ROSENTHAL V. SHEPARD BROADCASTING SERV.
INC district or municipal courts of this Commonwealth were then given and a member of
KEY PASSAGES FROM THIS CASE (1)
I. The giving of advice as to legal matters has been commonly recognized as
an important part of the activities reserved for members of the bar and
constitutes the practice of law. Quoted 1 time
RUGG, C.J.
This petition was instituted on November 24, 1936, by three members of the bar of
Massachusetts, residents of Boston, against the respondent, a corporation duly
organized and having a usual place of business in Boston. The petition was brought
pursuant to 46B, inserted in G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 221, by St. 1935, c. 346, 2. The
allegations of the petition set forth violations of G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 221, 46, as
amended by St. 1935, c. 346, 1, by the respondent in that it broadcasted to the
public radio programs known as the "Court of Common Troubles" and "Goodwill
Court." The purpose of the petition is to restrain the respondent from broadcasting
these programs on the ground that they constitute illegal practice of law. The
statute (St. 1935, c. 346, 1) forbids a corporation to "give legal advice in matters
not relating to its lawful business, or practice law." With reference to this statute it
was said in Matter of Shoe Manufacturers Protective Association, Inc. 295 Mass.
369, "All practice of law by corporations is now expressly forbidden by statute. . . .
In addition to this sweeping prohibition against the practice of law the statute also
expressly forbids the doing by corporations of certain specified acts comprised in or
related to such practice." The case was referred to a master whose report has been
confirmed and whose findings are not in dispute. The case has been reserved
without decision for our determination on the pleadings and the report of the
master.
The material facts are these: The respondent maintained and operated a
broadcasting station in Boston as a commercial enterprise for its own profit. The
respondent sold the use of its broadcasting facilities to individuals or corporations
for fixed periods of time during which such persons or corporations, under
agreement with the respondent, produced programs for broadcasting. Such a
purchaser was called a sponsor. There were other programs, called sustaining
programs, which were produced and paid for by the respondent. The programs of
the court of common troubles originated in the studio of the respondent in Boston.
The goodwill court program originated in New York, was transmitted over a
telegraph wire from New York to the respondent's studio in Boston, and was relayed
by the respondent through its Boston station. The same program was also
"broadcast over sixty-six different channels" in thirty-nine different States. This
program was sponsored by a corporation interested in the sale of a particular brand
of coffee and was interspersed with remarks advertising that coffee.
The program of the court of common troubles was conducted in this fashion: The
announcer stated that the opinions to be expressed on the cases presented were to
be based on the law of Massachusetts, and that there was no intention to offer legal
advice as a substitute for that given by attorneys. The names of two judges in the
the bar was introduced as conductor. It was announced that anyone was invited to
state his problems and that the purpose was to furnish enlightenment as to the law
of Massachusetts. The conductor then asked some person to present his problem.
That was done and the conductor clarified the matter by further questions if thought
desirable. Then the advisory answer was given by one of the judges. The general
practice pursued in determining the persons to appear before the microphone was
for the conductor, prior to the broadcast, to meet various individuals who had
written their problems and sent them either to the respondent or to the conductor.
The conductor exercised his judgment in the selection of the particular persons
whose problems were to be presented. Opportunity was thus afforded for
consideration beforehand of the problem both by the conductor and by the judge
who expressed an opinion at the time of the broadcast. The master's report sets
forth numerous instances where advice was given touching proper registration of an
automobile, remedies for nonpayment of rent by a tenant, the right of an
administratrix to recover possession and control of personal property belonging to
the estate, the claim of a tenant for fixtures installed by him, the right of a young
woman to an engagement ring after termination of the engagement, and divorce.
Most of the cases stated involved questions of civil rights and liabilities and were of
a nature usually dealt with by practising attorneys in the course of giving advice to
clients in office consultation and by judges of trial courts in the consideration of
cases before them while on the bench.
The programs of the goodwill court were produced in New York and transmitted to
the respondent's studio in Boston. The respondent received a money consideration
for the use of its facilities in broadcasting these programs. The methods pursued in
the presentation of the goodwill court program were similar to those already
described as to the presentation of the court of common troubles program, except
that the conductor, so far as known, was not a member of the bar. The two judges
who acted at each broadcast were at some times presiding judges in various courts
in the State of New York and at other times either retired judges of the State of New
York or presiding or retired judges of the State of New Jersey. There are recited in
the master's report various instances of the giving of advice over the broadcasting
facilities of the respondent touching the legal problems arising in the usual
experiences of life. The announcer at the outset of the program stated that the
opinions to be expressed were based upon and in accordance with the law of New
York and not in accordance with that of any other jurisdiction; that the law was
different in different jurisdictions; and that there was no design in giving legal
advice to supplant lawyers.
The goodwill court has been discontinued since December 20, 1936, when public
statement to that effect was made. No program of the court of common troubles
has been presented since December 19, 1936, although no public statement has
been made concerning it. The time theretofore allotted to these programs by the
respondent has been devoted to programs of a different character.
The respondent does not argue that it may practice law. Plainly it cannot lawfully do
so. Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607. Matter of Maclub of America, Inc. 295
Mass. 45, 47. It is clear that the programs presented by the court of common The question of costs remains. The allowance of costs in equity always rests in the
troubles were within the sweep of the prohibitions of St. 1935, c. 346, 1. court's discretion. G.L. (Ter. Ed.), c. 261, 13. The petitioners brought this
proceeding under statutory authorization for the public welfare and not for selfish
1 reasons or for pecuniary profit. The case has become moot because of the voluntary
The giving of advice as to legal matters has been commonly recognized as an conduct of the respondent in ceasing to continue to give the broadcasts. It seems to
important part of the activities reserved for members of the bar and constitutes the us proper to award costs to the petitioners. Cohen v. Levy, 228 Mass.
practice of law. The instances of giving such advice by the respondent stated in the 383. Daudelin v. Lee, 258 Mass. 7, 9. Perkins v. Horte, 282 Mass.
master's report form the practice of law. Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 301. Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 362. A decree may be entered dismissing
613. Matter of Shoe Manufacturers Protective Association, Inc. 295 Mass. 369, 372, the petition because no relief can be afforded in the circumstances, but with costs
373. People v. Association of Real Estate Tax-payers, 354 Ill. 102, 109, to the petitioners.
110. Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 584. People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334. The
giving of legal advice in the manner described in the master's report not only Ordered accordingly.
violates the confidential relation of an attorney and client but is inconsistent with
the traditional standards of the bar and the courts.
The argument that these programs were designed as gratuitous service to indigent
persons is without foundation. There is no finding that the persons seeking and
receiving such advice were indigent. There is an express finding that the respondent FIRST DIVISION
was conducting these programs as a part of its commercial adventure for profit.
There is no finding that the motives of the respondent were charitable. The form
which the activities of the respondent take is illegal and contrary to the statute and
against the policy of the Commonwealth as there declared. PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
-versus
It is not necessary to differentiate as to the liability of the respondent touching
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
these two programs. No discussion is required to show that the respondent was Respondent. Promulgated:
liable under the statute for the one originated in Boston and broadcasted from its
September 4, 2009
Boston studio. See Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co. 8 F. Supp. 889.
The respondent has discontinued both series of programs assailed by the present RESOLUTION
petition. That was done within less than a month after this petition was instituted.
The circumstances attending such discontinuance are not set out with much fulness CORONA, J.:
in the record. The inference seems strong, however, that there is no likelihood that This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
these programs will be resumed by the respondent. The question as to the legality Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of these programs has become moot by conditions arising since the institution of of clients and encroachment of professional services.
the present proceeding. Sullivan v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 233 Mass. Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
543. Swig v. State Ballot Law Commission, 265 Mass. 19. Independent-Progressive convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
Party v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 266 Mass. 18. Brown v. City Council of financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce them to
Cambridge, 289 Mass. 333. Mullholland v. State Racing Commission, 295 Mass. 286, hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
289. In these circumstances it seems plain that there is no ground for the issuance
of an injunction. That relief would be of no use to the petitioners and would be To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James
apparently of no value in aid of the public welfare. Hubrite Informal Frocks, Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
Inc. v. Kramer, 297 Mass. 530, 533-534, and cases there collected. relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for
a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]
There is no claim for damages set forth in the petition and there is no finding as to
damages. The case cannot be retained for the assessment of damages. No Front
injunction ought to issue on the facts disclosed. There appears to be no reasonable
basis for apprehension that the programs may be resumed, so that the issues raised NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
by the petition do not remain justiciable. Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 LAW OFFFICE
U.S. 360, 362. It follows that the petition must be dismissed. CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing
and circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in
Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the
CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants
advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation
and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence [19] (consisting of the sworn statements
of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to
prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule
2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that
a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again
the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client
list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied
Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of
the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for
the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter
of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23] Either of these circumstances
may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the
prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients
cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which
calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation
statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client
for the purpose of obtaining employment. [26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to
the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A
lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. [27] For this reason, lawyers
are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or
use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled
to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded
the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in
the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution.
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
15 - Maelotisea S. Garrido v. Attys. Angel E. Garrido and Romana P.
Valencia (2010) [I suggest you read the original of this. Very interesting J]
Doctrine Possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. Admission to the practice only creates
the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer. Facts: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit
and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment against Atty. Garrido and Atty.
Valencia According to Maelotisea, She and Atty. Garrido were married back
in 1962. Subsequently, she found out that the two lawyers got married in
Hong Kong in 1978, while she and Garrido were still married. She also found
out that the two had a daughter. In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal
home and joined Atty. Valencia at their residence. Since he left the conjugal
home, he stopped giving Maelotisea and his family the needed financial
support. In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges
and imputations. He alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he
was already married to Constancia David when he married Maelotisea. As he
and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty.
Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he
confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and
his financial difficulties. He denied that he failed to give financial support to
his children with Maelotisea. Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages
were contracted before he became a member of the bar, with the third
marriage contracted after the death of Constancia. Also, Atty Garrido argues Labiano, pirated a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an affidavit
that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules. Maelotisea in support of Atty. Linsangans allegations.
filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed arguing that she Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labianos calling card which
wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido. Issues: 1. W/N the appears as follows:
FRONT
disbarment case against Atty. Garrido would prosper 2. W/N the disbarment
case against Atty. Valencia would prosper 3. W/N the offenses charged have NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
prescribed 4. W/N Maelotiseas motion for the dismissal of the complaints LAW OFFICE
she filed against the respondents will prosper Held/Ratio: 1. YES He did not CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,Section Fe Marie L. Labiano
20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Paralegal
Professional Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey the BACK
laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code SERVICES OFFERED:
of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct ABROAD.
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing
the legal profession. 2. YES Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the printing of such calling cards.
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the ISSUES:
dignity of and discredited the legal profession. Her actions were so corrupt 1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional
as to approximate a LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS ALS2014B JUSTICE HOFILENA services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
ALS2014B 20 of 176 sof criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
HELD:
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her 1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the A lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him
confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. By
romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous recruiting Atty. Linsangans clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical,
marriages. 3. NO Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure do predatory overstep into anothers legal practice.
not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for 2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of
membership in the Bar because admission to the practice of law is a Professional Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano,
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest. he admitted he actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that
4. NO In light of the public service character of the practice of law, Labiano was connected to his law office. Through Labianos actions, Atty. Tolentinos
law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation
Maelotisea is considered more of a witness than a complainant in these
on the strength of Labianos word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more
proceedings. She filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had favorable result.
presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts Labianos calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her finance legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a
desistance. client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
598 SCRA 133 Legal Ethics Unethical Solicitation of Legal Business in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the
Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter
of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the
prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients
cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states w/ financial assistance, was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a
personal and direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished
with severity. At any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was
suspended by the Supreme Court for one year.