ThEmE: RoyAl STAlEmATE

Climax of the Syrian Wars

The battle of Raphia, 217 BC
oN ThE AfTERNooN of juNE 22, 217 (All dATES ARE BC) PTolEmy
Iv PhIloPATER, lIkEly AT ThE INSISTENCE of hIS GENERAlS,
RESolvEd To BRING ANTIoChuS III To BATTlE. ThE TWo ARmIES
hAd BEEN CAmPEd oPPoSITE EACh oThER foR AlmoST fIvE
dAyS ANd ThE BoTChEd ATTEmPT oN PTolEmyS lIfE By
ThEodoTuS, hIS ERSTWhIlE GovERNoR of CoElE SyRIA
NoW IN SElEuCId SERvICE, WAS A PRoduCT of ThIS PRo-
CRASTINATIoN (PolyBIuS 5. 82.1; 81.1-6 All REfERENCES
To ThIS AuThoR uNlESS oThERWISE STATEd). TWo
dAyS PREvIouS, ANTIoChuS hAd CloSEd ThE dISTANCE
BETWEEN ThE TWo CAmPS fRom 1.8 kIlomETRES To A lIT-
TlE lESS ThAN oNE kIlomETRE. AS A RESulT ThERE WERE
fREquENT STRuGGlES AT ThE WATERING-PlACES AS WEll AS
INfANTRy ANd CAvAlRy SkIRmIShES IN ThE SPACE BETWEEN ThE
CAmPS (5.80.5-7).

By Michael Park

Ptolemy, who had force-marched his much preparation and drill

army through the waterless region
from Pelusium to the spot he was
bound for (5.80.2-3) some nine kilome-
tres southwest of Raphia (near to mod-
had been invested in the
Lagid (Ptolemaic) force (see
below), there remained the
fact that its reliability was
Livius.org

ern Dikla, Egypt) in five days a distance
of near 180 kilometres at 36 kilometres
per day had chosen his ground with
a clear purpose. The Ptolemaic army,
unlike the Seleucid, had not fought a
major set-piece engagement in a gen-
eration with much of its work in the
intervening years having been carried
out by mercenaries. At the head of this
largely untried host, Ptolemys general
staff chose to adopt a largely defensive
strategy and block the Jiradi Pass.
The chosen ground, inside the east-
ern end of the pass, was some four
and a half kilometres in width. Sea
dunes guarded the northwestern side
whilst desert dunes from the Sinai and
limestone knolls hemmed the south-
east. To the southwest, the wells of
Sheik-Zuwayid would provide water as
would the sea dune wells. Although
open to question and so the
narrower field of the pass would
be to its advantage. In the wider
world, Ptolemy and his generals
almost certainly encouraged the revolt
and dynastic pretensions of Achaeus
Antiochus satrap of Asia Minor in the
Seleucid rear (5.42.7; 57.2; 66.3; 67.1). On
this battlefield, they would settle for
stopping Antiochus in his tracks. His
dispositions would reflect this strategy.
Antiochus had never really expect-
ed Ptolemy to fight indeed he was
encouraged in that belief (5.66.6-8).
Having arrived the same night as
Ptolemy, his surprise at the size of the
army that had taken the field against
him is evidenced by both his cautious
final advance from Gaza and his move-
ment into the pass a few days after his
arrival. Reports of the army advancing
Bust of Antiochus III the Great (242-187
BC), now in the Louvre, Paris.
from Pelusium and a lack of concise
information regarding its whereabouts
likely occasioned the former. As for
the latter, Polybius (5.80.4-6) says this
was to remove to more advantageous
ground and to inspire confidence in
his troops. Antiochus, finding himself
outnumbered in phalanx infantry and
roughly even in cavalry, had no desire
to encourage Ptolemy from his defen-
sive posture. Advancing into the more

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 ThEmE: RoyAl STAlEmATE
restricted field of the pass he would
inspire confidence in his troops by
accepting battle on the more advan-
tageous ground where he would not
have to stretch the lines of his phalanx
to match Ptolemys.
Given Ptolemys intentions,
Antiochus was compelled to adopt a
more aggressive posture. Not that he
would likely have chosen otherwise.
With Achaeus having assumed the dia-
dem at Sardis, Antiochus could ill afford
to wait. Having advanced into the pass
he could now deploy his line to match
Ptolemys with his experienced phalanx
holding the centre of the field. With a
combined arms assault from a stacked
right wing, Antiochus hoped to blast
the Ptolemaic left flank from its posi-
tion, crush its left wing infantry and
force Ptolemy back into the waterless
region hed recently crossed. Antiochus,
controlling the water of Raphia and
Sheik-Zuwayid, would thus have a nat-
ural border and free himself to deal
with Achaeus.
The Syrian Wars
The fourth Syrian War in sixty years
would be decided by the greatest clash
of arms since the battle of Ipsus in
301. Great armies would fight and kill
yet again to press the claims of
rival kings over the possession of Coele
Syria. The one, Ptolemy, absorbed in
unworthy intrigues and senseless and
continuous drunkenness, who treat-
ed the branches of government with
equal indifference (5.34.10); the other,
Antiochus, young and aggressive scion
of the Seleucid house with an empire to
set in order, if not reclaim.
The conflict was the latest mani-
festation of a long running sore of
Hellenistic politics, whose roots lay in the
events of the Diadoch Wars. Coele Syria
was unjustly occupied by Ptolemy
(Diod.18.73.2) after Triparadeisos (320)
and again after the battle of Gaza in
312. Later, as his allies fought at Ipsus
in 301, Ptolemy Soters contribution
to the grand alliance of kings against
Antigonus Monophthalmus was to
reoccupy Coele-Syria. In the aftermath
Seleucus, a key member of the alliance,
marched into Syria where in accor-
dance with the terms of the agreement,
he endeavoured to appropriate Coele
Syria. Ptolemy refused to give it up,
26 Ancient Warfare
AW nr6 nov-dec2010.indd 26
claiming that his allies were giving
him no part of the conquered territory,
even though he had been a partner
in the war. Seleucus, on the basis of
friendship, decided he would not for
the present interfere, but would con-
sider later how best to deal with friends
who chose to encroach (Diod. 21.5).
In the decades following, succes-
sive monarchs engaged in repeated
attempts to establish lasting control of
the strategic region, resulting in what
are termed the Syrian Wars. The third
and most recent of these, lasting from
246 to 241, saw Ptolemy III Euergetes
march as far as Babylon. After its set-
tlement, Ptolemy was left in control
of Coele Syria and the ports of Syria.
Amongst these latter was the city of
Seleuceia-in Pieria the capital, and so
to speak, the very inner shrine of the
kings realm (5.58.4).
Antiochus III, within a year of his
accession, was embroiled in a rebel-
lion in Media and the upper satrapies.
This, plus the determined resistance
of Ptolemys general Theodotus, fore-
stalled his attempt (221) on Seleuceia
and Coele Syria (5.43-46.5). Within two
years (219), though, Antiochus was back.
Advised to reclaim Seleuceia before any
other action was taken (5.58.4-8) he did
exactly that and might, for the moment
have been satisfied, but for the arrival
of a letter from Theodotus offering
to put Coele-Syria into his hands, and
inviting him to come thither with all
speed. At this Antiochus abandoned
his expedition against Achaeus, and
regarding everything else as of second-
ary importance and set about claim-
ing Coele Syria (5.61.6).
Ptolemys senior advisor, Sosibius,
and co-minister Agathocles imme-
diately set in play the only game in
town attempting by embassies to try
to retard the advance of Antiochus:
pretending to confirm him in the opin-
ion he originally entertained about
Ptolemy, namely, that he would not
venture to fight (5.63.2-3). The dip-
lomatic delaying tactics involving
Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus, and Aetolia
are illuminating in as much as they
illustrate the entire 84 years of dispute.
The real purpose though, was delay
and time to make their preparations
for war (5.63.5-6). And preparations
there most certainly were.
The Raphia campaign
Taking the court to Memphis, Sosibius
and his co-conspirator, Agathocles,
received the ongoing embassies from
Antiochus with every mark of courtesy
and kindness. What Antiochus ambas-
sadors or those sent by Sosibius
(5.66.9) signally did not receive was any
knowledge of what was transpiring
at Alexandria. Here the two ministers
of the crown had collected the mer-
cenaries whom they had on service in
towns outside Egypt. As well, they had
dispatched officers to recruit foreign
soldiers and were collecting provisions
both for the troops they already pos-
sessed, and for those that were com-
ing in. The recruiting did not stop at
soldiers: the Ptolemaic army required
seasoned officers and these too, came
from Greece. Echecrates of Thessaly,
Phoxidas of Melita, Cnopias of Allaria
and Socrates of Boeotia all came to
Alexandria and all, importantly, had
seen service under Demetrius II and
Antigonus Doson. They were swiftly put
in charge of the training of the army
(5.63.7-14).
As the interminable embassies
travelled back and forth, Antiochus
interested himself with the odd siege
and eventually agreed to a four month
truce over the winter of 219/18 (5.66.1-
2). Meanwhile the Lagid army trained
apace. The soldiers were divided by age
and nationality, after which they were
assigned to divisions and armed tak-
ing no account of what they had borne
before (5.64.1). Here the Greek merce-
naries were armed as phalangites and,
under Phoxidas and Andromachus,
drilled with the phalanx as one unit on
the same ground (see Ancient Warfare
I.1 Alexandrias Colourful Funeral
Stelae). Here also Echectrates splen-
didly trained the Greek mercenary cav-
alry and Polycrates the cleruchic cavalry
(that which was obtained from Libya
or enlisted in the country 5.65.5) and
the guard.
Convinced that Ptolemy would
not leave Egypt to fight, Antiochus
left his winter quarters in Seleuceia
(218) and stormed the Porphyrion Pass.
Subsequent resistance aside from
Sidon was sporadic and typified by
the desertion of Ptolemys commanders
(Theodotus had earlier given over Tyre
and Ptolemais). After consolidating his
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Karwansaray Publishers
Bust of Ptolemy IV Philopater (Father
loving, 244-205 BC), now in the
Louvre, Paris.
hold on Coele Syria Antiochus retired
to Ptolemais for the winter. In the fol-
lowing spring of 217 Ptolemy finally
mobilized his retrained army and ven-
tured to make a contest of the province.
Antiochus, informed of his approach,
gathered his army and marched for
Raphia where he would deal with
friends who chose to encroach.
Deployment for battle
Marching out from camp and form-
ing into line, the phalanx divisions of
Sosibius and Andromachus filled the
centre of the field; around these troops
the rest of the army would be arrayed.
The near 20,000 Egyptians under
Sosibius held the right of this block.
The Greco-Macedonian phalanx of
25,000 stood to their left. Both these
formations adopted a depth of 24 ranks
allowing the deployment of the rest of
the infantry thus plugging the pass,
AW nr6 nov-dec2010.indd 27
whilst allowing some room
for the cavalry to maneu-
ver.
To the immediate
right of the Egyptian
phalanx Phoxidas led the
8,000 mercenary Greek
phalangites into position
sixteen deep. Alongside
the Greeks the Gauls and
Thracians, 6,000 of them,
took their station under
Dionysius. Rounding out the
right was the Greek mercenary
cavalry under Echecrates who
commanded the right wing. To
his front was posted a 33 strong
elephant corps.
Next to the Greco-Macedonian
phalanx Ptolemy arranged the
3,000 Libyans armed and trained
in the Macedonian fashion and
these were abutted by Socrates 2,000
sarissa-armed peltasts. Anchoring
the Lagid infantry on the far left were
the phalanx infantry elite: the 3,000
guard troops of the royal agema
(basilikon agema) under Eurylochus.
These last three divisions were also
arrayed sixteen deep. The extrem-
ity of the Ptolemaic left wing was held
by Polycrates and the cleruchic cav-
alry: 2,300 strong along with Ptolemy
himself and his cavalry guard of 700
(5.82.3-7). Forty of Ptolemys elephants
guarded this wing and 3,000 Cretans
stood behind them and alongside the
cavalry they would support. The Lagid
battle line ran slightly northwest to
southeast, from the ancient road near
to the sea dunes to somewhat south of
the modern El-Arish-Rafa road, occupy-
ing the available ground afforded by
the pass.
Antiochus phalanx, at the regu-
lar depth of sixteen (18.30.1), was
deployed opposite Ptolemys in the cen-
tre of the field. The phalanx of Greco-
Macedonians, almost 20,000 in num-
ber under Nicarchus and Theodotus
Hermiolius, stood opposite Ptolemys
virgin native phalanx. To its right,
under Theodotus, the Aetolian who
had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten
thousand picked men from the whole
kingdom, armed in the Macedonian
fashion, most of whom had silver
shields (5.79.4-5). These elite Syrian
troops, the argyraspides, likely formed
ThEmE: RoyAl STAlEmATE
8,000 of this corps and the remaining
2,000, the nature of whom can really
only be guessed at, may well have been
hypaspists (peltasts).
To the left of the phalanx was
Antiochus make do infantry of the
defensive left wing. Abutting the pha-
lanx were 10,000 Arabs, likely javelin
men, at a similar depth to the phalanx.
Alongside these were 5,000 light armed
Medes, Cissians and Carmanians and
they were joined by 3,000 Agrianians,
Thracians and Persians with 1,500
Lydian and Kardouchoi (Cardaces,
likely modern Kurds) javelin men at
the end. Themison, with 2,000 cavalry,
commanded the wing and 33 elephants
stood across its front (5.82.11-13).
The Seleucid right wing, which
would lead the offensive, Antiochus
would command in person. Alongside
the argyraspides, he posted the 5,000
mercenary thureophoroi from Greece
under the command of Hippolochus
(cf 5.84.9). These troops would con-
front Ptolemys infantry agema and his
peltasts: their role would be crucial to
the battle plan. Byttacus, with 5,000
light troops (Daae, Carmanians and
Cilicians) under his command, provided
both extra width for the infantry line as
well as support for the sixty elephants
posted in front of the wing. Alongside
these lights stood 2,500 Cretans and
Antipaters 2,000 strong cavalry corps
rounded out the main line. The royal
ile (regiment) and cavalry agema, of
1,000 each and which he would lead,
Antiochus placed at an angle to his
main line. This angle, given his attack-
ing posture, was near certainly ech-
eloned rearwards in deep column and
would be somewhat difficult to discern
from the Ptolemaic lines (5.82.8-10).
Both kings rode the lines with their
officers and, in the case of Ptolemy,
his sister Arsinoe addressing words
of encouragement and exhortation to
their officers and friends. Neither hav-
ing been on the throne long enough
to point to any glorious or famous
achievement of his own instead
reminded them of the glory of their
ancestors, and the great deeds per-
formed by them. These words were
directed particularly to the officers and
men of the phalanx on both sides for
it was these that they both rested
their strongest hopes on (5.83.1-6). This
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 ThEmE: RoyAl STAlEmATE
Carlos de la Rocha
done, both returned to their chosen
stations opposite each other on the
north-western side of the field.
Battle begins
Antiochus signaled for the attack to
begin and the elephants lumbered off
at the run with Byttacus light infantry
following in support. Across the field
Ptolemy ordered his own elephants for-
ward. Polycrates cavalry, along with the
Cretans, began an advance left and for-
ward behind them. Immediately mat-
ters went astray as only some few of
Ptolemys elephants came to close quar-
ters with the foe. These few, very likely
Indian rather than African given they
were towered, engaged fiercely as they
butted heads and swung tusks at and
into each other. In the towers atop the
elephants, amid the arrows and mis-
siles from the light armed, the soldiers
maintained a brilliant fight lunging
at and striking each other with saris-
sae. Too few to make any appreciable
difference, Ptolemys elephants were
forced back and onto their own lines.
Here, as Polycrates advanced, elephants
28 Ancient Warfare
AW nr6 nov-dec2010.indd 28
careered back onto his troops throwing
horse, rider and Cretans into panic
As the Seleucid elephants gained
the ascendancy Antipaters cavalry
corps, launched at the Ptolemaic left
close behind them, charged into the
dust covered melee. Antiochus, skirting
the outer edge of the elephants, led his
column at the charge whilst the Greek
thureophoroi, on the other side of the
elephants, advanced toward the Lagid
elite units of foot at the double.
Echecrates, away on the Ptolemaic
right wing, waited first to see the
result of the struggle between the
other wings of the two armies (5.85.1).
Looking towards the north-west he
can have made out little of what was
unfolding. Heat haze combined with
over three and a half kilometres of
intervening distance obscured all
detail other than the immense cloud of
dust that was now the Ptolemaic left:
a cloud that appeared to be moving,
inexorably, rearwards. Beyond the light
troops of his own wing and the phalanx
of Greeks, the Egyptian phalanx, flank-
ing their Macedonian counterparts,
stood with sarissae raised and waited.
Across the sand and dust, flashes could
be made out as the enemys shields
caught the sun: the Seleucid infantry
were drawing shields from their shoul-
ders.
Leading his royal ile and the cavalry
agema at the gallop, Antiochus swung
out and around the elephant battle.
Polycrates cavalry rent by elephants
retreating onto and through his posi-
tion was now a mass of terrified
and rearing horses. Ptolemys Cretans,
increasingly confined by the cavalry
they were to assist and taking any open-
ing for retreat available to them, added
to the escalating disarray. At this point
Antiochus, appearing from behind the
cloud and noise that was the elephant
disaster to Polycrates front, drove vio-
lently into the latters defenceless flank
(5.84.8). Troop after troop of Seleucid
cavalry charged into Polycrates men
who, unable to cope with the elephants
and the flank attack, died as spears
drove into both horse and rider. Under
impossible pressure Ptolemys left wing
cavalry gave ground falling back and
29-11-2010 20:21:44

onto its own infantry.
The confusion and dislocation
amongst the Ptolemaic cavalry eventu-
ally turned to rout. Antiochus, envision-
ing a crushing victory as Polycrates
cavalry eventually fled, pressed the
rout and the pursuit. His object, more
likely than not, was Ptolemy himself
who, along with what remained of his
cavalry guard, had used the dust and
din of the tumult to circle back and
away towards the safety of his phalanx
which was unengaged (5.85.7).
Charge of the Lagid wing
Opposite Echecrates position the trum-
peting of the Seleucid elephants quick-
ly drowned whatever sounds drifted
across from the Ptolemaic left wing.
Looking forward Echecrates saw the
dust coming his way and, worse, that
the elephants opposite his division
were afraid even to approach the hos-
tile elephants (5.85.1) and had either
remained stationary or began to back
away. The disaster of the left now por-
tended for the right and Echectrates
could wait no longer.
In a move that was doubtless
planned, Echecrates sent a rider to
Phoxidas ordering an advance and for
Phoxidas himself to charge the part of
the enemy opposite him with his Greek
mercenaries along with the Gauls.
Then, ordering the Thracian infantry
(the division behind the elephants)
to follow him, he led them and the mer-
cenary cavalry out to the right off the
field and around the limestone ridge
so as to get outside the elephant scrim-
mage and out of view of the Seleucid
cavalry behind its elephants. The Greeks
lowered their sarissae and set off at
the charge. The Gauls, as the Greeks
stepped off, advanced into and around
the elephants to engage the Seleucid
light troops advancing in support of
them (5.85.1-3).
On the Ptolemaic left, the infantry
agema was in the ineluctable process
of disintegration. Panicked elephants,
showing no respect for man or sarissa,
trampled the former and splintered the
latter. Phalangites, not already crushed,
were thrown into in a state of utter
terror as fleeing elephants caught pro-
truding sarissae skittling their wielders
and any near to them. To their right,
the elephants having already thrown
AW nr6 nov-dec2010.indd 29
their ranks also into confusion (5.84.9),
Ptolemys peltasts also came under
attack. Antiochus Greek mercenaries
assaulted the Lagid phalangites as they
struggled for cohesion. Gaps in the pel-
tasts ranks the inevitable result of
their own elephants falling back into
them opened invitingly. Into these
gaps streamed the Seleucid Greeks
whilst the agema shattered and lack-
ing any formation broke and gave
way (5.84.7). Byttacus men, meanwhile,
were taking targets of opportunity
with impunity from the peltasts flank
as well as the remnants the Ptolemaic
left wing.
Ptolemy, sheltered by his phalanx,
was watching the disintegration of his
entire left wing. Whilst his phalanx
was still intact in the centre of the field,
both it and his camp might well be
overrun shortly. To his right his Greek
phalanx, along with the right wing
infantry, had advanced to the charge.
Urged on by his officers, Ptolemy came
around the right flank of his Egyptian
phalanx and riding along its front
showing himself in the view of both
armies struck terror in the hearts of
the enemy, but inspired great spirit and
enthusiasm in his own men. At this
Andromachus and Sosibius gave orders
for sarissae to be couched and for the
45,000 strong backbone of the army
to follow the right wing and advance
upon the enemy phalanx. (5.85.9)
Antiochus Greek mercenaries, shov-
ing sarissae aside with their thureoi,
attacked Ptolemys disorganised pha-
langites with spear and sword in hand
to hand combat. With the Lagid infan-
try agema largely destroyed, its corps
of peltasts was now in danger of being
cut to pieces. As casualties mounted
alarmingly the peltasts gave ground.
Stepping over and around the dead or
dying, the Greeks stabbed and hacked
at Ptolemys peltasts pushing them
backwards, with ever increasing ease,
until they were driven out of the line
(5.84.9).
Ptolemys camp, being close to
the battle line like that of Antiochus
(cf 5.80.6), now presented a strate-
gic obstacle. Antiochus troops could
not execute a turn to their left in an
attempt to roll up Ptolemys line as they
would be exposed on their right sides
to any missile fire or defenders sallying
ThEmE: RoyAl STAlEmATE
from the camp including the survivors
of the peltasts and infantry agema.
The Seleucid cavalry of the left,
advancing in concert with their ele-
phants, were taken completely by
surprise in their flank and rear by
Echectrates assault column appear-
ing from around the limestone knolls.
The mercenary cavalry charged into
Themisons troops and quickly drove
them from their ground (5.85.3) across
and onto their light troops. The Seleucid
lights the Persians, Cardaces, Lydians
and Agrianians found themselves cor-
ralled by the cavalry they were osten-
sibly supporting. Order quickly turned
to shambles as Echectrates Thracian
troops, having loosed javelins, created
mayhem with their romphaia pole
weapons with a blade some seventy or
more centimetres long. Horses and rid-
ers fell indiscriminately as the blades
were swung and thrust.
Seleucid collapse
The Seleucid phalanx, having watched
their elephants and light troops move
off, readied for the advance. As they
were about to step off the Arab tribal
levies, protecting their left flank, were
taken in a vicious assault by Phoxidas
and his Greek phalangites. The Arabs,
light javelin men, failed to withstand
the initial charge and those not imme-
diately run through or crushed in the
contact, began to look for any meth-
od of escape. As the cavalry fled the
Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians, taken
frontally by the Gauls, also came under
attack from Echectrates Thracians.
Ptolemys phalanx brigades,
advancing at the double, left behind
the carnage of their left wing and
closed on their Seleucid counterparts.
In the initial collision the picked Syrian
troops stood their ground for a time.
Alongside them the Greco-Macedonian
phalanx came under severe pressure.
The lights of the Seleucid left wing, led
by their defeated cavalry, were falling
back towards and behind them in the
direction of the camp and, eventually,
Raphia. Echectrates did not bother with
a headlong pursuit but drove across
into what remained of the light infan-
try. The Thracians and Gauls followed
and carnage was wrought by Galatian
swords and Thracian romphaia. As
their light infantry fled the field the
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Seleucid Greco-Macedonian phalanx
found itself denuded of support and
under flank attack. With Ptolemys
Egyptians driving them back they buck-
led and fled. The argyraspides, aware
of the imminent danger of envelop-
ment, also retreated towards camp.
Now Echectrates pursued killing large
numbers of the enemy [] by means of
his cavalry and mercenaries on his right
wing (5.86.1).
On the far side of the field Antiochus,
confident that the success of his Greek
mercenaries inside of his cavalry and
elephants was reflected across the line,
continued his pursuit. At the warning
of one of his older officers he called a
halt to collect his forces and assess the
state of battle. Looking back across the
field to his centre he realised that the
cloud of dust raised by the phalanx
was moving towards their own camp.
Antiochus and his cavalry returned to
the field at the full gallop to find his
whole line in full retreat and his cam-
paign in tatters (5.85.13).
Antiochus had lost some 10,000
infantry and 300 cavalry killed as well
as 4,000 men taken prisoner. He retired
to Raphia with such of his men as
had fled in compact bodies. Ptolemy,
seemingly taken aback by the victory
(5.87.3), retired to his own camp and
there spent the night having lost 1,500
infantry killed and seven hundred cav-
alry. These, almost to a man, fell dur-
ing the debacle on the left of his line.
Whilst Polybius says that sixteen of
his elephants were killed, and most of
the others captured, it is difficult to
see an army in flight capturing some
fifty elephants (5.86.3-6). Ptolemy, hav-
ing buried his dead and despoiled
the enemys, marched on Raphia the
next day. Antiochus, like Antigonus
Monophthalmus at Paraetecene, had
decamped before sunrise and found
refuge at Gaza (5.86.4).
Aftermath
The towns and cities came over to
Ptolemy and within three months hed
re-established control over the region.
Before concluding a one year truce with
Antiochus Ptolemy, in a display of phar-
aonic propaganda, made a show inva-
sion of Phoenicia. He then returned to
Egypt and, according to Polybius, lost
32 Ancient Warfare
AW nr6 nov-dec2010.indd 32
all interest in matters of interstate rela- dence. When they did the Ptolemies
tions resuming his habitual effemi- would lose Upper Egypt for decades.
nacy and corruption of his manner of The struggle for Coele Syria, too, did
life (5.87.3) one suspects. not end at Raphia. Antiochus would
The military victory, though quite take it back after the battle of Panion in
emphatic, would not settle the issue. 200. Thirty two years later the intermi-
Antiochus returned to his kingdom and nable dispute would have an end when
busied himself disposing of Achaeus. the final arbiter of all the Hellenistic
His loss here actually facilitated the kingdoms, Rome, in the form of Gaius
stabilising of his own kingdom and Popilius Laenas literally drew a circle
his following campaign to restore the around it (29.27.1-9). n
upper satrapies. Ptolemy took little
active part in interstate politics again.
The evidence (Egypt coining less in sil- Michael Park trained as a teacher in
ver and eventually ceasing such) sug- English, history and science back in
gests economic trouble and an inability the seventies. When not working at his
to pay for mercenaries on a continu- day job, he pursues his real interests:
ing basis. The lasting result, for Egypt, decent red wine and collecting classics
was the sudden spike in nationalism and works on ancient history as well as
brought on by the training of Egyptian writing. Income not already disposed of
troops for the battle. Taken with their supports something of a mini Library of
success at Raphia they refused any Congress on the subject. He would like
longer to receive orders from the king; to thank Christopher Webber and Paul
but looked out for a leader to represent McDonnel-Staff for the answers to some
them, on the ground that they were questions. They should not be blamed
quite able to maintain their indepen- for how those answers were utilised.
Further reading:
- Polybius (Shuckburgh translation) is the literary source for Antiochus
invasion and the campaign (5.58-71 and 79-87). The trilingual Raphia
Inscription provides confirmation of dating and the period of the cam-
paign. Polybius battle narrative, though, is very Diodorus-like and suffers
from summarising and cherry picking. As J.P. Mahaffy wrote his descrip-
tion, as we have it, is incoherent. Thus, for example, one has to work
out the probabilities of troop placement from the garbled 82.10 and I
have placed the medium infantry (Greeks) alongside the phalanx with
Byttacus lights supporting the elephants.
Modern works are not plentiful outside of general treatises. The exhaus-
tive and exhausting to find Raphia, 217 BCE, Revisited by E Galili
(Scripta Classica Israelica, 3, 1976-77) is a treasure trove and well worth
the tracking down. Bar Kochva, Seleucid Army Organisation and the Great
Campaigns provides a shorter analysis.
- J.P. Mahaffey, The Army of Ptolemy at Raphia. Hermathena 13 (1898), 140-5
provides some discussion of the textual problems.
- G.T. Griffiths, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World. Chicago 1975
(reprint) deals with both armies - mainly from the mercenary point of
view and Bevan The House of Ptolemy (Chicago 1985, reprint) chapter VII
for a general overview.
- F. Walbank, Historical Commentary on Polybius. I (Oxford 1957), 585-616
and III (Oxford 1979), 773-4.
For the possibility of Indian elephants in Ptolemys array see M. Charles,
Elephants at Raphia: Reinterpreting Polybius 5.845, The Classical
Quarterly 57.1 (2007), 306-311 .
29-11-2010 20:21:53