CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines examination of the samples he extracted from the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-
appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b),
Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)
(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as
follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m.,
the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift
wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and
no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending
the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p.
6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were
then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two
feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages before the box
was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box
ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of
one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He
was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section.
Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes
and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to
the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October
6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's
packages were placed and, in the presence of the
NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-
foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found
to have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis
supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was
likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that
the package contained bricks or cake-like dried
marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It
turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge
of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects
(tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no
avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the
Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance
from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant,
while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited
by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the
seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of
the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry
Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried
leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-
134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors,
to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND
SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR
PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE
NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME
INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p.
1; Rollo, p. 55)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed
offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and
therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in
evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935
Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are
considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio
by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684,
6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20
SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence
obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant,
abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted
in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its
seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV)
constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to
the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co.,
(Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
[1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See
also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March
14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to,
the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State
acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting
in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345
[1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as
such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of
his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US
757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616
[1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65
L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against
unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental
action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his
property, subject to the right of seizure by process
duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661
[1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the
automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d
121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d
621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517
(1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however,
was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel
in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he
left behind a travel case containing the
evidence***complained of. The search was made on
the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
them of the bag's contents, and made it available to
the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it
do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through
a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment
only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the
Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI
agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence
later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his
conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be
clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to
fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal
search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of
the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of
Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts
(TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing
the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and
later summoned the agents to his place of business.
Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the
shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the
NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of
accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v.
State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer,
there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US
v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of
California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State,
429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise
held that where the property was taken into custody of the
police at the specific request of the manager and where the
search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the
land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself
posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals.
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest
or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only
the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the
1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo,
p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in
laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the
modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2,
Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or
warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the
issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
[1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12
[June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an
act of the State would result in serious legal complications and
an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an
individual effected through private seizure equally applies,
in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it
is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that
the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed
fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully
examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements
without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional
rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their
duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be
given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the
contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is
that appellant refused to give any written statement while
under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI,
Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job
Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with
the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not
contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne
out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense
that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being
investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed
judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference
made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial
investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error,
appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of
the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a
certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a
pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute
conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and
gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the
German national was about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v.
Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J.
Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989];
People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92
SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not
even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address
or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should
have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B",
Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the
contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight
to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j],
Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to
claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial
court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Penned by Judge Romeo J. Callejo.
** It reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
*** Forged checks.

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find

appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary
to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An
acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour
could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four
(4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for
appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking
without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial
court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and
the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the
Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply
accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and
ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so"
(Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to
do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs.
Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering

that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously
convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the
Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the
consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a
Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is
just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich,
Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p.
244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the

mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 188920 February 16, 2010
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR.,
RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON
R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN
CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI and ELEAZAR P.
QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R. NEREUS O.
ACOSTA, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already
resolved by the Court involving a leadership dispute within a
political party. In this case, the petitioners question their
expulsion from that party and assail the validity of the election
of new party leaders conducted by the respondents.
Statement of the Facts and the Case
For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of
the preceding events is in order.
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as
erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his
partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr.
(Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the
announcement without consulting his party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference
to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but,
when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new
officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon
immediately filed a petition1 with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was
illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, the National
Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council
(NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed
that under the amended LP Constitution,2 party officers were
elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on
November 30, 2007.
On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority
of the LPs NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006
assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could
be likened to "people power," wherein the LP majority removed
respondent Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also
said that the amendments3 to the original LP Constitution, or
the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year
term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of
Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a
resolution,4 partially granting respondent Drilons petition. It
annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding
of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the
election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was
invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in
accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the
amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been
properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed to have ended.
Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover
capacity until new officers were elected.
Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the
COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a
resolution,5 granting respondent Drilons petition and denying
that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority,
that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party
leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been
validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent
Drilons term as LP president was to end only on November 30,
2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party
leaders before respondent Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine
NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified
to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons
associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their
membership status and raised issues regarding the
composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed
respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP
president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor,
Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R.
Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon,
Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for
mandatory and prohibitory injunction6 before the COMELEC
against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta,
the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin
Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that
the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly
convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and
claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based
on a list appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir
Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common
exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had
103 members.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the
incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO
meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor,
were given the status of "guests" during the meeting. Atienzas
allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon
arbitrarily thumbed them down and "railroaded" the
proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to
another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to
Atienzas allies.
On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that
Roxas election as LP president faithfully complied with the
provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The partys 60th
Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for
determining the NECO members because supervening events
changed the bodys number and composition. Some NECO
members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave
after accepting positions in the government. Others had lost
their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections,
making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP
members who got elected to public office also became part of
the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became
NECO members upon respondent Drilons nomination, a
privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP
Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not
fixed or static; it changed due to supervening circumstances.
Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed
petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned
for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006.
This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution
that NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO
members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez,
forfeited their party membership when they ran under other
political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were
dropped from the roster of LP members.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed
resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted
that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the
composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution
explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body.
That some lost or won these positions in the May 2007
elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to
prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was
not properly convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP
members, the COMELEC observed that this was a
membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the
political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party
matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
The Issues Presented
Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:
1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in
the case, is an indispensable party; and
2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted
LP members, have the requisite legal standing to
question Roxas election.
Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the
following issues:
3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it upheld the NECO membership that
elected respondent Roxas as LP president;
4. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the
validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving
the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al.
from the party; and
5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated
petitioners Atienza, et al.s constitutional right to due
process by the latters expulsion from the party.
The Courts Ruling
One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should
dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to
implead the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point
out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction against the NECO, the controversy could
not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to
the case.7
But petitioners Atienza, et al.s causes of action in this case
consist in respondents Roxas, et al.s disenfranchisement of
Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders and in the
illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were
supposedly excluded from the elections by a series of
"despotic acts" of Roxas, et al., who controlled the
proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et al.s expulsion
from the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent
Drilons "railroading" of election proceedings. Atienza, et al.
attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.
Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some
affirmative relief been sought from it, the LP is not an
indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.s prayer for the
undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.s acts and the
reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.
Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners
Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to question the election
of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP
members, having been validly expelled from the party or
having joined other political parties.8 As non-members, they
have no stake in the outcome of the action.
But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,9 legal
standing in suits is governed by the "real parties-in-interest"
rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states
that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest" is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words,
the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.s lack of standing
as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the
Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the
petition.
Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.s allegations that
respondents Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP
members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and
not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and
that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of
NECO members. If Atienza, et al.s allegations were correct,
they would have been irregularly expelled from the party and
the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to
recognition as members of good standing and to the holding of
a new election of officers using the correct list of NECO
members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to
take part in another election would stand to be benefited or
prejudiced by the Courts decision in this case. Consequently,
they have legal standing to pursue this petition.
Three. In assailing respondent Roxas election as LP
president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the NECO
members allowed to take part in that election should have
been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in
the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al.
allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president,
adopted that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC and
it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Courts
decision in the earlier cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that
list for the next party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect
defied the Courts ruling when they removed Atienza as party
chairman and changed the NECOs composition.10
But the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th
Anniversary Souvenir Program was drawn before the May
2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in the NECO
membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the
amended LP Constitution required. Respondent Drilon adopted
the souvenir program as common exhibit in the earlier cases
only to prove that the NECO, which supposedly elected
Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had been
improperly convened. It cannot be regarded as an immutable
list, given the nature and character of the NECO membership.
Nothing in the Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies
that the NECO membership should be pegged to the partys
60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been
no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did
not intend the NECO membership to be permanent. Its Section
2711 provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent
senators, members of the House of Representatives,
governors, and mayors who were LP members in good
standing for at least six months. It follows from this that with
the national and local elections taking place in May 2007, the
number and composition of the NECO would have to yield to
changes brought about by the elections.
Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them
to membership had to be dropped. Newly elected ones who
gained the privilege because of their offices had to come in.
Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away,
resigned from the party, or went on leave could not be
expected to remain part of the NECO that convened and held
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
elections on November 26, 2007. In addition, Section 27 of the
amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party
president to nominate "persons of national stature" to the
NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to
the admission of 12 NECO members nominated by respondent
Drilon when he was LP president. Even if this move could be
regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.s way of ensuring their
election as party officers, there was certainly nothing irregular
about the act under the amended LP Constitution.
The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the
amended LP Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al.
explained in details how they arrived at the NECO composition
for the purpose of electing the party leaders.12 The explanation
is logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld
the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP
president.
Petitioner Atienza claims that the Courts resolution in the
earlier cases recognized his right as party chairman with a
term, like respondent Drilon, that would last up to November
30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that position
violated the Courts resolution. But the Courts resolution in the
earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining
Atienza under Sections 2913 and 4614 of the amended LP
Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any
officer for cause as it saw fit.
Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC
selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled on the
composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality
of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said,
weigh heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the
case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim,
categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
intra-party leadership disputes.15
But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in
this case is not the validity of the expulsion of petitioners
Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO
assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP president.
Given the COMELECs finding as upheld by this Court that the
membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP
Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the
party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of
officers that the NECO held.1avvphi1
While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP
members belong to their faction, they did not specify who these
members were and how their numbers could possibly affect
the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of
party leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the
individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for
Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had
no quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the claims
of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their
expulsion from the party impacts on the party leadership issue
or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it
was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim.
Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et
al.s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be
settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
What is more, some of petitioner Atienzas allies raised
objections before the NECO assembly regarding the status of
members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the
election, implying that its membership, whose composition has
been upheld, voted out those objections.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is
limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all
controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference
from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes
internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership
disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court
ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections16 that the
COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-
C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity
of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for
its acts." The Court also declared in another case17 that the
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily
involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party
leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a
leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the
amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for
all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who
can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of
nomination for candidates to local elective posts.18 In simple
terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard
bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights
and privileges that will redound to the benefit of its official
candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered
political parties that have to be carried out through their
leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus
particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly
conduct of the elections.19
Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from
the party is not a simple issue of party membership or
discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-
protected right to due process of law. They claim that the
NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them
to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party.
According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are
the equivalent of administrative proceedings20and are,
therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down
in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.21
But the requirements of administrative due process do not
apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process
standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies
created by the state and through which certain governmental
acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or
instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state
delegates governmental power for the performance of a state
function."22 The constitutional limitations that generally apply to
the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to
administrative bodies.
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states
powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking
of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1
is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the
rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to
protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action,
but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In
the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from
such private acts apply. The right to due process guards
against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the
fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in
private controversies involving private parties.23
Although political parties play an important role in our
democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its
citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument.
The discipline of members by a political party does not involve
the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due
process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against
the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may C E R T I F I C AT I O N
have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those
that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is
through their charter, which is a contract among the party hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
been violated have recourse to courts of law for the the writer of the opinion of the Court.
enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue
against the government or any of its agencies.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts
will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary
Footnotes
matters within a political party. A political party is free to 1
Docketed as COMELEC Case SPP 06-002.
conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally- 2
The original LP Constitution was known as the "Salonga Constitution." It was
protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula,24 the amended several times under the party leadership of Senators Raul Daza and
Franklin M. Drilon. The amended LP Constitution came to be known as the
Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves "Daza/Drilon Constitution."
the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate 3
Referred to as the Daza-Drilon amendments.
without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state 4
Rollo, pp. 91-107.
5
policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, The Court did not render a full-blown decision but, instead, issued a resolution
to which was appended the individual opinions of Justices Antonio T. Carpio,
according to the free choice of the people.25 Dante O. Tinga and Cancio C. Garcia.
6
Docketed as COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.
7
Rollo, pp. 756-757.
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its 8
Id. at 757-761.
discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP president but 9
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 216.
refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from 10
11
Rollo, pp. 27-31.
SECTION 27. COMPOSITION. The National Executive Council (NECO) shall
the party. While the question of party leadership has be composed of the following members:
implications on the COMELECs performance of its functions 1. The Party Chairperson;
under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same 2. The Party Vice-Chairperson;
cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s 3. The Party President;
4. The Party Executive Vice-President;
expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an 5. The Party Vice-Presidents for Policy, Platform and Advocacy, External Affairs,
issue of party membership and discipline, in which the Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, the National Capital Region and Sectors;
COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its 6. The Party Secretary General;
7. The Party Deputy Secretary General;
power over political parties. 8. The Party Treasurer;
9. The Party Deputy Treasurer;
10. The Party Legal Counsel;
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and 11. The Party Spokesperson;
UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections 12. The Party Deputy Spokesperson;
dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001. 13. The Party Director General;
14. All incumbent Senators and members of the House of Representatives who
are members of the Party in good standing for at least six (6) months;
SO ORDERED. 15. All incumbent Governors of Provinces who are members of the Party in good
standing for at least six (6) months;
16. All incumbent Mayors of Cities who are members in good standing for at least
ROBERTO A. ABAD six (6) months;
Associate Justice 17. All former Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Republic who are members
of the Party in good standing for at least six (6) months;
18. All Past Presidents of the Party;
19. The National Presidents of all established Allied Sectoral Groups (Youth,
WE CONCUR: Women, Urban Poor, Labor, etc.);
20. Such other persons of National Stature nominated by the Party President and
approved by the National Directorate.
REYNATO S. PUNO Interim vacancies for these offices shall be filled by the NECO but only for the
Chief Justice remaining portion of the term.
12
Rollo, pp. 750-754.
13
SECTION 29. TENURE.- All Party officers and members of the NECO shall
hold office for three (3) years and until their successors shall have been duly
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA elected and qualified or unless sooner removed for cause.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 14
SECTION 46. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS.- Any officer of the Party may be
removed or suspended on the following grounds:
1. Commission of any act antagonistic to the Party objectives or inimical to its
CONCHITA CARPIO PRESBITERO J. interests, or for violation of or deliberate failure to support any of its fundamental
decisions;
MORALES VELASCO, JR. 2. Membership in another political party, either by act or deed;
Associate Justice Associate Justice 3. Dishonesty, oppression or misconduct while in office, gross negligence, abuse
of authority or dereliction of duty; and
4. Failure to attend two (2) consecutive Party meetings or at least of the
TERESITA J. meetings duly convened within a calendar year of the appropriate committee or
ANTONIO EDUARDO
LEONARDO-DE Party organ.
B. NACHURA Any officer of the Party may be subjected to disciplinary actions, including
CASTRO
Associate Justice suspension from effective exercise of his Party rights for a period of one year or
Associate Justice less for the same or less serious cause as may be established by the National
Executive Council or the national Political Council.
15
Rollo, pp. 33-38.
DIOSDADO M. 16
G.R. No. 80218, Minute Resolution dated November 5, 1987.
ARTURO D. BRION
PERALTA 17
Palmares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 86177-78, Minute Resolution
Associate Justice dated August 31, 1989.
Associate Justice 18
Section 51 of the amended LP Constitution reads:
"SECTION 51. CERTIFICATES OF NOMINATION Certificates shall be issued
by the Party President or the General Secretary upon authorization by the former,
MARIANO C. DEL for candidates for President, Vice- President, Senators and members of the
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTILLO House of Representatives.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice The Party President or the General Secretary may authorize in writing other
Party officers to issue Certificates of Nomination to candidates for local elective
positions.
MARTIN S. Certificates of Nomination as guest candidates may only be issued by the Party
JOSE P. PEREZ President or the General Secretary, upon the latters authorization."
VILLARAMA, JR. 19
In Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 70,
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 83 (2004), the Court cited the rights and privileges of political parties and its
official candidates as follows:
"x x x The dominant majority party, the dominant minority party as determined by
the COMELEC, for instance, is entitled to a copy of the election returns. The six
JOSE C. MENDOZA (6) accredited major political parties may nominate the principal watchers to be
Associate Justice designated by the Commission. The two principal watchers representing the
ruling coalition and the dominant opposition coalition in a precinct shall, if
available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

precinct. Three (3) of the six accredited major political parties are entitled to
receive copies of the certificate of canvass. Registered political parties whose
candidates obtained at least ten percent (10%) of the total votes cast in the next
preceding senatorial election shall each have a watcher and/or representative in
the procurement and watermarking of papers to be used in the printing of
election returns and official ballots and in the printing, numbering, storage and
distribution thereof. Finally, a candidate and his political party are authorized to
spend more per voter than a candidate without a political party." (Citations
omitted)
20
Rollo, pp. 41-43.
21
69 Phil. 635 (1940).
22
Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2005 Edition,
Ruben E. Agpalo, pp. 3-4, citing Luzon Development Bank v. Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees, 319 Phil. 262 (1995).
23
City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311 (2005).
24
373 Phil. 896, 912 (1999).
25
Section 6, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight
steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to
the weight standards of the airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress
his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under
282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the
weight standards of the company is not a bona fide
occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated
against because other overweight employees were promoted
instead of being disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con,
We uphold the legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however,
should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social
justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is
not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
The Facts
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international
flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five
feet and eight inches (58") with a large body frame. The proper
weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to
166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated
by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back
then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave
from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his
weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the
companys weight standards, prompting another leave without
pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to
return to work. But petitioners weight problem recurred. He
again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to
February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds
over his ideal weight. In line with company policy, he was
removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989.
He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and
report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told
that he may avail of the services of the company physician
should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be
evaluated on July 3, 1989.2
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It
was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He
was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the
limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon
personally visited petitioner at his residence to check on the
progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217
pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the
visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a
letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto
Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:
Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss
from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable
percentage until such time that my ideal weight is achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the
designated time schedule you will set for my weight check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui4
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his
ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3,
1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain
grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the
weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he
was given one more month to comply with the weight
requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check
on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding would
continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight
standards.5
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he
was seen submitting his passport for processing at the PAL
Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a
repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with
accordingly. He was given another set of weight check
dates.6 Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report
for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required
to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.7
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed
at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of
166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he
followed up his case requesting for leniency on the latter part
of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992
and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice
of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on
weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt
of the charge within which to file his answer and submit
controverting evidence.8
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his
Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he
claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been
condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the
company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed
that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has
not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are
similarly situated."
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where
petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so
as to attain his ideal weight.10
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that
due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering
the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years," his services were
considered terminated "effective immediately."11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12 petitioner
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes
ruled13 that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The dispositive
part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered, declaring the complainants dismissal illegal, and
ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position
or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal
on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for purposes of appeal
is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998
at P651,000.00;
b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
SO ORDERED.14
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not be
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not
hamper the performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did,
petitioner could be transferred to other positions where his
weight would not be a negative factor.17 Notably, other
overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr.
Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.18
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).19
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner without loss
of seniority rights and other benefits.20
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution22 of PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to
quash to the NLRC.23
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the
following tenor:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the
Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by our findings
herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive
portion of said decision concerning complainants entitlement
to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainants
entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of
simply backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual
reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to
manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of
complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten
(10) days from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed
as complainants reinstatement through payroll and execution
in case of non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the
Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.25
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain
weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food intake,
is a disease in itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no
intentional defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the
lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.27
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of
PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the
Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the
performance of his duties as flight steward despite being
overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should
have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of
petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance
of the weight standards of PAL.28
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.30
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed31 the
NLRC:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the
petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and
VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents
complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC because it "looked at wrong and irrelevant
considerations"33 in evaluating the evidence of the parties.
Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL are
meant to be a continuing qualification for an employees
position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight standards is
an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under
Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It
is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to
suggest.35 Said the CA, "the element of willfulness that the
NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at
a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper."36 In
other words, "the relevant question to ask is not one of
willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and
whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify
under this standard."37
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the
weight standards of PAL are reasonable.38 Thus, petitioner was
legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the
prescribed weight standards.39 It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.40
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held
that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational
qualification which, in case of violation, "justifies an employees
separation from the service."42
Issues
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are
posed for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN
BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e)
OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES;
II.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR
OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED
WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE
EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONERS CLAIMS
FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR
BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under
Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no
other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing
qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely
put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable
to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight
standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under
Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere
"orders" of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights"
that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and
keep his or her position in the company. In other words,
they were standards that establish continuing
qualifications for an employees position. In this sense, the
failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article
282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness
in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the
employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does
not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one
that falls under Article 282(e) the "other causes analogous to
the foregoing."
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that
apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They
apply prior to employment because these are the standards
a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They
apply after hiring because an employee must continue to
meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job.
Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for
which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to
(d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply
because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of
whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x
x45
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He
claims that obesity is a "physical abnormality and/or
illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated,
Inc.,47 he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to
fall squarely within the specific causes enumerated in
subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of
subparagraph 1(f) and says that Naduras illness occasional
attacks of asthma is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under
consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial
court said, "illness cannot be included as an analogous cause
by any stretch of imagination."
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-
paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law
are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How
Naduras illness could be considered as "analogous" to any of
them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or
pretense that the same was contracted through his own
voluntary act.48
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu
in Nadura is substantially different from the case at
bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The
law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No.
1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura,
thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura,
the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work
because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed
for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not
dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is
whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation
pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of
the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight
standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not
accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost
leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with
the weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against
petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able
to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is
possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude,
determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the
clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself
claimed that "[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to
ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it
now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot
of expenses."50 However, petitioner has only himself to blame.
He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.51 He chose to ignore the
suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when
required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid
explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of
willpower rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island,
Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals,52decided by the United States Court of Appeals
(First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980
and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the
mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being operated
by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an
unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her
performance met the Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988,
Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time, "she stood
52" tall and weighed over 320 pounds." Respondent claimed
that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability to
evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at
greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to
discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was in direct
violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,53 which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however,
that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within
the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is
a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and
rid herself of concomitant disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is
a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent
discriminated against Cook based on "perceived" disability.
The evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is
a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the
metabolic system and the neurological appetite suppressing
signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects
within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
systems. Notably, the Court stated that "mutability is relevant
only in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing
from a given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those
conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by
behavioral alteration."
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the
words of the District Court for the District of Rhode Island,
Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds
more than what is considered appropriate of her height."
According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320
pounds" in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his
heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal
weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in
the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an
analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that
justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be
unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly
puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is
solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through
all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature
of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks
the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."54
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona
fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of
a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer
can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).55 In the United
States, there are a few federal and many state job
discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an
employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited
discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary
to the normal operation of a business or enterprise.56
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does
not exist if there is no statute providing for it.57 Further, there is
no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.58
Both arguments must fail.
First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No.
727761 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons62 contain
provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee
Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government
and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU),63 the Supreme
Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in
determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under
this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance
of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the standard
is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-
related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the
legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper
Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court held that in order to justify a
BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of
the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.67
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is
used because it is parallel to BFOQ.68 BFOQ is valid "provided
it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance."69
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo
Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,70 the Court did not hesitate to pass
upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its
employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It was
held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its
purpose is the protection of the interests of the company
against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and
procedures.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be
applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor
Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in holding that the weight
standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound
to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers it transports.74 It is bound to carry its passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
for all the circumstances.75
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of
a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight
standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting
obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a
common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has
committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to
achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most
particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the
aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as
imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of
the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be
gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times
in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care
for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not
farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records.
People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that
airline companies transport their passengers to their respective
destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is
unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to
serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of the
passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to
care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the
aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to
the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need
cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open
emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in
cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand
grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin
attendant are important factors to consider in case of
emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow
aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that
"[w]hether the airlines flight attendants are overweight or not
has no direct relation to its mission of transporting passengers
to their destination"; and that the weight standards "has
nothing to do with airworthiness of respondents airlines," must
fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by
petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was involved there
were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as
flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight
engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the
airline company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight
engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the
same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another
matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles and
emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
attendant would certainly have difficulty navigating the
cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to
perform their task. That an obese cabin attendant occupies
more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which
courts can judicially recognize without introduction of
evidence.77 It would also be absurd to require airline
companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the
aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin
attendants like petitioner.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the
possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft,
should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant
during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of
the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes
mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what
cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost
seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might
slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is
blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the
weight standards of PAL were made known to him prior to his
employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he
must maintain at all times.78 In fact, never did he question the
authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down
his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith
demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang
tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight
limitations based on height and body frame for both male and
female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to
allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to
meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate
any possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action
on the part of PAL.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was
discriminated against by PAL.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a
convenient excuse to discriminate against him.79 We are
constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA
that "[t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case
as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to
escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight
entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that
impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the
reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private
respondents failure to comply."80It is a basic rule in evidence
that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.81
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an
affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with
particularity. There is nothing on the records which could
support the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner
cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed
cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him.
Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are
similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got
from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other
employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed
overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to
indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal
weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their
being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the
discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant
data that could have adequately established a case of
discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL
really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."82
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative
agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded
respect, even finality.83 The reason is simple: administrative
agencies are experts in matters within their specific and
specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast
rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by
substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative
bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as
to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts
must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of
administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set
aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.85
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably
misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the
equal protection clause guaranty86 of the Constitution.
However, in the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals.88 Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal protection
guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection
erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how
egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.91
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages
are moot.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for
reinstatement and wages have not been mooted. He is entitled
to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was
illegally dismissed" up to the time that the NLRC was reversed
by the CA.92
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even
pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein.
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of
reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ of
execution,93 the option to exercise actual reinstatement or
payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not
belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the
courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything
under the sun" to frustrate his "immediate return to his previous
position,"94 there is evidence that PAL opted to physically
reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in
accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter.95 In fact,
petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February
23, 2001, as shown by his signature.96
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the
Court in a case97 that "[t]he unjustified refusal of the employer
to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of
his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to
reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution"98 and
""even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer
to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court."99 He failed
to prove that he complied with the return to work order of PAL.
Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
to insist on the payment of his full backwages. Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite
being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render the issues C E R T I F I C AT I O N
in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the
impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law does Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
not exact compliance with the impossible.100 Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay. the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to Chief Justice
separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of
Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 136; Annex "A" of Annex "G."
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to The Cabin Crew Administration Manual of PAL provides:
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other "C. A cabin crew one (1) to four (4) pounds over his/her weight maximum shall be
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, given a verbal warning and a two (2)-week period in which to meet weight
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent standards.
1. A record of the verbal warning shall be maintained in the cabin crews
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from permanent file.
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for 2. A cabin crew who fails to progress shall be given a written letter and an
petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule. additional two (2)-week period to meet weight standards.
3. A cabin crew who fails to reach the prescribed weights standard as required
shall be removed from schedule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed a. A cabin crew who has been removed from schedule shall report to his/her
assigned Check Cabin Crew for a weight check every two (2) weeks and will be
employee as an act "social justice,"101 or based on required to lose two (2) pounds per week.
"equity."102 In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) b. A cabin crew who fails to reach his/her required weight standard within a
was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the maximum period of ninety (90) days shall be terminated.
moral character of the employee.103 c. A cabin crew will return to active flight duty when he/she has reduced to his/her
maximum weight requirement.
1. A cabin crew who returns to active flight duty after being removed from
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half schedule and within the following three (3) months exceeds the maximum weight
standard will be removed from schedule until he/she reached his/her maximum
(1/2) months pay for every year of service.104 It should include allowable standard.
regular allowances which he might have been receiving.105 We D. A cabin crew who is five (5) pounds or more over his/her weight maximum will
are not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any be given a written letter and a two (2) week period to show substantial weight
reduction to meet standards. At the end of the initial two (2) weeks period, a
serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his cabin crew who has shown progress will continue on weight check until he/she
moral character. We also recognize that his employment with reached his/her maximum allowable standard.
PAL lasted for more or less a decade. 1. Cabin crew who fails to show substantial weight reduction shall be removed
from schedules.
a. Refer to letter C above for discipline guideline.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals 2. A cabin crew who is ten (10) pounds or more over his/her weight maximum
shall be removed from schedule immediately."
is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G.
MEN
Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent HEIGHT SMALL MEDIUM LARGE FRAME
to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service, which FEET FRAME FRAME
should include his regular allowances. inches w/o
shoes
128-137 134-147 142-161
SO ORDERED. 8 132-141 138-152 147-166
9 136-145 142-156 151-170
RUBEN T. REYES 10 140-150 146-160 155-174
11 144-154 150-165 159-179
Associate Justice
Six 0 148-158 154-170 164-184
1 152-162 158-175 168-189
WE CONCUR: 2 156-167 162-180 173-194
3 160-171 167-185 178-199
4 164-175 172-190 180-204
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
WOMEN
Associate Justice<brchairperson< p=""> HEIGHT SMALL MEDIUM LARGE FRAME
FEET FRAME FRAME
inches w/o
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- MINITA V. CHICO- shoes
MARTINEZ NAZARIO Five 2 102-110 107-119 115-131
Associate Justice Associate Justice 3 105-113 110-122 118-134
4 108-116 113-126 121-138
5 111-119 116-130 125-142
</brchairperson<>
6 114-123 120-135 129-146
7 118-127 124-139 133-150
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA 8 122-131 128-143 137-154
Associate Justice 9 126-135 132-147 141-158
10 130-140 136-151 145-163
11 134-144 144-159 153-173
2
Annex "C" of Annex "G."
3
Annex "D" of Annex "G."
4
Rollo, p. 139.
5
Annex "E" of Annex "G."
AT T E S TAT I O N
6
Annex "F" of Annex "G."
7
Annex "G" of Annex "G."
8
Annex "H" of Annex "G."
9
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been Annex "J" of Annex "G."
10
Annex "K" of Annex "G."
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the 11
Annex "M" of Annex "G."
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. 12
Annex "N" of Annex "G."
13
Rollo, pp. 94-99; Annex "E." NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-03078-96-A,
promulgated on November 18, 1998.
14
Id. at 99.
15
Id. at 96.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

16
Id. at 96-98. or other selection criteria are shown to be related for the position in question and
17
Id. at 98. are consistent with business necessity;
18
Id. c) Utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that:
19
Annexes "N" and "O." 1) have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
20
Annex "Q." 2) perpetuate the discrimination of others who are the subject to common
21
Annex "U." administrative control.
22
Annex "R." d) Providing less compensation, such as salary, wage or other forms of
23
Annex "V." remuneration and fringe benefits, to qualified disabled employee, by reason of
24
Rollo, pp. 76-88; Annex "C." NLRC NCR Case No. 019725-99, promulgated on his disability, than the amount to which a non-disabled person performing the
June 23, 2000. Penned by Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo and concurred in by same work is entitled;
Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso. e) Favoring a non-disabled employee over a qualified disabled employee with
25
Id. at 87-88. respect to promotion, training opportunities, study and scholarship grants, solely
26
Id. at 83. on account of the latters disability;
27
Id. f) Re-assigning or transferring a disabled employee to a job or position he cannot
28
Id. at 83-86. perform by reason of his disability;
29
Annex "E." g) Dismissing or terminating the services of a disabled employee by reason of his
30
Annex "BB." disability unless the employer can prove that he impairs the satisfactory
31
Rollo, 46-64; Annex "A." CA-G.R. SP No. 63027, promulgated on August 31, performance of the work involved to the prejudice of the business
2004. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), entity; Provided, however, That the employer first sought to provide reasonable
with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Eliezer R. De los Santos, accommodations for the disabled persons;
concurring. h) Failing to select or administer in the most effective manner employment tests
32
Id. at 64. which accurately reflect the skills, aptitude or other factor of the disabled
33
Id. at 60. applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than the
34
Id. at 61. impaired sensory, manual or speaking skills of such applicant or employee, if
35
Id. any; and
36
Id. i) Excluding disabled persons from membership in labor unions or similar
37
Id. organizations.
38 63
Id. at 62. 3 SCR 3 (1999).
39
Id. 64
The focus is not on the validity of the particular standard but rather on the
40
Id. validity of its more general purpose.
41
Annex "B." 65
To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated
42
Rollo, p. 70. that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees sharing the
43
Id. at 659-660. characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue hardship on the employer.
44 66
Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 228.
of the following causes. 67
Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, id. at 242-243, citing Flood, R.G. and Cahill,
a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful K.A., The River Bend Decision and How It Affects Municipalities Personnel Rule
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; and Regulations (June 1993), Illinois Municipal Review, p. 7.
68
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; Id. at 243.
c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his 69
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations
employer or duly authorized representative; Commission, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997, 272 SCRA 596, 613.
d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his 70
G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004, 438 SCRA 343.
71
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized Rollo, p. 96. "In light of the nature of complainants function as a cabin flight
representatives; and crew member, the setting of weight standard by company policy finds relevance,
e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. and in fact, reasonableness. But in judging what is reasonably set for a cabin
45
Id. at 60-61. crew member to comply should not be viewed in isolation from its obvious
46
Id. at 663. ultimate objective, which is to maintain agility at all time while on flight, especially
47
G.R. No. L-17780, August 24, 1962, 5 SCRA 879. in time of emergencies, effect to grooming merely secondary. x x x"
48 72
Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., id. at 881-882. Id. at 84. "Observe that the reasonableness of the rule [i.e., the weight
49
Rollo, p. 153. standards of PAL] was already established with his [i.e., the Labor Arbiter] finding
50
Id. to which we agree that the aim thereof is to maintain their agility to as to
51
Id. at 137. assure the air safety of passengers, as well by his finding of the parties unanimity
52
10 F. 3d 17, 20 (Ist Cir. 1993). in the correctness of the weight range that should be observed by complainant as
53
(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations prescribed in the rule. x x x"
73
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined Id. at 61-62. "While the private respondent disputes in his position paper the
in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be reasonableness of PALs weight standards, the NLRCs assailed decision finds
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to the weight standard to be valid and reasonable. In our view, this is a fair and
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial correct assessment as the weight limits are not whimsical standards. They are
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency standards put in place by an air carrier for reasons of safety in order to comply
or by the United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall with the extraordinary diligence in the care of passengers that the law exacts. x x
promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments x"
to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and 74
Civil Code, Art. 1733.
75
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall Id., Art. 1755. Thus, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common
be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it
regulation may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. (Id., Art. 1756)
such regulation is so submitted to such committees. Not only that. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers
54
Id. at 71. cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
55
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed. statements on tickets, or otherwise. (Id., Art. 1757) So much so that when a
56
45A Am. Jur. 2d, Job Discrimination, 269. passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the liability for negligence
57
Rollo, p. 669. of a common carrier is valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence. (Id., Art.
58
Id. at 670. 1758) Even a reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the liability of the
59
Constitution (1987), Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to common carrier. (Id.)
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full The burden that the law imposes on a common does not stop there. A common
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. carrier is liable for the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective willful acts of its employees. (Id., Art. 1759) This liability attaches although such
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, the orders of the common carrier. (Id.) Truly, the requirement of the law is very
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in strict in that the liability of a common carrier for the death of or injuries to
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may passengers does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a
be provided by law. good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. (Id.) The
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers liability of a common carrier cannot be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by the
and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise. (Id., Art. 1760)
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to Although the passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to
foster industrial peace. avoid injury to himself (id., Art. 1761), the contributory negligence of the
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the proximate cause is the negligence of the common carrier. (Id., Art. 1762) In such
right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and case, the amount of damages shall only be equitably reduced. (Id.) It does not
growth. totally excuse the common carrier.
60
ART. 3. Declaration of Basic Policy. The State shall afford protection to labor, Lastly, a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, the account of the willful acts or negligence of the other passengers or of
race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The strangers, if the employees of the common carrier through the exercise of the
State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. omission. (Id., Art. 1763)
61
Approved on March 24, 1992. 76
472 US 400 (1985).
62 77
Sec. 32. Discrimination of Employment. No entity, whether public or private Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 2.
shall discriminate against a qualified disabled person by reason of disability in 78
See Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines,
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, promotion, or discharge of Inc., G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004, 438 SCRA 343, 356.
employees compensation, job training and other terms, conditions and privileges 79
Rollo, p. 673.
80
of employment. The following constitute acts of discrimination: Id. at 63.
a) Limiting, segregating or classifying a disabled job applicant in such a manner 81
Jimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116960, April 2,
that adversely affects his work opportunities; 1996, 256 SCRA 84, 89.
b) Using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that 82
Rollo, p. 63.
83
screen out or tend to screen out a disabled person unless such standards, tests Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, October 7, 1996, 263 SCRA 1.
84
Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

85
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
117038, September 25, 1997, 279 SCRA 445.
86
Constitution (1987), Art. III, Sec. 1. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."
87
People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57, 65.
88
Id. at 67. The Court, in buttressing its ruling also cited the Sponsorship Speech
of Commissioner Bernas in the Bill of Rights; Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986, viz.:
"First, the general reflections. The protection of the fundamental liberties in the
essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is
to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder."
89
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment (ratified July 9, 1868), Sec.
1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
90
16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, 799 citing District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 US 418, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1973), rehg denied, 410 US 959,
93 S. Ct. 1411, 35 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1973) and on remand to, 489 F. 2d 1272 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 32 L. Ed.
2d 627 (1972); Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 54 F. 3d 261, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1290, 66 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 43542, 1995 FED App. 147P (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
judgment vacated on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2519, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1044, 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 64 (US 1996), ON REMAND TO, 128 F. 3d 289, 75 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 115, 1997 FED App. 318P (6th Cir. 1997); Gallagher v.
Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F. 3d 1442, 98 Ed. Law Rep. 639 (10th Cir.
1995); Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F. 3d 1452 (DC Cir. 1997), rehg denied, 113 F.
3d 219 (DC Cir. 1997).
91
Id., citing Medical Institute of Minnesota v. National Assn of Trade and
Technical Schools, 817 F. 2d 1310, 39 Ed. Law Rep. 62 (8th Cir. 1987); First Nat.
Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 523 S.W. 2d 808 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied, 421
US 992, 95 S. Ct. 1999, 44 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1975) and cert. denied, 421 US 1016,
95 S. Ct. 2424, 44 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1975).
92
Rollo, p. 687.
93
Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 118651, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 806.
94
Rollo, p. 684.
95
Id. at 648. Petitioner was informed that:
"In connection with our manifestation dated 25 January 2001 you are hereby
directed to physically return to work effective 01 March 2001. You are to report to
the Office of the Vice-President-Airport Services.
Pending appeal you are going to be assigned to a substantially equivalent
position in accordance with the 18 November 1998 Decision of Labor Arbiter
Ramon Valentin Reyes as modified by the 23 June Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
Failure on your part to heed this order may be a ground to administratively
charge you in accordance with the Company Code of Discipline, policy, rules and
regulations.
CESAR B. LAMBERTE"
96
Id.
97
Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003, 401
SCRA 424.
98
Id. at 430.
99
Id.
100
Pizza Inn/Consolidated Foods Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. L-74531, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 773; Philippine
Engineering Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-27880,
September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 89.
101
San Miguel Corporation v. Lao, 433 Phil. 890, 898 (2002); Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
L-80609, August 23, 1988, 164 SCRA 671, 682.
102
Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 107
(2000).
103
San Miguel Corporation v. Lao, supra at 898; Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, id.; Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
National Labor Relations Commission, supra at 682.
104
Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra at 108.
105
Planters Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
78524, January 20, 1989, 169 SCRA 328; Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-74191, December 21, 1987,
156 SCRA 740; Soriano v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-
75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 130612 May 11, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-
appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City (Branch 57), finding accused-
appellant guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to
death, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P480,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at
around 4 o'clock, when the body of six-year old Jennifer
Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in
Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The child's body bore several
stab wounds. Jennifer had been missing since lunch time.
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr.
Ma. Fe Leticia Macaranas, the rural health physician of
Malasiqui, showed that Jennifer died of multiple organ failure
and hypovolemic shock secondary to 38 stab wounds at the
back. Dr. Macaranas found no lacerations or signs of
inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls
of the victim's genitalia, although the vaginal canal easily
admitted the little finger with minimal resistance. Noting
possible commission of acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas
recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert of the
NBI. 2
The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-
appellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victim's
grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime. At
around 6:30 in the evening of that day, police officers
Montemayor, de la Cruz, and de Guzman of the Malasiqui
Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant
at the Malasiqui public market and took him to the police
station where accused-appellant, upon questioning by SPO1
Antonio Espinoza, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay. He
likewise disclosed that at around 3:30 that afternoon, he had
given the fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa and Jorge
Casingal, his aunt and uncle respectively, in Poblacion Sur,
Bayambang, Pangasinan. The next day, October 18, 1996,
SPO1 Espinoza and another policeman took accused-
appellant to Bayambang and recovered the bayonet from a
tricycle belonging to the Casingal spouses. The police officers
executed a receipt to evidence the confiscation of the
weapon. 3
On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Macaranas,
SPO4 Juan Carpizo, the Philippine National Police chief
investigator at Malasiqui, filed, on October 21, 1996, a criminal
complaint for murder against accused-appellant before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malasiqui. On October 25,
1996, Dr. Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI,
performed an autopsy on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The
result of his examination of the victim's genitalia indicated that
the child's hymen had been completely lacerated on the right
side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo amended the
criminal complaint against accused-appellant to rape with
homicide. Subsequently, the following information was filed: 4
That on or about the 17th day of October,
1996, in the afternoon, in barangay Guilig,
Municipality of Malasiqui, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design and
armed with a bayonnete, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with Jennifer Domantay, a
minor of 6 years old against her will and
consent, and on the same occasion, the said
accused with intent to kill, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab with
the use of a bayonnete, the said Jennifer
Domantay, inflicting upon her multiple stab
wounds, which resulted to her death, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs.
At the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses,
namely, Edward, Jiezl, Lorenzo, all surnamed Domantay,
Joselito Mejia, Antonio Espinoza, Celso Manuel, and Dr.
Ronald Bandonill, to establish its charge that accused-
appellant had raped and killed Jennifer Domantay.
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17,
1996, accused-appellant and his two brothers-in-law, Jaime
Caballero and Daudencio Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in
front of the latter's house in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan.
Edward Domantay said that he was in front of Macasaeb's
house, tending to some pigeons in his yard.5 After the group
had consumed several bottles of San Miguel gin, accused-
appellant gave money to Edward Domantay and asked him to
buy two bottles of gin and a bottle of Sprite. 6 Edward said he
joined the group and sat between Daudencio Macasaeb and
accused-appellant. 7 Edward said that accused-appellant, who,
apparently had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and said:
"No diad Antipolo tan L[i]pa et walay massacre, diad Guilig
wala, walay massacren kod dia, walay onakis-akis" ("In
Antipolo and Lipa, there were massacres; here in Guilig, there
will also be a massacre. I will massacre somebody here, and
they will cry and cry"). Edward Domantay saw that tucked in
the left side of accused-appellant's waistline was a bayonet
without a cover handle. 8 It was not the first time that Edward
had seen accused-appellant with the knife as the latter usually
carried it with him. 9
Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2
o'clock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996, she and four
other children were playing in front of their house in Guilig,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Jiezl saw accused-appellant and
Jennifer Domantay walking towards the bamboo grove of
Amparo Domantay where Jennifer's body was later found.
Accused-appellant was about two meters ahead of Jennifer.
The bamboo grove was about 8 to 10 meters from the house of
Jiezl Domantay. 10
Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezl's
testimony that accused-appellant had gone to Amparo
Domantay's bamboo grove in the afternoon of October 17,
1996. Lorenzo said that afternoon, on his way to his farm, he
saw accused-appellant about 30 meters away, standing at the
spot in the bamboo grove where Jennifer's body was later
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
found. Accused-appellant appeared restless and worried as he
kept looking around. However, as Lorenzo was in a hurry, he
did not try to find out why accused-appellant appeared to be
nervous. 11
Prosecution witness Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that,
in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was about to take his
lunch at home in Alacan, a neighboring barangay about half a
kilometer from Guilig, when accused-appellant implored Mejia
to take him to Malasiqui at once. Mejia told accused-appellant
that he was going to take his lunch first, but the latter pleaded
with him, saying they will not be gone for long. Mejia, therefore,
agreed. Mejia noticed that accused-appellant was nervous and
afraid. Accused-appellant later changed his mind. Instead of
going to the town proper, he alighted near the Mormon's
church, outside Malasiqui. 12
In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza
and Celso Manuel who testified that, on separate occasions,
accused-appellant had confessed to the brutal killing of
Jennifer Domantay.
SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-
appellant after the latter had been brought to the Malasiqui
police station in the evening of October 17, 1996. Before he
commenced his questioning, he apprised accused-appellant of
his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, in English, which was later
translated into Pangasinense. 13 According to SPO1 Espinoza,
accused-appellant agreed to answer the questions of the
investigator even in the absence of counsel and admitted
killing the victim. Accused-appellant also disclosed the location
of the bayonet he used in killing the victim. 14 On cross-
examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the
course of his questioning was accused-appellant assisted by
counsel. Neither was accused-appellant's confession reduced
in writing. 15 Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial
court over the objection of the defense.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of
station DWPR, an AM station based in Dagupan City. He
covers the third district of Pangasinan, including Malasiqui.
Sometime in October 1996, an uncle of the victim came to
Dagupan City and informed the station about Jennifer
Domantay's case. 16 On October 23, 1996, Manuel went to
Malasiqui to interview accused-appellant who was then
detained in the municipal jail. He described what transpired
during the interview thus: 17
PROS. QUINIT:
Q Did you introduce yourself as a media practitioner?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourself to the accused?
A I showed to Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior Otot" my I.D.
card and I presented myself as a media practitioner with my
tape recorder [in] my hand, sir.
Q What was his reaction to your request for an interview?
A He was willing to state what had happened, sir.
Q What are those matters which you brought out in that
interview with the accused Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior
Otot"?
A I asked him what was his purpose for human interest's sake
as a reporter, why did he commit that alleged crime. And I
asked also if he committed the crime and he answered "yes."
That's it.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. QUINIT:
Q You mentioned about accused admitting to you on the
commi[ssion] of the crime, how did you ask him that?
A I asked him very politely.
Q More or less what have you asked him on that particular
matter?
A I asked "Junior Otot," Bernardino Domantay, "Kung
pinagsisisihan mo ba ang iyong ginawa?" "Opo" sabi niya,
"Ibig mo bang sabihin Jun, ikaw ang pumatay kay Jennifer?",
"Ako nga po" The [l]ast part of my interview, "Kung nakikinig
ang mga magulang ni Jennifer, ano ang gusto mong
iparating?", "kung gusto nilang makamtan ang hustisya ay
tatanggapin ko". That is what he said, and I also asked Junior
Otot, what was his purpose, and he said, it was about the
boundary dispute, and he used that little girl in his revenge.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview
was conducted in the jail, about two to three meters away from
the police station. An uncle of the victim was with him and the
nearest policemen present were about two to three meters
from him, including those who were in the radio room. 18 There
was no lawyer present. Before interviewing accused-appellant,
Manuel said he talked to the chief of police and asked
permission to interview accused-appellant. 19 On questioning
by the court, Manuel said that it was the first time he had been
called to testify regarding an interview he had conducted. 20 As
in the case of the testimony of SPO1 Espinoza, the defense
objected to the admission of Manuel's testimony, but the lower
court allowed it.
Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy
of the victim on October 25, 1996, testified that Jennifer
Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab wounds she
sustained on her back, 21 the average depth of which was six
inches. 22 He opined that the wounds were probably caused by
a "pointed sharp-edged instrument." 23 He also noted on the
aforehead, neck, and breast bone of the victim. 24 As for the
results of the genital examination of the victim, Dr. Bandonill
said he found that the laceration on the right side of the hymen
was caused within 24 hours of her death. He added that the
genital area showed signs of inflammation. 25
Pacifico Bulatao, the photographer who took the pictures of the
scene of the crime and of the victim after the latter's body was
brought to her parents' house, identified and authenticated the
five pictures (Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E) offered by the
prosecution.
The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone
witness. Accused-appellant denied the allegation against him.
He testified he is an uncle of Jennifer Domantay (he and her
grandfather are cousins) and that he worked as a janitor at the
Malasiqui Municipal Hall. He said that at around 1 o'clock in the
afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was bathing his pigs outside
in the house of his brother-in-law Daudencio Macasaeb in
Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. He confirmed that Daudencio
was then having drinks in front of his (Macasaeb's) house.
Accused-appellant claimed, however, that he did not join in the
drinking and that it was Edward Domantay, whom the
prosecution had presented as witness, and a certain Jaime
Caballero who joined the party. He also claimed that it was he
whom Macasaeb had requested to buy some more liquor, for
which reason he gave money to Edward Domantay so that the
latter could get two bottles of gin, a bottle of Sprite, and a pack
of cigarettes. 26 He denied Edward Domantay's claim that he
(accused-appellant) had raised his shirt to show a bayonet
tucked in his waistline and that he had said he would massacre
someone in Guilig. 27
Accused-appellant also confirmed that, at about 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, he went to Alacan passing on the trail beside the
bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay. But he said he did not
know that Jennifer Domantay was following him. He further
confirmed that in Alacan, he took a tricycle to Malasiqui. The
tricycle was driven by Joselito Mejia. He said he alighted near
the Mormon church, just outside of the town proper of
Malasiqui to meet his brother. As his brother did not come,
accused-appellant proceeded to town and reported for work.
That night, while he was in the Malasiqui public market, he was
picked up by three policemen and brought to the Malasiqui
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
police station where he was interrogated by SPO1 Espinoza
regarding the killing of Jennifer Domantay. He denied having
owned to the killing of Jennifer Domantay to SPO1 Espinoza.
He denied he had a grudge against the victim's parents
because of a boundary dispute. 28 With respect to his
extrajudicial confession to Celso Manuel, he admitted that he
had been interviewed by the latter, but he denied that he ever
admitted anything to the former. 29
As already stated, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty
as charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: 30
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing,
the Court hereby finds the accused,
Bernardino Domantay @ "Junior Otot" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of
Rape with Homicide defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation and as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 and accordingly, the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection, and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the total amount of Four
Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P480,000.00), 31 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that: 32
I follows; that he has the right to remain silent;
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions
to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel are inadmissible
in evidence because they had been obtained in violation of Art.
III, 12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces
of evidence excluded, the remaining proof of his alleged guilt,
consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 33
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this section or section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation,
that is, "when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect." 34 R.A. No. 7438 has extended the
constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has
not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for
questioning. 35
Decisions 36 of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial
confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the
Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17,
1996, 37 he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the
brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already
under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art.
III, 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza
narrated what transpired during accused-appellant's
interrogation: 38
[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior
to the interrogation conducted to him, I
informed him of his constitutional right as
that he has the right to a competent lawyer
of his own choice and if he can not afford [a
counsel] then he will be provided with one,
and further informed [him] that all he will say
will be reduced into writing and will be used
the same in the proceedings of the case, but
he told me that he will cooperate even in the
absence of his counsel; that he admitted to
me that he killed Jennifer Domantay, and he
revealed also the weapon used [and] where
he gave [it] to.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver
was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel.
For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is
inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged
confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded
by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence,
being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree." As explained
in People v. Alicando: 39
. . . According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from
it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise,
illegally seized evidence is obtained as a
direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence,
but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is
based the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to
gain other evidence because the originally
illegal obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-
appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is
admissible. In People v.
Andan, 40 the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed
to the crime during interviews with the media. In holding the
confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave
his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court
said: 41
[A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the
newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The
Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and
another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed
to the State and its agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the
jail when he was interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and
was similar to that which prevails in a custodial
investigation. 42 We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was
interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed
outside the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle
of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be
interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions
freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said
he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police
officers around because about two to three meters from the jail
were the police station and the radio room. 43 We do not think
the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure
or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving
his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that "it is . . . not altogether
improbable for the police investigators to ask the police
reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information
from the accused." 44 This is pure conjecture. Although he
testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no
evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even
assuming that he was, it has not been shown that, in
conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit
incriminating information from accused-appellant. To the
contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance
against the government by exposing official wrongdoings.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting
for the police or that the interview was conducted under
circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant
confessed to the killing our of fear. As already stated, the
interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after
accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the
police.
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of Jennifer
Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished
by the other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points
with his confession. He was seen walking toward the bamboo
grove, followed by the victim. Later, he was seen standing near
the bamboo grove where the child's body was found. Rule 133
of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient
ground for conviction. An extrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
4. Evidence necessary in treason cases.
No person charged with treason shall be
convicted unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal
killing to have been committed without the children who were
playing about eight to ten meters from Amparo Domantay's
grove, where the crime took place, having heard any
commotion. 45 The contention has no merit. Accused-appellant
could have covered the young child's mouth to prevent her
from making any sound. In fact, Dr. Bandonill noted a five by
two inch (5" x 2") contusion on the left side of the victim's
forehead, which he said could have been caused by a hard
blunt instrument or by impact as her head hit the
ground. 46 The blow could have rendered her unconscious,
thus precluding her from shouting or crying.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of Jiezl
Domantay contradicts that of Lorenzo Domantay because
while Jiezl said she had seen accused-appellant walking
towards the bamboo grove, followed by the victim, at around 2
o'clock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996. Lorenzo said he
saw accused-appellant standing near the bamboo grove at
about the same time.
These witnesses, however, did not testify concerning what they
saw exactly the same time. What they told the court was what
they had seen "at around" 2 o'clock in the afternoon. There
could have been a between difference in time, however little it
was, between the time Jiezl saw accused-appellant and the
victim walking and the time Lorenzo saw accused-appellant
near the place where the victim's body was later found. Far
from contradicting each other, these witnesses confirmed what
each had said each one saw. What is striking about their
testimonies is that while Jiezl said she saw accused-appellant
going toward the bamboo grove followed by the victim "at
around" 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996,
Lorenzo said he had seen accused-appellant near the bamboo
grove "at around" that time. He described accused-appellant
as nervous and worried. There is no reason to doubt the claim
of these witnesses. Lorenzo is a relative of accused-appellant.
There is no reason he would testified falsely against the latter.
Jiezl, on the other hand, is also surnamed Domantay and could
also be related to accused-appellant and has not been shown
to have any reason to testify falsely against accused-appellant.
At the time of the incident, she was only 10 years old.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accused-
appellant's guilt with respect to the killing of the child. It is clear
that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 [parricide] shall kill
another without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article [murder], shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and be punished
by reclusion temporal.
The killing was committed with the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The record shows
that the victim, Jennifer Domantay, was six years old at the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
time of the killing. She was a child of small build, 46" in
height. 47 It is clear then that she could not have put up much of
a defense against accused-appellant's assault, the latter being
a fully grown man of 29 years. Indeed, the physical evidence
supports a finding of abuse of superior strength: accused-
appellant had a weapon, while the victim was not shown to
have had any; there were 38 stab wounds; and all the knife
wounds are located at the back of Jennifer's body.
But we think the lower court erred in finding that the killing was
committed with cruelty. 48 The trial court appears to have been
led to this conclusion by the number of wounds inflicted on the
victim. But the number of wounds is not a test for determining
whether there was circumstance. 49 "The rest . . . is whether
the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the
victim's suffering thus . . . there must be proof that the victim
was made to agonize before the [the accused] rendered the
blow which snuffed out [her] life." 50 In this case, there is no
such proof of cruelty. Dr. Bandonill testified that any of the
major wounds on the victim's back could have caused her
death as they penetrated her heart, lungs and liver, kidney and
intestines. 51
Second. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to hold
accused-appellant guilty of raping Jennifer Domantay. Art. 335.
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in part provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.
Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprive of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented.
As the victim here was six years old, only carnal
knowledge had to be proved to establish rape. Carnal
knowledge is defined as the act of a man having
sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a
woman. 52 For this purpose, it is enough if there was
even the slightest contact of the male sex organ with
the labia of the victim's genitalia. 53 However, there
must be proof, by direct or indirect evidence, of such
contact.
Dr. Ronald Bandonill's report on the genital examination he had
performed on the deceased reads: 54
GENITAL EXAMINATION; showed a
complete laceration of the right side of the
hymen. The surrounding genital area shows
signs of inflammation.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area
indicate the probability of penetration of that
area by a hard, rigid instrument.
Hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape; 55 neither
does its presence prove its commission. As held in People
v. Ulili, 56 a medical certificate or the testimony of the physician
is presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to show
that the latter had lost her virginity. Consequently, standing
alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of the alleged victim
was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is
corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that
rape may be deemed to have been established. 57
This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a
hymenal tear may be caused by objects other than the male
sex organ 58 or may arise from other causes. 59 Dr. Bandonill
himself admitted this. He testified that the right side of the
victim's hymen had been completely lacerated while the
surrounding genital area showed signs of inflammation. 60 He
opined that the laceration had been inflicted within 24 hours of
the victim's death and that the inflammation was due to a
trauma in that area. 61 When asked by the private prosecutor
whether the lacerations of the hymen could have been caused
by the insertion of a male organ he said this was possible. But
he also said when questioned by the defense that the
lacerations could have been caused by something blunt other
than the male organ. Thus, he testified: 62
PROS. F. QUINIT:
Q Now, what might have caused the complete laceration of
the right side of the hymen, doctor?
A Well, sir, if you look at my report there is a remark and it
says there; findings at the genital area indicated the
probability of penetration of that area by a hard rigid
instrument.
Q Could it have been caused by a human organ?
A If the human male organ is erect, fully erect and hard then
it is possible, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q In your remarks; finding at the genital area indicates the
probability of penetration of that area by a hard rigid
instrument, this may have also been caused by a dagger used
in the killing of Jennifer Domantay is that correct?
A Well, sir when I say hard rigid instrument it should not be
sharp pointed and share rigid, it should be a hard bl[u]nt
instrument.
Q Do you consider a bolo a bl[u] instrument, or a dagger?
A The dagger is a sharp rigid but it is not a bl[u]nt instrument,
sir.
Q This Genital Examination showed a complete laceration of
the right side of the hymen, this may have been possibly
caused by a dagger, is it not?
A No, sir. I won't say that this would have been caused by a
dagger, because a dagger would have made at its incision . . .
not a laceration, sir.
Q But this laceration may also have been caused by other
factors other the human male organ, is that correct?
A A hard bl[u]nt instrument, sir could show.
Q My question is other than the human male organ?
A Possible, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q You mentioned that the hymen was lacerated on the right
side?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And if there is a complete erection by a human organ is this
possible that the laceration can only be on the right side of
the hymen?
A Yes, your Honor, its possible.
Q How about if the penetration was done by a finger, was it
the same as the human organ?
A Well, it defends on the size of the finger that penetrat[es]
that organ, if the finger is small it could the superficial
laceration, and if the finger is large then it is possible your
honor.
Q How about two fingers?
A Possible, sir.
To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions
for rape with homicide based on purely circumstantial
evidence. In those instances, however, the prosecution was
able to present other tell-tale signs of rape such as the location
and description of the victim's clothings, especially her
undergarments, the position of the body when found and the
like. 63 In People v. Macalino, 64 for instance, the Court affirmed
a conviction for the rape of a two-year old child on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. 65
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
The Court notes that the testimony or
medical opinion of Dr. Gajardo that the fresh
laceration had been produced by sexual
intercourse is corroborated by the testimony
given by complainant. Elizabeth that when
she rushed upstairs upon hearing her
daughter suddenly cry out, she found
appellant Macalino beside the child buttoning
his own pants and that she found some
sticky fluid on the child's buttocks and some
blood on her private part.(Emphasis in the
original)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial
evidence from which to infer that accused-appellant sexually
abused the victim. The only circumstance from which such
inference might be made is that accused-appellant was seen
with the victim walking toward the place where the girl's body
was found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe
he simply inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing
the lacerations in the hymen. Otherwise, there is no
circumstance from which it might reasonably be inferred that
he abused her, e.g., that he was zipping up his pants, that
there was spermatozoa in the girl's vaginal canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates
against the finding of rape. In describing the stab wounds on
the body of the victim, he testified: 66
[A]fter examining the body I took note that
were several stab wounds . . . these were all
found at the back area sir . . . extending from
the back shoulder down to the lower back
area from the left to the right.
Considering the relative physical positions of the
accused and the victim in crimes of rape, the usual
location of the external bodily injuries of the victim is
on the face, 67 neck, 68 and anterior portion 69 of her
body. Although it is not unnatural to find contusions on
the posterior side, these are usually caused by the
downward pressure on the victim's body during the
sexual assault. 70 It is unquestionably different when,
as in this case, all the stab wounds (except for a
minor cut in the lower left leg) had their entry points at
the back running from the upper left shoulder to the
lower right buttocks.
It is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue
shorts and white shirt when her body was immediately after it
was found. 71 Furthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the
back portion of her shorts. 72 This must be because she
wearing this piece of clothing when the stab wounds were
inflicated or immediately thereafter, thus allowing the blood to
seep into her shorts to such an extent. As accused-appellant
would naturally have to pull down the girl's lower garments in
order to consummate the rape, then, he must have, regardless
of when the stab wounds were inflicted, pulled up the victim's
shorts and undergarments after the alleged rape, otherwise,
the victim's shorts would not have been stained so extensively.
Again, this is contrary to ordinary human experience.
Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no
sufficient proof that it was accused-appellant who had raped
her. He did not confess to having raped the victim.
From the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also
committed rape. In the special complex crime of rape with
homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. 73
Third. The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Domantay the amount of P30,000.00 as
actual damages. However, the list of expenses produced by
the victim's father, Jaime Domantay, only totaled P28,430.00.
Of this amount, only P12,000.00 was supported by a receipt.
Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that a party may recover
actual or compensatory damages only for such loss as he has
duly proved. Therefore, the award of actual damages should
be reduced to P12,000.00.
In addition, the heirs of Jennifer Domantay are entitled to
recover exemplary damages in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Art.
2230 of the Civil Code provides for the payment of exemplary
damages when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstance. An amount of P25,000.00 is
deemed appropriate. 74
In accordance with our rulings in People
v. Robles 75 and People v. Mengote, 76 the indemnity should be
fixed at P50,000.00 and the moral damages at P50,000.00. 77
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE
and another one is rendered FINDING accused-appellant guilty
of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and sentencing him to a prison term of 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and ORDERING him to pay the heirs
of Jennifer Domantay the amounts of P50,000.00, as
indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages, P25,000.00, as
exemplary damages, and P12,000.00, as actual damages, and
the costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes
and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Purisima and Buena, JJ., no took part.
#Footnotes
1 Per Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada.
2 Records, p. 15. Dr. Macaranas was not presented as a witness and
her post-mortem report was not offered in evidence by either party.
3 Folder of Exhibits, p. 5; Exh. G.
4 Records, p. 1.
5 TSN, pp. 3-4, March 4, 1997.
6 Id., pp. 8, 13.
7 Id., p. 19.
8 Id., pp. 13-15 (Translation by the trail court).
9 Id., pp. 20-21.
10 TSN, pp. 4-7, 13, March 3, 1997.
11 TSN, pp. 4-5, 13, April 3, 1997.
12 TSN, pp. 4-7, March 13, 1997.
13 TSN, p. 6, Feb. 28, 1997.
14 TSN, p. 4, Feb. 25, 1997.
15 TSN, p. 8, Feb. 28, 1997.
16 TSN, p. 14, April 10, 1997.
17 Id., pp. 6-9.
18 TSN, p. 10, April 10, 1997.
19 Id., p. 13.
20 Id., p. 15.
21 Records, p. 20.
22 TSN, pp. 12-13, April 8, 1997.
23 Id., p. 16.
24 Id., pp. 10-11.
25 Records, p. 20.
26 TSN, pp. 8-11, April 15, 1997.
27 Id., p. 26-27.
28 Id., pp. 17-18, 27-29.
29 Id., p. 31.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

30 Rollo, p. 32; Decision, p. 14.

31 Broken down as follows: P200,000.00 as moral damages;
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
and P30,000.00 for funeral and related expenses.
32 Rollo, p. 50; Appellant's Brief, p. 1.
33 Id., pp. 54-60; Id., pp. 5-11.
34 People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997).
35 Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 (1993).
36 People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 (1995); People v. Espaola, 271
SCRA 689 (1997); People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199 (1998); People v.
Tan, 286 SCRA 207, 214 (1998) citing cases.
37 Accused-appellant was picked up by the police without any warrant
of arrest, although his case did not fall under any of the three instances
where warrantless arrests are authorized under Rule 113, 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
38 TSN, p. 4, Feb. 25, 1995.
39 251 SCRA 293, 314 (1995).
40 269 SCRA 95 (1997).
41 Id., at 314. Reiterated in People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199 (1998).
42 Rollo, p. 59; Appellant's Brief, p. 10.
43 TSN, p. 10, April 10, 1997.
44 Rollo, p. 59; Appellant's Brief, p. 10.
45 Rollo, pp. 62-63, Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-14.
46 TSN, pp. 10-11, April 18, 1997.
47 Records, p, 13.
48 Rollo, p, 32; Decision, p. 14.
49 People v. Tonog, 205 SCRA 772 (1992); People v. Manzano, 58
SCRA 250 (1974).
50 People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19, 36 (1996), citing People v. Lacao,
60 SCRA 89 (1974).
51 TSN, p. 16, April 8, 1997.
52 People v. Alib, 222 SCRA 517 (1993); People v. Orita, 184 SCRA
105 (1990).
53 People v. Evangelista, 282 SCRA 37 (1997); People v. Orita, supra.
54 Records, p. 20.
55 People v. Butron, 272 SCRA 352 (1997); People v. Gabris, 258
SCRA 663 (1996); People v. Alimon, 257 SCRA 658 (1996); People v.
Lazaro, 249 SCRA 234 (1995); People v. Salinas, 232 SCRA 274
(1994).
56 225 SCRA 594 (1993).
57 See People v. Macalino, 209 SCRA 788, 795 (1992).
59 HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, 617 (1931).
60 Records, p. 20.
61 TSN, p. 20, April 8, 1997.
62 TSN, pp. 15-19, April 8, 1997 (emphasis added).
63 See People v. Develles, 208 SCRA 101 (1992); People v. Magana,
259 SCRA 380 (1996).
64 209 SCRA 788 (1992).
65 Id., at 797.
66 TSN, pp. 12-13, April 8, 1997.
67 People v. Advincula, 96 SCRA 875, 878 (1980); People v. Lood, 117
SCRA 467, 471 (1982); People v. Aguirre, 143 SCRA 572, 578 (1986);
People v. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82, 92 (1996).
68 People v. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440, 448 (1979); People v. Saligan, 101
SCRA 264, 269 (1980); People v. Vizcarra, 115 SCRA 743, 746 (1982);
People v. Umali, 116 SCRA 23, 32 (1982); People v. Aguirre, supra.;
People v. Dawandawan, 184 SCRA 264, 269 (1990); People v.
Magana, supra.
69 People v. Saligan, supra; People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454, 459
(1993).
70 See People v. Madridano, 227 SCRA 363, 363 (1993); People v.
Emplo, supra.; People v. Garcia, supra.
71 Exh. C.
72 Ehx. B.
73 See People v. Dino, 160 SCRA 197, 209 (1988).
74 People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 (1997).
75 G.R. No. 124300, March 25, 1999.
76 G.R. No. 130491, March 25, 1999.
77 Supra note 74.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 117040 January 27, 2000
RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition seeking review of the resolutions, dated
March 30, 1994 and August 26, 1994, of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner Ruben Serrano's
complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for
reconsideration. The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department
Store as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and
prevent pilferage of merchandise.1 Initially hired on October 4,
1984 on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a
regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he became head of
the Security Checkers Section of private respondent.2
Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private
respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and
engage the services of an independent security agency. For
this reason, it wrote petitioner the following memorandum:3
October 11, 1991
MR. RUBEN SERRANO
PRESENT
Dear Mr. Seranno,
In view of the retrenchment program of the
company, we hereby reiterate our verbal
notice to you of your termination as Security
Section Head effective October 11, 1991.
Please secure your clearance from this
office.
Very truly yours,
[Sgd.] TERESITA A. VILLANUEVA
Human Resources Division Manager
The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a
complaint on December 3, 1991 for illegal dismissal, illegal
layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, and
nonpayment of salary and overtime pay.4
The parties were required to submit their position
papers, on the basis of which the Labor Arbiter
defined the issues as follows:5
Whether or not there is a valid ground for the
dismissal of the complainant.
Whether or not complainant is entitled to his monetary
claims for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of
salaries, 13th month pay for 1991 and overtime pay.
Whether or not Respondent is guilty of unfair labor
practice.
Thereafter, the case was heard. On April 30, 1993, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner to have been
illegally dismissed. He ruled that private respondent failed to
establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent
or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent
failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private
respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting
employees whose employment would be terminated; that
private respondent had not shown that petitioner and other
employees in the security section were so inefficient so as to
justify their replacement by a security agency, or that "cost-
saving devices [such as] secret video cameras (to monitor and
prevent shoplifting) and secret code tags on the merchandise"
could not have been employed; instead, the day after
petitioner's dismissal, private respondent employed a safety
and security supervisor with duties and functions similar to
those of petitioner.1wphi1.nt
Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered:6
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is
hereby decreed:
(a) Finding the dismissal of the complainant to be
illegal and concomitantly, Respondent is ordered to
pay complainant full backwages without qualification
or deduction in the amount of P74,740.00 from the
time of his dismissal until reinstatement. (computed till
promulgation only) based on his monthly salary of
P4,040.00/month at the time of his termination but
limited to (3) three years;
(b) Ordering the Respondent to immediately reinstate
the complainant to his former position as security
section head or to a reasonably equivalent
supervisorial position in charges of security without
loss of seniority rights, privileges and benefits. This
order is immediately executory even pending appeal;
(c) Ordering the Respondent to pay complainant
unpaid wages in the amount of P2,020.73 and
proportionate 13th month pay in the amount
of P3,198.30;
(d) Ordering the Respondent to pay complainant the
amount of P7,995.91, representing 10% attorney's
fees based on the total judgment award
of P79,959.12.
All other claims of the complainant whether monetary
or otherwise is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, in its
resolution of March 30, 1994; reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay
equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, unpaid
salary, and proportionate 13th month pay. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.
The NLRC held that the phase-out of private respondent's
security section and the hiring of an independent security
agency constituted an exercise by private respondent of "[a]
legitimate business decision whose wisdom we do not intend
to inquire into and for which we cannot substitute our
judgment"; that the distinction made by the Labor Arbiter
between "retrenchment" and the employment of cost-saving
devices" under Art. 283 of the Labor Code was insignificant
because the company official who wrote the dismissal letter
apparently used the term "retrenchment" in its "plain and
ordinary sense: to layoff or remove from one's job, regardless
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
of the reason therefor"; that the rule of "reasonable criteria" in
the selection of the employees to be retrenched did not apply
because all positions in the security section had been
abolished; and that the appointment of a safety and security
supervisor referred to by petitioner to prove bad faith on private
respondent's part was of no moment because the position had
long been in existence and was separate from petitioner's
position as head of the Security Checkers Section.
Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following issue:
IS THE HIRING OF AN INDEPENDENT SECURITY
AGENCY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
REPLACE ITS CURRENT SECURITY SECTION A
VALID GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE
EMPLOYEES CLASSED UNDER THE LATTER?7
Petitioner contends that abolition of private respondent's
Security Checkers Section and the employment of an
independent security agency do not fall under any of the
authorized causes for dismissal under Art. 283 of the Labor
Code.
Petitioner Laid Off for Cause
Petitioner's contention has no merit. Art. 283 provides:
Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee
due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of
this Title, by serving a written notice on the, workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to
the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the
worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In
case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure
or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not
due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month
pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
In De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission,8 this
Court upheld the termination of employment of three
mechanics in a transportation company and their replacement
by a company rendering maintenance and repair services. It
held:
In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as
part of the company's cost-saving program, the
services rendered by the mechanics became
redundant and superfluous, and therefore properly
terminable. The company merely exercised its
business judgment or management prerogative. And
in the absence of any proof that the management
abused its discretion or acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the court will not interfere with the
exercise of such prerogative.9
In Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,10 the Court likewise upheld the termination of
employment of water pump tenders and their replacement by
independent contractors. It ruled that an employer's good faith
in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put
in doubt by the availment of the services of an independent
contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees
to promote economy and efficiency.
Indeed, as we pointed out in another case, the "[management
of a company] cannot be denied the faculty of promoting
efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are
essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate
determination of whether services should be performed by its
personnel or contracted to outside agencies . . . [While there]
should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be
paid to what management decides."11Consequently, absent
proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of
judgment by an employer.12
In the case at bar, we have only the bare assertion of petitioner
that, in abolishing the security section, private respondent's
real purpose was to avoid payment to the security checkers of
the wage increases provided in the collective bargaining
agreement approved in 1990.13 Such an assertion is not
sufficient basis for concluding that the termination of
petitioner's employment was not a bona fide decision of
management to obtain reasonable return from its investment,
which is a right guaranteed to employers under the
Constitution.14 Indeed, that the phase-out of the security
section constituted a "legitimate business decision" is a factual
finding of an administrative agency which must be accorded
respect and even finality by this Court since nothing can be
found in the record which fairly detracts from such finding.15
Accordingly, we hold that the termination of petitioner's
services was for an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy. Hence,
pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, petitioner should be
given separation pay at the rate of one month pay for every
year of service.
Sanctions for Violations of the Notice Requirement
Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an
employee for any of the authorized causes the employer must
serve "a written notice on the workers and the Department of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof." In the case at bar, petitioner was given
a notice of termination on October 11, 1991. On the same day,
his services were terminated. He was thus denied his right to
be given written notice before the termination of his
employment, and the question is the appropriate sanction for
the violation of petitioner's right.
To be sure, this is not the first time this question has arisen.
In Subuguero v. NLRC,16 workers in a garment factory were
temporarily laid off due to the cancellation of orders and a
garment embargo. The Labor Arbiter found that the workers
had been illegally dismissed and ordered the company to pay
separation pay and backwages. The NLRC, on the other hand,
found that this was a case of retrenchment due to business
losses and ordered the payment of separation pay without
backwages. This Court sustained the NLRC's finding.
However, as the company did not comply with the 30-day
written notice in Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the Court ordered
the employer to pay the workers P2,000.00 each as indemnity.
The decision followed the ruling in several cases involving
dismissals which, although based on any of the just causes
under Art. 282,17 were effected without notice and hearing to
the employee as required by the implementing rules.18 As this
Court said: "It is now settled that where the dismissal of one
employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven
to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he
was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and
opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the
employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the
requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process."19
The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed
that even though the dismissal is based on a just cause or the
termination of employment is for an authorized cause, the
dismissal or termination is illegal if effected without notice to
the employee. The shift in doctrine took place in 1989
in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC.20 In announcing the change, this
Court said:21
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
The Court holds that the policy of ordering the
reinstatement to the service of an employee without
loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during
the period of his separation until his actual
reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years
without qualification or deduction, when it appears he
was not afforded due process, although his dismissal
was found to be for just and authorized cause in an
appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, should be re-examined. It will be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose
on him the services of an employee who has been
shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his
dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize
the rank and file if the undeserving, if not undesirable,
remains in the service.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to
account for failure to extend to private respondent his
right to an investigation before causing his dismissal.
The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal
of an employee must be for just or authorized cause
and after due process. Petitioner committed an
infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be
imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal
notice and conduct an investigation as required by
law before dismissing petitioner from employment.
Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner
must indemnify the private respondent the amount of
P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on
the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission
committed by the employer.
The fines imposed for violations of the notice requirement have
varied from P1,000.0022 to P2,000.0023 to P5,000.0024 to
P10,000.00.25
Need for Reexamining the Wenphil Doctrine
Today, we once again consider the question of appropriate
sanctions for violations of the notice experience during the last
decade or so with the Wenphil doctrine. The number of cases
involving dismissals without the requisite notice to the
employee, although effected for just or authorized causes,
suggest that the imposition of fine for violation of the notice
requirement has not been effective in deterring violations of the
notice requirement. Justice Panganiban finds the monetary
sanctions "too insignificant, too niggardly, and sometimes even
too late." On the other hand, Justice Puno says there has in
effect been fostered a policy of "dismiss now; pay later" which
moneyed employers find more convenient to comply with than
the requirement to serve a 30-day written notice (in the case of
termination of employment for an authorized cause under Arts.
283-284) or to give notice and hearing (in the case of
dismissals for just causes under Art. 282).
For this reason, they regard any dismissal or layoff without the
requisite notice to be null and void even though there are just
or authorized cause for such dismissal or layoff. Consequently,
in their view, the employee concerned should be reinstated and
paid backwages.
Validity of Petitioner's Layoff Not Affected by Lack of Notice
We agree with our esteemed colleagues, Justices Puno and
Panganiban, that we should rethink the sanction of fine for an
employer's disregard of the notice requirement. We do not
agree, however, that disregard of this requirement by an
employer renders the dismissal or termination of employment
null and void. Such a stance is actually a reversion to the
discredited pre-Wenphil rule of ordering an employee to be
reinstated and paid backwages when it is shown that he has
not been given notice and hearing although his dismissal or
layoff is later found to be for a just or authorized cause. Such
rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it is really unjust to
require an employer to keep in his service one who is guilty, for
example, of an attempt on the life of the employer or the latter's
family, or when the employer is precisely retrenching in order
to prevent losses.
The need is for a rule which, while recognizing the employee's
right to notice before he is dismissed or laid off, at the same
time acknowledges the right of the employer to dismiss for any
of the just causes enumerated in Art. 282 or to terminate
employment for any of the authorized causes mentioned in
Arts. 283-284. If the Wenphil rule imposing a fine on an
employer who is found to have dismissed an employee for
cause without prior notice is deemed ineffective in deterring
employer violations of the notice requirement, the remedy is
not to declare the dismissal void if there are just or valid
grounds for such dismissal or if the termination is for an
authorized cause. That would be to uphold the right of the
employee but deny the right of the employer to dismiss for
cause. Rather, the remedy is to order the payment to the
employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until
the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But,
otherwise, his dismissal must be upheld and he should not be
reinstated. This is because his dismissal is ineffectual.
For the same reason, if an employee is laid off for any of the
causes in Arts. 283-284, i.e., installation of a labor-saving
device, but the employer did not give him and the DOLE a 30-
day written notice of termination in advance, then the
termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual
and he should be paid backwages. However, the termination of
his employment should not be considered void but he should
simply be paid separation pay as provided in Art. 283 in
addition to backwages.
Justice Puno argues that an employer's failure to comply with
the notice requirement constitutes a denial of the employee's
right to due process. Prescinding from this premise, he quotes
the statement of Chief Justice Concepcion Vda. de Cuaycong
v. Vda. de Sengbengco26 that "acts of Congress, as well as of
the Executive, can deny due process only under the pain of
nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw
are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the
contrary notwithstanding." Justice Puno concludes that the
dismissal of an employee without notice and hearing, even if
for a just cause, as provided in Art. 282, or for an authorized
cause, as provided in Arts. 283-284, is a nullity. Hence, even if
just or authorized cause exist, the employee should be
reinstated with full back pay. On the other hand, Justice
Panganiban quotes from the statement in People v.
Bocar27 that "[w]here the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that
right is void for lack of jurisdiction."
Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process
The cases cited by both Justices Puno and Panganiban refer,
however, to the denial of due process by the State, which is not
the case here. There are three reasons why, on the other hand,
violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be
considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the
employee's dismissal or layoff.
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a
limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the
exercise of private power, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text
of Art. III, 1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. .
. ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take
the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the
Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this
power is consistent with what are considered civilized
methods.
The second reason is that notice and hearing are required
under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized
society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is
obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the
adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written
notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an
opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is
none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the
eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to
determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment.
Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the
requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and
hearing is at the trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of
notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due process.
Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement
before he dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right
of the latter to question the legality of his dismissal. As Art.
277(b) provides, "Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the
validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the
regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission."
Indeed, to contend that the notice requirement in the Labor
Code is an aspect of due process is to overlook the fact that
Art. 283 had its origin in Art. 302 of the Spanish Code of
Commerce of 1882 which gave either party to the employer-
employee relationship the right to terminate their relationship
by giving notice to the other one month in advance. In lieu of
notice, an employee could be laid off by paying him
a mesada equivalent to his salary for one month.28 This
provision was repealed by Art. 2270 of the Civil Code, which
took effect on August 30, 1950. But on June 12, 1954, R.A. No.
1052, otherwise known as the Termination Pay Law, was
enacted reviving the mesada. On June 21, 1957, the law was
amended by R.A. No. 1787 providing for the giving of advance
notice or the payment of compensation at the rate of one-half
month for every year of service.29
The Termination Pay Law was held not to be a substantive law
but a regulatory measure, the purpose of which was to give the
employer the opportunity to find a replacement or substitute,
and the employee the equal opportunity to look for another job
or source of employment. Where the termination of
employment was for a just cause, no notice was required to be
given to the, employee.30 It was only on September 4, 1981
that notice was required to be given even where the dismissal
or termination of an employee was for cause. This was made
in the rules issued by the then Minister of Labor and
Employment to implement B.P. Blg. 130 which amended the
Labor Code. And it was still much later when the notice
requirement was embodied in the law with the amendment of
Art. 277(b) by R.A. No. 6715 on March 2, 1989. It cannot be
that the former regime denied due process to the employee.
Otherwise, there should now likewise be a rule that, in case an
employee leaves his job without cause and without prior notice
to his employer, his act should be void instead of simply
making him liable for damages.
The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283
can not be considered a requirement of the Due Process
Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be
entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the
case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art.
282 (i.e., serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of the employer, gross and
habitual neglect of duties, fraud or willful breach of trust of the
employer, commission of crime against the employer or the
latter's immediate family or duly authorized representatives, or
other analogous cases).
Justice Puno disputes this. He says that "statistics in the DOLE
will prove that many cases have been won by employees
before the grievance committees manned by impartial judges
of the company." The grievance machinery is, however,
different because it is established by agreement of the
employer and the employees and composed of representatives
from both sides. That is why, in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. v. Court of Appeals,31 which Justice Puno cites, it was held
that "Since the right of [an employee] to his labor is in itself a
property and that the labor agreement between him and [his
employer] is the law between the parties, his summary and
arbitrary dismissal amounted to deprivation of his property
without due process of law." But here we are dealing with
dismissals and layoffs by employers alone, without the
intervention of any grievance machinery. Accordingly
in Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation,32 although a
professor was dismissed without a hearing by his university,
his dismissal for having made homosexual advances on a
student was sustained, it appearing that in the NLRC, the
employee was fully heard in his defense.
Lack of Notice Only Makes Termination Ineffectual
Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process.
Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a
right granted to a party can be exercised. Others are simply an
application of the Justinian precept, embodied in the Civil
Code,33 to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith toward one's fellowmen. Such is the
notice requirement in Arts. 282-283. The consequence of the
failure either of the employer or the employee to live up to this
precept is to make him liable in damages, not to render his act
(dismissal or resignation, as the case may be) void. The
measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee
should have received were it not for the termination of his
employment without prior notice. If warranted, nominal and
moral damages may also be awarded.
We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor
Code, the employer's failure to comply with the notice
requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a
mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of
employment which makes the termination of employment
merely ineffectual. It is similar to the failure to observe the
provisions of Art. 1592, in relation to Art. 1191, of the Civil
Code34 in rescinding a contract for the sale of immovable
property. Under these provisions, while the power of a party to
rescind a contract is implied in reciprocal obligations,
nonetheless, in cases involving the sale of immovable property,
the vendor cannot exercise this power even though the vendee
defaults in the payment of the price, except by bringing an
action in court or giving notice of rescission by means of a
notarial demand.35 Consequently, a notice of rescission given
in the letter of an attorney has no legal effect, and the vendee
can make payment even after the due date since no valid
notice of rescission has been given.36
Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just
cause for the termination of employment can make the
dismissal of an employee illegal. This is clear from Art. 279
which provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement.37
Thus, only if the termination of employment is not for any of the
causes provided by law is it illegal and, therefore, the
employee should be reinstated and paid backwages. To
contend, as Justices Puno and Panganiban do, that even if the
termination is for a just or authorized cause the employee
concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages would be
to amend Art. 279 by adding another ground for considering a
dismissal illegal. What is more, it would ignore the fact that
under Art. 285, if it is the employee who fails to give a written
notice to the employer that he is leaving the service of the
latter, at least one month in advance, his failure to comply with
the legal requirement does not result in making his resignation
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
void but only in making him liable for damages.38 This disparity
in legal treatment, which would result from the adoption of the
theory of the minority cannot simply be explained by invoking
resident Ramon Magsaysay's motto that "he who has less in
life should have more in law." That would be a misapplication
of this noble phrase originally from Professor Thomas Reed
Powell of the Harvard Law School.
Justice Panganiban cites Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC,39 in
support of his view that an illegal dismissal results not only
from want of legal cause but also from the failure to observe
"due process." The Pepsi-Cola case actually involved a
dismissal for an alleged loss of trust and confidence which, as
found by the Court, was not proven. The dismissal was,
therefore, illegal, not because there was a denial of due
process, but because the dismissal was without cause. The
statement that the failure of management to comply with the
notice requirement "taints the dismissal with illegality" was
merely a dictum thrown in as additional grounds for holding the
dismissal to be illegal.
Given the nature of the violation, therefore, the appropriate
sanction for the failure to give notice is the payment of
backwages for the period when the employee is considered not
to have been effectively dismissed or his employment
terminated. The sanction is not the payment alone of nominal
damages as Justice Vitug contends.
Unjust Results of Considering Dismissals/Layoffs Without Prior
Notice As Illegal
The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken
by the employer to terminate employment either for an
authorized or just cause can result in an injustice to the
employer. For not giving notice and hearing before dismissing
an employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or even of
an attempt against the life of the employer, an employer will be
forced to keep in his employ such guilty employee. This is
unjust.
It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social
economic force."40 But so does it declare that it "recognizes the
indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed
investment."41 The Constitution bids the State to "afford full
protection to labor."42 But it is equally true that "the law, in
protecting the right's of the laborer, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer."43And it is
oppression to compel the employer to continue in employment
one who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in
operation when it is not economically in his interest to do so.
In sum, we hold that if in proceedings for reinstatement under
Art. 283, it is shown that the termination of employment was
due to an authorized cause, then the employee concerned
should not be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to
comply with the 30-day notice requirement. Instead, he must
be granted separation pay in accordance with Art. 283, to wit:
In case of termination due to the installation of labor-
saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected
thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at
least one month for every year of service, whichever
is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses
and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at
least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
If the employee's separation is without cause, instead of being
given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case,
whether he is reinstated or only granted separation pay, he
should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without
written notice at least 30 days in advance.
On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under
Art. 282, if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any
of the just causes mentioned in said Art. 282, then, in
accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated.
However, he must be paid backwages from the time his
employment was terminated until it is determined that the
termination of employment is for a just cause because the
failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the
termination of his employment without legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of
the National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by
ordering private respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to
pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay
for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his
proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages
from the time his employment was terminated on October 11,
1991 up to the time the decision herein becomes final. For this
purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for
computation of the separation pay, backwages, and other
monetary awards to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Puno, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see Separate opinion.
Panganiban J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., I join the dissenting opinion of J. Puno.
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., separate opinion;
We point out at the outset that this Petition for Review which
was filed before the promulgation of St. Martin Funeral Home
v. National Labor Relations Commission,1 is not the proper
means by which NLRC decisions are appealed to this Court.
Before St. Martin Funeral Home, it was only through a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 that NLRC decisions could be
reviewed and nullified by us on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. After St. Martin Funeral Home, petitions
like the one at bar are initially filed in the Court of Appeals for
proper adjudication.
In the interest of justice, however, and in order to write finis to
the instant case which has already dragged on for so long, we
shall treat the petition pro hac vice as one for certiorari under
Rule 65 although it is captioned Petition for Review
on Certiorari; after all, it was filed within the reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Briefly, on 4 April 1985 private respondent Isetann Department
Store, Inc. (ISETANN), employed petitioner Ruben Serrano as
Security Checker until his appointment as Security Section
Head. On October 1991 ISETANN through its Human
Resource Division Manager Teresita A. Villanueva sent
Serrano a memorandum terminating his employment effective
immediately "in view of the retrenchment program of the
company," and directing him to secure clearance from their
office.2
Petitioner Serrano filed with the NLRC Adjudication Office a
complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages
against ISETANN. Efforts at amicable settlement proved futile.
Ms. Cristina Ramos, Personnel Administration Manager of
ISETANN, testified that the security checkers and their section
head were retrenched due to the installation of a labor saving
device, i.e., the hiring of an independent security agency.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Finding the dismissal to be illegal, the Labor Arbiter ordered
the immediate reinstatement of Serrano to his former or to an
equivalent position plus payment of back wages, unpaid
wages, 13th month pay and attorney's fees.
On appeal the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and ruled that
ISETANN acted within its prerogative when it phased out its
Security Section and retained the services of an independent
security agency in order to cut costs and economize. Upon
denial of his motion for reconsideration3 Serrano filed the
instant petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC.
Art. 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for the
termination of employment by the employer: (a) serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or the latter's representative in
connection with the employee's work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach
by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime
or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and, (e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
On the other hand, Arts. 283 and 284 of the same Code
enumerate the so-called authorized causes: (a) installation of
labor saving devices; (b) redundancy: (b) retrenchment to
prevent losses; (d) closure or cessation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closure or cessation is for the purpose
of circumventing the provisions of the law; and, (e) disease.
The Just causes enumerated under Art. 282 of the Labor Code
are provided by the employee who causes the infraction.
The authorized causes are provided by the employer either
because of outside factors such as the general decline in the
economy or merely part of its long range plan for business
profitability. Corollarily, in termination for a just cause, the
employee is not entitled to separation pay unlike in termination
for an authorized cause. In addition, the basis in computing the
amount of separation pay varies depending on whether the
termination is due to the installation of a labor saving device, or
redundancy, in which case, the employee is entitled to receive
separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service. In case the
termination is due to retrenchment in order to prevent losses or
in case of closure or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses, the separation pay is lower, i.e.,
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. As may be
gleaned from the foregoing, where the cause of termination is
for the financial advantage or benefit of the employer, the basis
in computing for separation pay is higher compared to
termination dictated by necessity with no appreciable financial
advantage to the employer.
In the instant case, we agree with the NLRC that the dismissal
of petitioner Serrano was for an authorized cause, i.e.,
redundancy, which exists where the services of an employee
are in excess of what are reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it
is superfluous, and the superfluity may be the outcome of other
factors such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of
other business, or dropping of a particular product line or
service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the
enterprise.4
The hiring of an independent security agency is a business
decision properly within the exercise of management
prerogative. As such, this Court is denied the authority to delve
into its wisdom although it is equipped with the power to
determine whether the exercise of such prerogative is in
accordance with law. Consequently, the wisdom or soundness
of the management decision is not subject to the discretionary
review of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC unless there is a
violation of law or arbitrariness in the exercise thereof, in which
case, this Court will step in.5Specifically, we held
in International Harvester Macleod, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court6 that the determination of whether to maintain
or phase out an entire department or section or to reduce
personnel lies with management. The determination of the
need for the phasing out of a department as a labor and cost
saving device because it is no longer economical to retain its
services is a management prerogative.
After having established that the termination of petitioner
Ruben Serrano was for an authorized cause, we now address
the issue of whether proper procedures were observed in his
dismissal.
Since the State affords protection to labor under the
Constitution,7 workers enjoy security of tenure and may only be
removed or terminated upon valid reason and through strict
observance of proper procedure.8 Article 279 of the Labor
Code specifically provides
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement.
Security of tenure however does not guarantee perpetual
employment. If there exists a just or an authorized cause, the
employer may terminate the services of an employee but
subject always to procedural requirements. The employer
cannot be legally compelled to have in its employ a person
whose continued employment is patently inimical to its interest.
The law, while affording protection to the employee, does not
authorize the oppression or destruction of his employer.9
Subject then to the constitutional right of workers to security of
tenure and to be protected against dismissal except for a just
or authorized cause, and without prejudice to the requirement
of notice under Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause
of termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires, in accordance with company
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set
by the DOLE.10
As specifically provided in Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the
employer may terminate the employment of any employee due
to redundancy by serving a written notice on the worker and
the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date
thereof. In the instant case, ISETANN clearly violated the
provisions of Art. 283 on notice.11 It did not send a written
notice to DOLE which is essential because the right to
terminate an employee is not an absolute prerogative. The lack
of written notice denied DOLE the opportunity to determine the
validity of the termination.
The written notice ISETANN sent to Serrano was dated 11
October 1991 or on the same day the intended termination was
to take effect. This obviously did not comply with the 30-day
mandatory requirement. Although the cause for discharge may
be just or authorized, it is still necessary and obligatory to
afford the employee concerned his basic and more important
right to notice. Serrano was not given the chance to make the
needed adjustments brought about by his termination.
Significantly, the notice is intended to enable the employee not
only to prepare himself for the legal battle to protect his tenure
of employment, which can be long, arduous, expensive and
complicated by his own standards, but also to find other means
of employment and ease the impact of the loss of his job and,
necessarily, has income.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
We are of the view that failure to send notice of termination to
Serrano is not tantamount to violation of his constitutional right
to due process but merely constitutes non-compliance with the
provision on notice under Art. 283 of the Labor Code.
The legitimacy of a government is established and its functions
delineated in the Constitution. From the Constitution flows all
the powers of government in the same manner that it sets the
limits for their proper exercise. In particular, the Bill of Rights
functions primarily as a deterrent to any display of arbitrariness
on the part of the government or any of its instrumentalities. It
serves as the general safeguard, as is apparent in its first
section which states, "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the
laws."12 Specifically, due process is a requirement for the
validity of any governmental action amounting to deprivation of
liberty.13 It is a restraint on state action not only in terms of what
it amounts to but how it is accomplished. Its range thus covers
both the ends sough to be achieved by officialdom as well as
the means for their realization.14
Substantive due process is a weapon that may be utilized to
challenge acts of the legislative body, whether national or local,
and presumably executive orders of the President and
administrative orders and regulations of a rule-making
character. Procedural due process, on the other hand, is
available for the purpose of assailing arbitrariness or
unreasonableness in the administration of the law by executive
department or the judicial branch. Procedural due process
likewise may aid those appearing before Congressional
committees if the proceedings are arbitrary or otherwise
unfair.13
Procedural due process demands that governmental acts,
more specifically so in the case of the judiciary, not be affected
with arbitrariness.16 The same disinterestedness required of
men on the bench must characterize the actuations of public
officials, not excluding the President, to satisfy the
requirements of procedural due process.17
In his dissent Mr. Justice Puno states that "the new majority
opinion limiting violations of due process to government action
alone is a throwback to a regime of law long discarded by more
progressive countries." He opines that "today, private due
process is a settled norm in administrative law," citing
Schwartz, an authority in administrative law.
We beg to disagree. A careful reading of Schwartz would
reveal that requirements of procedural due process extended
from governmental to private action only in instances where
there is "sufficient governmental involvement" or "the private
action was so saturated with governmental incidents."
The cardinal primary requirements of due process in
administrative proceedings were highlighted in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations:18 (a) the right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in
support thereof; (b) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (c) the decision must have something to support
itself; (d) the evidence must be substantial; (e) the decision
must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (f) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act
on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate; (g) the board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties
to the proceeding may know the various issues involved, and
the reason for the decision rendered.
Also in Lumiqued v. Exevea19 it was held
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one's
side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even more
creditably as it is more practicable than oral
arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is
not always an indispensable aspect of due process.
As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said
to have been denied due process of law, for this
opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the observance of due
process is demanded in governmental acts. Particularly in
administrative proceedings, due process starts with the tribunal
or hearing officer and not with the employer. In the instant
case, what is mandated of the employer to observe is the 30-
day notice requirement. Hence, non-observance of the notice
requirement is not denial of due process but merely a failure to
comply with a legal obligation for which we strongly
recommend, we impose a disturbance compensation as
discussed hereunder.
In the instant case, we categorically declare that Serrano was
not denied his right to due process. Instead, his employer did
not comply with the 30-day notice requirement. However, while
Serrano was not given the required 30-day notice, he was
nevertheless given and, in fact, took advantage of every
opportunity to be heard, first, by the Labor Arbiter, second, by
the NLRC, and third, by no less than this Court. Before the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, petitioner had the opportunity to
present his side not only orally but likewise through proper
pleadings and position papers.
It is not correct therefore to say that petitioner was deprived of
his right to due process.
We have consistently upheld in the past as valid although
irregular the dismissal of an employee for a just or authorized
cause but without notice and have imposed a sanction on the
erring employers in the form of damages for their failure to
comply with the notice requirement. We discussed the
rationale behind this ruling in Wenphil Corporation v.
NLRC20 thus
The Court holds that the policy of ordering
reinstatement to the service of an employee without
loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during
the period of his separation until his actual
reinstatement but not exceeding three years without
qualification or deduction, when it appears he was not
afforded due process, although his dismissal was
found to be for just and authorized cause in an
appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and
Employment should be re-examined. It will be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose
on him the services of an employee who has been
shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his
dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize
the rank and file if the undeserving, if not undesirable,
remains in the service . . . . However, the petitioner
must nevertheless be held to account for failure to
extend to private respondent his right to an
investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule is
explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an
employee must be for just or authorized cause and
after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction
of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed
a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and
conduct an investigation as required by law before
dismissing petitioner from employment. Considering
the circumstances of this case petitioner must
indemnify private respondent the amount of
P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on
the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission
committed by the employer (emphasis supplied).
In Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations Commission21 Mr.
Justice Davide Jr., now Chief Justice, made this clear
pronouncement
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
It is now settled that where the dismissal of an
employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so
proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due
process, i.e. he was not furnished the twin
requirements of notice and the opportunity to be
heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer
must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the
requirements of or for failure to observe due process.
The sanction, in the nature of indemnification or
penalty, depends on the facts of each case and the
gravity of the omission committed by the employer.
This ruling was later ably amplified by Mr. Justice Puno in Nath
v. National Labor Relations Commission22 where he wrote
The rules require the employer to furnish the worker
sought to be dismissed with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (1)
notice which apprises the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
In the instant case, private respondents have failed to
furnish petitioner with the first of the required two (2)
notices and to state plainly the reasons for the
dismissal in the termination letter. Failure to comply
with the requirements taints the dismissal with
illegality.
Be that as it may, private respondent can dismiss
petitioner for just cause . . . . We affirm the finding of
the public respondent that there was just cause to
dismiss petitioner, a probationary
employee (emphasis supplied).
Also, in Camua v. National Labor Relations Commission23 this
Court through Mr. Justice Mendoza decreed
In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC found that no written notice of the charges had
been given to petitioner by the respondent company. .
. . Accordingly, in accordance with the well-settled
rule, private respondents should pay petitioner
P1,000.00 as indemnity for violation of his right to due
process . . . . Although an employee validy dismissed
for cause he may nevertheless be given separation
pay as a measure of social justice provided the cause
is not serious misconduct reflecting on his moral
character (emphasis supplied).
Non-observance of this procedural requirement before would
cause the employer to be penalized by way of paying damages
to the employee the amounts of which fluctuated through the
years. Thus, for just cause the indemnity ranged from
P1,000.00 to P10,000.00.24 For authorized cause, as
distinguished from just cause, the award ranged from
P2,000.00 to P5,000.00.25
This Court has also sanctioned the ruling that a dismissal for a
just or authorized cause but without observance of the
mandatory 30-day notice requirement was valid although
considered irregular. The Court ratiocinated that employers
should not be compelled to keep in their employ undesirable
and undeserving laborers. For the irregularity, i.e., the failure to
observe the 30-day notice of termination, the employer was
made to pay a measly sum ranging from P1,000.00 to
P10,000.00.
With regard to the indemnity or penalty, which we prefer
seriously to be referred to as "disturbance compensation," the
Court has awarded varying amounts depending on the
circumstances of each case and the gravity of the commission.
We now propose that the amount of the award be uniform and
rational and not arbitrary. The reason for the proposal or
modification is that in their non-compliance with the 30-day
notice requirement the erring employers, regardless of the
peculiar circumstances of each case, commit the infraction
only by the single act of not giving any notice to their workers.
It cannot be gainfully said that the infraction in one case is
heavier than in the other as the non-observance constitutes
one single act. Thus, if the dismissal is illegal, i.e. there is no
just or authorized cause, a disturbance compensation in the
amount of P10,000.00 may be considered reasonable. If the
dismissal is for a just cause but without notice, a disturbance
compensation in the amount P5,000.00 may be given. In
termination for an authorized cause and the notice requirement
was not complied with, we distinguish further: If it is to save the
employer from imminent bankruptcy or business losses, the
disturbance compensation to be given is P5,000.00. If the
authorized cause was intended for the employer to earn more
profits, the amount of disturbance compensation is
P10,000.00. This disturbance compensation, again we strongly
recommend, should be given to the dismissed employee at the
first instance, the moment it is shown that his employer has
committed the infraction of not complying with the 30-day
written notice requirement to tide him over during his
economic dislocation.
The right of the laborers to be informed of their impending
termination cannot be taken lightly, and the award of any
amount below P5,000.00 may be too anemic to satisfy the
fundamental protection especially accorded to labor and the
workingman. In fact, it is hardly enough to sustain a family of
three; more so if the employee has five or more children, which
seems to be the average size of a Filipino family.
Henceforth, if the dismissal is for a just cause but without
observance of the 30-day notice requirement, the dismissal is
deemed improper and irregular. If later the dismissal is
ascertained to be without just cause, the dismissed employee
is entitled to reinstatement, if this be feasible, otherwise to
separation pay and back wages plus disturbance
compensation of P10,000.00 and moral damages, if warranted.
On the other hand, if the dismissal is ascertained to be with
just cause, the dismissed employee is entitled nevertheless to
a disturbance compensation of P5,000.00 if the legal
requirement of the 30-day notice to both employee and DOLE
has not been complied with.
In instances where there is obviously a ground for dismissal,
as when the employee has become violent and his presence
would cause more harm to his co-workers and the security and
serenity of the workplace, the employee may be suspended in
the meantime until he is heard with proper observance of the
30-day notice requirement. Likewise, if the dismissal is for an
authorized cause but without the required notice, the dismissal
is improper and irregular and the employee should be paid
separation pay, back wages and disturbance compensation of
P5,000.00 or P10,000.00.00 depending on the cause. As
already intimated, if the authorized cause is for the purpose of
saving the employer from imminent bankruptcy or business
losses, the disturbance compensation should be P5,000.00;
otherwise, if the authorized cause is for the employer, in the
exercise of management prerogative, to save and earn more
profits, the disturbance compensation should be P10,000.00.
In the instant case, Serrano was given his walking papers only
on the very same day his termination was to take effect. DOLE
was not served any written notice. In other words, there was
non-observance of the 30-day notice requirement to both
Serrano and the DOLE. Serrano was thus terminated for an
authorized cause but was not accorded his right to 30-day
notice. Thus, his dismissal being improper and irregular, he is
entitled to separation pay and back wages the amounts of
which to be determined by the Labor Arbiter, plus P10,000.00
as disturbance compensation which, from its very nature, must
be paid immediately to cushion the impact of his economic
dislocation.
One last note. This Separate Opinion is definitely not
advocating a new concept in imposing the so-called
"disturbance compensation." Since Wenphil Corporation v.
NLRC 26 this Court has already recognized the necessity of
imposing a sanction in the form of indemnity or even damages,
when proper, not specifically provided by any law, upon
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
employers who failed to comply with the twin-notice
requirement. At the very least, what is being proposed to be
adopted here is merely a change in the terminology used, i.e.,
from "sanction," "indemnity," "damages" or "penalty," to
"disturbance compensation" as it is believed to be the more
appropriate term to accurately describe the lamentable
situation of our displaced employees.
Indeed, from the time the employee is dismissed from the
service without notice in this case since 11 October 1991
to the termination of his case, assuming it results in his
reinstatement, or his being paid his back wages and separation
pay, as the case may be, how long must he be made to suffer
emotionally and bear his financial burden? Will reinstating him
and/or paying his back wages adequately make up for the
entire period that he was indistress for want of any means of
livelihood? Petitioner Serrano has been deprived of his only
source of income his employment for the past eight (8)
years or so. Will his reinstatement and/or the payment of his
back wages and separation pay enable him to pay off his debts
incurred in abject usury to which he must have succumbed
during his long period of financial distress? Will it be
adequate? Will it be just? Will it be fair? Thus, do we really and
truly render justice to the workingman by simply awarding him
full back wages and separation pay without regard for the long
period during which he was wallowing in financial difficulty?
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission should be MODIFIED.
The termination of petitioner RUBEN SERRANO being based
on an authorized cause should be SUSTAINED AS VALID
although DECLARED IRREGULAR for having been effected
without the mandatory 30-day notice.
ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE INC. should PAY petitioner
SERRANO back wages and separation pay the amounts of
which to be determined by the Labor Arbiter, plus P10,000.00
as disturbance compensation which must be paid immediately.
Consequently, except as regards the disturbance
compensation, the case should be REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter for the immediate computation and payment of the back
wages and separation pay due petitioner.
EXCEPT as herein stated, I concur with the majority.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;
The rule of audi alteram partem hear the other side, is the
essence of procedural due process. That a "party is not to
suffer in person or in purse without an opportunity of being
heard" is the oldest established principle in administrative
law.1 Today, the majority is relies that the all important right of
an employee to be notified before he is dismissed for a just or
authorized cause is not a requirement of due process. This is a
blow on the breadbasket of our lowly employees, a
considerable erosion of their constitutional right to security of
tenure, hence this humble dissenting opinion.
A review of our law on dismissal is in order.
I. DISMISSAL DUE TO JUST CAUSE
The law allowing dismissal of an employee due to a just cause
is provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer
may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of the crime or offense by
the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representative;
and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The long established jurisprudence2 is that to justify dismissal
of an employee for a just cause, he must be given two kinds of
notice by his employer, viz: (1) notice to apprise the employee
of the particular acts or omissions for which the dismissal is
sought, and (2) subsequent notice to inform him of the
employer's decision to dismiss him. Similarly, deeply ingrained
is our ruling that these pre and post notice requirements are
not mere technicalities but are requirements of due process.3
Then came the case of Wenphil Corporation vs. NLRC and
Mallare in 1989.4 It is the majority view that Wenphil reversed
the long standing policy of this Court on dismissal. This is too
broad a reading of Wenphil. A careful statement of the facts of
Wenphil and the ruling of this Court is thus proper.
First, the facts. The private respondent Roberto Mallare is the
assistant head of the backroom department of petitioner
Wenphil Corporation. At about 2:30 pm on May 20, 1985,
Mallare had an altercation with his co-employee, Job
Barrameda, about tending the Salad Bar. He slapped
Barrameda's cap, stepped on his foot, picked up an ice
scooper and brandished it against the latter. He refused to be
pacified by another employee who reported the incident to
Delilah Hermosura, assistant manager. Hermosura summoned
Mallare but the latter refused to see the former. It took a
security guard to bring Mallare to Hermosura. Instead of
making an explanation, Mallare shouted profane words against
Hermosura. He declared that their altercation should only be
settled by him and Barrameda.
The following morning, Mallare was suspended. In the
afternoon, he was dismissed from the service. He received an
official notice of his dismissal four (4) days later.
Mallare filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal
suspension, illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. No
hearing was conducted in view of the repeated absence of the
counsel of Mallare. The parties submitted their respective
position papers. On December 3, 1986, the Arbiter denied the
complaint as he found Mallare guilty of grave misconduct and
insubordination, which are just causes for dismissal. The
Arbiter also ruled that Mallare was not denied due process. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed. It held that Mallare was denied
due process before he was dismissed. It ordered Mallare's
reinstatement and the payment of his one (1) year backwages.
On certiorari to this Court, we reversed the NLRC and
reinstated the decision of the Arbiter with the modification that
petitioner should pay to Mallare an indemnity of P1,000.00 for
dismissing Mallare without any notice and hearing. We held:
Petitioner insists that private respondent was afforded
due process but he refused to avail of his right to the
same; that when the matter was brought to the labor
arbiter he was able to submit his position paper
although the hearing cannot proceed due to the non-
appearance of his counsel; and that the private
respondent is guilty of serious misconduct in
threatening or coercing a co-employee which is a
ground for dismissal under Article 283 of the Labor
Code.
The failure of petitioner to give private respondent the
benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed
constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
to due process of law and equal protection of the
laws. The standards of due process in judicial as well
as administrative proceedings have long been
established. In its bare minimum due process of law
simply means giving notice and opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered.
The claim of petitioner that a formal investigation was
not necessary because the incident, which gave rise
to the termination of private respondent, was
witnessed by his co-employees and supervisors, is
without merit. The basic requirement of due process
is that which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial.
However, it is a matter of fact that when the private
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, he
was afforded the right to an investigation by the labor
arbiter. He presented his position paper as did the
petitioner. If no hearing was had, it was the fault of
private respondent as his counsel failed to appear at
the scheduled hearings. The labor arbiter concluded
that the dismissal of private respondent was for just
cause. He was found guilty of grave misconduct and
insubordination. This is borne by the sworn
statements of witnesses. The Court is bound by this
finding of the labor arbiter.
By the same token, the conclusion of the public
respondent NLRC on appeal that private respondent
was not afforded due process before he was
dismissed is binding on this Court. Indeed, it is well
taken and supported by the records. However, it can
not justify a ruling that private respondent should be
reinstated with back wages as the public respondent
NLRC so decreed. Although belatedly, private
respondent was afforded due process before the
labor arbiter wherein the just cause of his dismissal
had been established. With such finding, it would be
arbitrary and unfair to order his reinstatement with
back wages.
Three member of the Court filed concurring and dissenting
opinions. Madam Justice Herrera opined that: (a) Mallare was
dismissed for cause, hence, he is not entitled to reinstatement
and backwages; (b) he was not denied due process; and (c) he
has no right to any indemnity but to separation pay to cushion
the impact of his loss of employment Mr. Justice Padilla took
the view that: (1) Mallare was not entitled to reinstatement and
backwages as he was guilty of grave misconduct and
insubordination; (2) he was denied administrative due process;
and (3) for making such denial, Wenphil should pay
"separation pay (instead of indemnity) in the sum of
P1,000.00." Madam Justice Cortes held that: (1) Mallare was
not illegally dismissed; (2) he was not denied due process; (3)
he was not entitled to indemnity; and (4) if P1,000.00 was to be
imposed on Wenphil as an administrative sanction, it should
form part of the public fund of the government.
I shall discuss later that Wenphil did not change our ruling that
violation of the pre-dismissal notice requirement is an
infringement of due process.
II. DISMISSAL DUE TO AUTHORIZED CAUSE
The applicable law on dismissal due to authorized cause is
Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel. The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor serving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation
of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing
is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of
this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers
and the [Department] of Labor and Employment at
least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.
In case of termination due to the installation of labor-
saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected
thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to
prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation
of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least
six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
In Sebuguero v. NLRC,5 we held thru our esteemed Chief
Justice Davide that "the requirement of notice to both the
employees concerned and the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) is mandatory and must be written and
given at least one month before the intended date of
retrenchment." We explained that the "notice to the DOLE is
essential because the right to retrench is not an absolute
prerogative of an employer but is subject to the requirement of
law that retrenchment be proved to prevent losses. The DOLE
is the agency that will determine whether the planned
retrenchment is justified and adequately supported by
fact."6 Nonetheless, we ruled:
The lack of written notice to the petitioners and to the
DOLE does not, however, make the petitioners'
retrenchment illegal such that they are entitled to the
payment of back wages and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement as they contend. Their retrenchment,
for not having been effected with the required notices,
is merely defective. In those cases where we found
the retrenchment to be illegal and ordered the
employees' reinstatement and the payment of
backwages, the validity of the cruse for retrenchment,
that is the existence of imminent or actual serious or
substantial losses, was not proven. But here, such a
cause is present as found by both the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. There is only a violation by GTI of the
procedure prescribed in Article 283 of the Labor Code
in effecting the retrenchment of the
petitioners.1wphi1.nt
It is now settled that where the dismissal of an employee is in
fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is
not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not
furnished the twin requirements of notice and the opportunity to
be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must
be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of or
for failure to observe due process. The sanction, in the nature
of indemnification or penalty, depends on the facts of each
case and the gravity of the omission committed by the
employer and has ranged from P1,000.00 as in the cases
of Wenphil vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, Seahorse Maritime Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, Shoemart, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Alonzo,
and Aurelio vs. National Labor Relations Commission to
P10,000.00 in Reta vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Alhambra Industries, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission. More recently, in Worldwide
Papermills, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the
sum of P5,000.00 was awarded to the employee as
indemnification for the employer's failure to comply with the
requirements of procedural due process.
Accordingly, we affirm the deletion by the NLRC of the award
of back wages, But because the required notices of the
petitioners' retrenchment were not served upon the petitioners
and the DOLE, GTI must be sanctioned for such failure and
thereby required to indemnify each of the petitioners the sum
of P20,000.00 which we find to be just and reasonable under
the circumstances of this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
III. RE-EXAMINATION OF THE WENPHIL DOCTRINE:
FROM BAD TO WORSE
The minority of the Court has asked for a re-examination of
Wenphil because as the majority correctly observed, "the
number of cases involving dismissals without the requisite
notice to the employee although effected for just or authorized
causes suggests that the imposition of fine for violation of the
notice requirement has not been effective in deterring
violations of the notice requirement."
We must immediately set Wenphil in its proper perspective as
it is a very exceptional case. Its doctrine must be limited to its
distinct facts. Its facts therefore ought to be carefully examined
again. In Wenphil, it was clearly established that the employee
had a violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and
even defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him. The
employee was working for a fast food chain that served the
public and where violence has no place. These facts were
established only in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
after the employee filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. There
were no formal investigation proceedings before the employer
as the employment was dismissed without any notice by the
employer. Given these facts, we ruled that the pre-dismissal
notice requirement was part of due process; nonetheless, we
held that the employee was given due process as he was
heard by the Labor Arbiter; we found that the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter proved that the employer was guilty of
grave misconduct and insubordination; we concluded with the
rule that it would be highly prejudicial to the interest of the
employer to reinstate the employee, but the employer must
indemnify the employee the amount of P1,000.00 for
dismissing him without notice. We further held that "the
measure of this award depends on the facts or each case and
the gravity of the omission committed by the employer."7
At the outset, I wish to emphasize that Wenphil itself held, and
repeatedly held that "the failure of petitioner to give private
respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed,
constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to due
process of law and equal protection of the laws. The standards
of due process of law in judicial as well as administrative
proceedings have long been established. In its bare minimum
due process of law simply means giving notice and opportunity
to be heard before judgment is rendered."8 The Court then
satisfied itself with this bare minimum when it held that the post
dismissal hearing before the Labor Arbiter was enough
compliance with demands of due process and refused to
reinstate an eminently undesirable employee. Heretofore, the
Court was far from satisfied with this bare minimum as it strictly
imposed on an employer compliance with the requirement of
pre-dismissal notice, violation of which resulted in orders of
reinstatement of the dismissed employee. This is the only
wrinkle wrought by Wenphil in our jurisprudence on dismissal.
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the Court still punished
Wenphil's violation of the pre-dismissal notice requirement as it
was ordered to pay an indemnity of P1,000.00 to the
employee. The indemnity was based on the iterated and
reiterated rule that "the dismissal of an employee must be for
just or authorized cause and after due process."9
Our ten (10) years experience with Wenphil is not a happy one.
Unscrupulous employers have abused the Wenphil ruling.
They have dismissed without notice employees including those
who are not as eminently undesirable as the Wenphil
employee. They dismissed employees without notice as a
general rule when it should be the exception. The purpose of
the pre-dismissal notice requirement was entirely defeated by
employers who were just too willing to pay an indemnity for its
violation. The result, as the majority concedes, is that the
indemnity we imposed has not been effective to prevent unjust
dismissals employees. To be sure, this is even a supreme
understatement. The ugly truth is that Wenphil is the mother of
many unjust and unauthorized dismissals of employees who
are too weak to challenge their powerful employees.
As the Wenphil indemnity doctrine has proved to be highly
inimical to the interest of our employees, I humbly submit a
return to the pre-Wenphil rule where a reasonless violation of
the pre-dismissal notice requirement makes the dismissal of an
employee illegal and results in his reinstatement. In fine, we
should strike down as illegal the dismissal of an employee
even if it is for a justified end if it is done thru unjustified means
for we cannot be disciples of the Machiavellian doctrine of the
end justifies the means. With due respect, the majority decision
comes too near this mischievous doctrine by giving emphasis
on the end and not the means of dismissal of employees. What
grates is that the majority today espouses a doctrine more
pernicious than Wenphil for now it announces that a violation
of the pre-dismissal notice requirement does not even concern
due process. The reasons relied upon by the majority for this
new ruling against the job security of employees cannot inspire
assent.
FIRST. I would like to emphasize that one undesirable effect of
Wenphil is to compel employees to seek relief against illegal
dismissals with the DOLE whereas before, a remedy can be
sought before the employer. In shifting this burden, an
employee's uneven fight against his employer has become
more uneven. Now, an illegally dismissed employee often goes
to the DOLE without an exact knowledge of the cause of his
dismissal. As a matter of strategy, some employers today
dismiss employees without notice. They know that it is more
advantageous for them to litigate with an employee who has no
knowledge of the cause of dismissal. The probability is that
said employee will fail to prove the illegality of his dismissal. All
that he can prove is that he was dismissed without notice and
the penalty for the omission is a mere fine, a pittance.
The case at bar demonstrates how disastrous Wenphil has
been to our helpless employees. In holding that the petitioner
failed to prove his cause of action, the majority held ". . . we
have only the bare assertion of petitioner that, in abolishing the
security section, private respondent's real purpose was to
avoid payment to the security checkers of the wage increases
provided in the collective bargaining agreement approved in
1990." The bare assertion of the petitioner is understandable.
The notice given to him spoke of a general ground
retrenchment. No details were given about the employer's
sudden retrenchment program. Indeed, the employee was
dismissed on the day he received the notice in violation of the
30-day requirement. He was given no time, no opportunity to
ascertain and verify the real cause of his dismissal. Thus, he
filed with the DOLE a complaint for illegal dismissal with a hazy
knowledge of its real cause. Heretofore, it is the employer
whom we blame and penalize if he does not notify his
employee of the cause of his dismissal. Today, the majority
puts the blame on the employee for not knowing why he was
dismissed when he was not given any notice of dismissal. In
truth, the suspicion of the petitioner in the case at bar that he
was dismissed to avoid payment of their wage increases is not
without basis. The DOLE itself found that petitioner has unpaid
wages which were ordered to be paid by the employer. The
majority itself affirmed this finding.
What hurts is that while the majority was strict with the
petitioner-employee, it was not so with the employer ISETANN.
Immediately, it validated the finding of the NLRC that petitioner
was dismissed due to the redundancy of his position. This is
inconsistent with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the
employer failed to prove retrenchment, the ground it used to
dismiss the petitioner. A perusal of the records will show that
Ms. Cristina Ramos, Personnel Administration Manager of the
employer ISETANN testified on the cause of dismissal of the
petitioner. She declared that petitioner was retrenched due to
the installation of a labor saving device. Allegedly, the labor
saving device was the hiring of an independent security
agency, thus:10
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Perdigon:
You said that your company decided to phase out the position
of security checkers . . .
Ms. Ramos:
Yes Sir.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Q: And instead hired the services of a security agency?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you not retrench the position of security checkers?
A: We installed a labor saving device.
Q: So you did not retrench?
A: No. sir.
Q: How about the position of Section Head of Security
Department?
A: It was abolished in 1991.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Are you aware of the retrenchment program of the
company as stated in this letter?
A: Actually it's not a retrenchment program. It's an installation
of a labor saving device.
Q: So you are telling this Court now that there was no
retrenchment program?
A: It was actually an installation of a labor saving
device (emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: . . . What (is) this labor saving device that you are referring
to?
A: The labor saving device is that the services of a security
agency were contracted to handle the services of the security
checkers of our company.
Q: Are you sure of what labor saving means, Madam witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said you installed a labor saving device, and you
installed a security agency as a labor saving device?
A: We hired the services of a security agency.
Q: So according to you . . . a security agency is a labor saving
device?
Atty. Salonga:
Already answered, your Honor.
Obviously, Ms. Ramos could not even distinguish between
retrenchment and redundancy. The Labor Arbiter thus ruled
that petitioner's dismissal was illegal. The NLRC, however,
reversed. The majority affirmed the NLRC ruling that
ISETANN's phase out of its security employees is a legitimate
business decision, one that is necessary to obtain reasonable
return from its investment. To use the phrase of the majority,
this is a "bare assertion." Nothing in the majority decision
shows how the return of ISETANN's investment has been
threatened to justify its so-called business decision as
legitimate.
SECOND. The majority holds that "the need is for a rule which,
while recognizing the employee's right to notice before he is
dismissed or laid off, at the same time acknowledges the right
of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes
enumerated in Art. 282 or to terminate employment for any of
the authorized causes mentioned in Arts. 283-284. If the
Wenphil rule imposing a fine on an employer who is found to
have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice is
deemed ineffective in deterring employer violations of the
notice requirement, the remedy is not to declare the dismissal
void if there are just or valid grounds for such dismissal or if the
termination is for an authorized cause. That would be to uphold
the right of the employee but deny the right of the employer to
dismiss for cause. Rather, the remedy is to consider the
dismissal or termination to be simply ineffectual for failure of
the employer to comply with the procedure for dismissal or
termination.
With due respect, I find it most difficult to follow the logic of the
majority. Before Wenphil, we protected employees with the
ruling that dismissals without prior notice are illegal and the
illegally dismissed employee must be reinstated with
backwages. Wenphil diluted that rule when it held that due
process is satisfied if the employee is given the opportunity to
be heard by the Labor Arbiter. It further held that an employee
cannot be reinstated if it is established in the hearing that his
dismissal is for a just cause. The failure of the employer to give
a pre-dismissal notice is only to be penalized by payment of an
indemnity. The dilution of the rule has been abused by
unscrupulous employers who then followed the "dismiss now,
pay later" strategy. This evil practice of employers was what I
expected the majority to address in re-examining the Wenphil
doctrine. At the very least, I thought that the majority would
restore the balance of rights between an employee and an
employer by giving back the employee's mandatory right to
notice before dismissal. It is disquieting, however, that the
majority re-arranged this balance of right by tilting it more in
favor of the employer's right to dismiss. Thus, instead of
weakening a bit the right to dismiss of employers, the majority
further strengthens it by insisting that a dismissal without prior
notice is merely "ineffectual" and not illegal.
The stubborn refusal of the majority to appreciate the
importance of pre-dismissal notice is difficult to understand. It
is the linchpin of an employee's right against an illegal
dismissal. The notice tells him the cause of his dismissal. It
gives him a better chance to contest his dismissal in an
appropriate proceeding as laid down in the parties' collective
bargaining agreement or the rules of employment established
by the employer, as the case may be. In addition, it gives to
both the employee and employer more cooling time to settle
their differences amicably. In fine, the prior notice requirement
and the hearing before the employer give an employee a
distinct, different and effective first level of remedy to protect
his job. In the event the employee is dismissed, he can still file
a complaint with the DOLE with better knowledge of the cause
of his dismissal, with longer time to prepare his case, and with
greater opportunity to take care of the financial needs of his
family pendente lite. The majority has taken away from
employees this effective remedy. This is not to say that the pre-
dismissal notice requirement equalizes the fight between an
employee and an employer for the fight will remain unequal.
This notice requirement merely gives an employee a fighting
chance but that fighting chance is now gone.
It is equally puzzling why the majority believes that restoring
the employee's right to pre-dismissal notice will negate the
right of an employer to dismiss for cause. The pre-Wenphil rule
simply requires that before the right of the employer to dismiss
can be exercised, he must give prior notice to the employee of
its cause. There is nothing strange nor difficult about this
requirement. It is no burden to an employer. He is bereft of
reason not to give the simple notice. If he fails to give notice,
he can only curse himself. He forfeits his right to dismiss by
failing to follow the procedure for the exercise of his right.
Employees in the public sector cannot be dismissed without
prior notice. Equal protection of law demands similar treatment
of employees in the private sector.
THIRD. The case at bar specifically involves Article 283 of the
Labor Code which lays down four (4) authorized causes for
termination of employment.11 These authorized causes are: (1)
installation of labor-saving devices; (2) redundancy; (3)
retrenchment to prevent losses; and (4) closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the law. It also
provides that prior to the dismissal of an employee for an
authorized cause, the employer must send two written notices
at least one month before the intended dismissal one notice
to the employee and another notice to the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE). We have ruled that the right to
dismiss on authorized causes is not an absolute prerogative of
an employer.12 We explained that the notice to the DOLE is
necessary to enable it to ascertain the truth of the cause of
termination.13 The DOLE is equipped with men and machines
to determine whether the planned closure or cessation of
business or retrenchment or redundancy or installation of labor
saving device is justified by economic facts.14 For this reason
too, we have held that notice to the employee is required to
enable him to contest the factual bases of the management
decision or good faith of the retrenchment or redundancy
before the DOLE.15 In addition, this notice requirement gives
an employee a little time to adjust to his joblessness.16
The majority insists that if an employee is laid off for an
authorized cause under Article 283 in violation of the prior
notice requirement, his dismissal should not be considered
void but only ineffectual. He shall not be reinstated but paid
separation pay and some backwages. I respectfully submit that
an employee under Article 283 has a stronger claim to the right
to a pre-dismissal notice and hearing. To begin with, he is an
innocent party for he has not violated any term or condition of
his employment. Moreover, an employee in an Article 283
situation may lose his job simply because of his employer's
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
desire for more profit. Thus, the installation of a labor saving
device is an authorized cause to terminate employment even if
its non-installation need not necessarily result in an over-all
loss to an employer possessed by his possessions. In an
Article 283 situation, it is easy to see that there is a greater
need to scrutinize the allegations of the employer that he is
dismissing an employee for an authorized cause. The acts
involved here are unilateral acts of the employer. Their nature
requires that they should be proved by the employer himself.
The need for a labor saving device, the reason for redundancy,
the cause for retrenchment, the necessity for closing or
cessation of business are all within the knowledge of the
employer and the employer alone. They involve a constellation
of economic facts and factors usually beyond the ken of
knowledge of an ordinary employee. Thus, the burden should
be on the employer to establish and justify these authorized
causes. Due to their complexity, the law correctly directs that
notice should be given to the DOLE for it is the DOLE more
than the lowly employee that has the expertise to validate the
alleged cause in an appropriate hearing. In fine, the DOLE
provides the equalizer to the powers of the employer in an
Article 283 situation. Without the equalizing influence of DOLE,
the employee can be abused by his employer.
Further, I venture the view that the employee's right to security
of tenure guaranteed in our Constitution calls for a pre-
dismissal notice and hearing rather than a post facto dismissal
hearing. The need for an employee to be heard before he can
be dismissed cannot be overemphasized. As aforestated, in
the case at bar, petitioner was a regular employee of
ISETANN. He had the right to continue with his employment.
The burden to establish that this right has ceased is with
ISETANN, as petitioner's employer. In fine, ISETANN must be
the one to first show that the alleged authorized cause for
dismissing petitioner is real. And on this factual issue,
petitioner must be heard. Before the validity of the alleged
authorized cause is established by ISETANN, the petitioner
cannot be separated from employment. This is the simple
meaning of security of tenure. With due respect, the majority
opinion will reduce this right of our employees to a mere
illusion. It will allow the employer to dismiss an employee for a
cause that is yet to be established. It tells the employee that if
he wants to be heard, he can file a case with the labor arbiter,
then the NLRC, and then this Court. Thus, it unreasonably
shifts the burden to the employee to prove that his dismissal is
for an unauthorized cause.
The pernicious effects of the majority stance are self-evident in
the case at bar. For one, petitioner found himself immediately
jobless and without means to support his family. For another,
petitioner was denied the right to rely on the power of DOLE to
inquire whether his dismissal was for a genuine authorized
cause. This is a valuable right for all too often, a lowly
employee can only rely on DOLE's vast powers to check
employer abuses on illegal dismissals. Without DOLE, poor
employees are preys to the claws of powerful employers. Last
but not the least, it was the petitioner who was forced to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. To a jobless employee, filing a
complaint is an unbearable burden due to its economic cost.
He has to hire a lawyer and defray the other expenses of
litigation while already in a state of penury. At this point, the
hapless employee is in a no win position to fight for his right. To
use a local adage, "aanhin pa ang damo kung patay na ang
kabayo."
In the case at bar, the job of the petitioner could have been
saved if DOLE was given notice of his dismissal. The records
show that petitioner worked in ISETANN as security checker
for six (6) years. He served ISETANN faithfully and well.
Nonetheless, in a desire for more profits, and not because of
losses, ISETANN contracted out the security work of the
company. There was no effort whatsoever on the part of
ISETANN to accommodate petitioner in an equivalent position.
Yet there was the position of Safety and Security Supervisor
where petitioner fitted like a perfect T. Despite petitioner's long
and loyal service, he was treated like an outsider, made to
apply for the job, and given a stringent examination which he
failed. Petitioner was booted out and given no chance to
contest his dismissal. Neither was the DOLE given the chance
to check whether the dismissal of petitioner was really for an
authorized cause. All these because ISETANN did not follow
the notice and hearing requirement of due process.
FOURTH. The majority has inflicted a most serious cut on the
job security of employees. The majority did nothing to restore
the pre-Wenphil right of employees but even expanded the
right to dismiss of employer by holding that the pre-dismissal
notice requirement is not even a function of due process. This
seismic shift in our jurisprudence ought not to pass.
The key to the new majority ruling is that the "due process
clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental
powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power such
as the termination of employment under the Labor Code." The
main reason alleged is that "only the State has authority to take
the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the
Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this
power is consistent with settled usage of civilized society."
There can be no room for disagreement on the proposition that
the due process clause found in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. Nor can
there be any debate that acts of government violative of due
process are null and void. Thus, former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion emphasized in Cuaycong v. Senbengco 17 that
". . . acts of Congress as well as those of the Executive, can
deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial
proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the
same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary
notwithstanding." With due respect to the majority, however, I
part ways with the majority in its new ruling that the due
process requirement does not apply to the exercise of private
power. This overly restrictive majority opinion will sap the due
process right of employees of its remaining utility. Indeed, the
new majority opinion limiting violations of due process to
government action alone is a throwback to a regime of law long
discarded by more progressive countries. Today, private due
process is a settled norm in administrative law. Per Schwartz, a
known authority in the field, viz:18
Private Due Process
As already stressed, procedural due process has
proved of an increasingly encroaching nature.
Since Goldberg v. Kelly, the right to be heard has
been extended to an ever-widening area, covering
virtually all aspects of agency action, including those
previously excluded under the privilege concept. The
expansion of due process has not been limited to the
traditional areas of administrative law. We saw how
procedural rights have expanded into the newer field
of social welfare, as well as that of education. But due
process expansion has not been limited to these
fields. The courts have extended procedural
protections to cases involving prisoners and parolees,
as well as the use of established adjudicatory
procedures. Important Supreme Court decisions go
further and invalidate prejudgment wage
garnishments and seizures of property under replevin
statutes where no provision is made for notice and
hearing. But the Court has not gone so far as to lay
down an inflexible rule that due process requires an
adversary hearing when an individual may be
deprived of any possessory interest, however brief the
dispossession and however slight the monetary
interest in the property. Due process is not violated
where state law requires, as a precondition to
invoking the state's aid to sequester property of a
defaulting debtor, that the creditor furnish adequate
security and make a specific showing of probable
cause before a judge.
In addition, there has been an extension of procedural
due process requirements from governmental to
private action. In Section 5.16 we saw that Goldberg
v. Kelly has been extended to the eviction of a tenant
from a public housing project. The courts have not
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
limited the right to be heard to tenants who have
governmental agencies as landlords. Due process
requirements also govern acts by "private" landlords
where there is sufficient governmental involvement in
the rented premises. Such an involvement exists in
the case of housing aided by Federal Housing
Administration financing and tax advantages. A tenant
may not be summarily evicted from a building
operated by a "private" corporation where the
corporation enjoyed substantial tax exemption and
had obtained an FHA-insured mortgage, with
governmental subsidies to reduce interest payments.
The "private" corporation was so saturated with
governmental incidents as to be limited in its practices
by constitutional process. Hence, it could not
terminate tenancies without notice and an opportunity
to be heard.
But we need nor rely on foreign jurisprudence to repudiate the
new majority ruling that due process restricts government
alone and not private employers like ISETANN. This Court has
always protected employees whenever they are dismissed for
an unjust cause by private employers. We have consistently
held that before dismissing an employee for a just cause, he
must be given notice and hearing by his private employer.
In Kingsize Manufacturing Corporation vs. NLRC,19 this Court,
thru Mr. Justice Mendoza, categorically ruled:
. . . (P)etitioners failure to give notice with warning to
the private respondents before their services were
terminated puts in grave doubt petitioners' claim that
dismissal was for a just cause. Section 2 Rule XIV of
the Rules implementing the Labor Code provides:
An employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating the
particular acts or omission constituting the
ground for dismissal. In case of
abandonment of work, the notice shall be
served on the worker's last known address.
The notice required, . . ., actually consists of two parts
to be separately served on the employee, to wit: (1)
notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which the dismissal is sought; and (2)
subsequent notice to inform him of the employer's
decision to dismiss him.
This requirement is not a mere technicality but a
requirement of due process to which every employee
is entitled to insure that the employer's prerogative to
dismiss or lay off is not abused or exercised in an
arbitrary manner. This rule is clear and unequivocal . .
. .20
In other words, we have long adopted in our decisions the
doctrine of private due process. This is as it ought to be. The
1987 Constitution guarantees the rights of workers, especially
the right to security of tenure in a separate article section 3
of Article XIII entitled Social Justice and Human Rights. Thus, a
20-20 vision of the Constitution will show that the more specific
rights of labor are not in the Bill of Rights which is historically
directed against government acts alone. Needless to state, the
constitutional rights of labor should be safeguarded against
assaults from both government and private parties. The
majority should not reverse our settled rulings outlawing
violations of due process by employers in just causes cases.
To prop up its new ruling against our employees, the majority
relates the evolution of our law on dismissal starting from
Article 302 of the Spanish Code of Commerce, to the New Civil
Code of 1950, to R.A. No. 1052 (Termination Pay Law), then to
R.A. No. 1787. To complete the picture, let me add that on May
1, 1974, the Labor Code (PD 442) was signed into law by
former President Marcos. It took effect on May 1, 1974 or six
months after its promulgation. The right of the employer to
terminate the employment was embodied in Articles
283,21 284,22 and 285.23 Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 which was
enacted on August 21, 1981 amended Articles 283 and 284,
which today are cited as Arts. 282 and 283 of the Labor
Code.24
On March 2, 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was approved which
amended, among others, Article 277 of the Labor Code.
Presently, Article 277 (b) reads:
Art. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. (a) . . . .
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of
workers to security of tenure and their right
to be protected against dismissal except for
a just or authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under
Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for
termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance
with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to the guidelines set
by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the
right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint
with the regional branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission. The burden of
proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause shall rest on the
employer. . . . .
Previous to the amendment, Article 277 (b) read:
Art. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. (a) . . . .
(b) With or without a collective agreement,
no employer may shut down his
establishment or dismiss or terminate the
employment of employees with at least one
year of service during the last two years,
whether such service is continuous or
broken, without prior written authority issued
in accordance with the rules and regulations
as the Secretary may promulgate.
Rule XIV, Book V of the 1997 Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code provides:
Termination of Employment
Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. No
worker shall be dismissed except for a just or
authorized cause provided by law and after due
process.
Sec. 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who
seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
notice stating the particular acts or omissions
constituting the grounds for his dismissal. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may
answer the allegations stated against him in the
notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so desires.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
These laws, rules and regulations should be related to our
decisions interpreting them. Let me therefore emphasize our
rulings holding that the pre-dismissal notice requirement is part
of due process. In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. vs. Court of Appeals,25 which was decided under the
provisions of RA No. 1052 as amended by RA No. 1787, this
Court ruled that "the failure of the employer to give the
[employee] the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed
constitute an infringement on his constitutional right to due
process of law and not to be denied the equal protection of the
laws. . . . Since the right of [an employee] to his labor is in itself
a property and that the labor agreement between him and [his
employer] is the law between the parties, his summary and
arbitrary dismissal amounted to deprivation of his property
without due process." Since then, we have consistently held
that before dismissing an employee for a just cause, he must
be given notice and hearing by his private employer as a
matter of due process.
I respectfully submit that these rulings are more in accord with
the need to protect the right of employees against illegal
dismissals. Indeed, our laws and our present Constitution are
more protective of the rights and interests of employees than
their American counterpart. For one, to justify private due
process, we need not look for the factors of "sufficient
governmental involvement" as American courts do. Article 1700
of our Civil Code explicitly provides:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are
not merely contractual. They are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts must yield to the
common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject
to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar
subjects.
Nor do we have to strain on the distinction made by American
courts between property and privilege and follow their ruling
that due process will not apply if what is affected is a mere
privilege. It is our hoary ruling that labor is property within the
contemplation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Thus, in Philippine Movie Pictures Workers Association
vs. Premiere Productions, Inc.,26 private respondent-employer
filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition
seeking authority to lay off forty-four of its employees. On the
date of the hearing of the petition, at the request of the counsel
of the private respondent, the judge of the CIR conducted an
ocular inspection in the premises of the employer. He
interrogated fifteen laborers. On the basis of the ocular
inspection, the judge concluded that the petition for lay off was
justified. We did not agree and we ruled that "the right of a
person to his labor is deemed to he property within the
meaning of constitutional guarantees. That is his means of
livelihood. He can not be deprived of his labor or work without
due process of law. . . . (T)here are certain cardinal primary
rights which the Court of Industrial Relations must respect in
the trial of every labor case. One of them is the right to a
hearing which includes the right of the party interested to
present his own case and to submit evidence in support
thereof."
I wish also to stress that the 1999 Rules and Regulations
implementing the Labor Code categorically characterize this
pre-dismissal notice requirement as a requirement of due
process. Rule XXIII provides:
Sec. 2. Standards of due process: requirements of
notice. In all cases of termination of employment,
the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed.
I. For termination of employment based on just
causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if the employee so desires, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present
his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on
the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstance,
grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be
served on the employee's last known address.
II. For termination of employment as based on
authorized causes defined in Article 283 of the Code,
the requirements of due process shall be deemed
complied with upon service of a written notice to the
employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the
Department at least thirty (30) days before the
effectivity of the termination, specifying the ground or
grounds for termination.
The new ruling of the majority is not in consonance with this
Rule XXIII.
If we are really zealous of protecting the rights of labor as
called for by the Constitution, we should guard against every
violation of their rights regardless of whether the government
or a private party is the culprit. Section 3 of Article XIII of the
Constitution requires the State to give full protection to labor.
We cannot be faithful to this duty if we give no protection to
labor when the violator of its rights happens to be private
parties like private employers. A private person does not have
a better right than the government to violate an employee's
right to due process. To be sure, violation of the particular right
of employees to security of tenure comes almost always from
their private employers. To suggest that we take mere geriatric
steps when it comes to protecting the rights of labor from
infringement by private parties is farthest from the intent of the
Constitution. We trivialize the right of the employee if we adopt
the rule allowing the employer to dismiss an employee without
any prior hearing and say let him be heard later on. To a
dismissed employee that remedy is too little and too late. The
new majority ruling is doubly to be regretted because it comes
at a time when deregulation and privatization are buzzwords in
the world being globalized. In such a setting, the new gods will
not be governments but non-governmental corporations. The
greater need of the day therefore is protection from illegal
dismissals sans due process by these non-governmental
corporations.
The majority also holds that the "third reason why the notice
requirement under Art. 283 is not a requirement of due process
is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an
impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the case in
termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 282."
Again, with due respect, I beg to disagree. In an Article 283
situation, dismissal due to an authorized cause, the employer
is not called upon to act as an impartial judge. The employer is
given the duty to serve a written notice on the worker and the
DOLE at least one month before the intended date of lay-off. It
is the DOLE, an impartial agency that will judge whether or not
the employee is being laid off for an authorized caused.27 It is
not the employer who will adjudge whether the alleged
authorized cause for dismissing the employee is fact or fiction.
On the other hand, in an Article 282 situation, dismissal for a
just cause, it is also incorrect to hold that an employer cannot
be an impartial judge. Today, the procedure on discipline and
dismissal of employees is usually defined in the parties'
collective bargaining agreement or in its absence, on the rules
and regulations made by the employer himself. This procedure
is carefully designed to be bias free for it is to the interest of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
both the employee and the employer that only a guilty
employee is disciplined or dismissed. Hence, where the charge
against an employee is serious, it is standard practice to
include in the investigating committee an employee
representative to assure the integrity of the process. In
addition, it is usual practice to give the aggrieved employee an
appellate body to review an unfavorable decision. Stated
otherwise, the investigators are mandated to act impartially for
to do otherwise can bring havoc less to the employee but more
to the employer. For one, if the integrity of the grievance
procedure becomes suspect, the employees may shun it and
instead resort to coercive measures like picketing and strikes
that can financially bleed employers. For another, a wrong,
especially a biased judgment can always be challenged in the
DOLE and the courts and can result in awards of huge
damages against the company. Indeed, the majority ruling that
an employer cannot act as an impartial judge has no empirical
evidence to support itself. Statistics in the DOLE will prove the
many cases won by employees before the grievance
committees manned by impartial judges of the company.
Next, the majority holds that "the requirement to hear an
employee before he is dismissed should be considered simply
as an application of the Justinian precept, embodied in the Civil
Code, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith toward one's fellowmen." It then rules
that violation of this norm will render the employer liable for
damages but will not render his act of dismissal void. Again, I
cannot join the majority stance. The faultline of this ruling lies
in the refusal to recognize that employer-employee relationship
is governed by special labor laws and not by the Civil Code.
The majority has disregarded the precept that relations
between capital and labor are impressed with public interest.
For this reason, we have the Labor Code that specially
regulates the relationship between employer-employee
including dismissals of employees. Thus, Article 279 of the
Labor Code specifically provides that "in cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to instatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement."
This provision of the Labor Code clearly gives the remedies
that an unjustly dismissed employee deserves. It is not the
Civil Code that is the source of his remedies.
The majority also holds that lack of notice in an Article 283
situation merely makes an employee dismissal "ineffectual" but
not illegal. Again, the ruling is sought to be justified by analogy
and our attention is called to Article 1592, in relation to Article
1191 of the Civil Code. It is contended that "under these
provisions, while the power to rescind is implied in reciprocal
obligations, nonetheless, in cases involving the sale of
immovable property, the vendor cannot rescind the contract
even though the vendee defaults in the payment of the price,
except by bringing an action in court or giving notice of
rescission by means of a notarial demand." The analogy of the
majority cannot be allowed both in law and in logic. The legal
relationship of an employer to his employee is not similar to
that of a vendor and a vendee. An employee suffers from a
distinct disadvantage in his relationship with an employer,
hence, the Constitution and our laws give him extra protection.
In contrast, a vendor and a vendee in a sale of immovable
property are at economic par with each other. To consider an
employer-employee relationship as similar to a sale of
commodity is an archaic abomination. An employer-employee
relationship involves the common good and labor cannot be
treated as a mere commodity. As well-stated by former
Governor General Leonard Wood in his inaugural message
before the 6th Philippine Legislature on October 27, 1922, "it is
opportune that we strive to impress upon all the people that
labor is neither a chattel nor a commodity, but human and must
be dealt with from the standpoint of human interests."
Next, the majority holds that under the Labor Code, only the
absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can
make the dismissal of an employee illegal. Quoting Article 279
which provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement.
it is then rationalized that "to hold that the employer's failure to
give notice before dismissing an employee . . . results in the
nullity of the dismissal would, in effect, be to amend Article 279
by adding another ground, for considering a dismissal illegal."
With due respect, the majority has misread Article 279. To start
with, the article is entitled "Security of Tenure" and therefore
protects an employee against dismissal not only for an unjust
cause but also for an unauthorized cause. Thus, the phrase
"unjustly dismissed" refers to employees who are dismissed
without just cause and to employees who are laid off without
any authorized cause. As heretofore shown, we have
interpreted dismissals without prior notice as illegal for violating
the right to due process of the employee. These rulings form
part of the law of the land and Congress was aware of them
when it enacted the Labor Code and when its implementing
rules and regulations were promulgated especially the rule
ordering employers to follow due process when dismissing
employees. Needless to state, it is incorrect for the majority to
urge that we are in effect amending Article 279.
In further explication of its ruling, the majority contends "what is
more, it would ignore the fact that under Art. 285, if it is the
employee who fails to give a written notice to the employer that
he is leaving the service of the latter, at least one month in
advance, his failure to comply with the legal requirement does
not result in making his resignation void but only in making him
liable for damages." Article 285(a) states: "An employee may
terminate without just cause the employee-employer
relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least
one (1) month in advance. The employer upon whom no such
notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages."
In effect, the majority view is that its new ruling puts at par both
the employer and the employee under Article 285, the
failure of an employee to pre-notify in writing his employer that
he is terminating their relationship does not make his walk-out
void; under its new ruling, the failure of an employer to pre-
notify an employee before his dismissal does not also render
the dismissal void. By this new ruling, the majority in a short
stroke has rewritten the law on dismissal and tampered its pro-
employee philosophy. Undoubtedly, Article 285 favors the
employee as it does not consider void his act of terminating his
employment relationship before giving the required notice. But
this favor given to an employee just like the other favors in the
Labor Code and the Constitution are precisely designed to
level the playing field between the employer and the employee.
It cannot be gainsaid that employees are the special subject of
solicitous laws because they have been and they continue to
be exploited by unscrupulous employers. Their exploitation has
resulted in labor warfare that has broken industrial peace and
slowed down economic progress. In the exercise of their
wisdom, the founding fathers of our 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions as well as the members our past and present
Congresses, have decided to give more legal protection and
better legal treatment to our employees in their relationship
with their employer. Expressive of this policy is President
Magsaysay's call that "he who has less in life should have
more in law." I respectfully submit that the majority cannot
revise our laws nor shun the social justice thrust of our
Constitution in the guise of interpretation especially when its
result is to favor employers and disfavor employees. The
majority talks of high nobility but the highest nobility it to stoop
down to reach the poor.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
IV. NO UNJUST RESULTS OF CONSIDERING
DISMISSALS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AS
ILLEGAL
The majority further justifies its new ruling by holding:
The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial
action taken by the employer to terminate
employment either for an authorized or just cause can
result in an injustice to the employer. For not having
been given notice and hearing before dismissing an
employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or
even of an attempt against the life of the employer, an
employer will be forced to keep in his employ such
guilty employee. This is unjust.
It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary
social economic force." But so does it declare that it
"recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investment." The Constitution
bids the State to "afford full protection to labor." But it
is equally true that "the law, in protecting the rights of
the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer." And it is oppression to
compel the employer to continue in employment one
who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in
operation when it is not economically in his interest to
do so.
With due respect, I cannot understand this total turn around of
the majority on the issue of the unjustness of lack of pre-
dismissal notice to an employee. Heretofore, we have always
considered this lack of notice as unjust to the employee. Even
under Article 302 of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1882
as related by the majority, an employer who opts to dismiss an
employee without any notice has to pay a mesada equivalent
to his salary for one month because of its unjustness. This
policy was modified by our legislators in favor of a more liberal
treatment of labor as our country came under the influence of
the United States whose major labor laws became the matrix
of our own laws like R.A. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. In accord with these laws, and as
aforediscussed, we laid down the case law that dismissals
without prior notice offend due process. This is the case law
when the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 and until
now despite its amendments. The 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions did not change this case law. So with the 1987
Constitution which even strengthened the rights of employees,
especially their right to security of tenure. Mr. Justice Laurel in
his usual inimitable prose expressed this shift in social policy in
favor of employees as follows:
It should be observed at the outset that our
Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging
unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from economic
and social distress which was threatening the stability
of governments the world over. Alive to the social and
economic forces at work, the framers of our
Constitution boldly met the problems and difficulties
which faced them and endeavored to crystallize, with
more or less fidelity, the political, social and economic
propositions of their age, and this they did, with the
consciousness that the political and philosophical
aphorism of their generation will, in the language of a
great jurist, "be doubted by the next and perhaps
entirely discarded by the third." (Chief Justice
Winslow in Gorgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.
W., 209). Embodying the spirit of the present epoch,
general provisions were inserted in the Constitution
which are intended to bring about the needed social
and economic equilibrium between component
elements of society through the application of what
may be termed as the justitia communis advocated by
Grotius and Leibnitz many years ago to be secured
through the counter-balancing of economic and social
forces and employers or landlords, and employees or
tenants, respectively; and by prescribing penalties for
the violation of the orders" and later, Commonwealth
Act No. 213, entitled "An Act to define and regulate
legitimate labor organizations."28
This ingrained social philosophy favoring employees has now
been weakened by the new ruling of the majority. For while this
Court has always considered lack of pre-dismissal notice as
unjust to employees, the new ruling of the majority now
declares it is unjust to employers as if employers are the ones
exploited by employees. In truth, there is nothing unjust to
employers by requiring them to give notice to their employees
before denying them their jobs. There is nothing unjust to the
duty to give notice for the duty is a reasonable duty. If the duty
is reasonable, then it is also reasonable to demand its
compliance before the right to dismiss on the part of an
employer can be exercised. If it is reasonable for an employer
to comply with the duty, then it can never be unjust if non-
compliance therewith is penalized by denying said employer
his right to dismiss. In fine, if the employer's right to dismiss an
employee is forfeited for his failure to comply with this simple,
reasonable duty to pre-notify his employee, he has nothing to
blame but himself. If the employer is estopped from litigating
the issue of whether or not he is dismissing his employee for a
just or an authorized cause, he brought the consequence on to
himself. The new ruling of the majority, however, inexplicably
considers this consequence as unjust to the employer and it
merely winks at his failure to give notice.
V. A LAST WORD
The new ruling of the majority erodes the sanctity of the most
important right of an employee, his constitutional right to
security of tenure. This right will never be respected by the
employer if we merely honor the right with a price tag. The
policy of "dismiss now and pay later" favors monied employers
and is a mockery of the right of employees to social justice.
There is no way to justify this pro-employer stance when the
1987 Constitution is undeniably more pro-employee than our
previous fundamental laws. Section 18 of Article II (State
Policies) provides that "the State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare." Section 1, Article XIII (Social Justice
and Human Rights) calls for the reduction of economic
inequalities. Section 3, Article XIII (Labor) directs the State to
accord full protection to labor and to guaranty security of
tenure. These are constitutional polestars and not mere works
of cosmetology. Our odes to the poor will be meaningless
mouthfuls if we cannot protect the employee's right to due
process against the power of the peso of employers.
To an employee, a job is everything. Its loss involves terrible
repercussions stoppage of the schooling of children,
ejectment from leased premises, hunger to the family, a life
without any safety net. Indeed, to many employees, dismissal
is their lethal injection. Mere payment of money by way of
separation pay and backwages will not secure food on the
mouths of employees who do not even have the right to
choose what they will chew.
I vote to grant the petition.
VITUG, J., separate (concurring and dissenting) opinion;
The lawful severance by an employer of an employer-
employee relationship would require a valid cause. There are,
under the Labor Code, two groups of valid causes, and these
are the just causes under Article 2821 and the authorized
causes under Article 2832 and Article 284.3
An employee whose employment is terminated for a just cause
is not entitled to the payment of separation
benefits.4 Separation pay would be due, however, when the
lay-off is on account of an authorized cause. The amount of
separation pay would depend on the ground for the termination
of employment. A lay-off due to the installation of a labor
saving device, redundancy (Article 283) or disease (Article
284), entitles the worker to a separation pay equivalent to "one
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
(1) month pay or at least one (1) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher." When the termination of
employment is due to retrenchment to prevent losses, or to
closure or cessation of operations of an establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay is only an equivalent of "one (1)
month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher." In the above instances, a
fraction of at least six (6) months is considered as one (1)
whole year.
Due process of law, in its broad concept, is a principle in our
legal system that mandates due protection to the basic rights,
inherent or accorded, of every person against harm or
transgression without an intrinsically just and valid law, as well
as an opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal, that
can warrant such an impairment. Due process guarantees
against arbitrariness and bears on both substance and
procedure. Substantive due process concerns itself with the
law, its essence, and its concomitant efficacy; procedural due
process focuses on the rules that are established in order to
ensure meaningful adjudications appurtenant thereto.
In this jurisdiction, the right to due process is constitutional and
statutory.
Due process in the context of a termination of employment,
particularly, would be two-fold, i.e., substantive due process
which is complied with when the action of the employer is
predicated on a just cause or an authorized cause, and
procedural due process which is satisfied when the employee
has the opportunity to contest the existence of the ground
invoked by the employer in terminating the contract of
employment and to be heard thereon. I find it difficult to ascribe
either a want of wisdom or a lack of legal basis to the early
pronouncements of this Court that sanction the termination of
employment when a just or an authorized cause to warrant the
termination is clearly extant. Regrettably, the Court in some of
those pronouncements has used, less than guarded in my
view, the term "due process" when referring to the notices
prescribed in the Labor Code5 and its implementing rules6 that
could, thereby, albeit unintendedly and without meaning to,
confuse the latter with the notice requirement in adjudicatory
proceedings. It is not seldom when the law puts up various
conditions in the juridical relations of parties; it would not be
accurate to consider, I believe, an infraction thereof to ipso-
facto raise a problem of due process. The mere failure of
notice of the dismissal or lay-off does not foreclose the right of
an employee from disputing the validity, in general, of the
termination of his employment, or the veracity, in particular, of
the cause that has been invoked in order to justify that
termination. In assailing the dismissal or lay-off, an employee
is entitled to be heard and to be given the corresponding due
notice of the proceedings. It would be when this right is
withheld without cogent reasons that, indeed, it can rightly be
claimed that the fundamental demands of procedural due
process have been unduly discarded.
I do appreciate the fact that the prescribed notices can have
consequential benefits to an employee who is dismissed or laid
off, as the case may be; its non-observance by an employer,
therefore, can verily entitle the employee to an award of
damage but, to repeat, not to the extent of rendering outrightly
illegal that dismissal or lay-off predicated on valid grounds. I
would consider the indemnification to the employee not a
penalty or a fine against the employer, the levy of either of
which would require an appropriate legislative enactment;
rather, I take the grant of indemnity as justifiable as an award
of nominal damages in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 2221-2223 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in
every obligation arising from any source enumerated
in article 1157, or in every case where any property
right has been invaded.
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall
preclude further contest upon the right involved and
all accessory questions, as between the parties to the
suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.
There is no fixed formula for determining the precise amount of
nominal damages. In fixing the amount of nominal damages to
be awarded, the circumstances of each case should thus be
taken into account, such as, to exemplify, the
(a) length of service or employment of the dismissed
employee;
(b) his salary or compensation at the time termination
of employment vis-a-vis the capability of the employer
to pay;
(c) question of whether the employer has deliberately
violated the requirements for termination of
employment or has attempted to comply, at least
substantially, therewith; and/or
(d) reasons for the termination of employment.
I might stress the rule that the award of nominal damages is
not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the
recognition and vindication of a right. The degree of recovery
therefor can depend, on the one hand, on the constitution of
the right, and, upon the other hand, on the extent and manner
by which that right is ignored to the prejudice of the holder of
that right.
In fine7
A. A just cause or an authorized cause and a written
notice of dismissal or lay-off, as the case may be, are
required concurrently but not really equipollent in their
consequence, in terminating an employer-employee
relationship.
B. Where there is neither just cause nor authorized
cause, the reinstatement of the employee and the
payment of back salaries would be proper and should
be decreed. If the dismissal or lay-off is attended by
bad faith or if the employer acted in wanton or
oppressive manner, moral and exemplary damages
might also be a warded. In this respect, the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are just due.
The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts,
the court may award exemplary damages if
the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner
(Civil Code).
Separation pay can substitute for reinstatement if
such reinstatement is not feasible, such as in case of
a clearly strained employer-employee relationship
(limited to managerial positions and contracts of
employment predicated on trust and confidence) or
when the work or position formerly held by the
dismissed employee plainly has since ceased to be
available.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
C. Where there is just cause or an authorized cause
for the dismissal or lay-off but the required written
notices therefor have not been properly observed by
an employer, it would neither be light and justifiable
nor likely intended by law to order either the
reinstatement of the dismissed or laid-off employee or
the payment of back salaries to him simply for the
lack of such notices if, and so long as, the employee
is not deprived of an opportunity to contest that
dismissal or lay-off and to accordingly be heard
thereon. In the termination of employment for an
authorized cause (this cause being attributable to the
employer), the laid-off employee is statutorily entitled
to separation pay, unlike a dismissal for a just cause
(a cause attributable to an employee) where no
separation pay is due. In either case, if an employer
fails to comply with the requirements of notice in
terminating the services of the employee, the
employer must be made to pay, as so hereinabove
expressed, corresponding damages to the employee.
WHEREFORE, I vote to hold (a) that the lay-off in the case at
bar is due to redundancy and that, accordingly, the separation
pay to petitioner should be increased to one month, instead of
one-half month, pay for every year of service, and (b) that
petitioner is entitled to his unpaid wages, proportionate 13th-
month pay, and an indemnity of P10,000.00 in keeping with the
nature and purpose of, as well as the rationale behind, the
grant of nominal damages.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
In the case before us, the Court is unanimous in at least two
findings: (1) petitioner's dismissal was due to an authorized
cause, redundancy; and (2) petitioner was notified of his
dismissal only on the very day his employment was terminated.
The contentious issue arising out of these two findings is as
follows: What is the legal effect and the corresponding sanction
for the failure of the employer to give the employee and the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the 30-day
notice of termination required under Article 283 of the Labor
Code?
During the last ten (10) years, the Court has answered the
foregoing question by ruling that the dismissal should be
upheld although the employee should be given "indemnity or
damages" ranging from P1,000 to P10,000 depending on the
circumstances.
The present ponencia of Mr. Justice Mendoza holds that "the
termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual
and the [employee] should be paid back wages" from the time
of his dismissal until the Court finds that the dismissal was for
a just cause.
Reexamination of the "Indemnity Only" Rule
I am grateful that the Court has decided to reexamine our ten-
year doctrine on this question and has at least, in the process,
increased the monetary award that should go to the dismissed
employee from a nominal sum in the concept "indemnity or
damages" to "full back wages." Shortly after my assumption of
office on October 10, 1995, I already questioned this practice
of granting "indemnity only" to employees who were dismissed
for cause but without due process.1 I formally registered
reservations on this rule in my ponencia in MGG Marine
Services v. NLRC2 and gave it full discussion in my Dissents
in Better Buildings v. NLRC3 and in Del Val v. NLRC.4
Without in any way diminishing my appreciation of this
reexamination and of the more financially-generous treatment
the Court has accorded labor, I write to take issue with the
legal basis of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, in
arriving at his legal conclusion that "the employer's failure to
comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial
of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for
the termination of employment which makes the termination of
employment merely ineffectual." In short, he believes that (1)
the 30-day notice requirement finds basis only in the Labor
Code, and (2) the sanction for its violation is only "full back
wages."
With due respect, I submit the following counter-arguments:
(1) The notice requirement finds basis not only in the
Labor Code but, more important, in the due process
clause of the Constitution.
(2) Consequently, when the employee is dismissed
without due process, the legal effect is an illegal
dismissal and the appropriate sanction is full back
wages plus reinstatement, not merely full back wages.
It is jurisprudentially settled, as I will show presently,
that when procedural due process is violated, the
proceedings in this case, the dismissal will be
voided, and the parties will have to be returned to
their status quo ante; that is, the employee will have
to be given back his old job and paid all benefits as if
he were never dismissed.
(3) In any event, contrary to Mr. Justice Mendoza's
premise, even the Labor Code expressly grants the
dismissed employee not only the right to be notified
but also the right to be heard.
In short, when an employee is dismissed without notice and
hearing, the effect is an illegal dismissal and the appropriate
reliefs are reinstatement and full back wages. In ruling that the
dismissal should be upheld, the Court majority has virtually
rendered nugatory the employee's right to due process as
mandated by law and the Constitution. It implicitly allows the
employer to simply ignore such right and to just pay the
employee. While it increases the payment to "full back wages,"
it doctrinally denigrates his right to due process to a mere
statutory right to notice.
Let me explain the foregoing by starting with a short
background of our jurisprudence on the right to due process.
Without Due Process, the Proceedings Are Illegal
In the past, this Court has untiringly reiterated that there are
two essential requisites for an employer's valid termination of
an employee's services: (1) a just5 or authorized6 cause and (2)
due process.7 During the last ten years, the Court has been
quite firm in this doctrinal concept, but it has been less than
consistent in declaring the illegality of a dismissal when due
process has not been observed. This is particularly noticeable
in the relief granted. Where there has been no just or
authorized cause, the employee is awarded reinstatement or
separation pay, and back wages.8 If only the second requisite
(due process) has not been fulfilled, the employee, as earlier
stated, is granted indemnity or damages amounting to a
measly P1,000 up to P10,000.9
I respectfully submit that illegal dismissal results not only from
the absence of a legal cause (enumerated in Arts. 282 to 284
of the Labor Code), but likewise from the failure to observe due
process. Indeed, many are the cases, labor or otherwise, in
which acts violative of due process are unequivocally voided or
declared illegal by the Supreme Court. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. v. NLRC,10 the Court categorically ruled that the failure of
management to comply with the requirements of due process
made its judgment of dismissal "void and non-existent."
This Court in People v. Bocar 11 emphatically made the
following pronouncement, which has been reiterated in several
cases:12
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation
of basis constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus the violation of the State's right to
due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
(Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-
30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot
be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregarded of the
right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs.
Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell
Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27,
1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
"lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head"
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
In the earlier case Bacus v. Ople,13 this Court also nullified the
then labor minister's clearance to terminate the employment of
company workers who had supposedly staged an illegal strike.
The reason for this ruling was the denial of sufficient
opportunity for them to present their evidence and prove their
case. The Court explained:14
A mere finding of the illegality of a strike should not be
automatically followed by a wholesale dismissal of the
strikers from their employment. What is more, the
finding of the illegality of the strike by respondent
Minister of Labor and Employment is predicated on
the evidence ascertained through an irregular
procedure conducted under the semblance of
summary methods and speedy disposition of labor
disputes involving striking employees.
While it is true that administrative agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidities of
procedure, it is equally well-settled in this jurisdiction
that avoidance of such technicalities of law or
procedure in ascertaining objectively the facts in each
case should not, however, cause a denial of due
process. The relative freedom of the labor arbiter from
the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade
what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due
process.
In the said case, the respondent company was ordered to
reinstate the dismissed workers, pending a hearing "giving
them the opportunity to be heard and present their evidence."
In Philippine National Bank v. Apalisok,15 Primitivo Virtudazo,
an employee of PNB, was served a Memorandum stating the
finding against him of a prima facie case for dishonesty and
violation of bank rules and regulations. He submitted his
Answer denying the charges and explaining his defenses.
Later, two personnel examiners of the bank conducted a fact-
finding investigation. They stressed to him that a formal
investigation would follow, in which he could confront and
examine the witnesses for the bank, as well as present his
own. What followed, however, was a Memorandum notifying
him that he had been found guilty of the charges and that he
was being dismissed. After several futile attempts to secure a
copy of the Decision rendered against him, he instituted
against PNB a Complaint for illegal dismissal and prayed for
reinstatement and damages.
The trial court held that Virtudazo had been deprived of his
rights to be formally investigated and to cross-examine the
witnesses. This Court sustained the trial court, stating
resolutely: "The proceedings having been conducted without
according to Virtudazo the "cardinal primary rights of due
process" guaranteed to every party in an administrative or
quasi-judicial proceeding, said proceedings must be
pronounced null and void."16
Also in Fabella v. Court of Appeals,17 this Court declared the
dismissal of the schoolteachers illegal, because the
administrative body that heard the charges against them had
not afforded them their right to procedural due process. The
proceedings were declared void, and the orders for their
dismissal set aside. We unqualifiedly reinstated the
schoolteachers, to whom we awarded all monetary benefits
that had accrued to them during the period of their unjustified
suspension or dismissal.
In People v. San Diego,18 People v. Sola,19 People
v. Dactrdao,20 People v. Calo Jr.21 and People v. Burgos,22 this
Court similarly voided the trial court's grant of bail to the
accused upon a finding that the prosecution had been deprived
of procedural due process.
In People v. Sevilleno,23 the Court noted that the trial judge
"hardly satisfied the requisite searching inquiry" due the
accused when he pleaded guilty to the capital offense he had
been charged with. We thus concluded that "the accused was
not properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation leveled against him."
Because of the nonobservance of "the fundamental
requirements of fairness and due process," the appealed
Decision was annulled and set aside, and the case was
remanded for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused.
Recently, the Court vacated its earlier Decision24 in People v.
Parazo25 upon realizing that the accused "a deaf-mute, a
mental retardate, whose mental age [was] only seven (7) years
and nine (9) months, and with low IQ of 60 only" had not
been ably assisted by a sign language expert during his
arraignment and trial. Citing People v. Crisologo,26 we ruled
that the accused had been deprived of "a full and fair trial and
a reasonable opportunity to defend himself." He had in effect
been denied his fundamental right to due process of law.
Hence, we set aside the trial proceedings and granted the
accused a re-arraignment and a retrial.
Of late, we also set aside a Comelec Resolution disallowing
the use by a candidate of a certain nickname for the purpose of
her election candidacy. The Resolution was issued pursuant to
a letter-petition which was passed upon by the Comelec
without affording the candidate the opportunity to explain her
side and to counter the allegations in said letter-petition. In
invalidating the said Resolution, we again underscored the
necessity of the observance of the twin requirements of notice
and hearing before any decision can be validly rendered in a
case.27
Clearly deducible from our extant jurisprudence is that the
denial of a person's fundamental right to due process amounts
to the illegality of the proceedings against him. Consequently,
he is brought back to his status quo ante, not merely awarded
nominal damages or indemnity.
Our labor force deserves no less. Indeed, the State recognizes
it as its primary social economic force,28 to which it is
constitutionally mandated to afford full protection.29 Yet,
refusing to declare the illegality of dismissals without due
process, we have continued to impose upon the erring
employer the simplistic penalty of paying indemnity only.
Hence, I submit that it is time for us to denounce these
dismissals as null and void and to grant our workers these
proper reliefs: (1) the declaration that the termination or
dismissal is illegal and unconstitutional and (2) the
reinstatement of the employee plus full back wages. The
present ruling of the Court is manifestly inconsistent with
existing prudence which holds that proceedings held without
notice and hearing are null and void, since they amount to a
violation of due process, and therefore bring back the parties to
the status quo ante.
Exception: When Due Process Is Impractical and Futile
I am fully aware that in a long line of cases starting
with Wenphil v. NLRC,30 the Court has held: where there is just
cause for the dismissal of an employee but the employer fails
to follow the requirements of procedural due process, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
former is not entitled to back wages, reinstatement (or
separation pay in case reinstatement is no longer feasible) or
other benefits. Instead, the employee is granted an indemnity
(or penalty or damages) ranging from P1,00031 to as much as
P10,000,32 depending on the circumstances of the case and
the gravity of the employer's omission. Since then, Wenphil
has perfunctorily been applied in most subsequent
cases33 involving a violation of due process (although just
cause has been duly proven), without regard for the peculiar
factual milieu of each case. Indemnity or damages has become
an easy substitute for due process.
Be it remembered, however, that the facts in Wenphil clearly
showed the impracticality and the futility of observing the
procedure laid down by law and by the Constitution for
terminating employment. The employee involved therein
appeared to have exhibited a violent temper and caused
trouble during office hours. In an altercation with a co-
employee, he "slapped [the latter's] cap, stepped on his foot
and picked up the ice scooper and brandished it against [him]."
When summoned by the assistant manager, the employee
"shouted and uttered profane words" instead of giving an
explanation. He was caught virtually in flagrante delicto in the
presence of many people. Under the circumstances action was
necessary to preserve order and discipline, as well as to
safeguard the customers' confidence in the employer's
business a fastfood chain catering to the general public
where courtesy is a prized virtue.
However, in most of the succeeding cases, including the
present one before us in which the petitioner was dismissed on
the very day he was served notice, there were ample
opportunities for the employers to observe the requisites of due
process. There were no exigencies that called for immediate
response. And yet, Wenphil was instantly invoked and due
process brushed aside.
I believe that the price that the Court has set for the
infringement of the fundamental right to due process is too
insignificant, too niggardly, and sometimes even too late. I
believe that imposing a stiffer sanction is the only way to
emphasize to employers the extreme importance of the right to
due process in our democratic system. Such right is too sacred
to be taken for granted or glossed over in a cavalier fashion. To
hold otherwise, as by simply imposing an indemnity or even
"full back wages," is to allow the rich and powerful to virtually
purchase and to thereby stifle a constitutional right granted to
the poor and marginalized.
It may be asked: If the employee is guilty anyway, what
difference would it make if he is fired without due process? By
the same token, it may be asked: If in the end, after due
hearing, a criminal offender is found guilty anyway, what
difference would it make if he is simply penalized immediately
without the trouble and the expense of trial? The absurdity of
this argument is too apparent to deserve further discourse.34
Worker's Right to Notice Is Constitutional, Not Merely Statutory
According to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Mendoza, the
"violation of the notice requirement cannot be considered a
denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's
dismissal or lay-off." He argues that the due process clause of
the Constitution may be used against the government only.
Since the Labor Code does not accord employees the right to
a hearing, ergo, he concludes, they do not have the right to
due process.
I disagree. True, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza,
traditional doctrine holds that constitutional rights may be
invoked only against the State. This is because in the past,
only the State was in a position to violate these rights,
including the due process clause. However, with the advent of
liberalization, deregulation and privatization, the State tended
to cede some of its powers to the "market forces." Hence,
corporate behemoths and even individuals may now be
sources of abuses and threats to human rights and liberties. I
believe, therefore, that such traditional doctrine should be
modified to enable the judiciary to cope with these new
paradigms and to continue protecting the people from new
forms of abuses.34-a
Indeed the employee is entitled to due process not because of
the Labor code, but because of the Constitution. Elementary is
the doctrine that constitutional provisions are deemed written
into every statute, contract or undertaking. Worth noting is that
"[o]ne's employment, profession, trade or calling is a property
right within the protection of the constitutional guaranty of due
process of law."35
In a long line of cases involving judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative proceedings, some of which I summarized
earlier, the Court has held that the twin requirements of notice
and hearing (or, at the very least, an opportunity to be heard)
constitute the essential elements of due process. In labor
proceedings, both are the conditio sine qua non for a dismissal
to be validly effected.36 The perceptive Justice Irene Cortes has
aptly stated: "One cannot go without the other, for otherwise
the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal."37
Even the Labor Code Grants the Right to a Hearing
Besides, it is really inaccurate to say that the Labor Code
grants "notice alone" to employees being dismissed due to an
authorized cause. Article 277 (b)38 of the said Code explicitly
provides that the termination of employment by the employer is
"subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of
tenure[;] . . . without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written
notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard . . . ."
Significantly, the provision requires the employer "to afford [the
employee] ample opportunity to be heard" when the
termination is due to a "just and authorized cause." I submit
that this provision on "ample opportunity to be heard" applies
to dismissals under Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor
Code.
In addition, to say that the termination is "simply ineffectual" for
failure to comply with the 30-day written notice and, at the
same time, to conclude that it has "legal effect" appears to be
contradictory. Ineffectual means "having no legal force."39 If a
dismissal has no legal force or effect, the consequence should
be the reinstatement of the dismissed employee and the grant
of full back wages thereto, as provided by law not the latter
only. Limiting the consequence merely to the payment of full
back wages has no legal or statutory basis. No provision in the
Labor Code or any other law authorizes such limitation of
sanction, which Mr. Justice Mendoza advocates.
The majority contends that it is not fair to reinstate the
employee, because the employer should not be forces to
accommodate an unwanted worker. I believe however that it is
not the Court that forces the employer to rehire the worker. By
violating the latter's constitutional right to due process, the
former brings this sanction upon itself. Is it unfair to imprison a
criminal? No! By violating the law, one brings the penal
sanction upon oneself. There is nothing unfair or unusual about
this inevitable chain of cause and effect, of crime and
punishment, of violation and sanction.
Due Process Begins With Each of Us
To repeat, due process begins with the employer, not with the
labor tribunals. An objective reading of the Bill of Rights clearly
shows that the due process protection is not limited to
government action alone. The Constitution does not say that
the right cannot be claimed against private individuals and
entities. Thus, in PNB v. Apalisok, which I cited earlier, this
Court voided the proceedings conducted by petitioner bank
because of its failure to observe Apalisok's right to due
process.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Truly, justice is dispensed not just by the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies like public respondent here. The administration
of justice begins with each of us, in our everyday dealings with
one another and, as in this case, in the employers' affording
their employees the right to be heard. If we, as a people and as
individuals, cannot or will not deign to act with justice and
render unto everyone his or her due in little, everyday things,
can we honestly hope and seriously expect to do so when
monumental, life-or-death issues are at stake? Unless each
one is committed to a faithful observance of day-to-day
fundamental rights, our ideal of a just society can never be
approximated, not to say attained.
In the final analysis, what is involved here is not simply the
amount of monetary award, whether insignificant or
substantial; whether termed indemnity, penalty or "full back
wages." Neither is it merely a matter of respect for workers'
rights or adequate protection of labor. The bottom line is really
the constitutionally granted right to due process. And due
process is the very essence of justice itself. Where the rule of
law is the bedrock of our free society, justice is its very
lifeblood. Denial of due process is thus no less than a denial of
justice itself.
In Addition to Reinstatement and Back Wages, Damages May
Be Awarded
One last point. Justice Vitug argues in his Separate Opinion
that the nonobservance of the prescribed notices "can verily
entitle the employee to an award of damages but . . . not to the
extent of rendering outrightly illegal that dismissal or lay-
off . . . ." I, of course, disagree with him insofar as he denies
the illegality of the dismissal, because as I already explained, a
termination without due process is unconstitutional and illegal.
But I do agree that, where the employee proves the presence
of facts showing liability for damages (moral, exemplary, etc.)
as provided under the Civil Code, the employee could be
entitled to such award in addition to reinstatement and back
wages. For instance, where the illegal dismissal has caused
the employee "physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury" due to the
bad faith of the employer, an award for moral damages would
be proper, in addition to reinstatement and back wages.
Summary
To conclude, I believe that even if there may be a just or an
authorized cause for termination but due process is absent, the
dismissal proceedings must be declared null and void. The
dismissal should still be branded as illegal. Consequently, the
employee must be reinstated and given full back wages.
On the other hand, there is an exception. The employer can
adequately prove that under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, there was no opportunity to comply with due process
requirements; or doing so would have been impractical or
gravely adverse to the employer, as when the employee is
caught in flagrante delicto. Under any of these circumstances,
the dismissal will not be illegal and no award may properly be
granted. Nevertheless, as a measure of compassion, the
employee may be given a nominal sum depending on the
circumstances, pursuant to Article 2221 of the Civil Code.
Depending on the facts of each case, damages as provided
under applicable articles of the Civil Code may additionally be
awarded.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition. Ruben Serrano
should be REINSTATED and PAID FULL BACK WAGES from
date of termination until actual reinstatement, plus all benefits
he would have received as if he were never dismissed.
Footnotes
1
TSN of testimony of petitioner, pp. 24, 76-78, April 24, 1992.
2
Petitioner's Position Paper, Annex C; Records, p. 19.
3
Id., Annex B; id., p. 21.
4
Records, p. 2.
5
Decision, dated April 30, 1993, of Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu.
Petition, Annex A; Rollo, p. 30.
6
Id., pp. 35-36.
7
Petition, p. 10; id., p. 16.
8
21 SCRA 652 (1992).
9
Id., at 662.
10
G.R. No. 131108, March 25, 1999.
11
Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., 39
SCRA 276, 284-285 (1971).
12
Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 131108, March 25, 1999.
13
TSN, p. 61, April 24, 1992.
14
CONST., ART. XIII, 3.
15
E.g., Aurora Land Projects Corporation v. NLRC., 266 SCRA 48
(1997).
16
248 SCRA 532 (1995).
17
This provision reads:
Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes.
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work:
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
18
Bk. VI, Rule 1, of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations to Implement
the Labor Code provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 2. Security of tenure . . . .
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards
of due process shall be substantially observed.
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in
Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with
the assistance of counsel if he so desires, is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence
presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify his termination.
For termination of employment as defined in Article 283 of the Labor
Code, the requirement of due process shall be deemed complied with
upon service of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate
Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment at least
thirty days before effectivity of the termination, specifying the ground or
grounds for termination . . .
xxx xxx xxx
19
Sebuguero v. NLRC, 248 SCRA at 547.
20
170 SCRA 69 (1989).
21
Id., at 75-76.
22
E.g., Aurelio v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 432 (1993) (dismissal of a
managerial employee for breach of trust); Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v.
NLRC, 183 SCRA 421 (1990) (dismissal for absenteeism, leaving the
work place without notice, tampering with machines); Shoemart, Inc. v.
NLRC, 176 SCRA 385 (1989) (dismissal for abandonment of work).
23
Sebuguero v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 536 (1995) (termination of
employment due to retrenchment).
24
E.g., Worldwide papermills, Inc. v. NLRC, 244 SCRA 125 (1995)
(dismissal for gross and habitual neglect of duties).
25
E.g., Reta v. NLRC, 232 SCRA 613 (1994) (dismissal for negligence
and insubordination).
26
110 Phil. 113, 118 (1960).
27
138 SCRA 166, 170 (1985).
28
Art. 302 of the Code of Commerce provided:
In cases in which no special time is fixed in the contracts of service,
any one of the parties thereto may dissolve it, advising the other party
thereof one month in advance.
The factory or shop clerk shall be entitled, in such case, to the salary
due for said month.
29
R.A. No. 1052, as amended by R.A. No. 1787, provide:
Sec. 1. In cases of employment without a determine period, in a
commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment or enterprises, the
employer or the employee may terminate at any time the employment
with just cause; or without just cause in the case of an employee by
serving written notice on the employer at least one month in advance,
or in the case of an employer by serving such notice to the employee
at least one month in advance or one-half month for every year of
service of the employee, whichever is longer, a fraction of at least six
months being considered as one whole year.
The employer, upon whom no such notice was served in case of
termination of employment without just cause shall be entitled to
compensation from the date of termination of his employment in an
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

amount equivalent to his salaries or wages corresponding to the P1,000.00; Aurelio v. NLRC, G.R. No. 99034, 12 April 1993, 221 SCRA
required period of notice. 432 The managerial employee breached the trust and confidence of
30
Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp. 110 Phil. 198 (1960); Malate Taxicab his employer but for failure to observe the notice requirement the
and Garage, Inc. v. CIR, 99 Phil. 41 (1956). company was fined P1,000.00; Worldwide Papermills Inc. v. NLRC,
31
71 SCRA 470, 480 (1976). G.R. No. 113081, 12 May 1995, 244 SCRA 125 The employee was
32
77 SCRA 321 (1977). found guilty of gross and habitual neglect of his duties and of
33
CIVIL CODE, ART. 19. excessive absences. For failure to comply with the notice requirement
34
Art. 1191: "The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal the company was fined P5,000.00; Reta v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112100, 27
ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is May 1994, 232 SCRA 613 The employee was guilty of inefficiency
incumbent upon him. . . . . negligence and insubordination but the company was fined P10,000.00
Art. 1592: "In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have for failure to observe the notice requirement.1wphi1.nt
25
been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed Sebuguero v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115394, 27 September 1995, 248
upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee SCRA 532 The employees were retrenched in order to prevent
may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand further losses but the company failed to observe the notice
for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially requirement, hence was fined P2,000.00 for each employee;
or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a Balbalec et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107756, 19 December 1995, 251
new term. SCRA 398 The employees were retrenched to prevent business
35
De la Cruz v. Legaspi, 98 Phil. 43 (1955); Taguba v. Vda. de Leon, losses but the company was fined P5,000.00 for each employee for
132 SCRA 722 (1984). failure to observe the notice requirement.
36 26
See Maximo v. Fabian, G.R. No. L-8015, December 23, 1955, See Note 21.
(unpub.), 98 Phil. 989. PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;
37 1
Emphasis added. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 1991 ed., p. 224 citing Painter v.
38
Art. 285 reads: Liverpool Gas Co., 3 Ad. & E I. 433, 449, 11 Eng. Rep. 478 (K. B.
Termination by employee. (a) An employee may terminate without 1836).
2
just cause the employee-employer relationship by serving a written Kingsize Manufacturing Corp. vs. NLRC, 238 SCRA 349 (1994).
3
notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. The Ibid.
4
employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the 170 SCRA 69.
5
employee liable for damages. 248 SCRA 532, 545 (1995).
6
(b) An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any Ibid., p. 546.
7
notice on the employer for any of the following just causes: Op cit., p. 76.
8
1. Serious insult by the employer of his representative on the honor Op cit., pp. 74-75.
9
and person of the employee; Op cit., p. 76.
10
2. Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the TSN, August 4, 1992, pp. 30, 37-38, 42-49.
11
employer or his representative; A fifth authorized cause is "disease of the employee" provided in
3. Commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his Article 284 of the Code.
12
representative against the person of the employee or any of the Sebuguero, supra.
13
immediate members of his family; and International Hardware, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
4. Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing. 176 SCRA 256, 259 (1989).
39 14
210 SCRA 277 (1992). Sebuguero v. NLRC, supra.
40 15
Art, II, 18. Wiltshire File Co. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 665, 676 (1991).
41 16
Id., 20. Balbalec v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 398, 406 (1995).
42 17
Art. XIII, 3. 110 Phil 113 (1960).
43 18
Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil, 485, 487 (1940) Schwartz, op cit., pp. 273-274.
19
(per Laurel, J.) Accord, Villanueva v. NLRC, 293 SCRA 259 (1998); DI Supra.
20
Security and General Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 458 (1996); See also JGB and Associates, Inc. vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 457 (1996);
Flores v. NLRC, 256 SCRA 735 (1996); San Miguel Corporation v. Philippine Savings Bank v. NLRC, 261 SCRA 409 (1996); Pasudeco
NLRC, 218 SCRA 293 (1993); Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Inc. vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 737 (1997); P.I. Manpower, Inc. vs. NLRC,
Ople, 163 SCRA 323 (1988). 267 SCRA 451 (1997); Canura v. NLRC, 279 SCRA 45 (1997);
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. NLRC, 287 SCRA 213 (1998);
BELLOSILLO, J., separate opinion; Mabuhay Development Industries vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 1 (1998),
1
G.R. No. 130866 16 September 1998, 295 SCRA 494. all ponencias of Mr. Justice Mendoza.
2 21
Exh. "B," Records, p. 21. Art. 283. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an
3
Rollo, p. 63. employment without a definite period for any of the following just
4
Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. causes:
115395, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA 536; Almodiel v. National (a) The closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 100641, 14 June 1993, 223 enterprise, or where the employer has to reduce his work force by
SCRA 341. more then one-half (1/2) due to serious business reverses, unless the
5
De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
101539, 4 September 1992, 213 SCRA 652, 662. chapter;
6
G.R. No. 73287, 18 May 1987, 149 SCRA 641. (b) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
7
Art. XIII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution, reiterated in Art. 3, Labor Code. orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
8
Art. 3, Labor Code. (c) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
9
Alcantara, Samson S., Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation, (d) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
1993 Ed., p. 347. by his employer or representative;
10
Art. 227, Labor Code. (e) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
11
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee representative; and
due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, (f) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
22
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. The termination of employment
of the establishment or undertaking . . . by serving a written notice on of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices,
the worker and the Ministry of Labor and employment at least one (1) redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, and other similar causes,
month before the intended date thereof. . . . shall entitle the employee affected thereby to separation pay . . . .
12 23
Sec. 1. Art. III, 1987 Constitution. Art. 285. Disease as a ground for termination. An employer may
13
Fernando, Enrique M., The Bill of Rights, 1972, ed., p. 71. terminate the services of an employee who have been found to be
14
Id., p. 78. suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
15
Id., pp. 80-81. prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health
16
Id., p. 94. of his co-employees . . . .
17 24
Id., p. 96. The adjustment of the numbering of the Articles is due to the fact that
18
69 Phil. 635 (1940). there are two (2) Article 238.
19 25
G.R. No. 117565, 18 November 1997, 282 SCRA 146-147. 71 SCRA 470 (1976).
20 26
G.R. No. 80587, 8 February 1989, 170 SCRA 69. 92 Phil. 843 (1953).
21 27
G.R. No. 115394, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA 535. International Hardware, Inc. vs. NLRC, 176 SCRA 256 (1989);
22
G.R. No. 122666, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 379. Sebuguero v. NLRC, supra.
23 28
G.R. No. 116473, 12 September 1997, 279 SCRA 45. Concurring opinion in Ang Tibay et al. vs. Court of Industrial
24
Shoemart, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 74229, 11 August 1989, 176 Relations, et al., 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
SCRA 385 The employee was found to have abandoned his job but VITUG, J., separate (concurring and dissenting) opinion;
1
for failure to observe the notice requirement, the employer was fined Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an
P1,000.00; Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Alonzo, G.R. No. 78090, 26 July 1991, employment for any of the following causes:
199 SCRA 617 The employee violated company rules and
regulations but because of procedural lapse the company was fined
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
2
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to
the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on
the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to
the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker
affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at
least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall
be considered one (1) whole year.
3
Art. 284. Disease as ground for termination. An employer may
terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be
suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health
of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay
equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
4
See San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 255 SCRA 580. Section 7,
Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides:
Sec. 7. Termination of employment by employer. The just causes for
terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided in
Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an employee for a
just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in Code,
without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges
he may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining
agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.
5
See Footnote 2.
6 10
Sec. 1, Rule XXIII, of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code clearly
states that "(i)n cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for just or authorized
causes as provided by law, and subject to the requirements of due
process.
Sec. 2, I, of the same Rule provides that in case of termination of
employment based on just causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
is it required that there be
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned,
with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the
evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify his termination.
In cases of termination based on authorized causes under Article 283
of the Labor Code, Section 2, II, of the same Rule mandates that there
be "a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional
Office of the Department (of Labor and Employment) at least thirty
days before the effectivity of the termination," specifying the ground/s
therefor.
7 30
See MGG Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
1
See Panganiban, Battles in the Supreme Court, 1998 ed., p. 155 et
seq.
2
259 SCRA 665, July 29, 1996.
3
283 SCRA 242, December 15, 1997. In that case, I proposed to grant
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement because, by the employee's
acts, he had made reinstatement improper, a fact not present in the
instant case.
4
296 SCRA 283, September 28, 1998.
5
Art. 282 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
6
Arts. 283 & 284 provide:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to
the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation or operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on
the workers and the [Department] of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination
due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the
worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent
to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for
every year of service whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to
prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishments or undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
month pay or to as least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall
be considered one (1) whole year.
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination. An employer may
terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be
suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health
of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay
equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, whichever is greater a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
7
Mapalo v. NLRC, 233 SCRA 266, June 17, 1994; Ala Mode
Garments, Inc. v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 497, February 17, 1997; Pizza
Hut/Progressive Development Corp. v. NLRC, 252 SCRA 531, January
29, 1996; MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664, July
29, 1996; Ranises v. NLRC, 262 SCRA 671, September 24, 1996.
8
Conti v. NLRC, 271 SCRA 114, April 10, 1997; Alhambra Industries,
Inc. v. NLRC, 238 SCRA 232, November 18, 1994; JBG and
Associates, Inc. v. NLRC, 254 SCRA 457, March 7, 1996; Samillano v.
NLRC, 265 SCRA 788, December 23, 1996.
9
Alhambra Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, ibid.; Segismundo v. NLRC, 239
SCRA 167, December 13, 1994; Sebuguero v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 532,
September 27, 1995; Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69, February
8, 1989.
210 SCRA 277, 286, June 23, 1992, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
11
138 SCRA 166, 170-171, August 16, 1985, per Makasiar, CJ.
12
Among those are Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, 87,
September 12, 1986; People v. Albano, 163 SCRA 511, July 26, 1988;
Saldana v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 396, 403, October 11, 1990;
Paulin v. Gimenez, 217 SCRA 386, 392, January 21, 1993.
13
132 SCRA 690, October 23, 1984, per Cuevas, J.
14
Ibid., p. 703.
15
199 SCRA 92, July 12, 1991, per Narvasa, J., (later CJ).
16
Ibid., p. 101.
17
282 SCRA 256, November 28, 1997.
18
26 SCRA 252, December 24, 1968.
19
103 SCRA 393, March 17, 1981.
20
170 SCRA 489, February 21, 1989.
21
186 SCRA 620, June 18, 1990.
22
200 SCRA 67, August 2, 1991.
23
G.R. No. 129058, March 29, 1999, per Bellosillo, J.
24
G.R. No, 121176, May 14, 1997.
25
July 8, 1999 Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, per
Purisima, J.
26
150 SCRA 653, 656, June 17, 1987, per Padilla, J.
27
Villasora v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133927, November 29, 1999.
28
18, Art II, 1987 Constitution.
29
3, Art. XIII, ibid.
170 SCRA 69, February 8, 1989, per Gancayco, J.
31
In Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, ibid.; Sampaguita Garments Corp. v.
NLRC, 233 SCRA 260, June 17, 1994; Villarama v. NLRC, 236 SCRA
280, September 2, 1994; Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, 183
SCRA 421, March 21, 1990; Kwikway Engineering Works v. NLRC,
195 SCRA 526, March 22, 1991, and several other cases.
32
In Reta v. NLRC, 232 SCRA 613, May 27, 1994; and Alhambra
Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, 238 SCRA 232, November 18, 1994.
33
Seahorse Maritime Corp. v. NLRC, 173 SCRA 390, May 15, 1989;
Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, supra; Cario v. NLRC, 185 SCRA
177, May 8, 1990; Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp. v. NLRC, 187
SCRA 694, July 23, 1990; Cathedral School of Technology v. NLRC,
214 SCRA 551, October 13, 1992; Aurelio v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 432,
April 12, 1993; Sampaguita Garments Corp. v. NLRC, 233 SCRA 260,
June 17, 1994; Villarama v. NLRC, supra.
34
See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Better Buildings, Inc. v.
NLRC, 283 SCRA 242, 256, December 15, 1997.
34-a
See Panganiban, Leadership by Example, 1999 ed., pp. 60-61.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

35
Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 263 SCRA 174, October
15, 1996; per Romero, J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 101.
36
RCPI v. NLRC, 223 SCRA 656, June 25, 1993; Samillano v. NLRC,
265 SCRA 788, December 23, 1996.
37
San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 173 SCRA 314, May 12, 1989.
Art. 277. . . .
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure
and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford
the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with
company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set
by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by
the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with
the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the termination
pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding
by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment
before whom such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a
serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass lay-off.
39
The New World Dictionary, Second College Ed (1974), defines
effectual as "having legal force; valid." Thus, ineffectual, being its
opposite, means having no legal force or not valid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and
PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with
constitutional overtones, involving the validity of the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from
marrying employees of any competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the Decision1 dated May 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated
March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
62434.2
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical
representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had
undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which
stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
existing company rules; to disclose to management any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides
that an employee is expected to inform management of any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. If
management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employees
employment with the company, the management and the
employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation
for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with
Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a
competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in
Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several
reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of
interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still,
love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his
marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons
superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide
which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they
told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible
because he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy
against entering into a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsys
employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug
company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy
package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation from
her company, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated. At the same time, they would be able to avail of the
attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve
the problem. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer
in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a
milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos
"least-movement-possible" policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan
City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked
Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer
and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee.
Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon
until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson
defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson
was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products
which were competing with similar products manufactured by
Astra. He was also not included in product conferences
regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance
machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary
arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half
() month pay for every year of service, or a total
of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15,
2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on
relationships between its employees and persons employed
with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the ground that
the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate
court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from
having personal relationships with employees of competitor
companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate
courts Decision, but the motion was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the NCMBs finding that the
Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an
employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii) the Court
of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was
constructively dismissed when he was transferred to a new
sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity to attend
products seminars and training sessions.6
Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees
marrying employees of competitor companies violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates
invalid distinctions among employees on account only of
marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees
right to marry.7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as
shown by the following circumstances: (1) he was transferred
from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the
Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered a
diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars
and training sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he
was prohibited from promoting respondents products which
were competing with Astras products.8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company
policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with
and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a
valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does not
violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecsons
reassignment from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales
area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales
area does not amount to constructive dismissal.9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and
sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in
ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or
interest that may conflict with their responsibilities to the
company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having
personal or family interests in any competitor company which
may influence their actions and decisions and consequently
deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at
preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its
secrets, procedures and policies.10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit
marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future
relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is
therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. It
maintains that considering the nature of its business, the
prohibition is based on valid grounds.11
According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy, an employee
of Astra, posed a real and potential conflict of interest. Astras
products were in direct competition with 67% of the products
sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxos enforcement of the foregoing
policy in Tecsons case was a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives.12 In any case, Tecson was given several months
to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to
resign but to ask his wife to resign form Astra instead.13
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the
assailed company policy because when he signed his contract
of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated
therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign from
respondent if the management finds that his relationship with
an employee of a competitor company would be detrimental to
the interests of Glaxo.14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecsons reassignment to another
sales area and his exclusion from seminars regarding
respondents new products did not amount to constructive
dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecsons refusal to resign, he was
relocated from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area
to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area.
Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also
considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Since Tecsons
hometown was in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots
to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the Bicol
region to the Butuan City sales area would be favorable to him
and his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory
and minimizing his travel expenses.15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecsons exclusion from the
seminar concerning the new anti-asthma drug was due to the
fact that said product was in direct competition with a drug
which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would pose a
potential conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in
Tecsons receipt of his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-
up created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales
area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area
instead of Naga City because the supplier thought he already
transferred to Butuan).16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy
against its employees marrying employees from competitor
companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether
Tecson was constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecsons contract of employment with Glaxo
being questioned by petitioners provides:
10. You agree to disclose to management any existing
or future relationship you may have, either by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. Should it
pose a possible conflict of interest in management
discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from the
Company as a matter of Company policy.
17
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide
by the existing company rules of Glaxo, and to study and
become acquainted with such policies.18 In this regard, the
Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its employees
of its rules regarding conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship,
or interest that may run counter to the responsibilities which
they owe Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest,
financial or otherwise, in any competitor supplier or
other businesses which may consciously or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
unconsciously influence their actions or decisions
and thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo
Wellcome or knowledge of Company plans to
advance their outside personal interests, that of their
relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for
income which would impair their effective job
performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or
relationships that may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees of competing drug
companies are expected to disclose such relationship to the
Management. If management perceives a conflict or potential
conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together by
management and the employee, to arrive at a solution within
six (6) months, either by transfer to another department in a
non-counter checking position, or by career preparation toward
outside employment after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees must
be prepared for possible resignation within six (6) months, if no
other solution is feasible.19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals
when it ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from
having a relationship with an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs
and information from competitors, especially so that it and
Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees
is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships
of that nature might compromise the interests of the company.
In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic
interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a
policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments
and to expansion and growth.20 Indeed, while our laws
endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social
justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every
labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law
also recognizes that management has rights which are also
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a legitimate business
practice to guard business confidentiality and protect a
competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs
male and female applicants or employees who are married to a
competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer
that discharged an employee who was married to an employee
of an active competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.23 The Court pointed out that the policy was
applied to men and women equally, and noted that the
employers business was highly competitive and that gaining
inside information would constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held
in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal
protection clause erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.25 The only
exception occurs when the state29 in any of its manifestations
or actions has been found to have become entwined or
involved in the wrongful private conduct.27 Obviously, however,
the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the
company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests
to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the
application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-
handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision
and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo
does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships
between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its
employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing. What the company merely
seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee
and the company that may arise out of such relationships. As
succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage.
An employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of
his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a
personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual.
However, an employees personal decision does not detract
the employer from exercising management prerogatives to
ensure maximum profit and business success. . .28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed
company policy which forms part of respondents Employee
Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such
as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his
employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction
when he signed his employment contract and when he entered
into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and
voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo,
the stipulations therein have the force of law between them
and, thus, should be complied with in good faith."29 He is
therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tescon
was constructively dismissed when he was transferred from
the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan
City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was
excluded from attending the companys seminar on new
products which were directly competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a
quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely;
when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when
a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer
becomes unbearable to the employee.30 None of these
conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not
show that Tescon was demoted or unduly discriminated upon
by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court,
Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in
reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioners transfer to another place of
assignment was merely in keeping with the policy of the
company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus valid
Note that [Tecsons] wife holds a sensitive supervisory position
as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which
requires her to work in close coordination with District
Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties include
monitoring sales of Astra products, conducting sales drives,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

establishing and furthering relationship with customers, 2

Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro A. Tecson, petitioners, v.
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., respondent.
collection, monitoring and managing Astras inventoryshe 3
Now Astra Zeneca Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
therefore takes an active participation in the market war 4
Rollo, pp. 28-32.
5
Id. at 55.
characterized as it is by stiff competition among 6
Id. at 9.
pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is significant, 7
8
Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 14-17.
petitioners sales territory covers Camarines Sur and 9
Id. at 96-112.
Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her 10
Id. at 99-100.
11
Id. at 101-102.
employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, 12
Id. at 102-103.
all in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest not 13
Id. at 102-104.
14
Id. at 104-105.
only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the 15
Id. at 64.
others market strategies in the region would be inevitable. 16
Id. at 106-110.
17
See Decision of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[Managements] appreciation of a conflict of interest is 18
Item No. 6 of Tecsons employment contract cited by the Court of Appeals in its
therefore not merely illusory and wanting in factual basis31 Decision, Id.
19
Excerpt of Glaxos Employee Handbook, Annex "A" of respondents
Comment, Id. at 114.
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations 20
Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution provides:
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
Commission,32 which involved a complaint filed by a medical recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the
representative against his employer drug company for illegal right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
growth.
dismissal for allegedly terminating his employment when he 21
Sta. Catalina College v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court 144483, November 19, 2003.
22
Emory v. Georgia Hospital Service Association (1971), DC Ga., 4 CCH EPD
upheld the right of the drug company to transfer or reassign its 7785, 4 BNA FEP Cas 891, affd (CA5) 446 F2d 897, 4 CCH EPD 7786; Cited
employee in accordance with its operational demands and 45 Am Jr 2d Sec. 469.
23
42 USCS 2000e2002e17. Title VII prohibits certain employers,
requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management training
hereunder, also finds application in the instant case: committees from discriminating against applicants and employees on the basis of
race or color, religion, sex, national origin, or opposition to discriminatory
practices.
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or There is no similar legislation in the Philippines.
24
Avery v. Midland County, 390 US 474, 20 L. Ed 2d 45, 88 S Ct 1114, on
medical representative is expected to travel. He should remand (Tex) 430 SW2d 487; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1, 3 L Ed 2d 5, 78 S Ct
anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their 1401.
25
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 US 418, 34 L.Ed.2d 613, 93 S. Ct. 602, 35
business. It would be a poor drug corporation which cannot L.Ed.2d 694, 93 S. Ct. 1411; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US 163, 32
even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets L.Ed.2d 627, 92 S. Ct. 1965; United States v. Price, 383 US 787, 16 L.Ed. 2d
267, 86 S. Ct. 1152; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715, 6
calling for opening or expansion or to areas where the need for L.Ed.2d 45, 81 S. Ct. 856; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1, 92 L.Ed.1161, 68 S. Ct.
pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments 836, 3 ALR2d 441; United States v. Classic, 313 US 299, 85 L.Ed 1368, 61 S. Ct.
1031, 86 L.Ed 565, 62 S. Ct. 51; Nixon v. Condon, 286 US 73, 76 L.Ed. 984, 52
are part of the employment contract.33 S. Ct. 484, 88 ALR 458; Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennet, 284 US 239, 76
L.Ed 265, 52 S. Ct. 133; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 US 323, 70 L.Ed. 969, 46 S. Ct.
521; U.S. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., N.Y., 90 S. Ct. 1598, 398 U.S. 144, 26
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented L. Ed. 2d 142.
26
by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of The equal protection clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution is a restriction on the state governments and operates
time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave exclusively upon them. It does not extend to authority exercised by the
Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest Government of the United States. 16 A Am Jur 2d 742.
27
Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 US 556, 41 L Ed 2d 304, 94 S Ct 2416; Evans v.
brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When their Newton, 382 US 296, 15 L Ed 2d 373, 86 S Ct 486; Anderson v. Martin, 375 US
relationship was still in its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at 399, 11 L Ed 2d 430, 84 S Ct 454; Peterson v. Greenville, 373 US 244, 10 L Ed
2d 323, 83 S Ct 1119; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra note 25.
Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his 28
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 28.
employment with the company and on the companys interests. 29
Article 1159, Civil Code. See National Sugar Trading and/or the Sugar
Regulatory Administration v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 151218, January
After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve 18, 2003, 396 SCRA 528; Pilipinas Hino, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
the conflict by either resigning from the company or asking his 126570, August 18, 2000, 338 SCRA 355.
30
Leonardo v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 125303,
wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to and 126937, June 16, 2000, 333 SCRA 589.
retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory 31
Rollo, pp. 30-31.
32
G.R. No. L-76959, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 713.
performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from 33
Id. at 719.
her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated 34
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 24-27.
requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When
the problem could not be resolved after several years of
waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales
area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably,
the Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only
reassigned him to another area where his home province,
Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecsons transfer,
Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Clearly,
the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith
on the part of Glaxo.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario*,

JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by
Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole. Rollo,pp. 22-32.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN
PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for
petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor
Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu
and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage
a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court
reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties
parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the
projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,
1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2)
Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads.
For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3)
Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna
and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or
deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting
was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr.
The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this
afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the
first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused
from joining the demonstration and should report for work;
and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order
not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article
XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow
this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather
too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a
cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M.,
March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex
"F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about
400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration
on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift,
charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act
No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was
accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo
de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a
corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by
Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting
Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim
that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave
the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional
freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an
order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu,
Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible
for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a
consequence, considered to have lost their status as
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56,
rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23,
1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on
September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on
Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order
dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to
law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within
which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and
17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60,
rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11,
1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein
petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated
September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under
Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September
22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their
motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly
dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among
others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the
filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the
said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their
written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their
motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-
75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196
(pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969,
which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the
counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the
requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for
reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of
its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision,
resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be
perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the
respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their
motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of
the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel,
attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk
(Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief
from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed
on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of
appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles
which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the
dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core
as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs
as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion
of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those
who have no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the
happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was
the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His
interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was
entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the
right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by
the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than
the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to
protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently
stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the
liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition,
are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of
abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so
that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or
agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation
only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases
to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs
political, economic or otherwise.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object
or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory
nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts
or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional
or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of
a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it
has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr.
Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices
Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the
press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to
the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned
Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike,
concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence
temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing
principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion
cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein
private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and
completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general
and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe
were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members fro the harassment of local police
officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to
rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform
more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity
as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it
securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it
also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local
police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its
own employees all the more weakened the position of its
laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all
the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to
further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well
as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of
herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic
human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property
rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners
or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a
stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they
believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter
that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as
that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or
adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be
fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the
scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he
cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing
salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom
of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a
coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity
and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of
our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom
and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so
that capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly
the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a
potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a
moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working
shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court
Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the
"duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain
construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a
stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage
mass demonstration against police abuses during working
hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the
workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of
the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4,
1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such
an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression
of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing
or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or
damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate
the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a
labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members
as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in
order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of
their cause but also immediately action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the
issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of
the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are
reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the
issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more
the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and
abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the
Union notified the company two days in advance of their
projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might
sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day,
especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on
March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their
telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of
March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43,
rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion
on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for
excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its
mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal
the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor
practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm
to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the
service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3
of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial
Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ...
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an
unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration
staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4,
1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged
police abuses, denial of which was interference with or
restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such
common action to better shield themselves against such
alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular
shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under
pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection
deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of
employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging
bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an
discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban
employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank
case, supra, that for the employees to come within the
protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on
Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be
involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long
as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their
interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the
questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15,
1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed
by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular
shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for
work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III,
petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the
employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were
more important to them because they had the courage to
proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of
dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a
day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of
the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer,
more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were
willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police
abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to
recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech,
free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it
necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the
alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby
concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be
submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction
over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be
referred by the President of the Philippines for proper
investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local
police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large
extent the operations of the complainant company," the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any
finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not
sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to
whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with
purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted
from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day
of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled
by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the
materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or
products were damaged due to absence of its workers on
March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost
of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings
could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or
damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of
its workers for only one day.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress
of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8)
leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration
and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial
of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of
the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other
directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the
State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of
Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under
obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for
otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a
lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial
Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect
the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial
unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral,
social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the
case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the
very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to
implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed
mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the
Constitution.
V promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
It has been likewise established that a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no
rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice
of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment.
Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an
individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence
in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served
sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private
firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers
claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police.
Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the
Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the
questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on
all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which
must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by
the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate
legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must
yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights.
There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right
to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech,
the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration.
It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when
exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights
would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period
for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time.
And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the
latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5)
days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of
said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of
filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above
intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the
Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative
delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29,
1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of
the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late.
Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28,
1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was
filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the
inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial
Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light
of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing
rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human
rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible
with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic.
The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over
the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of
necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial
Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but
instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of
Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been
fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1,
Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the
motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration
dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the
order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise
prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file
arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.);
although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.),
long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such
supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October
28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf
such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order
or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and
unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of
free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and
defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the
complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense
not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first
time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the
constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the
very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final
and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is
thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the
Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before
the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them
and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling
reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations
rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring
opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this
principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties
that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case,
without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus,
this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa.
In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the
records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or
of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate
judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it
is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike
down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond
the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a
certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which
cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there
can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not
the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses,
this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose
to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can
be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults
in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary
return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis
supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial
Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an
unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies
justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms,
including the right to survive, must be according supremacy
over the property rights of their employer firm which has been
given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the
case at bar, no actual material damage has be demonstrated
as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it,
obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash
with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution
concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law.
It should be stressed that the application in the instant case
Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon
by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such
application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human
rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the
peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the
C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was
re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the
1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-
e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the
petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly discovered,"
as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the
ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon
the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations
shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other
powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination
of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and
power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this
provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of
the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is
not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the
parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute
or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes.
(Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila
Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these
reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to
have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not
its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was
founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of
newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315;
Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that
the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer,
can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured
to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel
erroneously believing that he received a copy of the
decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22,
1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969,
which practically is only one day late considering that
September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities
when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the
attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs.
Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v.
Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited
with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil.
600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156
[1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.),
decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its
proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained
committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63
Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the
ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted
not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts
have organized and function, but as means conducive to the
realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid.,
p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly
rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial
rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v.
Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put
by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of
the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice
Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice
Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure
substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and
rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is
harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court
itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not
include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are
members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact,
upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union
members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only
the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically
named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief;
Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for
respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee
participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the
Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in
the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If
that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular
shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a
consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did
not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all
should have been simply to charge said one-day absence
against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8)
leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as
aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their
daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families
aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at
the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those
who consciously seek to destroy our system of Government,
but from men of goodwill good men who allow their proper
concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to
accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we
must remember, however, is that preservation of liberties does
not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same
effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The
only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness
of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the
moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle
over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of
all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties,
even if we feel secure because we belong to a group that is
important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of
Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all
honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good
intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of
the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being
subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more
expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to
assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and
security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.
This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and
implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings
Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight
(8) employees for having written and published "a patently
libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his
resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the
promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice
Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the
respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of
some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small
group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such,
is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It
is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416
[1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the
respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline
for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity
to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization
of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs.
NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to
discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil.
Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The
Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the
right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by
interfering with the countervailing right of self organization
(Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that
the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the
employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory
action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted
an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of
section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to
fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra,
where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the
bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the
more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where
the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any
of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October
9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8)
petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation
from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources
during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming
Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of
duty compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the
stipulation of facts upon which the decision under review is
based. It is as follows:
1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc.,
is a corporation existing and operating under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at 666
Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and the
respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO or
members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the
projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM 2:00 PM workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,
1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang,
(2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or
deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting
was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr.
The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this
afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the
first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused
from joining the demonstration and should report for work;
and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order
not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article
XXIV "NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE". All those who will not
follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De
Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall
be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather
too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a
cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M.,
March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected
demonstration did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
a large extent the operations of the complainant company". (p.
5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of
Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair
Labor Practice against petitioners charging that: .
3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein)
particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the existing
collective bargaining agreement and without filing the
necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for
work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a)
subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
part of which read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further
committing the same and its representatives namely:
respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu,
Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly
responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are
hereby considered to have lost their status as employees of
the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were
notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there seems
to be no serious question that they were actually served
therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted
this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief
dated October 30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on
the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969,
or seven (7) days after they were notified of the court's
decision, that petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed that they filed
their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In
other words, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed
two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided
for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days
after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the
same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one
raised by respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the
failure of petitioners to file not only their motion for
reconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof
within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the
Court of Industrial Relations acted correctly and within the law
in rendering and issuing its impugned order of October 9, 1969
dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely
applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Court
in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations 1 wherein
it was ruled that:
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of
the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive
part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
No arguments were advanced in support thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file
its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of
its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the
motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
arguments were filed out of time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the
same time lodged the present petition with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief
(respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before us
for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment not
merely an interlocutory order there is no doubt. The fact
that there is need for computation of respondent Perlado's
overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This
in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American World
Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan American Employees
Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in
ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his
representative to compute the compensation due, the
Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and
thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe
so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical
function, at most. And the report would still have to be
submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very
terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of the
amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be made
clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see
Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the
sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of
this Court both answer the question in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to
reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within
five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the
decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16 which
says that the motion must be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. But if said arguments could not be
submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section
commands the 'the movant shall file the same within ten (10)
days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a
movant that "(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods
shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has
since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs.
Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma motion
for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in order
pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in
support of said motion were or were not filed on time.
Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA)
vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where
a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the order or
decision subject of reconsideration comes final. And so also,
where the arguments in support of the motion for
reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary
period, the pre forma motion for reconsideration although
seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in essence
is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW)
vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the motion for
reconsideration is denied upon the ground that the arguments
in support thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision
subject of the motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and
pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Judge
Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to reconsider
without arguments in support thereof of August 12 was
filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration, was a
Sunday. But, actually, the written arguments in support of the
said motion were submitted to the court on August 27. The
period from August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15)
days. Surely enough, said arguments were filed out of time
five (5) days late. And the judgment had become final.
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963
seeking extension of time within which to present its
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was
grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of
counsel which would not enable him to do so within the stated
ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were only filed
on August 27 five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is
to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed
only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which
is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court
act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate
thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely
filed its arguments on the 27th.
To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up
the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing rule against the
extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting
arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed
petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms,
sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on
August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the
reglementary period had expired.
Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September
16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time.
That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and
unappealable. We may not review the same.
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent,
which has not been in any way modified, much less revoked or
reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to
go into the merits of petitioners' pose that the respondent court
erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also
to ultimately uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on
constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are
predicated on an exposition of the constitutional guarantees of
freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of
grievances, so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to
overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this
case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere admiration
for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant
dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by petitioners
themselves and in the light of its attendant circumstances, this
case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee,
particularly when it directly affects individual freedoms
enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of
this Court. It is my understanding of constitutional law and
judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the most
valuable of our constitutional rights may be protected by the
courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of
procedure consistent with substantive and procedural due
process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be
sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very often
fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this
principle is applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in
cases wherein there is a possible denial of due process. I have
not come across any instance, and none is mentioned or cited
in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a final and
executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside upon
the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the
violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts
to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any
law or from any judicial precedent or reason of principle, the
main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were
universally established and accepted as an absolute rule, that
the violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void
and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA
663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the
proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the
judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol
vs. Homeres 2 which, in principle, served as its precedent, for
the very simple reason that in both of those cases, the accused
were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was
compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the
prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to
be allowed to present evidence to establish his defense after
his demurrer to the People's evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in
those cases are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here,
petitioners do not claim they were denied due process. Nor do
they pretend that in denying their motion for reconsideration,
"the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
trenched upon any of their constitutional immunities ...,"
contrary to the statement to such effect in the main opinion.
Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other
pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be
found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court
as being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a
valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as
follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved
is whether or not the respondent Court en banc under the
facts and circumstances, should consider the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of
certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this
petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en
banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of procedure
without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by
petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:
III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a
fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining in
bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration
and conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad
faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent
court refused to act one way or another on the petition for
relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union guilty
of bargaining in bad faith and consequently dismissing the
persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such
conclusion is country to the evidence on record; that the
dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to
assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities for
redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and
then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad
faith were not borne out by the records. It was not even
alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and
which the respondent company tried to prove was that the
demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of
the provisions of the "no-lockout no strike" clause of the
collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and
proof submitted by the respondent company were practically
resolved when the respondent court in the same decision
stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the
demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of a strike. We
do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
of a temporary stoppage of work.' (Emphasis supplied, p. 4,
5th paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union
bargained in bad faith is not tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent
company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and
the respondent company convened twice in a meeting to
thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners requested
that the employees and workers be excused but the
respondent company instead of granting the request or even
settling the matter so that the hours of work will not be
disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass
dismissal;
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request
of the company that the first shift shall be excluded in the
demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union
belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and
lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead
and join the demonstration because most of them belonged to
the first shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the
demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the
right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a
conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any
evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically
change the terms or conditions of employment because it was
only for one (1) day and the company knew about it before it
went through. We can even say that it was the company who
bargained in bad faith, when upon representation of the
Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the employees demonstrating,
the company tacitly approved the same and yet while the
demonstration was in progress, the company filed a ULP
Charge and consequently dismissed those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of
the union participated in the demonstration and yet, the
respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed
from the union thus losing their status as employees of the
respondent company. The respondent court should have taken
into account that the company's action in allowing the return
of more or less three hundred ninety two (392)
employees/members of the union is an act of condonation and
the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of
discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines
Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958).
Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the
court, while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the
union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it
will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in
the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the
constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the
statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in Republic
Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because it will appear
that the rights of the union is solely dependent upon the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in
proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that
"the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission vs.
L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only
by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay
vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is
no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of the
respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual
petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law.
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their
status as employees of the respondent company did not meet
the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits of the
case." Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the
complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the hearing
of the can. The important and substantial merit of the case is
whether under the facts and circumstances alleged in
respondent company's pleadings, the demonstration done by
the petitioners amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in
violation of the "no strike no lock out" clause of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners respectfully
reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court had
altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does
not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners
should have been absolved of the charges against them.
Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its
own findings, went out of bounds by declaring the petitioners
as having "bargained in faith." The stand of the respondent
court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "non-
siquitor";
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the
freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the
duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution
is subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the
petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such
attempt to override the constitutional provision would be null
and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not
taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by the
respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners
are not raising any issue of due process. They do not posit that
the decision of the industrial court is null and void on that
constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the respondent
court for having priced the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement herein involved over and above their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig
police, but in no sense at all do they allege or contend that
such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the
proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves
consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error
of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main
opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and indignantly
condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of
the fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to
allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question, when
that specific issue has not been duly presented to Us and
properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the simple
reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not
afford it the opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed
constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court
committed an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of
bargaining in bad faith when the charge against them alleged
in the complaint was for having conducted a mass
demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this
jurisdictional question has no constitutional color. Indeed, We
can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial judge
did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and
proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm
still, We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners'
priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the
premises. The unbending doctrine of this Court is that
"decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period
fixed by law; litigations would be endless, no questions would
be finally settled; and titles to property would become
precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen them at
any time in the future". 3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the
interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional
precept not constituting a denial of due process, should not
make any difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured
by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an
ordinary statute than by a misconstrued or constitutional
injunction affecting his individual, freedoms. In both instances,
there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not for the
more paramount considerations that inform the principle of
immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the
reason why, as I have already noted, the main opinion does
not cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial
doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than denial of
due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid
judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs.
Secretary of Education, 4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern
Broadcasting, 5 is that "it is one of our (the Supreme Court's)
decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is
specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the
court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the petitioners
have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have
they adequately argued the constitutional issues so extendedly
and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme
Court to hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a
constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process
renders its judgment or decision null and void, and, therefore,
subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has
become final and executory. I have actually tried to bring
myself into agreement with the views of the distinguished and
learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting
from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity with
settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my
effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I
could go along with petitioners under the authority of our
constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section
2(5) of Article VII of the Philippines 6 (reenacted
practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the 1973
Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection that the
very power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts
involving questions of law(and these include constitutional
issues not affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive
agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only
in the manner provided in the law of the Rules of Court. In
other words, before We can exercise appellate jurisdiction over
constitutional issues, no matter how important they may be,
there must first be a showing of compliance with the applicable
procedural law or rules, among them, those governing appeals
from the Court of Industrial Relations involved herein.
Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial
court is already final and executory, this Court would be devoid
of power and authority to review, much less alter or modify the
same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation
confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We should
pass upon a question or issue not specifically raised by the
party concerned, which, to be sure, could be enough reason to
dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same; rather,
the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to
entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no
less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of
Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by the main
opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs.
Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the facts
of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in
view of reconsideration but even their argument supporting the
same within the prescribed period, "the judgment (against
them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the
finality and enforceability of their judgments are made
contingent on the correctness thereof from the constitutional
standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not they are correct is
something that is always dependent upon combined opinion of
the members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally
as changeable as the members themselves are changed, I
cannot conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to
a trustful administration of justice than the idea that, even
without any showing of denial of due process or want of
jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of such
court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than
those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud
under Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code. 7 And just to emphasize
the policy of the law of respecting judgments once they have
become final, even as this Court has ruled that final decisions
are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors, 8 it is
only when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and
executory judgments may be set aside, 9 and this only when
the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go
Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration
of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as
they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown
upon any attempt to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy
Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which
courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To
fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits,
more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus
keep causes ever within his power, to determine and
redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments
about from one party to the other, and to change his
conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may
change its hues, then litigation might become more
intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See
Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de
los Angeles, L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not
as to the unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but
rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of the
judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I
said then:
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not
escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of
the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical
implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision,
amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I
want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not
detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding force
of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications. The
public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial
decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the
highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them.
Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I
believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing
is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision
of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it
should have been, and, by opinion, I would like to guide the
court a quo as to what, in my own view, is the true and correct
meaning and implications of decision of this Court, not that of
Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely
involving cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court
refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure in its
determination to accord substantial justice to the parties I still
believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me.
I am certain, however, that in none of those precedents did this
Court disturb a judgment already final and executory. It too
obvious to require extended elucidation or even reference any
precedent or authority that the principle of immutability of final
judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may considered
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on
public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea
that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due
process to hold on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain
that the long existing and constantly applied rule governing the
filing of motions for reconsideration in the Court of Industrial
Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement on
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but
instead constricts the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court on
Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieve
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been
fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1,
Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the
motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule
insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not
justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can
readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual or logical
basis for such a critical view of the rule in question. Said rule
provides:
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six
copies, within five (5) days from the date on which he
receives notice of the order or decision, object of the
motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified
under oath with respect to the correctness of the
allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof,
personally or by registered mail, on the adverse
party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies,
duly verified under oath.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be
submitted with arguments supporting the same. If
the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously
with said motions, upon notice Court, the movant
shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of
the filing of his motion for reconsideration. The
adverse party shall also file his answer within ten
(10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of the
arguments submitted by the movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered,
or after ten (10) days from the receipt of the
arguments in support of said motion having been
filed, the motion shall be deemed submitted for
resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is considered
necessary to bear oral arguments, in which case the
Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to
that effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall
be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or
the supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As
amended April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial
Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as
everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court
well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a
judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion for
reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion
and with barely a brief statement of the fundamental ground or
grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the same
by making the necessary exposition, with citations laws and
authorities, in the written arguments the be filed (10) days later.
In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just advising
the court and the other party that the movant does not agree
with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief
and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement
is to apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible
time that a reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the
parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be
warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation
is prolonged. It must borne in mind that cases in the industrial
court may involve affect the operation of vital industries in
which labor-management problems might require day-to-day
solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and concerned
that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of the
case be known to the other so that both avenues for earlier
settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by
the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed
petitioners was no more than the following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this
Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court dated
September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the
hearing of the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file
their respective arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to
Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for
Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the
filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible.
What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even
taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to
comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late
five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of
their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is
that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who
took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as
I shall explain anon "is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court".
(Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very
indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to
overlook such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion,
the rules fixing periods for the finality of judgments are in a
sense more substantive than procedural in their real nature, for
in their operation they have the effect of either creating or
terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular
judgment concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered
such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or authority to
alter or modify the same enhances such substantive character.
Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating rights
and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules
partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again
are substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are
inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a
prescribed period. On the other hand, procrastination or failure
to act on time is unquestionably a form of abandonment,
particularly when it is not or cannot be sufficiently explained.
The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription,
and be has no reason to complain because public policy
demands that rights must be asserted in time, as otherwise
they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-
evident principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel
disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for
the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of the Court of
Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
whether we can suspend rules of other courts, particularly that
is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being administrative
agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in order to
hasten the administration of substance justice, this Court did
exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules, I
am positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a
case in which the judo has already become final and
executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their
petition, in a belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in
the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief
alleging that their failure to file "Arguments in Support of their
Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period or
five (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake committed by the President of
the respondent Union and on office clerk of the counsel for
respondents as shown attested in their respective affidavits",
(See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief, consisted allegedly of
the President's having forgotten his appointment with his
lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the said office
employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work
instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy
with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these
allegations, for, under probably more justification
circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation
previous case this wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered respondent
Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due time appeal
from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk
forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed
and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to
observe procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of
Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of common place
excuses, in the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings
that they are neither credible nor constitutive of excusable
negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952;
Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, December 1966) is
certainly such whimsical exercise of judgment to be a grave
abuse of discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA
300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial
court sought to be reviewed in the present case has already
become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the
petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous from the
constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I
vote to dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang
on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police department, upon two days' prior notice to
respondent employer company, as against the latter's
insistence that the first shift 1should not participate but instead
report for work, under pain of dismissal, the industrial court
ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual
petitioners as union officers and organizers of the mass
demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on
respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair
labor practice for having so carried out the mass
demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was not a
declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against
respondent employer, and ordering the dismissal of the union
office manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact
and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair
labor practice since respondent firm conceded that "the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed'
by the Constitution" and the union up to the day of the
demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to
excuse the first shift and allow it to join the demonstration in
accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective
bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the
union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court
itself the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike,
there being no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but
merely the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to
enable the workers to exercise their constitutional rights of free
expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
grievance against alleged police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners'
motion for reconsideration for having been filed two days late,
after expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its
rules, due to the negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the
union president should likewise be set aside as a manifest act
of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from
the normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their
motion for reconsideration due to such negligence which
was not acted upon by respondent court should have been
granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would
otherwise be caused the petitioners through their summary
dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in
good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by
the Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of
actual loss from the one-day stoppage of work was shown by
respondent company, providing basis to the main opinion's
premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for
having included the first shift workers in the mass
demonstration against its wishes was but an act of arbitrary
vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual
petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford protection
to labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may
be deprived of such basic rights without due process which
is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience
to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to
any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly
it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness." 2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders
of the respondent court and concur in the judgment for
petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of
duty compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the
stipulation of facts upon which the decision under review is
based. It is as follows:
1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc.,
is a corporation existing and operating under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at 666
Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO or
members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the
projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM 2:00 PM workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,
1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang,
(2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or
deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting
was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr.
The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this
afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the
first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused
from joining the demonstration and should report for work;
and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order
not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article
XXIV "NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE". All those who will not
follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De
Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall
be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather
too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a
cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M.,
March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected
demonstration did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to
a large extent the operations of the complainant company". (p.
5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of
Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair
Labor Practice against petitioners charging that: .
3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein)
particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the existing
collective bargaining agreement and without filing the
necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for
work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a)
subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
part of which read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization is found guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and is hereby ordered to cease and
desist from further committing the same and
its representatives namely: respondent
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano
de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino
and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly
responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor
practice act, are hereby considered to have
lost their status as employees of the
Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex
F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were
notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there seems
to be no serious question that they were actually served
therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted
this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief
dated October 30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on
the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969,
or seven (7) days after they were notified of the court's
decision, that petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed that they filed
their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In
other words, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed
two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided
for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days
after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the
same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one
raised by respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the
failure of petitioners to file not only their motion for
reconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof
within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the
Court of Industrial Relations acted correctly and within the law
in rendering and issuing its impugned order of October 9, 1969
dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely
applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Court
in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations 1 wherein
it was ruled that:
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of
the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive
part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
No arguments were advanced in support thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file
its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of
its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the
motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
arguments were filed out of time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the
same time lodged the present petition with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief
(respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before us
for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment not
merely an interlocutory order there is no doubt. The fact
that there is need for computation of respondent Perlado's
overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This
in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American World
Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan American Employees
Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in
ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
representative to compute the compensation due, the
Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and
thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe
so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical
function, at most. And the report would still have to be
submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very
terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of the
amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be made
clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see
Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the
sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of
this Court both answer the question in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to
reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within
five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the
decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16 which
says that the motion must be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. But if said arguments could not be
submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section
commands the 'the movant shall file the same within ten (10)
days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a
movant that "(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods
shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has
since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs.
Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma motion
for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in order
pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in
support of said motion were or were not filed on time.
Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA)
vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where
a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the order or
decision subject of reconsideration comes final. And so also,
where the arguments in support of the motion for
reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary
period, the pre forma motion for reconsideration although
seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in essence
is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW)
vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the motion for
reconsideration is denied upon the ground that the arguments
in support thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision
subject of the motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and
pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Judge
Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to reconsider
without arguments in support thereof of August 12 was
filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration, was a
Sunday. But, actually, the written arguments in support of the
said motion were submitted to the court on August 27. The
period from August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15)
days. Surely enough, said arguments were filed out of time
five (5) days late. And the judgment had become final.
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963
seeking extension of time within which to present its
arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was
grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of
counsel which would not enable him to do so within the stated
ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were only filed
on August 27 five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is
to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed
only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which
is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court
act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate
thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely
filed its arguments on the 27th.
To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up
the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing rule against the
extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting
arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed
petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms,
sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on
August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the
reglementary period had expired.
Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September
16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time.
That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and
unappealable. We may not review the same.
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent,
which has not been in any way modified, much less revoked or
reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to
go into the merits of petitioners' pose that the respondent court
erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also
to ultimately uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on
constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are
predicated on an exposition of the constitutional guarantees of
freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of
grievances, so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to
overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this
case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere admiration
for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant
dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by petitioners
themselves and in the light of its attendant circumstances, this
case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee,
particularly when it directly affects individual freedoms
enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of
this Court. It is my understanding of constitutional law and
judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the most
valuable of our constitutional rights may be protected by the
courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of
procedure consistent with substantive and procedural due
process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be
sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very often
fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this
principle is applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in
cases wherein there is a possible denial of due process. I have
not come across any instance, and none is mentioned or cited
in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a final and
executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside upon
the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the
violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts
to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any
law or from any judicial precedent or reason of principle, the
main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were
universally established and accepted as an absolute rule, that
the violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void
and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA
663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the
proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the
judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol
vs. Homeres 2 which, in principle, served as its precedent, for
the very simple reason that in both of those cases, the accused
were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was
compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the
prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to
be allowed to present evidence to establish his defense after
his demurrer to the People's evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in
those cases are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here,
petitioners do not claim they were denied due process. Nor do
they pretend that in denying their motion for reconsideration,
"the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
trenched upon any of their constitutional immunities ...,"
contrary to the statement to such effect in the main opinion.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other
pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be
found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court
as being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a
valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as
follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved
is whether or not the respondent Court en banc under the
facts and circumstances, should consider the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of
certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this
petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en
banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of procedure
without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by
petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:
III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a
fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining in
bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration
and conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad
faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent
court refused to act one way or another on the petition for
relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union guilty
of bargaining in bad faith and consequently dismissing the
persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such
conclusion is country to the evidence on record; that the
dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to
assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities for
redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and
then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad
faith were not borne out by the records. It was not even alleged
nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and which the
respondent company tried to prove was that the demonstration
amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of
the "no-lockout no strike" clause of the collective bargaining
agreement. However, this allegation and proof submitted by
the respondent company were practically resolved when the
respondent court in the same decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the
demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of a strike. We do
not think so, as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute
although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of work.' (Emphasis supplied, p. 4, 5th
paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union
bargained in bad faith is not tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent
company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the
respondent company convened twice in a meeting to thresh
out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners requested that the
employees and workers be excused but the respondent
company instead of granting the request or even settling the
matter so that the hours of work will not be disrupted,
immediately threatened the employees of mass dismissal;
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of
the company that the first shift shall be excluded in the
demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union
belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and
lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be stated
that the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join
the demonstration because most of them belonged to the first
shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the
demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the right
to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a
conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any evidence
on record. The demonstration did not practically change the
terms or conditions of employment because it was only for one
(1) day and the company knew about it before it went through.
We can even say that it was the company who bargained in
bad faith, when upon representation of the Bureau of Labor not
to dismiss the employees demonstrating, the company tacitly
approved the same and yet while the demonstration was in
progress, the company filed a ULP Charge and consequently
dismissed those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of
the union participated in the demonstration and yet, the
respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed
from the union thus losing their status as employees of the
respondent company. The respondent court should have taken
into account that the company's action in allowing the return of
more or less three hundred ninety two (392)
employees/members of the union is an act of condonation and
the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of discrimination
(Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association,
G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the opinion
stated in the decision by the court, while there is a collective
bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration
or go on strike because it will change the terms and conditions
of employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is
over and above the constitutional rights of a man to
demonstrate and the statutory rights of a union to strike as
provided for in Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent
because it will appear that the rights of the union is solely
dependent upon the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in
proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that "the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L & N
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed
to the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to know
and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No.
L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no
scintilla of evidence to support the findings of the respondent
court that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith. Corollary
therefore, the dismissal of the individual petitioners is without
basis either in fact or in law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their
status as employees of the respondent company did not meet
the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits of the
case." Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the
complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the hearing
of the can. The important and substantial merit of the case is
whether under the facts and circumstances alleged in
respondent company's pleadings, the demonstration done by
the petitioners amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in
violation of the "no strike no lock out" clause of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners respectfully
reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court had
altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does
not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners
should have been absolved of the charges against them.
Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its own
findings, went out of bounds by declaring the petitioners as
having "bargained in faith." The stand of the respondent court
is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "non-siquitor";
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom
to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the duly
constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution is
subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the
petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such
attempt to override the constitutional provision would be null
and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not
taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by the
respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners
are not raising any issue of due process. They do not posit that
the decision of the industrial court is null and void on that
constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the respondent
court for having priced the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement herein involved over and above their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig
police, but in no sense at all do they allege or contend that
such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the
proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves
consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error
of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main
opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and indignantly
condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of
the fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to
allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question, when
that specific issue has not been duly presented to Us and
properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the simple
reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not
afford it the opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed
constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court
committed an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of
bargaining in bad faith when the charge against them alleged
in the complaint was for having conducted a mass
demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this
jurisdictional question has no constitutional color. Indeed, We
can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial judge
did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and
proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm
still, We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners'
priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the
premises. The unbending doctrine of this Court is that
"decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period
fixed by law; litigations would be endless, no questions would
be finally settled; and titles to property would become
precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen them at
any time in the future". 3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the
interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional
precept not constituting a denial of due process, should not
make any difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured
by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an
ordinary statute than by a misconstrued or constitutional
injunction affecting his individual, freedoms. In both instances,
there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not for the
more paramount considerations that inform the principle of
immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the
reason why, as I have already noted, the main opinion does
not cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial
doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that
infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than denial of
due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid
judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs.
Secretary of Education, 4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern
Broadcasting, 5 is that "it is one of our (the Supreme Court's)
decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is
specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the
court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the petitioners
have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have
they adequately argued the constitutional issues so extendedly
and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme
Court to hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a
constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process
renders its judgment or decision null and void, and, therefore,
subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has
become final and executory. I have actually tried to bring
myself into agreement with the views of the distinguished and
learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting
from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity with
settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my
effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I
could go along with petitioners under the authority of our
constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section
2(5) of Article VII of the Philippines 6 (reenacted
practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the 1973
Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection that the
very power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts
involving questions of law(and these include constitutional
issues not affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive
agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only
in the manner provided in the law of the Rules of Court. In
other words, before We can exercise appellate jurisdiction over
constitutional issues, no matter how important they may be,
there must first be a showing of compliance with the applicable
procedural law or rules, among them, those governing appeals
from the Court of Industrial Relations involved herein.
Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial
court is already final and executory, this Court would be devoid
of power and authority to review, much less alter or modify the
same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation
confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We should
pass upon a question or issue not specifically raised by the
party concerned, which, to be sure, could be enough reason to
dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same; rather,
the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to
entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no
less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of
Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by the main
opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs.
Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the facts
of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in
view of reconsideration but even their argument supporting the
same within the prescribed period, "the judgment (against
them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the
finality and enforceability of their judgments are made
contingent on the correctness thereof from the constitutional
standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not they are correct is
something that is always dependent upon combined opinion of
the members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally
as changeable as the members themselves are changed, I
cannot conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to
a trustful administration of justice than the idea that, even
without any showing of denial of due process or want of
jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of such
court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than
those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud
under Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code. 7 And just to emphasize
the policy of the law of respecting judgments once they have
become final, even as this Court has ruled that final decisions
are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors, 8 it is
only when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and
executory judgments may be set aside, 9 and this only when
the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go
Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits
of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any
attempt to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy
Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which
courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To
fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits,
more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful.
'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep
causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine
them term after term, to bandy his judgments about from one
party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely and
as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, then
litigation might become more intolerable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson
(1911), 18 Phil., 257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de
los Angeles,
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the
unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on
the correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in
question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not
escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of the
Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical implications
of a ruling that would authorize the revision, amendment or
alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want to
emphasize that my position in this opinion does not detract a
whit from the soundness, authority and binding force of existing
doctrines enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of
maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions, which inform
said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order. I am not
advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying to put
forth for execution a decision that I believe should have been
rather than what it is. All I am doing is to view not the judgment
of Judge Tengco but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-
20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and, by
opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my
own view, is the true and correct meaning and implications of
decision of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely
involving cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court
refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure in its
determination to accord substantial justice to the parties I still
believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me.
I am certain, however, that in none of those precedents did this
Court disturb a judgment already final and executory. It too
obvious to require extended elucidation or even reference any
precedent or authority that the principle of immutability of final
judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may considered
to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on
public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea
that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due
process to hold on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain
that the long existing and constantly applied rule governing the
filing of motions for reconsideration in the Court of Industrial
Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement on
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but
instead constricts the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court on
Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieve
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been
fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1,
Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the
motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule
insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not
justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can
readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual or logical
basis for such a critical view of the rule in question. Said rule
provides:
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within
five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of the
order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the
same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness
of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof,
personally or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The
latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under
oath.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted
with arguments supporting the same. If the arguments can not
be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon notice
Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days from the
date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration. The adverse
party shall also file his answer within ten (10) days from the
receipt by him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the
movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after
ten (10) days from the receipt of the arguments in support of
said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed
submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is
considered necessary to bear oral arguments, in which case
the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to that
effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for reconsideration
or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments,
as the case may be. (As amended April 20, 1951, Court of
Industrial Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as
everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court
well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a
judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion for
reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion
and with barely a brief statement of the fundamental ground or
grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the same
by making the necessary exposition, with citations laws and
authorities, in the written arguments the be filed (10) days later.
In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just advising
the court and the other party that the movant does not agree
with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief
and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement
is to apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible
time that a reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the
parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be
warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation
is prolonged. It must borne in mind that cases in the industrial
court may involve affect the operation of vital industries in
which labor-management problems might require day-to-day
solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and concerned
that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of the
case be known to the other so that both avenues for earlier
settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by
the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed
petitioners was no more than the following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this
Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court
dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not
in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the
hearing of the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file
their respective arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to
Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for
Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing
of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible. What
worse in this case is that petitioners have not even taken the
trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to comply with
the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5) days in
filing their written arguments in support of their motion, and, the
only excuse offered for such delay is that both the President of
the Union and the office clerk who took charge of the matter
forgot to do what they were instructed to do by counsel, which,
according to this Court, as I shall explain anon "is the most
hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who
fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the
Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And
yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to
overlook such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion,
the rules fixing periods for the finality of judgments are in a
sense more substantive than procedural in their real nature, for
in their operation they have the effect of either creating or
terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular
judgment concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered
such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or authority to
alter or modify the same enhances such substantive character.
Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating rights
and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules
partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again
are substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are
inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a
prescribed period. On the other hand, procrastination or failure
to act on time is unquestionably a form of abandonment,
particularly when it is not or cannot be sufficiently explained.
The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription,
and be has no reason to complain because public policy
demands that rights must be asserted in time, as otherwise
they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-
evident principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel
disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for
the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of the Court of
Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to
whether we can suspend rules of other courts, particularly that
is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being administrative
agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in order to
hasten the administration of substance justice, this Court did
exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules, I
am positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a
case in which the judo has already become final and
executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their
petition, in a belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in
the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief
alleging that their failure to file "Arguments in Support of their
Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period or
five (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake committed by the President of
the respondent Union and on office clerk of the counsel for
respondents as shown attested in their respective affidavits",
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
(See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief, consisted allegedly of
the President's having forgotten his appointment with his
lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the said office
employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work
instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy
with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these
allegations, for, under probably more justification
circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation
previous case this wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered respondent
Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due time appeal
from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk
forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and
habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The
uncritical acceptance of this kind of common place excuses, in
the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are
neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence
(Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs.
Judge Domingo, L-19457, December 1966) is certainly such
whimsical exercise of judgment to be a grave abuse of
discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial
court sought to be reviewed in the present case has already
become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the
petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous from the
constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I
vote to dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang
on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police department, upon two days' prior notice to
respondent employer company, as against the latter's
insistence that the first shift 1should not participate but instead
report for work, under pain of dismissal, the industrial court
ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual
petitioners as union officers and organizers of the mass
demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on
respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair
labor practice for having so carried out the mass
demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was not a
declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against
respondent employer, and ordering the dismissal of the union
office manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact
and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair
labor practice since respondent firm conceded that "the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed'
by the Constitution" and the union up to the day of the
demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to
excuse the first shift and allow it to join the demonstration in
accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective
bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the
union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court
itself the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike,
there being no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but
merely the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to
enable the workers to exercise their constitutional rights of free
expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
grievance against alleged police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners'
motion for reconsideration for having been filed two days late,
after expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its
rules, due to the negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the
union president should likewise be set aside as a manifest act
of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from
the normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their
motion for reconsideration due to such negligence which
was not acted upon by respondent court should have been
granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would
otherwise be caused the petitioners through their summary
dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in
good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by
the Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of
actual loss from the one-day stoppage of work was shown by
respondent company, providing basis to the main opinion's
premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for
having included the first shift workers in the mass
demonstration against its wishes was but an act of arbitrary
vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual
petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford protection
to labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may
be deprived of such basic rights without due process which
is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience
to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to
any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly
it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness." 2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders
of the respondent court and concur in the judgment for
petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
Footnotes
1 L-7428, May 24, 1955.
2 American Com. vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 421.
3 Justice Cardoso, Nature of Judicial Process, 90-93; Tanada
and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed., 71.
4 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638, Emphasis supplied.
5 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, 35-36.
6 See Chafee on Freedom of Speech and Press, 1955, pp. 13-
14.
7 Justice Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights (1961), p. 64, cited by
Justice Castro in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA, 663,
692.
8 March vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509; Tucker vs. Texas, 326
U.S. 517, 519-520.
9 NACCP vs. Button (Jan. 14, 1963), 371 U.S. 415, 433, 9 L.
Ed. 2nd 405, 418.
10 Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1.
11 Thomas vs. Collins (1945), 323 U.S., 516, 530, cited by Mr.
Justice Castro in his concurring opinion in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 895.
12 Edu vs. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 489;
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1165-66, 1175.
13 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835; L-32432, Sept. 11,
1970, 35 SCRA 28; Ignacio vs. Ela (1965), 99 Phil. 346;
Primicias vs. Fugoso (1948), 80 Phil. 71; Terminiello vs.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1; Virginia State Board of Education vs.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639; 87 Law. Ed. 1628, 1638.
14 March 9, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 270; Greenbelt, etc. vs.
Bresler (May 18, 1970), 398 U.S. 6, 20; see also Justice
Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 78-81, 96-113.
15 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
16 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
17 Dennis vs. U.S. (1951), 341 U.S. 494.
18 March vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker vs. Texas, 326
U.S. 517.
19 Pickering vs. Board of Education 391 U.S. 563, 574, (1968).
20 Security Bank Employees Union-NATU vs. Security Bank
and Trust Co., April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503, 515; Caltex vs.
Lucero, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1196, 1198-99; Malayang
Manggagawa sa ESSO vs. ESSO July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA
801,806, 807, De Leon vs. National Labor Union, 100 Phil.,
792; PAFLU vs. Barot, 99 Phil. 1008 Continental Manufacturing
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

Employees Assoc., et. al. vs. C.I.R., et al., L-26849, Sept. 30,
1970, 35 SCRA 204.
21 Sotto vs. Ruiz, 41 Phil. 468; Shuttleworth vs. Birmingham
(1969), 394 U.S. 147; Largent vs. Texas, 318 U.S. (1943) 418;
Jamison vs. Texas, (1943) 318 U.S. 413; Lovell vs. Griffin
(1938) 303 U.S. 444; Grosjean vs. American Press Co. (1936)
297 U.S. 233; Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil., 393; Justice
Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 90-93.
22 Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574, 20 L.
Ed. 2nd, 811, 820.
23 Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R. et. al., Sept. 27, 1967, 21
SCRA 226, 232, 233, 661, 662, 663-664, 211 21 SCRA 233.
25 Justice Sanchez in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA
663, 692, Aug. 19, 1968; see also concurring opinion of Justice
Castro; Camasura vs. Provost Marshall, 78 Phil. 131.
26 Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 1949.
27 Fay vs. Noia 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
28 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, supra.
28-a Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. W.C.C. L-25665, May 22,
1969, 28 SCRA 285-298.
29 Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103, as amended.
29a Elizalde & Co., Inc. vs. C.I.R., et. al., September 23, 1968,
25 SCRA 58, 61-63; Bien vs. Castillo, 97 Phil. 956; Pangasinan
Employees, etc. vs. Martinez, May 20, 1960, 108 Phil. 89,
Local 7, etc. vs. Tabigne, Nov. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 276; Luzon
Stevedoring vs. C.I.R., July 26, 1963, 8 SCRA, 447; Manila
Metal, etc. vs. C.I.R., July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 552.
30 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82; Mercado vs. Go Bio, 48
O.G. 5360.
30-a See Workmen's Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Augusto, L-31060, July
29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123, 127.
30-b Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
304, 312, 312; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275.
30-c L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 933-34.
30-d 28 SCRA 933-934.
30-e L-28714, June 13, 1970, 33 SCRA 887, 907-908.
30-f L-27807, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 738, 742-3.
30-g 34 SCRA 742-743.
31 A Living Bill of Rights (1961), pp. 61, 62, 64; 24 SCRA, 690-
692; Emphasis supplied.
32 21 SCRA 226-241. Sept. 27, 1967.
33 21 SCRA 232-237.
BARREDO, dissenting:
1 25 SCRA 58.
2 86 Phil. 525.
3 Daquis vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913, reiterated in Maramba vs.
Lozano, 20 SCRA 474. See also Vicente vs. Lucas, 95 Phil. 716.
4 97 Phil. 806, at p. 816.
5 73 Phil. 408.
6 Under which this case was filed.
7 Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159, cited by Moran in
Vol. 11, p. 246 (1970 ed.).
8 Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25.
9 Amuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Javier vs. Parades, 52 Phil.
910; Domingo vs. David, 68 Phil. 134.
10 Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100.
TEEHANKEE, concurring:
1 The first shift comprised the workers from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.
Respondent company had no objection to the two regular
shifts workers (7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.) being
excused from work for the mass demonstration.
2 Ermita-Malate Hotel Operators Ass'n. vs. City Mayor, 20
SCRA 849(1967), per Fernando, J.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant.
Hartigan and Welch for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco
Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels
of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in
question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the
original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank.
Upon March 31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and
was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum,
payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties
to this mortgage at that time estimated the value of the
property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in
excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this
instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which
appears to have been his native country; and he there died,
upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the
Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the
institution of the present action, it was necessary for the
plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the
defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly
obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form
in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the
order of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped
envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the
defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of
Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant
to the following provision contained in section 399 of the Code
of Civil Procedure:
In case of publication, where the residence of a
nonresident or absent defendant is known, the judge
must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to
be forthwith deposited by the clerk in the post-office,
postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served,
at his place of residence
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not
affirmatively appear. There is, however, among the papers
pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed
by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an employee of the attorneys of
the bank, showing that upon that date he had deposited in the
Manila post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio
Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the
complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, the summons, and the order
of the court directing publication as aforesaid. It appears from
the postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably used an
envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt
purports to show that the letter emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First
Instance; and the defendant not having appeared, judgment
was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon
July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In
this decision it was recited that publication had been properly
made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice
having been given mail. The court, upon this occasion, found
that the indebtedness of the defendant amounted to P249,355.
32, with interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was
ordered that the defendant should, on or before July 6, 1908,
deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the
satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of
the failure of the defendant to satisfy the judgment within such
period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila
should be exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated
in said order was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court
ordered the sale of the property. The sale took place upon July
30, 1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the
sum of P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908, this sale was
confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the
precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion was made in this cause
by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the
original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the court to set
aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment
rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth
in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the
judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
subject of the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the
judgment was denied, and from this action of the court Vicente
Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
has appealed. No other feature of the case is here under
consideration than such as related to the action of the court
upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will
be discussed in what appears to be the sequence of most
convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we
shall, for the purpose of argument, assume that the clerk of the
Court of First Instance did not obey the order of the court in the
matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to
the defendant in Amoy; and in this connection we shall
consider, first, whether the court acquired the necessary
jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the
mortgage and, secondly, whether those proceedings were
conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising
judicial power, is used in several different, though related,
senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the
court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a
particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court
over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to
the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines
the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it
may entertain and the relief it may grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary
appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal
process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the
litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of
the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings
wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the
latter case the property, though at all times within the potential
power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at
all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure
is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the
litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction
over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of
land under our system for the registration of land. Here the
court, without taking actual physical control over the property
assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner,
to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to
adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the
world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a
mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an
action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially
such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow
application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in
courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the
proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the
true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or
lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the
defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form
of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment
entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the
author of a well known treaties, has said:
Though nominally against person, such suits are to
vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure; they treat
property as primarily indebted; and, with the
qualification above-mentioned, they are substantially
property actions. In the civil law, they are styled
hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the
enforcement of the lien against the res; in the
common law, they would be different in chancery did
not treat the conditional conveyance as a mere
hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an
equitable lien; so, in both, the suit is real action so far
as it is against property, and seeks the judicial
recognition of a property debt, and an order for the
sale of the res. (Waples, Proceedings In Rem. sec.
607.)
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant
for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as
to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This,
however, does not affect the proposition that where the
defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it
should therefore be considered with reference to the principles
governing actions in rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure
proceeding and an action of attachment, concerning which the
Supreme Court of the United States has used the following
language:
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly
a suit in personam, with the added incident, that the
property attached remains liable, under the control of
the court, to answer to any demand which may be
established against the defendant by the final
judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance
of the defendant, and no service of process on him,
the case becomes, in its essential nature, a
proceeding in rem, the only effect of which is to
subject the property attached to the payment of the
defendant which the court may find to be due to the
plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not
personally served, the preliminary seizure is to, be considered
necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this
case the lien on the property is acquired by the seizure; and
the purpose of the proceedings is to subject the property to
that lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage,
contract, or statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary;
and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner
provided by law precisely as though the property had been
seized upon attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405;
44 L. ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in an
attachment the property may be seized at the inception of the
proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit it is not taken into
legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not
materially affect the fundamental principle involved in both
cases, which is that the court is here exercising a jurisdiction
over the property in a proceeding directed essentially in rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance in a mortgage foreclosure, it is evident that the
court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from
the statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court,
in this most general sense, over the cause of action is obvious
and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by
the voluntary submission of the defendant or by the personal
service of process upon him within the territory where the
process is valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident
and, remaining beyond the range of the personal process of
the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never
acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the property
itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is the
responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of
judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in such
case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it
possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is
entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over
the property, considered as the exclusive object of such action,
is evidently based upon the following conditions and
considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within
the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the
property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage;
and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings
takes the property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to
sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An
obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this
proceeding than such as can be enforced against the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the
following proposition relative to the foreclosure proceeding
against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to
come in and submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the
court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the
power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction
over the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that
the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can
be enforced against the property itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly
apprehended, for there are many expressions in the American
reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires
personal jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by
publication and notice; but such is not the case. In truth the
proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident
cannot be acquired by publication and notice was never clearly
understood even in the American courts until after the decision
had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States
in the leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L.
ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of other decisions
which have subsequently been rendered in that and other
courts, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot
be thus acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to
question; and it is now fully established that a personal
judgment upon constructive or substituted service against a
nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This
doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted
process, including service by publication and personal service
outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered;
and the only exception seems to be found in the case where
the nonresident defendant has expressly or impliedly
consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A., 585; 35 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 312
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra)
proceeds is that the process from the tribunals of one State
cannot run into other States or countries and that due process
of law requires that the defendant shall be brought under the
power of the court by service of process within the State, or by
his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to
pass upon the question of his personal liability. The doctrine
established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this
point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due
process of law, is binding upon the courts of the Philippine
Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in
proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who
is not served personally within the state, and who does not
appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court
cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him.
(Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665;
Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed.,
729.) Therefore in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a
nonresident, upon whom service has been effected exclusively
by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be
entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch,
99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment
entered in the court below offends against the principle just
stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact
entered a personal judgment against the absent debtor for the
full amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage. We
do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is
necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to
ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the
defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a
necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present case
the judgment which was entered contains the following words:
Because it is declared that the said defendant
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is
indebted in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the
interest, to the 'Banco Espanol-Filipino' . . . therefore
said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount
etc., etc.
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is
clearly intended merely as a compliance with the requirement
that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence
of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil
Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor for the
deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has
been sold and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt.
(sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever
may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk of
the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the
defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise
impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion
that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than
would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to
a resident of a foreign country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that
we are fully aware that many reported cases can be cited in
which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of
publication or notice in a case of this kind is a question
affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is
sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the
publication. This phraseology was undoubtedly originally
adopted by the court because of the analogy between service
by the publication and personal service of process upon the
defendant; and, as has already been suggested, prior to the
decision of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between
the legal effects of the two forms of service was obscure. It is
accordingly not surprising that the modes of expression which
had already been molded into legal tradition before that case
was decided have been brought down to the present day. But it
is clear that the legal principle here involved is not effected by
the peculiar language in which the courts have expounded
their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the
supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such gravity as
to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was
secured by the Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the
time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of July 1, 1902, sec.
5.) In dealing with questions involving the application of the
constitutional provisions relating to due process of law the
Supreme Court of the United States has refrained from
attempting to define with precision the meaning of that
expression, the reason being that the idea expressed therein is
applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any
attempt ay precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As
applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down
with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if
the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be
a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must
be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have
an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure
case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident
owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be
made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this
necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and
usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the
defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called
constructive, or substituted service of process in any true
sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the
owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take
such steps as he sees fit to protect it. In speaking of notice of
this character a distinguish master of constitutional law has
used the following language:
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and
personal notice is provided for, it is rather from
tenderness to their interests, and in order to make
sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall not be lost
to them, than from any necessity that the case shall
assume that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527,
quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not
involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall
thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the
publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the
chances that he should discover the notice may often be very
slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his
receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the
correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as
upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be
noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the
mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of
notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case
where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all
these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in
cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered
absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the
efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual
notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in
the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may
be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with
knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a
nonresident, to take measures that in some way he
shall be represented when his property is called into
requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to get
notice by the ordinary publications which have usually
been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and
he must abide the consequences. (6 R. C. L., sec.
445 [p. 450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by
legal process upon the constructive notice, then our
statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty
legislative declarations, without either force, or
meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction
of the court, no personal judgment can be rendered,
and if the judgment cannot operate upon the property,
then no effective judgment at all can be rendered, so
that the result would be that the courts would be
powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident.
Such a result would be a deplorable one. (Quarl vs.
Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662, 667.)
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory
provisions relative to publication or other form of notice against
a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to
the publication of notice in the newspaper it may be stated that
strict compliance with the requirements of the law has been
held to be essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove
etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that where
newspaper publication was made for 19 weeks, when the
statute required 20, the publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the
sending of notice by mail, the requirement is that the judge
shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk
of the court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must
be deposited in the mail. We consider this to be of some
significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the
principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the
absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as the
due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the
possible failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as
he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might
possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the
notice before it should reach its destination and be delivered to
him. This idea seems to be strengthened by the consideration
that placing upon the clerk the duty of sending notice by mail,
the performance of that act is put effectually beyond the control
of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is obvious that so
much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as relates
to the sending of notice by mail was complied with when the
court made the order. The question as to what may be the
consequences of the failure of the record to show the proof of
compliance with that requirement will be discussed by us
further on.
The observations which have just been made lead to the
conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in
fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as
amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our
opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the
judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a
newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law
unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was
absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this
irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a
question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due
process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no
distinction between the much and the little. The court either
has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the
mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to
the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the
conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the
validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due
process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to
be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that
due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the
defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in
the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that
failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the
requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect
upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have
been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of
judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these
conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress
declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law has not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two
conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk to send the notice
to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the
court and (2) that such irregularity did not infringe the
requirement of due process of law. As a consequence of these
conclusions the irregularity in question is in some measure
shorn of its potency. It is still necessary, however, to consider
its effect considered as a simple irregularity of procedure; and
it would be idle to pretend that even in this aspect the
irregularity is not grave enough. From this point of view,
however, it is obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment
on the ground of the irregularity in question must fail unless it
shows that the defendant was prejudiced by that irregularity.
The least, therefore, that can be required of the proponent of
such a motion is to show that he had a good defense against
the action to foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of the kind is,
however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which
accompanies the motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an
irregularity or defect in the proceedings is usually required to
be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the
relief is sought, and in addition to this showing also a
meritorious defense to the action. It is held that a general
statement that a party has a good defense to the action is
insufficient. The necessary facts must be averred. Of course if
a judgment is void upon its face a showing of the existence of
a meritorious defense is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.)
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this
aspect of the case. In this connection we quote the following
passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course of
publication:
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face,
and may therefore be enforced if permitted to stand
on the record, courts in many instances refuse to
exercise their quasi equitable powers to vacate a
judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was
entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends of
justice, and where it appears that the party making
the application is himself without fault and has acted
in good faith and with ordinary diligence. Laches on
the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed
sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he
might otherwise be entitled. Something is due to the
finality of judgments, and acquiescence or
unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this
character, since courts are always reluctant to
interfere with judgments, and especially where they
have been executed or satisfied. The moving party
has the burden of showing diligence, and unless it is
shown affirmatively the court will not ordinarily
exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L., 694,
695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died January 29, 1910. The
mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far
back in 1906; and the proceedings in the foreclosure were
closed by the order of court confirming the sale dated August
7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to
suppose that a man who had placed a mortgage upon property
worth nearly P300,000 and had then gone away from the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
scene of his life activities to end his days in the city of Amoy,
China, should have long remained in ignorance of the fact that
the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold, even
supposing that he had no knowledge of those proceedings
while they were being conducted. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of things that he should have acquired
information as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila;
and upon the basis of this rational assumption we are
authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume
that he did have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of
his property.
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that
there is a presumption that things have happened according to
the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot
conceive of a situation more appropriate than this for applying
the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver. In support of this
presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible to
consider the probability that the defendant may have received
actual notice of these proceedings from the unofficial notice
addressed to him in Manila which was mailed by an employee
of the bank's attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Grannis vs.
Ordeans (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in
view of the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in
making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we
think the presumption is clear and strong that this notice
reached the defendant, there being no proof that it was ever
returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it was
delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China,
there is a probability that the recipient was a person sufficiently
interested in his affairs to send it or communicate its contents
to him.
Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the
process of law depended upon the mailing of the notice by the
clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be
idle and frivolous; but the considerations mentioned are
introduced in order to show the propriety of applying to this
situation the legal presumption to which allusion has been
made. Upon that presumption, supported by the circumstances
of this case, ,we do not hesitate to found the conclusion that
the defendant voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his
property from the obligation which he had placed upon it; that
knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to him; and
that he acquiesced in the consequences of those proceedings
after they had been accomplished. Under these circumstances
it is clear that the merit of this motion is, as we have already
stated, adversely affected in a high degree by the delay in
asking for relief. Nor is it an adequate reply to say that the
proponent of this motion is an administrator who only qualified
a few months before this motion was made. No disability on
the part of the defendant himself existed from the time when
the foreclosure was effected until his death; and we believe
that the delay in the appointment of the administrator and
institution of this action is a circumstance which is imputable to
the parties in interest whoever they may have been. Of course
if the minor heirs had instituted an action in their own right to
recover the property, it would have been different.
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice
by reason of the fact that the bank became the purchaser of
the property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly below
that which had been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset
price of the property. In this connection, it appears that in
article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this
foreclosure, as amended by the notarial document of July 19,
1906, the parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the
effect that the value therein placed upon the mortgaged
properties should serve as a basis of sale in case the debt
should remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a
foreclosure. The upset price stated in that stipulation for all the
parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in
behalf of the appellant that when the bank bought in the
property for the sum of P110,200 it violated that stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage
providing for a tipo, or upset price, does not prevent a
foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the
foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy
Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Espaol Filipino vs.
Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases
here cited the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale,
not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a third party. Whether
the same rule should be applied in a case where the
mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser has apparently not
been decided by this court in any reported decision, and this
question need not here be considered, since it is evident that if
any liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing for a price
below that fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal
liability derived from the contract of mortgage; and as we have
already demonstrated such a liability could not be the subject
of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. If the plaintiff bank became
liable to account for the difference between the upset price and
the price at which in bought in the property, that liability
remains unaffected by the disposition which the court made of
this case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such an
obligation can in no wise affect the validity of the judgment
entered in the Court of First Instance.
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show
either a meritorious defense to the action or that the defendant
had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice,
we may be permitted to add that in our opinion a motion of this
kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial proceedings long ago
closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon
grounds which appeal to the conscience of the court. Public
policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld. The
maximum here applicable is non quieta movere. As was once
said by Judge Brewer, afterwards a member of the Supreme
Court of the United States:
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be
upheld, and that titles obtained in those proceedings
be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If
technical defects are adjudged potent to destroy such
titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of the
property, for no prudent man will risk his money in
bidding for and buying that title which he has reason
to fear may years thereafter be swept away through
some occult and not readily discoverable defect.
(Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)
In the case where that language was used an attempt was
made to annul certain foreclosure proceedings on the ground
that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based
erroneously stated that the State of Kansas, when he was in
fact residing in another State. It was held that this mistake did
not affect the validity of the proceedings.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk
failed to send the notice by post as required by the order of the
court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a proper
assumption; and the proposition which we propose to establish
is that there is a legal presumption that the clerk performed his
duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which presumption is
not overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure
it is declared that there is a presumption "that official duty has
been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it is declared
that there is a presumption "that the ordinary course of
business has been followed." These presumptions are of
course in no sense novelties, as they express ideas which
have always been recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite et
solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium. There is
therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed
his duty about mailing this notice; and we think that strong
considerations of policy require that this presumption should be
allowed to operate with full force under the circumstances of
this case. A party to an action has no control over the clerk of
the court; and has no right to meddle unduly with the business
of the clerk in the performance of his duties. Having no control
over this officer, the litigant must depend upon the court to see
that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen
the conclusion just stated. There is no principle of law better
settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required,
every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to
have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment
or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings
from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United
States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is
silent with respect to any fact which must have been
established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be
presumed that such fact was properly brought to its
knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11
L. ed., 283.)
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a
decedent] the court are presumed to have adjudged
every question necessary to justify such order or
decree, viz: The death of the owners; that the
petitioners were his administrators; that the personal
estate was insufficient to pay the debts of the
deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the
manner of sale, were within the constitutional power
of the Legislature, and that all the provisions of the
law as to notices which are directory to the
administrators have been complied with. . . . The
court is not bound to enter upon the record the
evidence on which any fact was decided. (Florentine
vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially
does all this apply after long lapse of time.
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U.
S., 255) contains an instructive discussion in a case analogous
to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order
to foreclose a mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a
nonresident debtor it was necessary that publication should be
made in a newspaper for a specified period of time, also be
posted at the front door of the court house and be published on
some Sunday, immediately after divine service, in such church
as the court should direct. In a certain action judgment had
been entered against a nonresident, after publication in
pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of
the proceedings was called in question in another action. It
was proved from the files of an ancient periodical that
publication had been made in its columns as required by law;
but no proof was offered to show the publication of the order at
the church, or the posting of it at the front door of the court-
house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the judgment
of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme
Court of the United States said:
The court which made the decree . . . was a court of
general jurisdiction. Therefore every presumption not
inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor
of its jurisdiction. . . . It is to be presumed that the
court before making its decree took care of to see that
its order for constructive service, on which its right to
make the decree depended, had been obeyed.
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject
of collateral , or indirect attack, while in the case at bar the
motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for relief
against it. The same general presumption, however, is
indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or indirect attack
the only difference being that in case of indirect attack the
judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid unless the
record affirmatively shows it to be void, while in case of direct
attack the presumption in favor of its validity may in certain
cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the
court made its decree with the knowledge that the
requirements of law had been complied with appear to be
amply sufficient to support the conclusion that the notice was
sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that there
ought to be found among the papers on file in this cause an
affidavit, as required by section 400 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so sent by the
clerk; and no such affidavit appears. The record is therefore
silent where it ought to speak. But the very purpose of the law
in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to
sustain a prior judgment in the face of such an omission. If we
were to hold that the judgment in this case is void because the
proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers which we call
the record, the result would be that in the future every title in
the Islands resting upon a judgment like that now before us
would depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of
such affidavit among the papers and would be liable at any
moment to be destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of
paper. We think that no court, with a proper regard for the
security of judicial proceedings and for the interests which
have by law been confided to the courts, would incline to favor
such a conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a case
of this kind is to hold that the legal presumption that the clerk
performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the absence
from the record of the proper proof of that fact.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the
practice prevailing in the Philippine Islands the word "record" is
used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the collective
mass of papers which contain the history of all the successive
steps taken in a case and which are finally deposited in the
archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of the litigation. It is
a matter of general information that no judgment roll, or book of
final record, is commonly kept in our courts for the purpose of
recording the pleadings and principal proceedings in actions
which have been terminated; and in particular, no such record
is kept in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. There
is, indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure which
directs that such a book of final record shall be kept; but this
provision has, as a matter of common knowledge, been
generally ignored. The result is that in the present case we do
not have the assistance of the recitals of such a record to
enable us to pass upon the validity of this judgment and as
already stated the question must be determined by examining
the papers contained in the entire file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of
Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing that upon April 4, 1908, he
sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant
at Manila, Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative
proof that the clerk of the court failed in his duty and that,
instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail,
he relied upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that
this is by any means a necessary inference. Of course if it had
affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to
comply with this order and had directed the notification to
Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this would be
conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of
the order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the
attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the
defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very
slight basis for supposing that the clerk may not have sent
notice to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position
that when the record states the evidence or makes an
averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be
presumed that there was other or different evidence respecting
the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than stated. If, to give
an illustration, it appears from the return of the officer that the
summons was served at a particular place or in a particular
manner, it will not be presumed that service was also made at
another place or in a different manner; or if it appears that
service was made upon a person other than the defendant, it
will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was
made upon the defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350,
366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we
believe that these propositions are entirely correct as applied
to the case where the person making the return is the officer
who is by law required to make the return, we do not think that
it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, the
affidavit was made by a person who, so far as the provisions of
law are concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider
is whether a motion in the cause is admissible as a proceeding
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the
judgment of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will
be set aside, and the litigation will be renewed, proceeding
again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action
had not been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does
not ask the favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His
purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the court,
to the end that the litigation may again resume its regular
course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which
expressly recognizes the authority of a Court of First Instance
to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the
litigation in the same cause. This is as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court
may relieve a party or legal representative from the
judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against
him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; Provided, That application thereof
be made within a reasonable time, but in no case
exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or
proceeding was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is
supplied by section 513 of the same Code. The first paragraph
of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides
as follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First
Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly
deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, and the Court of First Instance
which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so
that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party
so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to
the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first
learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not
thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have
judgment set aside. . . .
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is
intended to supplement the remedy provided by section 113;
and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other
means recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a
proceeding in the same cause, procure a judgment to be set
aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system
of practice in civil causes, and it contains provisions describing
with much fullness the various steps to be taken in the conduct
of such proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the
method of beginning, conducting, and concluding the civil
action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same
Code it is declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be
in accordance with the provisions of this Code. We are
therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in
sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all others, so far as
relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has
been once concluded.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the
requirements of either of these provisions; and the
consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an
irregularity of procedure, we cannot suppose that this
proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the
cause, since it is clear that, if based on such an error, the came
to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we have
already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as
void for want of jurisdiction over the defendant. The idea
underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch as the
judgment is a nullity it can be attacked in any way and at any
time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its face, that is, if it
were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there
might possibly be something in this. Where a judgment or
judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is
entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is
not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment
could be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of
due process of law, the party aggrieved thereby is bound to
resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under
accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized in
American courts, a proper remedy in such case, after the time
for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to
bring an action to enjoin the judgment, if not already carried
into effect; or if the property has already been disposed of he
may institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this
character an appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has
been taken without due process, the law concedes due
process to recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming the
judgment to have been void as alleged by the proponent of this
motion, the proper remedy was by an original proceeding and
not by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code
of Civil Procedure defines the conditions under which relief
against a judgment may be productive of conclusion for this
court to recognize such a proceeding as proper under
conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the point
of procedure here involved, we refer to the case of People vs.
Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion will
not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse of the time limited
by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all
cases, after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the
judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse
of such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment
by a proceeding in court for that purpose an action regularly
brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be noted
taken verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the
judgment appealed from is without error, and the same is
accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
I dissent. It will not make me long to state my reasons. An
immutable attribute the fundamental idea of due process
of law is that no man shall be condemned in his person or
property without notice and an opportunity of being heard in his
defense. Protection of the parties demands a strict and an
exact compliance with this constitutional provision in our
organic law and of the statutory provisions in amplification.
Literally hundreds of precedents could be cited in support of
these axiomatic principles. Where as in the instant case the
defendant received no notice and had no opportunity to be
heard, certainly we cannot say that there is due process of law.
Resultantly, "A judgment which is void upon its face, and which
requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate
its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which
should be lopped off, if the power so to do exists. It can bear
no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to the
defendant." (Mills vs. Dickons, 6 Rich [S. C.], 487.)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager
and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons
stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin
termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o
bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el
plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la
localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato,
ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han
visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro
forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u
obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo
de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para
una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros
que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de
practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley
No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a
que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero,
puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand,
prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the
majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938,
there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by
the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated
September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from
the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT
with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation
are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had
been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil
war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern
labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace
has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor
practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union,
Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the
motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after
stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion
that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to
dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest
of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several
observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of
Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles
which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before
it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings
had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and
we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of
the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.
The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting
statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion
drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of counsel have no
evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than
a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
but its functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of
farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary
of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be
by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth
with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section
4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of
such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce
them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph
2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries
established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting
for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of
laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid
by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section
5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective
system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al.,
G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al.,
G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act
No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed
or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural
dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to
this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to
be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.
Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this
court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if
the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more
fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301
U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric
Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985,
989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6
Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose
of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S.
25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227
U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States
v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed.
624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv.
Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs.
L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.)
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right
to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So
agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or ordered.
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and Moran, JJ., concur.
may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,

therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In
the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates
to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial

questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is

sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not
satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in
a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of

a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union,
Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc.,
from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the
National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to
prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after
considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that
the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it
acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140128 June 6, 2001
ARNOLD P. MOLLANEDA, petitioner,
vs.
LEONIDA C. UMACOB, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the (a)
Decision1 dated May 14, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 48902 affirming in toto Resolution No. 973277 of
the Civil Service Commission; and (b) Resolution2dated August
26, 1999 of the said court denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Decision.
The case stemmed from the affidavit-complaint for sexual
harassment filed by Leonida Umacob (respondent) against
Arnold Mollaneda (petitioner) with the Civil Service
Commission - Regional Office XI, Davao City (CSC-RO XI) in
September 1994 alleging:
"That sometime on September 7, 1994 at around 7:30 o'clock
more or less, in the morning, while inside the office of Mr.
Rolando P. Suase, Admin Officer 2 of Davao City Schools,
located at the Division Office Building, along Palma Gil St.,
Davao City, to follow-up my request for transfer from my
present assignment to either Buhangin District or Bangoy
District, Davao City, Mr. Rolando P. Suase was not around and
it was school Division Superintendent, Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda
who was seated at his (Rolando's) table, as at the time, the
office of Mr. Arnold Mollaneda just adjacent was being cleaned
by a janitor.
That immediately I approached him and seated opposite to him
and handed to him my letter of recommendation from DECS
Regional Director, Region XI, Dr. Ramon Y. Alba,
recommending my possible transfer and after reading the
same advised her to return next week as there is no available
item and that he will think about it. However, I insisted that he
will give me a note to fix the time and date of our next meeting
and or appointment at his office. At this instance, he handed
me a piece of paper with his prepared signature and requested
me to write my name on it, after which, he took it back from me
and assured me to grant my request and at the same time, he
made some notations on the same piece of paper below my
name, indicating my possible transfer to Buhangin or Bangoy
District of which I thanked him for the accomodation. At this
point, he stood up, bringing along with him the paper so that I
also stood up. However, before I could get outside the office,
he then handed to me the said piece of paper and advised me
to give it to a certain May Pescadero, personnel clerk, for the
making/cutting of the order of transfer. All of a sudden he
hugged and embraced me, then he kissed my nose and lip in a
torrid manner. That I tried to resist but he forcibly held my neck
so that he was able to kiss me in an easy way. That - not
contented, he then mashed my left breast. He did the
malicious act for several times, afterwhich he warned me not
to tell anybody what he did to me inside the office.
That as a result of the very unfortunate incident, I was
so shocked, that I was not able to speak or talk or
confess to my husband what our School
Superintendent did to me. Likewise, I also informed
one Venus Mariano, also DECS employee, who
advised me to stay and remain calm. However, I
decided to report the matter to San Pedro Patrol
Station."3 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent furnished the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports - Regional Office XI, Davao City (DECS-RO XI) a
copy of her affidavit-complaint. Thus, on September 30, 1994,
Regional Director Susana Cabahug issued an order4 directing
the formation of a committee to conduct an investigation of
respondent's complaint against petitioner.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed with the CSC-RO XI his
answer to the affidavit-complaint denying the allegations
therein and alleging that there are "material contradictions," in
respondent's version of the incident, thus:
"1) On the date of the alleged happening of the incident, she
was with her husband who was just outside the Office of Mr.
Mollaneda according to witness Security Guard Raul Moncada,
but she did not report the incident to her husband, nor did she
register any complaint on that date September 7, 1994;
She reported the alleged acts of lasciviousness complained of
to the police only the following day, September 8, 1994, at
about 3:45 P.M. as shown by the extract of the entry of the
police blotter attached to her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT in this
case.
2) In her report to the police as shown by the said police
blotter, she said that "While at the office of Mr. Arnold
Mollaneda, Division Superintendent DECS XI, she was
requested by the latter to transfer in the office of Mr. Rolando
Suase as the janitor/security guard was cleaning the room of
the respondent."
And her version as published in The Mindanao Daily Mirror in
the issue of September 10, 1994 (see ANNEX C of the
complaint of Mollaneda to the City Prosecution Office).
"Omacob said Mollaneda in a written note told her to transfer to
the room of a certain Rolando Suase since the janitor will clean
his room. But before she could move to the other room
Mollaneda allegedly hugged, kissed and mashed her breast
and told her not to tell it to anybody."
3) In her instant Affidavit-Complaint, she again says "while
inside the Office of Mr. Rolando P. Suase x x x to follow-up my
request for transfer x x x Mr. Suase was not around and it was
Schools Division Superintendent, Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda who
was seated at his (Rolando) table, as at that time, the Office of
Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda just adjacent was being cleaned by a
janitor x x x." It was inside the office of Mr. Suase that she was
given a note on her request for transfer by Mr. Mollaneda to be
given to May Pescadero when "At this point, he stood up
bringing along with him the paper so that I also stood-up,
however, before I could get outside the office, he then handed
to me the said piece of paper and advised me to give it to a
certain May Pescadero, personnel clerk for the making/cutting
of the order of transfer and at the same time all of a sudden, he
hug and embraced me, then he kissed my nose and lips in a
torrid manner. That I tried to resist but he forcibly held my neck
so that he was able to kiss me in an easy way. That not
contented, he then mashed my left breast, which he did the
malicious act for several times, afterwhich he warned me not to
tell anybody what he did to me inside the office."5
In the present petition, petitioner alleged his own version of the
incident,6 thus:
"Petitioner, in his sworn statement, stated that on September 7,
1994, he had interviewed or conferred with about three (3)
persons already who were applying for new teaching positions
or for transfers when Respondent came to HIS OFFICE. When
it was her turn to be interviewed, petitioner told her that she
could not be transferred immediately because the Division only
had very few vacant items and the same were already given to
earlier applicants. Nevertheless, she was told to wait while he
searched for a new vacant item.
Petitioner gave the Respondent a note for her to give to the
Acting Personnel Officer Mildred "May" Pescadero so that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Respondent may be included in the list of teachers applying for
transfer. Upon reading the note, however, the Respondent
angrily told him why could she not be immediately
accommodated when she had the written recommendation of
Dir. Ramon Alba. She told Petitioner that asking her to wait
was unfair because there were other applicants from Marilog
district who were transferred and one of them who was slated
to be transferred was Mrs. Daylinda Bacoy.
Petitioner explained to the Respondent that Mrs. Bacoy
suffered an injury when she fell off the horse she was riding on
when she went to her school in Kiopao Elementary School.
Petitioner scolded the Respondent for her insubordinate
attitude toward him. She was counting so much on the
recommendation of Dir. Ramon Alba who was Petitioner's
superior, and could not believe that no positive action was
made by Petitioner on the basis of said recommendation. In
going OUT OF THE OFFICE OF PETITIONER, she was heard
to have murmured that Petitioner would regret his act of
discrimination.
There was no act of sexual harassment that occurred during
the relatively brief conversation between the herein parties.
The witnesses, whose affidavits were attached to the Affidavit
of Mr. Mollaneda, all swore to the fact that they saw what
transpired between Petitioner and the Respondent and that
there was no act of sexual harassment that occurred.
Moreover, they swore to the fact that the interview took place
inside Mr. Mollaneda's office as the both parties were seen
through a glass panel separating Petitioner's office and the
anteroom."
Meanwhile, pending resolution by the CSC-RO XI of
respondent's complaint, the DECS investigating committee
recommended to the DECS Regional Director "the dropping of
the case" for lack of merit.7
On June 5, 1995, the CSC-RO XI issued a resolution charging
petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of
authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The said office found there was a prima facie case
against him8 and eventually elevated to the Civil Service
Commission (Commission) the records of the case.
Thereafter, the Commission designated Atty. Anacleto Buena
to hear and receive the evidence in the case. A formal hearing
was conducted in Davao City. Both parties were assisted by
counsel.
On July 7, 1997, the Commission issued Resolution No.
973277 finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the government
service with all its accessory penalties.9 Forthwith, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in Resolution
No. 981761.10
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review alleging: "first, that the Commission erred in
finding him guilty x x x notwithstanding the fact that he was
denied his right to due process; and second, that the
Commission erred in giving weight to the hearsay testimonies
of the witnesses for respondent."11
On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision12 affirming in toto Resolution No. 973277 of the
Commission. The appellate court held:
"It is a time-honored rule that the matter of assigning values to
the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts,
tribunals, or administrative bodies or agencies exercising
quasi-judicial powers. Unlike appellate courts, they can weigh
such testimony in clear observance of the demeanor, conduct
and attitude of the witnesses at the trial or hearing. Thus,
absent any showing that they have overlooked facts of
substance and value that if considered might affect the result,
their findings must be given weight and respect.
In the present case, nothing significant has been shown to
convince this Court that the Commission acted with bias or
ignored something of substance that could have, in any
degree, warranted an exoneration of petitioner from the
charges hurled against him.
It bears mentioning that respondent victim is a public school
teacher. If she is not motivated by the truth, she would not
have subjected herself to the rigors of a hearing before the
Commission and airing in public matters that affect her honor.
It is hard to conceive that respondent would reveal and admit
the shameful and humiliating experience she had undergone if
it were not true. In any case, the fact that petitioner could not
proffer any explanation as to why respondent and the
prosecution witnesses would falsely testify against him logically
proves that no improper motive impelled them to accuse the
former of such serious offense as sexual harassment.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner, in the present case, may not successfully plead
violation of his right to due process as he, in fact, participated
at the pre-trial, agreed to matters therein taken up, attended
the hearing, and lengthily cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses.
Anent petitioner's contention that the decision of the
Commission was in conflict with newspaper reports of a
decision dismissing the case against him for insufficiency of
evidence, suffice it to state that what the movant considers as
a decision is merely a newspaper report. Newspaper accounts
and clippings are hearsay and have no evidentiary
value. (People vs. Aguel, 97 SCRA 795)."13
Rebuffed in his bid for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
Decision, petitioner filed the instant petition, and as grounds
therefor alleges:
"I
THE RELIANCE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE
THEORY THAT FINDINGS OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES
ARE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT, IS MISPLACED IN
VIEW OF THE PERTINENT FACTS OF THE CASE.
II
A SIMILAR ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WAS INSTITUTED IN
AND INVESTIGATED BY THE D.E.C.S. AND A RESOLUTION
WAS RENDERED DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINST
PETITIONER.
III
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PETITIONER WERE ALL EYE-WITNESSES TO THE ACTUAL
INCIDENT, WHICH CAST DOUBT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF
THE RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONY."14
Petitioner contends that the oft-cited rule - the matter of
assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best
performed by the x x x administrative bodies or agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers - finds no application in the
present case. According to petitioner, the failure of the CSC
Commissioners to "personally observe the demeanor, conduct
and attitude of the witnesses" and their reliance solely on Atty.
Buena's recommendation and notes should have discouraged
the Court of Appeals from giving weight to the findings of the
Commission. Petitioner also argues that respondent engaged
in forum shopping by filing her affidavit-complaint with the
DECS-RO XI and CSC-RO XI; and that the Court of Appeals
should have considered in his favor the DECS-RO XI's
resolution dismissing the administrative case against him.
Finally, petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erroneously
gave credence to the "hearsay" testimonies of Melencio
Umacob, respondent's husband, and Venus Mariano, secretary
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
of the Assistant Division Superintendent of the Davao City
Schools. These witnesses testified that respondent narrated to
them the events concerning the sexual harassment committed
against her by petitioner.
For her part, respondent reiterates the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that in reviewing administrative cases, the appellate
court is traditionally sanctioned to subscribe to the findings of
the lower court or administrative body or agency since it is in a
better position to determine the credibility of witnesses. As to
the alleged "act of forum-shopping," petitioner claims that in
pursuing redress of her grievances, she sought refuge both in
the court and in the Commission for she believed they are the
proper fora for her criminal and administrative complaints. And
lastly, respondent counters that the Commission did not err in
giving more credence to the testimonies of her witnesses,
stressing that petitioner's witnesses are biased, they being his
subordinates.
During the pendency of this case in this Court, petitioner
submitted the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5,
Davao City, acquitting him of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness which arose from the same incident involved in
the present administrative case.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is
actually urging us not to give credence to the factual findings of
the Commission on the ground that the Commissioners did not
personally hear the case.
The fact that the Commission assigned Atty. Buena to hear and
receive evidence does not render its factual findings unworthy
of credence. In laying down the precedent that the matter of
assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best
performed by trial courts or administrative bodies rather than
by appellate courts, this Court merely recognizes that the trial
court or the administrative body as a trier of facts is in a better
position to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and the
credibility of their testimonies as they were within its proximal
view during the hearing or investigation. At any rate, it cannot
be gainsaid that the term "administrative body or agency"
includes the subordinate officials upon whose hand the body or
agency delegates a portion of its authority. Included therein are
the hearing officers through whose eyes and ears the
administrative body or agency observes the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses and listens to their
testimonies.15
It must be emphasized that the appointment of competent
officers to hear and receive evidence is commonly resorted to
by administrative bodies or agencies in the interest of an
orderly and efficient disposition of administrative cases. This
Court, in American Tobacco Company v. Director of
Patents,16 ruled:
"Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides
solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not
preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the
basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be
made."
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his
own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from
utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the
aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts,
on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are
those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due
process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that
the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who
will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not
deprived of his right to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by
the evidence in the record, there is no question that the
requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In
short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the
officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is
made by said officer. It is, however, required that to "give the
substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making
determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the
determinations must consider and appraise the evidence
which justifies them.
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make
preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the
hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of
all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of
Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is
procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in
what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings."
Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may
employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or
investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing and make
reports on the basis of which the agency shall render its
decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity. Corollarily,
in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the cardinal
requirements of due process in administrative proceedings,
one of which is that "the tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate."17 Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate
was rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where the
hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate,
the body or agency shall not merely rely on his
recommendation but instead shall personally weigh and
assess the evidence which the said subordinate has gathered.
In the case at bar, it is evident that the Commission itself
evaluated in detail the evidence of both parties as reported by
Atty. Buena. In fact, in laying down its conclusion, it made
constant reference to the testimonies of the parties and of their
witnesses and to the documentary evidence presented.
It must be addressed that, the Commission's act of delegating
the authority to hear and receive evidence to Atty. Buena is not
without legal basis. Section 47, Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987)
provides that the Commission may deputize any department or
agency or official or group of officials to conduct an
investigation on the complaint filed by a private citizen against
a government official or employee. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other
action to be taken.
Going further, petitioner complains that he was not furnished a
copy of Atty. Buena's notes and recommendation. The Court
cannot empathize with him. In Ruiz v. Drilon,18 we
unequivocally held that a respondent in an administrative case
is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendation of any investigating committee created to
inquire into the charges filed against him. He is entitled only to
the administrative decision based on substantial evidence
made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the
charges and the evidence presented against him during the
hearing.19 Besides, Atty. Buena's findings and recommendation
are internal communications between him and the Commission
and, therefore, confidential. In Pefianco v. Moral,20 this Court
held:
"Respondent's (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of
the DECS Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the
Decision itself x x x [t]he report is an internal communication
between the Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary,
and therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and
used the same in making his own determination of the facts
and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the Decision
he may make.
The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be
used as part - although not controlling - of the basis for the
decision. Only when the party adversely affected by the
decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Commission may all the records of the case, including the
aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. In the latter
appellate tribunal, the respondent's counsel may be allowed to
read and/or be given a copy of the Report to enable the
appellant to file an intelligent and exhaustive appellant's Brief
Memorandum."
Petitioner's second argument requires no lengthy discussion.
First, he did not raise the issue of forum-shopping before the
Commission.21 It bears emphasis that respondent merely
furnished the DECS-RO XI a copy of her affidavit-complaint.
And second, we surveyed the records and there is nothing
therein which supports petitioner's claim that the DECS-RO XI
dismissed respondent's affidavit-complaint. The resolution22 of
the DECS mainly recommended to the Regional Director of the
DECS-RO XI the dropping of the case. A recommendatory
resolution does not have the effect of actually disposing of a
case. Its function is merely to advise the disciplining authority
of what action should be taken or what penalty should be
imposed. It is not controlling and the disciplining authority may
or may not conform with the recommended action.
On petitioner's assertion that the testimony of respondent's
witnesses are hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in
evidence, we are constrained to hold a different view. A reading
of the testimonies of Umacob and Mariano shows that they
were not presented to prove the truth of respondent's
accusations against petitioner, but only to establish the fact
that respondent narrated to them what transpired between her
and petitioner. While it is true that the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the
fact that the statement was made.23 Regardless of the truth or
falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement
may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making
of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.24
Significantly, respondent herself and her witnesses were
present during the hearing of the case. Hence, petitioner was
given the opportunity to cross-examine them. The real basis for
the exclusion of hearsay evidence lies in the fact that a
hearsay testimony is not subject to the tests which can
ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of the truth of
testimony, since the declarant is not present and available for
cross-examination.25
Lastly, petitioner cannot find solace in the dismissal of the
criminal case against him. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence
is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case against an
accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence does not foreclose the
administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill
of health in all respects. In dismissing the case, the court is
simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the
guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a
condition sine qua non for conviction because of the
presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees
an accused.26 However, in administrative proceedings, the
quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.27 Substantial evidence means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.28 After a more incisive scrutiny of the
records, we are convinced that petitioner's culpability has been
proven by substantial evidence. Respondent's testimony was
found by the Commission to be "natural, straightforward,
spontaneous and convincing."29 Unlike petitioner's testimony,
that of respondent is replete with details consistent with human
nature. Clearly, the dismissal of the criminal case against
petitioner by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Davao City
cannot bind this Court in the disposition of the instant
administrative case.30
In sum, we find no reason to reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals. While it is unfotunate that petitioner will lose his job
because of a moment's indiscretion, this Court shall not flinch
in imposing upon him the severe penalty of dismissal. As
Schools Division Superintendent, petitioner is bound by a high
standard of work ethics. By succumbing to his moral perversity,
he failed to live up to such standard. Indeed, he provided a
justifiable ground for his dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Penned by Justice Artemio Tuquero and concurred in by Justices Eubolo
Verzola and Candido Rivera, Rollo, pp. 22-31.
2
Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 44-45.
3
Annex "D" of the Petiton, Rollo, p. 46.
4
Annex "H" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 68.
5
Annex "G" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 49-50.
6
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
7
Annex "M" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 74-75.
8
Resolution dated June 5, 1995, Annex "N" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 76-80.
9
Rollo, pp. 82-88.
10
Rollo, pp. 102-108.
11
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 28.
12
Rollo, pp. 23-31.
13
Rollo, pp. 29-31.
14
Petition, Rollo, p. 10.
15
"The necessary rule (the one who decides must hear) does not preclude
practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the
department. Assistants may prosecute inquiries. Evidence may be taken by an
examiner. Evidence thus taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent
subordinates. Arguments may be oral or written. The requirements are not
technical. But there must be a hearing in a substantial sense. And to give the
substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon
evidence, the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise
the evidence which justifies them." (Morgan vs. United States of America, 298 US
468-482 [OCT 1935], 80 L. ed 1288-1296)
16
67 SCRA 287 (1975); Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. vs.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 211 SCRA 565 (1992); National Union of
Printing Workers vs. Asia Printing, et al., 99 Phil 589 (1956); Cebu Transit Co. vs.
Jereza, 58 Phil 760 (1933).
17
Lupo v. Administrative Action Board, 190 SCRA 69 (1990).
18
209 SCRA 695 (1992).
19
Pefianco v. Moral, 322 SCRA 439 (2000).
20
21
Ibid.
Gardose v. Tarroza, 290 SCRA 186 (1998).
22
Rollo, pp. 74-75.
23
People v. Cusi, Jr., 14 SCRA 944 (1965).
24
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 607 (1997).
25
Francisco, Evidence, 1996 Ed., 246; 20 Am Jur. 400-401.
26
Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1 (1993).
27
Vedaa v. Valencia 295 SCRA 1 (1998) Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423
(1998); Lorena v. Encomienda 302 SCRA 632 (1999); Lachica v. Flordeliza, 254
SCRA 278 (1996); Manila Central Line Corp. v. Manila Central Line Free Workers
Union-National Federation of Labor, 290 SCRA 690 (1998).
28
Heirs of E.B. Roxas, Inc. v. Tolentino 167 SCRA 334 (1988).
29
Resolution No. 973277, Rollo, p. 85
30
Moreno v. Bragat 293 SCRA 581 (1998); Office of the Court Administrator v.
Matas 247 SCRA 9 (1995); Agpalo, The Law of Public Officers, First Ed. 1998, p.
367.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40824 February 23, 1989
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MR. & MRS. ISABELO R.
RACHO, respondents.
The Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.
Lorenzo A. Sales for private respondents.
REGALADO , J.:
Private respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Isabelo R. Racho, together
with the spouses Mr. and Mrs Flaviano Lagasca, executed a
deed of mortgage, dated November 13, 1957, in favor of
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter
referred to as GSIS) and subsequently, another deed of
mortgage, dated April 14, 1958, in connection with two loans
granted by the latter in the sums of P 11,500.00 and P
3,000.00, respectively. 1 A parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 38989 of the Register of Deed of
Quezon City, co-owned by said mortgagor spouses, was given
as security under the aforesaid two deeds. 2 They also
executed a 'promissory note" which states in part:
... for value received, we the undersigned ... JOINTLY,
SEVERALLY and SOLIDARILY, promise to pay the
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM the sum of .
. . (P 11,500.00) Philippine Currency, with interest at the rate of
six (6%) per centum compounded monthly payable in . . .
(120)equal monthly installments of . . . (P 127.65) each. 3
On July 11, 1961, the Lagasca spouses executed an
instrument denominated "Assumption of Mortgage" under
which they obligated themselves to assume the aforesaid
obligation to the GSIS and to secure the release of the
mortgage covering that portion of the land belonging to herein
private respondents and which was mortgaged to the
GSIS. 4 This undertaking was not fulfilled. 5
Upon failure of the mortgagors to comply with the conditions of
the mortgage, particularly the payment of the amortizations
due, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and caused
the mortgaged property to be sold at public auction on
December 3, 1962. 6
More than two years thereafter, or on August 23, 1965, herein
private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner and
the Lagasca spouses in the former Court of
First Instance of Quezon City, 7 praying that the extrajudicial
foreclosure "made on, their property and all other documents
executed in relation thereto in favor of the Government Service
Insurance System" be declared null and void. It was further
prayed that they be allowed to recover said property, and/or
the GSIS be ordered to pay them the value thereof, and/or they
be allowed to repurchase the land. Additionally, they asked for
actual and moral damages and attorney's fees.
In their aforesaid complaint, private respondents alleged that
they signed the mortgage contracts not as sureties or
guarantors for the Lagasca spouses but they merely gave their
common property to the said co-owners who were solely
benefited by the loans from the GSIS.
The trial court rendered judgment on February 25, 1968
dismissing the complaint for failure to establish a cause of
action. 8
Said decision was reversed by the respondent Court of
Appeals 9 which held that:
... although formally they are co-mortgagors, they are so only
for accomodation (sic) in that the GSIS required their consent
to the mortgage of the entire parcel of land which was covered
with only one certificate of title, with full knowledge that the
loans secured thereby were solely for the benefit of the
appellant (sic) spouses who alone applied for the loan.
xxxx
'It is, therefore, clear that as against the GSIS, appellants have
a valid cause for having foreclosed the mortgage without
having given sufficient notice to them as required either as to
their delinquency in the payment of amortization or as to the
subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of any
default in such payment. The notice published in the
newspaper, 'Daily Record (Exh. 12) and posted pursuant to
Sec 3 of Act 3135 is not the notice to which the mortgagor is
entitled upon the application being made for an extrajudicial
foreclosure. ... 10
On the foregoing findings, the respondent court consequently
decreed that-
In view of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed, and another one entered (1) declaring the
foreclosure of the mortgage void insofar as it affects the share
of the appellants; (2) directing the GSIS to reconvey to
appellants their share of the mortgaged property, or the value
thereof if already sold to third party, in the sum of P 35,000.00,
and (3) ordering the appellees Flaviano Lagasca and Esther
Lagasca to pay the appellants the sum of P 10,00.00 as moral
damages, P 5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. 11
The case is now before us in this petition for review.
In submitting their case to this Court, both parties relied on the
provisions of Section 29 of Act No. 2031, otherwise known as
the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provide that an
accommodation party is one who has signed an instrument as
maker, drawer, acceptor of indorser without receiving value
therefor, but is held liable on the instrument to a holder for
value although the latter knew him to be only an
accommodation party.
This approach of both parties appears to be misdirected and
their reliance misplaced. The promissory note hereinbefore
quoted, as well as the mortgage deeds subject of this case, are
clearly not negotiable instruments. These documents do not
comply with the fourth requisite to be considered as such
under Section 1 of Act No. 2031 because they are neither
payable to order nor to bearer. The note is payable to a
specified party, the GSIS. Absent the aforesaid requisite, the
provisions of Act No. 2031 would not apply; governance shall
be afforded, instead, by the provisions of the Civil Code and
special laws on mortgages.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
As earlier indicated, the factual findings of respondent court
are that private respondents signed the documents "only to
give their consent to the mortgage as required by GSIS", with
the latter having full knowledge that the loans secured thereby
were solely for the benefit of the Lagasca spouses. 12 This
appears to be duly supported by sufficient evidence on record.
Indeed, it would be unusual for the GSIS to arrange for and
deduct the monthly amortizations on the loans from the salary
as an army officer of Flaviano Lagasca without likewise
affecting deductions from the salary of Isabelo Racho who was
also an army sergeant. Then there is also the undisputed fact,
as already stated, that the Lagasca spouses executed a so-
called "Assumption of Mortgage" promising to exclude private
respondents and their share of the mortgaged property from
liability to the mortgagee. There is no intimation that the former
executed such instrument for a consideration, thus confirming
that they did so pursuant to their original agreement.
The parol evidence rule 13 cannot be used by petitioner as a
shield in this case for it is clear that there was no objection in
the court below regarding the admissibility of the testimony and
documents that were presented to prove that the private
respondents signed the mortgage papers just to accommodate
their co-owners, the Lagasca spouses. Besides, the
introduction of such evidence falls under the exception to said
rule, there being allegations in the complaint of private
respondents in the court below regarding the failure of the
mortgage contracts to express the true agreement of the
parties. 14
However, contrary to the holding of the respondent court, it
cannot be said that private respondents are without liability
under the aforesaid mortgage contracts. The factual context of
this case is precisely what is contemplated in the last
paragraph of Article 2085 of the Civil Code to the effect that
third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation
may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own
property
So long as valid consent was given, the fact that the loans
were solely for the benefit of the Lagasca spouses would not
invalidate the mortgage with respect to private respondents'
share in the property. In consenting thereto, even assuming
that private respondents may not be assuming personal liability
for the debt, their share in the property shall nevertheless
secure and respond for the performance of the principal
obligation. The parties to the mortgage could not have
intended that the same would apply only to the aliquot portion
of the Lagasca spouses in the property, otherwise the consent
of the private respondents would not have been required.
The supposed requirement of prior demand on the private
respondents would not be in point here since the mortgage
contracts created obligations with specific terms for the
compliance thereof. The facts further show that the private
respondents expressly bound themselves as solidary debtors
in the promissory note hereinbefore quoted.
Coming now to the extrajudicial foreclosure effected by GSIS,
We cannot agree with the ruling of respondent court that lack
of notice to the private respondents of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale impairs the validity thereof. In Bonnevie, et al.
vs. Court of appeals, et al., 15 the Court ruled that Act No. 3135,
as amended, does not require personal notice on the
mortgagor, quoting the requirement on notice in such cases as
follows:
Section 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of sale for
not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality where the property is situated, and if such property
is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also
be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
There is no showing that the foregoing requirement on notice
was not complied with in the foreclosure sale complained of .
The respondent court, therefore, erred in annulling the
mortgage insofar as it affected the share of private
respondents or in directing reconveyance of their property or
the payment of the value thereof Indubitably, whether or not
private respondents herein benefited from the loan, the
mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were
valid.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and REINSTATING the
decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. Q-9418 thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Record on Appeal, 9, 22; Rollo, 54.
2 Rollo, 58.
3 Ibid., 26.
4 Record on Appeal, 27-31; Rollo, 54.
5 Rollo, 59.
6 Ibid., Id.; Record on Appeal, 64.
7 Branch IV, Civil Case No. Q-9418; Record on Appeal, 1- 38; Rollo, 54.
8 Record on Appeal, 69-73; Ibid.
9 CA-G.R. No. 42193-R; Justice Pacifica P. de Castro, ponente, Justices
Luis B. Reyes and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., concurring.
10 Rollo, 61-63.
11 Ibid., 66.
12 Ibid., 61.
13 Sec. 7, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
14 Record on Appeal, 3-4; Rollo, 54.
15 125 SCRA 122 (1983).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN
BERNAS, S. J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO,
JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO
ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS
HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO,
RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA. petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the
RTC-Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST
MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO
SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and
JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson &
Jimenes for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for
petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo.
Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
In 1975, the Court was confronted with
a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, a religious
seminary which has a working arrangement with the Ateneo de
Manila University regarding accreditation of common students,
to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for
credit during summer, to continue her studies. 1 Squarely
meeting the issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that
students in the position of petitioner possess, not a right, but a
privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied
the prime and indispensable requisite of
a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a
clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner,
the petition did not prosper.
In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom
of institutions of higher learning, as recognized by the
Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a school to
choose its students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse
admittance to its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila
University proper, is again challenged.
Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening
paragraph, the individual concerned was not a regular student,
the respondents in the case at bar, having been previously
enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the
earlier case, the petitioner was refused admittance, not on
such considerations as personality traits and character
orientation, or even inability to meet the institution's academic
or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the
classroom. The school pointedly informed her that ". . . it would
seem to be in your best interest to work with a Faculty that is
more compatible with your orientations."
On the other hand, students who are now being refused
admission into petitioner University have been found guilty of
violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The
case attracted much publicity due to the death of one of the
neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted on another.
Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another
dimension to the concept of academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning, this time a case fraught with social and
emotional overtones.
The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel,
are as follows:
As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity
organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on
February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining
its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie"
H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of
serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital on
February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for
another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was
also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal
failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted
upon him on the same occasion.
In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia
del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee 2 which was tasked to investigate and
submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required
respondent students to submit their written statements within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent
students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file
a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive
suspension. 3 Through their respective counsels, they
requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or
affidavits.
In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students
for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." 4
Respondent students were then required to file their written
answers to the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991;
otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to
present their defenses.
On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary
Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan,
Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel
Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against
respondent students.
In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were
informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on
Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter
also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from
initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against
you consist of testimonies of students, showing your
participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations."
Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written
answers to the above charge on or before February 22 1991,
otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their
defenses. 5
In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students,
through counsel, requested that the investigation against them
be held in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies
of the evidence against them. 6
Respondent students were then directed by the Board to
appear before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify
their answer with regard to the charges filed by the
investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in
a letter to a petitioners dated February 27, 1991, counsel for
respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from
February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. 7
Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on
March 2, 1991 for clarificatory questions. 8 They were also
informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance
with the rules laid down in the case of Guzman vs. National
University; 9
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-
neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be
defined in accordance with the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina,
Senate Bill No. 3815;
d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of
participation of the petitioners in the alleged hazing incident
in imposing the penalty;
e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the
President of the University, i. e., Respondent Joaquin Bernas S.
J.
On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that,
"in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board
leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that
this case be decided not just on the Law School level but also
on the University level." 10
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found
respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo
Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students
acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites
of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which
allows them to participate in the physical hazing. Although
respondent students claim that they were there to assist and
attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were
assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized
activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made
no effort to prevent the infliction of further physical punishment
on the neophytes under their care. The Board considered
respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of
hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents
guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through
acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity
among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal,
the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her
prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the
President of the University the decision of whether to expel
respondents or not.
Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila
University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus:
"that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;'
that even assuming they did not lay hands on the neophytes,"
respondents students are still guilty in accordance with the
principle that "where two or more persons act together in the
commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical
volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is
responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the
offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded
that the "offense of the respondents can be characterized as
grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian
education and contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he
imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. 12
In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by
petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the Board excluded respondent
students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the
resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter
resolution was promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their
case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of
the two students on March 21, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they
were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of
school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is
issued, they would be prevented from taking their
examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged
lack of due process in their dismissal.
On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary
restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing
respondent students and stopping the former from conducting
hearings relative to the hazing incident. 15
Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary
restraining order were then held. On April 7, 1991, the
temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991
lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the
temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a
Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon
Caguioa, and Ramon Ereeta to investigate the charges of
hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a
Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of
the Special Board, as additional respondents to the original
petition. 16
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing
that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to
the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the
conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against
respondent students; that a supplemental petition cannot be
admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the
supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining
order beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime. 17 Acting on the
urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for
a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of
respondents Judge Capulong, granted respondent students'
prayer on April 10, 1991. 18
On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to
reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court
ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of
the final examinations which allegedly the students were not
allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status
quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo
Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant
case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in
the amount of P50,000.00. 19
On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board
investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the
dropping of their names from its roll of students. 20
The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge
issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by
respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of
P50,000.00.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of
respondent judge. 21
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues
on academic freedom, namely: (1) whether a school is within
its rights in expelling students from its academic community
pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2)
whether or not the penalty imposed by the school
administration is proper under the circumstances.
We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent
judge ordering readmission of respondent students.
Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when
he ruled that respondent students had been denied due
process in the investigation of the charges against them.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the
decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President
of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived
at without affording them their right to procedural due process.
We are constrained to disagree as we find no indication that
such right has been violated. On the contrary, respondent
students' rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as
enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National
University, 22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch 23 and Non v.
Dames II 24 have been meticulously respected by petitioners in
the various investigative proceedings held before they were
expelled.
Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their
argument that it is Ang Tibay case 25 and not the Guzman case
which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases
essentially deal with the requirements of due process,
the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case, since
the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be
satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have
the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case. 26
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements
were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa,
petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law
School, notified and required respondent students on February
11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written
statement on the incident, 27 the records show that instead of
filing a reply, respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While of the students
mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted
written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter
were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file
their statements. 29
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were
adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February
14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991
letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as
contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed
individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters
dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that
respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce
evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled
against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the
very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration
Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler
and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed
pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since
they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the
written statements which became the basis of petitioners'
February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due
process. 31 Granting that they were denied such opportunity,
the same may not be said to detract from the observance of
due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students'
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the
March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the
investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals
that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz. 32
Respondent students' contention that the investigating
committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth
because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it
was reached only after receiving the written statements and
hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. 33 Similarly, the
Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was
preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent
students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault
petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and
allege that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of
the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits
hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who
aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be
overemphasized that the charge filed before the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and
the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect
to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had
occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due
process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 34 Accordingly,
disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with
the precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having
given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which
is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in
accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the
subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to
be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the
investigation under scrutiny.
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of
dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing
frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by
their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of
reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the
school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit
d' corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of
those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a
position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering
that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before
the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of
Appeals. 35
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, 36 as in this case, where the issue is whether or not
respondent students have been afforded procedural due
process prior to their dismissal from petitioner university.
Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a
Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to
suffer irreperable damage in the event that private respondents
are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who
have been investigated and found by the Disciplinary Board to
have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and
standards will certainly undermine the authority of the
administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to
do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's
academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935,
1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential
freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term
"academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 37 thus: (1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught;
(3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to
study.
Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to
claim the title "gadfly of the State" has deservedly earned for
himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr
to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great
teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most
sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he
willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for
alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his
own words how this charge of "corruption," the forerunner of
the concept of academic freedom, came about:
Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do,
come about me of their own accord: they like to heart the
pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine
others themselves; there are plenty of person, as they soon
discover, who think that they know something, but really know
little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them
instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This
confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of
youth. And then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does
he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in
order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the
ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers
about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth,
and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better
cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of
knowledge has been detected which is the truth; and as
they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in
battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your
ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. 38
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic
mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority,
whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to
give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the
insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the
time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities,
renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their
autonomy.
In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations
along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of
freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the
dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors
of the new German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries
such as the Universities of Leiden (1554), Helmstatdt (1574)
and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of
inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental
human rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic
freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging
rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been
associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and
the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in
university communities, such as professors, researchers and
administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the
immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever
it may lead," free from internal and external interference or
pressure.
But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the
freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into
unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of
academic freedom have been stressed the need for assuring
to such individuals a measure of independence through the
guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The
components of this aspect of academic freedom have been
categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how
to teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic
freedom could have developed only pari passu with its
institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the
right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure. In
the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of:
(1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may
be admitted to study.
In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change
of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government,
namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy
Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed
under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most
especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the
term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions
to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.
The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5
of the 1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities established
by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State
University at that time, being the University of the Philippines,
the Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank
favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the rest.
In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973
Constitution provided in its Section 8(2): "All institutions of
higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his
interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G.
Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of
academic freedom to the University as an institution as
distinguished from the academic freedom of a university
professor." 39
Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution?
In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded
coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission of the 1986 came up with this formulation:
"Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers,
and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing
speeches, the final version which was none too different from
the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions,
as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In
anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of
academic freedom are included herein, ConCom
Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers
of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic
freedom." 40
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon
asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we
mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution
itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . . "
Gascon finished off the broken thought, "the faculty and the
students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we have
consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to
an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school,
the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather
than a right. While under the education Act of 1982, students
have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by
the academic institution. 42
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable
rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and
promotion of students. This . . . extends as well to parents . . .
as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the
schools." 43
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of the college.
The rules may include those governing student
discipline." 44 Going a step further, the establishment of rules
governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of
militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students
demanded and plucked for themselves from the ponoply of
academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the
rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Holfeldian terms,
they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn
under the rules laid down by the school.
Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as
their own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of
its curriculum and assidously strives to turn out individuals of
unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder
of the order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and
their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are
the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are
established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the
studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the
development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.
In essence, education must ultimately be religious not in the sense
that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or
profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the
renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education
which inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears that the particular
brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been
lost on the respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as
the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they
may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently
enrolled, as well as those who come after them.
Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v.
Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and
orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the
circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit
petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student
body." 46 Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but
congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a
congruence between the offense committed and the sanction imposed
was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento. 47
Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by
petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded
on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991,
the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent
students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result
of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while
Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of
respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as
"brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the
imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even
suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty
of dismissal upon respondent students. This finds authority and
justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools. 48
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of
respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondents
students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The
resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo
de Manila University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the
decision of the Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL
ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. I do not join in the statement in
the ponencia which seem to me to be a prejudgment of the criminal
cases against the private respondents for the death of Lenny Villa.
# Footnotes
1 Garcia v. The Faculty Admission's Committee, Loyola School of Theology, No.
L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 227-298.
2 Composed of Faculty Members: Atty(s) Jacinto Jimenez, Sedfrey Candelaria,
Carlos Medina, Alternate: Dean Antonio Abad. Students: Mr.(s)Arthur Yap,
Reynaldo Dizon, Ms Patricia Ty. Administration: Dean Cynthia del Castillo
(Chairperson).
3 Annex B, Rollo, p. 41.
4 DISCIPLINE
Dedication to study, respect for authority, strict observance of the rules and
regulations of the University and the school and unfailing courtesy are expected
at all times of all Ateneo Students. The Administration reserves to itself the right
to suspend, dismiss from the School at any time, strike from the list of candidates
for graduation and/or withhold the Ateneo diploma from or expel any student
whom it may deem unworthy. Any of the following acts shall constitute a ground
for suspension, dismissal striking from the list of candidates for graduation and/or
withholding of the Ateneo diploma, or expulsion, depending on the severity of the
offense:
xxx xxx xxx
3 Hazing; carrying deadly weapons; drunkeness, vandalism; "assaulting a
professor or any other school authority, including members of the staff or
employees of the School;" Petition, p. 8, emphasis supplied.
5 Annex D, Rollo, p. 45.
6 Annex E, Rollo, p. 46.
7 Annex F, Rollo, p. 48
8 Annex G, Rollo, p. 49.
9 L-68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699.
10 Annex Q, Rollo, p. 88.
11 Annex H, Rollo, p. 175.
12 The dismissed students are: Ernest Montecillo, E Amado Sabban, Joseph
Lledo, Santiago Ranada III, Judge Fernandez, Dalmacio Lim, Adel Abas, Ronan
de Guzman, Zosimo Mendoza and Manuel Escalona. Annex I, Rollo, p. 52.
13 Annex J, Rollo, p. 54.
14 Annex K, Rollo, p. 55.
15 Annex L, Rollo, pp. 67.
16 Annex M, Rollo, pp. 68-73.
17 Annex N, Rollo, pp. 76-81.
18 Annex A, Rollo, p. 40.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

19 Annex M, Rollo, p. 189.

20 Annex M, Rollo, p. 189.
21 Of the respondent students dismissed in the March 10, 1991 Resolution,
Santiago Ranada III and Ronan de Guzman are not named private respondents
herein.
22 L-68288, July 11, 1986 142 SCRA 699.
23 L-76353, May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA 7.
24 G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990, 185 SCRA 523.
25 69 Phil. (1940).
26 Supra, at 22.
27 Annex B, Rollo p. 41.
28 Order dated May 17, 1991, Annex A, p. 35.
29 Annex C, Rollo, p. 43.
30 See Annex B, Rollo, p. 41 and Annex D, Rollo, p. 44.
31 Rollo, p. 115.
32 Supra at 20.
33 Annex C, Rollo, p. 43.
34 Alcuaz v. PSBA, QC Branch, supra at 20.
35 Rollo, pp. 99-100.
36 PALEA v. PAL, Inc., No. L-31396, January 30, 982, 111 SCRA. 215 and
Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, No. L-26971, April 11, 1972.
37 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
38 Riley, Woodbridge, STORY OF ETHICS, Men and Morals, Vol. II, p. 62,
Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1933.
39 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, p. 489 (1962).
40 A ConCom Record, p. 439.
41 No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277. See also the cases of
Tangonan v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245 and
Magtibay v. Garcia, No. L-28971, January 28, 1983,120 SCRA 370.
42 Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, effective September 11, 1982.
43 Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals [Resolution], G.R. No. 90063, December 12,
1989.
44 Supra, at 22.
45 In his article "The Aims of Education," Alfred North Whitened explained "A
religious education is an education which includes duty and reverence. Duty
arises from our potential control over the course of events. Where attainable
knowledge could have changed the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice. And
the foundation of reverence is this perception, that the present holds within itself
the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of
time, which is eternity." Fuess, Claude M. and Basford, Emory S., Editors,
UNSEEN HARVESTS, A Treasury of Teaching, p. 92, The Macmillan Company,
1947.
46 Supra, at 43.
47 G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.
48 Ateneo de Manila v. Court of Appeals, No. L-56180, October 16, 1986, 145
SCRA 100.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167569 September 4, 2009
CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167570
JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171946
HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the
Commissioner of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; ATTY.
FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in their
capacity as Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,
vs.
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570
are petitions for review on certiorari to set aside the October
25, 2004 Decision1 and February 16, 2005 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that affirmed the
Decision3 dated January 6, 2004 and Order4 dated May 3,
2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
167 in SCA No. 2218 upholding the preparation and filing of
deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go, the corresponding
Charge Sheet5 dated July 3, 2001, and the deportation
proceedings thereunder conducted.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review
on certiorari, seeks to set aside the December 8, 2005
Decision6 and March 13, 2006 Resolution7 of the appellate
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277.
Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual
milieu, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570
and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution8 dated
February 26, 2007.
9 against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9)19 in
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for
deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration)
against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents
himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances
and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his
contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued
by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated
Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that although it
appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos
and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be
tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be
handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He
also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy,
through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover
up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents
and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine
passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,10 averring
that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a
harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in
their business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth
to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a
natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who
was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1,
paragraph 411 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act
No. 62512 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having
taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having
executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on
July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit were
registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind
such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit.
Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955
elections.13 He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines
as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no
record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-
affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in
the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and
Tagalog.14
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he
is "FChinese," he maintained that such was not of his own
doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil
Registrars Office who might have relied on his Chinese-
sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted
that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if
his fathers citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have
been changed when the employees of that office realized that
his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.15 As regards
the entry in his siblings certificates of birth, particularly Juliet
Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy
averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made
without prior consultation with his father.16
In a Resolution17 dated February 14, 2001, Associate
Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation against Jimmy. Associate
Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National
Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that
Jimmys father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with
the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation
of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to
Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
On March 8, 2001,18 the Board of Commissioners (Board)
reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of
Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys
claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his
fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the
preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges
against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed
relation to Section 45(c)20 of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise
known as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,21 as
amended, committed as follows:
xxxx
1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in
Iloilo City, as evidenced by a copy of his birth
certificate wherein his citizenship was recorded as
"Chinese";
2. That Respondent through some stealth
machinations was able to subsequently cover up his
true and actual citizenship as Chinese and illegally
acquired a Philippine Passport under the name
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
JAIME T. GAISANO, with the use of falsified
documents and untruthful declarations, in violation of
the above-cited provisions of the Immigration Act[;]
3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and
officially represent[ed] and introduce[d] himself as a
citizen of the Philippines, for fraudulent purposes and
in order to evade any requirements of the immigration
laws, also in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.22
On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition23 with application for injunctive reliefs
before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SCA
No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001
Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet,
and the proceedings had therein. In essence, they challenged
the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation
proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision24 dated April 17,
2002, in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the apprehension
and deportation of Jimmy. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of
Commissioners hereby Orders the apprehension of respondent
JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO and that he be then
deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen, without prejudice,
however, to the continuation of any and all criminal and other
proceedings that are pending in court or before the prosecution
arm of the Philippine Government, if any. And that upon
expulsion, he is thereby ordered barred from entry into the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.25
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June
13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari and
prohibition26 before the trial court and reiterated their
application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main
issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002
Decision.27 Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a
Decision28 dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the
dismissal of the petition.
Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion
was likewise denied.29
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the
Board issued a warrant of deportation30 which led to the
apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for
habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by
reason of his provisional release on bail.31
Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No.
2218 as well as the Resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They
imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing
upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their
petition was merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001
Resolution and the charge sheet.
The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.32 It did not find
merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship should
proceed only before the proper court in an independent action,
and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over
individuals who were born in the Philippines and have
exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal
also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of
being Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an
alleged alien, and in the process, determine their citizenship.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle
of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines; hence, could
not be made a ground to ones claim of Philippine citizenship.
Like the trial court, the appellate tribunal found that Carlos
failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable
period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.
Furthermore, it held that the belated submission to the local
civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance in
September 1956 was defective because the affidavit of
election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the
delay of several years before their filing with the proper office
was not satisfactorily explained.
The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved
by the appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals stated that the
trial court necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal
bases warranting the deportation proceeding in order to
determine whether the Board acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the
appellate court found that due process was properly observed
in the proceedings before the Board, contrary to the claim of
Jimmy.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration.
Their motion having been denied,33 Carlos and Jimmy each
filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court,
respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570.
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143,
Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.
issued Warrant of Deportation No. AFF-04-00334 dated
November 16, 2004 to carry out the April 17, 2002 Decision in
BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the apprehension
and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan
Detention Center, pending his deportation to China.35
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition
for habeas corpus36 before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension
and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his
release on recognizance.
In an Order37 dated December 6, 2004, the trial court
dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas
corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once
a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau.
Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was
also denied by the trial court in an Order38dated December 28,
2004.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the appellate court, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The Court of Appeals granted the
petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of
his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. The Court of
Appeals held as follows:
xxxx
the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner
without any proof whatsoever of his violation of the bail
conditions [that he was previously granted] is arbitrary,
inequitable and unjust, for the policies governing the grant of
his bail should likewise apply in the cancellation of the said
bail. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, yet considering that it is such a
harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person who all his life has always lived
in the Philippines, where he has established his family and
business interests, one who appears to be not completely
devoid of any claim to Filipino citizenship, being the son of a
Filipina, whose father is alleged to also have elected to be a
Filipino, the constitutional right of such person to due process
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
cannot be peremptorily dismissed or ignored altogether, and
indeed should not be denied. If it later turns out that the
petitioner is a Filipino after all, then the overly eager
Immigration authorities would have expelled and relegated to
statelessness one who might in fact be a Filipino by blood.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with
reference to the Warrant of Deportation issued by the BID is
hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, through Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.,
Atty. Faizal Hussin and Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of their
deputized agents, are ENJOINED from deporting petitioner
Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, until the issue of
petitioners citizenship is finally settled by the courts of justice.
SO ORDERED.39
Their motion for reconsideration40 having been denied on
March 13, 2006, Hon. Alipio Fernandez, in his capacity as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, and Atty. Faisal
Hussin and Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity as
Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of Immigration, are before
this Court as petitioners in G.R. No. 171946.
The parties have raised the following grounds for their
respective petitions:
G.R. No. 167569
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND
VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE
HEREIN PETITIONER CARLOS GO SR.S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE
RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO
DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT
THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS
THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE
COURT A QUO.
III.
A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
IV.
ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL
THE REQUIREMENTS OF COM. ACT NO. 625.
V.
PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE
"PRESUMPTION OF CITIZENSHIP."
VI.
RESPONDENTS "CAUSE OF ACTION" HAD LONG
PRESCRIBED.41
G.R. No. 167570
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND
VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONERS FATHER,
CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D.
ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE
PROCESS.
III.
THE B.I.D.S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN
PETITIONER JIMMY T. GO HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
IV.
GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE
HEREIN PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL
BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF
EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE
"SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD
BEFORE THE B.I.D.42
G.R. No. 171946
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN ENJOINING RESPONDENTS DEPORTATION. 43
Succinctly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether
the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy
had prescribed; (b) whether the deportation proceedings are
null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable
party therein; (c) whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and
Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is
substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction
from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to
give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of
alienage; (d) whether due process was properly observed in
the proceedings before the Board; and (e) whether the petition
for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
The arguments raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective
petitions are merely a rehash of the arguments they adduced
before the appellate tribunal and the trial court. Once again,
they raised the same argument of prescription. As to Carlos, it
is his position that being recognized by the government to have
acquired Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of
Election issued to him on September 11, 1956, his citizenship
could no longer be questioned at this late date. As for Jimmy,
he contends that the Boards cause of action to deport him has
prescribed for the simple reason that his arrest was not made
within five (5) years from the time the cause of action arose,
which according to him commenced in 1989 when he was
alleged to have illegally acquired a Philippine passport.
In any event, they argue that the deportation proceeding
should be nullified altogether for failure to implead Carlos as an
indispensable party therein. Jimmy posits that the deportation
case against him was made to depend upon the citizenship of
his father, Carlos, in that the Board found justification to order
his deportation by declaring that his father is a Chinese citizen
even though the latter was never made a party in the
deportation proceedings. They argue that the Board could not
simply strip Carlos of his citizenship just so they could question
the citizenship of Jimmy. To do so without affording Carlos the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine
citizenship would be the height of injustice. For failing to accord
him the requisite due process, the whole proceeding should
perforce be stuck down.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear
cases against an alleged alien, they insist that judicial
intervention may be resorted to when the claim to citizenship is
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the claim is correct, like in this case. Their claim to Philippine
citizenship, they said, is clearly shown by the fact that they
were born, had been raised and had lived in this country all
their lives; they speak fluent Tagalog and Ilonggo; they engage
in businesses reserved solely for Filipinos; they exercise their
right to suffrage; they enjoy the rights and privileges accorded
only to citizens; and they have no record of any Alien
Certificate of Registration. More importantly, they contend that
they were validly issued Philippine passports. They further
posit that the judicial intervention required is not merely a
judicial review of the proceedings below, but a full-blown,
adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the rules of evidence
are strictly observed.
Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos
opted to present controverting arguments to sustain his claim
to Philippine citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that
according to him, he was never impleaded in the deportation
proceedings.
Carlos takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that
the doctrine of jus soli failed to accord him Philippine
citizenship for the reason that the same was never extended to
the Philippines. He insists that if his Philippine citizenship is not
recognized by said doctrine, it is nonetheless recognized by
the laws enforced prior to the 1935 Constitution, particularly
the Philippine Bill of 190244 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916 (Jones Law of 1916).45
According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as
well as their children born after the passage of said laws to be
citizens of the Philippines. Because his father, Go Yin An, was
a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the
Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his
fathers citizenship. Article IV, first paragraph, of the 1935
Constitution therefore applies to him. Said constitutional
provision reads:
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
xxxx
Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos
also claims that he followed the citizenship of his Filipina
mother, being an illegitimate son, and that he even validly
elected Philippine citizenship when he complied with all the
requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He submits that what is
being disputed is not whether he complied with Com. Act No.
625, but rather, the timeliness of his compliance. He stresses
that the 3-year compliance period following the interpretation
given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice46 to Article IV, Section
1(4) of the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when
election must be made, is not an inflexible rule. He reasoned
that the same decision held that such period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino, like in his case.47
We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.
Carlos and Jimmys claim that the cause of action of the
Bureau has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on
citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an
individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed
out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission
on Elections,48 we said that decisions declaring the acquisition
or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status
with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of
the modes recognized by law for the purpose.49 Indeed, if the
issue of ones citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the
courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is
more reason why the government should not be precluded
from questioning ones claim to Philippine citizenship,
especially so when the same has never been threshed out by
any tribunal.
Jimmys invocation of prescription also does not persuade us.
Section 37 (b) of Com. Act No. 613 states:
Section 37.
xxxx
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and
12 of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be
effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the
cause of deportation arises.
xxxx
As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for
violation of Section 37(a)(9),50 in relation to Section 45(e)51of
Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing provision, his
deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made within 5
years from the time the cause for deportation arose. The court
a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year period should be
counted only from July 18, 2000, the time when Luis filed his
complaint for deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing
the action which determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription.52 Additionally, Section
2 of Act No. 3326,53 as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin to Run," provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
xxxx
The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his
passport was issued because the government was unaware
that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the government been
aware at such time that he was not a Filipino citizen or there
were certain anomalies attending his application for such
passport, it would have denied his application.
As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we
reiterate that an indispensable party is a party in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action,
and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.54 To be
indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest,
that is, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.55 Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does
not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
What is sought is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that
he is an alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be decided
on is the propriety of his deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims
that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3),56 Article IV of the 1935
Constitution because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a
citizen.57 Since his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it
becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter.
However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos citizenship
will in no way prejudice him.
Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own,
in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a
matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as
the occasion may demand.58 Res judicata may be applied in
cases of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a persons citizenship must be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.59
In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or
his deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once
again as the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall
have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury
nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be
an indispensable party in this case.
There can be no question that the Board has the authority to
hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee
and in the process determine also the question of citizenship
raised by him.60 However, this Court, following American
jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary
jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board61 wherein we stressed that
judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts
themselves believe that there is substantial evidence
supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are
reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct.62 Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a
deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings.63
While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the
same should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a
competent court in proper proceedings.64 After all, the Boards
jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of
citizenship.65 Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen
and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have
his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation
proceedings.66 The decision of the Board on the question is, of
course, not final but subject to review by the courts.671avvphi1
After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court
was not convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the
Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation
proceedings considering that what were presented particularly
the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings,
Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese
citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election of
Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as
additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on
time.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the
appellate tribunal. The question of whether substantial
evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to
the regular courts is a question of fact which is beyond this
Courts power of review for it is not a trier of facts.68 None of
the exceptions69 in which this Court may resolve factual issues
has been shown to exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their
arguments and the evidence they presented once again, the
same conclusion will still be reached.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to
Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine
or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of
jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The
doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the
acquisition of ones citizenship.70 However, the Supreme Court
abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v.
Secretary of Labor.71 Since then, said doctrine only benefited
those who were individually declared to be citizens of the
Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application
of jus soli.72
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 190273 nor the Jones Law of
191674 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim
that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at
the time of the passage of the said laws, without any
supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under
the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality.75 Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate
child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him
all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the
Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen
himself.76 However, it is our considered view that absent any
evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a
Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied
to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine
citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find that
the appellate court correctly found that it did not.
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4),
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."77
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of
majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching
21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on
cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship,
this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing
Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be
made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.78
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing
Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person
has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it
is our considered view that not a single circumstance was
sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period.
The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and
1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the
acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the
other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not
validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most,
his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a
right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not
alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is
determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights
and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof
of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to
be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens
of this country.79
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino.
No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship
must be resolved in favor of the state.80
As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their
citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same, we
have no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the
deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are ruling
that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called
upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue
of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may
be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of
the same. And we are of the opinion that said proceedings
should not be enjoined.
In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due
process was not observed in the deportation proceedings must
likewise fail.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character,
summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings.81 The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.82 As long as the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
the demands of due process are sufficiently met.83 Although
Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution
and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found that
he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present
controverting evidence, thus:
x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated
September 11, 2001 signed by BSI Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma
on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that when
his representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about the said
Order, the latter chanced upon the Resolution dated February
14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge Sheet
dated July 3, 2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he filed a
"Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum" and as
such, was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten
(10) days to submit his required memorandum. x x x84
This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due
process.
As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend
that the appellate tribunal erred in enjoining Jimmys
deportation.85
Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They
argue that the existence of the remedy of an ordinary appeal
proscribes the filing of the petition for certiorari as was done in
this case. They point out that the appeal period in habeas
corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days.
This clearly shows that an ordinary appeal is the more plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must be the one
availed of.86 Since the decision of the trial court was not
properly appealed, the same may be said to have attained
finality, and may no longer be disturbed.87
They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas
corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition for habeas
corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or
not there is a lawful ground for Jimmys apprehension and
continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board
dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmys deportation has
already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken
by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the
Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time
the decision was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they
insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmys
apprehension and detention.88
Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot
rely on the bail on recognizance he was previously granted to
question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail
can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation,
and not when the order of deportation had already been issued
by the Board.89 Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has
no legal basis. Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas
corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is
no longer proper once the applicant thereof has been charged
before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy.90Nonetheless,
they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and
academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained.91
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and
adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal
considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished
liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners
in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more
justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ.92 Contrary to the
petitioners stand, Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002
Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the
availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and
in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due
process.93 He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid
and effective until the final determination of his citizenship
before the proper courts.94 Moreover, he maintains that the
petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to
inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal,
to order the release of the detainee.95As in his petition in G.R.
No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before
the Board is void for failure to implead therein his father, and
that he should have been given a full blown trial before a
regular court where he can prove his citizenship.96
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we
find the petition in G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.a1f
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary
remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available
only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of
certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where
another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the
error.97
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the
remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-
hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that
no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-
evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to
be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 498 of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application.99
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or
the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not
be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court. The term "court" in this context includes quasi-judicial
bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.100 Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed
via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have
no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.101
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact
ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Courts
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to 16

Id.
continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas
17
Id. at 685-687.
corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it
18
Rollo, (G.R. No. 167570), pp. 155-156.
19
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
respondents regarding the same subject. designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are
charged against the alien:
DENIED. The Decision dated October 25, 2004 and Resolution dated xxxx
February 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 (9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in sections forty-
are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. five and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may
The Decision dated December 8, 2005 and Resolution dated March be brought against them: Provided, That in the case of an alien who,
13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277 are for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and December and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his
28, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, That the
imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with
are hereby REINSTATED. the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien
concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved
No pronouncement as to costs. by the Department Head;
xxxx
20
Section 45. Any individual who
SO ORDERED. xxxx
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to
be false; or
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING xxxx
Associate Justice
21
An Act to Control and Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the
Philippines, approved on August 26, 1940.
22
Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 157.
WE CONCUR: 23
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 692-742.
24
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 106-124.
25
Id. at 124.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO 26
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 743-761.
Associate Justice 27
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 125-126.
28
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 612-617.
29
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 135-136.
CONCHITA CARPIO 30
Id. at 137.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
MORALES 31
Records, p. 71, SP. Proc. No. 11447.
Associate Justice 32
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), p. 609.
Associate Justice 33
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 308.
34
Id. at 309.
ROBERTO A. ABAD 35
Id. at 310.
Associate Justice
36
Id. at 311-316.
37
Id. at 327-330.
38
Id. at 331-332.
AT T E S TAT I O N 39
Id. at 46-48.
40
Id. at 50.
41
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 566-588.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in 42
Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), pp. 32-46.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion 43
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 18.
of the Courts Division.
44
An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of
Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes,
approved on July 1, 1902.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING 45
An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as
Associate Justice to the Future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and
Chairperson to Provide a More Autonomous Government for those Islands, approved
on August 29, 1916.
46
No. L-18069, May 26, 1962, 5 SCRA 108.
C E R TI F I CATI O N 47
Id. at 110.
48
G.R. Nos. 120295 & 123755, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727.
49
Id. at 761.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division 50
Supra at 19.
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above 51
Section 45. Any individual who
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was xxxx
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. (e) Being an alien, shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to
be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any requirement of the
immigration laws; or
REYNATO S. PUNO xxxx
Chief Justice
52
Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, No. L-41427, June 10, 1988, 162 SCRA
66, 72.
53
Approved on December 4, 1926.
Footnotes 54
Rules of Court, Rule 3,
*
Additional member per Raffle of June 29, 2009 in place of Associate SEC 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.3/4Parties in
Justice Arturo D. Brion who concurred in the assailed Resolution. interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 597-609. Penned by Associate Justice shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and 55
Rules of Court, Rule 3,
Japar B. Dimaampao concurring. SEC. 2 Parties in interest.3/4A real party in interest is the party who
2
Id. at 611. stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
3
Id. at 612-617. Penned by Judge Alfredo C. Flores. party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
4
Id. at 618-619. law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
5
Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 157. name of the real party in interest.
6
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 35-49. Penned by Associate Justice See also Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116236, October 2,
Eliezer R. De los Santos with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria 1996, 262 SCRA 623, 630.
and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. concurring. 56
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
7
Id. at 50. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos with SECTION 1.
Associate Justices Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court) and xxxx
Jose C. Reyes, Jr. concurring. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
8
Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 530. xxxx
9
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 631-634. 57
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), p. 642.
10
Id. at 636-646. 58
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-21289,
11
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292, 367; Lee v. Commissioner of
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: Immigration, No. L-23446, December 20, 1971, 42 SCRA 561, 565;
xxxx Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 854, 877-878.
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. 59
Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, supra at 878. See also
xxxx Burca v. Republic, No. L-24252, June 15, 1973, 51 SCRA 248, 259-260.
12
An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine 60
Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81798, December 29, 1989, 180
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino SCRA 756, 761.
Citizen, approved on June 7, 1941. 61
96 Phil. 665 (1955).
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 642-643. 62
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra at 672. See also Co v. The
14
Id. at 645-646. Deportation Board, No. L-22748, July 29, 1977, 78 SCRA 104, 107.
15
Id. at 644.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

63
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board, id. at 671. See also Co v. The Bengzon v. Ocampo, 84 Phil. 611, 613 (1949); Ong See Hang v.
101

Deportation Board, id. at 107; Calacday v. Vivo, No. L-26681, May 29, Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-9700, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA
1970, 33 SCRA 413, 416. 442, 447.
64
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra at 672. See also Co v. The
Deportation Board, supra at 107-108.
65
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra at 670, citing Miranda, et al.
v. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531, 533 (1954).
66
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra at 671.
67
Vivo v. Montesa, No. L-24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155, 159.
68
Civil Service Commission v. Bumogas, G.R. No. 174693, August 31,
2007, 531 SCRA 780, 785.
69
Ong v. Bogalbal, G.R. No. 149140, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA
490, 501; Heirs of Dicman v. Cario, G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006,
490 SCRA 240, 261-262; Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408,
September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.
70
See United States v. Ang, 36 Phil. 858 (1917); United States v. Lim
Bin, 36 Phil. 924 (1917); Santos Co v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 52 Phil. 543 (1928); Haw v. Collector of Customs, 59 Phil. 612
(1934); Lam Swee Sang v. Commonwealth of the Philippines, 73 Phil.
309 (1941); Gallofin v. Ordoez, 70 Phil. 287 (1940).
71
79 Phil. 249, 257-258 (1947). See also Tio Tiam v. Republic of the
Philippines, 101 Phil. 195, 198-199 (1957).
72
R. Joson and R. Ledesma, Manual on the Alien Registration Act of
1950 10 (1999).
73
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection
of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at
Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
74
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except
such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
PROVIDED, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is
hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of the Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions
of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein.
75
J. Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands: Notes and
Cases Part II 929 (2004 ed.), citing Ching Leng v. Galang, 104 Phil.
1058 (1958), unreported; Serra v. Republic, 91 Phil. 914 (1952),
unreported; Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. v. Lim, 105 Phil. 1321
(1959), unreported; Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Go Callano,
No. L-24530, October 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 890.
76
In re: Florencio Mallare, Adm. Case No. 533, September 12, 1974, 59
SCRA 45, 52; Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar of
Vicente D. Ching, B.M. No. 914, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 1, 10-11.
77
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D.
Ching, supra at 8.
78
Id. at 8-9.
79
I R. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship
Laws 405 (2006 ed.)
80
Paa v. Chan, No. L-25945, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 753, 762.
81
Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682, 691 (1948).
82
CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125298,
February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 99, 111; Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111933, July 23, 1997, 276 SCRA
1, 7.
83
Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA
264, 269.
84
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 131.
85
Id. at 18.
86
Id. at 21-23.
87
Id. at 24.
88
Id. at 25-28.
89
Id. at 28.
90
Id. at 28-29.
91
Id. at 29.
92
Id. at 432-433.
93
Id. at 435-436.
94
Id. at 441.
95
Id. at 442.
96
Id. at 443-449.
97
Dwikarna v. Domingo, G.R. No. 153454, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 748,
754.
98
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized.3/4 If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
99
Office of the Solicitor General v. De Castro, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2018,
August 3, 2007, 529 SCRA 157, 168-169.
100
Id. at 169-170; Kiani v. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID),
G.R. No. 160922, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 341, 357.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional
Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled
to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail
and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions
is "No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the
exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May
23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for
hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for
the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the
issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to
Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds
probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly
let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued.
Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court
fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary
liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same
to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender
to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
respondent in its Hold Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order,
the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into
legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled
Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United
States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the
Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,
1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the
secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the
secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to
Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as
the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez
sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the
Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition
for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however,
assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said
GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 --
dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which
to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this
Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an identical
vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that
private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United
States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed
with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for
Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No.
01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was
the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15,
1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1)
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax
evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire
fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4)
false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections
1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation
of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title
18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for
his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez
filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioners application for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the
Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5,
2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on
the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused
in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on
June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July
4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of
this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under
Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing
Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize
bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such
power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114
(Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which
[were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for
allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in
extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the
existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in
extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of special circumstances
which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no
special circumstance exists that will engender a well-
founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are
ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on
May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T.
Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied
upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had
been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail
orders." 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address
are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing
before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether
he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall
take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari
arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of
Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also
preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide
us in disposing of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a
Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the
issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the
parties to submit their respective memoranda and position
papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration
motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders
are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and
(3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of
sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape
and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of
law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner
submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition is lodged
with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes
cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would
still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues
resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that
all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of
Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing
bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a
judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the
same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on
bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals,
which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court
will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of
the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to
flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the
Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court
will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given,
through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions:
(1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public
interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari
is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same
as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from
being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve
pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are
special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v.
Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and
which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs.
Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in
Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary
jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy
justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an
end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to
file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only
result in a waste of time and money.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the
higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of
Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended
its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In
the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the
proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties
involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with
that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals,
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain
direct resort to us in cases where special and
important reasons or exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the
important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it
best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings
constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as
yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an
interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a
law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069
is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition
treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,26 understanding
certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding
the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the
Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international
travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to
another for the purpose of committing crime and evading
prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly,
governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with
criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have
come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument
of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is
the only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordance with municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the
principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction
competent to try and punish them is that the number of
criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the
extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime
within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of
effective extradition arrangements and the consequent
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a
corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to
escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious
criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly
does the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in
suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by
our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the
concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest
purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy
refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and
progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the
Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its
vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster
international travel, and an expanding ring of international
crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist
state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process
to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties
thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each
others legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our
duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition
treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the
person sought to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our
full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the
requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been directly
attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused
are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by
itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the
guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of
evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission
of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms
of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal
case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.
Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment
becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres
to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
the case and the demands of the nations foreign
relations before making the ultimate decision to
extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not
called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during
the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person
charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction
with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the
function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that
are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38The ultimate purpose
of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether
the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered
into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it.
Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its
implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes
comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to
fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our
country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good
faith with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country
if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the
Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding
government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law
require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the
issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.
This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that
persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused
were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. 45 Prior
acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state
right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there;
and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that
the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes
he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his
aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as
his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of
flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the
will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC
--informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that
petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape
and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those
sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers
and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should
not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional
right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that
there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the
procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the
petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the
formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the
presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their
arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing,
Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the
petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue
a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may
be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the
presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having
received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the
presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the
hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of
arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
(Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of
immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our
Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest
of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant.
Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48and
giving them time to prepare and present such facts and
arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the
word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The
trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination
to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the
filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a
speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention
of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of
Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H,
the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E.
Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force
of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2)
Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits
that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the
Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the
Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness
[excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela
Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex
GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental
Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and
(5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and
enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten
an impression from these records adequate for him to make an
initial determination of whether the accused was someone who
should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the
ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts
and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was
prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded
from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did
exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US
Government in support of [its] request for extradition of herein
respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence
of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the
extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon
receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer
after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably
absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a
hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily
so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend
something reasonable and something not inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with
previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore,
the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning
is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to
the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it
for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the
Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would
have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the
requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is
invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination --
under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses
they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a
judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just
for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the
"judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which
to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a
judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a
warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record,
judges merely further examine complainants and their
witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the
accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present
evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of
defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to
negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert
the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of
the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary
nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a
criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of the accused. If a different
procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not
the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents
demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to
restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in
form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is
extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.
If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie
finding 58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is
determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the
judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity
to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in
extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional
provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including
those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions
are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the
relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent
with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also
apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision
in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a
person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest
warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
"conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above,
as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies
only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule
that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the
right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited
are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings
are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition
court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing
that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty
x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion
of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of
his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that
the essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case
-- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is
enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness,
either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his
being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary
is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the
Petition with its supporting documents after a determination
that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent
prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the
ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest;
and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to
apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he left the
jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings
could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the
due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
process now has thus become hollow. He already had that
opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he
ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to
increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to
accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of
time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His
supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due
process that he had previously shunned pales against the
governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty
obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the
suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not
exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and
palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives,
cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence,
it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our
treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively
liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to
evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of
any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty --
expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition
proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as
a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from
coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.1wphi1.nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases
falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the Treaty,
since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily
surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention
here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis
of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition
cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in
extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional
duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as
the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to
due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is
"dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for
its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe
and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested
or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for
and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis,
and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving
the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is
basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest
concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst
states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be
characterized by caution, so that the vital international and
bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes
the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill
international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special
circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to
grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have
carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss
them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was
elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that
basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his
Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In
People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on
his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he
is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at
any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws. This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction
that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of
the people are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts
that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the
24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function
depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to
nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve
provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace
and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who
are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for
and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his
extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against
their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with
Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant
him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the
extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to
confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not
convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are
summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the
Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither
is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the
constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal
action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad
faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another
matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of
this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent,
with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be justified.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special
circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the
extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support
this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition
request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he
has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the
request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to
mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its
conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting
government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled
from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand
his ground and still be within reach of our government if and
when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and
granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has
been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail
has been previously denied. In the present case, the
extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the
application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with
the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we
believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The
parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given
more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this
Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents
claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not
only petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also
private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter
required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then
position papers on the application for bail, both of which were
separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the
Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position
Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them
in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the
great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the
Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the
potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with
additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties
and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which
the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be
repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear factual
and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his
voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private
respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he
realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual
matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual
presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal
arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of
persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the
spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written
by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively
deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in
this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it
will only further delay these already very delayed
proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be
summary in character. What we need now is prudent and
deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What
is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-
out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly
"disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless,
but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath,
this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due
process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress
these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to
determine whether the request expressed in the petition,
supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be
adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist
the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive
who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the
criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is
deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty
partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the
latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent
to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.
Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available.
It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has
escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the
jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given
the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and
its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie
finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and
Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit
further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants
or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the
judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the
potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and
to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may
apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of
absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is
no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there
exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The
grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for
the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the
principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In
extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to
judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each
case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due
process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed,
available during the hearings on the petition and the answer
is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of
extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a
bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience
of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its
authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of
the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in
its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight
functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise
grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions,
delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest
these summary extradition proceedings become not only
inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to
our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partners
simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should
not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and
escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and 1

Rollo, p. 74.
international cooperation.
2
Id., pp. 122-125.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted
3
Presided by Judge Guillermo G. Purganan.
4
Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 4; rollo, p. 125.
with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the 5
322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000; and 343 SCRA 377, October 17,
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic 2000.
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and 6
Signed on November 13, 1994, and concurred in by the Philippine
technicalities that may negate that purpose. Senate on November 29, 1995.
7
In Civil Case No. 99-94684.
8
The 40-page Decision (322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000) was penned
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC by Justice Jose A. R. Melo with the concurrence of Justices Josue N.
Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, Bellosillo, Jose C. Vitug, Santiago M. Kapunan, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
Fidel P. Purisima, Arturo B. Buena, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and
while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE Sabino R. de Leon Jr. Dissenting were Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.;
insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The and Justices Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Artemio V.
bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Panganiban, Bernardo P. Pardo and Minerva P. Reyes, with Justices Puno
Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the and Panganiban writing separate Dissents.
9
Penned by Justice Puno and concurred in by Chief Justice Davide; and
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed Justices Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Reyes and
pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty De Leon Jr. Dissenting were Justices Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan,
with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs. Buena and Santiago, with Justices Melo and Santiago writing separate
Dissents (343 SCRA 377, October 17, 2000).
10
Annex E of the Petition.
11
Annex M of the Petition.
12
Annex O (certified true xerox copy) of the Petition.
13
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on July 3, 2002, upon
receipt by this Court of respondents Counter-Manifestation. Earlier, on
September 3, 2001, this Court received petitioners Memorandum
SO ORDERED. signed by Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez and State
Counsel Claro B. Flores. Filed on August 23, 2001 was private
respondents Memorandum signed by Attys. Mario Luza Bautista, Nick
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Emmanuel C. Villaluz and Brigette M. da Costa of Poblador Bautista and
Associate Justice Reyes.
14
Petition, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 10-11.
15
During the Oral Argument on August 14, 2001, the Court asked the
WE CONCUR: parties to discuss three issues: 1) the propriety of the filing of the
Petition in this case before this Court; 2) whether Mr. Mark Jimenez is
entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest; and 3) whether the procedure followed by respondent judge in
issuing the warrant of arrest and granting bail was correct.
16
Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 4.
(signed) 17
Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice v. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 47, and Nelson Marquez, CA-GR SP No. 61079, promulgated on
May 7, 2001.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
18
Petition, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 4-5.
19
Phil. Air Lines Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 111 SCRA
Chief Justice 215, 219, January 30, 1982; citing Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA
307 April 11, 1972.
20
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 301
JOSUE N. REYNATO S. SCRA 637, January 22, 1999.
BELLOSILLO PUNO 21
Malonzo v. Zamora, GR No. 137718, July 27, 1999, citing cases.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
22
289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998, per Martinez, J.
23
190 SCRA 31, 38, September 24, 1990, per Fernan, CJ.
24
Philippine National Bank v. Sayo Jr, 292 SCRA 202, 232, July 9, 1999,
per Davide, CJ, citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, April 18,
VICENTE V.
JOSE C. VITUG 1999; Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, January 27, 1993;
MENDOZA Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, September 1, 1994. See also Cruz v.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128,
December 6, 2000; Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, GR No.
142801-802, July 10, 2001.
CONSUELO 25
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 ed., p. 37, citing Macondray &
LEONARDO A. Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 446, July 16, 1937; Roldan v. Villaroman, 69
YNARES-
QUISUMBING Phil. 12, October 18, 1939; Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, September
SANTIAGO 21, 1931; Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162,
Associate Justice
Associate Justice September 30, 1976; People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126, November 29,
1922; Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, February 28, 1957; Salaysay v.
Castro, 98 Phil. 364, January 31, 1956.
ANGELINA 26
Last "Whereas" clause of PD 1069.
ANTONIO T. 27
See "Whereas" clause of PD 1069 and preamble of the RP-US
SANDOVAL-
CARPIO Extradition Treaty.
GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice 28
Bassiouni, International Extradition, 1987 ed., p.68.
Associate Justice 29
In Rodriguez v. Comelec (259 SCRA 296, July 24, 1996), the Court
defined fugitive from justice as one who flees after conviction to avoid
punishment or who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution.
MA. ALICIA RENATO C. 30
Bassiouni, supra, p. 21.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CORONA 31
Id., p. 67.
32
Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., pp. 19-20.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 33
Supra, p. 392, October 17, 2000, per Puno, J.
34
Coquia, "On Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty," The
Lawyers Review, August 31, 2000, p. 4.
CONCHITA CARPIO- ROMEO CALLEJO, 35
See Bassiouni, supra, p. 546; citing 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1910).
MORALES SR. 36
Supra.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 37
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.
38
Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., p. 157.
39
Id., p. 545.
40
In line with the Philippine policy of cooperation and amity with all
CERTIFICATION nations set forth in Article II, Section 2, Constitution.
41
The United States District Court, District of Nevada, Las Vegas,
Nevada: "In the Matter of the Extradition of Charlie Atong Ang, a
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is fugitive from the country of the Philippines," [the court] has denied Mr.
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had Angs motion for bail, per petitioners Manifestation dated June 5,
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to 2002.
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
42
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.
43
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62, March 23, 1903.
44
See footnote no. 41, Petition for Certiorari, p. 18; rollo p. 19;
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Manifestation dated June 5, 2002.
45
Persily, "International Extradition and the Right to Bail," 34 Stan. J.
Chief Justice Intl L. 407 (Summer, 1998).
46
Ibid.
Footnotes
47
39 CJS 875, citing People v. Blair, 33 NYS 2d 183, 190, 191; Amerada
Petroleum Corporation v. Hester, 109 P. 2d 820, 821, 188 Okl. 394.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

48
Id., citing Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 55 S.W. 2d 767, 165 abdication of the duty of protection which it owes to all within
Tenn. 447.
49
Petition for Extradition, pp. 2-3; rollo pp. 49-50.
its territory under the expediency of a treaty.
50
Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 3; rollo, 124.
51
In the questioned July 3, 2001 Order (p. 4; rollo, p. 125), respondent
judge admitted that the Annexes of the Petition for Extradition had
The Government maintains that an extradition court has no
been received by the court a quo on May 25, 2001; yet, in its Order power to authorize bail in the absence of any law conferring
dated May 23, 2001 ( rollo, p. 74), it already set for hearing the such power; and that the 1987 Constitution, as well as the
issuance of the warrant of arrest. Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to persons arrested
52
See 9, PD 1069.
53
Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra, p. 87; citing 1 L. and detained for violation of Philippine Laws, but not to
Oppenheim, International Law, (8th ed., 1955), pp. 952-53. extradition proceedings in which courts do not render
54
280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997. judgments of conviction or acquittal.
55
Id., p. 381, per Panganiban, J.
56
247 SCRA 652, 680, per Puno, J.
57
Ibid.; citing Allado v. Diokno, 233 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994. The argument is as ingenious as it is fallacious. It is settled that
58
Prima facie finding, not probable cause, is the more precise the power to admit to bail exists in extradition proceedings,
terminology because an extradition case is not a criminal proceeding in
which the latter phrase is commonly used. although as a matter of policy it may only be granted under
59
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody "exceptional circumstances." This, quintessentially, has been
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or the doctrine advocated in a cavalcade of American cases
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
starting with Wright v. Henkel, 190 US 40 (1902); and worth
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) mentioning, of course, are Paretti v. United States, 112 F.3d
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not 1363 (1977), Bealieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915 (1977), and
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment." In re Kirby, et al., 106 F.3d 855(1996); which are also
60
De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per
Fernando, J. (later CJ).
discussed extensively by Mr. Justice Puno.
61
18, Art. VII, Constitution.
62
Paretti v. United States of America, 122 F. 3d. 758, May 6, 1997.
63
Garcia v. NLRC, GR No. 110494, November 18, 1996; Paat v. Court of
Apart from these cases, there is likewise a considerable
Appeals, January 10, 1997. number of authorities which support the general view that the
64
See Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA power to admit to bail is a necessary incident of the power to
536, March 20, 1993. hear and determine cases. 2 In other words, one of the inherent
65
Ibid. See also Busuego v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 473, March 11,
1999. powers of the judiciary with regard to proceedings before it has
66
Coquia, "On the Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty," been the admission of a prisoner to bail where, in the exercise
supra; citing Kelso v. US Department of State, 13 F Supp. 291 [DDC of his discretion, the judge deems it advisable. A fortiori, even
1998]. in the absence of express statutory grant of authority to courts,
67
It states: "If the person sought consents in writing to surrender to the
Requesting State, the Requested State may surrender the person as judicial power to admit to bail parties properly within their
expeditiously as possible without further proceedings." jurisdiction must be deemed to exist. It must be mentioned,
68
1, Art. VIII, Constitution. however, that this authority is not absolute for the Constitution,
69
5, Art. VIII, Constitution.
70
I.A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 98.
statutes and the Rules of Court render it readily subject to
71
Private respondent argues that the following cases -- In re Michell, limitations.
171 F. Rep. 289, June 30, 1909; United States v. Kirby, Brennan and
Artt, 106 F. 3d. 855, February 27, 1997 and 158 F. 3d. 462, October 9,
1998. Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 460 F. Supp. 915, March 14, 1977; and 554 Significantly, both the extradition treaty between the United
F. 2d 1, April 6, 1977 -- should be treated as examples of special States and the Philippines, and the Philippine Extradition Law
circumstances. In our view, however, they are not applicable to this (PD 1069) contain no provision expressly withholding from the
case due to factual differences. Hence we refrain from ruling on this
argument of Jimenez.
courts the power to grant bail. Had the intention of the parties
72
324 SCRA 689, February 3, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J. to the treaty been to totally nullify the pre-existing power of the
73
Id., pp. 700-702. extradition court on the matter of bail, they could have easily
74
The US request for extradition was dated June 16, 1999; and yet, to provided for it in the treaty. But since they had not done so, it
date, more than three years later, the Petition for Extradition is still
languishing in the trial court. would be reasonable to presume that they had not so intended.
Indeed, the treaty fails to even remotely suggest such judicial
limitation insisted upon by the Government.

Separate Opinion
BELLOSILLO, J.:
While I do not absolutely disagree with the well-reasoned
ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban, I prefer nevertheless to
surf with the reflections of Mr. Justice Puno expressed in his
Separate Opinion which, in essence, espouse the balancing of
the duty of the State to faithfully comply with its commitments
under a treaty on one hand, and its responsibility to protect the
fundamental rights of its citizens on the other.
I wish to express some concerns however, particularly the
crucial issue of whether a potential extraditee may apply for
and be released on bail during the pendency of the extradition
proceedings. This to me should not be ignored.
In Northern PR Co. v. North Dakota, 1 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
intoned: "The cardinal article of faith of our civilization is the
inviolable character of the individual." Thus, fundamental rights
and civil liberties, although not unlimited, occupy a place
inferior to none in the hierarchy of constitutional values. These
are among the most cherished privileges enjoyed by free men,
of which it is the sacred duty of the State to maintain and
protect against the erosion of possible encroachments,
whether minute or extensive, foreign or domestic.
Truly, there is neither logic nor persuasion to the suggestion
that bail should only be allowed in criminal cases, or that class
of cases where courts must "render judgments of conviction or
acquittal." Bail as a remedy is available where there is
deprivation of liberty prior or during trial. In the 1909 case of
United States v. Go Siaco, 3 akin to the situation confronting us,
but involving a deportation proceeding, this Court allowed the
potential deportee to post bail although a deportation
proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was then no law
providing for bail in deportation cases -
x x x x we see no reason why bail should not be allowed in this
class of cases. As is said by the Supreme Court, the defendant
has committed no crime. In this particular case the defendant
was born in this country, has lived here for more than 35 years
and is now living here with his mother, a native of the Islands.
There is no reason to think that his being at large will be any
menace to the people in the locality where he resides, nor is
there any reason to believe that his attendance at court abide
the judgment which may be entered against him cannot be
secured by the giving of bail as in ordinary cases. To refuse
him bail is to treat him as a person is treated who has
committed the most serious crime known to the law, and while
we do not intend to say that this is a criminal proceeding, we
do say that some of the machinery used for making the
investigation required by Act No. 702 is the machinery of the
criminal law, and to it are applicable those provisions of
General Orders No. 58, relating to bail.

It is lamentable however that the position taken by the Were we to adopt the view pressed upon us by the
Government in the instant case amounts to an unpardonable Government, it would restrict the reciprocal operation of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
treaty, and create a striking lack of symmetry between the
rights of Filipinos subject of extradition and that of American
extraditees. Filipino citizens sought to be extradited by the
United States government will be absolutely denied of the
chance at provisional liberty during the pendency of the
extradition proceedings against them; while American fugitives
from justice sought to be extradited by the Philippine
government could always exercise the right to petition for bail,
and consequently, enjoy better chances of avoiding the
inconvenience of incarceration during the pendency of the
extradition proceedings. Certainly, there is no warrant for the
discrimination. The Philippines and the United States dealt with
each other as equals. Their extradition treaty discloses the
intention that they shall stand on the same footing. The
governing principles should always be reciprocity and equality.
We cannot curtail a citizen's right to freedom on speculations
and fears where there exist reasonable mechanisms
appropriate to address them. To my mind, the risk of flight does
not ipso facto call for denying his right to bail. Trial judges must
henceforth weigh carefully and judiciously other methods to
assure the presence of the accused during the proceedings
and right after, when he ought to be deported already. Bail may
be set at huge amounts or passports cancelled and hold-
departure orders issued or border patrols heightened, in order
that the extraditee may not flee from our jurisdiction. In this
regard, while I agree that it is the extraditee's burden to prove
the least likelihood of flight, the extradition court is also entitled
to presume that the executive branch has done all it can to
forestall his sudden disappearance. The executive branch
cannot plead its helplessness and inutility to defeat the grant of
bail to the extraditee.
In any event, all things being equal, the personal
circumstances of respondent Jimenez would negate any idea
of flight risk. He is a popular, even notorious, fellow whose face
is more frequently than others plastered in the tri-media. His
stature as representative for a congressional district in Manila
makes escape from Philippine jurisdiction not only
embarrassing for him but also constitutive of the offense of
abandonment of duty. His family and business interests are
said to be strategically placed in this country. Indeed, where
respondent Jimenez has more to lose from flight, the possibility
thereof appears remote and speculative.
Equity especially tilts in favor of respondent Jimenez in light of
our ruling in Montano v. Ocampo 4 where we allowed bail to an
elected senator of the country who was charged with the
capital offenses of murder and frustrated murder. In resolving
to grant bail in favor of Senator Montano, this Court took
special notice of the accused's official and social standing as
senator from which we concluded that flight was remote if not
nil despite the capital crimes he had to face. In the same
breath, respondent Jimenez is a duly elected Congressman
with personal circumstances that will not risk the ignominy of
flight, considering further the crimes he is charged with are far
less severe and ignoble, since most of them had something to
do with election campaign contributions than the seemingly
serious indictment for murder and frustrated murder against
Senator Montano.
If we grant for the sake of argument that the possibility of flight
exists, still respondent Jimenez' detention would be
unwarranted by law and the Constitution if the only purpose of
the confinement is to eliminate a rare odd of danger that is by
no means actual, present and uncontrollable. After all the
Government is not powerless to deal with or prevent any threat
by measures it has the ways and means to implement. The
thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the
United States Supreme Court in connection with the
application for bail of ten (10) communists convicted by a lower
court for advocacy of a violent overthrow of the United States
Government is pertinent and elucidating in principle -
The Government's alternative contention is that defendants, by
misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail.
Grave public danger is said to result from what they may be
expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit
every opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist countries, it
is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the
jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as
yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from
predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in
this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and
injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary
judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as
those of which defendants stand convicted x x x x If, however, I
were to be wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters
of principle, there is a very practical aspect of this application
which must not be overlooked or underestimated - that is the
disastrous effect on the reputation of American justice if I
should now send these men to jail and the full Court later
decide that their conviction is invalid. All experience with
litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question about
a conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal.
Indeed this experience lies hack of our rule permitting and
practice of allowing bail where such questions exist, to avoid
the hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons with
consequent reproach to our system of justice x x x x Risks, of
course, are involved in either granting or refusing bail. I am not
naive enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities
of the defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to
the dangers, the worst they can accomplish in the short time it
will take to end the litigation is preferable to the possibility of
national embarrassment from a celebrated case of unjustified
imprisonment of Communist leaders. Under no circumstances
must we permit their symbolization of an evil force in the world
to be hallowed and glorified by any semblance of martyrdom.
The way to avoid that risk is not to jail these men until it is
finally decided that they should stay jailed.
If the commentary is not comparable with ours on the issues
presented, its underlying principle is of universal application. If
only to preserve our regime of civil liberties and stem a
precedent where bail is unscrupulously disallowed, respondent
Jimennez may be placed under the surveillance of the
authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be
deemed adequate to insure that he will be available anytime
when the Government is ready to extradite him, although the
surveillance should be reasonable and the question of
reasonableness should be submitted to the court a quo for
remedial measures in case of abuse. He may also be required
to put up a bond with sufficient surety or sureties to ensure that
his extradition is not thwarted.
In our society - and even in the United States, I am sure -
freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of
the civil liberties protected by the Constitution. To unduly
sacrifice the civil liberties of an individual by reason of an
unfounded fear of being unable to fulfill treaty obligations,
would be to render impotent the ideals of the dignity of the
human person, thereby destroying something of what is noble
in our way of life. Certainly, if civil liberties may be safely
respected without imminently or actually impairing faithful
compliance with treaty obligations, as in this case, then there is
no valid reason for disregarding them.
I wish to emphasize, however, lest the best of my intentions be
misconstrued, that it is not my purpose here to encourage,
much less foment, dishonor of the treaty duly entered into by
our Government. By all means we have to fulfill all our
international commitments, for they are not mere moral
obligations to be enforced at the whims and caprices of the
State. They create legally binding obligations founded on the
generally accepted principle in international law of pacta sunt
servanda which has been adopted as part of the law of our
land. But, in so doing, we must be ever conscious of the need
to balance in one equation our commitments under the treaty,
and the equally important right of the individual to freedom
from unnecessary restraint.
As the vast powers and enormous resources of both the United
States of America and the Republic of the Philippines are
marshalled against a puny individual that is respondent
Jimenez, he is certainly entitled to some measure of protection
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
to ensure that no unwarranted intrusions or undue curtailment
of his liberty is committed.
I vote to REMAND the petition to the court a quo to ensure that
proper safeguards are afforded respondent in the course of the
extradition proceedings.
JOSUE N. BELOSILLO
Footnotes
1
236 U.S. 585.
2
United States v. Evans, 6 Cir., 1880, 2F. 147; In re Gannon, D.C. Pa.
1928, 27 F.2d 362; In re Chow Goo Pooi, 9 Cir., 25 F. 77; In re Ah Kee, 9
Cir., 1884, 21 F. 701; Whitfield v. Hanges, 8 Cir., 222 F. 745; Ewing v.
United States, 6 Cir., 1917, 240 F. 241.
3
12 Phil. 490.
4
L-6352, Reso. dated 29 January 1953, 49 O.G. 1855.
Separate Opinion
PUNO, J:
This is a case of first impression involving not only the states
interest to comply with its extradition treaty with the United
States but also its equally imperative duty to protect the
constitutional rights of its citizens to liberty and to due process.
Our decision will affect important rights of all our citizens facing
extradition in foreign countries. Personalities should not
therefore bend our decision one way or the other for the
protection of the Bill of Rights extends indifferently to all alike.
We begin with the unfudged facts. The records reveal that
when the private respondent learned of the filing of the petition
for extradition against him and before the extradition court
could issue any summons, he filed a motion to be furnished a
copy of the petition and to set for hearing petitioners request
for the issuance of warrant of arrest. Alternatively, he prayed
that he be allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty.
Respondent judge granted private respondents motion. After
hearing, he issued a warrant for the arrest of private
respondent but allowed him to post bail.
Petitioner assails the orders of the respondent judge and
submits the following issues for resolution by this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing
Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail
in the absence of any law that provides for such
power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the
1987 Constitution and section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of
the Rules of Court, as amended, which were relied
upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in
extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in
extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the
existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in
extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of special circumstances
which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no
special circumstance exists that will engender a well-
founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are
ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals resolution promulgated on
May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T.
Rodriguez, et al. vs. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 17 Manila, CA- G.R. SP No. 64589, relied
upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had
been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail
orders."
The substantive issues are shortlisted as follows: (1) whether
or not the private respondent is entitled to notice and hearing
before a warrant for his arrest can be issued; and (2) whether
or not he is entitled to post bail for his provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending.
With due respect, I offer the following views on the issues as
hewn above, viz:
I.
The right to notice and hearing of private respondent as
an extraditee.
The first issue demands a two-tiered analysis based on the
following questions:
(1) Can the private respondent, as potential
extraditee, demand as a matter of right, that he be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition before
the summons and/or the warrant of arrest are issued
by the extraditing court?
(2) Can he demand a hearing for the purpose of
determining the necessity and propriety of the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest?
The majority opinion submits that neither P.D. No. 1069 nor the
Constitution authorize respondent judge to give the private
respondent a copy of the petition for extradition and
immediately set for hearing the request for a warrant of arrest
against the latter.
I beg to disagree. There can be no disagreement that P.D. No.
1069 deserves an interpretation that would blend with the
purpose of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, i.e., the minimization
of flight risk and the facilitation of an extraditees surrender to
the requesting state. But this stance should not be taken to
mean that this Court can cast a blind eye to the private
respondents constitutional rights to life, liberty and to due
process. While this Court is obliged to accord due respect to
the states interests to comply with its treaty obligations, it
cannot also shirk from its duty to protect the fundamental rights
of its citizens. Thus, a full and careful weighing of these
warring interests is imperative as we did in its predecessor
case Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion. 1 With due respect, it is
my humble submission that the majority failed to allocate the
proper weight due to the constitutional rights of the private
respondent to life, liberty and to due process. These rights are
now conceded in the civilized world as universal in character
and it was never the intent of the RP-US Extradition Treaty to
trivialize their significance.
It bears emphasis that this Courts ruling in Secretary of Justice
vs. Lantion did not per se negate the constitutional rights of a
potential extraditee to liberty and due process. If we rejected
private respondents invocation of these rights in said case, it
was only because (1) the threat to his liberty by provisional
arrest has already passed; 2 and (2) the threat to his liberty
upon the filing of the petition for extradition was merely
hypothetical. 3 At that time, the government of the United
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
States has not requested for the provisional arrest of the
private respondent. Likewise, the petition for extradition has
not yet been filed before the extradition court. Thus, after
carefully balancing the conflicting interests of the parties at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, we upheld the
states interests under its extradition treaty with the United
States, viz:
To be sure, private respondents plea for due process deserves
serious consideration, involving as it does his primordial right
to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with
important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they
serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights
demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law. The approach
requires that we take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given type of
situation. These interests usually consist in the exercise of the
individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the
governments promotion of fundamental public interests or
policy objectives on the other.
In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the
private respondents claim to due process predicated on
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due
process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which
accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to
be accorded the weight it deserves.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner
avers that the Court should give more weight to our national
commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite
the extradition of its laws. Petitioner also emphasized the need
to defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters relating to
foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle
of separation of powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding
is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being
claimed by private respondent is nebulous and the degree of
prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater
weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the
petitioner Secretary of Justice." 4
We stressed that the denial of the private respondents
privilege of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceeding is merely a soft restraint on his right
to due process, viz:
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, we
stress that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no
right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of
the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires
a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the
degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination
should be made as to whether procedural protections are not
at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the
extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer
grievous loss." 5
The extradition process against the private respondent has,
however, moved away from the stage of evaluation of
documents by the executive officials of the Philippine
government. A formal petition for the extradition of the private
respondent has now been filed with our court of justice. With
this development, the competing interests of our government
and of the private respondent have developed new dimensions
and they need to be rebalanced. In re-adjusting the balance, I
respectfully submit the following propositions, viz.
(a) A potential extraditee has the right to be notified of the filing
of the petition for extradition.
It is my humble submission that from the moment the petition
for extradition is filed before the extradition court, a potential
extraditee has the right to demand that he be furnished a copy
of the petition. This right inheres from the duty imposed by P.D.
No. 1069 to the extradition judge to summon a potential
extraditee to appear and answer the petition "as soon as
practicable." It is a mandatory duty that should be carried out
by the extradition judge; the law does not give him any
discretion.
This submission is in accord with our ruling in Secretary of
Justice vs. Lantion, 6 where we held that: "P.D. No. 1069 which
implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time
when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for
extradition as well as the supporting papers, i.e., after the filing
of the extradition in the extradition court."
(b) The need for a hearing to determine whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against an extraditee is addressed to
the sound discretion of the extraditing judge.
The majority opinion holds that the private respondent
extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. It relies on section 6 of P.D. No.
1069, which provides:
Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing;
Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the
petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue
a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may
be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the
presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will serve the ends of justice. Upon
receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having
received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the
presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for
hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of
arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the accused."
(emphasis supplied)
The majority interprets this provision as follows:
It is significant to note that section 6 of PD 1069, our
Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest
of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant.
Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties,
receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time
to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to hearing can no longer be considered
immediate. The law could have intended the word as a mere
superfluity but, on the whole, as means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should issue."
Clearly, the opinion leans heavily on the use of the word
"immediate" which qualified the arrest of an extraditee. It holds
that "the qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for
hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant."
Again, I beg to disagree. I submit that the decision whether to
send notice to an extraditee and hear him before ordering his
arrest should be left to the sound discretion of the extraditing
judge. This is crystal clear from section 6 of P.D. No. 1069
which provides:
x x x He may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines
if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will serve the ends of
justice." (Italics supplied)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Under this provision, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
dependent on a big "if," or to an all important condition - - - if it
will serve the ends of justice. The determination of whether a
warrant of arrest against an extraditee will serve the ends of
justice is certainly not a cut and dried duty. It involves the
appreciation of highly contentious facts, both objective and
subjective in nature. Their appreciation requires a judicial mind
honed in the law of evidence. The history of extradition will
reveal that, initially, the task of determining whether an
extraditee should be immediately arrested was given to the
executive authorities of the extraditing state. The matter, in
other words, was treated purely as an executive function but
unfortunately, the practice was given to abuses. Recognizing
that certain human rights are universal in nature and beyond
violation, the task of adjudging whether a potential extraditee
should be immediately arrested pending his extradition
proceeding was transferred to judges. The office of the judge
was called upon to insure that fundamental fairness is not
denied to a potential extraditee. The extraditing judge is not to
act as a stamp pad but has to exercise his sound discretion on
whether to issue the warrant. Under our law on extradition, P.D.
No. 1069, section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on
whether to order the arrest of the extraditee is guided by the
following consideration - - - whether the arrest will serve the
ends of justice. The grant of this judicial discretion will be
rendered naught if we subject the action of the extraditing
judge to unnecessary fetters. With due respect, the view that
the extraditing judge has no discretion to determine whether to
notify and hear a potential extraditee before ordering his arrest
cuts too much on the freedom of action of the extraditing judge.
I submit that we should give the extraditing judge more
discretion on the matter. If the extraditing judge feels that the
notice and hearing will allow an extraditee to flee, I have no
doubt, he will immediately order his arrest. If, however, he
believes that notice and hearing will not pose such danger and
that he needs to hear the parties to make a better
determination on whether the immediate arrest of an extraditee
will serve the ends of justice, let us not deny him the discretion
to do so. The essence of discretion is freedom of action and
we negate that essence when we impose needless limits on
the judges freedom of action.
Prescinding from these premises, I cannot also subscribe to
the submission of the majority that the phrase "if it appears" in
section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 conveys the message that accuracy
is not as important as speed in issuing a warrant of arrest
against a potential extraditee. We are concerned here with the
priceless right to life and liberty, with the right to due process
before ones liberty is taken away. We are not dealing with
chattels. We should not lay down the doctrine that speed
should be preferred to accuracy for speed breeds recklessness
and we cannot be reckless with our right to life and liberty.
I agree that the trial court should not be expected to make an
exhaustive determination of the facts of the case before issuing
a warrant of arrest. To be sure, that is not expected of any
judge, not even from a judge of a criminal case. In the case at
bar, however, the extraditing judge ordered the hearing only to
have a better basis for determining whether the immediate
arrest of the private respondent will best serve the ends of
justice. A careful look at the petition for extradition will show
that it does not provide enough basis for the extraditing judge
to determine whether the immediate issuance of warrant of
arrest will serve the ends of justice. I quote the opinion on the
documents attached to the petition for extradition, viz:
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of
Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H,
the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E.
Savage trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force
of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2)
Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits
that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the
Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits
that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the
Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of Witness
[excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela
Byers and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex
GG, the Exhibit J Table of Contents for Supplemental
Evidentiary Appendix with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and
(5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward and
enclosed Statements in two volumes."
Even a cursory reading of these documents will not sustain the
thesis that "it is evident that the respondent could have already
gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to
make an initial determination of whether the accused was
someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best
serve the ends of justice.
The documents are evidence tending to prove the guilt of the
private respondent in regard to the cases filed against him in
the United States. They are not evidence, however, to prove
that the private respondent will flee the Philippine jurisdiction
while his extradition petition is being heard. In other words, the
petition for extradition may be in due form but it does not
establish sufficient factual basis to justify the immediate
issuance of warrant of arrest against the private respondent.
The probability of his flight from our jurisdiction is central to the
question of whether he should be arrested. In the absence of
evidence establishing that private respondent will flee, I cannot
join the ruling that the respondent extraditing judge gravely
abused his discretion in calling for a hearing so that the parties
can adduce evidence on the issue.
Likewise, it is postulated:
Moreover, the law specifies the courts setting a hearing upon
receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer
after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent
from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at
that stage been intended, the law could have easily so
provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the
Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little
step in the entire proceedings."
Once more, I beg to disagree from this reading of our law on
extradition. The law, it is true, did not provide that the
extraditing judge must hold a hearing before he issues a
warrant of arrest. The call for a hearing is not mandatory but
neither is it prohibited. Ergo, the matter of whether there ought
to be a hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest is
addressed to the discretion of the extraditing judge. The
exercise of this discretion depends on the configuration of the
facts of each case.
II.
The right to bail of a potential extraditee during the
pendency of the petition for extradition.
I respectfully submit that a potential extraditee can hinge his
right to bail in our Constitution. The mere silence of our
extradition treaty with the Unites States and our extradition law
(P.D. No. 1069) does not negate the right to bail of a potential
extraditee. Our adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, as well as international norms, customs and
practices support an extraditees right to bail. But while an
extraditee may apply for bail, its grant depends on presentation
of clear and convincing evidence that the extraditee will not
frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction.
Again, I proffer the following propositions:
First. The right to bail inheres from the rights to life, liberty and
to due process.
Our Constitution jealously guards every persons right to life
and liberty against unwarranted state intrusion; indeed, no
state action is permitted to invade this forbidden zone except
upon observance of due process of law. 7 Like the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail gives flesh to the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
guarantee to liberty, without which, the right to liberty can prove
meaningless, and due process will only be an empty slogan.
However, unlike the privilege of habeas corpus which is
principally a remedy against illegal restraint on liberty, 8 the
right to bail is available even when the reason for the detention
is lawful. The purpose of bail is to relieve a person the rigors of
prolonged imprisonment until the main case against him is
resolved, and at the same time, insure his attendance when
required by the authorities. 9 It is the prospect of prolonged
detention, not the detention itself, which offends the
constitutional right to due process.
In Teehankee vs. Rovira, 10 this Court rejected the view which
limits the right to bail to persons charged with criminal
offenses. We ruled that the constitutional right to bail applies to
all persons, viz:
"This constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to
persons against whom a complaint or information has already
been filed; it lays down the rule that all persons shall before
conviction be bailable except those charged with capital
offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only
those persons who have either been arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty may have the occasion to
seek the benefit of said provision. But in order that a person
can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that
he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed
against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest,
detention or restraint by officers of the law, he can claim this
guarantee of Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and
until he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence
against him is strong. Indeed, if, as admitted on all sides, the
precept protects those already charged under a formal
complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just
reason for denying its benefit to one against whom the proper
authorities may yet conclude that there exists no sufficient
evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored
position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous
and absurd. If there is presumption of innocence in favor of
one already formally charged with a criminal offense, a fortiori
this presumption should be induced in favor of one yet so
charged although arrested or detained." (emphasis supplied)
In United States vs. Go-Siaco, 11 this Court held that while
deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature, an alien
deportee may avail of the constitutional right to bail, viz:
The order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime. It is
not a banishment, in the sense which that word is often applied
to the expulsion of citizen from his country by way of
punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his
own country of an alien who has not complied with the
conditions upon the performance of which the Government of
the nation, acting within its constitutional authority and through
the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to
reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the
provisions of the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury
and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel
and unusual punishments, have no application.
It will be seen that this declaration is not inconsistent with the
view that while the proceeding is not a trial or sentence of a
crime or offense, it may in so far use the machinery of the
criminal law as to admit of application the provisions in such
law relating to bail x x x.
x x x We see no reason why bail should not be allowed in this
class of cases. As is said by the Supreme Court, the defendant
has committed no crime x x x To refuse him bail is to treat him
as a person who has committed the most serious crime known
to the law, and while we do not intend to say that this is a
criminal proceeding, we do say that some of the machinery
used for making the investigation required by Act No. 702 is
the machinery of the criminal law x x x."
This ruling is reiterated in United States vs. Benito 12 and in
Pagado vs. Aldanese. 13
The case of Ong Hee Sang, et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration and Portugal 14 is not a departure from our
previous rulings on the right to bail of a deportee. In said case,
the Court ruled that the grant or denial of an aliens application
for bail lies within the discretion of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation pursuant to section 37 (9) (e) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which states: "Any alien
under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released
under a bond or under such other conditions as may be
imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." 15 The Court
ratiocinated as follows:
The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
invoked in favor of petitioners-appellees considering that
deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action and
the order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime, it
being merely for the return to his country of an alien who has
broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside
with our borders."
The Court explained the difference of the Go Siaco case as
follows:
The case of U.S. vs. Go Siaco is not in point because said
case was a proceeding brought under the provisions of Act No.
702 which falls, by provision of said law, under the jurisdiction
of the courts of justice. The case at bar is deportation
proceeding under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which
expressly vests in the Commissioner of Immigration the
exclusive and full discretion to determine whether an alien
subject to deportation should or should not be granted."
It is apparent, therefore, that the ruling in the Ong Hee Sang
does not negate the right to bail. It merely meant that the
standard for granting or denying bail under the Constitution is
different in deportation proceedings. It is different because
there is a specific law which provides for such standard in
deportation proceedings, i.e., Commonwealth Act No. 613 or
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Neither did the case
preclude the grant of bail on due process grounds as in the
case Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 16 where this Court held that
while "temporary detention is a necessary step in the process
of exclusion and expulsion of undesirable aliens and that
pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has
a right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a
reasonable length of time, too long a detention may justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus" 17 and entitle an alien to
be released on bail, viz:
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and except for crimes committed against the
laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends
to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality
xxx
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3), the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the Nation. And in a resolution entitled
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations of which the
Philippines is a member at its plenary meeting on December
10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental
rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was
there resolved that All human beings are born free and equal
in degree and rights (Art. 1); that Everyone is equal and is
entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status (Art.
2); that Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the Constitution or by law (Art. 8); that
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile (Art. 9, etc.)" 18
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
It must be noted that the Mejoff case was decided when C.A.
No. 613 was already in effect. Similarly, in Chirskoff vs.
Commission of Immigration 19 the Court released the alien
deportee on bail because his prolonged detention violates his
right to liberty, viz:
"[F]oreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal
charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may
not be indefinitely kept in detention; that in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a
member, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental
rights as applied to human beings were proclaimed; that the
theory on which the court is given power to act is that the
warrant of deportation, not having been executed, is functus
officio and the alien is being held without any authority of law;
and that the possibility that the petitioner might join or aid
disloyal elements if turned out at large does not justify
prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being to impose
conditions in the order of release and exact bail in reasonable
amount with sufficient sureties."
In the case of Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court again
held that although a deportation proceeding does not partake
of a criminal action, the constitutional right of a person to due
process should be protected therein, viz:
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a
harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such
person to due process shall not be denied. Thus, the
provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly
on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary
investigation must be conducted to determine if there is
sufficient cause to charge respondent for deportation. The
issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without a warrant and
service of warrant should be in accordance likewise with Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; search warrants
issued by the CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure; and so the matter of bail, motion
to quash, trial, among others." 21 (emphasis supplied).
There is no reason why an extraditee should be denied the
right to apply for bail. While an extradition proceeding is not
criminal in nature, it is a harsh and extraordinary process. It
may involve a restraint of liberty that under some
circumstances can be greater than in an ordinary criminal
case. 22 For in extradition proceedings, the extraditee will be
transported and tried to another jurisdiction of which laws he
may be unfamiliar. 23
Second. The right of an extraditee to apply for bail should be
treated in light of our other treaty obligations, especially those
concerning the promotion and protection of human rights. 24
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which
the Philippines is a party, a treaty shall be interpreted "in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose," 25 taking into
account the "relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties." 26
As members of the family of nations, the Philippines and the
United States have the responsibility to uphold fundamental
human rights, and the dignity and worth of the human person.
They are mandated to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained. 27
Being signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 28 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 29 both countries are committed to protect and promote
the right of every person to liberty and to due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can take proceedings
before a court, in order that such court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention, and order his release
if the detention is not lawful. 30
Although the right to liberty is a relative right and may be
suspended or derogated in exceptional circumstances, 31 it is a
generally accepted principle in international law that the
presumption lies in favor of the existence of the right, and the
burden lies with the authorities to justify the lawfulness of the
arrest or detention. This presumption creates an obligation on
state authorities to make effective remedies available to every
person under detention for the enjoyment of his fundamental
right to liberty.
Third. There is no customary rule of international law
prohibiting bail in extradition cases.
At present, there is no customary norm prohibiting bail in
extradition cases. On the contrary, most countries, including
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa and
Pakistan, among others, allow a potential extraditee to be
released on bail. Members of the European Union have
recently ratified the European Convention on Extradition, which
also provides a procedure for bail.
Fourth. Even the United States grants bail to an extraditee,
albeit in exceptional circumstances.
In the United States, the ruling case law upholds the right of a
potential extraditee to apply for bail. The US Supreme Court in
the landmark case of Wright vs. Henckel, 32 recognized the
authority of the circuit courts to receive application for and
grant bail in certain exceptional case, thus:
We are unwilling to hold that the circuit courts possess no
power in respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically
vested by statutes, or that, while bail should not be ordinarily
granted in cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not in
any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that
relief."
This dictum planted the seeds of the current federal common
law on bail in international extradition proceedings. 33It
recognized the existence of the right to bail based on
"exceptional circumstances" 34 which the extraditee must prove.
The following are some of the instances which were
considered "special circumstances" to warrant the grant of bail:
(a) age, background of defendant, and lack of any suitable
facility to hold him; 35
(b) parity with other defendant on similar charge, granting bail
would promote harmony among factions in x x x dispute,
likelihood of delay, and pending constitutional challenge to the
extradition statute; 36
(c) need to participate in litigation in which entire fortune
depended; 37
likelihood of delay and bailable offense in seeking
extradition; 38 and
provisional arrest justifies grant of bail and disparity of
treatment of persons on same charge. 39
The trend in recent years is for courts to liberalize the bail
standard as they place primary emphasis on the accuseds risk
of flight. 40 The rationale of this trend was succinctly laid down
in Beaulieu vs. Hartigan, 41 to wit:
"In none of the cases dealing with the issue of bail in an
extradition setting was a district judge who granted bail
subsequently reversed by a reviewing court. Analysis of these
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
cases leads me to the conclusion that the special
circumstances doctrine of Wright, though still viable, must be
viewed, in the light of modern concepts of fundamental
fairness, as providing a district judge with flexibility and
discretion in considering whether bail should be granted in
these extradition cases. The standard scrutiny and concern
exercised by a district judge should be greater than in the
typical bail situation, given the delicate nature of international
relations. But one of the basic questions facing a district judge
in either situation is whether, under all circumstances, the
petitioner is likely to return to court when directed to do so.
Fundamentally, it is a judgment call by the district court based
on the totality of circumstances, including extremely important
consideration of the countrys treaty agreements with other
nations; a district judge should approach the bail situation in an
extradition case with an added degree of caution, given the
additional factor of an international treaty."
Fifth. While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant is
discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate the ends of
justice.
In extradition cases, the extradition court does not inquire into
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Neither does the court
measure the injury caused to the community, as the offense
was not committed within its jurisdiction. The court, therefore,
cannot base its decision to grant or deny bail on the gravity of
the offense, as it could in criminal cases. Rather, it should base
its decision on whether it will frustrate the ends of justice. The
risk of flight of an extraditee is an important factor to consider
in determining whether his bail will frustrate justice.
Whether or not a potential extraditee is a flight risk is
determined by two factors: (1) capacity to flee; and (2) intent to
flee. The combination of these two factors determines the
degree of risk that the trial court must assess and weigh. While
there is no mathematical formula to guide the court in gauging
the precise risk posed by a particular combination of these two
factors, it is commonsensical to assume that one without the
other would not result to any risk at all. For while one has the
capacity to flee, if he does not intend to flee, the fear of flight
would be for naught, and vice versa.
Sixth. The burden of proof to justify the arrest and detention of
the potential extraditee initially rests on the petitioning
executive authorities.
Under our extradition treaty and law, a potential extraditee may
be arrested and detained under any of the following
circumstances: (a) upon the receipt of the request for the arrest
of the potential extraditee and even before the filing of the
request for extradition; (b) upon the filing of the petition for
extradition before the extradition court; or (c) during the
hearing of the petition for extradition.
In all the above circumstances, the issuance of a warrant of
arrest depends on a showing that it will serve the ends of
justice. Initially, it is the burden of the petitioning executive
authorities to prove that the warrant against the extraditee will
serve the ends of justice.
Seventh. After the warrant of arrest is issued, the burden of
proof on the right to be admitted to bail shifts on the potential
extraditee.
In criminal cases, the presumption lies in favor of granting bail.
This is so because of the constitutional presumption of
innocence, which is not overturned by the finding of probable
cause upon which the warrant of arrest against the accused
was issued.
However, the presumption of innocence, from which the
ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail emanates, is
inoperative in extradition cases. The issuance of the warrant of
arrest in extradition cases is not based on the finding that the
accused is probably guilty of the offense for which he was
charged in the requesting State. The warrant is predicated on
the finding that it will serve the ends of justice. Once issued, it
raises a presumption of the continuing presence of the
circumstances upon which the issuance of the warrant was
based. More often than not, this circumstance is the probability
that the extraditee will flee from the jurisdiction of the
extraditing court. The burden of proving admittance to bail is
thus shifted to the extraditee.
It should be underscored that due process, which is the basis
of bail in extradition proceeding, merely grants the potential
extraditee the opportunity to avail of the remedy of bail; it does
not give him the right to demand that he be released on bail
under any circumstance. What the right to due process
prohibits is the outright denial of the remedy of bail; it does not
prohibit a reasonable denial of the application for bail after
carefully weighing all the circumstances at hand.
III.
There is need to remand the case at bar to the extradition court
in fairness to the parties.
I respectfully submit that in fairness to both parties, the case
should be remanded to the extradition court so that the proper
procedure and standard to determine the right to bail can be
complied with. I put no blame on the extradition court nor to the
parties in this regard for we are still developing our
jurisprudence on extradition. There is need for remand for the
following reasons, viz:
First. As aforediscussed, the petitioner has the burden of proof
to show that the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the
private respondent will serve the ends of justice. This burden of
proof can not be satisfied by the petitioner in the case at bar by
merely relying on the petition for extradition and its annexes.
The petition and its annexes do not prove that the private
respondent is a flight risk. They only show that he has been
indicted in the court of the United States.
Second. On the issue of whether the private respondent is
entitled to bail, the petitioner cannot rely on the presumption
against bail in extradition proceedings. The presumption
against bail in extradition proceedings is founded on the
assumption that the extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Thus, it
was explained in Beaulieu vs. Hartigan, 42 viz:
"The vast majority of fugitives from justice in foreign countries
fled from those countries knowing that charges have been, or
were likely to be, brought against them. Thus the typical
subject of an extradition request has a demonstrated
propensity to flee rather than face charges and in general is
likely to continue his flight if released pending extradition." 43
The presumption against bail therefore arises only when the
extraditee is a "fugitive from justice." To avail of this
presumption, it is a condition sine qua non that competent
evidence be proffered that the extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.
In Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 44 we ruled that the term fugitive
from justice "includes not only those who flee after conviction
to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution." 45 In Rodriguez vs.
COMELEC, 46 we clarified that this definition indicates that "the
intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones
flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can
only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when
there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction." 47
From the records, it appears that the claim of the petitioner that
the private respondent is a fugitive from justice is based on the
following allegations: (a) that an investigation for the charges
against him was then on going; and (b) that upon learning that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
he was about to be charged, he fled from the United States.
Thus, petitioner alleged:
Learning that an investigation involving his violations of United
States federal laws was about to be terminated and that he
was about to be charged, Jimenez fled the United States
jurisdiction. Under United States law, he is therefore a fugitive
from justice. A "fugitive from justice" is a person who commits a
crime within a state and withdraws himself from such
jurisdiction (Ex Parte Montoya, 135 P.2d 281, 282, 170 Or.
499). Because he has fled once, there is a greater likelihood
that he will flee to another jurisdiction once more and frustrate
extradition. Thus, he poses a serious risk flight. The interest of
justice will be best served if he is arrested and detained
pending extradition proceedings, which after all, is summary in
nature." 48
It is clear, however, that the warrant of arrest in connection with
Indictment No. 99-00281-CR-SEITZ against the private
respondent was issued on April 15, 1999. 49 Private respondent
claims that he was already in the Philippines when the
indictment against him was filed and the warrant for his arrest
was issued. During the oral argument of the case at bar, the
following exchange between the counsels of the parties took
place, viz:
USec Gutierrez: It may be mentioned that the proposed
extraditee stands charge (sic) of several charges from the
United States of America and a warrant of arrest was issued
against him and he fled the jurisdiction of the United States of
America to evade prosecution and there would again be
another risk of plight (sic) and to ensure the proposed
extraditee will be present during the extradition proceeding,
therefore this request on the part of the petitioner for the
issuance of warrant of arrest. 50
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Bautista: The Honorable Counsel has declared
gratuitously that Mr. Mark Jimenez is a fugitive from the United
States, left the United States because of the indictment against
him. That is totally false. The petition itself says that a warrant
for the arrest of Mr. Jimenez was issued in the United States in
April 1999. Mr. Jimenez was here in the Philippines on May
1998 and he has not left the country since then. So he left the
United States long before, a year before the warrant of arrest
was issued, so how can we say that he is a fugitive from
justice?" 51
That private respondent arrived in the country on May 10, 1998
is evidenced by the records and is not contradicted by the
petitioner. 52 On the other hand, petitioners claim that private
respondent knew of the ongoing investigation as well as of the
existence of the charges against him when he fled from the
United States is devoid of evidence. Therefore, it would be
fatal for the petitioner to rely alone on the presumption against
bail in extradition cases to justify the denial of bail of the private
respondent.
In Rodriguez, petitioner arrived in the Philippines on June 25,
1985 and the complaint in Los Angeles was filed on November
2, 1985. We ruled that "it was clearly impossible for Rodriguez
to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant
- much less conviction- to speak of yet at such time." We
rejected the contention that Rodriguez would have known the
on-going investigation, viz:
It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by the private
respondent to show Rodriguez intent to evade the law. This
was done by offering for admission a voluminous copy of an
investigation report on the alleged crimes committed which led
to the filing of the charges against petitioner. It was offered for
the sole purpose of establishing the fact that it was impossible
for the petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to
its magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads
because investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive
or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law
enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of
those who would be charged." 53
Furthermore, we held that "the circumstantial fact that it was
seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez departure that charges
against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good
faith in his favor. The same suggests nothing more than the
sequence of events, which transpired. A subjective fact as that
of petitioners purpose cannot be inferred from the objective
data at hand in absence of further proof to substantiate that
claim."
Third. In granting bail to the private respondent, the standard
used by the extraditing court is not clear. An extradition
proceeding is sui generis, hence, neither the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of
proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases can apply.
Thus, in Lantion, 54 we explained:
We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui
generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of
the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still
undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in
United States v. Galanis:
An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and
the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in
this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant
to a valid treaty.
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding
and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is
summary in nature while a criminal proceeding involve a full
blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the
rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission
of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive
may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where
judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice
whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in
balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the
nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to
extradite."
With humility, I submit that the Court should fashion out a
higher standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible
extraditee. The higher standard is demanded by the fact that
our extradition treaty obligates us to assure that an extraditee
will not abscond from our jurisdiction. Failure to comply with
this obligation will expose our country to international
embarrassment. It will defeat the purpose of extradition
treaties, i.e., the suppression of crimes, especially
transnational crimes to which the Philippines is very
vulnerable. The standard, I propose, is the standard of clear
and convincing evidence which is higher than mere
preponderance of evidence but lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If this new and stricter standard would be
adopted, it ought to follow that the parties should be given a
chance to offer evidence to meet the same. Contrary to the
claim, the voluminous pleadings already filed by the parties are
insufficient to resolve the issue of whether the private
respondent is entitled to bail. These pleadings proffer legal
arguments but not proof of facts. The remand of the case at
bar is therefore not a cop-out but is proper and it will not delay
the proceedings. The extradition court can be ordered to finish
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
the hearing on the limited issue of bail within one (1) week.
After all, extradition proceedings are summary in nature.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I offer the following views:
First. The filing of a petition for extradition does not per se
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against an extraditee.
The petition, in some instances, may not contain sufficient
allegations and proof on the issue of whether the possible
extraditee will escape from the jurisdiction of the extraditing
court.
Second. When the petition for extradition does not provide
sufficient basis for the arrest of the possible extraditee or the
grant of bail as in the case at bar, it is discretionary for the
extradition court to call for a hearing to determine the issue.
Third. An extraditee has the right to apply for bail. The right is
rooted in the due process clause of the Constitution. It cannot
be denied simply because of the silence of our extradition
treaty and law on the matter. The availability of the right to bail
is buttressed by our other treaties recognizing civil and political
rights and by international norms, customs and practices.
Fourth. The extraditee may apply for bail but its grant depends
on the discretion of the extraditing court. The court must satisfy
itself that the bail will not frustrate the ends of justice.
Fifth. In deciding whether to grant bail or not to a possible
extraditee, the extraditing court must follow a higher and
stricter standard. The extraditee must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he will not flee from the jurisdiction of
the extraditing court and will respect all its processes. In fine,
that he will not frustrate the ends of justice.
As emphasized, the case at bar has entered a new stage and
the competing interests of the state and the rights of the private
respondent as an extraditee need to be rebalanced on the
scale of justice. These competing rights and interests have to
be rebalanced for they have developed new dimensions and
some facts may have to be accorded greater or lesser weights
to meet the more paramount interest of our people. This
paramount interest is always in motion as it is affected by the
inexorable changes wrought in time both by man and machine.
In rebalancing these conflicting interests, we should take care
not to diminish to a disturbing degree an extraditees
fundamental rights to life, liberty and due process. These rights
have evolved as universal rights and extradition treaties for all
their utility were never meant to disparage, let alone, derogate
them to inutility.
Likewise, in rebalancing these interests, we should not weaken
the role of courts in tempering the harshness of extradition
proceedings. We should not therefore dilute the discretionary
power of courts to determine whether a hearing should be
called before ordering the immediate arrest of a possible
extraditee.
In counter-balance, we should not be soft on extraditees who
are facing charges in countries where we have extradition
treaties. While rights are being universalized, so too are crimes
being internationalized. We should not allow our country to be
the sanctuary of criminals who demand rights but deny the
rights of others. Thus, there is need to impose a higher and
stricter standard before we grant bail to potential extraditees.
We are in the difficult step by step process of developing our
jurisprudence in extradition. In Lantion, our first extradition
case, we held that an extraditee has no right to demand
examination of the documents of extradition while the request
for extradition is just being processed and evaluated by the
Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice. In the case at bar,
our second extradition case, we have the opportunity to
impose a higher and stricter standard that will govern a plea for
bail of an extraditee. I urge the Court to seize the rare
opportunity for this can well be our humble contribution to
mans relentless search for elusive peace.
Prescinding from all these premises, I vote to remand the case
at bar to the extradition court so that it can follow the proper
procedure and higher standard in determining the right to bail
of the private respondent.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Footnotes
1
343 SCRA 377 (2000).
2
Id., p. 389. "Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069
clearly provide that private respondent may be provisionally arrested
only pending receipt of the request for extradition. Our DFA has long
received the extradition request from the United States and has turned
it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United States
has not requested for private respondents provisional arrest.
Therefore, the threat to private respondents liberty has passed. It is
more imagined than real."
3
Id., p. 390. "It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of
arrest for the temporary detention of the accused pending the
extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the
extradition court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the
extradition is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and
there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the
appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondents liberty
is merely hypothetical."
4
Id., pp. 390-391.
5
Id., pp. 392-393.
6
Supra note 1.
7
1987 Constitution, Article III, section 1. "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
8
The writ of habeas corpus is an order issued by a court directed to a
person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the
person whose liberty is being restrained at a designated time and
place, and asking him to show sufficient cause for the continued
custody of the person so detained. See Rule 102, Revised Rules of
Court.
9
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741 (1995), citing Almeda
vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975).
10
75 Phil. 634 (1945).
11
12 Phil. 490 (1909).
12
37 Phil. 53 (1917).
13
42 Phil. 415 (1921).
14
114 Phil. 368 (1962).
15
Tiu Chuan Hai, et al., vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 (1958).
16
90 Phil. 70 (1951).
17
Id., p. 72.
18
Id., pp. 73-74.
19
90 Phil. 257 (1951).
20
180 SCRA 756 (1989).
21
Id., pp. 762-763.
22
A Recommended Approach to Bail in International Extradition Cases,"
86 Mich. L. Rev. 599, 607 (1987).
23
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 296 (1978). The US Supreme Court
opined: "The extradition process involves an extended restraint of
liberty following arrest even more severe than that accompanying
detention with a single State. Extradition involves, at a minimum,
administrative processing in both the asylum State and the demanding
State, and forced transportation in between. It surely is a significant
restraint on liberty."
24
In Europe for instance, a State Party to an extradition treaty may
refuse extradition on the ground that the basic human rights of the
fugitives will be violated by the requesting state if he is extradited. The
primacy of human rights norms over extradition treaties arises from
the notion of jus cogens--- or those peremptory norms which the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties acknowledges to be superior
than any treaty obligation because they form part of the ordre public of
the international community or of a particular region. See Article 53 of
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also, J. Dugard and C.
Wyngaert, "Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights," 92 AJIL 187-
212 (1998).
25
Article 31(1), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
26
Id., Art. 31 (3) (b).
27
Preamble, United Nations Charter. Concern for human rights is also
embodied in Article 13, par. 1 (b), Article 55 (c) and Article 62(2) of the
U.N. Charter.
28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter cited as
UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 10, 1948. Although not a treaty, the principles of freedom
contained in the UDHR have been generally regarded as customary,
hence, binding among the members of the international community.
See Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, supra.
29
The UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter cited as ICCPR) on December 16,
1966. The Philippines signed the convention on December 19, 1966
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

but ratified it only on October 23, 1986. On the other hand, the United Treaty laws, particularly those which are self-executing, have
States signed the convention on October 5, 1977 but ratified it only on
June 8, 1992.
equal stature as national statutes and, like all other municipal
30
The UDHR provides that: laws, are subject to the parameters set forth in the
"Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in degree and Constitution. The Constitution, being both a grant and a
rights; circumscription of government authority by the sovereign
Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in
this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power and its
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social limitation upon which an act of government is justly measured.
origin, property, birth, or other status; This instrument contains a rule for all agencies of the
xxx xxx xxx government and any act in opposition thereto can only be
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights struck down as being invalid and without effect. 2 When the
granted him by the Constitution or by law; great Charter gives a mandate, the government can do no less
Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or than to accept it; its rejection would be an act of betrayal. The
exile"
Similarly, Article 9 of the ICCPR provides:
edict in its Bill of Rights granting to all persons, without
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall distinction, the fundamental right to bail, is clear. No statute or
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived treaty can abrogate or discard its language and its intent.
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedures as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of The draft ponencia would assume that the Constitution
the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any confines the grant of provisional liberty to criminal cases, and
charges against him;
3. Anyone arrested or detained in a criminal charge shall be brought
that it has no application to extradition proceedings. This
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise assumption would have reason for being if it were solely in
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within reasonable time or to criminal cases that a person could face an imminent threat of
release. deprivation of his right to life or liberty, for indeed, it is this
4. Anyone who was deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that such court threat, rather than case nomenclature, that must be the focus
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order and it would be superficial to think otherwise. While defying a
his release if the detention is not lawful. neat definition, extradition has all the earmarks of a criminal
5. Anyone who has been a victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall process --- an extraditee would suffer deprivations, be denied
have an enforceable right to compensation.
31
Absolute rights are those which may not be suspended or derogated his freedom and restricted in his movements, not much unlike
in any circumstance. Examples of absolute or non-derogable rights are a criminal indictee. Extradition proceedings involve an
freedom from torture and arbitrary killing. On the other hand, relative extended restraint of liberty following arrest, peculiar to an
or derogable rights are those which may be suspended or derogated
under circumstances such as the occurrence of public emergency or
accused in a criminal case, which can even be more severe
commission of an offense. than an accompanying detention in a single state, for, at a
32
190 US 40 (1902). minimum, it can mean protracted proceedings in both the
33
Persily, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 Stan. J. Intl. asylum state and the demanding state and a forced
L 407, 408 (1998).
34
The ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail is modified when a transportation in between. 3 In Herras Teehankee vs.
person faces a warrant of extradition. 18 U.S.C.A. 3146, 3184. Rovira, 4 the Court observed that bail is constitutionally
35
Hu Yau-Leung vs. Soscia, 649 F. 2d 914 (1981). available to all persons, even those against whom no formal
36
In re Kirby, et al., 106 F. 3d 855 (1996). charges are filed.
37
In re Mitchell, 171 F. 289 (1909).
38
In re Gannon, supra.
39
Hall, Bail in International Extradition, supra at 604. "Indeed, if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those
40
Ibid.
41
430 F. Supp. 915 (1977). already charged under a formal complaint or information, there
42
554 F. 2d 1 (1977). seems no legal and just reason for denying its benefits to one
43
Persily, supra, p. 429, citing Reform of the Extradition Laws of the against whom the proper authorities may not even yet
United States: Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before the Subcommittee On
Crime of the House Committee On Judiciary, 98th Cong. 42-43 (1983).
conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To
44
243 SCRA 538 (1995). place the former in a more favored position than the latter
45
Id., p. 542, citing Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 300 by F. would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a
B. Moreno; Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally
244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 F. 980;
Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 P. 2d 792.
charged with criminal offenses ... a fortiori, this presumption
46
259 SCRA 296 (1996). should be indulged in favor of one not yet so charged although
47
Id., p. 307. arrested and detained."
48
Petitioners Memorandum Re: Prayer for Jimenez Arrest, Rollo, p. 87.
49
Petition for Extradition, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 54-55.
50
TSN June 5, 2001, pp. 11- 15; Rollo, pp. 267-271. xxxxxxxxx
51
Id., pp. 24-25; Id., pp. 280-281.
52
Sworn Statement, Rollo, p. 195.
53
Supra note 1, p. 308. "We reiterate now that under the Constitution, all persons,
54
Ibid. without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so
charged with any criminal offense, 'shall before conviction be
bailable,' the only exception being when charge is for a capital
Separate Opinion offense and the court finds that the evidence of guilt is strong."

VITUG, J.:
"The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." 1
The proposal to curtail the right of an individual to seek bail
from the courts of law, acting in extradition cases, as well as
his right to notice and hearing before being arrested, brings to
mind the not so distant past of the Spanish Inquisition and an
uneasy realization that we have yet to totally free ourselves
from the grip of a dark page in history.
Notably, our extradition law (P.D. 1069, paragraph. 1, Section 9
thereof), expressly provides that in the hearing of the
extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar
as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of
the proceedings, shall apply. In this regard, Section 3, Rule
114, of our Rules of Criminal Procedure is unequivocal ---
"All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled
to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with capital
offenses or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and the time of the application for bail, is punished
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong."

My reservation on the draft ponencia is premised on the
following theses first, it would ignore constitutional
safeguards to which all government action is defined, and
second, it would overstep constitutional restraints on judicial
power.
Nowhere in the Extradition Treaty with the United States is the
grant of bail mentioned but so also it is not prohibited. This
obscurity must not be held to negate the right to bail; on the
contrary, it should be viewed as allowing, at the very least, the
evident intendment and spirit of the fundamental law to prevail.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
A Constitution does not deal with details, but only enunciates
general tenets that are intended to apply to all facts that may
come about and be brought within its directions. 5 Behind its
conciseness is its encompassing inclusiveness. It is not skin-
deep; beneath that surface is what gives it real life and
meaning. It can truly be said that the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibbling over patchwork but proceeds
from its gut consciousness and dynamic role as a brick in the
ultimate development of the edifice. 6
Resort to overly rigid procedures is being justified as a need to
keep in line with our treaty obligations. Verily, comity in our
relations with sovereign states is important, but there are
innate rights of individuals which no government can negotiate
or, let alone, bargain away.
Analogy between extradition process and proceedings where
the right to bail is said to be unavailing, i.e., deportation
proceedings and proceedings before a military tribunal, would
not at all be apropos. Deportation proceedings are no more
than inquiries and just involve the simple fact of whether or not
an alien has an authorized entry within a named country or, if
authorized, whether or not he has complied with the conditions
for a continued stay thereat. A subject found to be illegally
staying in a country is merely transported back to his place of
origin. Most importantly, such a person is not considered to be
under judicial custody. Proceedings before a military tribunal,
upon the other hand, are confined to members of the military
organization who give consent to its jurisdiction. The stringent
proceedings before such tribunals place emphasis on
summary procedures, a speedy resolution of the case being
vital in maintaining discipline, obedience and fitness among the
ranks 7 that cannot obviously be compromised in any sound
military establishment.
The draft ponencia would rely heavily on foreign jurisprudence,
notably American cases, to belabor the point that the right to
bail is extraneous to extradition proceedings. The citation,
particularly of the jurisprudence obtaining in the United States,
could be predicated on the Eighth Amendment of the US
Federal Constitution. This amendment however, recognizes
merely by implication the right to bail by simply disallowing
excessive bail; it does not expressly provide for the grant of
bail. 8 Individual states have incorporated into their own state
constitutions various versions -- some give it as a matter of
right and some do not a fact which partially explains the lack
of uniformity in state jurisprudence on the matter. Where some
states provide for a constitutional right to bail, the same is
almost invariably viewed as affording a greater right than that
provided in the federal charter. 9
In contrast, the Philippine Constitution strongly and clearly
mandates that, except for those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong, bail is an undeniable right of every person ---
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required." 10
Thus, grappling in this jurisdiction with the compatibility of the
grant of bail in extradition proceedings with basic constitutional
guarantees has not been and should not be a predicament.
Absent any standard, except for the constitutional limitation
that the same be not excessive, the grant of bail in the United
States largely rests on judicial discretion under the umbrella of
judicial power. And so it has been so regarded in Wright v.
Henkel, 11 the primary case governing access to bail in United
States extradition proceedings, where the Court has held:
"We are unwilling to hold that the Circuit Courts possess no
power in respect of admitting bail other than as specifically
vested by statute or that, while bail should not ordinarily be
granted in cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not, in
any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that
relief."
Henkel, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1903, has been
criticized to have imposed an amorphous standard and has
resulted in an incoherent and inconsistent approach to
bail. 12 While the clamor for its re-examination appears to be
getting persistent by the day, 13 it has nevertheless become the
forerunner in the judicially-prescribed "special circumstances"
standard in deciding whether the bail should be granted or
denied. 14 These "special circumstances" vary from reasons
of ill-health to material prejudice depending on the
peculiarities of the case.
In In re Mitchel, 15 to cite an example, the court there caused
the release of an extraditee who was charged with larceny by
the requesting state based on the assertion that his continued
detention rendered him incapable of consulting with his
counsel. The court was careful to emphasize that it had
become imperative for him to obtain advice of counsel because
his entire fortune depended upon his doing so. The court then
added that while he had knowledge for a long time of the
extradition, he had made no attempt to flee. 16
But Philippine courts need not really bother borrowing from
dicta in foreign jurisdictions. The absoluteness of the
constitutional grant under Section 13, Article, III of the
Constitution precludes any need for further standards than
those explicitly expressed by it. Judicial discretion is confined
to the issue of whether or not the offense charged is a capital
crime and a determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong. The rule may appear to be too simplistic but it is
the correct approach. At all events, I would not be comfortable
in developing a "special circumstances" standard on the basis
of mere pro hac vice pronouncements from elsewhere. In
Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons 17 , this Court has
expressed unqualified acquiescence to the deeply ingrained
policy of restraint against unwarranted judicial adventurism that
can otherwise easily get out of hand. 1wphi1.nt
Given the foregoing, the trial court did not err, let alone commit
a grave abuse of discretion, in the grant of bail to the
extraditee.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the Petition.
JOSE C. VITUG
Footnotes
1
Section II, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
2
Bernas, 1987 Constitution, 1st Edition, Bk. 2, p. 1.
3
Jeffrey A. Hall, "A Recommended Approach to Bail in International
Extradition Cases," Michigan Law Review, December 1987.
4
66 SCRA 38, 43.
5
16th AmJur 2d.
6
See the writers opinion in G.R. No. 146710-15.
7
Reid vs. Covert, 354 U.S. 683, 694 (1969), cited in Bernas, Ibid. p.
370.
8
U.S. ex. re. Keating vs. Bensinger, D.C. Ill. 1971, 322 F. Supp. 784,
Mastrian vs. Hedman, C.A. Minn. 1964, 326 F2d 708, certiorari denied
84 S.Ct. 1128,376 U.S. 965, 11 L. Ed. 2d 982. The eighth Amendment
of the U.S. Federal Constitution merely provides
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
9
Ray vs. State, 679 N.E. 2d 1364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
10
Section 13, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
11
190 U.S. 40 (1903).
12
Jeffrey Hall, Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
M. Cherif Bassiouni, "International Extradition United States Law and
Practice," Vol. II, November 1987, Oceana Publications, Inc., p. 535.
15
171 F, 289 (S.D. N.Y 1909), cited in Bassiouni, Ibid., at p. 535.
16
Ibid.
17
76 Phil 756, 769.
Dissenting Opinion
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
With all due respect, I am disturbed by the majority opinions
disregard of basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition.
The majority opinion is too sweeping and dogmatic for a case
of first impression. I find the views on the indiscriminate denial
of fundamental rights too open-ended and heedless of
entrenched jurisprudence on Bill of Rights protections.
The sheer novelty of the worlds only superpower asking that a
Filipino be brought before it to face criminal prosecution seems
to mesmerize policy makers and this Court alike into depriving
that citizen of constitutional protections. The issue before the
respondent court is a fairly innocuous one whether or not the
petition for extradition is meritorious. We are not concerned
with the guilt or innocence of the respondent. He is presumed
innocent of the crimes charged until he is convicted by a
foreign court. He is likewise presumed innocent of the
demands found in the request for his extradition. But the
majority opinion has chosen to adopt a presumption of guilt. It
presumes that the petition calling for the forcible separation of
the respondent from his homeland, family, occupation, and
friends is correct even before the merits are ascertained. It
presumes that he will flee.
A person convicted of a crime, except for the most serious
offenses, is allowed bail while an appeal is pending.
Respondent Jimenez has not been convicted of any crime. His
guilt or innocence is not in issue before the respondent court.
The only legal affront he has committed is his refusal to leave
the pleasures of life in his country and go to a place where he
fears the reception to him would be disagreeable and much
less pleasant. Eventually after trial in the respondent court,
respondent may be compelled to undergo what he fears. But
until that decision is rendered and becomes executory, he must
be presumed innocent of any crime or any affront to law or
treaty. There can be no deprivation of basic rights and
freedoms merely because the case is one of extradition.
I submit that we must consider the implications of a ruling that
in criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused
must be protected, but in a case neither criminal nor civil, one
which we call "sui generis," basic freedoms become irrelevant
and non-available. A non-criminal proceeding, less onerous
and repulsive to society than prosecution for crime, and where
the penalty is only to be brought for trial before the court with
jurisdiction, is stripped of guarantees and protections given to
hard-boiled recidivists pending arrest and trial.
We have denied a prospective extraditee the right to be
informed before trial of the nature and cause of the charges
against him. 1 Due process is essential in all court proceedings
criminal, civil, investigatory, administrative, or even sui
generis, a class the Court uses as an excuse to justify
deprivation of that most elemental of rights, the right of
notice. 2 The Court has ruled that respondent Mark Jimenez or
any other person sought to be extradited must first be exposed
to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public denunciation
in court before he may be informed of what the requesting
State has against him. The right to notice before trial is denied.
The majority opinion states that a prospective extraditee is not
entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant of arrest can be
issued against him. Worse, he is denied the right to bail and
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending.
All the jurisprudence explaining the parameters of the
unreasonable searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution 3 becomes inapplicable. The petition for extradition
and its attachments take the place of probable cause. The right
against unreasonable search and seizure is available to all
persons including those not charged with any crime. 4 But now,
we create an unusual exception. It is not available to one who
may be seized against his will for possible extradition to a
country where his innocence or guilt will first be determined.
Arrest and imprisonment will become virtually certain in
extradition proceedings. The only thing required of the Court is
to go over the request for extradition and its supporting
documents. Arrest is virtually assured because of the absence
of notice and hearing. It is inconceivable that the officials of a
requesting State would be so dense or careless as to fail to
include in the request for extradition a prima facie showing that
the respondent deserves to be seized and forcibly brought to
the foreign country for trial. According to the majority opinion,
from the forwarded documents, we expect the trial court to
"merely xxx xxx xxx get a good first impression sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused." This novel doctrine justifying the
near certainty of automatic arrest and detention goes against
this Courts decisions, too numerous to mention, protecting
citizens and aliens alike from unreasonable arrests or seizures.
Can we expect anything other than a "good first impression" to
arise from the mere reading of a request for extradition?
In criminal prosecutions, the judge must personally determine
probable cause for the arrest. Facts and circumstances must
first be presented which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty of the offense. 5 In the
majority opinion, the request for extradition by the foreign
country takes the place of a hearing for probable cause. After
trial, it is possible that the petition for extradition may be
denied. Under the majority opinion, the possibility of a
judgment of denial does not influence the immediate arrest and
indefinite detention of the respondent since notice and hearing
before arrest are not required. He must be jailed while the
grant or denial of the petition is being considered.
The majority opinion gives five (5) postulates of extradition.
With all due respect, I fail to see how compliance with these
postulates should result in a disregard for constitutional
liberties.
I agree with the first postulate. It is a general proposition that
extradition is a major instrument for the suppression of crime
and the Philippines should cooperate in facilitating the arrest
and custodial transfer of a fugitive from one State to another.
However, I cannot see how compliance with the requirements
for notice and hearing and the ascertainment of reasonable
cause would hamper the suppression of crime. If they do, why
should they appear in our laws and in the decisions of this
Court? Does obedience to the dictates of due process and the
prohibition against unreasonable seizures mean any lesser
determination to eradicate crime? Effective extradition
arrangements and deterrence of flight abroad by felons are not
incompatible with fundamental liberties. The act of according
due process and reasonable seizures does not make the
Philippines an isolationist state. The employment of beneficial
objectives to justify the repression of far more worthy values is
pejorative in nature, one in which the Court should not engage.
The second postulate is based on the apriorism that the two
parties to an extradition treaty accept and trust each others
legal system and judicial processes. We trust the fairness of
the American system of justice. However, why should we
assume that it is a breach of trust which the requesting country
will look upon with disfavor if we accord notice and hearing to
the respondent before a warrant of arrest is issued? If bail is
allowed while the extradition petition is pending before the trial
court, does this signify a lack of confidence on our part in the
capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the
basic rights of the person sought to be extradited?
The Constitution of the United States provides that "(t)he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but on probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized." 6 The offenses upon which the request for
extradition is premised are relatively light. Undoubtedly, bail will
be given by the American courts on the basis of a presumption
of innocence and the lack of gravity of the offenses. If the
alleged offenses themselves are bailable both here and in the
United States, I see no connection between the grant of the
right against unreasonable seizures or the right of bail and the
gratuitous assertion of the majority opinion that this is an
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
absence of trust and confidence in the American legal system
and judicial process.
The guarantees of the Philippine Bill of Rights are derived from
American sources. Why should we withhold them out of a
misplaced fear that their grant may be interpreted as a lack of
faith in the American judicial system?
The third postulate states that extradition proceedings are sui
generis. It is a dogma pernicious in its consequences to
declare that a classification of sui generis lifts a court
proceeding beyond constitutional protections. The trial before
the respondent court is not criminal in nature. It is less onerous
than a criminal prosecution. Yet, the majority opinion confers
upon one accused of grave crimes far greater rights than an
extraditee whose guilt of lesser offenses is not even in issue.
Classifying a proceeding as sui generis does not mean that
procedural guarantees available in criminal prosecutions, civil
trials, or administrative proceedings are thereby waived or
become irrelevant. The classification should not mean
exemption from notice or hearing for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. It cannot result in non-entitlement to bail.
The process of extradition does not involve the determination
of the guilt of an accused. The majority opinion states that
extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance to restore a person charged with crime to the
jurisdiction with the best claim to try him. If so why should the
person sought to be extradited be imprisoned without bail while
the grant of assistance is pending? With more reason should
constitutional protections be given to him. The correctness of a
decision to forcibly remove a person from his homeland, family,
and friends should not be taken lightly. In determining whether
the extradition request complies with the extradition treaty, the
trial court should not be encouraged by a postulate to act in a
cavalier manner or treat the proceedings as inconsequential in
nature.
The majority opinion states as its fourth postulate that
compliance with treaties shall be in good faith. If the
respondent court grants bail to the respondent in extradition
proceedings, does this constitute a failure to fulfill our
obligations under the extradition treaty? I am not aware of any
treaty which requires the incarceration of a respondent while
the court determines whether or not he falls under the treaty
provisions. Why should the furnishing of notice and the holding
of a hearing for an arrest warrant paint a bad picture of our
country before the world community? There should be a
contrary impression of adherence to fairness and justice. We
cannot fault the trial court for adopting procedural safeguards
which help insure the correctness of its decision. If compliance
in good faith with the treaty requires that the respondent be
immediately seized and confined in the national penitentiary,
why should an extradition trial still be held? We might as well
give full faith and credence to the request for extradition and
without any trial or hearing, place the respondent in the next
airplane leaving for the requesting country. The discussion in
the majority opinion of the postulates of extradition implies that
the implementation of an extradition treaty rarely or never
results in a refusal to allow extradition and that the court
proceedings do not amount to anything more than a formality.
Otherwise, why should he languish in the penitentiary while his
extradition case is pending?
The fifth and last postulate uses the underlying risk of flight. To
say that all persons sought to be extradited have a propensity
to flee is too sweeping a statement to be adopted as an axiom.
In every criminal prosecution, the prosecution can, with greater
reason, argue that the accused will escape and go into hiding.
But never has the possibility of flight sufficed to always require
incarceration while court proceedings are going on. The
opposite practice is the one we have adopted. The right to bail
has been elevated into a constitutional guarantee. Only for the
most serious of offenses when evidence of guilt is strong may
an accused be denied freedom upon the posting of bail prior to
his conviction. 7 In fact, the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provide that any person in custody
who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city, or municipality where he is
held. 8 The respondent is not charged of any crime before our
courts.
The five postulates of extradition outlined in the majority
opinion are motherhood statements over which there can be
no quarrel. However, these postulates should be interpreted in
a manner that preserves procedural safeguards instead of
being used to support the petitioner's intent to cut corners.
Compliance with treaty obligations does not mean
unquestioning obedience to everything stated in a petition for
extradition. The allegations will still be proved, refuted, and
determined. Much less does it result in instant seizure without
notice and hearing or incarceration without any recourse to
legal methods of gaining provisional liberty.
Is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest?
The majority opinion agrees with the Department of Justice
that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it informed the respondent that an extradition
petition had been filed against him and that petitioner was
seeking his arrest. The opinion states that the exercise of
discretion by the judge is a notice to escape and to avoid
extradition.
The truth is that long before January 18, 2000 when G.R. No.
139465 was decided, 9 respondent was fully aware of the
information which this Court now declares should not have
been given to him. Respondent could have fled but he did not
do so. Instead, he made himself more visible; he ran for
Congress and engaged in various civic activities always in the
public eye.
Paraphrasing the ruling in G.R. No. 139465 on the motion for
reconsideration, the threat of private respondent's flight from
the Philippines has passed. It is more imagined than real at
this time. 10
Petitioner states that the procedure requiring notice and
hearing will set a dangerous precedent. The Court agrees that
those sought to be extradited including terrorists, mass
murderers and war criminals may invoke it in future
extradition cases.
To lump up respondent Jimenez and all persons in extradition
proceedings with terrorists, mass murderers, and war criminals
is contrary to all rules of reasonable and valid classification.
Respondent is charged before the district court of Florida with
conspiracy to defraud, attempted tax evasion, fraud through
the use of radio television, false statements, and unlawful
election contributions. There is absolutely no indication of
terrorism, mass murder, or war crimes against him. He is
definitely not a candidate for confinement in the Guantanamo
Prison Compound. The fear of terrorists is not reason to
deprive all subjects of extradition proceedings any and all
constitutional protections. Methods of dealing with terrorists
should not be used against suspected tax evaders or violators
of election laws. The fact that terrorists are denied bail is not
reason to deny this constitutional guarantee to persons being
tried for offenses where no individual is a victim.
It is error to expect that all persons against whom charges
have been filed would voluntarily and cheerfully submit to trial.
There are procedural safeguards such as preliminary
investigation intended to secure a person presumed innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from
the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial and also to
protect the state from useless and expensive trials. 11 For both
the State and the accused, there could be sound reasons to
oppose or avoid prosecution.
If there is reason in some cases for the State not to prosecute,
there is greater reason for a prospective accused to take all
steps that would prevent his having to go before a criminal
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
court. We may assume that any fears of oppressive
prosecution in the mind of the private respondent are
unfounded and imagined. This should not lead the Court to
conclude that a natural aversion to criminal prosecution is
always based on ignoble or indefensible reasons. Neither
should a natural desire to avoid unpleasant situations be used
to deny basic rights and privileges.
I submit that it is a dangerous precedent for this Court to rule
that the prima facie existence of probable cause for a warrant
of arrest can be derived from a mere reading of the petition for
extradition and its supporting documents. The determination of
probable cause is effectively taken away from the judge and
transferred to the Department of Justice. Worse, the
determination could come directly from an office not equipped
to make it, namely the Department of Foreign Affairs. In either
case, the Constitution is infringed.
The majority opinion is overly influenced by the fear that a
person sought to be extradited would be tempted to flee. Of
course, it is natural for any person facing court litigation of any
kind to try to avoid it. An accused already being tried in court or
an appellant who appeals a judgment of conviction has greater
reason to flee if possible. Yet, this is not cause to deny him
notice of proceedings or the right of provisional liberty while his
case is pending. If bail is going to be denied respondent
Jimenez, it should be after a full hearing and with the
application of all constitutional guarantees.
The majority opinion states that under the Constitution only the
complainants and the witnesses he may produce are required
to be examined. 12 It overlooks that in this case no complainant
and no witness has been examined. A warrant of arrest is
ordered issued on the sole basis of documents. There may be
no requirement to notify and hear the accused before a warrant
of arrest is issued. But neither is there any prohibition against
the judge hearing an accused before a warrant is issued; more
so if he is already in court and strongly opposes his being
arrested pending trial. In his search for the truth, the judge
should not be restrained in the exercise of sound discretion.
In this case, the petition has already been filed. The
respondent has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The motion to have him arrested and detained is an
incident of the pending case. There is no need to take him into
custody in order to make him forthcoming for trial. 13 Mr.
Jimenez appears to be more than willing and, in fact, is already
answering the request for extradition. He is not before the court
to answer for any crime. But he is there. Strangely, the court
would deny him provisional liberty in a case not criminal in
nature but which could make him answer for alleged offenses
in another country if the court should decide against him. What
cannot be denied to him in the criminal prosecution is denied in
a case which may or may not lead to such prosecution.
The absence of logic behind the majority opinions denial of
basic rights becomes clearer when it comes to the issue on the
right to bail. The reason given for the denial of the right to bail
is not merely deceptive; it has dangerous implications. It states
that the constitutional provision on bail applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine Criminal Law. The reasoning states, that ergo, the
right to bail does not exist in non-criminal prosecutions. The
absence of a constitutional provision on the right to bail of a
person subject to extradition is simply based on the fact that
the idea of incarcerating a person for something other than
crime never occurred to the framers of the Constitution. There
can be no forcible detention in non-criminal situations.
Incarceration for something not related to crime would be
arbitrary detention or illegal detention. It could even be slavery
or involuntary servitude. In all these cases, the issue of bail
does not arise. If we insist on classifying extradition as a
proceeding not covered by the protections given to accused
persons, we should rule that bail is not provided because the
respondent is not supposed to be imprisoned. There is no
need for bail because the detention is illegal in cases not
related to crime. Extradition cases may not be criminal in
nature. But they assist and precede criminal prosecutions.
The petitioner twists the right to bail out of context when it
argues that the right available during criminal prosecutions is
irrelevant and should be disregarded when the court action is
non-criminal in nature and, therefore, it is not available in civil,
administrative, regulatory, and extradition proceedings. The
fallacy of the argument is readily apparent.
I cannot go along with the proposition that a person who tries
to avoid criminal prosecution is always a criminal, coward, or
weakling who prefers to run and hide. There are many reasons
why people will fear trial in criminal cases. It is not
overprotection or excessively liberal treatment to enforce
constitutional guarantees in extradition cases. It is fairness and
adherence to the rule of law. The judge has discretion on
whether or not he should allow bail. He should have a sound
basis for the probability or likelihood of flight.
The majority opinion starts by asking two questions. (1) Are
prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before
warrants for their arrest are issued? and (2) Are they entitled to
bail and provisional liberty while extradition proceedings are
pending? The answer is a curt "No". By the brevity and terse
nature of the answer, it seems absolute and inflexible.
Towards the end of the majority opinion, 14 however, two
exceptions are allowed. First, the applicant is not a flight risk.
Second, there exist special and compelling circumstances.
To my mind, the issues in this case should be framed
differently. On the first question, the present provisions of law
and decisions of this Court on arrests and seizures should be
assumed and followed. On the second question, the Court
should apply the same principles on the right to bail found in
the Constitution to persons facing trial for extradition. Thus, all
persons, except those where the probability of flight is clear
and present or the crimes for which extradition is sought are
heinous, shall before judgment in the extradition proceedings,
be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even where the requesting country is one with
which the Philippines maintains strong ties. Excessive bail
shall not be required. 15
The majority opinion cites my ponencia in People v.
Jalosjos. 16 Jalosjos was already convicted and his appeal was
pending when he was re-elected. The crime of statutory rape
where a minor is involved is particularly heinous. The evidence
of guilt was not merely strong; it was beyond reasonable doubt
as found in our decision. Disenfranchisement of constituents is
not reason for his release.
The case of Congressman Jimenez is an entirely different one.
Respondent has not even faced trial as yet. There can be no
proof of strong evidence against him. All we have are still
accusations.
Respondent is not charged with heinous crimes. The alleged
tax evasion is at the stage of attempt. The defraudation is part
of a conspiracy. Perjury and illegal election contributions are
relatively not so serious offenses as to support denial of the
right to bail.
The respondents being a Congressman should be viewed
from the aspect of possibility of flight. Why should a person run
for Congress, campaign all over his district, and expose
himself regularly to newspaper media and television if he
intends to flee the country? There is a hold-order against him
found in all ports of exit and entry. When his constituents voted
Jimenez to Congress knowing fully well that an extradition
case was or could be filed against him, it was an expression of
confidence that he would not run away. Their faith may be
misplaced or proved wrong later, but today, it must be taken at
face value as against mere suppositions, fears, and
apprehensions. The rules on denial of bail where possibility of
flight is established must be followed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
The request for extradition comes from the United States. In
the course of the most perilous period in the life of that nation,
the American Supreme Court stated that "the constitution is a
law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times and under all circumstances. xxx xxx xxx no doctrine
involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by
the next of man than that its provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government." 17
The extradition of respondent is not an exigency of
government. The provisions of the Bill of Rights of the two
States which entered into the treaty are fully applicable in
extradition. If a person is to be arrested and detained, current
laws and procedures for arrests and detentions should be
employed. The novelty of extradition cases in the Philippines
cannot result in any suspension or disregard of basic liberties
whether here or in the United States. The mantle of
constitutional protections should cover persons covered by
extradition requests.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Footnotes
1
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377 (2000).
2
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1 and Sec. 14(2); People v. Mencias, 46
SCRA 88 [1972].
3
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2.
4
Moncado v. Peoples Court, 80 Phil. 1.
5
People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil. 667 (1937); Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, 64 Phil. 33 (1937); U.S. v. Addison, 28 Phil. 566 (1914);
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984).
6
American Bill of Rights, Amendment No. IV of the U.S. Constitution.
7
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 13.
8
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 114, Sec. 17 (c).
9
328 SCRA 160 (2000).
10
343 SCRA 377, 389 (2000).
11
Salonga v. Hon. Pano et al., 134 SCRA 438 (1985).
12
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2.
13
Rule 113, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
defines arrest as "the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."
14
Decision, p. 34.
15
See Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 13.
16
324 SCRA 689 (2000).
17
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 (1866); 71 U.S. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281.
Concurring Opinion
Carpio, J:
I concur with the well-written ponencia of Justice Panganiban. I
write this concurring opinion to afford extraditees in this country
the right to bail, in carefully limited exceptions, under the equity
and rule making power of the Court. It is the constitutional duty
and power of the Court to protect and enforce the fundamental
rights 1 of all persons in this country. This should include, to the
extent that the Court can grant under its power, the right of
extraditees in this country to avail of the same or similar
remedies that courts in the countries of our treaty partners
have accorded to their own extraditees.
The right to bail is a constitutional right available to an accused
in domestic criminal proceedings except in offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua or higher when evidence of guilt is
strong. 2 An extraditee, however, cannot invoke this
constitutional right in international extradition because
extradition proceedings are not criminal proceedings.
Extradition proceedings are like deportation and court martial
proceedings where there is no constitutional right to bail.
Thus, in the leading case of Ong See Hang v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 3 the Court held that:
The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
invoked in favor of petitioners-appellees, considering that
deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action
(Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682; U. S. ex rel. Zapp, et al.
v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization, supra)
and the order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime (U.
S. v. Go-Siaco, 12 Phil. 490; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32), it
being merely for the return to his country of an alien who has
broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside
within our borders (U. S. v. De los Santos, 33 Phil. 397, Lao
Tang Bun v. Fabre, supra)."
This was reiterated in several cases, the most recent being In
RE Andrew Harvey v. Santiago, 4 decided under the 1987
Constitution. Here, the Court ruled that:
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release
on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in
deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right
but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien
under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released
under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed
by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word
"may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly
discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-9700, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 442).
"Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing
deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai, et al
vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation
proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by
aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, supra)."
In Commendador v. de Villa, 5 involving the court martial of
military putschists against the Aquino Government, the Court
held that:
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents
in G.R. No(s). 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and
is not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested
in Arula, where we observed that `the right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does
not exist."
The justification for this exception was well explained by the
Solicitor General as follows:
`The unique structure of the military should be enough reason
to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the
right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous
soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system,
are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for
the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid
out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent
elements carry out their activities outside of and against the
existing political system.
National security considerations should also impress upon this
Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents
constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say
1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail,
or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already
discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they
could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well
result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including
this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable.
This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or
things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject
of the treatment is substantially different from others. The
accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other
members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have
been discriminated against because they are not allowed the
same right that is extended to civilians."
Finally, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 6 the Court, speaking
through Justice Reynato S. Puno, declared that:
We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui
generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of
the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still
undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in
United States v. Galanis:
`An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and
the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in
this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant
to a valid treaty.
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding
and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is
summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-
blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the
rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission
of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive
may be ordered extradited `upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where
judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice
whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in
balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the
nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to
extradite.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and
the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to
a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the
latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for
the procedural due process required by a given set of
circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action."
The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations
calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure."
Clearly, in this jurisdiction there is no constitutional or statutory
right to bail in non-criminal proceedings like in extradition. This
doctrine is so well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that there is
no need to belabor this point. Courts in the countries of our
treaty partners, however, have allowed bail to extraditees in
their own countries even in the absence of a constitutional 7 or
statutory 8 right to bail. This places our own citizens who face
extradition proceedings in this country at a disadvantage in
terms of available remedies. The United States, for example,
allows bail to extraditees when "special circumstances" 9 are
present. Canada also allows bail under a similar rule. 10
This situation calls for equality in treatment by extending, in
carefully limited exceptions, the right to bail to those facing
extradition proceedings in this country. Nevertheless, we must
insure that we do not cripple the ability of our Executive
Department to comply in good faith with our treaty obligations
under international law. This requires a calibrated balancing,
on the one hand, of the States interest in cooperating with our
treaty partners in international criminal law enforcement, and
on the other hand, of the need to give our own citizens no
lesser right and protection than what our treaty partners so
zealously provide to their own citizens.
Thus, following the emerging trend in the United States, 11 and
guided by our own experience in combating transnational
crimes including international terrorism, the Court should rule
that our extradition courts may, after the arrest of the
extraditee, grant the extraditee bail if he establishes that he
does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community, and
there is no other special circumstance that would warrant
denial of bail. The burden of proving he is entitled to bail rests
on the extraditee because by resisting the extradition to face a
fair trial abroad, the extraditee is presumed to be a flight risk.
This is why courts have consistently held that the presumption
is against bail in extradition cases. 12
The development of extradition law is still in its infancy in this
country. We are fortunate that the present Constitution has
empowered the Court to adopt rules to protect and enforce the
fundamental rights of the people. In the United States, the
grant of bail to extraditees is still largely governed by the 1903
case of Wright v. Henkel, with only the cryptic "special
circumstances" as the standard prescribed by the U.S.
Supreme Court for extradition courts in the U.S. to
follow. 13 The instant case provides the opportunity for this
Court to lay down a clear-cut guideline for our own extradition
courts to follow. This will insure that our Executive Department
can comply promptly with extradition requests as required by
the nature of our treaty obligations while at the same time
protecting the fundamental rights of our citizens.
In essence, extradition is police assistance extended by a state to
arrest a person charged with a crime in another state and surrender
him to the authorities of that state. The power to arrest by the assisting
state is legitimized by a treaty, which has the force of a statute 14 and
forms part of municipal law. 15 The benefit of extradition is the mutual
assistance between states in criminal law enforcement across national
boundaries. The assisting state acts as an arresting agent and in some
jurisdictions the extradition process is mainly an executive function.
Even under our extradition treaties, the final decision whether to
extradite or not rests with the President of the Philippines, not with the
courts. 16 Thus, ordinarily an assisting state does not grant bail to the
extraditee whose recourse is to apply for bail before the court of the
state where he is charged with a crime. The assisting state, however,
for equity considerations may choose to accord bail to the extraditee.
One equity consideration is to put extraditees in one country in equal
footing with extraditees in the country of the treaty partner. Another
equity consideration is to grant the right to bail, in carefully limited
exceptions, to preserve and enforce fundamental rights.
This rule will not change the situation for extraditee Mark B. Jimenez in
the instant case because Jimenez has failed to establish that he is not
a flight risk. Having fled the United States just as he was about to be
indicted for several serious crimes, Jimenez is presumed to be a flight
risk for extradition purposes in this country. Jimenez has not
successfully rebutted this presumption before the extradition court.
Jimenez has also refused to honor his agreement with the U.S.
Department of Justice, made in August 1998 through his U.S. counsel,
to return to the United States 17 where he faces a maximum prison term
of not less than 100 years if convicted on all counts. 18Given his
resources, and the gravity of the charges against him, Jimenez
remains a serious flight risk.
The special circumstances" that Jimenez has alleged do not inspire
confidence that he will not likely flee. Jimenez claims that he has been
admitted to the Witness Protection Program which shows his lack of
intent to flee. The Department of Justice, however, has disowned
issuing to Jimenez a Certificate of Admission to the Witness Protection
Program. The Department of Justice should know who have been
admitted to the Witness Protection Program because the Department
itself administers the Program. Under the Witness Protection, Security
and Benefit Act, the issuance of the Certificate of Admission is the
operative act that establishes admission to the Program. 19 Unless he
can present a Certificate of Admission, Jimenezs claim should be
rejected, and even taken as an act of misrepresentation to the
extradition court, in view of the statement by the Department of Justice
that there is no record of Jimenezs admission to the Program. 2 20
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

For the same reason, Jimenezs claim that he is a state witness in the
plunder case against ex-President Joseph Estrada, and that "his flight
would strip him of (the) immunity he is entitled to," 2 21 cannot be given
credence. Under the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act, the
Certificate of Admission is essential to the discharge of the accused
and his utilization as a state witness. 2 22 Without the Certificate of
Admission, Jimenez is not entitled to immunity under the Program.
2 23 The Department of Justice will issue the Certificate of Admission
only if it is satisfied with the proposed testimony of the witness as
disclosed in his sworn statement. Since until now the Department of
Justice has not issued a Certificate of Admission to Jimenez, it could
mean that the Department is either not satisfied with what Jimenez is
bargaining to testify against ex-President Joseph Estrada, or that
Jimenez may not be the least guilty. 2 24 Unless Jimenez presents to
the extradition court the Certificate of Admission, and this he has not
done, Jimenezs claim of being a state witness against ex-President
Estrada is baseless and self-serving.
18
Page 17, Petition for Certiorari.
19
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6981 provides as follows: " x x x If after said examination
of said person, his sworn statement and other relevant facts, the Department is
satisfied that the requirement of this Act and its implementing rules are complied
with, it may admit such person into the Program and issue the corresponding
certificate."
20
Pages 28-29, Petitioners Memorandum.
21
Page 46, Memorandum for Private Respondent.
22
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981 provides as follows: "The certificate of admission
into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the
provincial or city prosecutor who is not required to include the Witness in the
criminal complaint or information and if included therein, to petition the court for
his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a state Witness. x x x."
23
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981 provides that "[a]dmission into the Program shall
entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the offense
or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used x x x."
24
Section 10, R.A. No. 6981.
25
Annex "A-1" of Private Respondents Comment.

Jimenez claims that the Department of Justice knows his whereabouts

because he is under 24-hour PNP protection. Jimenez asserts in his
Sworn Statement 2 25 that the Department of Justice has provided him
police protection because he "was admitted into the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ on 2 March 2001." This is patently false. The
Department of Justice states that there is no record of Jimenezs
admission to the Witness Protection Program. Jimenez has not
presented a Certificate of Admission to the Program which under the
Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act would entitle him to the
benefits, protection and immunities of the Program.

That Jimenez enjoys the privilege of a 24-hour PNP security detail

does not establish that he is a state witness under the Witness
Protection Program. As a member of the House of Representatives,
Jimenez may have requested the PNP to provide him a security detail
for his own benefit and protection. In such a case, the PNP security
detail takes instructions from Jimenez and not from the Department of
Justice. The 24-hour PNP security detail would hardly be effective in
preventing Jimenez from fleeing the country.

The other special circumstances" alleged by Jimenez, like his seven

children residing in the Philippines, and his lack of visas to travel to
other countries, deserve scant consideration. Considering his age,
Jimenezs seven children are all probably of age by now, and even if
they are all still minors, they would hardly become public charges if left
behind in the Philippines. The lack of visas has never deterred the
flight of fugitives from any country. Besides, any Filipino can travel to
any of our nine ASEAN neighbors without need of a visa.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Footnotes
1
Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides as follows: "The Supreme
Court shall have the following powers: (1) x x x (5) Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, x x x."
2
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.
3
4 SCRA 442 (1962).
4
162 SCRA 840 (1988).
5
200 SCRA 80 (1991).
6
343 SCRA 377 (2000).
7
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required." The excessive bail clause did not establish a
constitutional right to bail. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987),
attached as Annex "7", Memorandum for Private Respondent, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared: "The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing
merely that `[e]xcessive bail shall not be required. This Clause, of course, says
nothing about whether bail shall be available at all."
8
The U.S. Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not grant the right to bail in extradition
cases.
9
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903), attached as Annex "2", Memorandum for
Private Respondent.
10
Canada v. Pitman, 1986 WL602917 (Ont. H.C.), Supreme Court of Ontario.
11
Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9 th Cir. 1997), attached as Annex "5",
Memorandum for Private Respondent.
12
United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996), attached as Annex
"8", Memorandum for Private Respondent.
13
U.S. lower courts have differed in their interpretation of the "special
circumstances" standard. See A Recommended Approach to Bail in International
Extradition Cases, Jeffrey A. Hall, Michigan Law Review, December, 1987.
14
La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373 (1984); Ram Singh v.
Insular Collector of Customs, 38 Phil. 862. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322
SCRA 160 (2000), the Court stated: "Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogat priori takes effect - a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty."
15
Guerreros Transport Services, Inc. v. Blaylock Trans. Services Employees
Association-Kilusan, 71 SCRA 621 (1976).
16
Paragraph 2, Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
17
Letter dated August 23, 2001 written by Mr. John E. Harris, Director, Office of
the International Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, addressed to
Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez of the Philippine Department of Justice,
attached to Petitioners Memorandum.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 81798 December 29, 1989
LAO GI alias FILOMENO CHIA, SR., his wife, ONG UE, and
his children FILOMENO, JR., MANUEL, ROSITA VICENTA
and DOMINGA, all surnamed CHIA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioners.
GANCAYCO, J.:
On September 3, 1958 the Secretary of Justice rendered
Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 finding Filomeno Chia, Jr.,
alias Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his
father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino citizen born on
November 28, 1899 being the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia
and Maria Layug of Guagua, Pampanga. However on October
3, 1980 the Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147,
series of 1980 cancelling Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 and
setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the
ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A
motion for reconsideration of said Opinion was denied by the
Minister of Justice on February 13, 1981.
On March 9, 1981 a charge for deportation was filed with the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) against Lao
Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children.
An amended charge was filed with the CID on March 19,1981
alleging that said respondents refused to register as aliens
having been required to do so and continued to refuse to
register as such. On August 31, 1981 another amended charge
was filed alleging that Manuel Chia committed acts of
undesirability.
On September 4, 1981 said respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the amended charges on the ground that the CID has
no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No.
191, series of 1958. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the
private prosecutor. The CID special prosecutor also filed an
opposition on the ground that the citizenship may be threshed
out as the occasion may demand and that due process was
accorded to respondents. The respondents filed a reply
thereto. The motion to dismiss was denied by the CID and a
motion for reconsideration of said denial was also denied in a
resolution dated December 10, 1981.
Said respondents then filed with this Court on February 11,
1982 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining
order docketed as G.R. No. 59619. After requiring a comment
thereon, on April 28, 1982 this court en banc resolved to
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public
documents in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in
Criminal Case No. 60172 for alleging that he was a Filipino
citizen in the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of certain
real property. He was acquitted by the trial court in an order
dated May 5, 1982 on the ground that Opinion No. 191, series
of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice may be equated as res
judicata and that revocation thereof by Opinion No. 147, series
of 1980 cannot be considered just, fair and reasonable.
On June 1, 1982 respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid resolution of this Court dismissing the petition
but this was denied by another resolution of this Court dated
August 17, 1982. A second motion for reconsideration thereof
was also denied by this Court on September 16, 1982.
On September 23, 1982 the CID set the deportation case
against respondents for hearing and Acting Commissioner
Victor G. Nituda gave respondents three (3) days to move for
reconsideration of the order directing them to register as aliens
and to oppose the motion for their arrest. On September 27,
1982 respondents filed said motion for reconsideration and
opposition but this was denied by Acting Commissioner Nituda
on September 28, 1982. The latter directed respondents to
register as aliens within two (2) days from notice thereof. The
deportation case was set for hearing on October 5, 1 982 but
on the same day respondents filed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with a prayer for injunctive relief in the Court of
First Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 82- 12935
whereby a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. On April
17,1985 a decision was rendered by the trial court dismissing
the petition for lack of legal basis and for want of supervisory
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court on the particular subject
involved. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
was dissolved.
An appeal therefrom was interposed to the Court of Appeals. In
due course a decision was rendered on August 19, 1987
dismissing the appeal with costs against petitioners. A motion
for reconsideration of the decision filed by petitioners was also
denied in a resolution dated January 7, 1988.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
wherein they seek to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals and ask that a new one be rendered setting aside the
order of the CID dated September 28, 1982 and directing it to
proceed with the reception of the evidence in support of the
charges against the petitioners. The issues raised in the
petition are as follows:
1. The issues raised in G.R. No. 59619 before the Honorable
Supreme Court were different from the issues raised in Civil
Case No. 82-12935-CV.
2. The minute resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 59619 did not make a categorical ruling that petitioner
entered and remained in the Philippines by false pretenses.
3. The issue of whether or not petitioners' citizenship was
secured by fraud is precisely the subject matter of the
proceedings before the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, in which no evidence had been presented yet in
support of the charge of fraud in the acquisition of petitioners'
citizenship.
4. Petitioners are not subject to immediate deportation.
5. The order for the arrest of petitioners in case of failure to
register as aliens was premature since there was no
competent determination yet that their citizenship was indeed
procured by fraud.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
6. The Honorable Court of Appeals overstepped its appellate
jurisdiction, when it ruled on matters not covered by the
Decision of the lower court.
There can be no question that the CID has the authority and
jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against
petitioners and in the process determine also the question of
citizenship raised by the petitioners. Section 37(a) (1) of the
Immigration Act provides as follows:
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon
the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence
of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date
of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or
without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other
than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13,
Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
From the foregoing provision it is clear that before any alien
may be deported upon a warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration, there should be a prior determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground as
charged against the alien.
In this case it appears that petitioners are charged with having
entered the Philippines by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection or admission by the
immigration authorities at a designated port of entry.
After appropriate charges are filed in the CID the specific
grounds of which he should be duly informed of, a hearing
should be conducted, and it is only after such a hearing by the
CID that the alien may be ordered deported. In such a hearing,
Opinion No. 191, Series of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice
and Opinion No. 147, Series of 1980 of the Minister of Justice
will bear much weight in the determination by the CID of the
citizenship of said petitioners.
The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner
Nituda that they register as aliens as required by the
Immigration Act. While it is not disputed that it is also within the
power and authority of the Commissioner to require an alien to
so register, such a requirement must be predicated on a
positive finding that the person who is so required is an alien.
In this case where the very citizenship of the petitioners is in
issue there should be a previous determination by the CID that
they are aliens before the petitioners may be directed and
required to register as aliens.
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act
by or under the authority of the sovereign power. 1 It is a police
measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people. 2
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a
harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such
person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the
provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly
on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
as amended, it is provided:
c No alien shall be deported without being informed of the
specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a
hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or
omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and
concise language to enable a person of common
understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be
deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper
judgment. 3
Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary
investigation must be conducted to determine if there is a
sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation. 4 The
issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without warrant and
service of warrants should be in accordance likewise with Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; 5 search warrants
issued by the CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure; 6 and so the matter of bail, motion
to quash, and trial, 7 among others. Fealty to the prescribed
rules of procedure in deportation cases shall insure a speedy,
fair and just dispensation of justice.
The Court takes note of the fact that a private prosecutor is
assisting in the prosecution of the case by the special
prosecutor of the CID. The Court sees no reason why a private
prosecutor should be allowed to participate in a deportation
case. Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly Section 16, Rule 110 thereof, an offended party
may intervene in a criminal prosecution when there is civil
liability arising from the criminal action claimed by said party. In
such case he may intervene by counsel.
In deportation cases, the Court cannot conceive of any
justification for a private party to have any right to intervene.
Even if such party can establish any damages due him arising
from the deportation charge against the alien, such relief
cannot be afforded him in the deportation proceeding. His
recourse if at all is in the ordinary courts. Thus the Court rules
that the intervention of a private prosecutor should not be
allowed in deportation cases. The possibility of oppression,
harrassment and persecution cannot be discounted. The
deportation of an alien is the sole concern of the State. This is
the reason why there are special prosecutors and fiscals
tasked to prosecute such cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
questioned order of the respondent Commission on
Immigration and Deportation dated September 28, 1982 is
hereby set aside. The respondent Commission on Immigration
and Deportation is hereby directed to continue hearing the
deportation case against petitioners and thereafter, based on
the evidence before it, to resolve the issue of citizenship of
petitioners, and if found to be aliens, to determine whether or
not the petitioners should be deported and/or otherwise
ordered to register as aliens. No costs.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 In re R. McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 211, 224 (1918).
2 Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534 (1910).
3 Section 9, Rule 110, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4 Section 15, Preliminary Investigation, Deportation Rules of
Procedure; Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5 Sections 5 and 6 of the Deportation Rules of Procedure.
6 Section 7, supra.
7 Sections 16, 17 and 21, supra; Rules 114, 117 and 119, 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-
-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His
only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his
fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him
in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to
uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the
government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds
and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of
the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual
backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the
doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it
was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia
and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties
with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter
referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by
way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in
the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7
thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying
an extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in
the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida,
and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on
the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be
charged in the United States with violation of the following
provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four
[4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of
another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty
less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249
designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge
of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began
with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the
extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The
panel found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and
that there are some other matters that needed to be
addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents,
private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July
1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall
have received copies of the requested papers. Private
respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter
be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be
given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United
States Government, and after receiving a copy of the
Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter,
petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by
private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of
the extradition request and supporting documents
from the United States Government, pending
evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
extradition documents submitted in accordance with
the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty
between the Philippines and the United States
enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be received and admitted
as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our
domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned
documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin
to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We
merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have
been complied with by the Requesting Government.
The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition
when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition,
request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request
for ample time to evaluate said documents.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
2. The formal request for extradition of the United
States contains grand jury information and documents
obtained through grand jury process covered by strict
secrecy rules under United States law. The United
States had to secure orders from the concerned
District Courts authorizing the United States to
disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine
government and law enforcement personnel for the
purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further
disclosure of the said information is not authorized by
the United States District Courts. In this particular
extradition request the United States Government
requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.
This Department's denial of your request is consistent
with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the
counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in
abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a
party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for
extradition or surrender of accused or convicted
persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel
herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request,
and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter
dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from
considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the
United States), with an application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
(pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional
trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August
9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved
that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the
same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated
the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents,
namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status
quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from
conducting further proceedings in connection with the request
of the United States Government for the extradition of the
petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a
Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to
the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this
Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the
preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the
parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their
written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a
Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing
that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM
COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST
FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO
THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS
AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION
TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT
OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT,
GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON
THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM
PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION
TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT
NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL
NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to
file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary
restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph
C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or
persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to
CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated
August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No.
99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this
17th day of August 1999.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999,
after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective
memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural
and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these
issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties,
compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is
private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights
of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily
render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic
(the issues of which are substantially the same as those before
us now), while a negative resolution would call for the
immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August
24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process
leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper
regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private
respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this
entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and
obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed
be a breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's
basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has
elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case,
brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the
propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance
of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition
procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed
only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the
implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also
called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof
defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree
relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not
convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal
charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the
authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction
over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is
requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name
and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the
Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and place of the
commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the
contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for
evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of
the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements
of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he
shall forward the request together with the related
documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in
his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive
authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the
request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain
whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of
information which describe the identity and probable
location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the
procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing
the essential elements of the offense for which
extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the
punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing
any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of
information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of
said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree
No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the
Requested State, would provide probable cause for
his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had
been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a
judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also
see to it that the accompanying documents received in support
of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S.
Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of
Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that
"[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of
the Requested State determines that the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that
the extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver
the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge
of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The
lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the
proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer
that the court take the extradition request under consideration
(Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of
the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue
an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and
to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.),
particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the
extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding.
Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in
the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the
Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with
the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the
hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney
having charge of the case may, upon application by the
Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the
proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a
decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons
therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case,
or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is
appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be
final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal
cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned
appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief
(Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense
mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the
application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial
court also determines whether or not the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article
3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as
backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the
nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the
only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are
forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition
papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request
is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense
which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has
the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it
would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the
extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign
Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24
hours later, the Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs
discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant
secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his
Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for
which reason he simply forwarded the request to the
Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of
the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its
responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it
upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents
and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with
the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-
US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection
that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to
evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had
to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition
petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also
at this stage where private respondent insisted on the
following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the
supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in
having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and
to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that
the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the
filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their
duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other
enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs,
moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own,
indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the
extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to
participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of
regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly
reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents
and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law.
The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law,
could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to
officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the
DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day,
make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings
proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a
criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is
purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the
executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the
extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its
face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination
whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-
military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29;
Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition
Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-
judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a)
taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based
upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing
Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power,
which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is
one or the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority
(Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power
allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities
coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require
disclosure of information by means or accounts, records,
reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or
otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing,
and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or
quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable
to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the
Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory
body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise
judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the
facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid
down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions:
Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before
it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not
authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties,
then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative
body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body
has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and
obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.
Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has
no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be
effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is
limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition
petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary
investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by
certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of
the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the
deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional
arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of
the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in
case of urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of
the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days
if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree
No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which
the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect,
the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to
the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested
(Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will
only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the
purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from
the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition
petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective
extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is
not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent
one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that
the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment
sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described
by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law
enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or
investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out
by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are
rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been
advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the
right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn,
August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478;
Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344
[1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal
aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed
physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in
his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The
Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA
1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license
as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than
forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge
of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed
under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we
therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture
of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed
criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a
penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda,
Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing
American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is
under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the
forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding
is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where
it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to
be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in
nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of
deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this
true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it
does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second
only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while
forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent
in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request
exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the
process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the
same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent
or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of
extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may
result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can
possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA
241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition
treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for
petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not
akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a
treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the
prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do
with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
"any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general
public good, which regards and preserved these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law"
(Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with
treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern
about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord
common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language
and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what
their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit
with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the
elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient
character which make them capable of meeting every modern
problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to
the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and
expanding future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not
denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal
straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of
the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of
cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78).
Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very
idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive
due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of
being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights
of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-
observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the
right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative
investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights,
granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint,
the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to
submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents
within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent
shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by
the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in
certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for
immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the
preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of
filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies
or like establishments which are immediate threats to
public health and decency, and the cancellation of a
passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative
action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded
from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later
time without prejudice to the person affected, such as
the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a
temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered
but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may
be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of the described situations
mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition
proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the
subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate
rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition
Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or
extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to
deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition
Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to
effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the
state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am
Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged
fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in
proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts
essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the
papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was
in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was
committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the
commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in
the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35
C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with
the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such
papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially
include a copy of the instrument charging the person
demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit
made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect
to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said
papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the
government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S.
408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of
the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction
or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand
or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his
attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic
one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p.
410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407
and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally
provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the
Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of
the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular
officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation
(31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he
attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles,
which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with
special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal
statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through
the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for
the provincial arrest of an individual may be made
directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the
U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the
event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for
extradition is transmitted subsequently through the
diplomatic channel.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming
Philippine extradition request to the Department of
Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State
prepares a declaration confirming that a formal
request has been made, that the treaty is in full force
and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties
provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition
proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that
the documents have been authenticated in
accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18
U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized
to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in
support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether
the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign
country. The court must also determine that (a) it has
jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to
conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought
for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits
extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe
that the defendant is the person sought and that he
committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with
jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having
received a "complaint made under oath, charging any
person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition
(Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of
American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a
preliminary examination before a committing
magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence
of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for
extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of
law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court
then forwards this certification of extraditability to the
Department of State for disposition by the Secretary
of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender
an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18
U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not
litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition.
However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination
whether to surrender an individual to the foreign
government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United
States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the
Department of State which has the power to evaluate the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in
the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to
act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the
Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having
satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12),
then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly,
however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case,
perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of
Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request
as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and
prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the
U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be
given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation
stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the
possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American
Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures
to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed
to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry
from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the
Philippine Government that no right that of liberty
secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines
Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the
altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system
is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is
not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will
not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no
question that not even the strongest moral conviction
or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of
the Constitution is a majority of one even as against
the rest of the nation who would deny him that right
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343,
375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that
extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be
effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused
or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and
adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard
of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the
evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the
strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In
interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not,
in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act
favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the
extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory
requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not
been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition
treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the
power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition
documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the
request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty,
he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance
with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government
with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of
Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the
requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed
the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the
official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation
meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers
in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department.
With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just
be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its
intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that
urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where
notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is
tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a
later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one
hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it
results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved,
may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the
request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court.
The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No.
1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the
extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest
allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The
prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative
due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private
respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which
reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are
available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to
information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary
right of access to official records documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on
matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of
access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate
or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided
by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-
Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that
ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private
respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under
the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters
contained in the documents requested are not of public
concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the
distinction between matters vested with public interest and
matters which are of purely private interest only becomes
material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the
matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if
the person invoking the right is the one directly affected
thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact
definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the
conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public
concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives or simply because such
matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the
real party in interest is the people and any citizen has
"standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government
action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and
may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he
actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on
matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal
proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access
to information within the control of the government (Bernas,
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996
ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official
records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent
pertain to official government action from the U.S.
Government. No official action from our country has yet been
taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of
foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a
third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the
extradition papers are matters of public concern since they
may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the
balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the
interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official
governmental action of our own government has as yet been
done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and
in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall
under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the
extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be
forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject
matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a
conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the
proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law
implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of
the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private
respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties
to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The
observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules
of international law form part of the law of the and land no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where
the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law
over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The
doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees
that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes
effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal
a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes
and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between
international law and municipal or national law? En contrario,
these two components of the law of the land are not pined
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of
the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by
Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due
process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier
abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during
the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent
as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures
also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these
rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as
an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the
extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the
rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process
rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly,
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as
explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request
for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of
the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the
same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the
action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's
revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this
stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of
Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has
authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If
the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot
be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even
during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in
jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the
evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the
prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law
(Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential
Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there
is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution
which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory
would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the
prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already
been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not
provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting
foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of
Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the
essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano
vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA
457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA
632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the
method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs.
United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
[1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.
Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid
objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its
commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial
and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do
we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree
No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government
Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA
661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271
SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary
proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and
Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for
Members of the Integrated National Police who may be
charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the
Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary
dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal
investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still
operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of
Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal
investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to
us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way by
which the employee is so informed is by furnishing
him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a
basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second
minimum requirement is that the employee charged
with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a
reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present evidence
in support of his defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in
nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the
respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a
clear and present danger of loss of property or employment,
but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's
favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation
of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity
jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside
legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell &
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondent's due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty,
are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be
true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict
construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty.
That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy
on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and
opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must
ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant
and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684
having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the
same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissent.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ.
Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion.
Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno &
Panganiban.
Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
The only real issue before the Court, I would take it, is whether
or not private respondent can validly ask for copies of pertinent
documents while the application for extradition against him is
still undergoing process by the Executive Department.
There is, I agree with the majority, a right of access to such
extradition documents conformably with the provisions of
Article III, Section 7, of the Philippine Constitution.1 The
constitutional right to free access to information of public
concern is circumscribed only by the fact that the desired
information is not among the species exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guaranty and that the
exercise of the right conforms with such reasonable conditions
as may be prescribed by law.
There is no hornbook rule to determine whether or not an
information is of public concern. The term "public concern"
eludes exactitude, and it can easily embrace a broad spectrum
of matters which the public may want to know either because
the subject thereof can affect their lives or simply because it
arouses concern.2
I am not convinced that there is something so viciously wrong
with, as to deny, the request of private respondent to be
furnished with copies of the extradition documents.
I add. The constitutional right to due process secures to
everyone an opportunity to be heard, presupposing
foreknowledge of what he may be up against, and to submit
any evidence that he may wish to proffer in an effort to clear
himself. This right is two-pronged substantive and
procedural due process founded, in the first instance, on
Constitutional or statutory provisions, and in the second
instance, on accepted rules of procedure.3 Substantive due
process looks into the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the law
that figures to interfere with the right of a person to his life,
liberty and property. Procedural due process the more
litigated of the two focuses on the rules that are established
in order to ensure meaningful adjudication in the enforcement
and implementation of the law. Like "public concern," the term
due process does not admit of any restrictive definition. Justice
Frankfurter has viewed this flexible concept, aptly I believe, as
being ". . . compounded by history, reason, the past course of
decisions, and stout confidence in the democratic faith."4 The
framers of our own Constitution, it would seem, have
deliberately intended, to make it malleable to the ever-
changing milieu of society. Hitherto, it is dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application that
makes it appropriate to accept an enlarged concept of the term
as and when there is a possibility that the right of an individual
to life, liberty and property might be diffused.5 Verily, whenever
there is an imminent threat to the life, liberty or property of any
person in any proceeding conducted by or under the auspices
of the State, his right to due process of law, when demanded,
must not be ignored.
A danger to the liberty of the extraditee, the private respondent,
is real. Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America provides that in
case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the
provisional arrest of the person prior to the presentation of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
request for extradition. I see implicit in this provision that even
after the request for extradition is made and before a petition
for extradition is filed with the courts, the possibility of an arrest
being made on the basis of a mere evaluation by the Executive
on the request for extradition by the foreign State cannot totally
be discounted.
The conclusion reached by the majority, I hasten to add, does
not mean that the Executive Department should be impeded in
its evaluation of the extradition request. The right of the
extraditee to be furnished, upon request, with a copy of the
relevant documents and to file his comment thereon is not
necessarily anathema to the proceedings duly mandated by
the treaty to be made.
I vote to deny the petition.
KAPUNAN, J., separate concurring opinion;
I vote to dismiss the petition, both on technical and substantial
grounds.
The petition in the case at bar raises one and only issue, which
is the validity of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued
by respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion on August 9, 1999 in
Civil Case No. 99-94684. The TRO directed respondents in
said case to:
. . . maintain the status quo by refraining from
committing the acts complained of; from conducting
further proceedings in connection with the request of
the United States Government for the extradition of
the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition
with the Regional Trial Court; and from performing
any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to
the United States, for a period of twenty days from
the service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.1 (Emphasis ours.)
The petition itself categorically states that "(t)he issue sought to
be presented and litigated here is solely-the validity of the
TRO."2
Notably, there is no allegation in the petition that respondent
Judge is without jurisdiction to hear the case below or that he
has exceeded his jurisdiction in hearing the same. Nor is there
any other act, ruling, order, or decision, apart from the TRO
already mentioned, of respondent Judge that is being
challenged in the petition before us.
Since, as alleged in the petition, a copy of the TRO was served
on respondents below on August 10, 1999, the TRO ceased to
be effective on August 30, 1999; consequently, the instant
petition has become moot and academic. This Court does not
exercise jurisdiction over cases which are moot and
academic or those not ripe for judicial consideration.3
Assuming that the present case has not become moot and
academic, still, it should be dismissed for lack of merit.
The substantive issues raised in this case are: (a) whether a
person whose extradition is sought by a foreign state has due
process rights under Section 2, Article III of the 1997
Constitution before the Department of Justice as the request
for extradition is being evaluated, or whether due process
rights maybe invoked only upon the filing of a petition for
extradition before a regional trial court; and (b) whether or not
private respondent has a right of access to extradition
documents under Section 7, Article III of the 1997 Constitution.
Petitioner contends that due process rights such as the right to
be informed of the basis of the request for extradition and to
have an opportunity to controvert are not provided in the
extradition treaty or in P.D. 1069 and therefore does not exist in
this stage of the proceedings. Further, he argues that the
documents sought to be furnished to private respondent only
involve private concerns, and not matters of public concern to
which the people have a constitutional right to access.
While the evaluation process conducted by the Department of
Justice is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal
cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it
involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to
be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly
taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered
to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and
pursuit of happiness are taken away from him a fate as
harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this
reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against
him and the right to controvert them.
While the extradition treaty and P.D. 1069 do not provide for a
preliminary investigation, neither does either prohibit it. The
right to due process is a universal basic right which is deemed
written into our laws and treaties with foreign countries.
Like a preliminary investigation, the evaluation by the
Department of Justice of the extradition request and its
accompanying documents is to establish probable cause and
to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution.
In this connection, it should be stressed that the evaluation
procedure of the extradition request and its accompanying
documents by the Department of Justice cannot be
characterized as a mere "ex-parte technical assessment of the
sufficiency" thereof. The function and responsibilities of the
Department of Justice in evaluating the extradition papers
involve the exercise of judgment. They involve a determination
whether the request for extradition conforms fully to the
requirements of the extradition treaty and whether the offense
is extraditable. These include, among others, whether the
offense for which extradition is requested is a political or
military offense (Article 3); whether the documents and other
informations required under Article 7(2) have been provided
(Article 7); and whether the extraditable offense is punishable
under the laws of both contracting parties by deprivation of
liberty for a period of more than one year (Article 2).
Consequently, to arrive at a correct judgment, the parties
involved are entitled to be heard if the requirements of due
process and equal protection are to be observed.
With respect to petitioner's claim that private respondent has
no right to demand access to the documents relating to the
request for extradition, suffice it to say, that any document used
in a proceeding that would jeopardize a person's constitutional
rights is matter of public concern. As Martin Luther King said,
"injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere," so any
violation of one's rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is
everybody's concern because they, one way or another,
directly or indirectly, affect the rights of life and liberty of all the
citizens as a whole.
Due process rights in a preliminary investigation is now an
established principle. The respondent has a right of access to
all of the evidence. He has the right to submit controverting
evidence. The prosecuting official who conducts the
preliminary investigation is required to be neutral, objective,
and impartial in resolving the issue of probable cause. I see no
reason why the same rights may not be accorded a person
sought to be extradited at the stage where the Department of
Justice evaluates whether a petition for extradition would be
filed before a regional trial court. If denied such rights, not only
denial of due process rights but of equal protection may be
raised.
It is suggested that after a petition for extradition is filed with a
regional trial court, the person sought to be extradited may
exercise all due process rights. He may then have access to all
the records on the basis of which the request for extradition
has been made. He may controvert that evidence and raise all
defenses he may consider appropriate. That, it is urged, meets
the due process requirement.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
But why must he wait until the petition for extradition is filed?
As succinctly expressed, if the right to notice and hearing is to
serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at
a time when the deprivation can still be prevented.4 Like the
filing of an information in a criminal case, the mere filing of a
petition for extradition causes immediate impairment of the
liberty of the person sought to be extradited and a substantial
curtailment of other rights. His arrest may be immediately
ordered by the regional trial court. He would be compelled to
face an open and public trial. He will be constrained to seek
the assistance of counsel and incur other expenses of
litigation. The public eye would be directed at him with all the
concomitant intrusions to his right to privacy. Where the liberty
of a person is at risk, and extradition strikes at the very core of
liberty, invocation of due process rights can never be too early.
QUISUMBING, J., concurring opinion;
As I concur in the result reached by the ponencia of Justice
Melo, may I just add my modest observations.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the
rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. Stated otherwise, the constitutionally mandated duties of
our government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize
treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
For this primordial reason, I vote to DENY the petition.
Moreover, considering that the Extradition Treaty between the
USA and Philippines appears mute on the specific issue before
us, the Court in the exercise of its judicial power to find and
state what the law is has this rare opportunity of setting a
precedent that enhances respect for human rights and
strengthens due process of law.
As both majority and dissenting colleagues in the Court will
recognize, American authorities follow two tracks in extradition
proceedings: (1) the interstate practice where, pursuant to
statute, the state Executive upon demand furnishes the would
be extraditee or counsel copies of pertinent documents as well
as the request for extradition; and (2) the international practice
where the Executive department need not initially grant notice
and hearing at all. Rules of reciprocity and comity, however,
should not bar us from applying internationally now what
appears the more reasonable and humane procedure, that is,
the interstate practice among Americans themselves. For in
this case the American people should be among the most
interested parties.
Truly, what private respondent is asking our Executive
department (notice, copies of documents, and the opportunity
to protect himself at the earliest time against probable peril)
does not, in my view, violate our Extradition Treaty with the
USA. His request if granted augurs well for transparency in
interstate or intergovernmental relations rather than secrecy
which smacks of medieval diplomacy and the inquisition
discredited long ago.
That private respondent is a Filipino citizen is not decisive of
the issue here, although it is obviously pertinent. Even if he
were a resident alien (other than American perhaps), he is, in
my view, entitled to our full protection against the hazards of
extradition (or deportation, similarly) from the very start. More
so because, looking at the facts adduced at the hearing and on
the record of this case, the charges against him involve or are
co-mingled with, if not rooted in, certain offenses of a political
nature or motivation such as the ones involving alleged
financial contributions to a major American political party. If so,
long established is the principle that extradition could not be
utilized for political offenses or politically motivated charges.
There may, of course, be other charges against private
respondent in the USA. But then they are, in my view, already
tainted there with political color due to the highly charged
partisan campaign atmosphere now prevailing. That private
respondent's cases will be exploited as political fodder there is
not far-fetched, hence the need here for cautious but
comprehensive deliberation on the matter at bar. For, above
all, it is not only a Treaty provision we are construing; it is
about constitutional and human rights we are most concerned.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring opinion;
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo with its
conceptive analysis of a citizen's right to be given what is due
to him. I join in his exposition of this Court's constitutional duty
to strike the correct balance between overwhelming
Government power and the protection of individual rights
where only one person is involved.
However, I am constrained to write this short concurrence if
only to pose the question of why there should be any debate at
all on a plea for protection of one's liberty which, if granted, will
not result in any meaningful impediment of thwarting any state
policy and objectives.
I see no reason why respondent Mark Jimenez, or other
citizens not as controversial or talked about, should first be
exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public
denunciation in court before he may be informed of what the
contracting states in an extradition treaty have against him.
There is no question that everything which respondent
Jimenez now requests will be given to him during trial. Mr.
Jimenez is only petitioning that, at this stage, he should be
informed why he may be deported from his own country.
I see no ill effects which would arise if the extradition request
and supporting documents are shown to him now, instead of
later.
Petitioner Secretary of Justice states that his action on the
extradition request and its supporting documents will merely
determine whether or not the Philippines is complying with its
treaty obligations. He adds that, therefore, the constitutional
rights of an accused in all criminal prosecutions are not
available to the private respondent.
The July 13, 1999 reply-letter from petitioner states the
reasons why he is denying respondent Jimenez's requests. In
short, the reasons are:
1. In evaluating the documents, the Department
merely determines whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have
been complied with by the Requesting Government.
The constitutional rights of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions are, therefore, not available.
2. The United States Government has requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of certain grand jury information.
3. The petitioner cannot hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request.
For extradition to be an effective tool of criminal law
enforcement, requests for surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
I respectfully submit that any apprehensions in the Court
arising from a denial of the petition "breach of an
international obligation, rupture of states relations, forfeiture of
confidence, national embarrassment, and a plethora of other
equally undesirable consequences" are more illusory than
real. Our country is not denying the extradition of a person who
must be extradited. Not one provision of the extradition treaty
is violated. I cannot imagine the United States taking issue
over what, to it, would be a minor concession, perhaps a slight
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
delay, accorded in the name of human rights. On the other
hand, the issue is fundamental in the Philippines. A citizen is
invoking the protection, in the context of a treaty obligation, of
rights expressly guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution.
Until proved to be a valid subject for extradition, a person is
presumed innocent or not covered by the sanctions of either
criminal law or international treaty. At any stage where a still
prospective extraditee only seeks to know so that he can
prepare and prove that he should not be extradited, there
should be no conflict over the extension to him of constitutional
protections guaranteed to aliens and citizens alike.
Petitioner cites as a reason for the denial of respondent's
requests, Article 7 of the Treaty. Article 7 enumerates the
required documents and establishes the procedures under
which the documents shall be submitted and admitted as
evidence. There is no specific provision on how that Secretary
of Foreign Affairs should conduct his evaluation. The Secretary
of Justice is not even in the picture at this stage. Under
petitioner's theory, silence in the treaty over a citizen's rights
during the evaluation stage is interpreted as deliberate
exclusion by the contracting states of the right to know. Silence
is interpreted as the exclusion of the right to a preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation provided by the laws
of either one of the two states.
The right to be informed of charges which may lead to court
proceedings and result in a deprivation of liberty is ordinarily
routine. It is readily available to one against whom the state's
coercive power has already been focused. I fail to see how
silence can be interpreted as exclusion. The treaty is silent
because at this stage, the preliminary procedure is still an
internal matter. And when a law or treaty is silent, it means a
right or privilege may be granted. It is not the other way
around.
The second reason alleging the need for secrecy and
confidentiality is even less convincing. The explanation of
petitioner is self-contradictory. On one hand, petitioner asserts
that the United States Government requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of certain
information. On the other hand, petitioner declares that the
United States has already secured orders from concerned
District Courts authorizing the disclosure of the same grand
jury information to the Philippine Government and its law
enforcement personnel.
Official permission has been given. The United States has no
cause to complain about the disclosure of information
furnished to the Philippines.
Moreover, how can grand jury information and documents be
considered confidential if they are going to be introduced as
evidence in adversely proceedings before a trial court? The
only issue is whether or not Mr. Jimenez should be extradited.
His innocence or guilt of any crime will be determined in an
American court. It is there where prosecution strategies will be
essential. If the Contracting States believed in a total non-
divulging of information prior to court hearings, they would
have so provided in the extradition treaty. A positive provision
making certain rights unavailable cannot be implied from
silence.
I cannot believe that the United States and the Philippines with
identical constitutional provisions on due process and basic
rights should sustain such a myopic view in a situation where
the grant of a right would not result in any serious setbacks to
criminal law enforcement.
It is obvious that any prospective extraditee wants to know if
his identity as the person indicated has been established.
Considering the penchant of Asians to adopt American names
when in America, the issue of whether or not the prospective
extraditee truly is the person charged in the United States
becomes a valid question. It is not only identity of the person
which is involved. The crimes must also be unmistakably
identified and their essential elements clearly stated.
There are other preliminary matters in which respondent is
interested. I see nothing in our laws or in the Treaty which
prohibits the prospective extraditee from knowing until after the
start of trial whether or not the extradition treaty applies to him.
Paraphrasing Hasmin vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Trocio vs.
Manta, 118 SCRA 241 (1941); and Salonga vs. Hon. Pao,
134 SCRA 438 (1985), the purpose of a preliminary evaluation
is to secure an innocent person against hasty, faulty and,
therefore, oppressive proceedings; to protect him from an open
and extensively publicized accusation of crimes; to spare him
the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial; and also to
protect the state from useless and expensive trails. Even if the
purpose is only to determine whether or not the respondent is
a proper subject for extradition, he is nonetheless entitled to
the guarantees of fairness and freedom accorded to those
charged with ordinary crimes in the Philippines.
The third reason given by petitioner is the avoidance of delay.
Petitioner views the request to be informed as part of
undesirable delaying tactics. This is most unfortunate. Any
request for extradition must be viewed objectively and
impartially without any predisposition to granting it and,
therefore, hastening the extradition process.
In the first place, any assistance which the evaluating official
may get from the participation of respondent may well point out
deficiencies and insufficiencies in the extradition documents. It
would incur greater delays if these are discovered only during
court trial. On the other hand, if, from respondent's
participation, the evaluating official discovers a case of
mistaken identity, insufficient pleadings, inadequate
complaints, or any ruinous shortcoming, there would be no
delays during trial. An unnecessary trial with all its
complications would be avoided.
The right to be informed is related to the constitutional right to
a speedy trial. The constitutional guarantee extends to the
speedy disposition of cases before all quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16). Speedy
disposition, however, does not mean the deliberate exclusion
of the defendant or respondent from the proceedings. As this
Court rules in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970),
"the right to a speedy trial, means one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being
to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety
and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his
guilt (in this case, his being extradited) determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may
interpose."
The right to be informed and the right to a preliminary hearing
are not merely for respondent. They also serve the interests of
the State.1wphi1.nt
In closing, I maintain that the paramount consideration of
guaranteeing the constitutional rights of individual respondent
override the concerns of petitioner. There should be no hurried
or indifferent effort to routinely comply with all requests for
extradition. I understand that this is truer in the United States
than in other countries. Proposed extraditees are given every
legal protection available from the American justice system
before they are extradited. We serve under a government of
limited powers and inalienable rights. Hence, this concurrence.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
If the case at bar was strictly a criminal case which involves
alone the right of an accused to due process, I would have co-
signed the ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
Jose A.R. Melo, without taking half a pause. But the case at
bar does not involve the guilt or innocence of an accused but
the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our
government's international obligation to surrender to a foreign
state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged
offense committed within that jurisdiction. The issues are of
first impression and the majority opinion dangerously takes us
to unknown shoals in constitutional and international laws,
hence this dissenting opinion.
Extradition is a well-defined concept and is more a problem in
international law. It is the "process by which persons charged
with or convicted of crime against the law of a State and found
in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for
trial or punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged
with an offense but have not been brought to trial; to those who
have been tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped
from custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia.
It does not apply to persons merely suspected of having
committed an offense but against who no charge has been laid
or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for
obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment."1 The definition covers
the private respondent who is charged with two (2) counts of
conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States,
four (4) counts of attempt to evade or defeat tax, two (2) counts
of fraud by wire, radio or television, six (6) counts of false
statements or entries and thirty-three (33) counts of election
contributions in the name of another. There is an outstanding
warrant of arrest against the private respondent issued by the
US District Court, Southern District of Florida.
A brief review of the history of extradition law will illumine our
labor. Possibly the most authoritative commentator on
extradition today, M. Cherif Bassiouni, divides the history of
extradition into four (4) periods: "(1) ancient times to
seventeenth century a period revealing almost exclusive
concern for political and religious offenders; (2) the eighteenth
century and half of the nineteenth century a period of treaty-
making chiefly concerned with military offenders characterizing
the condition of Europe during that period; (3) from 1833 to
1948 a period of collective concern in suppressing common
criminality; and (4) post-1948 developments which ushered in
a greater concern for protecting the human rights of persons
and revealed an awareness of the need to have international
due process of law regulate international relations."2
It is also rewarding to have a good grip on the changing slopes
in the landscape of extradition during these different periods.
Extradition was first practiced by the Egyptians, Chinese,
Chaldeans and Assyro-Babylonians but their basis for allowing
extradition was unclear. Sometimes, it was granted due to
pacts; at other times, due to plain good will.3 The classical
commentators on international law thus focused their early
views on the nature of the duty to surrender an extraditee
whether the duty is legal or moral in character. Grotius and de
Vattel led the school of thought that international law imposed
a legal duty called civitas maxima to extradite criminals.4 In
sharp contrast, Puffendorf and Billot led the school of thought
that the so-called duty was but an "imperfect obligation which
could become enforceable only by a contract or agreement
between states.5
Modern nations tilted towards the view of Puffendorf and Billot
that under international law there is no duty to extradite in the
absence of treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral. Thus, the
US Supreme Court in US v. Rauscher,6held: ". . . . it is only in
modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon
themselves the obligation of delivering up these fugitives from
justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for trial
and punishment. This has been done generally by treaties . . .
Prior to these treaties, and apart from them there was no well-
defined obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives to
another; and though such delivery was often made it was upon
the principle of comity . . ."
Then came the long and still ongoing debate on what should
be the subject of international law. The 20th century saw the
dramatic rise and fall of different types and hues of
authoritarianism the fascism of Italy's Mussolini and
Germany's Hitler, the militarism of Japan's Hirohito and the
communism of Russia's Stalin, etc. The sinking of these isms
led to the elevation of the rights of the individual against the
state. Indeed, some species of human rights have already
been accorded universal recognition.7 Today, the drive to
internationalize rights of women and children is also on high
gear.8 The higher rating given to human rights in the hierarchy
of values necessarily led to the re-examination of rightful place
of the individual in international law. Given the harshest eye is
the moss-covered doctrine that international law deals only
with States and that individuals are not its subject. For its
undesirable corrally is the sub-doctrine that an individual's right
in international law is a near cipher. Translated in extradition
law, the view that once commanded a consensus is that since
a fugitive is a mere object and not a subject of international
law, he is bereft of rights. An extraditee, so it was held, is a
mere "object transported from one state to the other as an
exercise of the sovereign will of the two states involved."9 The
re-examination consigned this pernicious doctrine to the
museum of ideas.10 The new thinkers of international law then
gave a significant shape to the role and rights of the individual
in state-concluded treaties and other international agreements.
So it was declared by then US Ambassador Philip C. Jessup in
audible italics: "A very large part of international affairs and,
thus, of the process of international accommodation, concerns
the relations between legal persons known as states. This is
necessarily so. But it is no longer novel for the particular
interest of the human being to break through the mass of
interstate relationship."11 The clarion call to re-engineer a new
world order whose dominant interest would transcend the
parochial confines of national states was not unheeded.
Among the world class scholars who joined the search for the
elusive ideological underpinnings of a new world order were
Yale Professor Myres McDougal and Mr. Justice Florentino
Feliciano. In their seminal work. Law and Minimum World
Public Order, they suggested that the object of the new world
should be "to obtain in particular situations and in the
aggregate flow of situations the outcome of a higher degree of
conformity with the security goals of preservation, deterrence,
restoration, rehabilitation and reconstruction of all societies
comprising the world community."12 Needless to stress, all
these prescient theses accelerated the move to recognize
certain rights of the individual in international law.
We have yet to see the final and irrevocable place of individual
rights, especially the rights of an extraditee, in the realm of
international law. In careful language, Bassiouni observes
that today, "institutionalized conflicts between states are
still rationalized in terms of sovereignty, national interest, and
national security, while human interests continue to
have limited, though growing impact on the decision-making
processes which translate national values and goals into
specific national and international policy."13
I belabor the international law aspect of extradition as the
majority opinion hardly gives it a sideglance. It is my humble
submission that the first consideration that should guide us in
the case at bar is that a bilateral treaty the RP-US
Extradition Treaty is the subject matter of the litigation. In
our constitutional scheme, the making of a treaty belongs to
the executive and legislative departments of our government.
Between these two departments, the executive has a greater
say in the making of a treaty. Under Section 21, Article VII of
our Constitution, the President has the sole power to negotiate
treaties and international agreements although to be effective,
they must be concurred in by at least two thirds of all the
members of the Senate. Section 20 of the same Article
empowers the President to contract or guarantee foreign loans
with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. Section 16
of the same Article gives the President the power to appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In addition,
the President has the power to deport undesirable aliens. The
concentration of these powers in the person of the President is
not without a compelling consideration. The conduct of foreign
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes
with life and death significance to the nation especially in times
of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of
government which can act on the basis of the best available
information and can decide with decisiveness. Beyond debate,
the President is the single most powerful official in our land for
Section 1 of Article VII provides that "the executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines," whereas Section
1 of Article VI states that "the legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives . . . except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum," while Section 1 of Article VIII provides that
"judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law." Thus, we
can see that executive power is vested in the President alone
whereas legislative and judicial powers are shared and
scattered. It is also the President who possesses the most
comprehensive and the most confidential information about
foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials
regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He
has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence
data.14 In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant
and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of
discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay,
validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent
standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an
international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of
confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other
problems with equally undesirable consequences.
These are some of the dominant policy considerations in
international law that the Court must balance against the claim
of the private respondent that he has a right to be given the
extradition documents against him and to comment thereon
even while they are still at the evaluation stage by the
petitioner Secretary of Justice, an alter ego of the President.
The delicate questions of what constitutional rights and to
what degree they can be claimed by an extraditee do not admit
of easy answers and have resulted in discrete approaches the
world over.15 On one end of the pole is the
more liberal European approach. The European Court of
Human Rights embraces the view that an extraditee is entitled
to the benefit of all relevant provisions of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. It has held that ". . . in so far as a
measure of the extradition has consequences adversely
affecting the enjoyment of a convention right, it may, assuming
that the consequences are not too remote, attract the
obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant
convention guarantee."16 At the other end of the pole is
the more cautious approach of the various Courts of Appeal in
the United States. These courts have been more
conservative in light of the principle of separation of powers
and their faith in the presumptive validity of executive
decisions. By and large, they adhere to the rule of non-
inquiry under which the extraditing court refuses to examine
the requesting country's criminal justice system or consider
allegations that the extraditee will be mistreated or denied a
fair trial in that country.17
The case at bar, I respectfully submit, does not involve an
irreconcilable conflict between the RP-US Extradition Treaty
and our Constitution where we have to choose one over the
other. Rather, it calls for a harmonization between said treaty
and our Constitution. To achieve this desirable objective, the
Court should consider whether the constitutional rights invoked
by the private respondent have truly been violated and even
assuming so, whether he will be denied fundamental
fairness. It is only when their violation will destroy the
respondent's right to fundamental fairness that his
constitutional claims should be given primacy.
Given this balancing approach, it is my humble submission that
considering all the facts and facets of the case, the private
respondent has not proved entitlement to the right he is
claiming. The majority holds that the Constitution, the RP-US
extradition and P.D. No. 1069 do not prohibit respondent's
claims, hence, it should be allowed. This is too simplistic an
approach. Rights do not necessarily arise from a vacuum.
Silence of the law can even mean an implied denial of a right.
Also, constitutional litigations do not always involve a clear cut
choice between right and wrong. Sometimes, they involve a
difficult choice between right against right. In these situations,
there is need to balance the contending rights and primacy is
given to the right that will serve the interest of the nation at that
particular time. In such instances, the less compelling right is
subjected to soft restraint but without smothering its essence.
Proceeding from this premise of relativism of rights, I venture
the view that even assuming arguendo respondent's weak
claim, still, the degree of denial of private respondent's rights
to due process and to information is too slight to warrant the
interposition of judicial power. As admitted in
the ponencia itself, an extradition proceeding is sui generis. It
is, thus, futile to determine what it is. What is certain is that it
is not a criminal proceeding where there is an accused who
claim the entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
Let it be stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no
accused and the guilt or innocence of the extraditee will not be
passed upon by our executive officials nor by the extradition
judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant do
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee. Indeed, an extradition proceeding
is summary in nature which is untrue of criminal
proceedings.18 Even the rules of evidence are different in an
extradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less stringent,
again because the guilt of the extraditee is not under
litigation.19 It is not only the quality but even the quantum of
evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal
case, an accused can only be convicted by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.20 In an extradition proceeding, an extraditee
can be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existed of
a prima facie case."21 If more need be said, the nature of an
extradition decision is different from a judicial decision whose
finality cannot be changed by executive fiat. Our courts22 may
hold an individual extraditable but the ultimate decision to
extradite the individual lies in the hands of the Executive.
Section 3, Article 3 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty specifically
provides that "extradition shall not be granted if the executive
authority of the Requested State determined that the request
was politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation." In the United States, the Secretary of State
exercises this ultimate power and is conceded considerable
discretion. He balances the equities of the case and the
demands of the nation's foreign relations.23 In sum, he is not
straitjacketed by strict legal considerations like an ordinary
court.
The type of issue litigated in extradition proceedings which
does not touch on the guilt or innocence of the extraditee,
the limited nature of the extradition proceeding, the availability
of adequate remedies in favor of the extraditee, and
the traditional leeway given to the Executive in the conduct of
foreign affairs have compelled courts to put a high
threshold before considering claims of individuals that
enforcement of an extradition treaty will violate their
constitutional rights. Exemplifying such approach is
the Supreme Court of Canada which has adopted a highly
deferential standard that emphasizes international comity and
the executive's experience in international matters.24It
continues to deny Canada's charter protection to extraditees
unless the violation can be considered shocking to the
conscience.
In the case, at bar and with due respect, the ponencia inflates
with too much significance the threat to liberty of the private
respondent to prop us its thesis that his constitutional rights to
due process and access to information must immediately be
vindicated. Allegedly, respondent Jimenez stands in danger of
provisional arrest, hence, the need for him to be immediately
furnished copies of documents accompanying the request for
his extradition. Respondent's fear of provisional arrest is not
real. It is a self-imagined fear for the realities on the ground
show that the United States authorities have not manifested
any desire to request for his arrest. On the contrary, they filed
the extradition request through the regular channel and, even
with the pendency of the case at bar, they have not moved for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
respondent's arrest on the ground of probable delay in the
proceedings. To be sure, the issue of whether respondent
Jimenez will be provisionally arrested is now moot. Under
Section 1 of Article 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, in
relation to Section 20(a) of PD No. 1069, the general principle
is enunciated that a request for provisional arrest must be
made pending receipt of the request for extradition. By filing
the request for extradition, the US authorities have implicitly
decided not to move for respondent's provisional arrest. But
more important, a request for respondent's arrest does not
mean he will be the victim of an arbitrary arrest. He will be
given due process before he can be arrested. Article 9 of the
treaty provides:
PROVISIONAL ARREST
1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may
request the provisional arrest of the person sought
pending presentation of the request for extradition. A
request for provisional arrest may be transmitted
through the diplomatic channel or directly between the
Philippine Department of Justice and the United
States Department of Justice.
2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:
a) a description of the person sought;
b) the location of the person sought, if known;
c) a brief statements of the facts of the case,
including, if possible, the time and location of the
offense;
d) a description of the laws violated;
e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of a
warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of
conviction against the person sought; and
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the
person sought will follow.
3. The Requesting State shall be notified without
delay of the disposition of its application and the
reasons for any denial.
4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be
discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty
(60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this
Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested
State has not received the formal request for
extradition and the supporting documents required in
Article 7.
In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest. (a) In case of urgency,
the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant
treaty or convention and while the same remains in
force, request for the provisional arrest of the
accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition
made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.
(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or
direct by post or telegraph.
(c) The Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall
upon receipt of the request immediately secure a
warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused from
the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of
the province or city having jurisdiction of the place,
who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest
of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
shall inform the requesting state of the result of its
request.
(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional
arrest, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not
received the request for extradition and the
documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the
accused shall be released from custody.
The due process protection of the private-respondent against
arbitrary arrest is written in cyrillic letters in these two (2)
related provisions. It is self-evident under these provisions that
a request for provisional arrest does not mean it will be
granted ipso facto. The request must comply with certain
requirements. It must be based on an "urgent" factor. This is
subject to verification and evaluation by our executive
authorities. The request can be denied if not based on a real
exigency of if the supporting documents are insufficient. The
protection of the respondent against arbitrary provisional
arrest does not stop on the administrative level. For even if the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation agrees with the
request for the provisional arrest of the respondent, still he has
to apply for a judicial warrant from the "presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province of city having
jurisdiction of the place. . . . ." It is a judge who will issue a
warrant for the provisional arrest of the respondent. The judge
has comply with Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which
provides that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the .
. . persons or things to be seized." The message that leaps to
the eye is that compliance with this requirements precludes
any arbitrary arrest.
In light of all these considerations, I respectfully submit that
denying respondent's constitutional claim to be furnished all
documents relating to the request for his extradition by the US
authorities during their evaluation stage will not subvert his
right to fundamental fairness. It should be stressed that this is
not a case where the respondent will not be given an
opportunity to know the basis of the request for his extradition.
In truth, and contrary to the impression of the
majority, P.D. No. 1069 fixes the specific time when he will be
given the papers constituting the basis for his extradition. The
time is when he is summoned by the extradition court and
required to answer the petition for extradition. Thus, Section 6
of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary
Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices. (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding
judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. He
may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
accused which may be served anywhere within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon
receipt of the answer within the time fixed, the
presiding judge shall hear the case or set another
date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the
warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served
each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case.
Upon receipt of the summons and the petition, respondent is
free to foist all defense available to him. Such an opportunity
does not deny him fairness which is the essence of due
process of law.
Thus, with due respect, I submit that the ponencia failed to
accord due importance to the international law aspect of an
extradition treaty as it unduly stressed its constitutional law
dimension. This goes against the familiar learning that in
balancing the clashing interests involved in extradition
treaty, national interest is more equal than the others. While
lately, humanitarian considerations are being factored in the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
equation, still the concept of extradition as a national act is the
guiding idea. Requesting and granting extradition remains a
power and prerogative of the national government of a State.
The process still involves relations between international
personalities.25 Needless to state, a more deferential treatment
should be given to national interest than to individual interest.
Our national interest in extraditing persons who have
committed crimes in a foreign country are succinctly expressed
in the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1069, viz:
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations;
WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern
not only of the state where it is committed but also of
any other state to which the criminal may have
escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life
and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in
the interest of civilized communities that crimes
should not go unpunished. . . . .
The increasing incidence of international and transnational
crimes, the development of new technologies of death, and the
speed and scale of improvement of communication are factors
which have virtually annihilated time and distance. They make
more compelling the vindication of national interest to insure
that the punishment of criminals should not be frustrated by
the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. This overriding national
interest must be upheld as against respondent's weak
constitutional claims which in no way amount to denial of
fundamental fairness.
At bottom, this case involves the respect that courts should
accord to the Executive that concluded the RP-US Extradition
Treaty in the conduct of our foreign affairs. As early as 1800,
the legendary John Marshall, then a congressman, has opined
that the power to extradite pursuant to a treaty rests in the
executive branch as part of its power to conduct foreign
affairs.26 Courts have validated this forward-looking opinion in a
catena of unbroken cases. They defer to the judgment of the
Executive on the necessities of our foreign affairs and on its
view of the requirements of international comity.
The deferential attitude is dictated by the robust reality that of
the three great branches of our government, it is the Executive
that is most qualified to guide the ship of the state on the
known and unknown continents of foreign relations. It is also
compelled by considerations of the principle of separation of
powers for the Constitution has clearly allocated the power to
conduct our foreign affairs to the Executive. I respectfully
submit that the majority decision has weakened the Executive
by allowing nothing less than an unconstitutional headbutt on
the power of the Executive to conduct our foreign affairs. The
majority should be cautions in involving this Court in the
conduct of the nation's foreign relations where the inviolable
rule dictated by necessity is that the nation should speak with
one voice. We should not overlook the reality that courts by
their nature, are ill-equipped to fully comprehend the foreign
policy dimension of a treaty, some of which are hidden in
shadows and silhouettes.
I vote to grant the petition.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion;
With due respect, I dissent.
The main issue before us is whether Private Respondent Mark
B. Jimenez is entitled to the due process rights of notice and
hearing during the preliminary or evaluation stage of the
extradition proceeding against him.
Two Staged in Extradition
There are essentially two stages in extradition proceedings: (1)
the preliminary or evaluation stage, whereby the executive
authority of the requested state ascertains whether the
extradition request is supported by the documents and
information required under the Extradition Treaty; and (2) the
extradition hearing, whereby the petition for extradition is heard
before a court of justice, which determines whether the
accused should be extradited.
The instant petition refers only to the first stage. Private
respondent claims that he has a right to be notified and to be
heard at this early stage. However, even the ponencia admits
that neither the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor PD 1069 (the
Philippine Extradition Law) expressly requires the Philippine
government, upon receipt of the request for extradition, to give
copies thereof and its supporting documents to the prospective
extraditee, much less to give him an opportunity to be heard
prior to the filing of the petition in court.
Notably, international extradition proceedings in the United
States do not include the grant by the executive authority of
notice and hearing to the prospective extraditee at this initial
stage. It is the judge or magistrate who is authorized to issue a
warrant of arrest and to hold a hearing to consider the
evidence submitted in support of the extradition request. In
contrast, in interstate rendition, the governor must, upon
demand, furnish the fugitive or his attorney copies of the
request and its accompanying documents, pursuant to
statutory provisions.1 In the Philippines, there is no similar
statutory provision.
Evaluation Stage Essentially Ministerial
The evaluation stage simply involves the ascertainment by the
foreign affairs secretary of whether the extradition request is
accompanied by the documents stated in paragraphs 2 and 3,
Article 7 of the Treaty, relating to the identity and the probable
location of the fugitive; the facts of the offense and the
procedural history of the case; provisions of the law describing
the essential elements of the offense charged and the
punishment therefor; its prescriptive period; such evidence as
would provide probable cause for the arrest and the committal
for trial of the fugitive; and copies of the warrant or order of
arrest and charging document. The foreign affairs secretary
also sees to it that these accompanying documents have been
certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippines in the United States, and that they are in English
language or have English translations. Pursuant to Article 3 of
the Treaty, he also determines whether the request is politically
motivated, and whether the offense charged is a military
offense not punishable under non-military penal legislation.2
Upon a finding of the secretary of foreign affairs that the
extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient
and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same
to the justice secretary, who shall immediately designate and
authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the
proper regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration.3
When the Right to Notice and Hearing Becomes Available
According to private Respondent Jimenez, his right to due
process during the preliminary stage emanates from our
Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III thereof, which
provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
He claims that this right arises immediately, because of the
possibility that he may be provisionally arrested pursuant to
Article 9 of the RP-US Treaty, which reads:
In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request
the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)
presentation of the request for extradition. A request
for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the
diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine
Department of Justice and the United States
Department of Justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Melo's ponencia supports private respondent's
contention. It states that there are two occasions wherein the
prospective extraditee may be deprived of liberty: (1) in case of
a provisional arrest pending the submission of the extradition
request and (2) his temporary arrest during the pendency of
the extradition petition in court.4 The second instance is not in
issue here, because no petition has yet been filed in court.
However, the above-quoted Article 9 on provisional arrest is
not automatically operative at all times, and in enforcement
does not depend solely on the discretion of the requested
state. From the wordings of the provision itself, there are at
least three requisites: (1) there must be an urgency, and (2)
there is a corresponding request (3) which must be made prior
to the presentation of the request for extradition.
In the instant case, there appears to be no urgency
characterizing the nature of the extradition of private
respondent. Petitioner does not claim any such urgency. There
is no request from the United States for the provisional arrest
of Mark Jimenez either. And the secretary of justice states
during the Oral Argument that he had no intention of applying
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.5 Finally, the
formal request for extradition has already been made;
therefore, provisional arrest is not likely, as it should really
come before the extradition request.6
Mark Jimenez Not in Jeopardy of Arrest
Under the outlined facts of this case, there is no open door for the
application of Article 9, contrary to the apprehension of private
respondent. In other words, there is no actual danger that Jimenez will
be provisionally arrested or deprived of his liberty. There is as yet no
threat that his rights would be trampled upon, pending the filing in court
of the petition for his extradition. Hence, there is no substantial gain to
be achieved in requiring the foreign affairs (or justice) secretary to
notify and hear him during the preliminary stage, which basically
involves only the exercise of the ministerial power of checking the
sufficiency of the documents attached to the extradition request.
It must be borne in mind that during the preliminary stage, the foreign
affairs secretary's determination of whether the offense charged is
extraditable or politically motivated is merely preliminary. The same
issue will be resolved by the trial court.7 Moreover, it is also the power
and the duty of the court, not the executive authority, to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that
the extraditee committed the crimes charged.8The sufficiency of the
evidence of criminality is to be determined based on the laws of the
requested state.9 Private Respondent Jimenez will, therefore, definitely
have his full opportunity before the court, in case an extradition petition
will indeed be filed, to be heard on all issues including the sufficiency
of the documents supporting the extradition request.10
Private respondent insists that the United States may still request his
provisional arrest at any time. That is purely speculative. It is
elementary that this Court does not declare judgments or grant reliefs
based on speculations, surmises or conjectures.
In any event, even granting that the arrest of Jimenez is sought at any
time despite the assurance of the justice secretary that no such
measure will be undertaken, our local laws and rules of procedure
respecting the issuance of a warrant of arrest will govern, there being
no specific provision under the Extradition Treaty by which such
warrant should issue. Therefore, Jimenez will be entitled to all the
rights accorded by the Constitution and the laws to any person whose
arrest is being sought.1wphi1.nt
The right of one state to demand from another the return of an alleged
fugitive from justice and the correlative duty to surrender the fugitive to
the demanding country exist only when created by a treaty between
the two countries. International law does not require the voluntary
surrender of a fugitive to a foreign government, absent any treaty
stipulation requiring it.11 When such a treaty does exist, as between the
Philippines and the United States, it must be presumed that the
contracting states perform their obligations under it with uberrimae
fidei, treaty obligations being essentially characterized internationally
by comity and mutual respect.
The Need for Respondent Jimenez to Face Charges in the US
One final point. Private respondent also claims that from the time the
secretary of foreign affairs gave due course to the request for his
extradition, incalculable prejudice has been brought upon him. And
because of the moral injury caused, he should be given the opportunity
at the earliest possible time to stop his extradition. I believe that any
moral injury suffered by private respondent had not been caused by
the mere processing of the extradition request. And it will not cease
merely by granting him the opportunity to be heard by the executive
authority. The concrete charges that he has allegedly committed
certain offenses already exist. These charges have been filed in the
United States and are part of public and official records there.
Assuming the existence of moral injury, the only means by which he
can restore his good reputation is to prove before the proper judicial
authorities in the US that the charges against him are unfounded. Such
restoration cannot be accomplished by simply contending that the
documents supporting the request for his extradition are insufficient.
Conclusion
In the context of the factual milieu of private respondent, there is really
no threat of any deprivation of his liberty at the present stage of the
extradition process. Hence, the constitutional right to due process
particularly the right to be heard finds no application. To grant
private respondent's request for copies of the extradition documents
and for an opportunity to comment thereon will constitute "over-due
process" and unnecessarily delay the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the Petition.
Footnotes
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
1
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers a pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
2
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530; Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA
256.
3
Aniag, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424; Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 597.
4
Abraham, Henry J., Some Basic Guidelines of "Due Process of Law." The Lawyers Review,
Vol. IX, 30 April 1995, p. 1.
5
Cruz, Isagani A. Constitutional Law. 1995 Ed. pp. 94-95.
KAPUNAN, J., separate concurring opinion;
1
Annex "L," petition.
2
Petition, p. 4.
3
Edillon vs. Fernandos, 114 SCRA 153 (1982); Pangilinan vs. Zapata, 69 SCRA 334 (1976).
4
Stanley v. Illinois, 1405 U.S. 645, 647.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;
1
Weston, Falk, D'Amato, International Law and World Order, 2nd ed., p. 630 (1990).
2
International Extradition, United States Law and Practice, 2nd ed., p. 7 (1987).
3
The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and the United States: A Brief
History, 4 B.C. Int'l. & Comp. L. Rev. 39 (1981).
4
They were supported by scholars like Heineccuis, Burlamaqui, Rutherford, Schmelzing and
Kent. See Sheareer, Extradition in Internal Law, p. 24 (1971).
5
They were supported by scholars like Voet, Martons, Kuber, Leyser, Lint, Seafied, Schmaltz,
Mittermaier and Heffter. See Shearer, supra, p. 24.
6
119 US 407, 411, 7 S. Ct. 234, 236, 30 L. ed. 425 (1886).
7
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966).
8
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
otherwise known as "Bill of Rights for Women" was adopted by the UN General Assembly in
December 1979. As of November 1999, one hundred sixty seven (167) states including the
Philippines have ratified or acceded to it. See Statement of Angela King, Special Adviser to the
Secretary General of the UN on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Judicial
Colloquium on the Application of International Human Rights Law at the Domestic Level,
Vienna, Austria, October 27, 1999.
9
Blakesley and Lagodny, Finding armony Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, Jurisdiction,
The Role of Human Rights and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under International Criminal Law,
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 44 (1991).
10
See generally Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., (1966); Korowicz, The
Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 Am. J., Int'l. Law 553 (1966).
11
The Conquering March of an Idea, Speech before the 72nd Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association, St. Louis, Mo., September 6, 1949.
12
See also R. Falk and S. Mendlovitz, Strategy of World Order, etc. (1996); G. Clark and L.
Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (1966); Bassiouni, International Extradition in
American Practice and World Public Order, 36 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1968).
13
Bassiouni, supra, p. 625.
14
US v. Curtiss-Wright Expert Corp., 299 US 304, 57 S Ct. 216, 81 L. ed. 255 (1936).
15
Spencer, The Role of the Charter in Extradition Cases, University of Toronto L. Rev., vol. 51,
pp. 62-63, (Winter, 1993).
16
Spencer, op cit., citing the decision in Soering, 11 E.H.R.R. 439 (1989).
17
Semmelman, Federal Courts, The Constitution and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International
Extradition Proceedings, Cornell Law Rev., vol. 76, No. 5, p. 1198 (July 1991).
18
Sec. 9, P.D. No. 1069.
19
Ibid.
20
Sec. 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.
21
Sec. 10, P.D. No. 1069.
22
Referring to the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals whose decisions are deemed
final and executory. See Section 12, P.D. No. 1069.
23
Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 Col. Law Rev., pp. 1314-1329.
24
Spencer, op cit., citing decided cases.
25
Weston, Falk and Amato, International Law and World Order, 2nd ed., p. 630 (1990).
26
Semmelman. op cit., p. 1206.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 COMPILED CASES (FULL-TEXT)

7
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion; 5 (2) & (3) in rel. to 10, PD 1069. See also last par., p. 13 of ponencia.
1 8
35 CJS 14(1) Extradition 410. See also ponencia, p. 25. 18 USCS 3184, n 58 Criminal Procedure 456; 31A Am Jur 2d 109 Extradition 828.
2 9
See ponencia, pp. 11-12. 18 USCS 3184, n 64 Criminal Procedure 458.
3 10
Ibid., Section 5, pars. (1) & (2), PD 1069. See Wright v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 341, August 15, 1994.
4 11
Ponencia, p. 18. 31A Am Jur 2d Extradition 14.
5
TSN, p. 76.
6
See also TSN, p. 30.