
consonance with extant realities and practicalities.
[21] serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, the
piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically
dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial
to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the
court and are matters of record having some bearing
filing of multiple suits by the individual members of
on the issue submitted which the parties failed to
the association.
raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters
not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to
What is more decisive to the resolution of the
an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as
present controversy, however, is a matter not errors on appeal but upon which the determination of
addressed by the parties in the case before this Court, a question properly assigned is dependent.[23]
that is, the fact that the petition filed before the trial
court is for mandamus to compel MIAA to segregate In this case, although the propriety of the
filing of a petition for mandamus was no longer
34
raised as an issue before this Court, MIAA asserted in
its answer[24] to the original petition that the
homeowners association is not entitled to a writ of
mandamus because it has not shown any legal right to
possess the subject property and a correlative
obligation on the part of MIAA to segregate the
property from its Conceptual Development Plan.
MIAA averred:
28. Petitioner is not entitled to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
For a writ of mandamus to issue, it is
essential that petitioner has a legal
right to the thing demanded and that it
is the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required. The legal
right of petitioner to the thing
demanded must be well-defined, clear
and certain. The corresponding duty of
respondent to perform the required act
must also be clear and specific
(Cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203,
210 [1968]).
29. Petitioner, in view of the
expiration of the lease contracts of its
individual members, has failed to
show that it has the legal right to
possess the subject property.
30. There is therefore no
corresponding duty on the part of
respondent MIAA to segregate the
property from the scope of its
Conceptual Development Plan.[25]
The question of whether the homeowners association
is entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus was
again raised in the memorandum[26] filed by MIAA
with the Court of Appeals. MIAA alleged:
Appellant is not entitled to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus. For a
writ of mandamus to issue, it is
essential that the appellant has a legal
right to the thing demanded and that it
35
is the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required. The legal
right of appellant to the thing
demanded must be well-defined, clear
and certain. The corresponding duty of
respondent to perform the required act
must also be clear and specific (cf.
Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203, 210
[1968]).
In view of the expiration of the
lease contracts of its individual
members, appellant has failed to show
that it has the legal right to possess the
subject property. There is therefore no
corresponding duty on the part of the
MIAA to segregate the property from
the scope of its conceptual
development plan.[27]
The question of whether mandamus is the
proper remedy was clearly raised in the trial court
and the Court of Appeals although it was largely
ignored by both courts. This issue being
indispensable to the resolution of this case, we shall
rule on the matter.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when
petitioners legal right to the performance of a
particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear
and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is
indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law.[28]
In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly
issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner
has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and
that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative
duty to perform that which is demanded of him.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to
compel compliance with
a duty, which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the
writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not
to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the
office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right
but to implement that which is already established.
Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded,
mandamus will not issue.
In this case, the Court of Appeals itself
conceded that no definitive ruling as regards the
rights of the individual members of the homeowners
association could yet be made considering the need
for a full determination of whether their claimed
rights under the pertinent laws have ripened into
actual legal and vested rights. The appellate court
even outlined the requisites under PD 1517 which
have yet to be complied with, namely: (1) the
submission to the NHA of a proposal to acquire the
subject property as required under Sec. 9[29] of PD
1517;
and (2) proof that the members of the homeowners
association are qualified to avail of the benefits under
PD 1517 as mandated by Sec. 6[30] of the same law.
Resort to mandamus is evidently premature
because there is no showing that the members of the
homeowners association have already filed an
application or proposal with the NHA to acquire their
respective lots. There is still an administrative
remedy open to the members of the homeowners
association which they should have first pursued,
failing which they cannot invoke judicial action.[31]
36
We note that while respondent alleges that its
members enlisted themselves with the NHA in order
to avail of the benefits of the law, the NHA, in its
answer[32] to the petition, denied this allegation for
being self-serving. Whatever rights the members of
the homeowners association may have under the
relevant laws are still in substantial doubt or dispute.
Hence, the petition for mandamus was appropriately
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
So, too, should the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition contained in the same petition be
denied. Writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
are prerogative writs of equity and their granting is
ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts to
be exercised on equitable principles. Said writs
should only be issued when the right to the relief is
clear.[33] As our findings in this case confirm, the
homeowners association failed to establish a clear
legal right to the issuance of the writs of mandamus
and prohibition prayed for.
There is, moreover, another ground for the
dismissal of the petition filed before the trial court
which appears to have been overlooked by the parties
in this case.
In the original petition filed before the trial
court, the homeowners association averred that
although EO 903 transferred to MIAA the properties
and assets of MIA, such transfer was made subject to
what the homeowners association claims to be the
existing rights of its members.[34] MIAA dismissed
this allegation as an erroneous conclusion of law.[35]
We cite the complete text of the relevant
provision of EO 903 to fully understand the import
thereof and its effect on the present controversy.
Section 3 thereof states:
Sec. 3. Creation of the Manila
International Airport Authority.There
is hereby established a body corporate
to be known as the Manila
International Airport Authority which
shall be attached to the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications.
The principal office of the Authority
shall be located at the New Manila
International Airport. The Authority
may establish such offices, branches,
agencies or subsidiaries as it may
deem proper and necessary; Provided,
That any subsidiary that may be
organized shall have the prior approval
of the President.
The land where the Airport is
presently located as well as the
surrounding land area of
approximately six hundred hectares,
are hereby transferred, conveyed
and assigned to the ownership and
administration of the Authority,
subject to existing rights, if any. The
Bureau of Lands and other appropriate
government agencies shall undertake
an actual survey of the area transferred
within one year from the promulgation
of this Executive Order and the
corresponding title to be issued in the
name of the authority. Any portion
thereof shall not be disposed
through sale or through any other
mode unless specifically approved
by the President of the
Philippines. [Emphasis supplied.]
As can clearly be seen from the foregoing
provision, while it is true that the ownership and
administration of the airport and its surrounding land
was assigned to MIAA subject to existing rights,
which we may here understand to be the rights
granted under PD 1517, EO 903 specifically requires
37
the approval of the President of the Philippines
before any disposition by sale or any other mode may
be made concerning the property transferred to
MIAA.
The Executive Secretary as representative of
the President of the Philippines is, therefore, an
indispensable party in actions seeking to compel the
sale or disposition of properties of the MIAA. Section
7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that parties-
in-interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants.
Thus, the presence of all indispensable parties
is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is
not before the court that the action should be
dismissed. The plaintiff is mandated to implead all
indispensable parties, and the absence of one renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties, but even as to those present. One who is a
party to a case is not bound by any decision of the
court; otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to
due process.[36]
For the foregoing reasons, the prayer for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction must
perforce be denied. Preliminary injunction is a mere
ancillary remedy which cannot stand separately or
proceed independently of the main case. Having
declared that the petition filed before the trial court
was correctly dismissed, the determination of the
homeowners associations entitlement to a writ of
preliminary injunction is already moot and academic.
[37]
 Besides, as earlier noted, the right of the SPOUSES REGINO SE and
VIOLETA DELA CRUZ, SPOUSES
members of the homeowners association to possess EDUARDO and CHARITO PEREZ
and purchase the subject property is still uncertain and MARCELINO TOLENTINO,
considering that they have not completed the process Respondents.
x------------------------------------
for the acquisition of their lots as outlined in PD
--------------x
1517.

DECISION
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at
protecting substantive rights and interests. The writ of
preliminary injunction is issued by the court to CARPIO MORALES, J.,
prevent threatened or continuous irreparable injury to
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied For the Courts consideration is the propriety of the
and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the issuance of a writ of
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of
fully. The writ is issued upon the satisfaction of two respondent Spouses Regino Se and Violeta dela Cruz
requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be (Spouses dela Cruz).
protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said
Respondent Spouses Eduardo and Charito Perez
right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
(Spouses Perez) obtained a P250,000 loan from
issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave
Spouses Isagani and Diosdada Castro (petitioners) on
abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to
November 15, 1996, to secure which they executed a
protect contingent or future rights. Where the
real estate mortgage in petitioners favor covering an
complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction
unregistered 417 square meter parcel of land, located
is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage
in San Isidro, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Tax
without proof of actual existing right is not a ground
Declaration (TD) No. 01844 (the property).
for an injunction.[38]

With this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary

Respondent Spouses Perez having failed to settle
to discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
their loan, petitioners extrajudicially foreclosed the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
mortgage and, as the highest bidder at the public
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
auction, bought the property on February 4, 1999. It
dated June 30, 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
turned out that before the foreclosure or sometime
Civil Case No. 97-1598 of the Regional Trial Court
in 1997 respondent Spouses Perez, contrary to a
of Pasay City is ordered DISMISSED.
SPOUSES ISAGANI and provision of the real estate mortgage, sold the
DIOSDADA CASTRO, property to respondent Spouses dela Cruz who had in
Petitioners, fact caused the cancellation of TD No. 01844 by TD
No. 01892 in their name on August 15, 1997.
- versus -

38
 Petitioners thus filed on April 8, 1999 a
complaint against herein two sets of respondent
Spouses, for annulment of Deed of Sale and TD No.
01892[1] and damages before the Malolos Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Respondent Marcelino Tolentino,
Municipal Assessor of Hagonoy, Bulacan was
impleaded as defendant. The complaint was raffled to
Branch 7 of the RTC.
By respondent Spouses dela Cruzs allegation,
before buying the property, they inspected it and
found no improvements thereon that would put them
on guard against the integrity of the TD of the sellers-
Spouses Perez which TD, contrary to petitioners
claim, bore no annotation of the mortgage. They had
in fact constructed a house on the property in the
course of which they were approached by petitioners
who informed them of an existing mortgage
thereover, but as petitioners did not present any
document to prove it, they paid no heed to the
information.
During the pendency of petitioners complaint against
respondents spouses, petitioners filed an ex-
parte motion before Branch 16 of the RTC for the
issuance of a writ of possession over the property by
virtue of the foreclosure of the mortgage of the sale to
them of the property. [2] Petitioners motion was
granted and a writ of possession dated August 2, 2001
was issued and enforced against respondent Spouses
dela Cruz who were evicted from the property.
On December 7, 2002, petitioners amended, with
leave of court, their complaint, alleging that, inter
alia, respondent Spouses Perez failed to redeem the
mortgage within the reglementary period.
39
In their Answer to the Amended Complaint,
respondent Spouses dela Cruz prayed for the issuance
of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore them to
physical possession of the property, which prayer
Branch 7 of the RTC granted by Order of October 29,
2004 in this wise:
. . . It is not disputed that the Sps.
Isagani Castro and Diosdada Castro,
herein plaintiffs, were placed in
possession of the subject property by
virtue of a writ of possession issued by
Branch 16 of the Court. This writ of
possession commanded the sheriff to
require the spouses Eduardo Perez and
Charito Lopez and all persons
claiming rights under them to vacate
subject property and surrender
possession thereof to spouses Castro.
At that time, the Spouses Regino Se
and Violeta dela Cruz were in
possession of the property as owners
thereof, having already purchased the
same from the Sps. Castro. Their
evidence of ownership is Tax
Declaration No. 01892 of the Office of
the Municipal Assessor of Hagonoy,
Bulacan, the property being still an
unregistered property. They were not
claiming rights under the spouses
Perez. They were and still are the
owners in their own right. Hence, the
writ of possession issued was
improperly implemented and under
Art. 539 of the Civil Code, they must
be restored to said possession by the
means established by the laws and the
Rules of Court. The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction
prayed for is undeniably one of the
means established by the laws and the
Rules of Court. [3] (underscoring
supplied)
 Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
trial courts Order of October 29, 2004 was denied by
Order of March 5, 2007, hence, they filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Order,
the appellate court denied petitioners petition, by
Decision of September 14, 2009.[4]
Hence, the present petition.
The trial court anchored its assailed Order granting
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on
Article 539 of the Civil Code. The Article reads:
Art. 539. Every possessor has a
right to be respected in his possession;
and should he be disturbed therein, he
shall be protected in or restored to said
possession by the means established
by the laws and the Rules of Court.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, respondent Spouses dela Cruz actually
took possession of the property before the real estate
mortgage covering it was foreclosed, and had in fact
cancelled the TD in Spouses Perez name and had one
issued in their name. It appears, however, that
petitioners did not inform Branch 16, RTC of the
previous sale of the property to third parties, herein
respondent Spouses dela Cruz, and the latters actual
possession thereof.
For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear
showing of extreme urgency to prevent irreparable
injury and a clear and unmistakable right to it must be
proven by the party seeking it. The primary objective
of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case can be heard.[5]
40
[T]he rule is well-entrenched that the
issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court. It bears
reiterating that Section 4 of Rule 58
gives generous latitude to the trial
courts in this regard for the reason that
conflicting claims in an
application for a provisional writ more
often than not involve a factual
determination which is not the
function of appellate courts. Hence,
the exercise of sound judicial
discretion by the trial court in
injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is
manifest abuse, which is wanting in
the present case.[6] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, the rule is well-entrenched that for
grave abuse of discretion to exist as a valid ground
for the nullification of an injunctive writ, there must
be a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Or the
power must be exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. [7]
Recall that respondent Spouses dela Cruz had
long before the foreclosure of the mortgage or
sometime in 1997 bought and took possession of the
property, and had in fact cancelled the seller-
respondent Spouses Perez TD and had one issued in
their name. By petitioners seeking ex parte the
issuance to them on February 1999 of a writ of
possession over the property, which was granted and
the writ enforced against respondent Spouses de la
Cruz, they disturbed the status quo ante litem. The
trial court did not thus commit grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the writ of opportunity to present evidence in support of their
preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of Spouses respective claims.[9]
de la Cruz.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
For the enforcement of the writ of possession
against respondent Spouses dela Cruz, who did not SO ORDERED.
take part in the foreclosure proceedings, would
amount to taking of real property without the benefit
of a proper judicial intervention. The procedural
shortcut which petitioners is impermissible. Even
Article 433 of the Civil Code instructs that Actual
possession under claim of ownership raises
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property. The contemplated judicial process is not
through an ex-parte petition as what petitioners
availed of, but a process wherein a third party,
Spouses de la Cruz herein, is given an opportunity to
be heard.[8]

The jurisdictional foundation for the issuance

of a writ of injunction rests not only in the existence
of a cause of action and in the probability of
irreparable injury, among other considerations, but
also in the prevention of multiplicity of suits.

Since petitioners failed to show that the

appellate court erred in upholding the trial courts
exercise of its discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, the challenged
Decision stands.

Parenthetically, the issuance of the challenged

writ does not render petitioners case closed. Whether
there existed a conspiracy between both sets of
respondent spouses to defraud petitioners can be only
be determined after the principal action is tried on the
merits during which the parties are afforded the

41