Wassmer vs.
Velez 12 SCRA 648 -Trial court rendered a joint decision finding Dunca guilty
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez
arranged their marriage to be held on September 4 of
the same year. The bride-to-be has been devoted with
all the preparations for their wedding. However, two days
before their marriage, Paking left a note that they must
postpone the marriage for his mother was against it. A
day before their wedding, Paking wrote again that the
wedding shall push through. Worse, Paking did not show
up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly
humiliated.
The breach of promise to marry made by Velez
prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit against the former.
Velez never filed an answer, thus, awarding moral and
exemplary damages to Wassmer.
Velez appealed on the court and stated that he
failed to attend the wedding day because of fortuitous
events. He also insisted that he cannot be civilly liable
for there is no law that acts upon the breach of promise
to marry. He also contested the award of moral and
exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary damages
may be awarded in a breach of promise to marry suit.
HELD: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. Howver, Wassmer has already made
preparations for the wedding. Velezs failure to appear
on the wedding day is contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the
Civil Code. Under the law, the injured party is entitled to
moral damages as well as to exemplary damages
because Velezs acted in wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner (Article 2232) in breaching his
promise to marry Wassmer.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself
and on behalf of the
minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark
and Francis Rafael,
all surnamed Dy), respondents.
G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000
-On October 10, 1989, Patricio Durian, Provincial
Prosecutor of Isabela filed in the
RTC of Isabela an information charging Romeo Dunca
y Tumol with reckless
imprudence resulting in double homicide and
damage to property.
-On June 20, 1989, in Cauayan, Isabela, Dunca being
the driver and person-incharge
of a White Trailer Truck Tractor with Plate No. N2A-
867 registered in
the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, with a
load of 2,000 cases of empty
bottles of beer grande.
-Accused entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment.
The offended parties made
a reservation to file a separate civil action against the
accused.
-They also filed a complaint against Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corpo as employer of
Tumol based on quasi delict.
-The respondents withdrew the reservation to file a
separate civil action against the
accused and manifested that they would prosecute the
civil aspect ex delicto in the
criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the
separate civil action based on
quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from
the same act or omission of
the accused driver.
-the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases
and conducted a joint trial
of the same.
beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136).
-Petitioner and accused filed a notice of appeal and the
private respondents moved
for amendment of the joint decision to hold the petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the
damages in the event of insolvency of the accused
which was granted by the court.
-Petitioner filed a supplemental notice of appeal from the
supplemental decision.
-During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped
bail and fled to another
country. CA dismissed the appeal of the accused in the
criminal case.
-CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of RTC so
petitioner filed for MR. CA
denied the MR of the petitioner for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner as owner of the truck
involved in the accident be held
subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties
in the criminal action
against
the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action
by the offended parties
against the employer of the truck driver?
HELD:
No. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation can not be held
subsidiarily liable because of
the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against it. In view of the
reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil
action for recovery of civil
liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal
action. Such separate civil
action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
Uypitching v. Quiamco G.R. No. 146322
G.R. NO. 146322, DECEMBER 06, 2006
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING AND RAMAS
UYPITCHING SONS, INC., PETITIONERS, VS.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, RESPONDENT .
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique
tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give
everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are
the underlying principles of law and order in society.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was
approached by Juan Davalan,[2] Josefino Gabutero and
Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a
criminal case for robbery[3] filed by Quiamco against
them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100
motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of
registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate
of registration but the three accused never came to see
him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an
open space inside respondent's business establishment,
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and
accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had
been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner
Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned
corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was
mortgaged to petitioner corporation.[4]
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments,
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the
payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan
stopped paying the remaining installments and told
petitioner corporation's collector, Wilfredo Verao, that
the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by
respondent's men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner
Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,[5] went to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle.
The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola,
talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent.
While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking,
petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the
establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a
motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in
his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the
establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle.
Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner
Uypitching's instruction and over the clerk's objection,
took the motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a
criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law[6] against respondent in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.[7] Respondent
moved for dismissal because the complaint did not
charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought
the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint[8] and denied petitioner
Uypitching's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against
petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, Branch 37.[9] He sought to hold the petitioners
liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the
motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that
respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a
baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated
and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City
Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs in favor
of respondent.
Petitioners' suggestion is misleading. They were held
liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless
complaint against respondent but also for making a
slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from
respondent's establishment in an abusive manner.
Correctness of the Findings
of the RTC and CA
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and
CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public
imputation of a crime to respondent[14] but also the taking
of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have
accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone
was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to
respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners' concern, we also
find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
the filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and
bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described their
action as a "precipitate act."[15] Petitioners were bent on
portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we
quote with approval the following findings of the RTC, as
adopted by the CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the
complaint before the City Prosecutor's Office] because
Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have
known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable
cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified
theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty.
Uypitching had no personal knowledge that [respondent]
stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by
his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Verao[,] that Juan
Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s)
for the motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by
the men of [respondent]. It must be noted that the term
used by Wilfredo Verao in informing Atty. Ernesto
Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay
for the remaining installment was [']taken['], not
[']unlawfully taken['] or 'stolen.' Yet, despite the double
hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only
executed the [complaint-affidavit] wherein he named
[respondent] as 'the suspect' of the stolen motorcycle but
also charged [respondent] of 'qualified theft and fencing
activity' before the City [Prosecutor's] Office of
Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily
signifies the presence of malice. What is deplorable in all
these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle,
did not accuse [respondent] or the latter's men of
stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a
case for qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty.
Uypitching's act in charging [respondent] with qualified
theft and fencing activity is tainted with malice is also
shown by his answer to the question of Cupid
Gonzaga[16] [during one of their conversations] - "why
should you still file a complaint" You have already
recovered the motorcycle..."[:] "Aron motagam ang
kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to the thief of
motorcycle.")[17]
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a
factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on
this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the RTC and the CA.
Petitioners Abused Their
Right of Recovery as
Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for
petitioner corporation's exercise of its right as seller-
mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary
to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the
mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the
mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-
defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover
such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to
obtain judicial foreclosure.[18]
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil
action necessary to acquire legal possession of the
motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on
respondent's establishment with his policemen and
ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search
warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal
seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even
mouthed a slanderous statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-
petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful
procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the
prejudice of respondent. Petitioners' acts violated the law
as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper
norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of
right," prescribes that a person should not use his right
unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise
he opens himself to liability.[19] It seeks to preclude the
use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a
means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to
prejudice or injure another.[20] The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;
there must be no intention to harm another.[21] Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was
taken at petitioners' instance was not only attended by
bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by
law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners' exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to
respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of
filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be
considered to be in accordance with the purpose for
which the right to prosecute a crime was established.
Thus, the totality of petitioners' actions showed a
calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly
ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively
harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to
law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent.
Hence, they should indemnify him.[22]
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Ravina v. Villa Abrille G.R. No. 160708
G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA VS.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, FOR HERSELF AND
IN BEHALF OF INGRID DLYN P. VILLA ABRILLE,
INGREMARK DWIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL
DIELSVILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN
DYAN VILLA ABRILLE
QUISUMBING, ACTING C.J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and
Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four
children, who are also parties to the instant case and are
represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter
parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located in Davao
City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a
parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still
single and which is registered solely in his name under
TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan
from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The
house was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses
continuously made improvements, including a poultry
house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his
family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their
movables to support the family and the studies of her
children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and
the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the
petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold
the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent,
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said
deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house
and the four children were in school, Pedro together with
armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance
with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings
from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter
Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from
entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening
under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police
Station, but police authorities refused to intervene,
saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that
the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her
children, so much so that one flunked at school.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and
wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same being
contrary to law and evidence.[10]
RULING:
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by
which respondent and her children were removed from
the family home deserves our condemnation. While
respondent was out and her children were in school,
Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the
petitioners[21] surreptitiously transferred all their personal
belongings to another place. The respondents then were
not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode
despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine
that: Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.[22]When a right is exercised in a
manner that does not conform with such norms and
results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrong doer must be held
responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damages caused. [23] It is patent in this
case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of these
established civil law standards.
Ledesma vs Court of Appeals (Article 27 of the New
Civil Code)
Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 449
(1988)
Facts:
A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as
Magna Cum Laude, because the president, herein
petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College
neglected his duty to inform the student on the result of a
case against the student which has, as its punishment,
the removal of awards or citations of the student. Said
case was the extension of loans to students, which the
president contends to be against the school rules and
regulations, and which the student innocently performed
in her capacity as the treasurer of the Student
Leadership Club and in accordance to the Constitution
and By-Laws of the club, on the belief that said
constitution was presented and approved by the
president. The student appealed to the Director of the
Bureau of Public Schools after being denied for
reconsideration by the president, where upon
investigation, it was found out that the student acted in
good faith and that her awards be reinstituted. The
president, upon receiving said decision, delayed action
and even e-mailed the director to reverse his decision.
The student therefore graduated as a plain student and
without honors and her award as Magna Cum Laude
was only entered on the scholastic records weeks after
the receipt by the president of the decision and after the
graduation.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages
under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. The presidents failure to graduate a student with
honors and blatant disregard of the students rights on
the account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of
duty without just cause, rendering him liable for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code.
Undoubtedly, the student and the students parents went
through a painful ordeal brought about by such neglect.
Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27
are but proper.